

diplomatic premises; but, in this case, the United States Government had already formally and at the highest level expressed its regret to the Government of Nicaragua. He recalled, moreover, that under Article 52 (2) in Chapter VIII of the Charter, Member States were urged “to make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through ... regional arrangements or by ... regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council”. He noted that that was precisely what had happened with the present incident: the question it raised had been dealt with in a resolution adopted by the appropriate regional agency — OAS — on 8 January 1990. The matter was therefore closed. The United Kingdom saw no reason to re-open it in the Council. The incident did not pose any threat to international peace and security; nor did it provide any basis for a Council resolution under Chapter VI of the Charter.⁵²

The President then put the draft resolution to the vote. It received 13 votes in favour, 1 against (United States) and 1 abstention (United Kingdom), and was

⁵² Ibid., pp. 34-35.

not adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.

Speaking after the vote, the representative of Canada stated that he had voted for the draft resolution because it reaffirmed certain basic and important principles guiding the conduct of international relations. By adopting the draft resolution, the Council would have appropriately added its voice to the voices of other international bodies that had addressed the issue of inviolability of diplomatic missions.⁵³

The representative of Finland said that she had voted in favour of the draft resolution out of respect for the norms of international law. However, her Government wished to register its concern over the submission of the draft resolution to the Council. Finland had difficulty in accepting that the subject matter fell within the competence of the Council, as defined in the Charter of the United Nations since the events described were not of such a character as to present a threat to international peace and security.⁵⁴

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 36-37.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 38.

Asia

14. The situation relating to Afghanistan

Decision of 26 April 1989 (2860th meeting): adjournment

On 15 February 1989, pursuant to resolution 622 (1988) of 31 October 1988, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a report on the activities of the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP).¹ Since 15 May 1988, UNGOMAP had been monitoring the implementation of the Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan, concluded under United Nations auspices, and signed at Geneva on 14 April 1988 by Afghanistan and Pakistan, and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America as guarantors (the “Geneva Agreements”).² The Secretary-General confirmed the

complete withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan in compliance with the Geneva Agreements. He added that it was imperative to move forward to ensure the implementation of all the obligations under the Agreements, whose provisions were to be implemented in an integrated manner. He observed that the external aspects of the situation needed to be fully resolved, in conformity with the Agreements, to enable the Afghan people to decide their own future and to achieve peace and stability in their homeland. He stressed that it was for them to

Relations, in particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention; (ii) Declaration on International Guarantees, signed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States; (iii) Bilateral Agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees; and (iv) Agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation relating to Afghanistan.

¹ S/20465.

² S/19835, annex I. The Agreements consisted of four instruments: (i) Bilateral Agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual

decide upon the next steps, in their efforts towards the establishment of a broad-based government.

By a letter dated 3 April 1989 addressed to the President of the Security Council,³ the representative of Afghanistan transmitted a letter of the same date from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, requesting the convening of an emergency meeting of the Council, in accordance with Articles 34 and 35 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations, in view of the “intensification of aggressions and interferences of Pakistan in the internal affairs of Afghanistan”.

At its 2852nd meeting, on 11 April 1989, the Council included the letter from the representative of Afghanistan in its agenda. The President (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) also drew the attention of Council members to a letter dated 7 April 1989 from the representative of Pakistan,⁴ transmitting a message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of his country. The latter questioned the appropriateness of an emergency session of the Security Council. He contended that Articles 34 and 35 (1) of the Charter had no bearing on the situation inside Afghanistan. He described the situation as a purely internal one, in which the Afghan people were resisting the rule of an illegal and unrepresentative regime that had been imposed on them by external military intervention and which was responsible for massive and brutal violations of human rights. He stated that the request of the “Kabul regime” for a Security Council debate was therefore untenable. He also rejected the allegations that Pakistan had conducted military aggression against Afghanistan and interference in its internal affairs.

The Council considered the item at its 2852nd, 2853rd, 2855th to 2857th, 2859th and 2860th meetings, from 11 to 26 April 1989.

Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the following, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote: at the 2852nd meeting, the representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Syrian Arab Republic; at the 2853rd meeting, the representatives of Cuba, Democratic Yemen, the German Democratic Republic, Japan, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey; at the 2855th meeting, the representatives of India, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Nicaragua,

the United Republic of Tanzania and Viet Nam; at the 2856th meeting, the representatives of Angola, Bulgaria, the Comoros and Iraq; at the 2857th meeting, the representatives of Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, the Congo, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Somalia and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; and at the 2859th meeting, the representatives of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. At the 2853rd meeting, the Council also decided, at the request of the representative of Saudi Arabia, to extend an invitation to Mr. A. Engin Ansay, Permanent Observer of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) to the United Nations, under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. At the invitation of the President, the representatives of Afghanistan and Pakistan took seats at the Council table.

