



**SOBREEDAD**

GRADO			TOTAL
Primero	7	5	12
Segundo	6	8	14
Tercero	7	5	12
Cuarto	5	6	11

Xuejiao Joy Cheng and Kurt Moses

# Promoting transparency through information: A global review of school report cards

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Xuejiao Joy Cheng and Kurt Moses



United Nations  
Educational, Scientific and  
Cultural Organization



International Institute  
for Educational Planning

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## Presentation of the series: Ethics and Corruption in Education

Several studies conducted over the last two decades have emphasized the negative impact of corruption on the economic, social, and political development of countries. Corruption increases transaction costs, reduces the efficiency of public services, distorts the decision-making process, and undermines social values. Studies have also shown a strong correlation between corruption and poverty: Statistical regressions suggest that an improvement in the ‘control of corruption’ indicator by one standard deviation (two points) is associated with an increase of some \$11,000 in GDP per capita (Sturm, 2013, in OECD, 2015). Moreover, corruption tends to contribute to the reinforcement of inequities by placing a disproportionate economic burden on the poor and limiting their access to public services.

As a consequence, fighting corruption has become a major concern for policy-makers and actors involved in development. In view of the decrease in international aid flows and increasingly stringent conditions for the provision of aid – due to growing pressure on public resources within donor countries and the pressure exerted by taxpayers on governments to increase transparency and accountability in resource management – fighting corruption is now regarded as a major priority on the agendas of countries and international agencies of development cooperation. The Drafting Committee of the World Education Forum expressed this concern in the following terms: ‘Corruption is a major drain on the effective use of resources for education and should be drastically curbed’ (UNESCO, 2000). In other terms, to ‘ensure inclusive and quality education for all and promote lifelong learning’ – the fourth of the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals – the issue of corruption must be properly addressed.

A quick review of the literature highlights a number of global and sectoral attempts to tackle the issue of corruption. In the social sector, for example, several studies have been conducted on corruption in relation to

the provision of healthcare services. However, it appears that the education sector has not received adequate attention from national education authorities and donors, despite numerous grounds for prioritizing the challenge of combating corruption in education:

- Public sector reforms aimed at improving governance and limiting corruption-related phenomena cannot produce significant results unless adequate attention is paid to the education sector, as in most countries this constitutes the largest or second-largest public sector in both human and financial terms.
- Any attempt to improve the functioning of the education sector to increase access to quality education for all will be undermined if problems related to corruption, which have severe implications for the efficient use of resources and quality of education and school performance, are not being properly addressed.
- Lack of integrity and unethical behaviour within the education sector are inconsistent with one of the primary aims of education – to produce ‘good citizens’ respectful of the law, human rights, and equity. They are also incompatible with any strategy that considers education as a principal means of fighting corruption.

In this context, IIEP launched a research project entitled ‘Ethics and Corruption in Education’. Corruption is defined as the systematic use of public office for private benefit that results in a reduction in the quality or availability of public goods and services. The main objective of this project is to improve decision-making and the management of educational systems by integrating governance and corruption concerns into methodologies of planning and administration of education. More specifically, it seeks to develop methodological approaches for studying and addressing the issue of corruption in education and to collect and share information on the best approaches for promoting transparency, accountability, and integrity in the management of educational systems in both developing and industrialized countries.

The project includes publications on topics of relevance such as school financing, pro-poor education incentives, teacher codes of conduct, textbook

production and distribution, and academic fraud. It also includes monographs on success stories in improving management and governance, as well as case studies that facilitate the development of methodologies for analysing transparency and integrity in education management.\*

Within this framework, IIEP conducted a study to explore the recent development of school report cards and to examine cases in which report cards prove especially successful in helping to improve transparency and accountability in education systems. The study is based on interviews and survey findings from 14 countries where school report cards have been implemented over recent years, and compares their design and implementation through a series of frameworks. It gauges the settings for school report cards through an index of transparency and accountability, and examines their role in fighting corruption in the education sector. Finally, it suggests a theory of change as well as a checklist to guide future school report card implementation with a focus on transparency and accountability issues.

IIEP is very grateful to Xuejiao Joy Cheng and Kurt Moses for their valuable insights and would like to thank them accordingly.

Jacques Hallak\*\* and Muriel Poisson\*\*\*

\* An information platform entitled ETICO has been created within the framework of the project and can be accessed at: <http://etico.iiep.unesco.org>.

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This study was prepared under the supervision of Muriel Poisson, Head a.i., Research and Development, at the UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP).



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Any errors are those of the authors only.

## List of abbreviations

9YBE	Nine Years Basic Education
ASER	Annual Status of Education Report
AMO	annual measurable objective
CG	capitation grant
CSC	Community Score Card
CSO	civil society organization
CVA	citizen voice and action
EMIS	education management and information systems
ESEA	Elementary and Secondary Education Act
IDEB	Basic Education Development Index
IDESP	Education Development Index of the State of Sao Paulo
LITE	Leadership Initiative for Transformation and Empowerment
PAE	Special Program for the Improvement of Educational Achievement
PESRP	Punjab Education Sector Reform Program
PISA	Programme for International Student Assessment
PSLE	primary and secondary leaving exam
PTA	parent–teacher association
SMC	school management committee
SNIE	National Education Systems Indicator
SPAM	school performance appraisal meeting
SPIP	school performance improvement plan
SPR	school performance review
SRC	school report card
TIMSS	Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
TNP2K	National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction
UGX	Ugandan shilling
US	United States
USAID	US Agency for International Development

## Glossary of key terms

*Accountability*: the establishment of clear roles and responsibilities, rules, and consequences tied to school quality and management.

*Bottom-up process* (for school report cards): a process through which the collection and distribution of school-level information is initiated at the community level.

*Formal sanction/rewards model* (for school report cards): a model in which education authorities use formal sanctions and rewards to establish and maintain school accountability.

*Information-for-accountability*: ‘The use of information, in and of itself, as the instrument of change’ (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos, 2011).

*Market model* (for school report cards): a model in which market incentives are used to establish and maintain school accountability.

*Public-participation model* (for school report cards): a model in which accountability for schools is generated by public participation in school monitoring.

*School report card*: the aggregation of education information on schools, such as enrolment, teacher, and student attendance, and students’ academic performance at the school level.

*Top-down process* (for school report cards): a process in which the collection and distribution of school-level information is initiated by the central authority of a country or jurisdiction.

*Transparency*: information that is ‘easy to understand and simple to access by all stakeholders on all flows of educational resources’ (Hallak and Poisson, 2007), processes, and outcomes.

# Executive summary

This publication examines the development of school report cards (SRCs) in selected countries around the world, with a particular emphasis on developing countries. It is intended to assist policy-makers and programme implementers in making informed decisions about how to use SRCs. The report includes:

- a review of the existing literature,
- interviews with 22 individuals at various levels of government covering different areas of responsibility connected with implementing countries,
- a descriptive summary of 14 countries,
- a summary of structures that can help review efforts undertaken to date,
- a set of newly developed indicators that integrate issues of accountability and anti-corruption effectiveness in the interpretation of SRCs,
- selected summaries and suggestions for improvement.

The report builds on a USAID Working Paper developed in 2006 for the EQUIP 2 Project (Cameron, Moses, and Gillies, 2006) and examines cases in which report cards have proven especially successful in helping to improve transparency and accountability in education systems. It presents interview and survey findings from 14 countries where SRCs have been implemented in recent years, and compares their design and implementation. It gauges the settings for SRCs through an accountability and transparency index based on the authors' observations, and examines whether and how SRCs can be used as part of the toolkit in the fight against corruption in the education sector. Finally, it proposes an implementation framework to help improve the delivery of education services and reduce corrupt practices.

Some key highlights are:

- School report cards can be powerful tools to engage communities and hold schools accountable for providing students with a high-quality education. If the process is inclusive and participatory, SRCs can serve



as a unique channel allowing education stakeholders to make more informed decisions based on school-level data.

- Reporting in SRCs appears to be more comprehensive than before. More comprehensive models include measuring outputs – a key factor in accountability – and parent perception.
- Most countries that appear to be less successful in SRC implementation lack a good understanding of SRC standards and what consequences can be expected based on SRC results. Most SRCs are missing clear, effective accountability measures, as well as clear links to those capable of making changes.
- More systematic efforts to employ SRCs to identify corruption often focus on specific areas, such as corruption in finance, teacher behaviour, and information systems.
- The exact relationship between implementation of SRCs and a country's perceived level of education corruption is unclear. A number of countries with higher levels of perceived corruption in education are among those using more sophisticated SRC approaches.
- Accountability is a key element in the fight against corruption, and is led, in part, by transparency. Three case study areas, namely Indonesia, Brazil, and the state of Virginia in the United States, employ a combination of transparency and measurable consequences, which increase the accountability of schools.

The report summarizes the following main points and lessons learned about SRCs:

- Little rigorous research to date has been undertaken on results and key factors.
- Pressures in the social sector are prompting stakeholders to demand more information about schools and schooling.
- Increased emphasis on 'data-driven decision-making' has led more SRCs to emphasize comparisons, often at multiple levels.
- SRCs are a complex undertaking that depends on multiple factors and stakeholders.
- SRCs have the potential to become tools to combat corruption.

- Formal sanctions help to establish more effective consequences, while a participatory approach helps to clarify roles and responsibilities, and provides more incentives for all stakeholders to contribute to education.

Moving forward, the report makes the following suggestions to SRC designers and implementers:

- Create mechanisms to encourage and ensure public discussion of information, as such debate has the potential to hold educators accountable, even in the absence of harsh sanctions.
- Present SRC data in meaningful ways by incorporating graphic elements, as well as comparisons with standards and other schools, and within the school over time.
- Distribute information in a timely and relevant manner.
- Provide school leaders with technical assistance by sharing best practices from schools with similar socioeconomic backgrounds or through guidance from peers or pedagogical advisors.
- Make community members and local education authorities responsible for distributing information on school performance, rather than school principals, who may have less incentive.
- Incorporate anti-corruption elements into SRCs, such as sharing information on potentially corrupt practices and promoting community monitoring and dialogue.

# Introduction

## **Background: The demand for information**

The demand for data in the public sector has never been as high as in the past decade. Following a wave of democratization in the 20th century, citizens in democratic societies have increased the pressure for information (Gaventa and McGee, 2013), with the emphasis on accountability in public service delivery further propelling the demand for data from public bodies. As Gaventa and McGee (2013) point out, the 2004 *World Development Report* highlighted the problem of public service failures and advocated more direct, ‘short-route’ accountability between service users and their providers. Moreover, the United Nations’ ‘data revolution’ report on the impact of the Millennium Development Goals notes that, globally, efforts to improve data for monitoring and accountability are growing (UN Data Revolution Group, 2014).

