

THE 2010 DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LECTURE

Idealism and Realism

Negotiating sovereignty in
divided nations

Francis Deng

Uppsala 2010

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Preface

On 9 December 1948 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This was a response to the hitherto unprecedented scale of targeted mass extinction of defined groups of people by the German Nazi regime, which Winston Churchill had termed in a broadcast speech of 1941 ‘a crime without a name’. The Genocide Convention went into force three years later. It defined genocide as ‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’, and it made genocide a punishable crime under international law. It was the first United Nations normative framework of its kind.

Unfortunately, nothing followed the adoption of the Convention that demonstrated a will to prevent genocide. Half a century later the renowned scholar William Schabas undertook a sobering stocktaking overview of ‘The Genocide Convention at Fifty’. As he concluded: ‘Some must have believed, in 1948, that the unthinkable crime of genocide would never recur. Perhaps the gaps in the convention are only the oversights of optimistic negotiators, mistaken in the belief that they were erecting a monument to the past rather than a weapon to police the future. Their naiveté may be forgiven. A failure to learn the lessons of the fifty years since its adoption cannot.’¹

Schabas could say this against a background of repeated genocides. Renowned scholar Barbara Harff listed in 2003 37 genocides and politicides in the world between 1955 and 2001.² Only a few of them were seen in that light at the

1 William Schabas, *The Genocide Convention at Fifty*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace, Special Report, 7 January 1999, p. 8.

2 Barbara Harff, ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955’, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No.1, 2003, pp. 57-73.

time. This includes the slaughter of ‘Communists’ in Indonesia in 1965 (a politicide), persecution of Mayas in Guatemala during several decades and the mass killings in Rwanda in 1994. The total numbers do not approach those of the Holocaust, but the intentions were often comparable, the brutality well orchestrated and the impact on the survivors severe.

The Convention of 1948 had declared the intention to establish a genuine and universal international criminal court to act in the spirit of the Convention. It took another 50 years for this to be created in June/ July 1998 at the Rome Diplomatic Conference – and only with further compromises, and with those taking deviating views refusing to fully recognise the Court and its jurisdiction. Since then, several steps have taken the international system closer to the possibility both of preventing and of responding in a more coherent way to crimes that violate the Genocide Convention.

The political and legal shifts towards a more systematic intention to accept the challenges posed by the ongoing mass violence occurring in our world have resulted in new initiatives. One step was Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1366, adopted on 30 August 2001. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed in 2004, at the Stockholm International Forum on Genocide, the creation of a Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide (SAPG). In July of the same year he appointed the Argentinian human rights lawyer Juan Mendez to the post. The mandate is based on tasks relating to the preventive concern expressed in SCR 1366(2001), in particular to collect information and act as an early warning mechanism.³

³ See the full text of the Resolution documented in an Appendix.

The mandate of the first SPAG expired in March 2007. On 29 May 2007 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Francis Deng as the second SPAG. Following a proposal by the Secretary-General, submitted on 31 August 2007 in a letter to the Security Council President (S/2007/721) the position was upgraded from Assistant Secretary-General to a full-time post as Under-Secretary-General.⁴ Further proposals were to expand the title into Special Representative on the Prevention of Genocide and Mass Atrocities and to appoint a Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect. Following discussions in the Security Council and the General Assembly, the title remained in the original version as Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide. On 21 February 2008 the Secretary-General finally appointed Ed Luck as Special Advisor with a focus on the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Both offices have since then been working closely together and a re-structuring is currently in progress, which will bring both mandates under one institutional umbrella.

Given the challenges of the noble task and Dr Francis Deng's longstanding professional track record, showing his clear commitment to human rights and justice, it was not difficult to select him as the presenter of the 2010 Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture. Like few others, Francis Deng combines the diplomat, elder statesman, scholar and international civil servant in a spirit related to the legacy of the second Secretary-General of the United Nations. Speaking freely, he captured the attention of the several hundred people in the auditorium mainly because he did not shy away from

⁴ This was based on the recommendations of an Advisory Committee on Genocide Prevention. The committee was appointed in May 2006 by Secretary-General Kofi Annan to provide guidance and support to the work of the SAPG, but the panel's report and recommendations were never released.

addressing the dilemmas inherent in his current position. He impressed many among the audience by his sensible treatment of the difficult choices his office has to make: walking the thin line between justice, prosecution and pragmatism. While it is difficult to accept that perpetrators commit their crimes by impunity, this might under certain circumstances bring an end to mass violence and save the lives of thousands more potential victims. The moral dilemma of handling such a choice made a strong impression on the listeners and resulted in a thought-provoking encounter.

