The UNESCO COURIER

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AN APPEAL FOR SOLIDARITY

FEBRUARY 1993



VIOLENCE

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A LETTER TO OUR READERS

AN APPEAL FOR SOLIDARITY

■ In recent months we have received many letters from students, teachers and librarians in the schools and universities of Africa and Asia enquiring about the possibility of free subscriptions to the *Unesco Courier*. The writers had been introduced to the magazine as a result of a free distribution of numbers published in 1989, 1990 and 1991. In many different countries the discovery aroused the same interest—and occasioned the same insistent appeal.

■ The fact is that the extent of the response took us by surprise. We do our best to produce a magazine that reflects the humanist and universalist ideals of Unesco. But we never imagined the depth of the need to which these ideals are a response. In countries faced with the problem of sheer survival we were inclined to think that food and nutrition were the sole priorities. However, the letters we have received let us know in no uncertain terms that while rice and wheat, vaccines and antibiotics are urgently needed, it is equally important to create the future.

■ The letters tell us that young people everywhere are not satisfied with mere survival; they want to build a better future. To do so they must be aware of what is happening, not only in their own immediate neighbourhood but in the world at large. They need to learn to think for themselves about the problems they face, while at the same time remaining faithful to their own values. But they must also come to terms with the problems of the wider world they are helping to shape, and that means looking out to other cultures than their own and adopting universal norms and values.

■ We feel honoured that these students, teachers and librarians from Bangladesh and India, from Senegal and Benin, think that the *Unesco Courier* can help to show them the world in all its diversity—and its fundamental unity. In return, they have helped us to realize that everywhere, even in lands where life can be extremely hard, people continue to dream, to hope and to look further than their own immediate situation, regarding themselves as members and creators of a single humanity.

HOW YOU CAN HELP

■ We have already provided a certain number of free subscriptions and will continue to do so. But our limited resources prevent us from doing this on a large scale.

■ As a result we are appealing to subscribers in the more affluent countries and asking them to help in two different ways.

■ First we appeal to those of you who may be willing to offer a "solidarity subscription" to a school, university or library in a country of the South—we shall be happy to give you the address and other details of the recipient of your subscription.

■ But you can also help in another way. The requests we have received from the countries of the South for free subscriptions to the *Courier* are only the tip of the iceberg. They bear witness to a desire for intellectual solidarity that is an extraordinary manifestation of optimism in a time of widespread disarray.

■ Solidarity is urgently needed, but it has traditionally taken the form of emergency aid, attempts to halt massacres, cure epidemics and overcome famine. It is now time to go further and by direct, personal action build bridges between peoples in new areas—in culture, images, books and ideas.

■ This appeal is an invitation to explore this territory. You can take part by writing to us and letting us know about your ideas, however tentative, and experiences of these forms and areas of solidarity. We shall be happy to publish the most interesting of your comments and thereby provide a forum for an international exchange of ideas.

■ *Help us to build new bridges.*

The Editors of the *Unesco Courier*

WRITE TO US

ADDRESS YOUR LETTERS TO: SOLANGE BELIN, "OPERATION SOLIDARITY", THE UNESCO COURIER, 31 RUE FRANÇOIS-BONVIN, 75732 PARIS CEDEX 15 (FRANCE). TO GIVE A SUBSCRIPTION USE THE COUPON INSERTED IN THIS ISSUE, CLEARLY INDICATING THAT YOU WISH TO TAKE PART IN "OPERATION SOLIDARITY"

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La Tempête (1886), a sculpture by Auguste Rodin (detail).

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The UNESCO COURIER

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"The Governments of the States parties to this Constitution on behalf of their peoples declare,
"that since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed . . .
"that a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.
"For these reasons, the States parties . . . are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives. . . ."

EXTRACT FROM THE PREAMBLE TO THE CONSTITUTION OF UNESCO, LONDON, 16 NOVEMBER 1945

JOSÉ CARRERAS

talks to Serafín García

José Carreras is one of the leading lyric tenors of our time. His operatic repertoire comprises some 60 roles which he has performed all over the world under the direction of outstanding conductors, notably Herbert von Karajan. He is also a brilliant singer of lieder and folk songs. During a career which has been interrupted by serious illness, he has won many national and international honours. The creator of a medical research foundation which bears his name, José Carreras is one of today's great servants of music.

■ *Did you first become interested in music as a child?*

—I had a rather happy childhood. There was one very revealing moment I particularly remember. I was only four when my family left Barcelona—where, by the way, I was born on 5 December 1946—and emigrated to Argentina. Times had become very hard in Barcelona, which was still suffering from the after-effects of the Spanish Civil War and the Second World War. For political and financial reasons, my parents had decided to try their luck on the other side of the Atlantic. But they were soon disappointed, and we came back to Spain after a year.

But what I chiefly remember about our expedition was the crossing. I had a great time on the boat and, I think, amused the other passengers with my imitations of tango singers and dancers.

■ *Were you just having fun, or do you think it was already a sign that you had a vocation for music? How did you become a singer?*

—Through a whole chain of circumstances, of course, and not because of some sudden inspiration. Like all other five- or six-year-old boys in Catalonia, I dreamed of playing football and scoring more goals than anyone else. I also wanted to spend as much time as possible in the cinema. In those days there wasn't much else to do in one's spare time. We had a season ticket to the cinema and would sometimes sit through two showings in succession.

I enjoyed taking off a very popular singer called Luis Mariano. But what really encouraged me most to take up singing was the film *The Great Caruso*, with Mario Lanza in the title role. The day after I saw the film I started imitating Mario Lanza, and I noticed I was able to reproduce almost all the arias in *The Great Caruso*, which I'd never heard before, with startling accuracy. My parents weren't exactly great opera-lovers, but they were so impressed they started wondering whether my love of music was not after all a sign that I really had a vocation. They gave me a record-player and records of *The Great Caruso* and Neapolitan songs sung by Giuseppe di Stefano. I was absolutely thrilled.

I was eight when my father enrolled me at the Barcelona Conservatory and took me for the first time to a performance of Verdi's *Aida* at the Teatro del Liceo in Barcelona. It was pure magic! Attending a live performance of an opera, with all the singers, the orchestra, the sets, the atmosphere and all the rest, was a decisive experience for me. Three years later, when I was eleven, I got a chance to appear on the stage of the great Teatro del Liceo when I played a child in Manuel de Falla's *El Retablo de Maese Pedro*. It was a difficult part to sing as it was written for soprano.

After this promising debut, my parents began to take serious advice on whether or not I should embark on a singing career. They made such a fuss over me that the pianist and conductor José Iturbi thought it wise to dampen their enthusiasm a bit by pointing out that they would have to wait until my voice broke before coming to any decision. In the meantime, I was encouraged to specialize in science and began to study chemistry. But I found it pretty hard going. All I could think of was singing. In the end, on the occasion of my twenty-first birthday during the 1967-1968 academic year, I finally decided to take up

the career that was clearly closest to my heart.

Shortly afterwards I made the acquaintance of someone who was to become one of my closest friends, Montserrat Caballé. She had great confidence in me from the very start. She arranged for me to sing with her at the Teatro del Liceo in 1970. It was there too that I played Gennaro in Gaetano Donizetti's *Lucrezia Borgia*. After that, I was asked to appear at all the world's great opera-houses.

■ *What does music mean to you?*

—It's first and foremost my profession, which is in itself important to me. But above all it is the only channel through which I can express some of my deeper emotions. Although I'm someone who tends to keep himself to himself, when I sing I discover private feelings within me which I try to communicate to the audience.

Singing is all about communicating. That's why technique is important. The better your technique, the more likely you are to be able to communicate. But that's not enough. A singer must also be able, through technique, to inject life and substance into music, to give it a soul. Technique and a fine voice can never suffice on their own.

That's why I think the "perfection" of a recording, obtained after a lot of technical tinkering, can never surpass a live performance, for all its inevitable imperfections. As I've often said, when you're a tenor you must start singing in the heart, move up to the head, then let it out through the voice. Your heart, which wants to express a number of emotions, is the point of departure. But it wouldn't serve much purpose unless your head took charge and warned you not to overdo it or, on the contrary, to let rip a bit more. It is by that subtly circuitous route that the voice, working hand in hand with technique, can genuinely express the emotions of the heart while at the same time obeying the instructions of the mind.

■ *Is opera the only kind of singing you like? What do you think of flamenco, for example, a popular art based on cante jondo, or "deep song," which seems outlandish to some and is a delight to others?*

—When well performed, *cante jondo* is an extraordinarily sensitive, sophisticated and expressive form of singing, especially when the emotional charge is such that the singer, just as he seems to have given his all and is on the point of collapse, somehow manages to summon up enough strength to lend his final burst of song a timbre so personal it becomes unique.

I'm a great fan of *cante jondo*, and by that I mean genuine *cante jondo*. What I can't stand, however, is the watered-down version that is so often served up to us.

■ *Do you also appreciate other types of music, like jazz or rock?*

—Please don't imagine that professional classical musicians, and especially those who work in opera, spend all their time listening only to Wagner or Verdi. I love classical music, I love symphonic music, but I also love pop, rock and other types of music—it all depends on what mood I'm in.

I like pop music when it's well performed. And sometimes I really adore it. Take the Beatles, for example. They first began to be widely played when I was still in my teens. They left a deep impression on my generation. I still regard them as great musicians. When it's good, their kind of music is something that I respond to with intensity.

■ *When it comes down to it, then, the only distinction you make is between good music and bad music.*

—Absolutely. While we're on the subject, let me anticipate a question I'm often asked—whether operatic tenors should sing so-called popular music or not. I think they should, first because I like listening to that kind of music and singing it, and then because it may also be a way of attracting a new audience to opera.

■ *I was about to ask you what you think about the charge of elitism that is often levelled at opera and classical music in general.*

—It's true they are often accused of being elitist. In the old days that kind of accusation might have seemed justified. But times have changed. Nowadays, classical music and opera are appreciated by an ever-wider public from an increasingly broad social background. That is partly due to the performers themselves, who are much less likely to behave like prima donnas nowadays. But the main reason for the change is the influence of the audiovisual media, which have enabled hundreds of thousands of people to get to know and enjoy this kind of music. Like any other form of artistic expression, music needs an audience. It can only be decoded and become accessible if it reaches the public—you can't love anything until you know it.

■ *How would you relate music to other arts like painting, sculpture and literature?*

—Music has one specific characteristic, which has both advantages and drawbacks, but which makes it livelier than many other forms of artistic expression: it is produced instantaneously. That means that in certain circumstances it has an extra emotive force and a quite extraordinary expressive power. Having said that, I should add that I also adore literature.

■ *Do you think that a painting, say, can inspire a range of emotions, from the deepest gloom to the wildest euphoria, as powerfully as music?*

—It's not impossible. But it's literature, of course, that comes closest to music in this respect. After all, opera is a marriage of words and music.



■ *If you were marooned on a desert island and could take only one work by each great composer with you, which ones would you choose?*
—What an agonizing choice that would be! I would definitely take Mozart's *Marriage of Figaro* and Bellini's *Norma* with me. I couldn't do without Rossini's *The Barber of Seville* or Donizetti's *The Elixir of Love.* I'd also take Wagner's *Tristan and Isolde,* Bizet's *Carmen* and Puccini's *La Bohême.* As for Verdi, how could one possibly choose between *Rigoletto, La Traviata* and *Il Trovatore*?

■ *Which are your favourite operatic roles?*
—Rodolfo in *La Bohême* and Don José in *Carmen* are two of my favourites. I also like Nemorino in *The Elixir of Love.*

■ *Do you still ever get first-night nerves?*
—I don't know whether what I feel is really nerves. All I do know is that on the day of a big premiere I start giving myself a check-up the moment I wake up. I examine my instrument, that is to say my voice. I try to reassure myself that all is well, physically and psychologically, and that my voice is responding properly to the instructions it is getting from my brain. Why does one have nerves like that? Perhaps because if you're a member of the chorus, a small mistake can go unnoticed, whereas a single muffed note by a tenor can be of momentous importance.

■ *People often say that opera is going through a crisis. Do you agree?*
—It seems always to have been the case—but this is a very controversial subject. I myself see a crisis looming on the horizon because there isn't enough young blood at the moment to keep the complex structure of opera firmly on its feet. This shortage of talent has attained alarming proportions. Unless a new generation emerges soon, opera is in danger of going into terminal decline.

■ *You're a man of great curiosity and a wide range of interests. Is there another field in which you would have liked to excel?*
—When I was very small, as I told you, I was mad about soccer. Like countless other Spanish boys, I dreamt of playing centre forward for Spain, or for Barcelona. But I think it would be going too far to talk of frustration. If I hadn't gone in for singing and classical music, I'd certainly have chosen some other activity to do with art.

■ *Does your professional work leave you time to devote yourself to your other activities?*
—I try not to perform more than two or three times a week. I strive to reconcile my professional life with my private life. It's not always easy, especially now that I have a third activity on top of all my other commitments—the foundation which bears my name, and whose purpose is to fight leukaemia.

■ *What gave you the idea of setting up the José Carreras Foundation?*
—I got the idea of setting up the Foundation after my personal experience of leukaemia. As you may know, I was ill for almost a year. During that time, the great support and encouragement I got from lots of people helped me fight and, eventually, beat the disease. It was then that I discovered that the tenors usually described as my rivals, Luciano Pavarotti and Placido Domingo, were not just great singers but also wonderful human beings. When it was time for them to leave after paying me a visit, one of them would say "*Bon courage,* champ!" and the other "José, you've got to pull through, otherwise there won't be anyone left for me to match myself with." It was words like that, and a host of others from much less well-known people, that helped me through the ordeal. And that's what gave me the idea that if I ever recovered I would set up a Foundation to help fight that terrible disease.

■ *What has the Foundation achieved so far?*
—It has already become very well known, and several distinguished people are involved in it. Its technical committee is headed by Professor E. Donald Thomas, who won the Nobel Prize for medicine, and several leading Spanish and American scientists. The Foundation, which was set up in Barcelona in 1988, already has offices in the United States, Switzerland and Austria. We have some very ambitious plans and programmes. Our main aim is to help scientific research with funding and grants. Scientists believe that the best way to help fight the disease is to step up research efforts.

■ *Where does it get its money from?*
—The Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González is the Foundation's honorary president. His support has been very valuable. Many public and private institutions have taken their cue from him and given us moral and financial support. We've also raised finance for the Foundation in recent years by organizing gala performances around the world in which I have sung. Then there have been donations from the public. When they are well informed, people are extremely generous.

■ *Is there any particular message you would like to pass on?*
—I suffered from leukaemia and recovered from it. Leukaemia is a very serious disease, but there was nothing exceptional about my recovery. Scientists now say people have an increasingly good chance of recovery. But you have to *want* to recover. So I'd like to say to those suffering from the disease that, even if there's only a chance in a million of getting better, that chance could be yours. You have to fight, and fight by drawing on all your inner resources. You'll be surprised how great they are. ■

Editorial by Bahgat Elnadi and Adel Rifaat

Violence

VIOLENCE today seems to be all around us. It is something we cannot ignore. Is it more widespread than it once was, or is it simply appearing in more blatant forms? Even if we are not directly confronted with violence it is impossible to shut our eyes and ears to its existence. If we are spared violence in our homes, it lies in wait for us elsewhere, when we take the subway, perhaps, or travel by air. We see it every day on the screen, in news and current affairs broadcasts and in fiction. We end up by expecting to encounter violence on every street corner.

