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**“National Identity and  
Attitudes Towards Migrants**

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**Findings from the ISSP”**

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# Nationalism, Citizenship and Immigration in Social Science Research

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## Editorial Introduction

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The study of nationalism and citizenship has become a dominant topic in social science research over the past two decades. While this development was partly related to theoretical and methodological developments within the intellectual field proper, including the crisis of modernisation theories and the rise of historical-comparative sociology since the 1970s, the most important factor of this renewed interest was the unexpected re-emergence of nationalist movements throughout the world. Of particular relevance, besides the often violent processes of nation-building following the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, was the increase of cultural heterogeneity resulting from immigration waves to Western countries in the post-war period. It was in fact the latter that prompted the merging of previously unrelated literatures on nationalism, citizenship and migration. Social scientists, observing that immigration often led to social unrest and that states chose diverse public policies to confront immigration and integration, have developed a strong interest in describing and explaining both migration processes and the emerging patterns of integration or incorporation.

Indeed, citizenship, immigration and integration policies, as well as attitudes toward migrants, are some of the topics that currently receive most attention from social scientists. This reflects the scholarly community's concern not only for the rights of thousands of immigrants to Western countries, but also for the quality of liberal democracy in these countries. Indeed, the dominant model of citizenship, and more specifically, the ease with which immigrants can become citizens, reflects the quality of democracy in a given state.

The current thematic issue of UNESCO's *International Journal on Multicultural Societies* (IJMS) takes up these concerns by focusing on popular attitudes to immigrants in industrial countries. As we argue in this thematic introduction, such an approach is crucial in order to move beyond existing research about the impact of models of nationhood on immigration and integration policies. The contributions to this issue adopt such an approach by drawing on recent statistical data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP); analysing attitudes towards migrants in three multinational states – Israel, Spain and the United Kingdom –

they provide preliminary evidence that challenges established wisdom on the difference between civic and ethnic models of nationhood.

### **1. Models of Nationhood in Research on Citizenship, Immigration and Integration**

There has been passionate debate in the social sciences around the explanation of contrasts between flexible and restrictive immigration policies, between open and xenophobic societies, between assimilationist and multiculturalist integration policies, between models of citizenship dominated by *jus sanguinis* and those dominated by *jus soli* and, finally, between policies that neatly distinguish between citizenship rights and immigrants' rights and those where the boundaries between one and the other set of rights are more fluid. A common characteristic of all explanations of the phenomena described above has been the emphasis on the role of prevailing models of nationhood in the receiving countries.

(a) This emphasis is most notable in research about the institution of citizenship. More than fifteen years of intense research on nationalism, starting with Michael Hechter's ground-breaking book *Internal Colonialism* (Hechter 1975), had made social scientists sensitive to the role of national identity in explaining social and political phenomena in the early 1970s, citizenship among them. In this context, the partial overlap between the literatures on nationalist and ethnic conflict may have propitiated that many experts on nationalism perceived the recent migration waves to Western countries through the lens of knowledge on nationalism. It is not a coincidence that in the same year as Liah Greenfeld presented her comparative history of nationalism based on the distinction of civic and ethnic types of nationalism (Greenfeld 1992), Rogers Brubaker connected these two types with models of citizenship, based on *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* respectively, and their impact on contemporary immigration policies in France and Germany (Brubaker 1992; see also Schnapper 1994). Nothing underlines more the transitional significance of the simultaneous publication of these two books than the fact that, despite thematic and analytical differences, they shared the thesis that the political history of Germany in the twentieth century, and, within it, Nazism and *jus sanguinis*, was influenced by an ethnic model of nationhood. However, the analytical role of Germany's ethnic model of nationhood in the two books differed in ways that signals a far-reaching shift in focus from nationalism to citizenship in social science research; whereas German nationalism was mainly a dependent variable in Greenfeld's analysis, it had become an independent variable, indeed the main independent one, in Brubaker's. In short, then, the early 1990s were characterised by a shift in research from nationalism to citizenship, and within the field of citizenship studies from a purely Marshallian focus, centred on the breadth of civil, political and economic rights (Marshall 1964), to a Weberian focus on citizenship as an institution of both inclusion and exclusion.

Brubaker's impact was arguably greater than Greenfeld's. Beyond the actual merits of the two books, we may speculate that one important reason for this contrasting

impact is that at the time, following the publication of major works on nationalism by authors such as Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Michael Mann and Anthony Smith, the field of nationalism was saturated whereas the study of citizenship models in the context of the migration wave to Europe in the post-war era was still unexplored terrain. After all, the ideas contained in Brubaker's book were hardly revolutionary: it was a well-known fact among legal scholars and historians that France and Germany represented the *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* models of citizenship respectively (e.g. Grawert 1973). Furthermore, Brubaker's explanation of this contrast with reference to French republicanism and German ethnic nationalism, while plausible, was constructed on a rather thin empirical basis; this was not the expected type of evidence after more than a decade of renewal in historical-comparative sociology, with its strong reliance on primary sources and a rigorous specification of causal mechanisms. Primary sources, in the form of a careful analysis of parliamentary debates, figured prominently in Brubaker's study, but only to demonstrate the relative strength of the *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* traditions in France and Germany respectively.

Eventually, no major intellectual debate was necessary to rebut the elegant but overly simplistic model proposed by Brubaker (there is a fine line between parsimony and simplicity). Almost simultaneously with the publication of Brubaker's book, Germany adopted naturalisation laws that broke to a large extent with the *jus sanguinis* tradition whereas France approved laws that considerably modified the *jus soli* tradition. Wondering how it was possible that models of citizenship apparently anchored in long-standing traditions of nationhood and with profound historical roots suddenly became so flexible, research shifted to short-term changes in political discourses and practices (e.g. Favell 1998; Joppke 1999). In addition to the political developments that undermined Brubaker's argument, empirical research in the 1990s questioned its historical plausibility. It was not only shown that French and German historical realities hardly corresponded to the strongly stylised ideal-types of the republican and ethnic models of nationalism, but also that the institution of citizenship in France and Germany had evolved considerably over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Christian Joppke (1999) points out, for example, that in the first third of the nineteenth century France led the transition from *jus soli* to *jus sanguinis*, viewed as more liberal because it allowed people freedom of movement without the risk of losing their citizenship status; it was only by the end of the nineteenth century, the period on which Brubaker's book focuses, that the French state reverted to *jus soli*. The main conclusion to be drawn from a decade of research on citizenship is that although specific and stable dimensions of conceptions of nationhood do impact on citizenship models, the latter vary considerably over time and are also influenced by other political and economic factors.

(b) A similar emphasis on prevailing models of nationhood is characteristic of research on the rights of non-citizens. The model of liberal democracy in Western countries, resting on the equal civil, political and social rights of their citizens, is called into question when a significant percentage of the population is excluded

from the status of citizen. At first glance, this situation resembles the Greek polis, in which the citizens were only a small percentage of the population; or nineteenth-century Europe, where not only slaves but also women and individuals with few economic resources were excluded from citizenship. However, contemporary democracies differ qualitatively from ancient and nineteenth-century democracies in the degree to which individual rights are granted independently of citizenship status. Yasemin Soysal's analysis of emerging post-national forms of membership explains this trend towards the uncoupling of individual rights and citizenship by the international institutionalisation of human rights (Soysal 1994). Whereas citizens and non-citizens still enjoy different rights, the trend is for non-citizens and citizens to share a minimum of civil, political and social rights. Although Soysal's explanatory model remains contested (see Guiraudon 1998; Joppke 1999; Münch 2001), there is a wide consensus that the gradual uncoupling of individual rights and citizen status introduces a new dimension to the evaluation of the quality of democracy: the extension of rights to non-citizens.

We can thus distinguish between (i) states where access to citizen status is restrictive and where the rights of non-citizens are limited; (ii) states where access to citizen status is restrictive, but where immigrants enjoy a large set of citizenship rights; (iii) states where access to citizen status is easy but where non-citizens enjoy few rights; and, finally, (iv) states where access to citizen status is easy and where non-citizens enjoy a large set of citizenship rights. Just as scholars have associated conceptions of nationhood to the regulation of access to citizenship, conceptions of nationhood could potentially be related to particular combinations of rights for non-citizens and citizens.

(c) The extension of citizen rights to immigrants sometimes goes together with the protection and even promotion of the customs and traditions of certain immigrant minorities, regardless of their citizenship status. This type of policy falls within what is known as multiculturalism. Multiculturalism distinguishes itself from liberalism by complementing the language of individual rights with the language of collective rights (Kymlicka 1995; Inglis 1996; Koenig 1999). The aim of these collective rights is to protect the specific cultural traits of minorities through the authorisation of certain practices (e.g. private and public use of mother tongue; practising one's religion in public space, etc.), the institutionalisation of mechanisms that protect these groups against discrimination based on these practices, and the active promotion of minority cultures.

As we would expect, the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism reappears in explanations of immigration and integration policies. Multicultural policies are thus contrasted with both assimilationist policies characteristic of civic republican nation-states and differentialist policies of ethnic nation-states (Castles 1995). Joppke (1999) has criticised such explanations and emphasised the role of alternative political considerations behind integration policies; in fact, he argues that we are currently witnessing a retreat of multiculturalism and the emergence of

liberal conceptions of assimilation in both theory and policy (Joppke 2004; Joppke/Morawska 2003; see also Brubaker 2001).

## 2. Nationhood and Attitudes towards Migrants

Interestingly, despite a number of years of debate over nation-building processes and models of nationhood, few studies have rested on systematic research on how the population actually defines the nation (Hjern 1998). The counter-argument could be made that researchers have been more interested in political and intellectual elites than in the population in general, because it is they who decide on the institutional regulation of citizenship, immigration and integration policies. This argument does not clarify, however, why such elite studies rarely rely on actual interviews with members of the elite. More problematically, social researchers have often tended to generalise to the whole population on the basis of documents which, while indispensable and useful when studying the distant past, are not as useful as other sources when investigating contemporary transformations. One unintended consequence of the preference for indirect sources of information has been the tendency to present nations as more or less homogeneous blocs (e.g. ethnic versus republican nations).

Closely related to these methodological problems, is the widespread tendency to conflate an *analytical* distinction of “civic” (or universalistic) and “ethnic” (or particularistic) nationalism with *concrete* historical cases; such conflation, introduced into social science literature by Hans Kohn’s famous analysis of “Western” and “Eastern” nationalism (Kohn 1967), has itself been part of discourses constructing national identities since the nineteenth century, when Friedrich Meinecke pitted the French “state nation” (*Staatsnation*) against the German “cultural nation” (*Kulturnation*). Looking at definitions of nationhood among the population might show that *both* versions of nationalism can in fact be found in one and the same country.

Finally, as researchers on transnational communities have argued, it could be argued that by taking for granted the boundaries of the nation-state, social science research on citizenship falls victim to what has been called a “methodological nationalism” (Glick-Schiller and Wimmer 2003). More specifically, by assuming that elite constructions of national identity affect immigration and integration policies, academic research reproduces the modes of perception and definitions of problems articulated by policy-makers and politicians (Favell 2001; Florence and Martiniello 2005).

In sum, we actually know very little about how the “nation” defines itself and how such definitions impact on social relations between majorities and minorities. In this issue, we attempt to remedy this gap in the literatures on nationalism and citizenship by analysing interview data on national identity and attitudes towards migrants collected by the International Social Survey Programme. ISSP has conducted yearly cross-national representative surveys on a variety of central

topics in the social sciences since 1985. One emphasis of the programme, which now comprises thirty-nine members (not all of which are states, e.g. Flanders), has been to allow for the monitoring of changes over time. This objective is achieved through very strict rules about the number of items that can be changed whenever a study is replicated. The surveys on which the papers in this issue are based is the 2003 module on national identity, which replicate another series conducted in 1995. The questionnaire for both waves includes an unmatched number of items on social identifications, national identity, attitudes toward immigrants, ideas on citizenship, views on globalisation and regional integration, and views on the institutional regulation of the immigrant population's way of life in host societies.

### **3. Contributions to this Issue**

This issue includes three contributions to the study of the impact of conceptions of nationhood on how indigenous citizens perceive immigrants and on the status and rights they would like immigrants to have in the host society. The case studies are Israel, Spain and the United Kingdom. All three are multinational states. As the main goal is to determine the applicability of an ethnic/civic distinction in conceptions on nationhood to the population at large and to test the relative usefulness of that distinction in the explanation of models of citizenship, attitudes toward immigrants and modes of regulation of immigrant groups' cultures in host societies, we have tried to maximise variation between the case studies. Key dimensions in this variation are the legitimacy of political arrangements developed to address these states' multinational character, the relative presence of immigrants in the different states, the timing of the immigrants' arrival, the pace at which they arrived, and their origin. Spain and the United Kingdom are officially non-ethnic states which, to different degrees, recognise their multinational character, whereas Israel is an ethnic state; Israel and the United Kingdom have large foreign-born populations, which have been arriving in successive waves since the Second World War, whereas Spain has a smaller percentage of immigrants in its population and began to receive migrants only in the 1990s.

Do citizens adhere to standard models of nationhood? The three contributors demonstrate that standard models of nationhood do not clearly differentiate citizens. The same citizen can defend a model of nationhood that includes civic and ethnic elements. How does Israel's ethnic state impact on the relationship between models of nationhood and attitudes toward immigrants? Lewin-Epstein and Levanon show that in such a state much depends on the immigrants' ethnic origin. How do models of nationhood impact on different dimensions of attitudes toward immigration in ethnic-neutral countries such as Spain and the United Kingdom? Heath and Tilley, as well as Díez Medrano, show that the cleavages are not those so neatly described in the elite literature, with citizens who do not adhere clearly to either an ethnic or civic model of nationhood often holding the most welcoming attitudes towards immigrants. Díez Medrano goes so far as to challenge the traditional ethnic/civic distinction and to propose an alternative cleavage distinguishing "credentialist" from "postnationalist" citizens. In all, the papers demonstrate the need to go



beyond existing research on nationalism and citizenship by empirically analysing the prevalence of different models of nationhood and citizenship among the population. Only then can we adequately capture the complex interplay between elite representations and popular attitudes of nationhood in their respective impact on political institutions and public policies in the fields of citizenship, immigration and integration.

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# National Identity and Xenophobia in an Ethnically Divided Society

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*Recent studies have suggested that national identity is empirically related to negative sentiments of individuals towards foreigners. This type of analysis has hitherto been based on the notion that xenophobia is shaped by the specific nature of national identity in a given society. Representing a stronger and more exclusive perception of national identity, ethnic national identity (compared with civic national identity) is expected in this line of research to result in less favourable perceptions of immigrants. In this paper we expand this approach by arguing that, in deeply divided societies, national identity itself may have different meanings among different social groups. Specifically, our analysis indicates that members of dominant ethnic groups ascribe higher importance to national identification than members of subordinate ethnic groups, and centre their perception of ethnic national identity on ancestral terms, while marginal ethnic groups tend to also associate this form of identity with affective and cultural elements. In addition, we propose a theoretical framework for the understanding of the relationship between national identity and xenophobia. In particular, we focus on the group threat model and the cultural affinity perspective, as both theories explain out-group hostility by focusing on group identity. Analysis of Israeli data from the ISSP module on national identity provides support primarily for the cultural affinity thesis, revealing that, in contrast to previous studies, ethnic national identity is negatively related to xenophobia among members of the Jewish ethnic group. This finding is discussed in terms of the distinctive features of Israeli society and its immigration context.*

Several years ago Hjern (1998) lamented the lack of empirical (quantitative) research on the relationship between perceptions of the “other” and forms of people’s attachment to the nation-state. Specifically, he claimed that there is a need for systematic examination of the relationship between national identity and xenophobia. While the body of research on xenophobia has grown considerably in just a few years, especially in the European context (Hoskin 1991; Quillian 1995; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Wimmer 1997; Fetzer 2000; Scheepers et al. 2002;

Raijman et al. 2003), the quest for systematic comparative study on xenophobia and national identity is as pertinent today as it was then.

One promising route of research suggests that differences in the extent of xenophobia, and particularly the attitudes of the majority population towards newcomers, has to do with the specific nature of national identity in a given society (see Hjern 1998, 2004). In other words, the logic of this relationship is to be found in the different forms of state/society organisation, ranging from the multicultural society to the ethnic model (Castles and Miller 1998). This approach, while recognising the importance of different forms of state/society organisation, tends to take national identity as a societal phenomenon, albeit expressed at the individual level with different degrees of emphasis on various aspects such as civic or ethnic bases of identity. Representing a stronger and more exclusive perception of national identity, ethnic national identity is expected in this line of thought to result in less favourable perceptions of immigrants (compared with civic national identity), resulting in higher rates of xenophobia (Hjern 1998).

In this paper we aim to expand this approach by arguing that in deeply divided societies, national identity itself may have different meanings among different social groups. In multi-ethnic societies, such as Israeli society, support for ethnic and civic aspects of national identity will differ between members of the dominant ethnic group and members of subordinate ethnic groups. These patterns are further complicated in the Israeli case where Jewish immigration has been part of the *raison d'être* of the state. Hence, the Israeli case may shed light on the relationship between national identity and perceptions of newcomers from yet a new perspective. Two prevailing themes in the literature on ethnic conflict and xenophobia, the cultural affinity perspective and the group threat approach (Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967; Bobo 1988; Olzak 1992; Quillian 1995; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Fetzer 2000; Scheepers et al. 2002; Raijman and Semyonov 2004), are discussed as possible explanations for the divergence in the role of national identity in shaping individual attitudes between members of different ethnic groups. In view of the ethnic diversity and tensions that characterise Israeli society, especially the ethno-national cleavage between Jews and Arabs, analysis of the relationship between national identity and xenophobia in the Israeli context is of interest not only for its own sake but for the potential it holds for a better understanding of the role of national identity in deeply divided societies.

