Migration and Identity: Implications for Hosts and Guests

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UNESCO, 5 May 2010

Changing patterns of international migration

*from 19th and 20th century long-term poverty-related migration
out of rural-agrarian to urban-industrial lands
to
diverse mobilities of varying scale and duration

*from involuntary asylum-seeking departures from home
to
voluntary adventure-seeking, often circular mobilities

*from long-distance land and sea travel
to
airborne mobility and virtual (digital/electronic) networking

Table 1: International migrants by region of destination, 1960-2000 (millions)

| Region	1960	1980	2000
World	75.9	99.8	174.9
Developed nations	32.1	47.7	110.3
Developing nations	43.8	52.1	64.6
Africa	9.0	14.1	16.3
Asia	29.3	32.3	43.8
Europe	14.0	22.2	32.8
USSR (former)	2.9	3.3	29.5
Latin America (Caribbean)	6.0	6.1	5.9
North America	12.5	18.1	40.8
Oceania	2.1	3.8	5.8

Source: United Nations, Trends in Total Migrant Stock- the 2003 Revision.

Table 2: Traditional Countries of Immigration and Europe 1910 and 2000 (thousands)

	1910			2000		
	Population	Migrants	Percent	Population	Migrants	Percent
Australia	4,455	787	17.7	19,153	4,705	24.6
Canada	7,207	1,587	22.0	30,769	5,826	18.9
New Zealand	1,008	306	30.3	3,784	850	22.5
United States	91,972	13,516	14.7	283,003	34,988	12.3
W. Europe*	143,099	3,348	2.3	183,502	18,836	10.3

* Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Switzerland

Source: International Labor Office, World Statistics of Aliens: A comparative study of Census returns, 1910-1920 and United Nations Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2003 Revision.

Post World War II migration to Western Europe

NETHER LANDS

W GERMANY

BELGIUM

LUX

FRANCE

YUGO SLAVIA

TURKEY

GREECE

PORTUGAL SPAIN

TUNISIA

MOROCCO

ALGERIA

West Germany

France

Belgium

Luxembourg

Netherlands

MAURITANIA

MALI

SENEGAL

NIGER

UPPER VOLTA

IVORY COAST

TOGO

DAHOMEY

0   Km   600

Magnetism of Germany in latter 20c

Table 3: Population Inflows into selected OECD Countries 2000 and 2001 (000s)

Country	2000	2001
Europe		
Austria	66.0	74.8
Belgium	68.6	66.0
Czech Republic	4.2	11.3
Denmark	22.9	25.2
Finland	9.1	11.0
France	126.8	141.0
Germany	648.8	685.3
Greece	…	…
Hungary	20.2	19.5
Italy	271.5	232.8
Ireland	24.1	28.0
Luxembourg	10.8	11.1
Netherlands	91.4	94.5
Norway	27.8	25.4
Portugal	15.9	14.2
Sweden	42.6	44.1
Switzerland	85.6	99.5
Australia	92.3	88.9
Canada	227.3	250.3
Japan	345.8	351.2
New Zealand	38.8	62.1
United Kingdom	379.3	373.3
United States	849.8	1064.3

Source: OECD (2003) Trends in International Migration 2003 Paris: OECD (adapted from Table A1.1)

"Arab Spring", North Africa and Lampedusa

Inside Greece's Guantánamo:

Ninety per cent of illegal immigrants in the EU arrive through the Greek-Turkish border – and into the appalling conditions of its detention camps. Yet people keep coming

The number of refugees grew with the Iraq crisis and the war in Afghanistan. Since 99 per cent are Muslims, I give them a Muslim burial

Increased "Aero-mobility" in the 21c

Figure 1: Growth of world population and the stock of international migrants (persons living outside their country of birth.

Data Sources: United Nations, Population Division 2005 and United Nations 2004,Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic and Social Survey 2004, International Migration.