Genocide prevention, however, does not consist only of preventing atrocities from ever emerging. To be successful, it must start much earlier. This is where the issue of sovereignty and responsibility comes in. The book Deng and his colleagues wrote on this topic in 1996 was timely.⁵ It influenced the adoption of the principles of an international as well as governmental responsibility to protect exposed populations from the risks of genocide. As Deng says in his lecture: ‘The challenge then becomes one of how to negotiate sovereignty, how to engage governments in a constructive dialogue.’ His words in this regard are memorable: ‘I consider my mandate an impossible one, but one that must be made possible.’ As the Office of the UN Special Advisor itself states, early prevention is a challenge of good governance and equitable management of diversity. That means eliminating gross political and economic inequalities and promoting a common sense of belonging on an equal footing. It is a broad agenda, and Deng is keenly aware of this, as he goes on to say in his lecture: if it is a task of ‘constructive

⁵ Francis M. Deng, Sadikiel Kimaro, Terrence Lyons, Donald Rothchild, and I. William Zartman *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings 1996.

management of diversity, to minimise disparities, to promote equality, inclusiveness, then there is room for all the agents of the United Nations and other actors beyond the United Nations’.

Dag Hammarskjöld’s conclusion in an address at the University of California’s Convocation on 13 May 1954 is in this context as valid today as it was then: ‘It has been said that the United Nations was not created in order to bring us to heaven, but in order to save us from hell.’ According to him, ‘that sums up as well as anything I have heard both the essential role of the United Nations and the attitude of mind that we should bring to its support’.⁶ We trust that this year’s Dag Hammarskjöld Lecture contributes to the cultivation of such awareness.

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⁶ Quoted from: *Public Papers of the Secretaries-general of the United Nations. Volume II: Dag Hammarskjöld 1953-1956*. Selected and Edited with Commentary by Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote. New York and London: Columbia University Press 1972, p. 301.



Francis Deng delivering her lecture in Uppsala University Main Hall

Idealism and Realism

Negotiating sovereignty in divided nations

Francis M. Deng

It is always a great pleasure to be back in Sweden. I have often said that an ambassador to a country is the ambassador not of his country alone but also of the country where he is accredited. And therefore it gives me a great pleasure to return to a country where I was ambassador at a rather young age – my first diplomatic posting – and therefore quite a formative one. I'll tell you a little anecdote that shows perhaps the extent to which I was raw, and I say it without being too embarrassed. I went to present my credentials in Norway and as I was talking to the Director General of the foreign ministry he said: 'Mr Ambassador, why did you choose Sweden as your seat for your mission in Scandinavia?' I replied: 'It was a choice made by my government, not mine. But isn't Sweden the centre of Scandinavia?' And he got up and said: 'Mr Ambassador, you come to my country to say Sweden is the centre?' And I said: 'I'm talking geographically of course.' He said: 'Even geographically – if you consider Iceland – Sweden is not the centre.'

In preparing for this lecture I thought about how to relate it to the core values that Dag Hammarskjöld stood for. And although the title we were using is still appropriate ('Genocide Prevention – A Challenge of Constructive Management of Diversity') I had to adapt it a little bit to sharpen my message. Genocide prevention and the challenge of managing diver-

sity are internal principles for governance. But the role of the international community, which is also critically important, does not figure in the original title, even though it is implicit. And so I have adjusted the title of my lecture to ‘Idealism and Realism: Negotiating sovereignty in divided nations’.

I consider that the ideals that Dag Hammarskjöld stood for in terms of peace, justice, respect for human rights for all, and caring for the vulnerable – instead of simply catering for the interest of the state – to be ideals that continue to inspire all of us who are called upon to serve humanity within the United Nations. I should say that Dag Hammarskjöld and what he stood for is not only a challenge and an inspiration for all those who serve within the United Nations, but has clearly become the standard by which all the consecutive Secretaries-General are evaluated.

My second emphasis has to do with what I consider the gap between aspirations and realities. By the gap I mean that although the ideals of the United Nations, which Dag Hammarskjöld spearheaded and symbolised, are universal, our performance leaves a great deal to be desired, and unfulfilled promises. And why is that so? I believe it’s because the United Nations, itself not yet entirely united, is an organisation of nations that are internally acutely divided, of nations where the stratification means that some groups enjoy all the rights and privileges of citizenship, and others are excluded, neglected and even persecuted.