## **1. Theories of Inter-Group Antagonism**

The literature on the sources of inter-group hostility and conflict offers several theoretical accounts, focusing on either individual or group-level processes. While the former emphasise personality traits and individual interests, the latter directs attention to group interests and cultural traits. A review of the main claims of these theories is provided in this section, serving as the basis for the theoretical argument, presented subsequently, regarding the relationship between national identity and

xenophobia. It is worth bearing in mind that our interest in a collective form of identity, such as national identity, naturally leads us to focus our attention mainly on theories that highlight group-level processes.

Self-interest motivations and personality traits are the main aspects underscored by individual-level theories. According to the self-interest model, antagonism between members of different groups emerges out of conflicts regarding material interests (Kluegel and Smith 1986). More specifically, personal vulnerability to economic (as well as political) deprivation, in the form of unemployment, low income and deteriorating living conditions, provides a direct source for inter-ethnic hostility (Bobo and Hutchings 1996). Individuals in precarious economic conditions are expected, according to this perspective, to perceive out-group members as representing a greater threat to their well-being and thus to exhibit a higher level of hostility towards immigrants or members of other ethnic groups. In support for this claim, research on attitudes toward immigrants consistently documents the effect of income and labour force status (Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Rajzman et al. 2003). The prejudice model, in contrast, does not locate the sources of antagonism in personal interests but instead in psychological dispositions (Allport 1954). In particular, it asserts that hostility arises out of socially learned feelings of aversion (Bobo and Hutchings 1996), that are shaped by cultural ideas and out-group stereotypes, which are reinforced in the context of superficial contact (Pettigrew 1971; Fetzer 2000). Better information on out-group members, acquired through either education or true acquaintance with such individuals are expected, on the other hand, to reduce out-group hostility (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1971; Fetzer 2000). Indeed, higher educational attainment was found to be negatively related to xenophobia (Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Rajzman et al. 2003).

Among theories of inter-group hostility that stress group-level characteristics, the group threat model and cultural affinity perspective are the most prominent. The group threat model builds on the insights of the self-interest model, but extends the claim to the collective level. Building on Blumer's (1958) group position model, Bobo and Hutchings (1996: 955) contend that "feelings of competition and hostility emerge from historically and collectively developed judgments about the positions in the social order that in-group members should rightfully occupy relative to members of an out-group". This model directs attention to the relationship between biased dispositions towards out-groups and self-esteem motivations (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Hogg and Abrams 1990). In addition, this approach underscores the effect of either actual or perceived material group competition or threat on inter-group attitudes (on the distinction see Blalock 1967). Such conditions are expected to extenuate the need and tendency of individuals to perceive their groups as superior to other groups, leading to an increased level of inter-group antagonism (Lewin-Epstein 1989; Scheepers et al. 2002). Indeed, there is ample empirical support for the effect of group threat on inter-group attitudes and relations (Olzak 1992; Bobo and Hutchings 1996) and specifically on attitudes towards immigrants (Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002; Rajzman et al. 2003; Rajzman and Semyonov 2004).

In contrast to the competition model, the cultural affinity perspective turns our attention from economic group characteristics to cultural ones. The cultural affinity thesis posits that individuals will have favourable attitudes towards others with whom they share cultural characteristics and/or social ties (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). Extending this claim, the marginality perspective states that the experience of marginalisation leads to empathy towards members of other marginalised groups (Fetzer 2000). According to this account, certain groups, by reason of their shared experience of exclusion from the dominant culture, develop a sentiment of cultural affinity. This in turn leads to greater support for the welfare of other marginalised groups. Empirical support for this argument can be found in the documentation of greater tolerance towards immigrants on the part of members of marginal ethnic, racial or religious groups (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Binder et al. 1997; Fetzer 2000), and in the laboratory settings among members of low-status groups (Hewstone et al. 2002).

In an important contribution to the research on inter-group hostility, arguably extending the purview of the school of thought dealing with collective sources of out-group antagonism, Hjern (1998, 2004) has recently suggested that out-group attitudes are related to national identity. Hjern's analysis builds on Gellner's (1983) claim that individuals belong to the same national group if they recognise each other as doing so or if they share the same culture. Conceptualising national identity as a sense of similarity to some people, and difference from others, naturally leads Hjern to study the relationship between national identity and xenophobia. In so doing, however, he ignores the contribution of dominant theories of inter-group antagonism, thereby limiting his ability to provide theoretical insights that will help to explain the empirical association between national identity and xenophobia. We aim to extend his work by focusing on the meaning and implications of national identity in multi-ethnic societies, while basing our analysis on the inter-group hostility framework discussed above.

Immigration and growing cultural diversity pose a challenge to national identification patterns in two respects. First, admitting the other to citizenship is perceived as a threat to national cohesion and national identity. The dominant group and those whose identities are strongly linked to national-ethnic affinities stand to lose most from such changes. During periods of economic decline, a second threat becomes more pertinent – the threat to well-being posed by growing demands on available resources. These two forces often operate in tandem, leading to extreme hostility. Yet the Israeli case presents a situation in which at least some immigrants share an ethnic affinity with the majority population. Nonetheless, they may still pose an economic threat to the dominant ethnic group as well as an economic and cultural threat to subordinate ethnic groups. Hence, the circumstances of diverse immigrant populations and an ethnic split in the receiving society result in increasing complexity, and challenge the rather one-dimensional treatment of in-group sentiments towards foreigners.

## 2. The Meaning of National Identity

A thorough understanding of the meaning of national identity requires a discussion of nationalism. This section therefore starts with a brief discussion of the literature on the origins of nationalism and on ethnic and civic national aspects and types. Nationality, as Habermas (1994) points out, is specifically a modern phenomenon of cultural integration. It is based on the notion that certain cultural similarities should constitute the basis for the political community (Calhoun 1993; Gellner 1997), as well as on the principal that holds that the political and national unit should be congruent (Gellner 1983). While Hobsbaum (1990) and others further develop the view of nationalism as emerging from the developments that ushered in modernity, and hence as a modern phenomenon, Smith (1991) identifies the roots of the nation in past forms of collective identities – particularly ethnicity. He specifies several fundamental features that characterise nationality, listing five points: historic territory, common myths and traditions, mass public culture, common set of legal rights and duties, and a single economy. While the first two aspects share common themes with ethnic groups, the last three points derive mostly from the modern perception of the nation.

Although traditional political theory was premised on the coincidence of ethnic-cultural and political boundaries (Gellner 1983), the political reality of the nation-state was never as clear cut. Indeed, ethnic and cultural diversity are typical of modern nation-states (Smith, 1995). It is thus crucial, when discussing nationalism, to distinguish between national and ethnic groups. In Anglo-American literature an ethnic group that controls a bounded territory becomes a nation and establishes a nation-state (see Smith 1991). Continental European views on the relationship between nation and ethnic group typically followed a different view, based on the distinction between *Kulturnation* (nation defined by its culture) and *Staatsnation* (state nation or civic nation). As Habermas (1994) points out, nation-state formation in Germany was based on a romantically inspired middle-class notion of *Kulturnation* and was the embodiment of the collective and its superior meaning. The French *Staatsnation*, in contrast, developed through the democratic revolution. It was based on common will and the nation-state was interpreted as a political project of the community formed by the citizens at will and capable of transcending the tension between universalism and particularism. Other typologies refine the classification to better capture the diversity of nations (e.g. Castles and Miller 1998).

Students of national identity have generally distinguished between the ethnic-genealogical and the civic-territorial conception of the nation (Habermas 1994; Smith 1991, 1995; Jones and Smith 2001a). The former assumes a pre-political organic community integrated on the basis of descent. National identity in this case is mostly a matter of ascription and it derives from common linguistic and cultural elements. The civic-territorial model is centred on the notion of a voluntaristic political community in a demarcated territory and emphasises the legal-rational attributes of common institutions as the basis for national culture and identity (Jones and Smith 2001a). According to the multicultural model, proposed by

Castles and Miller (1998) as an alternative to the previous two models, national identity is based on the combination of sub-group membership and joint participation in civil society initiated by the permission to immigrate and enacted through residence and economic activity.

Country level typologies of national identity, while recognising the importance of different forms of state/society organisation, tend to take national identity as a societal phenomenon, albeit expressed at the individual level with varying degrees of emphasis on features such as civic or ethnic bases of identity. Representing a stronger and more exclusive perception of national identity, according to this line of thought ethnic national identity is expected to result in less favourable perceptions of immigrants (compared with civic national identity), resulting in higher rates of xenophobia (Hjern 1998). As our analysis focuses on inter-group relations and individual attitudes, this approach will need to be complemented for our purposes with theories on the subjective qualities of national identity.

The subjective dimension of national identity relates to individuals' self-definition as members of the community and the centrality of the nation for this identification. As members of nations cannot possibly know all their fellow members, their association and mutual feelings depend on the ability of national ideologies to transfer their sentiments and individual experiences to the abstract level (Eriksen 2004). The nation can thus be characterised as an imagined political (and possibly ethnic) community (Anderson 1991), representing a metaphorical kin group or place (Eriksen 2004). Following this line of reasoning, Shils (1995: 107) refers to national identity as "... the shared image of the nation and the mutual awareness of its members who participate in the image" (see also Gellner 1983: 7).<sup>1</sup> As such, national identity can be understood as a form of attachment to a collective (cf. Hjern 1998; Jones 2000; Jones and Smith 2001a; Svallfors 1996). Membership in a national group has important implications for personal identity. According to a nationalist worldview, only as a part of a distinctive culture (contrasted with perceptions of universality) can a person reach fulfilment (Gellner 1997). This is achieved by providing a social bond between individuals (Smith 1991), which satisfies their needs for belonging, loyalty and pride (as well as other affective dimensions) to and in a group (see Rouhana 1997). In addition, nationality and national identity help individuals to define who they are and provide them with a sense of purpose through the prism of collective personality and its distinctive culture (Smith 1991).

It is not surprising, in light of the important subjective functions provided by national identity, that recent empirical attention has been directed to the significance of different forms of national identity. Research findings suggest that the theoretical distinction between civic-territorial (or voluntaristic) and the ethnic-

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PT<sup>1</sup> TPAAt the same time Shils notes at least minimal recognition of other collectivities and thus points to the fact that identity is relational.



cultural dimensions is well founded (Hjern 1998; Jones and Smith 2001a), although in contrast to what is expected by advocates of national typologies, both elements, as well as combinations of them, tend to appear in all countries and are even supported by the same individuals (Hjern 1998; Jones and Smith 2001b). Thus it is argued here that different bases of national identity may be empirically distinguished and in particular the extent to which they are tied to ethnic or civic perceptions of nationhood. Such identities will in turn be instrumental in shaping people's perception of out-group members (see Baubock (1996) on the importance of attitudes stemming from national traditions for determining public policies).

### **3. National Identity and Xenophobia in Multi-Ethnic Societies – a Conceptual Framework**

National identity and xenophobia are linked, according to the conceptual framework presented in this paper, by a common dependence on the relational bases of group identity. Building on the work of Barth (1969) on ethnic boundaries, our framework suggests that national identity represents a feeling of commonality that is defined in opposition to the perceived identity of members of other social groups. National identity, that is, is based on perceived similarity to some people and difference from others (Hjern 1998). This sense of affiliation with a nation at once implies perceived boundaries and a distinction between “insiders” and “outsiders” (Verdery 1994). Therefore, like any form of social identity, national identity has a dual character; it defines who is a member and hence demarcates the boundaries of the collective (national community) and at the same time it defines, by implication, who is not (the foreigner) (Castles and Miller 1998; Hjern 1998). This dual character is closely related to status interests (and by implication to stratificational outcomes), as it usually emerges from (and enhances) a belief in the superiority of the cultural values that are to be preserved through the cultivation of the group's distinctiveness (Weber 1968: 925).

A relational understanding of national identity is especially useful when analysing attitudes towards immigrants, as this conceptualisation directs attention to mechanisms that are similar to those identified by theorists of group-level sources of inter-group antagonism. Both the group threat model and the cultural affinity perspective explain out-group hostility by focusing on group identity, with the former emphasising status maintenance motivations of members of the dominant ethnic group (Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967; Bobo and Hutchings 1996), and the latter stressing sympathetic reaction towards out-group members on the basis of shared cultural traits (Fetzer 2000). Combining these schools of thought enables us to gain new insight into the sources of the relationship between national identity and xenophobia, until now only empirically investigated (e.g. Hjern 1998, 2004). Specifically, the ethnic element of national identity is based on ascriptive characteristics and organic perception, the legitimacy of which is (culturally) threatened by immigrants. In such a context (or for individuals espousing this form of national identity), status maintenance motivations of dominant group members may lead to negative attitudes towards foreigners. By contrast, the civic element of

national identity is based on a voluntaristic and associational notion of nationality that emphasises common territory and participation in a political community and rational-legal institutions. Although this notion of nationality still establishes and maintains boundaries between insiders and outsiders, it allows for an integration of foreigners into the community in so far as they are willing to accept the prevailing cultural and political norms.

On the basis of the above premises, we would expect that civic-based national identity should be more weakly associated with out-group antagonism than ethnic-based national identity.<sup>2</sup> Empirical evidence indeed provides support for these assertions (Hjern 1998, 2004). Our focus on group-level processes does not lead us, however, to ignore the factors identified by theories of individual sources of xenophobia (i.e. the self-interest and prejudice perspectives). Independent of the effect of group-level traits, our relational framework allows for the effect of individual characteristics, such as precarious economic conditions (i.e. unemployment and low income) and contact with and information on members of out-groups (with academic education as an example of a factor that can improve information).

Investigating the relationship between national identity and xenophobia in a multi-ethnic society allows us to contribute in a non-trivial way both to the literature on inter-group relations and to the research on national identity. Our relational perception of national identity leads to the assertion that the effect of support for civic or ethnic formulations of national identity on xenophobia should be different for members of the dominant ethnic group than for members of marginalised ethnic groups. Specifically, for the dominant ethnic group support for the ethnic dimension of national identity will lead to perception of out-groups as posing a cultural threat, resulting in higher out-group hostility. The obverse is expected if the newcomers are perceived as having affinity with the in-group. This extends the claim of the group threat perspective from economic competition to cultural threat, and relates the latter to patterns of national identification. Indeed, empirical evidence for the importance of cultural threat in forming attitudes towards foreigners has recently been documented (Raijman and Semyonov 2004).

Two scenarios are derived from the existing literature for marginal ethnic groups. The first is that members would ascribe lower importance (compared with the dominant ethnic group) to the ethnic dimension of national identity and as a result would show lower levels of xenophobia. This pattern conforms to the expectations of the cultural affinity perspective, further specifying the mechanisms that are responsible for the proposed association between marginality and xenophobia. A second scenario, bearing conflicting implications, is that for members of minority ethnic groups other social identities, based most notably on religion and regional

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PT<sup>2</sup> TPThe same argument holds with respect to positive attitudes towards newcomers who are considered akin to in-group members. We still expect civic-based national identity to be less strongly associated with these attitudes than ethnic-based national identity.

distinctions, will replace the role of ethnic national identity as the major element predicting out-group hostility. Before detailing the hypotheses to be evaluated in this study, however, additional information is needed on the national context within which our analysis takes place. Our framework incorporates additional potential outcomes by noting the possibility that ethnic minorities might be threatened by the potential of alliance between newcomers and the dominant ethnic group, leading to hostile attitudes towards newcomers on economic or cultural grounds, or both.

#### 4. The Israeli Case

##### 4.1. *Citizenship, Immigration and the Ethnic Basis of Israeli Society*

Israel is an ethnically divided society. The population, which exceeded 6.5 million in 2004, consists of a large Jewish majority, most of whom are immigrants or first-generation descendents of immigrants, and a sizeable Arab minority of Palestinian origin (approximately 17 per cent of the population),<sup>3</sup> most of whom are Muslim. Like all modern states, Israel formally defines its citizenry. The legal apparatus constituted for this purpose includes two separate legislative acts: the Law of Return and the Citizenship Law (for a detailed discussion of these laws and their amendments see Shachar (2000)). The Law of Return underscores the ethno-cultural nature of Israeli citizenship in that it views persons eligible for *return* – Jews and certain categories of relatives – as already belonging to its community of citizens and grants them full citizenship upon arrival in Israel. The Citizenship Law of 1952 (amended in 1980) established the entitlement to citizenship for non-Jews (mostly Palestinian) who resided in the territory when Israel gained independence, and granted citizenship to their offspring as well.

Since its establishment, the State of Israel has practised an “open door” policy accepting all Jews (but only Jews) who wanted to settle in it. The State of Israel views Jewish migration as a returning Diaspora and sees it as the natural right of all Jews to return to their historic homeland. Jews who immigrate to Israel acquire Israeli citizenship upon arrival and are entitled to all benefits conferred by this status (Shachar 2000). Jewish ethnicity of immigrants supersedes other considerations such as age, profession and financial status, or any other entrance requirements (Geva-May 1998).<sup>4</sup> Throughout the years Israeli governments have considered Jewish immigration and its rapid integration into Israeli society a demographic imperative for the state, and therefore a fundamental responsibility of the state. Issues of national identity and perception of immigrants are thus obfuscated by the fact that Palestinians who are native to the territory (in terms of recent history) are a marginalised and subordinate ethnic minority while the mostly

PT<sup>3</sup> TPNot counting the Palestinian population of East Jerusalem.