At the same time, the amount of information available on a daily basis has increased at an exponential rate. One estimate suggests that ‘90% of the data in the world has been created in the last two years’ (UN Data Revolution Group, 2014). In the public sector, improved legal structures such as the establishment of right-to-information laws have empowered citizens to inquire about the effectiveness of public service delivery. For example, according to an estimate from the World Bank, more than 95 countries have established laws guaranteeing citizens’ rights to information from public bodies (Lemieux, 2014).

As with other public service sectors, the demand for transparency in education has increased correspondingly with the availability of information. In countries where considerable progress in education attainment has not been matched by a rise in education quality, debate focuses on students’ learning outcomes (Pandey, Goyal, and Sundararaman, 2011). According to Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos (2011), the number of low- and middle-income countries participating in the Trends in International Mathematics

and Science Study (TIMSS) increased from 15 in 1995 to 38 in 2011, while the number participating in the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) increased from 18 in 2000 to 37 in 2009. The availability of international and national student assessment and comparison data helps to reveal gaps in education quality and puts pressure on education systems to deliver better results.

In addition, initiatives that promote education accountability – coupled with the push for education decentralization and the promotion of school-based management by multilateral donor agencies such as the World Bank – have brought education decision-making closer to communities, parents, and students. As these stakeholders become more empowered in school monitoring and management, they also demand more information and hold education service providers accountable.

School report cards serve as an important means to provide school-level information to schools, parents, and communities, which in turn increases accountability and transparency in the education system.

## **Definition of school report cards**

School report cards (SRCs) typically refer to the aggregation of education information at the school level. For example, an education system may present school-level information in the report card on pupil–teacher ratios, student achievement, and teacher absenteeism. SRCs differ from the more prevalent education management and information systems (EMIS) reports, which typically target education authorities as the main audience and usually present education information at a national or regional level. This helps education decision-makers to monitor educational progress and outcomes, plan budgets, and make informed policies. In contrast, SRCs provide education information at a much more decentralized level. Although some SRCs include the government as a target audience, they are typically used to inform the general public about school performance, so as to enable stakeholders to more effectively hold schools and districts accountable for education quality.

The design and implementation of SRCs varies among countries. They can be categorized into multiple types according to different analytical angles. For example, SRCs can provide information at the central, regional, or school level depending on the body providing the framework for and collecting the data.

### *Underlying motivation and purpose of SRCs*

SRC efforts are initiated for a host of reasons including political initiatives that promote transparency in public service sectors, demands from local communities and civic groups, education decentralization processes, and donor requirements. They can serve a variety of purposes including increasing accountability in the education system, assisting in school planning and budgeting processes, providing feedback to administrators and teachers, and increasing social participation which can improve civil society.

### *Format of SRCs*

SRCs are typically organized into one of the following formats:

- *scorecards* that show school scores on a numerical or letter scale based on a list of pre-determined criteria that represent performance or progress;
- *school profiles* that usually present a combination of quantitative and qualitative information that forms an overall picture of school operation and quality in a report format;
- *school-education index*, which presents a composite score based on indicators (e.g. student learning outcomes and education efficiency) for each school, enabling users to compare schools and assess how a school changes over time;
- *league tables/school rankings* that rank schools from best to worst at the national or regional level, based on a set of indicators such as school performance on standardized learning assessments.

### *The participatory nature of SRCs*

*Standardized SRCs* present school-level information on a set of indicators (usually determined by education experts or authorities) that remain the same across schools. *Participatory SRCs* allow community members to determine and assess a set of performance indicators tailored to community, parent, and student needs.

### *Data sources for SRCs*

Data for SRCs can originate from a variety of sources, including EMIS, standardized assessments, community monitoring reports, and observations from school inspectors and peers.

### *Content of SRCs*

SRCs can contain different types of information, including:

- school funding levels,
- condition of school facilities,
- teacher qualifications,
- teacher behaviours,
- school management overviews,
- student learning outcomes.

### *Comparisons allowed in SRCs*

The majority of SRCs have consistent indicators, which allows users to compare school performance. This increases competition and social pressure for schools to improve. SRCs may include comparisons with a standard, such as student achievement results set by the federal government; comparisons with other schools in the same locality or schools with similar student backgrounds; and year-to-year comparisons of the school itself.

## Purpose and methodology: Filling the evidence gap

In recent years, research studies have focused increasingly on the effectiveness of SRCs. Most of these studies employed randomized controlled trials – the ‘gold standard’ in evaluation – to gauge the impact of innovative experiments in SRCs. However, there remains a lack of information regarding recent efforts to implement SRCs in countries around the world. This study was conducted to compensate, at least in part, for this evidence gap. It reached out to 48 programme implementers, policy researchers, ministry of education staff members, and civil society and international organizations from 22 countries. They helped to identify 14 countries implementing or that have recently implemented SRCs.<sup>1</sup> It surveyed and/or interviewed<sup>2</sup> 20 individuals<sup>3</sup> familiar with SRC implementation in these 14 countries.<sup>4</sup>

Because the use of SRCs is still relatively new, many of the cases described in this report have not been rigorously evaluated, and the lessons learned rely predominantly on desk review findings and anecdotal evidence. However, a series of frameworks was created to compare the motivations, purposes, audiences, data sources, and contents of school report cards, and country cases were evaluated using an index of transparency and accountability. Through the use of these tools the authors hope to provide a systematic approach to understanding SRCs.

## Organization of the study

This report is organized into an Introduction and five chapters. *Chapter 1* provides a literature review of the theories and research studies that support the potential effectiveness of SRCs, as well as probable reasons for noted limitations. *Chapter 2* provides an overview of SRC studies in 14 countries

- 1 The study covered school report card implementation since 2006, although the majority of cases identified commenced implementation from 2010 onward.
- 2 Twenty individuals were interviewed, six of whom also filled out surveys. See Annex B for survey questions.
- 3 See Annex A for a list of interviewees who provided input to the country case studies.
- 4 The 14 countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Malawi, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, South Africa, Uganda, and the United States. Argentina and South Africa are not featured in the study as these two countries had just started or were about to start implementing school report cards.

(see *Figure I.1*), with a focus on comparison of their purposes, audiences, data sources, and contents. *Chapter 3* analyses the level of accountability and transparency reflected in different SRCs that employ an accountability and transparency index. It also presents SRC accountability approaches (*Table 3.2*) and explores country cases that have introduced anti-corruption elements into SRC design. *Chapter 4* discusses promising elements that appear to increase SRC effectiveness and explores similar issues that arise in multiple countries. The final chapter combines lessons learned from the literature review and the country case studies, and suggests a theory of change, as well as a checklist to guide future SRC implementation, with a focus on transparency and accountability issues.

**Figure I.1** Featured SRC programmes





# Chapter 1

## Literature review of school report cards

The recent literature offers mixed views and conflicting evidence regarding whether and how providing information via school report cards (SRCs) can help to transform the education system and bring about positive changes in school management and performance.

### 1.1 How may information lead to greater accountability?

There are three main channels through which information may lead to better accountability in education systems: the market, formal sanction or rewards, and public participation.

#### *The market*

SRCs can serve as a means to increase market competition by providing more adequate information about school performance. Market models of education are appearing in a variety of countries. For example, the Australian government subsidizes private school attendance based on the socioeconomic background of students. The subsidy covers 14 per cent to 80 per cent of the school costs, and is designed to increase school competition (Ryan and Watson, 2009). If parents and pupils can be viewed as ‘consumers’ of education services, then more information can help them make better informed decisions. With school choice as an enabling factor, information availability will create competition in the education marketplace, with schools competing for student enrolment and income by improving student learning outcomes (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos, 2011).

In the United States, Hastings and Weinstein (2008) discovered that providing information on student test scores to low-income parents enabled them to make informed school choices, which resulted in improved student test scores. Attending a school with test scores that average one standard

deviation higher led to improvement in students' own test scores by a standard deviation of 0.37 to 0.41.

In Pakistan, where both public and private schools compete for students at the village level, Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2014) discovered that test scores improved by a standard deviation of 0.11 when researchers provided report cards containing average test scores for all schools at the village level.

### *Formal sanctions or rewards*

SRCs can provide information that facilitates an education authority's decision to formally sanction or reward schools in a 'hard' accountability model. As Smith (2015) explains, 'the consequences in formal sanction/reward systems are explicit and enacted through formal channels'. More and more countries have linked school performance with financial rewards, technical assistance, or system-based punishment. For example, the federal government in Brazil provides additional resources to low-performing municipalities according to their average standardized test scores. In the Mexican state of Colima, low-performing schools receive a diagnosis of test results as well as assistance to develop school improvement plans. In the United States, low-performing schools in Virginia risk losing state accreditation and are required to adopt and implement school improvement plans. These practices are discussed in more detail in *Chapter 2*.

### *Public participation*

SRCs may lead to more public participation and therefore positive behaviour change by both the service provider and the consumer or the community at large. Instead of retaining a false perception of adequate school performance, information can provide more accurate evidence of school quality, becoming a 'motivator for action' for parents and the community (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos, 2011). Increased participation by parents and community members in the public monitoring of education services has the potential to change the behaviour of service providers. For example, an experiment in the health sector in Uganda showed that provision of a scorecard on the quality of health

facilities and encouragement of community-based monitoring in treatment villages improved healthcare quality significantly, with a corresponding drop in infant mortality of 33 per cent (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2009).

In the education sector in India, an impact evaluation in three states showed that community-level information campaigns on the roles and responsibilities of the public in school management led to an improvement in service delivery, with teacher attendance, for example, improving by 11 per cent in Uttar Pradesh (Pandey, Goyal, and Sundararaman, 2009).

Increased public participation not only helps to put pressure on service providers, such as teachers and schools, it also helps to coordinate efforts among all education stakeholders. Such coordination is important because education involves not only schools, but also parents and the community. Research indicates that improved communication and coordination results in a corresponding increase in the level of investment by all stakeholders to improve children's education.


In a year-long impact evaluation in Uganda, Barr *et al.* (2012) compared the effect of *participatory* SRCs with that of *standardized* report cards. They found that participatory SRCs – which allowed parents and communities to select indicators on school quality measures that they considered relevant – helped to reduce student and teacher absenteeism by 8.9 per cent and 13.2 per cent, respectively. They also increased pupil test scores by a standard deviation of approximately 0.19. Furthermore, a laboratory game conducted during the study shows that the participatory approach in SRC design seems to have changed group psychology, as members of the participatory model showed a higher tendency to contribute to the public good (see *Box 1.1*). This insight into personal preference in 'public good games' is important, as research shows a direct correlation between that preference and an individual's propensity to collaborate in participatory accountability systems (Barr, Packard, and Serra, 2014).

