



Published in the series:  
*New trends in technical and vocational education*

# Private technical and vocational education in sub-Saharan Africa: Provision patterns and policy issues

David Atchoarena and Paul Esquieu

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Published by:

International Institute for Educational Planning/UNESCO

7 - 9 rue Eugène-Delacroix, 75116 Paris

ISBN: 92-803-1217-0

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by

David Atchoarena  
and Paul Esquieu

November 2002

UNESCO: International Institute for Educational Planning

International Institute for Educational Planning [www.unesco.org/iiep](http://www.unesco.org/iiep)

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The publication costs of this study have been covered through a grant-in-aid offered by UNESCO and by voluntary contributions made by several Member States of UNESCO, the list of which will be found at the end of the volume.

Composition and printing: IIEP Publications  
Cover design: Nathalie Pruneau

International Institute for Educational Planning  
7-9 rue Eugène-Delacroix, 75116 Paris

ISBN: 92-803-1217-0  
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## Foreword

In sub-Saharan Africa, as in other parts of the world, technical and vocational education and training has been, and still is, subject to organizational restructuring, the introduction of market principles and even privatization. The rise of private sector provision can therefore be seen in a wider perspective of public sector transformation which affects the overall education sector.

One consequence of this transformation has been the increasing number of private providers. Thus, in many sub-Saharan countries today, most skills are acquired outside public institutions. This reality has far-reaching implications for public provision and, beyond, for the role of the State.

This publication attempts to map out the dynamics of private training provision in sub-Saharan Africa and to discuss the policy implications for governments. It does not provide final conclusions, since this is an area which still deserves further investigation and empirical evidence. However, it offers a unique vision of private provision in the region, particularly in Mali and Senegal, and suggests ways to improve regulation and consistency between public and private delivery. As such, it contributes usefully to a complex and vibrant debate on future strategies for skills formation.

This work was conducted as part of a broader review initiated and funded by the World Bank on vocational skills development in sub-Saharan Africa.

Gudmund Hernes  
Director, IIEP



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## List of abbreviations

AAC	Accreditation Advisory Committee (Lesotho)
ADEA	Association for the Development of Education in Africa
ADEC	Association of Distance Education Colleges (South Africa)
AFCSA	Association of Private Colleges of South Africa
APPVTI	(Association of Proprietors of Private Vocational Training Institutes (Ghana)
BE	Basic Education
BEP	<i>Brevet d'études professionnelles</i> [Vocational School Certificate]
BP	<i>Brevet professionnel</i> [Professional Certificate]
BTS	<i>Brevet de technicien supérieur</i> [Higher Technician's Certificate]
CAP	<i>Certificat d'aptitude professionnelle</i> [Industrial Vocational Training Certificate]
CCCO	<i>Codes des obligations civiles et commerciales</i> [Code of Civil and Commercial Obligations]
CEP	<i>Certificat d'études primaires</i> [Primary School Certificate]
CFCE	<i>Contribution forfaitaire à la charge de l'employeur</i> [Employers' Fixed Contribution tax] (Senegal)
CFMT	<i>Centre de formation aux métiers du tabac</i> [Tobacco Industry Training Centre] (Côte d'Ivoire)
CFPT/SJ	<i>Centre de formation professionnelle et technique Sénégal/Japon</i> [Vocational and Technical Centre of Senegal/Japan] (Senegal)

*List of abbreviations*

CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIDE	International Consortium for Educational Development
CNFTP	National Centre for Technical and Vocational Training
CNQP	<i>Centre national de qualification professionnelle</i> [National Centre for Professional Qualifications] (Senegal)
COP	<i>Centres d'orientation pratique</i> [Centres for Practical Guidance]
CRFP	<i>Centre régional de formation professionnelle</i> [Regional Centre for Vocational Training (Senegal)]
CTM	<i>Collèges techniques modernes</i> [Colleges of Modern Technology]
DEF	<i>Diplôme d'études fondamentales</i> [Basic Studies Diploma] (Mali)
DESS	<i>Diplôme d'études supérieures spécialisées</i>
DETP	<i>Direction de l'Enseignement technique et professionnel</i> [Department of Technical and Vocational Education]
DFID	Department for International Development
DOL	Department of Labour
DPRE	<i>Direction de la planification et de la réforme de l'État</i> [Department for State Planning and Reform]
DTAE	Department of Technical and Adult Education (Eritrea)
DUTS	Diplômes universitaire de technicien supérieur
ECICA	<i>École centrale pour l'industrie, le commerce et l'administration</i> [Central School for Industry, Commerce and Administration]
EIG	Economic Interest Grouping
ENI	<i>École nationale des ingénieurs</i> [National Engineering School]

*List of abbreviations*

ETQA	Education and Training Quality Assurance (South Africa)
FAFPA	<i>Fonds d'appui à la formation professionnelle et à l'apprentissage</i> [Fund for Supporting Vocational Training and Apprenticeship] (Mali)
FDFP	<i>Fonds de développement de la formation professionnelle</i> [Vocational Training Development Fund] (Côte d'Ivoire)
FET	Further Education and Training (South Africa)
GES	Ghana Education Service (Ghana)
GNP	Gross National Product
HEQC	Higher Education Quality Council (South Africa)
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IIEP	International Institute for Educational Planning
ISO	International Standards Organization
IUG	<i>Institut universitaire de gestion</i> [University Institute of Management]
IVTB	Industrial and Vocational Training Board
JSS	Junior Secondary School
MENJS	<i>Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de la Jeunesse et des Sports</i> [Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports] (Mali)
MESSRS	<i>Ministère des Enseignements secondaire, supérieure, et de la Recherche scientifique</i> [Ministry for Secondary Schools, Higher Education and Scientific Research]
MESW	Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare
METFP	Ministry of Technical and Vocational Training
METPS	<i>Ministère de l'Emploi, du Travail et de la Prévoyance sociale</i> [Ministry for Employment, Labour and Social Protection] (Cameroon)

*List of abbreviations*

MINESEB	Ministry of Secondary Education and Basic Education (Madagascar)
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOHE	Ministry of Higher Education
NACVET	National Council for Technical and Vocational Education and Training (Ghana)
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NVQF	National Vocational Qualifications Framework
NVTI	National Vocational Training Institute (Ghana)
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OEF	<i>Observatoire de l'emploi et de la formation</i> [Employment and Training Observatory]
OHADA	<i>Organisation pour l'harmonisation du droit des affaires en Afrique</i> [Organization for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa]
OIC	Opportunities Industrialization Centre (Ghana)
ONEP	National Bureau for Private Education (Madagascar)
ONETFOPP	<i>Office national de l'enseignement technique et de la formation professionnelle privé</i>
ONFP	<i>Office national de la formation professionnelle</i> [National Office for Vocational Training] (Senegal)
PAFPE	Support Project for Vocational and Job Training (Mali)
PCFP	<i>Projet de consolidation de la formation professionnelle</i> [Project for Consolidation of Vocational Training]
PDEF	Ten-Year Plan for Education and Training
PRODEC	Ten-Year Programme on Education
SA	<i>Société anonyme</i> (Public Limited Company)
SARL	<i>Société à responsabilité limitée</i> [Private Limited company]

*List of abbreviations*

SETAs	Sector Education and Training Authorities (South Africa)
SITAB	<i>Société ivoirienne de tabac</i> [Côte d’Ivoire Tobacco Company]
SME	Small- and Medium-sized Enterprise
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSS	Senior Secondary School
TS	Tax on Services
TVE	Technical and Vocational Education
TVEI	Technical and Vocational Education Institutions
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
TVT	Technical and Vocational Training
UFAE/GCMI	<i>Unités de formation et d’appui aux entreprises/génie civil, mines, industries</i> [Business Training and Support Units]/[Civil engineering, Mines and Industries]
UK	United Kingdom
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNEVOC	International Project on Technical and Vocational Education, UNESCO
VAT	Value Added Tax
VETA	Vocational Education and Training Authority (Tanzania)



### **The study team**

- David Atchoarena, Programme Specialist at the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP/UNESCO) was the overall co-ordinator of this project.
- The design of the case study surveys and the supervision and analysis of the results were led by Paul Esquieu, Chargé de mission, Department for Programming and Development, French Ministry of Education, and IIEP Consultant.
- Charlotte Sedel, IIEP Consultant, contributed to the literature review.

In each country, a national team conducted the survey and prepared specific reports.

#### *Mali team:*

- Ibrahima Aboubou, Consultant in educational engineering and software engineering;
- Bakary Coulibaly, Data collector;
- Lamissa Diabate, Consultant in educational engineering;
- Moriba Sahaba Fofana, Data collector;
- Louis Yafohon Konde, Consultant in educational sciences.

#### *Senegal team:*

- Macaty Fall, Team Leader, Technical advisor, 'Ministère de l'Enseignement technique, de la Formation professionnelle, de l'Alphabétisation et des Langues nationales' (Ministry for technical education, vocational training, literacy and national languages);
- Daouda Diarra, Consultant, Statistician;
- Abdou Sambe, Chairman, 'Collectif des établissements de formation préparant aux BTS' (Association of training institutions preparing for the BTS advanced vocational diploma).





## Acknowledgements

This book benefited from co-operation and financial support from the World Bank, as well as from the Norwegian Education Trust Funds.

The research could not have been realized without the assistance of many collaborators, in Bamako, Dakar and Paris, who contributed to compiling the information and drafting the text.

Conducting the surveys would not have been possible in Mali without the collaboration of the Ministry of Education and the 'Unité de formation et d'appui aux entreprises' (Unit for training and support to enterprises); or indeed in Senegal without the assistance of the 'ministère de l'Enseignement technique, de la Formation professionnelle, de l'Alphabétisation et des Langues nationales' (Ministry for technical education, vocational training, literacy and national languages).

The IIEP is also grateful to the private providers who in both countries were very co-operative.

Thanks are also due to Richard Johanson, World Bank consultant, whose comments contributed to the improvement of the book.



## Executive summary

### *Aim of the study*

Technical and Vocational Education (TVE) in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is undergoing deep restructuring. One significant dimension of this process of change concerns the role of private provision in improving and expanding the overall quantum of vocational training in the economy. Such a conceptual shift is very much supported by advocates of a deregulated system, for whom the adoption of market principles in the area of TVE will lead to greater efficiency and effectiveness.

While this debate was taking place, the deterioration of state-run TVE systems in a large number of countries of the region has de facto, created a market niche for private providers. Gradually, private providers have emerged in an uncoordinated and unmonitored fashion. In most countries, very little is known about the nature and operation of these entities.

Yet, it is assumed that, in many SSA countries, the private providers already make a significant contribution to training provision. It is also hoped that, in addition to relieving public finances, private-sector growth can promote useful competition within the private sector but also with public institutions, eventually leading to cost reduction and better quality and labour market responsiveness.

This study is meant to document the private provision trend in SSA and discuss policy implications. It reviews available information on the features of private TVE institutions, on their activity and cost-effectiveness. In addition, the study provides an in-depth analysis of the private Technical and Vocational

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Education and Training (TVET) sector in two selected sub-Saharan countries, namely Mali and Senegal, and draws preliminary lessons on the best approaches towards private provision in low development contexts.

### ***Structure of the book***

The book is made up of two parts. Part I is a review of the available literature to date on private Technical and Vocational Education (TVE) in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It provides a general overview of the sector and illustrates modes of state regulation currently being implemented in selected countries.

Part II analyzes the two case studies of *Senegal* and *Mali* concerning the emergence of private Technical and Vocational Education (TVE) institutions; and discusses forms of state intervention. This part attempts to formulate policy guidelines to improve the functioning of private TVE in both countries and to propose more general directions on regulation.

### ***Methodology***

The literature review was a desk-based exercise using a combination of materials including:

- (a) sources available at the IIEP documentation centre;
- (b) results of recent research by IIEP on private education and educational expenditures in SSA;
- (c) documents forwarded by the World Bank on recent case studies jointly undertaken by the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), published by EdInvest, on private education in selected SSA countries;
- (d) Contributions from the eight case studies on TVET produced as part as a combined study on public provision, also undertaken by IIEP on behalf of the World Bank.

This desk-based approach was followed by a more empirical exercise. Complementing the literature review on private TVE provision in SSA at large, field investigations focused on the emergence of private TVE institutions in two countries: one in which government regulation is very limited and the other experiencing significant state intervention — Senegal and Mali respectively. This selection was made because both countries experienced a rapid growth of private provision and also because of the interest expressed by ministries of education to collaborate in this exercise.

The field research involved a survey in each country on a sample of private providers. It also included broader country-specific data collection as well as a number of meetings and interviews with key stakeholders.

### ***Key findings***

#### *Features of private provision*

- (i) Private-sector provision of TVE represents a growing component of the overall training system in most of the countries for which information was collected. In some of the countries, the majority of the TVE students are already enrolled in private institutions (e.g. Mali).
- (ii) Private TVE institutions represent a very heterogeneous sector, difficult to identify with precision. Key elements to differentiate private providers include legal status, ownership, objectives and financing.
- (iii) Besides profit institutions targeting high-income groups, a large number of private institutions enrol low-income students, hence ensuring a social role (e.g. Mali, Senegal).
- (iv) A large number of private TVE institutions operate illegally. There are indications that in some countries most of them are not registered.
- (v) Although it is true to say that private provision concentrates on the service and commercial trades, there is often a significant number of private institutions' students enrolled in technical areas, mainly light industrial skills (21 per cent in Mali, in 2000).

- (vi) Not surprisingly, tuition fees usually represent a major source of income for private institutions. However, in some countries (e.g. Côte d'Ivoire, Mali), private institutions benefit from government subsidies and tax incentives. Church-related providers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) sometimes receive substantial donations, including from abroad.
- (vii) Findings from Mali and Senegal suggest that the private sector operates with lower costs and is more responsive to labour market demand, but this needs to be further investigated in other countries.  
The study also indicates that, to a large extent, private providers benefit from the investment and experience accumulated by the public sector through the use of curricula, training materials and, not least, instructors from the public sector.
- (ix) Findings from Mali and Senegal do not suggest that private institutions enjoy privileged links with enterprises. They do not provide much job-related training and do not include work-experience programmes for their students.
- (x) There is no evidence that the performance of private providers is on average better than that of public institutions. Quality varies greatly from one institution to another and it is likely that variations in standards are much wider within the private sector than for public institutions which are all subject to the same rules.

#### *Policy issues*

- (xi) The experience of Senegal illustrates that simplifying the procedures for establishing a private institution facilitates the growth of the private sector. However, it also shows that this measure is not sufficient to prevent the growth of an illegal sector.
- (xii) The presence of a large number of non-registered institutions raises complex issues regarding the mechanisms required to ensure quality and protect consumers against abuses. Increasing the control of private providers appears problematic, both because it may hamper private

initiative and due to the weak implementing capacity of the public sector in poor countries.

- (xiii) Registration and accreditation are essential functions. At present, in most SSA countries, there is no real capacity to perform these tasks; thus establishing this capacity is critical for a genuine expansion of the private sector.
- (xiv) In SSA, where poverty remains a major reality in most countries, supporting private provision requires that the financing issue be addressed. This is particularly the case to ensure the viability of non-profit oriented private providers catering for low-income students. Efforts are required to define criteria to allocate subsidies to private training on the grounds of equity and performance.
- (xv) In countries where the training levy is becoming a strategic source of job-related training, efforts are required to ensure that such financing can also benefit institutions providing pre-employment TVE. Establishing mechanisms for private TVE institutions to compete for public funding would both support their operations and bring them in contact with industry.
- (xvi) Within the framework of decentralization policies, local governments should be given more responsibilities in supporting private training provision. In particular they could play a key role in granting financial support to low-income students through bursaries and in facilitating the access to land for promoters wishing to establish a new centre or to expand an existing facility.
- (xvii) In a context where public funding for TVE is rare, financial assistance cannot and should not be the only form of state support to private providers. Providing tax incentives, disseminating information to the public about training programmes, tuition fees and results, and providing staff development programmes for both instructors and managers are among the measures that governments could implement to encourage private initiative, inform family choices, and consolidate private-sector capacities.

- (xviii) Furthermore, strong state funding weakens the health of the private sector and can affect its capacity to make innovations.
- (xix) In view of facilitating partnership with the private sector, governments could support the organization of the sector and the ongoing emergence of representatives able to engage in a policy dialogue and to take part in regulation.
- (xx) Finally, it is important to recall that government policy vis-à-vis private provision needs to be located within the broader context of TVE reform. Unless close attention is paid to the business and labour market realities of SSA, it is likely that the ongoing reform movement will not succeed in helping the SSA countries to meet the complex challenges of globalization and poverty reduction.

### **Rationale for TVE private provision: evidence from Mali and Senegal**

Expectations	Findings
<i>Arguments for private provision</i>	
Lower cost	In both countries unit cost is significantly lower in private institutions.
Greater responsiveness and innovation	In both countries private providers are present in new fields of training ignored by public institutions (e.g. computer science, tourism).
Increased diversity	In a context of limited public delivery, the push for finding a profitable market niche has led private promoters to diversify offers and enlarge choice for consumers. The introduction of some competition has contributed to inject elements of change in public institutions regarding not only training but also curricula and pedagogy.



Increased quality	In the absence of reliable indicators to assess and compare quality, this dimension could not be documented. However, there are always institutions of high quality within the private sector.
Better linkages with employers	There is no difference between public and private providers in this respect. In both sectors linkages with enterprises are weak (little or no forms of dual training, little or no involvement in the provision of training or other services to businesses).
Increased effectiveness and relevance	In the absence of labour market data on the employment and income situation of graduates (from both public and private institution), effectiveness cannot be measured and compared.
<i>Arguments against private provision</i>	
Concentration on commercial subjects and simple trades	While the more expensive programmes (BTS industrial) tend to remain mainly in the hands of public institutions, in both countries private providers are present in a wide variety of trades, including industrial ones.
Selectivity of training providers	Although private providers must earn their income they are not limited to the most profitable segments of the market.
Inequity	In Senegal, where private institutions receive very little or no public subsidy, many private institutions enrol students from low-income

families. There is no evidence that the parental income level of students is higher than in public institutions. However, there is clearly a segment of the private sector targeting mainly high-income groups, particularly at the post-secondary level.

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Variations in quality and effectiveness	Visits of institutions and interviews conducted in both countries indicated wide variations, probably wider than among public institutions.
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### **Private TVE in Mali: main findings**

The Malian private TVE sector has shown strong growth in the 1990s. The number of schools has risen from 11 in 1993 to 71 in 2000. The private sector today handles two-thirds of TVE enrolments, representing a total of 22,739 students for the 1999-2000 academic year. Between 1997-1998 and 1999-2000, private school enrolments saw a rapid rise, namely 86 per cent in two years.

In Mali, state financial support to the private sector is significant and increasing. The growing number of students enrolled by the Ministry in private TVE schools has meant a striking increase in state aid, which was in excess of 1 billion CFA francs in 2000. This amount represents more than a third of schools' overall revenue. However, this aid varies considerably from school to school: while some institutions do not receive any public money others rely entirely on government subsidies.

The school fees set by private schools are often equivalent or higher than what the state pays. Monthly payments vary, on average, between 8,000 CFA francs and 10,000 CFA francs. To this is sometimes added an enrolment fee which is quite low, around 5,000 CFA francs.

Based on the survey results, the average cost of a private TVE student can be estimated at about 150,000 CFA francs. This amount appears to be very close to the unit cost of 157,000 CFA francs calculated in the Review of Public Expenditure for the TVE sector as a whole. In reality, the cost per student is probably much higher in the public sector alone.

The available data on examination success in the private sector show a quite prominent fall-off in results during recent years, probably linked to the growing number of student strikes which have also affected private schools. The success of private school candidates seems however to continue to surpass national examination results, which only ranged from 38 per cent to 50 per cent in 2000, according to training fields.

A comparison between public-private tends to reinforce the idea of comparative advantages: the public seeming to perform better in the industrial field, the private doing better in services.

The state-led nature of private-sector growth in Mali makes it very vulnerable and raises concerns for a new form of regulation. In the present system, private providers' investment relies on expected fees paid by the state. Such dependence on state intervention, while assuring them of a guaranteed income, inhibits their ability to adapt the training 'supply' to labour market needs. Focusing state assistance towards schools which are performing well and to disadvantaged students is probably part of the answer.

### **Private TVE in Senegal: main findings**

It is difficult to appreciate the precise size of the TVE private sector in Senegal. According to official statistics, the private sector today enrolls almost one half of vocational training students. Although underestimated, this share largely exceeds the average importance of private schools in the overall education system.

The results of the survey show that the private sector of TVE is expanding. The schools surveyed are receiving a growing number of students: between 1995 and 2000, the increase in the number of enrolments for vocational education reached 84 per cent.

In Senegal, private schools operate essentially using their own financial means. It appears that nearly 90 per cent of their revenue comes from fees. Registration fees for day courses vary from an average of 13,000 CFA francs to 22,500 CFA francs. In addition, monthly payments range from 7,000 CFA francs to 30,000 CFA francs.

The results of the survey confirm the extreme diversity of private schools, where private entrepreneurs cohabit with private denominational and associative organizations to fulfil a public-service mission. This diversity of status and vocation is also reflected in the financial position of many schools. This varies greatly according to circumstances. Overall, according to the results of the survey, the sector is able to balance its accounts, but does not generate a sufficient profit margin to assure survival or expansion in proper conditions.

Based on all of the schools surveyed, the estimated average cost per student is close to 250,000 CFA francs (1.5 billions of CFA francs for a little more than 6,000 students). This amount is fairly modest compared to that for general secondary education (ranging from 196,000 CFA francs to 265,000 CFA francs, including external aid). This unit cost figure is much lower than the official cost figures for the public sector: 362,000 CFA francs for technical secondary education and 370,000 CFA francs for vocational secondary education.

On the basis of the sample taken, the results of the state examinations for students in the private sector do not appear particularly good (a success rate of under 50 per cent for most areas). However, it should be noted that in most cases available data suggest that these results are better than those reported for public schools, the aggregated national performance being very low.

In this context the improvement of the TVE sector, including private provision, requires a revision of the state's role, and in particular the further development of its regulatory function, which could take three complementary paths:

- the introduction of new methods of private-sector financing, providing access both to existing payroll tax-related resources and scholarships to disadvantaged students;
- the setting up of a partnership system, involving private-sector representatives, for the definition, recognition and upgrading of diplomas;
- the review, in consultation with private-sector representatives, of the legal and administrative framework which supervises the operations of private organizations and the strengthening of the Ministry institutional capacity to implement rules and regulations.



## General introduction

In most countries, the private sector is playing an increasing role in education. In recent years, the policy agenda has shifted from *inputs* towards *output* consideration. Hence, the state is becoming less concerned with who is delivering services while paying more attention to *quality, relevance* and *price*. This general trend goes beyond education and involves several other public domains such as health. In this context, although public services may still be, at least partly, publicly funded, private providers are becoming increasingly involved in the delivery and management of the concerned services. Current transformation of Technical and Vocational Education<sup>1</sup> (TVE) must therefore be seen as part of a wider movement of public-sector restructuring.

This policy shift has been influenced by the public-choice theory which argues that public decision-making should be governed by private-sector rationale, where individuals and groups seek to minimize their costs while maximizing their benefits. Besides this argument, advocates of a market for training suggest that private provision complements public-sector offerings and is more likely to promote a demand-driven system. In TVE, like in other sectors, adopting market principles is therefore expected to lead to greater diversity, efficiency and client choice.

Critics of the market rationale insist that cost reduction and profit-oriented management principles may not necessarily result in better quality and greater responsiveness. Increasing selectivity of training providers ('creaming off')

1. The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED, 1998) defines vocational and technical education as follows: Education which is mainly designed to lead participants to acquire the practical skills, know-how and understanding necessary for employment in particular occupation, trade or groups of occupations or trades.

the most profitable training areas), wide variations in quality and effectiveness are also among the reasons often cited to avoid excessive reliance on market principles. Furthermore, it is feared that private provision will not form the ground for an equitable and socially responsible system.

In the 1990s, TVE in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) encountered a number of structural and policy changes. The development of private providers and the emergence of competition between private and public institutions are probably among the most significant signs of transformation of contemporary TVE systems in the sub-region.

In SSA, origins of the training market can first be found in the crisis of public education systems. To some extent, it reflected a reactive attitude of families and students faced with the failure of public schools, in a context of labour market contraction. As a result, TVE private providers progressively mushroomed in an unco-ordinated and unmonitored fashion. More recently, initiatives to deregulate the provision of education, including TVE, reflect an effort to achieve a more flexible and responsive education and training system. Many SSA countries are moving away from a system dominated by public-sector delivery, towards a mixed structure of provision, combining public and private institutions. In some countries, the establishment of payroll taxes, earmarked for training, and the setting up of training Funds, tend to create competitive markets where resources are allocated to training providers after a tendering process.

Given the relatively recent transformation of training structures in SSA, not much is known about the TVE private providers in the sub-region. Much of the literature available on private education and training in SSA focuses on general education, mainly at the primary level. Furthermore, while there has been extensive policy debate on government policy, there is little research looking at the nature and operation of private TVE institutions in SSA.

There is therefore clearly a need to provide a comprehensive picture of private training institutions in SSA. Investigating their precise nature, their



needs, what programmes they offer, which teachers/trainers they employ, how they are funded, what relations they maintain with the state, is essential if governments are to develop policies to support the most effective operation of private providers, for the benefit of users and the economy. This report constitutes a step in that direction.

The book comprises two parts. The first reviews the literature available to date on private TVE in SSA. It represents an attempt to throw some light on the nature, size and operation of private TVE institutions in SSA. The review also includes an examination of the relationship between the state and private providers through the regulation issue.

The second part of the book is dedicated to the analysis of two case studies, namely on *Senegal* and *Mali*, illustrating contrasted policy contexts as far as the role of the state is concerned. Each case forms a specific chapter where the key findings of a survey conducted by the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP), early in 2001, on private providers are presented and discussed.

The book ends with a conclusion, which tries to derive from the case studies country-specific policy guidelines as well as more general considerations on the possible ways to address some of the most common weaknesses of private TVE in sub-Saharan Africa.



**PART I**  
Literature review



## Introduction

This review of the literature on the private Technical and Vocational Education (TVE) sector in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) comprises two parts. *Chapter I* provides an overview of the penetration of private providers in TVE in the sub-region. It starts with an analysis of the general process of privatization in education and a presentation of the main limitations of public TVE systems in SSA. This overall framework being defined, the following section offers a picture of private provision in 12 countries, including five French-speaking (Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger) and seven English- or Portuguese-speaking (Botswana, Eritrea, Ghana, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe). *Senegal* and *Mali*, which are the subjects of the second part of the report, are not discussed at this preliminary stage. Based on available information, this picture is necessarily partial and unbalanced. The following sections examine costs and effectiveness, which represent key issues in the policy debate on private provision.

*Chapter II* of the review analyzes the implications of this process of private-sector growth on the role of the state. In countries where the major part of the population is classified as being poor, the operation of a market for training first raises the issue of financing. It is doubtful that, in most countries of the region, a robust and performing private sector can flourish only on tuition fees. This assumption leads to the discussion of government support through subsidies. Finally, the complexity of the regulation issue is illustrated through a presentation of the ongoing experience of Lesotho and South Africa in establishing a mechanism to register private providers and an accreditation system to set and monitor standards.

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The review does not include a conclusion but rather *concluding remarks*, since this first analysis is completed by the results of the surveys conducted in Senegal and Mali, and which form the basis of the final part of the report. This first part must therefore be seen as providing background information and preliminary analysis on current trends in the private provision of Technical and Vocational Education (TVE) in the sub-region.

## *Chapter I*

### The development of private technical and vocational education in sub-Saharan Africa: an overview

#### 1. Private versus public provision in education

Governments finance education systems for several types of reason: education raises labour productivity, engenders more efficient resource utilization by households, reduces infant mortality, helps improve the health of individuals and is often associated with lower fertility rates. In sum, education contributes both to the welfare of individuals and to the economic and social growth of countries.

In the 1960s, the governments of newly independent African countries emphasized education for all, in order to promote the social and economic development of their countries. In pursuit of this objective, which was affirmed by the 1961 Addis Ababa conference, great efforts were made to develop education systems, with strong emphasis on primary and secondary education. Increasing the number of schools, developing school programmes, training teachers were the watchwords of the mass education policy of the sub-Saharan African countries. As a result, these countries often devoted a large proportion of their budgets to education.

From 1970 to 1990, aggregate school enrolments for all of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa tripled, rising from 27 million pupils to about 80 million. The two decades showed sharply contrasting growth trends: the annual average growth rate of school enrolment during the first decade was 9 per cent, whereas for the second period this figure fell to 2.4 per cent, a rate slightly below that

*Literature review*

of population growth over the same period. It should be noted, however, that the region's education systems vary greatly in size: 11 countries (Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Zimbabwe) have the largest systems and 75 per cent of all enrolments, while the 36 other countries share the remaining 25 per cent (Orivel, 1994).

The 1980s marked an abrupt halt in the development of African education systems, confirming the existence of an education crisis in Africa. This crisis was brought about by many factors, notably an unmanageable inflow of pupils, lack of resources, rising costs, the inertia and inefficiency of school systems, and the fact that the education provided was poorly suited to African conditions.

Today, although enrolment rates are still rising, educational conditions and quality have deteriorated. This is partly reflected in high rates of repetition in many countries, which severely compromise the cost-efficiency and the effectiveness of school systems.

In this context, the development of private education is increasingly seen as a means of palliating the deficiencies of public education in terms of access, internal efficiency, curricula and quality of teaching. The growing number of private institutions in African countries reflects not only families' loss of confidence in the public school systems, but also the inability of governments to meet the growing demands for education.

In view of the restrictions which economic crisis and public finance restructuring have placed on public spending, the state can no longer be the sole builder of education systems. Other stakeholders are therefore entering the education market by opening private institutions. Public schools are no longer a sure path to social advancement, and the rising number of private schools allows families to choose between the public and private sectors.



The crisis of public finance in all of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa also led to cuts in operating budgets of public institutions providing Technical and Vocational Education (TVE). As a consequence, many such institutions have sought alternative financing from private sources, as illustrated in the case of Senegal.

The rise in the number of private educational institutions and these attempts to diversify sources of finance have brought about a change in the role of the state. It now tends to play a new role to regulate education systems and markets. Recent laws of private provision and the rise of registration and accreditation procedures and bodies provide concrete examples of this development.

What distinguishes private education from public education? “Public Educational Institutions are controlled, managed and operated by a public education authority or government agency or by a governing body (council, board, committee) most of whose members are either appointed by a public authority or elected by public vote. Most educational institutions are public, since they fall under the jurisdiction of the public education authorities. Various other public authorities may also be involved, such as the government services responsible for health, job training, labour, justice, defence, social services, etc.

Whereas Private Educational Institutions are not operated by a public authority, but rather are controlled and managed by a private body or have a governing board most of whose members are not selected by a public agency or elected by public vote. Private Educational Institutions may be operated by a *non-governmental organization* (NGO) or association, a religious body, a special interest group, a foundation, or a business enterprise, on either a profit or non-profit basis” (UNESCO, 2000).

In some countries, “(...) a large number of private schools are extensively financed and regulated by the state. In fact, what we are really considering is a continuum of public and private financing and supervision” (James, 1991).

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How should the private institutions be classified? What kind of training institutions should they be regarded as? Who are the investors? What types of training are they providing? What role should the state play in the development of the private TVE sector? How can the supply of private training be regulated and supported? What should be the respective roles of the public and private sectors?

The answers to these questions depend to a great extent on the economic and social environment in which these private institutions operate. Depending on the country or institution involved, the state takes a different attitude towards the role of the private sector in meeting the demand for education; moreover, this stance is subject to change. The result is a great diversity in the private sector, not only between countries but also within each country.

The private education market ranges from institutions which are remarkably well organized, wealthy and effective, providing high-quality instruction, to others which are destitute and at permanent risk of closure. As a result of their reputations, the tuition they charge, their location, their recruiting methods, their relations with the state, private institutions exhibit highly varied financial situations, which inevitably impact on levels of service quality and learning achievement.

Private education competes with and complements public education, by capitalizing on the latter's inefficiencies and limitations. On the one hand, private institutions compensate for the inadequacies of public education by offering instruction in locations, or subjects, which the public sector does not cover. Private education thus contributes to the social objective of providing schooling to the greatest possible number of children.

On the other hand, private education may be in competition with public institutions, attracting families which are concerned about giving their children the best education possible. In this case, it allows some families to avoid the

deteriorating public school system and its inability to provide skills required by the labour market.

One of the aims of this study is to provide a better understanding of the emergence of a private sector in Technical and Vocational Education (TVE), from the standpoint of demand as well as that of supply. Demand for private education is not simply the result of a substitution effect arising from the deficit of the supply of public education; it also reflects demand for differentiated and higher-quality service. The supply of private education, in turn, can result from the availability of teachers from the strained public sector, low barriers to entry and a lack of government control (Hugon, 1993).

## 2. The crisis of the public TVE sector

Technical and Vocational Education (TVE) in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) attracted increasing attention during the 1970s because of expectations concerning the development of the modern sector, which was supposed to increase the need for skilled labour. Many African governments founded technical and vocational education institutions modelled after those of their former colonial powers. This pattern is particularly clear for French-speaking countries. The technical skills acquired were supposed to raise individuals' job prospects and productivity and, as a result, enterprises were supposed to become more competitive and make a greater contribution to economic growth – on condition that those trained in these institutions actually matched the requirements of the labour market.

These public institutions were, and still are, financially dependent on the state and under its administrative and operational control. They are to be found in many sectors of the economy, particularly services and manufacturing. The subjects taught are regarded as modernizing forces capable of contributing to economic take-off and to the development of manufacturing industry in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.