PT<sup>4</sup> TPImmigrants’ eligibility for Israeli citizenship is determined by an ascribed, ethnic-religious, criterion and includes Jews, children and grandchildren of Jews and their nuclear families (even if the latter are not Jewish). The definition of “Jew” is determined by Jewish religious law (*halakha*) as any person born to a Jewish mother or converted to Judaism.

immigrant Jewish population is the dominant group. Furthermore, the hegemonic (Jewish Israeli) ideology aims to distinguish Israeli identity from the Diasporic Jewish identity and at once relies on the latter's continuing immigration as a major source of demographic growth and national empowerment. Indeed, the Jewish population often exhibits ambivalence in the form of strong support for Jewish immigration and at the same time resentment towards the immigrants (Lewin-Epstein et al. 1993).

#### *4.2. National Identity in Israel*

Israeli national identity has a short and yet turbulent history. It was constructed during the twentieth century as part of the Jewish Zionist movement. The Zionist project involved the settlement of large waves of Jewish immigrants in the land of Palestine, governed in the earlier period by the Ottoman Empire and subsequently by the British Mandate. In fact, the formative period of Israeli national identity can be dated to the three decades prior to the establishment of the State of Israel. While deriving from the long history of the Jewish people, the new collective identity also embraced the ideas of nineteenth-century nationalism and secularism in the hope of creating a new and "normal" society.<sup>5</sup> A central feature of the collective identity was a clear reference to territory, with the understanding that all or part of the land under the control of the United Kingdom would be the basis for an autonomous "Jewish commonwealth". In this respect, the community of new settlers saw themselves as the direct descendants of the biblical Jewish people who once ruled the land. An additional feature of importance was that all Jews who accepted the Zionist version would be entitled to immigrate to the country, hence conceptualising the territory-based identity as a "potential" present in every Jew, irrespective of where they actually resided.

Most Jewish immigrants to Palestine, early in the twentieth century, arrived from European countries and many had in common the Yiddish language. Yet the emerging community consciously adopted Hebrew as its language. For centuries the Hebrew language – the historic language of the people of Israel – was used only for ritual purposes and its revival symbolised a break with the experience of Jewish exile and at the same time it infused biblical Israel into the emerging national identity. The political order in which the collective identity would be embedded rested on two central principles – democracy and Jewish nationalism. The two principles came to be central to the logic of the State of Israel, which can therefore be understood as an ethnic democracy (Smootha 1992).<sup>6</sup>

It is important to note that the development of Israeli identity as a deliberate effort was contested from the very beginning. The ultra-religious Jewish community did not accept a secular Jewish national identity, especially in a sovereign state. Indeed,

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<sup>5</sup> PT This section draws heavily on the works of Kimmerling (2001) and Ya'ar and Shavit (2003).

<sup>6</sup> These two principles, however, contain an internal contradiction that represents an ever-present threat to the democratic character of the State of Israel.

it continues its opposition to varying degrees into the present (Ya'ar and Shavit 2003). An even stronger challenge was posed by the Arab community of Palestine, then a demographic majority, which was vehemently opposed to Jewish immigration and the notion of a Jewish commonwealth in the territory of Palestine. The Palestinian collective identity had its roots in local-familial and regional identities that developed during the Ottoman rule and further crystallised during the British Mandatory period (Kimmerling 2000). It was strongly linked to the world of Islam, but had clear national-territorial aspirations regarding the regions heavily populated by Palestinian people. In this respect, “[t]he Jews ... were perceived not only as national enemies and intruders into the land, but also as an entity that violated (Islamic) cosmic order” (Kimmerling 2000: 68). Indeed, to a large extent, Israeli and Palestinian national identity spiralled as mutually denying and yet inseparable entities, as their aspirations were strongly linked to one and the same territory.

By the time Israel was established as an independent state and absorbed large waves of mass immigration (the Jewish population of Israel more than doubled in its first five years, from approximately 600,000 to over 1.5 million), the national identity that had been constructed and cultivated by the leadership of the pre-state community took hold as the hegemonic collective identity. The challenge of the immigrant absorption policy in the first two decades of state independence was to socialise the new immigrants, the overwhelming majority of whom were refugees. Many of the new immigrants came from Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa and, although they shared with the receiving society the Jewish religion and a belief in the “gathering of exiles”, their cultural heritage was quite alien to that of the dominant Jewish group.

If the maintenance of hegemony is a sign of successful collective identity then, from the vantage point of the early twenty-first century, we may conclude that the Jewish Zionist national identity ultimately failed and possibly it never stood a chance.<sup>7</sup> The veteran elite – those who advanced the Zionist project and successfully led the way to an independent state – were concerned with the possibility of “decomposition and alteration of the original characteristics of the state by mass immigration” (Kimmerling 2001: 6). Yet it seems that the process could not be avoided. While countervailing forces were always present, the past two decades have witnessed accelerated processes of decomposition and subdivision of Israeli nationalism.<sup>8</sup> The process of change was wide-sweeping,

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PT<sup>7</sup> TPSome argue that it was actually the success of the Zionist project that in a dialectical way has led to the fragmentation of the collective identity (e.g. Ya'ar and Shavit 2003).

<sup>8</sup> Kimmerling (2001) argued that seven such (sub)collective identities can be identified, each with its specific emphasis yet all sharing a common core. The previously hegemonic collective identity is now mainly the province of secular Ashkenazi upper and middle classes. The national religious have a somewhat different focus of identity as do the traditionalist Mizrahim (Jews from the Middle East and North Africa). The orthodox religious may be considered a fourth segment of the veteran Jewish population. To these should be added the new immigrants from the republics of the Soviet Union and immigrants from Ethiopia. In addition to these six populations of Jews with their

involving national-political, territorial and cultural components of the collective identity. The first two elements are associated with the changing understanding regarding the reality of Palestinian nationalism and the need for a territorial compromise. A third, cultural component that has accelerated in recent years involves resistance to the hegemonic cultural mainstream and its replacement with a multiplicity of cultural preferences. Overall, Jewish nationalism remains a central and largely consensual element of the collective identity of the majority Jewish population of Israel. This is an ethnic-based identity that is based in history, culture, religion and territory.

#### *4.3. Challenges to Israeli National Identity*

The principles of citizenship in Israel have come under considerable strain in the past decade or so, following recent waves of immigration. Aided by the amendments to the Law of Return which broadened the definition of non-Jewish family members who are eligible for citizenship by *return*, the number of non-Jewish and non-Arab citizens residing in Israel increased dramatically (Cohen 2002). During this same period a large number of non-Jews entered Israel as migrant workers. The figures at their peak were in excess of 250,000 (Cohen 2002; Kemp and Rajzman 2000). Despite aggressive deportation measures and tighter entry controls introduced in recent years, the most recent estimates of the foreign population (the overwhelming majority of whom are migrant workers) place the figures at 190,000 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 2005). While their impact on the economy is an on going topic of debate, for many the “problem of foreign labour” derives from the possibility that they and their families will attempt to settle in Israel, and will thus challenge the ethno-national principles of immigration and citizenship which officially distinguish between Jews and non-Jews (Rosenhek and Cohen 2000). Indeed, the presence of foreign workers has served as a catalyst, putting into motion a variety of civil organisations as well as local government practices that are redefining “citizenship and citizenship rights” (Kemp and Rajzman 2000; Menahem 2001).

From other quarters, the continuing challenge from the still marginal, yet substantial, Arab minority regarding the dominance of the Jewish elements in the Israeli collective identity, has become more vocal in recent years. Despite the claim that a new Israeli-Palestinian identity is emerging, as a result of parallel processes of Israelisation and Palestinianisation (see Smootha 1992; Amara and Schnell 2004), most empirical evidence underscores the growing conflict between the ethnic and civic dimensions of national identity characterising Arab citizens of Israel (Peres and Yuval-Davis 1969; Hofman and Rouhana 1976; Sulliman and Beit-Hallahmi 1997; Rouhana 1997). This conflict, and its accentuation, can be explained by the

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particular versions of Israeli identity, the Arab citizens of Israel form yet another unique population with its own collective identity.

lack of affective attachment among Arab citizens towards Israeli national identity, resulting from the Jewish ethnic basis for such identity (Rouhana 1997).

The challenge to Israeli national identity from recent immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) is of a different sort. Although a large percentage of the immigrants are not Jewish according to Jewish religious law, and many others are secular and resent the role of religion in the Israeli public sphere, both the state and the majority of the veteran Jewish population view their immigration as part of the “in-gathering” of the Jewish people. Concomitantly, most of the immigrants self-identify as Jews and less than a decade after their arrival in Israel many considered themselves Israeli (Al-Haj 2002). Yet in the past decade many scholars have debated the issue of their absorption into Israeli society and the extent to which this population group – new to Israeli society – will develop a separate ethnic identity. While it is possible that eventually this population will be integrated into the Jewish Ashkenazi middle class, it is widely agreed that at present it represents a unique subculture steeped in Russian secular culture and sustained by large numbers, geographic concentration, Russian language media and political organisations (Al-Haj 2002; Lissak and Leshem 1995; Ben-Rafael et al. 1998).

The foregoing discussion of Israeli national identity serves as the backdrop for our research. While the challenges described confront the hegemonic content of national identity in the Israeli context, this does not mean that the importance of nationality is waning. In fact, it is possible that such challenges reinforce the centrality of nationality, albeit with different meanings in different groups. Therefore we focus on three major population groups – veteran Jews,<sup>9</sup> recent (post-1989) Jewish immigrants from the FSU, and the Arab population – and investigate the meanings of their national identity and its relationship to xenophobia.

On the basis of the particular positions of the three groups in Israeli society we derive several hypotheses: First, due to the predominantly ethno-national Jewish basis for Israeli national identity, we expect that veteran Jewish citizens will ascribe higher importance than the other groups to the ethnic dimension of national identity. Conversely, we expect the civic dimension of national identity to be most pronounced in the Arab population for whom this the major means of attachment to the State. Second, we posit that for the veteran Jewish population a strong relationship exists between the ethnic dimension of national identity and xenophobia, while the association of xenophobia with the civic dimension of national identity is weak or even negative. The hypothesised effect of the ethnic dimension on attitudes towards out-group members reflects the (actual or perceived) cultural threat such individuals pose to members of the dominant ethnic group. We allow here for the possibility that even if respondents frame their attitudes towards newcomers with Jewish immigrants rather than guest labourers in mind, they may still see this group as a potential cultural, as well as economic, threat.

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PT<sup>9</sup> TPNatives of Israel or immigrants who arrived before 1989.

Third, two conflicting hypotheses, arising from the cultural affinity and group threat models, are tested regarding the relationship between national identity and xenophobia for the marginal Arab group. Whereas the first expects that Arab citizens will show lower levels of xenophobia due to lower support for the ethnic basis of national identity, the second allows for the replacement of the ethnic dimension with other primordial bases for social identity, most notably religion, and for hostile sentiments to surface. As regards immigrants from the FSU, their secularism and recent immigration experience seem to preclude the materialisation of the second scenario, leading to the expectation that low support for ethnic national identity in this population will give rise to lower levels of xenophobia compared with the veteran Jewish population. Finally, acknowledging the importance of individual characteristics in shaping inter-group antagonism, the effects of education, income and age on xenophobia are evaluated.

## **5. Data and Variables**

### *5.1. Sample and Data Collection*

The present study utilises data from the national identity module collected in 2003 as part of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). The ISSP is an on-going effort of cross-national collaboration that has mushroomed from less than ten participating countries in the mid-1980s to over thirty-five countries two decades later.<sup>10</sup> The empirical analysis carried out here is based on data collected in Israel during the winter of 2003. Random sampling in a multi-stage procedure was used to select respondents 18 years and older from the Israeli population (residing in Israel at least one year). Face-to-face interviews were carried out with the selected individuals in their homes. The interviews were conducted in Hebrew, Arabic and Russian and lasted 30–45 minutes. The questionnaire was composed largely of items concerning identity, national pride and attitudes regarding cultural diversity, immigrants, foreign imports, etc. In addition to the attitudinal items, respondents were asked to provide detailed demographic and socio-economic information. Overall, 1,218 respondents were interviewed, representing a response rate of 62 per cent.

### *5.2. Variables, Measures and Data Analysis*

The dependent variable in the present study is xenophobia – attitudes of fear or hatred directed towards out-group members. More specifically, the variable measures attitudes of respondents towards immigrants to the country and is based on the following question: “There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in Israel (by ‘immigrant’ we mean people who come to settle in Israel). How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?” The statements then referred to possible effects – negative (increases

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PT<sup>10</sup> TP Further details may be obtained from the ISSP website (<http://www.issp.org>).



crime, takes jobs away from natives, receives too much government assistance) and positive (good for the economy, improve society) – immigrants might have on society. In all, the questionnaire included five items which form a single factor.<sup>11</sup> It should be noted that these items could be interpreted by respondents in several ways: although we used the term immigrants rather than Olim (which is the term used specifically for Jewish immigrants to Israel), in order to somewhat neutralise the ideological bias in favour of Jewish immigration, respondents might still think of this group when answering the questions, especially as the questions refer to people who have come to settle. Some may have responded with guest labourers in mind although they are not usually connected with the term “immigrant”. While some of them have been living in Israel for many years, people do not normally think of them as settling in Israel. Finally, interviewees may have responded on the basis of a generalised sentiment towards foreigners.

The same factor structure (albeit with somewhat different factor loadings) was found among the native-born Jewish population and the Arab population, and even among the recent Jewish immigrants from the FSU. As the factor scores were quite similar, a simple measure was constructed by averaging the scores of each respondent on the five items. The scaling quality of this measure was high, especially in the veteran Jewish and Arab samples. The Cronbach  $\alpha$  reliability coefficients were 0.77, 0.66, 0.76 in the veteran Jewish, FSU immigrant and Arab samples, respectively (results of the factor analysis are presented in Table A1 in the appendix).

The independent construct of primary interest in the present study is national identity. The operational definition of the variable used for our analysis is based on responses to the question: “Some people say that the following things are important for being truly Israeli. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?” Respondents were then asked to rate eight attributes from “very important” to “not important at all”. These included being born in Israel, having Israeli citizenship, living in Israel most of one’s life, being able to speak Hebrew, being Jewish, respecting the political institutions and laws, feeling Israeli, and having Israeli ancestry. Factor analysis using varimax rotation revealed that the eight items represent two factors. This finding is in line with analysis conducted on other data sets that included similar items (Jones and Smith 2001a, 2001b; Hjern 1998).

Essentially, the factor structure appears to reveal a civic and an ethnic component of national identity. The analyses were conducted separately for each of the three

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PT<sup>11</sup> TPAs noted earlier, Israel is a (Jewish) immigrant society and Jewish immigration is not only tolerated but officially encouraged. To the extent that respondents interpret the questions as referring to the returning Diaspora of Jews, they may express positive affects rather than fear and hatred. Hence we use the term “xenophobia”, which is commonly used in the growing literature on attitudes towards foreigners in general and immigrants in particular, with some reservation and caution that in the present case positive sentiments may be expressed as well as negative ones and our aim is precisely to uncover the social configurations in which the various sentiments reside.

population groups and in each case the set of items representing each of the factors and their factor loadings differ somewhat, but the two-factor solution and its underlying structure appears to be stable across groups.<sup>12</sup> Based on these results, two measures were constructed to tap the two components of national identity. These are based on the simple average of the relevant items for each dimension depending on the population-specific factor analysis.

An additional measure was constructed to tap the centrality of national identity as part of one's identity repertoire. This measure, subsequently referred to as NIC (national identity centrality), is derived from responses to the question: "In general, which in the following list is most important to you in describing who you are?" The list consisted of ten characteristics including, in addition to "your nationality", such elements as occupation, social class, family, location of residence and political party. Respondents were asked to note the most important, the second most important, and the third most important element describing who they were. A measure was then constructed, ranging from 0 if nationality was not listed among the three most important characteristics, to 3 if nationality was listed as the most important element describing who the respondent was.

Other variables are used in the analysis primarily as control variables and in order to gauge additional sources of xenophobia. These include age (in years), religiosity, education and family income. Religiosity is measured somewhat differently for Jews and non-Jews (whether Muslim or Christian). Jewish respondents were asked to place themselves on a commonly used four-point scale, ranging from ultra-orthodox to secular. The non-Jewish respondents were asked to what extent they adhere to precepts of their religion and the response categories ranged from 1 (to a very large extent) to 5 (not at all). Education was measured in years of schooling, as reported by respondents. Family income was reported in ten broad categories each representing a range of income values. The lowest category refers to a monthly family income of NIS4,500 (new Israeli shekels, approximately \$1,000) or less, and the highest category includes family incomes of NIS20,000 or more per month. For the present analysis, the scale was transformed by calculating the mid-point of the appropriate income interval for each respondent (respondents who checked the first – lowest – category of monthly income were given a value of NIS2,250, etc.). Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of all these variables.

## **6. Findings**

Before reviewing the population characteristics that emerge from the descriptive statistics, it would be useful to portray in some detail the latent structure of national identity in the three population groups (veteran Jews, recent Jewish immigrants from the FSU, and Arab citizens of Israel), as it is instructive in uncovering the

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PT<sup>12</sup> TPArab citizens as well as Jewish citizens of Israel note that being "truly Israeli" requires some primordial elements, most notably being Jewish.

meaning of this construct in an ethnically divided society. The factor structure was investigated separately for each of the three groups: the veteran Jewish population (hereafter Veterans), recent Jewish arrivals to Israel from republics of the Former Soviet Union (hereafter Olim),<sup>13</sup> and Arab citizens of Israel (hereafter Arabs). Table 1 presents the results of these analyses. While a two-factor solution was reached in all three population groups, the factor structure reveals certain particularities in each, illuminating the diverse meanings infused into the construct of national identity by groups located in different spaces of Israeli social structure.

