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Организация
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联合国教育、
科学及文化组织

Lessons Learned from UNESCO's Field Reform

in Africa

September 2015

Table of Contents

Acronyms

AO	Administrative Officer
AU	African Union
BFC	Bureau of Field Coordination
BFM	Bureau of Financial Management
BSP	Bureau of Strategic Planning
CAP	Complementary Additional Programme
Cap EFA	Capacity Development for Education for All Programme
DRTF	Decentralization Review Task Force
ECA	(United Nations) Economic Commission for Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
EXB	Extrabudgetary (resources)
HIC	High-income countries
HQ	UNESCO Headquarters
HRBA	Human rights based approaches
HRM	Human Resource Management
IEE	Independent External Evaluation of UNESCO
IICBA	UNESCO International Institute for Capacity Building in Africa
IOS	Internal Oversight Service
LIC	Low income countries
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MIC	Middle income countries
MSS	Management of Support Services
MRO	Multisectoral Regional Office
NEPAD	The New Partnership for Africa's Development
NO	National Office
NPO	National Programme Officer
PCPD	Post-conflict post-disaster
REC	Regional Economic Communities
RM	Resource Mobilization
RP	Regular Programme
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
UCPD	UNESCO Country Programming Document
UIL	UNESCO Institute for Lifelong Learning
UIS	UNESCO Institute for Statistics
UNCT	United Nations Country Teams
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNRC	United Nations Resident Coordinator

Executive Summary[1]

Background and purpose

At its 36th session the General Conference approved a comprehensive reform of UNESCO's field network to enhance the quality of programme delivery to Member States, to ensure a more flexible and visible field presence and to improve UNESCO's alignment with the United Nations system-wide coherence. Subsequently, due to financial constraints, it was decided to initially implement the field reform in the Arab States and Africa, and later the Africa region only, with the roll-out of the reform to other regions being deferred to a later date, pending an analysis of the lessons from phase one in Africa. In this context, IOS undertook a review of the reform in the Africa region for the purpose of drawing early lessons and providing the Director-General and Governing Bodies with information to undertake any necessary adjustments should it so be determined.

The review was conducted in the first half of 2015 by a team of IOS evaluators. The methodology of the evaluation comprised a desk study, a number of site visits, four stakeholder surveys and semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders and partners.

Findings

There is broad agreement that the main goals of the reform of the field network were and remain highly pertinent. The review came across some promising examples of emerging good practices, an increased and more vigorous focus on new partnerships and resource mobilization at the country and regional level, and a sustained effort to adapt to the realities of the new field structure. Achievements include: (i) despite the difficult financial situation faced by the Organization, the five Multi-sectoral Regional Offices (MROs), with the support of host Member States, were put in place and staffed/complemented with expertise covering most if not all of UNESCO's sectors; (ii) programme sectors increased their efforts to decentralize financial resources to the field, with Africa given priority; and (iii) increased and more effective engagement of UNESCO within a number of UN country teams.

The achievements thus far have been limited due to a number of factors, including:

a.   The reform of the field network was challenging both in terms of time and resources available to execute it properly. The entire process was significantly affected by both the financial crisis at UNESCO and the overall global economic crisis, which resulted in major delays and reductions.[2] In addition, staff deployment was slower than expected with significant delays in filling key posts. Some of these issues are of a systemic nature; nevertheless they have had negative effects on the roll-out and success of the reform.

b.   The field reform in Africa itself was not complemented by a strategy with clear targets and deliverables or a robust implementation plan with clear targets and deliverables. In parallel, no structured contingency plans were developed to deal with the consequences of the financial crisis.

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[1] This summary is contained within 197 EX/5, Part III.
[2] For example, the indicative staff configuration for MROs was drastically reduced and supporting platforms, such as regional support platform for administrative and financial support, were suspended.

c.   Although attempts were made to define responsibilities and accountabilities these were not well understood. Multiple actors at Headquarters (Bureau of Strategic Planning, Bureau of Human Resources Management, Bureau of Financial Management, Sectors) assumed some level of management responsibility but there was no central entity responsible for coordinating the reform and its roll-out. Although having the overall coordination role for activities in Africa, the Africa Department was not visibly engaged in the reform and its precise functions were unclear to many staff and stakeholders. As a consequence, overall leadership, monitoring and oversight over the reform was ambivalent, uncoordinated and uneven.

d.   There was no specific human resource strategy to enable smooth implementation of the field reform in Africa and the deployment of staff. The review found a few examples of staff members being re-deployed to locations despite not having the experience, technical competencies or language skills to adequately serve the needed function. The majority of staff movement was intra-regional in nature.

e.   The structures to emerge from the reform do not, in some cases, align with the approved criteria for establishing UNESCO's field presence. In this regard, the mandate, location and therefore rationale for a number of offices would merit further review, especially in the context of strategically positioning UNESCO to better deliver upon the post-2015 development agenda.

f.   The field reform in Africa has not fully aligned UNESCO with the African Regional Economic Communities as originally intended. In some cases, there even exist two or three UNESCO Multi-sectoral Regional Offices within the country coverage of one Regional Economic Community. UNESCO is also not fully aligned with the two regional groupings of the UN Development Group (UNDG): western-central and eastern-southern, a potentially significant issue in the context of UNESCO's delivering on the post-2015 development agenda.

Way Forward

The relevance of the field reform has become even greater given the adoption of the new Sustainable Development Goals in 2015. Building on the lessons provided by the review, UNESCO now needs to seize the opportunity to further refine its field network so it meets the challenges of the post-2015 Agenda. Thus, the key lessons provided in this report should be considered jointly with a forward looking agenda so as to provide the most appropriate strategic responses:

a.   More investment is needed if the reform is to meet its intended objectives, recognizing that the most potential for additional resources is likely going to be coming from extra-budgetary funding and not from core funding, as is the current trend within the broader UN system. This may also require more flexible field structures as well as further consolidation of the field network as a means for developing a critical mass of core programme staff and expertise in MROs.

b.   Greater clarity around the responsible entity for the overall management of the field network, including responsibilities for managing and monitoring the reform initiative, would result in efficiency gains. With regard to managing the implementation of further reforms specific to Africa, several options could be considered, inter alia, reviewing the precise role and the optimal geographic location of the Africa Department.

c.   The post-2015 Agenda presents an opportunity for UNESCO to review and redefine its field presence, its working modalities and its comparative advantages. This will require

specific strategies that respond to, inter alia, meeting Member States' needs for normative support, integrated policy advice, capacity development, innovation, gender mainstreaming and support to South-South cooperation. Some of this needs to be done by leveraging existing partnerships as well as by developing new ones, ensuring that the appropriate critical mass of technical expertise is made available and by developing more transversal programmes across the five mandates of UNESCO.

d. Careful consideration needs to be given to whether any further roll-out of reform should be preceded by an in-depth evaluation of current strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, all within the context of the post-2015 sustainable development agenda.

PART 1: BACKGROUND

Evolution of the UNESCO field network

1. UNESCO's previous decentralization strategy was established nearly fifteen years ago. That strategy and associated implementation plan was approved by the Executive Board in 2000 and 2001. In the spring of 2001 the then Director-General announced the finalization of the reorganization of the decentralized structure and the strategy formally entered its implementation phase following the 161st session of the Executive Board.

2. The previous decentralization strategy, which focused on country, regional and sectoral presence, was based upon a three-tiered approach consisting of *cluster offices* serving a limited number of Member States in all five of UNESCO's programme areas, specialized thematic *regional bureaux* to back up the cluster offices, and on a more exceptional basis, small *country offices* maintained in accordance with specific criteria[3]. This strategy led to the closure of 24 field offices across the world which, in the vast majority of cases, were small field offices consisting of only one professional staff member.

3. Periodically during its implementation phase, the decentralization strategy was accompanied by formal monitoring and oversight mechanisms. The Internal Oversight Service carried out reviews of the field network in 2003[4] and 2009[5]. The then Director-General established a Decentralization Review Task Force (DRTF) in 2003, chaired by the then Deputy Director-General with representation from senior level field and Headquarters managers. The DRTF's purpose was to review and take stock of progress, as well as to provide measures to optimize the efficiency and effectiveness of UNESCO's field presence.

4. In view of the momentum of the United Nations country-level reform and system-wide coherence[6], and related discussions, the work of the DRTF became increasingly pertinent and timely. In conducting its formal review, the DRTF took stock of the achievements and challenges facing the decentralization reform. In its final report[7], the DRTF identified a number of fundamental issues that were negatively affecting the performance of the field network and grouped them into two main categories: human resources issues and structural issues, as illustrated below, along with options to adjust UNESCO's network of field offices:

Human Resource Issues

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[3] At that moment in time, the Africa region was served by a Regional Bureau for Education in Dakar, a Regional Bureau for Sciences in Nairobi, ten cluster offices and five national offices: a total of 17 offices.

[4] 167 EX/14.

[5] 185 EX/6 Part V.

[6] Note in particular, the UN General Assembly resolution 62/208 (2007 Triennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system – TCPR). IOS also undertook review of UNESCO's participation in "One UN" Pilots and reported its findings in 181 EX/20.

[7] The DRTF convened a number of times between 2004 and 2008. The findings of their work are contained in 182 EX/6 Part II (August 2009): Report by the Director-General on the implementation of the reform process - Review of the decentralization strategy.

- *The field network is suffering from limited human resources*
- *Not all cluster offices have RP professional staff in all UNESCO domains (i.e. multidisciplinary teams)*
- *Professional staff profiles in regional thematic bureaux do not reflect the diversity of subject expertise corresponding to UNESCO's priorities*
- *More senior level professionals are required in all types of offices to affirm UNESCO's expertise in its field of competence*
- *NPO posts are at junior levels with tasks and responsibilities corresponding to higher grades and need to be harmonized with those of other United Nations agencies*
- *High-level assistance to directors and heads of field offices is needed*
- *Grade levels of AOs are not commensurate with the entrusted responsibilities and not aligned to those applied in other United Nations agencies.*
- *There is a severe shortage of general service staff on RP posts.*
- *The lack of human resources compels field offices to employ a large number of temporary personnel often for lengthy periods of time, representing a considerable liability for the Organization and putting at risk some core functions*

Structural Issues

- *Offices with dual cluster and regional mandates cannot deliver equally well on both responsibilities.*
- *Complex reporting lines are not conducive to full programme and management accountability.*

5. In recognition of the weaknesses in its decentralization model and the emerging requirements to support country-level action and to ensure active involvement in UN joint programming efforts, it was evident that the model needed to be revisited and adjusted as appropriate[8].