*Literature review*

Public TVE institutions attracted a great deal of criticism in the early 1990s, on the grounds that, first, they were unable to train skilled workers to meet the requirements of enterprises and were unaware of the need for continuing education and, second, they were extremely costly. Often, the graduates of these institutions joined the ranks of the unemployed, owing to hiring restrictions in the public sector, the economic crisis and the fact that the training provided did not match the jobs available. The fact is that, in many countries, public technical and vocational education institutions were not able to adapt to the new structure of the labour market and the new skill requirements of companies in the formal and informal sectors.

The current orthodoxy concerning social rates of returns states that the social profitability of vocational secondary education is generally lower than for general secondary education (Psacharopoulos, 1988). Rates-of-return evidence has contributed to the reduction of donors' support to TVE. However, there are many concerns about the reliability and relevance of rate-of-return analysis in SSA (Bennell, 1996 a, b, c).

The high rate of population growth in sub-Saharan Africa applied pressure to all education systems, requiring an increase in public spending on education just to keep enrolment rates at the same level. However, the financial crises in these countries and the structural adjustment policies followed since the mid-1980s severely constrained their public education budgets. The Technical and Vocational Education (TVE) sector was hit especially hard by these policies because it was being subjected to harsh criticism, as discussed above.

It should also be pointed out that public Technical and Vocational Education (TVE) in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is addressed to a minute proportion of those enrolled in school. Not only are enrolments low in general secondary education, but also those who opt for technical education form a tiny minority. In Eritrea, for example, there are 89,000 pupils in the public secondary education system, of which 674 are in technical institutions, whereas primary school enrolment totals 241,000 pupils. In Senegal, enrolments amount

to about 207,000 in secondary education, of which 4,000 are in technical institutions; and 955,000 in primary schools (UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1999). However, these figures should be considered as indicators due to the fact that, in several countries, e.g. Senegal, the existing information system does not adequately cover Technical and Vocational Education (TVE).

In view of the rigorous selection process at the secondary level in African public education systems, private Technical and Vocational Education (TVE) would seem to offer a solution for pupils who are rejected at the end of the primary level but who wish to continue their schooling. The dynamics of private TVE in Senegal will document this phenomenon.

No country can give up on training young people: their technical skills are needed to increase productivity in both the formal and informal sector and to contribute to economic growth. Given the limitations of public provision, increasing attention has been devoted, during the past 10 years, to strategies and mechanisms aimed at giving broader responsibilities to private institutions and business (Middleton and Demsky, 1988).

In the early 1990s, a number of donors, particularly the World Bank, began to emphasize the need to extend private TVE programmes, for several reasons:

- To supplement governments' limited financing capacity in a sector where the cost of training is high, as TVE often requires expensive machinery and equipment, as well as skilled and experienced instructors.
- To increase efficiency and innovation. Private financing is subject to profitability constraints, which usually lead to greater efficiency than that observed in the public sector whenever the level of quality is maintained at a lower unit cost. Under competitive pressure, private finance can also make it possible to increase access to innovation.

*Literature review*

- To broaden access to technical and vocational education.
- To respond more rapidly to the training requirements of high-growth markets.

Although some factors are undeniably favourable to the rise of the private sector, which is often encouraged by the state and which caters to a demand expressed by many families, the labour market and economic conditions prevailing in SSA tend to hold back the establishment of a market for training.

### 3. The private supply of technical and vocational education: a first outlook

#### *3.1 Preliminary considerations: defining the sector*

Various types of institution can supply private technical and vocational education:

- *Private not-for-profit training institutions.* These are mainly denominational schools, which are usually registered with the authorities and regulated by government legislation. They may receive subsidies and other public support. This category also includes institutions financed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
- *Private for-profit training institutions,* which are particularly numerous in urban areas. They charge tuition fees, which, typically, constitute their main source of revenue, and practise selective admissions. However, profit-oriented centres may receive subsidies from the government or other sources. They may be registered with the authorities, but their number and status vary according to the local context. The profit-oriented private sector tries to carve out and hold a position on the education

market by taking advantage of the deficiencies of the public education system.

- *Companies that supply in-house training* in order to enhance the technical skills of their employees. In some cases, company-training centres are also open to other target groups.

In sub-Saharan Africa, formal private education existed well before the establishment of any public schools, owing to the influence of European missionaries. During the colonial period, these private schools received considerable subsidies from metropolitan governments, but following independence the African states had to make political choices concerning their fate. For example, Guinea, the Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Ethiopia and Nigeria chose to nationalize these schools (Kitaev, 1999).

It is obviously more difficult to conduct a study of private TVE institutions than of public institutions, as the latter are attached to a governmental authority, which usually has statistical information concerning them. In contrast, private institutions may not be organized at all. Some sub-Saharan African countries have a great variety of private TVE institutions whose fields of expertise are not well known to the authorities. It is probable that no clear definition of these institutions has been laid down, and estimates as to the number of institutions, trainees and teachers are highly uncertain.

### **3.2 Private provision in selected Francophone countries<sup>2</sup> (Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Mauritius, Niger)**

#### **3.2.1 Cameroon**

In order to find a remedy to the shortcomings of the TVE system and in a context of the state's progressive disengagement, private promoters are establishing centres oriented towards the new technologies and qualifications which seem to be adapted to the needs of the labour market. There are about a hundred registered centres while the majority would still be operating clandestinely (*Ministère de l'Emploi, du Travail et de la Prévoyance sociale* (METPS), 2000).

The majority of the training programmes offered by private institutions concern nine sectors of the economy, namely:

- (i) handicraft and industrial trades;
- (ii) occupations connected with computer science;
- (iii) secretarial and accounting;
- (iv) bank;
- (v) medical and health services;
- (vi) transport;
- (vii) hotel management and tourism;
- (viii) communication industry;
- (ix) agriculture and rural development.

Whereas the objective of greater reliance on market mechanisms was to encourage the diversification of the training streams, the provision of training by Private Centres remains concentrated around computer science and office management. Professionals do not take part in the elaboration of the training programmes. It turns out that there is no uniformity in the programmes for

2. Not including Mali and Senegal, which form part of the second part of the report.



comparable training activities. Likewise, there is no national structure in charge of the conception and evaluation of the vocational training programmes.

It is to be noted that in most private centres, the number of permanent trainers does not exceed 50 per cent of the teaching staff.

Technical and Vocational Education (TVE) institutions, whether public or private, are usually not subjected to any control due to lack of government resources. However, private centres may experience pre-registration inspection.

In this context, increasingly private training providers request inspection services in view of improving the quality of their programme. They also call for a clear policy in the field of vocational training. A proposal was submitted by private providers to the Ministry of Employment and Labour to establish a tripartite body in charge of quality control.

Similarly, private providers would like to be involved in the registration process, in order to improve, through concerted efforts, the profile of the private sector.

### 3.2.2 Côte d'Ivoire<sup>3</sup>

Private technical education is experiencing an important increase in the number of institutions as well as in the number of students. The irregular nature of the available statistics does not allow having a precise picture of this evolution. In 1984-1985<sup>4</sup>, with all levels of training taken into account, there

3. Based on, Kone, Z. 2001. *Côte d'Ivoire, National Monograph on TVET*, UNESCO/IIEP. Additional information is provided in the World Bank/IFC draft report on the private education sector in Côte d'Ivoire (1999).
4. Resorting to such old data can be explained by the fact that since the disappearance of the *National Bureau for Professional Training* (ONFP) in 1989, the ministerial department in charge of technical and vocational education no longer attaches any interest to the systematic collection of statistics on that level of the education system mainly on the level of secondary and/or private sectors. The few most recent available data are fragmentary and less reliable.

were 45 private technical education institutions with 14,493 students and pupils, whereas the 89 public technical education institutions admitted 16 394 students and pupils. In 1987-88, these figures were respectively, 77 private institutions with 16,986 students and pupils and 69 public institutions with 10,569 students and pupils.

A number of private providers offer training at the post-secondary level. Originally, higher private education used to admit students who had been left out by public institutions due to lack of sufficient qualifications. The reality has little evolved because the creation of public schools did not follow demographic growth. For that matter, today, higher private education admits students selected by the state upon having obtained good results in their high school examinations (*Baccalauréat*). On the whole, these institutions simultaneously admit students selected by the state, high school leavers from foreign countries as well as students having failed their *baccalauréat* but who are desirous to access training at the *Brevet de technicien supérieur (BTS)* level. Generally, there is lack of rigour with regard to the conditions of admission (certificates, educational level mainly) to higher private schools. Consequently, the students' levels remain poor in many cases.

The majority of private TVE institutions are profit making. The fields of privileged training are accounting and business management, trade actions and sales force, secretarial, international trade, insurance, marketing and data processing. The training streams for studies like industrial maintenance, Post-Graduate Professional degree – taken after a Masters degree – *Diplôme d'études supérieures spécialisées (DESS)* and Engineering are still in the experimentation phase.

The significant development of private technical education is the result of the system of public subsidies that the government has implemented. It mainly involves total or partial cover of the training fees for state-sponsored students selected by the state, allocation of qualified teachers, etc.

Private providers are subject to a classification constituting a label system. They are classified in four categories, namely:

- Category 1 : State-partner institutions (enjoying a specific agreement with the Ministry);
- Category 2 : Authorized and recommended institutions;
- Category 3 : Authorized institutions;
- Category 4 : Non-authorized institutions.

The criteria used for establishing this classification are the results from the state examinations, the ratio of qualified teachers, etc.

The expansion of the private sector is complementary with that of the public sector which can no longer admit all the applicants for training at all levels. But the private sector will become a real factor of dynamism for the public sector when it will be in position to substantially improve on the quality of its teaching through the upgrading of teaching materials and teaching staff qualifications.

### *3.2.3 Madagascar<sup>5</sup>*

The private sector holds an important place in the Malagasy system of technical and vocational education and there is every reason to believe that it contributed significantly to meeting the increased demand for education over the past years. With 255 private institutions<sup>6</sup>, against 60 for the public sector, it takes more than 75 per cent of the total enrolments of technical and vocational education. Its place is particularly preponderant in the low-level training, since about 75 per cent of the students registered in these classes attend a private institution.

5. Based on Zoana, B., 2001, *Madagascar, National Monograph on TVET*, UNESCO/IIEP.
6. This number represents institutions registered by the Department of Technical and Vocational Education (DETP) of the Ministry of Secondary Education and Basic Education (MINESEB) before 1994 and the METFP after 1994.

Although this sector has been in existence for a long time now, it is only in the course of recent years that it experienced a particularly important development. According to information from the Register of Technical and Professional Education Institutions and Centres compiled by the Ministry of Technical and Vocational Training (METFP), 20 per cent of the private institutions that were operating in 1996 were set up in 1990. Between these two dates the enrolments in this sector rose by 70 per cent while, on the contrary, those of the public sector decreased noticeably.

The increase in the enrolment of students within private technical institutions is also a symbol of their dynamism. In effect, if the total enrolment was 7,547 in 1990, it rose to 32,000 students in 1999, which represents an annual growth rate of 15.5 per cent. For that same year, 730 registered private institutions, including training centres, were counted with 2,618 trainers or teachers, according to the information gathered from the National Centre for Technical and Vocational Training (CNFTP).

As for the status of private TVE institutions, four can be described as follows:

- (i) non-religious private institutions;
- (ii) religious private institutions;
- (iii) semi-private institutions<sup>7</sup>; and
- (iv) non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The streams for service activities represent 38.7 per cent of the training offered. The industrial streams come second with 21.9 per cent.

The 1999 law on the status of private Technical and Vocational Education Institutions stipulates that:

7. Semi-private institutions are training centres for institutions which were nationalized by the end of the 1970s, that is to say, at the beginning of the second Republic, as well as training centres attached to government institutions but which are granted financial autonomy.

- The state must contribute to the preservation of the interests of the registered technical and private Technical and Vocational Training Institutions having signed a contract programme. In exchange, these contract institutions are subject to obligations towards the state.
- According to the modalities which will be fixed through regulatory channels, financial subsidies in nature or in any other form will be granted by the state to the registered private Technical and Vocational Education Institutions with a contract programme.
- Subsidies do not constitute a right. They may be used for other needs than those specified by the decision of attribution.

The participation of the state can be in the following forms:

- assistance in human resources;
- eventually, material grants within the framework of twinning of schools or partnership;
- possibility of attending the training offered by the Ministry of Technical and Vocational Education (MTVE) through the ONETFOPP;
- grant of a special fiscal policy or benefit of an incentive fiscal policy.

In compensation for its participation, the state may exercise technical and financial controls.

Technical and Vocational Education Institutions with programme contracts may benefit from advantages provided for in the participation of the state. These institutions are supposed to observe the clauses of the contract or risk being sanctioned negatively.

The data on the volume of transfer carried out by the state as well as its evolution are not available. In effect, to date, it is still the Ministry of Secondary and Basic Education (MINESEB), through the National Bureau for Private Education (ONEP), which controls the subsidies.

According to Decree 99/23 on the status of accredited Technical and Vocational Education Institutions, any registered private body whose primary

vocation is to offer technical and vocational education leading to a qualification approved and/or recognized by the state can be considered for accreditation.

Accredited Technical and Vocational Education Institutions are bound mainly to conform to the law governing the education and training system. They are subject to teaching and/or administrative controls of the Ministry of Technical and Vocational Education. At the moment, 233 accredited private institutions exist. Among the 233 accreditations, 180 were issued by the Ministry of Secondary Education and Basic Education (MINESEB) and 53 by the Ministry of Technical and Vocational Education (METFP).

#### *3.2.4 Mauritius*

In Mauritius the central body in the field of TVET is the Industrial and Vocational Training Board (IVTB). Besides operating the public vocational education system, the IVTB is also responsible for managing the resources collected through a training levy. Technical education, mainly provided in a Lycée polytechnique, is under a Technical School Management Trust Fund.

The training levy serves both to finance the public vocational education system and to promote training in the economy at large. Hence, employers through a reimbursement scheme can recover 75 per cent of the cost of training. This financing mechanism has contributed to the emergence of a vibrant private training sector.

Every year the IVTB issues a directory of private training centres. In 2001, the IVTB had registered 150 training institutions and 1,200 trainers. These institutions provide award and non-award courses. Award courses lead to a qualification recognized by an outside body, usually based in the United Kingdom. For these programmes the Ministry of Education (MOE) ensures supervision. Non-award courses lead to certificates of attendance and are of a shorter duration.

Most private institutions provide training in ‘soft’ areas (management, information technology, etc.). They mainly cater for workers and school-leavers who cannot enter university.

There is a growing concern for standards and quality control. The ISO certification system is gradually being implemented in private institutions.

The Mauritius recipe combines an interesting mix of earmarked funding, private-provision promotion and regulation through the IVTB, which involves both government and industry representatives. A major issue for the future of the system lies in its dependence on foreign certification bodies. Attempts have been made to conceive a National Vocational Qualification Framework but with mixed results. After having envisaged adopting the Scottish model (SCOVET), Mauritius is now trying to implement a framework derived from the Australian model. A law was recently passed in Parliament to establish a National Qualification system; however, no clear decision has been made so far regarding the precise nature of the system required.

### *3.2.5 Niger*

The 1998 law on the orientation of the education system clearly stipulates that private education is recognized by the state. A specific legal framework defines precisely the operation of the private sector.<sup>8</sup>

8. – Ordinance 96-035 of 16 June 1996 on the regulation of private education in Niger.
- Decree N°. 966210 / PCSNN / MEN of 19 June 1999 on the creation of the modalities of application of the Ordinance on the regulation of private education in Niger.
- Decree N°. 0044 / MEN / DEPRI / DETFP of 10 March 1999 on the creation of a National Commission in charge of examining the applications for the opening and extension of Private Institutions for general, professional or technical education.
- Decree N°. 0182 / MEN / MFP / TE / DPE / FP / DEPRI of 7 October 1999 on the liberalization of school fees and professional training in private education.
- Article 4 of Ordinance 99-66 of 20 December 1999, instituting a tax on professional training. This tax can actually benefit public and private Technical and Vocational Education Institutions (TVE).

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These texts set a framework for private TVE by the obligation to have an opening administrative authorization. They also define strict rules concerning the following: the Director who must originally be from the teaching profession, the control rules, the subsidies and scholarships.

This legal instruction, although acknowledging the private initiative, is highly bureaucratic. It does not provide much incentive for establishing new institutions and improving outputs. Founders complain that the cumbersomeness of the procedures affects the development of private education. Moreover, government does not have the capacity to enforce this legal framework. Discussions are held to revise the legal framework and transfer of the state's responsibility towards private providers (employers' unions, trade unions) in view of promoting the self-regulation of this sector.

In 1999, 27 private institutions of technical and vocational education were registered, enrolling 2,600 students (see *Table 1*). The private sector represents about 43 per cent of all TVE institutions and 31 per cent of students.

Technical and vocational education is marked by the diversity of the management structures. Besides profit-oriented institutions, six centres are controlled by NGOs and churches.

A provision pattern clearly shows the predominance of tertiary-sector streams (secretarial, office management, accounting, etc.) as compared to the industrial or handicraft areas. As a matter of fact, 74 per cent of private institutions only propose the tertiary areas. That is mainly explained by the low capacity of the founders' current investment, preferring to focus on skill areas not requiring heavy capital.



**Table 1. Private TVE indicators, Niger, 1999**

Students / Schools	97.1
Students / Teachers	7.1
Students / Classes	23.6
Teachers / School	13.8

*Source: Développement de l'enseignement privé et communautaire au Niger, Crédit IDA 2618 NIR. Étude réalisée par le BIEF — Rapport final, juillet 2000.*

A recent survey on private education in Niger<sup>9</sup> identified the following features of private training providers:

- (i) Surveyed institutions stated that they readjust the content of certain initial training programmes according to the needs expressed directly by the business world or by the trainees themselves.
- (ii) The concern to respond to the enterprises' demand for qualifications is equally seen through the significant place given to the programmes for continuing education which seem to be organized within 55 per cent of the institutions.
- (iii) The concern to bring the training closer to enterprises is also expressed by the practice of work-experience programmes: 50 per cent of the institutions having replied to the question, declare to be organizing work experience. However, the dual type of training is seemingly non-existent.
- (iv) Only a few institutions have recourse to casual teachers from enterprises.
- (v) Very few institutions are in a position to give information on the rate of the employment of their students and career path of their former students.
- (vi) The analysis of the answers concerning the equipment shows that institutions are under-equipped in terms of workshops and laboratories.

9. *Développement de l'enseignement privé et communautaire au Niger, Crédit IDA 2618 NIR. Étude réalisée par le BIEF — Rapport final, juillet 2000.*

Those results suggest that private TVE institutions, while recognizing the need to develop linkages with the world of work, are not equipped to adjust their practice accordingly.

The survey also provides information on fees charged by private institutions (see *Table 2*).

**Table 2. Fees in private technical and vocational education schools and in private lycées, Niger, 1999**

	Number of replies	Average	Minimum	Maximum
TVE				
Elementary level	3	38,500 FCFA	37,000 FCFA	40,000 FCFA
Middle level	12	116,622 FCFA	40,000 FCFA	160,000 FCFA
Higher level	7	212,500 FCFA	180,000 FCFA	250,000 FCFA
Lycée				
2nd	17	93,706 FCFA	60,000 FCFA	125,000 FCFA
1st	17	99,875 FCFA	60,000 FCFA	135,000 FCFA
Terminale	15	104,867 FCFA	60,000 FCFA	140,000 FCFA

*Source: Développement de l'enseignement privé et communautaire au Niger, Crédit IDA 2618 NIR. Étude réalisée par le BIEF – Rapport final, juillet 2000.*

The school fees left to the charge of the families in technical and vocational education are relatively expensive and by far higher than the general education streams (except for the elementary level). Therefore, a significant development of private technical and vocational education cannot solely be based on the families' financing (school fees). This implies the search for other sources of financing (scholarships, financing by enterprises on the apprenticeship tax).

According to a 1996 law, government was supposed to subsidize private institutions. The payment of the subsidy was stopped during the 1999/2000 school year. Similarly, the provision of fellowships to students allocated to private institutions, introduced in 1993 on a pilot basis, was interrupted in 1997.

### **3.3 Private provision in selected Anglophone and Lusophone countries (Botswana, Eritrea, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe)**

#### **3.3.1 Botswana<sup>10</sup>**

In 2001, there were about 121 Private Vocational Schools registered with the Ministry of Education (MOE) in Botswana, with about 56 of these being located in Gaborone. The number of registered institutions has increased significantly over recent years – in 1994 only 70 private institutions were registered. The majority of students enrolled have progressed from the Junior Secondary School (JSS) system. Very few enrol after studies in the Senior Secondary Schools (SSS).

The *Survey of Private Vocational Institutions in Botswana* (1997)<sup>11</sup> observed that access to most private vocational training institutes is ‘open to all’ as their sustainability is based on enrolling a sufficient number to cover costs. The tendency is to declare that a junior certificate is required, but any mature person with some work experience is generally acceptable. Centres are able to make claims concerning the success stories of graduates who are well placed, employed and productive, but these may be expectations and do not apply to the majority of graduates. Some of the courses studied – like typing, bookkeeping and dressmaking – have a flooded labour market. Many

10. Adapted from Nganunu, M., Kewagamang, M. (ed.). 2001. *Botswana, National Monograph on TVET*, UNESCO/IIEP.

11. Mudariki *et al.*, 1997.

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of the private vocational education and training institutes become employers of their own graduates – thus the beneficiaries are a few of the graduates and the institutions. A few of the owners and managers, especially in dressmaking, are the products of private vocational training institutions. In the final analysis the state benefits in a variety of ways: people are trained at no cost to the state; youth are kept involved and off the labour market temporarily; students come out older and more mature, with selected skills and a sense of direction.

These institutions tend to concentrate on business and commercial courses such as typing, secretarial studies, business administration, dressmaking and computing. Very few appear to be currently involved with technical skills training such as construction, woodwork, auto-mechanics, electronics, engineering or production. None are training in agriculture, even though there is great potential and apparent need for this in Botswana. It is thought that the high cost of related equipment, suitable accommodation, the need of well-qualified and experienced staff, and the high upkeep cost involved with teaching such technologies, would prevent many of these institutions from embarking along these routes.

Currently, enrolments in private vocational schools are not included in national statistics; it is therefore difficult to have a precise picture of the size of the private sector. However, when comparing the number of institutions in the public (18, not excluding the 41 Brigades) and private (121) sectors, one can guess that the size of enrolments in private institutions is not negligible.

All private schools are expected to operate within the parameters of the Education Act, failing which this may lead to closure of the school by the Ministry of Education (MOE). Currently foreigners own a majority of these schools and they cater mostly for JSS drop-outs. Since they are privately owned they charge varying amounts of fees, with some charging exorbitantly whilst others charge very low fees. Some of them are ‘fly-by-night’ schools with the sole aim of profit making and many of them literally disappear

overnight with cash in hand. Such schools often operate illegally, without any formal registration with the Ministry of Education (MOE), thus contravening the Education Act.

Not all organizations involved in private vocational training should be expected to register as private vocational training institutes. Examples would be NGOs committed to community development that run short courses to impart new skills to their constituencies (for example, Kuru Development Trust in Ghanzi and Maiteko Tshwaragano Development Trust in Hukuntsi). Another example would be the Thuto Commercial School, which offers short courses in bore-hole installation and maintenance and the Human Resources Training Group, which trains up to 1,000 people a year in heavy plant operation. These latter examples probably do not need to be considered as private vocational training, as they may fit better under the Apprenticeship Act than under private Vocational Education and Training.

The quality of training offered throughout the schools is highly variable. The standard of education in some of the schools is high and very promising, hence such schools, if they are run as community projects, receive some financial assistance from the government. For example, the Gabane Private Secondary School is currently benefiting from this assistance. Plans are under way for the government to offer financial assistance to other private vocational schools provided they meet the criteria for government assistance.

The positive aspects of private vocational schools include:

- (i) they do assimilate a number of young people into some form of practical skills training that they may not otherwise have gained;
- (ii) the cost to central government may be zero at present;
- (iii) they employ a number of personnel such as administrators, teachers and students who may otherwise be among the unemployed.

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Some are geographically situated where there is a lack of government training facilities.

The Ministry of Education (MOE) plays a supervisory role in that it carries out the inspection, guidance, monitoring and evaluation of these schools. Currently there is an officer who deals specifically with registration issues; this being an effort to monitor the illegal mushrooming of private schools. The schools handle curriculum and certification issues themselves. Intervention by the Ministry of Education on such issues is very limited.

The status of some of the schools is very reputable and is such that public officers are sent to the schools for further development. The MOE recognizes the certificates of some of these schools, though government does not recognize the overwhelming majority of the qualifications from these schools.

Through the Botswana *Private Vocational Schools' Association*, the MOE and the private schools discuss different issues pertaining to vocational education in Botswana. It is through this forum that issues such as accreditation and quality control are addressed.

### 3.3.2 Eritrea<sup>12</sup>

In Eritrea, the establishment of private training institutions is much welcomed by government. Indeed, it is clearly stated in policy documents that all encouragement will be given to the participation of the private sector in educational development, including in the field of TVET. Therefore, the Ministry of Education (MOE) regards private providers of TVET as partners complementing public delivery, rather than as competitors.

The total number of registered private institutions amounts to 189; however, most of them provide short-term programmes concentrated in light skill areas (68 are driving schools, 59 are tailor training centres, see *Table 3*).

12. Adapted from: Tekie, T.M., 2001. *National Monograph on TVET*, UNESCO/IIEP.

**Table 3. Vocational training in the private sector**

Skill training area	Number of training establishments	Main type of programmes
Computer training	19	Computer applications, programming languages, hardware maintenance, accounting and business, English language.
Typing	21	Typing.
Home economics	19	Home economics, and food preparation and preservation (some provide embroidery training).
Tailoring and	59	Tailoring of traditional and modern garments, suits, trousers, etc. for men, women and children.
Driving	68	From 2nd to 5th driving licence.
Intermediate TVET	2	Agriculture and technical courses.
Advanced TVET	1	Machine and metallurgy.
<b>Total</b>	<b>189</b>	

*Source:* MOE, 2001.

Only three private institutions offer technical education similar to that available in public schools. They provide courses at the *intermediate and advanced level* (see *Tables 4-5*).

The intake for the intermediate level is Grade 9 completers of senior secondary schools (two years of senior secondary education). At present there are eight intermediate TVET schools, including two private. Advanced-level TVET institutions recruit senior secondary school graduates as well as graduates from the intermediate level, following two years of work experience. There are only two institutions at this level, including one private. All three private technical schools are Catholic institutions.

It is also known that there are several missionaries that run community-based vocational training for women in textiles, embroidery, cooking and other

home economics-related courses. However, in the absence of recorded data, it is not possible to know their number and the socio-economic status of the target groups.

**Table 4. Intermediate-level TVET enrolment in private institutions (1999/2000)**

	HAS		DTS		Total		
	G	T	G	T	G	T	As percentage of total enrolment
Enrolment	10	53	6	43	<b>16</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>7%</b>
Trainers	-	8	-	10	<b>-</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>14%</b>
Student/ trainer ratio	6.6		4.3		<b>5.3</b>		<b>11.2 (public sector ratio)</b>

Key:

HAS: Hagaz Agriculture School.

DTS: Dombosco Technical School.

Source: MOE.

**Table 5. Advanced-level trainers (1996/1997-1999/2000)**

Academic year	Trainees						Trainers					
	PTI (private)		ABCI (public)		Total		PTI (private)		ABCI (public)		Total	
	G	T	G	T	G	T	G	T	G	T	G	T
1996/97	-	20	-	-	-	<b>20</b>	-	16	-	-	-	<b>16</b>
1997/98	1	54	25	91	<b>26</b>	<b>145</b>	-	16	1	10	<b>1</b>	<b>26</b>
1998/99	5	78	62	187	<b>67</b>	<b>256</b>	-	16	2	16	<b>2</b>	<b>32</b>
1999/2000	5	67	67	221	<b>72</b>	<b>288</b>	-	16	2	13	<b>2</b>	<b>29</b>

Key:

PTI= Pavoni Technical Institute (private)

ABCI= Asmara Business and Commerce Institute (public)

Source: MOE.



The report of the 1997 assessment on private training providers, conducted by the Department of Technical and Adult Education (DTAE), reveals that the private sector participates in providing training in areas such as embroidery, home economics, driving, computer operation and maintenance and accounting. Substantial numbers of enterprises that give training in tailoring and embroidery are located in the rural areas and are mostly run by missionaries. On the other hand, the majority of those which provide skill training in computer operation, typing, home economics and driving, operate in Asmara and other large towns.

It is interesting to note that, at the advanced level, and against the common trend, the public institution provides tertiary trades, while the private one offers industrial subjects (mostly *machining* and *metallurgy*, see Table 6).

**Table 6. Enrolment in advanced level by trade and school (1999)**

Trade	Institute		Total
	ABCI (public)	PTI (private)	
Accounting	53	-	53
Secretarial science	51	-	51
Banking and finance	56	-	56
Management	27	-	27
Machine shop/Metallurgy	-	69	69
<b>Total</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>256</b>

Key:

PTI= Pavoni Technical Institute (private)

ABCI= Asmara Business and Commerce Institute (public)

Source: DTAE/MOE.

Private training institutions are given an operating licence by the National Licence Office only after they are certified as qualified by the Adult Education Division of the Ministry of Education. The latter issues a qualification certificate based on:

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- quantity and quality of facilities;
- level and qualification of trainers; and
- syllabus.

Except for the Catholic schools, all private training institutions charge trainees, and are profit making. Beyond policy statements, the government has not taken substantive measures to support private providers. Therefore, at this stage they mainly rely on fees and external support to finance their operations.

In the absence of hard data it is difficult to assess the overall performance of private providers, apart from the three Catholic technical schools, which enjoy relatively good working conditions and a good image. Because of the shortage of staff in the MOE, little follow-up/supervision is made to ensure that they adhere to the minimum requirements. Detailed information/data on the number of graduates, qualification of staff, level and type of teaching equipment and capital are not available.

### 3.3.3 *Ghana*<sup>13</sup>

It is estimated that there are, in Ghana, over 400 schools run by religious organizations, private individuals/boards and NGOs, which provide a variety of TVET programmes. A total number of 213 of private TVET providers are recognized and registered after inspection by the National Vocational Training Institute (NVTI). It is to be noted that, in the public sector, there are 156 government vocational training institutions run by nine different agencies throughout the country.

Besides profit-oriented private providers, many of the centres operated by NGOs are offering useful and innovative training. For example, the Opportunities Industrialization Centre (OIC) runs vocational training courses

13. Adapted from: Glover, J., 2001. *Ghana, National Monograph on TVET*. UNESCO/IIEP.

in three centres for youth between 16 and 20 years old. Training is offered in block making, carpentry, electricity, plumbing, secretarial skills, catering, textiles, ceramics, and graphic arts. The duration of training is from 12 to 15 months. OIC places emphasis on job counselling and placement as well as on regular micro labour market surveys in order to adjust training courses according to the labour market needs, especially in the informal sector. Due to this flexibility, OIC has been successful in job placement of trainees. As no fee is charged, the OIC programmes are very popular, especially since assistance is also provided in obtaining suitable employment for the graduates of the programme. OIC in Accra accommodates 300 trainees. The other two centres, in Kumasi and Takoradi, have about 120 trainees each.

In addition to the registered private training institutions, some large employers run their own training centres. For example, both Mercedes Benz and Mechanical Lloyd (for BMW) run training schools for mechanics for their vehicles. Other large private companies run formal apprenticeship programmes for their staff.

The majority of the private training institutions concentrate training on secretarial and accounting skills. Similar to the public-sector institutes, almost all courses in private institutions are of long duration, namely three or four years.

Such institutions often charge high fees (by Ghanaian standards) to the order of US\$20-US\$30 per term.

The majority of instructors in public and private institutions is drawn directly from graduates of technical institutes and polytechnics: these instructors have rarely had industrial experience or pedagogic training. From time to time NVTI offers short, in-service training programmes for both public and private instructors. Many difficulties are encountered in obtaining the participation of private school instructors, as the owners of the private institutions are often unwilling to provide the necessary night and transport allowances for their staff.

Training conditions vary a lot from one institution to the other. Those providing craft skills often have no workshop of their own and carry out the required practical work in neighbouring informal-sector workshops.

Currently there are two competing examination and certification systems in operation. Firstly, the Ghana Education Service (GES) Technical Institutes use localized City and Guilds examinations; while NVTI and much of the private sector use specially developed NVTI trade tests. Few small-scale and informal-sector employers pay attention to the certificates a person possesses, but insist on seeing the competence and skill he/she has at hand. Ghana, like many other countries, is considering moving away from formal examinations in the skill training area towards a process of continuous assessment of specific competence gained in and out of training institutions.

The quality of instruction is variable, ranging from good to very poor. The performance of private institutions often depends largely on the extent to which external aid agencies or religious bodies have been involved. Some institutions do manage to provide effective training. This is especially the case in the areas of catering and dressmaking. Other providers, however, including some which are registered, are of very low quality.

However, in theory, the NVTI and the Ghana Education Service (GES) must approve any private vocational institution before it can be established. In practice, these bodies do not have the capacity to fully assume their responsibilities.

There is also an Association of Proprietors of Private Vocational Training Institutes (APPVTI) which is involved in improving the quality of private-sector training. It is expected that the Association will play a growing role, in partnership with government, to improve the operation of the sector.

In 1990, the government established the National Council for Technical and Vocational Education and Training (NACVET) which is jointly under the

Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare (MESW). Eventually it will be responsible for school accreditation, curriculum development, testing, statistics, and industrial relations. It will also be responsible for monitoring and evaluation, policy analysis, and for assessing the quality of the training programmes carried out by the institutions supported by the project as well as those financed by other donors.

Recognizing that the private sector has an important role to play in TVET delivery, the government intends to promote its development. Three main forms of private-sector participation will be promoted: (1) operation of TVET institutions by private individuals, religious bodies, and NGOs; (2) enterprise-based training; and (3) employee-sponsored and enterprise-sponsored training.