Unprotected by their countries, where can those excluded groups turn, but to the international community? But when they do, a narrow concept of sovereignty as a barricade against the outside world is invoked and used

by the states to prevent involvement from the outside world. It would not help to be confrontational, because we do know that when governments assert their sovereignty they have the upper hand. And, very often, international actors are forced to cave in and follow the will of the state, and in a sense compromise the rights of the vulnerable under state sovereignty.

The challenge then becomes one of how to negotiate sovereignty, how to engage governments in a constructive dialogue that would bridge sovereignty and responsibility, that would turn sovereignty from being a barricade against the outside world, into a positive challenge of a state's responsibility for its people. To me, that is a challenge I have faced in my two mandates: both as special representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons from 1992 to 2004 and since 2007 as special advisor for the prevention of genocide.

My appointment to both positions happened in a somewhat similar way: I was surprised by a telephone call from Boutros-Ghali. He said my name had come up and that he was pleased to appoint me as his special representative for internally displaced persons. I said I was honoured and flattered, but could he have his people give me more details as to what the position meant and what it would entail before I could give him my final word. And he said: 'Come on, Francis, I know you very well.' Boutros-Ghali had been Egypt's minister of state for foreign affairs when I was Sudan's minister of state for foreign affairs and we had worked very closely together. He said: 'I know how concerned you are with these issues. This is not only a crisis that affects many around the world, it is a problem that Africa suffers from the most, and in Africa it is your own country, the Sudan, that is the worst affected. And in the Sudan, it is your own people

in the southern Sudan that are the worst hit. I cannot see how you can say 'no'. So I'll tell them that you have accepted. And if later on you still want to discuss, we can discuss further.'

He was right. I don't know the statistics today, but at my time there were some 25 to 30 million people internally displaced around the world in some 50 countries. People forced by conflict to flee their areas of normal residence or homes, but who had not crossed international borders. Had they crossed international borders they would have been refugees, and they would have been the subject of protection and assistance by the High Commissioner for Refugees under the 1951 Convention. These people not only needed the protection and assistance that refugees also need, but because they remained within their national borders, and in the zone of conflict, they were even more vulnerable than those who had crossed international borders. Yet, because they were internally displaced, the international community had no access to them, and therefore they could not avail themselves of protection or assistance from the international community. And because their displacement was considered an internal issue, falling under the sovereignty of the state, it was considered very sensitive, and the UN mandate on internal displacement was a very controversial one, which in the end was accepted only with major compromises.

I was aware of that, and therefore, from the very beginning I had to think seriously: How do I deal with this very sensitive issue? If I was to be seen as confrontational, adversarial, and in a sense getting into a kind of conflictual relationship with the state, doors would be closed and I would not have the opportunity to gain access to the needy populations. I would not be in a position to engage the governments, and therefore we would not be

helpful to the people who were desperately in need. I decided to build on work I was doing at the Brookings Institution, looking at African conflicts in the context of the Cold War. During the Cold War, as we all know, we used to look at regional and even internal conflicts as proxy wars of the superpowers. And they were to be managed – sometimes resolved, sometimes aggravated – by the superpowers. With the end of the Cold War the superpowers withdrew, and we had to begin to see the conflicts in their proper context – as regional or internal. This was a positive development; they were no longer distorted as proxy wars. But by the same token we had to reapportion responsibility; we could no longer depend on the superpowers as their interests were no longer involved. We had to find internal solutions, whether domestic or sub-regional or continent-wide.

But issues could not be left entirely to the states to manage, because in an age of concern with human rights and humanitarian issues, no state could say: ‘This is an internal issue and it does not matter how I mismanage my situation, it’s none of your concern.’ The world is watching closely, and, if necessary, would get involved. And so, after a series of studies – regional studies, country-specific studies – we produced a volume with the title, *Sovereignty as responsibility*. Sovereignty as responsibility meant that the state had to take care of its citizens and – if it needed support – call on the sub-regional, regional or continental organisations, or ultimately the international community. But if it did not do that, and its people were suffering and dying, the world would not watch and do nothing. They would find a way of getting involved.

I decided that the concept of sovereignty as responsibility was the most constructive way of engaging governments. And so, once I assumed the

position of special representative for internally displaced persons, I used that as my normative basis. The first five minutes with the president or the minister concerned were crucial in my sending the message across to them: ‘I realise that this is an internal matter that falls under state sovereignty; I’m respectful of your sovereignty. But I do not see sovereignty negatively, as a barricade against the outside world. I see it as a very positive concept of state responsibility for its people. And if it needs support, to call on the international community.’