Something in the terrible twilight of our century seems to call forth violence as inevitably as storm-clouds herald a storm. With the collapse of European communism, the balances that reposed on the East-West bipolar system have been upset. But when the great wind of freedom began to blow through the world, fear also began to spread, an insidious fear of the new, the unknown, the unexpected.

We live in a world in the throes of change, a world of multifarious possibilities, a world in which everything must be reinvented. But as things stand at present, not everyone has a chance to participate in this rebirth. The disparities are too great between those who can contribute to the forces of change and those who are condemned to passively endure their repercussions. The disinherited far outnumber the privileged, the powerful are infinitely stronger than the weak. Confronted with too many challenges at once, individuals, minorities and nations are tending to turn in upon themselves, to reject others and to reject change itself. Tensions, conflicts and rigidity seem to be reappearing, both in our personal lives and in the communities to which we belong.

Violence, then, is near at hand. Since it has existed since the dawn of history and is so deeply rooted in the unconscious, how could it fail to find, in the prevailing climate of disarray, increasing opportunities to show its face and appear in new guises?

What are the origins of violence? Some scientists, and not the least distinguished, have suggested that the causes of violence are specifically biological—a thesis which was convincingly rejected at a meeting of leading scholars held in Seville in 1986. Does violence have a socio-economic basis? Is it a consequence of the insoluble contradiction between individual and social experience? In what conditions does it cease to be latent and erupt? Do the mass media report it accurately or do they give overdue attention to it and make it worse?

These are some of the questions that are posed in this issue. Underlying them is a concern to know whether, and if so how, it is possible to respond to violence otherwise than by further violence. Some answers to these questions are to be found in ethics, in politics and in art. They are based on the imperative of respect for the person, for personal rights and freedoms, on a course of political action that looks to negotiation and not repression, and on a form of co-operation that everywhere honours justice and solidarity.

The task involved is immense and never-ending. It is more urgent than ever today.

When cities run riot

by Loïc J. D. Wacquant

Eruptions of big-city violence in the West are symptoms of a malaise that needs treatment in depth

OCTOBER 1990 in Vaulx-en-Velin, a quiet, depressed working-class town in the suburbs of Lyon, France: several hundred youths, many of them second-generation immigrants from the Maghrib, take to the streets and confront police after a neighbourhood teenager dies in a motorcycle accident caused by a patrol car. For three days, they clash with law enforcement officials and riot troops hastily dispatched by the government, stoning police vans, ransacking stores and setting 200 cars on fire. When calm finally returns, dozens of injured are counted, damage is estimated at some $120 million, and the country is in shock. The long-simmering rage of the *banlieues*—declining peripheral areas with high densities of degraded public housing—tops the political agenda.

July 1992 in Bristol, England: a nearly identical chain of events triggers several nights of rioting on the Hartcliffe estate, a poor industrial district on the southern edge of town. Violence breaks out after two local men joyriding on a stolen police motorcycle are killed in a collision with an unmarked police car. Later that night, some hundred youths go on the rampage through the local shopping centre. When police counter-attack, they are showered with bricks and stones, steel balls, scaffolding and petrol bombs. Over 500 elite troops have to be called in to restore order to a one-square-kilometre area temporarily turned

Los Angeles (1992).

Vaulx-en-Velin, France (1990).

urban guerrilla zone. Similar disturbances break out that summer in Coventry, Manchester, Salford, Blackburn and Birmingham.

April 1992 in Los Angeles: the acquittal of four white police officers in the brutal videotaped beating of Rodney King, a defenceless black motorist arrested after a car chase, sets off an explosion of civil violence unmatched in American history this century. In the black ghetto of South Central, white motorists are snatched out of their cars and beaten, stores vandalized, police cars overturned and set aflame. The Korean-owned licquor outlets, swapmeets and markets that dot the area are targeted for systematic destruction. So overwhelming is the eruption that neither firefighters nor the police can prevent the torching of thousands of buildings. Rioting promptly mushrooms outwards as scenes of mass looting multiply. A state of emergency is proclaimed and 7,000 federal troops, including 1,200 Marines, are drafted in. Sniper fire and shootings between rioters, police and storeowners who take up arms to defend their shops bring the death toll to forty-five. By the end of the third day of upheaval, nearly 2,400 have suffered injury and 10,000 are under arrest; a thousand families have lost their homes and twenty thousand their jobs. Total destruction is estimated at a staggering one billion dollars.

These outbursts of collective violence are but three drawn from a list of urban disturbances too long to enumerate. For the past decade has witnessed a spectacular increase in public unrest and rioting at the heart of the large cities of the First World. Most of the disorders, big and small, that have shaken up the French *banlieues,* the British inner cities and the ghettos and *barrios* of America have involved chiefly the youth of poor, segregated and dilapidated urban neighbourhoods and appear to have been fuelled by growing "racial" tensions in and around these areas. Thus the dominant interpretation in media accounts and political debates has been that they are essentially "race riots" expressive of animosity against, or between, the ethnic and/or immigrant "minorities" of these countries.

There is much to support this view. The Europe of the 1980s has indeed been swept by a seemingly unstoppable wave of racist sentiment. In France, long-covert "anti-Arab" hostility has burst out into the open and fuelled an increase in racist assaults, and it has found its political expression in the xenophobic populism of the National Front. In the United Kingdom, antagonism between black West Indians, Asians and whites has flared up in repeated street confrontations and grown more acrimonious, so much so that public unrest and violence are increasingly perceived as essentially "black" problems. Meanwhile in the United States a society-wide backlash against the gains made by so-called minorities (mainly African-Americans but also Latinos

Violence and counter-violence: Los Angeles (1992).

LOÏC J. D. WACQUANT is a French sociologist affiliated with the Society of Fellows of Harvard University. He has conducted extensive research on racial inequality in the United States and on comparative urban poverty. His recent publications include: *The Zone: le métier de "hustler" dans le ghetto noir américain* (1992), and "Redrawing the Urban Color Line: The State of the Ghetto in the 1980s" (in C. Calhoun, ed., *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*, 1993). He is currently writing a book about the culture and economics of professional boxing.

and some Asian groups) in the wake of the civil rights movement of the 1960s has led to a sharp deterioration of race relations revealed *inter alia* by an escalation in racially motivated or "hate" crime, a generalized fear of black males on the street, inter-ethnic incidents on university campuses, and the blatant exploitation of anti-black feelings by some politicians.

Yet the urban riots of the 1980s are not a simple extension of traditional uprisings such as the United States has experienced throughout this century. A closer look at their anatomy suggests that these disorders have, in varying proportions, combined two logics: that of protest against racial injustice and that of the poor rising against economic deprivation and widening social inequalities with the most effective, if not the only, weapon at their disposal, namely direct forcible disruption of civil life.

The 1980s may be the decade of the slow maturing of *mixed riots*—mixed in terms of their causes or goals as well as by virtue of their multi-ethnic composition. For, contrary to media portrayals, neither the French *banlieues* nor the British inner cities are solely or even predominantly populated by immigrants, and those who partook in unrest there were more often than not recruited across ethnic lines. Moreover, their demands are the demands of working-class youths everywhere: jobs, decent schools, affordable or improved housing, access to public services, and fair treatment by police. Similarly, in South-Central Los Angeles, the thousands who pilfered merchandise from burning supermarkets and mini-malls during the riot were far from being all blacks: over half of the first 5,000 arrests were Latinos and another 10 per cent whites. The uprising was not exclusively an Afro-American outcry against gross racial discrimination; it was also a revolt against poverty, hunger, and the severe material aggravation brought on by economic recession and cutbacks in government programmes. As one of the city's most astute observers puts it, "the nation's first multiracial riot was as much about empty bellies and broken hearts as it was about police batons and Rodney King."

VIOLENCE FROM ABOVE

It is tempting to view outbreaks of collective violence "from below" as symptoms of moral crisis, pathologies of the lower class, or as signs of the impending societal breakdown of "law

and order". But close comparative analysis of their timing, makeup and unfolding shows that, far from being irrational, recent public unrest by the urban poor of Europe and America is a (socio)logical response to the massive *structural violence* unleashed upon them by a set of mutually reinforcing economic and political changes. These changes have resulted in a polarization of classes which, combined with racial and ethnic segregation, is producing a *dualization of the metropolis* that threatens not simply to marginalize the poor but to condemn them to outright social and economic redundancy.

This violence "from above" has three main components: mass unemployment bringing in its wake pervasive material deprivation, relegation to decaying neighbourhoods, and heightened stigmatization in public discourse, all of which are the more deadly for occurring against the backdrop of a general upswing in inequality. Unlike previous phases of economic growth, the uneven expansion of the 1980s, when it occurred at all, failed to "lift all boats" and instead led to a deepening schism between rich and poor, and between those stably employed in the core, middle-class sectors of the economy and uneducated individuals trapped at the margins of an increasingly insecure low-skill labour market.

For the residents of flagging working-class areas, the reorganization of capitalist economics—visible in the shift from manufacturing to education-intensive services, the impact of electronic and automation technologies in factories and offices, and the erosion of unions—and the reduction of government outlays in the areas of welfare and low-income housing have translated into unusually high rates of long-term joblessness and a regression of material conditions. Simultaneously, advanced countries have had to absorb a fresh influx (or the definitive settlement) of immigrants from the Third World who are typically channelled into these very neighbourhoods where economic opportunities and collective resources are already diminishing. Such spatial segregation intensifies hardship by concentrating in degraded and isolated enclaves downwardly-mobile families of the native working class and immigrant populations of mixed nationalities who are young, economically fragile and equally deprived of skills that are readily marketable in the core of the new economy.

Such an accumulation of social ills explains the oppressive atmosphere of drabness, ennui and despair that pervades poor communities in

"The widening gulf between rich and poor. . . ." A Paris street scene (1989).

many large Western cities. Residents of these cramped neighbourhoods feel that they and their children have little future other than the life of misery and exclusion to which they seem consigned at present. Added to this is the rage felt by poor urban youths as a result of the cultural discrimination and stigmatization imposed on residents of decaying urban areas.

Lastly there is the curse of being poor in the midst of a rich society in which active participation in the sphere of consumption has become a *sine qua non* of social dignity—a passport to citizenship even among the most dispossessed. As testified by the proliferation of "mugging" in the British inner city, *la dépouille* (the stripping of fancy clothes under threat of force) in the estates of the *banlieue*, and gold-chain snatching and drug dealing on the streets of the American ghetto, violence and crime are often the only means that working-class youths with no employment prospects have of acquiring the money and the consumer goods indispensable for acceding to a socially recognized existence.

THE DILEMMAS OF POLICING

If direct forms of infra-political protest by way of popular disruption of public order, direct seizure of goods and destruction of property have spread, it is also true that formal means of pressure on the state have declined along with the decomposition of traditional machineries of political representation of the poor.

The widening gulf between rich and poor, the growing self-closure of political elites, the increasing distance between the lower class and the dominant institutions of society all breed distrust and disaffection. They converge to undermine the legitimacy of the social order. In the vacuum created by the lack of political linkages and the absence of legitimate mediations between poor urban populations and a society from which they feel excluded, it is no wonder that relations with the police have become both salient and bellicose, and that incidents with the "forces of order" are invariably the detonator of explosions of popular violence in the cities. Trends in all countries converge to show that, whenever the police come to be considered as an alien force by the community, they become unable to fulfil any role other than a purely repressive one and can only *add* to further disorder and violence.

Political responses to urban violence and to the civil disruption it causes vary significantly from country to country depending on national ideologies of citizenship, state structures and capacities, and political conjuncture. They span a continuum between outright criminalization and repression at one end, and politicization of the problem via the collective renegotiation of social rights at the other.

The recent upsurge in popular violence at the heart of advanced urban societies has deep roots in the epochal transformation of their economy, cities, and state policies. The governments of rich nations have, to varying degrees, been unable or unwilling to stem the growth of inequality and to prevent the social and spatial cumulation of economic hardship, marginality and stigmatization in deteriorating working-class enclaves of the changing populace. The continued conjugation of ethnic iniquity and class exclusion in the same fragile areas promises to produce more unrest and to pose a daunting challenge to the very idea of citizenship in Western cities for years to come. ■

Bangladesh, after the destruction of the mosque at Ayodhya in India (1992).

The ruses of racism

by Michel Wieviorka

Racist violence has recently resurfaced. What conditions encourage its growth?

A Ku Klux Klan demonstration in Atlanta (USA) on Martin Luther King Day, 20 January 1992. Martin Luther King Day is celebrated each year in the United States to commemorate the Nobel Prize-winner and non-violent champion of the Black cause, who was assassinated in 1968.

RACISM is not always overtly, brutally violent—it does not always kill. Racial discrimination, expressions of prejudice and racist tracts can all carry ominous overtones of violence, but they cannot be ranked alongside the physical violence perpetrated in pogroms, lynchings, immigrant-bashing, murders and other types of assault, which is what I wish to discuss.

What is more, the most violent forms of racism do not necessarily grow out of other varieties of racism. Contrary to popular belief, prejudice does not invariably and inevitably lead on to acts of violence. Deep-seated racism may be widespread in societies where there is no outward sign of naked violence.

For racist violence to erupt, a certain set of conditions must exist. One conditioning factor is the attitude of those in authority: what they are willing and able to do in order to deal with those who engage in racist acts. When a government is weak or remote, or even tinged with racism itself, it encourages political groups and forces wishing to turn their message of hatred, contempt, subordination and rejection into deeds. It may even become actively racist itself or manipulate racist violence, as happened in the Russian Empire at the turn of the century, where the Czarist regime was largely instrumental in setting off the pogroms.

But there are other factors. Some institutions—particularly the legal system and the police—may use methods which, although not deliberately or explicitly racist in themselves, nevertheless contribute to the spread of serious outbreaks of violence. Many official enquiries have found that when police behaviour has exacerbated ethnic and social tensions instead of defusing them, it has often led to an escalation of violence in which racism occupies a prominent place.

Yet another factor is the existence of political forces capable of providing racist violence with an organized structure and an ideological foundation. As long as such forces do not exist or are relegated to the sidelines of society, violence is always possible and sometimes erupts, but it crops up in the form of sudden outbursts and short-lived explosions, in other words of acts which, numerous though they may be, are not linked by any apparent unifying principle.

When such forces do gain a political foothold, however, the violence for which they provide a structure, even if it is not directly organized by them, nonetheless becomes more

cold-blooded, methodical, and active. It becomes a matter of schemes and strategies; it channels popular feelings of hatred and hostility towards the group marked out as a racial target, but does not allow them to be expressed spontaneously. It may even prevent them from being expressed at all, on the political grounds that any act of violence should be consistent with the aims and thinking of the party or organization.

This is why the emergence of a political force with a racist ideology and plans does not necessarily mean that there will be an immediate increase in violence, for violence may actually be detrimental to its attempts to achieve legitimate political status. Violence may create an image of disorder and accordingly be played down until the movement achieves power, when it will be able to indulge in violence in its most extreme forms. Conversely, there may be an increase in violence when the power of a racist force or party is on the wane, because some of its members may take a harder line if they feel they have no political future. The end of apartheid in South Africa is providing scope not for more racism but for more racial violence.

Since the beginning of the modern era, racism has been linked to patterns of domination, especially those of colonialism set against the background of empire-building. But it has also informed trends in thinking which, from the nineteenth century onwards, influenced aspects of physical anthropology and other doctrinaire intellectual movements. When the term "racism" emerged in the period between the two World Wars, some of the theories from the past were refurbished. Above all, racist attitudes spread all over the world in the wake of the social upheavals that are at the root of various forms of racial violence.