**Box 1.1 Laboratory game to test participants' willingness to contribute to the public good**

As part of an impact evaluation on the effectiveness of participatory SRC in Uganda conducted by Barr *et al.* (2012), a laboratory game was designed to test participants' propensity to contribute to the public good. Each of the 12 participants was responsible for either standardized or participatory school-level scorecards and were given the option to allocate a token to either a private or a group account. If allocated to the private account, the token returned a value of UGX 5,000 (approximately US\$2.50); if allocated to the group account, each token returned a value of UGX 1,000 to all participants. In other words, an individual's decision to contribute to the group account depended highly on his or her belief in others' willingness to contribute as well. The study found that members belonging to the participatory scorecard treatment group showed a higher tendency to contribute to the group account than those belonging to the standardized scorecard treatment group.

Source: Barr *et al.*, 2012.

**Figure 1.1 How school-level information can increase accountability in education systems**



Source: Adapted from Smith, 2015.

## **1.2 Potential reasons for limitations and unintended consequences of SRCs**

Although information has the potential to lead to positive behaviour change in communities and schools, this capacity has not necessarily been manifested in research experiments. For example, a study in India showed that providing the community with information on school quality and the role of local education committees elicited no change in parental behaviour (Banerjee *et al.*, 2010). In an impact evaluation in Kenya, researchers found that providing parents with information on pupils' performance in literacy and numeracy assessments and strategies for participation led to no significant change in private or collective action (Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai, 2013).

There are multiple reasons why the simple provision of information is not a simply remedy for improving accountability or school management and quality.

### *The free-rider problem*

As Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos (2011) note, one important characteristic of information is that 'once it has been created and disseminated, it can be used by all – and one person's use does not reduce another person's use'. Information presented in SRCs constitutes what economists call a 'public good' and is therefore subject to the free-rider problem (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2009). That is to say, because the information provided by an SRC cannot be harnessed by a single individual for his or her exclusive benefit, some stakeholders may choose not to contribute or participate in measures designed to make improvements to school practices based on this information, but still benefit from actions taken by those who do (Barr, Packard, and Serra, 2014). In addition, while report cards provide more systematic information on school management and student learning, parents may only care about their individual student's education and not about changing the broader school community (Levin, 1974).

### ***Lack of incentives***

Lack of incentives is often cited as a reason for the failure of the ‘information-for-accountability’ model. Even in cases where information is provided, if parents do not believe in the value of education, public access to information may not lead to any action (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos, 2011). According to the 2008 Kenya Afrobarometer survey, only 11 per cent of respondents thought community members had primary responsibility for managing schools (Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai, 2013). Smith and Rowland (2014) further note that voicing concerns can be a ‘costly’ exercise, as the time involved may otherwise be used for an economically productive activity, such as farming. In certain cases, community members simply accord improvements in education quality a lower priority than other competing issues (Banerjee *et al.*, 2010; Mizala and Urquiola, 2013). Hastings and Weinstein (2008) also note that even in situations where parents have the freedom to choose better-performing schools (e.g. the United States), the best predictor of whether parents actually exercise that right is proximity to those schools. ‘Parents choose schools to maximize utility, which is increasing in expected academic achievement but decreasing in time and travel costs, and ... even with transparent information, school choice can only be as effective as the options offered to parents’ (Hastings and Weinstein, 2008).

### ***Lack of capacity***

As Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai (2013) argue, even when citizens have the incentives to change education service delivery, they need to understand ‘whom to contact, what to say, and more generally, how the political and educational systems work and where they can most effectively apply pressure for improvements’. Otherwise the lack of capacity may become a ‘roadblock’ preventing them from taking action, or leading them to undertake actions that have no impact. During their impact evaluation of 550 households in 26 Kenyan villages, Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai (2013) found that 72 per cent of parents reported that they did not know what actions to take, or would not know which strategy to use to ascertain what actions to take, even once presented with their children’s test scores.

### *Lack of enabling environment (school autonomy and school choice)*

Lack of school autonomy may also explain why information provision alone leads to no change in school management. Namely, if schools and communities are not sufficiently involved in teacher hiring, resource allocation, or budgeting, little can be done – even when these stakeholders want to use information obtained from SRCs to drive changes in school practices (Smith, 2015). Conversely, lack of school choice also decreases the potential effectiveness of school-level information. If parents and students are not empowered to select better-performing schools based on the available information, the mere provision of SRCs will not lead to school improvement measures that are propelled by inter-school competition.

### *Inequality effect and ‘elite capture’*

Research indicates that provision of SRCs may result in unintended consequences if they are not carefully designed. For example, SRCs may exacerbate education inequality in cases where illiterate parents are unable to easily understand the information presented. Such situations result in ‘elite capture’ of information (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos, 2011). Instead of representing the voices of the community as a whole, more educated or politically powerful individuals may employ information to advance their own ends, sometimes to the detriment of others (Bruns, Filmer, and Patrinos, 2011). For example, in the United States, California’s school choice option<sup>5</sup> has led to more market control by private organizations under the pretext of representing parents’ voices in ‘firing’ ineffective schools. As Smith and Rowland (2014) discovered, organizations with special interests tend to possess more expertise and incentives to organize parent petitions for reforming or closing local schools. In particular, when parents lack the necessary information to make the best educational choice for their children, ‘the likelihood that their voices will be drowned out by interest groups rises’

5. Under California’s parent trigger law, when a local school is failing, the parents can ‘pull the trigger’. They do so by presenting a petition which must be signed by the majority of parents. They can then choose a future plan for the school from four options: the turnaround model, the restart model, school closure, and the transformation model.

(Smith and Rowland, 2014). For example, in one case where a majority of parents signed a petition for a school turnaround plan, it transpired that some did not necessarily understand the petition they had signed (*Los Angeles Times*, 2011).

### *Gaming the system*

Other potential negative consequences include attempts by schools' to 'game the system' when information on school performance is linked to a high-stakes school evaluation. Again, in the United States, some schools intentionally exclude low-performing students to appear more effective in state-wide assessments (Smith and Rowland, 2014).

## **1.3 Implementation matters**

Recent research has explored the effectiveness of supplying stakeholders with information as a means of improving education in various developing countries. The results have been mixed for a variety of reasons. Researchers have proposed a number of theories to explain the success or failure of SRCs. The study took this a step further by comparing the implementation strategy of the evaluation studies featured in the previous section. As can be seen in *Table 1.1*, the effectiveness of information campaigns cannot be easily generalized as each study varies in its specific design. It is worth noting, for example, that experiments which have shown positive results tend to combine the provision of information with community mobilization. Moreover, in participation models, some of the successful experiments target both the service provider and the community.

A review of existing literature shows mixed results from SRCs. On the one hand, information at the school level may stimulate change through multiple channels. In a market and school-choice-enabled environment, information puts pressure on schools to improve performance. With the presence of formal sanction and reward systems, information enables system administrators to manage schools according to their quality, again adding incentive for schools to improve. Furthermore, information can help parents



form a more accurate picture of their child's school and therefore participate in public monitoring of education services or better contribute to their children's education.

**Table 1.1 Comparison of the design of recent impact evaluations on information-for-accountability/school report cards**

Study	Positive results?	Stakeholder*	Strategy**	Model
<b>Pakistan</b> (Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja, 2014)	Yes	Single (parents only)	Information only	Market
<b>Uganda</b> (Barr <i>et al.</i> , 2012)	Yes	Multiple	Information + mobilization	Participation
<b>Uganda</b> (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2009)	Yes	Multiple	Information + mobilization	Participation
<b>India</b> (Pandey, Goyal, and Sundararaman, 2011)	Yes	Single (community members only)	Information + mobilization	Participation
<b>India</b> (Banerjee <i>et al.</i> , 2010)	No	Single (community members only)	Information + mobilization	Participation
<b>Kenya</b> (Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai, 2013)	No	Single (parent only)	Information only	Participation

Notes: \* Stakeholders may include service providers (teachers and schools), consumers (community members), and the government. This category examines whether the study addresses only single or multiple stakeholders in the education sector.

\*\* This category examines whether the study design only provides information or also involves community mobilization (e.g. involving community members in data collection and discussion, educating communities about their right to information).

On the other hand, as Lieberman, Posner, and Tsai (2013) note, the information-for-accountability model includes many assumptions and is subject to failure for a variety of reasons. The literature also reveals that parents in developing countries may lack the incentive or capacity to act on the information they receive. In addition, as noted earlier, report cards can also lead to unintended consequences such as elite capture or schools gaming the system.

## Chapter 2

# School report cards: Country overviews

Bearing in mind the potential of SRC information, as well as careful consideration of their limitations, the study examined a variety of SRC practices to establish whether research findings are reflected in implementation, and how recent country cases can better inform or complement research results. This chapter presents findings based on a detailed overview of the design and implementation of SRCs in different countries. Country cases are grouped by models – whether information is used within a formal sanction/reward system to increase accountability, or as a means to encourage social monitoring and participation to hold schools accountable.<sup>6</sup> These different examples provide important empirical evidence regarding the success or otherwise of the information-for-accountability approach in transforming the education development landscape. The actual name of SRCs may differ by country, as shown in the summary descriptions below.

### 2.1 Formal sanction or reward models

#### *Brazil: Basic Education Development Index (since 2007)*

In 2007, Brazil launched an important initiative under the Education Development Plan, a systematic measurement of education quality in schools in each municipality of the country. This initiative employed an indicator called the Basic Education Development Index (IDEB in Portuguese). The main aim of this effort was to hold schools accountable for student learning outcomes at the national level by setting benchmarks and creating a culture of assessment. In addition to serving as a yardstick for school quality, the IDEB also guides the education authority in making more informed decisions about resource allocation and technical assistance for schools.

6. The report does not discuss the use of information for school choice, as suitable cases for that model could not be identified.

### *Data source and content*

The IDEB is calculated for each school based on: (i) average student performance in a national, census-based test for Portuguese and Maths at Grades 4 and 8, combined with assessment data for Grade 11 students; and (ii) the average student promotion rate<sup>7</sup> from grade to grade, the repetition rate and the graduation rate. When combined, those indicators measure a school's education quality and its internal efficiency. The data are scaled as an index score from 1 to 10 with the levels aligned to PISA scores (OECD, 2011). Every two years, the federal government sets individual targets for schools based on a trajectory starting in 2005 and ending in 2021, with the aim of bringing each school in line with the average worldwide PISA score. Schools are also responsible for developing their own improvement plans in collaboration with their municipalities, which are then monitored at the state level (OECD, 2011).

### *Distribution*

Results from the IDEB are published for each school and then compared with peers in the same municipality and the national average. Each school is supposed to discuss an improvement strategy with parents and communities before additional resources are disbursed to help schools achieve their pre-identified targets (OECD, 2011).