1 - LE TERRE PROMESSE

CANADA

FEDERAZIONE RUSSA

USA

dalla Cina

MESSICO

Dall'Europa occ. verso Usa

verso il Portogallo

ALGERIA

LIBIA

CINA

INDIA

dal Brasile

GIAPPONE

Verso Usa e Canada

Verso Usa

Verso Usa

PERÙ

BRASILE

INDONESIA

ARGENTINA

SUDAFRICA

AUSTRALIA

verso il Giappone

Immigrati in percentuale della popolazione (2005)

■ oltre il 20%　■ 8% - 20%　■ 3% - 7%　□ 0% - 2%

Changing Migrant Profiles

*from poorly-educated to qualified professionals

*from family/group displacements to individual mobility

*from job-seeking refugee/asylum to creative entrepreneurs

Figure 3. Educational qualifications of the foreign-born in OECD countries around 2001.
Source: OECD (2007).

Figure 3. In- and Out-Migration, Sweden, 1969-1996.

	Foreign citizens	Swedish citizens
Agriculture and forestry	1,4	5,8
Manufacturing	39,7	23,6
Construction	3,8	7,1
Hotel, Restaurant Commerce	14,0	13,8
Postal, tele- and communications	4,8	7,0
Banking, Social Security	4,0	6,7
Public services and miscellaneous	31,6	35,7

Swedish citizens 4.098.900

Foreign citizens 233.500 5,4%

TOTAL 4.332.400

Lokal avvikelse från
rikagenomsnittet på
5.07 i procent av
totalbefolkningen

ABSOLUT ANTAL/MIL²

195 <	
20 <	≤ 195
0 <	≤ 20
−70 <	≤ 0
−116 <	≤ −70
−167 <	≤ −116
	≤ −167

PEOPLE BORN IN SWEDEN · PEOPLE BORN ABROAD

Male Age Female

Figure 4. People Born in Sweden and People born Abroad—31 December 1981. Source: Statens Offentliga Utredningar; Folkmängd.

Immigration to and emigration from Ireland, 1995-2008 (Source: CSO)

|	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Immigration	31200	39200	43900	44000	48800	52500	59100	66900	50600	50100	84500	107800	109600	83800
Emigration	33,200	31,200	29,000	21,200	31,500	26,700	26,300	25,500	20,700	18,500	29,600	35,900	42,200	45,400

Figure 1.1: Gross National Income per capita, 2004 (US$)
Source: World Bank, 2005.

Population by place of birth (Source: Central Statistics Office)

Immigrants to Ireland 1981-2006

Top 10 national groups resident in Ireland, 2002 and 2006

|	2002		2006
1. UK	101,257	1. UK	112,548
2. USA	11,135	2. Poland	63,276
3. Nigeria	8,650	3. Lithuania	24,628
4. Germany	7,033	4. Nigeria	16,300
5. France	6,231	5. Latvia	13,319
6. China	5,766	6. USA	12,475
7. Romania	4,910	7. China	11,161
8. Spain	4,347	8. Germany	10,289
9. South Africa	4,113	9. Philippines	9,548
10. Philippines	3,742	10. France	9,064

Source: Census 2002, Census 2006. Available online at [http://www.cso.ie]

Polish Nationals, 2006

According to the 2006 Census, there are over 60,000 Poles resident in Ireland or 1.5% of the population. Source: CSO.

Concentration
by electoral division

- More than twice the national average
- More than the national average
- Less that the national average

Monaghan

Sligo

Roscommon

Athlone

Galway

Dublin

Limerick

Waterford

Killarney

Cork

Dublin

Mary Gilmartin & Gerald Mills
School of Geography, Planning & Environmental Policy, UCD.

Figure 4. Educational profile of Irish/UK and non-Irish/UK-born in Dublin, 2006.
Source: 2006 Census of Population, 5% Sample of Anonymised Records (COPSAR).

Figure 3.4: Emigrants and Immigrants, Poland, 2000-2004
Source: Central Statistical Office, CSO, Warsaw, 2005.

