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Cultural Organization

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Item 18 of the provisional agenda

REPORT ON THE INDEPENDENT EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF UNESCO

SUMMARY

Pursuant to 182 EX/Decision 24 and 35 C/Resolution 102, the Independent External Evaluation team presents a synthesis report of the conclusions and recommendations of the Independent External Evaluation of UNESCO. This summary document has been produced to meet the statutory requirements for submission of Executive Board documents ahead of the full evaluation report to be published in an addendum to this document.

Action expected of the Executive Board: decision in paragraph 62.

INTRODUCTION

1. At its 182nd session the Executive Board, having considered alternative approaches, recommended to the General Conference that a forward-looking, independent evaluation be carried out, focused on the external challenges UNESCO faces in the twenty-first century. This recommendation was accepted by the General Conference.

2. This report synthesizes Independent External Evaluation (IEE) conclusions and recommendations and is produced to meet the statutory requirements for submission of Executive Board documents ahead of the full evaluation report. Supporting analyses are elaborated in the full “Final Report”.


3. The UNESCO IEE was undertaken by an 11-person cross-regional team between January and July 2010. The team visited field and liaison offices and UNESCO institutes; attended the regional C/5 consultations; conducted case studies of 15 programmes; observed the Executive Board in April 2010; reviewed documentation including IOS Strategic Programme Objective (SPO) evaluations;¹ met with Permanent Delegations in electoral groups and, when requested, individually; and interviewed Secretariat staff and senior management.

STARTING FRAMEWORK: UNESCO’S CHALLENGES

4. The IEE is intended to answer the overarching question:

“How should UNESCO position itself to address the challenges of the twenty-first century and make the most of prospective opportunities?”

Answering this question requires understanding the links between global challenges, UNESCO’s mandate and possibilities for future “positioning”.



5. The starting framework outlined above emphasizes that:

- UNESCO has choices as to the roles it wishes to play in the twenty-first century – hence the term “opportunity space”;

¹ Refer to document 185 EX/6 Part IV, a synthesis report of the evaluations of UNESCO's Strategic Programme Objectives (SPOs). The full SPO evaluation reports can be found at: http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=21622&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

- global challenges include both global trends and how the international system is organized – “global architecture”;
- these challenges become relevant to UNESCO when “filtered” through its mandate;
- this mandate is mediated by diverse country, regional and global needs and by available resources and capacities;
- UNESCO’s “positioning” involves both priority setting and choice of modalities – implementation and governance are integral to positioning.

OVERVIEW OF MAIN CONCLUSIONS

A. Mandate and vision

6. UNESCO was established “for the purpose of advancing, through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and the common welfare of mankind”. The IEE has concluded that this “vision” remains relevant and essential as part of the wider international system today, as it was in 1946 and indeed in 1926 when the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (UNESCO’s predecessor) was created.

7. Extensive discussions with Member States and UNESCO’s partners in the United Nations and beyond have confirmed the extent to which UNESCO is valued and its achievements recognized. However, these discussions, together with country visits and the examination of current UNESCO programmes, also suggest that UNESCO is unevenly delivering to its mandate.

8. In seeking to assess UNESCO’s current performance, the IEE considered how the mandate has evolved and been operationalized; and concluded that:

- UNESCO’s mandate has been progressively reinterpreted over the years to match contemporary understandings and global needs.
- UNESCO continues to have strong intellectual roots: its programmes fit well with contemporary state-of-the-art analyses and “theories” of both peace-building and “common-welfare”, in an international development context (see Annex Table 1).
- UNESCO has developed a number of programmes of high repute, such as World Heritage, leading oceanographic and freshwater programmes, biosphere reserves, tsunami early warning systems, bioethics, promoting press freedom and the EFA *Global Monitoring Report*. Weaker programmes have also been highlighted.

Despite these positive conclusions, there are also clear weaknesses in the way the mandate has been operationalized:

- UNESCO’s mandate is “permissive”: relevance claims can be made for almost any global problem or crisis. Greater focusing of efforts, based on factors other than relevance, is therefore needed to avoid incoherence given current underfunding.
- There have been persistent attempts to “concentrate” work in larger programmes, promote “intersectorality” or cross-sector platforms and prioritize “objectives” in order to maximize synergies and impact. These efforts have been undermined by the continued autonomy of Sectors, weak incentives for collaboration, sectoral budget systems, too many priorities and cross-cutting objectives, and lack of consensus in governing bodies and in the Secretariat. Instances of successful synergies are often the triumph of informal efforts by committed individuals over institutional barriers to cooperation.

- Member States, while emphasizing the need for “greater focus”, have themselves contributed to the current lack of coherence both by funding decisions (e.g. reducing regular budget contributions while increasing extrabudgetary resourcing) and by lobbying to sustain weak programmes or introduce incoherent activities.

B. Global “Challenges”

9. There is a broad consensus internationally about global “challenges” stemming from trends in globalization, demography (e.g. population growth and migration), environmental disasters, resource scarcity, socio-economic inequalities, and political and cultural instability. These “trends” embedded in a globalized and knowledge-intensive world are documented in many “prospective” studies as well as in UNESCO’s C/4 and C/5 analyses. At this level UNESCO has already positioned itself to address twenty-first century trends. However, it is less well positioned to address those trends within a global “architecture” that has undermined many of its traditional modalities and assumptions.

10. Shifts in the global architecture since 1946, including growth in numbers of independent States, communications in the “knowledge society”, competition with other intergovernmental and non-governmental agencies, new regional structures and the accelerating speed of technical and socio-economic change, have attendant consequences for UNESCO’s organization, operations and governance (see Annex, Table 2 for more detailed analysis). While UNESCO has adapted to an extent, significant gaps have built up between the demands posed by the contemporary global architecture and UNESCO’s current institutional positioning. This gap undermines UNESCO’s ability to “make the most of prospective opportunities”.

11. The cumulative effects of changes in global architecture are systemic, long-standing and mutually reinforcing and carry serious reputational, operational and financial risks. This diagnosis is not new: there have been many previous evaluations, task forces and reports pointing in similar directions. Hence the IEE conclusion that UNESCO’s capacity to manage change, deploy its “organizational memory” and use knowledge effectively is an important issue for UNESCO to address.

12. The analysis summarized in Table 2 suggests that in today’s competitive and decentralized world UNESCO needs to be less centralized, risk-averse and silo-like; more outward-looking with stronger partnership capacities; more adaptable and flexible; and able to demonstrate a capacity to deliver as well as assert its mandate.

13. A number of positive “reforms” have been initiated, especially since 2000. These include improvements in strategic planning, inserting institutional priorities such as “gender” and “Africa” across programmes, initiating “decentralization” from Headquarters, reinforcing links with the United Nations in New York and with other specialized agencies, the start of administrative reform, greater attention to results, and establishing an independent evaluation and internal audit function. However, these are only first steps: many changes have been partly implemented and internally driven by rationalization and cost-reduction considerations rather than by strategic choice about future purpose and direction.

C. Decentralization and field presence

14. Decentralization has been an institutional concern in UNESCO at least since the reforms of 1999/2000. The rationale is to make UNESCO more effective in a decentralized and “networked” world, which requires a decentralized, responsive and empowered field presence.

15. This priority has been highlighted by United Nations reform which confronts UNESCO with new pressures to strike a balance between Headquarters and the field. UNDAF participation pulls UNESCO towards a conventional “development agency” role that in order to meet IADGs focuses on country needs and highlights the importance of field presence at country level. This is reinforced

by new decentralized funding resources such as multi-donor trust funds and budget support. UNESCO's field office network is already over-extended, often under-resourced and poorly staffed. Reinforcing this network at country level so that UNESCO becomes an effective UNDAF partner risks weakening normative and peace-building roles at regional and global levels unless properly approached. This highlights the importance of:

- Integrating normative and operational practice by demonstrating how international standards can be operationalized, contextualized and generalized. Such "learning by doing" is significantly different from traditional "back stopping".
- Balancing the global, regional and country distribution of UNESCO's efforts. While the country-based UNDAF model has obvious advantages for UNESCO, a regional alignment of UNESCO with the United Nations regional organizations, including the Regional Economic Commissions, may offer a better framework in the medium term.

16. Field networks need to be strengthened to support capacity-building, enhance UNESCO's credibility and ensure access to resources. UNESCO would benefit from a smaller number of more capable and well-resourced multi-skilled (and multidisciplinary) regional and subregional bureaux. This poses challenges for both the Secretariat and Member States. For the former, fundamental change in field structures requires streamlined interfaces within Headquarters; a reconsideration of already-existing sector-specific field capacities; a very different human resources philosophy and management style; strengthened regional and subregional capacities in planning and self-management; greater mobilization of national capacities including but not confined to emerging middle-income countries; and new ways of working with partners. For some Member States the trade-off will be between political preferences for "the United Nations flag in my capital" versus a field presence that can deliver effectively.

17. There is a growing difference between countries and regions. Developed countries, least developed countries (LDCs) and new "middle-level" or emerging economies each place different demands on UNESCO which needs to increasingly differentiate its strategies. Proposals to concentrate and upgrade subregional offices in sub-Saharan Africa alongside African Union subregions are one example of this differentiation, as is the growing scope for "self-benefitting" activities among the emerging economies and support for South-South cooperation.

D. Impact for Member States

18. Most evidence of UNESCO's impact – i.e. long-term, fundamental and sustainable changes that make a difference for "end users" – tends to be anecdotal. UNESCO has invested in results-based management (RBM), whose implementation in practice mostly focuses on outputs and activities. The evaluation culture in UNESCO is weak, with evaluation mostly perceived as a control and compliance function; and evaluation recommendations are under-utilized. In addition, the intangible nature of much of UNESCO's work, together with its long-term goals makes assessing impact complex and costly.

19. The IEE has identified many examples of significant contribution to impact at each stage in the "value chain" of UNESCO's five main "functions". Impact occurs when UNESCO works with partners and is essentially facilitative: helping beneficiaries to help themselves. UNESCO does not unilaterally bring about change for others; it is usually Member States and partners that choose to use UNESCO as a "platform" for their priorities. This is consistent with the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action and has important implications: the need to start strategizing and programming from Member State priorities; the importance of ongoing dialogue with Member States; and the centrality of capacity-building. Working with Member States and partners necessitates collaboration as well as competition with other agencies – an important consideration when judging UNESCO's assumed "comparative advantage".

20. IEE analysis identified several consistent factors associated with UNESCO's positive contributions to impact. These strengths include: partnering and networking capacities; the presence of motivated, capable and skilled staff; cooperation between sectors and disciplines; administrative flexibility in Headquarters; horizontal coordination among field units; a bottom-up rather than top-down logic that empowers staff; and strategic continuity rather than "one-off" decisions. In the absence of these factors UNESCO's effectiveness is reduced.

21. It is difficult to track outcomes and impacts of the Organization given that the current reporting is based on the C/5 expected results at the Main Line of Action (MLA) level. Outcomes and impacts are not systematically reported against the C/4 Strategic Programme Objectives and Expected Outcomes. It would also help if the reporting system enabled outcomes and impacts to be captured at the regional, subregional and country levels.

E. UNESCO within the United Nations

22. "Delivering as One" (DaO) and United Nations "system-wide coherence" have become an important part of UNESCO's proximate "global architecture". This has gained greater focus with the MDGs and beginnings of the post-2015 debate. United Nations reform and UNDG participation have provided UNESCO and other specialized agencies with new opportunities which have been enthusiastically and in some areas effectively grasped.

23. This has led to new funding possibilities, revised UNDAF rules converging business processes across the United Nations; and recognition of "Non-Resident Agency" (NRA) status. Despite such progress there continue to be "turf wars" between United Nations agencies, reinforced by overlapping agency mandates not addressed in the DaO model even though signposted in "One UN".

24. New opportunities opened up by recent United Nations experience have highlighted UNESCO's strengths: the continued relevance of culture, the sciences and education; capacities of UNESCO's institutes and the stronger field offices; convening intergovernmental initiatives; and high-level capacity-building. Weaknesses have also been highlighted: over-centralization; poor coordination within Headquarters and between Headquarters and field offices and institutes; the absence of career planning for staff; unwillingness to trust or grant discretion to decentralized offices; poor partnering skills; and in some locations weak delivery capacity on the ground. These weaknesses have left gaps that other agencies have filled; and led to missed opportunities for UNESCO.

25. There is also an "expertise gap" in the United Nations profile that UNESCO is sometimes expected to fill, variously described as a "think tank" role or as the "brains" of the United Nations. UNESCO should consider in discussion with United Nations partners how to meet – or manage – such expectations.

F. Civil society² and the private sector

26. The rationale for closer working with civil society and the private sector includes: accessing knowledge and expertise; mobilizing national and international actors in support of UNESCO's values; diversifying funding; reinforcing democracy in a globalized world; and legitimating international public action. This is part of a wider discourse about "global governance" in an age when governments and intergovernmental bodies cannot achieve their goals single-handed.

27. The Cardoso Report at the United Nations level indicated new thinking about civil society and "global governance", mirrored in UNESCO's 1995 Directives and the 2007 "Sexennial Report". However, UNESCO's progress in engaging with civil society does not match international best practice, even though there are good practices in some programmes, field offices and National Commissions.

² Understood to include scientific and specialist expertise.

28. UNESCO is also following United Nations-wide moves to improve links with the private sector and “global partnerships”. Earlier initiatives in 2000 and 2003 were not fully implemented and UNESCO is currently developing a new private sector strategy.

29. UNESCO was founded with a strong commitment to civil society through National Commissions, and the recognition of scientific and specialist expertise in an “intellectual” organization. While the world has moved towards an inclusive model of policy-making and governance open to expertise, civil society and the private sector, UNESCO has from the 1950s onwards become increasingly “intergovernmental” in a traditional sense. For example:

- UNESCO appears uneasy entering into strategic partnership with independent expertise and non-governmental stakeholders, except as sources of funding or to support programme delivery.
- Despite active engagement with experts and NGOs in some programmes and governing bodies of institutes, UNESCO does not systematically mirror this at an institutional level.
- The General Conference does not have access to sufficient programme-independent sources of expertise to advise on priority-setting.
- Private sector relationships have not generally been strategic: involving private sector actors in open dialogue about shared goals is rare.
- There is little engagement with newer forms of “global public-private partnerships” and innovative financing vehicles.
- Although UNESCO maintains “formal” and “operational” relations with NGOs – the General Conference now has a “Partners Forum” and the Executive Board an NGO Committee – relationships are often formalistic and mostly focused in the North.
- UNESCO is perceived by civil society as bureaucratic with complex procedures and weak partnering capacities.
- National Commissions vary considerably in their civil society involvement and networking commitment.

30. UNESCO nonetheless has strong foundations to build on: mobilizing its extensive knowledge networks; building on a long history of NGO relations; and taking advantage of UNESCO’s strong brand in the private sector.

G. “Network UNESCO”

31. Despite partnership weaknesses, UNESCO has assembled a network of world-class assets – strategic programmes, institutes, National Commissions, clubs, scientific and expert communities – that has often allowed it to demonstrate new ways to promote international cooperation and development. At present this network is under-valued and under-managed. There is limited appreciation among Member States or the Secretariat of the potential of this broader UNESCO “community”, favouring instead an “institutional” perspective that privileges the formal, top-down, Headquarters-led UNESCO.

32. Much could be achieved building on UNESCO’s networks. Conceiving of UNESCO as an institutional “hub” working with a loosely coupled network (the UNESCO “community”) would build on positive aspects of current reality and make it easier to take advantage of global and increasingly decentralized opportunities – e.g. for new partnerships, new funding sources and new contexts for normative and capacity-building work.

H. Governance

33. “The division of competences between the governing bodies and the Secretariat” revisits topics that have a long history in UNESCO. There are unresolved “boundary disputes” between the Executive Board and the General Conference, with regard to policy-making and priority-setting on the one hand and programme design and oversight on the other; and between the governing bodies and the Secretariat over governance as priority-setting versus so-called micro-management. The latter appears to derive significantly from Executive Board dissatisfaction with Secretariat-provided accountability and reporting information. It will be difficult to maintain a workable separation between governance and management without an adequate level of trust between UNESCO’s three organs.

34. UNESCO governance is highly dispersed with many intergovernmental and expert committees (for the culture conventions, intergovernmental programmes and category 1 institutes). This dispersal of governance reflects the near-impossibility of unitary governance in a highly heterogeneous agency and is reinforced by high volumes of extrabudgetary resource over which the main governing bodies have limited control.

35. At present, the governance of semi-autonomous parts of the “UNESCO community” is rarely discussed, nor are the consequences for operational capacity, e.g. servicing a high number of conventions. Minimally there needs to be greater communication and feedback among all governing bodies and better sharing of specialist expertise. This is especially important as expertise tends to be stronger in decentralized bodies. Efforts at re-centralization rather than strengthening coordination are likely to be counter-productive.

36. Many governance improvements in UNESCO start from a procedural standpoint rather than with the need to build consensus about global challenges and UNESCO’s “positioning”. There are of course many potential procedural improvements that would improve governance efficiency and effectiveness. However, substantive changes in systems and practices are also needed. (We have, for example, noted the ramifications of reporting on vague results unconnected to logical, goal oriented programming; political issues “crowding out” governance tasks; and poorly prepared debates.)

37. Comparing UNESCO with other intergovernmental bodies, the Executive Board has a larger than expected membership in proportion to total Member States. However, the number of days per year it meets is similar to comparable agencies with a “constituency-oversight” model which it shares with WHO, GEF, UNDP and FAO.³ It also shares the strengths and weaknesses of this model: strong as a democratic forum but weak on strategic leadership, the latter tending to become the domain of the Secretariat, given the size of the Executive Board and the division of roles between governing bodies. The IEE, along with IMF and GEF evaluations of “governance”, concluded that different governance models have their strengths and weaknesses: no one model is ideal. For this reason, the IEE has concluded that the priority is not to change governance models but rather to seek to streamline and remedy the weaknesses of the present model as far as possible.

I. Framing future directions

38. In the light of the transaction costs of maintaining “five organizations as one”, several structural “macro-options” for change were assessed, including:

- “de-merging” UNESCO into its constituent parts: this was rejected because, although benefitting stronger programmes, it could fatally weaken other important programmes;

³ This analysis follows that used in IMF and GEF governance evaluations.

- continue the existing “direction of travel” of efficiency-driven, procedural improvement and coordination, which while undoubtedly necessary has limited potential without greater focusing of efforts aligned with UNESCO’s vision and mandate;
- a more decentralized, networked UNESCO that would recognize existing centres of autonomy and build on the strengths of the wider UNESCO community.

A combination of the last two options was judged most likely to allow UNESCO to meet future challenges and underpins IEE recommendations.

39. In the medium term the IEE has concluded that successful repositioning of UNESCO also depends on changing institutional cultures. UNESCO should aim to be:

- *innovative* – rewarding risk-taking and building on commitment to a common vision;
- *inclusive* – engaging strategically with Member States and other partners;
- *reflexive* – systematically learning from its own experience and through piloting change;
- *outward-looking* – positioning itself as part of a wider global system;
- *collaborative* – prioritizing collective rather than partisan interests and working across boundaries.