At the 2852nd meeting, the representative of Afghanistan stated that his Government wished to draw the Council’s attention to the serious threat posed to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan by the blatant acts of aggression and interference in its internal affairs committed by Pakistan. The recent intensification of Pakistan’s armed aggression and its overt and covert interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan had acquired ever-wider dimensions, threatening peace, stability and security in south-west Asia. Pakistan’s actions had prompted Afghanistan to turn to the Council under Chapter VI of the Charter, on the peaceful settlement of disputes, and on the basis of the Council’s obligations under Articles 34 and 35. The speaker contended that Pakistan’s aggression and interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs constituted a violation of various international instruments, including the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.⁵ He claimed that they were also in breach of the principles agreed upon in the Geneva Agreements on the normalization of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. He maintained that Pakistan’s acts of aggression and interference had changed “from the imposed undeclared war of the past 10 years into a full-fledged war” against Afghanistan. Those acts included the following: extensive deployment of its armed forces along the eastern and southern borders with Afghanistan, in particular around the city of Jalalabad; the establishment of military

³ S/20561.

⁴ S/20577.

⁵ Annex to General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970.

training centres in Pakistan for training extremists to carry out destructive activities in Afghanistan; the transfer of arms and ammunition to extremist forces in Afghanistan; the participation of Pakistani militiamen in military operations in Afghanistan; and violations by the Pakistan air force of Afghan airspace. The speaker stated that those violations of the Geneva Agreements had been duly reported to UNGOMAP in some 390 notes, but none of the complaints had yet been investigated. He asked that a list of those notes be circulated as a document of the Council.⁶ He questioned whether any principle of international law allowed States to resort to the use of force and to conduct acts of aggression against the territory of another State in an effort to change that State's system. He claimed, further, that Pakistan's support for the creation by the "Alliance of Seven" of an "interim government" on its territory amounted to an interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and a violation of the Afghan people's right to self-determination. Pakistan evidently planned, he stated, to annex Afghanistan under the guise of forming a confederation.

The representative of Afghanistan added that the current leadership of his country was intent on achieving a peaceful solution to the country's problems, as evidenced by its signing of the Geneva Agreements. It was committed, moreover, to the establishment of a broad-based Government, as called for in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-third session.⁷ However, his Government wished to reiterate that only by ensuring the ceasefire and its respect by all other forces concerned would it be possible to hold a free and democratic election with the participation of all political parties. He called for the establishment by UNGOMAP of additional outposts in strategic areas, which could play an important role in reducing tensions, implementing the Geneva Agreements, and promoting a cessation of Pakistan's military aggression and interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Politically, he called for the convening of an international conference to establish Afghanistan's permanent neutrality and

demilitarization. He proposed that the Soviet Union and the United States — as co-guarantors of the Geneva Agreements — and the other members of the Council should participate, adding that the participation of other States would also be welcomed. In conclusion, the speaker stated that, in view of the present grave situation, the continuation of which would result in a serious regional conflict, Afghanistan, in accordance with Articles 33 and 34 of the Charter, requested the Council to take the following actions: (a) to take all urgent measures within its competence under the Charter to stop Pakistani aggression and intervention against Afghanistan; (b) to send a fact-finding mission made up of members of the Security Council to Afghanistan and Pakistan; and (c) to request the Soviet Union and the United States, as co-guarantors of the Geneva Agreements, to play a further active role in persuading Pakistan to meet its obligations under those Agreements.⁸

The representative of Pakistan expressed regret that the Council's time should be taken up by the request for the convening of an emergency session, under cover of Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter. He stated that those articles had no bearing on the situation within Afghanistan. What was happening there was a continuation of the struggle of the Afghan people to overthrow an illegal and unrepresentative regime that had been imposed on them by external military intervention. That struggle was a purely internal matter, which in no way endangered peace and security within the meaning of Article 34. The speaker dismissed the allegations made against his country by the "Kabul representative" as baseless and untenable. He observed that the UNGOMAP teams had found no evidence of Pakistan's alleged massing of troops along its border with Afghanistan, of the alleged training camps, of arms and ammunition being transported from Pakistan to Afghanistan, or of any violation by Pakistan of Afghan airspace or territory. The charge that Pakistani troops were fighting alongside the Mujahideen inside Afghanistan was preposterous; the latter had no need of such assistance. The UNGOMAP reports clearly stated, moreover, that there was no evidence that Pakistan had prevented any refugees from returning to Afghanistan. As for the interim Government of Afghanistan, the speaker stated that it had been elected through a secret ballot by a representative Consultative Shura, an independent

⁶ The President of the Council subsequently drew the attention of Council members to a letter dated 12 April 1989 from the representative of Afghanistan containing a list of the instances of Pakistan's aggression and interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan notified to UNGOMAP as at 2 April 1989 (S/20585).