A SOCIAL EQUITY PERSPECTIVE

- ❑ **EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES**

- ❑ **URBAN SEGMENTATION AND GHETTO'S**

- ❑ **ETHNIC-CULTURAL VS. SOCIAL-ECONOMIC?**

- ❑ **EUROPE ON THE MOVE**

- ❑ **THE POSITION OF MIGRANTS**

- ❑ **ETHNIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP**

MIGRANT ENTREPRENEURSHIP

- BUSINESS ACTIVITIES → UNDERTAKEN BY MIGRANTS WITH A SPECIFIC SOCIO-CULTURAL AND ETHNIC BACKGROUND *(CHOENNI, 1997; WALDINGER ET AL. 1990)*


- MAMMA MIA!!!

MIGRANT ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN NL

4 MAIN GROUPS → STAM-GROUP

MIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS IN THE NETHERLANDS IN ABSOLUTE FIGURES
(SOURCE: CBS, 2006)

Consequences of Changed Mobility Patterns

*Demise/re-affirmation of national and imperial borders, e.g., Shengen?

*Increased freedom of access to new destinations, yet some concern over cultural homogenisation

•Security concerns

•*Employment: Intra-national tensions between entrepreneurs and trade-unions unions

*Unbounded E-access (e.g., mobile phones) versus fears of "entrapment"

*Power implications of "aero-mobility": airport-security and militarisation of networks: concern about "vectors" rather than "territories"

*Rise of "the right" in national politics

Figure 3: Foreign born stock by major national destinations 2000

Source: United Nations Population Division (2002) International Migration Report

Figure 6: The increase in the undocumented immigrant population in the United States. The bands suggest the uncertainty attached to the estimates.

Source: Passel, J. 2006. The size and characteristics of the unauthorized migration population in the United States. Estimates based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey. Washington, D.C. The Pew Hispanic Center. Research Report.

Figure 5: The composition of the foreign born population in the United States

Source: Passel, J. 2006. The size and characteristics of the unauthorized migration population in the United States. Estimates based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey. Washington, D.C. The Pew Hispanic Center. Research Report.

Paris
Brussels
Frankfurt
Zurich

Rotterdam
LONDON

Toronto
NEW
YORK
Chicago
San Francisco
Los Angeles
Washington
Houston
Miami
Mexico City
Caracas

Berlin
Verina
Milan
Madrid

Seoul
TOKYO
Osaka
Hong Kong
Taipei
Bombay
Bangkok
Manila

Singapore

Rio de Janerio
São Paulo
Buenos Aries

Johannesburg

Sydney

■ Dominant world city

▲ Major world city

○ Secondary world city

Erberts IV Equal Area Projection

Table 5: Refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons and other displaced persons

| Region	Number of persons (2005)
Sub-Saharan Africa	4,929,946
North Africa	226,858
Middle East	5,427,952
South and Central America	2,513,016
United States	549,083
Canada	167,723
Australia	66,786

The numbers in Sub-Saharan Africa include 1.3 million displaced persons in Somalia and the Sudan, in the Middle East, 1.2 million persons in Iraq and in South America 2.0 million persons in Columbia

Source: United Nations, 2005 Global Refugee Trends, United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Geneva.

Figure 10: The distribution of demographic stress 2000-2010

Source:Richard Cincotta, Robert Engelman and Daniele Anastasion 2003. The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War. Washington, D.C. Population Action International, p. 71.

Figure 2: The growth of the World's population

Data Source: United Nations, Population Division, 2005

Far-right parties gain gain
amid resentment over economic battering in Hungary

Irish times
30 April 2011

Tensions escalate between Hungarians and Roma minority minority

Vlaams Belang blends Flemish cause into its anti-migrant agenda

ARTHUR BEESLEY

in Brussels

The party may be intensifying its creed of xenophobia to tackle the more popular N-VA

Success of Wilders tilts mainstream politics sharp right

Belgian newspaper *Le Soir*'s reproduction of Vlaams Belang's poster of a white sheep kicking a red sheep emblazoned with the insignia from the Turkish and Moroccan flags from ground covered by European flags.