The following steps will be taken to encourage private-sector participation:

- eliminating policies that discriminate against private institutions;
- extending to students in private institutions similar benefits prevailing in public institutions (e.g. scholarships and loans);
- making public teacher-training facilities accessible to private institutions;
- promoting greater interaction between private and public institutions, for example in the use of public resources;
- providing tax incentives to encourage private investment in training equipment;
- setting clear criteria and using constructive supervision to ensure quality improvement in private institutions.

#### *3.3.4 Kenya<sup>14</sup>*

The education and training sector in Kenya has not grown appreciably to meet the demands made for post-secondary education and training. Annually, close to 130,000 young Kenyan secondary-school graduates look for employment or further education and training, in the private sector.

14. Adapted from: Kerre, B.W. 2001. *Kenya, National Monograph on TVET*. UNESCO/IIEP.

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At the moment data on the number of institutions and enrolments in the private sector are not readily available. However, it is clear that the majority of the private TVT institutions are profit oriented and run short, light TVET programmes with heavy concentration in accounting and business trades. More recently, training packages in the field of information and communications technology have grown.

It has been difficult to determine the quality of private programmes, although some are qualitative and have excelled in national examinations. There is a move to establish an appropriate accreditation system for such institutions in the country.

#### *3.3.5 Mozambique*

In Mozambique, the emergence of private training providers is still new and modest. This process is directly linked to the democratization of society and the establishment of a market-oriented economy.

A number of non-profit institutions catering for disadvantaged young people have been established by churches and NGOs. There are still few profit-oriented centres and the existing ones are concentrated in management, secretarial, computing and commercial skills. In 1999 the Ministry of Education reported the existence of five for-profit TVET institutions, all located in Maputo, and offering administrative and commercial courses at the intermediate level (entry level requiring general secondary education, 10th class, and 3.5 years of duration leading to the technician level).

No more precise and more recent data seem to be available on private TVET and the government does not seem for the moment to have considered the role that this sector could play in the future. The draft 1999 policy paper does not include any specific section on private provision.

### 3.3.6 South Africa<sup>15</sup>

Prior to the implementation of the Further Education and Training Act (1998), there was limited government regulation of the private college sector. Colleges offering distance education were required to register with the Correspondence College Council under the Correspondence Colleges Act of 1965. The sector was otherwise regulated by two voluntary associations, the Association of Private Colleges of South Africa (AFCSA) and the Association of Distance Education Colleges (ADEC).

The sector can be broadly divided into two components: one group of colleges affiliated to the main association of private providers (below referred to as the associated colleges) and a second, more amorphous group of institutions which are not affiliated to any formal association and about which very little is known. The following comparative data in *Table 7* are presented to illustrate the relative importance of the associated private colleges.

**Table 7. Headcount enrolment at associated private colleges and other providers of training, 1995<sup>16</sup>**

Training provider	Headcount	Percentage of total
Associated private colleges	223,102	34.8
Technikons	190,247	29.7
Technical colleges	112,303	17.5
Teacher colleges	81,225	12.7
Other colleges (Nursing, Police etc.)	33,398	5.2
TOTAL	640,275	100.0

15. Adapted from: Bird, A., 2001. National monograph on technical and vocational training in South Africa, UNESCO/IIEP.

16. Buckland, P.; Jaff, R.; Reid, K., NTB Study 1(c) Expenditure on Training in the Private College Sector, June 1996. Available from National Business Initiative, Johannesburg. Table 3.1, page 5.

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In 1996 a study was commissioned by the National Training Board into the “Expenditure on Training in the Private College Sector”. This study, whilst now five years out of date, provides one of the few overviews of private training. Its results indicate that “almost two-thirds of enrolments at private colleges are in commercial courses, whilst only one-sixth are in technical courses”:

- Commercial courses constitute 62 per cent of enrolment and 64 per cent of expenditure by individuals in private colleges.
- Technical courses, although 16 per cent of enrolment, account for only 7.5 per cent of expenditure.
- Of the commercial courses, almost two-thirds require Std 10 (matriculation) or above as an entry requirement.
- Technical courses constitute only 16 per cent of all enrolments.
- Hobbies and self-development include courses such as African languages and communication skills, as well as flower arranging, photography and various leisure courses, such as sailing and navigation. These constitute 10.9 per cent of enrolments and 6.0 per cent of expenditure.

Women constitute 42 per cent of all learners enrolled in private colleges, while men (Africans) make up some 45 per cent. Of these learners 8.7 per cent were full-time study students, 18.0 per cent were part-time and a massive 73.3 per cent were distance learners. Of the programmes, 1.3 per cent were shorter than six months, 20.1 per cent were between six months and a year, and 78.6 per cent were one year or longer. Interestingly the study found that whilst the level of representation of different racial groups was similar to that in public technical colleges, over 90 per cent of the learners in private college training programmes are already in employment – which makes sense when one considers the fees charged: between R200 and R35,000 for a graduate



degree programme. The average cost for a one-year programme (in 1995 rands) was R1,500.00. The study found that (in 1995 rands) the total private investment by students in these colleges was R334 million, 80 per cent of which was contributed by private individuals.

Private colleges receive very little funding from government. A small number of colleges undertake contracts for the Department of Labour, in which they provide training for unemployed people.

In a study conducted by the World Bank in partnership with the UniCity of Johannesburg (the local government authority)<sup>17</sup> it was found that there is generally distrust of government institutes (except for technikons, which enjoy relatively higher regard) by the private sector. Over 70 per cent of large firms indicated a strong preference for private training institutions, with only 35 per cent indicating government training institutions as being important or moderately important. When it came to small firms, about 70 per cent indicated they prefer in-house training, and fewer than 20 per cent saw government institutions as important or moderately important. In both cases technikons appear to be the exception, rated over 50 per cent by both large and small firms.

However, although in general the private college sector is more positively viewed by employers than the public sector, as reported earlier, the Tourism study<sup>18</sup> found some caveats to this: "Private colleges have to be closer to the market to survive. Therefore they tend to use more trainers from industry and update their curriculum. Part of their ability to attract students depends on the ability to create expectation in the mind of the student that paying for college will lead to better job prospects. However, formal placement

17. This study is as yet unpublished and the figures are derived from a presentation to the Department of Labour on 5 March 2001. Copies of the study to be shortly available by the UniCity of Johannesburg.

18. USAID Workforce Development Strategies, South African Pilot, SETA Strategic Planning Methodology, 30 March 1999, delivered by the Department of Labour (unpublished), p. 77.

programmes were said by contact group members to be weak. There was also a lot of concern expressed during the contact groups regarding 'fly-by-night' training institutes that have entered the tourism training industry but that are not doing a quality job. There is also a need for better and more transparent and consistent information for the public and the industry on existing providers». This situation has motivated greater involvement of the government in the functioning of the private sector. The accreditation system being currently implemented is meant to serve that purpose (see below).

### *3.3.7 Tanzania and Zimbabwe*

In both countries, private provision represents a significant portion of the TVET sector. However, no comprehensive data are available describing its precise size, profile and results. A study recently commissioned by DFID provides useful information on private-sector training institutions in both countries (Bennell *et al.*, 1999).

#### *3.3.7.1 Tanzania*

In Tanzania, the statistics produced by the Vocational Education and Training Authority (VETA) show that, in 1995, private providers represented close to 90 per cent of total TVET enrolments. At that date the VETA list of private providers included 330 institutions, of which 158 were run by churches.

The sample-based survey conducted for DFID suggests that the rapid increase of private training providers took place during the economic liberalization period (1991-1995).

Two-thirds of the sampled institutions show enrolment figures below 50, suggesting that the sector is dominated by small operators. The same results indicate that training in industrial areas, mainly traditional manual trades, represented about 60 per cent of total enrolment. The most popular trade seemed to be tailoring with one-third of total enrolments. This provision pattern suggests a preponderance of artisan training.

Females represented about 60 per cent of total enrolment. This gender enrolment pattern in the sampled institutions marked a significant difference with the situation prevailing in public institutions.

Data on modes certification indicated that in most non-profit making private institutions, most of them church affiliated, students take government trade tests at the end of a two- to three-year course. On the contrary, two-thirds of the profit-oriented centres granted only certificates of attendance, corresponding to shorter training programmes in soft skill areas.

Instructors' profile in surveyed institutions revealed that most of them were employed on a full-time basis. Their salary level ranged between three times and ten times the *per capita* income (1996 figure), the highest salaries being offered by profit-oriented institutions.

When analyzing the fees charged by institutions and comparing them with data on household consumption, the authors of the survey conclude that "it is clear that both not-for-profit and for-profit training courses are relatively costly and are only affordable among the better-off households". Fees represented between 73 per cent (not-for-profit) and 83 per cent (for profit) of the total income of private providers, the other sources being mainly donors (mostly church-run centres) and the sale of products and services (for-profit institutions).

Performance measured through internal efficiency showed a marked difference between non-profit institutions and the others. On average, not-for-profit private providers combined high drop-out rates with low pass rates. The results were much better for profit-oriented institutions. Differences in students' profile and trades offered may explain such differences and could motivate some sort of government intervention.

At present state regulation mainly deals with registration. The legislation on private providers defines criteria regarding facilities, staffing and funding

which are required for registration. VETA is responsible for enforcing these regulations. Full registration is subject to inspection by VETA. Institutions which have not yet been inspected or which meet all standards receive preliminary registration. Post-registration inspection is very rare, suggesting that VETA hardly has the capacity to ensure that the once-met standards are maintained over time. Lack of staff and finance seem to be the main factors explaining this situation.

Among the sample, a majority of private providers are dissatisfied with government involvement and find it either 'unsupportive' or 'very unsupportive'. They expect three forms of support, mainly, better inspection, better access to recognized qualifications and access to the training levy. Hence, quality and finance are the major concerns of private providers in Tanzania. It seems that beyond facilitating through an appropriate legal framework the creation of private TVET institutions, the government has not put in place the mechanisms likely to ensure quality, measure standards and to strengthen the financial viability of the sector.

#### 3.3.7.2 Zimbabwe

It was only from the 1990s that Zimbabwe recognized the contribution that private TVET institutions could make to meet the skills needed on the labour market. As a result the number of private institutions has grown rapidly and significantly, although no precise figure is available.

The survey conducted for DFID in 1996 suggests that, unlike Tanzania, private training institutions tend to be of a relatively large size, the median enrolment figure being 500. Another difference in the data collected for the two countries relates to the type of training delivered. In Zimbabwe three-quarters of the total enrolment of the surveyed institutions were studying commercial and service skills (commercial, secretarial and computing classes), industrial trades only representing about 5 per cent. This pattern could be related to the structure of the economy and the relatively smaller presence of the informal sector in Zimbabwe (Bennell, *op.cit.*).

A significant share of students is already employed and takes evening classes. They represented two-thirds of learners in the commercial and service areas.

Regarding the distribution by gender, females represented close to 60 per cent of the students from surveyed institutions. This result suggests that private provision offers more learning opportunities for women than the public institutions, where they only represented 30 per cent of total enrolment.

The rapid increase in private-sector enrolment (about 12 per cent per annum in the sample) suggests a high demand for vocational skills. To some extent this can be related to a limited capacity in public institutions. Furthermore, the public sector tends to provide mainly traditional artisan skills, while the market increasingly requires tertiary-sector training. This seems to suggest that the private sector was faster to respond to changing labour market needs and that it complements public-sector delivery. However, negative opinions about the quality of public institutions among the employers may have fuelled a certain preference for the private sector. For some of them, private institutions could then also play a substitutional role.

The increasing demand for vocational qualifications in a context of low employment opportunities, and the relatively high percentage of employed people among the students, may indicate that individuals seek to improve their skills to become more competitive or self-employed in a depressed labour market. Investment in training can also reflect an effort to reduce the risk of becoming unemployed.

A specificity of the Zimbabwe context is the strong presence of foreign certification systems, particularly United Kingdom examination boards. Besides the fact that it can reflect a preference of individuals and employers, it may also be a side effect of the regulations in place. For, while registration for the provision of national qualifications is subject to strict criteria, this is not the case for foreign courses.

The data collected on teaching staff revealed a strong predominance of part-time instructors. This may be a preference of promoters in order to reduce labour cost, it could also be related to the high proportion of evening courses.

According to the DFID-commissioned survey, fees are relatively high, particularly in management, secretarial, computing and commercial classes. The median tuition fees were equivalent or above the minimum monthly wage (1996). Low-income students were mainly found in institutions offering artisan skills where fees were more affordable. However, fees charged by NGO training centres were generally found to remain beyond the purchasing power of poor families.

Like in Tanzania, private providers rely mainly on tuition fees to survive. In a predominantly low-income environment, this has led to the existence of sub-standard institutions. Such a situation, detrimental to the image of the private TVET sector, has generated complaints from recognized institutions. In the absence of state support, disadvantaged groups are not able to receive the skills provided by the private sector, some of which are not available in public institutions.

The involvement of the Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) mainly takes the form of registration and inspection. In spite of a general attitude in favour of private-sector provision, opening a centre still involves a complex procedure and, according to the same survey, the registration process takes from 6 to 12 months. In contrast to this restrictive de facto attitude, the MOHE implements hardly any inspection visits. As in Tanzania, lack of staff and budget are said to explain this situation. There is therefore no mechanism in place to monitor standards. Furthermore, in spite of a real shift in its general attitude towards the private sector, no policy document clearly stipulates the principles and measures adopted by government to promote and possibly support private TVET institutions.

#### 4. Expenditures and cost structures of private TVE institutions

The financial resources of private TVE institutions consist of their own capital, tuition fees, the proceeds from various activities conducted by the institution and any subsidies received from the state or from other donors. If a private institution receives no subsidies, then its tuition receipts, and possibly other self-generated income, must, at least, cover its operating expenses.

Neo-classical economists tend to support the view that the private sector should expand and eventually replace, at least in some areas, public provision, due to the expected higher efficiency of private management. Such performance should be reflected in lower costs.

Tables 8 and 9 below, taken from an IIEP study on national education expenditures in Benin, illustrate this difference between the public and private provision.

**Table 8. Average secondary TVE recurrent spending per pupil in Benin, 1996 (CFA francs)**

(CFA francs)	Public TVE	Private TVE
Teachers' salaries	83,893	37,003
Salaries of non-teaching staff	44,735	17,754
Teaching supplies	13,711	5,332
Other operating expenditures	41,839	21,099
Canteens, boarders	-	3,029
<b>Total</b>	<b>184,178</b>	<b>84,217</b>

*Source:* Péano and Oulai, 1999.

Average expenditure per pupil in public TVE in Benin is twice that in the private TVE sector. This difference is partly due to the nature of the training provided. Private programmes are geared towards the services sector and consequently require less expensive facilities and equipment, whereas the training courses provided in the public sector are oriented more towards industry and require the use of costly machinery and equipment. Such differences in the structure of provision by skill area between the public and private sectors introduce a bias in the comparison.

Under every expenditure category shown in *Table 8*, private institutions spend less per pupil than do public ones. For many private institutions, the financing problem is particularly acute where current operational expenditures are concerned, particularly teachers' wages. In the absence of outside contributions, the resources of private institutions are derived mostly from pupils' families, via the payment of tuition fees. When tuition revenue is low, school founders are forced to balance their budgets by recruiting more pupils and/or reducing the various expenditure items (including teachers' wages) as much as possible. In institutions where the entire wage bill must be paid from tuition receipts, there is thus a strong temptation to minimize staff cost by using less qualified and/or experienced teachers (e.g. Cameroon, see Péano and Esquieu, 2000).

In other respects as well, private institutions show a fair degree of flexibility in the make-up of their teaching staffs: although they do sometimes have permanent staff, they differ from public institutions in that they make more use of temporary teachers (Senegal, Mali).

In sub-Saharan Africa, private institutions can easily find such limited-term staff among the public-sector teachers, for whom this is a means of supplementing their wages. In some countries, one reason why private institutions seem profitable is that they have an ample supply of public-sector teachers whom they pay at a marginal hourly wage (see the Senegal case study, below).



These differences in average spending per pupil between the private and public sectors may also be attributable to other factors. For instance, it is possible to increase the number of pupils per class. It would be expected that classes tend to be larger in private TVE institutions than in the public sector, in order to hold down the number of teachers and operating expenditures. However, this may not necessarily be the case, as documented in the Mali and Senegal surveys (see below).

**Table 9. Breakdown of recurrent expenditures of public and private secondary TVE institutions in Benin (percentages)**

Cost item	Public TVE (%)	Private TVE (%)
Teachers' salaries	45.6	44.0
Salaries of non-teaching staff	24.3	21.1
Teaching supplies	7.4	6.3
Other operating expenditure	22.7	25.0
Canteens, boarders	-	3.6
Total	100	100

*Source:* Péano and Oulai, 1999.

It can be seen from *Table 9* that teachers' wages are the leading recurrent expenditure item in both the public and private sectors, accounting respectively for 46 per cent and 44 per cent of total spending. In fact the cost structure in both sectors is relatively identical.

Additional data on cost differential between public and private providers are available in a survey recently conducted, for the World Bank, on private education in Niger (BIEF, 2000). It describes the unit cost structure in TVE as shown in *Table 10*.

**Table 10. Unit cost in private TVE in Niger (1998)**

	Cost per student	Percentage
Teachers' salaries	49,925	53.4
Salaries of non-teaching staff	36,283	20.7
Teaching supplies	8,758	5.8
Other operating expenditures	6,039	4.2
Capital expenditures	11,331	11.8
Other	6,991	4.1
Total	119,327	100.0

Source: BIEF, 2000, *Développement de l'enseignement privé et communautaire au Niger, Rapport final*.

According to the same document, the unit cost in public TVE was estimated at 720,295 FCFA for the same year. This would suggest that in Niger, on average, public TVE is six times more expensive than private provision. Once again, it is difficult to make useful comparisons in the absence of precise information on the type of training provided in public and private institutions.

These examples from Benin and Niger show that caution is necessary when applying a cost analysis approach. Although necessary, it does not provide a sufficient basis for evaluating a technical and vocational education institution. Low cost may simply mean that the resources deployed (e.g. facilities and equipment) are not sufficient to provide adequate quality. However, it is expected that budget constraints and accountability may lead private providers to a more efficient use of resources. This rationale has formed the basis for allocating public money to privately run and owned institutions.

## 5. The effectiveness of private TVE institutions: missing evidence

Effectiveness is the relationship between the objective pursued and the result actually attained. In the case of technical and vocational education, the objective is mainly to increase skills for greater productivity and income.

Private-sector support strategies often assume that pupils in private institutions are better trained than are those in the public system. This statement cannot be verified, due to the lack of studies comparing the school-to-work transition of young trainees from the private and public sectors.

It is logical, however, for the reputation of a private institution to be based on its ability to train young people who can be taken up immediately by the labour market. This is why many observers consider that the private sector must be adaptable if it wishes to survive in an often-competitive environment. Then, it is expected that the rules of the free market and competition generally push private educational institutions to adapt their training programmes to the requirements of individuals and business, as well as making them more cost-effective.

In a context governed by the laws of supply and demand, private institutions must enjoy some flexibility in programme organization and management in order to meet the needs of enterprises effectively and thus to satisfy their pupils' desire to make the transition to working life. Although private institutions often follow state-run curricula, their private status allows them to show more flexibility as to management of the number of pupils, the teaching methods used, the qualifications of the teaching staff, recruitment policy, etc. Private status should also give institutions more freedom and initiative to develop linkages with enterprises to provide pupils with practical training and eventually with jobs. The discussion of the survey results on Mali and Senegal will show that this is not always the case. Although private

providers may be more alert to identify labour market trends and adapt their offerings consequently, their teaching mode and management style are often close to that of public institutions.

Yet, the relationships between private institutions and companies are of the utmost importance. When lacking up-to-date facilities and equipment for training, the founders of private training institutions have an interest in developing partnerships with private-sector companies. For example, they can conclude agreements with the business community allowing trainees to participate in internships within companies and thus to absorb the social and occupational realities of their chosen specialities via a first contact with the business world. However, this possibility exists primarily for industry-oriented technical education, a field in which there are fewer private institutions.

In sum, the reputedly flexible management of private institutions should give them the ability to adjust their training programmes to local labour markets and consequently to establish their reputation among the population, employers and future trainees alike. This assumption can hardly be tested on a large scale due to the lack of empirical evidence.

It should also be noted that pupils and their families still place a high value on obtaining a diploma, which is a sign of social success although it may not guarantee access to the job market (see Senegal case study below). Hence, private training institutions tend to have 'house diplomas', which of course are obtained by passing the examinations set by the institution. Consequently, families select one institution rather than another on the basis of criteria which have no fundamental connection to pupils' integration into the labour market. This must lead to qualify the assertion that private institutions are more effective: there is an inherent ambiguity as to the purpose of private TVE institutions, as they are both training pupils for employment and preparing them to obtain their diplomas.

In many sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, denominational private schools – many of which are Roman Catholic – have been highly regarded by both public opinion and the state because of their strong examination results. In many cases, these are due to the presence of better-qualified teachers and better equipment, made possible by the international linkages of the Church. For some Catholic schools, it is also due to a highly selective recruitment process.

Although it is customary to consider that some private institutions can be of better quality than public schools, this sort of generalization must be handled with care, as financial constraints or a concern for high profitability can impede the proper functioning of these institutions. Such patterns were documented in a recently published IIEP study on Cameroon (Péano and Esquieu, 2000).




## Chapter II

### Regulation of private provision

#### 1. The issue

Ideally, private provision should be seen in a broader perspective of complementarity between the public and private sectors. Private TVE takes place in a complex context combining diverse components catering for different segments and aiming at various objectives. *Diagram 1* below offers an overall view of the various types of technical and vocational education available.

**Diagram 1. Technical and vocational education available**



The public/private dimension further adds to this complexity. The penetration of market mechanisms in such an environment surely requires to revisit the role of government vis-à-vis training provision. With the emergence of new stakeholders on the training market, the state's role in technical and vocational education has changed. Besides providing finance and delivering training, government is increasingly playing a new role of regulation. This role is meant to support private provision but also to prevent the development of a large illegal sector.

It is worthwhile to encourage the creation and development of private technical and vocational schools because they contribute to the country's economic and social development by training skilled labour. Furthermore, the state should not necessarily discourage institutions that compete with the public education system, since these institutions not only meet social demand but also bring a competitive spirit to the entire education system. This can raise standards, leading to more stringent requirements and higher-quality delivery.

Since the early 1990s, many voices have emphasized the need to encourage the growth of the private TVE sector as a means of bringing training more into line with employment. However, the state cannot rely on market forces alone, paying no attention to the way private education operates, the conditions needed for a fair balance, the quality of instruction and the survival of certain institutions, since this market is not perfect. In the neo-classical model, market equilibrium is reached when supply meets demand as a result of a price mechanism. In reality, the underlying assumptions regarding full competition at the supply side and market transparency are hardly met. Furthermore, the time-frame of private investors is typically shorter than that of government. "The formal institutions at the heart of the education system, whether public or private, must clearly proceed in concerted fashion and in accordance with a long-term view. It is therefore the task of public policy to ensure coherence in space and time; in other words, to set guidelines and to regulate" (Delors, 1996).



The term ‘regulation’ refers here to a set of tools or mechanisms used by government to encourage, but also to control and monitor private providers.

Regulation of education encompasses the entire environment in which students, teachers, schools and government itself must operate as they work towards the objective of a higher-quality, more efficient education system. In view of the objective of technical and vocational education, namely to train skilled labour, the state must take into consideration the changing structure of the labour market in order to provide the right incentives to facilitate private investments in skill areas matching the real needs of the economy.

Governments tend to establish a system of control and support suited to their environments, in which the role of each of the stakeholders is clearly defined. As a result, regulations and agreements with the state should govern most private educational institutions. They are authorized to open under certain conditions, such as whether the premises are up to standard, the degrees held by teachers, adherence to official programmes, adherence to the national diploma system, etc. *Box 1* entitled Forms of Regulation below provides an overview of the various regulatory tools at the disposal of the state. The stringency of this framework varies with the country, according to the degree of supervision and control the government wishes to exercise over the expansion of the private supply of education.

Besides defining rules, standards and criteria, enforcement and implementation are often big challenges. This is where many governments face major limitations.

### **Box 1. Forms of regulation**

#### ◆ Administrative controls

Schools must be accredited by the state.  
Schools must comply with health and safety standards.  
Schools must comply with construction standards.  
The number of pupils is limited to the school's admission capacity.  
Schools must have not-for-profit status.  
Schools must submit financial balance sheets.  
A minimum level of investment is stipulated.

#### ◆ Regulation of scholastic affairs

Schools must adhere to public-sector programmes.  
The numbers of hours of instruction and school holidays are set by the state.  
The attainment level required for admittance is set by the state.  
The teaching language is imposed by the state.  
Certification.

#### ◆ Regulations concerning teachers and pupils

Teachers' wages and qualifications are set by the state.  
Procedures and criteria for hiring and firing teachers are set by the state.  
Statements of how resources are allocated between teachers' compensation and other 'inputs' must be submitted.  
Tuition charges are state-controlled.  
Procedures and criteria for selecting students are set by the state.

(James, 1991)

## 2. Funding of private institutions

### *2.1 Tuition fees*

Both private and public TVE institutions charge tuition fees, which are an important source of revenue. For unsubsidized private institutions they are obviously the main, if not the only, source of revenue.

Tuition fees are also very important to the way the institution functions. When the amount is set freely by the founder, tuition can be an internal means of controlling the nature of the clientele: very often, a trade-off can be effected between the number of pupils enrolled and the level of the tuition fees. Low fees are often set in order to increase enrolment, but this may detract from the quality of instruction if classes are overcrowded. Conversely, high tuition fees usually mean that the institution is targeting a particular social category, a strategy that entails wealth-based selectiveness and small class size. This is particularly true if the private institution is positioned on a niche market where demand is low. However, institutions that charge high tuition fees generally have a good reputation, which keeps demand relatively high. Some parents who wish to send their children to expensive institutions may be forced to borrow funds to meet the fees.

It is also possible, however, to introduce selection based on entrance examinations. This allows recruiting the number of pupils desired or needed from a pool of quality candidates. Such practice is often the underlying reason for the strong results posted by these institutions. Several different strategies may be adopted, particularly where good students from modest backgrounds are concerned. It may be in the institution's interest to keep such students, even at the cost of providing financial support (a system of scholarships or exemption from tuition fees). In this case, the private sector's contribution to society and the community (helping children from all types of background to succeed) coincides with the individual interest (promoting the image of the institution, which attracts or holds the best students by the quality of the instruction it provides) (Péano and Esquieu, 2000).

In sum, the level of tuition fees may have various effects on demand for schooling, and it would be worth while to analyze the relationship between this factor and the quality and reputation of the institution. It may be expected that, in the long run, expensive institutions cannot survive unless they provide quality training ('value for money effect'). However, some institutions charging very little fees may also be able to offer high standards due to their access to other sources of income.

In sub-Saharan Africa, as elsewhere, the tuition fees charged by private institutions vary widely. They are determined by a number of factors, some endogenous to the institution and some exogenous. The former have to do with operating costs and the founder's policy concerning the teaching staff, enrolments and subjects taught. Exogenous factors relate rather to the school's clientele and location; for example, tuition fees tend to be higher in urban than in suburban areas. This will be illustrated later on the basis of the Mali and Senegal case studies.

Tuition fees vary with the country, the institution, the disciplines and the strategy of the private institution. It seems that in most countries, government does not put any limit on private school fees. Some sort of fee regulation can be found in Côte d'Ivoire where fees need to be ratified (LaRoque, 1999). Such provision, in theory, enables government to exercise control over the training market. As already indicated, in reality inspection visits are rarely enforced.

In analyzing tuition charges, it is important to distinguish between for-profit and not-for-profit institutions. The former will tend to charge high fees and to position in certain countries, the drop in living standards limits the price institutions can charge. Founders must therefore balance their budgets by recruiting more students and/or cutting teachers' costs by using part-time staff. Financial restrictions can have a negative impact on the quality of the instruction provided and, in the end, graduates are poorly trained and incapable of integrating themselves into the labour market. Gradually, a vicious circle is

set in motion, since the drop in training quality detracts from the reputation of the institution and generally leads to bankruptcy. Generally, these institutions are in a vulnerable situation because their survival and the amortization of invested capital could be compromised by the weakened financial position of households.

Not-for-profit institutions are more open to a disadvantaged category of the population by charging relatively low tuition fees; just enough to cover their operating costs. Although these institutions are in a better position to receive outside assistance (from the state, NGOs, religious community etc.), they are not exempt from financial difficulties and closure on account of payment arrears.

Private educational institutions are seeking resources to supplement their tuition receipts. To this end, some institutions offer several short paid training courses each year, corresponding to a specific skilled job and meeting the requirements for this type of occupation.

The advantage of *Technical and Vocational Institutions* is that the subjects taught can be of interest to enterprises: the ever-tighter constraints on businesses, arising from continual technological change and the heightened competitiveness of economies, have increased the need for ongoing training of the labour force. In the same way as public schools, private institutions can aim for a business clientele, but in this case the training requirements will very likely be much more stringent than for those of families.

The private sector's capacity for expansion faces very serious obstacles – particularly financial obstacles – both at the time of the initial investment and in sustaining training delivery. This situation, as well as the concern for equity, can lead government to provide subsidies to private providers.

## **2.2 Government subsidies**

The development of the private education sector does not necessarily imply a complete absence of public financing, as in some cases the state subsidizes private institutions. Governments do in fact provide both direct and indirect assistance to private technical and vocational institutions. Direct aid takes the form of financial grants (Senegal), whereas indirect aid may be provided through the secondment of teachers on the government payroll (Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon), loans of land to founders (Senegal) and tax breaks.

Governments' reasons for subsidizing private institutions vary with the country and the role of the private sector in the education system. Government subsidies should in all logic first be directed towards private institutions whose training programmes are complementary to those of public institutions, provided of course that they correspond to market needs. It is however not always easy to distinguish between institutions supplying complementary training and those whose offerings compete with those of the state. The development of a private supply of education may be regarded as a deliberate strategy aimed at satisfying both enterprises' need for skilled workers and the social demand for training at lower cost to the state.

Subsidies allow the government to keep control over some private institutions and to steer their behaviour in certain directions. They can therefore be used to correct existing imbalances in the education system. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, the bulk of private technical and vocational institutions are located in Abidjan. For several years, the state has tended to grant subsidies to institutions located in rural areas or towns other than Abidjan in order to redress this strong regional imbalance. In an effort to ensure synergy between the public and the private sectors, government may be tempted to subsidize private institutions positioned in sectors regarded as strategic for the country's economic development or where there are very few public institutions. Under these circumstances, the two sectors complement one another instead of competing.

The impact of public grants depends on the financial position of the institution. In relatively well-off institutions, where the subsidy forms a negligible proportion of the budget, it is regarded as a mere gesture or reward. This was for instance observed in Catholic institutions visited by IIEP staff members in Senegal. For the schools experiencing the greatest difficulties, in contrast, the government subsidy is the main source of funding for teachers' wages.

### 3. Registering private providers and monitoring standards

#### **3.1 Rationale**

Developing a private supply of training requires a degree of transparency in the operation and management of institutions as well as compliance with certain standards, if only to inform and protect users. This is why the state lays down procedures for accrediting and monitoring institutions. Such intervention is particularly necessary in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), where the private supply of education is very often a response to demand exceeding the capacity of the public education system. In this situation, individuals are willing to pay in order to continue their schooling, without really being informed as to the quality of the teaching provided. It seems obvious, however, that some institutions will be of poor quality, employ deceptive advertising and exploit their customers.

The first form of control over the private supply of education is the authorization to open an establishment. In most cases, several distinct, sequential administrative procedures are required for official recognition of the institution, and consequently for the granting of any public subsidies (see *Box 2*).

**Box 2. Procedure for opening a private institution in Cameroon**

The creation and opening of a private institution require authorization from the Ministry of Education (MOE). Creation and launching involve two distinct procedures, which must be carried out in succession.

The authorization to create a private school or training institution is the first step. The future founders submit their plan in the form of a standardized application file containing a stamped application, a police record, a technical report with plans of the foundations and buildings to be constructed, the builders' estimates, and a deed of ownership for the land (Article 5). The file is submitted to the *Délégation provinciale de l'Éducation nationale*, and the MOE has 90 days to reject the application if it chooses to do so. The authorization to create the institution is granted for a period of three years (Article 5).

The second step is obtaining authorization to open an institution, and the founder follows a procedure similar to the first. The application file to be deposited at the *Délégation provinciale de l'Éducation nationale* includes a copy of the building authorization, a certificate of membership in one of the four founders' organizations, the names of all administrative and teaching staff, a bank statement for an account other than the founder's personal account and showing a balance equal to three months' wages for the entire staff, and a list of teaching facilities. The authorization to open is given in the form of an order from the Ministry of Education and is valid indefinitely.

Having followed this procedure to its end, the founder may make a public announcement of the opening of the school, begin to enrol pupils and hence start collecting tuition payments.

(Péano and Esquieu, 2000).



Often, the conditions governing the opening of a private institution entail time-consuming administrative procedures. There are also specific regulations concerning the organization of teaching institutions, particularly where teachers are concerned. These regulations can be an obstacle to the creation of private schools. However, enforcement of regulations is generally a problem, since governments usually do not have the human and financial resources needed to exert real control over the creation and operation of private institutions. As a result, the state often plays a more limited role in regulating the education market than it is supposed to.

Recognizing the potential role of private providers in establishing a vibrant TVE sector, while insisting on the need to protect learners and to ensure quality, governments are paying increasing attention to the registration and accreditation issues as illustrated by the experience of Lesotho and South Africa.