Racial violence is no longer only the crude expression of colonial-type domination. It may also stem from an economic crisis, in which a deprived group, threatened with a decline in social status or exclusion from the mainstream, turns against another group in an attempt to oust it, on racial grounds, from a shrinking job market. The racism of the poor whites, which led to the lynching of blacks in the southern United States at the end of the nineteenth century and to race riots in the big cities of the northern United States in the first half of the twentieth century, came about when the whites saw their black neighbours as dangerous competitors on the industrial job market.

But racial violence may also occur among more affluent classes, which want to maintain the gap separating them from the less privileged. The method they use is a combination of social and racial segregation, which may in fact lead to more cold-blooded and calculated forms of violence. At the beginning of the century, well-to-do white citizens in the southern United States organized lynching parties to punish black men accused of raping white women or of theft.

However, racist violence does not always stem solely or directly from social factors. It may originate in a real or imagined threat to the identity of a group, or it may accompany the expansion of a state or religion, sometimes claiming to represent universal values, as often happened during the colonial period.

The urge to uphold a particular identity can lead to unlimited violence, fuelled either by an obsessive fear of "racial intermingling" or by reference to an absolute difference that prohibits all social intercourse and all contact between races except in war. Such forms of racism are intended to keep others at bay, to ensure that they are segregated or even expelled or destroyed. The aim is not so much to establish the inferior status of a given group on the grounds of its physical attributes as to ensure that a community remains homogeneous or a nation remains pure, or to justify their unimpeded expansion.

Identity-related racism and the violence that goes with it can have three quite distinct motivations.

In some cases, this form of racism is founded on the affirmation of an identity that claims to be universal and seeks to crush everything that opposes it. The history of colonization contains many instances of this pheno-

A confrontation between police and skinheads outside a hostel for immigrants at Rostock (Germany) in 1992.

An anti-racist rally in Bonn (Germany), November 1992.

menon. Conversely, it may be based on the resistance of a nation or community to the modern world, in which case the chosen target is a group that is seen as the incarnation of evil, intrusion, or the corruption of culture or traditional values. The Jews have long been denounced and attacked as representives of a hated modernity. The explosive violence of the pogroms and the more methodical violence of the gas chambers largely grew out of criticisms, phantasms and rumours that reproached the Jews on the grounds of their cosmopolitanism, wealth, political power and influence in the media.

Thirdly, this identity-related racism may flare up as a result of a clash between two or more communities within the same political entity or a multiracial or multicultural society. In such cases, violence results from strained relations between communities, from a process of interaction in which one group's real or imagined attempt to assert itself prompts reactions from other groups and triggers off a spiralling power struggle that may end in an outburst of violence and political chaos. The civil war in Lebanon and the breakup of Yugoslavia are recent examples of conflicts where overt or implied references to race can be sensed behind rhetorical appeals to the nation or to the cultural, confessional and historical community.

When violence is associated with racism, therefore, it is governed by various conditions that dictate the course it takes and is rooted in a wide range of social and identity-related factors. But the important thing about violence is that it compresses into a single action factors that may be not only different but contradictory. Perpetrators of racist violence may wish, for example, to exclude a specific group from their society, and also assign it an inferior position in society so as to exploit it. This happens frequently in industrialized countries, where immigrants are employed to do low-grade jobs and rejected on account of their culture. Or to take another case, in Czarist Russia and central Europe at the beginning of the present century, it was the rich, assimilated Jew, symbol of modernity, who was regarded as an intolerable threat, yet the victims of the pogroms were the culturally conspicuous and poverty-stricken Jewish masses.

This is the paradox of violence: not only is it unembarrassed by its inherent contradictions, it also creates its own logic and its own dynamics, so that in the end it alters the conditions that allowed it to emerge in the first place. ■

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Seventy years of violence and fear have left the former USSR in a disastrous situation

A looming avalanche

by Andrei Nuikin

Above, *Screaming Man* (1987), a painting by the Mexican artist Juan Esperanza.

THERE is a science-fiction story in which an inventor succeeds in reviving sounds that have long since died away. If we could do that in real life, I fear that the sound which would stand out above all others would be the scream of human suffering, and that it would reverberate endlessly throughout the world. True, wild animals kill. But they do so speedily and because they need to eat, and not because they want to torture their victims. Human beings behave differently.

The history of the world bristles with examples of tyrannical and brutal acts committed by the strong against the weak, by crowds against isolated individuals, by the armed against the defenceless. Even today, as the second millennium draws to a close, and even in the most prosperous and civilized countries, there are still manifestations of violence of all kinds, which are often unspeakably cruel and are, unfortunately, increasingly common.

Now our "country"—as we still call the ex-Soviet Union out of habit—could hardly be described as a wealthy nation. And on the evidence of what is going on in the trouble spots of our shattered empire, one may perhaps be forgiven for wondering bitterly whether it can still be described as a civilized country, however considerable its past cultural achievements, many fragments of which are still in evidence today.

How and why do nations with a cultural

heritage as rich as ours relapse into barbarity and become so chillingly indifferent to the sufferings of others? Unfortunately ours is not the first case of this kind in history nor, I suspect, will it be the last. The development of a great culture is always a slow and gradual process, whereas regression to brutality is swift. It happens with all the suddenness of an avalanche, to use our current buzz word.

But the term avalanche may be misleading if it is interpreted to mean what is more usually called an "outbreak of violence", or if it is seen as just the result of a regrettable act or climate of opinion. In the mountains it is perfectly possible to trigger off a devastating avalanche just by coughing; but that is no reason to recommend cough mixture as the only way to prevent avalanches.

Violence has broken out in our so-called "zones of interethnic conflict". I say "so-called" because there is a steadily increasing body of evidence that ethnic differences alone, like many other kinds of difference in areas such as race, religion, class, gender, age and taste, do not in themselves cause conflicts. Such differences can trigger off disputes, hatred and bloodshed only when they are combined with certain individual or collective forces such as greed, hunger for power, stupidity or unscrupulousness on the part of individuals or groups.

Economic difficulties, impoverishment and other serious problems have all been cited to justify the ferocity that is now raging. But why, when whole villages of Ukrainian peasants were starving to death in the early 1930s, did they not hate the Russians, even though the famine in the Ukraine was a direct result of Kremlin policy (whose architect, it is true, was a Georgian)?

Besides, the first bloody interethnic clashes that swept the country took place well before the present "avalanche" of pauperization, at a time when we were still living in the kind of poverty we were used to. It is of course easy to incite the poor to behave irresponsibly and feel hatred for others. But it would be a mistake, I believe, to regard poverty as the root cause of such behaviour. Poverty simply helps to create a situation that provocateurs can exploit.

Queuing in a St. Petersburg suburb.

THE STREET IN ARMS

It would be equally unfair to pin the blame for interethnic clashes as violent as those we have experienced solely on ambitious politicians, intriguing mafias or scheming clans. An accumulation of snow, rocks and mud cannot turn into an avalanche until it has attained a critical mass and acquired all the physical characteristics that will enable it to start moving. A people is never putty in the hands of history.

Moscow News recently published a photograph taken in Dushanbe, in Tajikistan, which showed a group of armed civilians frisking their fellow citizens, who were docilely standing there with their hands up (see photo page 18). The caption read: "While politicians carve up power, a third force is taking shape: the street in arms."

Violence is nothing new for humanity, especially for our country. But to understand the nature of the violence now sweeping through the republics of the ex-Soviet Union—a violence which, alas, has probably not yet peaked, hence its very real threat to world civilization—we must be clear in our minds about what we mean by "the street in arms". What is at issue is the use of weapons on a massive scale, participation in politics by large sections of the population as part of a spontaneous phenomenon which is prompted by widespread discontent and is out of government control. But that is not all.

It is also, and perhaps above all, a specific qualitative state—at once social, moral and psychological—of our *people*, which has lost many of its finest qualities and whose behaviour is gradually deteriorating to the point at which it displays the familiar characteristics of the *mob*. The mob, as we all know, is never the sum total of the moral, psychological and intellectual qualities of the individuals who comprise it.

Almost all the regions of our country are now suffering from the consequences of the Bolsheviks' criminal "policy of nationalities". Extremely brutal repression of entire ethnic groups and anti-Semitic campaigns disguised



as a struggle against "cosmopolitanism" were part of the strategic logic of that policy. But, contrary to that logic, the peoples of this country lived on the whole in harmony with one another until very recently—at least without any manifestation of hysterical hatred. The most ruthless cases of repression of ethnic groups were depersonalized administrative acts. Several Caucasian peoples and the Crimean Tartars were deported beyond the Urals with cold-blooded cruelty. The operative word is *cold-blooded.* It goes without saying that no one dared protest or come to the aid of those peoples. If an order to shoot them on the spot had been issued, they would have been shot.

On the whole, those who carried out criminal orders and those who were on the receiving end did not hate each other personally. If the orders had been countermanded, most of those whose task it was to carry them out would probably have been delighted. What happens nowadays is very different: hordes of normally peace-loving, hard-working peasants storm into their neighbours' devastated villages and their prisons not just to destroy and loot, but to give free rein to their hatred by brutalizing and humiliating.

During the darkest hours of the Stalinist terror, the regime often used the people to perpetrate crimes. But then the people was an instrument, not the author. Today the situation has radically changed. While itself still the target of violence, the people—not the whole people (though that is little consolation)—is increasingly instigating acts of violence as a benevolent executioner.

Above, the French cartoonist Pancho's contribution to an anthology of drawings on the theme of freedom. The book was published in 1990 to mark the thirtieth anniversary of the foundation of Amnesty International.

Left, "The street in arms": a group of armed civilians search their fellow citizens for weapons in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

This is what is meant by the expression "the street in arms."

But how did this sorry state of affairs come about? Must we accept that only a reign of terror by dictatorial regimes can cause a people to behave in a friendly and tolerant manner towards other nations, religions and traditions? After obtaining a degree of freedom, a more liberal regime, and a chance at last to decide for itself, is it really possible that this people can regress to a state of savagery—or at the very least be willing to act as a docile instrument for bloodthirsty rogues?

The reader will doubtless expect that such an odious interpretation of events should, as usual, be dismissed out of hand. But I'm afraid I cannot oblige. Recent events in our society have already cost us dearly and, alas, seem set to prove even more disastrous. It would be sad indeed if we failed to draw the necessary conclusions from them, however unpalatable they may be.

Any normal person regards the notion of a *people* as sacred. Its capacity for moral regeneration is enormous, but not unlimited. It would be naive to assume that the effects of seventy years of systematic attempts to stifle the nation's healthy moral and intellectual forces have been negligible, or that they have been corrected by a few years of waffle about universal human values and the virtues of democracy.

At a time when our country is poised to enter the civilized world of modern democracy, ninety per cent of its people are vegetating below the poverty line (today it would be more accurate to describe them as destitute). A similar percentage of the population have lost social status and lapsed into the state of a lumpen proletariat. Not only workers and peasants, but the intelligentsia, shopkeepers, army officers and politicians have lost their class awareness, social structures, spirit of solidarity, self-respect, sense of honour and even basic professional skills. As for the new class

of business people, it is unfortunately still only embryonic. One of the effects of a growing lumpen proletariat has been that the mechanisms of public opinion no longer function normally, and that moral standards and sets of values have been lost.

"The worst thing is that people get used to killing each other," said Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan, in a recent interview. Murder and even collective killings have become commonplace. Between news about spring sowing and a report on the latest fashions, radio and television journalists trot out the daily death toll without batting an eyelid.

"That's where your perestroika and your democracy have got us!" the diehards chant gleefully. But they forget, or pretend to forget, that for over seventy years the notion of loving one's neighbour was steadily erased from the hearts and minds of our people. Everything in the system worked to that end, from social and state institutions to the army, the secret police, party ideology, education, the propaganda system and the arts.

In comparison with the noble ideals we were told to aim for, human life was presented as something insignificant, a mere trifle. The murder of one's neighbour or the death of this or that individual in the name of those "lofty aims" used to be glorified as an act of heroism. That official attitude prompted people, once they had been "freed from prejudice", to take an active part in a multifarious enterprise of humiliation, violence and extermination. At least fifty million people ended up in gulags. One person out of three in the Soviet Union was either a victim or an executioner. And only recently more than a million youngsters learnt the rudiments of their trade, so to speak, on the bloodstained battlefields of Afghanistan.

But our collective experience of this phenomenon is even more comprehensive than I have just suggested. Several generations of men and women lived, from the cradle to the grave, in a society where absolutely everything, from the structure of power and the economy, culture, ideology, religion and education, was founded on coercion, violence, fear and the restriction of freedom. Sadly, the self-destructive avalanche is now ready to move; looming high above us, its mighty mass has begun to quake. From time to time a fragment or two comes crashing down. With such a peril in the offing, extreme caution is called for. For who can say what gunshot or cough may suddenly trigger the avalanche, which, if it happens, will leave in its wake a terrible trail of destruction? ■

La Déchirure, **a watercolour by the American artist Alice van Buren.**

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Undertones of war

by Ivan Colovic

Lying deep in the individual unconscious, the seeds of conflict can be germinated by propaganda

WHY, in time of war, do a large number of usually peace-loving and inoffensive people allow themselves to be overcome by hatred and cause death and destruction with terrifying determination and anger?

Freudian pyschoanalytical theory locates the source of this aggressiveness, which erupts and becomes widespread above all during wartime, in the individual unconscious. The unconscious may be compared to a kind of Pandora's box where aggressive impulses which originate at the time of a person's first contacts with other people are repressed and confined. Freud defined it as the place "where the germs of all that is evil in the human soul are stored".

The regression to barbarity that manifests itself in wartime is, then, made possible by the presence of that barbarity in our unconscious. Here Freudian thought tallies with Christian demonology, whose basic postulate is neatly encapsulated in this excellent phrase by the Swiss writer Denis de Rougemont: "The enemy is always within us."

Two main conclusions may be drawn from this. First, people in wartime do not surrender their individuality and become swamped by a collective feeling of aggression whose psychical nature may differ from that of individual psychology. It is true that the "normal" person only takes part in the atrocities of war when encouraged to do so by the massive participation of other members of the community. But such participation is in a personal capacity. The person has an unconscious subjective motivation for joining in.

If the origins of aggression are to be found in the unconscious of each individual, it follows that the disposition to make war is universal. It does not spring from the innate character of any ethnic group or nation. As the celebrated French psychoanalyst Marie Bonaparte remarked, "Any people, even one which in time of security behaves in the most humane manner, is capable of regressing to a state of primal barbarity."

Thus people are sufficiently motivated to make war by their unconscious aggression, which seeks to discharge itself onto external objects to avoid becoming a self-destructive force. However, this aggression is not so much the first cause of wars as their main weapon, or rather the essential "natural resource" without which a war economy cannot function.

Since this resource is of strategic importance for the state, the latter has a fundamental interest in controling and monopolizing it. "Each citizen of a nation," wrote Freud in his "Thoughts for the times on war and death" (1915), "can in this war realize with horror . . . that the state has forbidden the individual to use injustice, not because it wishes to abolish injustice, but because it wishes to have the monopoly of it, like that of salt and tobacco." Marie Bonaparte makes a comparison between hatred and capital which follows the same lines: "Hatred, in the heart of men, is a capital that must be invested somewhere."