6. This was to be further highlighted by the Independent External Evaluation of UNESCO:[9]

"The rationale is to make UNESCO more effective in a decentralized and "networked" world, which requires a decentralized, responsive and empowered field presence…..UNESCO's field office network is already over-extended, often under-resourced and poorly staffed. Reinforcing this network at country level so that UNESCO becomes an effective UNDAF partner risks weakening normative and peace-building roles at regional and global levels unless properly approached…..Field networks need to be strengthened to support capacity-building, enhance UNESCO's credibility and ensure access to resources…..

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[8] 182 EX / Decision 6, para. 14, 'requests the Director-General to submit to it at its 185th session, without prejudice to any other option, a third option for the decentralization reform, entirely aligned with the principles of the United Nations reform, and in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolutions concerning the triennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the UN system ..'

[9] Excerpts from the Report on the Independent External Evaluation of UNESCO, 185 EX/18.

UNESCO would benefit from a smaller number of more capable and well-resourced multi-skilled (and multidisciplinary) regional and sub-regional bureaux.

This poses challenges for both the Secretariat and Member States. For the former, fundamental change in field structures requires streamlined interfaces within Headquarters; a reconsideration of already-existing sector-specific field capacities; a very different human resources philosophy and management style; strengthened regional and sub-regional capacities in planning and self-management; greater mobilization of national capacities including but not confined to emerging middle-income countries; and new ways of working with partners. For some Member States the trade-off will be between political preferences for "the United Nations flag in my capital" versus a field presence that can deliver effectively.

Proposals to concentrate and upgrade sub-regional offices in sub-Saharan Africa alongside African Union sub-regions are one example of this differentiation, as is the growing scope for "self-benefitting" activities among the emerging economies and support for South-South cooperation."

Proposed reform of the field network

7. In line with the IEE recommendation on "*bringing UNESCO closer to the field*", along with extensive consultations with key stakeholders, the Director-General presented her proposal[10] on the reform of the field network to the 185th session of the Executive Board in October 2010. The main goal of the reform was to reinforce UNESCO's presence on the ground and to improve the effectiveness of programme implementation.

8. The stated objectives of the reform of the field network included:

    - enhancing the quality and efficiency of service delivery to Member States;
    - ensuring a more flexible and visible presence at both regional and country levels; and
    - improving alignment with the United Nations system-wide coherence.

    One major element of the proposal was a simplified field structure consisting of two levels: a multi-sectoral regional level adapted to regional integration spaces and a flexible country-level responsive to the specific needs and requirements of Member States. The proposal included the establishment of 14 Multisectoral Regional Offices (MRO) with expanded mandates and covering the geographic areas of regional economic integration – Africa (5), Asia & Pacific (3), Latin America and the Caribbean (3), Arab States (2) and Europe and North America (1), selected on the basis of a number of objective criteria.[11] At the country level, the proposal entailed the establishment of desks[12] and maintaining a number of national offices on the basis of two main criteria.[13] The key roles and

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[10] [185 EX/29](): Report of the Director-General on the reform of the field network.
[11] Ibid, paragraph 22. Criteria included: the presence of a regional hub of United Nations agencies; coherence with regional spaces; facilities offered by Member States; logistical issues, such as the existence and frequency of air links; quality of communications and internet access.
[12] Ibid, paragraph 26. In general, a P3 / P4 grade international staff either housed in the office of the resident coordinator or assigned as a focal person for a limited number of countries and housed in the UNESCO MRO.
[13] Ibid, paragraph 27. Criteria included: efficiency, as determined by a cost-effectiveness relationship (ratio between the fixed costs allocated in the regular budget and the extrabudgetary resources

responsibilities of the various field entities have been described in numerous Executive Board documents.[14]

9. The Director-General's proposed two-level structure (multisectoral regional and national) to address one of the weaknesses of the previous decentralization strategy and its three-level structure (regional, cluster and national), namely that in cluster offices that were also functioning as regional bureaux, the regional responsibilities were taking precedence over, or overshadowing, the cluster function. In practical terms, the current MRO structures in Africa are sub-regional in nature, and could be considered as larger cluster offices with expanded country coverage as compared to the previous model.

10. In parallel, three national offices (Brazzaville, Kinshasa, Maputo) continued to operate. All cluster offices were transformed into national offices, eleven in total, with the exception of Harare and Yaoundé which became MROs. It is worth mentioning that a number of antennae continued to exist or were established during the reform process. The map[15] below indicates the current coverage of each MRO, along with the location of national offices and antennae.

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raised) and performance indicators; or, a special context that requires stronger country presence such as in post-crisis and post-disaster (PCPD) countries.

[14] See 187 EX/33, para. 9; 192 EX/4 Part IV Section III; and DG/Note/14/3.

[15] The locations are those contained in DG/Note/14/2 of January 2014. During the review, it was observed that UNESCO is present in a number of other countries through project appointments for extrabudgetary projects.

Figure 1: UNESCO's Field Presence in Sub-Saharan Africa

11. The table below illustrates the structural transformation that has taken place over the past two biennia as an outcome of implementing the reform of the field network in Africa.

Table 1: UNESCO field office locations

2012 – 2013 (36 C/5)	2014 – 2017 (37C/5)
Regional Offices 1. Dakar (Education) 2. Nairobi (Natural Sciences) Cluster 3. Accra 4. Bamako 5. Dar es Salaam 6. Harare 7. Libreville 8. Windhoek 9. Yaoundé National Offices 10. Abuja 11. Brazzaville 12. Bujumbura[16] 13. Kinshasa 14. Maputo	Multisectoral Regional Offices 1. Abuja 2. Dakar 3. Harare 4. Nairobi 5. Yaoundé National Offices 6. Abidjan 7. Accra 8. Addis Ababa (also Liaison) 9. Bamako 10.Brazzaville 11. Dar es Salaam 12. Juba 13. Kinshasa 14. Libreville 15. Maputo 16. Windhoek

12. The proposal also recognizes the critical need to strengthen the overall human resource capacity by placing the right people with the right profiles in the right place. The intention of the proposal was, inter alia, to establish a critical mass of expertise at the sub-regional level i.e. in the MROs, including more senior level subject expertise in UNESCO priority areas.[17]

13. The plan included a provision to create a regional support platform – to be placed in Addis Ababa as it concerns Africa – in the areas of finance, administration, information technology and human resources.

14. As the cornerstone of field operations, the MROs were to be enhanced through the creation of a number of functions including a deputy director, a programme evaluation / knowledge management unit, a unit for post-conflict and post-disaster work in select MROs, and the upgrading of the Administrative Officer post to P3 level.

15. This standard structure, which was designed to be flexible and capable of adjustment depending upon the specific requirements of the respective regions concerned, is illustrated in the table below.

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[16] The former national office in Bujumbura was transformed into a "*House for a Culture of Peace*".
[17] This is consistent with recommendations from Evaluation of Priority Africa (2012), a summary of which is in Annex 1.

Table 2: Indicative RP staff configuration for the adaptive field architecture – MRO[18]

MANAGEMENT	
Director	D-2[19] or D-1
Deputy	P-5
Executive assistant	P-1/2
Principal secretary	L-5
Secretary	L-4
PROGRAMMES	
ED, SC, SHS, CLT and CI	2 P-5, 5 P-4 or P-3 and 5 NPO
Programme assistants	5 L-4
PCPD unit[20]	P-5, NPO and L-6
Programme evaluation / knowledge management / public information	P-5, P-3, P-1/2 and NPO
ADMINISTRATION	
Administrative officer	P-3
Finance officer assistant	L-7
Budget officer assistant	L-6
Human resources assistant	L-6
Clerks/Assistants	4 L-2
PLATFORM (regional administrative and financial support platform)	
Chief finance and human resources	P-4
Finance officer	P-3
Human resources officer	P-1/2
IT specialist	NPO
Finance clerks/assistants	2 L-7, L-5
Human resources clerk/assistant	L-7

For comparative purposes with the initial proposal, the table below presents the indicative current RP staffing situation in a given MRO.

MANAGEMENT	
Director	D-1
Principal secretary	L-5
PROGRAMMES	
ED, SC, SHS, CLT and CI	1 P-5, 4 P-4 or P-3 and 2 NPO
Programme assistants	3 L-4
ADMINISTRATION	
Administrative officer	P-3
Finance officer assistant	L-7
Budget officer assistant	L-6
Human resources assistant	L-6
Clerks/Assistants	2 L-2

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[18] As indicated in 186 EX/28. More detailed table on the current staffing situation is in Annex 2 of this report.
[19] In MROs assuming also responsibility for interfacing with Regional UNDG Teams and representing the Organization in United Nations discussions and decision-making processes on the strategies for each region towards achieving country-level results.
[20] One or two in each region, as necessary.

16. Implementation plan – the initial proposal was to reform the field network gradually with implementation scheduled to take place over the two biennia (2012–2013 and 2014–2015), starting with the Africa and Arab regions. The choice of Africa was triggered by the priority status given to the region. At the 187th session of the Executive Board, the session immediately preceding the 36th General Conference, in anticipation that the Zero Nominal Growth (ZNG) budget scenario might be approved, it was proposed to postpone implementation of the field reform in the Arab States and to focus on implementation of phase one in Africa. Phase one implementation in Africa included four key milestones[21]:

- the establishment of new mandates for offices and reporting lines (planned 2012);
- the transfer and or deployment of key international staff, including directors and heads of office (planned 2012);
- the completion of personnel movements of national staff (planned 2013); and
- an assessment of phase one implementation (planned 2013).

Financial Crisis

17. The 36th General Conference (November 2011) approved the comprehensive reform of UNESCO's field network. At the same time, two Member States suspended regular programme contributions marking the beginning of a significant financial crisis for the Organization.

18. Despite the challenging financial situation, the intention of the Organization at the time was to remain fully committed to implementing the reform in Africa. Nonetheless, it was broadly recognized that the rate of implementation would be negatively affected by the availability of resources.