In Denmark

> To win votes in this country, you must talk tough on foreigners

In Germany

German populists hope to emulate Wilders's success

DEREK SCALLY

in Berlin

Germany's pro-EU stance, the rock on which the Continent was united, is being challenged

AMID THE ruined buildings with shattered windows, Storkower Strasse eastern Berlin is an unlikely place for a political revolution.

Yet that is what the men are planning on the fourth floor of the renovated tower block that still smells of East German disinfectant.

Die Freiheit – Freedom – is the name of their political party, which hopes to win disaffected voters uneasy about migration and unsettled by the euro zone crisis.

The moment has been carefully chosen. For six decades, Germany's staunch, unquestioning pro-EU consensus was the rock on which the continent was united, its people apparently inoculated by history against extremism, populism and intolerance.

The last year has given pause for thought. First there was the runaway bestseller *Germany Does Itself In*. Ostensibly an analysis of failed integration of minorities, this book goes further, its author, Thilo Sarrazin, linking genetics and intelligence and suggesting the future Germany will be dominated by a slow-witted Muslim majority.

The 1.5 million copies sold indicate a hunger in certain quarters for discussion of these issues. German politicians who protest about Sarrazin risk being dubbed elitist and out of touch.

According to received wisdom, Die Freiheit is the type of populist party that cannot work in Germany. But the party has studied closely Dutchman Geert Wilders, and hopes for a strong result in Berlin's city-state election in the autumn.

Heading the party's Berlin campaign is René Stadtkewitz, a former Christian Democrat (CDU) disillusioned by the centrist course the party has taken under Chancellor Angela Merkel.

The mild-mannered 46-year-old has little of Geert Wilders's wild-eyed charisma, but he hopes to win over Thilo Sarrazin readers. Talking to *The Irish Times*, he quickly conflates Muslim immigrants with Islamist extremists to create an existential threat to German society.

Asked whether he sees parallels between Germans demonising Muslims now and Jews then, he deftly turns the argument around.

"Nobody could imagine back then with the rise of the National Socialists that a handful of crazies could drag an entire country into the abyss," he says. "But look at Sudan or Turkey and you see . . . a terrible new ideology, and once again we have to defend ourselves."

Germany must shake off decades of "misunderstood tolerance" and encourage Muslims in Germany to "secularise, to free themselves from the sharia haze . . . of killing people who aren't believers".

"Of course we are still talking about a minority," he says, "but demographic developments suggest in Europe we could soon have a majority. And if we don't have the strength to tell them now what freedom is, one day we won't be able to be to."

Beyond anti-Islamic slogans, his party is critical of the EU and the euro zone rescue effort, saying it will amount to nothing if "the will is not there to admit the construction mistakes at the heart of the euro".

Dr Kai-Olaf Lang, of Berlin's SWP think-tank, says considerable hurdles still stand between a populist party such as Die Freiheit and a political breakthrough. No one in Die Freiheit or the neo-Nazi NPD has enough charisma to bewitch voters, he says, nor do these parties have the resources needed to make an impact in Germany's vast federal state structure.

Crucially, he says, no populist party yet enjoys the favour of the best-selling tabloid *Bild*.

"We don't yet see the right constellation," he says, "though polls suggest the demand from electorate would be there, around 15-20 per cent."

It's a different story over the border in Austria, where the support of the *Kronenzeitung* – read by one in four Austrians – helped the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) into power in Vienna a decade ago with the conservative People's Party (ÖVP).

The pressures of office triggered a party meltdown and the charismatic leader, Jörg Haider, left to form a new party. His fatal car crash in 2008 solved that problem and now the FPÖ is surging ahead in polls under Haider's equally charismatic protege, Heinz-Christian Strache.

With 26 per cent support, the FPÖ is Austria's second most popular party, tapping traditional Austrian reservations about Islam, migration and the EU and amplifying them into a broad euroscepticism or even xenophobia around tomorrow's opening of Austria's labour market to EU neighbours.

To its critics, the FPÖ is a textbook example of how a permanent populist presence reshapes political landscapes, creating me-too copycats and desensitising the public to extreme views. The Austrian interior ministry's annual reports into political extremism in the country devote considerable attention to animal rights extremists but make no reference to meetings between FPÖ figures and neo-Nazis, filled with Hitler salutes and Nazi symbols.