### *Consequences*

The federal government links school performance with concrete consequences – the 1,000 lowest-performing municipalities receive extra resources, and the remaining low-performing municipalities receive technical support (Buchmann and Neri, 2008).

7. The promotion rate refers to the average promotion rate between grades, and is calculated by education level.

### **Box 2.1 IDESP in the state of Sao Paulo**

The state of Sao Paulo in Brazil has taken the IDEB a step further by creating its own state-wide assessment system and school report card, entitled the Education Development Index of the State of Sao Paulo (or IDESP in Portuguese). Created in 2007, the IDESP is calculated by combining a school's average performance on Sao Paulo's standardized tests and student promotion rates. Every school has an annual growth objective reflecting its starting point each year, as well as the socioeconomic status of its students. Teachers, school managers, parents, and communities monitor the school's progress towards this goal. School achievement is directly linked to employees' performance bonuses, with consideration given to a school's background. If a school reaches 100 per cent of the set target, its employees receive 100 per cent of the bonus. If it reaches 80 per cent of the target, employees receive 80 per cent. If a school does not attain its goal, its employees become ineligible for performance bonuses.

For more information, see: [www.educacao.sp.gov.br/noticias/servidor-entenda-as-metas-do-idesp-e-consulte-o-indice-de-sua-escola](http://www.educacao.sp.gov.br/noticias/servidor-entenda-as-metas-do-idesp-e-consulte-o-indice-de-sua-escola).

### *Colombia: School Excellence Report (since 2015)*

Colombia aspires to become the most educated country in the region by 2025, but faces a unique challenge in building accountability into its education system, as it is the only country in Latin America with no national curriculum by grade or subject.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, few accountability mechanisms exist to monitor the educational quality of individual schools. Since 2013, Colombia has worked to respond to the challenge, enhancing monitoring efforts by administering annual standardized tests for Grades 3, 5, and 9. School Excellence Reports were introduced in 2015 to provide better feedback to schools, to help create standards and goals, and to engage parents and communities in dialogue.


#### *Data source*

The School Excellence Report contains information on average performances in literacy and maths from national standardized learning assessments for

8. Decentralized curricula have been implemented in Colombia since 1994.

students in Grades 3, 5, and 9,<sup>9</sup> as well as average student promotion rates. Each school also receives a score for its combined performance against a number of indicators (namely: Progress, Performance, Efficiency and School Climate) on a scale of 1 to 10 (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1 One section of the Colombia School Excellence Report



Source: Horacio Alvarez, Inter-American Development Bank.

### Distribution

The results of School Excellence Reports are available online and published once a year in preparation for 'Day E'. The Ministry of Education has nominated 25 March as Day E, or a 'Day of Excellence',<sup>10</sup> when principals and teachers are encouraged to discuss their school's performance on the report and plans for school improvement. Activity kits are sent to public schools to provide technical guidance on information dissemination and

9. Census-based standardized exams have been implemented since 2013.

10. Activities during Day E are supposed to be mandatory among public schools, but the Ministry has not established formal procedures to enforce implementation.

discussion. To increase accountability, the Ministry encourages schools to coordinate with local education offices and to sign an 'Agreement of Excellence' listing their goals for the following year.

### *Consequences*

At present, the Agreement of Excellence does not include consequences for success or failure. However, the Ministry of Education has announced that, as of 2016, it will start rewarding schools financially based on the degree to which they meet their self-designated goals.<sup>11</sup>

### *Ghana: School Report Card (since 2011)*

Ghana first piloted its SRC programme in 2004–2005 with funding from the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Subsequent funding from the Ghana Partnership for Education Fund Grant,<sup>12</sup> led by the World Bank, has enabled the implementation of SRCs in 75 disadvantaged districts. While traditional EMIS school reports are intended to facilitate government planning of educational resources, the SRCs aim to present up-to-date school-level information in a more pictorial format to community members participating in school management through school performance appraisal meetings (SPAMs).

### *Data source and content*

Each school's head teacher fills out a SRC data capture form containing a series of questions. The results from each school are then forwarded to the district education office, which produces school reports in the form of tables and charts. The data collection process happens twice a year at the beginning of the first and third terms. The SRC covers enrolment, pupil performance, attendance, number of textbooks, and student learning outcomes. It also includes teacher attendance, receipt of grants, and number of school meetings

11. The financial incentive scheme has not yet been formalized into education law.

12. The grant plans to disburse a total of US\$75 million between October 2012 and October 2015, and aims to 'improve the planning, monitoring, and delivery of basic education services in deprived districts of the recipient's territory'. For more information, see: [www.worldbank.org/projects/P129381/ghana-education-all-gpef?lang=en](http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P129381/ghana-education-all-gpef?lang=en).

held by parent–teacher associations (PTAs) and school management committees (SMCs). Although Ghana’s SRCs contain student achievement data, it is noteworthy that the data come from assessments administered by teachers from individual schools. Since the assessments are not standardized, it is not possible to compare student achievement across schools or districts.

### *Distribution*

The head teacher is supposed to post the SRC results openly. However, at present the majority of SRCs are posted only on the wall of the head teacher’s office, which greatly limits access to this school-level data. In Ghana, each school is required to have a SPAM, which comprises community members who are responsible for monitoring school performance, participating in school management, and designing school improvement plans. SPAM members are supposed to use SRC results to guide the decision-making process and develop a school performance improvement plan (SPIP). However, the extent to which SPAM members incorporate the school-level information varies greatly by community, and depends on the will and capacity of each SPAM.

### *Consequences*

Submitting a SPIP is a prerequisite for schools to receive a capitation grant. District education officers also assess individual school performance against school’s preset plans, but as of autumn 2015 there were no consequences linked to school performance.


### *Guatemala: School Profile/Ficha Escolar (since 2013)*

To increase transparency on the performance of its education system, the Guatemala Ministry of Education launched an online portal entitled the National Education Systems Indicator (SNIE in Spanish), which provides updated information on a series of indicators on education quality and financing (see *Figure 2.2*). The school profile (*ficha escolar*) is an important component of the online information transparency system, and provides policy-makers, school staff, and the public with school-level information on



areas including student enrolment, school expenditure, and student learning outcomes. School profiles are designed to help guide education policy planning and raise public awareness about school quality.

Figure 2.2 Online portal of the National Education Systems Indicator



Source: SNIE website.

### Data source and content

School profiles contain a variety of indicators that present a holistic picture of operation, performance, and changes in the school across time.<sup>13</sup> The school-level information includes:

- general data including whether the school is public or private, is situated in an urban or rural area, and has a school board and a school governance structure;

13. For a sample school profile, see <http://estadistica.mineduc.gob.gt/fichaescolar/>.

- student enrolment numbers by grade and gender;
- efficiency indicators including promotion, retention, and completion rates by grade, gender, and year;
- bilingual education data such as whether the school is monolingual or bilingual, the main language of the community, and the ethnic composition of students and teachers;
- special education information including the number of students with special education needs and the amount of special education resources;
- standardized tests results on reading and maths;
- the number and positions of teaching and administrative staff;
- the school's resource allocation including the breakdown of financial allocations for each school programme as well as its intended beneficiaries.

### *Distribution*

School profiles are posted on the online portal where the information is available to the general public.

### *Consequences*

No concrete consequences for school performance have been established based on school profile information.

### *Mexico: School Report Card (since 2005)*

The Ministry of Education in Mexico openly states on its website that it is 'committed to transparency and accountability', that it considers the information parents have about schools to be 'fundamental to the participation of the educational community', and that it will 'contribute to improving the educational system'.<sup>14</sup> As part of its efforts to provide information on school quality, the Ministry has been administering and disseminating school performance data on nationwide standardized learning assessments for multiple grades in primary and secondary schools.

14. See the Ministry of Education's website for more details: [www.enlace.sep.gob.mx/content/ba/pages/estadisticas/](http://www.enlace.sep.gob.mx/content/ba/pages/estadisticas/).

### *Data source and content*

The content of Mexico's SRC comes from a nationwide standardized test called ENLACE, which covers Spanish, mathematics, and one other rotating subject. The Ministry sends schools their SRCs in a poster format that offers a visual representation of how the school fared in the assessment in recent years, as well as in comparison with the state and national averages. Furthermore, school directors and teachers can access the ENLACE website, where they can enter unique school codes to examine data on student performance in different sub-areas of the subject tests. Detailed information on student performance is available at both the classroom and school level. For example, student performance on the mathematics test includes a detailed analysis of questions answered correctly or incorrectly by a majority of students. The corresponding subject area is presented in a colour-coded visual format. This analysis helps teachers to make future pedagogical adjustments in a targeted way.

### *Distribution*

Schools are required to post the results of the ENLACE assessment at the entrance of the school building to ensure the information is readily available to the public. Every two months, school directors are required to host meetings with the 'school council of social participation' – an organization in each school consisting of parents, teachers, and former students – to discuss the ENLACE results. They are also required to host meetings with teachers and PTA members to discuss implementation of the school's improvement plans. Availability of information about school performance through the ENLACE results has empowered parents to demand higher-quality education from schools.

### *Consequences*

No punishment or rewards have been linked to school performance in Mexico.

**Box 2.2 Mexico's Special Programme for the Improvement of Educational Achievement (PAE) in the state of Colima (2009–2011)**

The Special Programme for the Improvement of Educational Achievement (Programa de Atención Específica para la Mejora del Logro Educativo) in the state of Colima, Mexico, takes transparency on school quality a step further. It aims to improve the education provided by low-performing schools through a 'supportive and collaborative environment' in which teachers and school directors are advised how to interpret the ENLACE results and make corresponding pedagogical adjustments (De Hoyos, Garcia-Moreno, and Patrinos, 2015).

According to school performance on the nationwide ENLACE standardized tests, the governor selected and published the names of 108 low-performing schools in the state. In the announcement, the governor emphasized that the government also shouldered responsibility for the poor performance. Each school was then assigned a 'pedagogical advisor' who trained teachers on how to interpret the ENLACE results and access the ENLACE website to understand detailed information regarding student performance on different questions of the subject tests.

Through the establishment of professional data networks, the schools were connected with best-performing schools in the same locality, and advised on how to develop school improvement plans. An evaluation study shows that the 'process of self-evaluation and analysis' in a 'shared-responsibility' model helped to improve test scores for low-performing schools. However, further implementation of school improvement plans and pedagogical interventions failed to correlate with improvements in student learning outcomes (De Hoyos, Garcia-Moreno, and Patrinos, 2015).

***Tanzania: PSLE School Ranking (since 2013)***

Education is one of the Government of Tanzania's priority areas under its 'Big Results Now' initiative, which emphasizes improving information transparency to increase accountability in public services. The demand for transparency in education data is further facilitated by the government's 'Open Data' initiative. In this framework, the government has published school-level primary and secondary leaving exam (PSLE) results to hold schools accountable for student performance since 2013. The government also set up national learning goals aimed at achieving passing rates for PSLEs of 60 per cent in 2013, 70 per cent in 2014, and 80 per cent in 2015.