MYTHS AND THE SUPEREGO

What procedures does the state use in wartime to efficiently exploit its monopoly of its citizens' aggression and to reap profit from its capital of hatred? It should be said at once that these procedures are full of contradiction and ambiguity. It is not simply a question of lifting the ban on pillage, torture and killing. Perhaps people have always been, as Freud also pointed out, "tempted to satisfy their need for aggression at their neighbours' expense . . . by martyrizing and killing them. But opposition to this temptation comes from the superego . . . which is the psychical location of models and prohibitions."

The normal individual's superego must be deceived before his or her repressed aggression can be fully unleashed. It is not a matter of neutralizing or eliminating the pressure of moral censorship, of anaesthetizing the superego, but of increasing the pressure, of inflating the superego. For a mobilized soldier, to kill in war is not a licentious act, the satisfaction of a hidden desire. It is a duty, a sacrifice, a heroic gesture. By the same token, it is those who refuse to take part in war who are regarded with the contempt due to those who are criminally irresponsible and think only of their own pleasure.

This apparent paradox stems from the process of identification, described by Freud as "the assimilation of one ego to another, with the result that the first ego behaves in some respects like the second, imitates it and in a sense accepts it within itself." The individual's capacity to "receive within himself" someone else is first exercised in the interiorization of the paternal model, in other words in the formation of an ideal image through which the person seeks self-affirmation.

This ambiguity also appears in the projection of the child-father relationship onto the social and political plane. In the child who

A Soviet monument to military heroes.

This French patriotic allegory painted at the beginning of the First World War echoes the famous relief sculpture known as the *Départ des volontaires de 1792* or *La Marseillaise* on the Arc de Triomphe in Paris. A bearded figure representing a veteran of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 is shown leading a group of French soldiers to the defence of their native soil.

becomes an adult, writes Franco Fornari in his *Psychoanalysis of War*, "the loyalty he feels towards his leader, or the group personifying his ideal, will be counterbalanced by the hatred he feels for some other chief or some other group. He is thereby disposed to make war. . . . Another effect of the cleavage of the image of the father into two figures is that the gods of one people are the devils of another."

Individuals are motivated by their psychological structure and the nature of their relations with other members of society to transgress the prohibition to kill. If they are to violate this law, as they do in wartime, without becoming criminals or madmen, recourse to extreme violence must be presented in an acceptable form.

There are two main ways of doing this. First of all by endowing acts of war, and notably the destruction of the enemy, with an extraordinary, even sacred value. Victory in arms becomes a matter of supreme importance; on it depends the survival of the nation and the physical existence of a people. Everything must be done to eliminate the danger of defeat. Valiant soldiers must attack and kill the foe as a sacred duty.

War—always forced on us and thus defensive—brings us into conflict with one or several specific enemies. But it is also presented as the continuation of earlier wars which our ancestors waged against their enemies, and this gives a mythical dimension to the current conflict. The ego participates in an

"us" which is present in the historical arena but also belongs to a collective entity *in illo tempore* (at that time in the past). War provides people with an opportunity to identify with their ancestors, to experience great moments when mythical heroes come to the fore.

In the same mythical perspective, the prestige of the leader (of the nation and/or the army), which is psychologically speaking a projection of love for the father, is increased because he appears as the incarnation of the founding hero of the community. "Charisma," notes the psychosociologist Serge Moscovici, "has the characteristics of an evocation of the past. . . ."

THE SNARES OF PROPAGANDA

It is, then, not surprising to find this myth-oriented line of thought in the tricks of war propaganda. The "media war" currently being waged on the territory of the former Yugoslavia is an example of this. The aim of painting the adversary as a "wild animal", a "monster" or a "barbarian" is not merely to humiliate him but to transform the destruction of such an inhuman creature into an exploit worthy of mythical heroes, of saviours of humanity carrying out a duty imposed by the highest moral authorities, that is in accord with the superego.

This accord with the superego can also be made in a totally different way—by banalization rather than dramatization, by using war propaganda to make horror seem pleasant, perhaps even amusing, but certainly unexceptionable. Euphemism is the instrument of this type of propaganda, which has a number of variants, as the Yugoslav conflict reveals. One form glorifies outdoor life, physical effort, comradeship, humour and singing around the camp fire. Another takes up more or less the same cheering refrain but concentrates on the idea that war offers boys an opportunity to prove their virility and achieve adult status. And those who refuse the opportunity to undergo the rite of passage into the ranks of virile warriors are rebuked and ridiculed as mother's pets.

Alternatively, war may be presented as a highly rational and sophisticated operation, a technological process controlled by professionals, masters of the soldier's art. In this case, the blood and terror of war simply do not exist. There is no hatred, no killing, no suffering. The adversary is "neutralized" but no enthusiasm is shown. The ideal would be a war without human losses, won or lost "on points". There is nothing here to embarrass the superego, and the individual can set out, reassured, for the battlefield, feeling that he has in no way compromised his humanity. And so the devil's work is done. ■

Poster no. 3 **(acrylic on canvas, 1971) a painting on the theme of revolution by the Italian artist Giangiacomo Spadari.**

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GREENWATCH

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Dossier

A BUDDING ROMANCE BETWEEN INDUSTRY AND THE ENVIRONMENT?

by France Bequette

"Industrial plants, once the most visible polluters, have begun in the last 20 years to realize their responsibility for maintaining a healthy environment," according to *The State of Canada's Environment* (1991), a remarkable work published in Ottawa by the Canadian government. "Some have not always done so willingly or altruistically," continues the report, "but many have acted pragmatically. Much more remains to be done, but the progress achieved thus far suggests that industries can operate in a way that is much less damaging to the environment than in the past."

Encouraging industry to clean up its act is precisely the goal that the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) sets out to achieve. The ICC, a non-governmental organization also known as the World Business Organization, is not widely familiar to the public. Its members are 7,500 companies

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THE BRAZIL NUT SURVIVAL CHAIN

The brazil-nut tree (*Bertholletia excelsa)* needs a regular support group to produce the delicious nuts that are exported around the world. A species of bee capable of covering 20 km in an hour is in charge of pollination. If the trees are not themselves in flower, the bees feed instead on a species of orchid that grows on them. In charge of cracking the nuts, which would otherwise be too hard to permit germination, is a squirrel-like rodent called the agouti. If any link in this chain were to go missing, the others would also disappear—and that would be bad news for Brazil. ■

TORONTO: CAPITAL OF EDUCATION

The World Congress for Education and Communication on Environment and Development (ECO-ED) was held in Toronto, Canada, from 16 to 21 October 1992. Its purpose was to share the messages of the Earth Summit in Rio with a large public of people working in education and communication. The Congress, which was sponsored by UNESCO and the International Chamber of Commerce in co-operation with the United Nations Environment Programme, was hosted by the North American Association for Environmental Education, the Council of Outdoor Educators of Ontario, the UNESCO Canada Man and the Biosphere Environmental Education Awareness and Training Network and the Ontario Association for Geographic and Environmental Education. More than 3,000 people from 84 different countries attended its sessions. Related events included a Curricula and Resources Fair presenting an international showcase of resource materials for environment and development education. A catalogue is available, both in print and in computer disc form, from ECO-ED, Suite 803, 25 George St., Toronto M5A4L8, Canada. ■

AN ATLAS WEIGHING 14 KG!

You will definitely not find *Elevage et potentialités pastorales sahéliennes* ("Livestock Production and Potential in the Sahel") in the paperback department of your local bookshop. This 180-page atlas, published by the Centre technique de coopération agricole et rurale, an international agency created by the Lomé Convention to spread scientific information in the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, and based in Ede-Wageningen (The Netherlands), measures 81 cm by 66 cm—the size of a coffee-table. Although the population of the Sahel countries is only 25 million—just 6 per cent of the total population of Africa—their livestock represents 14 per cent of the continent's total animal count. The atlas depicts the background and environment in which livestock rearing takes place, covering soil analysis, water resources, and localized information on animal nutrition and veterinary services. This magnificently illustrated work, which is divided by country into six sections, each of which can be bought separately, is only available in French. ■

NEW FUEL FOR BOMBAY TAXIS

Some developing countries are mindful of the environment, and one that is doing something about it is India. According to the magazine *India Today*, Bombay's multitudinous fleet of taxis will gradually convert to use compressed natural gas. So far, 2,000 have been equipped to do so, and half of the remaining 28,500 will be fitted out by June 1993. The move is expected to produce two advantages: a reduction in air pollution and a 20-per-cent saving on passenger fares, given that a kg of natural gas costs only half as much as a litre of petrol. ■

IN BANGLADESH, BASIC HUMAN NEEDS COME FIRST

Shortly after the Second World Climate Conference, held in Geneva in 1990, the World Meteorological Organization interviewed several world leaders and published the interviews in a book called *Climate Change*. In it, Begum Khaleda Zia, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, pointed out that on average the monsoon floods 20 per cent of her country every other year and 37 per cent once every ten years. Records were broken in 1987 and again in 1988, when floods respectively covered 40 per cent and 60 per cent of the country. With the population doubling every 30 years and food needs constantly growing, social and economic development has top priority. In this context, putting money aside exclusively for environmental protection is currently out of the question. ■

FROM NORTH SEA TO BLACK SEA

A canal linking the Rhine, at Bamberg, to the Danube, at Kelheim, was inaugurated last September, thereby opening an unbroken waterway from Rotterdam in the Netherlands to the Rumanian port of Constanza on the Black Sea. The entire route covers 3,500 kilometres and links 13 countries. Supporters call it the engineering achievement of the century, while its detractors have described it as the most ridiculous project since the Tower of Babel. In particular, the canal link was opposed by German environmentalists seeking to protect the wildlife of the Altmühl Valley in southeastern Germany, between Bamberg and Kelheim. The canal provides a thoroughfare for trains of large-capacity barges, a form of transport that is three times less expensive than rail and six times cheaper than road haulage. Environmentalists might also acknowledge that it is safer than either alternative and causes less pollution. ■

THE FATE OF THE FOREST

Kalimantan is the Indonesian part of the island of Borneo. The area contains immense sources of wealth, including petroleum, gas, coal, gold, diamonds and hardwood. Studies have turned up 3,000 different species of trees in the eastern part of Kalimantan's primary forest alone. About 30 million cubic metres of wood are lumbered each year, representing 60 per cent of Indonesia's output of marketable timber. The surface area which is cleared or farmed each year is of the order of 900,000 hectares, while only between 90,000 and 250,000 hectares are reforested. No one knows if a forest can recover its original balance under these circumstances, but it is hard to pass judgement on a country that has to devote 40 per cent of its income to servicing debt. ■

VIENTIANE GOES ELECTRIC

In the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the energy situation has undergone a spectacular change over the past ten years. Electricity has been taking over from the burning of wood, and now accounts for 50 per cent of household energy consumption in Vientiane, almost as much as in Bangkok or Manila. Two out of three families cook with electricity, and ownership of inexpensive electrical appliances has mushroomed. One problem is that surging demand for electricity for domestic use is sapping Lao PDR's ability to trade electricity, the country's leading export, for much-needed foreign exchange. An energy sector management assistance programme, partly sponsored by the World Bank, in co-operation with the national utility, Electricité du Laos, seeking to encourage the population to adopt more rational consumption patterns while obtaining maximum energy efficiency from the imported appliances. ■

A CLEAN-UP FOR AUSTRALIAN PORTS

Ships unload 58 million tonnes of ballast water and sediments in Australian ports each year. In the past, much of it was drawn from other harbours, but since February 1990 ships that have loaded ballast water in any port have been required, by order of the Minister for Resources, to replace it with water from the high seas. The reason is that micro-organisms from the open sea are not likely to adapt to the sea-water found in ports, which for the most part has a much lower salt content. The previous practice of transferring ballast water from one port to another, however, carried the risk of introducing into local environments foreign organisms such as fish, algae or toxic micro-organisms that could contaminate shellfish intended for human consumption. Australia is one of the first countries in the world to adopt such measures to protect its marine environment. ■

A BUDDING ROMANCE BETWEEN INDUSTRY AND THE ENVIRONMENT?

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 25

and business organizations in 123 countries. It also speaks for the world of business at the United Nations and in specialized government agencies. Its Business Charter for Sustainable Development, launched in April 1991, sets forth 16 principles for environmental management. The object is for every business to put environmental protection among its highest corporate priorities by improving its environmental policies and performance, training employees, advising customers, assessing the environmental impacts of its activities, developing emergency plans, contributing to the transfer of environmentally sound technology, and fostering openness and dialogue with its Board of Directors, its employees and with the public.

At first glance, the Charter may seem somewhat vague. Article 5, for instance, reads: "Prior assessment: To assess environmental impacts before starting a new activity or project and before decommissioning a facility or leaving a site." Jan-Olaf Willums, Executive Director of the ICC, explains: "Our purpose is not to impose directives, but to set forth principles that should raise business leaders' awareness and lead to voluntary initiatives. We also wish to show through specific examples that it is possible to respect the Charter without any loss, and even profit from it. In addition, we want to provide tools for the achievement of sustainable development, which is indispensable."

Will the Charter contribute to the transfer of technology that the developing countries are hoping for? "That is one of its goals," says Willums. "We would like industrial co-operation to increase, not only from North to South and West to East but also from East and South to South and vice versa. We are not only addressing industrialists, but governments too. We are not asking them to change their rules. We are merely suggesting some improvements."

Any manufactured product is a source of pollution. Even so, business initiatives to reduce it, however small, can have tangible and beneficial effects. In *From Ideas to Action*, published by the ICC in 1992, Willums and Ulrich Golüke report the example of the German firm Mercedes Benz, a company which supports the Charter. A car body can be considered as a mass of raw material that can be recycled at some future date. The metal can be used again. Plastic is specially marked during production so that it can be easily identified for recycling. In the past wire cable was distributed through the car in segments (there might be up to 50 pieces in a door), making it hard to recover. Mercedes Benz has designed the electrical layout so that the entire length of cable, which may be as long as 3 km and weigh up to 50 kg in some top-end models, can be pulled out in one piece.

Robert Bosch, another German manufacturer, has developed a "super" electronic control chip which transfers all the driver's instructions to the vehicle through a single cable, with a second cable sufficing for the entire electrical system. This cable-efficient design decreases the weight of the vehicle considerably, thus saving fuel and reducing pollution.

Eastman Kodak also supports the Charter. Concerns about single-use throwaway cameras led company engineers to redesign them so as to be recyclable. Kodak pays photo developers for each used camera returned for recycling. By December 1991 over three million cameras had been returned for recycling in the United States, Canada, Europe and Japan, thus diverting 250,000 kg of waste from disposal facilities. The firm recycles or reuses all of the parts, sometimes as many as six times, to manufacture "new" disposable cameras.

Diapers—disposable or washable?

DIAPER WARS

Despite these encouraging examples, Carlo Pesso, a consultant with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), remains cautious. He notes that pollution is usually invisible to the naked eye and that scientific analysis is the sole key for ascertaining the state of the environment. Products must be scrutinized "from the cradle to the grave", that is throughout their entire life-cycle of production, distribution, use and disposal. A document published by

On this car, parts that can be recycled are shown in green.

OECD in 1991 entitled *Ecological Labelling in OECD Countries* notes that "comparing and assessing different types of environmental degradation is extremely difficult to do in a satisfactory manner. . . . How to compare a product which is durable but difficult to dispose of to a product which has a shorter life but which breaks down less harmfully after disposal?"