A future “change process” therefore needs to include a process of “culture change” as well as structural and procedural change.

40. The IEE analysis suggests that what UNESCO requires is not a transition to a new “steady State” but rather transition to a more *adaptive* state, capable of continuing adaptation in future. Such a transition inevitably takes time; however, many important changes can be addressed in the shorter term.

RECOMMENDATIONS

41. The IEE is charged to deliver “actionable and timely recommendations” and is therefore recommending a “renewal strategy” built on five “strategic directions”. The label “strategic directions” strives to strike a balance. While indicating overall directions and means, we have avoided being over-prescriptive. UNESCO’s governing bodies and the Secretariat will need to work together to develop and implement a more detailed plan, although an outline plan is suggested in the fuller “Final Report”.

Strategic Direction One: Increasing UNESCO’s Focus

42. UNESCO needs to further focus its efforts to address challenges consistent with its mandate for international cooperation (“peace”) and development (“common welfare”). Focusing should ensure that all activities contribute to UNESCO’s priorities, differentiating between more and less strategically important programmes.

43. Greater focus will require:

- the selection of a limited number of cross-cutting strategic objectives with which all programmes should be aligned;
- regular assessment of existing and planned programmes in terms of their relevance, strengths and potential for cross-programme synergies;

- advanced consultation with United Nations partners to minimize duplication;
- using “programme models” and “theories of change” that demonstrate intended connections between activities and their contribution over time to programme and agency objectives;
- administrative, budgetary, planning and human resources systems that support coherence, focus and synergy;
- exit strategies for some programmes to support the continuation of activities where possible through their transfer to other parts of the UNESCO “community” or even other host bodies.

44. In the medium-term progressive refocusing and routine programme review will also allow a needed reassessment of sector and division boundaries.

Strategic Direction Two: Positioning UNESCO closer to the field

45. UNESCO should position itself closer to country needs, resources and partners, in order to ensure its relevance, effectiveness and impact. To this end UNESCO should aim to become less Headquarters-oriented with a more mobile and de-concentrated workforce able to move flexibly between the field and Headquarters.

46. This can be achieved through:

- a smaller but stronger network of multidisciplinary bureaux at subregional level with devolved powers;
- taking advantage of NRA status while also deploying temporary in-country teams and working closely with United Nations partners;
- priority-setting at regional, subregional and country levels involving Member States, and United Nations and other partners;
- delivering capacity-building and normative activities through modalities that strengthen international cooperation networks and solidarity;
- encouraging programmes to relocate elements of their Headquarters-based work to the field, especially to regional centres in developing/emerging countries;
- human resources policies that support career planning and mobility.

47. UNESCO needs to better utilize skills and expertise that are nowadays available globally. This is especially important in emerging economies which can assist UNESCO in strengthening South-South, South-North and South-North-South cooperation. This would be facilitated both by improved partnership capabilities and by more flexible staff contracts and procurement procedures.

48. Continued investment in high-quality independent evaluation will be required to demonstrate impact. This could be further strengthened by devolving and supporting self-evaluation functions to field offices.

Strategic Direction Three: strengthening participation in the United Nations

49. Intensifying engagement with United Nations Headquarters and with United Nations partners in New York and in the field is needed to ensure that UNESCO meets the highest international

agency standards and continues to help shape its own formative context together with other specialized agencies.

50. Specific ways of strengthening UNESCO's involvement in the United Nations would include:
- improved dialogue with United Nations partners when formulating programmes and at all programming stages to lessen competition and increase the likelihood of synergies;
 - enhancing the role of the New York Office and encouraging greater programme staff involvement in United Nations relationships;
 - active support from Member States for strengthened United Nations partnerships by maximizing policy coherence between country representation in capitals, Paris and New York;
 - strategic dialogue with United Nations Headquarters to help identify scope for UNESCO to add value to the United Nations system consistent with its intellectual networking capacities and mandate.

51. There are other prerequisites for strengthening UNESCO's participation in the United Nations system that will follow from general moves to reposition UNESCO. For example:

- enhanced partnering capacities;
- a willingness to strengthen and devolve power to field and liaison offices accompanied by suitable accountability and oversight mechanisms;
- improved coordination between administrative departments and sectors in Headquarters;
- reformed human resources policies and management training.

Strategic Direction Four: strengthening governance

52. There should be a clearer division of labour between UNESCO's three organs, refocusing each on their distinctive roles. Addressing weaknesses in present governance arrangements will require separate and joint initiative by the governing bodies and the Secretariat.

53. Governing bodies should consider:

- improving General Conference and Executive Board access to independent expertise and scientific advice when formulating policies and main programmatic directions, for example through the use of independent panels of advisers;
- developing an "accountability framework" that clarifies and delimits expectations of the Secretariat;
- considering the advantage of specialized subcommittees (sectoral or priority-focused) to reduce Executive Board workload;
- reviewing how Member State representation can be aligned with UNESCO's specialized agency status.

54. The Secretariat should consider:

- putting in place a permanent programme review process linked with independent evaluation;

- developing new ways of reporting results that demonstrate high-level outcomes and impacts linked with coherent programmes;
- strengthening priority-setting and dialogue to be more inclusive of civil society and the private sector.

55. Governing bodies and the Secretariat should together consider:

- enactment of a four-year integrated planning and programming cycle, as presently advocated across the United Nations which would make preparing C/5 documents more efficient and less burdensome;
- agreeing on information required for governance oversight;
- continuing the integration of extrabudgetary resources into governance oversight;
- developing strategies for network governance of the wider UNESCO community.

Strategic Direction Five: developing a partnership strategy

56. UNESCO needs to develop a comprehensive strategy for partnership that looks outwards to civil society, expert communities and the private sector to ensure its relevance, advance its values and implement its programmes. This becomes even more important if UNESCO is to realize its networking potential.

57. Such a strategy should aim to support:

- civil society and other partners contributing to defining UNESCO's goals rather than being regarded solely as vehicles for programme delivery;
- making UNESCO more accessible and less bureaucratic, especially important for NGOs;
- renewing networks (e.g. between institutes, programmes, universities and centres of excellence) that can improve UNESCO's links with scientists, researchers and communities of practice;
- a linked strategy for the "private sector" that recognizes and accommodates the diversity of companies, foundations, innovative financing vehicles and public-private partnerships.

58. Given the importance of National Commissions connecting UNESCO with civil society, their role needs to be reviewed and revitalized, ideally through capacity-building initiatives, South-South as well as North-South.

59. Partnerships evolve over time and require appropriate structures and processes. Flexible procedures, creating opportunities for ongoing dialogue and partnership "styles of working" would also facilitate partnership formation and strengthening.

IMPLEMENTATION AND FOLLOW-UP

60. IEE analyses and recommendations provide a starting point for an ambitious renewal programme for UNESCO, drawing on many current initiatives and building on past reform efforts. Such a renewal programme will require joint and separate follow-up by the Secretariat and the Executive Board in conjunction with the General Conference. Delegation of follow-up to the Secretariat alone is impractical given the widespread implication for governing bodies of the

recommendations made. At the same time governing bodies are not constitutionally able to “manage” an internal change process within the Secretariat.

61. “Divisions of responsibility” should be agreed within a common framework that is clear about shared and separate responsibilities for follow-up.

PROPOSED DRAFT DECISION

62. The Executive Board may wish to adopt, if necessary, a decision along the following lines:

The Executive Board,

1. Recalling 182 EX/Decision 24 and 35 C/Resolution 102,
2. Having examined documents 185 EX/18 and Add.,
3. Invites the Director-General to embark upon the following process in response to the report’s recommendations:
 - (a) provision of a Management Response and Action Plan to the 186th session of the Executive Board, to include a response to the recommendations relating to increasing UNESCO’s focus, positioning UNESCO closer to the field, strengthening participation in the United Nations, strengthening governance and developing a partnership strategy,
 - (b) provision of a Progress Report on implementation of the Action Plan to the General Conference at its 36th session.

ANNEX

Table 1: Matching UNESCO's mandate, contemporary concepts and programme themes

UNESCO's mandate	Contemporary concepts and theories	Illustrative programme themes
<i>International Peace</i>	Socio-economic inclusion and solidarity	Poverty reduction; human rights; inclusion of minorities; democratic strengthening; managing transitions
	Intercultural differences	Intercultural exchange and dialogue; supporting cultural diversity; valuing identity formation and living culture
	Competition for scarce resources	Natural resource management; sustainable development; climate change
<i>Common Welfare</i>	Socio-economic justice	Poverty reduction; MDGs and IADGs; free media; governance transparency
	Public goods	Education; clean water; personal and community safety; equity and justice; biodiversity
	"The Commons"	Environmental sustainability; communication and information infrastructure; bioethics; strengthening communities

Table 2: Shifts in “Global Architecture” 1946-2010: Implications for UNESCO

	1946	2010	Requirement of UNESCO	Current realities
<i>Power distribution</i>	Bipolar, centralized and colonized world	A multi-polar world of decentralized and regionalized power	Decentralization responsiveness and engagement with contemporary power “nodes”	Lack of distributed/empowered field offices; perceived as centralized and bureaucratic
<i>Who owns UNESCO?</i>	Legitimate States – with individual claims for “membership”	Multi-level governance involving active civil society	Inclusive models of policy formation and delivery	Predominantly State-oriented, sceptical of other actors, e.g. civil society
<i>Global solidarity</i>	Post-war “recovery”, normative standards and democracy	Internationally agreed development goals, new aid modalities and human rights	Reconciling country-related development goals with global norms and promotion of international cooperation	Tension between “development” and global normative agenda
<i>Foundations of knowledge</i>	Knowledge “owned” by elites	Democratized knowledge in a distributed knowledge society	Ability to mobilize epistemic communities and indigenous knowledge	Well understood but imperfectly practised – not sufficiently ICT-based
<i>Change process</i>	Expectation of slow and predictable change	Rapid change and unpredictability and pervasive crises	Adaptive planning and management of uncertainty	Driven by own priorities and strategies, inward-looking and risk-averse
<i>United Nations configuration</i>	Unique United Nations mandate with little competition	Overlapping United Nations mandates and competing capacities	Partnership, collaboration and focus	Assertion of “mandated rights”; procedural coordination; insufficient investment in core competencies
<i>Cultural diversity</i>	Culture as the heritage of the North	Living and diverse culture and identity as a prerequisite for international cooperation	Facilitating dialogue; self-understanding and respect	Moved substantially from heritage to diversity but overload of “Convention” administration limits other activities – and remains “Statist”
<i>“Resources”</i>	Limited competition for core resources accessed through “generic” channels	Intense competition for resources designated for pre-specified purposes accessed through multiple channels	Focus and communicate “core mission” while demonstrating capacity to deliver	Pressure to modify institutional structure and priorities in pursuit of funds



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ADDENDUM

Full Evaluation Report

SUMMARY

Pursuant to 182 EX/Decision 24 and 35 C/Resolution 102, the Independent External Evaluation team presents the full evaluation report.

No decision is proposed in this addendum.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADG	Assistant Director-General
BIS	Bank for International Settlements
CA	Comparative Advantage
CEB	Chief Executives Board
CEPES	European Centre for Higher Education
COMEST	World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSPS	Civil Society and the Private Sector
CCT	Cross-cutting Theme
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DaO	Delivering as One
EIB	European Investment Bank
EFA	Education for All
ESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
EXCOM	Executive Committee
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
GEF	Global Environment Facility
HLCP	High-level Committee on Programmes
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resources
IADG	Internationally Agreed Development Goals
IBE	International Bureau of Education
IBSP	International Basic Sciences Programme
ICTP	International Centre for Theoretical Physics
IEE	Independent External Evaluation
IESALC	Institute for Higher Education in Latin America and the Caribbean
IFAP	Information for All Programme
IFI	International Financial Institution
IHE	Institute for Water Education
IHP	International Hydrological Programme
IICBA	International Institute for Capacity-Building in Africa
IIEP	International Institute for Educational Planning
IITE	Institute for Information Technologies in Education
IOC	Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
IOS	Internal Oversight Service
IP	Intersectoral Platform
IPDC	International Programme for the Development of Communication
MAB	Man and the Biosphere
MDG	United Nations Millennium Development Goals
MLA	Main Line of Action
MOST	Management of Social Transformations
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRA	Non-Resident Agency
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
PCPD	Post-Conflict and Post-Disaster
SPO	Strategic Programme Objective
ToR	Terms of Reference
UIL	Institute for Lifelong Learning
UIS	UNESCO Institute for Statistics
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United National Development Group

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
UNITWIN	University Twinning and Networking
WHC	World Heritage Convention
WHO	World Health Organization
WFP	United Nations World Food Programme

1. INTRODUCTION

Background

1. At its 182nd session the Executive Board recommended to the General Conference a strategic, high-level and forward-looking independent evaluation, focused on the external challenges UNESCO faces in the twenty-first century. This recommendation – which was accepted by the General Conference – identified six focus areas which are addressed in this report. The purpose of the evaluation (Annex, Section 1) is to provide actionable and timely recommendations to the governing bodies and the Director-General on the positioning of the Organization to meet future needs and challenges, taking into account recent changes and reforms, past and future prospects, trends and opportunities.

2. The Independent External Evaluation (IEE) was undertaken between January and August 2010. The IEE visited field and liaison offices, UNESCO Institutes and the United Nations in New York and Geneva; attended the Regional C/5 Consultations; conducted case studies of programmes/themes of activity; observed the Executive Board in April 2010; reviewed documentation; met with Permanent Delegations gathered in Electoral Groups during Consultation Meetings and when requested individually; and interviewed Secretariat staff and senior management individually and in workshop settings (Annex, Section 2 presents the evaluation team and data collection).

Limitations

3. The scope and complexity of the evaluation questions, together with the limited amount of time and resources, has imposed strict limits on opportunities for in-depth analysis. In particular:

- The evaluation has not assessed the internal management and organization of UNESCO. The IEE was asked *not* to evaluate, for example, financial management, planning and budgeting processes, human resource management, field office management, etc. However, the IEE has inevitably observed the consequences of internal arrangements where they have implications for impact and effective responses to challenges.
- The evaluation has not independently assessed the impact of UNESCO's activities – relying instead on secondary analysis of other evaluations and reports and the judgments of a wide cross-section of interviewees. The IEE was asked to analyse *how* impact comes about, i.e. the processes whereby impact is created rather than on an assessment of that impact itself; and has focused its work accordingly.

4. The evaluation findings are presented in three reports: a short version which is an extensive summary of the main findings, conclusions and recommendations (185 EX/18); the present report which contains much of the substance of analysis as well as conclusions and recommendations; and a longer reference report, available on UNESCO's website, which presents more of the theoretical arguments, illustrative case studies, and tables and figures that support the analysis.

2. GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND UNESCO'S POSITIONING

Introduction

5. The IEE is intended to answer the overarching question: "How should UNESCO position itself to address the challenges of the twenty-first century and make the most of prospective opportunities?" More particularly the ToR for this evaluation highlights "challenges within the mandate of UNESCO" and asks:

- What will these challenges be?
- How should UNESCO deal with these challenges?

In considering the ToR, which asks the IEE to look forward but also to look backwards, we have focussed “backwards” mainly on a 10-year period: looking back to the turn of the century and forward to the next 10 or sometimes 20 years. We do not consider it feasible within the resources and time available to build a long-term perspective for the remainder of the twenty-first century.

Global challenges

6. Answering this question requires understanding the links between global challenges, UNESCO’s purpose and mandate and possibilities for future “positioning”. Figure 1 presents a starting framework that depicts these links and possibilities, emphasising that:

- UNESCO has choices as to the roles it wishes to play in the twenty-first century – hence the term “opportunity space”;
- Global challenges include global trends and how the international system is organized – “global architecture”;
- These challenges become relevant to UNESCO when “filtered” through its mandate;
- This mandate is mediated by diverse country, regional and global needs and by available resources and capacities;
- UNESCO’s “positioning” involves both priority setting and choices of modalities – implementation and governance are integral to positioning.


7. The global “architecture” affects the “modalities” through which UNESCO is able to deliver on its priorities. As an example we discuss later in this report how United Nations reform has opened up new possibilities for UNESCO to deliver through United Nations country arrangements such as the UNDAF. Similarly, to the extent that UNESCO’s priorities are effectively implemented, this may also influence “global trends”. For example if UNESCO is consistently successful in promoting gender equality within EFA this should over time contribute to the modification of gender inequality trends more widely. As in any system there are virtuous and vicious circles between system elements.

8. There is a broad consensus internationally about global “challenges” stemming from international trends that are documented in many “prospective” studies as well as in UNESCO’s own analyses. Annex, section 3 contains an analysis of three separate reviews of global trends and challenges.¹ The conclusion from this analysis is that the global “trends” identified by UNESCO since the beginning of the twenty-first century are stable over time and consistent with a broad international consensus.² Underlying this consensus is the realization that many pressing issues cannot be effectively dealt with by sovereign nation states requiring international cooperation. One omission from the above is the cross-cutting theme of disasters – natural and conflict related. Although these are touched on in UNESCO’s own prospective analyses, few of the generic sources we have reviewed describe this sufficiently. Sources the IEE has reviewed³ suggest that this will feature more prominently in future global challenges.

¹ The twenty-first century: towards the identification of some main trends: Preliminary Contribution of the Analysis and Forecasting Office to the Work of the Executive Board’s Task Force on UNESCO in the Twenty-First Century. February 2000. Reflections on the Future Role of UNESCO: Some Key Issues, Trends and Challenges. 175 EX/INF.9 Add. <http://www.millennium-project.org/millennium/index.html>.

² See for example: Manuel Castels (1996) *The Rise of the Network Society*. Cambridge: Blackwell; Georges Dupuy (2005) *Petite Metaphysique des Tsunamis*. Paris: Seui; Ulrich Beck (2007) *World at Risk*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

³ E.g. UNISDR “Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction”; and EM-DAT (Disaster Risk database).

Figure 1: Framework to analyse global challenges and UNESCO's positioning

9. Trends are interconnected and mutually reinforcing making widespread global impact likely, while also transcending sectors reinforcing the need for “cross-disciplinary” approaches. These trends are well reflected in the programmatic priorities of UNESCO. Programmes on sustainable development, urbanization, poverty reduction, science and ethics, press freedom, and intercultural dialogue are consistent with global trends identified. The exception is PCPD which, given the possibility that disasters and conflicts will continue to increase, could become a more important part of UNESCO. In addition, although environmental priorities are not new they have taken on increasing prominence given the evidence of climate change and its consequences.

Mandate and vision

10. UNESCO’s “vision” is about peace, as the preamble to the Constitution states: *since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.*⁴

11. The purposes of UNESCO are stated twice in the Constitution, firstly in the preamble in the context of the United Nations. Thus the signatories “hereby create the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for the purpose of advancing, through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind for which the United Nations Organization was established and which its Charter proclaims”.

12. Secondly, the first Article then states that UNESCO was established for the following purpose: “to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations.”