**Table 1:** Item Loadings on Latent Dimensions of National Identity\* among Population Groups in Israel (Principle Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation)

	Veterans (n = 918)		Olim (n = 139)		Arabs (n = 152)	
	Civic identity	Ethnic identity	Civic identity	Ethnic identity	Civic identity	Ethnic identity
Respect political institutions – law	0.712		0.613		0.624	
Have Israeli citizenship	0.663		0.738		0.792	
To feel Israeli	0.758		0.676			0.795
Live in Israel most of one's life	0.705			0.649	0.791	
Be able to speak Hebrew	0.477			0.680		0.687
To have been born in Israel		0.730		0.787	0.741	
Have Israeli ancestry		0.767		0.580		0.715
To be a Jew		0.622		0.445		0.720
Percentage of overall variance captured by factor	28.9	23.5	20.6	26.2	28.6	27.4
Cronbach $\alpha$	0.75	0.59	0.50	0.65	0.74	0.71

\*Based on the question: "How important do you think each of the following is [for being truly Israeli]?"

We refer to one factor (the first factor in the case of Veterans and Arabs, the second factor in the case of Olim) as the civic dimension. For a clearer presentation we present in the table only factor loadings with scores greater than 0.40 and

PT<sup>13</sup> TP This is the transliteration of the Hebrew term for Jewish immigrants to Israel. It literally means "ascenders", as Jews immigrating to Israel are symbolically viewed as ascending to a higher spiritual plane.

discuss below the specific items associated with the two factors in each of the three groups. What constitutes the civic dimension of national identity, according to all three groups, is holding Israeli citizenship and having respect for Israel's political institutions and laws. These elements might be considered the core of civic national identity. Beyond these two components the population groups appear to differ. For both Jewish groups the affective component, "to feel Israeli", is part of civic national identity but this is not the case for Arabs. In the Arab population "to feel Israeli" is associated with the second – ethnic – dimension of national identity. This underscores the fact that while the Arab population may hold Israeli citizenship and take part in its political institutions they cannot feel Israeli, as "Israeliness" is strongly tied to the Jewish character of the State of Israel. On the other hand, among the Arab population having been born in Israel and living in the country most of one's life are constituent of civic identity, as these criteria establish their belonging to the territory even if they do not share the hegemonic ethnic or cultural signifiers of national identity.

The core of the ethnic component of national identity – the name we give to the second factor – as perceived by all three population groups is being Jewish and having Israeli ancestry. The fact that these two items are viewed as highly related implies that "having Israeli roots" (the phrase used for ancestry) was perceived by respondents as referring to primordial ties to the historical origins of the Jewish people. It is further noteworthy that beyond the core, the ethnic construct as perceived by each of the groups, differs somewhat. Among Jews, both Veterans and Olim, the ethnic basis of national identity includes being born in Israel, reflecting a long-standing rift (going back to the pre-state period) between old-timers and newcomer Jewish immigrants. While the entire Jewish society is an immigrant society, for Jews, being truly Israeli means at the very least having been born in the country as distinguished from being an immigrant. Indeed, Israeli-born Jews are often referred to as "Sabra", referring metaphorically to the prickly exterior and tender heart of the cactus fruit which dots the Israeli landscape. Early immigrants, and especially their offspring, typically look down upon and often marginalise new arrivals. This distinction is clearly evident in the identity structure of the recent Olim, for whom the ethnic factor includes having lived in the country most of one's life and being able to speak Hebrew. We interpret this structure to indicate that the Olim view the Veterans as distinct, and consequently identify themselves as a separate cultural group even though both are of Jewish ancestry.

Among the Arab respondents, the civic factor strictly involves elements of territory (having been born in Israel), institutions and citizenship. The ethnic dimension is constituent of Jewish religion and ancestry and their associated cultural (speaking Hebrew) and affective (feeling Israeli) ingredients. The preceding distinctions unmistakably reveal the core elements of national identity in Israel and underscore its dual character as a Jewish ethnic state and at the same time a political entity governed by democratic institutions. As noted earlier, on the basis of this analysis we constructed two measures – civic and ethnic – of national identity. Each

respondent received a score based on the mean of the items associated with each of the two factors depending on the population group one belonged to. Overall the reliability of the measures constructed from these items is quite good, as can be determined from the Cronbach  $\alpha$  coefficients provided in the last row of Table 1. Table 2 presents the distributional attributes of these measures and all other variables.

**Table 2:** Descriptive Statistics for all Variables Included in Analysis

Variable	Total population			Veterans (n = 918)		Olim (n = 139)		Arabs (n = 152)	
	Description	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Xenophobia		1	5	3.07	(0.91)	2.16	(0.65)	3.79	(0.73)
Civic identity	High scores reflect negative attitudes	1	4	1.52	(0.57)	1.48	(0.45)	1.54	(0.54)
Ethnic identity		1	4	2.02	(0.77)	2.13	(0.61)	2.61	(0.75)
NIC	Centrality of national identity	0	3	1.02	(1.21)	0.70	(1.10)	0.89	(1.08)
Age		18	96	45.85	(17.11)	46.96	(18.16)	34.82	(16.32)
Religiosity*	High scores indicate greater orthodoxy	1	4	1.99	(1.03)	1.22	(0.44)	2.77	(1.28)
Education	Years of schooling	0	25	13.18	(3.27)	14.39	(3.17)	12.81	(2.56)
Family income	NIS (thousands)	0	22.25	7.83	(4.98)	6.01	(4.13)	6.30	(2.79)

\*While scale measures religious adherence, the scores for Jews and Arabs should not be compared. The questions put to Jews and non-Jews differed and the response scale in the case of the former included four points whereas in the latter we used a five-point scale.

Attitudes towards immigrants, as expressed by the xenophobic mind-set, were measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 5. The mean score on this scale differed considerably across the three groups. The lowest mean value – 2.16 – is found among Olim. Given the potential range of the scale this value indicates a rather positive leaning of the attitudes expressed by the group and most likely reflects the fact that they interpret the items as referring to people like themselves. Veterans were somewhat more reserved with a mean score of 3.07 which places them in a position of indifference – neither strongly negative nor strongly negative attitudes – with respect to immigrants. In fact, considering the ideological commitment to Jewish immigration, these results might be viewed as expressing reservation about the open-door policy accompanied by exclusionary sentiments. The highest score on the xenophobia scale is found among the Arab population (3.79). For Arabs, the

immigrants clearly represent an out-group that at the very least strengthens the Jewish majority of Israel and additionally poses an immediate economic threat to their livelihood.

Scores for the civic and ethnic components of national identity were constructed in each group from somewhat different items, but to the extent that the two constructs – civic and ethnic national identity – are meaningful, the score calculated for each respondent reflects the importance attributed to each of the components. As evident from the figures in Table 2 the three groups have very similar mean scores on the civic dimension (around 1.5 on a scale ranging from 1 to 4). The score is rather low, especially when compared with the ethnic dimension, drawing attention to the fact that identification with the collective civic national identity in Israel is rather weak.

Turning to the ethnic basis of national identity, we find both higher mean scores (above 2.0) and greater variability across groups. Of particular interest is the fact that the highest mean score is found in the Arab population. Note that this does not refer to the Arabs' own identity (when Arab citizens of Israel are asked in open-ended questions how they would define their ethnic affiliation, slightly over half use the term Arab and one-quarter refer to themselves as Palestinian, 12 per cent use religion only and the remaining 10 per cent are dispersed among a variety of other responses); it refers to their view of Israeli national identity as an ethnically based identity, as discussed earlier, and hence one they cannot identify with. It is further noteworthy that the NIC score, which measures the extent to which nationality is central to one's own identity set, is highest among Veterans and lowest among Olim. The mean value of 0.70 calculated for the latter group suggests that nationality is rarely referred to as important when members of this group describe their identity repertoire. Only one-third of the Olim population chose nationality as one of the three elements central to their identity, compared with 47 per cent in the population of Veterans and 49 per cent in the Arab population. Indeed, for the latter groups nationality appears to be of central importance for the self-definition.

Regarding the demographic and socio-economic make-up of the various groups, we find that the Arab population is considerably younger (mean age 34.8 years) than the other groups and also less educated. This is in line with standard population statistics for Israel. Olim have the highest level of schooling – exceeding fourteen years – a full year more than Veterans. A second measure of socio-economic standing, which is pertinent to the way in which out-groups are viewed, is family income. On average the Veterans are better-off than the others. Their mean monthly family income is almost NIS8,000 (approximately \$1,800) compared with approximately NIS6,000 in the two other groups.<sup>14</sup> It is precisely on

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PT<sup>14</sup> TP The disadvantage of the Arab population in Israel along major dimensions and of social stratification and the labour market in particular has been documented by several studies (e.g. Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1993), and a detailed discussion of the causes and consequences are beyond the scope of this paper.

the basis of their labour market position that the Arab population is more likely to develop resentment towards foreigners even if they do not view the out-group as a threat to their national identity.

This issue is the subject of the next section, in which we investigate the relationship between national identity as well as socio-economic and demographic attributes to expressions of xenophobia in different population groups. To this end we use multiple regression analysis to obtain coefficient estimates from which we expect to learn the nature of the relationship.

**Table 3:** Coefficient Estimates Derived from OLS Regression Predicting Xenophobia for Three Population Groups in Israel (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Variable	Veterans (n = 918)		Olim (n = 139)		Arabs (n = 152)	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Age	-0.003 <sup>^</sup> (0.002)	-0.003 <sup>^</sup> (0.002)	-0.009 <sup>^</sup> (0.003)	-0.009 <sup>^</sup> (0.004)	0.008 <sup>^</sup> (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)
Religiosity <sup>*</sup>	0.324 <sup>^</sup> (0.034)	0.293 <sup>^</sup> (0.034)	-0.094 (0.129)	-0.105 (0.133)	0.001 (0.049)	-0.015 (0.049)
Education	-0.046 <sup>^</sup> (0.011)	-0.040 <sup>^</sup> (0.011)	-0.004 (0.019)	-0.009 (0.020)	0.073 <sup>^</sup> (0.022)	0.073 <sup>^</sup> (0.022)
Family income × 1,000	-0.013 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.007)	0.022 (0.015)	0.027 (0.016)	0.047 <sup>^</sup> (0.021)	0.045 <sup>^</sup> (0.021)
Civic identity		0.133 (0.080)		0.017 (0.161)		-0.208 (0.142)
Ethnic identity		-0.267 <sup>^</sup> (0.062)		0.171 (0.123)		0.110 (0.109)
NIC		0.041 (0.090)		0.064 (0.268)		-0.479 <sup>^</sup> (0.241)
NIC × civic identity		-0.061 (0.057)		0.090 (0.137)		0.114 (0.105)
NIC × ethnic identity		0.041 (0.041)		-0.082 (0.105)		0.105 (0.091)
Intercept	3.286	3.538	2.621	2.244	2.289	2.451
R <sup>2</sup>	0.183 <sup>^</sup>	0.214 <sup>^</sup>	0.121 <sup>^</sup>	0.150 <sup>^</sup>	0.129 <sup>^</sup>	0.182 <sup>^</sup>
R <sup>2</sup> change		0.031 <sup>^</sup>		0.029		0.053 <sup>^</sup>

\*While scale measures religious adherence, the scores for Jews and Arabs should not be compared. The questions put to Jews and non-Jews differed and the response scale in the case of the former included four points whereas in the latter we used a five-point scale.

<sup>^</sup>The coefficient is significant,  $\alpha < 0.05$ .

Table 3 presents results of the regression analysis with xenophobia as the dependent variable. Two models were estimated for each of the three population groups. Model 1 includes social and demographic variables – age, religiosity, education, family income – which have been shown in past research to affect attitudes towards foreigners. Model 2 introduces the national identity variables in order to assess the extent to which they add, as a cluster, to the understanding of xenophobic sentiments and how each of the identity variables is associated with these sentiments. The cluster includes the civic and ethnic components of national identity and NIC which measures the centrality of nationality in one's identity repertoire. In addition, two interaction terms – NIC with civic identity and NIC with ethnic identity – are constructed for the purpose of evaluating whether the components of national identity have a stronger effect on xenophobia when nationality is central to one's identity.

Turning first to the Veteran Jewish population, we find that social and demographic attributes account for slightly over 18 per cent of the variance in sentiments towards immigrants. Yet the individual coefficient estimates reveal a complex relationship. Age is negatively associated with xenophobia ( $b = -0.003$ ). In other words, older persons are less hostile as are the better educated Veterans ( $b = -0.046$ ). The effect of family income, although not statistically significant, is in the same direction. The coefficient for religiosity is positive ( $b = 0.324$ ) indicating that more religious Veterans express more hostile sentiments towards the immigrants. These relationships also hold in model 2, when the national identity variables are added.

As a cluster the national identity variables add 3 per cent to the model's  $R^2$ , an addition that is substantive as well as statistically significant. Yet, only the strong and negative coefficient for ethnic national identity ( $b = -0.267$ ) is statistically significant. The coefficient for civic identity is positive but not significant. Neither the centrality variable (NIC) nor the interactions are statistically significant. The negative coefficient for ethnic national identity is surprising in view of past research in North America and Europe. It points to the fact that persons with a strong sense of ethnic national identity exhibit more favourable attitudes towards the immigrants than persons with low scores on the ethnic component of national identity. This makes sense to the extent that they interpret the group of immigrants as a returning Jewish Diaspora rather than an out-group. It should be emphasised here that the effect of ethnic national identity is observed after controlling for socio-economic factors and even level of religiosity and hence appears to manifest a unique relationship between national identity and attitude towards others. Even more interesting is the fact that religiosity and ethnic identity are both significantly related to the measure of attitudes towards immigrants, albeit in opposite directions. This is surprising at first, as the Jewish character of the state is central to the ethnic basis of national identity. Yet the more religious Jews and especially the ultra-orthodox are highly concerned about the nature of recent immigration from the



FSU and especially over the large number of non-Jews who entered as family members, seeing this as a real threat to the Jewish character of Israel.

In this context it is of interest to interpret the lack of relationship between civic national identity and the attitude towards immigrants. It should be recalled that the ethnic and civic measures are not two poles of one continuum. One may score high on both these measures. While research findings in other contexts have noted a relationship between civic identity and less hostile attitudes towards immigrants, in the Israeli context, where respondents seem to think of the immigrants as potential members of the in-group of Jews, the intensity of civic identity should not necessarily be associated with attitudes towards immigrants as long as they adhere to the precepts of Israeli citizenship. Although it was suggested that the extent to which nationality is central to one's identity set might be related to the strength of xenophobic attitudes, no such relationship was found among Veterans.

Turning now to the Arab population, socio-economic factors appear to be associated with their attitudes towards immigrants but in a way quite different from that found among Veterans. More educated Arabs and those with higher family income are more hostile towards immigrants. While civic and ethnic components are not related to xenophobic attitudes, the extent to which nationality is central to the identity of Arab respondents is negatively related to their attitudes towards immigrants ( $b = -0.479$ ). These results reveal a complex attitude structure of the Arab minority towards immigrants to Israel. On the one hand they pose strong economic competition, especially for the better-educated Arabs. On this level there is resentment and negative affects more generally. On the other hand the immigrants, especially those who arrived in the 1990s – whether Jewish immigrants from the FSU or guest labourers – have challenged the cultural hegemony of the Veterans and paved the way for greater cultural diversity and pluralism. Against this backdrop it is Arabs for whom national and ethnic identities are more central who exhibit less hostility to the newcomers, as their incorporation into Israeli society may actually weaken the traditional Jewish hegemony.

In contrast to the rather intricate and somewhat unanticipated results of the regression analyses in the Veteran and the Arab populations, the regression models are essentially unproductive when it comes to the population of Olim. Other than the effect of age, no other variable is associated with the dependent variable. If they responded to the questions as gauging a generalised attitude towards an out-group, we would have expected at least the socio-economic variables to have some effect. Conversely, they might have interpreted the questions as referring to the way they themselves affect the receiving society. Indeed, in this case they would be both the subjects and the objects of the investigation, a situation which is quite difficult to interpret and clearly the notion of xenophobia would be inappropriate. Possibly, both interpretations are present, further obscuring underlying relationships. Data limitations prevent further investigation of Olim attitudes and our discussion focuses primarily on the two central groups of Veteran Jewish and Arab populations of Israel.

## **7. Discussion**

Studying a multi-ethnic society leads us to provide two important contributions relating to the meaning of national identity and its relations with xenophobia. The first is that national identity itself, as expressed in support for ethnic and civic aspects of national identification, carries divergent meanings for members of different ethnic groups. While previous research documented considerable cross-national similarity in the perception of national identity (e.g. Hjern 1998; Jones and Smith 2001a), our analysis suggests that such resemblance can mask substantial national variation, most notably along ethnic lines. Specifically, our analysis indicates that members of dominant ethnic groups ascribe higher importance to national identification than members of subordinate ethnic groups, and centre their perception of ethnic national identity on ancestral terms, while marginal ethnic groups tend to also associate this form of identity with affective and cultural elements. This may suggest that the nation primarily serves for the former group as a metaphorical kin-group (see Eriksen 2004), while the latter groups also identify boundary maintenance practices as constituting the national categorisation scheme that excludes them from becoming and feeling full members. In contrast to our expectations, a greater degree of consensus regarding both importance and meaning is evident with respect to civic national identity, which for all ethnic groups is principally related to citizenship status and respect for political institutions. In its emphasis on a voluntaristic collective perception, civic national identity may thus serve as the glue that allows competing ethnic groups to maintain a sense of common purpose.