In fact, this is precisely the kind of comparison which is being made by countries that have adopted ecological labelling. In Canada, for example, there has been a veritable duel between disposable and washable diapers. Each year, 1.7 billion disposable diapers end up in landfills, representing a total mass of about 250,000 tonnes of solid waste. In Canada, the manufacture of disposable diapers consumes approximately 65,500 tonnes of pulp, 8,800 tonnes of plastic and 9,800 tonnes of packing material a year. On the other hand, less than 10 kg of cotton is needed to produce all the reusable diapers required by a baby, but washing them requires large quantities of water, detergent and energy.

Canada's Environmental Choice programme studied the problem in depth. "Some people are concerned that exclusive use of reusable cotton diapers would increase cotton production and therefore the use of pesticides," it reported. However, it came to the conclusion that "even if all disposable diapers were replaced by 100% cotton diapers, the impact on the cotton industry would be minimal." (A pity for the countries of the South that have problems selling their cotton, one might add.) The Canadian EcoLogo was finally attributed to cloth diapers—provided they are able to endure a minimum of 75 uses.

Jan-Oluf Willums would like "eco-products" everywhere to be subject to the same standards. As Executive Director of the World Industry Council for Environment, an organization founded at the beginning of 1993 which aims to become a forum of co-operation for sustainable development, he will surely bear in mind this analysis from the Brundtland Report: "We have become accustomed to a sharp increase in economic interdependence among nations. We are now



forced to accustom ourselves to an accelerating ecological interdependence among nations. Ecology and economy are becoming ever more interwoven—locally, regionally, nationally, and globally—into a seamless net of causes and effects." ■

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HEAVEN-KING PRETENDS TO BE DEAD

A Vietnamese tale of the Muong people

THEY say that once upon a time, when Heaven and Earth still touched, men and animals could come and go as they wished on Earth as in Heaven.

Man was more intelligent than the other animals. One moment he would clear the land, the next plant one variety of tree, then another. And everywhere he worked hard to have enough food to eat. Animals, on the other hand, had no feeding places of their own, and they devastated plantations and harvests. Man made all sorts of traps, nooses, pitfalls, crossbows and slings so that he could kill the animals that caused such damage.

All the animals, both furred and feathered, hated man, but did not know how to take revenge on him. So after taking counsel together they decided to go and see Heaven-King and try to bring man to book. . . . Heaven-King listened to them, then summoned man so he could pass judgement. Man came. Heaven-King asked him:

"Why are you nasty to the animals?"

When he heard the question, man guessed that the animals had gone to complain to Heaven-King. He immediately answered:

"I beg Your Majesty to listen to me. It's the animals that are nasty. When we cultivate our fields and gardens, hedgehogs and boars come and destroy them; when we plant maize and beans, crows and turtle-doves come and dig up the seeds; when we raise pigs, dogs, buffaloes and cattle, tigers and panthers catch them and eat them. We men are always on the alert. Even when we eat or walk, ants and bees come and sting us."

Heaven-King was in a terrible quandary. He could not decide which party was right or what ruling to give. So he decided to send man away. A little later, he worked out a stratagem that would test the loyalty of both man and the animals. He had a coffin made and lay down inside it. But the coffin had a little hole in it, so he could see what was going on outside without anyone knowing. He sent a messenger to announce . . . that Heaven-King was dead, and that all living creatures of all species, wherever they lived, near or far, should come and mourn the passing of the Heaven-King. . . .

When they heard the news that Heaven-King had died, all the species, from dogs and foxes and birds to tigers and panthers, came to mourn his passing. . . . Only the human species was incapable of moving fast. By the time all the animals had arrived, man was still walking.

On the way, he met a yellow tortoise that was trying in vain to clamber over a tree-trunk which had fallen across its path. . . . When it saw man coming, the tortoise said:

"Help me get over this tree-trunk, and I'll tell you something very interesting. . . ."

Man helped the tortoise, which said:

"Once we arrive, we shall have to be on our best behaviour. Heaven-King is pretending to be dead—but it's only a way of testing the world."

When he got to Heaven-King's abode, man saw that all the animal species . . . were squabbling, while at the same time gorging themselves very noisily. . . . The man and the tortoise, who were in the know, were the only ones not to scramble for food. They waited to be served. As for Heaven-King's death, some wept and others did not. Those belonging to the human species unanimously agreed to sit by themselves and mourn together. Some of them, who were embarrassed about mourning without being able to produce any tears, moistened their eyes with saliva. But as they had been chewing betel, their saliva was red. So their noses and faces became red too. After savouring this spectacle, Heaven-King raised the lid of his coffin and said:

"The moment I was dead, all the animals I now see before me started foraging and eating to their heart's content. If I had really been dead, just imagine the pillaging they would have done! Only the human species, when mourning, weeps tears of blood. What cheek of the other species to come and complain that humans are horrible!"

. . . Heaven-King then passed judgement: he ruled in man's favour. The animals' retribution consisted of man being entitled and empowered to eat all animal species.

Heaven-King declared:

"Henceforth, man, with thy face to the ground thou shalt eat everything, and with thy face turned heavenwards, thou shalt eat everything."

On hearing that, the tortoise asked:

"What about me?"

"He will eat everything!" the Heaven-King declared.

The Muong, however, do not eat tortoise flesh. This is because they are grateful for being told that Heaven-King was pretending to be dead. . . . ■

■ *The story on this page appears in an anthology entitled* Compagnons du Soleil *("Companions of the Sun") co-published (in French) by* UNESCO, *Editions de la Découverte (Paris) and the Fondation pour le progrès de l'Homme. The anthology was prepared under the general editorship of the African historian Joseph Ki-Zerbo, in collaboration with Marie-Josèphe Beaud.*

A story too far?

by Daniel Hermant

By removing violence from its context, the media risk turning it into a spectator sport

WHENEVER the question of violence comes up, the media tend to be attacked on two grounds, one political, the other sociological. The political community takes a very close interest in violence, knowing as it does that violence and power are directly linked. The stakes are so high that politicians not only use direct coercion and violence to govern, but have come to realize that in a media-dominated society they also need to look after their public image. Journalists are directly implicated in what might be called the media strategy of political leaders because it is through them that governments get their message across.

The second reason for suspicion of the media has more to do with society at large. The media are made out to be the main vehicle for the spread of violence and, because of their amplifying effect, are thought to be responsible for an exaggerated perception of violence on the part of the public. The growing feeling of insecurity in cities may partly be the result of violence itself, but it arises above all, or so we are told, from the image of violence put across by television. The image of violence that is proposed—perhaps "imposed" would be a better word—by the media influences behaviour and encourages acts of violence, particularly by young people. According to this thesis, the cult of force and the admiration of brutality which are increasingly common today have largely been spawned by the media.

The media, then, come in for wholesale criticism from politicians, and are often used by them as a scapegoat. For the sake of clarity, let me start by making a distinction between two situations relating to the representation of

***Intervision* (1955), oil on canvas by Victor Brauner and Roberto Matta.**

Press photographers focus on a demonstrator during a farmers' day of action in Paris in October 1992.

violence: the media's relationship with government, and the media's attitude to terrorism.

The first set of criticisms focuses on the nature of the links between journalists and government. Journalists operate within a media strategy which, like any other strategy, can be analysed in terms of effectiveness, resources and goals. They are cogs in the machinery of government. Government can use their activities as an extension of its own, and thus bolster its ability to put pressure on the population. In authoritarian countries, the role of the media is to put out the official news that is the monopoly of the authorities. In other countries, including the democracies, they are often skilfully influenced, not to say manipulated, by governments.

When the problem is examined in greater detail, it becomes clear that news manipulation is a well-established and versatile technique which can range from mere omission to disinformation and pure invention. Let us take an extreme case, that of war. Over the last decade, armed forces everywhere have developed communications strategies that have taken into account the effect on public opinion, disastrous from the point of view of the military, of the American government's laissez-faire attitude towards the media during the Viet Nam War. Typical examples of such new strategies include the strict control of journalists' reports filed during the Falklands War, the absence of on-the-spot reporters during the US expedition to Grenada, and the mustering of a team of journalists by the American military command during Operation Desert Storm. In such situations, cutting the media down to size has become standard procedure.

The second criticism is connivance with terrorists, of which the media have often been accused. Take the spectacular hijackings of aircraft that took place in the 1980s, especially that of a TWA Boeing in 1985. Three American television channels, ABC, CBS and NBC, fought tooth and nail to get the most spectacular pictures. They baulked at nothing, handing out bribes and making deals with the militias that called the tune in Beirut. The weekly *Newsweek* even nicknamed ABC the "Amal Broadcasting Corporation".

In France, when there was a controversy over whether or not a girl pupil should be allowed to wear an Islamic headscarf at school, or when Ayatollah Khomeini's *fatwa* against the writer Salman Rushdie triggered off demonstrations, some journalists whipped up public interest by broadcasting comments from people who spoke only for themselves, but whose impassioned declarations had an effect on audience ratings because they involved viewers emotionally. The fact is that neither ideological sympathies nor constraints enter into media connivance with terrorist groups, which is guided purely and simply by such considerations as ratings and sales.

Now let's look at an extreme case. When the French journalist Jean-Paul Kauffmann and a crew from the television channel Antenne 2 were kidnapped in Beirut, they were transformed, whether they liked it or not, from hostages into *de facto* protagonists of terrorism. For almost three years, Antenne 2 opened its main 8 p.m. newscast by displaying a list of all the Beirut hostages and the number of days they had spent in captivity. *L'Evénement du Jeudi*, the weekly Kauffmann worked for, organized campaigns to mobilize public opinion, and its editor-in-chief made several trips to Beirut to negotiate Kauffmann's release. The media, which normally act only as a mouthpiece, an instrument for the transmission of messages, here grabbed all the parts: it played both the victim, the political protagonist (since it tried to solve the problem), and the observer reporting on the distress of the victim and his family as well as on various attempts to get him released—in other words it commented on its own activities.

DANGEROUS LIAISONS

Where the relationship between government and the media is concerned, the point at issue is not the exaggeration of violence but distortion or censorship. Governments have always tried to control the news media. What is more, it is not regarded as shocking when they succeed, for a certain form of violence is vested in the state. Many think it normal, especially at times of crisis, for government to control communications, and therefore journalists.

What is open to criticism is the wider application of that policy to every kind of situation and every type of news, an approach typical of countries under a dictatorial regime. Fortunately, there are structural limitations to this approach. News, like power, can rarely be monopolized in a democracy, and the relationship between the authorities and the media can be likened to a propaganda war between political forces, with journalists often managing to maintain their independence. In the case of

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authoritarian states, the plurality of news sources is provided from outside.

The second problem—the relationship between terrorism and the media—originates in a more complex set of factors. Two kinds of interests are involved, one political, the other commercial, which require the parties concerned to co-operate rather than to seek to dominate. This co-operation is based on the expectation of gain. However, the interests of terrorists and the interests of the media are not pursued at the same pace or in the same way. So connivance between them is possible only in the heat of the moment. It is shortlived and hinges on the possibility of getting a scoop. In 1979, in order to secure a brief interview with one of the hostages in the American embassy in Tehran, ABC television agreed to broadcast a twenty-five-minute anti-American harangue. President Jimmy Carter appeared on other channels, ostentatiously switching off ABC.

President Carter's symbolic gesture, which highlighted the conflict between the two interests, is a good illustration of the limitations of the connivance that is possible between the media and terrorism. The blatant opposition of the political impact of ABC's scoop to the political position of the American government robbed the device and those who used it of legitimacy. ABC was vigorously attacked in the American press for overstepping the mark. Eventually, if tardily, the media rediscovered the basic rules of journalistic practice.

In the final category under examination—that in which the journalist is a victim of violence—the distance between the message and the messenger is blurred and even abolished. Such a situation makes it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between ends and means, and thereby precludes any analysis in terms of strategy or responsibility. This explains why the notion of human rights has come back into prominence in such cases.

In the difficult context of the relationship between the media and violence, criticism of journalists is justifiable in the first two cases. Whether journalists are bought by government, or are happy to accept its prerogatives of their own free will, or simply respond to their concern as professionals to increase ratings and earn money, they know what is at stake and should assume their responsibilities. When they oppose government, they can resist pressure by pleading the right to inform and the freedom of the press. It would be dishonest of them to put forward the same argument when they yield to the siren voices of the scoop.

Some have tried to apply that interpretation to the case of terrorism. They argue that the enduring media interest in the hostage issue is the equivalent of the scoops obtained during the hijacking of aircraft. The media have even been accused of keeping the news value of the Beirut hostages at an artificially high level—which amounts to accusing them once again of exaggerating violence. But matters are not as simple as that. In this case it is not possible to point to the interest factor which had earlier played an important role: surely viewers grew weary of the way attention was focused on the hostages over such a long period of time? In order to interpret this type of relationship between violence and television a different approach is needed.

Up to this point, I have concentrated on the people involved, and tried to gauge the effects of their action on violence considered as a political or media resource. Now I should like to broaden my analysis and take into account the functioning of the media, which has its own logic and creates effects that have nothing to do with what journalists specifically intend.

The media constitute a self-contained world whose function is to transmit pictures or news. This world is not completely cut off from reality, since reality provides it with raw material. But the key issue is the process whereby reality is apprehended and then transferred to that self-contained world. The only reality then becomes that of the media, not that of the world, which is simply chopped up and reused. A story achieves its media existence and thus its "truth" when it is picked up by several papers, radio stations and television channels. The world of news-gathering is largely self-referential. A story is given wide coverage only if it has been assessed according to the values of the system, and not according to its source. Before being received, news needs, so to speak, to be "formatted", to use computer terminology. This approach is encapsulated in the expression "making news".

INFORMATION OR SPECTACLE?

This process has several perverse effects. The first of these is that violence loses its meaning. In real life, violence is rational in the sense that it serves a specific short-term purpose. In the media in general, on the other hand, violence has come increasingly to be treated as sufficient unto itself: the image is the thing that matters and the accompanying commentary is

Algiers, 1985. An incident during a hijacking.

a pointless embellishment. Violence presented to individual viewers in this way enables them to identify with what they see, just as they do with fiction. This transition to a different level, one of sensibility and spectacle, goes hand in hand with the kind of trivialization of violent images that inevitably results from following the news non-stop. We get more and more images from television, and less and less explanation of them. They no longer have any definite meaning. They float in a media continuum.

In this continuum—and this is another perverse result of the system—violence is removed from the context which produced it, which gives it meaning and which forms part of a story, a social situation. Violence here becomes part of a game or show, and like a game or a spectacle, fascinates but does not create anything. The spectacle of violence is a dead end. However often it is repeated, it remains meaningless. When the former President, and former actor, Ronald Reagan said, after viewing the film *Rambo,* that now he knew what he had to do, there began to be some confusion in people's minds about the difference between fictional and actual violence.

This confusion has now become widespread, with the advent of improved technology which makes live television a fact of everyday life. Many, for example, will remember the captain of the TWA Boeing mentioned earlier being threatened with a pistol, which was in fact just a piece of theatre, or the celebrated hoax of the Timisoara mass grave. The Gulf War, or rather its fictionalized media version, which was regarded by Western public opinion as a gigantic war game in which the enemy was no longer even present, was highly symptomatic of that relationship between violence and television.