19. The financial crisis was further compounded by the overall global financial crisis which resulted in the decline in aid to Africa from major donors, as illustrated in the figure below.[22]

Figure 2: Aid to Africa, $bn

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
[21] 187 EX/33, para. 30.
[22] The Economist, 25th July 2015.

20. Subsequently, in early 2013, a number of adjustments to the field reform were deemed necessary, namely the decision to indefinitely suspend the Regional Administrative Platform planned to be established in the Addis Ababa Office. The proposed programme evaluation / knowledge management function to be placed in all MROs and the establishment of a PCPD platform in select MROs were also later suspended.

21. The financial crisis also triggered Executive Board queries on the progress made and concerns about the sustainability of the field network. The report of sustainability of the field network will be presented to the Board at its 2016 spring session.

PART 2: EVALUATION PURPOSE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

22. The Evaluation Section of the Internal Oversight Service planned[23] an initial assessment of phase one implementation of the reform to shed light on progress and to highlight strategic considerations going forward. The main purpose of the review is to draw early lessons learned from the implementation of the field reform in Africa.

23. The findings are intended to inform the Director-General and the Executive Board of the overall status of the reform process to date and to identify early lessons learned from the field reform in Africa seeking to better understand the efficiency, coherence, effectiveness and sustainability of the reform process, along with its implementation to date. Taking into account the post-2015 agenda, the report also reflects on the strengths, weaknesses and opportunities relevant for UNESCO's positioning in the field in the coming years.

24. The review was undertaken between March and July 2015 by a team of evaluators from the Evaluation Office in the Internal Oversight Service. Two external experts provided comments to the report and participated in a final workshop with key UNESCO stakeholders to discuss its findings. Both Advisory and Reference Groups were formed to advise and assist with the exercise. As part of the methodology, the review used the following data collection methods:

   - *desk study*: the desk study included a comprehensive review of all key documentation, mainly relevant Executive Board documents on the reform. This enabled the team to develop an indicative intervention logic [24] (Annex 3) as a framework to better understand the potential causal linkages underlying the reform, thereby informing subsequent phases of the assessment;
   - *online surveys*: a total of four online surveys were administered to i) directors / heads of UNESCO field offices in Africa, ii) all UNESCO field office staff in Africa, iii) National Commissions for UNESCO in Africa, and iv) UN Resident Coordinators in relevant locations in Africa;.

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[23] 37 C/5, UNESCO Evaluation Plan, Annex IV.
[24] An intervention logic is widely used as a tool in programme planning and evaluation. It sets out the activities and expected effects (outputs, outcomes and impacts) of a given intervention, as well as the assumptions that explain how the activities will lead to the expected effects within the context of the intervention. While relevant Executive Board documents identify the overall goal and objectives of the reform, an explicit intervention logic is missing.

- *interviews*: the team administered semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders at UNESCO Headquarters, Permanent Delegations to UNESCO, programme managers and staff involved with work in Africa;
- *workshops*: workshops were held with the extended reference group, including informal meetings with representatives of National Commissions for UNESCO from Africa; and
- *site visits*: seven site visits were conducted covering all offices types / structures – Multisectoral Regional, National Offices and Liaison Office – in order to provide a comprehensive overview of the situation in the field. The sites included the following countries: Nairobi, Dakar, Harare, Abidjan, Addis Ababa, Windhoek and Johannesburg. The sites visits enabled the team to meet with key UNESCO partners such as National Commissions for UNESCO and relevant line ministries, UN sister agencies and key beneficiaries of UNESCO's work.

25. In terms of key limitations to the exercise, time and financial resource limitations prevented the review team from conducting site visits to all five of the sub-regions i.e. to the countries covered by the MROs in Abuja and Yaoundé. In order to compensate for this, data collection included select phone interviews with staff in offices that were not visited, in addition to the participation of the respective heads of office via skype in an interactive workshop to discuss emerging findings and issues. In addition, feedback received from online surveys was in some cases less reliable and uneven. Furthermore, the unavailability, consistency and accuracy of data, especially on human resource and finance matters posed a challenge.

PART 3: MAIN FINDINGS

26. Based on the data collected and subsequent analysis, the main findings of the review are organized into three categories: *strategic issues, financial issues and human resource issues.* In many respects, these issues are intertwined and complementary to one another. A fourth issue area, which is both directly and indirectly impacted by those aforementioned, concerns the implications of the post-2015 development agenda on UNESCO's field presence.

Strategic issues

27. A majority of the findings are of a strategic nature and in this respect, they are within the direct control of the Organization and can be remedied. While the reform of the field network and its initial implementation in Africa did benefit from an overall vision, the principal weakness to date has been the absence of explicit strategies and / or accompanying measures to support the reform in meeting its intended objectives.

28. **There is broad agreement that the main goals of the reform of the field network were and remain highly pertinent**. The objectives include the need to enhance the quality of service delivery to Member States, the desire to ensure a more flexible and visible field presence and the need for greater coherence within the United Nations system. These objectives are consistent with the findings of the Independent External Evaluation of UNESCO, they speak to the challenges identified during the review of the previous decentralization strategy, they respond to necessities dictated by reforms of the UN at

country level such as the "One UN" initiative, and as it concerns Africa, they speak to the priority accorded by UNESCO Member States to Priority Africa. Moreover, the many intended effects of the reform, as stipulated throughout many Executive Board documents, are broadly accepted as relevant and imperative to the effective operations of UNESCO at the field level, including more intersectoral and interdisciplinary work, greater integration with regional economic communities, enhanced participation in the various processes of the United Nations including the UNDG, and a desire to become more efficient thus reducing the operating costs of the field network, etc.

29. **The reform itself was not complemented by a strategy or an implementation plan, providing a clear roadmap of how it was expected to lead to its intended objectives.** As developed, the design of the reform lacked a cohesive and coherent strategy and was not accompanied with a robust plan of action. There is little supporting evidence of a comprehensive intervention logic demonstrating how the reform was to lead to its intended objectives. Such a tool would be useful going forward to complement UNESCO's ongoing efforts to strengthen Results-Based Management and Results-Based Budgeting practices.

30. A skeletal framework of administrative changes was established in various Executive Board papers and Ivory Notes allotting roles and responsibilities across the board to multiple actors (see Annex 4), including the Bureau of Field Coordination (BFC), which was subsequently dismantled as a separate entity and its various functions dispersed to other Central Services during 36 C/5 period. Apart from the four key milestones for phase one implementation in Africa that were presented to the Executive Board[25], the reform did not benefit in the ensuing period from a formal plan of action.

31. There was no specific strategies underpinning key objectives of the reform. For instance, one of the key intended effects of the reform is to strengthen UNESCO's presence and participation in UN regional and national processes. However, in the absence of more detailed expected results and a plan of action with responsibilities, targets, etc., the precise meaning of the intentions is unclear. For example, to what extent are MROs expected to participate in the UNDAF processes in all countries under their coverage? What type of support are MROs expected to provide to National Offices, antennae, etc? The absence of such strategies meant that regional directors were left to develop their own implementation strategy and to interpret what their role and focus should be. This led to a number of good initiatives but not to coherence across the 5 MROs. Occasions such as the upcoming September 2015 meeting of UNESCO field directors / heads should provide the much needed opportunity to develop a joint vision for the way forward.

32. No contingency plans were developed to deal with the consequences of the financial crisis. Despite the fact that key elements of the reform were not implemented or suspended, no visible re-adjustments or scaling back of the initial objectives were made.

33. **Although the Africa Department has the responsibility as the central coordinating body for activities in Africa, the responsibilities and accountabilities set out in the relevant Ivory Notes do not provide sufficient clarity with respect to the management**

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[25] [187 EX/33](#), para. 30.

of the reform. [26] Without a single overarching body to oversee the reform in Africa, management of the initiative has been ad hoc and limited at best. Various management responsibilities related to the field network are dispersed across multiple actors including BSP, HRM, Africa Department, MSS, BFM and the Programme Sectors. Among key stakeholders interviewed during the review, a significant majority expressed the need for a 'single entry point' for field-related functions as in the past under BFC. This sentiment may also be due, in part, to the suspension of the Regional Support Platform as it concerns administrative aspects.

34. In principle, the Senior Management Team (SMT)[27], as a strategic oversight mechanism within the Organization which aims to steer reform and to maintain an effective internal communication platform, and its committees was to periodically review progress in the implementation of programmes benefiting Africa. These meetings were to provide a forum for assessment of existing delivery mechanisms in the field, including current modalities of technical support provided by Headquarters services to field offices and their enhancement to optimize collaboration, as well as opportunity for the formulation of a collective regional strategy based on a limited number of critical issues. The review found limited evidence of this actually taking place.

35. One of the key lessons going forward is that any reform initiative must identify and empower a clear structure or unit with the responsibilities for management and oversight functions. Key responsibilities of such a unit would include, inter alia, the development of an implementation plan consisting of the time bound milestones to be achieved, the respective responsible actors, and a set of key performance indicators to guide monitoring and reporting on the progress in the implementation of the reforms.

36. **The role, potential and contribution of Category I Institutes, especially in the education area, has not been fully exploited.** A number of Category I Institutes are engaged in various activities in Africa, most visibly IICBA in Addis Ababa, ranging from capacity building (e.g. IIEP offered a large volume of customized training in educational planning in Benin, Rwanda and Namibia), policy development (UIL contributed to the Education Sector Analysis and the preparation of an Education Sector Development Plan for Tanzania) and the production of education-related statistics (UIS provided onsite support to 18 countries across the region on UIS survey instruments, data quality assessments and out-of-school children methodology). The review found very little recognition of the role that Category I Institutes could play in the reform.

37. **The rationale behind the current structure of national offices is not obvious.** The structures to emerge from the reform do not, in some cases, align with the approved criteria for establishing UNESCO's field presence. In this regard, the mandate, location and therefore rationale for a number of field offices would merit further review, especially in the context of strategically positioning UNESCO to better deliver upon the post-2015 development agenda.

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[26] DG/Note/14/3 and 14/2.
[27] 187 EX/33, para. 27.