### **3.2 *Accreditation of private institutions in Lesotho***<sup>19</sup>

#### **3.2.1 *Background***

In Lesotho, the development of private providers can be related to inability of the MOE to cope with the expansion of the demand for secondary education and to solve the inefficiency of the system reflected in high failure and drop-out rates. Furthermore, since the inception of formal education and training in Lesotho, a great number of Basotho children had access to neither, due to economic constraints. There was, until 2000, no provision for free education and training except at university level, where the government, through the National Manpower Development Secretariat, provided financial support to students.

19. Adapted from: Ramaphiri, N.P., Partnership and private TVET provision in Lesotho, trends, issues and options with particular reference to the accreditation of TVET institutions, Ministry of Education, Department of technical and vocational training, Lesotho. Paper presented at the sub-regional intensive training course on “The management and evaluation of TVET”, IIEP/SADC/MOE of Mozambique, 11 May, 2001, Maputo.

Children from low- or no-income families, who could not afford the payment of fees, and some of those who could not be absorbed in the school system due to limited facilities, were always forced to leave school and seek employment. The male children would cross the border to seek employment in the mines, factories and farms in South Africa where education and training attainment levels were of no significant importance.

It is in this context that, gradually, churches, communities and, later, private promoters established secondary and vocational schools to offer an alternative to students who could not enter public institutions or who dropped out.

On the demand side, the labour market combines high levels of unemployment with shortages of skilled manpower to carry out specialized tasks in the growing industry. This situation resulted in heavy dependence on outsiders for skills requiring specialized training.

This situation has resulted in an increased demand from individuals for vocational qualifications in an effort to increase their employability. While this search for higher qualifications can be positive it can also produce negative effects. On the positive side, investing in training facilitates upward economic and social mobility. On the negative side, a lot of Basotho are so obsessed with the need for higher/better qualifications that they enrol in almost any programme that provides some sort of a certificate, regardless of its value. This, coupled with the fact that there is no manpower development policy and no system of certification, has resulted in the mushrooming of private institutions that claim to cater for those who did not have access to public provision.

### *3.2.2 The issue and the mechanisms as envisaged by the Ministry of Education*

Private TVET provision expanded massively in the early 1980s. In 1985, after some reports that most of the new institutions gave very little regard to

quality, the Ministry of Education organized a conference which prepared the ground for communication between government and providers. An accreditation system was seen as the only way to ensure that quality was maintained at all levels through partnership between all the stakeholders. This system would benefit providers, trainees and government. The government would have control of the system, trainees would be assured quality and relevant programmes, and providers would continue to provide training and be able to access public funds paid to them in the form of bursaries to their trainees.

The concept of accreditation describes a process of quality control and assurance by means of which, as a result of evaluation, assessment or inspection, an institution is recognized as meeting minimum acceptable standards through its programmes. To be accredited is an explicit recognition that an institution is meeting the minimum standards of curriculum, staff requirements and other resources to achieve its goal or mission.

In spite of an agreement in principle, there is as yet no single co-ordinating body of accreditation. Notwithstanding, there exists an intricate web of 'accreditation systems' ranging from registration, common examinations and affiliation, to mention but a few. In the 1990s Lesotho witnessed what the Ministry of Education calls a 'mushrooming' of private institutions of learning that offer a multiplicity of courses and certificates/diplomas through a varied range of training levels. The term 'mushrooming' as used technically in Lesotho, carries with it implications of a strong sense of disapproval with regard to the uncontrolled proliferation of centres of learning. As a result of the lack of regulation, it happens that equal qualifications are certified differently whilst others, that are completely disparate, are certified at the same level.

Thus, a fully-fledged accreditation system is expected to eliminate or discourage low-quality providers and to establish transparency in the training market in order to create a better learning environment. It should force all training institutions to re-examine themselves, be more competitive and employ

the better-qualified trainers. It is envisaged that the accreditation system performs the following tasks:

- registration and cataloguing of institutions;
- screening of programmes for relevance;
- quality assurance, control and management;
- certification;
- monitoring/overseeing structures;
- observing international trends;
- easing the process of evaluating and fitting certificates to qualifications frameworks;
- evaluating resources.

Therefore, the Department of Technical and Vocational Training of the MOE has developed a complex list of criteria for accreditation of TVET institutions, including:

- Identification of a perceived need for the work being done
  - (a) appropriateness of purpose;
  - (b) number and quality of staff;
  - (c) adequacy of facilities;
  - (d) quality of teaching/training;
  - (e) content of syllabi;
  - (f) details of programme(s);
  - (g) method(s) of selection of student intake;
  - (h) method(s) of assessment of students;
  - (i) success in achieving objectives;
  - (j) organizational structure;
  - (k) availability of support documentation;
  - (l) sources of funding.
- Reasonable value for money for services offered.
- Health and safety.
- Governance and responsible authority.

It is not yet fully clear how the MOE will be able to implement such a framework. However, explanatory notes relating to these guidelines were developed to help promoters in the determination of the format and content of the submission for purposes of accreditation.

For the purposes of accreditation, technical and vocational education and training establishments are classified and stratified into three broad categories. These are categories X, Y and Z.

- Category X

These are company in-house training centres or those training establishments that have emerged as offshoots of parastatal organizations. The underlying hypothesis is that such a training centre is subsidized by the parent company. The training provided is essentially intended to benefit the company through improvement of job performance or an increase in productivity.

The recipients of the training programmes are groomed for upward mobility or technological updating within the purview of the company's goals.

- Category Y

These are community institutions or centres set by government Ministries or departments. They may be financed through donor assistance or in other cases the centre could be a self-help project but in essence, community based.

The underlying factor is that the centre is non-profit making but geared towards improving people's lives or providing specific functional skills that are needed in order to enhance the quality of life in the community.

- Category Z

Category Z institutions are essentially independent or private institutions. They are self-financing and their sustainability is dependent on the fees charged and paid by trainees. They are established primarily as business entities.

The Department of Technical and Vocational Training is currently working on the TVET Policy, which defines roles to be played by each stakeholder in the accreditation process. The TVT Act No. 25 of 1984 is also being reviewed and will incorporate accreditation guidelines and procedures. The Department is also in the process of establishing curriculum advisory committees composed of employers and employee organizations, training providers, professional bodies and government representatives. These committees will assist in the setting of standards and the all-inclusive qualifications framework and accreditation systems. Envisaged also is the Accreditation Advisory Committee (AAC), which will advise the Ministry of Education on all matters related to accreditation of TVET institutions; and the Vocational Examinations Council for quality assurance in all TVET examinations.

### *3.2.3 Progress (May 2001)*

Private providers have contributed to the development of education in Lesotho. They have managed to keep a lot of Basotho children in training, whereas they would otherwise be roaming the streets. While a consensus seems to have been reached between promoters and government to recognize the need for some sort of regulation, mainly through accreditation, implementing this strategy has proved to be difficult. Since 1998 the MOE has not been able to get its representatives on the Accreditation Advisory Committee (AAC). The lack of organization among private providers as a group seems to be a major obstacle to a proper regulation of the sector, conducted within a partnership framework.

Furthermore, the system of criteria defined by the Ministry for accreditation seems quite complex. In particular, in the absence of a proper manpower development policy and tools, assessing the relevance of the proposed training programmes may prove problematic. Improving the functioning of TVET, both in the public and private sectors, would require that the Ministries of Labour and Employment and Education devise a system that would make labour market information available to all stakeholders whenever it was needed.

### 3.3 *Registration and accreditation of training providers in South Africa*<sup>20</sup>

In South Africa the high demand for specialized skills has fuelled the rapid growth of private colleges (see above). In the absence of adequate regulation to monitor the activity of private providers, many have been delivering low-quality training.

Recognizing the need to address this problem, the government passed, in the late 1990s, three Acts providing for the registration and accreditation of providers (the *Higher Education Act*, the *Further Education Act* and the *National Qualification Framework*). Besides monitoring quality, the concern of government was to protect and reassure the public. “It is not a guarantee or endorsement, but it is designed to keep out unscrupulous and incompetent operators”.<sup>21</sup>

According to the new legislation, private institutions will need to go through a registration process. The Act states that the Director General of the *Department of Education* must designate a person to be a registrar and the registrar must then process applications.

To do this, the registrar must establish that the institution that is applying<sup>22</sup>:

- “(a) is financially capable of satisfying its obligations to prospective students; and
- (b) with regard to all its further education and training programmes:
  - (i) will maintain acceptable standards that are not inferior to standards at comparable public FET institutions;
  - (ii) will comply with the South African Qualifications Authority quality assurance requirements; and

20. Based on Bird, op.cit. and on contributions of the South Africa delegation to the IIEP/SADC/MOE of Mozambique workshop on TVET, May 2001, Maputo (see above).

21. Statement from an official of the Department of Education, 2001.

22. FET Act, 1998, clauses 25 and 26.

- (iii) will comply with any other reasonable requirements determined by the registrar;
- (c) will not unfairly discriminate against any person on the grounds of race, gender or disability”.

The registrar is empowered to register in full or conditionally.

The FET Act, interpreted by regulation, empowers the Minister to exempt institutions from registration. Initially the Minister only exempted those institutions already in operation prior to the promulgation of the Act. However he has subsequently extended this to all private further institutions.

Although no date has yet been set for registration, the Department of Education, in order to ascertain the extent of private provision, is implementing a pre-registration process.<sup>23</sup> This exercise will also help the Department to design a more systematic administration system so as to handle the registration process in an effective manner. Pre-registration requires private providers to submit a brief overview of their activities. This process was expected to be completed by 30 April 2001.

The registration process will not be a one-off procedure. Registration will first be granted for an initial period (two years), thereafter the process shall be repeated every five years. A report is being prepared by the Department to spell out the best mechanisms for registration, including the design and dissemination of application forms (July 2001). Applications will take into account categories of providers as defined in the report of the initial survey. Registration will then be initiated on this basis as from October 2001.

Besides registration, a provider is accredited by a quality assurance agency, called an Education and Training Quality Assurance (ETQA) body. An ETQA may be established in a social sector (for example a religious group),

23. The notice requesting private providers to produce information on their activity (enrolments, location, etc.) was made available at <http://education.pwv.gov.za>



in an economic sector (for example a Sector Education and Training Authority established under the Skills Development Act or a professional body) or in an education and training sub-system sector (such as the Higher Education Quality Council established under the Higher Education Act or the General and Further Education and Training Quality Assurance Council – currently being established by legislation). The principle of minimum duplication will apply in the establishment of ETQAs, i.e. an ETQA is accredited to quality assure specific qualifications and standards, based upon the needs of its associated sector. Most qualifications will be uniquely quality assured by a particular ETQA, so that its functions do not duplicate the functions of another ETQA. The functions of ETQAs include the following:

- accrediting providers;
- promoting quality amongst constituent providers;
- monitoring provision;
- evaluating assessment and facilitating moderation among constituent providers;
- registering assessors;
- the certification of learners;
- co-operating with relevant moderating bodies;
- recommending new standards or qualifications or modifications to existing standards and qualifications;
- maintaining a database;
- submitting reports.

ETQAs do not set standards; they assure the quality delivery and assessment of registered standards and qualifications. Furthermore an ETQA may not be a provider; its primary function is to assure the quality of provision and assessment of providers it has accredited.

In May 2001, 17 ETQAs had been accredited and they include the Higher Education Quality Council (HEQC) as well as 13<sup>24</sup> Sector Education

24. Verbal report from SAQA staff, 4 May 2001.

*Literature review*

and Training Authorities (SETAs) and 3 professional bodies. On 20 March 2000, the Minister of Labour established 25 Sector Education and Training Authorities. Each consists of a Board on which organized labour, organized business (including small business) and relevant government departments are represented.

While the rationale for regulating private training provision in South Africa seems clear, the design and implementation of the mechanisms for the registration and accreditation of providers appear quite heavy and complex. While it is too early to assess the impact of this new regulation framework on the functioning of the private training sector, its implementation will require close monitoring to ensure that the relative procedures involved do not hamper the dynamism of the market.

## Concluding remarks

Although the information base is relatively poor, it is clear that the emergence and proliferation of private training providers is a powerful movement in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) education systems. This rise of private provision of TVE can be seen in an historical context. In traditional African economies, skills were provided in an unstructured and unregulated way, on the job, through apprenticeship-type arrangements. During colonial times and throughout the first part of the independence era, the state started to finance and provide TVE. In most SSA countries, this process of state-run modernization resulted in supply-driven, public-sector-dominated systems. Today, the restructuring of TVE is giving birth to a new stage characterized by the search for more market-driven TVE systems. As a result SSA countries rather display various combinations of public and private providers, using different steering mechanisms related to specific segments of the training market. In some countries this is done, for job-related training, through tendering procedures in which private and sometimes public providers compete for funding (e.g. Côte d'Ivoire, Mali).

In most SSA countries TVE private providers form a heterogeneous and fragmented sector. They are very diverse in terms of status, offerings, size, students' profile as well as performance. It is therefore very difficult to develop a general discourse on private provision.

The rapid and, in some cases, impressive growth of private provision can be explained by two main factors. First, the poor quality of the public TVE sector motivated the search for a private-sector alternative, which is expected to be closer to the needs of the labour market. Second, increasing demand for private TVE is also due to the shortage of education and training opportunities in the public sector. Unsatisfied demand, particularly at the secondary and post-secondary levels, naturally builds up a market niche for private providers.

In the search for efficiency and labour market relevance, governments in SSA are now making great efforts to regulate what started as a largely spontaneous and sometimes chaotic process. Aiming at quality while relying increasingly on private providers and market mechanism to expand the quantity of training implies deep macro-level changes. In particular, it requires a new organization of training standards, delivery, assessment and funding.

While a deregulated system means less state involvement, the establishment of a training market requires adequate government intervention to facilitate the creation of private institutions and ensure transparency of the emerging market for training and support to some segments of the private sector, in particular for low-income students. However, in several SSA countries, the implementation of a regulatory framework faces a number of difficulties. The weak institutional capacity of Ministries in charge of TVE in most SSA countries makes it difficult to enforce the agreed rules and regulations. Although recognition and accreditation procedures can be considered legitimate and necessary, the cumbersome process involved can be, in some countries, too heavy and too long. Information collected in Côte d'Ivoire and Mali suggests that heavy tendering procedures can affect the entry and participation of training providers. In particular, small institutions can face difficulties in meeting administrative and teaching requirements while remaining competitive.

Furthermore, the market-oriented policies can result in private providers being increasingly dependent on public funding (e.g. Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritius). Hence, although it is clear that in the sub-region there is a shift towards greater reliance on market principles, the regulatory framework being established by many countries is far from a fully market-based system. By and large, the growth of private provision goes together with more sophisticated state framework setting and policy steering.

A significant side effect of market-oriented TVE policies is the gradual 'privatization' of public institutions. Although privatization is usually defined as private ownership and management, privatization in TVE can take other

forms. Increasing autonomy of public TVE institutions associated with the growth of cost-recovery mechanisms and growing competition among providers eventually reflect the rise of 'private-sector practices' in education (e.g. Senegal). Such a trend can be seen as a type of privatization.<sup>25</sup> In countries where public technical and vocational schools compete with private providers through bidding, the boundaries between the public and the private sectors become even more blurred.

In the context of SSA the future of a more market-oriented TVE system remains unclear. A number of issues need to be confronted. They include questions such as:

- On what grounds should state support be provided to private institutions? Equity (ensuring the access of disadvantaged groups to quality training)? Efficiency (competition-based improvement)? Expansion (complementing public provision)?
- What criteria should be used to support private providers?
- What type of support should be provided to private institutions? Finance? Training of trainers? etc.
- What mechanisms should be put in place to deliver such support? Direct subsidies? Scholarships? Fiscal incentives? etc.

Complementing this preliminary review, the two case studies on Mali and Senegal provide further and more detailed information on private provision. In *Box 3*, evidence from Tanzania and Chile is given on 'Can private schools remain better than public schools'?

25. This issue is documented and discussed in the combined report on public TVET in SSA.

**Box 3. Can private schools remain better than public schools? Evidence from Tanzania and Chile**

A number of studies conducted in various developing countries suggested that, based on students' learning, private schools, at the primary and secondary level, are generally more efficient than public schools. This is for instance the case in Tanzania, where growth in private enrolments has been spectacular since the late 1970s, particularly at the secondary level. Currently the share of private secondary schools' enrolment reaches about 55 per cent. Chile provides another interesting example of sharp increase in private education, as a result of the introduction of a voucher system. Between 19980 and 1996, enrolments in private schools increased from 15 per cent to 33 per cent of the total, largely at the expense of public schools. An advantage of private schools, in terms of students' outcome, was observed in the early years of the reform. Such results provided arguments for further expansion of private provision.

Recently published results on the efficiency and effectiveness of private and public schools in both countries add to the debate. Lassibille and Tan conclude their analysis based on data from a 1994 longitudinal survey by stating that "all else constant, private school students achieve, on average, lower scores than public school students, contrary to the results from the earlier studies for Tanzania". McEwan, using 1997 data on over 150,000 Chilean eight-graders, finds that "there is no important difference in achievement between public and non-religious voucher schools. In some cases, it appears that non-religious voucher schools produce slightly lower achievement than public schools".

Attempting to explain the difference between their results and earlier findings, the authors of both studies consider time and scale

factors. In a new market in disequilibrium, new schools may not be as efficient as more experienced institutions. In Tanzania, the authors believe that “the lagging performance of private schools also reflects the effects of high volatility associated with the almost complete reliance on income from student fees”. For McEwan, the Chilean case illustrates the fact that there is no evidence that the results experienced in small-scale experiments can be used “to infer the potential impact of a large-scale implementation of private school vouchers”. However, for the author, the absence of significant differences in effectiveness between public and non-religious private schools may also reflect the positive

*Sources:* Lassibille, G. and Jee-Peng, T., “Are private schools more efficient than public schools? Evidence from Tanzania”, in *Education Economics*, Vol.9, No. 2, 2001 and McEwan, P., “The effectiveness of public, catholic and non-religious private schools in Chile’s voucher system” in *Education Economics*, Vol.9, No. 2, 2001.

**PART II**  
Case studies:  
Private-sector technical and vocational education  
in Senegal and Mali





## Introduction

In the 1990s, Technical and Vocational Training (TVE) was subjected to a number of policy changes, of which the encouragement of private-sector training represented a major part of the reform strategy. However, while most observers report an expansion of private providers in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), limited data concerning them and their activities are available. According to the literature review undertaken as part of this research it seems that, so far, little investigation<sup>1</sup> has been conducted to examine the nature and operations of private TVE institutions.

For the purposes of the IIEP study, it was decided to focus on French-speaking countries. Two countries were thus selected, Mali and Senegal, both illustrating very different contexts for Technical and Vocational Training (TVE).

In *Senegal*, the TVE sector is underdeveloped with no clear strategy regarding its future. An increasing number of private providers are operating in an uncontrolled manner, with very little governmental regulation and support.

In *Mali*, TVE benefits from a positive institutional environment, partly due to the establishment of a Training Fund (FAFPA). The involvement of the government in the training market is very significant and a large number of private institutions' students are allocated and funded by the Ministry of Education (MOE). As a result, private providers have limited autonomy and the TVE market remains – to a large extent – in the hands of the state.

1. Among the surveys recently conducted, it is worth noting the research done in Botswana and Eritrea on behalf of their respective ministries of education and the study commissioned by the DFID in Tanzania and Zimbabwe (Bennel *et al.*, 1999).

The investigations took place first in Senegal, then in Mali, during the first quarter of 2001. In both cases, surveys were conducted in collaboration with a national team combining representatives from the ministries of education, private providers and a statistician. In Senegal, the team leader was one of the *conseillers techniques* of the junior Minister in charge of TVE. In Mali, in consultation with the Ministry of Education (MOE), the survey was conducted with the UFAE/GCMI, one of the new entities recently established to promote in-service training among enterprises, and which had recently been involved in the implementation of a survey of secondary schools.

In each country, the main objective of the survey was to collect information on the following items, the:

- profile and size of the institutions;
- courses offered;
- profile of the staff;
- profile of the students;
- recent enrolment trends;
- tuition fees charged;
- income and expenditures of institutions;
- relationship between institutions and enterprises;
- key performance indicators (drop-out, pass rates, etc.);
- impact of government regulations and policy;
- main problems identified by promoters and their expectations vis-à-vis the government.

At first a suitable questionnaire was developed to reflect these concerns. For Senegal, the final version was elaborated with the national team during a workshop held in Dakar in December 2000. This instrument was then adjusted following the results of a trial survey at the same time.

The questionnaire for Mali was adjusted, in a similar way, with the national team taking into account specific conditions. Some simplifications

were introduced due to the fact that some information had already been collected in year 2000 through a national survey on all secondary schools.

In both countries, the questionnaires were completed by owners, directors or training managers.

In Senegal, the survey covered 30 institutions out of a total of 73 registered by the Ministry of Education (MOE). The choice of sampled institutions was made on the basis of three criteria:

- skill area (service/industrial);
- level of training (secondary/post-secondary);
- geographic location (Dakar/other areas).

The implementation of the survey in Mali was significantly delayed due to students' strikes in secondary schools and private TVE institutions. This phenomenon illustrated one of the problems affecting the functioning and the quality of the education system in the country.

In Mali, the survey covered 20 institutions out of 71 registered and currently operating. All were located in the district of Bamako where over two-thirds of the registered institutions are concentrated. Many of the centres established in Bamako have duplicated their services in other regions. Hence, the skills offered outside of the capital district are also present in Bamako.

The construction of the sample took into account the date of creation of the institutions which included, also, schools dating back to colonial times as well as more recent centres established during the liberalization of the 1990s. Other variables used to select the institutions included courses offered (including female dominated trades), legal status (non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and commercial enterprises) and level of training (secondary and post-secondary).

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In both countries, the data collection process was complemented through interviews with key stakeholders in the public and private sectors. Broader information on TVE was gathered in order to replace the results of the surveys into a macro-perspective. A meeting was also organized, in both countries, with representatives of private providers and parents, to record their views, concerns and opinions about private provision and about the governments' involvement in the sector.

## *Chapter I*

### Case study: Senegal

#### 1. The general context of TVE

In Senegal, the study of Technical and Vocational Training (TVE) and the conditions of its development through private initiative straightaway meets a double obstacle of measurement and definition. The profile emerges of a sector of modest size, whose composition and exact scope remains vague. To this is added a complex organization due to historical precedent.

##### *1.1 Historical background*

Following independence, TVE was not governed by specific legislation. The Employment Code for Overseas Territories of 15 December 1952, as well as the Employment Code of 15 June 1961 were only concerned with employment contracts linking the company director to employees.

The first important law concerning TVE, adopted in 1967, concerning the Status of Private Education, did not make it possible to theoretically distinguish between technical and vocational education; in this sense, it is quite revealing about the fuzziness surrounding the philosophy and objectives of TVE, as much in the public as in the private sector.

The timid first steps taken by the 1967 law did not allow the private sector to compensate for the shortcomings of the state sector. To remedy the deficiencies and cumbersomeness of the initial text, on 6 June 1971, Senegal adopted a law concerning the Goals of National Education, responsible for defining aims, general objectives and the main lines of a State Education and

Training policy. Practical training<sup>2</sup> (vocalized junior secondary education) was then created to receive 80 per cent of students graduating from primary school. It had the special mission of orienting young people either towards the workplace or towards TVE. This principle, called *vocational guidance*<sup>3</sup>, reveals a concern with recognizing the limits of general and academic education in meeting the need for competitiveness and economic development.

Ten years later, the *National Conference for Education and Training* organized, in 1981, a Conference, which provided an occasion to carry out a rigorous audit of the overall education system. Devolution, decentralization and openness to private initiatives were among the basic recommendations of this *National Conference* which brought together all of the stakeholders and partners of education and training.

The decree by which the Ministry of Education (MOE) is organized, stipulated that two different departments should be created responsible, respectively, for secondary technical and vocational schools. The Conference also decided to create through the law of 11 August 1986 a National Office for Vocational Training (Office National de la Formation Professionnelle (ONFP)).

The ONFP, whose prime mission is to assist the state in setting the aims of vocational education policy, must also contribute to the creation of new training centres and finance training activities. Its funding is assured by the Employers' Fixed Contribution tax *Contribution forfaitaire à la charge de l'employeur* (CFCE) which is equal to 3 per cent of the gross salary of Senegalese workers, and through state grants. A real innovation, the ONFP was to be a key partner in developing TVE.

2. « Enseignement moyen pratique ».
3. *Vocational guidance* has two intentions: on one hand, to uncover the potential and talents of students through a wide range of learning experiences and, on the other, as a next step, to transmit the mastery of basic technical abilities through pre-professional activities.

Other creations, like the National Centre for Professional Qualifications (*Centre national de qualification professionnelle/CNQP*), the Vocational and Technical Centre of Senegal/Japan (*Centre de formation professionnelle et technique Sénégal/Japon/CFPT/SJ*), and the Regional Centres for Vocational Training (*Centres régionaux de formation professionnelle/CRFP*) are also an outcome of the recommendations of the 1981 National Conference. This new institutional landscape gave a second wind to the TVE sector, which nevertheless remains under the *perpetual control* of the state.

The stated motives behind the 1991 Outline Act generated new criticism and denounced the dislocation of the education system. The legislation thus underscored the “incapacity of Practical Training to correct the effects of dropping out”. The new law reaffirmed the general principle according to which “the state is the guarantor of the quality of education and training, as well as the certificates awarded”. It brought major innovations to the education system, which it structured in three cycles:

- *a basic cycle* which includes pre-school, primary and junior secondary education;
- *a secondary and vocational cycle* which includes both general and technical secondary education, and vocational training;
- *higher education*.

For the first time the general objectives of technical and vocational education were clearly distinguished: technical education is considered to lead to higher education, while vocational training prepares the student to exercise a skill in the workplace.

### **1.2 The current organization of TVE**

Technical and vocational education is founded on precise programmes and guidelines, which, although occasionally somewhat obsolete, lead to the standard ranking of state-awarded diplomas: Vocational Training Certificate



(*Certificat d'aptitude professionnelle/CAP*); Vocational School Certificate (*Brevet d'études professionnelles/BEP*); Professional Certificate (*Brevet professionnel/BP*); Technical *Bac* and Technical Certificate (*Baccalauréat technique or Brevet technique/BT*); Advanced Vocational Training Certificate (*Brevet de technicien supérieur/BTS*). Largely inspired by the French educational model, it is characterized by a heavy emphasis on examinations, theoretical and general knowledge, along with practical knowledge acquired in vocational training.

The TVE sector follows two main streams. First, there is a technical stream lasting three years and leading to a Technical *Bac* or certificate (G, T, S3, etc.). By providing students with “the knowledge and skills necessary to deal with the various courses offered at higher education level”, its aim is to rather prepare them for the continuation of studies. The other stream is a vocational one which prepares them for CAP and BEP diplomas intended to lead them directly into active employment, with programmes that make possible “the acquisition of skills and qualifications needed to practise a trade or profession”. The first stream can be compared to a ‘long’ course of studies, and the second to a ‘short’ one. They are the responsibility of two distinct departments within the Ministry of Education (Department of Secondary Technical Education – *Direction de l'Enseignement secondaire technique/DEST*; and the Department of Vocational Training – *Direction de la Formation professionnelle/DFP*).

This initial distinction or dichotomy, focused on secondary education, is not sufficient, however, to describe the wide variety of vocational training available in Senegal, which sometimes falls outside the categories of state-sanctioned diplomas.

Thus, upstream from this ‘secondary education’, and aimed especially at young girls coming out of primary schools, exists vocational training focused on family and social training, on home economics, cooking and sewing. Taught

in Centres for Women's Technical Training, they lead to accreditation and can be used to prepare a Vocational Training Certificate (CAP).

Other kinds of training, in crafts, are also given in the Regional Centres for Vocational Training (*Centres régionaux de formation professionnelle/CRFP*) whose best students can sit for the national CAP examinations.

*Vocational training* is also provided in a few Centres for Practical Training whose student clientele is made up of young people who do not continue at secondary level. This training has nevertheless become obsolete and affects only a small number of young people.

Finally, one should mention that a significant number of young people (but this is difficult to measure) leaving primary school turn towards an apprenticeship system, qualified as 'traditional', where the training is received on the job under a master craftsman. This kind of training, without precise pedagogical content, most often takes place in workshops. Intended for the mass of young people who have little or no education, it remains largely disorganized and unrecorded in statistics.

Taking into consideration the low rate of continuation at secondary school level – only 20 per cent of primary school graduates – one can wonder about the opportunities open to the mass of students – 80 per cent of the young generation – to obtain qualifications and to be integrated into working life. In particular, what is the exact status, place and role of Practical Training whose utilitarian though marginal curriculum still seems to function today as a sort of pre-professional stream within the 'vocational guidance' concept mentioned above?

Downstream from the *Bac* (i.e. school-leaving certificate or high-school diploma) and in parallel to classical university studies, there is a current trend towards the development of courses leading to an Advanced Vocational Training Certificate (BTS, or *Bac+2*) or to equivalent diplomas. Although

belonging to higher education, these courses are closely related to vocational training and are claimed as such by the Ministry concerned. Note that the private sector has a strong presence in this niche.

### ***1.3 A relatively undeveloped sector with an indefinite profile***

TVE in Senegal is somewhat chaotic – and rather difficult to grasp – with training taking sundry forms from post-primary to higher education. Targeting widely different publics, it fills the most diverse functions.

Students studying at secondary and university level attend a wide range of schools. Also, one finds both technical high schools (*lycées*), as well as training centres or ‘institutes’ which in the various industrial specialties lead ‘directly’ to state diplomas, but can also widely diverge from them. These schools, especially those from the private sector, thus offer personalized and customized training, which can lead to ‘home-made’ diplomas (‘Labour Skill Diplomas’ – *Certificat d’aptitude à l’insertion/CAI*; ‘Vocational Study Diplomas’ – *Diplôme d’études professionnelles/DEP* instead of the Technical School Certificate/BEP; or ‘Advanced Technical Diplomas’ – *Diplôme de technicien supérieur/DTS* instead of an Advanced Vocational Training Certificate/BTS). These diplomas are sometimes considered as half-way houses (for example between the *Bac* and the BTS).

The relative dispersal of institutions responsible for TVE is coupled with a motley blend of administrative ‘regulators’, from which technical and vocational teaching has been able to ‘benefit’ over time as Ministerial departments changed, along with their successive responsibilities. Today, besides the *Ministries of Education* and of *Higher Education*, the *Ministries of Agriculture, Crafts, Health*, and even *Tourism*, also share responsibility for schools, providing training in their respective areas.

When this survey was carried out, TVE was run by the delegated Ministry, responsible for Literacy, Technical and Vocational Training, and its

two departments, the Department for Technical Education (*Direction de l'Enseignement technique/DET*) and the Department for Vocational Training (*Direction de la Formation professionnelle/DFP*) which shared the responsibility for the training provided by schools. Thus, within the same *lycée*, some sections were dependent on the DFP (for Technical Certificates, BEPs and BTSs) while others were dependent on the DEST (for Technical *Bacs*). Henceforward, the school principal was accountable to two entities.

The Regional Centres for Vocational Training (*Centres régionaux de formation professionnelle/CRFP*) set up an autonomous project (financed by the European Union) within the Ministry. This special status turned them into a sort of enclave which did not contribute to the setting up of a genuine training system, i.e. a unified system of interrelated programmes, forming a coherent package.

Also, uncertainties arose concerning technical training for the *Bac+2* level (i.e. two years of training after high-school graduation). Thus, the Advanced Vocational Training Certificate (BTS) is considered as vocational training when it is provided by *lycées*, but equivalent programmes offered by the *École polytechnique* are considered as part of higher education. This ambiguous method of dealing with *Bac+2* technical training is causing anxiety for the Department of Vocational Training (DFP) which fears that this jurisdiction will be entirely handed over to the Ministry for Higher Education (MOHE).

The 'Ten-Year Plan for Education and Training' (*Plan décennal de l'éducation et de la formation/PDEF*, September 2000), developed as part of a special United Nations initiative for Africa, basically agreed with this critical analysis. Concerning TVE, it found a large number of weaknesses and in particular noted that "despite this diversity of administrative structures, the current condition of TVE appears to be far from brilliant. The sub-sector which has existed since independence has not seen an orderly and harmonious

development, both from the point of view of access and also of quality, and this, despite all the attempts and efforts of the state.”

In its action plan, the PDEF calls for a series of measures aimed at improving the access, quality and management of TVE. **One should note that no specific measures exist for the private sector.**

After the last legislative elections in April 2001, the renewal of interest in TVE led to the handing over of responsibility for the sector to a fully responsible and autonomous Department and no longer a delegated Ministry (Presidential Decree of 12 May 2001). This decision confirmed a commitment made by the President during the National Conference on TVE.

The organizational diversity and complexity of vocational training was evidently reflected in statistical terms, and thus on how it was managed and supervised. A rapid review of the various sources of existing information is extremely revealing.

- As for an annual census carried out mainly by the services responsible from the Ministry of Education (more precisely, the Department for State Planning and Reform – *Direction de la Planification et de la Réforme de l'État/DPRE*), the results published in the yearbook for 1999-2000 ‘officially’ mentioned 4,000 students undergoing technical training; 10,000 others were attending vocational training courses, and were distributed according to a list of specialties, with no reference given as to the level of certificate being prepared.
- The Education III sector analysis, financed by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in co-operation with the Senegalese Government, and entrusted to the International Consortium for Educational Development (*Consortium international de développement en éducation/ CIDE*), drew on a survey conducted among 120 schools. Without pretending to be exhaustive, but going beyond the strict definition of secondary

schools, it evaluated their enrolment capacity to be 27,700 places, with a total of 17,539 students registered during the 1999-2000 school year, of which only a half (8,863) were preparing a state certificate.

- An older diagnosis, done by the French Co-operation Mission, pointed out that from 1994 onward, there was a total of 20,700 students, 6,500 of whom were in secondary technical training, 11,800 in vocational training and, finally, 2,400 students in both state and private schools, mainly in Advanced Vocational Training (BTS).
- There also exist 'ministerial' statistics giving annual examination and competition results for vocational studies. For the 1999 session, they mentioned a total of 5,000 candidates for examinations (CAP, BEP, BT, BTS), which suggests a much higher number of students registered in the various years of study (it is probable that not all of them showed up for the national examinations).