13. In considering UNESCO’s coverage we have taken both purposes into account, i.e. those which it shares with the United Nations of which it is a part and those that relate uniquely to its specific functions. These purposes of UNESCO are further elaborated in terms of:

⁴ UNESCO Constitution, adopted in London 16 November 1945.

- “mass communication” and “the free flow of ideas”;
- “popular education” and the “ideal of equality of educational opportunity”;
- “assuring the conservation of the world’s inheritance ...”.

14. Scientific activities are less explicitly described reflecting the relatively late insertion of science into UNESCO’s purpose – prior to the founding conference the new organization was provisionally known as “UNECO”. However Julian Huxley the first Director-General of UNESCO, who was one of the strongest advocates of the inclusion of science at UNESCO’s preparatory conference, understood much of education and culture as ultimately based on science which he saw as including the social as well as natural sciences – or as he put it *Sozialwissenschaft* as well as *Naturwissenschaft*.⁵ Science is included in the Constitution most explicitly as part of the “world’s inheritance” and “the international exchange of persons”.

15. The IEE has concluded that this “vision” and set of purposes remain as relevant and essential as part of the wider international system today, as it was in 1946 and indeed in 1926 when the League of Nations’ International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (UNESCO’s predecessor) was created. This judgement as to “relevance” was supported by extensive discussions with Member States and UNESCO’s partners in the United Nations and beyond. All confirmed the extent to which UNESCO’s purpose and vision is valued. However, as subsequent chapters describe, these discussions, together with country visits and the examination of current UNESCO programmes, also suggest that UNESCO is unevenly delivering its mandate.

16. In seeking to assess UNESCO’s current performance, the IEE considered how the vision has evolved and been operationalized. We concluded that UNESCO’s purpose has been progressively reinterpreted over the years to match contemporary understandings and global needs. Thus “peace-building” in 1946 bridging ideological divides in the early years of the Cold War has given way to promoting a dialogue among civilizations and a culture of peace; and supporting countries in post-conflict and disaster situations, for example by protecting the human rights of women and girls during armed conflicts. Similarly “common welfare” in 1946 was inevitably framed in terms of post-Second World War reconstruction while nowadays it is most commonly framed in terms of the MDGs and IADGs.

Connecting UNESCO’s activities with “peace” and “common welfare”

17. If UNESCO is an organization committed to “peace” and to “common welfare” which in modern times is expressed in terms of MDGs and IADGs, the question remains: can UNESCO’s activities be plausibly connected with “peace” and “common welfare”? The IEE was unable to identify any widely shared UNESCO “theories” that connected the UNESCO vision with its specific programmes and activities. However working backwards from an analysis of current programmes we were able to identify a strong theoretical foundation to what UNESCO sets out to do. This is summarized in Table 1 which links UNESCO’s “programme themes” with contemporary theories and the substance of UNESCO’s purpose.

18. International peace is understood in the UNESCO context as being more about “peace-building” than “peace-keeping”. From this perspective we have identified three main “theories” or explanations of international peace:

- *Socio-economic inclusion and solidarity*, which argues that societies that offer citizens a stake in terms of income and rights are more likely to promote solidarity and avoid marginalization and fragmentation.

⁵ Julian Huxley “UNESCO its purposes and its philosophy” Paris 1946.

- *Intercultural differences*, which argues that cultural identities are important, that contact and exchange cross cultural divides and that respect for the culture of others is an important determinant of peace and conflict.
- *Competition for scarce resources*, which argues that, given that a major source of conflict is competition for resources, cooperation, natural resource management and a common response to new sources of scarcity (such as climate change) is a means to support peace.

19. It is worth noting that these bodies of theory span both national and international building blocks of peace and are consistent with detailed analyses of “trends” wherein sub-national causes of conflict are becoming more common. “Common Welfare” is also supported by various bodies of theory. In particular:

- *Social justice*, which to an extent overlaps with “socio-economic inclusion” but includes not only poverty reduction but also notions of “social opportunities”:⁶ basic services and good governance as a means as well as an end to human development.
- *Public goods* that are not “tradable” and for which market mechanisms do not efficiently allocate, constitute an important element of welfare and are used to justify “collective action” (by governments or sometimes by CSOs) to provide goods such as clean water, safety on the streets, biodiversity and basic education.
- *Managing the Commons*, that is managing in the common interest what might through self interest be otherwise destroyed. This is a concept that underpins norms to ensure environmental sustainability, key infrastructures and the institutions that help support collective agreement around new norms including communities both global and national.

Table 1: Matching purpose, contemporary concepts & programme themes		
UNESCO’s purpose	Contemporary Concepts & Theories	Illustrative Programme Themes
“International Peace”	Socio-economic inclusion and solidarity	Poverty reduction; human rights; gender and equity; inclusion of minorities; democratic strengthening; managing transitions
	Intercultural differences	Intercultural exchange and dialogue; supporting cultural diversity; valuing identity formation and living culture
	Competition for scarce resources	Natural resource management; sustainable development; climate change
“Common Welfare”	Social justice	Poverty reduction; gender and equity; MDGs and IADGs; free media; governance transparency
	Public goods	Education; clean water; personal and community safety; equity and justice; biodiversity
	“Managing the commons”	Environmental sustainability; communication and information infrastructure; bioethics; strengthening communities

⁶ Amartya Sen (1990): “Justice: Means versus Freedoms”. In: *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 19.

20. As Table 1 suggests contemporary theories match many of UNESCO's actual programmes. For example UNESCO world heritage can be seen both as a "public good" and as a vehicle for "intercultural exchange"; oceanographic research as a way of "managing the commons" and of reducing "competition for scarce resources"; the tsunami warning system as a "global public good"; and promoting press freedom and the EFA *Global Monitoring Report* are examples of "socio-economic inclusion" and advocating "social justice". On this basis we conclude that not only is UNESCO's purpose of continued relevance but in the modern world has been framed in ways that is also supported by contemporary state-of-the-art analyses and "theories" concerning both "peace" and "common welfare".

21. Despite these positive conclusions there are also clear weaknesses in the way the purpose of the Organization has been operationalized. In particular UNESCO's purpose and vision is "permissive": relevance claims can be made for almost any global problem or crisis. There is therefore an acknowledged need for a greater focusing of efforts, based on factors other than relevance, to avoid incoherence, given current underfunding. There have been persistent attempts to "concentrate" work in larger programmes, promote "intersectorality" or cross-sector platforms and prioritize "objectives" in order to maximize synergies and impact. These efforts have been undermined by the continued autonomy of sectors, weak incentives for collaboration, sectoral budget systems, too many priorities and cross-cutting objectives, and lack of consensus in governing bodies and in the Secretariat. (These points are further elaborated in Chapter 7.)

Table 2: SHIFTS IN "GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE" 1946-2010: IMPLICATIONS FOR UNESCO				
	1946	2010	Requirement of UNESCO	Current Realities
Power Distribution	Bipolar, centralized & colonized world	A multi-polar world of decentralized & regionalized power	Decentralization responsiveness & engagement with contemporary power "nodes"	Lack of distributed/empowered field offices; perceived as centralized & bureaucratic
Who owns UNESCO?	Legitimate states with individual claims for "membership"	Multi-level governance involving active civil society & private sector	Inclusive models of policy formation & delivery	Predominantly state-oriented, sceptical of other actors e.g. civil society
Global Solidarity	Post war "recovery", normative standards and democracy	Internationally Agreed Development Goals, new aid modalities & human rights	Reconciling country-related goals with global norms & promotion of international cooperation	Tension between "development" and global normative agenda
Foundations of Knowledge	Knowledge "owned" by elites	Democratized knowledge in a distributed knowledge society	Ability to mobilize epistemic communities & indigenous knowledge	Well understood but imperfectly practised – not sufficiently ICT based
Change Process	Expectation of slow & predictable change	Rapid change, unpredictability & pervasive crises	Adaptive planning & management of uncertainty	Driven by own priorities & strategies, inward-looking & risk-averse
United Nations Configuration	Unique United Nations mandate with little competition	Overlapping United Nations mandates & competing capacities	Partnership, collaboration & focus	Assertion of "mandated rights"; procedural coordination; insufficient investment in core competences
Cultural Diversity	Culture as the heritage of the North	Living & diverse culture, & identity as a prerequisite for international cooperation	Facilitating dialogue; self understanding & respect	Moved substantially from heritage to diversity but overload of "Convention" administration limits other activities & remains "Statist"
Resources	Limited competition for core resources through "generic" channels	Intense competition for resources designated for pre-specified purposes accessed through multiple channels	Focus & communicate "core mission" while demonstrating capacity to deliver	Pressure to modify institutional structure & priorities in pursuit of funds

Global architecture

22. As Figure 1 indicated “challenges” consist of “trends” in the context of “global architecture”. While UNESCO is positioned to address twenty-first century trends, it is less well-positioned to address those trends within contemporary global “architecture”. Table 2 analyses shifts in global architecture together with a “thumbnail” sketch of the consequences for UNESCO. These consequences are assessed at two levels: how UNESCO is now and capabilities needed.

23. Considering UNESCO’s position, positive “reforms” have been initiated since 2000, including improvements in strategic planning, inserting institutional priorities such as “gender” and “Africa” across programmes, initiating “decentralization” from Headquarters, reinforcing links with the United Nations in New York and with other specialized agencies, the start of administrative reform, greater attention to results, and starting up an independent evaluation and internal audit function. However these are only first steps: many changes have been partly implemented and driven by rationalization and cost reduction considerations rather than by strategic choice about future purpose and direction.

24. Changes in global architecture have undermined many of UNESCO’s traditional modalities and hence UNESCO’s ability to “make the most of prospective opportunities”. In today’s competitive world UNESCO needs to be less centralized, risk-averse and silo-like; more outward-looking with stronger partnership capacities; more adaptable and flexible; and able to demonstrate a capacity to deliver as well as assert its mandate.

Conclusions

25. UNESCO’s purpose and vision has proved durable and adaptable and provides as relevant a framework in the twenty-first century as it did in the mid-twentieth century. In terms of “challenges”, with the exception of PCPD and environmental/climate change priorities which although long-evident is more prominent, the major international trends that UNESCO faces have been relatively stable: what is unpredictable and changeable is the combination of these trends and their geographical incidence. UNESCO has been restricted by shifts in “global architecture” to which it has only partially adapted. These mainly organizational and cultural limitations – on partnering, coordination in Headquarters, risk-taking and innovation – have affected UNESCO’s ability to deliver and demonstrate its relevance and to effectively operationalize its mission.

26. UNESCO’s programmes continue to be relevant in principle to Member States, but lack resources because of reduced funding in real terms and limited organizational capacities that follow, have spread UNESCO very thinly. These issues are discussed in greater depth in the following chapter. The above discussion has also underlined the importance of the need to focus efforts especially given UNESCO’s very limited resources.

27. The IEE has not assessed UNESCO’s funding, nor was this part of its remit. However it is important to recognize that resource constraints and donor funding decisions have consequences and that if sufficiently severe must also affect UNESCO’s ability to position itself to face twenty-first century challenges.

3. IMPACT FOR MEMBER STATES

Introduction

28. The ToR asks about the “impact” of UNESCO in addressing the challenges it faces, and in particular:

- How has UNESCO’s work impacted the policies and strategies of Member States and what is its relevance to Member States’ policies?

- What does this suggest in terms of how UNESCO should position itself?

29. The term impact is variously defined. An everyday understanding would be: “what difference are we making?”. Those who professionally evaluate the results of policy actions realize that this leaves unanswered questions such as: results for whom? over what time-scale? and what happens if “difference” has negative consequences? For this reason more elaborated definitions have evolved such as that used in the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Glossary which defines impact as: “Positive and negative long-term effects on identifiable population groups produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. These effects can be economic, socio-cultural, institutional, environmental, technological or of other types.”

30. More technical definitions focus on the uniqueness of the effect achieved by posing the counterfactual question:⁷ “would this have happened anyhow, without the intervention of the “agent” concerned?”. The IEE has defined “impact” for UNESCO as an action that:

- Makes a difference to intended beneficiaries and their partners to which beneficiaries and partners also contribute;
- Relates to UNESCO’s major objectives in a significant way;
- Is likely to be sustainable rather than requiring continuous maintenance or subsidy;
- Follows from a necessary intervention by UNESCO even though it is likely that others may also contribute.

This definition begins to highlight some of the difficulties in demonstrating UNESCO’s impact, in particular the contribution of “beneficiaries” and partners to impacts that occur.

Capturing UNESCO’s contribution to change

31. Colloquially having an impact implies that an actor such as UNESCO brings about change in the world. The actor is influential – while the “target” of a service or other policy instrument is relatively passive. Conceptualizations of impact that start from this perspective direct attention to a chain that leads from inputs to outputs, outcomes and in the longer term “impacts”. This perspective on “impact” leads to questions about needs, the deployment of resources, an assessment of outputs, how efficiently outputs have been produced and the effects this has for “beneficiaries”.

32. An alternative understanding of impact starts by assuming that social, economic, technical and political change rarely comes about through the actions of a single external agent. When a government receives advice it first of all has to decide that it is interested in that advice; and once received has to decide to follow up and work to change its policies. “Beneficiaries” are not passive and the most that advisors, capacity-builders and the like can achieve is to “facilitate and catalyse” change. This is consistent with the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action, and with much development oriented thinking.⁸

33. The IEE has concluded that most activities of a United Nations specialized agency such as UNESCO are more understandable within the second understanding of impact than the first. Indeed this is implied by UNESCO’s five “functions”: being a “laboratory of ideas” a “catalyst for international cooperation”, a “clearing house” and a “standard setter” requires active participation

⁷ Vaessen, J. (2010) Methodological and Conceptual Issues in the Evaluation of Impact in Development Cooperation. Maastricht:: Datawyse, provides a fundamental and up-to-date picture of the knowledge in this field.

⁸ The book by David Ellerman (advisor to Joseph Stiglitz at the World Bank) provides a good summary: Helping People to Help Themselves. University of Michigan, 2005.

from others. It might be argued that “capacity-building” comes closer to a passive “recipient” model but even here practitioners know that commitment and learning are essential for building capacity.

34. The IEE has identified many indications of significant contribution by UNESCO at each stage in the “value chain” of UNESCO’s five main “functions”, for example:

- Clearing house: gathering together experts in new fields of scientific ethics such as nanotechnology and publishing proceedings (COMEST);
- Laboratory of ideas: shifting perspectives from environmental protection to sustainable development (MAB);
- Standard setter: normative instruments concerning world heritage and declarations on press freedom often incorporated into national legislation (WHC and IPDC);
- Capacity-builder: developing comprehensive education policies (EFA) and helping develop a school improvement system (IIEP in Latin America);
- Catalyst for international cooperation: encouraging Member States to share data – about ocean and fresh water resources (IHP and IOC) and education performance (UIS) and bringing together traditional enemies in technical settings.

35. These functions have been defined as UNESCO’s roles⁹ and they provide a useful and appropriate definition. An important additional class of contribution is in the growing area of PCPD which cuts across all the five “functions” and indeed potentially all programme boundaries. Thus in relation to the preservation of cultural sites in Iraq and reconstruction in Myanmar after hurricane damage, UNESCO has undoubtedly both made a contribution and had an impact. In general it is easier to demonstrate impact (or its absence) in the PCPD area than in others because of the often short-term nature of the response.

36. It is much more difficult to make a systematic assessment of whether the more generic contributions described above merit the label impact for a number of reasons:

- UNESCO has not invested in systems that identify impact: RBM and evaluations mostly focus on outputs, activities and rather general “expected results” at MLA level and risk missing the “big-picture”, i.e. major effects that do not fit into any single MLA box.
- Results are rarely understood in context: assessments of impact are especially weak at the country and subregional levels and tend to be snapshots rather than assessments over time.
- UNESCO’s work has a significant intangible element – policy redirection, internalizing norms and contributing to international cooperation and peace can be difficult to operationalize and measure.
- Long-term goals require careful modelling of the theory of change as well as persistent monitoring and evaluation efforts. This makes assessing impact complex and costly – it is an assessment that needs to be applied selectively.
- UNESCO rarely deals with a single beneficiary: education ministries themselves need to work with schools, teachers associations and civil society. UNESCO works with “systems”; being effective requires “system change” and the diffusion of innovation across different parts of a “target” system.

⁹ UNESCO Medium-Term Strategy 2008-2013, 34 C/4.

Contexts in which UNESCO's contribution to impact is high

37. Much of the impact of UNESCO arises out of work at the global level through which impact occurs in developed as well as developing countries. However, analysis of impact is usually concerned with UNESCO's contribution to change in developing countries and countries in transition and hence there is a focus on a field presence, while recognizing that some activities such as normative and/or conventions development take place at Headquarters. In the long term this needs to be addressed as many twenty-first century challenges concern countries at all income levels.

38. UNESCO's activities and programmes occur in a context: its own immediate context of offices, staff programmes and networks, and a country and regional context, all of which is set into the "global architecture". The IEE has concluded that the current status of the field network is not sustainable and is negatively affecting UNESCO's reputation as well as its effectiveness. UNESCO's "field presence" is also being further challenged by the operational implications of United Nations' moves towards "system-wide coherence". Government representatives, UNESCO staff and partners offered consistent ideas of what makes UNESCO strong or weak in different country settings.¹⁰ For example strong offices were described as:

- Well managed and led;
- Having a critical mass of staff with adequate coverage of programmes/sectors/disciplines;
- Having experienced senior staff – not always "international staff" but national experts;
- Working together across the team;
- Well integrated into regional structures;
- Working well with United Nations partners;
- Able to mobilize funds and resources including those of institutes and wider networks (National Commissions, clubs and schools);
- Having developed a country (or cluster/subregional) plan.

39. Weak offices were also consistently described and had the opposite characteristics; e.g. poorly managed, working in fragmented ways, poorly staffed, poorly connected to governments and partners, and without coherent country/subregional plans or strategies.