Analysing Israeli society, a multi-ethnic society characterised by ethnic stratification and tensions, provides valuable insights into the forces that shape attitudes towards foreigners. Our analysis indicates that self-interest motivations are particularly relevant in explaining the attitudes of members of a marginal ethnic group. This is not surprising, considering the disadvantage of the Arab population in Israel along major dimensions and of social stratification (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1993). Adopting a relational perspective on national identity, we direct attention to group-level explanations of xenophobia. In this regard, our findings can be interpreted as lending stronger support to the cultural affinity perspective than to the group threat model. Contrary to our expectations and in contrast to previous findings from Europe (Hjern 1998, 2004), ethnic national identity was found to be negatively related to xenophobia among Veteran individuals. In addition, we found that centrality of national identity was negatively related to xenophobia among Arabs. In interpreting these two results it is useful, we think, to direct the attention to the unique character of Israel, which in some respects is not the state of all its citizens (as Arabs are often marginalised) while, as the state of the Jewish people, it “belongs” also to those who are not yet its citizens (potential Jewish immigrants). Consequently, the Israeli social and political context is periodically (re)shaped by waves of Jewish immigrants who settle in the country with varying degrees of governmental support. As previously discussed, the last wave of immigration can be distinguished from previous ones particularly in terms

of its size, geographic concentration, and strength of political organisations (Al-Haj 2002; Lissak and Leshem 1995; Ben-Rafael et al. 1998). Immigrants (actual or potential), in this context, can simultaneously be perceived by members of the dominant ethnic groups as sharing similar cultural traits with them (most notably Jewish ethnicity and tradition), and by the marginal ethnic groups as representing a potential threat to the hegemonic ethnic national identity that has developed in Israel. In such a context the expectations of the cultural affinity thesis that Arabs will generally show more favourable attitudes towards foreigners is understandably not supported. Finally, our analysis does not provide support for the group threat model. As the foregoing discussion has suggested, in Israeli society the cultural affinity between Veteran Jewish citizens and immigrants has so far retarded the development of a perception among the former that the latter pose a cultural threat.

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## Appendix

**Table A1:** Item Loadings on the Xenophobia Scale\* among Population Groups in Israel (Principle Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation)

	Veterans (n = 918)	Olim (n = 139)	Arabs (n = 152)
Immigrants take jobs away from people born in country	0.777	0.570	0.819
Immigrants generally good for economy	-0.740	-0.740	-0.435
Immigrants improve society by bringing in new ideas and cultures	-0.697	-0.747	-0.688
Immigrants: government spends too much money	0.697	0.592	0.804
Immigrants increase crime rates	0.677	0.590	0.815
Percentage of overall variance captured by factor	51.6	42.6	52.9
Cronbach $\alpha$	0.77	0.66	0.76

\*Based on the question "How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements [concerning immigrants from other countries living in Israel]?"

# British National Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration

ANTHONY F. HEATH AND JAMES R. TILLEY  
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*This paper explores the distinction between ethnic and civic conceptions of the nation in Britain and the implications for xenophobia and multiculturalism. There is broad consensus on the importance of civic aspects of the nation, such as respecting political institutions, whereas there is dissent on the importance of ethnic aspects such as the role of ancestry. We therefore distinguish three groups: those who believe that both ethnic and civic aspects are important to be truly British, those who believe that civic but not ethnic aspects are important, and a third group of the disengaged who feel that neither is important. People in the first “ethnic-cum-civic” group want to reduce the number of immigrants, remove illegal immigrants, are more likely to report that they are racially prejudiced, and are less enthusiastic about anti-discrimination laws. People in the “civic only” group tend to be more favourable towards multiculturalism. As previous research has shown, people who regard ethnic aspects of national identity as important tend to be rather older than members of our “civic only” group, whereas the “neither civic nor ethnic” group tends to be the youngest. From our data it is not possible to say whether these age differences reflect life cycle or generational factors. Our best guess is that the disengagement of the young may be more a result of their early stage in the life cycle, whereas the emphasis on ancestry of older people may be more a consequence of generational differences, reflecting the climate when they grew up. If this interpretation is correct, then we might expect to see Britain gradually shifting further towards a “civic only” conception of identity.*

**T**his paper focuses on the relationship between national identity and attitudes towards immigration in Britain. In the classic formulation of national identity, Benedict Anderson conceptualised the nation as an imagined political community – imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. He went on to argue that it is imagined in the sense that “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their members ... yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion”, and that it is a community because “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived



as a deep horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 1983: 6–7). However, Anderson also emphasises that the nation must involve a boundary between those who are conceived to belong to it and those who are excluded from membership. In contrast to the nation, and helping to define it, are the “others”, the non-members to whom the deep horizontal comradeship does not extend. Linda Colley, in her masterly analysis of the development of a shared British identity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, emphasises the crucial role that the “other” represented by Catholic France played in forging a common sense of British identity out of the separate prior (and continuing) nations of England, Wales and Scotland (Colley 1992a, 1992b).

We might expect, then, that a sense of national identity would be associated with a stronger fellow-feeling towards fellow nationals and a weaker sense of solidarity with non-nationals. In times of war we would expect this to be exacerbated and to become a more overt xenophobia, especially directed at nationals of the opposing power (such as the French during the Napoleonic wars). But in general we would expect members of one nation to exhibit lower levels of trust of non-nationals than of fellow nationals. However, we would not expect this to be a uniform pattern within a nation. Two, probably related, dimensions of attachment to one’s nation can be distinguished, and these might both have implications for attitudes towards non-nationals. First, there is the well-known distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism, which we can think of as distinct criteria for defining membership of the nation. Second, we can distinguish the degree of affective attachment to one’s nation. These are conceptually distinct, although as we shall see are empirically correlated. Both may have important implications for attitudes towards non-nationals.

Ethnic conceptions of the nation tend to place greater emphasis on bloodlines, ancestry and cultural assimilation, that is with ascribed characteristics that are more or less fixed at birth or during early socialisation. They are concerned with people having been born and brought up in a country and likely to be associated with weaker support for multiculturalism and higher levels of concern about immigration. In contrast, civic conceptions place greater importance on aspects such as respect for political institutions, possessing national citizenship and speaking the national language. These are potentially achieved characteristics and thus open to immigrants to acquire. We thus would expect people who adopt a civic conception to be more willing to extend a degree of fellow-feeling to immigrants.

The classic discussion by Brubaker (1992) distinguished the different conceptions of national identity embodied in French and German traditions, and we would expect national differences to be related to such factors as the criteria and ease of gaining citizenship. But we can also anticipate that, within a given country, individuals may vary in the emphasis that they give to the different conceptions. We thus use it as a within-country rather than between-country tool.

A second important distinction is between degrees of affective attachment to the nation. For some, the sense of belonging to the nation may be much stronger than it is for others. There have, for example, been challenges from outside the nation with the rise of European integration and of what we might term “postnationalism” (Dogan 1994). Dogan sees European integration as leading to a blurring of national identities, just as it involves some blurring of national sovereignty, as a result of growing interdependence between the member states. Shared interests as members of the European Union may also serve to diminish a sense of distinct national interest. Whereas once France was the “other” that helped to define British identity, the modern world no longer places nation-states in these direct conflicts. Somewhat related arguments have been presented by theorists of postmodernity who argue that such identities are now largely a matter of personal choice. Stuart Hall, for example, argues that unified national identities are challenged by processes of globalisation and that postmodern identities are a “moveable feast” for individuals who now have access to “a variety of possibilities and new positions of identification ... making identities more positional, more political, more plural and diverse” (Hall et al. 1992: 309).

For some people, then, national identities may be of little emotional significance – mere labels in an EU passport rather than giving a strong sense of collective identity. Postnationalists, or cosmopolitans, may thus feel little sense of national pride or patriotism and accordingly make little distinction in how they trust or treat fellow-nationals and nationals of other states.

It would not be surprising if there were some empirical connection between cosmopolitanism and civic conceptions of the nation, and between ethnic conceptions and a stronger feeling of national sentiment. There may well be similar processes underlying both dimensions, with younger generations of the highly educated tending towards a more cosmopolitan and civic orientation, older, less-educated and less-travelled generations tending towards an ethnic and patriotic orientation. And we expect both to be related to attitudes towards immigrants.

Using data from the 2003 *International Social Survey Programme* (ISSP), which was administered as part of the *British Social Attitudes* series, this paper begins by exploring the different dimensions of national identity in Britain. In order to assess how appropriate the civic/ethnic distinction is in a British context, we create scales of civic and ethnic national identity and carry out basic cluster analysis in order to examine the extent to which people fall into different “types” in terms of the way they conceptualise national identity. After this, there is an analysis of our second conceptual dimension of strength of attachment to the nation, and how this relates to the civic/ethnic distinction. We then turn to explore the way in which these dimensions relate to attitudes towards immigrants.

We focus largely on British identity and pride in being British. However, we should remember that the United Kingdom is a multination state with distinct Welsh, Scottish and Northern Irish nations as well as the English. Most British

citizens have dual identities. Attitudes towards immigration may well vary systematically between these four nations but it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate these differences within the UK.

## 1. Civic versus Ethnic Dimensions

We begin the analysis by constructing measures of ethnic and civic dimensions of British identity. As part of the 2003 ISSP series of questions, respondents were asked the following:

*Some people say that the following things are important for being truly British. Others say that they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is [Very important / Fairly important / Not very important / Not important at all / Can't choose]*

- *To have been born in Britain*
- *To have British citizenship*
- *To have lived in Britain*
- *To be able to speak English*
- *To be a Christian*
- *To respect Britain's political institutions and laws*
- *To feel British*
- *To have British ancestry*

Table 1 shows the percentages of respondents rating each item as being “very” or “fairly important” in “being British”. It is clear that there is general agreement about the importance of most items. This is particularly the case for speaking English, where 87 per cent felt that this was important, having British citizenship (83 per cent) and respecting British laws and institutions (82 per cent). Having British ancestry was ranked as considerably less important, with just under half of respondents saying that this was important, but being a Christian was viewed as least important, with only three in ten in agreement. More generally, it is noteworthy that the items that have a more “civic” aspect (such as British citizenship, respecting British laws and feeling British) tend to have higher levels of importance than those with more “ethnic” connotations (such as being born in Britain and having British ancestry). In this respect we can say that Britain tends towards a civic conception of British identity.

**Table 1:** Importance of Different Aspects of “Being British”

	Respondents answering very or fairly important (%)*
Born in Britain	72
British citizenship	83
Lived life in Britain	69
Speak English	87
Be a Christian	33
Respect laws/institutions	82
Feel British	75
Have British ancestry	49
n (unweighted)**	844

\*Sample restricted to British citizens.

\*\*To maximize the n we combined “can’t choose” and “not answered” codes into a single middle category for all eight items.

Source: British Social Attitudes survey (2003).

Table 2 shows factor analysis loadings for each item, revealing two distinct dimensions of national identity that seem to correspond rather well to ethnic and civic conceptions. Items on the list that refer to birthplace, ancestry and ethnic components of “Britishness” load together, and conversely the items that refer to characteristics that can in principle be acquired, such as feeling British, speaking English, and respect for British institutions, load together on a separate dimension. This is exactly the same pattern that Jones and Smith (2001) found in their analysis of the same items from the ISSP 1995 module on national identity.

**Table 2:** Scores for Maximum Likelihood Factor Analysis of Criteria for National Identity

	Civic dimension	Ethnic dimension
Born in Britain	*	0.73
British citizenship	0.45	*
Lived life in Britain	*	0.58
Speak English	0.51	*
Be a Christian	*	0.51
Respect laws/institutions	0.60	*
Feel British	0.64	*
British ancestry	*	0.76
Initial eigenvalues	1.18	3.41

\*Scores below 0.4 not reported.

Source: British Social Attitudes survey (2003), British citizens only (unweighted n = 744).

While we have two conceptually distinct dimensions, it is important to recognise that they are correlated. In other words, many respondents will score highly in both the civic and ethnic dimensions. This can be seen clearly in Table 3, which shows the distribution of respondents in the two dimensions.

**Table 3:** Proportion of Scores on Ethnic and Civic Nationalism Scales

		Civic nationalism (%)				All
		Important			Not important	
Ethnic nationalism	Important	23.3	1.8	0	0	25.1
		16.7	10.2	3.0	0.2	30.1
		12.4	11.5	3.8	0.6	28.3
	Not important	6.5	5.1	3.6	1.3	16.5
	All	59.9	28.6	10.4	2.1	100.0

*Source:* British Social Attitudes survey (2003) (unweighted n = 844).

Another way of looking at Table 3 is to note the broad consensus on the importance of civic aspects of British identity – speaking English, respecting British political institutions and so on – with 60 per cent scoring in the highest category of the civic scale and a further 28 per cent in the next highest category. But there is considerable dissent on the importance of ethnic aspects, with respondents spread much more evenly across the four categories of the scale.

This suggests a pattern of three key groups as regards conceptions of British identity. One group of respondents scores highly on both civic and ethnic conceptions of identity and make up around half the sample (52 per cent of the sample being in the four top left-hand cells of the table). A second group scores highly on the civic identity scale but low on the ethnic identity scale (36 per cent being in the four bottom left-hand cells). The third group consists of the relatively small number of respondents who seem to believe neither dimension of national identity is important for “true” Britishness. These can be seen in the four bottom right-hand cells of the table but only amount to 9 per cent of the total. Finally, there is hardly anyone in the sample who supports an ethnic conception of identity on its own. Thus 3 per cent of the sample are in the four top right-hand cells of the table, but even these respondents give middle rather than high importance to ethnic aspects of British identity. Thus there is evidence of a stand-alone civic national identity, an ethnic-cum-civic identity, and a conception of identity that appears based on neither. The final cell remains rather empty, however; there appear to be few people who claim a stand-alone ethnic national identity. (For further details of this categorisation see Tilley et al., 2004.)

We can validate this typology using some further questions on citizenship rights. Respondents were asked:

*How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?*

- *Children born in Britain of parents who are not citizens should have the right to become British citizens.*
- *Children born abroad should have the right to become British citizens if at least one of their parents is a British citizen.*
- *Legal immigrants to Britain who are not citizens should have the same rights as British citizens.*

We would expect that people who adopt more ethnic conceptions of citizenship would tend to disagree with these statements, and indeed the expected pattern is shown in Table 4.

**Table 4:** Conceptions of National Identity and Attitudes towards Citizenship Issues

	Agree that children born in Britain should have the right to become citizens (%)	Agree that children born abroad should have the same right to become citizens (%)	Agree that legal immigrants who are not citizens should have the same rights (%)	n
Ethnic and civic	52.7	61.3	30.0	439
Civic only	75.8	79.4	55.2	300
Neither	68.9	60.8	40.5	78
All	62.2	66.9	39.6	833

Source: British Social Attitudes survey (2003).

As we can see, people who have “civic only” conceptions of citizenship are much more likely to support rights to acquire citizenship and to give equal rights to legal immigrants. The “neither civic nor ethnic” group comes next, while the “ethnic-cum-civic” group is the most hostile to these rights.

## 2. National Pride and Patriotic Sentiments

Heath *et al.* (1999) have shown the continued importance of British national sentiment as a notion which should be “conceptualised as an autonomous principle in its own right” for its explanatory power in determining views on issues such as Europe, nuclear defence, devolution and Irish unification in survey analysis (Heath *et al.* 1999: 158). Similarly, Hutchinson and Smith have stated that “what is often conceded is the power, even primacy, of national loyalties and identities over those of even class, gender and race” (Hutchinson and Smith 1994: 4).

Using a battery of questions from the ISSP (and very similar to those originally developed by Heath et al. in 1994), we can create a scale measuring how “patriotic” individuals are. This might be best thought of as a measure of affective attachment to the nation, capturing an emotional bond or sense of closeness. The scale uses the following questions:

*Please tick one box to say how much you agree or disagree with the following statements [Agree strongly / Agree / Neither agree nor disagree / Disagree / Disagree strongly / Can't choose]*

- *I would rather be a citizen of Britain than of any other country in the world.*
- *There are some things about Britain today that make me feel ashamed of Britain.*
- *The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the British.*
- *Generally speaking, Britain is a better country than most other countries.*
- *People should always support their country, even if the country is in the wrong.*
- *When my country does well in international sports, it makes me feel proud to be British.*
- *I am often less proud of Britain than I would like to be.*

Answers to these seven items were turned into a “patriotism scale”, scored from 0 (least patriotic) to 10 (most patriotic). (See also McCrone and SurrIDGE 1998 for their use of these items in a similar fashion.) These items work well as a single scale, all the items falling into a single dimension and the overall scale having a high level of internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha of 0.68). This patriotism scale also correlates well with a simple measure of national pride (a correlation of 0.60).

We suggested earlier that this notion of patriotism was conceptually distinct from our measures of ethnic and civic conceptions of national identity. However, empirically we find that there is a strong association between our measure of patriotism and the scale measuring an ethnic conception of identity. The correlation between the two measures is 0.56, whereas the correlation between patriotism and a civic conception is much weaker at 0.31. Not surprisingly, therefore, we find that there is a strong association between our typology of national identities and the new measure of patriotism. As Table 5 shows, people who have ethnic-cum-civic conceptions of British identity have the highest score on the patriotism scale; people with “civic only” conceptions have rather lower scores; while the third group, who reject both civic and ethnic conceptions, have the lowest levels of patriotism.

**Table 5:** Conceptions of National Identity, Patriotism and Internationalism

	Mean score on patriotism score	Agree that international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions (%)	Agree that Britain should follow decision of international organisations (%)	n
Ethnic and civic	6.0	60.1	19.8	439
Civic only	4.6	71.3	28.7	300
Neither	4.2	57.7	24.4	78
All	5.3	63.3	23.2	833

Source: British Social Attitudes survey (2003).