These data, which are interesting in that they differentiate the results according to the type of diploma, reveal very low success rates for BTS (16 per cent) and, to a lesser degree, for BEP (29 per cent) and for CAP (34 per cent). Figures like these also shed light on the problem of the mediocre performance of TVE, since admission into vocational schools is pre-determined by a very selective examination (only 11 per cent admitted in 1999).

The results of the Technical *Bac* are less disturbing: for the 1999 session, the rate of success was 44 per cent, i.e. a rate equivalent to that of general *Bacs* (school-leaving certificate). The question of examination failure is thus highly relevant to vocational training, where very few candidates are successful in the various examinations.

Putting data like these side by side very well illustrates the full extent of inaccuracy where 'technical and vocational education' is concerned. This is

partly due to the way the sector is defined, but also to the absence of a measurement tool that can provide complete and detailed results. Moreover, this tool is being used by the Department most directly concerned (DFP); nor has it been totally mastered - at least not up until now - by the DPRE (which collected information from regional offices of the Ministry of Education, IAs and IDENs).

Despite this uncertainty, it is a fact that the TVE sector plays only a minor role in the Senegalese education system, but seems however to be exceeding the “2 per cent of enrolments for secondary schools” (if one compares it to the 186,000 junior secondary school students or, more precisely, to the 59,000 students at general secondary level), as is acknowledged in various documents and reports, especially in UNESCO’s 1999 Yearbook. This modest place does not meet the training demand, which is considerable if not overwhelming, but is constantly encountering selective barriers, which are nothing less than Draconian. As shown above, the excessively selective competitive entrance examinations for state schools eliminate approximately 90 per cent of all candidates, while the facilities available seem to be largely unused. As for the ‘happy few’, they seem meagrely rewarded in their final examinations, with only about a third succeeding. All of this discourages many candidates, who are thereby tempted to opt for private education.

#### ***1.4 Poorly co-ordinated training***

The very structure of the vocational training system gives rise to a problem: it comes from the partial and incomplete application of the French model during the sixties.

For the shorter cycle (consisting of courses leading to CAP and BEP), the Ten-Year Plan for Education and Training (PDEF) deplored that “in the face of a growing population of young people to be taken care of, the financial means for the Vocational Training Certificate (CAP) and the Technical School Certificate (BEP) are inadequate”. The PDEF remarked that in 1997, over

67 per cent of students left basic education without any qualifications. Moreover, there are no alternatives in non-formal education for these young people; however, it should be possible to offer apprenticeship opportunities so as to avoid early unemployment.

In the long cycle (Technical Bac and Technical Certificate/BT), the major problem encountered today for technical graduates is, according to the PDEF: “the absence of adequate infrastructure at the post-secondary level (BTS). For industrial BT, the lack of equipment and specialized trainers is one of the main obstacles to attain the objectives of the reform launched in 1984”.

The Technical *Bacs* (F1, F2, F3, now called T1 et T2) were set up in Senegal without the simultaneous creation of advanced technical courses, offering two additional years which are indispensable for professionalizing training at a higher level. The Technical *Bacs* were not devised to lead to immediate employment, and its graduates find themselves penalized in comparison to general secondary graduates for obtaining access to higher scientific or technological education. The holder of T *Bacs* are those who encounter the greatest difficulties in pursuing their education, and some people would like to see this stream suppressed.

*Technical Certificates* (BT) allow more specialization and professionalization than T *Bacs* (same level of enrolments, same number of years). They can serve as a basis for recruiting BTS candidates, thus allowing the best students to continue their vocational studies. Generally speaking, potential candidates are very numerous and more certain of a better certification than that already acquired.

The way TVE is currently organized in Senegal suffers, moreover, from an absence of pathways allowing the continuing of studies, or the changing of streams.



### **1.5 Weakness of school/business partnerships**

Although the importance of the training/employment relationship is widely recognized, it has not yet given rise to a visible search for partnerships, or regular co-operative opportunities. No real partnership programme has been organized.

Thus, in some centres, training was set up or changed according to the notion trainers had formed about demand, without it having been clearly voiced by the economic sector. The only available reference material was a study done by the National Office for Vocational Training (ONFP) in 1991 which noted the lack of middle management personnel to liaise between workers and engineers.

One can regularly find initiatives to organize contact with businesses interested in work-experience schemes and the eventual placement of students. This is particularly the case of some kinds of training supported from abroad. Despite these initiatives, initial training remains overall far removed from the workplace environment.

The in-house training of salaried workers is poorly developed in initial training centres (less, it seems, than in Mali); however, the involvement of technical and vocational schools in the continuing education of workers would allow the gap to be bridged between businesses and the public education 'supply'. This would be beneficial to adapting content to needs, and indirectly favour the placement of graduates. Furthermore, this evolution is perfectly consistent with the logic of 'making schools profitable' adopted by these schools (see below).

It still remains to be known why the wished-for partnerships with professional entrepreneurial organizations are not working. During a meeting, the General Secretary of the SPIDS, an organization which brings together 90 companies representing 80 per cent of overall sales for Senegalese

businesses, recognized the lack of interest in training among member companies, and the difficulties encountered in conducting surveys on employment and qualifications.

The National Office for Vocational Training (ONFP) should be a driving force in this area, and in developing in-house training, and should act as an interface between the 'demands' of business and the educational 'supply'. But in reality, the target of the ONFP turns out to be totally different from that of training schools. The Office seems very little concerned with the modern industrial and service sector. Between 1992 and 1999, it provided job-related training for the four sectors of the Senegalese economy (primary, secondary, services and informal). The most served sectors were the primary (53.5 per cent of the total number of trainees) and the informal (22.3 per cent).

### ***1.6 The costs and financing of TVE***

The Ten-Year Plan for Education and Training (PDEF) has pointed out the inadequate financing of this sector. In particular, it notes that if the national education budget has regularly risen from 1986 to 1997, from 47 billion CFA francs to 95 billion, the share devoted to TVE has not ceased declining. In terms of total public education expenditure (regardless of source) during 1997, the share reserved for technical and vocational education was no more than 4.3 per cent, compared to 9.6 per cent in 1992. It should also be noted, in terms of technical assistance, that Official Development Assistance (ODA) for public education was 38 per cent of total expenditure in 1998. According to data provided by the Ministry of Education, ODA was virtually non-existent for vocational training in 1998.

The question of how TVE is to be financed inevitably raises that of its cost, or more precisely of the extra cost it entails (which is often appreciable for industrial training) relative to the same level of general education. What

exactly is the situation in Senegal, and are any reliable comparative data available?

The Ten-Year Plan for Education and Training (PDEF) evaluates the unit cost in technical secondary education at 232,318 CFA francs in 1996, an amount only slightly greater than the 196,405 CFA francs calculated for general secondary education. This difference is quite small compared to the much higher cost of a post-secondary student: the latter costs 33 times as much as a primary school pupil (38,543 CFA francs), whereas a student in a technical senior secondary school costs 'only' 6 times as much.

The Review of Public Expenditure in the Education Sector (MEFP/UPE, MEN/DAGE) for 1998 provides fuller information which does not always agree with that of the PDEF.

For example, the 'public-sector unit cost' in general secondary education is estimated at 191,554 CFA francs in 1995, as compared to 335,323 CFA francs for technical education (361,719 in 1996) and 303,920 CFA francs for vocational education (370,033 in 1996). In the same year, the cost per post-secondary student was slightly over 1 million CFA francs, as against 37,000 CFA francs per elementary school pupil.

In addition to public sources of funding (central and local governments), the document considers the contribution made by households and Official Development Assistance (ODA). Factoring in the funds derived from these sources causes a perceptible increase in the unit cost of technical secondary (744,000 CFA francs in 1995) and general secondary education (264,829 CFA francs), whereas these sources are considered to make a negligible contribution in vocational and higher education.

These figures and the uncertainty regarding public and private funding must be borne in mind in addressing the issue of investment in the TVE sector. There is every reason to believe that the unit cost of state education

is calculated using total enrolments (public + private), which has the effect of artificially lowering this cost. In reality, therefore, the cost of a student in secondary technical or vocational education is probably slightly higher than the figures presented in the Review of Public Expenditure. The 'relative' extra cost for secondary vocational education can be explained by the student/teacher ratios, where class size is noticeably lower. Also, resources are rarely fully used. This inadequate exploitation of available means makes the current severe selection system appear even more grotesque, both for those entering and those leaving the system. To the relatively high cost of technical education must be added an 'output' that is incredibly meagre.

The National Office for Vocational Training (ONFP), which has been operating since 1988, has the particular mission of financing vocational training activities and financially contributing to the creation of new centres. To accomplish this, the ONFP is financed by a fraction (5 per cent) of the Employers' Fixed Contribution tax. A third of these resources is spent in financing the Office's own operations, and two-thirds are spent on the funding of training. In 2000, the Office was thus able to finance the training of 4,000 persons. This training was provided by various schools (56 of them in 1999).

The way this system operates gives rise to at least two problems. First of all, the insufficiency of available resources, in terms of needs. It is evidently regrettable that 96 per cent of the Employers' Fixed Contributions tax, which represents an annual sum of 4 billion CFA francs, cannot presently serve to improve and develop vocational training facilities, both initial and job-related, an anomaly which moreover tends to explain or justify the low level of interest among business people for training.

Next, the kind of training available and those providing it lack both transparency and accountability. Businesses and craftsmen do not have the means to be effectively part of the decision-making process. Moreover, the setting up of training programmes is not the subject of a public invitation to

tender, which would put all TVE institutions on an equal footing, including those from the private sector.

The project of starting a Training Fund, which was called for in the Ten-Year Plan for Education and Training (PDEF), should allow both for a minimum nest egg to be set aside to create a real partnership, and the setting up of mechanisms to achieve a more equitable and efficient distribution of resources. The amount of this 'experimental' Fund will be initially \$1 million for three years.

The question of funding should also examine, besides the state and private business, other sources available, especially the possibilities of households and local governments. The latter should see their role grow as decentralization progresses. They are also much appealed to by schools for social aid and scholarships for students, many of whom are not able to cover current enrolment fees. Available data on the sharing of education expenses by economic stakeholders bring to light the minimal financing on the part of local governments in the TVE sector, the burden on households (10.5 per cent of expenditure, apart from foreign aid) and the importance of Official Development Assistance (ODA), whose contribution is nearly equal to that of the Senegalese Government (see *Table 1*).

Encouraged to launch initiatives to complete inadequate operating budgets, state TVE schools can, according to the decree of 1991, generate new resources. These resources are managed by the bursar's office for the centres, under the responsibility of the principal. This decree has made possible the wide development of revenue-generating activities for the centres, and especially for teachers. The survey done by the International Institute for Educational Planning (UNESCO/IIEP) of four schools in Dakar reveals that these resources can represent up to seven times the current operating budget for a school (cf. the complementary report by the IIEP on state TVE schools in sub-Saharan Africa).

In all cases, these resources are in line with the Ministerial directives concerning cost-recovery. However, even if this aim has been achieved, no serious indicators exist on the relevance of this kind of training for finding work. Student flows are not being managed in terms of economic needs: this training meets, above all, the social demand of families.

Faced with the proliferation of this kind of cost-recovery measures in state schools, some representatives from the private sector, especially those preparing students for an Advanced Vocational Training Certificate (BTS), do not hesitate qualifying and denouncing these practices as ‘unfair competition’.

## 2. Development of the private sector

### *2.1 From independence to the 1994 law*

It was only in 1967, with law No. 67-51 of 29 November, that Senegal adopted its first piece of legislation concerning the Status of Private Education. This law (Article 1) recognized the four following categories of school:

- general education schools;
  - technical and vocational schools;
  - physical education schools;
  - art academies
- “created through private, individual or collective initiative”.

Article 2 of the law defined private technical or vocational education schools as follows: “Deemed to be private technical and vocational schools are institutions which under conditions specified in Article 1 provide their students with training that totally or partially prepares them to exercise a job or a profession of a commercial, industrial, craft or agricultural nature, or

give home economics courses, whether this training is complemented by general theoretical subjects or not”.

**Table 1. Source of financing and intrasectoral distribution of expenditure for 1996 (in millions of CFA francs)**

	Government	Local government	Households	ODA	Total	% of total
Administration	13,843				13,843	11.1
Pre-school	12				12	
Primary	31,207	767	16,121	3,037	51,132	41.2
Public	30,407	767	6,925	3,037	41,136	
Private	800		9,196		9,996	
Secondary						
Middle	8,177	159	6,427		14,764	11.9
Public	8,177	159	1,096		9,432	
Private			5,331		5,331	
Secondary						
General	9,239	192	1,456	2,308	13,195	10.6
Public	9,239	192	453	2,308	12,192	
Private			1,003		1,003	
Technical	1,993	8	235	1,762	3,920	3.2
Public		8	98	1,762	3,861	
Private			137		137	
Professional – Public	1,961			1,959	3,920	3.2
Higher education –						
Public	20,667		275	2,369	23,311	18.8
Total Public	86,301	1,125	8,846	11,436	107,709	86.7
Total Private	800		15,668		16,468	13.3
TOTAL	87,101	1,125	25,514	11,436	124,176	100.0
Share (%)	70.1%	0.9%	19.7%	9.2%	100%	

Source: The World Bank. 2000. *Project appraisal document*. Republic of Senegal, PDEF, Report No.19610-SE.

A definition like this does not make it possible to distinguish technical from vocational training in any conceptual sense. To distinguish state from private schools, one often refers to the public or private initiative behind their creation. Teaching and training in state institutions are in principle free, while private schools demand, besides high enrolment fees, significant monthly payments.<sup>4</sup>

Actually, the major preoccupation of the state in this sub-sector – and inspired by the then regime’s social democratic ideology – was to educate managers to take over from the colonial administration. In a context of strong state leadership, the private sector was not considered as an essential player in the education system.

The opportunities created by the 1967 law were only of a very timid nature, the creation of private schools implying heavy and long bureaucratic procedures. Article 6 had indeed defined the preliminary authorization process in no uncertain terms: **“no-one can open a private school without first having received authorization”**. This system was an impediment in so much as this authorization came after a series of administrative and pedagogical inquiries at the various levels of territorial administration: departmental inspection, regional inspection, prefect, governor, Ministry.

The administrative red tape which was to result from these provisions would limit the private sector’s ability to offset the shortcomings of state technical and vocational education. Thus, in 1971, Senegal adopted its first *Outline Act for National Education*, defining the aims, general objectives and main lines for the development of state education and training policy.

However, the incapacity of the state implicitly raised the problem of the place of private schools in the education system. A knowledge of the needs

4. The criterion for distinguishing the two according to school fees is no longer relevant since the signing of Decree No. 91-1135 of 6 December 1991, authorizing vocational schools to generate and use their own resources. These are, in fact, state schools.



of the labour market was a prerequisite for defining a relevant policy for technical and vocational education. ***The basic question came down to knowing whether private schools should simply complement the public sector, or develop their own capacities and initiatives, while incurring the risk of competing with the former.***

This dilemma was due to the failure of the education system to adapt. Faced with unemployment and the underemployment of graduates from general secondary schools<sup>5</sup>, it was essential to improve the quality of teaching. In other words, it was necessary to revise programmes and/or reorient streams towards the real needs of the economy. Moreover, crafts and apprenticeship programmes were gradually being recognized as pathways for the professional placement of graduates.

## ***2.2 From preliminary authorization to preliminary declaration***

After having criticized the dislocation of the education system, the Principles Act No. 91-22 of 16 February 1991 recognized “the incapacity of Practical Training to correct the effects of a decline in education.”

The education system was benefiting at the time from a relatively favourable tax break which exonerated “***schools and universities under administrative regulation***” from paying Value Added Tax (VAT) “***on condition that teaching was their main activity.***”<sup>6</sup> Under the influence of this law, Senegalese taxes on business activity were characterized by a double system: VAT and TS (tax on services) which was suppressed in 1990.

5. Unemployment developed at the rate of 10 per cent between 1960 and 1991. In 1991, 62 per cent of jobs were private jobs compared with 38 per cent in the public sector, while in 1981, these percentages were respectively 57 per cent and 43 per cent. See *Common evaluation of the country's status: the UN system in Senegal*, August 1998, pp. 94-95.
6. Law No. 87-10 of 21 February 1987 concerning the General Tax Law, which was modified by Laws No. 90-01 of 2 January 1990 and No. 92-40 of 9 July 1992.

After stating that “National education is placed under the responsibility of the state which guarantees citizens the Right to Education by setting up a training system”, the law also made clear that “*private, individual or collective initiatives can, under the conditions laid down by the law, contribute to the task of Education and Training*”.

This educational structure is, today, mainly regulated by the law of 23 December 1994 which eased and liberalized the procedures necessary to open a new school, whether general, technical or vocational. Article 7 provides that a school be authorized to operate as soon as it can produce “*acknowledgement of having deposited the preliminary declaration with the competent authorities*”. In fact, from that year forward, their number has rapidly increased. Today there are over 1,000 authorized schools, compared with only 400 six years ago, with the majority of them offering a general education.

#### **Box 1. Application document (Senegal)**

As requisite documents, the regulations ask for ten (10) different pieces for the school, itself; and ten (10) pieces for the responsible informant according to the terms of Article 3 of Decree No. 98-526 of 26 June setting the conditions for the opening and control of private schools.

*For the school application:*

- *a statement on the educational, professional and social aims of the school and its public usefulness;*
- *an overall blueprint of the premises (classrooms, laboratories, washrooms, libraries, etc.);*
- *a statement on the qualifications and diplomas offered;*
- *a presentation of the courses, timetable and duration of courses;*

- *conditions for recruiting students and auditors, as well as enrolments according to subject, section and system (boarding school, half-board, day school);*
- *the number of teachers, as well as the criteria for recruitment according to subject;*
- *the number of classes planned, which cannot be less than two (2) classes for secondary level;*
- *a descriptive account of the management, administrative and surveillance personnel;*
- *proof of ownership, rental or leasing contract for the premises for a minimum of three (3) months;*
- *the designation and exact address of the school.*

*For the responsible informant:*

- *a preliminary declaration of intention addressed to the Ministry responsible for Technical and Vocational Education;*
- *a birth certificate;*
- *a proof of nationality;*
- *an extract of from the Criminal Records Office, dated within the previous three months;*
- *certified copies of diplomas and curriculum vitae; if the responsible informant does not have the requisite academic level, he or she is asked to recruit a qualified principal;*
- *copies of the statutes, constitution and the group or congregation, accompanied by a written statement designating the responsible informant as responsible, if the need should arise;*
- *proof of reciprocity, if the responsible informant is a foreign national;*

- *the list of previous formulated requests for authorization, whether successful or not;*
- *a legal affidavit to respect the official regulations, and to respect the timetable and programmes proposed, to submit to visits and educational inspections, and doctors responsible for school hygiene, and finally to annually file a report to the responsible Ministry at school opening and closing on the moral, pedagogical and material status of the school;*
- *a bank attestation proving that the school has a sum on hand equal to three-months' paid salaries for the staff to be recruited.*

The complete dossier is submitted to the Departmental Inspectorate for Education in the locality concerned, in return for written 'acknowledgement of submission' which authorizes the school to begin operating.

*Source:* M. Fall. Private technical and vocational education in sub-Saharan Africa, the case of Senegal: a review of the legal framework, Office of the Minister responsible for Literacy, Technical and Vocational Education/UNESCO-IIEP. 2001.

After two years of operation, the state can officially recognize the private schools according to pedagogical and material conditions, but also with reference to accounting criteria: the regular payment of salaries and social welfare contributions. To date, only a small minority (200) of schools are formally recognized; and can, based on this status, benefit from state grants, whose total amount is today around 1 billion CFA francs, i.e. about 1 per cent of the total National Education Budget. In comparison, it is estimated that the private schools' share of total enrolments is above 10 per cent for primary schools, and up to 20 per cent for secondary education. In the area of TVE, eight recognized private schools share an annual grant of over 30 million CFA francs.

**Box 2. Method for calculating grants and bonuses to private schools (Senegal)**

The total amount of the grant in the budget of the Ministries involved<sup>7</sup> is allotted as follows:

- 9/10th for teaching personnel
- 1/10th for exam bonuses

To encourage the opening of private schools in regions deep inside the country (nearly 70 per cent of schools are concentrated in Dakar), the amount of grants allocated to teaching personnel in these interior zones is more important than for cities. However, within the same zone, the amount per teacher is uniform, whatever the qualifications.

The calculation of grant per teacher is done as follows according to zone:

$N$  = overall teaching staff in zone 1

$N'$  = overall teaching staff in zone 2

$S$  = total grant to be shared

$X$  = grant per teacher for zone 1

$Y$  = grant per teacher for zone 2

Sharing the total grant is done in the relation of  $2N$  to  $3N'$

7. When this survey was done, the concerned Ministries were the Ministry for Technical and Vocational Education, the Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry for Youth and Sports, and the Ministry of Culture, all of which have under their control private schools for vocational training. For 2001, this represents a budget of 34 million CFA francs within the National Education Budget!

For zone 1, the formula for calculating the grant would be:

$$X = \frac{2 S}{2 N + 3 N'}$$

For zone 2, the formula to calculate the grant would be:

$$X = \frac{3 S}{2 N + 3 N'}$$

All examination bonuses are determined by the results obtained by the private school at the various competitions and official examinations. Thus, to benefit it must have at least the following numbers who pass: 3 for the Vocational Training Certificate (CAP) and for the Technical School Certificate (BEP); 4 for the Technical *Bac* or Technical Certificate.

*Source:* M. Fall. Private technical and vocational education in sub-Saharan Africa, the case of Senegal: a legal analysis, Office of the Minister responsible for Literacy, Technical and Vocational Education/UNESCO-IIEP, 2001.

### **2.3 Legal status of private schools**

The 1994 law no doubt introduced a degree of flexible liberalization which favoured the rise of the private sector in various forms: a diversity of schools and legal status, new courses and teaching methods, and a new style of recruitment for both students and teachers.

Under various designations (centres, courses, groups, institutions, educational complexes or simply private schools), the private network includes a wide diversity of legal status (denominational, associations, private enterprise, etc.). Private schools for technical and vocational education can take the

form of an Economic Interest Grouping (EIG), a public limited company (SA), a private (limited) company (SARL), a one-person company, a non-government organization (NGO) or a secular or denominational association.<sup>8</sup>

NGOs are private associations or organizations which are duly registered, and non-profit making, aimed at supporting development in Senegal; they are authorized to do so by the government in accordance with the terms of Decree No. 96-103 of 8 February 1996, setting out the operating procedures for NGOs.

The *Uniformity Act for Companies and Economic Interest Groupings* of OHADA<sup>9</sup> makes it possible to distinguish between two legal categories:

- companies: these are **“one or two persons who agree to combine their resources so as to share profits or to take advantage of resultant savings except for assuming losses which could result from the company’s operation”**.

Tax law considers every activity done by a company as a business activity. It follows that private schools providing instruction and training which are public limited or private (limited) companies,<sup>10</sup> whether one-person or

8. Private (limited) companies, public limited companies and one-person companies are considered as commercial companies, and NGOs and denominational administrations as associations. Economic Interest Groupings are considered as non-lucrative entities whose aim is not to generate and share profits. Tax breaks are thus reserved for non-profit organizations.
9. Organisation pour l’harmonisation du droit des affaires en Afrique (The Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa) of 17 April 1997. The Uniformity Act abrogates national legislation only where its measures are in contradiction to it.
10. A public limited company is a company whose capital is divided into shares and which is made up of one or several persons (associates) who support losses only up to the amount of the capital they have invested. Capital stock cannot be below 10 million in shares for a nominal value equal to 10,000 francs at least. The private (limited) company is defined as one in which a (one-person, private (limited)) company or several associates are only responsible for share debt up to their contribution to capital stock which cannot be below 1 million and whose shares have a nominal value which cannot be below 5,000 francs.

collective, among others, will be considered as such<sup>11</sup> and subject to existing tax laws, with corporate taxes of 35 per cent on profits earned by companies. In the same way, measures concerning the Employment Code and Social Security will be fully applied: private schools must be in good standing with the Senegalese Social Security Department and Pension Fund for all recruited personnel.

- an Economic Interest Grouping: it is defined as **“an organization whose sole aim is to implement for a determined period of time all of the means needed to facilitate or develop the economic activity of its members, as well as improving or increasing the results of this activity”**.

In other words, the EIG does not directly give rise to the making and sharing of profits despite its registration in the commercial register, which does not entail the presumption of business activity according to the Senegalese Code of Civil and Commercial Obligations (*le Code des obligations civiles et commerciales/COCC*).

This is why tax law considers EIG private educational and training institutions as accountable legal entities exempted from taxes because they are non-profit making. However an EIG can choose to pay existing corporate taxes on profits (at the rate of 35 per cent of taxable profits). If EIGs are economic entities, they can be subject to a proportional tax of 25 per cent and a progressive tax with a ceiling rate of 18 per cent.

Private institutions in the form of an NGO also have the double advantage of not being taxed, but are also exonerated from paying VAT, real-estate taxes and professional taxes. Denominational organizations also benefit from this favourable situation. This kind of tax break explains why nearly a half of the schools surveyed opted for the legal status of EIGs (14 out of 27 schools).

11. Besides these two forms, the Uniformity Act makes provision for other kinds of company: general partnerships, limited partnerships, joint-venture companies, and de facto partnerships.



However, when it appears that the benefits accruing to the activity are genuine commercial or industrial profits, tax law considers them as such, and submits them to corporate taxes, no matter what designation was chosen by its members.

All in all, concerning tax breaks and incentives, tax laws do not allow significant exonerations or exemptions to the benefit of private educational institutions<sup>12</sup> even if, in contrast to other sectors, their profits are spread over nine months.

#### 2.4 The private TVE 'supply'

It is difficult to appreciate the exact importance of the private sector in the area of TVE, even in its purely school-based form. Some rather rudimentary statistics gathered by the DPRE show the following evolution (*Table 2*).

**Table 2. Evolution of enrolments for technical and vocational education (public and private)**

Type of school	1993/1994 (technical) 1994/1995 (vocational)		1999/2000	
	Total	Girls	Total	Girls
Technical	6,573	2,265	4,425	1,630
Public	5,334	1,580	3,758	1,202
Private	1,239 (19%)	685	667 (15%)	428
Vocational	7,446	4,561	10,411	4,274
Public	5,135	3,347	5,301	2,195
Private	2,311 (31%)	1,214	5,110 (49%)	2,079

Source: Ministry of Education, Department for State Planning and Reform (DPRE).

12. By way of exception, apprenticeship contracts and decisions made when applying employer/employee arbitration were exempt from registration formalities; see the former general Tax Code introduced by Law No. 76-93 of 21 August 1976.

According to official statistics, the private sector thus enrolls today nearly one half of vocational training students, i.e. a share which largely exceeds the average importance of private schools in the overall education system.

However, one should relativize this importance, given the low level of enrolments in question. One should also note that the DPRE statistics in this area largely underestimate reality. They concern a total of 37 schools, which are moreover the same ones as in 1994, while within the Ministry, the Department of Vocational Training has a list of 60 authorized private schools. Nor is this list exhaustive, since it does not include about 50 other schools that the administration is aware of, and which are operating, nor does it include schools under the supervision of other ministries. Furthermore, its definition ignores many illegal schools which have come to light during recent years. It seems rather that, in reality, vocational enrolments in the private sector represent well over double the number of students in the state sector.

The results of the survey conducted by the IIEP on a sampling of 28 private schools make it possible to clarify the nature of the training offered and its clientele. The schools examined include a total of 236 classes and 69 workshops, for a total enrolment of 7,568 students, including all courses being offered both during the day and in evening classes. Among this total, the 1,339 students attending evening classes represent nearly 20 per cent of enrolments. Girls are well in the majority. There are 4,135 of them (55 per cent of enrolments), with 722 studying at night. They are especially present in service-sector training and advanced courses.

One can well see that the private sector of TVE is in full expansion. Without taking into account the new schools that are being created, the schools surveyed are receiving a growing number of students: between 1995 and 2000, the increase in the number of enrolments for vocational education reached 84 per cent.

Among schools, some offer a quite wide spectrum of training, combining general, technical and vocational education. Others (a sort of Vocational *Lycée*), continue to concentrate on the latter two. Institutes are devoted to very specialized training, especially in higher education (preparing Advanced Vocational Training Certificates/BTS, i.e. 'home-made' Advanced Technical Diplomas/DTS). In some cases, the school and the training activities can be part of a much larger organization.

If private schools "must respect, if they exist, the programmes in use in state schools for the same studies and at the same class levels, they can, if they do not exist, formulate them, themselves, and submit them to the competent authorities".

All in all, the 'classic' courses at secondary-school level (CAP, BEP, BT and Technical *Bac*) represent less than half of enrolments for day courses and less than a quarter for night courses (see *Tables 3 and 4*).

**Table 3. Distribution of enrolments for schools surveyed (day courses)**

Legal status	CAP	BEP	BT	Tech- nical Bac	Others	Total day courses							
	Service sector		Industry sector		Total								
EIG	12	141	153	325	89	414	34	0	34	0	262	74	937
Public Ltd. Co.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	133	30	163
Private (Ltd.) Co.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	233	374	607
One-person Co.	104	203	307	207	85	292	31	21	52	109	560	801	2,121
Association/NGO	155	344	499	93	153	246	123	0	123	0	180	170	1,218
Denominational	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	487	404	292	1,183
All together	271	688	959	625	327	952	188	21	209	596	1,772	1,741	6,229
No. of girls	211	80	291	355	22	377	122	5	127	337	1,055	1,226	3,413

**Table 4. Distribution of enrolments for schools surveyed (evening courses)**

Legal status	CAP	BEP	BTS	Other	Total evening courses	Total school enrolments
EIG	0	8	0	35	43	980
Public Ltd. Co.	0	0	0	8	8	171
Private (Ltd.) Co.	0	0	0	201	201	808
One-person company	0	0	61	86	147	2,268
Association/NGO	0	0	0	0	0	1,218
Denominational	69	235	0	636	940	2,123
All together	69	243	61	966	1,339	7,568
No. of girls	28	152	20	522	722	4,135

The types of teaching are quite varied within schools and according to their type. All kinds of learning streams are present (CAP, BEP, BT, BTS and other specialities) in EIG, Association/NGO and one-person company types. Public limited companies and private (limited) companies have a tendency to specialize in BTS courses, which represent nearly 30 per cent of enrolments, handled by day courses. The ‘other training’ (advanced) is not rare: it represents 28 per cent of enrolments for day courses and the essential part (72 per cent) of young people studying at night schools.

Industrial training (mechanics, electricity, electronics, refrigeration systems, etc.) are generally provided at CAP, BEP and BT levels, while service training (office automation, secretarial skills, Information Technology, management, tourism, etc.) is dominant at BTS level. No school is providing industrial training as an evening course.

As proof of its relative ‘attractiveness’, private vocational training is available to foreign nationals from other west and central African countries.

They compose on average 11 per cent in one-person companies and private (limited) companies; 9.5 per cent in denominational schools; and 8.6 per cent in public limited companies. Associations/NGOs have no foreign students.

## **2.5 Financing**

Private schools differ fundamentally from state schools by the fact that they operate essentially using their own financial means. It appears that nearly 90 per cent of their revenue comes from households whose children they educate in return for school fees. The downside of the financial autonomy characterizing private schools is a certain isolation and often financial vulnerability, especially in their capacity for investment.

Most private promoters (17 out of 28) do not own their school building or the land they occupy. Those who do, belong to a collective or denominational organization or an association. The problem of initial financial investment constitutes a serious obstacle in the absence of land grants by the state, or local governments.

Moreover, promoters anxious to develop their activities encounter difficulty in obtaining bank loans. Thus, many are planning expansion, but do not have the funds necessary for construction or the acquisition of additional land.

Also, a clear majority (17 out of 28) deplore the burden that investment in teaching materials represents. They admit experiencing difficulty in acquiring the necessary equipment to improve or adapt training.

School revenues mainly come from school fees, whose amount evidently depends on the number of students (which varies according to the attractiveness and the capacity of the school) and on the level of these fees, made up of enrolment fees and monthly payments which vary according to the level of education.

Enrolment fees for day courses vary from an average of 13,000 CFA francs for the BEP/industrial sector to 22,500 CFA francs for the BTS/service sector, and even more still for 'other specialties'. Monthly payments range from 7,000 CFA francs for the CAP/industrial sector to 30,000 CFA francs for the BTS/service sector. It should be noted that rates for evening courses can be higher than for day courses.

If one notices with no surprise that the level of fees rises with the level of education, they also appear lower for industrial specialties, which one would think would be higher than service specialties. No doubt linked to the fact that the families concerned are less advantaged or have less ready cash on hand, this somewhat paradoxical phenomenon shows that the provision of industrial training raises the particular problem of 'profitability', likely to discourage promoters.

Moreover, these average school fees conceal disparities between schools. If we take for example the CAP/service sector, the enrolment fees attain on average 12,389 CFA francs, the minimum being 8,000 CFA francs, the maximum 20,000 CFA francs. Average monthly payments are 9,000 CFA francs, the minimum 5,000 CFA francs and the maximum 15,000 CFA francs. One notes similar disparities for BEPs. In the survey sampling, these two types of short professional courses are given only in schools which have EIG, association or one-person company status. Fees are systematically higher for advanced training, of the BTS type or other. Moreover, schools with public limited company, private (limited) company or denominational status which specialize in this kind of training apply higher fees than the others – monthly payments can even reach an average of 50,000 CFA francs in Catholic schools, i.e. double the average amounts noted for EIG schools.