The subtext, in the right spirit of solidarity with the government, would be: ‘But in this day and age of concern with human rights and humanitarian issues, the world will get involved in one way or another. So the best way for you to protect your sovereignty is not only to protect your own people and take care of them, but to be seen to be doing so, and to call on the international community if necessary. That’s how you gain internal legitimacy; that’s also how you gain external legitimacy and a respected place in the international community.’

I have to say that this approach was relatively successful in engaging governments. And I had to do it not just as a job, but as a mission. You come to the affected area within a country with United Nations-labelled planes and cars, all the symbols of UN involvement, and you go to see all these desperate people and they see in you the concern of the world. And the faith they have is: ‘If only the world knew, our plight would be addressed’. And so if you go with all this evidence of international concern and then you leave and nothing happens to them, the hope they had, the faith they had in the international community, would disappear, and their optimism would turn into despair. They would be worse off than if we had not gone

in the first place. Therefore I would plead on their behalf, with the colonel in the battlefield, the officers, the police and the administrators, and up the ladder, to the state powers, the president and the ministers.

I always asked the displaced populations: ‘What message would you want me to take back to your leaders?’ Invariably, in all parts of the world where I went, the response was the same: ‘We have no leaders there, those are not our leaders.’ In one Latin American country, the spokesman said, ‘Those people see us as criminals not citizens, and our only crime is that we are poor.’ In a central Asian country I heard a similar answer, but explained in ethnic terms: ‘None of our people is in that government.’ In an African country the prime minister is said to have said to a senior UN official: ‘The food you give to those people, those internally displaced populations, is killing my soldiers.’ Such comments draw attention to the vacuum of responsibility that these people face and for which they need the international community; and the international community – because of the barricades of sovereignty – is usually denied access. My point is: We cannot live on ideals that cannot be fulfilled. We have to aspire to the ideals, but we have to deal with the reality on the ground. And the reality on the ground is that we need the cooperation of the member states to fulfil our mission.

Then comes my next mandate on genocide prevention. Genocide, even more than that of internal displacement, is a very sensitive notion. It is a concept about which both those who perpetrate genocide and those called upon to prevent or stop it are usually in denial. That is why we usually recognise genocide after the fact, in historical terms. It’s an issue we would

assume the world would be clearly united in preventing and punishing. But by the same token, it's an issue often seen as too sensitive for comfortable conversation, too difficult to touch, and therefore, the general response is denial.

This mandate came to me in a very similar way to the one on internal displacement; I got a surprising e-mail saying: 'Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon is about to make a decision to appoint a special advisor on the prevention of genocide. Your name is on the list, perhaps at the top of the list, and he wants to know, if he were to ask you, whether you would consider accepting.' I said: 'This comes to me as a total surprise. But if I were asked, I would take it as a call of duty and a service to humanity, which I cannot take lightly.' Two days later I met the Secretary-General, and four days after our meeting my appointment was announced.

After the initial feelings of being honoured and flattered I quickly started to worry about what I had put myself into. How could I deal with this very sensitive issue? Again, I decided to look at practical ways of being able to do what needed to be done. I thought the best way was first of all to de-mystify the notion of genocide, to regard it not as something that is untouchable, something too difficult to deal with, but as a problem that is the result of extreme identity-related conflicts. Conflicts that target specific groups of people, identified either by the factors specified in the 1948 Convention, which include national groups, racial groups, ethnic groups or religious groups, or for that matter by some other criteria.

But it is not the mere fact of being different that causes genocidal conflict. It is the implications of these differences in terms of how much

people are differentiated and stratified. Whereas some groups enjoy the dignity and rights of citizenship, others are marginalised, discriminated against, excluded, de-humanised and denied the dignity and the rights that normally should accrue from citizenship. It is the reaction of these extremely marginalised groups – those discriminated against, those who are excluded – that generates the conflict. A conflict of resistance to the indignity, a conflict emanating from despair, from having no constructive, peaceful ways of promoting your interest of achieving equality and a sense of belonging to the nation, which then generates a counter-reaction by the state.

Escalation then becomes a zero-sum situation. And this means it's either you or me, in terms of survival. It is paradoxical that the existential threat that the more powerful feel from the weaker, which then motivates them to react with a genocidal onslaught, creates a dynamic that the groups in conflict cannot manage. It usually takes a third party to mediate. Of course, the irony of all this is that the subjectivity with which people define themselves, as opposed to the objective realities, often means that what divides people has a lot to do with myth rather than reality. The people at war are often not as divided as they think they are.