40. It appears that weaker offices outnumber stronger offices in the present field office network. The likelihood of UNESCO having "impact" is evidently influenced by this state of affairs. Thus in weaker offices:

- Inputs are limited by inadequate resources;
- Poorly staffed offices have less credibility with governments and partners;
- The absence of good coverage of different programmes and disciplines undermines joined-up work and UNESCO's ability to respond;
- Activities are less relevant if based on general UNESCO-wide priorities rather than country/subregional needs;

¹⁰ Field Office Evaluations: A report consolidating the results of evaluations. IOS/EVS/PI/49

- Outputs tend to be small-scale, one-off activities with no follow-up and with low visibility;
- Very limited links with UNESCO's network (including its institutes);

41. In these circumstances UNESCO will make less of a difference, results will be less sustainable: impact will be reduced. Focusing on field offices raises the general question of "context". UNESCO's ability to make a contribution to beneficiaries in the short and long term is shaped not only by its own resources, organization and capability but also by opportunities and constraints it faces. Among the contextual factors that shape country/subregional opportunities are:

- *The orientation of Member State Governments towards UNESCO*: Some Member States are especially well-disposed and naturally look to UNESCO for inputs that are consistent with its mandate and current priorities. For example UNESCO's reputation has allowed it to deliver in Myanmar and Gaza, which was not possible for other agencies.
- *The stage of development and consequences for "needs"*: Member States change as development progresses. We have noted instances where articulated needs moved rapidly: in Africa from inventories of cultural monuments to assistance with cultural industries; in Asia from general poverty reduction to "reaching the unreached" when economic growth took off; and in parts of Africa and Latin America from basic education to vocational training and higher education. Post-conflict situations and political transitions also open up opportunities. For example, in Brazil major needs were thrown up by the transition to democracy which UNESCO responded to effectively and in innovative ways.
- *Proximity to other agencies*: Certain centres are natural hubs with a high density of United Nations, regional and other agencies including NGOs. (This is an indicator of the kind of global decentralization that characterizes the contemporary "global architecture"). Location in such hubs makes it easier to cooperate with other United Nations partners (as in Bangkok, New York and Panama) and with regional organizations such as the African Union (in Addis Ababa) and the European Union (in Brussels).
- *The quality and independence of the National Commissions*: Their contribution can be significant both to programme planning and implementation – but this potential is not always realized. To do so they need to be adequately resourced, connected to government but still independent, linked to all relevant departments and engaged with civil society. Many National Commissions that we encountered did not meet these conditions: they were effectively part of a single ministry (usually education), had no resources, were not involved with civil society and staff turnover was high.

42. How UNESCO maximizes the potential of these opportunities is the most important explanation for how context shapes UNESCO's effectiveness and ultimately its impact. Hence the importance of effective leadership and management, strategic planning at the subregional and country levels and having appropriate and experienced staff in the field capable of coordinating local expertise and mobilizing resources.

43. Judging the relevance of UNESCO to Member States' policies and strategies is not straightforward. In aggregate terms the comprehensive and relatively unselective nature of the C/4 and C/5 consultation process ensures that most Member States' needs are covered somewhere by UNESCO's priorities. In specific cases the following "constraints" have been encountered:

- UNESCO often does not have sufficient resources to deliver in line with priorities – funds are short and offices understaffed;
- Some Member States' priorities are judged by UNESCO for good reasons to be less central than others;

- The absence of basic infrastructure can leave Member States unable to absorb policy advice and capacity-building inputs;
- UNESCO is sometimes poorly placed to conduct policy dialogue in a particular country because of weak networks, a weak National Commission or under-skilled staff;
- Other “providers” (United Nations agencies or MDBs) are judged to be more effective or better resourced.

Three UNESCO narratives: “legacy”, “presence” and “efficacy”

44. We encountered three narratives about UNESCO which can be summarized as the “legacy” narrative, the “presence” narrative and the “efficacy” narrative.

- The “**legacy narrative**”, describes UNESCO as a previously important institution that “in the past did great things”, but has become “invisible” or “faded”. Those who adhere to this narrative may refer to a historic programme “that many years ago was very important for us”. They generally associate UNESCO with “world heritage” and “historical monuments”.
- The “**presence narrative**” describes UNESCO as “much more visible”: “we hear a lot about their mandate and the need to respect their lead roles”. This narrative recognizes that there has been a change, in the words of one United Nations informant: “UNESCO has come back from the dead” but is “better at arguing its case than delivering on what it promises”.
- The “**efficacy narrative**” describes UNESCO as “doing good work”. The adherents of this narrative usually know one programme well or have attended a major event that they associate with UNESCO. “It is the leading United Nations agency for water”; “the work on press freedom has been very important”. This narrative is generally positive about UNESCO – the one positive thing the informant knows tends to spill over.

45. Although we would not claim that IEE work is “representative” it is worth reporting that the consistent pattern was for “legacy” and “presence” narratives to predominate and “efficacy” narratives to be relatively rare. This observation is confirmed by other sources including IOS evaluations. The origins of an “efficacy” narrative where it exists, usually stem from three inputs:

- Symbolic and knowledge-based events (conferences, workshops, campaigns, launch of initiatives and “years”) that are contemporary in relevance, forward-looking and on the frontier of “new thinking”.
- Operational activities linked to normative principles and innovative ideas. As one informant put it, to be a “laboratory of ideas” you must prove that the theory works by experimenting. You have the idea then you experiment; create the laboratories, and then you scale up.
- Inputs from the wider UNESCO “community” (institutes, experts networks, world heritage and MAB sites, UniTwin professors, National Commissions, etc.) which can strongly reinforce the UNESCO story.

46. The importance of a narrative that emphasizes UNESCO’s “efficacy” cannot be overstated. It legitimates UNESCO in the eyes of governments, civil society and the private sector, opens doors and mobilizes resources, and strengthens UNESCO’s authority. If the dominant narrative is less positive, it can lead others to disregard or undervalue genuine achievements. There are interesting lessons to be learned from other United Nations agencies that have undergone reform as to how positive narratives can be constructed and sustained (see below).

Conclusions

47. How has UNESCO's work impacted the policies and strategies of Member States? IEE's fieldwork together with other reports and evaluations suggest that:

- There are many areas where UNESCO's contribution in terms of its five "functions" is considerable and well-recognized.
- That nonetheless UNESCO is seen as under-performing in terms of its expected contribution and mandate.
- Some of this perceived underperformance follows from an inappropriate understanding of impact which puts too much emphasis on what UNESCO can and should deliver on its own. From a "facilitating and catalysing change" perspective, UNESCO's underperformance is less pronounced.
- Many of the preconditions of effectiveness are known – these are partly contextual i.e. shaped by external factors to UNESCO but many others are internal and derive from staffing, management and strategic choices that UNESCO makes.
- The dominant narratives about UNESCO do not emphasize its "efficacy": this matters and the development in actual terms (i.e. not simply through public relations) of a more positive narrative about UNESCO would have positive consequences.
- Although UNESCO has underinvested in evaluations that are capable of tracking "impacts" there are limits to the likely value for money of a very large investment in impact-oriented evaluation approaches. Better quality change-oriented evaluation methods with a limited amount of long-term monitoring is what is most needed.

48. How should UNESCO position itself for impact? The above discussion suggests that:

- The nature of UNESCO's field presence and how it is organized and managed is an important precondition for achieving impact. Improvements in staffing, resourcing, planning and leadership together with strong and independent National Commissions and other partnerships will improve UNESCO's impact.
- Geographical location also matters: if UNESCO is well represented and staffed in "hubs" where other United Nations agencies are located and in other regional centres it will find it easier to coordinate, build partnerships and ensure UNESCO's own plans reflect wider regional and subregional priorities.
- UNESCO needs to put in place the preconditions for a new narrative of "efficacy". This is not simply a question of addressing low-visibility but also requires strategic focusing on lead priorities; greater coherence between operational activities and normative work; and the exploitation of all UNESCO's assets (institutes, networks, sites, UniTwin professors, National Commissions, etc.) to reinforce a real understanding of UNESCO's many contributions.

4. UNESCO WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

Introduction

49. The IEE was asked to consider UNESCO's role and contribution as part of the United Nations system, for example:

- UNESCO's "niche and comparative advantage" as well as other "possible areas where UNESCO could add value";
- The extent to which "UNESCO's strategy and programmes contribute to the purposes and goals of the United Nations including reform";
- "What steps have been taken to improve complementarity with other United Nations agencies and international organizations?"

Opportunities offered by United Nations reform

50. The founding process of UNESCO paralleled the foundation of the United Nations itself. UNESCO and other specialized agencies are only loosely accountable to the United Nations, being described in the United Nations' own organigram as "autonomous organizations working with the United Nations and each other". The need for United Nations reform has been advocated since at least 1997 much of it centred on "peace and security" – especially membership of the Security Council – but increasingly also in relation to United Nations work in development and humanitarian spheres. With the publication of "Delivering as One" (DaO), the report of the "Secretary-General's High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence", the United Nations has become a much more important part of UNESCO's proximate "global architecture".¹¹

51. Relationships with other parts of the United Nations are not unitary. UNESCO has a natural affinity with the established specialized agencies and less of an affinity with funds and programmes. At the same time in stronger offices there is a generally positive view of UNESCO's mandate and purpose from most United Nations agencies (including funds and programmes). UNESCO has embraced the opportunities offered by the United Nations reform process and is seen by United Nations partners as an active participant in the United Nations "coherence" process. This has already affected UNESCO positively and in many ways, e.g.:

- Intensifying joint working with other United Nations agencies;
- Opening up new funding possibilities;
- Revised UNDAF rules to potentially accommodate UNESCO's work;
- Beginning the harmonization of business processes across the United Nations;
- Recognition and adjustments for "Non-Resident Agency" (NRA) status.

52. New opportunities opened up by recent United Nations experience highlight UNESCO's strengths:

- The continued relevance and acceptance that culture, the sciences and education are vital for development;
- Capacities of the stronger UNESCO institutes and field offices;
- The ability to convene intergovernmental initiatives;
- High-level capacity-building, albeit unevenly distributed.

53. Weaknesses have also been highlighted that limit UNESCO's capacity to contribute to United Nations reform. Although there is a great deal of goodwill towards UNESCO, a great deal of frustration was also expressed:

- UNESCO needs to focus on "the big issues" and position itself strategically – it can't claim competence in everything.

¹¹ UN 9/11 2006. Delivering as One. Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel.

- Where UNESCO has the lead they should fill that role.
- In the areas where UNESCO does not perform it leaves space for others. UNESCO has missed many opportunities.
- UNESCO is expected to provide the United Nations with intellectual leadership.
- UNESCO emphasizes its own programme and strategy – but now it is the country that chooses. Putting all agency priorities into the UNDAF ignores this fact.
- There is a lack of experienced and senior staff. High levels of expertise are required for DaO and inter-agency work.
- UNESCO is well represented at CEB and related bodies: they are well prepared but tend to be conservative – protecting UNESCO's own priorities and business practices.
- UNESCO is small and poorly funded. It is driven by budget shortage.
- UNESCO is hierarchical and over-centralized. There is an unwillingness of Headquarters to grant discretion to decentralized offices.
- There is poor coordination within Headquarters and between Headquarters and field offices and institutes making it difficult to resolve problems “on the ground”.
- UNESCO prefers to work in isolation rather than in partnership – “Instead of offering technical complementary inputs which would require working together they prefer to divide up the territory”.

54. In general these comments are consistent with other sources of information – indicating as they do the need for UNESCO to focus its priorities, deliver well on what it does, adapt its administration and management, invest in high-quality staff and hone its partnership capabilities. These issues recur throughout the IEE analysis.

“Niche”, “comparative advantage” and specialization

55. The ToR's underlying concern is to identify what UNESCO does well compared with other United Nations agencies. This is a reasonable question but there are problems with using the logic of “comparative advantage” (CA). This is a precise technical term in economics and carries with it certain assumptions. CA assumes that even when a supplier produces more than one product or service at a lower opportunity cost than a competitor, it is still to the advantage of that supplier to specialize in those goods or services where opportunity cost is lower compared with competitors. This well-established theory assumes for demonstration purposes that (a) markets are perfect – that different suppliers are able to compete fairly with each other; (b) there is a common metric (e.g. labour costs as a proportion of world prices) in order to judge relative efficiencies; and (c) the capital needed to produce is relatively immobile. We question whether these conditions apply.

56. It is better to use other concepts to justify specialization and efficiency: for example considering strengths and weaknesses; alliance management in value-chains; complementarity and competition in partnerships; and flexible specialization as contribution to efficiency. It is however possible to use CA as a loose metaphor – a non-rigorous label for “doing something better”. The difficulty of applying CA is illustrated by the following examples from a review of the SPO evaluations commissioned by IOS and interviews conducted by the IEE team. We found that CA was variously described in terms of:

- *The UNESCO mandate* – e.g. we have the mandate for education, science and culture, this is UNESCO's comparative advantage;

- *Linking normative and operational activities* – e.g. science for sustainable development or fostering cultural diversity, this is UNESCO's comparative advantage;
- *UNESCO's lead-role* – e.g. UNESCO is the lead body for EFA, this is UNESCO's comparative advantage;
- *Something UNESCO does well* – e.g. we have a reputation for water research, scientific ethics and world heritage, this is UNESCO's comparative advantage;
- *What others are **not** doing or mandated to do* – e.g. culture is UNESCO's unique task, and hence this is UNESCO's comparative advantage;
- *Having different sectors and disciplines* – e.g. UNESCO can work across sectors and disciplines;
- *Having "convening power"* – e.g. can bring together networks of scientists and experts, this is UNESCO's comparative advantage;
- *Being part of the United Nations* – e.g. as a United Nations agency we are able to act as an "honest broker", this is UNESCO's comparative advantage.

57. These items, while loosely linked to CA, are a useful pointer to different understandings of UNESCO's strengths. They suggest that UNESCO needs a combination of qualities. Having a mandate is not sufficient if UNESCO does not fulfil that mandate; having formal leadership granted by the General Assembly is not the same as exercising leadership; and having many disciplines, programmes or sectors is not sufficient if UNESCO does not work across disciplinary boundaries when necessary. In a United Nations context, complementarity with other United Nations offerings must also be taken into account, as must the priorities of Member States.

58. The IEE reviewed these strengths in terms of UNESCO's five "functions" across SPO evaluations. Here also the definitions were variable but overall these evaluations rated UNESCO highly with greatest consistency as a "catalyst for international cooperation" and "clearing house" and less highly as a "laboratory of ideas" or "standard setter". This is consistent with a more widespread perception that UNESCO is less the "powerhouse of new ideas" than it used to be.

Implications of United Nations reform

59. The United Nations already influences UNESCO's choices and in some future scenarios these influences could become even stronger. Although it is not possible to predict the future, there are two sets of dynamics that are of importance:

- *First dynamic: The balance between the four strands of United Nations work:* The emerging balance between peace and security, development and poverty reduction, environmental sustainability and humanitarian relief is not yet predictable. There is a view that humanitarian and PCPD work is likely to become more central for the United Nations with many development roles being taken on by Bretton Woods institutions. This is part of a more general scenario which anticipates a growing risk of disasters and conflicts, both natural and man-made. It also anticipates the outcome of the post-2015 debate on the MDGs. The early stages in this debate suggest that one option could be for different priorities and structures for the United Nations in sub-Saharan Africa than elsewhere. If there was a shift towards some mix of "peace-building" and a reinforced humanitarian role with less emphasis on development work outside of Africa, this would have implications for UNESCO.
- *Second dynamic: Extent of depth and breadth of operational integration:* Secretaries-General from Dag Hammarskjöld to Boutros Ghali and Kofi Annan have proposed

streamlining/integrating United Nations activities, but most proposals have not gone forward as intended. The original DaO proposals were intended to be more fundamental than the eight DaO pilots have proved to be in practice. For example rationalizing overlapping mandates and addressing governance and funding were supposed to be included in “One UN” but have not been. There has been an emphasis in the second “One Plan” (OP 2) instead on process and procedures. By some accounts this “dilution” occurred following the inclusion of specialized agencies as well as ExComs in the reform process. However it is also apparent that there are voices among the ExComs that would prefer to limit the scope of DaO – for example by maintaining direct agency links with governments and separate programmes (joint programming but not joint programmes).

60. The following scenarios are possible depending on the way the above dynamics play out:

- A greater emphasis on PCPD closely linked with an extended vision of “peace-building” that could also include many of UNESCO’s core competences. This would allow for a deepening and extension of UNESCO’s PCPD work, possibly at the expense of other programmes.
- A strengthening of a “basic services” or “safety-net” development role (i.e. focusing on basic needs where it is demonstrably possible to “make a difference”). This would probably not favour UNESCO emphasizing more the competences of the ExComs and global funds.
- A stronger focus on environmental sustainability that would again favour some but not other parts of UNESCO, especially important if this focus was accompanied by changes in incentives and funding.
- The generalization of DaO pilot principles to most if not all countries. This would intensify joint working with other United Nations agencies, accelerating the speed with which UNESCO would be likely to adopt “good practice” in procedural and process terms, taking the DaO Pilot principles to most if not all countries.

61. This latter scenario would (a) open up many new operational and normative opportunities for UNESCO; and (b) shift requirements for UNESCO (and other United Nations agencies) for planning and programming – the latter becoming a shared United Nations function. It may also partly address problems of overlapping mandates. While particular scenarios are undetermined, it does seem likely that DaO principles will rapidly become the norm in those locations where UNDAF-type development work remains important.¹²

United Nations reform and field presence

62. United Nations reform confronts UNESCO with new pressures to strike a balance between Headquarters and the field. Working with other United Nations colleagues, being accountable for significantly larger programmes and budgets, refocusing on country priorities all demand more of UNESCO field staff and their managers.¹³ There is a view that UNDAF participation risks pulling UNESCO towards a conventional “development agency” role. In order to meet IADGs and the priorities of governments UNESCO has to focus on country needs and strengthen its presence at country-level. This is a “taken-for-granted” by many of the United Nations officials that we interviewed. These pressures are reinforced by new decentralized funding resources such as multi-donor trust funds and budget support. The question remains as to whether reinforcing the field office network at country-level risks weakening normative and peace-building roles at regional and global levels.

¹² 38th United Nations Issues Conference, 2007. Delivering Coherence: Next Steps for a Unified United Nations System.

¹³ Delivering as One: Lessons Learned from Pilot Countries. June 2009. UNDO Working Groups in Nine Countries.

63. The IEE conclusion is that these risks are avoidable, depending on how UNDAF participation is approached. Overall the model that would best match DaO conditions (which we expect to become the norm) would have the following shape:

- UNESCO would benefit from a smaller number of more capable and well-resourced multi-skilled (and multi-disciplinary) regional and subregional bureaux and antennae. This is necessary to support capacity-building, enhance UNESCO's credibility and ensure access to resources.
- This field presence needs to have global and regional as well as country responsibilities – making an input into normative as well as operational activities and involving functional decentralization as well as the redeployment of posts.
- Both of the above imply a continuing transfer of staff and posts from Headquarters to the field – or at the very least a far more mobile staff complement, where everyone spends large parts of their career away from Paris.
- It will be important to integrate normative and operational practice by demonstrating, perhaps through “pilot” schemes, how international standards can be operationalized, contextualized and generalized. Such “learning by doing” is significantly different from traditional “back-stopping”.
- While the country-based UNDAF model has obvious advantages for UNESCO, a regional alignment of UNESCO with the United Nations' regional organizations, including the Regional Economic Commissions, may offer a better framework in the medium term.

64. This approach will pose challenges for both the Secretariat and Member States. For the former, fundamental change in field structures requires streamlined interfaces within Headquarters; a reconsideration of already-existing sector-specific field capacities (such as Regional Education Bureaux); a very different HR philosophy and management style; strengthened regional and subregional capacities of planning and self-management; greater mobilization of national capacities including emerging middle-income countries; and new ways of working with partners. For some Member States the trade-off will be between political preferences for “the United Nations flag in my capital” versus a field presence that can deliver effectively.