⁷ General Assembly resolution 43/20 of 3 November 1988.

⁸ S/PV.2852, pp. 5-25.

body representing a wide spectrum of Afghan opinion. The interim Government included eminent Afghans representing different points of view. Its admission into the Organization of the Islamic Conference showed that it was supported by a very important group of countries. It also showed that the Islamic countries continued to view the “Kabul regime” as illegal and unrepresentative of Afghanistan. The speaker stressed that peace and security in Afghanistan could be restored only if power were transferred from the “illegal Kabul-based regime” to a broad-based government acceptable to the Afghan people as a whole. The establishment of such a government was the exclusive prerogative of the Afghan people themselves. That was acknowledged by the Geneva Agreements and General Assembly resolution 43/20 of 3 November 1988, which, *inter alia*, mandated the Secretary-General of the United Nations to facilitate the establishment of a broad-based government. The creation of the interim government was a major step towards the achievement of that objective. The speaker recalled that Pakistan’s aim, in requesting the establishment of UNGOMAP, had been to ensure a neutral machinery to investigate complaints regarding the implementation of the Geneva Agreements. The Kabul regime had now chosen to ignore that established mechanism for redress of complaints and had instead approached the Security Council in an attempt to malign Pakistan. Pakistan, for its part, remained ready to continue its cooperation with UNGOMAP and to discuss with the Secretary-General any relevant proposals that would enable the Mission to continue to discharge its responsibilities effectively. The speaker concluded by assuring the members of the Council that Pakistan remained committed to promoting a comprehensive settlement of the Afghanistan issue on the basis of the Geneva Agreements and General Assembly resolutions.⁹

At the 2853rd meeting, on 17 April 1989, Mr. Ansary, Permanent Observer of OIC, stated that while the Islamic Conference welcomed the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, it was concerned that they had installed an “illegal regime” which did not enjoy the support of the people. The Afghan people continued, therefore, in their struggle to eliminate the last vestiges of foreign occupation. OIC believed that the transfer of power to a broad-based interim government acceptable to the Afghan people

was a *sine qua non* for the restoration of peace in Afghanistan, the creation of conditions conducive to the voluntary return of the Afghan refugees, and the exercise of the right to self-determination by the people of Afghanistan, free from outside intervention or coercion. It had welcomed, therefore, the establishment by the people of Afghanistan of an interim Government, through the convening of a Consultative Shura, in exercise of their right to self-determination. Indeed, it had invited the representatives of that Government to occupy the vacant seat of Afghanistan in the Organization, and now wished to invite other intergovernmental organizations to follow suit. He added that, in the view of OIC, the various aspects of the problem that remained to be solved should be dealt with by the Afghans themselves, since it was an internal matter of that country — especially after the withdrawal of the foreign troops. Any attempt to “internationalize” the question by bringing it before the Security Council would only delay its resolution.¹⁰

The representative of the United States stressed that his Government’s policy towards Afghanistan was designed to uphold the principle that the Afghan people themselves must be allowed to determine their own future, without outside interference or coercion. The conditions must be created for them to be able to carry out a true act of self-determination. The “illegitimate Kabul regime” was impeding that process as it tried to retain its waning grip on Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the present process in the Council appeared to be being used by that same regime as part of such an effort. There was, of course, a proper role for the international community to play. It was to continue to support the Afghan people’s desire to choose their own government, to provide assistance to the refugees to return home in safety and to help rebuild the country once stability and peace were achieved. The speaker noted that there were several United Nations mechanisms in place to deal with the problems created by the conflict. His country fully supported them. However, it would oppose any attempt to use those mechanisms to perpetuate the “illegitimate regime in Kabul” or to impose a political settlement on the Afghan people. He dismissed as “spurious allegations” the charges made against Pakistan, a country that had sacrificed so much to care for millions of Afghan refugees, the world’s largest refugee population. With regard to a ceasefire, his Government believed that that

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-39.

¹⁰ S/PV.2853, pp. 6-11.

issue could only be decided by the Afghan people themselves. The United States did not believe that the Security Council could or should at this time take a more prominent role in Afghanistan unless the Afghan people themselves and all the Afghan parties actively sought greater Council involvement. Now that the Soviet troops had withdrawn, the Afghan people should be permitted to achieve full self-determination, with the support and assistance of the United Nations.¹¹

Several speakers echoed the views expressed by the representative of Pakistan and the Permanent Observer of OIC. For them, the struggle between the people of Afghanistan and the “Kabul regime” was an internal problem which did not fall within the competence of the Security Council under Articles 34 and 35 (1). They called for recognition of the right of the Afghan people to persist in their determination to stand on their own feet and welcomed the creation of the interim government as a step in that direction. Stressing that the interim government of Afghanistan had been recognized by the Islamic Conference, they urged the Council not to buttress the “Kabul regime”, which did not enjoy the support of the Afghan people and would have to make way sooner or later for a truly representative government.¹²