38. Despite the existence of approved criteria[28], the extent to which five offices, in particular, fulfill these criteria is tenuous: Accra, Dar es Salaam, Libreville, Maputo and Windhoek.[29] At present, these countries are clearly neither currently in crisis situations, nor transitioning from a crisis or disaster situation. The efficiency criterion itself is not entirely clear either, and the review found no formal monitoring or reporting on this criterion for individual offices. It is understood that these offices are transitioning from being cluster offices under the previous decentralization model to national offices under the current reform and, as such, are in the middle of a process. Nonetheless, maintaining the formal structures, as compared to more flexible, cost-efficient alternatives such as a desk or antennae housed within the United Nations Resident Coordinator (UNRC) or National Commission for UNESCO, merit serious consideration.

39. When considering the possible closure of field offices, it is important to recognise the closure of a physical structure does not imply that programme delivery at country level will be terminated. If determined that key programme priorities exist, UNESCO should take steps to ensure that appropriate, effective modalities are identified to deliver services to Member States e.g. establishment of project appointments via the mobilization of extrabudgetary resources. The review observed a number of such cases whereby the Education Sector has established temporary presence in a country to delivery extrabudgetary projects e.g. Cap EFA projects. This modality responds to a clear need, it is flexible, and it increases UNESCO's visibility and presence on the ground without committing itself to long-term operations which in the current climate is less financially sustainable.

40. However, the capacity implications of a model by which an individual is out-posted to a given country needs to be given careful consideration. The review noted the views of several Administrative Officers who highlighted that fact that this arrangement does have a noticeable effect on the workload from an administrative perspective. For example, many of these individuals are on short-term temporary assignments and are unfamiliar with UNESCO procedures, rules and regulations and the use of various administrative platforms. As a result, the responsible administrative function, either in the MRO or NO, is required to provide additional backstopping. A wider application of this model may necessitate, in parallel, a strengthening of administrative capacities and encouraging longer term staff to consider such short term opportunities as part of career development.

41. **The location of UNESCO MROs in Africa do not fully adhere with the criteria established for their selection[30],** the main implication of which is the need to more clearly define the roles and accountabilities of the respective offices in supporting sub-regional and regional integration efforts. As a result, the reform has not enabled UNESCO to fully align with the geographical coverage of the African Regional Economic Communities and the

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[28] Efficiency, as determined by a cost-effectiveness relationship (ratio between the fixed costs allocated in the regular budget and the extrabudgetary resources raised) and performance indicators; special context that requires stronger country presence such as in post-crisis and post-disaster (PCPD) countries.

[29] UNESCO is not significantly present in PCPD countries which are currently on the agenda of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Central African Republic and Burundi).

[30] Note 36 C/27, paragraph 35, criteria which include "presence of a regional hub of United Nations agencies and coherence with regional integration spaces" and 185 EX/29, paragraph 21, "… in closer consistency with the geographical coverage of regional integration organizations…"

United Nations at the regional level. While UNESCO's regional presence was to be consistent with the geographical coverage of regional integration organizations, consultations with Member States to determine the location of MROs resulted in agreement to organize the locations around four sub-regions – West, East, Southern, and Central – according to the African Union's regional categorization.[31] There is a degree of inconsistency between the two which raises the question as to what was the guiding principle behind office location selection. The countries of the African Union are divided into eight Regional Economic Communities (REC) but not all of these groupings are relevant for this exercise, as two[32] have their secretariats in countries outside of UNESCO's designation for the Africa region.

Figure 3: MRO Alignment with African RECs

42. UNESCO has no formal office structure in some REC secretariat locations (Djibouti, Gaborone and Lusaka) and differing office structures in the remaining three (Abuja: MRO and Dar es Salaam and Libreville: NO). In light of the manner in which UNESCO assigned country coverage, in nearly all cases (with the exception of Yaoundé and the ECCAS) there exists more than one MRO within the country coverage of any one REC. The allocation of responsibility for Burundi to Yaoundé is also not easily explained as Burundi is a member of the COMESA and the EAC and has its strongest links within the COMESA/EAC regions. Assigning responsibility for Burundi to Nairobi would have been the obvious choice. It is worth noting that the Africa Department is the "focal point for UNESCO's relations with the African Member States, the African Union and Africa's Regional Economic Communities".[33] In view of the unevenness in this approach, a necessary course of action is to provide greater clarity towards understanding which office assumes the primary responsibility for the

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[31] 36 C/27, paragraph 60.
[32] CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States) has its secretariat in Tripoli and UMA (Arab Magreb Union) has its secretariat in Rabat.
[33] DG/Note/14/3, paragraph 21 b.

representative vs. liaison vs. management function vis-a-vis the various RECs and what the accountabilities are in this respect.

> With regard to the importance of clarifying responsibilities among UNESCO entities in the field, the following example illustrates a further level of potential complexity in UNESCOs field network. UNESCO Dakar assumes the responsibility for coordinating a regional project contributing to a reform of the higher education system among eight West African countries. The project is funded by the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa (UEMOA) whose secretariat is based in Bamako. So while UNSECO Dakar manages project implementation, the UNESCO National Office in Bamako assumes the representative / liaison function. In addition, it is worth noting that three of the UEMOA countries fall within the coverage of UNESCO Abuja. As this case demonstrates, clarity over roles and communication amongst the various UNESCO offices is essential to ensure efficient and effective implementation and oversight.

43. UNESCO is also not fully aligned with the regional grouping of the UN Development Group (UNDG) where the UN formally recognises two regions in Africa (Western/Central and Eastern/Southern Africa), with the main hubs located in Dakar and Johannesburg[34]. UNESCO does not have D2 representation in its east and southern Africa offices which excludes the organization from participating in all Regional UNDG team functions i.e. namely the assessment of UNCTs and UN Resident Coordinators. The location of certain UNESCO MROs (Abuja, Yaoundé, and Harare) are also not regional hubs for other key UN partner agencies. Further, in the case of the Addis Ababa office, the combined function, being both liaison office to AU and the national office to Ethiopia, has been challenging in terms of securing adequate coverage of both functions. This situation may have implications to the extent that the regional level gains further importance within the context of the post-2015 development agenda and the SDGs e.g. in promoting regional level programme approaches and partnerships which will require some consideration as how best to ensure effective engagement with the regional UNDG, AU and ECA.

44. **The reform has not visibly led to a sharpened programmatic focus supported by regional or country strategies/frameworks.** The issue of sharpened programmatic focus needs to be addressed in the context of a rapidly-changing international development landscape, inclusive of financing models for multilateral organisations.

45. The review observed several examples of 'flexible' approaches to programme delivery whereby MRO's are delivering projects / programmes outside the geographic boundaries of the office (e.g. HIV/AIDS work which aligns with a wider regional grouping western & central and eastern & southern Africa; the regional work of the Pole de Dakar; water-related coordination activities from Nairobi). An even greater level of such flexibility in programme delivery and development of substantial capacity in one location would be beneficial going forward, especially in view of the limited technical expertise in many programmatic / thematic areas.

46. However, with respect to making UNESCO more relevant and effective on the ground by better aligning its programmes to the specific needs and requirements of Member States,

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[34] While Nairobi is a hub for many UN agencies, the Secretariat for the UNDG Eastern and Southern Africa is located in Johannesburg.

the review found very few examples of field work being guided by explicit programmatic strategies. There are very few up-to-date UNESCO Country Programme Documents[35]. For the time being, the reform has not resulted in the development of regional strategies or frameworks at the level of the MROs. The effort by the Harare MRO in this regard (in developing regional frameworks) is positive and should be replicated throughout all MROs.

47. While the Operational Strategy for Priority Africa, approved by the 37th General Conference, and the six flagship programmes guide the Organization's action in Africa, it is not entirely clear whether field offices limit their work to these areas or that they are strategically guided by them. Rather, in interviews with staff the review found that the flagships represent an 'obligation' of sorts and, more often than not, require tailored additional reporting. Interestingly enough, in principle all activities contribute in some manner to the flagships.

48. Decentralizing UNESCO further to be closer to the field came with the intention of having greater access and understanding to and of the needs on the ground. One key challenge is that UNESCO is not well-positioned today in terms of human resource capacity to deliver downstream interventions in the wide array of existing programme priorities. Beyond this, there needs to be a continued discussion about whether UNESCO is best fit for purpose at a global and regional level serving as a standard-setting, normative agency whose expertise rests in technical specialisations and coordination, or is it best positioned to support mainly national interventions at the request of member states and/or donors. In this regard, it needs to be recognised that voluntary, mainly bilateral, funding now represents the largest funding source for activities in the field, and thus presents the risk of UNESCO focusing disproportionally on downstream activities.

49. The reform in Africa has brought to light the shortcomings of the lack of focus with which UNESCO is currently struggling. For instance, while there is emerging evidence that UNESCO has become more engaged in UNDAF processes, this also has potential downsides. A review of UNESCO's current engagement in UNDAFs revealed over-commitments in several areas, which carries the risk of not delivering or meeting expectations, in particular in countries with limited or no UNESCO presence. Limited staff presence and capacity often means UNESCO is missing out on contributing, and in cases where engagement has been seen – there is the question on which of UNESCO's sectors or flagships should take priority or have prominence. Field and HQ focal points interviewed spoke about the conflicts they face when having to state one or two priorities UNESCO would promote for UNDAF developments – would it be Culture or Education or Science? Even when it may seem obvious, the presence of other UN agencies working in the same area with significantly more resources (human and capital) is seen as affecting UNESCO's raison-d'etre. Without specific focus, or more representation, UNESCO is missing out on highlighting and driving towards achieving unified results in the sectors in which it operates.

50. **The implementation of the reform to date has not been adequately supported by a robust knowledge management function**. Apart from a recent initiative which originated in the UNESCO Dakar office with the objective of promoting better collaboration and knowledge sharing amongst field offices (to be found on CONNECT U portal), little has been

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[35] The BSP website indicates a total of 15 UPCDs for countries in Africa, 8 of which are valid for the current period.

done. In its initial design, the reform had called for a programme evaluation / knowledge management / public information function in each MRO to be staffed by four full-time professionals. In this way, the reform seemed to understand the value of knowledge management, knowledge sharing, identifying good practice etc., essential when operating in a decentralized environment. However, due to financial constraints, the decision was taken to suspend this essential function.