I've been to Bosnia at the peak of the conflict, I've been to Central Asia, to many countries in Africa, and usually when you look at the people in conflict, it's not easy to tell whether they are as different as they think they are. I remember going to Burundi, addressing groups, some of whom looked typical Tutsis, in the way we are told Tutsis look, and some of whom looked typical Hutus. I asked the foreign minister of the country after all these meetings: 'Can you always tell a Tutsi from a Hutu?' His response

was: ‘Yes, but with a margin of error of 35 per cent.’ And that margin of error is everywhere. But if you then take the challenge as one of how to manage diversity, to promote a sense of equality, a sense of belonging to the nation on an equal footing, a sense of pride in being a citizen, because you feel you enjoy the dignity and rights associated with citizenship – this is a challenge which no self-respecting government can question, can oppose. This is a challenge which should be a topic of constructive discussion with any government.

The concept of sovereignty as responsibility, recast in the 2005 outcome document of the Summit of Heads of State and Government as ‘the responsibility to protect’ has three pillars: the responsibility of the state to protect its own populations; the responsibility of the international community to assist the state to enhance its capacity to discharge its national responsibility; and the responsibility of the international community to take collective action under the UN Charter when a state is manifestly failing to protect its own populations. Measures under this last pillar range from diplomatic intercession to the imposition of sanctions, and, in extreme cases, to military intervention.

We have developed a Framework of Analysis that gives us eight sets of categories or factors that we look at in determining what the level of risk of genocide is. And they are all very practical issues that range from the existence of identity groups, to the extent to which there are circumstances that could be conducive to conflict, the presence of armed groups and arms and so forth, the factors that tend to constrain prevention. And on to whether there are actions being carried out that are reflective of genocide, and evidence of the intent to destroy a people, in part or in whole, which

is a definition of genocide. We also consider other triggering factors such as elections, and if they tend to be seen as winner takes all. If it is perceived that the winner will take whatever power, resources and services that come from victory, the stakes become very high. This is in contrast to the notion of elections being seen as the core of democracy in a state, and in some fashion giving a position of respect and dignity to the opposition.

In many third world countries elections are simplistically viewed out of context, and not ascribed the kind of values associated with democracy in other parts of the world. Once the Framework of Analysis is widely accepted, it can make governments stand in front of the mirror and ask themselves some tough questions: How are we performing? Where are we weakest? Where do we need to reform? And it becomes a tool for self-scrutiny and a way of achieving the objectives that any self-respecting government should want: namely of addressing the issues and preventing the kind of atrocities that usually precede genocide. I see this as a constructive approach, which frankly in my own work appears to be gaining ground.

Contrary to what people expected I was invited, for instance, to the African Union (AU) to address the Peace and Security Council and the Panel of the Wise, which adopted the Framework of Analysis to be incorporated into the AU's early warning mechanism. I have been invited to a number of countries in Africa, and have also engaged in meetings around the world, carrying this message of constructive management of diversity as a tool for prevention of genocide and other mass atrocities. Many of my colleagues said I would not be able to make frequent flyer mileage, because I would not be invited to visit countries. But I have to say that so far the delicate balance between asserting the need for international protection

for the vulnerable and the need for constructive engagement on the part of governments seems to be working.

I know that this is not the approach favoured by those who believe that on these matters we should cry out loud, stand on the mountain-top and preach what is right and condemn what is wrong. However, when we do that, we might satisfy our conscience, but how much can we help the people who need to be helped in a practical way? I also think that a regional approach is critically important, because countries in the same region quite often share the problem. Crisis in one country overflows into the neighbouring countries in the form of refugees, carrying their baggage of political crisis that can destabilise the whole region.

Let me conclude by saying that I consider my mandate an impossible one, but one that must be made possible. The way to make it possible is for my office to play the role of a catalyst: a catalyst that can then raise awareness, generically, and specifically in given situations, mobilising those with capacities for action; in a sense a collaborative approach that involves everyone. Because if we take genocide prevention of the type that I have talked about, as constructive management of diversity, to minimise disparities, to promote equality and inclusiveness, then there is room for all the agents of the United Nations and other actors beyond the United Nations. And that, in essence, is what we are trying to do.

So, to end with the essence of the title that I chose: I'm trying to bridge the gap between our aspirations for the ideal and our engagement with

the realities on the ground. It is one thing to say to governments that in the name of human rights we will override their sovereignty; to threaten that if they violate human rights the world will move in and will stop them from doing it by whatever means necessary. It is another thing to say: 'Sovereignty itself means responsibility, and the dignity you enjoy in the international community, the respect you have, your legitimacy at home and abroad, has a lot to do with the degree to which you discharge the positive responsibilities of sovereignty.' The notion of sovereignty as responsibility has now evolved into the responsibility to protect, with the three pillars outlined earlier as shared between the state and the international community.