Criticisms of the media treatment of violence are, then, based on a number of misunderstandings. To begin with, the relationship between the media and violence does not obey a single schema. It may be analysed either in terms of the people involved or in terms of the way the media system functions. In the first case, the role of journalists in the distortion or censorship of acts of violence should be examined on a case-by-case basis. Journalists belong to a social group whose interests, ulterior motives and honesty may vary. A hasty assessment of their role is bound to lead to oversimplification.

When the way in which the media function is analysed, however, a distinction must be made between the media's role as purveyor of spectacle and its role as a provider of information. Spectacle does not exaggerate violence; it simply garbles its meaning, disconnects it from its political or social context, and removes it from the real world. Information, on the other hand, strives to put violence back into the context that engendered it, to look at it in perspective and to explain it.

Spectacle encourages viewers to remain passive, while information spurs them to adopt a more critical, judgemental stance. The whole point of discussing the relationship between violence and television is less to meditate on the contagious effect that television images of violence may or may not have than to encourage information as opposed to media hype. ■

A US Army General gives a press conference in a hotel in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, during the Gulf War (1991).

Rock 'n' Revolt

by Isabelle Leymarie

Above, Rap fever.

ROCK, a musical and social phenomenon of unprecedented scope and intensity, raises in acute form the question of the relationship between music and violence. Its history has been fraught with violence. Jim Morrison, leader of The Doors, apostle of sex, alcohol and LSD, died young, of a heart attack in his bathtub in Paris. Stars Jimi Hendrix and Janis Joplin both died of drug overdoses. Acid rock has become synonymous with punks and English football riots. The fans of Metallica and Guns and Roses have burned cars, and during a recent concert in Montreal they wrecked a stadium and injured twelve people. The Sex Pistols proclaimed in their song "Anarchy in the UK": "I wanna destroy passers-by, for I wanna be anarchy". John Phillips, a member of The Mamas and The Papas, was reported by musicologist David Tame as claiming that any rock group can whip a crowd into a hysterical frenzy by carefully controlling a sequence of rhythms. In 1967 he went ahead and did just that in Phoenix. When Hell's Angels roughed up spectators during a Rolling Stones concert in California, rocker Mick Jagger remarked that "Something like this happens every time I play that song".

Although physically less conspicuous, violence is also expressed in the lyrics of urban music such as rap (a recent hit by star rapper Ice T is entitled "Cop Killer") and free jazz ("We are not angry young men, we are enraged!" proclaimed saxophonist Archie Shepp in the late 1960s). Here, violence is palpable in lyrics, song titles, public statements by musicians, and in the music itself: the mega-volumes, "fuzz" effects and distortions of rock, the hammer beats of rap, the shrieking saxophones and cascading notes of jazz, and the amplified bass of reggae. Violence is also associated with other types of music. In Stanley Kubrick's film *A Clockwork Orange,*

An image from Stanley Kubrick's bleak and violent film *A Clockwork Orange* (1971).

the hero, Alex, driven crazy by the sounds of Beethoven, jumps out of a window. In Cuba during the 1920s and 1930s, concerts by rival bands playing the popular music known as *son* degenerated into brawls which had to be broken up by the police.

Violence, in more controlled forms, is present in many musical traditions, old and new: in the wailing of women in the funeral lamentations of Macedonia; in certain Senegalese songs whose lyrics pour out a stream of bitter invective against new wives brought into a household; in the drumbeats of African *griot* storytellers which once stimulated the ardour of warriors and today perform a similar role for the participants in traditional wrestling matches. It is found in martial music, in hunting calls, and in filmed thrillers where it plays a crucial role in setting the mood.

Violence is also present in classical music such as Handel's "Saul", Beethoven's *Eroica Symphony,* in operas generally, such as those of Verdi, who once said that he sought to express "passions above all else" and almost all of whose heroines die tragic deaths, in Mahler's *Fourth Symphony*, in Berlioz's *Symphonie Fantastique,* with its dramatic *Dies irae,* and in Stravinsky's *The Rite of Spring,* in which a virgin, sacrificed to the gods, dances herself to death (a riot broke out during the first performance). One could continue the list indefinitely.

AN EXTRAORDINARY POWER

Is it possible, asks musicologist Gilbert Rouget in his book on music and trance, that music may be endowed with a magical power capable of whipping people into the state of madness which the ancient Greeks called "mania"? Or does it have no objective reality? Rouget cites Timotheus of Miletus, who lived in the fourth century BC and once said that music "was capable of tempting Alexander away from a banquet to take up arms, and then of luring him back again to his guests with a lilting harmony". Rouget also quotes Boethius, who claimed that the Dorian mode inspired virtue, whereas the Phrygian mode aroused passion and violence, and refers to Aristotle's theory of the ethos of modes, which was similar to that of Boethius. He concludes that music can induce a trance in some cases and calm in others, and that it "derives its power from its integration into a given set of representations".

It is true that in order to grasp the symbolism in a particular type of music it is essential

to be familiar with the set of representations into which it is integrated and the context in which it is performed. In the West, for example, the major modes evoke elation and rejoicing and the minor modes inspire melancholy, while in the East other modes such as Arab *maqam* and Indian *ragas* evoke totally different emotional moods. Similarly, drums and trumpets are regarded as martial instruments and flutes are associated with pastoral. All this is bound up with mental associations that are to a large extent culturally determined.

Leibniz spoke of the "anxiety-causing effect" of dissonance, and yet today dissonances, which have become commonplace in contemporary music, have lost much of their disquieting character (even Chopin's mazurkas, when first performed, were criticized for their "dissonance"). Verdi's use of double basses to introduce the final scene of *Othello*, Berlioz's use of percussion instruments in the *Symphonie Fantastique*, and Alfred Hitchcock's use of violins to heighten dramatic tension, are all illustrations of the way in which musical choices are both personal and culturally determined.

And yet music, when considered as a group of organized sounds and hence as a purely acoustic phenomenon, is also known to produce certain physiological and psychological effects which have been scientifically documented. Certain rhythms and sound frequencies, for example, can accelerate or slow down the human metabolic rate and even induce hypnosis. John Diamond, a specialist in behavioural physiology, has shown how the relative strength of certain muscles, a function which is easily measurable, varies according to the type of music to which people are listening. Animals and plants are also known to react physically to music. According to studies carried out in India, Russia and the United States, plants seem to hate "heavy metal" rock music and twist themselves as far away as possible from the offending loudspeaker, while they adore classical violin and will grow even more lushly to the sounds of disco.

Noise engenders violence; it can even drive people to suicide. Some artificial noises, especially those which emanate from continuous-frequency engines, have been found to have a pathological effect on the body's cellular structure, and can sometimes cause cancer, while natural sounds, like those of waves, the warbling of birds and certain types of classical or African music, can create a sense of well-being and even a healing effect by harmonizing with our biorhythms.

In recent years, the practice of music therapy has enjoyed considerable popularity. Members of the Research Group in Pediatric Anaesthesiology at the Hospital for Sick Children in Paris and doctors in many American hospitals have used carefully selected types of music to reduce their patients' dependency on tranquillizers. In *The Burmese Harp* (1956), a fine film by the Japanese director Kon Ichikawa, a soldier-musician saps his comrades' will to fight whenever he plays and sings.

Study of the relationship between music and violence also raises the question of the political aspect of music. In many parts of the world, musicians such as the bards of Nepal, the *griots* or the musicians of Ethiopia are perceived as pariahs or as socially inferior, and are believed to lead dissolute lives and be addicted to drugs and alcohol. Music has often been used as an instrument of domination. In some African societies, *mirliton* reed pipes and other instruments provide a musical accompaniment during the ritual parading of masks, which women and children must not see and which perpetuate male dominance.

The French writer Jacques Attali has observed that in Western societies the upper classes have always encouraged artistic creation, but only in order to maintain the established order and legitimize their own authority. In the 1950s, the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo y Molina encouraged the practice of the *merengue*, a dance closely related to the samba, but gave orders that the musicians should sing his praises and exiled those who

***Mick Jagger*, a computerized print by the French artist Leo Scalpel.**

French troops on parade.

opposed him. In many countries, music has become a form of propaganda or been appropriated by the Church, and judgements about music have been an endorsement of manipulation and intolerance.

Authoritarian colonial regimes arbitrarily associated drums with violence and debauchery, and long banned black music. The "New Age" writer Corinne Hélène claims that jazz and juvenile delinquency go hand in hand. But this baseless claim is fraught with prejudice, for how can the beautiful and expressive phrasing of a Sarah Vaughan or an Ella Fitzgerald be associated with juvenile delinquency? Why should jazz as a whole be connected with this social problem when most young jazz musicians are now graduates of music conservatories and universities and the overwhelming majority of jazz fans are intellectuals? How indeed, when music, for many deprived black and Hispanic adolescents of America's urban ghettos, far from leading to delinquency, is often a lifeline?

In the United States, moral-majority pressure groups have stigmatized some rock records as "obscene", in the hope of getting them withdrawn from the market, but they also tried to ban the Robert Mapplethorpe photo exhibition and other artistic events which did not correspond with their ideals. On the other hand, some kinds of music such as "muzak", which supposedly increase consumer sales and induce people in restaurants to eat more but are actually a form of audio-brainwashing and noise pollution, are broadcast all day long in shopping centres and other public areas.

Jacques Attali has also remarked that "show business, the star system and the hit parade are signs of deep-rooted institutional and cultural colonization". In this context music, through a sometimes violent protest against official art and the mechanization of society, becomes a means of fighting authority. "Music exists," adds Jacques Attali, "to help us hear the sound of change. It forces us to invent new categories, to come up with a new momentum capable of rejuvenating a view of society that has become ossified, trapped, moribund." This is partly true of rock and its rebellious anti-establishment stance, and of jazz, rap and reggae—all musical forms which proclaim their black identity and have rejected old models along with the hypocrisy and inhumanity of materialism. In certain ritualized settings, notably during festivals, subversive songs are often used to express grievances against the establishment.

A YEARNING FOR HARMONY

Does music engender violence or does it express violence? And if it does express violence, does it, by sublimating violent impulses and dissipating tensions, play a cathartic role and "soothe the savage breast"? Music, for Attali, is the "audible tape of society's vibrations and signs." It is undeniably deeply rooted in the collective psychology: rock, rap, free jazz and reggae all express the violence of the cultures which have bred them. But people and their environment are inseparable: the pent-up violence in the individual affects society and vice versa. While music reflects the collective *gestalt* of a society, its particular form of expression also reflects the emotions of the musician.

In China, Egypt, India and ancient Greece, music was believed to possess a certain ethical value and the power to uplift or debase the soul. In ancient China, the imperial government existed in harmony with the twelve celestial tones, and during the Confucian Chin dynasty, certain "virtuous" songs and musical instruments were reputed to temper the harshness of the regime. Classical music is also imbued with spirituality: Mozart's Don Giovanni brings down divine vengeance upon himself by assassinating a nobleman and burns in hell for it. Liszt aspired to compose

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War drums in Papua New Guinea.

inspirational works, and although Wagner's "Tetralogy" (the four-opera *Ring* cycle) expresses both the fall of humanity cut adrift from the gods and the distress of the artist faced with the world's misfortunes, Wagner had a deeply moral view of art.

The French sociologist Jean Duvignaud has written that art expresses "nostalgia for a lost form of communication in the shape of a forbidden dream that is continually revived by the irrepressible desire of the human emotional impulse". He goes on to say that a successful work of art "rebuilds behind the self a unity which pieces together the shards of a divided humanity". Now that idealism has been demolished and the philosophy of music has become a thing of the past, while the media (which tend to put the visual image before the musical message) bombard us with vulgar and iconoclastic music, it is more than ever incumbent on musicians and artists in general to adopt an ethical position. The most influential creators of the twentieth century, notably the film-makers whose art is one of our era's most powerful forms of expression—artists such as Kurosawa, Ozu and Satyajit Ray—have been passionate humanists.

Musical eurhythmics presupposes both inner and outer harmony, peace with oneself and with the universe. Violence, in its latent form, is an intrinsic part of human nature and of the universe generally. But when violence is unleashed and expressed, often in a paroxysm, in music or other art forms, it is a symptom either of social unrest or of inner imbalance or torment, emotional deprivation and arrested development.

And just as the wind can rise from a gentle breeze to a raging hurricane, so music can enchant or destroy us. It is for musicians to create works which enrich life, which contribute to the harmony of humanity, without compromising the quality of their art (some forms of therapeutic music, such as "New Age" music, do not really have any aesthetic value).

However, when music achieves perfection, it allows us to catch a glimpse of the divine; it becomes, according to a Buddhist belief, the most refined art, the path to enlightenment. According to the Taoist sage, Zhuangzi, "Music allows man to remain pure, simple, sincere and in this way to rediscover his primitive emotions". (A few centuries later, Wagner would also use music to explore primitive forms of expression.) The great violinist Yehudi Menuhin once observed that "music creates order out of chaos". Nietzsche's humorous conclusion was that "Without music, life would be a mistake". ■

A scene from *The Music Room* (1958), a film by the Indian director Satyajit Ray.

The Seville Statement

Peace is possible. War is not a biological necessity but a social invention, and peace must be invented to replace it. This is the message of the Seville Statement, which was drawn up in 1986 by an international team of specialists (biologists, psychologists, ethologists, geneticists and others) on the initiative of the Spanish National Commission for UNESCO as part of the International Year of Peace sponsored by the United Nations. The Statement has been endorsed by many organizations of scientists around the world, and in 1989 was adopted by UNESCO, which is disseminating it worldwide in the form of a brochure published in English, French, Spanish and Arabic. The Statement attracted considerable attention at the second World Congress on Violence and Human Coexistence which was held at Montreal (Canada) in July 1992.

Salient passages from the Statement are published below.

INTRODUCTION

We, the undersigned scholars from around the world and from relevant sciences, have met and arrived at the following Statement on Violence.

In it, we challenge a number of alleged biological findings that have been used, even by some in our disciplines, to justify violence and war. Because the alleged findings have contributed to an atmosphere of pessimism in our time, we submit that the open, considered rejection of these mis-statements can contribute significantly to the International Year of Peace.

We state our position in the form of five propositions. We are aware that there are many other issues about violence and war that could be fruitfully addressed from the standpoint of our disciplines, but we restrict ourselves here to what we consider a most important first step.

FIRST PROPOSITION

It is scientifically incorrect to say that we have inherited a tendency to make war from our animal ancestors. Although fighting occurs widely throughout animal species, only a few cases of destructive intra-species fighting between organized groups have ever been reported among naturally living species, and none of these involve the use of tools designed to be weapons. Normal predatory feeding upon other species cannot be equated with intra-species violence. Warfare is a peculiarly human phenomenon and does not occur in other animals.

The fact that warfare has changed so radically over time indicates that it is a product of culture. Its biological connection is primarily through language which makes possible the co-ordination of groups, the transmission of technology, and the use of tools. War is biologically possible, but it is not inevitable, as evidenced by its variation in occurrence and nature over time and space. There are cultures which have not engaged in war for centuries, and there are cultures which have engaged in war frequently at some times and not at others.

SECOND PROPOSITION

It is scientifically incorrect to say that war or any other violent behaviour is genetically programmed into our human nature. While genes are involved at all levels of nervous system function, they provide a developmental potential that can be actualized only in conjunction with the ecological and social environment. While individuals vary in their predispositions to be affected by their experience, it is the interaction between their genetic endowment and conditions of nurturance that determines their personalities. Except for rare pathologies, the genes do not produce individuals necessarily predisposed to violence. Neither do they determine the opposite. While genes are co-involved in establishing our behavioural capacities, they do not by themselves specify the outcome.