Hans Öllinger, an Austrian Green Party MP who monitors extremism, says Austria's major parties no longer risk chastising a party today that might be their coalition partner tomorrow.

"The People's Party in particular doesn't want to do anything to upset its government option with the FPÖ," says Mr Öllinger, "so everything in Austria that might suggest far-right connections is airbrushed out."

The populist Swiss People's Party (SVP) has long since abandoned the airbrush. One in four Swiss voters backs the granddaddy of European populism and, these days, when people think of the alpine state they are as likely to think of the SVP's recent poster campaigns as of Heidi and Toblerone.

There was a failed migration referendum on deporting foreign criminals in 2008 that used a poster of a black sheep being kicked off the Swiss flag by white sheep. A successful 2009 referendum banning minarets on Swiss mosques had SVP posters with missile-like minarets lined up on the Swiss flag.

The party delights in denying the obvious racist undertones of its campaigns but, in doing so, has transformed direct democracy referendums into what one analyst dubs "resentment events".

"They have freed politics from the bothersome burden of having to be sensible," writes Swiss analyst Peter Schneider.

"Complaining that populists contribute nothing to solve problems misses the point entirely, just like telling a hooligan that violence doesn't solve anything."

Heinz-Christian Strache, leader of Austria's *Die Freiheit* or Freedom Party

Farmers, Fishermen, Gypsies, Guests: Who Identifies?

Prospects for dialogue between hosts and guests

Data from research in Sweden 1982-88

Thematic Foundations for Dialogue between Hosts and Guests

MEANING

METAPHOR   MILIEU

HORIZON

VOCATIONAL MEANING/ LIVELIHOOD

Immigrant deployment of professional skills

Walloon-Sweden 17c
Sweden-America 19c
Finnish – Sweden 18-20c

Immigrant contributions to entrepreneurial innovation

Trade Union re-actions

Male-female contrasts of employment opportunity

METAPHOR

Linguistic access: vernacular diversity versus monlingual hegemony

Intra-national tensions between entrepreneurs and trade-unions

Potential occasions/ sites for encounters between hosts and guests

Differences in
World-view/
"Root Metaphor"

Changing Discourses on Migration

*from rhetorics of assimilation and multi-culturalism to concerns about social social cohesion and cultural integration

*from population policies based primarily on national priorities to Internationally-harmonised policies of immigration

*from strategies of accomodation to market-based "development" immigration immigration

*In post 9/11 USA substantial increase in detentions and deportations

HOST CONCERNS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MIGRANTS

"assimilation"   or   "social equity/cohesion"

"multi-culturalism " or "cultural integration"

National rhetorics on immigration versus
Internationally-harmonised policies and practices

"accomodation" or market-based "development"

"citizenship": rights and responsibilities

MILIEU: DIALOGUE ON SOCIETAL INTERESTS

IDENTITY

NICHE

ORDER

IDENTITY

Settled "sense of place" versus "trans-locality"

Retaining homeland links versus integration in host country

Geographies of everyday life: architecture and encounter

ORDER

Political geometry of administrative discretion

Taken-for-granted practices of everyday life

Policy directives on housing vis-à-vis ghettoes

Educational policies in EU countries

NICHE

What place for immigrants in host societies?

Assets or liabilities in an increasingly global economy?

Native vs non-native entrepreneurialism

"Home" versus "Housing"

HORIZON

Long term settlement or temporary asylum/adventure?

Inter-generational communication/attitudes toward host country country

Professional career: potential prospects

Memory and vision: role of traditional arts/culture

Prince Pitirim Kropotkin
1842-1921

Geography ... must teach us,
from our earliest childhood,
that we are all brethern,
whatever our nationality...

It must show that each nationality brings its own precious building stone for the general development of the commonwealth, and that only small parts of each nation are interested in maintaining national hatreds and jealousies. Pitirim Kropotkin, 1885. What geography ought to be, Report to the Royal Geographical Society, London by J. Scott Keltie.