Unfortunately, the responsibility to protect is being seen more and more in terms of the third pillar: that is, when all else fails and the world is forced to use coercive means to control the situation. But that is an absolute last resort. Even the third pillar has non-coercive measures that can be taken.

I therefore end by saying: Let us of course continue to press for greater reform. We have made a great deal of progress. We have to keep pushing for progress, sing the inspiration of Dag Hammarskjöld, who strove and eventually sacrificed his life, in pursuing the ideals of the United Nations, in protecting the vulnerable, the weak, from the strongest. Let us hopefully move the progress forward towards an ideal that we know we will not achieve soon, but which inspires us to continue to struggle, to press on. In the meantime let us find some practical ways of working with governments to minimise the negative impact of sovereignty and to make sovereignty a concept of responsibility.

Francis Deng


On 29 May 2007, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced the appointment of Dr. Francis M. Deng of the Sudan as the new Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide, a position he holds at the level of Under-Secretary General.

From 2006 to 2007, Dr. Deng served as Director of the Sudan Peace Support Project based at the United States Institute of Peace. He also was an Wilhelm Fellow at the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a research professor of international politics, law and society at Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.

Before joining the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dr. Deng was a Distinguished Visiting Scholar at the John Kluge Center of the Library of Congress. Dr. Deng served as Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons from 1992 to 2004, and from 2002 to 2003 was also a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace.

Dr. Deng served as Human Rights Officer in the United Nations Secretariat from 1967 to 1972 and as the Ambassador of the Sudan to Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the United States. He also served as the Sudan's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. After leaving his country's service, he was appointed the first Rockefeller Brothers Fund Distinguished Fellow.

He was at the Woodrow Wilson International Center first as a guest scholar and then as a senior research associate, after which he joined the Brookings Institution as a senior fellow, where he founded and directed the Africa Project for 12 years. He was then appointed distinguished professor at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York before joining Johns Hopkins University.



Among his numerous awards in his country and abroad, Dr. Deng is co-recipient with Roberta Cohen of the 2005 Grawemeyer Award for “Ideas Improving World Order” and the 2007 Merage Foundation American Dream Leadership Award. In 2000, Dr. Deng also received the Rome Prize for Peace and Humanitarian Action.

Dr. Deng holds a Bachelor of Laws [with honours] from Khartoum University and a Master of Laws and a Doctor of the Science of Law from Yale University. He has authored and edited 40 books in the fields of law, conflict resolution, internal displacement, human rights, anthropology, folklore, history and politics and has also written two novels on the theme of the crisis of national identity in the Sudan. He was born in 1938 and in 1972 married Dorothy Anne Ludwig, with whom he has four sons.

Appendix

Security Council Resolution 1366

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 4360th meeting,
on 30 August 2001**

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1196 (1998) of 16 September 1998, 1197 (1998) of 18 September 1998, 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998, 1209 (1998) of 19 November 1998; 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000, 1318 (2000) of 7 September 2000, 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000 and 1327 (2000) of 13 November 2000,

Recalling also the statements of its President of 16 September 1998 (S/PRST/1998/28), 24 September 1998 (S/PRST/1998/29), 30 November 1998 (S/PRST/1998/35), 24 September 1999 (S/PRST/1999/28), 30 November 1999 (S/PRST/1999/34), 23 March 2000 (S/PRST/2000/10), 20 July 2000 (S/PRST/2000/25), 20 February 2001 (S/PRST/2001/5) and 22 March 2001 (S/PRST/2001/10),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Armed Conflict (S/2001/574) and in particular the recommendations contained therein relating to the role of the Security Council,

Reiterating the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirming its commitment to the principles of the political independence, sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all States,

Mindful of the consequences of armed conflict on relations between and among States, the economic burden on the nations involved as well as on the international community, and above all, the humanitarian consequences of conflicts,

Bearing in mind its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security and reaffirming its role in the prevention of armed conflicts,

Stressing the need for the maintenance of regional and international peace and stability and friendly relations among all States, and underlining the overriding political, humanitarian and moral imperatives as well as the economic advantages of preventing the outbreak and escalation of conflicts,

Emphasizing the importance of a comprehensive strategy comprising operational and structural measures for prevention of armed conflict; and recognizing the ten principles outlined by the Secretary-General in his report on prevention of armed conflicts,