A number of other speakers also questioned the appropriateness and value of a Council debate on the current situation in Afghanistan.¹³ Some stressed that, with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from the country, the external aspects of the situation had been addressed; it was now a purely internal matter, which concerned the right of the Afghan people to self-determination. Others observed that the Geneva Agreements provided a mechanism — the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan — for handling the complaints under consideration; they were not a matter for the Council. They noted, moreover, that the General Assembly, in its resolution 43/20, had asked the Secretary-General to encourage and facilitate an early comprehensive political settlement of the Afghan question, through the

establishment of a broad-based government. They encouraged those efforts and urged the parties concerned to do the same with concrete actions, by implementing in earnest the Geneva Agreements.

Several other speakers similarly maintained that the Geneva Agreements and General Assembly resolution 43/20, which were complementary, formed the basis for the settlement of the Afghan issue.¹⁴ They called for strict implementation of the Agreements by all parties. They reaffirmed moreover that a political solution should be based on full respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan and the right of the Afghan people freely to determine their form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system. They stressed that the Afghan people should engage in a process of dialogue and reconciliation leading to the formation of a broad-based government, with many expressing support for the good offices of the Secretary-General and UNGOMAP.

Other speakers, on the other hand, shared the views expressed by the representative of Afghanistan.¹⁵ They stressed that the situation in Afghanistan was not an internal matter, but a threat to regional peace and security; commended the compliance with the Geneva Agreements by Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, but regretted the lack of compliance by the other parties, particularly Pakistan; favoured a weightier role for the United Nations in the implementation of the Geneva Agreements; and endorsed various proposals made by the representative of Afghanistan — concerning a ceasefire, a strengthening of UNGOMAP by setting up

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-53.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 11-16 (Saudi Arabia); pp. 17-20 (Malaysia); pp. 38-41 (Turkey).

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43 (Japan); S/PV.2855, pp. 12-13 (China); pp. 13-18 (United Kingdom); pp. 28-31 (Finland); S/PV.2856, pp. 27-30 (Comoros); S/PV.2857, pp. 11-12 (Bangladesh); pp. 12-15 (Nepal); pp. 16-18 (Yugoslavia); and S/PV.2859, pp. 13-20 (Somalia).

¹⁴ S/PV.2853, pp. 21-22 (Syrian Arab Republic). See also S/PV.2855, pp. 7-11 (United Republic of Tanzania); pp. 23-28 (Madagascar); S/PV.2856, pp. 31-33 (Iraq); pp. 38-42 (Angola); S/PV.2857, pp. 12-15 (Nepal); pp. 16-18 (Yugoslavia); pp. 28-32 (Congo); and S/PV.2859, pp. 3-7 (Burkina Faso); pp. 27-31 (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya).

¹⁵ S/PV.2853, pp. 22-27 (German Democratic Republic); pp. 28-32 (Cuba); pp. 33-38 (Mongolia); pp. 43-50 (Democratic Yemen). See also S/PV.2855, pp. 3-7 (India); S/PV.2856, pp. 6-11 (Lao People's Democratic Republic); pp. 11-16 (Nicaragua); pp. 17-21 (Ethiopia); pp. 21-26 (Viet Nam); pp. 33-37 (Bulgaria); S/PV.2857, pp. 3-10 (Czechoslovakia); pp. 18-28 (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic); and S/PV.2859, pp. 8-11 (Algeria); pp. 11-12 (Hungary); pp. 20-25 (Poland); and pp. 31-38 (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic).

observer posts along the Afghan-Pakistan border and the convening of an international conference under United Nations auspices to discuss questions relating to the neutrality and demilitarization of Afghanistan. Several of those speakers rejected the formation of a “so-called interim government” on foreign territory, which did not represent the Afghan people, and was undemocratic and illegal.

At the 2855th meeting, on 19 April 1989, the representative of the United Kingdom echoed previous speakers in stressing the need for the restoration of peace, which could only be achieved if the Afghans could establish a representative government accepted by the overwhelming majority of the population. The common interest of the international community had been set out in the consensus resolution adopted by the General Assembly in November 1988, calling for the restoration of Afghanistan’s independent and non-aligned status and for the return of refugees in safety; and reaffirming “the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever”. The withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan was a welcome step towards the achievement of those aims. The priority now must be for the Afghans themselves to exercise their right to self-determination. The speaker observed that the present regime had failed to win back politically through its national reconciliation policy what it had lost militarily. There was no prospect of its winning over the hearts and minds of the Afghan people or of evolving into a representative government. It had already been rejected by the Afghan people, as evidenced by the decision by over 5 million Afghans to leave their country since the Soviet occupation. With regard to the requests made by the representative of Afghanistan, the speaker stated that the future of UNGOMAP was primarily a matter for the parties to the Geneva Agreements. More active forms of political assistance, such as United Nations-supervised elections, the dispatch of a United Nations peacekeeping force or the holding of an international conference would be appropriate only if they were wanted by a broad majority of Afghans. In conclusion, the speaker remarked that there was no reason why those who had fought for nine years to liberate their country would or should give up a struggle in which they enjoyed the overwhelming support of the Afghan