This third group, who subscribe neither to a civic nor to an ethnic conception of national identity, is particularly interesting. The data on patriotism and pride indicate that the members of this group are the least attached in an affective way to the British nation, even though they are all British citizens. National identity, then, appears not to be particularly salient to them. However, it would be wrong to think of this group as postnationalists in Dogan's sense. The ISSP asked a number of questions about relations with international organisations, for example:

*How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?*

- *For certain problems, like environment pollution, international bodies should have the right to enforce solutions.*
- *In general Britain should follow the decision of international organisations to which it belongs, even if the government does not agree with them.*

As Table 5 shows, our third group were not especially likely to support international organisations. On these issues they are rather close to the average for the public as a whole, although they also tend to be more likely to give "neither agree nor disagree" responses. Rather than characterising them as postnationalists, it might be more accurate to describe them as disengaged. Nationalism does not mean a great deal to them, but that does not entail positive views towards internationalism or other issues. In fact it is our "civic only" group that tends to be most internationalist.

### 3. Attitudes to Immigration

In what ways, then, are these measures of ethnic and civic conceptions of national identity and of patriotism related to attitudes towards immigration? We first look at attitudes towards immigration policy, that is at questions about whether migrants from other countries should be allowed to enter the UK. We have two key questions here:



- *Do you think the number of immigrants to Britain nowadays should be increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, reduced a lot?*
- *How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? ... Britain should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants.*

Table 6 shows responses to these two questions broken down by our typology of national identity. A large majority of the sample as a whole thought that the number of immigrants should be reduced and that stronger measures should be taken to exclude illegal immigrants. In this respect the British public, despite its generally civic conception of identity, is not especially welcoming to immigrants. However, there were major differences in response between our three groups. The first group – those with ethnic-cum-civic conceptions – were much more strongly inclined to exclude immigrants, whereas those with civic but not ethnic conceptions were distinctly more liberal on both questions (as were the “neither ethnic nor civic” group).

**Table 6:** Conceptions of National Identity and Attitudes towards Immigration

	Agree that number of immigrants should be reduced (%)	Agree that stronger measures should be taken to exclude illegal immigrants (%)	n
Ethnic and civic	85.0	87.3	439
Civic only	60.3	78.7	300
Neither	64.1	70.6	78
All	74.0	82.6	833

*Source:* British Social Attitudes survey (2003).

We also find that our measure of patriotism tends to be associated with anti-immigrant attitudes: the more patriotic the individual, the more likely they are to say that the number of immigrants should be reduced. If we undertake a multivariate analysis, including our measures of civic and ethnic conceptions as well as patriotism, we find that the relationship with patriotism becomes non-significant. In other words, it is not patriotism per se that leads to hostility towards immigration but an ethnic conception of the nation.

#### 4. Modes of Incorporation

A second distinct set of concerns is not about immigration into Britain but how the immigrants should adapt to British life. A key distinction here is between an assimilationist view, which historically has been perhaps the dominant view, and a multicultural view which has come into prominence more recently in a number of Western countries, most notably in Canada where multiculturalism has become

official policy following the 1989 Multiculturalism Act. Multiculturalism has also seen some official support in Britain, although it is highly contested.

Two questions are relevant to these debates in the ISSP module:

- *How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions.*
- *Some people say that it is better for a country if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions. Others say that it is better if these groups adapt and blend into the larger society. Which of these views comes closer to your own?*

**Table 7:** Conceptions of National Identity and Attitudes towards Assimilation and Multiculturalism

	Agree that ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs (%)	Agree that it is better if groups adapt and blend into the larger society (%)	n
Civic and ethnic	13.3	61.3	439
Civic	20.5	53.4	300
Neither	20.5	40.8	78
All	16.4	56.2	

*Source:* British Social Attitudes survey (2003).

Clearly, there is little support for multiculturalism in Britain and rather more preference for assimilation. However, it is important to recognise that many respondents did not have a clear view on either of these issues. Around a quarter of respondents said “neither agree nor disagree” to the first question and around a quarter said “can’t choose” in answer to the second. Despite their contentiousness among elites, these issues do not appear to have great resonance with the public.

However, to the extent that people do have views, we find that respondents with more ethnic conceptions tend to favour more assimilationist policies than do the other two groups. The differences are relatively small, however, and we should note that the rather low proportion of assimilationist responses on the part of the “neither civic nor ethnic” group actually reflects a particularly high level of indifference in this group rather than a positive preference for multiculturalism.

## 5. Racial Prejudice and Fair Employment

Apart from issues of assimilation and multiculturalism, an important question is how immigrants are treated once they have arrived. Should they be treated the same as the indigenous white majority with respect to housing, education and employment? Whereas the United Kingdom has not gone as far as the United States with affirmative action programmes to ensure equal access to education and jobs, it has none the less officially supported equality of opportunity, and a succession of Acts in 1967, 1976 and 2000 have legislated against racial discrimination.

The ISSP module did not ask any questions on this topic, but the issue has been covered in previous British Social Attitudes surveys and in the European Social Survey (ESS). According to the ESS, for example, around 70 per cent of the British public in 2001 supported "... a law against racial or ethnic discrimination in the workplace". Similar results had previously been found in the British Social Attitudes survey with around 75 per cent in 1997 supporting the "*law in Britain against racial discrimination, that is against giving unfair preference to a particular race in housing, jobs and so on*".

We found that attitudes towards racial discrimination laws were closely linked to people's own self-assessed racial prejudice, with people who admitted to being prejudiced not surprisingly also opposing these laws.

**Table 8:** Conceptions of National Identity and Self-Assessed Prejudice

	Describe themselves as a little or a great deal prejudiced (%)	n
Ethnic and civic	37.1	432
Civic only	25.0	299
Neither	16.7	78
All	30.1	836

Source: British Social Attitudes survey (2003).

Table 8 again shows that respondents in our "ethnic-cum-civic" group tended to be the most likely to describe themselves as prejudiced. The "civic only" group were markedly less likely to say that they were prejudiced, whereas the "neither civic nor ethnic" group were the least likely to admit to prejudice. In this respect, disengagement from the nation appears to accompany a more tolerant approach to strangers.

## **6. Conclusions**

On the whole, Britain is not particularly welcoming to immigrants. Three-quarters of our sample felt that the number of immigrants should be reduced and four-fifths felt that stronger measures should be taken to exclude illegal immigrants. However, once immigrants have arrived, the British public appear to be rather more tolerant. Most people do not have strong views on questions of assimilation and multiculturalism, and most are in favour of laws outlawing discrimination. This is in line with public policy, where successive governments (of both main parties) have successively toughened immigration and citizenship laws but at the same time have strengthened legislation to outlaw racial discrimination.

Underlying this pattern is the key role of ethnic conceptions of citizenship. As we noted, there is broad consensus in Britain on the importance of civic aspects, such as respecting political institutions, for British identity but there is also dissent on the importance of ancestry. People who feel that ancestry is important for being British also want to reduce the number of immigrants, to remove illegal immigrants, are more likely to report that they are racially prejudiced, and are (probably) less enthusiastic about anti-discrimination laws.

Patriotism, in contrast, at least as we have measured it, plays a relatively minor role. There is a correlation between patriotism and having an ethnic conception of the nation (although in part this is because the least patriotic are the most disengaged and tend to think that nothing much matters for national identity). But once we have taken account of the ethnic dimension, patriotism turns out to be only weakly related to anti-immigrant feeling.

The civic dimension is rather separate. To be sure, it is correlated with patriotism and with the civic dimension (although again partly because the disengaged reject both civic and ethnic conceptions). But it is not linked in any way to anti-immigrant feeling. Instead it tends to link up with multiculturalism, although the strength of this link should not be exaggerated.

As previous research has shown, people who regard ethnic aspects of national identity as important tend to be rather older than members of our “civic only” group, whereas the “neither civic nor ethnic” group tends to be the youngest. From our data it is not possible to say whether these age differences reflect life cycle or generational factors. Our best guess is that the disengagement of the young may be more a result of their early stage in the life cycle, whereas the emphasis on ancestry of older people may be more a consequence of generational differences, reflecting the climate when they grew up. If this interpretation is correct, then we might expect to see Britain gradually move further towards a “civic only” conception of identity.

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# Nation, Citizenship and Immigration in Contemporary Spain

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*The theoretical literatures on nationalism and citizenship have often relied on the distinction between civic and ethnic models. The applicability of this distinction to ordinary citizens' views has been taken for granted but remains largely untested. This paper uses Spanish data to contrast the civic/ethnic distinction with a Weberian one that contrasts bearers of restrictive and open conceptions of nationhood and citizenship. The statistical results suggest that this second distinction is a more valid construct than the traditional one.*

Of the large number of studies on nationalism that have been published over the last twenty-five years, few have focused on Spanish nationalism and issues of citizenship in the Spanish state. Contributions to the study of Spanish nationalism by Andrés de Blas (1989), José Álvarez Junco (2001), and Borja de Riquer (1994), work on immigration policy by researchers such as Antonio Izquierdo (1992, 1996) and Ricard Zapata (2002), and legal sources on nationality and citizenship, suffice to provide an overview of historical trends in official conceptions of the Spanish nation and in citizenship and immigration policies.

In contrast to the stereotyped understanding of the nation, according to which its alleged members unanimously identify with it and agree on what defines it, historical and sociological research demonstrates that this is rarely the case (Hechter 1975; Díez Medrano 1995). Not all residents of the Basque Country identify with a Basque nation called “Euskadi”, nor do all residents of the United Kingdom – not even British citizens – identify themselves as British. Similarly, the process of nation-building has been, and still is, fraught with conflict between contrasting visions of the nation. This conflict was perhaps lesser in the French or English cases than in the Spanish, German or Italian cases. In the former, a republican or liberal version of the nation became hegemonic relatively early on. This conception rested on the will of the people to participate in a common project, and, like in most states that formed before the age of nationalism, stressed the main epic events in the countries' respective histories (e.g. Greenfeld 1995; Colley 1992).

In Spain, a liberal version of the nation competed with a conservative, ethnic one, until the end of the Francoist regime in the second half of the 1970s. As Álvarez

Junco demonstrates in *Mater Dolorosa* (2001), conservative sectors took a long time to accept the concept of the nation, but when they did, towards the middle of the nineteenth century, they gave it a profoundly Roman Catholic content. For conservatives, Catholicism was the essence of the Spanish nation: Being Spanish was one and the same as being Catholic. With the restoration of democracy, the liberal conception of the Spanish nation triumphed over the conservative one. Its main dimensions are subjective and territorial (where territoriality often encompasses the old extra-European Imperial possessions and Portugal and Andorra). Thus, although the law on Spanish nationality includes a biological element, expressed in the granting of Spanish citizenship to all descendants of Spanish parents or grandparents, it also contains naturalisation requirements that are homologous to those found in other Western democracies.

Apart from Catholicism, neither language nor descent have been as relevant in defining the Spanish nation as they have been in defining other nations. Nonetheless, both language and descent have entered the nationalist vocabulary of the Spanish population through the peripheral nationalist movements of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia. Language, for example, has been a central element in Catalan and Galician nationalism and is increasingly so in Basque nationalism. Meanwhile, descent (as expressed in an emphasis on the predominance of a certain blood type among the population) was a central element in the early official definition of the Basque nation and continues to linger as part of the way both Basque and Spanish nationalists imagine the Basque nation.

The dominant model of citizenship in Spain is consistent with the official definition of the Spanish nation. Contrary to what happened during the period that Hobsbawm calls the “Age of Empire”, when it was possible to have a country’s nationality without being a citizen of that same country, in contemporary Spain to be Spanish is equivalent to being a Spanish citizen. One must examine the requirements for acquiring Spanish nationality/citizenship in order to evaluate the more or less liberal character of the citizenship model prevailing in Spain. Both the Constitution and the Civil Code include *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* elements in their definition of Spanish citizenship and in regulations to acquire it. Although being born in Spain does not confer automatic Spanish citizenship, which distinguishes Spain from other Western democracies, the legal residence requirement to acquire citizenship immediately after birth is only one year. One year of legal residence is also required of foreign citizens married to Spanish citizens. Meanwhile, legal residents of Spain who were born abroad must wait ten years before they are entitled to apply for Spanish citizenship. Legal residents who are Sephardic Jews or who were born in Portugal, Andorra, or any of the countries that were part of the extra-European Spanish empire, however, must wait only two years before they are entitled to apply for Spanish citizenship. These written legal requirements for obtaining Spanish citizenship date back to the 1889 Civil Code, a period in which there was no meaningful immigration to Spain.

Effective legal residence in Spain is thus the main prerequisite for becoming a Spanish citizen for those without Spanish descent and, in fact, recent research shows that numerous obstacles to obtaining legal residence substantially undermine the liberal character of Spain's citizenship model (Cornelius 2003). Apart from legal residence, other significant requirements for Spanish citizenship are good behaviour – in principle, an ethnically neutral criterion – and proof of effective integration into Spanish society. Both criteria were already spelled out in the 1889 Civil Code and although the burden of proof falls on the applicants, we know little about the extent to which this requirement is used to discriminate by race, religion or other ethnic characteristics. Basic knowledge of the Spanish language is the main indicator of integration that the law requires but, unlike in other states, there is no language test.

Recent developments in Spanish citizenship law have tended towards the elimination of barriers to the possibility of keeping or applying for Spanish nationality for the population of Spanish descent. Changes in the Civil Code, for example, have made it possible for individuals residing abroad to become Spanish citizens if their grandparents were Spanish by origin, regardless of whether they or their children at some point lost or gave up their Spanish citizenship. Changes in the law have also made it easier for Spanish citizens to acquire another nationality without losing the Spanish one. It suffices nowadays to notify public authorities, within three years of the acquisition of the new passport, of one's desire to retain Spanish nationality.

The official model of integration for the immigrant population in Spain corresponds to the liberal model. This liberal approach actually contrasts with the explicitly multiculturalist spirit that characterises the integration of the different territorially located cultures that comprise the Spanish state: Thus, the Spanish Constitution states that the Spanish nation proclaims its will to “protect all Spaniards and the peoples of Spain in the exercise of their human rights, their cultures and traditions, their languages and institutions”. Instead of adopting a multiculturalist policy towards immigrants, consistent with its policy towards peripheral national groups, the Spanish state has guaranteed immigrants a certain number of civil, political and social rights, and has remained neutral with respect to the different immigrant cultures. Undoubtedly, however, this policy translates in practice into a policy of linguistic assimilation (to Spanish and to the different regional languages) and of institutional discrimination against religions other than Catholicism (in education, for example, where the Roman Catholic Church enjoys financial privileges with respect to other religions and where religious education has generally been limited to the teaching of Catholicism).

Spanish immigration policy dates from the mid-1980s and has been repeatedly revised since then, as immigration flows have increased. From this paper's perspective it is worth emphasising that government policy has not encouraged or discouraged immigration. There is indeed a strong debate on the benefits and costs of this entirely new phenomenon for Spanish society. Instead, immigration policy



has aimed to control the flows and to reduce the number of illegal immigrants, so far unsuccessfully (Izquierdo 1992, 1996; Cornelius 2003; Arango 2000). It has also remained formally neutral with respect to the geographical origin of newcomers, even though bilateral treaties with countries that send particularly high numbers of people have strengthened pre-existing migration flows. As in the majority of Western societies, there is no explicit policy favouring immigrants from specific cultural or racial groups.

I examine Spaniards' conceptions of the nation, their views on citizenship and integration, and their attitudes towards immigration and immigrants. One goal pursued in this analysis is to determine the extent to which the Spanish population's views on these topics are consistent with the corresponding official and institutionalised versions. In addition, I analyse the degree of congruence between Spaniards' views on these different but related topics. Finally, I contrast the construct validity of two typologies of concepts of nationhood. The first draws from the literature on nationalism, which roughly distinguishes between civic and ethnic conceptions of the nation. The alternative concept draws from Weber's ideas on social closure. It posits that groups differentiate themselves from one another by the number of hurdles they set to those who want to become legitimate members of the community. Postnationalists are indifferent to whether individuals fulfil any criterion whatsoever, whereas credentialists demand the fulfilment of a long list of criteria for inclusion in the national community. The relative construct validity of these two typologies is here determined by empirically examining how they correlate with selected variables. The construct whose associations with these other variables are stronger can be said to have greater construct validity. The data that I analyse were collected in 2003 as part of the National Identity module of the International Social Survey Programme. It is the second survey that has been conducted on this topic, the first one dating back to 1995 (for detailed analysis of this and related surveys on attitudes towards immigrants, see Díez Nicolás 1998, 1999; Díez Nicolás and Ramírez Lafita 2001).

## 1. The Meaning of Being Spanish

The survey on national identity asked respondents to say how important they thought that certain characteristics were for determining whether a person could be considered Spanish. The question read:

- *Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think the following is ...*

The possible answers were Very important / Important / Not very important / Not important at all. The list of characteristics presented to the respondents encompassed all key dimensions referred to in the literature on nationalism. Seven of them were part of a single battery, whereas the last item was included in another section of the questionnaire and was worded differently:

*How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement(s)?*

- *It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY'S] customs and traditions to become fully [COUNTRY'S NATIONALITY]*

In contrast to the other battery of questions, the possible answers to this question included the middle category “neither agree nor disagree”, which undoubtedly may have had an impact on the percentage of respondents who said that they agreed or disagreed.