THIRD PROPOSITION

It is scientifically incorrect to say that in the course of human evolution there has been a selection for aggressive behaviour more than for other kinds of behaviour. In all well-studied species, status within the group is achieved by the ability to co-operate and to fulfil social functions relevant to the structure of that group. "Dominance" involves social bondings and affiliations; it is not simply a matter of the possession and use of superior physical power, although it does involve aggressive behaviours. Where genetic selection for aggressive behaviour has been artificially instituted in animals, it has rapidly succeeded in producing hyper-aggressive individuals; this indicates that aggression was not maximally selected under natural conditions. When such experimentally-created hyper-aggressive animals are present in a social group, they either disrupt its social structure or are driven out. Violence is neither in our evolutionary legacy nor in our genes.

FOURTH PROPOSITION

It is scientifically incorrect to say that humans have a "violent brain". While we do have the neural apparatus to act violently, it is not automatically activated by internal or external stimuli. Like those of higher primates and unlike those of other animals, our higher neural processes filter such stimuli before they can be acted upon. How we act is shaped by how we have been conditioned and socialized. There is nothing in our neurophysiology that compels us to react violently.

FIFTH PROPOSITION

It is scientifically incorrect to say that war is caused by "instinct" or any single motivation. The emergence of modern warfare has been a journey from the primacy of emotional and motivational factors, sometimes called "instincts", to the primacy of cognitive factors. Modern war involves institutional use of personal characteristics such as obedience, suggestibility, and idealism, social skills such as language, and rational considerations such as cost-calculation, planning, and information processing. The technology of modern war has exaggerated traits associated with violence both in the training of combatants and in the preparation of support for war in the general population. As a result of this exaggeration, such traits are often mistaken to be the causes rather than the consequences of the process.

CONCLUSION

We conclude that biology does not condemn humanity to war, and that humanity can be freed from the bondage of biological pessimism and empowered with confidence to undertake the transformative tasks needed in this International Year of Peace and in the years to come. Although these tasks are mainly institutional and collective, they also rest upon the consciousness of individual participants for whom pessimism and optimism are crucial factors. Just as "wars begin in the minds of men", peace also begins in our minds. The same species which invented war is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility lies with each of us. ■

The political solution

by Sami Naïr

'Politics is by definition the antidote to naked violence'

Above, *Policemen of the World* (1975), a bronze sculpture (11 x 50 cm) by the Vietnamese artist Diem Phung Thi.

Two responses need to be kept under control in the face of violence: fear and moral revulsion. But this is extremely difficult, because fear and moral revulsion are healthy reactions to an outbreak of violence. Healthy, but unfortunately unequal to the act of violence itself; they are reactions to the effects of the act, not actions affecting the conditions that allow violence to occur.

Fear and moral revulsion are generated by different feelings. Fear accompanies awareness of danger to the human body, to its physical integrity. Moral revulsion arises from the feeling that, since the notion of good is the foundation of the social order, violence, which is the embodiment of evil, must undermine that foundation. In the first case, the response is legitimate (this is the instinct of self-preservation identified by Spinoza and Freud) but irrational, for it cannot be proportionate to the extent of the act of violence. In the second case, the reaction is not legitimate (because it presupposes that the act of violence is alien to the social order) but rational, because it is based on an awareness that violence destroys that order. But the two reactions lead to the same result: they answer violence with violence. This is the opposite to what is desired.

So another, more realistic attitude to the problem of violence is required. Its starting point is the familiar notion that human beings, when left to themselves, will set in motion the *bellum omnium contra omnes,* or "war of all against all". The realistic approach, as opposed to the moralistic one, takes for granted that violence is central to human life, the social order and human relationships. The problem is how to control, eradicate or transcend it.

To transcend human violence is, in a sense, to transcend humanity itself. But there is no need to seek the principle of that transcendence. It is not the kind of magic formula that prophets discover as a result of revelation (though it has to be said that all religions are based on this precept), nor is it a personal decision that individuals are free to impose on themselves. There is no need to look for a solution because, paradoxically, it already exists. It resides in the fact that any human being is also a social being, or a "political animal", to use Aristotle's term. In other words, the solution already resides in the imperative *necessity* of the social order. The social order requires individual human beings

to transcend themselves, because it has structured them into a community, into an organized society. The historical form taken by that organization, at least in the tradition of volatile societies in both East and West, has been the state.

A STATE MONOPOLY

The state is the starting point of society. It may well also be its end product—but only those who, like Hegel, claim to be the mouthpiece of absolute knowledge can be absolutely certain of that. Experimental research has shown beyond doubt that the violence of individuals is incompatible with the state and that the state cannot effectively perform its role as guarantor of the social order unless it dispossesses individuals of their violence, or unless, in Max Weber's phrase, it holds a legitimate monopoly of violence.

The way in which this monopoly is created is neither abstract nor straightforward. In each case, specific historical conditions, power struggles, conflicts and the clash of vested interests combine to produce a certain type of state or form of domination. Their degree of legitimacy depends on the relationship that unites them or sets them against human society and the individual within that society. I shall therefore not examine here the historical question of the formation of the state. I shall examine the problem of the transcendence of human violence from a purely theoretical standpoint, which of course has repercussions on one's day-to-day outlook on violence.

Paradoxically, the transcendence of individual violence in the state comprises both the abolition and the maintenance of violence. Abolition, because through the exercise of the general will violence becomes a norm, enshrined in the legal system. No state, however dictatorial it may be, can afford to ignore the will of the community. History is of course littered with examples of states whose sole legitimacy has depended on their possession of arms, but even in such cases there is constant reference to the community and to its will. This is what always gives legitimacy to the prohibition of individual violence (which in turn becomes necessary in the face of oppression). Rousseau and Kant had opposing views on this matter. Rousseau held that if the social contract is not respected, and since it is based on the principle of the general will, then the individual is

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"No state, however dictatorial it may be, can afford to ignore the will of the community". Above, a crowd demonstrates in Santiago de Chile on 7 October 1988 after General Pinochet had been defeated in the referendum he had organized.

entitled to opt out of it and rebel, whereas Kant urged the individual to submit to the moral law, which he held to be superior to the general will. And that moral law stipulated an absolute rejection of violence.

Let us be quite clear about this: the usual form taken by the transcendence of violence is the transformation of violence, its inversion into a legal norm. But violence is also, by the same process, maintained, in the form of the coercion exercised on those who oppose the established community, whether they be internal opponents who wish to use violence to question the prevailing order, or external opponents (other states), which strive by force to impose their violence on the state.

And so there is an eminently complementary relationship between the abolition and the maintenance of violence; but violence has a different form in each case. It would be a big mistake ever to assume that violence has disappeared, or should disappear, from the state, and that the era of the "perfect citizen" has dawned. In fact violence never disappears from life. Its emergence is a sign, a symptom, a harbinger. But of what?

Of a deregulation of the social order. The more an organized system is perverted by violence, the more its capacity to integrate the community is weakened. In this respect, recourse to violence is an attack on the social order rather than a justification of it. It always reveals the weak points in the system. This point is valid both for individual and for group violence. The French social scientist Emile Durkheim showed how the normative order is called into question by the act of suicide, which is the most radical form violence can take since it is directed against the self. Needless to say, if violence heralds a weakening of the social order, the latter cannot be rescued by the power of the state alone. For as it weakens, the state can and often does lose its legitimacy. To that extent, an outbreak of violence is a straw in the wind, an invitation to the social order to turn inwards and take stock of itself, to find out what has made violence possible.

POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

The state cannot put an end to violence either by decree or by force of arms. The latter course soon leads to bloodshed, and people will imagine the blood to be that of their nearest and dearest. Such situations can be resolved only through *discussion*, in the sense of communication between individual wills. This form of communication is what politics is all about. Politics is by definition the antidote to naked violence. When Clausewitz said that war is the continuation of politics by other means, he did not imply that politics is the continuation of war by other means. He was simply saying that war is limited by politics, and vice versa. In other words, that between violence and discussion, and between force and consensus, there is no continuity, but a break. Politics is incompatible with force: it is the realm of shared decision-making through collective communication.

Here too, starry-eyed optimism should be avoided, first because debate can be manipulated (how many demagogues has the world seen since the time of Cleisthenes of Athens!),

Vivre, a terra-cotta group (60 x 35 cm) by the French artist René Lamoureux.

and secondly because in Western civilization, which probably now gives priority to the image over the printed word, people are tending to become passive consumers of powerful images to the detriment of their role as citizens.

The view that politics is the antidote to violence has far-reaching implications. It implies first of all that politics is the only way to contain outbreaks of violence within the social order. When violence begins to break free from and destroy the social order, it becomes a counter-society. On careful examination, this can be seen to be the case of all movements of those who are rejected or relegated to the sidelines of the social order. Fundamentalism in Islamic society, for example, has all the characteristics of a politically antisystemic movement. However, the function of politics is to integrate, not to exclude, to institutionalize conflicts, not stifle them.

This brings me to the second consequence of my argument: if politics is to be effective—and that should be its sole aim—it must interface with actual reality, with the empirical generality of divergences, contradictions, interests and conflicts, as well as the infinite range of passions that underlie them. In other words, politics must be democratic.

But democracy in this context should not be taken to mean simply the exercise of freedom. For freedom is also—more often than is usually imagined—a source of violence. It should be regarded as that which encourages the equality of all citizens—equality here being taken to mean, at least in democratic systems, satisfying the minimum aspirations of each person.

Only democratic politics can get to the roots of violence. It alone can decipher its codes and reveal its underlying causes, because it alone can extend the legal rights enjoyed by men and women. And what is violence if not a desperate appeal for such an extension? ■

The seal of the Commonwealth, the Cromwellian regime established in England in 1649 after the temporary overthrow of the monarchy.

COMMENTARY

by Federico Mayor

This article is one of a series in which the Director-General of UNESCO sets out his thinking on matters of current concern

Encouraging diversity

THE major challenge that faces us today is how to manage and promote diversity as a positive force, so that the recently released energies of ethnic, linguistic and spiritual solidarity serve as catalysts for creativity rather than destruction, for concord rather than division. If the fading away of the Cold War has brought an era of ideological conflict to an end, the hatreds it generated have already given way to ethnic antagonisms deeply rooted in memory. This has happened in Europe. It is happening in Africa. It is beginning to happen in Asia.

Humanity seems to be entering—or, more precisely, to be re-entering—an extremely dangerous era of ethnic and racial tension. Since the hostility of one tribe towards another is among the most instinctive human reactions, these resurgent forces need to be more vigorously combated than ever before.

We must harness all our energies to promoting a culture of peace among and between human communities at all levels—a culture of mutual respect and tolerance, a culture of public liberty, a culture of ethnic coexistence that fosters pluralistic and open societies within which human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy can flourish. The example of Yugoslavia is a grim reminder of what can happen when long-suppressed yearnings are not recognized in time.

Maintaining cultural diversity requires us to work together to strengthen newly gained freedoms and openness while protecting each people against the pitfalls of hastily transferred alien models. The achievement of such a balance is important, whatever the tasks nations must shoulder, whether in the context of managing the transition to a market economy, raising the citizens' standard of living, modernizing society without destroying the ancestral values upon which it rests, or protecting cultural identity in the face of the homogenizing forces of modern technological civilization. The aim must be to contribute to the pluralism of the entire planet as well as to the persistence of plural societies in each nation-state.

The challenge is likewise to develop self-reliance and reinforce endogenous resources, both material and human, with a view to increasing the number of trained cadres, to reducing the often large discrepancies in resources between one country and another, to learning how to work together in a spirit of healthy competition, and to developing the ability to function in the international arena.

The international community also has a duty to foster the spirit of solidarity and an ethic of responsibility on the part of those in a position to help the most fragile and vulnerable nations. This means that the recipients of technical expertise and resources from outside must be watchful and determined from the outset to maintain the co-operation process on an equal footing.

At a time when the entire United Nations system is returning to the roots of its mandate for the construction of peace and when all countries, both industrialized and developing, are turning once again to it as the irreplaceable forum in which to map out new international approaches, we need vision and perseverance more than ever before.

We have no choice but to promote a genuine world partnership for development, for the overriding global threat to the security and well-being of our planet is the growing gulf between North and South. It is our duty to promote development as an endogenous, sustainable, internationally equitable process centred on human beings as individuals.

We have a long way to go. A profound change in behaviour and attitudes is required on the part of all. This requires first of all a spirit of solidarity that is inspired by the sense of a *moral* imperative to respect each other, to share and work together, to promote the primacy of the human person and basic human rights. This truly exceptional time in history also calls for exceptional solutions. The world as we have known it since the end of the Second World War is being radically reshaped. Great imagination, innovation and creativity are required.

International partnerships and interaction are an important ingredient for creativity in problem-solving—a quality not possessed only by artists, poets and inventors. This creativity means being adaptable, curious, flexible. It requires a willingness to frame bold questions instead of depending on traditional answers. It means an open mind, an open heart, and a sensitive awareness of the need to encourage fresh definitions, reconcile old opposites, and help draw new mental maps for a changing world. Ultimately it will be honest introspection, openness to *oneself,* that will lead to compassion for the experience of *others,* and it will be compassion that will lead us to a future in which the pursuit of individual freedom will be balanced with a recognition of the need to provide for the common good.

The only way to meet these challenges is to follow the peaceful path of empathy and tolerance. ■

Hadrian's Wall

by Anthony Allan

Above, a view of Hadrian's Wall (United Kingdom), the barrier that defended the northern frontier of Roman Britain. The monument was placed on UNESCO's World Heritage List in 1987.

IT snakes for 117 kilometres across the neck of England, from the River Tyne to the Solway Firth, a fifty-six-kilometre-long inlet of the Irish Sea that still marks the border between England and Scotland. Nowadays the frontier is an open one; only roadside signs welcoming drivers to a new country mark the passage from one land to the other. But when Hadrian's Wall was built, in the second century AD, the situation could hardly have been more different.

Britain was then a congeries of mutually hostile tribes, only partly subdued by the legions of the Roman Empire. The wall was constructed to draw a permanent line between the conquered lands of the south, where the *pax Romana* ran, and the turbulent lands to the north that had not been drawn into the Roman orbit.

The wall marked the northernmost frontier of the Roman Empire, which stretched away to the south and east as far as the Sahara Desert and the sands of Arabia. The ribbon of stone that still bisects this rolling, grey-and-green, austerely beautiful northern landscape remains the best-known and best-preserved of all the empire's artificial frontiers. The strategic thinking that lay behind it is succinctly summarized in the only surviving Roman comment on its construction, from an anonymous life of the emperor Hadrian (AD 117-138): "It was he who first built a wall, eighty miles long, to divide the Romans from the barbarians".

Rome's interest in Britain had first been aroused by Julius Caesar himself, who had invaded the island in 55 BC, returning the following year to accept the submission of the local tribes. The invasion, involving a risky sea-crossing, helped cement Caesar's reputation as a military magician in Rome, where the island had previously been regarded as semi-legendary, an Ultima Thule about which almost nothing was known. Although the victory was not followed up and the legions left after what amounted to little more than a reconnaissance in force, the campaign won Caesar a greater number of days of public thanksgiving in the capital than had been accorded him for the conquest of Gaul.