Noting with satisfaction the increased recourse, with consent of receiving Member States, to Security Council missions to areas of conflict or potential conflict, which among others, can play an important role in the prevention of armed conflicts,

Reiterating that conflict prevention is one of the primary responsibilities of Member States,

Recognizing the essential role of the Secretary-General in the prevention of armed conflict and the importance of efforts to enhance his role in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations,

Recognizing the role of other relevant organs, offices, funds and programmes and the specialized agencies of the United Nations, and other international organizations including the World Trade Organization and the Bretton Woods institutions; as well as the role of non-governmental organizations, civil society actors and the private sector in the prevention of armed conflict,

Stressing the necessity of addressing the root-causes and regional dimensions of conflicts, recalling the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General on Causes of Conflicts and the Promotion of

Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa of 13 April 1998 (S/1998/318) and *underlining* the mutually supportive relationship between conflict prevention and sustainable development,

Expressing serious concern over the threat to peace and security caused by the illicit trade in and the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons in areas of conflict and their potential to exacerbate and prolong armed conflicts,

Emphasizing the importance of adequate, predictable and properly targeted resources for conflict prevention and of consistent funding for long-term preventive activities,

Reiterating that early warning, preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, practical disarmament measures and post-conflict peace-building are interdependent and complementary components of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy,

Underlining the importance of raising awareness of and ensuring respect for international humanitarian law, *stressing* the fundamental responsibility of Member States to prevent and end impunity for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, recognizing the role of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in deterring the future occurrence of such crimes thereby helping to prevent armed conflict; and *stressing* the importance of international efforts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations in this regard,

Reiterating the shared commitment to save people from the ravages of armed conflicts, *acknowledging* the lessons to be learned for all concerned from the failure of preventive efforts that preceded such tragedies as the genocide in Rwanda (S/1999/1257) and the massacre in Srebrenica (A/54/549), and resolving to take appropriate action within its competence, combined with the efforts of Member States, to prevent the recurrence of such tragedies,

1. *Expresses* its determination to pursue the objective of prevention of armed conflict as an integral part of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;
2. *Stresses* that the essential responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national Governments, and that the United Nations and the international community can play an important role in support of national efforts for conflict prevention and can assist in building national capacity in this field and recognizes the important supporting role of civil society;
3. *Calls upon* Member States as well as regional and subregional organizations and arrangements to support the development of a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy as proposed by the Secretary-General;
4. *Emphasizes* that for the success of a preventive strategy, the United Nations needs the consent and support of the Government concerned and, if possible the cooperation of other key national actors and underlines in this regard that the sustained political will of neighbouring States, regional allies or other Member States who would be well placed to support United Nations efforts, is necessary;
5. *Expresses* its willingness to give prompt consideration to early warning or prevention cases brought to its attention by the Secretary-General and in this regard, encourages the Secretary-General to convey to the Security Council his assessment of potential threats to international peace and security with due regard to relevant regional and subregional dimensions, as appropriate, in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations;
6. *Undertakes* to keep situations of potential conflict under close review as part of a conflict prevention strategy and expresses its intention to consider cases of potential conflict brought to its attention by any Member State, or by a State not a Member of the United Nations or by the General Assembly or on the basis of information furnished by the Economic and Social Council;

7. *Expresses* its commitment to take early and effective action to prevent armed conflict and to that end to employ all appropriate means at its disposal including, with the consent of the receiving States, its missions to areas of potential conflict;
8. *Reiterates* its call to Member States to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security and in this regard urges them to provide the necessary human, material and financial resources for timely and preventive measures including early warning, preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, practical disarmament measures and peace-building as appropriate in each case;
9. *Reaffirms* its role in the peaceful settlement of disputes and reiterates its call upon the Member States to settle their disputes by peaceful means as set forth in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations including by use of regional preventive mechanisms and more frequent resort to the International Court of Justice;
10. *Invites* the Secretary-General to refer to the Council information and analyses from within the United Nations system on cases of serious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law and on potential conflict situations arising, inter alia, from ethnic, religious and territorial disputes, poverty and lack of development and expresses its determination to give serious consideration to such information and analyses regarding situations which it deems to represent a threat to international peace and security;
11. *Expresses* its intention to continue to invite the Office of the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator and other relevant United Nations agencies to brief its members on emergency situations which it deems to represent a threat to international peace and security and supports the implementation of protection and assistance activities by relevant United Nations agencies in accordance with their respective mandates;
12. *Expresses* its willingness to consider preventive deployment upon the recommendation of the Secretary-General and with the consent of the Member States concerned;