people; the Council would do ill to suggest that they should.¹⁶

The representative of France welcomed the signing of the Geneva Agreements as an important step towards the settlement of the Afghan conflict. However, he stressed that a comprehensive political solution depended on efforts at national reconciliation. In France’s view, such reconciliation would not be possible unless those who, in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of the Afghan people, represented a “painful past” stood aside to allow for the start of a genuine dialogue between all the components of that people. Only such a dialogue would make it possible for all Afghans to exercise their right to self-determination. France stood ready to promote such a dialogue as well as the implementation of an overall solution.¹⁷

The representative of Canada stated that, with the Soviet withdrawal completed, the Afghan people should determine their common future and choose their own form of government without outside interference. Canada supported the early establishment of a representative government in Afghanistan. Only in that way could there be a lasting solution to the conflict. The Afghans themselves must be permitted to establish the conditions that would allow the millions of refugees in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran to return to their homes and their country to be rebuilt. The Council could not make a meaningful contribution to that process in the absence of a request from the entire Afghan people. What the United Nations could do it was now doing. Canada supported the efforts of the Secretary-General to promote a political solution to the Afghanistan dispute, recognized the important contribution made by UNGOMAP in overseeing the implementation of the Geneva Agreements, and urged the international community to continue its support for the United Nations programme for humanitarian assistance and mine-clearance.¹⁸

On the other hand, the President of the Council, speaking in his capacity as the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and noting that his country was a guarantor of the Geneva Agreements, echoed or endorsed the views expressed by the representative of Afghanistan. He stressed that the

¹⁶ S/PV.2855, pp. 13-18.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 18-21.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-23.

Soviet Union strongly supported the recourse by the Government of Afghanistan to the Security Council in connection with the threat to that country's territorial integrity, independence and national sovereignty stemming from Pakistan's escalation of its aggressive activities and intervention in Afghanistan's internal affairs. Afghanistan's recourse to the Council was right, proper and timely. Current events in Afghanistan were by no means the strictly internal affair of the Afghan people, as had been argued by certain speakers. On the contrary, as demonstrated by the evidence adduced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, outside activities posed an ever-greater threat to the sovereignty and independence of Afghanistan, creating a threat to the peace and stability of South-West Asia. The Soviet Union's decision to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan had been based on the understanding that outside intervention in Afghan affairs from Pakistani territory would be completely stopped. Indeed, the two obligations were balanced in the Geneva Agreements. The speaker stressed that the obligation of non-interference and non-intervention on the part of Pakistan was not simply contractual; it was a confirmation of universally acknowledged principles of international law enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and in the definition of aggression adopted by the United Nations. In referring therefore to violations by Pakistan of the Geneva Agreements, the Soviet Union was speaking in shorthand; it wished to make clear that these were also violations of the principles of international law and provisions of the Charter. That was what made it so necessary, indeed urgent, for the Council to consider the present item. The speaker detailed a number of alleged violations by Pakistan of the Geneva Agreements, which he contended amounted to aggression against Afghanistan. Because of Pakistani intervention in the internal conflict in Afghanistan, moreover, a new dangerous dimension had been added: military confrontation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He dismissed the new alternative "government" formed by the Alliance of Seven in Jalalabad: the emergence of such a narrow unrepresentative "government" — whose goal was to seize power in the country — by no means constituted a step towards forming a broad-based coalition government that could bring peace to the Afghan people. On the contrary, it was a step away from that goal.