Empirical studies that have examined models of nationhood among the population have taken the ethnic/civic distinction at face value and readily interpreted the dimensions resulting from factor analysis as describing the ethnic/civic cleavage. Little has been made of the fact that, depending on the country, the factor analysis solution places the same specific items in either the “ethnic” or the “civic” dimension. Examples of this are language or birth in the state’s territory, which are alternatively described as ethnic or civic items. Furthermore, exploratory factor analysis as practised is built on the questionable assumption that all items of nationhood measure either the ethnic and civic dimensions of nationhood. Finally, we rarely read about the validity and reliability of the indicators that are taken to measure ethnic and civic conceptions of the nation. Rather than follow tradition, I prefer to start from the definition of ethnic and civic models of nationhood and classify citizens accordingly, based on this definition and on the criteria citizens choose as indicators of membership in the state community.

The criteria for citizenship included in the questionnaire can be classified into various categories:

- *Pure republican criteria: Long-term residence, feeling of belonging, and being a citizen of that state*
- *Political criteria: Respect for laws and political institutions*
- *Territorial criteria: Place of birth*
- *Cultural criteria: Language, religion, customs and traditions*
- *Descent*

The survey results refute simplistic conceptualisations of the nation that isolate this or that factor as the one that defines it. First, Spaniards notably consider all criteria important or very important (see Table 1); second, the correlations between the various items are positive, which suggests at the very least that Spaniards hold a complex conception of the nation, combining republican and other criteria. Alternatively, we could follow Weber in distinguishing between individuals who set numerous barriers to membership and those who set fewer ones. From this perspective, instead of republicans, ethno-nationalists, and so on, populations are divided between individuals with a credentialist vision of the nation, which keeps aspiring members out by setting a stringent and somewhat arbitrary list of criteria

for membership; and postnational individuals, who are indifferent to who is a member of the nation. The distribution of respondents according to how many criteria of Spanishness they consider important or very important shows that the very large majority of respondents have a credentialist vision of the nation. The mean, median and modal values for this distribution are 7, 8 and 8 respectively.

The only characteristic to which respondents attached little importance in defining who is a member of the nation was adaptation to Spanish customs and traditions. Only 23 per cent thought that this was important or very important. It is likely that this comparatively low percentage reflects the impact of the stronger wording (“It is impossible ...”) or of the inclusion of a middle category in the response set for this question. Nonetheless, the contrast between agreement with this question and agreement with the other items is large enough to justify the conclusion that adaptation to Spain’s customs and traditions is not high on the list of traits that Spaniards identify as defining membership in the Spanish nation.

Another criterion to which respondents attached relatively little importance was being Catholic, rated important or very important by 43 per cent of respondents. This finding is substantively significant because it shows that the National-Catholic ideology, if it ever had a hold on people’s minds, is no longer part of the Spanish population’s representation of the Spanish nation. Even among those who are 60 years old or older, the group that was most exposed to this ideology, only 60 per cent of respondents said that being a Catholic is important or very important for truly being a Spaniard. This is a lower percentage than those found within this same age group for all the remaining criteria, except that of adapting to the country’s customs and traditions.

**Table 1:** Importance of Different Criteria in Belonging to the Spanish Nation

Prerequisites for being a Spaniard	“Important” and “Very important” (%)
To have been born in Spain	87.4
To have Spanish citizenship	86.8
To have lived in Spain for most of one’s life	85.2
To be able to speak Spanish	82.9
To be a Catholic	43.2
To respect Spain’s political institutions and laws	89.3
To feel Spanish	86.8
To have Spanish ancestors	77.7
To share Spain’s customs and traditions*	22.8

\*This item does not belong to the same battery as the other items and appears later in the questionnaire.

Source: International Social Survey Programme (2003).

In order to convey the complexity of the population’s definitions of nationhood and at the same time link these survey results for the Spanish population to the

literature on the nation, I have classified respondents in different categories that reflect the criteria that they considered important or very important for truly being a Spaniard. This classification is perhaps less elegant than a simple distinction between civic and ethnic conceptions of the nation, but it comes closer to how citizens actually define membership of the nation. One major finding is that the large majority of respondents held a republican conception of the nation; that is, a conception where at least two of the following criteria – citizenship, the will to be part of the nation, and long-term residence in the state’s territory – are seen as important or very important. More than 80 per cent of respondents fall within this category (see Table 2). Meanwhile, the percentages of respondents who did not mention descent as important (see Table 1: 22.3 per cent), who did not attach importance to at least two of the core republican criteria (citizenship, will, long-term residence) (Table 2: *Non-republican* category) (5.9 per cent), or who did not find any of the listed criteria important (Table 2: *Indifferent* category) (1.1 per cent) are all low or very low.

The classification in Table 2 also differentiates republican respondents according to the number of criteria they consider important or very important. The category that I have labelled *Republican, with strong ethno-biological content and with politico-territorial content*, for example, includes respondents for whom all the cultural criteria as well as the political, the territorial, and two of the typically republican criteria (citizenship, will, long-term residence) are important. The percentage of republican respondents who fall in this category is smaller than that of those falling in other less restrictive ethno-biological categories. At the same time, Table 2 shows that few republican respondents expressed a “purely” republican conception of the nation, even when the territorial (birth) and political criteria are added. Only 1.2 per cent of respondents fell into this category.

**Table 2:** National Conceptions within the Spanish Population

	% (number of cases)
Non-republican	5.9 (71)
Ethno-biological republican	0.6 (7)
Republican, with strong ethno-biological content and with politico-territorial content	21.9 (265)
Republican, with moderate ethno-biological content and with politico-territorial content	29.1 (353)
Republican, with weak ethno-biological content and with politico-territorial content	22.0 (267)
Republican, with ethnic and politico-territorial content	9.2 (111)
Republican, politico-territorial	1.2 (14)
Indifferent (no trait is important)	1.1 (13)
Not classified	0.2 (2)
Missing values	9.0 (109)
Total	100 (1212)

Source: International Social Survey Programme (2003).

## 2. Nation and Citizenship

Recent literature on citizenship has stopped concentrating solely on rights and moved to the comparative analysis of rules for becoming a citizen (e.g. Joppke 1999, 2005). The main trend in Europe since the end of the twentieth century was for *jus sanguinis* to be complemented by *jus soli* (Joppke 2003). Spain has been a part of this trend at the same time as its legislation has reinforced the role of descent in the right to Spanish citizenship. The questionnaire on national identity asked respondents to express their degree of agreement or disagreement with two sentences concerning the requirements individuals need to fulfil in order to become Spanish citizens. They tap on the *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* dimensions of national identity. The sentences read as follows:

- *Children born in Spain of parents who are not citizens should have the right to become Spanish citizens.*
- *Children born abroad should have the right to become Spanish citizens if at least one of their parents is a Spanish citizen.*

It is useful to note that although the Spanish law on citizenship grants Spanish citizenship in the second case, it does not do so automatically in the first case. As noted above, however, one year of legal residence grants legal guardians the right to apply for Spanish citizenship on behalf of their Spanish-born child. Citizenship is granted as long as the Consulate or Consulates of the parents can certify that the child does not already have another citizenship.

**Table 3:** Criteria for Granting Spanish Citizenship

		Children born in Spain of parents who are not citizens should have the right to become Spanish citizens – % (number of cases)					
		Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	Total
Children born abroad should have the right to become Spanish citizens if at least one of their parents is a Spanish citizen	Strongly disagree	0.1 (1)			0.1 (1)	0.3 (3)	0.4 (5)
	Disagree	0.1 (1)	2.3 (26)	0.1 (1)	5.1 (58)	0.3 (3)	7.8 (89)
	Neither agree nor disagree	0.1 (1)	3.3 (38)	10.2 (117)	8.5 (97)	0.5 (6)	22.6 (259)
	Agree	0.3 (4)	3.5 (40)	6.0 (69)	41.3 (473)	3.2 (37)	54.4 (623)
	Strongly agree	3.0 (34)	0.7 (8)	0.6 (7)	2.1 (24)	8.5 (97)	14.8 (170)
	Total	3.6 (41)	9.8 (112)	16.9 (194)	57.0 (653)	12.7 (146)	100 (1146)

Source: International Social Survey Programme (2003).

Table 3 classifies respondents based on their reactions to the above two sentences. It shows that the majority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with both (55.1 per cent) and that the percentages of respondents who agreed with one of the sentences but disagreed with the other were small and very similar. In this sense, the views on citizenship of the majority of respondents are basically aligned with official guidelines. Nonetheless, a large percentage of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with at least one of the sentences. In conclusion, although there is no unanimity behind a particular model of citizenship, there is no significant opposition to what one can call the liberal model.

### **3. Post-Citizenship**

The last decades have witnessed a gradual extension of human rights uncoupled from citizenship (Soysal 1994). Spain has participated in this evolution, despite limitations on the civil and political rights of illegal immigrants that have repeatedly been denounced by Amnesty International. The large majority of Spaniards support this trend towards dissociating rights from citizenship. The survey on national identity shows indeed that three out of four Spanish respondents were in favour of legal immigrants benefiting from the same rights as Spanish citizens. This does not mean, however, that Spaniards no longer attach special status to being a citizen. The results discussed above certainly show that for most Spaniards territoriality, expressed through birth or residence, is the foundation of the Spanish demos. For the majority of Spaniards, the subject of rights is no longer the citizen but the resident. Thus 55 per cent of respondents in this survey supported both granting automatic citizenship to children born in Spain of foreign parents and granting legal immigrants the same rights as Spanish citizens. However, 14 per cent of respondents, while willing to grant the same rights to legal immigrants as to Spanish citizens, opposed granting automatic citizenship to children born in Spain of foreign parents. For these respondents, although the status of citizen is no longer tied to the enjoyment of rights, it still symbolizes membership in the nation. In fact, 85 per cent of them considered that it is important to be of Spanish descent in order to being a true Spaniard. This percentage contrasts with the 70 per cent found among those who supported both granting automatic citizenship to children born in Spain to foreign parents and granting legal immigrants the same rights as Spanish citizens.

### **4. Models of Integration for Immigrants**

The current wave of immigration to Europe has triggered intense debate on multiculturalism, that is on the collective rights of immigrants and on the state's obligation to protect these rights and promote immigrants' cultures (e.g. Joppke 2001; Kymlicka 2002). At the theoretical level, this debate has focused on the compatibility between multiculturalism in its many-faceted expressions and the traditional liberal state. The data from the Spanish survey on national identity provides relevant information on the model of integration that Spaniards prefer.

The questionnaire for this survey includes two questions that refer to multiculturalism. The first asks respondents to choose between the following two models of integration:

- *It is better for society if groups maintain their customs and traditions.*
- *It is better if groups adapt and blend into the larger society.*

The great majority of respondents, 61 per cent, supported the second, assimilationist, option.

**Table 4:** Assimilation or Multiculturalism?

	% (number of cases)
It is better for society if groups maintain their customs and traditions	28.5 (345)
It is better if groups adapt and blend into the larger society	60.7 (736)
Missing values	10.8 (131)
Total	100 (1212)

*Source:* International Social Survey Programme (2003).

The second question relating to Spaniards' preferred model of integration investigates support for state-promoted multiculturalism. It asks respondents to express their agreement or disagreement with the following sentence:

- *Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions.*

Although those who agreed outnumber those who disagreed, only 39 per cent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. It is also puzzling and a contradiction that this percentage is higher than that of those who supported a multicultural society. In fact, 22 per cent of respondents said that they support government assistance to ethnic minorities so that they preserve their customs and traditions and at the same time expressed a preference for a society in which immigrants adapt and blend into the larger society. There is no obvious explanation for this finding.

The cross-tabulation of answers to the two questions on multiculturalism also shows that about 13 per cent of respondents expressed what could be labelled as "passive multiculturalism", 15 per cent expressed "proactive multiculturalism" and 22 per cent expressed "consequent assimilationism", that is a preference for a situation in which immigrants blend into the larger society and in which the state

passively contributes to this goal by not spending resources on the preservation of these groups' customs and traditions. One can again conclude that Spanish attitudes are largely aligned with official policy, a policy that can be defined as mildly assimilationist.

**Table 5:** Proactive Multiculturalism

	Ethnic minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions – % (number of cases)
Strongly disagree	3.6 (44)
Disagree	17.2 (209)
Neither agree nor disagree	35.1 (426)
Agree	35.8 (434)
Strongly agree	3.4 (41)
Missing values	4.9 (58)
Total	100 (1212)

*Source:* International Social Survey Programme (2003).

## 5. Attitudes towards Immigration

Scholars interested in nationalism and citizenship have centred their analysis of immigration policy on whether these policies are selective on the basis of ethnicity or race. According to Joppke (2003), immigration policy has tended to become de-ethnicised and to emphasise economic needs and family reunification. Spain's immigration policy fits within this description even though immigrants have tended to come from a selected group of countries in Latin America and North Africa. Spain's governments have also been permissive towards and regulated immigration and fought, rather unsuccessfully, against illegal immigration. Tables 6 and 7 show that Spaniards' attitudes towards the arrival of immigrants and the fight against illegal immigrants are aligned with government policy. Table 6, for example, shows that respondents were cautiously favourable towards the arrival of immigrants. The modal answer (36 per cent) is that flows should remain at their current level, but 35 per cent preferred them to diminish a little. Also like the government, Spaniards strongly oppose illegal immigration, as Table 7 demonstrates. Half the respondents favoured tightening of measures taken to fight it, whereas one in five opposed such measures.



**Table 6:** Attitudes towards Immigration Flows

Do you think that the number of immigrants to Spain nowadays should be	% (number of cases)
Reduced a lot	13.0 (158)
Reduced a little	34.6 (419)
Remain the same	35.7 (433)
Increased a little	6.7 (81)
Increased a lot	2.4 (29)
Missing values	7.6 (92)
Total	100 (1212)

Source: International Social Survey Programme (2003).

**Table 7:** Attitudes towards Illegal Immigration

Spain should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants	% (number of cases)
Strongly disagree	5.1 (62)
Disagree	17.0 (206)
Neither agree nor disagree	23.3 (283)
Agree	40.0 (485)
Strongly agree	10.5 (127)
DK/NA	4.1 (49)
Total	100 (1212)

Source: International Social Survey Programme (2003).

One would expect respondents who favour an assimilationist model of integration to oppose the arrival of new migrants more than do respondents with multiculturalist views. Multiculturalist views indeed express a positive attitude towards cultural diversity, whereas assimilationist views express a preference for cultural homogeneity. Table 8 contrasts this hypothesis and shows that assimilationists are slightly more opposed to immigration than are multiculturalists.

In sum, there is little consensus among Spaniards with regard to immigration policies and to how to integrate immigrants. In general, they are cautious about immigrants and somewhat favourable towards the tightening of measures against illegal immigration, but there is no generalised feeling of rejection towards the arrival of immigrants. Finally, the analysis above shows that there is a slight association between assimilationist attitudes and opposition to immigration.

**Table 8:** Attitudes towards Integration of Immigrants and Arrival of Immigrants

		Model of integration (%) ( <i>n</i> )		Total
		It is better for society if groups maintain their customs and traditions	It is better if groups adapt and blend into the larger society	
Attitudes towards the arrival of immigrants	Increased a lot	11.7 (37)	14.2 (102)	13.5 (139)
	Increased a little	35.1 (111)	38.4 (275)	37.4 (386)
	Remain the same	37.7 (119)	39.3 (282)	38.8 (401)
	Decreased a little	10.4 (33)	6.4 (46)	7.6 (79)
	Decreased a lot	5.1 (16)	1.7 (12)	2.7 (28)
	Total	100 (316)	100 (7 17)	100 (1033)

Source: International Social Survey Programme (2003).

## 6. Perceptions on Immigrants

Most public opinion research on immigration has focused on perceptions of and attitudes towards immigrants. Research on xenophobia expresses rising concern in Western democracies about increasing support for far-right political parties. The relationship that may exist between visions of the nation and attitudes towards immigrants has been largely ignored in this type of study, however, which contrasts with the strong interest in this relationship among more historically oriented scholars (e.g. Greenfeld 1995; Brubaker 1992). Greenfeld, for example, posits a direct link between the ethnic character of the German nation and the Holocaust. In this section, I examine how Spaniards perceive immigrants and in the next section I examine the relationship between visions of the nation and these perceptions.

The questionnaire on national identity includes a battery of statements concerning the impact that immigrants have on Spanish society. Respondents had to say whether they agreed or disagreed with these statements. Table 9 displays the ratios of those who agreed to those who disagreed with each of the statements.


The percentages in this table reveal that respondents generally agreed with positive statements about immigrants but were divided on the negative ones. The two sentences for which there was the most agreement were those on the immigrants' contribution to rising crime rates (55 per cent) and to bringing new ideas and cultures (57 per cent). The sentence for which there was the least agreement was that about immigrants taking jobs from those born in Spain (39 per cent).

**Table 9:** Ratio of Agreement to Disagreement with Statements Referring to Immigrants

	Ratio agree/disagree
Immigrants increase crime rates	2.44
Immigrants are generally good for Spain's economy	2.96
Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in Spain	1.00
Immigrants improve Spain's society by bringing new ideas and cultures	4.72
Government spends too much money assisting immigrants	1.19

Source: International Social Survey Programme (2003).

In order to simplify the analysis of the relationship between these perceptions and other variables considered here, I have estimated a confirmatory factor analysis for the items. This type of analysis assumes that the items measure only imperfectly the respondents' position on a particular topic. Confirmatory factor analysis uses the information provided by each of the items and their associations with each other to better measure the respondents' underlying stand on a particular problem, by removing random measurement error. The confirmatory factor analysis shows, however, that there are not one but two interrelated factors, one encompassing the negatively worded items and the other encompassing the positively worded ones (Figure 1). As the validity and reliability of the items for the second factor are rather low, however, the analysis that follows uses only the factor formed by the answers to the three negatively worded items.

**Figure 1:** Confirmatory Factor Analysis Concerning Perceptions about Immigrants

Source: International Social Survey Programme (2003).