51. In order to better connect UNESCO's network of field offices with each other, and with Headquarters, in support of the reform's main objectives, further consideration will need to be given to establishing an effective knowledge management system / function in the MROs as a matter of priority. This importance of such a function is likely to take on a renewed significance within the context of the post-2015 development agenda and support to Members States on the SDGs.

52. **The reform did not include a communication strategy**, targeted at both internal and external stakeholders, explaining the reform, its goals, its working modalities, why is it important, what is expected to change through its implementation, etc. During the review, a common question "what reform?" was heard more than once from UNESCO staff as well as by individuals working closely with UNESCO (e.g. National Commissions). The lesson here is the importance of using every possible vehicle to communicate the vision and strategies of any change initiative.

53. Related to the issue of communication and visibility, going forward (i.e. in the context of the post-2015 development agenda) it would appear imperative that UNESCO communicate more clearly its brand, what UNESCO stands for, how what UNESCO provides is critical for Member States, how what it provides is unique from others, etc. And in this context, it is important to clarify where UNESCO's field offices fit and / or how should they be positioned. The importance of branding in this respect is as a means, inter alia, to motivate and provide direction to UNESCO staff, to improve Member State's understanding of what to expect from UNESCO, and to promote a stronger recognition of UNESCO vis-à-vis all of its key constituencies.

Financial resource issues

54. **The reform of the Field Network was challenging of the financial resources to do it properly**. Despite strong Member State support for the enhanced field presence, the financial support required to fully implement the reform did not materialize. The entire process was significantly affected by both the financial crisis at UNESCO and the overall global financial crisis, which resulted in major delays in implementation as the organization was facing serious funding shortages overall. This impeded the planned roll-out of the reform to Arab States, the planned establishment of a Regional Support Platform in Addis Ababa and programme evaluation / knowledge management units in MROs – all were eventually suspended in view of the financial constraints and concerns expressed by Member States about the financial sustainability of the field network under the current $507 million expenditure plan. Staff movements also did not take place as envisaged as they had to be taken within the global resourcing context and ensuring that key positions could be funded / maintained. Some of these delays, e.g. staff deployment, are of a systemic nature and not reform specific. Nevertheless, they have had negative effects on the scope of the

reform and its roll-out and the likelihood that the initial objectives will be attained. Furthermore, it led to reduced MRO staffing vis-à-vis the planned configuration as the required RP cuts were heavily focusing on abolishing or suspending posts. The figure below reflects the abrupt decline in resources as of 2011.

Figure 4: Decreasing RP budget since 2000 (USD millions)

55. The necessary modifications were done in a rather piecemeal fashion in so far as they were not visibly guided by a contingency plan, nor did they emerge from an analysis weighing the potential strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the various options. The exceptional financial constraints did not trigger any visible changes in approaches or working modalities, a recalibration of the expected results of the reform, changes in key milestones to be met, etc. The financial crisis led to major gaps in the implementation of the reform regarding the initially intended model and the measures taken were not done in a strategic, thoughtful manner.

56. Despite these challenges, all five programme sectors have increased their efforts to decentralise financial resources to the field, with priority accorded to Africa. In the 37 C/5 ($507 million expenditure plan), the distribution of regular programme resources is highest to Africa for all five programme sectors in comparison with the other four regions.

57. There remain challenges in the strategic allocation of regular programme resources to field offices, not always fully in line with the principles of granting all offices greater authority and accountability in the management of resources. For the most part, Programme sectors decentralize RP resources to the MROs, not to NOs. The decentralization of funds is guided mainly by the availability of international programme specialists, or thematic advisors, which is frequently not available in NOs. With respect to extrabudgetary funds, the figure below illustrates that expenditure by field offices in Africa has remained relatively stable while extrabudgetary managed by Headquarters (interregional and global) has risen significantly. This indicates, inter alia, that programme sectors at Headquarters are not decentralizing

more extrabudgetary resources, that field offices may suffer from delivery capacity issues or field office's RM efforts require strengthening.

Figure 5: Execution of extrabudgetary funds by region (end-of-year expenditure in thousands of US dollars)

Source: Executive Board documents, annual Management Chart for programme execution.

58. **Ad hoc approaches to extra-budgetary practices and the lack of a comprehensive resource mobilisation strategy hinders the ability of field offices to meet priority needs of Member States.** Additionally, more robust approaches to resource mobilisation are needed to strengthen the justification for presence in some locations and to enhance the financial sustainability of the field office network.

59. The challenges faced with regard to resource mobilization are well-documented in previous IOS audit and evaluation reports[36] and, in many respects, are of a systemic nature. This includes, inter alia, the absence of comprehensive resource mobilization (RM) strategies in field offices, the existence of multiple strategic programme priority frameworks (UNDAF, UCPD, CAP Complementary Additional Programme) which serve as a basis for RM strategy development, unclear roles, authorities, and responsibilities and uneven staff experience and capacities in RM. Despite the aforementioned challenges, extrabudgetary expenditure benefitting the Africa region has been relatively stable.

60. While from a regional perspective the picture might look promising, a closer look at current situation raises some concern. The question of the financial sustainability of the overall field network is closely related to extrabudgetary resources. While IOS did not conduct a

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[36] 190 EX/5 Part II (2012) and IOS Internal Audit on UNESCO's resource mobilization strategy and framework (2015).

comprehensive assessment of the issue of financial sustainability [37] , the table below highlights the challenges faced by the Organization in the current financial context. At the beginning of the 37 C/5 biennium, the Secretariat provided the following data to the Executive Board as part of its provisional planning. (Note the data below is not actual expenditure, rather a projection of costs and available funds.) The table illustrates that even at the planning stage, it was anticipated that the cost of operations in some regions would outweigh the funds available for programme delivery. The case of the Africa region is striking, where the provisional costs far exceed the available programme funds.

Table 3: Provisional planning for 2014-2015 decentralized funds by region

Region	Regular Programme			Extrabudgetary Programme	Total Costs (a+b)	Total Programme funds (c+d)
	Staff costs (a)	Running costs (b)	Programme budget (operational costs) for all 5 Major Programmes (c)	Extrabudgetary Funds (d)		
Africa	39,468	6,950	7,021	20,060	46,418	27,081
Asia and the Pacific	33,535	5,617	4,693	32,657	39,152	37,350
Arab States	20,625	2,251	2,948	35,911	22,876	38,859
Europe and North America	5,692	1,608	450	3,521	7,300	3,971
Latin America and the Caribbean	22,903	3,365	3,497	59,404	26,268	62,901
Grand total	**122,223**	**19,791**	**18,609**	**151,553**	**142,014**	**170,162**

Source:

Source : 194 EX/4 Part IV Add.

61. While this review does not present current expenditure data on a per office basis, largely because of difficulties associated with obtaining disaggregated data from UNESCO's information systems, it is strongly recommended that such data be systematically collected, monitored and reported by the responsible management entity. Such data will provide a more comprehensive and accurate picture of the financial viability of the field office network.

62. The review also found that the performance of individual offices is uneven in terms of RM. An in-depth, comparative analysis would not necessarily reveal much at this time due to the fact that no targets have been established for individual offices and that some MROs are only newly established in their regional function (e.g. Harare as compared to Dakar). Going forward, there needs to be greater attention paid to more robust, systematic monitoring of RM efforts at the level of individual offices especially as one measure for justifying field presence.[38]

63. The current situation also raises a question concerning the justification for presence in some locations, as some evidence indicates that the average cost of some field offices is high and oftentimes is matched with limited funding for activities. This further highlights the need for attracting additional resources to ensure the financial sustainability of field presence and setting clear benchmarks.

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[37] The Director-General will report on the financial sustainability of the field network at the 199th session of the Executive Board.
[38] Document 185 EX/29, para. 27. A National Offices will be maintained based upon two criteria, one being efficiency as measured by the ratio between the fixed costs allocated in the regular budget and the extrabudgetary resources raised.

64. *Resource mobilization and accountabilities* – Field office directors and heads have a clear responsibility for RM and it has been included in individual performance agreements. However, it is less clear who bears ultimate responsibility for RM to support regional initiatives in particular regarding the Regional Economic Communities or with the African Union. Some offices have expressed concern that RM to support such regional initiatives risk being undertaken by MROs to the benefit of countries where the MRO is based, rather than benefitting the entire region and thus National Offices. This is complicated to some degree by the fact that UNESCO has more than one MRO operating in the countries covered by a given REC.

65. The application of the new accountability framework still faces challenges with regard to Headquarters maintaining ultimate authority over extrabudgetary resources. This is particularly the case for funds mobilized at Headquarters but implemented in the field (e.g. Cap EFA), or Special Accounts managed from Headquarters. In the view of the programme sectors, there is wide agreement at HQ that they consider themselves ultimately accountable to the donor. They understand themselves to be responsible for regularly presenting progress to bi-lateral donors, and thus feel it appropriate to have full control and authority over the use of funds.[39]

66. With regard to accountabilities at the level of programme specialists, it was also observed during the review that few staff are equipped with necessary resource mobilization experience with a number of staff even expressing a degree of ambivalence and poor understanding as to the importance of mobilizing resources. Furthermore, the capacity to develop new and competitive funding proposals is limited and would need to get support and/or upfront investment.

67. *Unique characteristics of extrabudgetary resources* - At present, extra-budgetary funds are quite specific to support national-level interventions and are rarely intersectoral. If this trend in RM were to continue, as it might well be the case in the post-2015 development agenda, increased emphasis will need to be given to finding the appropriate capacities for more transversal national programme delivery, oversight and coordination.

68. The review identified a number of successful cases in Africa with regard to the use of self-benefitting funds as a means to strengthen project / programme sustainability (e.g. science sector in Namibia, education sector in Nigeria and Angola). A greater application of the self-benefitting modality is worthy of consideration moving forward as a means of addressing the issue of financial sustainability. Another modality offered by extra-budgetary funds is used by the education sector by setting up temporary, satellite offices with Project Appointment staff who are responsible for implementation of the intervention which do not require the longer-terms costs associated with establishing a permanent office.

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[39] In addition, the issue of respective cost recovery needs to be addressed, as it appears that those costs recovered remain primarily at HQ.