With regard to the way forward, the representative of the Soviet Union reiterated his country's appeal for a complete ceasefire. He did not preclude the possibility, at a later stage, of dispatching a United Nations peacekeeping force to strategic centres in Afghanistan or of otherwise broadening the stabilizing effect of a United Nations presence there. Meanwhile, he endorsed the proposal for the convening of an international conference on the neutrality and demilitarization of Afghanistan. A first step towards such a conference would be the establishment, under United Nations auspices, of a working group of experts for the exchange of views on an Afghan settlement: the major Afghan groups could participate, together with Afghanistan's direct neighbours and the guarantors of the Geneva Agreements. What the people of Afghanistan desperately needed was not weapons but economic and humanitarian assistance. The Soviet Union regretted, however, that in some quarters the provision of such assistance was being deliberately and openly politicized, thus distorting its humanitarian nature. Noting the important role played by the United Nations military observers, but their small number (only 20) in Pakistan, the speaker called for the effectiveness of UNGOMAP to be enhanced in response to the dangerous development of the situation. In particular, he endorsed the call by the Government of Afghanistan for an increase in the number of observer points on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. He hoped, moreover, that the Secretary-General would continue in his efforts to promote the implementation of the Geneva Agreements, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to him under General Assembly resolution 43/20. Turning to the role of the Security Council, he stressed that it must deal earnestly with this matter, bringing its authority to bear in order to extinguish the military conflagration in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union supported the specific proposals put forward by the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan in his statement. He concluded that it was the duty of the Security Council to make a genuine effort to put an end to foreign intervention and bloodshed in Afghanistan and to work for a ceasefire, the holding of an intra-Afghan dialogue and the creation of a broad-based coalition Government.¹⁹

At the 2857th meeting, on 24 April 1989, the representative of Afghanistan reiterated that the Council's discussion, at his country's request, of the

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-63.

question of Pakistan's aggression and interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan was fully in accord with Articles 34 and 35 (1) of the Charter: Pakistan's actions had been posing a grave threat to regional peace and security. He again detailed the nature of Pakistan's alleged intervention, including its support for the "so-called interim government". He added that Saudi Arabia, too, had played a role, claiming that it had funded participation in the "so-called Consultative Shura" and was backing certain Afghan guerrilla groups — in an effort to increase its influence in the establishment of the future government in Afghanistan. The speaker reaffirmed his Government's readiness to hold a national democratic election throughout the country, provided that a ceasefire was observed by all sides. He concluded by warning that, if the Council failed to adopt measures necessary for defusing the present tense situation and if Pakistani aggression and intervention against Afghanistan continued, his Government would have no choice but to use its legitimate right of self-defence.²⁰

At the 2859th meeting, on 26 April 1989, the representative of Saudi Arabia disputed the allegations made against it by the representative of the "Kabul regime". He added that that regime had no legitimate standing either in Afghanistan or before the Council.²¹

The representative of the United States considered that the debate had been unnecessary and needlessly prolonged. It had not furthered either the cause of peace or self-determination for the Afghan people, both of which goals were widely supported in the Council and closely intertwined. The Afghan people had been denied their right to self-determination during nine years of military occupation and were still being denied it by a regime clinging to power by force of arms against the will of the vast majority of its own people. The international community would continue to insist that they be provided with the opportunity to choose their own government. It should not and would not give its approval to an illegally installed regime. The United States agreed with the many speakers who had pointed out that Afghanistan had been the victim of foreign aggression. However, it wished to set the record straight: Pakistan was not and had never been the aggressor. On the contrary, it had supported and continued to support the terms and objectives of the

Geneva Agreements. Moreover, none of the allegations made by Afghanistan had been verified by the United Nations teams. The speaker hoped that the Council might now move on to more "constructive tasks".²²

The representative of Pakistan reiterated his country's view that the request to hold the current debate lacked validity. There was no threat to regional or international peace and security, as alleged. The complaints lodged by the "Kabul side" against Pakistan had been thoroughly investigated by UNGOMAP and had been found to be baseless. Pakistan rejected them categorically. The speaker claimed that the accusations against his country were designed to divert attention from the real obstacle to a peaceful settlement: namely, the military support by the Soviet Union for the "Kabul regime", which prevented an early and peaceful transfer of power to a broadly acceptable interim government. His Government was accordingly formally requesting the Secretary-General to establish additional UNGOMAP posts in various Afghan towns and airports, to monitor Soviet compliance with the Geneva Agreements. As to the call by some speakers for an immediate ceasefire, since Pakistan was not a party to the internal conflict in Afghanistan, it could not pronounce on a matter entirely within the competence of the Afghan people. The proposal for an international conference on the neutrality and demilitarization of Afghanistan was premature: it was something for a representative and legitimate government to consider, if it so wished, after a comprehensive settlement had been achieved. Similarly, the idea of a United Nations peacekeeping force, which was contingent upon a ceasefire, could be considered only if all the parties concerned agreed. That was not the case at present. The speaker drew the Council members' attention to recent remarks by the Prime Minister of Pakistan concerning the possible spillover of war into Pakistan: he had said that Pakistan had no intention of becoming a party to the Afghan conflict, but that if the "Kabul regime" resorted to committing an act of aggression against Pakistan, the latter would "respond accordingly". The speaker concluded by recalling that, after the first day of the current debate, the President of the Council had suggested that if Pakistan were agreeable the debate could be abandoned in favour of a statement by the President. Although Pakistan had responded positively, the debate had continued, to his delegation's surprise.