**Table 5. Enrolment fees and monthly payments for day courses according to stream (in CFA francs) for private schools surveyed**

Streams	Enrolment fees	Monthly payments
CAP/service	12,389	9,000
CAP/industrial	12,071	7,143
BEP/service	13,182	13,364
BEP/industrial	13,000	10,000
BT/service	15,000	18,750
BT/industrial	15,000	19,000
BTS/service	22,423	30,765
Other specialties	23,828	25,020

**Table 6. Enrolment fees and monthly payments for evening courses according to stream (in CFA francs) for private schools surveyed**

Streams	Enrolment fees	Monthly payments
CAP/service	6,000	10,000
BEP/service	45,000	8,000
BTS/service	15,000	22,500
Other specialties	55,175	32,714

One realizes that resource differences like these between schools, linked both to the streams offered and payments that can be obtained from households, lead to striking disparities in both material and financial conditions (see *Tables 5 and 6*).



If a concern for generating ‘profits’ leads promoters naturally enough to prioritize the least costly type of training (service sector), offering the highest revenue at advanced training level (enrolment fees, monthly payments), industrial training is still far from being absent.

There is evidently a ‘dual’ vocation among private schools. Some of them want, above all, to help adolescents. This is the case of associations/NGOs, whose enrolment fees and monthly payments are low and which experience difficulties in balancing their budgets. It frequently happens that the members of associations escape losses only through volunteer work and donations. On the contrary, other promoters seek on the training market – which they have previously ‘explored’ – the highest growth niches so as to open schools which are managed like real commercial concerns.

If resources from households represent about 90 per cent of ‘declared’ revenue, one also realizes the weakness of other resources, especially from the state (grants represent only 2 per cent of revenue for the 28 schools surveyed) and local governments (see *Table 4*). Revenue arising from continuing education appears relatively more important, but remains moderate overall in relation to total earnings (8 per cent). It seems to concern only a few schools (9 out of 28), a sign of their weak relationship with business.

The difficulties of some schools to balance their budgets are aggravated by substantial abatements or outstanding payments, rather than exemptions. The rates are on average 12.6 per cent (of students) for abatements, 10.7 per cent for outstanding payments and 7.2 per cent for exemptions. In management terms, public limited companies, private (limited) companies, and denominational organizations are better at controlling outstanding payments than EIGs and one-person companies. These indicators also reflect the problem of impoverishment among the TVE ‘clientele’.

**Table 7. Statement of revenue and expenses in 1999/2000 for the 28 schools surveyed (in thousands of CFA francs)**

Legal nature	Number	Households	Enterprises	Revenue			Total revenue
				Grants state/region	Sponsors	Other revenue (commissions, sales, etc.)	
<b>E I G</b>							
• Total	7	148,546	3,800	0	0	3,500	155,850
• Average		21,220	543	0	0	500	22,265
<b>Private (Limited) Co.</b>							
• Total	4	245,000	32,000	5,500	2,000	5,000	289,500
• Average		61,250	8,000	1,375	500	1,250	72,375
<b>One-person Co.</b>							
• Total	7	347,025	42,400	11,500	600	0	401,500
• Average		49,575	6,060	1,640	90	0	57,365
<b>Association/ NGO</b>							
• Total	6	91,075	2,000	0	11,808	5,000	109,883
• Average		15,180	333	0	1,968	833	18,313
<b>Denominational</b>							
• Total	4	524,291	40,000	6,000	0	5,000	575,291
• Average		131,073	10,000	1,500	0	1,250	143,823
<b>All together</b>							
• Total	28	1,355,937	120,200	23,000	14,408	18,500	1,532,045
• Average		48,426	4,293	8,214	5,146	6,607	54,715

In terms of expenditure, it comes as no surprise to learn that staff salaries are the main item. However, with around 60 per cent of the total, these expenses are far from being the only ones which oppress private promoters. Thus, one notes that 9 per cent of expenses are related to taxes and social welfare payments, and 11 per cent to current operations. The 20 per cent that remains is for the cost of leasing and investment, either for construction or the acquisition of land, or for the purchase of materials. The burden of taxes appears particularly high for private denominational schools, while private (limited) companies spend over half of their budget on investment, leasing and operations (see *Table 8*).

**Table 8. Profile of expenditure according to school status (in thousands of CFA francs)**

Legal nature	Expenses							Total Expenditure
	Staff salaries	Rent/ leasing	Operations	Taxes, social welfare payments	Investment, training	Construction/ land	Other expenses (insurance, consultants, etc.)	
<b>E I G</b>								
• Total	<b>86,782</b>	<b>16,121</b>	<b>11,972</b>	<b>3,414</b>	<b>7,850</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3,600</b>	<b>129,736</b>
• Average	12,400	2,303	1,710	488	1,121	0	515	18,537
<b>Private Ltd. Co.</b>								
• Total	<b>126,020</b>	<b>28,750</b>	<b>11,800</b>	<b>11,250</b>	<b>40,600</b>	<b>33,890</b>	<b>6,400</b>	<b>258,700</b>
• Average	31,505	7,190	2,950	2,812	10,146	8,472	1,600	64,675
<b>One-person Co.</b>								
• Total	<b>236,748</b>	<b>16,200</b>	<b>22,230</b>	<b>28,353</b>	<b>32,480</b>	<b>17,000</b>	<b>3,400</b>	<b>356,409</b>
• Average	33,821	2,315	3,175	4,050	4,640	2,430	485	50,915
<b>Association/ NGO</b>								
• Total	<b>82,060</b>	<b>15,300</b>	<b>33,245</b>	<b>11,190</b>	<b>12,235</b>	<b>6,950</b>	<b>10,080</b>	<b>171,060</b>
• Average	13,676	2,550	5,540	1,865	2,040	1,160	1,680	28,510
<b>Denomina-tional</b>								
• Total	<b>382,230</b>	<b>3,000</b>	<b>88,750</b>	<b>78,225</b>	<b>23,660</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>18,000</b>	<b>593,865</b>
• Average	95,560	750	22,187	19,556	5,915	0	4,500	148,466
<b>All together</b>								
• Total	<b>913,840</b>	<b>79,370</b>	<b>168,000</b>	<b>132,430</b>	<b>116,825</b>	<b>57,840</b>	<b>41,480</b>	<b>1,510,000</b>
• Average	32,637	2,835	6,000	4,730	4,172	2,066	1,481	53,920

All in all, when one examines the accounts (sometimes only approximative), one sees a difference in lifestyle. One can estimate that denominational organizations and private (limited) companies have at their disposal around 300,000 CFA francs per student, double that of associations (who appear to be largely in the red) and EIGs. These latter schools, neither of which is recognized by the state as providing a public service, and thus unqualified for state grants, can only continue to operate by counting on voluntary work of some of their personnel, or on material donations.

**Based on all of the schools surveyed, the estimated average cost per student would be close to 250,000 CFA francs** (1.5 billions of CFA francs for a little more than 6,000 students). This amount is fairly modest compared to that for general secondary education (196,000 CFA francs in 1996 according to the PDEF, 192,000 according to the Review of Public Expenditure for 1995, and 265,000 when all sources of funding are factored in). Although this figure is slightly higher than the unit cost per technical secondary student according to the PDEF calculation, it is clearly lower than the cost figures given in the Review of Public Expenditure: 362,000 CFA francs in 1996 for technical secondary education (781,000 when all sources of funding are counted) and 370,000 CFA francs for vocational secondary education. In the TVE sector, then, the cost per pupil seems indeed to be lower in private schools than in public and corresponds to about 76 per cent of the country's national wealth per inhabitant: 330,000 CFA francs in 2000 (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2000).

## **2.6 *The teaching personnel***

Teachers can be permanent or paid on an hourly casual basis, and must normally be on an official list of accreditation, which is not always controlled or controllable (the diplomas or qualifications required are defined according to regulations). One also meets former teachers or retired administrators who want to pass on their acquired skills to young people. The profiles, status and financial situations of teachers appear to be extremely variable, ranging

from hourly rates of about 10,000 CFA francs, or monthly rates above 200,000 CFA francs, down to virtual volunteer work (see *Table 9*).

Teachers working in private schools are mostly hourly-paid casual teachers – around 80 per cent – among which nearly a quarter are civil servants. In this sense, the private sector profits from the ‘potential’ of teachers coming from the state education system, who come to seek in the private sector a useful supplement to their salaries.

Although private schools are often involved in recruiting permanent teachers (especially ‘young graduates’), the hourly-paid-based system seems more flexible to them. Principals prefer this solution, which is less restrictive and often less expensive (teachers are paid on the basis of 9 months, the length of the school year, and not 12 months).

The teachers themselves hesitate between permanent job security and the freedom offered by the hourly-paid-based system, which also allows them the liberty to accumulate salaries in various schools.

**Table 9. Staff size and remuneration (in CFA francs)**

Legal nature	Permanent		Hourly-paid casual teachers			Hourly-paid civil servants		
	Staff	Salary/ month	Staff	Salary/ month	Salary/ hour	Staff	Salary/ month	Salary/ hour
<b>E I G</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>42,524</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>45,797</b>	<b>1,518</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>17,444</b>	<b>950</b>
<b>Public Ltd. Co.</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>185,000</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>69,565</b>	<b>3,200</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>71,600</b>	<b>3,200</b>
<b>Private (Ltd) Co.</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>146,667</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>86,667</b>	<b>2,333</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>26,667</b>	<b>1,667</b>
<b>One-person Co.</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>46,379</b>	<b>249</b>	<b>58,031</b>	<b>714</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>21,244</b>	<b>214</b>
<b>Association/NGO</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>69,583</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>18,370</b>	<b>1,467</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>9,889</b>	<b>250</b>
<b>Denominational</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>203,750</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>72,500</b>	<b>3,625</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>18,000</b>	<b>1,000</b>
<b>All together</b>	<b>184</b>	<b>88,565</b>	<b>700</b>	<b>52,021</b>	<b>1,754</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>19,777</b>	<b>780</b>

The comparison between TVE teacher salaries in the public and private sectors reveals a striking contrast (*Table 10*). On the basis of year-round employment, the status of a civil servant appears appreciably better in financial terms. The starting salary is clearly better in the public sector and the best-paid private teachers in the survey do not reach the level of maximum payment for secondary-school teachers.

These results seem to indicate that teaching in the private sector is less attractive than the status of civil servant. It is only by default (the state employer undergoing a financial crisis) that some graduates have turned to the private sector.

On the other hand, hourly-paid teaching in private institutions represents for government-employed teachers an important addition to their salaries. Concerning this point, it should be noted that the hourly rate for supply teaching by state-employed teachers is lower than that applied to other educators. This result suggests that promoters of private education pay teachers from the state system at a marginal rate.

In the associative (NGO) sector, the annual salary of hourly-paid casual teachers is visibly lower than the GDP per capita (165,330 CFA francs/330,000 CFA francs). This result suggests that this category of teacher combines several jobs. As the survey has shown, these teachers also include retired persons who are virtually volunteer workers.

**Table 10. Annual salaries for TVE teachers in the public and private sectors (in CFA francs)**

	Public (gross salary, secondary- school teacher)	Private	
		Hourly-paid casual teachers	Permanent
Minimum	1,646,000	165,330	510,288
Maximum	3,125,000	780,003	2,445,000

Source: Ministry of Education, and Survey data.

## 2.7 Examination results

On the basis of the sample taken, the results of the state examinations for students in the private sector do not appear particularly good (a success rate of under 50 per cent) except for the Technical *Bac* (91 per cent success rate). However, it should be noted that with the exception of the BT, the results of students from the sampling are higher (CAP, Technical *Bac*, BTS) or equivalent (BEP) to the national results, which are also extremely poor. It is however difficult to deduce from this comparison a general conclusion concerning private school performance (see *Table 11*).

**Table 11. Success rates for state diplomas**

	CAP			BEP			BT			Technical <i>Bac</i> (service sector)			BTS		
	C	S	R (%)	C	S	R (%)	C	S	R (%)	C	S	R (%)	C	S	R (%)
Sample	385	169	43.9	442	137	31.0	81	25	30.9	103	94	91.3	854	309	36.2
National	-	-	36.6	-	-	31.0	-	-	79.1	-	-	44.3	-	-	17.0

C: Candidates; S: Successful; R: Rate (per cent)

Source: Survey data, and Ministry of Education (Department of Vocational Training).

On the other hand, it is remarkable that results for 'home-made' diplomas largely exceed those obtained at state examinations, achieving a very high level (between 78 per cent and 84 per cent) (*Table 12*). Lacking a common yardstick, it is difficult to appreciate the value of these diplomas and the competences they reflect. Similarly, no information is available about employer opinions on these 'home-made' diplomas. If they are an attempt to respond to an obsolete national system, their proliferation and attribution at minimum cost affects the transparency of qualifications and the functioning of the labour market.



**Table 12. Success rates of ‘home-made’ diplomas**

	DTS			DTI			DTB			DTM			Other diplomas		
	C	S	R (%)	C	S	R (%)	C	S	R (%)	C	S	R (%)	C	S	R (%)
Sample	498	408	81.9	98	80	81.6	119	100	84.0	104	87	83.7	1,016	795	78.2

C: Candidates; S: Successful; R: Rate (per cent)

DTS: Diplôme de technicien supérieur; DTI: Diplôme de technicien en informatique;

DTB: Diplôme de technicien bureautique;

DTM: Diplôme de technicien en maintenance.

The results of private schools can also be appreciated based on internal efficiency. In the sample, drop-outs and exclusions reached 13.5 per cent which is not negligible. It is useful to point out that most dropping out is due to non-payment of school fees (in 64 per cent of cases). Losses are also largely a result of economic problems, probably due to a lack of family resources.

### 3. Overall assessment

#### *3.1 A dynamic and widely diverse private sector, with little state support*

Despite the ongoing confusion as to the exact limits of vocational training, the overall impression that arises is that of a sector which is both insufficiently developed and difficult to ‘read’, quite dispersed and relatively disorganized, lacking firm central control and administrative steering. The supply of TVE in Senegal does not today meet the strong social demand for this type of education. It does not provide a better response to the ambitions stated as early as 1996 in the document entitled ‘Policy paper on TVE’.

Ill-fitted to existing demand, TVE moreover suffers from a lack of internal consistency due to the absence of genuine streams or training alternatives. This planning fault is not unrelated to the system’s lack of transparency and

ignorance of ‘statistical’ information. To define and control the necessary development of TVE, and regulate student flows, not only from the beginning but also at the end of studies (what choices are offered to Technical *Bacs*, holders of CAP or BEP certificates?) presupposes the setting up of a reliable information tool.

As the International Consortium for Educational Development (CIDE) report notes, TVE in Senegal is shaped like an upside-down pyramid: it is rather developed at advanced levels, where there exists a demand, but which concerns only a relatively small and privileged part of the population (students). It remains largely inadequate for most students, the vast majority of whom have not been able to continue secondary studies, and to provide meaningful qualifications for the working population of Senegal (farmers, employees, craftsmen).

The extension of the private sector is evolving within this context, which henceforth has a strong presence on the Senegalese education scene. Most likely, private TVE schools today receive more young people than state systems, with particularly rapid development at post-secondary level (BTS). Even if it seems that the private school ‘supply’ is concentrated on service jobs, the industrial area is not totally absent from private schools, including post-*Bac* studies.

Given the absence of political will on the part of the public authorities, the development of private education results, above all, from the family’s unfulfilled wish for further training. It is moreover probable that, from the business side, this expansion corresponds to the need for qualified labour which is not being met by the public sector. The private sector indeed offers some kinds of training that do not exist in the public sector (IT, for example).

For several years now, its evolution is indeed marked by blatant contradictions: on one hand, there is a certain ‘collective’ indifference to the area of TVE, which cannot benefit from sufficient funding to assure smooth

operations and quality; and on the other, there exists the indisputable vitality of private initiatives that confirm the existence of solid demand, and which is filling the void left by the state. Indeed, the private sector is providing welcome relief for a state with limited financial resources. Faced with an underdeveloped public sector in a crisis situation, private resources thus attempt to meet real needs, but in a spontaneous and random way, with many imperfections and a great deal of meandering.

From now on, the private sector presents a double aspect. It is a complement and a support necessary to the public sector, but is expanding in a somewhat chaotic and uncontrolled way. Schools which have the opportunity to develop 'home-made' courses do not hesitate to deliver low-cost certificates, which do not necessarily have a high value on the job market. Not all of them are respecting the legal framework (payment of taxes and social security cost for instance) regulatory measures. For teachers, the private sector encourages recourse to hourly-paid casual teachers, a solution which is technically more flexible and financially advantageous. In some cases, recourse to hourly-paid casual teachers makes it possible to re-adjust a precarious financial balance or increase profit.

The results of the survey confirm the extreme diversity of private schools, where private entrepreneurs cohabit with private denominational and associative organizations to fulfil a public-service mission. This diversity of status and vocation is also reflected in the financial position of many schools. This varies greatly according to circumstances. Overall, according to the results of the survey, the sector is able to balance its accounts, but does not generate a sufficient profit margin to assure survival or expansion in proper conditions.

The development of quality technical and vocational education presupposes firm action by public authorities. In an economy which is dominated by the informal sector and by a poorly educated population with limited purchasing power, a simple *laissez faire* policy will not guarantee the blossoming of a real vocational market.

Moreover, if the public-private distinction is in theory self-evident, at least in financial terms, and if, by law, private schools are not supposed to employ teachers from the public service, in reality there exists some confusion, ambiguity and even competition between the two networks. If a 'socially sensitive' private sector definitely exists, with a public-sector spirit, enrolling subsidized students, the situation also occurs of state institutions driven by mercantile and profit motives: along beside students admitted through competitions and educated gratis, are others accepted in return for a financial contribution. Private promoters criticize this as unfair competition on the part of state schools. Moreover, they do not hesitate to voice their expectations clearly to their various partners.

Many promoters are wise and lucid enough to not necessarily expect from the state "grants, but rather an easing of their working conditions (appropriate tax breaks, access to property, a reduction in social welfare contributions, etc.)". They also expect the state to play a role as arbitrator and regulator, first within the private sector, that "must become more ethical", and vis-à-vis state schools, by demanding a "regulation of the market. The fact that public institutions introduce more and more fee-paying courses leads to the impression that the difficulties faced by private schools are not being dealt with through an open and fair manner".

For local governments, the most common wish expressed was to see social assistance reinforced, in the form of grants for needy students.

Promoters are also dialoguing with business so as to reinforce their partnerships, both for the development of continuing education and for the setting up of block-release training. Some would like to see them "become aware that this type of (dual) training contributes to their long-term sustainability".

Private schools are also expecting material aid from NGOs, associations and foreign institutions, for example, in the form of sorely needed equipment.

### **3.2 The question of financing**

In the field of TVE, especially on its private side, the question of financing, whether from one or several sources, appears today both key and crucial. It is even more so in that the means mobilized or available have a tendency to decrease. The portion of the education budget allotted to this sector has indeed diminished. It is today below 5 per cent: 1.9 and 2.8 billion CFA francs of a total budget of 95 billion. Grants made to private vocational schools are low: little over 30 million CFA francs, awarded to recognized schools, according to their number of teachers (for 9/10ths) and their examination results (for the remaining 1/10th).

Funding which could come from the Employers' Fixed Contribution tax paid by business and which annually brings 6 billion CFA francs into the state coffers is diverted from its natural use which should be towards initial or job-related training. Indeed, 95 per cent of this sum goes to the general State Budget, with 5 per cent being allocated to the National Office for Vocational Training (ONFP), of which a portion only goes towards vocational training.

Besides the resultant 'drying up' of funds, a situation like this does not encourage businesses and business leaders to get involved in a sector that they consider the responsibility of the state. Financial and technical partnerships which could have been undertaken for years now seem in abeyance.

Given these conditions, which are at the same time aggravated by inadequate financial contributions coming from local governments, schools are in some way left to their own devices. The public sector develops cost-recovery measures, sometimes in contradiction to its mission. Private centres, surviving basically on their 'own means', are dependent on the financial well-being of households, or the possibilities of raising private financing, especially through special partnerships: businesses, NGOs or foreign organizations.

In a context like this, the state cannot remain indifferent to the future of TVE, and must, with the private sector, seek the most appropriate forms of support to allow it to play an effective role in future progress.

The supply of TVE must be strengthened to respond to both labour market needs and social demand. Today, there are not sufficient numbers of streams, complete professional courses, and pathways. Besides, it is difficult to appreciate the effectiveness of private training since labour market data are lacking. Finally, the world of education is unfortunately at the antipodes of business concerns.

Despite its undeniable rise, the private sector cannot over the coming years single-handedly offset current shortcomings, nor shoulder the full weight of much-needed progress. The foray of the private sector into post-secondary TVE, although it opens new prospects for young high-school graduates who wish to further their education, once again accentuates the overall imbalance afflicting the vocational training 'supply': it is notoriously inadequate in providing basic skills to agriculture, industry and the crafts.

In free-market terms, the 'production cost' for a vocational student, compared to the revenue that he or she can generate forms the basis for investment decisions. All private businesses must balance their accounts. Private providers will thus tend to move towards more profitable sectors: those where they can hope for more abundant revenue (enrolment fees and monthly payments are generally higher in post-secondary programmes, which attract the more affluent parts of society), or else those which occasion the lowest expenses. In the industrial sector, where one finds private non-profit operators, the balancing of the budget will be achieved by cutting down on salary and equipment items, which evidently negatively impinges on the quality of teaching. The development of private schools thus risks engendering a dichotomy between those schools which are relatively well-off, operating in very targeted and high-revenue niches, and others with a more 'social' aim, but relatively destitute and inefficient.

### **3.3 Rethinking state involvement and regulation**

The private sector evidently has a role to play in years to come to support and strengthen state activities in favour of TVE, and help it to balance its budget. However, there is a need to reflect on what this role could and should be, and what kind of regulations it implies.

It is unrealistic to imagine that the private sector could play a simple surrogate role, smoothing over deficiencies and providing stopgap measures for state inactivity. If from a lack of means or sufficiently profitable prospects, the state abandons certain utilitarian commitments, one does not see why the private sector would necessarily jump into the role.

The private sector could on the other hand develop and build its own resources to complement the public sector. One is tempted to imagine the latter concentrating its efforts on industrial training, leaving the private sector to energize the new service sector. Such a 'market' sharing of training niches is a plausible scenario, but a bit over-simplistic. Other options are there to be explored.

Private schools already offer new training possibilities, including crafts and industry. In a context where the state is very selective for admission in its own TVE schools, liberalizing and encouraging private initiatives presents at least a double advantage:

- to widen and reinvigorate a range of training options, especially in high-growth sectors (faced with the static nature and obsolescence of state training);
- to set up other training methods, perhaps less academic, more flexible and freed from the French model.

In contrast, the rapid development of the private sector gives birth to a profusion of training programmes and diplomas which, in the absence of a clear qualification framework, can affect the functioning of the labour market.

The sound functioning of multifaceted technical and vocational education, closely aligned to the labour market, presupposes a revision of the state's role, and in particular the further development of its regulatory function, which could take three complementary paths:

- the introduction of new methods of financing, providing both access to resources allocated by the National Office for Vocational Training (ONFP), and soon to the new Fund, so as to target grants to private schools, and scholarships to disadvantaged students;
- the setting up of a partnership system, involving private-sector representatives, for defining, recognizing and upgrading diplomas;
- the review, in consultation with private-sector representatives, of the legal and administrative framework which supervises the operations of private organizations and the strengthening of the Ministry's institutional capacity to implement rules and regulations.





## *Chapter II*

### Case study: Mali

#### 1. The general context of TVE

##### *1.1 Historical background*

In Mali, private schools for Technical and Vocational Education (TVE) have developed in a haphazard fashion, according to the times. From 1963 to 1988: thirty-four schools were created, including eight by the state. Under the socialist regime and after the 1962 reform, the state took over the education system. Only the Catholic Church openly lent a hand in creating schools. Moreover, in the process of replacing the colonial administration by Mali nationals, general education was favoured.

Gradually, the way the education system was operating came under criticism, and the following was revealed during the National Seminar on Education of 1978:

- maladjustment of graduates to the labour market;
- high levels of dropping out and repetition;
- the high cost of education for the state.

Following this, the state tried to adapt the system through three kinds of measures:

- supporting rural development;
- the creation of Centres for Practical Guidance (Centres d'Orientation Pratique/COP);
- encouragement of new private schools (Decree No. 118/PC-RM of 20 September 1971).

Thus, out of the 30 or so schools opened between 1980 and 1988, 20 of them were from the private sector and devoted to TVE. At the same time, the state created two technical schools. It seems that, henceforth, private promoters showed a preference for the technical and vocational sector.

From 1989, Mali saw a sharp increase in the numbers of private technical and vocational schools. Around 164 schools opened their doors, in addition to 11 belonging to the state. It was during these years, which were also marked by the democratization of the political system, that new legislation was set up governing private education in Mali (Law No. 94-032 of 25 July 1994, decree No 94-276/PRM of 15 August 1994).

The above historical development shows the continuous growth of private technical and vocational schools. For some, this situation was due to the low efficiency and mediocre quality of state technical schools. For others, it revealed the existence of a training market for private schools.

### ***1.2 The current organization of TVE***

Mali's formal education system includes three kinds of education:

- *Basic education* divided into two cycles. The first, lasting six years, leads to a Primary School Certificate (*Certificat d'études primaires/CEP*); and the second, lasting three years, leads to a Basic Studies Diploma (*Diplôme d'études fondamentales/DEF*), equivalent to the French *Brevet d'études du premier cycle* (BEPC).
- *Secondary education*, duration of three years for general secondary, leads to a *Bac* or a School Leaving Certificate (High School Diploma). At this level, the TVE sector includes three kinds of programme: the Vocational Training Certificate (*Certificat d'aptitude professionnelle/CAP*) after two years; a Technical *Bac* (*Baccalauréat technique*) after three years, and a Technical Certificate (*Brevet technique/BT*) after four years.

- *Higher education* whose duration varies according to the institution and the subject studied. In principle, schools of higher studies provide professional training.


The two latter kinds of education are the responsibility of a separate Ministry: the Ministry for Secondary Schools, Higher Education and Scientific Research (*Ministère des Enseignements secondaire, supérieur et de la Recherche scientifique*/MESSRS).

It should be noted that in its TVE programmes, the Malian system is striving to meet two objectives: professional placement, and the pursuit of studies at a higher level. Thus, an individual having a Vocational Training Certificate (CAP) has the possibility of joining the labour market or continuing with a Technical Certificate (BT).

Technical education, in the strict sense, leading to the technical *Bac*, is only provided in one (public) institution.

This training at secondary level has been completed during recent years by a 'Bac+2 years' level, leading to an Advanced Vocational Training Certificate (*Brevet de technicien supérieur*/BTS) or a University Technical Degree (*Diplôme universitaire de technicien supérieur*/DUTS).

**Chart 1. The education system in Mali Basic education (BE) and secondary technical and vocational education**



### 1.3 Development and characteristics of the TVE sector

It is important to establish the importance of TVE within the secondary school system, whose enrolments have been showing an overall appreciable increase during recent years. If general education continues to handle the majority of students attending secondary schools, the share of TVE is far from being negligible: it has progressed over recent years so as to account for more than a third.

Concerning secondary school enrolments, gender differences remain important: boys make up 67 per cent of enrolments, compared to 33 per cent for girls. This phenomenon is more pronounced at general secondary level (69 per cent boys, 31 per cent girls) than for technical and vocational education (64 per cent boys, 36 per cent girls (see *Tables 1 and 2*)).

**Table 1. Evolution of enrolments by type of education and gender**

Type of education	1997-1998			1998-1999			1999-2000		
	B	G	T	B	G	T	B	G	T
General secondary	28,943	12,985	<b>41,928</b>	33,302	14,615	<b>47,917</b>	36,265	16,065	<b>52,330</b>
Technical and vocational	12,489	6,940	<b>19,429</b>	15,622	9,907	<b>25,529</b>	20,379	12,711	<b>33,090</b>
Total	40,832	19,925	<b>60,757</b>	48,924	24,522	<b>73,446</b>	56,664	28,776	<b>85,420</b>

Source: Ministry of Education, 2000, PRODEC (Ten-Year Programme on Education – Programme décennal concernant l'éducation), Survey on Secondary School Education in Mali, database.

**Table 2. Distribution of enrolments for TVE according to status, gender and type of training**

	1997-1998			1998-1999			1999-2000		
	B	G	Total	B	G	Total	B	G	Total
Private	7,760	4,454	<b>12,214</b>	10,180	7,006	<b>17,186</b>	13,673	9,066	<b>22,739</b>
Public	4,729	2,486	<b>7,215</b>	5,442	2,901	<b>8,343</b>	6,706	3,645	<b>10,351</b>
Total	12,489	6,940	<b>19,429</b>	15,622	9,907	<b>25,529</b>	20,379	12,711	<b>33,090</b>
CAP industrial	2,491	339	<b>2,830</b>	2,660	495	<b>3,155</b>	2,821	377	<b>3,198</b>
CAP service	4,320	3,063	<b>7,383</b>	3,661	3,245	<b>6,906</b>	3,406	3,344	<b>6,750</b>
BT industrial	1,714	299	<b>2,013</b>	2,522	360	<b>2,822</b>	4,066	532	<b>4,598</b>
BT service	3,964	3,239	<b>7,203</b>	6,779	5,807	<b>12,586</b>	10,086	8,458	<b>18,544</b>

Source: Ministry of Education, 2000, PRODEC, Survey on Secondary Education in Mali, database.

Within two years, the numbers preparing for a BT have largely outpaced those preparing a CAP, a change which tends to reinforce the predominance of training in the service sector, which is especially prevalent at BT level

(around 80 per cent of enrolments, compared with a little more than two-thirds at CAP level, and three-quarters for overall TVE).

The private sector has a growing share of TVE and even a quite dominant share, since it now accounts for over two-thirds. The increase in enrolments in private schools has been particularly intense over recent years.

#### ***1.4 The Ten-Year Programme on Education (PRODEC) and projects to support vocational education***

Next to basic education, the development of a vocational education system constitutes the second major thrust of the policy which the Malian Government intends to continue, especially through its Ten-Year Programme. Vocational education has an important role to play in the country's economic development and must contribute to making training available to complete the basic education of young people who hold Basic Studies Diplomas (*Diplôme d'études fondamentales/DEF*). Moreover, to achieve this, PRODEC has set an extremely precise objective, expressed in terms of student flows and 'guidance'. So as to contain and even reduce the level of school 'drop-outs', it expects that by 2008 secondary education will be receiving 65 per cent of those who obtain a DEF, with 24 per cent in vocational training.

It is thus a question here of developing the student capacity of the training institutions, especially by increasing secondary technical capacity to 6,000 places by 2007-2008. Moreover, schools need to widen their skills for continuing education, providing services and co-operating with manufacturers, including micro-businesses, as part of a block-release training programme.

It is important to understand that, unlike Senegal, the goals of Malian education policy concern the private sector in a very explicit way. Thus, recognizing the strong presence of the private sector in vocational education, these goals foresee "***the private sector playing an important role in the funding and provision of training***" (Primature, Amendments made to the

major goals of educational policy, PRODEC, June 1999) and that it “*will be more involved in the management, financing and provision of training*”. Having judged that the private sector is too dependent on state grants (see below), the policy which consists of guiding grant-holding students towards private schools is restated.

This programme is supported by the Project for consolidating vocational training (*Projet de consolidation de la formation professionnelle/PCFP*). Created by the Malian Government with the support of the World Bank and implemented in 1997, this project has three key elements:


- initial vocational training: structural reform and equipment for training centres, improved quality of teaching;
- the Fund for Supporting Vocational Training and Apprenticeship (*le Fonds d'appui à la formation professionnelle et à l'apprentissage/FAFPA*): financing continuing education in both modern business and crafts, support to businesses so as to define their training needs and projects, investment funding for training institutions;
- Employment and Training Observatory (*Observatoire de l'emploi et de la formation/OEF*) to improve knowledge of the labour market, so as to better match training with the needs of the market.

Besides the support project of the World Bank, several other endeavours contribute to supporting or transforming the sector.

The programme's objectives and main projects are presented in the following chart.



**Chart 2. Programme objectives and main projects**



Source: C. Dessallien. Supervisory mission for the Franco-Malian Support Project for Vocational and Job Training (PAFPE) – Final Report – French Embassy in Mali, Department for Co-operation and Cultural Initiatives (*Service de coopération et d'action culturelle*). 2000.

As part of these measures, French co-operative efforts have set up a Franco-Malian Support Project for Vocational and Job Training (PAFPE). Conceived and implemented in close co-operation with the Project for Consolidating Vocational Training (PCFP), this project is aimed at assisting the transformation of technical and vocational education by assigning it the responsibility for job-related training (continuing education). The approach adopted by the PAFPE consists in giving priority to the demand for training

arising from the manufacturing sector (businesses and crafts). The project has three initial elements:

- Element 1: to improve the public training ‘supply’ by supporting the Business Training and Support Units (*Unités de formation et d’appui aux entreprises/UFAE*<sup>13</sup>);
- Element 2: to contribute to the regulation of the training market by providing assistance to the Fund for Supporting Vocational Training and Apprenticeship (*Fonds d’appui à la formation professionnelle et à l’apprentissage/FAFPA*) (to contribute to financing vocational training in priority sectors, to support engineering capability for training in the modern and craft sectors, to develop FAFPA management capacities);
- Element 3: to contribute to mobilizing resources and energies by supporting grass-roots initiatives (contribute to the setting up of employers’ organizations, support NGOs working in the field of vocational training and the craft industry).

### ***1.5 Subsequent effects on the training market***

The reform of the TVE sector in Mali went through an overhaul of administrative procedures for managing, financing and implementing vocational courses. In this context, two organizations strongly contributed to the emergence of a training market, namely: the Fund for Supporting Vocational Training and Apprenticeship (the *Fonds d’appui à la formation professionnelle et à l’apprentissage/AFPA*) and the Business Training and Support Units (*Unités de formation et d’appui aux entreprises/UFAE*).