13. *Calls upon* all Member States to ensure timely and faithful implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (A/CONF.192/15) adopted on 20 July 2001 and to take all necessary measures at national, regional and global levels to prevent and combat the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons in areas of conflict;
14. *Expresses* its willingness to make full use of information from the Secretary-General provided to him inter alia, under paragraph 33 section II of the Programme of Action in its efforts to prevent armed conflict;
15. *Stresses* the importance of the inclusion, as part of a conflict prevention strategy, of peace-building components including civilian police within peacekeeping operations on a case-by-case basis to facilitate a smooth transition to the post conflict peace-building phase and the ultimate conclusion of the mission;
16. *Decides* to consider inclusion as appropriate, of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration component in the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping and peace-building operations with particular attention to the rehabilitation of child soldiers;
17. *Reiterates* its recognition of the role of women in conflict prevention and requests the Secretary-General to give greater attention to gender perspectives in the implementation of peacekeeping and peace-building mandates as well as in conflict prevention efforts;
18. *Supports* the enhancement of the role of the Secretary-General in conflict prevention including by increased use of United Nations interdisciplinary factfinding and confidence-building missions to regions of tension, developing regional prevention strategies with regional partners and appropriate United Nations organs and agencies, and improving the capacity and resource base for preventive action in the Secretariat;
19. *Endorses* the call of the Secretary-General for support to the follow-up processes launched by the Third and Fourth High-level United

- Nations-Regional Organizations Meetings in the field of conflict prevention and peace-building, and to provide increased resources for the development of regional capacities in these fields;
20. *Calls* for the enhancement of the capacity for conflict prevention of regional organizations, in particular in Africa, by extending international assistance to, inter alia, the Organization of African Unity and its successor organization, through its Mechanism of Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, as well as to the Economic Community of West African States and its Mechanism for Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts, Peacekeeping and Security;
 21. *Stresses* the need to create conditions for durable peace and sustainable development by addressing the root-causes of armed conflict and to this end, calls upon Member States and relevant bodies of the United Nations system to contribute to the effective implementation of the United Nations Declaration and Programme of Action for a Culture of Peace (A/53/243);
 22. *Looks forward* to further consideration of the report of the Secretary-General on Prevention of Armed Conflict by the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, as well as other actors including the Bretton Woods institutions and supports the development of a system-wide coordinated and mutually supportive approach to prevention of armed conflict;
 23. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.



Laying a wreath at Dag Hammarskjöld's Grave

Uppsala University

Uppsala University, founded in 1477, is the oldest and best-known university in Scandinavia. Famous scholars such as Rudbeck, Celsius and Linnaeus were professors at the university. Seven Nobel Prize laureates have been professors at the university, among them Archbishop Nathan Söderblom, who was also the University's Pro-Chancellor. He received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1930.

In the same year Dag Hammarskjöld completed his studies at Uppsala with a bachelor's degree in Law. He had begun his studies in 1923, received a BA in Romance Languages, Philosophy and Economics in 1925 and took a further post-graduate degree in Economics early in 1928.

In 1981, the Swedish Parliament established a Dag Hammarskjöld Chair of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University. The university's international studies library is also named after Dag Hammarskjöld.

Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation

The Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation was established in 1962 in memory of the second Secretary-General of the United Nations. The purpose of the Foundation is to search for and examine workable alternatives for a democratic, socially and economically just, ecologically sustainable, peaceful and secure world, particularly for the Global South.

Over the years, the Foundation has organised over 220 seminars and workshops and produced over 160 publications of material arising from these events, among them the journal *Development Dialogue*.



Copies of this publication may be obtained from the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation,
Övre Slottsgatan 2, S-753 10 Uppsala, Sweden, fax: +46-18-12 20 72,
web: www.dhf.uu.se, e-mail: secretariat@dhf.uu.se

Other titles in this series are:

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Martti Ahtisaari, *Can the International Community Meet the Challenges Ahead of Us?*

Karen AbuZayd, *Rights, Justice and United Nations Values – Reflections through a Palestine Refugee Prism*



The medal which Uppsala University has produced in memory of Dag Hammarskjöld is awarded to the Dag Hammarskjöld Lecturers. It is designed by Annette Rydström and cast in bronze. The obverse shows a portrait of Dag Hammarskjöld and the reverse a handshake and a text in Latin which reads: 'Uppsala University to its disciple in memory of his outstanding achievements.'

Photo: Jan Eve Olsson, Kungl. Myntkabinettet



Dag Hammarskjöld
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