Human resource issues

69. Despite a number of important challenges with respect to HR issues, there has been a concerted effort over the past biennium to give priority to staffing in the Africa region. As the data in the table below illustrates, Africa is the only region to show a slight net increase in the number of RP staff.[40]

Table 4: Evolution of Regular budget established posts in the field by region and by category

	35 C/5			36 C/5			37 C/5		
	D/P/NO	Local	Total	D/P/NO	Local	Total	D/P/NO	Local	Total
Africa	121	87	208	123	83	206	122	98.5	220.5
Arab States	58	51	109	58	48	106	50	48	98
Asia and the Pacific	101	95	196	104	91	195	96	86	182
Europe and North America	27	10	37	27	11	38	22.5	9	31.5
Latin America and the Caribbean	72	70	142	73	69	142	61	58.5	119.5
Sub-total field			692			687			651.5
Sub-total HQ posts			1263			1206			871
Total posts			**1955**			**1893**			**1522.5**
% of posts decentralized			35%			36%			43%

Note: figures exclude UNESCO institutes and UIS. The 37 C/5 figures represent situation after restructuration of June 2014, not the 37 C/5 approved.
Source: HRM.

70. In parallel, due to the financial crisis, the HRM service suffered a loss of approximately 30% in staff capacity which has understandably affected the functioning of the service in key areas. All areas of work were affected by the decreased capacity (including the non-renewal of temporary staff and the suspension of posts).

71. **Despite the slight increase in RP staff in Africa, the review could not identify a specific human resource strategy to enable smooth implementation of the field reform in Africa and the deployment of staff**. This is one of the major obstacles to the effective roll-out of the reform, and is particularly noteworthy considering the significance of human resources deficiencies under the previous decentralization strategy and which the current reform sought to address.[41]

72. The review found several examples of staff members being re-deployed to locations despite not having the required technical profiles or language skills to adequately serve the needed function[42]. The majority of staff movement[43] was intra-regional in nature as illustrated in the table below.

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[40] The figures exclude UNESCO institutes.
[41] Please note that all MRO's are also supported by national programme officers and, in some cases, offices benefit from expertise seconded by the host country (e.g. Nigeria).
[42] For example, staff members have been transferred to MROs requiring English and French proficiency due to the office coverage, yet only possess one.
[43] Also there were 19 local support posts created in Africa and financed by the Emergency Fund with the objective of reinforcing the programme capacity in FOs.

Table 5: Number of Geographical movements of Director/Professional Staff in Africa

	2010 / 2011	2012 / 2013	1 Jan. 2014 to July 2015
HQ to Field	8	4	7
Field* to HQ	8	5	3
Field* Office to Field* Office	23	29	21
Total	39	38	31

- Including Category I Institutes (Source: HRM, July 2015)

73. In addition, the placement of interim staff, especially heads of offices, to various field offices is not subjected to transparent practice but rather is based on ad-hoc approaches. For example, both acting heads of Abuja and Addis Ababa were brought back to service from retirement to serve on temporary bases. Opportunities like this, e.g. interim heads of offices, are an excellent way to build and/or increase existing capacity through time-limited assignments to those offices.

74. Another important factor to emerge, to the extent that there are indications that the reform is leading to an absence of technical capacity and expertise in some thematic areas in the field, Headquarters is increasingly obliged to technically backstop and / or implement from Headquarters. Thus, accountabilities over the management and use of resources rest at Headquarters and / or are unclear and undefined, leading to confusion both in the field and at HQ.

75. In some cases field offices do not possess the right staff profile, in terms of a particular thematic area or the required level of expertise to respond to Member States' requests. This has placed greater pressure on Headquarters to perform coordination and backstopping functions, which runs opposite to the initial intention of the reform. Frequently referenced was the fact that the critical mass of expertise (existing previously in the Education and Natural Science bureaux) was split, causing increased pressure on regional coordination as well as a dispersion of technical expertise to the sub-regions, disallowing expertise to be increasingly mobile, flexible and/or adaptive to the needs of the continent. The following example illustrates this issue.

76. Dispersing expertise without clear authority also has led to other problems as evidenced during the preparations for the 2015 Regional Education Consultation in Rwanda.

> With the regional responsibility for education split between two MROs, content and logistical preparations for the Regional Education Consultation were split amongst the Dakar and Nairobi offices. The lack of a central coordinating focal point created confusion and problems in the management of the meeting and required eventually the stepping in of the Education Sector to seek to remedy the situation. Multiple interviews in the field and at HQ referenced how poor of a reflection the meeting was on UNESCO. Leadership appeared to be at odds, the lack of clear coordination emerged, and a cohesive continent-wide statement towards the World Education Forum in Incheon was of substandard quality.

77. The review observed cases in the Natural Science sector where technical expertise exists in one sub-region (e.g. Nairobi), but due to office structures, associated lines of accountability and MROs priorities, the respective staff member was not allowed to provide the much needed technical backstopping support to other MROs. In most cases, MRO management and sector staff have worked with goodwill and good faith to support one another, largely forgoing the new management structures created under the reform. Going forward, in light of the reduced level of technical capacity across UNESCO offices, the country coverage established for each of the MRO's cannot be an obstacle to effective programme delivery and backstopping; rather the field network needs to find flexible and innovative solutions to enhance coordination and implementation.

78. The review also found that few of the MROs have critical mass in any given programme sector, and are especially challenged in their efforts to adequately cover, in some cases, up to ten or more countries (e.g. this is the case for Nairobi and Yaoundé). The existing imbalances in the country coverage of individual MROs (e.g. 7 for Dakar and 13 for Nairobi) will need to be addressed through ongoing deployment / redeployment of staff. There also exist imbalances in the distribution of programme staff across MROs which will require further consideration in order to find the appropriate balance. For example, Dakar has approximately double the number of Education professionals than Nairobi despite that fact that the latter has double the number of countries to cover in their sub-region. At the same time, despite Dakar having more than double the number of Education professionals than provided for in the standard configuration, the office finds itself significantly stretched in terms of trying to provide adequate technical support to its sub-region.

79. The **accountability framework is not widely understood and too complex in many respects.** Heads of Field Offices recognize that the new reporting lines and accountabilities are a net positive. While recognized as a necessary step to strengthen and decentralize programme management and human resources administration, this new accountability framework is not widely acknowledged or understood by all staff, and reporting lines remain complex.

80. In addition, some MRO directors have pointed out that given the large number of countries under their coverage, combined with reduced staffing, the expectation to fulfil this responsibility will be difficult if not impossible to meet. An option to consider would be to introduce a deputy director post who could assume various critical roles, especially as directors of MROs are frequently on missions or overloaded with several priorities.

81. One of the intentions of the field reform was to decrease the burden of work in HQ by decentralising operations to the field, however no clear accountability and reporting framework was developed to ease implementation procedures. Accountability of RP remains rolled-up to the sectors in HQ and EXB accountability is often unclear, with various initiatives directed by HQ while other initiatives are under the sole purview/responsibility of field offices. A lack of clarity in this regard carries a risk of extrabudgetary operations being compromised and not necessarily in line with UNESCO policy.

PART 4: KEY LESSONS

82. The review reveals a number of key lessons which will require consideration by the Director-General and the Governing Bodies in order to identify the most appropriate strategic responses.

   a. **UNESCO's field presence in Africa will require further consolidation if the reform is to meet its intended objectives. The overall reform was challenging in its initial design and the subsequent financial crisis greatly restricted the Organization's ability to ensure full implementation. In hindsight, this unique situation should have been a signal to the Organization to scale back the initiative from many perspectives, most importantly by concentrating resources in a limited number of MROs.**

   Strategic consideration: More investment is needed if the reform is to meet its intended objectives, recognizing that the most potential for additional resources is likely going to be coming from extra-budgetary funding and not from core funding, as is the current trend within the broader UN system. This may also require a more flexible field presence as well as further consolidation of the field network as a means for developing a critical mass of core programme staff and expertise in MROs. Certain original reform features such as the regional AO platform, programme evaluation / knowledge management function, PCPD experts and a certain minimum capacities for each office were never implemented – the need for these should be carefully considered. In this context, the recently launched initiative Invest for Efficient Delivery attempts to ensure, inter alia, structured delivery in the Field for national and regional level support, sharpening delivery modalities and streamlining work processes.

   b. **The initial implementation phase of the reform in Africa coincided with the dismantling of the Bureau of Field Coordination. This has led to responsibilities for interaction with the field to be dispersed across various services and sectors and the absence of a visible single entry point. Greater clarity around the responsible entity for the overall management of the field network, including responsibilities for managing and monitoring the reform initiative, would result in efficiency gains. With regard to managing the implementation of further reforms specific to Africa, several options could be considered, inter alia, reviewing the precise role and the optimal geographic location of the Africa Department.**

   Strategic consideration: While the role of the Africa Department is clear with respect to the function of regional coordination of the organization's work in Africa, e.g. via the Priority Africa programme flagships, its role in managing the implementation of the reform per se is less evident. Within this context, the role of the Africa Department in particular and its geographic location (Headquarters vs. Africa) should be addressed as a matter of priority. As it concerns any future reform of the field network, the responsible management entity should necessarily develop an implementation plan specifying the expected results, key milestones, performance indicators and targets, etc.

   c. **The reform in order to succeed should have been underpinned by explicit strategic frameworks/plans/strategies, including at the regional level, leading to a tighter focus on key priority areas where UNESCO has an advantage. This**

dispersion of effort, coupled with the resource constraints, risks further weakening the relevance and potential impact of UNESCO's work.

Strategic consideration: There needs to be a renewed discussion around how field offices can effectively limit their engagement to fewer strategic priorities. This discussion also needs to carefully consider the respective function of various field entities (e.g. regional normative work, policy advice function vs. more downstream activities at the national level) and determine the appropriate balance in this respect. This prioritization should be aligned with an effective human resource strategy to make optimal use of existing human capacities, including those found in UNESCO's wider network (e.g. National Commissions for UNESCO, UNESCO Chairs, and UNESCO Category II centres).

d. **While there are many emerging opportunities for extra-budgetary resource mobilization (RM) at the country level, UNESCO needs to invest in project formulation, capacity building for RM and building strategic partnerships if the organization is to develop a sustainable presence at country level. Given the fact that the level of effort and time for raising larger amounts is similar to those of smaller amounts, offices need to avoid fragmentation of their portfolios and be able to say no to those opportunities that do not advance their programmatic focus**.