- FAFPA: since 1997, the activities of FAFPA have been important, if not decisive, in the field of continuing education. Its main aims are to improve the qualifications of the labour force so as to meet the needs of the
13. UFAEs were created by the law of March 1997 and mandated to provide training for the working population, to give counselling to businesses in training matters and to study the manufacturing process.

labour market, to upgrade the quality and capacity of vocational training institutions and to encourage businesses to get involved in the financing and management of worker training.

Under the responsibility of the Ministry of Employment, FAFPA is financed by an IDA credit (3.5 million CFA francs over five years), the Malian Professional Tax Fund of 0.5 per cent of the wage bill (300 million CFA francs in 1998) and by a grant from French and Swiss co-operative agencies. It helps businesses in modern and informal sectors to develop training programmes. These programmes are financed to the tune of 75 per cent. Faced with this mission, it has the responsibility of proposing to businesses appropriate training schemes. For this purpose it has gradually drawn up a 'catalogue' of 110 accredited centres.

In reality, the development of training was more rapid in the craft sector, where the National Federation of Malian Craftsmen has played an effective intermediary role, than in the modern sector, which has suffered from more restrictive procedures.

Besides the aid given to formulating needs and setting up training facilities, the fund is planning to directly support accredited TVE institutions, including private centres, by providing financing for equipment at some 50 per cent (half in the form of a grant and the other half as an interest-free loan). The training-of-trainers is also one of the Fund's main lines of action.

However, the part dealing with aid for material investment is the one which today shows the least satisfactory results, this in part because of excessive demands. Thus for 1998-1999, only eight centres benefited from material assistance. To improve this situation, one could see the Fund for Supporting Vocational Training and Apprenticeship (FAFPA) playing an advisory role, especially for private schools which often ignore the conditions attached to this aid (see *Table 3*).

**Table 3. FAFPA activity in financial terms (1998-99)**

Sector	Number of training programmes financed	Number of trainees	Number of professions/specialties	Funding from the FAFPA (in millions of CFA francs)
Informal sector (including apprentices)	93	4,592 860	18	187
Modern sector (including holders of a diploma)	106	2,140 100	22	410

Source: FAFPA (internal document n/d).


- UFAEs (Business Training and Support Units/*Unités de formation et d'appui aux entreprises*) are public institutions placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education and enjoying full financial autonomy. To date, only three have been created, placed respectively under the National Engineering School (*l'École nationale des ingénieurs/ENI*) called the UFAE for Civil Engineering, Mines and Industries – (UFAE/*Génie civil, Mines, Industries* – GCMI); the Central School for Industry, Commerce and Administration (*École centrale pour l'industrie, le commerce et l'administration/ECICA*); and the University Institute of Management (*Institut universitaire de gestion/IUG*). Their activities which are concentrated on training, but also on studies and counselling, are developing rapidly as shown by the growth in their sales figures (60 million CFA francs in 1998, 197 million CFA francs in 1999).

Note that in the context of the Ten-Year Programme on Education (PRODEC), with financing from the World Bank, the Ministry of Education (MOE) entrusted the UFAE/GCME in 2000 with a survey of all public and private secondary schools in Mali, which made it possible to create a database which provides useful information about the TVE sector (Ministry of Education, PRODEC, 2000).

UFAEs have an important role to play in promoting job-related training by developing counselling facilities for businesses. Although the immediate spin-off concerns TVE state schools, an increase in the demand for continuing education from businesses will also potentially benefit private centres, as well.

The setting up of the FAFPA and UFAEs and, more importantly, overall support measures for vocational training, have thus contributed to radically transforming the operation of the TVE sector in Mali. With a part of 'demand' showing profitable potential, a market is shaping up, both for the craft sector, as well as modern business. The Fund for Supporting Vocational Training and Apprenticeship (FAFPA) is at the very heart of the market, acting to facilitate exchange through intermediation and financing. Alongside it, the three UFAEs, which are key resource centres for professional skills (i.e. the ENI, IUG, ECICA), play the role of upgrading the supply of vocational training. The diagram below explains the new system.

**Chart 3. The vocational training market**



Source: C. Dessallien. Supervisory mission for the Franco-Malian Support Project for Vocational and Job Training (PAFPE) – Final Report – French Embassy in Mali, Department for Co-operation and Cultural Action. 2000.

### 1.6 The apprenticeship system

Apprenticeship is not integrated within the formal system. It acquires its practices from tradition, where the apprentice is formed by a master artisan who acts as a sort of ‘father figure’. The transmission of knowledge is essentially based on observation and imitation. This system belongs to what is commonly called the informal sector.

In most cases, apprenticeship gives rise to expertise. However, to the degree that training on the job has a predominant place, “apprenticeship offers few possibilities for learning the basic principles and theories on which practice is based”.

This general conclusion is reinforced by examining training conditions: little equipment in workshops; illiteracy or a low level of education among apprentices and their masters. Moreover, the system often encourages a passive attitude in the apprentice; the master keeps certain operations to himself (trade secrets) and only shares them if the apprentice is ‘worthy’. Finally, the apprentice has little chance to receive complementary training.

However, the activities of the Swiss co-operative agency (NGO Swiss Contact) and the Fund for Supporting Vocational Training and Apprenticeship (FAFPA) made it possible to develop and finance a training opportunity destined for apprentices and their masters.

### ***1.7. Problems within the TVE sector***

The situation of TVE in Mali presents at first sight a series of striking similarities with Senegal: a motley blend of supervisory bodies for training institutions (making ‘transparency’ and management of the sector difficult), an overall lack of training facilities, an excessive geographic concentration in and around the capital city, an imbalance of the training ‘supply’ in favour of the modern service sector, to the detriment of agriculture or the informal sectors which, all the same, have a major place in the country’s activities.

However, the Malian version of TVE also differs in many ways from Senegal. For reasons linked to its ‘political’ history, state control remains strong. If around two-thirds of vocational training is provided in private schools (over 20,000 students) the state often covers the expense of education for students which it has ‘guided’ once they have obtained their Basic Studies Diploma (*Diplôme d’études fondamentales/DEF*). This relatively important

contribution (in excess of 1 billion CFA francs) carries with it both positive aspects (undeniable financial support) and negative ones (private schools find themselves virtual prisoners of state involvement, which can lead to a dampening of initiative).

If the TVE sector in Mali is today undergoing definite expansion, and is benefiting from precise goals and priorities, this is not sufficient to guarantee it flawless development, in terms of both quantity and quality.

The first question or uncertainty is to know who is going to direct the necessary transformation and adaptation of TVE. The state alone does not seem capable of doing so, and moreover hesitates between leaving this sector under the full control of the Ministry of Education, or transferring it to the Ministry of Labour. Nor can it be entrusted to private initiative, which lacks both recognition and autonomy, and whose main function is to offset a lack of capacity in the state system. A hypothetical privatization of TVE would not be able to, alone, spearhead wished-for development by orienting and adapting the initial training system.

A smooth development of TVE requires, first of all, more financial means. However, it is probable that financing will decline even more in coming years, with a drop foreseen of state contributions to the private sector. Besides, the resources devoted to training by businesses or by the FAFPA remain extremely modest. These means are, all the same, indispensable for upgrading equipment in schools and recruiting qualified teachers, so as to assure quality training corresponding to the needs of business.

Beyond the financial aspects, there is also the question of renewing and revamping current programmes, so as to orient them towards high-growth specialties and those experiencing labour shortages, or home-grown technicians (maintenance, the tourist industry, but also some agricultural or health professions).



Today, it seems that the state and the private sector are staring each other down, waiting for the other to take the initiative. Getting out of this dead-end situation will probably require the involvement of other stakeholders (businesses, professional associations, etc.) capable of bringing to this area their expertise as well as their technical and financial support.

### **1.8 The costs and financing of TVE**

For 1999, secondary technical and vocational education represented 10 per cent of overall education expenses (i.e. 4 billion out of 40 billion CFA francs), with a little less than 3 per cent of enrolments, including students in private schools. In comparison to overall current expenses for secondary and higher education, the portion of secondary vocational schooling was 20 per cent in 1999 (i.e. 3.6 billion out of a total of 18 billion CFA francs) (see *Table 4*).

**Table 4. Distribution of current expenses (%) Ministry for Secondary and Higher Education (1999)**

Sector	Percentage (%)
General and technical secondary	39,3
Vocational secondary	20,0
Higher education	40,4
National Research Council (CNRST)	0,2
UFAE	0,1
<b>Total (18 billions CFA francs)</b>	<b>100,0</b>

*Source* : Ministry of Education, Review of public expenses, Bamako, June 2000.

Data available for unit costs show that a student in secondary technical and vocational training costs 10 times more to the community than a primary school pupil; this ratio is 25 times more for higher education. The Review of

Public Expenditure in the Education Sector for 1999 calculates the ratio of spending on the TVE sub-sector (4.2 billion CFA francs) to public and private enrolments (26,784 students), arriving at the figure of 157,000 CFA francs as the cost per TVE student, as against 15,000 CFA francs per primary education pupil.

However, it should be noted that these figures probably underestimate the real cost of TVE. In reality, students in the public sector generate most of government expense. Apart from scholarships, the ratio between TVE expenses and that for state students would give a result that is significantly higher than the 'official' unit cost. Since available information does not make it possible to make a more precise calculation, one can conclude, all the same, that the relation between the cost of a student in secondary technical and vocational education and that of elementary school is clearly over 10 times.

This confusion, due to the inclusion of private enrolments in the calculation of costs by the Ministry, also probably explains that the unit cost for general secondary school (161,000 CFA francs) appears slightly higher than that of TVE. There is a paradox here, that the imprecise calculation method is doubtless responsible for.

The information available on the nature of 'recurrent' expenditure of the Ministry on secondary and higher education shows that the most important item is that of scholarships, i.e. 29 per cent of the total, slightly more than personnel costs. The latter represent only 26 per cent, i.e. a proportion that is surprisingly small. Scholarships especially concern higher education. Subsidies for private schools represent a significant item, 10 per cent of expenditure which, added to scholarships, gives an idea of the scope of the Ministry's involvement in the private sector.

**Table 5. Recurrent expenses according to nature (%), Ministry for Secondary and Higher Education (1999)**

Nature of expenses	Percentage (%)
Personnel	26
Teaching material	19
Scholarships	29
Subsidies to private education	10
Payment for part-time teachers	3
Others	13
Total (19 billion CFA francs)	<b>100</b>

Source: Ministry of Education, Review of public expenditure, Bamako, June 2000.

Concerning the sub-sector of secondary vocational education, the data concerning the structure of expenditure confirm the relative weakness in the item for personnel and the importance of scholarships and aid. One should note the importance of material expenses which is linked to the setting up in 1999 of the Project for Consolidating Vocational Training (PCFP). The priority accorded by the government to the TVE sector is shown in the scale of the Project's investments, which in 1999 accounted for 56 per cent of the Ministry's overall allocations for equipment (see *Tables 5 and 6*).

**Table 6. Distribution of expenses for secondary vocational education (ordinary budget) Ministry for Secondary and Higher Education (1999)**

Nature of expenses	Percentage (%)
Personnel	20,6
Material	45,1
Scholarships and allowances	20,5
Other	13,8
<b>Total (3.6 billion CFA francs)</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source:* Ministry of Education, Review of public expenditure, Bamako, June 2000.

These efforts must not eclipse the state's difficulties in financing secondary technical and vocational education. State TVE schools are very scarce (11). Their lack of resources is especially noticeable in the area of training resources, which are often insufficient. The setting up of the UFAEs (see above) and the FAFPA has opened new prospects by allowing schools to generate revenue through continuing education. However, overall, these practices are not yet widespread. In this context, and facing a strong social demand, the appeal to the private sector represents an important strategy for developing TVE, and education in general.

## 2. Development of the private sector

### 2.1 *The sector's evolution*

After independence, Mali found itself with private schools which were already in operation. The young Republic, wishing to found a socialist regime (with direct state control), tolerated these schools without setting up a legal framework. However, the further development of private schools led the

Malian State to draw up legislation governing this sector, the extent and force of which seem to reflect the political and educational evolution of the country.

In 1971, a decree and an order ruled on the relationship between private schools and the Malian Government (Decree of 20 September 1971; Order No. 661 of the MENJS). Later, with the democratization of 1994, a free-market system was introduced. All individuals or legal persons can open a school (Article 2) and the amounts that can be charged as school fees are left open (Article 21).

According to Article 5, only those schools which “provide their students with access to advanced training or to elementary or middle secondary education preparing them to exercise a trade or profession in the primary, industrial or service sector” are deemed to be private secondary schools. Under the supervision of the state, these schools most often come under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, but also other organizations: Ministries for Rural Development, Health, Youth and Sports, or Culture.

The creation and opening of a private school requires preliminary authorization (Article 9) after completion of a case-file. These are the Ministries which grant authorization to create, open and run a school. If the legislation is not complied with, these authorizations can be withdrawn in accordance with the conditions laid down by legislation (Article 18).

Conditions for opening are subject to the submission of the following documents: papers relevant to the school, the promoter, the principal, the teaching personnel; a commitment to security and quality, rules of procedure, and timetables. Private schools are controlled by the technical services of the responsible Ministries in several ways: inspections of the teaching personnel, an annual submission to the Ministry of a report at the opening and closing of the school year, specific inspections (health, architectural, financial).

Teaching in private schools must include all or part of the official or approved programmes of the competent administrative authorities (Article 6) and lead to the granting of diplomas which can be either recognized or not recognized by the state.

From the legal standpoint and administrative obligations, three categories of private school are possible. Some have authorization to found, others have authorization to found and a warrant to open. In addition to this, a third group benefits from the recognition of promoting the public interest, on condition that it respects the employment code in recruiting both permanent and part-time personnel, and obtains examination results which are “comparable to that of state schools” (see below). This recognition gives the schools the right to state grants (Article 12).

In the way of special provisions, Article 20 provides for the possibility of the state facilitating the acquisition of land for school infrastructure, and Article 19 the possibility of special agreements with the Malian Government. Here it is a matter, in particular, of an agreement signed on 8 August 1972 between the government and the Malian Bishops’ Conference. This agreement, amended in 1976, is presently being renegotiated. It provides the Ministry of Education with the right to deploy personnel in Catholic private schools. The government also assumes the responsibility of providing assistance, so as to assure teachers in the private sector of salaries equivalent to their counterparts in state schools. This amount is equal to 70 per cent of their salaries, and this assistance rose to 80 per cent in 1976.

## ***2.2 Legal status and private school activities***

The Malian administration allows three steps for private education: authorization to found, warrant to open, recognition of promoting the public interest. According to this administrative process, the 164 recognized private schools are divided as follows:

- Authorization to found only (“décision de création seulement”) 92
- Authorization to found and warrant to open (“décision de création et arrêté d’ouverture”) 61
- Authorization to found, warrant to open, and recognized as promoting the public interest (“décision de création, arrêté d’ouverture et reconnaissance d’utilité publique”) 11

Again, according to official statistics, the distribution of private institutions, in terms of legal status, is as follows:

- Denominational status 4
- Associative status 2
- NGO status 2
- One-person company status 156

These data however are not fully reliable. First of all, obtaining an authorization to found a school does not signify a school actually opening and, according to the most recent figures obtained at the beginning of 2001, there are 71 schools which have in fact opened. Moreover, the information available does not always clearly explain the legal status.

The survey done by IIEP on 19 schools makes it possible to add a few details, in particular to reveal other kinds of legal status, like public limited companies (SA), and private (limited) companies (SARL).

In the sample, 6 schools are recognized as promoting the public interest, and all the others (13) have both authorization to found and open.

Most schools recognized as promoting the public interest are characterized as being organized on a national scale. This is the case of the network of Colleges of Modern Technology (*Collèges techniques modernes/CTM*), which are found in all regions except in Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, and are managed by a national private management. In the same way,

the 'Père Michel' Centre (CPM) and the Cours Jeanne d'Arc (CJA) belong to the Catholic Church. Another group of schools are recognized as promoting the public interest because of the unique or monopolistic nature of the training that they provide (IT, model building, hotel management).

The legal status of the schools surveyed shows that most of them are one-person limited companies (*sociétés unipersonnelles à responsabilité limitée*/SUARL) (12), or private (limited) companies (SARL), religious or denominational (2), associations (2), or a public limited company (SA).

A breakdown like this, confirming the lack of accuracy of overall designations, is consistent with Malian laws, in particular:

- The law governing private education in Mali which authorizes legal entities to create schools (Article 2).
- The law of 27 August 1992 instituting a Malian Commercial Code which lists the basic kinds of company that can be created in Mali. Here one finds private (limited) companies (SARL), public limited companies (SA), one-person limited companies (SUARL).
- The order of 28 March 1959, concerning associations, which allows the conducting of such activities, while excluding religious orders which, for their part, are regulated by the agreement of 8 August 1972 concerning education.

One-person companies are the favourite choice of promoters. This predilection is probably due to more constraints linked to the other company types. Indeed, an association or another type of company requires good faith among associates, concerted management procedures and a solid associative experience. The two associations in the sample were professional associations (Chamber of Commerce, Association of Tailors).

Nearly a third of the schools in the sample are involved in other activities than teaching, or belong to an organization with other activities. Three schools



are in this situation. The two denominational schools (CJA, CPM) are attached to the Catholic education system (general and pre-school teaching and literacy programmes). Literacy programmes are carried out in co-operation with AMAPRO. Techno Lab ISTA is the third, whose parent organization does studies, consulting and provides other services.

Three other schools, CFPHT, CPMN, IPSA, which are one-person companies not belonging to a larger organization, all the same, carry out other activities (support counselling, consultancy) in keeping with their area of competency (hotel management, tourism, IT, tailoring, etc.). This kind of practice probably shows their wish to diversify their sources of financing.

Finally, 13 schools do not belong to an organization and do not mention the exercise of other activities. In this group appear mostly one-person companies (9). The four others are associations (2) and private (limited) companies (2).

### **2.3 *The private training 'supply'***

According to data from the Ministry of Secondary Education, private TVE schools accommodated a total of 22,739 students for the 1999-2000 academic year. Between 1997-1998 and 1999-2000, private school enrolments saw a rapid rise, namely 86 per cent in two years. It is probable that an increase of this order also corresponds to an improvement in statistical information.

In terms of geographical distribution, with 49 schools, the district of Bamako contains the large majority of TVE schools (69 per cent), followed by the other regions in decreasing order: Sikasso (10), Koulikoro (7), Ségou (5), Kayes (4), Gao (4) et Mopti (2). In some way, this distribution of the 'supply' is congruent with the country's economic activities.

There is no information available on the distribution of students by skill area. However, data are available on school profiles, which are quite stable for the period (see *Table 7*). In 2000, a half of enrolments (52 per cent) were in schools offering both service and industrial training. The service training schools were, in terms of size, the second most important area of instruction, with 39 per cent of enrolments. If students of industrial schools accounted for only 6 per cent of the private sector, one should note that their capacity has more than doubled in two years. The centres for agricultural training represent only a marginal share (2 per cent) of the private 'supply'. Indeed the growth of the sector equally benefited all types of schools.

**Table 7. Evolution of TVE enrolments according to the dominant school profile**

School years	1997-1998		1998-1999		1999-2000	
School profile	Enrolments	%	Enrolments	%	Enrolments	%
Service sector	4,384	36	6,387	37	8,957	39
Industrial (including construction)	657	5	985	6	1,433	6
Mixed (service and industrial)	6,924	57	9,428	55	11,891	52
Agriculture	249	2	386	2	458	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>12,214</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>17,186</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>22,739</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source:* Ministry of Education, 2000, PRODEC, *Survey on secondary education in Mali, database.*

An examination of the distribution of enrolments according to the kind of training makes it possible to complete our knowledge of the private sector 'supply'. Over two-thirds (69 per cent) of students in private-sector secondary vocational schools are preparing a Technical Certificate (*Brevet technique/ BT*) to become future technicians. Service training largely exceeds this figure, with 79 per cent of enrolments in the private sector, compared to only 70 per cent in the state sector (and 76.4 per cent for overall TVE). Industrial

Vocational Training Certificates (*Certificat d'aptitude professionnelle/* CAP) and Technical School Certificates (*Brevet d'études professionnelles/* BEP) are far from unimportant (around one-fifth of students). Moreover, girls are overall rather well represented (40 per cent), even though they are largely concentrated in service training. Note that their share is perceptibly stronger (41 per cent) in BT than in CAP (31 per cent), and in the service sector (nearly 50 per cent) than in industrial occupations (10 per cent).

**Table 8. Distribution of private TVE enrolments according to type of diploma**

Diploma	Enrolments					
	1997/1998		1998/1999		1999/2000	
	Enrolments	Girls (%)	Enrolments	Girls (%)	Enrolments	Girls (%)
CAP service	4,905	39	4,750	47	4,966	50
CAP industrial	1,918	14	2,262	18	2,149	10
<i>Total CAP</i>	<i>6,823</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>7,012</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>7,115</i>	<i>31</i>
BT service	4,809	46	8,842	48	13,037	47
BT industrial	582	14	1,296	10	2,571	10
<i>Total BT</i>	<i>5,391</i>	<i>42</i>	<i>10,138</i>	<i>44</i>	<i>15,608</i>	<i>41</i>
<b>Overall total</b>	<b>12,214</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>17,150</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>22,723</b>	<b>40</b>

Source: Ministry of Education, 2000, PRODEC, *Survey on secondary education in Mali, database* (for 1998-1999 and 1999-2000 the data reveal a slight disparity of about a few dozen students between total enrolments according to school and type of diploma; moreover, the data on enrolments according to diploma seem to combine industrial and agricultural fields).

The private TVE sector saw a definite quantitative development, which was already evident in available national statistics but confirmed by the survey done on 19 schools. Besides the increase in school openings during recent years, the enrolments in the existing schools are everywhere increasing, leading promoters to undertake or consider expansion (see *Table 8*).

The development of the private sector is keeping pace with the evolution and diversification of the training proposed. If courses leading to a BT have today become more prevalent by accounting for half of the enrolments in day courses, there is undeniably an opening towards new levels of advanced (post-secondary) training, leading mainly, but not only, to a BTS.

Besides day courses, private promoters are also opening evening courses, whose enrolments are less, but which make it possible to rationalize the use of their facilities and increase their revenue.

Advanced training applies to over 10 per cent of enrolees attending day courses, and 40 per cent attending evening courses. As for courses leading to a CAP, they represent a third of enrolments in day courses, and a half in evening courses (see *Table 9*).

**Table 9. Distribution of enrolments for 2000-2001  
(19 schools surveyed)**

	CAP	Girls	BT	Girls	Others	Girls	Total	Girls
Day courses	1,848	1,187	2,965	958	610	186	5,423	2,331
Evening courses	518	443	102	25	420	103	1,040	571
Total	2,366	1,630	3,067	983	1,030	289	6,463	2,902

It should be noted that 14 schools out of 19 claim to offer continuing education to businesses. However, the low level of revenue generated reveals that this niche does not represent a significant part of their activity (see below).

#### **2.4 The financing of private vocational education**

The main sources of funding for private vocational education are the state, households and promoters. For the first two, financing includes scholarships, financial assistance, and subsidies (state) and school fees (state, households). A large part of the contribution of promoters consists of initial investment for the setting up of schools (infrastructure, equipment).

#### 2.4.1. State aid to students guided towards the private sector

State financial support to the private sector is constantly increasing. To understand this situation, one should point out that following a Basic Studies Diploma (*Diplôme d'études fondamentales*, DEF), the Ministry aims at combating 'school drop-outs' and providing possibilities for continuing secondary studies for graduates. Given student preferences and a certain number of criteria (age, performance, geographical location, social status, etc.), a guidance commission distributes students according to available school capacity. Faced with a lack of available places in state schools, a certain number of students are thus 'guided' each year towards private schools.

To accomplish this, the state provides grants and assistance of three kinds:

- living allowance;
- school fees;
- school equipment (overalls and smocks, notebooks, pens, etc.).

The amounts paid by the state for 'guided' and officially registered students are as follows in *Table 10*.

**Table 10. Scale of annual expenses paid by the state for students guided towards the private sector (in CFA francs)**

Specialties	Enrolment fees	School equipment	Living allowance
BT industrial	115,000	50,000	105,000
BT service	85,000	50,000	105,000
CAP industrial	85,000	50,000	105,000
CAP service	65,000	50,000	105,000

Source: Ministry of Education.

The living allowance is paid directly to the student (on condition of minimum school performance, and a cut-off age), while the enrolment fees are paid to the school. The distribution of state scholarships and assistance leads to three categories of student:

- *those with a full allowance*: living allowance + enrolment fees + school equipment, i.e. a total of  $105,000 + 85,000$  (on average) +  $50,000 = 240,000$  CFA francs (a little more than 3,000 students attending TVE are so financed);
- those with half allowance: enrolment fees + school equipment, i.e.  $85,000 + 50,000 = 135,000$  CFA francs;
- *state 'guided' students not benefiting from allowances*: enrolment fees, i.e. 85,000 CFA francs on average.

According to information from the MOE, the state would like to withdraw from this practice of systematic guidance, not only so as to grant more freedom to students, but also for economic considerations. This system of financial aid through the granting of scholarships has a very high total cost, over 6 billion CFA francs, particularly for higher education. In the framework of proposed financial disinvestment, the allowance, too, is being questioned, with its possible disappearance by 2004.

The growing number of students 'guided' towards private TVE schools has meant a striking increase in state aid, which was in excess of 1 billion CFA francs in 2000 (see *Table 11*). However, this aid revealed itself to vary considerably according to school: sometimes nothing, due to the lack of guided students, for others it represented the quasi-totality of revenue. These schools, almost entirely subsidized by the state, belong de facto to a semi-public sector.

**Table 11. State aid to the private TVE sector  
(in millions of CFA francs)**

1997-1998		1998-1999		1999-2000	
Scholarship recipients	Assistance	Scholarship recipients	Assistance	Scholarship recipients	Assistance
5 860 463,5	11 263	843,1	13 987	1 108	

Source: Ministry of Education, 2000, PRODEC, *Survey on secondary teaching in Mali, database*.

Moreover, as part of special grants, the state awards to private Catholic education 80 per cent of the salaries for teaching personnel (see above).

#### 2.4.2 State grants: assistance, but not without faults

Despite the defined criteria, the awarding of state grants can introduce an easy expedient. Some unscrupulous promoters can be tempted to advance the quantity of enrolments to the detriment of the quality of teaching. This is all the more likely since the limited number of places in state institutions obliges the state to direct its students towards the private sector in return for payment of school fees and school equipment.

In this system, the promoter opens the school, relying on fees paid by the state, which is pleased to find a training opportunity available on the market. However, in the long run, private schools run a risk since the high number of students sent to them by the state, while assuring them of a guaranteed income, inhibits their ability to adapt the training 'supply'. In addition, these state scholarship recipients or 'grant-holders' disturb the normal operation of private schools, which are increasingly affected by disturbances and school strikes in the state system. Being a majority within the private school cohort, 'state grant-holders' increasingly impose their forms of organization and militancy on the private system. One can observe that the

three private schools (Kodonso, Cheick Anta DIOP and Progress *Lycées*), which refused 'state grant-holders', have avoided strikes.

Promoters also complain about delays in the payment of school fees by the state. This situation indeed disturbs the running of their schools.

### 2.4.3 School fees

The 1994 law allows private schools the freedom of setting school fees. In reality one can distinguish among three scenarios: (i) schools that mainly receive students guided to them by the state and which thus receive remuneration according to a strict official scale; (ii) schools that receive no grant-holding students, often by their own choice, and that therefore freely set their own rates according to the law of the market; and finally, (iii) schools whose recruitment is mixed, i.e. combining 'guided' students and others who freely choose the school and pay out of their own pockets.

The school fees set by private schools are often equivalent or higher than what the state pays. Monthly payments are thus on average 8,000 CFA francs for a CAP, and 10,000 CFA francs for a BT. To this is sometimes added an enrolment fee which is quite low, around 5,000 CFA francs. One notes that, unlike Senegal, industrial training requires higher fees than does the service sector. This seems logical given the high cost of training materials.

However, beginning at secondary level (CAP/BT), some schools stand out from the others by asking for fees that are very much higher, sometimes exceeding 30,000 CFA francs per month. Fees like these can be explained by being very targeted towards a social class, or by the school's reputation and a kind of training which is not found in the public sector.

At advanced vocational education (BTS) level, the school fees are generally very much higher. Here it is really a question of a truly free market, which is not part of the government student-sponsored scheme and concerns



training which is markedly more costly, including the factor of teacher qualifications (IT, management).

#### *2.4.4. School revenue*

Examination of the financial accounts of schools surveyed (see *Table 12*), along with the data obtained during the survey on secondary education in Mali (Ministry of Education, 2000) raise a few questions. Anomalies and gaps are not uncommon; they show not only a certain secretiveness and opacity in accounting, but also the probable absence of strict financial controls and a lax supervision of the schools, themselves. The data do seem to be usable, however (after data control and cleaning), for 16 of the schools surveyed, which have a total enrolment of 5,333 students.

As for school revenue, school fees paid by the state and families provide the main sources of income, representing 80 per cent of the total income. The billion CFA francs in state aid to private schools represents more than a third of their overall revenue (see *Table 12* below). However, it appears that other resources are not always taken into account (aid and donations for denominational and associative schools) or even declared.

Revenue from businesses through continuing education, that one-half of schools surveyed claim to provide, remains relatively weak – no doubt below 10 per cent of total revenue. Even if the resources from job-related training do not appear to be radically different from those observed in Senegal, this practice seems, however, somewhat more frequent in Malian schools, which can be linked to the activities of the Fund for Supporting Vocational Training and Apprenticeship (FAFPA) and the Business Training and Support Units (UFAEs).

**Table 12. Statement of revenue and expenses for 16 institutions surveyed\* (5,333 students) in thousands of FCFA**

Revenue	Households	Enterprises	Government	Sponsors	Other revenue	Total
All institutions	284,900 39%	31,900 4.4%	301,300 41.3%	7,900 1.1%	104,100 14.2%	730,000 100.0%
Not including CTM	274,900 43.4%	31,900 5.1%	213,800 33.8%	7,900 1.2%	104,100 16.5%	632,600 100.0%

Expenses	Staff	Renting	Operations	Taxes	Investment	Construction	Other expenses	Total
All institutions	344,100 44.6%	58,500 7.6%	69,400 9.0%	44,900 5.8%	192,000 24.9%	45,500 5.9%	16,800 2.2%	771,200 100.0%
Not including CTM	275,400 45.0%	55,000 9.0%	69,400 11.3%	40,200 6.6%	109,000 17.8%	45,500 7.5%	16,800 2.8%	611,300 100.0%

\* The table presents the results both with and without the CTM, as the scale of the investments declared by this school 'distorts' the results.

## 2.5 Expenses and costs

The major expense item is the payment of salaries, which all the same represents less than half (45 per cent) of the total. Investments in teaching materials and construction comprise the second expense item, with a little more than 30 per cent of the total. Since other irreducible items (taxes, social welfare payments, leasing) are far from negligible, one realizes the burden of expenses negatively impacting the often perilous financial health of schools.

This overall structure is strongly influenced, however, by the presence of a large institution (the College of Modern Technology, or CTM) whose founder and principal has embarked on an extension programme (Advanced Vocational Training, or BTS) requiring very substantial investment financed from 'own funds'. Removing this school brings the overall share of investment down to 25 per cent and shifts the financial balance from a slight deficit to a slight surplus.

### 2.5.1 Investment

It turns out that 58 per cent of the schools surveyed own their own property (individually, 7, or collectively, 4) compared to 42 per cent which are leasing. Eight building lots were acquired via founder financing; three were bought collectively, two of these in the form of donations and loans.

Within the sample, no school has actually obtained land as a state or local government grant. Although the law facilitates the acquisition of land according to the needs and means of the state (Article 20), various reasons can explain the lack of state and local government participation at this level. The law first of all postdates the creation of many schools. Also, since promoters wish to have sites that are easy to reach, most schools are located in city centres: in many cases, neither the state nor local governments have appropriate land holdings available.

Results indicate that 63 per cent of schools surveyed (12/19) have carried out expansion programmes since their creation. The frequency of this confirms the importance of demand for private education.

### *2.5.2 Equipment*

All of the schools surveyed said that they had the necessary teaching material, but quite evidently the sophistication of the equipment varies enormously according to case.

Concerning the financing of equipment, 84 per cent of schools surveyed (16/19) purchased equipment using their own means. The others combined the contribution of personnel and other sources (FAFPA, donations, legacies, grants).

Responses concerning the means of financing land and equipment indicate that the main part of investment is assumed by promoters. This reality forces them to seek specialities that require the least investment. It also

explains the clamour of some promoters, who want the state to leave them free to set their own school fees.

### 2.5.3 Unit costs

Based on financial statements made by the surveyed schools, **the average cost of a private TVE student can be estimated at about 150,000 CFA francs**. This amount proves to be very close to the unit cost of 157,000 CFA francs calculated in the Review of Public Expenditure for the TVE sector as a whole; it should be remembered, however, that the latter figure tends to underestimate the actual unit cost considerably (see above). In fact, the cost per student is probably much lower in the private sector than in state schools and represents approximately 88 per cent of the GDP per capita, estimated at 170,000 CFA francs in 2000 (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2000). In comparison to Senegal, the cost per student thus appears lower in Mali in absolute terms (150 CFA francs, compared to 250,000 CFA francs), however a little higher in relative terms (88 per cent of GDP per capita, compared to 76 per cent in Senegal).

If one sticks to the data from the Survey on Secondary Education (*Ministry of Education, 2000*), actual state aid totals about 80,000 CFA francs per TVE scholarship recipient (1.1 billion for nearly 14,000 of them). Thus, it would be evidently lower than the average unit cost and also below what is foreseen in the official rate. This aid will thus not be sufficient to allow schools that are mainly recruiting grant-holders to completely cover costs. These schools could have more limited budgets than those which freely recruit students through higher school fees.