For example, the relationship between negative perceptions of immigrants and the respondents' preferred model of integration for immigrants can be examined. The expectation is that respondents with assimilationist views perceive immigrants more negatively than respondents with multiculturalist views. The results presented in Table 10 confirm this hypothesis. In particular, proactive multiculturalists perceived immigrants in a more favourable light than did assimilationists.

**Table 10:** Multiculturalism and Perceptions of Immigrants

Models of integration	Average value for the factor "Negative perception of the immigrants' impact on Spanish society"
Non-multiculturalist (it would be best if immigrants assimilate; the state should not actively protect ethnic minorities' cultures)	0.20 (401)
Fatalist multiculturalist (it would be best if immigrants assimilate; the state should actively protect ethnic minorities' cultures)	-0.02 (233)
Passive multiculturalist (it would be best if immigrants keep their cultures; the state should not actively protect ethnic minorities' cultures)	-0.11 (148)
Proactive multiculturalist (it would be best if immigrants keep their cultures; the state should actively protect ethnic minorities' cultures)	-0.30 (165)

*Source:* International Social Survey Programme (2003).

## 7. Nationhood, Citizenship and Immigration

The previous pages have examined Spanish views on a series of topics relating to the immigration phenomenon. In general, contrary to the oversimplifications that tends to occur in the nationalism and citizenship literatures, this analysis has shown a great degree of heterogeneity of views among the population. The nations in the name of which nationalists and scholars of nationalism speak are divided nations, groups in which heterogeneous and not always coherent visions compete against each other (Díez Medrano 1995). Despite this heterogeneity, however, not only has the analysis shown a great deal of alignment between elite and popular views, but it has also confirmed the great majority of the hypotheses proposed in the literatures on nationalism and citizenship.

All the results presented above can be summarised with a simple correlation matrix for some of the most relevant variables (Table 11). To simplify the presentation, I have recoded categorical variables into dummy variables. One of these dummy variables distinguishes respondents who hold an ethno-biological republican conceptualisation of the nation from the rest of the respondents. The second dummy variable distinguishes respondents who defend a model of citizenship that

combines *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* from the rest of the respondents. The other variables are measured as discussed above.

**Table 11:** Correlations between Conceptions of the Nation, Models of Citizenship, Post-Citizenship, Integration, Attitudes towards Immigration, and Perceptions of Immigrants

	Ethno-biological republican vision of the nation	Citizenship to children born in Spain of foreign parents and to children born abroad of Spanish parents	Post-citizenship	Multi-culturalism	Support for immigration	Negative perceptions of immigrants
Ethno-biological republican vision of the nation	1.00					
Citizenship to children born in Spain of foreign parents and to children born abroad of Spanish parents	-0.06*	1.00				
Postcitizenship	-0.09*	0.22*	1.00			
Multiculturalism	-0.03	0.04	0.06*	1.00		
Support for Immigration	-0.08*	0.08*	0.04	0.13*	1.00	
Negative perceptions of immigrants	0.16*	-0.04	-0.15*	-0.18*	-0.32*	1.00

\*Significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed).

Source: International Social Survey Programme (2003).

The correlation matrix in Table 11 shows that all associations are consistent with theoretical predictions, even those that are not statistically significant. These correlations are, however, small, which reveals a very low degree of cognitive integration of these related views and attitudes among Spanish respondents. An alternative interpretation is that each of these constructs can serve contradictory political purposes. For example, to prefer that immigrants keep their customs and traditions may be indicative of either a preference for the creation of an ethnically segregated society or a great degree of tolerance.

## **8. Ethnic vs Civic or Credentialist vs Postnational Conceptions of the Nation**

The literature on nationalism has drawn a sharp distinction between ethnic and civic conceptions of the nation. The description above shows that the Spanish population does not make such clear-cut choices. Spanish respondents define membership in the Spanish nation in a complex fashion, combining ethnic and civic criteria. In this section, I push this evaluation of the construct validity of the ethnic/civic distinction by contrasting it with the construct validity of a credentialist/postnational categorisation of models of nationhood. This latter categorisation draws from Max Weber's concept of social closure, and posits that populations distinguish themselves by the number of barriers to group membership that they erect.

I begin the analysis of the relative construct validity of the two categorisations by examining the relationship between models of nationhood and models of citizenship. The literature (e.g. Brubaker 1992) has generally privileged the ethnic/civic dichotomy and posited that ethnic conceptions of the nation are connected with *jus sanguinis* models of citizenship whereas civic conceptions of the nation are connected with *jus soli* models of citizenship. In contrast, a credentialist/postnational conceptualisation of models of nationhood would predict that a credentialist model of nationhood is associated with strong barriers to citizenship, whereas a postnational model of nationhood is associated with a liberal attitude towards granting citizenship. Tables 12 and 13 examine the associations between each of the categorisations of models of nationhood and models of citizenship.

The percentages in Table 12 show that respondents who think that neither birth nor descent are important for being truly Spanish support a view of citizenship centred on *jus sanguinis* less often than do other respondents. Only 6.2 per cent of the former, as opposed to 18.7 per cent of the latter, agree with granting citizenship to children born abroad to Spanish parents and disagree with granting it to those born in Spain to foreign parents. Furthermore, respondents who attach importance to descent but not to birthplace in defining Spanishness support the granting of citizenship to children born in Spain to foreign parents and not to children born abroad to Spanish parents less often than do other respondents. Indeed, whereas only 5.9 per cent of the former favour this model of citizenship, 14.7 per cent of the latter do. These findings thus support the hypothesis of a relationship, even if modest, between ethnic vs civic conceptions of the nation and models of citizenship. Other findings in Table 12 cast some doubts, however, on the construct validity of the ethnic/civic distinction. In the second row, for example, one would have expected support for a *jus sanguinis* model of citizenship to be greater among respondents who attach importance to descent but not to birthplace as criteria of Spanishness to be much greater than among respondents who attach importance to birth but not to descent. The percentages reported in Table 12, however, contradict this expectation: Although the contrast goes in the expected direction, it is very small (20.6 per cent vs 16.8 per cent). Also, in the fourth row of Table 12, support

for a *jus soli* model of citizenship would have been expected to be greatest among respondents who attach importance to birthplace but not to descent as criteria of Spanishness. The results contradict this expectation, however. Although support for *jus soli* is much greater among these respondents than among respondents who attach importance to descent but not to birth as criteria of Spanishness, it is of the same magnitude as that found among respondents who do not attach importance to either birth or descent and among respondents who attach importance to both.

**Table 12:** Birth and Descent in Conceptions of the Nation and Models of Citizenship

		Ethnic vs civic national conceptions – % (number of cases)				
		Neither birthplace nor descent are important	Descent is important; birthplace is not important	Birthplace is important; descent is not important	Both birthplace and descent are important	Total
Models of citizenship	Neither birth in Spain nor Spanish descent are sufficient for becoming a Spanish citizen ( <i>neither jus sanguinis nor jus soli</i> )	5.2 (5)	2.9 (1)	1.5 (2)	2.3 (20)	2.5 (28)
	Spanish descent is a sufficient condition for becoming a Spanish citizen; birth in Spain is not a sufficient condition ( <i>jus sanguinis</i> )	6.2 (6)	20.6 (7)	16.8 (23)	18.9 (163)	17.6 (199)
	Undecided	5.2 (5)	5.9 (2)	5.8 (8)	11.7 (101)	10.3 (116)
	Birth in Spain is a sufficient condition for becoming a Spanish citizen; Spanish descent is not a sufficient condition ( <i>jus soli</i> )	19.6 (19)	5.9 (2)	17.5 (24)	13.7 (118)	14.4 (163)
	Both Birth in Spain and Spanish descent are sufficient conditions for becoming a Spanish citizen ( <i>jus sanguinis and jus soli</i> )	63.9 (62)	64.7 (22)	58.4 (80)	53.3 (459)	55.2 (623)
	Total	100 (97)	100 (34)	100 (137)	100 (861)	100 (1129)

Source: International Social Survey Programme (2003).

Despite the problems listed above, the ethnic/civic nation construct fares better than the credentialist/postnational one. Table 12 illustrates this quite clearly when comparing rows 2 and 4, corresponding respectively to support for *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* models of citizenship. Although they are qualitatively different, *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* models of citizenship are equally restrictive as they both privilege one criteria over another (descent or birth, respectively). Table 12 shows, however, that whereas support for a *jus sanguinis* model is weakest among the least credentialist respondents (first column), support for a *jus soli* model is strongest among these same respondents.

**Table 13:** Postnational vs Credentialist National Conceptions and Models of Citizenship

		Postnational vs credentialist national conceptions (number of criteria of membership in the nation that are considered important) %			
		0-4	5-6	7-9	Total
Models of citizenship	Neither birth in Spain nor Spanish descent are sufficient for becoming a Spanish citizen ( <i>neither jus sanguinis nor jus soli</i> )	4.0 (5)	1.7 (3)	2.5 (20)	2.6 (28)
	Spanish descent is a sufficient condition for becoming a Spanish citizen; birth in Spain is not a sufficient condition ( <i>jus sanguinis</i> )	11.3 (14)	17.8 (31)	18.9 (150)	17.9 (195)
	Undecided	5.6 (7)	7.5 (13)	11.2 (89)	10.0 (109)
	Birth in Spain is a sufficient condition for becoming a Spanish citizen; Spanish descent is not a sufficient condition ( <i>jus soli</i> )	20.2 (25)	13.8 (24)	14.0 (111)	14.7 (160)
	Both birth in Spain and Spanish descent are sufficient conditions for becoming a Spanish citizen ( <i>jus sanguinis and jus soli</i> )	58.9 (73)	59.2 (103)	53.4 (424)	54.9 (600)
	Total	100 (124)	100 (174)	100 (794)	100 (1092)

Source: International Social Survey Programme (2003).

Table 13, which shows the association between postnational/credentialist models of nationhood as defined by the number of criteria considered important for being considered a Spaniard, conveys the same message. Thus, the relationships between the number of criteria considered important for being a Spaniard and support for a *jus sanguinis* or *jus soli* model of citizenship are positive and negative, respectively. Furthermore, an examination of the last row in the table shows that, contrary to what one would expect, the percentage of respondents who support granting citizenship both to those born in Spain to foreign parents and to those born abroad to Spanish parents, does not diminish significantly along with the number of criteria considered important to define membership in the Spanish nation. In sum, when the associations between models of nationhood and models of citizenship are



examined, the ethnic/civic distinction between models of nationhood fares marginally better than the postnational/credentialist one.

Next, one can further test for the relative construct validity of the ethnic/civic and postnational/credentialist models of nationhood by examining the relationships between each of these constructs and the respondents' perceptions of immigrants. Table 14 focuses on the former model of nationhood. It shows that the most negative perceptions of immigrants are found among respondents who attach importance to descent and ethnicity variables (2<sup>nd</sup> row). The least negative perceptions are found among respondents who hold conceptions of the nation devoid of ethnic and/or biological content, those whose conception of the nation can be defined as non-republican, and those who can be defined as indifferent to who is a member of the nation. Except with regard to the latter two categories, the results correspond to expectations.

Why do non-republicans and indifferent respondents display relatively more favourable attitudes towards immigrants than do other respondents? A plausible interpretation for the findings concerning non-republicans would be that they share with pure republicans a lack of emphasis on ethnicity or descent in the definition of membership in the nation and an emphasis on respecting Spain's political institutions and laws. Another possible interpretation is that the relevant cleavage between Spanish respondents is not a republican/non-republican one but a postnationalist/credentialist one that reflects different degrees of social closure. Indeed, both non-republicans and indifferent respondents share the fact that they attach little importance to most criteria of belonging presented to them. Furthermore, republicans who attach importance to descent, ethnicity, and to political and territorial criteria, are also those who attach importance to the highest number of criteria of membership.

**Table 14:** Conceptions of the Nation and Perceptions of Immigrants

Conceptions of the nation	Average value for the factor "Negative perception of the immigrants' impact on Spanish society"
Non-republican	-0.7 (51)
Ethno-biological republican	0.1 (797)
Ethnic republican	-0.3 (97)
Republican	-0.5 (10)
Indifferent	-0.8 (12)

*Source:* International Social Survey Programme (2003).

The relationship between conceptions of the nation and perceptions of immigrants can be seen as a crucial experiment of the relative validity of civic/ethnic and the credentialist/postnational models of nationhood. Positive or negative perceptions of immigrants are a measure of social closure, of the extent to which society is willing

to accept new members. If the civic/ethnic model of nationhood is at work, there should not be a relationship between the categories in this model and perceptions of immigrants; if anything, the key distinctions should be between republicans and non-republicans and between ethno-biological republicans and pure republicans. If, on the other hand, the credentialist/postnational model of nationhood is at work, then those who treat fewer criteria of membership in the nation as important (non-republicans, pure republicans, and indifferent) should perceive immigrants more favourably than do the rest of the respondents. The results reported in Table 14 support the second hypothesis more than the first. This conclusion is confirmed by correlating the number of criteria considered important for being a true Spaniard and the factor that measures negative perceptions of immigrants. The correlation coefficient for this relationship is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance and is equal to 0.26. This means that the greater the number of criteria respondents deem important for being a true Spaniard the more negative the perceptions of immigrants are.

A final test for deciding on the relative validity of the two constructs for defining membership in the nation takes respondents' attitudes towards the influx of immigrants as the dependent variable. Table 15 shows the average value for the scale of support for further immigration across different conceptions of the nation. Although contrasts are small in this case, non-republicans and indifferent respondents display the most favourable attitudes towards the arrival of immigrants. As these are precisely the categories corresponding to respondents who list the fewest number of criteria as relevant to consider someone as a true Spaniard, the results can be read as supporting the postnational/credentialist construct more than the ethnic/civic one. A correlation of  $-0.15$  between the number of criteria listed as important for being a true Spaniard and support for an increase in the number of immigrants, significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed test), further confirms these results.

**Table 15:** Conceptions of the Nation and Attitudes towards the Arrival of Immigrants

Conception of the nation	Mean value for the scale for the measurement of attitudes towards the arrival of immigrants (1 = decreased a lot; 5 = increased a lot).
Non-republican	2.83 (53)
Ethno-biological republican	2.40 (845)
Ethnic republican	2.37 (104)
Republican	2.92 (13)
Indifferent	3.17 (12)

Source: International Social Survey Programme (2003).

In conclusion, the various tests performed in this section to assess the relative construct validity of the ethnic/civic and postnational/credentialist models of

nationhood offer mixed results. While ethnic/civic distinctions fare somewhat better than postnational/credentialist distinctions in explaining the Spanish population's models of citizenship, postnational/credentialist distinctions fare much better than ethnic/civic ones in explaining attitudes towards immigration and perceptions of immigrants. One must thus conclude that, on the basis of the available evidence, scholarly distinctions between civic and ethnic conceptions of the nation are not the best way to interpret actual contrasts in the way Spaniards conceive the nation.

## 9. Conclusions

In this paper, I have described Spanish views, perceptions, and attitudes on a number of related topics that have been analysed in the literatures on national identity, citizenship and immigration politics over more than two decades. I have also examined the consistency between these views, perceptions and attitudes. Finally, I have evaluated the construct validity of two alternative but not exclusive categorisations of models of nationhood.

Spaniards conceive of the nation in republican terms, with a strong biological and ethnic content. Alternatively, they could be said to have a credentialist vision of the Spanish nation, with more than 50 per cent of respondents listing at least eight criteria as important or very important for truly being a Spaniard. Respondents also support a citizenship model that combines elements of *jus sanguinis* and of *jus soli*. Furthermore, there is a substantial degree of support for extending the rights that citizens already enjoy to legal immigrants. These postnational views coexist with a rather assimilationist model of integration. The survey results discussed also show that Spaniards hold mixed views of immigrants, with a sizeable proportion perceiving that they have contributed to rising crime rates. Nonetheless, they are tolerant towards the arrival of immigrants, as long as these immigrants are legal. At the descriptive level, the last major finding in this paper is that Spanish views, perceptions and attitudes concerning the nation, citizenship and immigration are only mildly consistent with each other.

The final section has examined the construct validity of ethnic/civic and postnational/credentialist models of nationhood when measured at the population level. The results of this analysis cast doubt on the idea that the Spanish population conceives of the nation in accordance with the scholarly community's categories. The analysis of respondents' attitudes towards the arrival of immigrants and of their perceptions of immigrants has revealed a more realistic image of Spaniards' conceptions of nationhood. Rather than thinking of the nation in republican, ethnic, biological, territorial or even political ways, Spaniards think of the nation in relatively open or relatively closed terms. The main cleavage among Spaniards is that between those who conceive of Spain as an elitist club and who then invoke all sorts of factors to restrict entry (credentialists), and those who do not really care about who is or is not a member of the nation (postnationalists). Future research will have to clearly distinguish between the roles of ethnic/civic and

credentialist/postnational cleavages, by including more indicators of these constructs in questionnaires on national identity. The findings demand, however, a theoretical reconsideration of typologies of nationalism. The literature has thus far paid close attention to nationalist rhetoric about the role of this or that factor in defining the nation. It is indeed probable, for example, that the racist rhetoric of German nationalism in Nazi Germany contributed to the Holocaust. Behind the nationalist rhetoric, however, lies a contrast between credentialist (closed) and postnational (open) views of the nation. This discovery opens new horizons for the analysis of nationalist rhetoric. For example, when seeking explanations for the racist character of German nationalism in the 1930s, research should not only focus on the nationalist discourse's racist content but also on the reasons why, at some point in history, German nationalism became closed to certain cultural groups, with the crucial sociological variable in this development being the greater degree of social closure and not its racist character. This means that we should revisit Weber's concept of social closure not only when studying citizenship but also when studying nationalism.

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