Reform in United Nations agencies

65. Alongside United Nations-wide reform, many of the United Nations' specialized agencies, funds and programmes have engaged in a vigorous “reform process” over the last decade, e.g. WHO, UNDP, UNICEF, UNAIDS, WFP and FAO. These are often associated with comprehensive agency-wide evaluations – most far more extensive than the IEE. The “lessons” from these processes include:

- the need to reduce the numbers of diverse activities, objectives and projects: key words are strategic priorities and positioning (e.g. WHO) and at the beginning of a process, “doing one thing well” (e.g. UNICEF);
- a stronger focus on staff quality through better recruitment, changed contracts and greater investment in staff development (e.g. UNICEF);
- weaknesses in intersectoral working: the phrase “working in silos” recurs (e.g. FAO);
- The wish of Boards and donors to be involved in following up reform and the evaluation process (e.g. UNICEF and FAO);

- Need to avoid “micro-management” but strengthen oversight by governing bodies – usually made possible through clearer priority setting and greater transparency (UNICEF and FAO);
- Reduce bureaucracy, “encourage risk-takers” and the capacity to adapt to change (e.g. UNDP) and improving “risk management” (e.g. UNICEF);
- Set up “change management teams” to ensure follow-up and implementation (e.g. UNAIDS, UNICEF);
- Need to improve the management of extrabudgetary resources (e.g. WHO).

66. There are many points of “cross-over” between these exercises and UNESCO’s current circumstances:

- Virtually all of these exercises are set in the context of the changing global architecture including new challenges and risks, current weaknesses in “global governance”, changing composition of ODA linked with new donor preferences and new global funds, and the requirements of greater integration across the United Nations.
- Some have occurred as a result of crises but most have been anticipatory, based on a felt-need to create organizations more adaptable to change, on the assumption that future demands are likely to become even more severe than those faced at present.
- All “reforms” have focused on the links between the agency’s internal and external worlds based on the assumption that to deal with new external challenges requires internal changes in management, staffing, culture and governance.
- The specific content of necessary changes resonates with those of UNESCO, e.g. silo-like behaviour in departments, lack of cross-organizational synergies, fragmented and unfocused activities and problems of coordination between Headquarters and the field.
- All have evolved into extensive programmes of change that have involved Secretariats and Boards in monitoring and implementing new priorities and systems over several years sometimes through successive “waves” of reform.

Conclusions

67. It is not easy to specify UNESCO’s uniqueness in the United Nations system. UNESCO has many strengths and “pockets of capacity” but there are also weaknesses and the match with Member State priorities is uneven. From a United Nations perspective as well as from an “impact” perspective the lack of focus is the most striking reality. The implication of this is that all programmes should be assessed using a composite set of criteria that should include assessments of programme capacity but also the complementarity of UNESCO’s programmes with other parts of the United Nations and Member State needs. Complementarity is emphasized because within the evolving United Nations system the issue may be less one of competition with other agencies and more how they complement each other. The centrality of complementary working underlines once again the importance of partnering skills.

68. Despite assessments of weaknesses and limitations, interview respondents affirm the importance of UNESCO’s purpose and contribution to United Nations goals. Rather insofar as UNESCO does not live up to expectations the fear is that the prospect of achieving United Nations goals are themselves thereby lessened. UNESCO is seen as an enthusiastic and capable participant in the machinery of undg and in the United Nations reform process. However there is some scepticism in parts of the United Nations as to motives. The fear is that UNESCO is driven by the search for funds and starts from its own programmes and priorities rather than the priorities

of Member States. There are reported difficulties in relation to UNESCO's abilities to deliver because of weaknesses in its field presence and coordination and liaison difficulties between the field and Headquarters and within Headquarters itself.

69. The IEE conclusion is that such difficulties can be handled provided that lessons obtained through the UNDAF and other parts of the reform process are learned and acted on. In reviewing reform processes and evaluations in other United Nations agencies it is clear that many have encountered problems similar to UNESCO. Improvements stem from a sustained effort to drive through reform. UNESCO will continue to benefit from active engagement in the United Nations reform process, in UNDG machinery and in country-based UNDAF planning – quite apart from the resource opportunities that UNDAF participation represents. United Nations reform has put in place a necessary framework to improve complementarity. Participation in UNDG machinery (CEB, HLCP, etc.) and in inter-agency working groups (e.g. on NRA status and cost recovery) have already yielded specific benefits for UNESCO. The wider United Nations system provides a rich learning environment that enables UNESCO to align its practices with other United Nations agencies and thereby “raise its game”. Furthermore maintaining a role for specialized agencies under whatever scenario for the future of the United Nations that emerges will be enhanced by UNESCO's active engagement together with other specialized agencies.

5. GOVERNING BODIES AND THE SECRETARIAT

Introduction

70. The IEE's ToR focuses on the “division of competences between the governing bodies and the Secretariat”. Further questions concern:

- How far “the current division of roles and responsibilities between governing bodies and the Secretariat are optimal”.
- What adjustments could be made to the existing structures “to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of UNESCO's work”.

71. Assessment of governance requires criteria for “good” governance, e.g. legitimacy, transparency, representativeness, diversity, efficiency and effectiveness. In the context of this evaluation “governance” is understood to be the exercise of political authority so as to steer the organization, provide strategic direction, set priorities, and allocate resources. The IEE has only partly evaluated UNESCO's governance, concentrating on the requirements of its ToR.

Comparison with other United Nations agencies

72. Comparative studies of governance¹⁴ in the United Nations system have analyzed how governing bodies are equipped to play their roles in terms of political counterweight, performance police (accountability), democratic forum, and strategic thinker. By combining institutional strengths and weaknesses in performing these four roles, three models of governance have been identified: the “delegate and control”, the “direct representation” and the “constituency-based oversight” models.

73. IFIs follow the “delegate and control model” in which power and representation are delegated to a relatively small Executive Board that exercises close control over the institutional activities; the CEO is also Chair of the Board and decision-making is based on weighted voting. In the IFIs this model ensures a strong political counterweight role for the Board and guarantees shareholders control over the use of resources. However, this comes at the expense of the Board's capacity to act as a “democratic forum” and “strategic thinker”.

¹⁴ IMF (2008) Governance of IMF: An Evaluation; Perez del Castillo, P. (2009) Governance of the GEF. OPS4 Technical Document.

74. The EIB, BIS and OECD have the “direct representation model”. Here, all members are directly and equally represented on the Executive Board; their voting systems rely on the principle of one-nation-one-vote or some form of double majority vote. The CEO usually chairs the Board meetings. In this model the role of political counterweight is weaker but Boards are better equipped for strategic thinking and accountability; and also enjoy strong status as democratic fora.

75. The “constituency-based oversight model” includes most specialized agencies as well as UNDP, UNICEF and GEF and also matches UNESCO’s circumstances. Member States are represented through constituencies and delegate power to non-plenary Executive Boards. Decisions are usually based on the one-nation-one-vote principle. This model rates strongly as a democratic forum, average in establishing accountability and weak in terms of political counterweight and strategic thinking. These weaknesses are reinforced if there is close oversight by governments of their representatives, and few specialization prerequisites for Board members.

76. Past evaluations conclude that performance levels in the four different roles are influenced by the board’s structural characteristics: for example, boards with high ratios of size to total membership are better equipped as a democratic forum, but at the same time the quality of interaction among members and efficiency in decision-making processes tend to be lower. Similarly, multi-country representation and a weighted voting system tend to score lower than single-country and one-nation-one-vote for the democratic forum function, and the fusion between the functions of CEO and Board Chairperson blurs the lines of responsibility, making boards less credible in their accountability roles.¹⁵ The above considerations suggest that:

- UNESCO’s governance, like other specialized agencies, is stronger in democratic representation than other roles;
- UNESCO faces a choice between fundamental constitutional amendments of its governance and more modest improvement within the present framework;
- Although each model has its inherent strengths and weaknesses, there is scope for improvement within any one model, whatever it might be.

77. In 2005, an ad hoc group of the General Conference¹⁶ favoured the reduction of the number of Executive Board members to increase efficiency, but the proposal – which would have affected the strength of democratic representation – foundered. The IEE favours identifying ways to improve the current governance model – such as streamlining, improving strategic oversight and remedying other weaknesses – without sacrificing the strengths of the current “constituency-based oversight” model.

Division of Competences

78. The UNESCO Constitution divides governance responsibilities between the General Conference, the Executive Board and the Secretariat. The General Conference “determine[s] the policies and the main lines of work of the Organization”; “summon[s] international conferences on education, the sciences and humanities”; produces recommendations and international conventions; “receive[s] and consider[s] reports sent to the Organization by Member States on the action taken upon the recommendations and conventions” and “elect[s] the members of the Executive Board and, on the recommendation of the Board...appoint[s] the Director-General”.

79. At the same time, the Executive Board is charged with preparing the agenda for the General Conference and “examining the programme of work for the Organization and corresponding budget estimates”. Moreover, the Executive Board is responsible for the execution of the programme adopted by the Conference and “shall take all necessary measures to ensure the effective and rational execution of the programme by the Director-General”.

¹⁵ Annex, section 4 presents a summary of the governance structures in other specialized agencies.

¹⁶ 2005 Ad Hoc Group Chaired by the President of the General Conference (171 EX/16).

80. The Director-General, nominated by the Executive Board and appointed by the General Conference, “formulate[s] proposals for appropriate action by the Conference and the Board” and “prepare[s] submission to the Board a draft programme of work for the Organization with corresponding budget estimates”. The Director-General also prepares and communicates to “Member States and to the Executive Board periodical reports on the activities of the Organization”. Thus the Director-General drafts the programme of work and budget which, after being examined and amended by the Executive Board, is adopted by the General Conference. Once the programme is approved, the Secretariat oversees its execution.

81. In this context, the “division of competences” or “division of responsibilities” is a complex set of mutual obligations. The ToR explicitly highlights the “division” between the governing bodies and the Secretariat. However it would appear from previous reports and assessments of UNESCO governance¹⁷ that the division of competences between governing bodies and the Secretariat is embedded in more general role uncertainty highlighted in past General Conference discussions.

82. The IEE has identified three governance problems:

- *Duplication*: Existing organs of governance at times overlap and risk duplication. Duplication of tasks occur between the Executive Board and its subsidiary bodies; between the Executive Board and the General Conference; and between the Executive Board and the Secretariat.
- *Disconnect*: This is the opposite of duplication: since the functions are not always clear, tasks and issues might fall between the chairs and not receive sufficient attention.
- *Responsibility-drift*: This occurs if one “organ” trespasses onto the territory of others: policy-making coming from the Board rather than the General Conference; or programme oversight being undertaken by the latter. The Secretariat setting priorities and governing bodies “micro-managing” also fall into this category. An analysis of Board decisions indicated that about 9% of decisions are aimed at managing the Organization while as many as 38% contain at least some managing element.

83. All three “problems” relate to the lack of a well-defined accountability framework. Lessons learned from other agencies suggest that a perception of information under-provision and consequent distrust can be reversed when activities are limited to a few clear, sensible and common priorities/objectives; but most importantly when a clear framework sets limits to what can be requested to single bodies while at the same time identifying a minimum level of requests that are deemed essential. In UNESCO approximately 30% of Board decisions are concerned with overseeing performance and a further 15% with holding the Secretariat accountable. Lack of agreement as to levels of accountability and dissatisfaction with information provided reinforce perceptions of “micro-management”.

Dispersed governance

84. UNESCO governance is highly dispersed with many intergovernmental and expert committees – administering Conventions, intergovernmental programmes and category 1 institutes. This reflects the near-impossibility of unitary governance in a highly heterogeneous agency and is reinforced by high volumes of extrabudgetary resources over which the main governing bodies have limited control. The decisional autonomy of a number of UNESCO programmes and institutes has been analyzed, specifying the role played in it by the General Conference and the Executive Board (e.g. what kind of decisions concerning the programmes/institutes are taken by the main UNESCO bodies) and a number of other dimensions. A general “autonomy score”, exemplifying the level of decisional autonomy that these “UNESCO

¹⁷ E.g. the 2005 Ad Hoc Group chaired by the President of the General Conference (171 EX/16); and 2009 Report on the Organization of the General Conference, by the President of the 34th session (35 C/43).

parts” enjoy from the main bodies, has been constructed.¹⁸ This analysis indicates that many programmes with their own intergovernmental committees and limited regular programme resourcing are only loosely tied in to UNESCO’s governing bodies.

85. National Commissions have roles in governance and are consulted in the budget process, and their input through the regional consultations should play a major role in setting priorities in the C/5 document. However weaknesses in National Commissions limit inputs from civil society, already weakly represented in UNESCO’s governing bodies.

86. UNESCO is subject to steering signals from project/programme councils/boards, councils/committees of conventions, recommendations and declarations, boards of institutes, and National Commissions, in addition to the General Conference and Executive Boards. Governance is multifaceted and dispersed: there are major “divisions of competency” related issues within UNESCO’s governance as well as between governing bodies and the Secretariat. This dispersal of competencies also applies to expertise. The General Conference and Executive Board do not have access to their own high-level external expertise to take an independent view on the various UNESCO programmes. Most such expertise is held within programme committee and advisory groups.

87. There are potential strengths in this system: as governance inputs multiply, Member States’ commitment and ownership are strengthened, extrabudgetary funds are raised and the involvement of Member States – particularly through Permanent Delegations – becomes more technical and less political.

88. At present, the governance of semi-autonomous parts of the “UNESCO community” is rarely discussed nor are its consequences for operational capacity (e.g. servicing a high number of conventions). This evaluation highlights the need for greater communication, feedback, collaboration, and the better sharing of specialist expertise among all governing bodies. This is especially important as expertise tends to be stronger in decentralized bodies. Efforts at centralization rather than strengthening coordination are likely to be counter-productive.

Mechanisms of governance

89. Several improvements to governance mechanisms have been suggested by previous studies of the General Conference and the Executive Board. Among problems identified have been the way time is organized and the passing of items back and forth between the Executive Board and the General Conference. The structures and processes of the Board and General Conference have been studied in detail and there is a set of recommendations, some of which have been implemented. However, at present there is no clarity about which of these recommendations have been accepted. Most concern procedures, structure of the programming cycle or report formatting. Some regard the structure of bodies (the presence of sub-committees or the number of members), but the substantive, strategic functions and roles of these bodies, and their capacity to build consensus about global challenges and UNESCO’s “positioning” have not been systematically addressed.

90. The Ad Hoc 2005 and the 35 C/43 reports seem to open up possibilities for substantial change: the former suggests more thematic debates in the Executive Board and that UNESCO should use its convening power to make the General Conference an event capable of attracting the public at large and the interest of the media, where “renowned experts or ministers”, as well as heads of delegations, have an opportunity to deliver strong political messages. The latter report also recommends the enhancement of ministerial roles, together with a sharper focus on strategic and programmatic debates (C/4s and C/5s) and a more selective choice of side events.

¹⁸ Annex, section 5 contains an analysis of the decision autonomy of different parts of UNESCO governance structures.

91. In the IEE's view, any enhancement of the role of Member States should aim to refocus on broad policy directions benefitting strategic clarity while avoiding downstream micromanagement. IEE's analysis suggests this is often currently the case.

92. It is in relation to priority-setting that political voice and Member State interests should be enhanced. At present political counterweight occurs late in the policy-cycle: one decision in five of the Executive Board has elements of both management and political counterweight. One interpretation of UNESCO's "division of competency" difficulties is that the Secretariat is given insufficient policy guidance up-front because of low consensus on priorities, and then faces retrospective policy clarification through (micro) management. The IEE favours developing a strengthened mechanism to reach common priorities.

93. Besides political issues "crowding out" governance tasks, we have noted the ramifications of reporting on vague results unconnected to logical, goal-oriented programming, and poorly prepared debates. Around 5% of decisions are mere acknowledgements of document contents that do not lead to action of any kind, and there is a wide-spread perception that influential discussions take place in informal rather than public settings. Although the workload can be reduced in more than one way, the creation of thematic sub-committees charged with ensuring strategic coherence across UNESCO's priority areas would allow the Executive Board (in plenary session) to focus mainly on strategic coherence.

94. The division of labour among sub-committees on the one hand, and among sub-committees and the plenary on the other hand, would facilitate coordination between the Executive Board and other governing bodies of institutes, programmes, conventions, etc. that deal with specific programmes/activities. UNESCO's governance system is said to be expensive, largely due to the length of the Board meetings. Reducing the workload of the plenary session of the Board would presumably make it easier to shorten meeting duration. On the other hand increasing the number of yearly meetings – at least of the sub-committees if not the plenary – might have contrary cost implications. It should be noted, however, that it is not easy to demonstrate that UNESCO's governance is much more expensive than comparable organizations. There may be a trade-off between improving governance or reducing expenditures.

Conclusions

95. The analysis in this chapter has ranged from a comparative discussion of governance to issues concerning the competences of UNESCO's three organs and the division of labour between them. The IEE concludes that it is necessary to take a holistic perspective on governance. When doing so, it is apparent that UNESCO's governance arrangements have some definite advantages: especially in relation to representation and giving the international community "voice". Dispersed governance of conventions, institutes and programme activities also has many potential advantages, though these are not always realized. Finally, the system's weaknesses should be acknowledged. Future development of governance needs to build on strengths, address weaknesses, and realize the opportunities, particularly those inherent in the dispersed system of governance.

96. The IEE stresses the need for a clearer division of labour among UNESCO's three organs, focusing on the division of competences between the Secretariat and the Member States, as well as on the distinctive role of each of the three organs. As to "what adjustments could be made to the existing structures to improve efficiency and effectiveness of UNESCO's work", the IEE concludes that addressing weaknesses in present governance arrangements will require improved coordination, greater access to independent expertise and greater openness to civil society.

6. CONTRIBUTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND PRIVATE SECTOR

Introduction

97. The IEE is expected to consider the contribution of civil society and the private sector (CSPS). In particular:

- Strengths and weaknesses of UNESCO's approach, its "structures" and partnerships;
- What partnerships are likely to be strategically most important in the future.

Why civil society and the private sector matter

98. Since the early 1990s the roles of CSPS in global development has changed dramatically. Globalization has stimulated the growth of civil society and has opened up a public space for debate and actions. It has also contributed to global public opinion, which is shaping the political agenda with citizen demands that transcend national boundaries. In this sense, as noted by the Cardoso panel on United Nations-civil society relations,¹⁹ civil society is as much part of today's global governance as are governments. Non-state actors are increasingly enhancing democracy and reshaping multilateralism, and civil society organizations are often the prime movers of innovative initiatives to deal with global challenges. A whole range of non-governmental organizations flourish in all countries, such as:

- International umbrella NGOs, such as the Red Cross, Save the Children and Médecins Sans Frontières;
- International development NGOs, such as Oxfam and Care;
- Philanthropic foundations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation;
- Private-public partnerships, such as UNITAID and IFFI;
- Social movements constituting loosely coupled networks such as "make poverty history".