The unit cost, estimated at 150,000 CFA francs, leads one to estimate the overall private TVE budget in Mali at a total cost of 3 billion CFA francs. State financing (1.1 billion CFA francs) appears to account for at least a third of this total, an estimate which seems more or less in line with the declarations of the private schools surveyed (see table).

## 2.6 TVE teaching personnel

In contrast to the public sector, private schools have more recourse to hourly-paid casual teachers, drawing partly on state schools and retired teachers (see *Table 13*).

Despite the high number of private schools, permanent teachers make up only 16 per cent of teaching personnel, compared to 58 per cent in the public sector, and contract personnel 10 per cent, compared to 37 per cent in the public sector.

This information suggests that by drawing on hourly-paid casual teachers, private school promoters are attempting to minimize their staff cost. However, beyond this concern with cutting costs, promoters claim that they do not find the skills required among 'young graduates'. The shortage of qualified teachers would thus motivate them to use teachers from the public sector. This way of structuring personnel, which is unstable by its very nature, raises some doubts about the private sector's capacity to build up real teaching teams and to create institutional continuity. It is probable that this situation has some effect on the training offered.

**Table 13. Teaching staff for the 1999-2000 academic year**

Status	Number of schools	Number of classes	Permanent	Hourly-paid casual teachers	Contract teachers	Total
Public	11	770	324	28	209	<b>561</b>
Private	58	2,069	261	1,168	155	<b>1,584</b>
Total	69	2,839	585	1,196	364	<b>2,145</b>

*Source:* Ministry of Education, 2000, PRODEC, *Survey on secondary teaching in Mali, database*.

Student/teacher ratios between public and private schools do not reveal any considerable differences (see *Table 14*). The relatively low student/teacher ratio in private schools (14 students per class) suggests that the financial pressures in private schools do not lead them to overcrowd classrooms.

**Table 14. Teaching conditions (public/private)**

Status	Number of schools	Number of classes	Teaching staff	Student enrolments	Student/teacher ratio	Class/teacher ratio
Public	11	770	561	10,351	18.5	1.4
Private	58	2,069	1,584	22,739	14.4	1.3
Total	69	2,839	2,145	33,090	15.4	1.3

*Source:* Ministry of Education, 2000, PRODEC, *Survey on secondary teaching in Mali, database*.

Like Senegal, the comparison of salary levels between public and private schools seems to reveal that civil-servant teachers in secondary schools receive higher pay (see *Table 15*). Based on the survey's data, the initial salary, as well as the maximum salary, is clearly lower in the private sector. From this point of view, private institutions would not seem to be especially attractive for young graduates wishing to teach in TVE.

**Table 15. Annual salaries of public and private TVE teachers**

Public (gross salary, secondary-school teacher)		Private (permanent instructors)	
Minimum	Maximum	Minimum	Maximum
916,000	2,158,000	480,000	1,920,000

*Source:* Ministry of Education and Survey data.

In relative terms, the income for teachers in the schools surveyed represents 3 to 11 times the GDP per inhabitant. As for the analysis of unit costs (see above), the comparison with Senegal reveals lower levels of payment in absolute terms, but higher ones in relative terms. Thus, in Senegal, the scale of private-teacher salaries is less than two to seven times the GDP per inhabitant.

### 2.7 Students' achievement

The repetition rate is relatively low (see *Table 16*). For overall enrolments in private schools, it varies between 11 per cent and 13 per cent compared to 22 per cent and 30 per cent in overall secondary vocational education. This rate has increased slightly from one year to another during the last three years among boys, while for girls this evolution is more irregular.

**Table 16. Enrolment and repetition according to gender and school year**

Total enrolment			Repetition		
<b>1997-1998</b>					
<b>B</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>Total</b>
7,760	4,454	12,214	700	622	<b>1,322</b>
<b>1998-1999</b>					
<b>B</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>Total</b>
10,180	7,006	17,186	1,227	693	<b>1,920</b>
<b>1999-2000</b>					
<b>B</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>G</b>	<b>Total</b>
13,673	9,066	22,739	1,846	1,005	<b>2,851</b>

Source: Ministry of Education, 2000, PRODEC, *Survey on secondary schools in Mali, database*.

The survey provides some information on dropping out and exclusions which represent a significant number of students (12 per cent). The main reasons for dropping out are family problems, finding a job, non-payment of school fees, and illness; while motives for exclusion come from disciplinary problems, poor motivation or lack of work.

The available data on examination success in the private sector (see *Table 17*) show a quite prominent fall-off in results during recent years, probably linked to the growing number of student strikes which have also affected private schools.

The success of private-school candidates seems however to continue to surpass national examination results, which were only 38 per cent in 2000 for CAP and around 50 per cent for a BT (see *Table 18*).

In the private sector – and this is true overall – boys succeed better than girls, and candidates in industrial speciality courses (essentially masculine) fare better than both genders in the service sector.

A comparison between public-private tends to reinforce the idea of comparative advantages: the public seeming to perform better in the industrial field, the private doing better in services (75 per cent rate of success, compared to a little less than 50 per cent for all candidates).



**Table 17. Examination results according to type of diploma, private sector**

1997-1998								
Diploma	Enrolled		Present		Passed		% Passed	
	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G
CAP service	1,268	593	1,261	591	828	359	66	61
CAP industrial	678	92	664	91	597	70	90	77
<b>Total CAP</b>	<b>1,946</b>	<b>685</b>	<b>1,925</b>	<b>682</b>	<b>1,425</b>	<b>429</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>63</b>
BT service	396	301	393	301	339	254	86	84
BT industrial	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
<b>Total BT</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>n/a</b>
1998-1999								
Diploma	Enrolled		Present		Passed		% Passed	
	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G
CAP service	918	751	912	736	452	369	50	50
CAP industrial	602	68	599	67	535	49	89	73
<b>Total CAP</b>	<b>1,520</b>	<b>819</b>	<b>1,511</b>	<b>803</b>	<b>987</b>	<b>418</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>52</b>
BT service	541	432	533	429	443	358	83	83
BT industrial	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
<b>Total BT</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>n/a</b>
1999-2000								
Diploma	Enrolled		Present		Passed		% Passed	
	B	G	B	G	B	G	B	G
CAP service	781	785	767	765	261	264	34	35
CAP industrial	632	84	623	70	524	37	84	53
<b>Total CAP</b>	<b>1,413</b>	<b>869</b>	<b>1,390</b>	<b>835</b>	<b>785</b>	<b>301</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>36</b>
BT service	359	372	353	371	279	267	79	72
BT industrial	91	3	90	3	61	1	68	33
<b>Total BT</b>	<b>450</b>	<b>375</b>	<b>443</b>	<b>374</b>	<b>340</b>	<b>268</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>72</b>

n/a: not available

Source: Ministry of Education, 2000, PRODEC, *Survey on secondary education in Mali, database*.

**Table 18. National results (public + private) CAP and BT (1999-2000)**

	Present	Passed	Rate of success %
CAP service	5,384	1,418	26
CAP industrial	1,373	1,122	82
<b>Total CAP</b>	<b>6,757</b>	<b>2,540</b>	<b>38</b>
BT1 service	3,768	1,582	42
BT1 industrial	882	617	70
<b>Total BT1</b>	<b>4,650</b>	<b>2,199</b>	<b>47</b>
BT2 service	2,195	1,073	49
BT2 industrial	616	449	73
<b>Total BT2</b>	<b>2,811</b>	<b>1,522</b>	<b>54</b>

(BT1: 1st part of BT, in 3rd year; BT2: 2nd part of BT in 4th year)

Source: Ministry of Education database.

### 2.8 *Adaptation of courses*

The curricula are criticized on two points by school principals. Some find them overcharged for the CAP. Thus, none of the schools surveyed is able to cover the entire curriculum within the normal two-year time span, which led one school to offer a three-year CAP. Other principals consider the courses obsolete, in particular for secretarial skills (typing with manual typewriters, shorthand, etc.). In response to this, at least one private school has managed to develop a recognized programme and diploma in this specialty.

The content of CAP courses deserves a thorough review to make it really compatible with their double purpose: providing skills necessary for a job, but also allowing the continuance of studies, especially for a BT.

### 3. Overall assessment

#### **3.1 A private sector showing strong growth**

The Malian private TVE sector has shown strong growth in the 1990s. The number of schools has risen from 11 in 1993 to 71 in 2000. The private sector today handles two-thirds of TVE students. In contrast to Senegal, the private sector has mainly based its training at secondary-school level, without having yet seen much expansion at the post-secondary level (Advanced Vocational Training Certificate/BTS type).

Another characteristic of the Malian experience is that the private sector is especially present in TVE (with 71 schools, compared to 57 in general secondary education) which thus seems to be a sector of education given high priority by private entrepreneurs.

Enrolments in the private sector are concentrated in service training (accounting, secretarial skills, management). However the sector has not, all the same, abandoned light industrial and construction skills. The type of training offered leads one to qualify the statement according to which private schools are just investing in the service sector. Another characteristic of the Malian private sector is that it handles more girls than the state sector, even if this trend is not able to offset the under-representation of young women students in TVE.

#### **3.2 A private sector benefiting from a supportive environment**

In Mali, the development of TVE directly responds to a concern with meeting an excess demand for training. In this context, the private sector is encouraged by an explicit state policy, combined with relatively important funding. State aid – approximately 1 billion CFA francs – represents one-third of the sector's revenues, and 62 per cent of private-school students enjoy state support. Moreover, the evolution of the private sector is part of a

general framework for the development of education and training which is relatively supportive.

This positive 'environment' hinges on the Ten-Year Programme on Education (PRODEC) which, after basic education, gives second place to vocational education and its adaptation to needs of the economy. It thus envisages that "the private sector will be increasingly involved in the management, financing and provision of vocational education since it is the normal living environment of vocational graduates." (PRODEC, the Main Lines of Educational Policy, May 1999). The setting up of PRODEC also resulted in the Project for Consolidating Vocational Training (PCFP) with the support of the World Bank and comprising three elements: Initial Vocational Training (*la formation professionnelle initiale/ FPI*), the Fund for Supporting Vocational Training and Apprenticeship (FAFPA), and the Employment and Training Observatory (*l'Observatoire de l'emploi et de la formation/OEF*).

For three years now, the activities of the FAFPA (with an annual budget of around 500 to 600 million CFA francs) has, with some success, aimed at matching demand for training coming from business with the available 'supply' in the modern and informal sector. The lack of support to TVE institutions for modernizing their equipment remains the least satisfying aspect.

Vocational training also draws on the energies of the French Malian Support Project for Vocational and Job Training (PAFPE) which aims at improving public provision, especially through UFAEs; to develop the FAFPA's capacity to supervise the training market; and to contribute to mobilizing energies, initiatives and existing resources.

### **3.3 *A private sector that nonetheless remains dependent on state support***

Although necessary, state support is also a source of weakness. If the law of 1994 was a big step forward in recognizing the role and place of

private education, it all the same presents some shortcomings and drawbacks. Three conclusions can be derived from the study of private-sector TVE.

### *3.3.1 State aid is important, but ambiguous*

The difference between a minority of private schools which have been granted public interest status and the others, while encouraging quality teaching, can be interpreted by users as setting a borderline between cut-rate training (schools not recognized as in the public interest) and a quality resource (made up of organizations recognized as having a public interest). Thus, the criteria of recognition do not say anything about school performance. Moreover, the government's practice is unclear, since it also allocates students obtaining a Basic Studies Diploma (*Diplôme d'études fondamentales/DEF*) to schools which are not both recognized and classified of public interest. Some private schools receive subsidized students just when they are opened, i.e. at a time when the Ministry has not yet been able to control their quality standards. Contrary to consumers' beliefs, there is no link between state accreditation and standards. Similarly, public financing of private institutions is by no means related to their performance.

### *3.3.2 Towards a shared regulation of private provision*

The development of private TVE meets the wishes of families and students, not all of whom 'are made for university studies'. Many private promoters choose to exploit this niche, due to the high rate of drop-outs and repetition in the general education system. To some extent, private providers also seem to respond to a situation where, increasingly, employers demand qualified labour notably for the use of new technologies.

At the same time there is evidence that the regulation of the private TVE sector needs to be revised. State assistance should thus first go towards schools which are performing well and to disadvantaged students. During the survey, many promoters expressed the desire for more state intervention

to control irregularities. Besides this call for a 'cleaning up' of the private sector, improving its operation requires the establishment of real dialogue between the government and representatives of the private sector.

### *3.3.3 The state cannot just 'go it alone'*

Despite the strong political will expressed in the Ten-Year Programme on Education (PRODEC), it is likely that the state will tend to reduce its financial aid to assist 'guided' students (who have obtained their DEF) towards private institutions. It is indeed probable that students will be, in future, freer in their choice of school, but at their own cost. It is moreover clear that the private sector will not be able to forcibly and completely take over financial responsibility. The current increase of enrolments, which seems to meet the objectives of the state as well as social demand, requires that private-sector growth be supported to provide quality training.

The service sector requires less investment (infrastructure, teachers) for TVE promoters (a situation which was confirmed by the surveys). Although training demand in the secondary sector (industrial/manufacturing) seems strong, fewer promoters are ready to get involved. It is therefore necessary to find ways of developing industrial courses, including for new technologies. So as to be able to invest more in this field, the private sector should seek foreign aid and financing. To do so, it must change its present behaviour, which is much too passive and far too dependent on state initiative.

Apart from financial aid, it would be beneficial to encourage closer co-operation between private schools on one hand, and the FAFPA and business, on the other. Potential synergy between initial training and job-related training will gain from being better developed. There is therefore a need for information, communication and better mutual understanding.

In addition to the doubts concerning the financial viability of an autonomous TVE market, other obstacles linked to the status of schools (a

strong presence of one-person companies) and of teachers (the predominance of hourly-paid casual teachers) hamper the establishment of a strong private TVE sector.

In more general terms, the strategy for the private sector leads one to reflect on the way that the various aspects of the private TVE sector are unfolding: the adaptation of existing programmes to economic realities, the design of courses and specialities that need promoting (maintenance, hotel management and tourism, agriculture, health, etc.), and the definition of course descriptions and levels of training appropriate to vocational training (a CAP conceived so as to facilitate jobs for students and/or allow them to continue their studies, continuation or suppression of the Technical *Bac*, development of the *Bac+2* level via training similar to the Advanced Vocational Training Certificate/BTS). Private initiatives are evidently bound to stimulate these questions. From the state's point of view, the question of responsibility for TVE seems today to consist in the following: will it remain one of the jurisdictions of the Ministry of Education, or will it be fully integrated within the Ministry of Employment?

## Conclusions and recommendations (Senegal, Mali)

### 1. Profile of the private sector

#### *1.1 A rapidly growing sector*

There is enough corroborating evidence today to affirm that the private TVE sector occupies a significant and growing position in sub-Saharan Africa. This is particularly true in the cases of Mali and Senegal, for which more precise data have been collected through specific surveys.

The foremost issue is therefore to determine what position the private sector should occupy relative to the public sector, and which measures are likely to promote its development in an economically efficient and socially fair manner.

The experience of the sub-Saharan African countries shows that the public/private relationship is more a matter of complementarity than of substitution or competition. The point is less to compensate for a withdrawal of the state than to find additional resources and different forms of action (which is not necessarily the case in other regions of the world).

#### *1.2 Definition*

First of all, the concept of a private TVE sector does not refer to a homogeneous entity calling for a uniform set of responses and treatments. Rather, this generic term encompasses three sub-sectors:



- A profit-oriented and even lucrative private sector which operates on market principles, based on charging relatively high fees in profitable training sectors, and which expects no assistance from the state.
- A private sector which is not mainly geared towards profit, and even in some cases has a strong 'social' dimension, often based on associative principles. In responding to the training needs of a school population from modest or poor backgrounds, it plays a de facto public service role, participates in the overall educational effort and requests support from the state. This category also includes a denominational sub-sector in which institutions derive a certain advantage from belonging to an extensive international network endowed with considerable resources (in Senegal and Mali, this is the case of most Catholic schools). This category as well forms a more structured whole and is, generally speaking, fairly autonomous.
- A private sector which is connected to the business world and whose purpose is to meet businesses' internal skill requirements, from a standpoint of human resource management. This type of school was not among those surveyed in Mali and Senegal.

The composition of the private TVE sector in sub-Saharan Africa is thus seen to be relatively complex. The sector does not amount merely to the sum of individual initiatives involving investment in the 'market-based' training sector in search of profit. It leaves considerable space for 'education having a social or general interest dimension'. The goals, resources, performances, requirements and expectations of these various types of private sector are highly diverse, and this state of affairs largely invalidates any undifferentiated commentary on the private sector in general.

### ***1.3 Statistical measurements***

It is difficult to get a clear picture of the private sector, of the range of training it provides, of the conditions under which it operates and of its results, owing to a problem of definition and to a body of statistical information which

is imperfect in Mali and quite rudimentary in Senegal. This lack of precise information is due, where government is concerned, to legislative and/or administrative deficiencies, and where schools are concerned, to a low propensity to engage in the practice of 'reporting', particularly in the absence of incentives. More information on the sector is available in Mali, where the state finances part of the cost of students in private schools, than in Senegal, where promoters derive no benefit whatsoever from any official recognition.

More generally, the formulation of a strategy for government action requires upgrading of the statistical system, concerning not only the private supply of training but also trends on the job market and the integration of private-school graduates into the workforce. The reason for this is that support to the development of the private sector makes no sense unless it satisfies the actual requirements of the economy.

#### ***1.4 Administrative recognition of schools***

In many cases, the legislative and regulatory structure established by the state over the course of a country's history was both over-elaborate and inefficient. More recently, the trend has been towards deregulation or greater flexibility of the rules that are supposed to apply to the private sector. In Senegal, the transition from a system in which prior authorization was required to one in which mere declaration suffices seems to have encouraged the growth of private provision, although the 'official statistics' do not show a corresponding increase in the number of TVE schools. Senegal's private sector resembles an iceberg, in that the submerged part is not well known but represents a considerable volume. In a context of strong social demand, excessive regulation hampers private initiative, but easing the regulations does not suffice to obtain greater transparency and regularization of the status of undeclared organizations.

In many countries, governments are concerned over the irresponsibility of some promoters and the uncertain quality of the training provided. Abusive

practices are helping to fuel a legitimate demand for protection of users (in South Africa, Lesotho, Mali, Senegal, etc.). Representatives of the private sector are often the first to demand that the moral standards of the sector be raised and to call on the government to join in this task of ‘weeding out’ schools of poor quality (Senegal, Mali).

### ***1.5 Legal status of schools***

In both Senegal and Mali, the varied statuses of private schools project an image of a relatively fragmented sector, made up primarily of one-person businesses, and which is therefore relatively vulnerable financially and has little organization or structure. These characteristics make it more difficult to raise the capital needed for heavy investment and the development of genuine educational engineering, which is difficult to implement at the scale of micro-enterprises.

### ***1.6 The status of teachers***

The status of teachers, most of whom are term employees, also contributes to the fragility of the sector. Although flexible employment conditions contribute to the sector’s ability to adapt the supply of training, the systematic use of term employment may undermine the gradual build-up of an institutional memory and real teaching teams.

It should be noted that a significant proportion of private-sector training instructors are public-sector teachers moonlighting for additional income. This amounts to an indirect, and involuntary, form of public assistance to the private sector.

### ***1.7 The types of training provided***

The literature on the private TVE sector describes the supply of training as being mainly oriented towards the tertiary sector (services, trade), which

seems to correspond to real economic conditions and to the inherently higher costs of industrial training programmes. However, the results of the surveys conducted in Senegal and Mali show a more balanced picture. The bulk of private-sector trainees are enrolled in tertiary-sector courses, but industrial training programmes do exist (they account for roughly 20 per cent of enrolments in Mali). The choice of a private technical and vocational training school is therefore not always synonymous with preparation for secretarial, administrative or accounting duties.

### ***1.8 Links with businesses and adaptability of provision***

The survey results do not seem to demonstrate any strong or close links between private schools and businesses. For example, the practice of alternating in-firm training with school-based education is somewhat rare, as are continuing education initiatives for company employees. Thus, nothing indicates that the autonomy, initiative and profit motive that accompany private status are enough to bring private training centres any closer to the job market than their public counterparts. The development of job-related training would probably help to promote such closer relations.

In this respect, the fact that a Training Fund (the FAFPA) exists in Mali has not, for the moment, led to any marked development of job-related training initiatives within schools that traditionally have been devoted to initial training. On the whole, the link between schools and business remains relatively undeveloped.

The cases of both Senegal and Mali, however, confirm the hypothesis that the private sector can show more flexibility, adaptability and imagination in satisfying the needs of the job market. In both countries, the private sector has invested in new market niches which are considered to have considerable growth potential (information technology, tourism), but are still neglected by a state education sector that in many respects is ossified and turned inward towards programmes and training courses that in some cases are completely

obsolete. In Senegal, the state recognizes an increasing number of degrees awarded exclusively in private schools.

### **1.9 Outcomes and social demand**

What can be said about the results achieved by private schools and the effectiveness and economic value of private training programmes? The information available, or gathered through surveys, is too fragmentary to allow firm conclusions. For example, there are no official data on the future careers of graduates. At the microeconomic level, even the schools that do take an interest in the future of their students rarely collect information on their integration into the job market. In this respect, private schools do not always differ from public schools and training centres. Lacking such data, we must be satisfied with indicators such as the persistence – or even the increase, it would seem – of household demand for training provided by the private sector. There is thus a presumption that such training is effective, but no certainty.

It is nevertheless true that private promoters, who are habitually concerned with preserving the viability and profitability of their businesses, are inherently more inclined to pay heed to companies' requirements. In addition to broadening the supply of training, the development of private initiatives undeniably entails a renewal and adaptation of the content of training courses and introduces teaching methods that place greater weight on combining book learning with the acquisition of real vocational skills.

Given the extreme heterogeneity of the private sector, we may put forward the hypothesis that the performances of private schools are distributed over a much broader scale than those of public schools, which does not necessarily guarantee better average performance. This phenomenon is clearly illustrated by the results of recent studies of private secondary education in Tanzania (see Lassibille et al., 2000). The private sector always includes highly effective and profitable schools whose enrolment fees reflect

their reputation and quality of instruction, and which may attract students from abroad (Senegal).

The expansion of the private sector is thus not necessarily an indication of preference, i.e. that families seeking an alternative to the public education system are willing to pay for better-quality or more 'profitable' education. It also indicates a situation of surplus demand which the public sector cannot satisfy. Recourse to the private sector is more a matter of 'choice' by default than a deliberate expression of preference. In Senegal, where state schools have been encouraged to generate funds and have therefore broadened their range of training programmes, we are seeing a fresh inflow of 'paying' students and enrolments in evening courses. This phenomenon does not, however, necessarily reflect better quality and greater relevance of the training provided. The short-term strategies of families should therefore be interpreted with caution. We cannot completely dismiss the hypothesis that a preference for the private sector is due in part to the fact that families presume that it offers better quality or a certain social standing.

## 2. Financing the private sector: diversification, innovation, incentives

### *2.1 Diversifying the sources of funding*

The private sector has staked out a position in a field that cannot be occupied by an underfunded public sector alone (the state cannot 'do everything by itself'). Today, private provision does not seem to have saturated the demand for vocational training, but consolidating and expanding it raises a genuine problem of financing.

In sub-Saharan Africa, this hard economic truth is due to the low level of family incomes, since private schools are mainly or entirely dependent on tuition fees. Mali and Senegal are particularly good examples of this problem

because, as in other regions, many TVE students come from modest or poor backgrounds. Better-off families continue, more often than not, to send their children to general secondary schools.

Under these conditions, some private schools today cannot function properly if they rely solely on the receipts from enrolment and tuition fees. These funding difficulties probably affect the quality of provision (salaries and recruitment of teachers, infrastructure and physical facilities). Interviews with school heads in Senegal and Mali provided a good deal of evidence on this point. To be sure, the details of the problem vary with the country and the type of private sector. However, state support is justified on the economic and social grounds of greater cost-effectiveness and a concern with broadening access to training for young people from poor backgrounds.

The financial support provided by the state can be substantial, of course, as shown by the example of Mali as compared to that of Senegal (about 1 billion CFA francs in Mali, as against 30 million CFA francs in Senegal). There is some doubt as to the sustainability of the Malian approach, however, and this policy is not without perverse effects. State intervention that is overly conspicuous or constraining can come to resemble an outright welfare system, which is far removed from the image of a (private) training market. This situation often proves to have a disempowering effect when government aid or subsidies are too unstable, or are paid at uncertain intervals.

The consolidation of the private sector therefore requires diversification of the sources of funding, both within the public sector and with the business community. In a context of decentralization, moreover, public financing is no longer limited to the central government budget. Local governments are playing a greater role in funding private TVE provision, particularly when such provision is suited to the requirements of local labour markets, or performs a 'community' service by enabling students rejected from the public education system to obtain schooling. In Senegal and more hesitantly in Mali, local

governments are already funding scholarships, showing one of the possible paths to diversification of public funding to the benefit of the private sector.

In the long run, opportunities for diversifying the sources of financing of private TVE schools will be largely determined by the funding capacity of modern-sector businesses. This fact argues in favour of continuing education initiatives on the part of schools. This sort of co-operation could benefit not only TVE but also businesses concerned with raising the wages, skill levels, and productivity of their employees.

Countries that have set up a specific mechanism for funding job-related training, as Mali has done with its Fund for Supporting Vocational Training and Apprenticeship (FAFPA), are probably in a better position to make this transition. Such rationalization of supply seems particularly desirable in economies at a low level of development, where the specialization of schools (initial training provided in some, job-related training in others) seems economically inefficient and financially costly.

The existence of a network of private schools, relying both on a kind of state 'quality label' and on the experience gained through contact with the business community, is conducive to the formation of a cluster of skills towards which foreign aid could be targeted as a matter of priority. This dynamic would be a driving force for the development of private initiatives.

Lastly, better information on and enhanced recognition of the private sector are prior conditions for external support. Some schools already receive aid from private organizations and foreign NGOs. Official bilateral and multilateral aid could also support private organizations' contribution to the provision of training.



## **2.2 Funding mechanisms**

Where funding mechanisms are concerned, it must be recognized that the limited information available on strategies for financing the private TVE sector in sub-Saharan Africa, and the insufficient number of experiences, preclude any conclusions as to the respective virtues of different instruments (scholarship or subsidy, scholarship or training voucher, contract or call for tenders). The instruments in use are still relatively traditional. The creation of competition between public and private schools for access to funding, the introduction of mechanisms linking funding to outcomes, and the use of training vouchers are currently not found in technical and vocational education in sub-Saharan Africa. Only the vocational training sub-sector shows a few innovative experiences. It would probably also be helpful to introduce innovations in the financing of initial training, drawing inspiration from the experience acquired by certain countries in other regions of the world.

Public funding of programmes implemented by the private sector should be based on precise, transparent objectives and criteria, particularly criteria relating to outcomes. In this respect, a system of public assistance seems fully justified, considering the social function fulfilled by certain private schools that provide training for disadvantaged children.

## **2.3 Incentives**

The surveys carried out in Mali and Senegal also highlighted the problem of financing the initial investment. Measures to provide promoters with easier access to credit would facilitate the founding of private schools. The difficulty of gaining access to land also constitutes a sizeable obstacle, especially in urban areas. This is an area where action would be relatively easy not only for the state, but for local authorities as well.

Taxation is also seen to be a handicapping factor. The surveys show that taxes account for 7 per cent of the costs of private schools in Mali and

9 per cent in Senegal. In both Mali and Senegal, measures to ease the tax regime, or even exemption from taxation, are clearly expected by the sector, since these schools engage in educational rather than commercial activities.

### 3. Regulation of the private sector

#### ***3.1 Rethinking the relationship between the private sector and the state***

The cases of Senegal and Mali present two very different situations in terms of the environment in which the private sector operates and develops. Senegal affords an example of private-sector development which is entirely driven by unsatisfied social demand. The easing of the regulatory framework governing the opening of private schools seems to have contributed to the expansion of the sector, though it has not prevented the existence of a clandestine sector. The state is virtually absent: it is unable to enforce compliance with the rules for opening and operating such schools; it exercises no real supervision of teaching methods; and it grants a provisional subsidy to a handful of schools that do not really need it. On the other hand, it is organizing a relatively 'protected' market-based training sector within the public school system. At the same time, those private providers which are mainly oriented towards low-income households face a problem of profitability (as shown by the scale of their outstanding obligations) and lack financial support.

Where certification is concerned, the spreading use of 'home-made' diplomas detracts from the transparency of graduates' qualifications and may in time come to impede the proper functioning of the labour market.

In Mali, the private sector is mainly a complement and an extension of the public education system. Government subsidies to private organizations that accept 'guided' students are justified on grounds of efficiency, but nevertheless hamper these schools' capacity for initiative and innovation.

This subsidy policy seems to be rather constraining (the state sets the amount of aid per 'guided' student). This fairly interventionist approach, in which the private sector finds itself dependent on the state, may hamper its development and the process through which private initiatives respond to the requirements of the job market and businesses.

The comparison between Senegal and Mali thus shows that they are at opposite extremes in this respect. The development of an efficient, sustainable private sector requires a configuration lying between these two extremes of neglect and excessive state control. The state should play a role that is both more flexible and more effective, through targeted aid based on clearly stated economic or social criteria: it should take into consideration the number of students; the types, levels and quality of training provided; and the social background of students.

The primary role of the state, however, is to create a favourable environment for the development of the private sector as part of an overall policy for developing TVE: what kinds of training (level, specialization)? What forms of further study? etc.

In this respect, examination of the current situation in Mali and Senegal leads to the following recommendations:

- the state should take measures to stop the anarchical growth of clandestine schools (often of poor quality), which can harm students and detract from employers' confidence in the TVE sector;
- the procedures and criteria for recognition of schools and for attribution of the 'public interest' label must be made more transparent and efficient;
- the state must overcome its current inertia where the granting of official recognition is concerned (11 schools are recognized in Mali and 8 in Senegal, and none have been recognized in Senegal for the last 7 years), as this amounts to creating genuine barriers to entry.

Formal state recognition granted to certain private schools, on the basis of transparent criteria relating to quality, efficiency and/or equity, should, in addition to any accompanying financial aid, serve as a benchmark, a label, an indicator for the benefit of other financial backers (notably foreign aid programmes) that are willing to provide informed support to the private sector. Senegal could take this path.

The current immobility or reluctance where recognition of schools is concerned is all the more harmful because, at the same time, individual Ministries are providing forms of support or financial aid to schools (e.g. the practice of ‘guiding’ students in Mali) with no other form of supervision. This paradox cannot fail to create a degree of confusion in policy concerning the private sector. *Table 1*: Comparative review of regulatory frameworks for private TVE in Senegal and Mali, and *Table 2*: Main obstacles to the development of the private sector according to interviewed head teachers in Mali and Senegal and suggested proposals, are presented below.

Private schools that enjoy government support of one sort or another, including some form of certification, should submit to a form of quality control. In the educational field, quality control is most commonly ensured through school inspections. It is not clear, however, that the state is always in a position to exercise such control, as shown by the examples of Mali and Senegal. That being the case, the participation of private schools in a national certification system, preferably defined through a consultative process, is probably the most realistic alternative for managing the quality of private TVE provision, on condition that the state contributes to the transparency of the market by publishing the results of certified private schools.

**Table 1. Comparative review of regulatory frameworks for private TVE in Senegal and Mali**

	Senegal	Mali
Legal framework	Law of 23 November 1994	Law of 25 July 1994
Conditions for setting up a private TVE institution	Prerequisite Declaration	Prerequisite Authorization
Fees	Free	Free
Subsidies	Low amount, granted to very few institutions	Granted to institutions which enrol students allocated by the Ministry
Fellowships	Few, granted by local governments	Yes, granted by the state to very few students
Access to land or buildings	No	No
Tax exemptions	VAT Exemption (depending on the legal structure)	No
Recruitment of teachers	Free choice subject to qualification requirements	Free
Teachers' salary	Free (guidelines provided by the Ministry)	Free
Curricula	State curricula but development of 'home-made' training	State curricula, development of specific curricula for new subjects
Certificates / Diplomas	State-recognized or specific	State-recognized or specific

**Table 2. Main obstacles to the development of the private sector according to interviewed head teachers in Mali and Senegal and suggested proposals**

Obstacles	Suggested proposals
1. Difficulty in financing the initial investment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• granting of land;</li> <li>• access to soft loans;</li> <li>• establishment of a special Fund to support private initiatives in TVE (Senegal).</li> </ul>
2. Student financing (high rate of arrears and default)	Grant of fellowships by the state and local governments.
3. Expenses burden (tax expenses but also paying off of realized investments)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tax reductions;</li> <li>• VAT exemption for pedagogical equipment.</li> </ul>
4. Lack of transparency of the market	The state should recognize private institutions in order to promote quality standards and to enable them to benefit from public subsidies.
5. High cost and bad quality of production factors (electricity, telecommunications, etc.)	-----

### 3.2 *Self-regulation and partnerships*

The organization of a TVE market calls for a partnership between government and representatives of the private sector, rather than regulation that is imposed exclusively by the state. In most African countries today (those for which data could be collected, that is), we are seeing the emergence of bodies representing the private TVE sector. This is the case of Senegal and Mali in particular. These organizations, which are not yet fully professional or representative, are nevertheless the natural partners of government for the formulation and implementation of policy concerning this sector. The situation of the private sector in the region suggests that priority topics for consultation should include the registration, recognition and funding of schools, the certification and granting of diplomas, and the status of teachers.

A strategic area for action relates to strengthening the institutional capacities of the private sector. On this point, the state can be of great assistance through the provision of continuing education for private-sector principals and teachers, as well as for the managers of professional organizations in the sector. It would seem that this area is still largely neglected.

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