**Table 2.1 Tanzania PSLE school ranking**

**PSLE 2014 school ranking**

Key: BAND 1 AVG 250 to 228, BAND 2: 227 to 206, BAND 3: 205 to 181, BAND 4: 180 to 156, BAND 5:155 to 131, BAND 6:130 to 106, BAND 7:105 to 81, BAND 8: 80 to 56, BAND 9:55 to 28, BAND 10:27 to 0

Centre name	District name	Region name	Clean candidates 2014	Number of students passed (A-C)	Average total marks (/250) 2014	Average total marks (/250) 2013	Change on average total marks from 2013	Band of school 2014	Band of school 2013	Rank of school 2014	Rank of school 2013
Twibhoki Primary School	Serengeti	Mara	33	33	234.7	208.3	26.4	1	2	1	29
Mugini English Medium Primary School	Magu	Mwanza	40	40	231.2	228.52	2.68	1	1	2	3
Peaceland English Medium School	Ukerewe	Mwanza	17	17	230.59	211.5	19.09	1	2	3	23
Alliance English Medium	Mwanza Ji	Mwanza	25	25	230.04	216.1	13.94	1	2	4	15
Kwema Modern Primary School	Kahama Mji	Shinyanga	50	50	229.38			1		5	
St Severine English Medium Primary School	Biharamulo	Kagera	53	53	227.43			2		6	
Rocken Hill Primary School	Kahama Mji	Shinyanga	58	58	227.03			2		7	
Tusiime Primary School	Ilala(M)	Dar es Salaam	168	168	225.37	230.01	-4.64	2	1	8	2
Imani Primary School	Moshi (V)	Kilimanjaro	29	29	223.34	218.75	4.59	2	2	9	12
Palikas Primary School	Kahama Mji	Shinyanga	19	19	222.47			2		10	

Source: National Examinations Council of Tanzania website.

### *Data source and content*

Tanzania ranks all public schools nationwide according to the average student score on the PSLEs. The ranking report presents each school's ranking nationwide, the number of students who have attended the exam versus the number that passed, and the average student score from the current and the previous year, as well as the school's ranking in the previous year. Schools are further divided into 10 colour-coded bands depending on the average student score (see *Table 2.1*). In addition to the school ranking report by average student score, a separate report ranks schools by the degree of improvement achieved since the previous year.

### *Distribution*

The school ranking is available online. The public can also look up specific schools and the performances of individual students.

### *Consequences*

No concrete consequences have been linked to school performance based on PSLE school rankings.

## ***United States: The Virginia School Report Card (since 1997)<sup>15</sup>***

In the United States, the state of Virginia provides transparent information on school quality and student achievement by posting SRCs online. The SRCs form part of two accountability programmes: state accreditation and a federal requirement.

To qualify for state accreditation, a school must meet state-mandated requirements in student achievement levels in English, history, mathematics, and science on state-wide assessments. High schools must meet additional minimum benchmarks for graduation and completion. Schools must also establish annual measurable objectives (AMOs) as required by the federal

15. The school report card has been used in Virginia since 1997 but has gone through various changes. This section focuses on the most recent version.

government under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA).<sup>16</sup> AMOs include proficiency targets in reading and maths for all students as well as student subgroups such as minority students, students with disabilities, and economically disadvantaged students, so that schools can focus on closing achievement gaps among these subgroups (Virginia Department of Education, 2014).

### *Data source and content*

Virginia School Report Cards provide information on:

- state accreditation results based on average student performance in English, mathematics, history, and science;
- the Proficiency Gap Dashboard for Federal Accountability, which indicates whether schools meet annual targets in student proficiency rates, for all students as well as student gap groups, in reading and maths;<sup>17</sup>
- student proficiency levels in other academic subjects such as writing and history;
- teacher qualification information including teachers' educational attainment and licensing;
- school safety indicators, which lists the number of offences by category (e.g. weapons offences, offences against student or staff, and property offences) for the last three years;
- overall student enrolment as well as enrolment in advanced programmes;
- student graduation information for high schools;
- schools performance against targets set by the federal government.

### *Distribution*

School report cards are made accessible to the public online.

16. ESEA has been known as No Child Left Behind since 2001.

17. Gap groups are traditionally underperforming students. Gap Group 1 are students with disabilities, English language learners, and economically disadvantaged students. Gap Group 2 are African-American students. Gap Group 3 are Hispanic students.

### Consequences

Schools that do not meet the minimum state requirement may risk losing state accreditation. Schools that are denied state accreditation are required to provide parents and other interested parties with ‘written notice of the school’s accreditation rating within 30 calendar days of the announcement of the rating’, as well as a copy of the school district’s proposed ‘corrective action plan’ describing steps to be taken to improve student learning outcomes (Virginia Department of Education, 2014).

**Table 2.2 A section of the Virginia School Report Card**

State accreditation results for all students								
Subject	Accreditation Benchmark	2012–2013		2013–2014		2014–2015		Met accreditation benchmark
		1 year	3 years	1 year	3 years	1 year	3 years	
English	75	95	97	91	95	91	92	Yes
Mathematics	70	91	96	90	93	92	91	Yes
History	70	95	97	98	97	99	98	Yes
Science	70	95	98	97	97	93	95	Yes

Source: Virginia Department of Education website.

Note: The table summarizes the data used in calculating the state accreditation status of the school and is reported for the ‘all students’ group. Yes = Met objectives based on current year results.

## 2.2 Public participation models

### *India: School Report Cards (since 2005)*

Since 2005, a civil society organization called Pratham has been heading citizen-led assessments on reading and literacy for children in India, the results of which are published through the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER). To further raise public awareness of the state of education quality in India, Pratham publishes school report cards, which combine learning



outcome results collected from communities and state-level performance<sup>18</sup> on key school indicators. ASER's annual report complements the official district report cards published through the District Information Systems of Education.<sup>19</sup>

### *Data source and content*

Data collection is accomplished through citizen-led, large-scale surveys organized by Pratham involving approximately 300,000 households in more than 15,000 villages. During the two-day survey, volunteers visit the public schools and record information on Right to Education<sup>20</sup> indicators, including student enrolment and attendance, teachers' appointment and attendance, school facilities, and government disbursement of school grants.<sup>21</sup>

### *Distribution*

School-level results are aggregated at the district and province levels and are available online. Pratham also presents the results through state-level presentations for audiences including government officials, civil society organizations, and international partner organizations. As data collection is conducted by and among community members, the process helps to raise citizen awareness of education quality.

### *Consequences*

No consequences have been linked with school performance.

18. Unlike other country cases featured in this report, Pratham does not publish school-level report cards. As specified later, however, data collection is undertaken at the school level by volunteers in the villages, and the process itself helps to educate the public about school-level education quality.
19. District-level data have been available since 1999 as part of the ongoing EMIS effort by the Government of India. For more information on DISE, visit: [www.dise.in](http://www.dise.in).
20. The RTE Act enacted in 2009 states that every child in India between the ages of 6 and 14 is entitled to free and compulsory elementary education. It sets requirements on student enrolment, teaching, and learning in schools.
21. SSA grants are the only form of school funding over which schools have autonomy.

### ***Indonesia: Community scorecards (since 2014)***

Education quality in rural areas of Indonesia is low compared with the rest of the country. Teacher absenteeism is especially rampant: the national average is about 10 per cent and may reach 20 per cent in rural areas. Monitoring teacher attendance has proven challenging for district governments due to geographic constraints, as well as the high cost of time and transportation. In 2010, the Indonesian government launched an initiative entitled the National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K) to find creative methods to coordinate the acceleration of poverty alleviation in different sectors. As part of the initiative, TNP2K is piloting a series of interventions among 31 villages in three districts to address the problem of teacher absenteeism in remote villages.

Community scorecards are one of those interventions. By establishing service agreements and enhancing public monitoring of teacher and school performances, TNP2K is hoping to increase teacher attendance and improve school quality with the mobilization of communities, schools, and teachers alike. The initiative planned to conduct the first phase of the pilot between 2014 and 2015, and then expand the pilot to 400 villages in six to nine districts.

#### *Data source and content*

To decide on the content of the community scorecard, extensive consultative meetings are held separately among teachers, community members, and student alumni of the targeted schools in order to identify key problems and needs from all stakeholders involved. The facilitators then organize interface meetings at the village level to share the inputs and facilitate discussions, after which a service agreement is established between teachers and community members. Community members are asked to establish five to eight indicators to gauge the performance of teachers and principals. Teacher attendance is a mandatory indicator because it addresses the issue of teacher absenteeism. Other indicators vary by community, and include whether teachers regularly assign students homework, whether they use corporal

punishment, and whether they visit absent students. Teachers in turn establish indicators to better solicit and guarantee parents' contribution to students' education<sup>22</sup> (see Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3 A service agreement between teachers and parents (with translation)



Teachers' inputs for parents in Ampas, Keerom
Not asking children to work
Not hitting children
Provide breakfast for children before going to school
Ensure children come to school on time
Ask children what they learned and whether or not they have homework

Source: Dewi Susanti, TNP2K.


After establishing the key indicators, the village forms a user committee<sup>23</sup> consisting of nine members including the school principal, teachers, representatives from the village council, youth leaders, parents, and other community members.

The user committee is tasked with monitoring and scoring each teacher and principal on a monthly basis. The monitoring methods vary by community and depend on the specific indicators chosen. For example, some user committees ensure at least one person is present at the school on a daily basis, and take turns accordingly. Other user committees monitor certain indicators such as corporal punishment by consulting students and parents who live close to the school.

22. Parent's performance is not monitored.

23. The standard of a user committee mirrors that of a school committee, which is recommended but seldom set up in rural communities.

Figure 2.4 Sample of community scorecard (with translation)



Source: Dewi Susanti, TNP2K.

For the teacher attendance indicator, TNP2K employs an innovative monitoring technique: teachers are required to report their attendance by submitting daily pictures with students and school facilities through a mobile phone application. The result is then shared with the user committee to determine the teacher’s attendance score.<sup>24</sup>

The example of a community score card shown in *Figure 2.4* shows the indicators chosen by a community and their corresponding maximum score. Each of the 5–8 indicators is given an assigned ‘weight’ with a total maximum score is 10. For example, if the indicator for teacher attendance has a total possible score of 2, communities may give a teacher a rating of 1.5.

24. Each school typically has three to four teachers with a maximum of 12 to 15.

### *Distribution*

Each user committee is charged with making a monthly public announcement about teacher and principal performances. They also post results in a public space to promote information transparency. At the district government level, the TNP2K task force submits monthly monitoring results to enable district governments to keep abreast of community perceptions of teacher and school quality.