99. Organizations such as these now mobilize a considerable proportion of financial resources as well as implementing capacity for all kinds of development activities. In all, NGOs are estimated to have contributed \$14.6 billion to actions of international solidarity in 2006, against \$8.8 billion in 2002.²⁰ The private sector has emerged as a growing component of international transfers. It does not only join the field of traditional charity: corporate social and environmental responsibility agendas have surged, linked to the globalization of world business.²¹ There is a growing sense among transnational companies that their economic fate is linked to their public image in the countries where they invest, as well as to their capacity to deliver solutions to the major national public policy challenges.

100. Against this background CSPS actors need to be approached not only because of their potential in development cooperation, but even more because they are significant actors in relation to UNESCO's mandate. The rationale for closer working with civil society and the private sector includes:

- Accessing visions, knowledge and experience that inform policy choices;

¹⁹ The Cardoso Report on the United Nations and Civil Society. Enhanced cooperation between the United Nations and all relevant partners, in particular the private sector. Report by the Secretary General (2003).

²⁰ Centre for Global Development, Working Paper 167, 2009. The end of ODA: Death and Rebirth of a Global Public Policy.

²¹ See for example, Innovative Financing for Development. The I-8 Group, Leading Innovative Financing for Equity.

- Mobilizing national and international actors in support of UNESCO's values; through CSPS organizations UNESCO can have access to wider networks of partners;
- CSPS have high legitimacy with specific stakeholder groups;
- CSPS actors can work in areas where governments cannot work, or where UNESCO cannot work together with governments, hence cooperation is a way to reach "special" target groups and objectives.

101. In the changing institutional structures of the present, working with CSPS can reinforce democracy in a globalized world and legitimate international public action. It is definitely not only a question of having project implementation partners or mobilizing funds. This challenge is part of a wider discourse about "global governance" in an age when governments and intergovernmental bodies cannot achieve their goals single-handed. CSPS in these terms poses a challenge to UNESCO's "intergovernmental" ethos and culture.

Evolving nature of CSPS actors

102. As much as UNESCO has a clear mandate to work with CSPS, one dilemma is that the distinction between the public sector, the private sector and civil society is changing character. NGOs are increasingly becoming partners and sub-contractors of governments. The trend has been facilitated by tax exemptions on donations to international development activities in many countries, thus privatizing and decentralizing solidarity initiatives. Such reforms range from exemptions for small donations to charities to considerable opportunity costs for governments that choose to exempt multi-billion dollar philanthropic foundations from taxation.²²

103. The IEE has noted that different policy documents use different definitions of what constitutes civil society.²³ UNESCO needs to define the concept in order to develop a strategy for both the private sector and civil society. The difference between what is usually called the civil society and what is called the private sector is changing and actors that are seen as civil society organizations in one society may be incorporated in another country. The function may call for different juridical forms in different societies. At present UNESCO holds to relatively traditional definitions as to what constitutes civil society and the private sector that risks missing new modalities of international cooperation that rest on international agreement and cooperation between civil society organizations and the private sector (e.g. UNITAID).

UNESCO's engagement

104. There is a long history of civil society and NGO involvement in UNESCO activities. In 1995 UNESCO adopted new directives²⁴ concerning its relations with NGOs which introduced:

- The establishment of partnership based on (i) the representativeness of the NGO; (ii) its dynamism; (iii) the nature and regularity of its cooperation;
- The establishment of two main types of formal relations, limited to a renewable period of six years:
 - associate relations;
 - consultative relations;

²² Global Development Centre, Working Paper 167, 2009. The end of ODA: Death and Rebirth of a Global Public Policy.

²³ What is a Non-Governmental Organisation? City University of London, Peter Willets.

²⁴ *Directives concerning UNESCO's relations with non-governmental organizations.*

- The establishment of operational relations, a more flexible and dynamic framework, so that the needs of cooperation with NGOs are better reflected. These are also open to national, local or field NGOs;
- The diversification of the cooperation arrangements, to cover intellectual cooperation, financial cooperation and material cooperation.

The new directives are regularly assessed, the latest review being from 2007.²⁵ It concluded that UNESCO's current relations with NGOs were productive and wide-ranging, and remained fully relevant for the effective discharge of the Organization's tasks. Nevertheless the resources allocated to NGOs have fallen steadily.

105. UNESCO's practice in relation to the CSPS is instrumental, the aim being to help UNESCO achieve its objectives: "The purpose of all these arrangements is to promote the objectives of UNESCO" (CPX-80/WS/8 1980:4). As we have seen above, however, the role of CSPS in relation to the United Nations at large has changed. Other agencies do not only partner with CSPS in order to involve them instrumentally, but also to reach programmatic objectives. The new partnerships emphasize the changing patterns of global governance.²⁶

106. Since the reclassification exercise which followed the adoption of the directives concerning UNESCO's relations with non-governmental organizations in 1995 and their modification in 2001, there has been little change in the landscape of NGOs maintaining official relations with UNESCO, and their number and geographical distribution have remained stable, despite a slight increase in the number of regional organizations. In recent years cooperation has grown with NGOs not maintaining official relations with UNESCO, both international and national. At the international level, the selection of partners often takes place informally, without using the list of NGOs maintaining official relations. At the same time, NGOs whose vital expertise is sought by programme sectors are barred from this formal relationship, often because they are unaware of or do not understand existing procedures.

107. At the national and regional levels, where the situation is similar, National Commissions and field offices frequently relate to CSPS organizations.²⁷ However, the IEE found that approaches were not consistent. The extent and nature of partnership depended on the insights, ambitions, and competences of field office staff and National Commission members. In many field offices staff members need to be better informed of the existing framework for cooperation.

Strengths and weaknesses of UNESCO's partnerships

108. As the discussion above has shown, UNESCO's relation to the private sector as well as to civil society has both strengths and weaknesses.²⁸ The major strengths are:

- UNESCO has a long history of working with CSPS, and many of the partnerships go back several decades;
- There is overall a high volume of partnership arrangements and collaboration across regions and sectors;

²⁵ Sexennial Report by the Executive Board to the General Conference on the Contributions Made to UNESCO's Activities by Non-Governmental Organizations (2001–2006). 34 C/27.

²⁶ Voice and Accountability for Human development: A UNDP Global Strategy to Strengthen Civil Society and Civic Engagement. UNDP August 2009.

²⁷ See, for example, ERC/NAC/ME/5 – 10/009. Informal Meeting of National Commissions for UNESCO during the 184th session of the Executive Board.

²⁸ Analysed in "UNESCO and civil society" as well as in "Study of UNESCO's Engagement with the Private Sector: Final Summary Report", 5 February 2010. The findings in these reports as well as in the sexennial analysis are supported by the IEE observations during field visits and through the observations of the regional consultations meetings for the C/5.

- UNESCO is increasingly finding ways of participating with CSPS organizations in “upstream” activities, policy dialogue and other normative functions;
- UNESCO has contributed to capacity development in civil society organizations and there are good results of this at country level;
- UNESCO has a strong reputation and considerable goodwill among many civil society organizations;
- UNESCO connects to large numbers of actors through its clubs, associated schools network, centres and institutes. UNESCO Chairs and goodwill ambassadors also lend visibility and connect to larger networks of actors;
- The National Commissions are a potentially strong organizational vehicle to connect to civil society organizations.

109. The major weaknesses are:

- UNESCO does not yet have a strategy for partnerships, although it is in the process of formulating strategies for civil society and the private sector;
- UNESCO takes an instrumental view of CSPS actors and uses them to achieve objectives as it sees appropriate. Relationships thus tend to be asymmetrical rather than equitable partnerships;
- A large number of partnerships are short-term, project-based and ad hoc, thus not utilizing the full potential of processes;
- The capacity of staff members to understand and interact with CSPS can be problematic. This is often because of different organizational cultures. Thus private sector organizations are more results-oriented and less bureaucratic than UNESCO and NGOs will often prefer less formal relationships;
- Organizational commitment varies; many staff members are positive to and actively engage with partners, but others are less supportive and are reluctant to relate to CSPS partners;
- There is an imbalance in the regional representation of partners, where most significant partnerships tend to be with NGOs based in Europe and the United States. Though this is to be expected, there could be more concerted efforts to strengthen partnerships with NGOs from other parts of the world;
- South-South arrangements are seldom used nor tripartite partnerships;
- Little investment in developing capacity assessment tools for civil society organizations and for assessing the value of partnerships;
- Lack of joint United Nations coordination to CSPS partnerships, UNESCO’s emerging strategy needs to be closely coordinated with the strategies of other agencies in order to be effective;
- Although UNESCO maintains “formal” and “operational” relations with NGOs – the General Conference now has a “Partners Forum” and the Executive Board an NGO Committee – relationships are often formalistic and mostly focused in the North;

- National Commissions vary considerably in their civil society involvement and networking commitment.

Conclusions

110. Despite weaknesses, UNESCO has assembled a network of significant assets – strategic programmes, institutes, National Commissions, clubs, scientific and expert communities – that has often allowed it to demonstrate new ways to promote international cooperation and development. At present this network is undervalued and undermanaged. There is limited appreciation among Member States or the Secretariat of the potential of this broader UNESCO “community”, favouring instead an “institutional” perspective that privileges the formal, top-down, Headquarters-led UNESCO.

111. Much could be achieved building on UNESCO’s networks. Conceiving of UNESCO as an institutional centre working with a loosely-coupled network (the UNESCO “community”) would build on positive aspects of current reality and make it easier to take advantage of global and increasingly decentralized opportunities – e.g. for new partnerships, new funding sources and new contexts for normative and capacity-building work .

112. In order for this to be realized, UNESCO needs to develop a comprehensive strategy for partnership that looks outwards to civil society, expert communities and the private sector to ensure its relevance, advance its values and implement its programmes. This becomes even more important if UNESCO is to realize its networking potential. Such a strategy should aim to support:

- CSPS partners contributing to defining UNESCO’s goals rather than being regarded solely as vehicles for programme delivery;
- Making UNESCO more accessible and less bureaucratic, especially important for NGOs;
- Renewing networks (e.g. between institutes, programmes, universities and centres of excellence) that can improve UNESCO’s links with scientists, researchers and communities of practice;
- Opening up governing bodies to CSPS inputs and representation.

113. Given the importance of National Commissions connecting UNESCO with civil society, their role needs to be reviewed and revitalized, ideally through capacity-building initiatives, South-South as well as North-South. Partnerships evolve over time and require appropriate structures and processes. Flexible procedures, creating opportunities for ongoing dialogue and partnership “styles of working” would also facilitate partnership formation and strengthening.

7. COHERENCE BETWEEN SECTORS

Introduction

114. The IEE was asked to consider “the coherence between the sectors of the Secretariat” and more particularly:

- The extent to which current work is “coherent and complementary” across Sectors;
- How greater cooperation between sectors and disciplines would strengthen UNESCO;
- What could be done to increase coherence of work of “the sectoral divisions”.

115. UNESCO's governing bodies as well as the Director-General over the years have emphasized the importance of intersectoral/interdisciplinary work, including encouraging the appropriate organizational changes.²⁹ There is widespread consensus about the potential benefits that could arise from increasing coordination and collaboration across the competences of UNESCO:

- Global challenges require holistic approaches to complex problems;
- To reach objectives, many programmes require different inputs from professional disciplines;
- To create synergies that relate to UNESCO's role as a laboratory of ideas, it is necessary to integrate new perspectives that come from different disciplines;
- To effectively disseminate knowledge where that makes a difference and adds value, it is necessary to cross disciplinary and other boundaries, e.g. the role of clearing house for ideas also inherently requires cross-cutting approaches;
- Efficiency gains that brought people together organizationally would potentially reduce duplication, transaction costs and even management costs.

Sectors, programmes and disciplines

116. There is thus a broad agreement on the need to deploy different sources of competence in order to deliver results in line with UNESCO's mandate and purpose. Working where necessary across sectors is a basic precondition for that. However notions of "intersectorality" are unclear and can encompass quite different arguments. Thus, the IEE has distinguished between different understandings that are prevalent. Some focus on:

- Sectors as the basic unit – they (Education, Culture, etc.) need to cooperate more with other sectors;
- Within sector cooperation (within Natural Sciences, Education, etc.) between the divisions within each sector;
- Professional disciplines that do not follow the organizational division into sectors: there is a need to work across professions and to combine the different professional competences within programmes;
- Programmes that contain different disciplines also need to reinforce each other;
- Efforts to increase coordination and collaboration need to take into account other parts of the UNESCO community: institutes, centres, UNESCO Chairs, goodwill ambassadors, networks of sites, associated schools, etc.

117. Common to the above distinctions is a need for people to work together, and the often reported "lack of intersectoral coordination" is one manifestation of that. The efforts to encourage intersectoral work have not generally been successful because of the continued power of sectors, weak incentives for collaboration, too many priorities and cross-cutting objectives, and a lack of consensus in governing bodies and in the Secretariat at senior levels. Even though there are some exceptions, the PCPD and the HIV/AIDS platforms being two examples, the reality is that very little intersectoral work takes place, and what has, is mainly at the margins of regular work with little support from UNESCO's organizational management and structures. The actual budget allocated to intersectoral work appears to have been reduced, e.g. from a target 15%–20% to dedicated

²⁹ 33 C/6, Chapter V para. 82, Task team on Intersectoral Programmes (TTIP), November 2006.

projects at the beginning of the 31 C/4 to 4% at the end of the period, with limited allocation of resources for cooperative work in the 34 C/4.³⁰

118. Intersectoral coordination often holds the key to unlocking other forms of collaboration, such as the mechanisms that impede collaboration between programmes, or between category 1 and 2 institutes and other parts of UNESCO. IEE country visits provided examples of programmes based in more than one part of UNESCO but also many examples when this did happen but could add value. The IEE identified two main problems:

- Knowing when to work across boundaries and when not to work across boundaries. Although intersectoral approaches generally need to be strengthened, there are also occasions when the “deep and narrow” competence is demanded.
- What kind of “cross-boundary” working is being proposed, for example distinguishing between a need to share information, a need to coordinate inputs from several sectors, and a need to develop intersectoral activities.

119. These are general questions that will need specific answers depending on specific needs and contexts. The strategic objective of future change or “renewal” should provide an enabling environment that encourages cooperation across all boundaries i.e. programmes and disciplines and other organizational units including sectors, divisions and institutes.

120. The present sectors are organizational units that began with an assumed coherence but now contain many programmes that could as easily be located elsewhere. UNESCO has an “intersectoral problem” because the sectors do not provide incentives for cross-UNESCO cooperation. This does not mean that the solution is to cross sector boundaries alone. An alternative “solution” would be to redraw the boundaries of sectors especially if the dominant concern is to achieve coherence at sector-level. An alternative view is that the grouping of activities with more or less coherence under a single managerial and administrative unit is a useful organizational device – and no more than that. Sectors resemble Ministries in Member States where under one government agriculture may be with food and under another may be moved closer to environment; or in one government sports may be with education and in another be co-located with health. Provided they are not a barrier to joint working, there is no need to be totally coherent nor do all specialities need to be co-located.

121. UNESCO does not currently have an enabling environment for cooperative and interdisciplinary working and the design and structure of sectors and associated divisions are the explanation for this. One shard of evidence that this is so: there is often effective interdisciplinary working inside sectors if not between them. Culture has social scientists and Communication and Information has education specialists. The IEE also observed that strategic priorities, gender equality in particular, were unevenly managed and not sufficiently prioritized. However sectors are not the only barrier to cooperative working:

- Strong boundaries of intergovernmental programmes discourage flexibility – lack of a structure to stand outside programmes and judge their worth because so much of UNESCO’s judgement capacities are located in programmes.
- Definition of posts, especially senior posts (directors and ADGs), are not defined as management posts but as experts. UNESCO does not have a senior management team; it has a senior team of experts who in some cases may have management experience but often do not.
- The Board and Permanent Delegations are now more likely to be diplomatic/civil service based. This also militates against an independent source of governance to review

³⁰ For details of the budget allocations to the ISP’s; see the following Executive Board document <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001875/187540e.pdf>.

programme boundaries and continuance, e.g. it can facilitate support for the continuance of weak programmes.

122. There have been many previous efforts to encourage collaboration across UNESCO and they are useful to review in order to identify more precisely what the barriers to collaboration are.³¹ How has the situation changed? Document 31 C/4 provided for two cross-cutting themes (CCTs) to facilitate intersectoral and interdisciplinary approaches. An IOS evaluation recognized many achievements, including some creative and innovative projects that have since become sustainable and are still continuing. A particularly strong feature of the CCTs was support for bottom-up proposals from cross-functional teams selected on a competitive basis that have served *inter alia* to energize staff and an opportunity to test out ideas that might not have emerged otherwise. Document 35 C/5 established twelve Intersectoral Platforms (IPs), but without assigned budgets. This approach has generally not been successful – the IPs are seen by Sectors as marginal to regular work and those IPs that appear to be doing well are continuations of CCT projects.

123. Disincentives vested in the vertical sector silos need to be counterbalanced with horizontal incentives. One version of coherence would be one in which most of the resources were vested in cross-cutting objectives and themes, run by theme managers (climate change, democracy and transparency, cross-cultural dialogue and diversity, etc.) and sectors became reservoirs of specialist knowledge. Such models are now used in many governments, where funds are allocated to policy objectives rather than to organizational entities – given that many objectives require multi-organizational responses.

Conclusions

124. The analysis above is largely consistent with previous analysis of intersectoral work in UNESCO, as well as with similar analyses in other United Nations agencies. This points to:

- The importance of creating an enabling environment for cooperation – the emphasis should not be to compel cooperation but to remove barriers that inhibit cooperation;
- The need for cross-boundary resources to support UNESCO's strategic objectives and priorities;
- The primary relevance of programmes as the unit of analysis – significant agglomeration of activities around a common objective is the basic unit, not sectors which are best regarded as a management device;
- The importance of regular programme reviews – including scientific/specialist reviews by independent expertise as well as evaluations to ensure coherence and identify cross-cutting work opportunities;
- The need for effective reviews – with the power to recommend the close-down of programmes and related governing bodies (intergovernmental committees) in exceptional circumstances.

125. The work done in UNESCO's various sectors is not always coherent and complementary, nor does it necessarily need to be. The starting point must always be the global trends and the global system architecture, and Member States' needs for cooperation. Most of the time that calls for responses building on integration of competences from UNESCO's sectors. There is a need to create strong incentives for collaboration, complementarity and coherence across sectors – and also within sectors, across programmes, and within the UNESCO network. The coherence across sectors can be increased through:

³¹ Evaluation of the Cross-Cutting Themes. IOS/EVS/PI69.

- A loosening of the monopoly hold of sectors over resources – i.e. introduce significant cross-organization resources that can be bid for if consistent with agreed priorities;
- A horizontal as well as vertical management control with a rebalancing towards greater management competence alongside expertise and specialization: UNESCO needs a cadre of top-flight managers;
- A process to identify the areas where UNESCO could strengthen its capacities by addressing challenges in collaborative ways (i.e. in ways that cross programme, sector, division and other boundaries).

126. Collaborative and interdisciplinary working more generally, rather than more “inter-sectorality” *per se*, is the key issue that UNESCO faces. Large, complex multi-dimensional problems require responses that build on collaboration between different parts of organizations – whether such parts are defined in terms of sectors, regions, or any other distinction.