It was not until ninety-seven years later that the Emperor Claudius, needing a military triumph to shore up an insecure hold on power, decided to complete what Caesar had begun. Britain was invaded again in AD 43, and this time the occupation was to be lasting. Yet only the southern portion of Britain was brought under Roman rule. Attempts were subsequently made to subdue the entire island, most notably by Cnaeus Julius Agricola, father-in-law of the historian Tacitus, who carried the Roman flag up to the highlands of Scotland before being recalled to Rome in AD 84 or 85. At some point in the ensuing decades, however, the legionary base he established in Scotland was abandoned for reasons that history does not record, and the Roman frontier was pulled back to the Tyne-Solway line.

When Hadrian made the decision to build the wall that bears his name, its exact siting was largely determined by a chain of forts—the so-

called Stanegate system—that had already been established in the area by Agricola's men. Its building marked an implicit limitation of Rome's ambitions—the entire island of Britain would not be conquered. Once that decision had been made, the lack of natural boundaries in the rolling moorlands of northern England made the erection of some permanent barrier almost inevitable.

The wall was built by legionaries, which is to say by a foreign army of occupation, for at the time of its construction only Roman citizens could join the ranks. The legions were not merely peerless military instruments, but also employed surveyors, masons, carpenters, glaziers, engineers—all the skills needed by colonizing forces.

In later centuries, however, the auxiliaries employed to man the wall were very much men of the region. The job often passed from father to son, and whole communities abutting the wall must have relied on sentry duty as their main source of employment from generation to generation.

In its final state, the Wall consisted of two courses of dressed stone sandwiching a core of rubble. The infill was usually bonded with mortar, though clay was sometimes used when locally available. The parapet's original gauge of ten Roman feet—almost three metres by present-day measures—was reduced in later sections to two-and-a-half metres, which made it just wide enough for two sentries to cross but not large enough to serve as an effective fighting platform.

A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM

Although the building of the wall itself was an extraordinary achievement, the defensive system surrounding it required even greater efforts. To the north—the side from which attacks were expected—there was a ditch that was on average about eight metres wide. The earth removed in digging it was ramped ahead of it to increase the drop for any would-be attacker. On the wall's less-exposed southern flank, a communications artery known locally to this day as the Military Road was backed by a rearward earthwork six metres wide and three metres deep—the vallum—that clearly delineated the military zone surrounding it.

More significantly still, the Wall system incorporated a chain of sixteen garrison forts, each capable of housing between 500 and 800 men. These were the guardians of the wall who would respond to the sentry's alarum at the first signs of trouble. In addition, fortlets known as milecastles interrupted the fortifications at intervals of one Roman mile—roughly one-and-a-half kilometres. Each contained twin sets of guarded double doors—the wall's access points—with barracks for guards in the walled courtyard between them. And between milecastles rose two observation towers, each about six metres square, spaced with military precision equidistantly from the towers and one another. Each turret enclosed a single room, in which a raised platform provided space for a single sentry to set his bedding.

The planning of the wall reflected both the strengths and weaknesses of off-site decision-making. On the one hand, its construction was a triumph of military efficiency; the bulk of it went up extremely rapidly, probably in less than a decade. On the other, the rigorous logic of the layout allowed little room for flexibility or adaptability to local conditions. To correspond rigorously to the mile measure, some milecastles had gates that opened onto steep drops, while others were constructed on an inconvenient camber even though flat land lay close by.

The frequency of these guarded gateways meant that no traveller would have had to stray more than half a mile off route to pass through the wall, and this fact provides a clue to the strategic thinking behind its construction. This much-pierced line was no impregnable bulwark, intended to repel attackers by its massive strength. Rather, it was a physically defined frontier line whose purpose was primarily border control. Far from seeking to hide behind its defences, the commanders who built it would have viewed the number of gates as an advantage, enabling them to deploy their own troops rapidly at different points and permitting unexpected sorties by units manoeuvred into position under cover of the curtain.

Ironically, the wall had barely been finished when it was abandoned by its builders. Within a decade of its completion, a new Emperor, Antoninus Pius (AD 138-161), decided once again to advance the Roman front line into Scotland. A new turf-and-timber construction went up 160 kilometres to the north along the still narrower isthmus between the estuaries of the rivers Forth and Clyde. The forward frontier was held for little more than two decades, however, and by the 160s Hadrian's Wall was back in commission as the point at which the Empire stopped.

It was to remain so for the rest of the Roman occupation of Britain. Though no exact date can be fixed for its abandonment, it seems not to have been long before 410, the year in which the Emperor Honorius finally told the people of Britain to look to their own protection after the last of the legions had been withdrawn.

In the three centuries during which it was in use, the Wall proved less than infallible as a defence against invaders. There were repeated incursions by raiders from north of the border.

Yet for all that, the wall for the most part served its builders' purpose well. The incursions through it proved in each case to be temporary, and the structure itself survived with little more than local damage to show for the fighting. As long as Rome had the resources and the will to retain the colony of Britain, the stone bulwark of the wall survived as its northernmost shield. After the Roman withdrawal, the wall faded from history.

The Guardian of the Wall as depicted in a 1942 *Prince Valiant* comic strip drawn by Harold R. Foster (1892-1982).

The coming of the automobile age made the wall easily accessible, and now its venerable stones attract visitors from all over the world. Tourism has caused some conservation worries, but the main problems faced by the staff of twenty-four permanently employed on its upkeep are posed by an older enemy: the harsh weather of the wild border region in which it lies. With the wall's original coping long gone, rain and rising damp saturate the stone, and the frosts of winter cause uneven uplift that can fracture the mortar sections that hold the core together.

As so often in conservation matters, the way ahead turns out to lie in looking back. The cement infilling used since the 1940s to consolidate the core has proved brittle and friable, and is now rarely employed. Instead, the wall's conservers have taken their cue from the Roman lime-kilns archaeologists have discovered along the wall's length; natural lime flexes more than concrete and so is better equipped to cope with the asperities of the northern climate. With its aid and a policy of careful supervision, there now seems little reason why Hadrian's extraordinary defence should not endure for another millennium. ■

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The Indus Valley civilization—cradle of democracy?

by Syed A. Naqvi

IN all the highly developed civilizations of the past—Mesopotamia, the Nile Valley, Anatolia, China—the pervasive influence of an imperial authority can be felt, providing patronage for the arts and directing the evolution of society. A close examination of the archaeological discoveries made in the Indus Valley seems to belie the presence of such an imperial authority in this civilization, which flourished some 5,000 years ago and covered almost twice the area of the civilizations of Mesopotamia and the Nile Valley combined. Yet although it seems to have lacked an authoritarian regime, the Indus civilization had a well-disciplined way of life, civic controls and an organizational system which could only have stemmed from the kind of "rule by the people" that was exercised in some Greek city-states some 2,000 years later. Did Greece give birth to democracy, or did Greece simply follow a practice developed earlier?

The fact that the Indus Valley script has not yet been deciphered is certainly a handicap to attempts to draw any final conclusions, but there is a vast array of material evidence available to help archaeologists, social scientists and other scholars to analyse the social and administrative structure of this civilization. In spite of the absence of grandiose structures acting as centres of authority such as forts, palaces or great temples, all the discoveries made so far suggest that the rule of law extended over an area measuring roughly 1,600 kilometres from north to south and more than 800 kilometres from east to west.

The main argument in support of this thesis is the existence of well-established norms and standards which would have required the consensus of the people if they had not been imposed by an authoritarian regime. It is impossible to ignore the evidence furnished by the perfect planning of the great city of Moenjodaro and the use in its construction of standard-size burnt bricks 27.94 cm long, 13.96 cm wide and 5.71 cm thick. Most of the houses had a standard layout and size, and

Aerial view of the ruins of Moenjodaro, a metropolis of the Indus Valley civilization in Pakistan. The site was placed on UNESCO's World Heritage List in 1980.

These weights and weighing dishes of polished stone are vestiges of the Indus Valley civilization.

only special structures, possibly public buildings, were treated differently within the framework of a city plan which also provided for separate residential and commercial areas. In the two major cities of Moenjodaro and Harappa, which are about 600 kilometres apart, the gridiron pattern of street layout uncovered by archaeological excavations shows how much consideration was given to the safety and security of the residents and suggests the existence of a highly developed and well-monitored civic control system. In their planning, the city architects and engineers of that time avoided the risks from heavy and fast traffic on the main thoroughfares by giving access to the houses from side lanes.

The grid layout and residential architecture are not the only evidence of an organized planning and control system. Never before and not until Greek and Roman times was so much attention paid to sanitation and civic facilities as in the Indus Valley civilization. Water discharge sluices from the houses drained refuse into small cesspits lined with bricks at the base of the walls, from which the dirty water was led through conduits to the main drains which ran along the streets below pavement level and were covered with sturdy bricks. This drainage system was connected to larger sewerage outlets which were also covered over and discharged waste and dirty water outside the populated area.

Another striking aspect of the rule of law imposed by the population has been revealed by the discovery of a virtually complete series of highly polished stone weights. Their shapes are cubical, half cubical, cylindrical and spherical, and very few of them are reported to be defective, They provide yet another proof of a civic authority maintaining consistent commercial standards.

It will, of course, be difficult to prove conclusively the existence of such a sophisticated concept of democracy until the Indus Valley script is deciphered and provides written evidence on the subject. But the signs are there, and further research in this direction may well establish that "rule by the people" originated in the Indus Valley. ■

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RECENT RECORDS

TRADITIONAL MUSIC
UNESCO COLLECTION

Syrion Orthodox Church. Antioch Liturgy
Anthology of Traditional Musics
UNESCO CD D 8039

These ancient liturgies of the so-called "Western Syrians" (Suryoye Ma'arboye), which are sung in the Suroyo dialect, a derivative of Aramaic, consist of versified (syllabic) singing and ornamented (melismatic) singing, the latter of which is more influenced by Arab and Iranian music. They include the solemn tradition of Urfa, which is of Turkish origin and has survived in Aleppo, the more decorative tradition of Tagrit (Iraq), the tradition of Amid, which has all but died out today, and the tradition of Mardin, near Aleppo. It is encouraging to think that despite all the trials and tribulations of the Syrian Orthodox Church this splendid music has survived.

Australia. *Aboriginol Music*
Musics and Musicians of the World.
UNESCO CD D 8040

When listened to outside its socio-cultural context—which, alas, is fast disappearing—this rhythmical music, which is often monotonous or based on a form of bourdon, and accompanied by a *didjeridu* (big wooden trumpet), lap-slapping and one or two percussion instruments, is chiefly of ethnological interest. Most of the pieces are associated with rites and specific symbols, and they obey aesthetic criteria of which we know nothing. They do, however, serve as a reminder that before the advent of modern technology humanity respected its myths and its dreams, was in harmony with the cosmic order, and communicated with animals and the natural world. Like ancient rock paintings, this music conjures up an almost nostalgic image of lives which, although primitive and difficult, are probably more harmonious than our own. For they are imbued with the magic of the earth, where the dividing line between reality and the supernatural is blurred.

POPULAR MUSIC

May May. *The Introduction*
CD Scotti Bros 512 515-2

May May, Muhammad Ali's pretty daughter (who bears a striking resemblance to the former boxer), is a newcomer to the musical scene. She sings an invigorating form of rap that is better to dance to than to listen to. The numbers are more interesting for their skilful cross-rhythms and May May's drive than for their lyrics. It is hard for a woman to break into the macho world of rap, but May May has plenty of determination. She has inherited her father's punch, so be prepared for a first-round knockout.

El Disco de Oro *Vol. 3*
Ismael Rivera/Rafael Cortijo y su Combo/Joe Valle/Celio González/Nelson Pinedo/Johnny López/Sonora Matancera
CD Seeco SCCD 9104

This is a delightful collection of Puerto Rican and Cuban hits of the late 1950s. At a time when Puerto Rico was awash with the kind of insipid popular music that appealed to the tastes of American tourists, percussionist Rafael Cortijo and singer Ismael Rivera gave the island's folk music, which is of African origin, a new lease of life. They enlivened *salsa* with the exotic rhythms of *bomba* and *plena* and with vigorous popular lyrics ("Chongolo", "El Pilón de Tomasa"). Sonora Matancera was the band which kept alive the typically 1940s and 1950s Cuban dance rhythm, *son*, in New York. It accompanied a lot of singers successfully, including, on this disc, Celio González, Nelson Pinedo and Johnny López, who even tries his hand at a calypso, "Linstead Market". Joe Valle, a Puerto Rican like Cortijo and Rivera, made *plena* popular in New York dance halls. His lively combo modelled itself on contemporary Cuban bands.

JAZZ

Eddy Louiss. *Wébé*
Eddy Louiss (Hammond organ, keyboards, vocals), Paco Sery (drums), Sylvio Marie (bass), Mr Vaye (spoken voice)
CD Nocturne NTCD 109

Eddy Louiss, who is regarded as one of the finest European jazz organists, here offers us several funk numbers, most of them modelled on the African funk, or "Afro-funk", popularized by Manu Dibango ("Funk Set", "Sax Fun"). There is also a religious composition ('Miséréré") and several more personal tracks with a dreamlike atmosphere ("Souvenirs d'une Autre Vie", "Djawa Dénam"). This is such an original disc it is hard to know which category of contemporary jazz to assign it to.

Thelonious Monk. *Straight, No Chaser*
Thelonious Monk (piano), Charlie Rouse (tenor saxophone), Lorry Gales (bass), Frankie Dunlop (drums)
CD Sony COL 14 468409 2

This reissue of some 1966 sessions includes the rugged "Locomotive", the lyrical "I Didn't Know about You" and "Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea", and the inventive "Japanese Folk Song", with its interesting thematic developments. Monk is a pianist who still means a great deal to musicians today because of his ability to surprise them. Although some of his partners on this record find it hard to adjust to his elliptical style (though not Charlie Rouse, who does a remarkably good job), most jazz musicians have greatly benefited from his harmonic and rhythmic genius and his unparalleled sense of phrasing.

CLASSICAL

Rachmaninov. *Second and Third Piano Concertos*
Yefim Bronfman (piano) and the Philharmonia Orchestra, conducted by Esa-Pekka Salonen
CD Sony Classical SK 47 183

These are brilliant performances of Rachmaninov's *Second* and *Third Piano Concertos* by the young Russian-Israeli pianist Yefim Bronfman and the Finnish conductor Esa-Pekka Salonen. Rachmaninov, who is so often accused of excessive romanticism and technical complexity, is here ethereally graceful, poetic and full of Slav charm. The *allegro ma non tanto* and the more serious *intermezzo* of the *Third Concerto* are particularly moving. Bronfman has a remarkable sense of contrast and phrasing, while Salonen is careful to render every nuance of the score.

Mozart. *Piano Sonatas K.310, K.331 and K.533/494*
Murray Perahia (piano)
CD Sony Classical SK 48 233

Murray Perahia combines verve and clarity in these sparkling versions of three Mozart piano sonatas. The A minor, K.310, was composed in Mannheim and Paris; the A major, K.331, was also thought to have been written in Paris, but this now looks less certain; and Mozart composed the F major, K.533/494, in Vienna. Perahia is to be congratulated on having had the courage to tackle these frequently recorded sonatas (particularly the A major, which has been massacred by generations of conservatory students). Murray Perahia, who was born in the Bronx but is descended from an old family of Sephardic Spanish Jews, is, with Alicia de Larrocha, probably one of the subtlest performers of Mozart's piano music.

ISABELLE LEYMARIE

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Theme
of the next issue
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Psychoanalysis

Also featuring an interview
with the French philosopher

LUC FERRY

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