### *Consequences*

TNP2K has encouraged district governments to link teacher salaries to attendance and performance in the future phases of the programme implementation.

### *Malawi: School Feedback Report in Dedza District (since 2012)*<sup>25</sup>

Recognizing that governments, schools, and communities often lack the information necessary for school planning and improvement, a development organization called Link Community Development International (Link)<sup>26</sup> has employed a participatory school monitoring and planning process entitled school performance review (SPR) in the Dedza district of Malawi. The programme aims to facilitate better decision-making for all education stakeholders by filling this information gap. SPR invites community members to become an integral part of the school planning and improvement process, helping them to realize their right and power to hold schools accountable and improve education quality. Open discussion and information-sharing have helped schools and communities form stronger connections.

25. SPR was first implemented in the Malangi District of Malawi from 2009 to 2012. Implementation in Dedza District started in 2012.

26. Link works to improve education services in five countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, South Africa, and Uganda. For more information, see: [www.lcdinternational.org/link-community-development-international](http://www.lcdinternational.org/link-community-development-international).

### *Data source and content*

In order to produce school report cards during the SPR process, the district education office selects 17 indicators, divided into four categories, which are then monitored by primary education advisors – individuals responsible for supporting primary schools in their assigned zones of the district – who act as data collectors. The four categories are:

- teaching and learning, which includes classroom environment and resources, lesson planning, teaching and learning processes, and classroom management;
- leadership and management, which includes financial management of the school, management of material resources, headmaster’s supervision of teaching and learning activities, and teacher development;
- school governance, which includes community management of the school, school–community relations, and community support for teaching and learning;
- child-friendly schools, which assesses inclusiveness, safety, health, and gender practices.

Data collection is undertaken by a group of two to four primary education advisors and head teachers, who conduct a day-long school visit to observe and rate school performance on the district-approved indicators, on a scale of one to four. At the end of the day, the group make recommendations for school improvement based on the findings, and sends the results to the district office, which in turn inputs the information on all 236 primary schools in the district into a central database.

### *Distribution*

Following monitoring, schools receive written feedback in the form of a report. This provides a detailed description of the rationale behind the assigned score for each of the 17 indicators for the school, as well as specific recommendations for future improvement (see *Table 2.3*). The district education office also produces school-specific graphics and encourages schools to display the information in a public space to help raise community awareness of the school’s performance.

## Consequences

The SPR is not linked to concrete consequences.

**Table 2.3** Sample of one section of the school feedback report

Indicator	Evaluation	Evidence to support evaluation
<i>Teaching and learning</i>		
1. Resources and physical classroom environment	<b>Achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Well-swept classrooms</li> <li>• Most learners seated at desks</li> <li>• Well-maintained chalkboards</li> <li>• No learning centres</li> </ul>
2. Lesson preparation and planning	<b>Not achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No lesson plan available in most classes</li> <li>• No evidence of thorough lesson preparation</li> <li>• Records are not kept up to date</li> </ul>
5. Assessment and record keeping	<b>Partially achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Learners are praised for correct answers</li> <li>• Marking of learners' written exercises</li> <li>• No promotion of homework</li> <li>• No attendance registers</li> </ul>
<b>Recommendations</b>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have all plans ready before each school day.</li> <li>• Update attendance registers.</li> <li>• Distribute the available books to learners.</li> <li>• Administer homework regularly.</li> </ul>

Source: Link Community Development Malawi, [www.lcdinternational.org](http://www.lcdinternational.org).

## *Nigeria: Citizen Report Card in the Niger Delta Region (2009–2011)*

The citizen report card initiative first started in the state of Delta, Nigeria, during 2009–2010, and was led by a civil society group called the Leadership Initiative for Transformation and Empowerment (LITE). LITE works to improve governance and human rights conditions and promote sustainable livelihoods in more than 200 communities in Delta and its neighbouring states. In 2010–2011,<sup>27</sup> LITE worked with 120 communities in all six states of the Niger Delta region to solicit the opinions of community members on

27. The first year of the project was funded by the United States Institute for Peace, while the second year was funded by the European Commission.

the delivery of health and education services. They created a citizen report card aimed at providing a channel for communities to voice their demand for good governance, draw the government's attention to particular issues, and create a call for action to effect policy changes. The use of report cards is a means by which government can better understand communities' demands for higher-quality education and health services.

### *Data source and content*

LITE trains field officers to conduct focus group interviews at the village level. In order to ensure participation from different community members, focus groups are divided by age and gender: young men, young women, older men, and older women. For the year 2012/2013, 470 focus group interviews were conducted among 9,000 participants from 120 communities in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria. The content of the survey was aggregated at the village level. In terms of education service provision, community members shared their perceptions of teacher quality and attendance, school inputs, and their view of who bears principal responsibility for educational improvements. Field officers also visited each school in the village to examine the conditions of teacher payment, pupil and teacher populations, and operating ratios. The opinions of community leaders were specifically solicited as these individuals play an important role in shaping public opinion and mobilizing communities.

### *Distribution*

Before publishing the results of the citizen report cards, field officers visited community members to share and validate the results and to obtain the agreement and authorization of community members. Once the reports were published, field officers held stakeholder meetings with government officials, the press, and community members. Participants reviewed the findings during the meetings and shared their conclusions. Local and state government officials attended meetings at different levels. Representatives from each county are invited to discuss results at state-level meetings, and are encouraged to make a statement about future actions to address highlighted issues.



### *Consequences*

The government did not link citizens' perception of education quality to specific consequences.

### *Pakistan: School Report Card in Punjab Province (since 2013)*

School report cards have been implemented for three years in Pakistan's most populous province, Punjab, as one component of the government-led education improvement project, the Punjab Education Sector Reform Program (PESRP). Under this programme, SRCs have been produced for each of the 54,000 public schools in all of the province's 36 districts. The SRC initiative is the province's first attempt to capitalize on the power of decentralized information to promote accountability at the local level.<sup>28</sup> The SRCs are designed to engage and empower the community by improving awareness of the quality of schools' resources and performance. The main audiences for the SRCs are stakeholders at the school level including head teachers, teachers, parents, and the community.

### *Data source and content*

The content of Punjab's SRCs is based on the province's central EMIS data. The Program Monitoring and Implementation Unit – Punjab's central monitoring department – sends out monitoring and evaluation assistants to schools to collect data on a monthly basis. The results are then fed into the SRC, which is produced on a semi-annual basis.

Punjab's SRCs provide a wealth of information with simple texts and straightforward graphics (see *Figure 2.5*). The information includes:

- student enrolment and attendance;
- the average passing rate on standardized leaving exams for students in Grades 5 and 8;

28. District-level report cards are also produced under PESRP with information available online. For more details, see: <http://pesrp.edu.pk/home#distranking>.

- teacher hiring;<sup>29</sup>
- school facilities including the availability of furniture, walls, toilets, electricity, and drinking water;
- school environment, which includes the condition of school buildings, student uniforms, school grounds, classrooms and latrines;
- school councils,<sup>30</sup> which includes the number of school council members and the number of school council meetings held;
- school financing, which includes the size of the non-salary budget<sup>31</sup> promised to each school versus the amount actually disbursed, as well as the amount ultimately spent by the school.

### *Distribution*


Distribution still presents a challenge for the government, which has advised schools to post the report card information in public spaces to raise community awareness about school quality and management.

### *Consequences*

The government has encountered difficulties in ensuring implementation of the policy among all schools, as there are at present no consequences linked to the regulation. To better enforce the accessibility of school report card data, the government has included ‘whether or not schools post information publicly’ as an indicator in the new monitoring process. Schools that do not post information receive a warning. Whether this ‘soft approach’ to enforcing implementation leads to actual change in school behaviours is yet to be seen.

29. The report card includes information on the number of teachers the school plans to hire versus the actual number of teachers hired.
30. In Punjab, the role of the school council includes hiring additional teachers, tracking student attendance, and advocating the right to education for out-of-school children. A school typically has 7–17 school council members comprised of head teachers, community members, and parents.
31. The non-salary budget of schools is supported by the World Bank to assist in hiring additional teachers or taking other measures to improve school conditions.

Figure 2.5 A Punjab school report card



Source: PESRP.

### Rwanda: Community Score Card (2013)

The Community Score Card (CSC) initiative was implemented by Transparency International Rwanda under the ‘Transparency and Accountability in the Management of Resources Allocated to the Nine Years Basic Education (9YBE)’ project. Starting in 2011, the project aimed to ‘increase transparency and accountability in the management of resources allocated to the 9YBE’, especially management of the capitation grant for school operations. To help achieve the project goal, CSC was implemented to increase community participation in school monitoring and evaluation, and to create a direct feedback mechanism between service providers and users to enhance accountability in the education system.<sup>32</sup> Deploying a

32. The scope of CSC implementation was rather limited, with implementation taking place in only 10 schools from 10 districts in five provinces across the whole country.

combination of social accountability tools, CSC enabled different stakeholder groups to evaluate school performance on a series of indicators and, after further discussions between service providers and users, elaborate school improvement plans.

#### *Data source and content*

9YBE divided the participants into four groups for each school – teachers, students, parents, and service providers – with at least eight members per group. Moderators then facilitated scoring exercises in each group, during which participants were asked to assess the effectiveness of schools based on a series of indicators.

The six groups of indicators were:

- infrastructure;
- teaching aids/materials;
- social welfare, including the provision of school lunches, student insurance, and teacher salaries;
- participation, including the role of teachers, students, parents, and service providers in student performance and school management;
- teaching system, including education system stability and the need for education policy review;
- capitation grant management and outcomes, which included:
  - effective use of capitation grants by service providers,
  - transparency in the usage of capitation grants,
  - level of fairness and promptness in reporting the number of pupils and teachers,
  - level of fairness in reporting on how schools use capitation grants,
  - level of involvement of teachers in the management of the school,
  - disbursement of funds from the capitation grants,
  - level of community satisfaction on their access to free education thanks to grant funds.

Following the scoring exercises, 9YBE established ‘input tracking matrices’ for each school, which compared the resources schools should have received (‘entitlement’) according to 9YBE, against their actual resources and operations. The matrix only included measurable indicators from the group assessments.