127. As earlier chapters have indicated, the extent to which such work becomes more the norm for UNESCO will partly depend on emerging United Nations and development scenarios and on what Member States want. In the context of such challenges, UNESCO will have great potential to strengthen its capacities and offerings, building on existing successful programmes that have already demonstrated cross-sectoral and multidisciplinary potential.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THE CASE FOR RENEWAL

Introduction

128. This chapter focuses on the implications of the preceding analysis: what change is needed and how such change should be approached. Conclusions related to the IEE’s ToR have already been identified in each of the preceding chapters. This chapter is mainly concerned with cross-cutting issues, because changes of the kind being recommended are inevitably interwoven.

129. IEE’s conclusions and recommendations are organized around the proposition that UNESCO needs to undergo a significant process of “renewal”, a term selected because it acknowledges both the scale of what is needed and the enormous potential that UNESCO represents for Member States and the United Nations system.

Conclusions regarding future challenges

130. Chapter 2 addressed “twenty-first century challenges” directly as did subsequent chapters when considering impact and relevance to Member States; system wide coherence in the United Nations; relationships with civil society; and the need for collaboration across UNESCO’s programmes, disciplines, sectors, institutes and networks. Overall the IEE has concluded that:

- Global trends have generally remained stable since the turn of the century although there has been an intensification of some already prevailing trends;
- In particular PCPD and environmental trends including those associated with climate change have intensified and are likely to do so further in the coming decades;
- Changes in the United Nations system pose a further challenge and depending on scenarios for United Nations “reform” over which UNESCO has limited control;
- UNESCO’s programmes are relevant to known needs and challenges but are insufficiently focused to ensure impact – even though small-scale activities can also make important contributions to development and peace-building;

- For the most part UNESCO's "challenges" stem from changes in global architecture that UNESCO has only partly been able to adapt to, exacerbated by resource and funding constraints;
- UNESCO needs to organize itself to meet the changes in its environment that arise from these "architectural" changes;
- The effectiveness of UNESCO will also be shaped by the extent to which it is able to create an enabling environment for cooperation across programmes, disciplines, sectors and other UNESCO entities including National Commissions;
- This will require in particular decentralization and de-bureaucratization, investing in human resources, planning proactively with Member States and United Nations partners; and building on the network capacities of UNESCO with civil society, including the private sector.

131. A consistent theme has been that forecasting the future is likely to be of limited reliability: uncertainty will continue to be one of the greatest challenges that UNESCO faces and a key determinant of UNESCO's successful "positioning" will be its adaptability and flexibility when confronting such uncertainty.

Framing future directions

132. This section introduces four considerations that have helped frame thinking about future directions and specific recommendations.

Balancing procedural and substantive change

133. Many of the needed changes identified in this report are procedural and efficiency-driven. More appropriate staff contracts and HR policies; better coordination between governing bodies; changing the reporting of results; improved consultation with United Nations partners when setting priorities; and strengthening evaluation at Headquarters and in field offices – all require changes in procedure and systems. At the same time the IEE has noted that sometimes advocated procedural changes (e.g. reducing the length of allowed speeches by Ambassadors, eliminating general debates or reducing the frequency of Executive Board meetings) are unrelated to clear goals. Furthermore many current barriers to UNESCO's effectiveness are themselves procedural: confused reporting relationships between the field and Headquarters; time-consuming visa systems; poor preparation for meetings; and distrusted HR policies. To that extent procedural change cannot be ignored.

134. There is therefore considerable scope for "streamlining" existing procedures and for improving systems; and many of the "strategic directions" that are identified below will also require new systems. There is already an established procedural "direction of travel" in UNESCO's reforms since 2000. The IEE's recommendations however start from goals rather than procedures and if anything tend to underspecify the "hows" rather than the "whats" of recommendations, recognising that specific procedures and systems will be best devised by UNESCO's Secretariat and governing bodies. Although continuing the existing "direction of travel" is undoubtedly necessary, it has limited potential without greater focussing of efforts on goals aligned with UNESCO's vision and mandate.

Recognizing "networked" UNESCO

135. The IEE has highlighted the diversity of the assets that UNESCO has created over many years including institutes, National Commissions, networks that support sites and programmes, UNITWIN professors, associated schools and UNESCO clubs. These assets, although relatively autonomous, are united in terms of many shared values. This highly decentralized UNESCO

network has a potential for connecting with communities, identifying needs, mobilizing funds and partners, and formulating and delivering programmes. The network also offers a potential home for existing and future programmes. One possible future vision of UNESCO is as an “incubator” generating new assets that support UNESCO’s goals and which then can be floated off to become part of the UNESCO network.

136. If the existing UNESCO network was better managed much could be achieved with limited resources. The dominant operational conception of UNESCO is as a corporate body, with its own strategy, budget, performance goals and indicators. However alongside this conception “network UNESCO” is as important as “institutional UNESCO” in many countries and communities. Giving greater priority to UNESCO’s network has cross-cutting implications, and networks therefore feature in many of the recommendations below.

Cultural and institutional change

137. The IEE has concluded that successful repositioning of UNESCO depends as much on changing institutional cultures as on changing institutional structures and processes. Culture, made up of beliefs, values and distilled experiences, sets the context for action, steering an organization towards its favoured solutions. Not all cultures are positive: in UNESCO, negative as well as positive lessons have been learned in the past. It is, for example, risk-averse, low-trust, inward-looking and uneasy with partnerships. Reversing this kind of culture is not straightforward: it cannot be changed mechanistically. However it is possible to identify desirable principles and use them as a benchmark to assess innovative measures. The IEE has concluded that UNESCO should aim to be:

- Innovative – rewarding risk-taking and building on commitment to a common vision;
- Inclusive – engaging strategically with Member States and other partners;
- Reflexive – systematically learning from its own experience;
- Outward-looking – positioning itself as part of a wider global system;
- Collaborative – prioritizing collective rather than partisan interests and working across boundaries.

138. A future “change process” should aim to include elements of “culture change” that reflects these principles. As highlighted earlier, UNESCO needs to communicate a “narrative of efficacy”. This will also rest in part on a successful cultural change process.

Flexibility and adaptability

139. The IEE analysis of twenty-first century challenges emphasizes future uncertainties:

- The likelihood of continuing high volumes of “disasters”, crises, conflicts and other unpredictable risks;
- Growing pressures to adapt in the face of United Nations-wide reforms, both in terms of business processes and in terms of its priorities and planning;
- Resource pressures arising from new funding modalities and pressure from donors to demonstrate results and efficacy.

This suggests that UNESCO will face increasing demands for organizational qualities such as adaptability and flexibility and needs to contemplate a transition to a more adaptive future state,

rather than to a new “steady-state”. Many of the recommendations that follow assume and seek to support such adaptability.

What is needed and feasible

140. The recommendations proposed here form a subset of a wider range of possible recommendations that could be supported by the IEE’s analysis. The judgement as to which recommendations to prioritize has sought to balance what is needed with what is feasible, drawing in part on experience in UNESCO (e.g. the fate of earlier “reforms”) as well as similar experience elsewhere.

141. Three considerations related to “feasibility” have in particular informed the recommendations put forward:

- Avoidance of fundamental constitutional change. Some relevant responses to problems and challenges could be met by far-reaching constitutional change. Examples of such recommendations would include: changing the composition and powers of the Executive Board; requiring Member States to send experts to fill UNESCO roles; relocating UNESCO away from Paris; and eliminating sectors. Recommendations such as these have been rejected because of a judgement that they are unlikely to be carried forward.
- Not over-specifying recommendations. The label “strategic directions” has been chosen to indicate ways forward while not specifying too closely how these might be implemented. We have sought to avoid being over-prescriptive, assuming that UNESCO’s governing bodies and Secretariat will need to develop a detailed action plan.
- Planning over an extended time horizon. The follow-up from the IEE’s work will be demanding, and UNESCO will therefore need to phase any change process so as to be able to limit disruption to its already intensive work programme. A multi-annual “renewal” programme with goals and review points after two, four, six and eight years would exemplify such an approach. It will for example allow for prerequisites (laying foundations), prioritizing and piloting innovations; and integrating new learning gained along the way even though we are aware that one danger of an extended time-horizon is that it may reduce the perceived urgency of necessary changes. In addition, a reasonably extended time horizon will allow for staffing decisions, including promotions, new recruitment and HRM/staff development initiatives to take effect.

Recommendations

142. The IEE is charged to deliver “actionable and timely recommendations” and is recommending a “renewal” strategy built on five “strategic directions”. Each of these “strategic directions” is introduced and the kinds of actions needed are then listed.

Strategic Direction One: Increasing UNESCO’s focus

143. UNESCO needs to further focus its efforts to address challenges consistent with its mandate for international cooperation (“peace”) and development (“common welfare”). Focusing should ensure that all activities contribute to UNESCO’s priorities and that barriers to collaborative working across the Organization are eliminated. At the same time there will be a need to differentiate between more and less strategically important programmes even when such programmes are of equal merit.

144. Greater focus is not simply a question of priority-setting but also requires a range of supportive procedures and supportive measures. These should include:

- The selection of a limited number of cross-cutting strategic objectives with which all programmes should be aligned;
- Regular assessment of existing and planned programmes in terms of their relevance, strengths and potential for cross-programme synergies;
- Advanced consultation with United Nations partners when plans are being made as well as on an ongoing basis to minimize duplication;
- Using “programme models” and “theories of change” that demonstrate intended connections between activities and their contribution over time to programme and agency objectives;
- Administrative, budgetary, planning and HR systems that support coherence, focus and synergy;
- Exit strategies for some programmes to support the continuation of activities where possible through their transfer to other parts of the UNESCO “community” or even other host bodies.

145. In the medium term, progressive refocusing and routine programme review will also allow regular reassessment of sector and division boundaries. “Sector” and division boundaries as well as programmes and platforms should be geared to enabling cross-UNESCO work so as to encourage synergies wherever they would add value.

Strategic Direction Two: Positioning UNESCO closer to the field

146. UNESCO should position itself closer to country needs, resources and partners, in order to ensure its relevance, effectiveness and impact. To this end, UNESCO should aim to become less Headquarters-oriented with a more mobile and de-concentrated workforce able to move flexibly between field and Headquarters. This can be achieved through:

- A smaller but stronger network of multi-disciplinary bureaux at subregional level with devolved powers;
- Taking advantage of NRA status while also deploying temporary in-country teams and working closely with United Nations partners;
- Priority-setting at a regional, subregional and Member State level involving Member States, United Nations and other partners;
- Delivering capacity-building and normative activities through modalities that strengthen international cooperation networks and solidarity;
- Encouraging programmes to relocate elements of their Headquarters-based work to the field, especially to regional centres in developing/emerging countries;
- HR policies that support career planning and mobility – every staff member should, for example, expect to spend at least 50% of their career in the field just as UNESCO itself also can reasonably expect a 50/50 balance between Headquarters and the field in the medium term.

147. UNESCO needs to better utilize skills and expertise that are nowadays available globally. This is especially important in emerging economies which can assist UNESCO strengthening South/South, South/North and South/North/South cooperation. This would be facilitated both by improved partnership capabilities and by more flexible staff contracts and procurement procedures.

148. Continued investment in high-quality independent evaluation will be required to demonstrate impact. This could be further strengthened by devolving and supporting self-evaluation functions to field offices.

Strategic Direction Three: Strengthening participation in the United Nations

149. Intensifying engagement with United Nations Headquarters and with United Nations partners in New York and in the field is needed to ensure that UNESCO meet the highest international agency standards and continues to help shape its own formative context together with other specialized agencies. This requires in particular a shift away from retrospective coordination, towards instead advance consultation and joint planning with United Nations partners wherever possible before new initiatives are decided on.

150. Specific ways of strengthening UNESCO's involvement in the United Nations would include:

- Improved dialogue with United Nations partners when formulating programmes and at all programming stages to lessen competition and increase the likelihood of synergies;
- Enhancing the role of the New York office and encouraging greater programme staff involvement in United Nations relationships;
- Active support from Member States for strengthened United Nations partnerships by maximizing policy coherence between country representation in capitals, Paris and New York;
- Strategic dialogue with United Nations Headquarters to help identify scope for UNESCO to add value to the United Nations system consistent with its intellectual networking capacities and mandate.

151. There are other prerequisites for strengthening UNESCO's participation in the United Nations system that will follow from general moves to reposition UNESCO. For example:

- Enhanced partnering capacities;
- A willingness to strengthen and devolve power to field and liaison offices accompanied by suitable accountability and oversight mechanisms;
- Improved coordination between administrative departments and sectors in Headquarters;
- Reformed HR policies and management training.

152. New HR policies that converge with those of other United Nations agencies will also allow easier movement between UNESCO and other agencies, thus accelerating the development of new skills while simultaneously opening up new opportunities for staff.

Strategic Direction Four: Strengthening governance

153. There should be a clearer division of labour between UNESCO's three organs, refocusing each on their distinctive roles. Addressing weaknesses in present governance arrangements will require separate and joint initiative by governing bodies and the Secretariat.

154. Governing bodies should consider:

- Improving General Conference and Executive Board access to independent expertise and scientific advice when formulating policies and main programmatic directions, for example through the use of independent panels of advisors;
- Developing an “accountability framework” that clarifies and delimits expectations of the Secretariat;
- Consider the advantage of specialized subcommittees (sectoral or priority-focused) to reduce Executive Board workload;
- Reviewing how Member State representation can be aligned with UNESCO’s specialized agency status.

155. The Secretariat should consider:

- Putting in place a permanent programme review process linked with independent evaluation;
- Developing new ways of reporting results that demonstrate high-level outcomes and impacts linked with coherent programmes;
- Strengthening priority setting and dialogue to be more inclusive of civil society and the private sector.

156. Governing bodies and the Secretariat should together consider:

- Enactment of a four-year integrated planning and programming cycle as presently advocated across the United Nations system which would make preparing C/5 documents more efficient and less burdensome;
- Agreeing information required for governance oversight as part of the development of a clear “accountability framework” that will stabilize and hopefully reduce the politicization of Secretariat/governing body relationships;
- Continuing the integration of extrabudgetary resources into governance oversight;
- Developing strategies for network governance of the wider UNESCO community integrated as far as possible into existing governance arrangements.

157. In the medium term, governance of the wider UNESCO community should take as much priority as “institutional” governance. This will fit well with the existing decentralized nature of UNESCO’s governance.

Strategic Direction Five: Developing a partnership strategy

158. UNESCO needs to develop a comprehensive strategy for partnership that looks outwards to civil society, expert communities and the private sector to ensure its relevance, advance its values and implement its programmes. This becomes even more important if UNESCO is to realize its networking potential.

159. Such a strategy should aim to support:

- Civil society and other partners contributing to defining UNESCO’s goals rather than being regarded solely as vehicles for programme delivery;
- Making UNESCO more accessible and less bureaucratic, especially important for NGOs;

- Renewing networks (e.g. between institutes, programmes, universities and centres of excellence) that can improve UNESCO's links with scientists, researchers and communities of practice;
- A linked strategy for the "private sector" that recognizes and accommodates the diversity of companies, foundations, innovative financing vehicles and private-public partnerships.

160. Given the importance of National Commissions connecting UNESCO with civil society, their role needs to be reviewed and revitalized, ideally through South-South as well as North-South capacity-building initiatives.

161. Partnerships evolve over time and require appropriate structures and processes. Flexible procedures, creating opportunities for ongoing dialogue and partnership "styles of working" would also facilitate partnership formation and strengthening.

Implementation: Coordination, change management and piloting

162. IEE analyses and recommendations provide a starting point for an ambitious renewal programme for UNESCO, drawing on many current initiatives and building on past reform efforts. Such a renewal programme will require joint and separate follow-up by the Secretariat and the Executive Board in conjunction with the General Conference. Delegation of follow-up to the Secretariat alone is impractical given the widespread implication for governing bodies of the recommendations made. At the same time governing bodies are not constitutionally able to "manage" an internal change process within the Secretariat.

163. "Divisions of responsibility" should be agreed within a common framework that is clear about shared and separate responsibilities for follow-up.

ANNEX SECTION 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUND

1. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations, established on 16 November 1945. Its stated purpose is to contribute to peace and security by promoting international collaboration through education, science, and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, the rule of law, and the human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the United Nations Charter.
2. UNESCO has 193 Member States and seven Associate Members. UNESCO's General Conference determines the policies and the main lines of work of the Organization. It meets every two years, and is attended by Member States and Associate Members, together with observers for non-Member States, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The General Conference approves the six-year Medium-Term Strategy (C/4) and the two-year Programme and Budget (C/5).
3. The Executive Board of UNESCO is elected by the General Conference. It consists of 58 Member States with a four-year term of office. The Executive Board meets biannually to examine the programme of work for the Organization and corresponding budget estimates.
4. Throughout its activities and projects, UNESCO performs and assumes a range of functions corresponding to its role as the international lead agency for education, the sciences, culture and communication. According to the Organization's Medium-Term Strategy for 2008-2013 UNESCO will, in fulfilling its mission, carry out five established functions: (i) laboratory of ideas, including foresight; (ii) standard-setter; (iii) clearing house; (iv) capacity-builder in Member States in UNESCO's fields of competence; (v) catalyst for international cooperation.³²
5. UNESCO is structured in five major programme sectors: Education, Natural Sciences, Social and Human Sciences, Culture, Communication and Information. In addition to Headquarters based in Paris, France, UNESCO includes a decentralized field network of 51 field offices plus two liaison offices with the United Nations. The network of National Commissions for UNESCO is a constituent element of UNESCO and unique in the United Nations system.
6. In addition to the field offices, UNESCO has 11 category 1 institutes and centres. These institutes are institutionally part of the Organization, approved by the General Conference, and have governing bodies that are elected by the General Conference or appointed, in whole or in part, by the Director-General and report to the General Conference. Institutes and centres under the auspices of UNESCO (category 2) are entities which are not legally part of the Organization, but which are associated with it through formal arrangements approved by the General Conference. At present, there are more than 50 category 2 institutes and centres.
7. The Organization has approximately 2,000 professional full-time staff,³³ a third of which are based in UNESCO field offices. About 60% of the professional full-time staff are allocated to programme sectors and the remaining 40% to support or central services.

INTRODUCTION

8. The 35th session of the General Conference recently approved an independent external evaluation of UNESCO of a comprehensive, strategic and forward-looking character. The issue of an independent external evaluation of UNESCO was an agenda item at the 181st and 182nd sessions of the Executive Board which were held prior to the General Conference. The decision taken at the 182nd session was important in outlining the overall scope of the evaluation

³² http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=6330&URL_DO=DO_PRINTPAGE&URL_SECTION=201.html

³³ Refers only to posts funded from the Regular Programme.

(182 EX/Decision 24 Part II).³⁴ The proposed independent external evaluation will complement UNESCO's existing biennial and medium-term evaluation plans, which include the evaluation of the Organization's "Strategic Programme Objectives", UNESCO's decentralized bodies and other thematic evaluations.

PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

9. The purpose of the external evaluation of UNESCO will be to provide actionable and timely recommendations to the Governing Bodies of the Organization and the Director-General for their review and action in order to position the Organization for meeting future needs and challenges. The evaluation will take into account the cumulative changes and reforms of the recent past, prospective issues and relevant trends. As a forward-looking exercise, the evaluation should identify the key lessons learned that can be applied to improve the efficiency, effectiveness and impact of the work of the Organization.

SCOPE

10. The General Conference has agreed that the evaluation should be strategically focused, high-level and forward-looking. The evaluation will focus primarily on the current and future opportunities and challenges within the Organization's core programmatic areas of competence as represented by the five major programmes.

11. The evaluation will answer the following overarching question:

"How should UNESCO position itself to address the challenges of the twenty-first century and make the most of prospective opportunities?"

12. According to the decisions taken by the General Conference and the Executive Board, the evaluation will focus, *inter alia*, on the following areas and illustrative set of questions. This illustrative set of questions will be further elaborated on by the external evaluation team during the inception phase with the final set of questions contained in the inception report.

³⁴

Decision 182 EX/24 Part II

1. Recalling 181 EX/Decision 19,
2. Having examined Part II of document 182 EX/24,
3. Considering that since the time UNESCO was established, the world has changed fundamentally, leading to new challenges in the fields of education, science, culture and communication,
4. Considering that many individual parts of UNESCO have been evaluated, but that the functioning of UNESCO as a whole has so far not been the subject of a comprehensive evaluation,
5. Recommends to the 35th session of the General Conference:
 - (a) to decide on an external and independent evaluation of UNESCO of a comprehensive, strategic and forward-looking character;
 - (b) to decide that the Terms of Reference will focus on *inter alia*:
 - (i) the international challenges within the mandate of UNESCO;
 - (ii) the impact of UNESCO in addressing these challenges;
 - (iii) the role of UNESCO within the United Nations system and in relation to other international organizations;
 - (iv) the division of competences between the governing bodies and Secretariat;
 - (v) the contribution of civil society and the business community,
 - (vi) the coherence between the sectors of the Secretariat.
 - (c) to request the Director-General to entrust the IOS with initiating this evaluation and to keep Member States informed as appropriate;
 - (d) to allocate the appropriate resources for this evaluation from the regular budget, to be supplemented by voluntary contributions from Member States.

Focus Area	Illustrate Evaluation Questions
The international challenges within the mandate of UNESCO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What will be the major international challenges that UNESCO will face in the future in carrying out its work? How should UNESCO deal with the challenges it anticipates? • What is the relevance of UNESCO's policies and programmes to the needs and priorities of Member States? To what extent does UNESCO's 2008-2013 Medium-Term Strategy (C/4) and 2010-2011 Programme and Budget (C/5) respond to the needs of Member States as reflected in their policies, strategies and programmes?
The impact of UNESCO in addressing these challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How has UNESCO's work impacted the policies and strategies of Member States? What does this suggest in terms of how UNESCO should position itself in the future? • How effectively has UNESCO been dealing with past and current international challenges? What can be learned from this for the future?
The role of UNESCO within the United Nations system and in relation to other international Organizations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What is UNESCO's niche and comparative advantage and what are other possible areas where UNESCO could add value in the medium and long term? • To what extent do UNESCO's strategy and programmes contribute to the purposes and goals of the United Nations, including reforms? • What steps have been taken to improve complementarity and coherence with other United Nations agencies and international organizations?
The division of competences between the governing bodies and the Secretariat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Is the current division of roles and responsibilities between the governing bodies (the Executive Board and the General Conference) and the Secretariat optimal? How could it be improved? • What adjustments could be made to the existing structures of the governing bodies and their working methods to improve efficiency and effectiveness of UNESCO's work?
The contribution of civil society and the business community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches to, and the structures of, UNESCO's existing partnerships with civil society and the business community? What has worked well? What can be learned from existing success stories? • What partnerships are likely to be strategically most important in the future?
The coherence between the sectors of the Secretariat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To what extent is the work done in UNESCO's various sectors coherent and complementary? Could any measures be taken to further increase coherence of the work undertaken by the sectoral divisions of UNESCO's Secretariat? • What are the areas where UNESCO could strengthen its comparative advantage by addressing international challenges in an intersectoral and multidisciplinary way?

METHODOLOGY

13. The methodology for the evaluation will include the following:
- (a) Document review including analysis of previous evaluations and key reference documents. Refer to the list provided at the end of the Terms of Reference.
 - (b) Interviews (structured, semi-structured, both in person and by telephone) with key informants (including representatives of the Secretariat, Permanent Delegations to UNESCO, National Commissions, government officials, United Nations agencies, representatives from civil society and the business community, partner organizations, etc.).
 - (c) A representative number of surveys to be distributed to (i) all Member States through the Permanent Delegations to UNESCO; (ii) key partner organizations;³⁵ and (iii) UNESCO staff at Headquarters and the decentralized field network.
 - (d) Visits to UNESCO Headquarters in Paris and field visits to selected locations, ideally to, *inter alia*, regional focal hubs (Bangkok, Beirut, Brasilia, Dakar, Dar es Salaam, Santiago) as well as major United Nations centres, such as New York City and Geneva.
14. The evaluation team will ensure triangulation in analyzing the data collected and in drawing findings and making recommendations.
15. In developing the inception report, the team will develop an evaluation matrix which will address the evaluation questions, the criteria for evaluating them, the sources of data that will be used and the data collection methods. As stated in paragraph 12, the illustrative set of questions will be further elaborated on by the external evaluation team during the inception phase, in close consultation with key stakeholders and IOS, with the final set of questions contained in the inception report.

DELIVERABLES AND SCHEDULE

16. The independent, external evaluation team will commit to the following key deliverables:
- (a) Inception report – the inception report will contain the evaluation framework, a detailed evaluation methodology, a work plan and logistical arrangements. (Indicative date: 31 January 2010);
 - (b) First Information Meeting for Permanent Delegations to UNESCO – Permanent Delegations to UNESCO will be informed about the evaluation progress and about any important emerging strategic issues. (Indicative date: mid March 2010);
 - (c) Second Information Meeting for Permanent Delegations to UNESCO – Prior to the preparation of the draft evaluation report, Permanent Delegations will be provided with information on the preliminary evaluation findings. (Indicative date: mid June 2010);
 - (d) Draft evaluation report – A draft evaluation report will be prepared in line with the structure outlined below. (Indicative date: 31 July 2010);

³⁵ The UNESCO partners and networks identified on UNESCO's website should be surveyed http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=22347&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.htm

- (e) Final evaluation report – The final evaluation report will be presented at the 185th session of the Executive Board in October 2010. The report will be structured as follows:
- Executive Summary
 - Introduction
 - Evaluation purpose
 - Evaluation methodology
 - Main findings
 - Lessons learnt
 - Recommendations
 - Annexes (including interview list, data collection instruments, key documents reviewed, Terms of Reference).

The final evaluation report will also be considered at the 36th session of the General Conference in 2011.

ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND LOGISTICAL ARRANGEMENTS

17. External Evaluation Team – The evaluation team is responsible for:
- conducting the evaluation in accordance with the Norms and Standards of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG);
 - submitting all deliverables as per this Terms of Reference;
 - identifying and contracting any additional evaluators or research assistants who possess specialized expertise not available within the core evaluation team;
 - informing the technical support group on a regular basis of progress in the conduct of the evaluation;
 - reporting to the Executive Board and/or Permanent Delegations in information sessions, as set out above.
18. The External Evaluation Team may seek external advice, in particular from eminent persons.
19. The External Evaluation Team will be selected through an open international competition per UNESCO's Procurement Rules and Regulations.
20. Technical support group: The main function of the technical support group is to provide factual information to the External Evaluation Team and, when requested, practical advice on any substantive aspect of the evaluation as well as to secure access to stakeholders. The Technical Support Group will be comprised of a representative number of UNESCO staff members including each of the five major programmes of UNESCO and UNESCO's Central Services.
21. Internal Oversight Service (IOS)/Evaluation Section – The primary function of IOS is to ensure the independence of the evaluation and the quality of all deliverables through strict adherence to the norms and standards of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG). IOS will be responsible for managing the selection process of the external evaluation team, managing the contract, facilitating the work of the external evaluation team, including contacts within UNESCO and key external partners, and providing access to all necessary documentation.

EVALUATION TEAM QUALIFICATIONS

22. Prior to the assessment of the technical proposals, the evaluation team's qualifications will be closely examined. The qualifications given below in A and B are minimum requirements. Those set out in B are for the team as a whole, not for each core team member. Failure to meet the requirements as set out in A and B will result in the immediate rejection of the technical proposal.

A. Qualifications for the Team Leader:

- Proven experience in large-scale organizational reviews/evaluations of relevance to policy-making (at least three references);
- Proven experience leading or directly managing complex evaluations or strategy development exercises.

B. Qualifications for the core team (including the Team Leader):

- Academic degrees relevant to UNESCO's fields of competence;
- Demonstrated experience in the field of international development and technical cooperation;
- Advanced knowledge of evaluation design and methodology;
- Extensive experience in strategy development;
- Understanding of and experience with the United Nations system;
- Knowledge of gender issues, including experience with gender evaluation methodologies;
- Fluency in English and French.

23. Following assessment of the above minimum requirements, each qualifying team will be assessed on criteria relating to the team's profile and the quality of the technical proposal. The evaluation team will ideally consist of a core evaluation team of three to four experts with complementary expertise and experience, supplemented by technical specialists and research assistants as necessary. The core team should be multicultural with appropriate gender balance, geographic representation and linguistic diversity. The core team should possess excellent writing, communication and presentation skills. The firm(s) or institution(s) with which the core team members are associated should have excellent quality assurance procedures, knowledge in UNESCO's fields of competence, experience with similar assignments and experience in working with the United Nations and/or other international organizations.

KEY REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

- (a) UNESCO Constitution
- (b) Medium-Term Strategy, 2008-2013, (34C/4)
- (c) Programme and Budget, 2008-2009 (34 C/5)
- (d) Programme and Budget, 2010-2011 (draft 35 C/5)
- (e) Report of the Director-General on the Activities of the Organization in 2006-2007 (35 C/3)

- (f) Review of Management and Administration in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), prepared by the Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations, 2000.
- (g) Strategic Programme Objective Evaluations: 1/2, 3, 6, 11, 14.

ANNEX SECTION 2: EVALUATION TEAM AND DATA COLLECTION

EVALUATION TEAM	
Elliot Stern, team leader Barbara Befani Oumou Ba Tall Chen Zhaoying Osvaldo Feinstein Kim Forss Stein Erik Kruse Nefissa Naguib Burt Perrin Tara Sharma Anne Teigen	
DATA COLLECTION	
Sources	Location
Field office visits	Accra, Addis Ababa, Amman, Bangkok, Beijing, Buenos Aires, Dakar, Doha, New Delhi, San Jose
Regional Consultations with National Commissions	Changwon, Kampala, London, Port of Spain, Rabat
Meetings with United Nations agencies	Geneva, New York, Washington D.C.
UNESCO institutes and centres	Paris, Geneva, Trieste, Venice, Addis Ababa, Buenos Aires

ANNEX SECTION 3: SUMMARY OF GLOBAL TRENDS AND CHALLENGES

UNESCO's Analysis and Forecasting Office, 2000	Reflections on Future Role of UNESCO, 2006	The Millennium Project
The third industrial revolution – effects of information networks and biotech	Process of globalization – global flows of capital and information; exclusion and interdependence	[All trends identified are “transnational in nature and trans-institutional in solution”]
Poverty, inequality and exclusion	The fight against poverty and intra-country inequalities	Rich and poor gap
New threats to peace and security especially “below the state level” rather than between states	Threats to peace and international security conflicts over resources, failing states, terrorism, international crime	Peace and conflict, transnational organized crime
Population growth, the demographic transition and dangers to health	Population growth, demographic changes, spread of diseases and epidemics	Population and resource, health issues
Urbanization of the world's population	Emergence of a large number of semi-autonomous mega-cities	
Degradation of the environment caused by climatic warming, non-sustainable consumption	Risks related to global hazards and natural disasters	Sustainable development and climate change ...clean water
The rise of the information society	Information and communication revolution with new risks of exclusion and to freedom of expression.	Global IT convergence
Changes in democracy and systems of international and regional governance	Changes in global governance, United Nations reform process, new global powers, influence of non-state actors	Democratization
New cross-cultural encounters: cultural pluralism, diversity and creativity	Cultural diversity, global religions and faiths, languages and multilingualism, intercultural dialogue	
Science and technology and the new ethical challenges	Technoscience, ethical, legal and normative limits	Global ethics

ANNEX SECTION 4: GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IN SELECTED UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES

	IMF	FAO	WHO	ILO	UNESCO	UNDP	UNICEF
Total number of members	187	193	193	183	196	no dedicated GC (The UN GA = 192)	no dedicated GC (The UN GA = 192)
Number of Executives	24	49	34	56 (of which 28 MS)	58	36	36
Frequency of meetings	3 weeks	2 x year	2 x year	3 x year	2 x year	3 x year	3 x year
Ratio of size to total membership	0.128	0.254	0.176	0.153	0.296	0.1875	0.1875
Frequency of General Conference	1 x year	1 x 2 years	1 x year	1 x year	1 x 2 years	(the UN GA = 1 x year)	(the UN GA = 1 x year)

ANNEX SECTION 5: ANALYSIS OF AUTONOMY OF GOVERNING BODIES

Overall level of decisional autonomy	
IOC	6.0
Diversity of Cultural Expressions	6.0
Cultural Objects and Museums	5.5
IPDC	5.0
WH	5.0
IBE	5.0
MAB	4.5
Ethics of S&T	4.0
IIEP	4.0
UIL (former UIE)	4.0
IITE	4.0
IESALC (former CRESALC)	4.0
IHE	4.0
ICTP	4.0
IICBA	4.0
CEPES	4.0
MOST	3.8
Bioethics	3.5
UIS	3.5
IFAP	3.0
IBSP	2.0
ESD	2.0
EFA	2.0

Code: The overall score is calculated as a sum of two scores: one measuring the autonomy of the programme-specific governing body and the other illustrating the level of involvement of the main bodies. In particular: presence of interagency committee = 1; presence of independent intergovernmental body = 3; presence of intergovernmental body elected by the GC = 2; presence of Committee of Experts serving in personal capacity = 1 (except the MOST programme which is given 1.5). If two or more bodies are present in the first 4 columns, the average score is computed into the final sum (eg. for the MAB programme: 2 for the intergovernmental body and 1 for the committee of experts yields an average 1.5). The presence of regional / national committees is not computed into the overall score because it is not relevant for institutes. The activity of the main bodies (GC and EB) is rated 1, 2 or 3 according to level of involvement in the programme (1 = high involvement, 3 = low involvement). The summary description of each governing arrangement is in the table below.

	Inter-agency committee (n.)	Independent Inter-governmental Body (n.)	Intergovernmental body elected by the General Conference (n.)	Committee of Experts serving in personal capacity (n.)	Regional Committees /Networks	National Committees	Functions of the General Conference/Executive Board*
IOC		X (138)			x	x	Amendment of Statutes
MAB			X (34)	X (12) (DG)	x	x	Amendment of Statutes (GC)
MOST			X (35)	X (7) (Bureau)		x	Refocusing of the programme (EB)
IPDC			X (39)				Creation of IPDC, Adoption of Statutes (GC)
IFAP			X (26)			x	Amendment of Statutes, approval of strategic plan, discussion of implementation report (EB)
WHC		X (187)		(committee of 3 organizations: IUCN, ICOMOS, ICCROM)			Proposals for functional autonomy (GC); Revision of the Convention, Programme Reinforcement, establishment of category 2 centres, et al. (EB)
Diversity of Cultural Expressions		X (89)					Pre-Convention work (thematic debate, proposed declaration, discussion on possible convention, draft convention – GC and EB)
Cultural Objects and Museums		x	X (22)	(partnerships with ICCROM)			Invitation to apply the Conventions, drafting of recommendations and declarations (GC and EB);
Bioethics			X (36)	X (36) (DG)	x	x	Priority setting, prep work for declaration, thematic debate, adoption of statutes (GC and EB)
Ethics of S&T				X (18) (DG)			Prep Work before establishment, Adoption and Revisions of Statutes (EB)
IBSP				X (DG)			Feasibility, Financial Sustainability, Establishment, Development, Assessment, Priority Setting (GC and EB)

ESD	X (16?)						Priority Setting, draft Resolution, est. of category 1 institute, framework for implementation (GC and EB)
EFA	X (4)				x		Thematic Debate, Prep Work for World Conferences (GC); implementation of summit decisions, Priority Setting, Thematic Debates (EB)
IIEP	X (12) (mixed – w/ indep experts)			X (12) (mixed – w/ reps of other United Nations agencies)			Amendment of Statutes (GC), discussion on legal framework/degree of autonomy (EB)
IBE			X (28)				Amendment of Statutes (GC); provisional agreements prior to transfer to UNESCO, discussion of proposal for the organization of the World Conference of Education, adoption of financial and staff regulations, proposal to strengthen the Institute (EB)
UIL (former UIE)				X (12) (DG)			Amendment of Statutes (GC); discussion of proposal to change the legal status of UIE, financial regulations for Special Account, name change (UIE to UIL) (EB)
IITE				X (11) (DG)			Creation of IITE (GC and EB); financial regulations for Special Account (EB)
IESALC (former CRESALC)				X (13) (mixed: DG, MS, NGOs)			Conversion from Regional Centre to category 1 Institute (GC), Amendment of Statutes, proposal for strengthening (EB)
IHE				X (13) (DG) (MS, universities and private sector)			Creation of IHE (GC and EB), Renewal of operational agreement with Dutch Government (GC), financial regulations for Special Account and discussion of report on entry into operation (EB)

ICTP	X (3) (mixed: UNESCO, IAEA and Italy)						Transfer of administrative responsibilities to UNESCO (GC and EB), financial regulations for Special Account (EB)
UIS			X (12) (mixed: DG, GC)	X (12) (mixed: DG, GC)			Adoption of Statutes (GC), discussion on creation of UIS, choice of location, negotiations with Canada, discussion of activities after one year from creation (EB)
IICBA				X (12) (DG)			Creation of IICBA, Amendment of Statutes (GC and EB); financial regulations for Special Account (EB)
CEPES				X (12) (DG?)			Amendment of Statutes, proposal for strengthening, financial regulations for Special Account (EB)

*Receiving reports submitted by programmes/institutes to governing bodies is not considered a “function” of the GC/EB in this context because in the vast majority of cases it is exclusively a transfer of information and does not require a decision; election of the programme/institute governing body members is also omitted because the details are reported in the third column. Not all functions/activities of EB/GC are always be reported, but the most specific are (e.g. there might be an “amendment of statutes” missing here and there). Our aim is in fact in assessing where the boundaries lie between GC/EB and other specific governing bodies, which is not necessarily better informed by a complete listing of functions.