²⁰ S/PV.2857, pp. 32-25.

²¹ S/PV.2859, pp. 24-27.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 38-42.

It had yielded nothing but further opportunities for indulging in “propaganda” against Pakistan and had effectively foreclosed the option of a statement by the President.²³

At the 2860th meeting, on 26 April 1989, the representative of Afghanistan reiterated that the root cause of the grave situation prevailing in the region lay in Pakistan’s continued interference and intervention in his country’s internal affairs. He stressed that other Islamic countries, including Saudi Arabia, should play a constructive role in bringing the Afghans together, instead of assisting and participating in the Pakistani aggression and intervention. He reaffirmed his Government’s support for an immediate ceasefire to facilitate the beginning of an intra-Afghan dialogue and for an end to the “senseless fratricidal war” to be able to rebuild the country.²⁴

The President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, said that the Council would have failed to meet its obligations under the Charter if it had not discussed the question of Afghanistan. Pakistan’s aggressive actions and interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan posed a threat to the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of that country, as well as a threat to regional peace and security. Attempts to deny Pakistan’s interference had been unconvincing. Claims that Pakistan’s innocence was attested to by the lack of confirmation of the violations of the Geneva Agreements in the reports of the UNGOMAP observers were absurd: it was well known that the Pakistan authorities had isolated UNGOMAP from the real situation and had shown the observers nothing that might cast aspersions on the conduct of the Government of Pakistan. During the debate, particular emphasis had been placed on the need for all parties fully to carry out their obligations under the Agreements and on the responsibility of the guarantor States to ensure their implementation. What was at stake in the implementation of the Agreements was the authority and interests not only of the countries directly involved in the conflict, but also of the entire international community. For this was a test of the will of States to seek peaceful ways to resolve conflicts. It was also a test of the political will of two permanent members of the Council. The speaker added that, as

²³ Ibid., pp. 42-63.

²⁴ S/PV.2860, pp. 3-22.

President of the Council, he had given serious consideration to the possibility that, after the initial statements of the representatives of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the work of the Council should be steered towards the preparation of a presidential statement on the substance of the problem. In that connection, he had taken into account the views that had been expressed to him by various members of the Council. He had put this proposal to the representatives of Afghanistan and Pakistan. While the representative of Afghanistan had responded positively, his Pakistani counterpart had agreed only that the President of the Council should state to the press that the Council had listened to the statements by the sides and had completed its consideration of the question. The speaker expressed disappointment with the uncooperative attitude of the representative of Pakistan. In conclusion, he appealed once again to the Council to discharge its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and to do its utmost to ensure a prompt settlement of the Afghan problem in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.²⁵

The representative of Pakistan maintained that his delegation had agreed to the issuance of a presidential statement in lieu of a prolonged debate. He had not expressed a view about the contents of such a statement, on the understanding that that would be subject to negotiation among the members of the Council and the parties concerned. Thereafter, he had heard nothing from the presidency, but had learned to his surprise that the debate had been scheduled to continue.²⁶

The President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, regretted that the Council would end the debate without adopting any statement.²⁷

The meeting was then adjourned.

Decision of 11 January 1990: resolution 647 (1990)

By a letter dated 9 January 1990 addressed to the President of the Security Council,²⁸ the Secretary-General recalled that, in his report of 20 October 1989

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 22-53.

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 56-62.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 63.

²⁸ S/21071.

to the Council,²⁹ he had indicated that more still needed to be done for the implementation of the Geneva Agreements, and had drawn the attention of the parties and the guarantors to the need to ensure strict implementation of their obligations. Having consulted the parties to the Agreements, he therefore proposed to the Council that the temporary detachment of military officers to Afghanistan and Pakistan be extended. He stated that the concurrence of the countries supplying the military personnel had already been secured.

At its 2904th meeting, on 11 January 1990, the Council included the Secretary-General's letter in its agenda.

The President (Côte d'Ivoire) drew the attention of the members of the Council to a draft resolution that had been prepared in the course of the Council's prior consultations.³⁰ He also drew their attention to a note by the Secretary-General dated 15 February 1989,³¹ and to his above-mentioned report of 20 October 1989.

The draft resolution was then voted upon and adopted unanimously as resolution 647 (1990), which reads:

The Security Council,

Recalling the letters dated 14 and 22 April 1988 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning the Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan, signed at Geneva on 14 April 1988,

Recalling also the note by the Secretary-General of 15 February 1989 and his report of 20 October 1989,

Recalling further its resolution 622 (1988) of 31 October 1988,

Taking note of the letter dated 9 January 1990 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council,

1. *Confirms* its agreement to the measures envisaged in the Secretary-General's letter of 9 January 1990 concerning the arrangements for the temporary deployment in Afghanistan and Pakistan of military officers from existing United Nations operations to assist in the mission of good offices for a further period of two months;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed of further developments in accordance with the Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan, signed at Geneva on 14 April 1988.