**Table 2.4 One section of the Input Tracking Matrix from Rwanda’s CSC**

District		Musanze					Remarks/ evidence
School		G.S. Muhoza II					
Community groups	Entitlement	Actual	Entitlement	Actual	Ratio		
A Infrastructure							
A.1	Classrooms	The school was supposed to have 34 classrooms.	The school has 36 classrooms.	34	36	105.9%	The primary classrooms are very old and are not cemented.
A.2	Toilets	There were expected to be 38 toilets.	They have 49 toilets available.	38	49	128.9%	Teachers’ toilets are missing, as teachers share with students.
A.3	Blackboards	As they have 36 classrooms, they were expected to have 72 blackboards	They have 58 blackboards	72	58	80.6%	The primary classes built before 2009 have only one blackboard.
A.4	Electricity	The school was expected to have electricity in all classes.	Electricity is available in only 22 classes out of 36.	36	22	61.1%	Within the 22 classes that have electricity some are missing bulbs.

Source: Transparency International Rwanda.

### *Distribution*

After groups of service users and providers scored the schools separately, the results were combined and discussed during an interface meeting. At the end of the meeting, participants devised roles and responsibilities for each

stakeholder group to enable each to better engage with education and contribute to the 9YBE programme. Participants were also expected to develop concrete action plans and commit to their implementation in the follow-up phases (Transparency International Rwanda, 2013). Transparency International Rwanda shouldered the responsibility for ensuring the broader community was made aware of the results from the evaluation.

### *Consequences*

No consequences have been linked with school performance to date.

### *Uganda: CVA Community Score Card (since 2008)*

Citizen Voice and Action (CVA) is a social accountability tool, developed by World Vision, that aims to engage citizens in the monitoring and improvement of public service delivery in the health and education sectors through collaborative, non-confrontational<sup>33</sup> dialogue sessions. Community scorecards are an important component of CVA's data collection and service-monitoring process. The CVA approach aims to enhance accountability in public service delivery and cultivate a sense of collective responsibility among community members and service providers. It does so by empowering community members to devise a set of indicators for school quality and rate the services according to these indicators.

The primary audience for community scorecards are parents, communities, and schools.

### *Data source and content*

In the participatory CVA model, both the data sources and content of community scorecards are decided by community members. With the assistance of World Vision, community members form working teams to host community-wide meetings involving all key stakeholders – head teachers, teachers, parents, and pupils – who then hold open discussions about education issues of importance to them. During the process,

33. For more details, see the CVA Field Guide: <https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B01TNkdJ61czblk1ZWhON2F0cWc/edit>.

communities develop indicators with visual cues for illiterate parents, vote on their level of satisfaction (indicated by smiling or sad faces), and create an action plan to address key issues hindering education quality in the community. As the content of the community scorecard is decided via a participatory approach, it varies according to the specific community. Common themes introduced by the communities include teacher attendance, provision of school lunch, and student absenteeism.

The working teams organize meetings each term. Since the members come from within the community, their proximity to the schools offers them ample opportunity to evaluate the quality of education service delivery on a regular basis.

### *Distribution*

The results of the community scorecards are recognized by all stakeholders, as the underlying indicators are devised and then rated by community members during the scorecard meetings. Governments are also informed of the community scorecard approach from the outset to ensure their buy-in. Once results from the community scorecard on the education sector are available, the working teams debrief the government before and during budget and policy planning sessions to enable the government to make tailored decisions regarding resource allocation and policy. According to the programme coordinator, however, the reactions of local governments vary. While some local governments view the input from community members as complementary to the formal school inspection process, others are less receptive and see constant feedback from the community as a threat to their authority.

### *Consequences*

Although local governments may make policy and resource-allocation decisions based on the scorecards, no formal consequences have been linked with school performance to date.

Table 2.5 School report cards by motivation, purpose, and audience

Country	Report card name	Motivation	Purpose	Audience
<i>Formal sanctions and rewards models</i>				
<b>Brazil</b>	Basic Education Development Index	Pressure from systematic learning assessment	Accountability for school performance	Schools
<b>Colombia</b>	School Excellence Report	Political initiative	Accountability for school performance	Governments, schools, and community
<b>Ghana</b>	School Report Card	Political initiative	Transparency on school performance and community participation in school management	Schools and communities
<b>Guatemala</b>	School Profiles	Political initiative	Transparency on school performance	Schools and the public
<b>Pakistan</b>	PESRP School Report Card	Decentralization process	Feedback from central level	Schools, parents, and communities
<b>Tanzania</b>	PSLE School-Level Report	Increase accountability under the 'Big Results Now' initiative and improve performance	Accountability for school performance	Schools
<b>Mexico</b>	School Report Card	Political initiative	Increase accountability and transparency to encourage parent participation and improve school quality	Schools and parents
<b>United States</b>	The Virginia School Report Card	Federal accountability and state accreditation requirement	Provide transparency on school progress for the public	Communities



Country	Report card name	Motivation	Purpose	Audience
<i>Public participation models</i>				
<b>India</b>	School Report Card	Local civil society organization (CSO) initiative	Community accountability	Government, CSOs, and communities
<b>Indonesia</b>	Community Score Card	Political initiative	Community monitoring for teacher attendance and quality	Communities, teachers and principals, and the government
<b>Malawi</b>	School Feedback Report	NGO-led effort	Facilitate school planning process	Initially, parents and schools
<b>Nigeria</b>	Citizen Report Card	Citizen advocacy effort	Bottom-up feedback and demand for public service	Government
<b>Rwanda</b>	Community Score Card	NGO-led effort	Create direct feedback mechanism between service providers and users	Communities, schools, and pupils
<b>Uganda</b>	CVA Community Score Card	Local demands and decentralization process	Increase social accountability through broader participation	Communities, schools, and pupils

Table 2.6 School report cards by data source, content, and distribution

Process	Name of SRC	Data sources	Content	Comparison	Publisher of SRC	Format of SRC
Top-down	Brazil – Basic Education Development Index	Census-based assessments	Learning outcomes	Standard and school with itself	Ministry of Education	Education index
	Colombia – Reporte de la Excelencia	Standardized tests, enrolment data	Promotion rate and learning outcomes	Standard and school with itself	Ministry of Education	School report
	Ghana – School Report Card	Head teacher survey results	Inputs, processes, and outputs	None	Ministry of Education	School report
	Guatemala – School Profiles	Enrolment, finance data, and standardized tests	Inputs, processes, and outputs	School with itself and other schools	Ministry of Education	School profile
	Pakistan – PESRP School Report Card	EMIS	Inputs, processes, and outputs	Standard and school with itself	Provincial government	School report
	Mexico – School Report Card	Standardized tests	Learning outcomes	School with itself and other schools	Ministry of Education	School report
	Tanzania – PSLE School-Level Report	Primary and Secondary Leaving Exam Results	Learning outcomes	Other schools and school with itself	Ministry of Education	School ranking
	USA – Virginia School Report Card	State-wide standard student learning assessments	Learning outcomes, inputs (teacher quality) and school safety indicators	Standard, school with itself, other schools	Virginia Department of Education	School report

Process	Name of SRC	Data sources	Content	Comparison	Publisher of SRC	Format of SRC
<b>Bottom-up</b>	India – Pratham School Report Card	Results of parent and community visits	Inputs and processes	Other schools	Pratham	State-level report
	Indonesia – Community Scorecard	Community monitoring and teacher self-reporting (by submitting photos via mobile phone)	Processes, parent satisfaction, and other community-devised indicators	Between teachers within one school	TNP2K/TNP2K and communities	Community scorecard
	Malawi – SPR School Feedback Report	School observation by school inspectors and head teachers	Inputs, processes, outputs, and parent satisfaction	Standard	LINK Malawi and communities	School feedback report
	Nigeria – Citizen Report Card	Survey and focus group discussions among community members	Inputs and processes	None	LITE Africa	Survey report
	Rwanda – Community Scorecard	Community scoring exercise and focus group discussions	Inputs and processes	Standard	Transparency International Rwanda	Scorecard
	Uganda – CVA Community Score Card	Community observation and perception	Participant decided – varies by community	Standard (decided by communities)	World Vision Uganda and communities	Scorecard

Note: Pakistan is the only country to use a top-down approach to encourage public participation. SRCs are generated at the central district government using EMIS data.

**Figure 2.6** Uganda CVA Community Score Card


SCORE CARD & VOTING SHEET		LOCATION	MUGOMU II GROUP				
GROUP INDICATORS	SYMBOL	SCORE	Very bad	Bad	Just OK	Good	Very good
Time Management			✓✓✓	○	○	○	○
Community Client's Status			✓✓✓	✓✓	✓✓	○	○
Health Workers Absentism			✓	✓	✓	○	○
STANDARD INDICATORS							
Quality of Staff			✓	✓	✓	○	○
Quality of Services			✓	✓	✓	○	○
Client Satisfaction of Services			✓	✓	✓	○	○

Source: World Vision Uganda (Sample of the community scorecard for health facilities).

### 2.3 Summary and comparison of key SRC design features


To better compare the similarities and differences of SRCs, this section summarizes their main design features (Tables 2.5 and 2.6) and further compares their content and types of comparison (Figures 2.7 and 2.8).

**Figure 2.7 Mapping school report cards by content**



Note: In the cases of Indonesia, Malawi, and Uganda, communities have the autonomy to design their own indicators to gauge school quality, which can potentially include all aspects of schooling.

**Figure 2.8 Mapping school report cards by comparison**



## Chapter 3

# School report cards: Level of accountability and transparency

The previous chapters examined the purpose, content, and distribution of school report cards in different contexts. This chapter focuses on the specific issue of accountability and transparency, and examines the question: Do all school report card models contribute to transparency and accountability in a country's local or national education system. And, if so, how? To answer these questions, the authors created an index of transparency and accountability, as it relates to school report cards, with the aim of identifying which elements of school-level information lead to accountability and transparency in the education system.

### 3.1 The accountability and transparency index

Before creating the accountability and transparency index, it was necessary to define the two concepts. According to Arcia *et al.* (2011), *accountability* refers to 'the acceptance of responsibility and being answerable for one's action'. Lewis and Pettersson (2009) define accountability as 'the act of holding public officials and service providers answerable for processes and outcomes, and imposing penalties if specified outputs and outcomes are not delivered'. Clear roles and responsibilities, as well as established rules and consequences, are key elements found in various definitions. In the context of school management, for example, accountability may include 'the act of compliance with the rules and regulations of school governance ... reporting to those with oversight authority over the school [and] linking rewards and sanctions to expected results' (Arcia *et al.*, 2011).

Multiple actors can typically hold schools accountable. The central government is one important monitoring agent, but it is also reasonable to

expect that local communities will exert pressure on service providers when information on performance is accessible (Figlio and Loeb, 2011).

Parents with children in school are not the only ones concerned with the improvement of school quality in the community. While parents usually care about school quality as far as it directly relates to their child's education attainment and progression, the intentions of community members who are not parents may be more altruistic. In particular, as potential future parents, community members may have a longer vision for the development of education in local schools than those with children already in the system. When acting together, parents and communities at large can exert significant pressure on service providers through demands for proper education service delivery.