Strategic consideration: UNESCO's approach to extra-budgetary resource mobilization is a strategic issue above and beyond the context of the reform of the field network. It is worth noting that the trend indicates more UN agencies are having to deal with the implications of moving towards operations being exclusively funded by voluntary extra-budgetary contributions. In the context of the field reform and Africa, UNESCO will need to consider, inter alia, where responsibilities for resource mobilization should sit institutionally (e.g. Africa Department, MROs, individual staff), the implications on how UNESCO should determine office presence, the nature and function of its field programmes, and human resource staffing issues.

e. **By dispersing existing capacity, the Africa Field Reform has thus far not led to increased technical capacity in the region, a key expectation of member states in the region. Further reform in UNESCO's other regions needs to carefully balance the strengths and weaknesses of the current structures in place with a view to optimizing regional presence and focus and to allowing more flexible field structures that can be adjusted at any given moment.**

Strategic consideration: While UNESCO's global presence needs to be sensitive to regional realities and demands, the overall framework needs to have a clear and simple accountability structure. A decision needs to be taken whether UNESCO will be represented through technical regional offices or through multi-sectoral regional offices or through a combination of the two. The possibility of an accountability framework with a central role for a regional bureau could also be explored as could be the option for re-establishing a stronger central function.

The post-2015 SDG agenda presents an opportunity for UNESCO to review and redefine its field presence, its working modalities and its comparative advantages. This will require specific strategies that respond to, inter alia, meeting Member States' needs for normative support, integrated policy advice, capacity development, innovation and

support to South-South cooperation. Some of this needs to be done by leveraging existing partnerships as well as by developing new ones, ensuring that the appropriate critical mass of technical expertise is made available and by developing more transversal programmes across the five mandates of UNESCO.

Careful consideration needs to be given to whether any further roll-out of reform should be preceded by an in-depth evaluation of current strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, all within the context of the post-2015 sustainable development agenda.

PART 5: POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

83. The review of the Africa field reform has yielded a number of important lessons that, if learned, can inform the organization's quest for greater efficiency and effectiveness following the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals in New York in September 2015. A number of targets relate to UNESCO's field of competences and many parts of UNESCO are already considering the implications of the post-2015 development agenda at the global as well as at the regional and country levels. The post-2015 development agenda provides an opportunity to revisit UNESCO's field presence and to align it with the new development paradigms.

84. The broadened focus beyond poverty to sustainable development and peace and security speaks to UNESCO's core mandate. All five of UNESCO's sectors can find their core work embedded, if not in a lead position of the SDGs. This is a challenge but also an opportunity that can build on some of UNESCO's strength while providing the impetus for change and innovation where needed. Many have called the post-2015 agenda a game changer and UNESCO will be well served to seize the opportunity.

85. The post-2015 era implies the primacy of nationally-owned and led development processes, with heightened levels of participation from numerous actors including civil society and the private sector. With the universal SDGs focusing on the national level, the UNDG and UNESCO will need to consider its positioning at the country level. In what configuration is UNESCO best suited to maximize its comparative advantage to convene and leverage partnerships between government, civil society and the private sector? Further, in what position is UNESCO in to ensure integrated and effective assistance alongside other UN entities, as well as other networks / bodies (e.g. RECs)? More consideration will also need to be given to sub-regional programmes as many challenges are similar and could be addressed more effectively on a sub-regional or regional basis. In this regard the role of regional partners (e.g. AU, ECA, the RECs) will increase. In its current configuration, UNESCO has a limited field presence and is lacking resources. Going forward, UNESCO must consider ways to maximize new forms of partnerships. Strategic reflections are needed to ask how UNESCO can best deliver work and under what conditions and with what necessary capacities.

86. With the SDGs serving as universal goals, strategic foresight is needed on how UNESCO will make itself relevant in multiple contexts (inclusive of HIC, MIC and LIC). Is UNESCO looking to serve only a specific type or condition of Member State (e.g. Crisis and Transition), or should it seek to map relationships with all types of Member States and work to partner and capitalize on varying potential relationships. With limited physical presence

and resources, UNESCO can work to cultivate and bolster the role of its already existing networks inclusive of National Commissions, Chairs and other networks – yet none of this should be done until focus and strategy are thoughtfully crafted. Defining key criteria as to where interventions should take place and in what format is crucial.

87. UNESCO needs to build on its comparative strengths and inherent value as a normative, universal and multilateral organization and deepen its current knowledge management products and knowledge sharing technologies within and across regions and at global level. The contributions of its Category 1 and 2 institutes as well as south-south networks are particularly important and could be further harvested and rolled out, in particular in the field.

88. UNESCO needs to ensure effective implementation of its universal mandate by using its field reforms to explore a wide array of new partner and funding options. This would entail, for instance, private capital and technologies for education and science and public private partnerships for cultural preservation and natural resource management. This may require the organization to move closer to the field, while at the same time requiring a different profile and deployment of capacity.

89. The SDGs will place a heightened focus upon Human Rights Based Approaches to programming and work. Going forward this will increase the complexity of how normative work should guide and govern operational practices. With its Global Priority Gender, UNESCO is well positioned to flagship this concept and support UN-wide mainstreaming of key HRBA and other approaches that work to alleviate inequity and inequality.

90. In conclusion, capitalizing on its huge networks and partners around the globe, UNESCO is well placed to respond to the related challenges of the post-2015 SDG agenda. Yet, as this review demonstrates, the necessary reform requires leadership, sustained commitment and investment. It may require the development of new ways of working as the emphasis will be on partnerships. It may require different skill sets at global and field levels, different profiles of staff, strengthening of certain skill sets in particular regarding knowledge management. Building on the lessons learned from this review, UNESCO should now seize the opportunity to further demonstrate its universal relevance and capacity to respond within post-2015 context.

ANNEX 1. SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATION OF PRIORITY AFRICA

In 1989, UNESCO established the "Priority Africa Programme" and thereby expressed its commitment to accompany Africa in its development, echoing the pledge of the wider international community. Since then, several policy and institutional frameworks have underpinned UNESCO's work in Africa resulting in "Priority Africa" being formalized as one of the two global priorities of the Organization in the 34 C/4 Medium-Term Strategy. The priority framework had so far not been the object of a formal evaluation. The evaluation of Priority Africa was requested by the Executive Board following the Independent External Evaluation.

The evaluation covers the progress achieved in the execution of UNESCO's programmes linked to Priority Africa, as well as the contribution of the different mechanisms dedicated to the coordination, implementation and monitoring of the Priority. It also aims to highlight lessons drawn from past achievements and challenges and to inform the future operational strategy supporting the implementation of Priority Africa.

OVERALL CONCLUSION

Despite many signs of positive economic development in Africa, the region still lags behind on the attainment of the EFA goals and the MDGs, justifying a continued prioritization of UNESCO's action, resources and capacities towards the region. The evaluation found that, during the twenty years of UNESCO's prioritization of Africa, the Organization has generated successful interventions in all sectors, and that the Africa Department has strengthened its role over time. In spite of these promising elements, a consistent finding has been the differing views on what Priority Africa exactly means and how it should be implemented. While the proportion of financial and human resources decentralized to Africa within the framework of the regular programme has increased and is now the highest among regions, the capacities decentralized to Africa need to be further strengthened to achieve a significant impact.

FINDINGS

Despite more than two decades of existence, there is a different understanding among key stakeholders of what exactly Priority Africa means and there is not a clear set of objectives or an operational plan for the achievements of results. In addition, the accountability for the delivery of results and the respective roles within the Organization of different entities (e.g., Sectors, Field Offices, Platforms, Africa Department) are not always clear and may overlap in some cases.

The resources decentralized to Africa have increased during the 34 C/4 period (between 2008 and 2012), and the region has benefited from the highest portion of decentralized human and financial resources as compared to other regions. Nevertheless, capacities in Africa still need to be strengthened to achieve significant impact. Despite a marked increase in staff budget in the approved 36 C/5 document, the actual number of posts that are Africa-based has not yet significantly increased. So far, much of the staff mobility observed has been taking place within the region rather than from Headquarters or from other regions to Africa.

Recent successful fundraising initiatives illustrate the potential for new extrabudgetary partnerships that UNESCO can foster "in the region, by the region, for the region". Despite these noticeable examples, the actual funds raised for the benefit of the region cannot be specifically attributed to a specific organizational set-up or mechanism.

Africa remains the region with a low implementation rate of extrabudgetary resources. Africa ranks second in the regions benefiting from extrabudgetary resources accounting for 14% of the total. Some of the systemic challenges that UNESCO faces in all regions are even more pressing in the African region (limited capacity of staff in the field and lack of qualified project management staff). In addition, while good practices recommend that programme management (from programme design to implementation and monitoring) take place at the local level, for many of UNESCO's programmes in Africa, decision-making and management authority often rest with Headquarters.

The added value of the institutional framework put in place to coordinate and drive Priority Africa, has been limited. The Africa Department has been strengthened and has been playing an important role especially to enhance UNESCO's strategic focus in the region by, for instance, reinforcing the cooperation between UNESCO, the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities. At the same time, the Department does not have the capacities to fulfil its envisaged programmatic functions. Furthermore, the tendency to locate some programmatic functions for Africa within the Africa Department may lead to inefficiencies or duplication and the roles and responsibilities need to be clarified. In addition, the Intersectoral Platform (IP) on Priority Africa, in existence since 2008, has not been very effective in the past in designing and managing intersectoral programmes for the benefit of the region. Some progress has been noted recently.

UNESCO's presence in Addis Ababa is essential to work closely with the African Union and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. However, due to currently insufficient staffing capacities, the Addis Ababa Office has not yet been able to fully assume its liaison function. In certain instances the Africa Department currently compensates for this.

RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of the evaluation's findings, and taking into account the current budgetary constraints and the upcoming field reform in Africa, the evaluation recommends action along the following main themes

- Strengthen capacities in the region;
- Clarify roles and responsibilities;
- Increase resources decentralized to the region;
- Enhance the strategic focus in the region;
- Improve the implementation rate of extrabudgetary projects; and
- Develop a vision and operational plan for the Africa region.