Decision of 28 March 1990: letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General

By a letter dated 12 March 1990 addressed to the President of the Council,³² the Secretary-General stated that the arrangements for the temporary deployment in Afghanistan and Pakistan of military officers from existing United Nations operations to assist in the mission of good offices would come to an end on 15 March. He added that his consultations with the signatories to the Geneva Agreements had indicated that another extension of the existing arrangements would "not meet with the necessary consensus". He therefore intended to redeploy a limited number of military officers from existing United Nations operations, by assigning them as military advisers to his Personal Representative in Afghanistan and Pakistan, to assist in the further implementation of a comprehensive political settlement.

By a letter dated 28 March 1990,³³ the President informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had no objection to the action he proposed.

Decision of 16 April 1992: statement by the President

On 10 April 1992, the Secretary-General issued a statement on the situation in Afghanistan,³⁴ in which he announced that an agreement in principle had been reached to have a pre-transitional council of 15 members in Kabul, which would take power immediately. That was the first step of the reconciliation. Secondly, they had agreed to the holding, as soon as possible, of an international conference within the framework of the United Nations.

On 16 April 1992, the Secretary-General made a further statement,³⁵ in which he said that he was deeply disturbed by the news he had received from his Personal Representative in Kabul concerning the developments that had occurred in the night of 15 to 16 April. He expected that the safety of all United Nations personnel would be respected and that they would be allowed freedom of movement in and out of

²⁹ S/20911.

³⁰ S/21073.

³¹ S/20465.

³² S/21188.

³³ S/21218.

³⁴ SG/SM/4727/Rev.1.

³⁵ SG/SM/4731.

the country as their responsibilities required. He added that there was no alternative to a political solution.

Later on 16 April 1992, following consultations among the Council members, the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:³⁶

The members of the Security Council strongly endorse the statement on the situation in Afghanistan issued by the Secretary-General on 10 April 1992 and share the Secretary-General's concern about the recent events there expressed in his statement of 16 April 1992. In this regard, it is imperative that all concerned display restraint and support the efforts of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Pakistan towards a political solution to the Afghanistan crisis, to which there is no viable alternative. Such a solution has been proposed by the Secretary-General with the objective of bringing an end to bloodshed and violence, promoting national reconciliation, and safeguarding the unity and territorial integrity of Afghanistan. Failure to do so could only perpetuate the suffering of the Afghan people. The members of the Council urge all parties in Afghanistan to assure the safety of all, especially United Nations personnel and their

³⁶ S/23818.

complete freedom of movement and the safety of the personnel of all diplomatic missions, as well as the safe departure of those who have chosen to leave.

Decision of 12 August 1992: statement by the President

On 12 August 1992, following consultations among the members of the Council, the President issued the following statement to the media on behalf of the Council:³⁷

The members of the Council express their utmost concern over the wide-scale fighting which has broken out in Kabul and which has already resulted in heavy loss of life and property, including to foreign missions and their personnel.

The members of the Council urge that the Government of Afghanistan take every measure to ensure the safety and security of all diplomatic and international missions, as well as their personnel in Kabul, and call upon all those involved in the hostilities to cease them and establish the necessary conditions for the safe evacuation of foreign personnel.

³⁷ S/24425; recorded as a Security Council decision in *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1992*, p. 98.

15. Items relating to the situation in Cambodia

A. Exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council concerning the dispatch of a fact-finding mission to Cambodia

Decision of 3 August 1989: letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General

By a letter dated 2 August 1989 addressed to the President of the Security Council,¹ the Secretary-General informed the Council members that he had attended the Conference on Peace in Cambodia convened in Paris at the initiative of the Government of France. He said that, at the opening of the Conference on 30 July 1989, he had made a statement expressing the view that peace in Cambodia could only be achieved in the framework of a comprehensive political settlement. In that context, he had noted that

¹ S/20768.

the Conference would be discussing the establishment of an international control mechanism, and had stated, inter alia, that: (a) no international control mechanism could function without the full cooperation of the parties concerned nor could one be imposed on them; (b) the establishment of a credible international control mechanism was dependent upon the identification of a clear and realistic mandate, the adoption of an effective decision-making process and the provision of the necessary human, logistical and financial resources, which could be evaluated only by a fact-finding mission; and (c) the international control mechanism could only be deployed in stages, on the understanding that all its functions should be agreed by the parties beforehand. He had given the assurance that, as Secretary-General of the United Nations, he stood ready, in keeping with established procedures, to offer any assistance the Conference might deem useful.

The Secretary-General reported further that the first ministerial session of the Conference had concluded, on 1 August 1989, with the adoption of a number of organizational measures, including a