ANNEX 2. REGULAR PROGRAMME ESTABLISHED FIELD POSTS - CURRENT STATUS BASED ON THE 37C/5 EXPENDITURE PLAN

Office	Type	DIR/Head	Programme							Administration and general support	Sub-total	Total RP staff
			ED	SC	SHS	CLT	CI	AFR	Sub-total			
Abidjan	NO	P5	1 NOA			1 NOA	1 NOA		4	1 P1/P2, 1 L2, 3 L4, 1 L5	6	10
Abuja	MRO	D1	1 P5, 1 P3	1 P4, 1 NOB	.5 P3	1 P4, 1P3	.5 P3		8	1 P3, 1 L3, 2 L4, 2 L5, 2 L6	8	16
Accra	NO	P5	1 NOC			1 NOB	1 NOA		4	1 P1/P2, 1 L2, 3 L4, 1 L5	6	10
Antananarivo	Antenna								0	1 NOB	1	1
Addis Ababa	LO	D1	1 P4	1 P4, 1P3	.5 P3	1 NOC	.5 P3	1 P3	7	1 P3, 1 L3, 2 L4, 2 L5	6	13
Bamako	NO	P5	1 NOA	1 NOA		1 NOB			4	1 P1/P2, 1 L2, 3 L4, 1 L5	6	10
Brazzaville	NO	P5	1 NOC	1 NOC			1 NOA		4	1 L2, 2 L4, 1 L5, 1 L7	5	9
Bujumbura	*				1 NOB	1 NOA			2	1 L5, 1 L7	2	4
Dakar	MRO	D2	5 P4, 1 P3, 1 L6, 2 NOC	1 P3	1 P4	1 P4, 1P3	1 P4		15	1 P3, 3.5 L2, 1 L3, 2 L4, 2 L5, 3 L6	12,5	27,5
Dar-es-Salaam	NO	P5	1 P4, 1 NOC	.5 NOB		0.5 NOB	1 NOB		5	1 P1/P2, 1 L2, 2 L4, 1 L5, 1 L6	6	11
Djibouti	Antenna								0	1 NOC	1	1
Harare	MRO	D1	1 P4, 1P3, 1 NOA	1 P5, 1 P3	.5 P4	1 P4, 1P3	.5 P4		9	1 P3, 1 L3, 5 L5, 1 L6	8	17
Juba	NO	P5	1 P3, 1NOC			1 NOA			4	1 P1/P2, 1 L2, 2 L4, 2 L5	6	10
Kigali	Antenna		1NOB						1		0	1
Kinshasa	NO	P5	1 P4			1 NOB	1 NOC		4	1 P1/P2, 1 L2, 2 L4, 1 L5, 1 L7	6	10
Libreville	NO	D1	1 NOC			1 NOB	1 NOB		4	1 L2, 1 L4, 2 L5, 1 L7	5	9
Luanda	Antenna		1NOA						1		0	1
Maputo	NO	P5	1 NOC			1 NOB			3	1 P1/P2, 1 L2, 1 L4, 2 L5	5	8
Nairobi	MRO	D1	2 P4,1 P3,1 L4, 1 NOA	1 P5, 2 P4, 1 NOC	1 P4	1 P4, 1P3	1 P4		14	1 P3, 1 L1, 1 L2, 1 L3, 2 L4, 1 L5, 1 L6, 1 L7	9	23
Ndjamena	Antenna		1P4						1	1 NOB	1	2
Windhoek	NO	P5	1P4, 1 NOC	1P3		1 NOB			5	1 P1/P2, 1 L2, 2 L4, 1 L5, 1 L6	6	11
Yaounde	MRO	D1	1P5, 1P3, 1NOA	1P3	.5 P3	2 P3	.5 P3		8	1 P3, 1 L3, 2 L4, 2 L5, 2 L6	8	16
Total		*16*	*39*	*15,5*	*5*	*21,5*	*9*	*1*	*107*		*113,5*	*220,5*

Source: HRM

Note: Figures represent situation after the restructuration of June 2014.

ANNEX 3. INTERVENTION LOGIC

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Implementation        Short-term effects      Medium-term         Long-term effects
Measures                                         effects
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I – Establish new field network (multisectoral regional, national & desks)

II – Deploy human resources, including development of guidelines and policies to support

III – Allocate financial resources

IV – Develop accountability framework

Field network more capable of providing Member States with necessary technical expertise

Multisectoral regional offices more capable of supporting and backstopping other Field Offices

Field offices forge stronger partnerships with Regional Economic Commissions

Field network increasingly participating in UN regional & national processes

Field Office programmes are more adequately funded

Field network better able to allocate resources & take decisions

Field network has lower operating costs

More simplified and rational management structures are in place

Field network more capable to administer, monitor and oversee programmes

Field network programmes are more intersectoral and multidisciplinary

Enhanced quality and efficiency of service delivery to Member States

Field Network programmes are better designed & more strategically focused

More flexible and visible presence at regional & country levels

UNESCO is more relevant and achieves greater impact in the field

Field network is more sustainable

Increased coherence within the UN system

ANNEX 4. FRAMEWORK OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNESCO'S FIELD NETWORK REFORM IN AFRICA

Actor	Responsibility
Multisectoral Regional Offices (MROs)	• have full authority in their respective regions with regard to the coordination of programme design, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and reporting • provide, with regard to subsidiary country-level structures, enhanced regional coordination, support and technical oversight • facilitate UNESCO's technical contribution to regional and sub-regional organizations/institutions through high-level participation and strategic policy formulation • ensure coherence between UNESCO programme inputs and those of other partners and forging and developing partnerships to further UNESCO's objectives and mobilize additional resources for their attainment are also key responsibilities • assume an expanded role in strategic analysis and policy development that will enhance UNESCO's role in policy dialogue with national authorities and the donor community at the country and regional levels, and underpin programme design and implementation • monitor regional perspectives and needs and ensure that these serve as input for normative work conducted from Headquarters • guide the prioritization, formulation, selection and implementation of all UNESCO's interventions in their regions, in line with the Organization's strategic orientations and approved programmes and work plans • are fully responsible and accountable for the delivery of UNESCO country and regional programmes in all countries under their coverage, except where national offices are established • exercise technical oversight over national offices and project antennas with regard to programme design, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and reporting • are responsible for providing policy guidance, substantive support, technical back-stopping and knowledge management services to both national offices and UNESCO desks in all UNESCO priority areas and "cross-cutting" themes, working as appropriate with other multisectoral regional offices as well as with UNESCO institutes and centres tasked with providing specialized support in their fields of competence • manage regional projects that provide support to regional institutions and individual countries in their regions, and maintain close cooperation with the relevant offices of other United Nations organizations • regularly inform Headquarters about key achievements, main challenges and lessons learned, including through periodic reports that will also provide a strategic assessment of regional and sectoral trends
National Offices	• enhance UNESCO's support to national development priorities and will operate under the technical oversight of the multisectoral regional offices • are fully responsible and accountable for the development and delivery of UNESCO programmes in the country of their respective location, including the preparation of UCPDs (if applicable) and the mobilization of extrabudgetary resources at the national level, in close consultation with their parent multisectoral regional office. • are in charge of all aspects of the financial and general administration of their office, including human resources management. • have formal responsibility for representing UNESCO and act as senior advisers to Governments on matters pertaining to UNESCO mandate.
Desks	• the core functions are: (i) to contribute to programme design, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and reporting; (ii) to facilitate government, United Nations partners and other stakeholders access to UNESCO expertise towards the development of new UNESCO projects and programmes; (iii) to promote the inclusion of UNESCO domains into the work of the UNCT; (iv) to assess demand for concrete interventions in UNESCO's focus areas; and v) to contribute to the implementation of UNESCO activities in the host country.
Africa Department	• institutional and intersectoral coordination of Global Priority Africa and of related reports and major initiatives, in close cooperation with all

	Secretariat entities in charge of designing, implementing and monitoring Priority Africa • focal point for UNESCO's relations with the African Member States, the African Union and Africa's Regional Economic Communities, in close consultation with programme sectors, the UNESCO Liaison Office in Addis Ababa and the field offices concerned • in the context of the reform of the UNESCO Field Network in Africa, support for the five multisectoral regional offices and the category 1 institutes active in the region, bolstered by a mechanism for regular consultation between field offices and Headquarters; • coordination of future-oriented thinking on Africa, in particular by organizing forward-looking meetings at the end of each biennium to set/confirm priorities, with the participation also of representatives and experts from other regions • better integration of UNESCO into regional United Nations mechanisms in Africa, ensuring, in particular, that the multisectoral regional offices cooperate technically and financially in existing mechanisms • support to the Directors and Heads of field offices in Africa in their functions as Representative to Member State(s), providing advice and guidance as necessary.
Programme ADGs	• global programme coherence; C/5 results attainment • oversight of all decentralized programmes • provide guidance and programmatic support to field units including all aspects of programme design, delivery and resources
BSP	• ensures the performance assessment for Directors/Heads of field offices, in consultation with Programme ADGs, except for Heads of national offices in Africa whose performance assessment is ensured by the Director of the parent multisectoral regional office, and Liaison Offices whose performance assessments of Directors and Heads are ensured by ODG • as overall coordinator of the work planning process, BSP ensures proper consultation at all levels during that process, especially between the field and headquarters • coordinate, receive and review periodic reports on programme execution • coordinate the assessment of the performance of Directors/Heads of field offices, based on programme delivery performance • backstop field offices in their involvement in UNDAFs and other joint programming exercises at the national level • coordinate overall resource mobilization efforts, ensuring due diligence of potential private sector partners and clearance of funding agreements
HRM	• managing the performance appraisal system for field office Directors, in close consultation with all relevant sectors/bureaux/offices at Headquarters and in the field. • advice and guidance on all aspects of human resources management.
BFM	• provides financial management support, oversight of Administrative Officers, technical backstopping for financial and administrative matters and handles field offices running costs, budgets and administrative procedures.
MSS	• central coordinating and strategic entity for the safety and security of personnel and premises in the field and is responsible for the overall compliance with established security policies and strategies; provides advice and support on all issues concerning the safety and security of personnel and premises in the field.

Source: Ivory Notes: DG/Note/14/2 and DG/Note/14/3 of 3 January 2014.