*Transparency* on the other hand, involves 'clear and public disclosure of information, rules, plans, processes and actions by governments, companies, organizations and individuals. It is the principle that public affairs need to be conducted in the open' (Transparency International, 2011). In the education sector, transparency requires 'clear information that is easy to understand and simple to access by all stakeholders on all flows of educational resources' (Hallak and Poisson, 2007). Transparency and accountability appear to be interlinked, as the transparency of information may serve as an important means to achieving accountability. However, the disclosure of information – while valuable in and of itself – may or may not increase the accountability of the education system.

Bearing in mind these definitions of the two key terms, the study identified key components of SRCs which are directly linked to the concepts of accountability and transparency. It then examined the extent to which these elements are incorporated into SRCs developed through the formal system and the public participation model.

The study developed an index based on six indicators and mapped the 14 SRC country cases accordingly (*Table 3.1*). The first four indicators each examine a different aspect of SRCs to determine the extent to which they can be considered transparent. The first two examine whether results are

shared with the public and community (i.e. service users), as well as with the oversight authority (i.e. local or central education offices). Ideally, both sets of actors should be informed of school performance results, as both have the potential to exert pressure on service providers (i.e. schools) to hold them accountable for their performance. Because of the large number of illiterate parents in developing countries, the third and fourth indicators examine the extent to which SRC information is accessible in terms of presentation and distribution. The last two indicators are more directly related to accountability. They are used to explore whether SRCs help to further distribute roles and responsibilities between stakeholders in the education service, and whether schools face positive or negative consequences as a result of their performance.

### *What does the Transparency and Accountability Index show?*

The following analysis synthesizes the level of transparency and accountability of SRCs according to the six indicators developed in the index.

#### *Are SRC results shared with the public/community?*

Yes. In both formal systems and bottom-up approaches, SRC results are shared with the community or the general public. Interestingly, in the top-down approaches SRC results are usually shared online, while bottom-up SRCs are distributed during briefings or group meetings. The different channels through which SRC information is made available affect the amount of information that actually reaches the intended audience. For low-income groups, lack of access to the Internet, as well as lack of awareness of the existence of such information, may hinder access to online SRC databases. In addition, where information is available online, it is hard to establish the proportion of the target audience that receives the data. Conversely, group meetings – a common feature of bottom-up approaches – help to ensure that SRC data reach the intended audience by debriefing community members about the results.



*Are SRC results shared with the oversight authority?*

Yes. Oversight authorities act as organizers of SRC data collection and distribution for all top-down approaches. In addition, information must reach the education authorities in order to facilitate the decision-making process – a key objective of top-down SRCs. Among the bottom-up approaches, it is noteworthy that all country cases have tried to engage with government agencies, in part by sharing the SRC results with them. In Malawi, for example, SRC results are shared with the district education office to facilitate the official school appraisal cycle. In Uganda, SRC results are shared with the local education department, which enables consideration of school performance as part of the school budget planning and allocation process.

*Is the information presentation easily understandable?*

The comprehensibility of SRCs varies. Among top-down SRCs some governments (e.g. Colombia and Guatemala) present information online with visual cues and colour coding to facilitate interpretation of the information, while others produce SRCs comprising lengthy and complicated school indicator tables (e.g. Virginia in the United States), making it harder for the general public to understand the available information.

More innovative presentations of information are found among bottom-up SRCs. For example, the participatory nature of the Ugandan Community Scorecard allows community members to use vivid symbols to represent school indicators, as well as ‘smiling face’ scales to gauge school performance. Indonesia also enables community members to decide upon the indicators in the scorecards and make the presentation of information more relevant. However, not all bottom-up SRCs comprise easy-to-understand information, as this depends partly on the data collection process involved and the main target audience. In Malawi, for example, school principals and district education officers conduct the school visits and complete school feedback reports with technical recommendations for a set of school performance indicators. Because one of the main purposes of a school feedback report is to provide professional feedback and improvement plans for schools, the content is less accessible to the general public. However, the public is made aware of school performance during group meetings.

Table 3.1 Index for accountability and transparency in school report cards

Country	Are results shared with the public/ community?	Are results shared with the oversight authority?	Is the presentation of information easily understandable?	Is information actively discussed and distributed?	Are roles and responsibilities further established or clarified?	Are consequences established?
<i>Formal systems</i>						
<b>Brazil</b>	Y (Yes) – available online	Y	N (No)	Distributed to each school but not necessarily discussed	TBD	Y
<b>Colombia</b>	Y – available online	Y	Y (with symbols and colour coding)	Supposedly	Y	Y
<b>Ghana</b>	Y – partially (in the headmaster's office)	Y	N	Supposedly	Y	N
<b>Guatemala</b>	Y – available online	TBD	Y (with visualization and simple statements)	TBD	TBD	N
<b>Mexico</b>	Y – posted in public	TBD	Y (with visual cues)	N	N	N
<b>Pakistan</b>	Y – available online	Y	Y	Supposedly (through parent–teacher meetings) but not enforced	TBD	N
<b>Tanzania</b>	Y – available online	Y	The league table concept is easy, but requires literacy	TBD	TBD	N

Country	Are results shared with the public/community?	Are results shared with the oversight authority?	Is the presentation of information easily understandable?	Is information actively discussed and distributed?	Are roles and responsibilities further established or clarified?	Are consequences established?
<b>United States</b>	Y – available online	Y	N	TBD	N	Y
<i>Public participation models</i>						
<b>India</b>	Y – available online	Y	Not for illiterate parents	Y – with education authority and CSOs	Y	N
<b>Indonesia</b>	Y	Y	Y (through oral discussion)	Y (through oral discussion)	Y	Y (through service agreement)
<b>Malawi</b>	Y – during school appraisal meetings	Y	Y (through oral discussion)	Y	Y	Y
<b>Nigeria – Delta State</b>	Y – facilitators debrief the community	Y	Y (through oral discussion)	Y (in community meetings)	Y	N
<b>Rwanda</b>	Y – group discussions	Y	N	Y	Y	N
<b>Uganda</b>	Y – during community meetings	Y	Y (through a scale of smiling faces and other visual cues)	Y	Y	N

Note: TBD = to be decided. It applies to situations in which the study was unable to obtain information on certain aspects of SRC practices. For example, it proved impossible to evaluate the extent of discussion of the results of some top-down SRC cases.

*Is information actively discussed and distributed?*

The results of this indicator vary and depend largely on whether the SRC model is top-down or bottom-up. In almost all bottom-up approaches, information is made comprehensible through discussions, debates, and explanations, and is therefore more accessible to a wider audience. Most of the top-down approaches do not offer opportunities for further discussion of information. The exceptions are Colombia, Ghana, and Mexico. In Colombia, schools and teachers are encouraged to discuss their school's performance during a designated time known as Excellence Day. In Ghana, SRC results are employed as inputs for community members to make school management decisions during school performance appraisal meetings. In Mexico, school directors are required to share the SRC results every two months with members of the council of school participation and PTAs.

*Are roles and responsibilities further established and clarified?*

Since the clarification of roles and responsibilities is a prerequisite for accountability measures in education, the study examined whether SRCs further clarify the roles and responsibilities for each education stakeholder. As *Table 3.1* illustrates, the bottom-up approach shows the most potential for clarifying the types of contribution expected from each stakeholder. The more those stakeholders discuss the issues they encounter in terms of school performance, the more they voice their needs and demands. For example, pupils better understand the importance of arriving at school on time, and teachers better clarify the responsibility of parents to properly feed their children. In the case of top-down approaches, unless additional built-in structures exist to support and ensure the dissemination of SRC information, merely posting the information online limits the possibility of further clarification of roles and responsibilities.

*Are consequences established?*

For this indicator, top-down SRCs have a distinct advantage in terms of establishing real consequences to ensure that schools and other stakeholders change behaviours to improve education quality. This is not surprising given

that governments have both the authority to enforce certain regulations, and the financial resources to grant rewards or impose sanctions. In contrast, communities have less leverage to ensure participation and action from service providers or the government as they lack the same level of authority and resources. However, because bottom-up SRCs are implemented closest to education service providers, they have the advantage of more frequent and detailed school monitoring, and are able to exert greater social pressure than top-down SRCs.

**Figure 3.1 Level of accountability and transparency for SRCs in featured countries**



Note: Malawi is placed on the border between soft and hard accountability models because SRC information is used to decide on indicators for school improvement plans to be evaluated in the following year. However, there is no explicit link between performance and rewards or punishments. Pakistan borders the two transparency dimensions as discussion of SRC information is encouraged but not enforced.

### *The Accountability and Transparency Dimensions Chart*

Figure 3.1 further compares the level of transparency and accountability of the SRC country cases according to a four-dimensional scale. In terms of the

transparency index, it examines whether school-level information is posted, or is posted *and* further discussed. In terms of the accountability index, it assesses the presence of ‘soft accountability’ through clarification of roles and responsibilities or enhanced social monitoring, or ‘hard accountability’ through linking rewards and/or punishments to school results in different SRCs. There is no evidence to suggest that one dimension of accountability or transparency is necessarily better than the other, but the categorization helps to shed light on the different practices in SRCs, as well as overall trends among the 14 country cases.

Most of the countries have yet to establish ‘hard accountability’ models, as they have not linked school performance with concrete actions to provide technical assistance to reward or punish schools. Most of the bottom-up country cases do post *and* discuss information in SRCs, whereas the majority of top-down SRCs post information publicly without necessarily ensuring the general public’s comprehension.

### **3.2 School report card practices for accountability and transparency**

In terms of data presentation and accessibility, it seems the most promising models are those in which the results of school report cards are openly communicated and discussed during community gatherings with multiple stakeholders. In-person meetings help illiterate parents better understand school performance, and the participatory nature of the community gathering format further helps establish roles and responsibilities more directly in the presence of all stakeholders at one time.

In Malawi, for example, after handing out the reports to schools, a school appraisal meeting is held with the participation of community members, head teachers, SMC members, village leaders, and students. During this meeting, the head teacher presents the findings of the school feedback report and then opens up the meeting for a discussion to enable community members to ask questions on related issues.

In the case of Uganda’s Citizen Voice and Action initiative, stakeholders – including parents and teachers – are able to better understand their role in

contributing to children's education as they participate as equals in a discussion of school performance based on a set of indicators determined by themselves. For example, when teacher absenteeism is raised as an issue, teachers feel a greater sense of responsibility because they are directly monitored by the community. At the same time, parents better understand that although tuition is free under the Free Primary Education Act, they are still expected to pay for pupils' books and stationery.<sup>34</sup>

While not all countries have measures in place to ensure data accessibility specifically for parents and the local community, all countries provide data to the local or central education authority. It appears that accessibility of information varies and depends on the distribution process, as well as the high-stakes or low-stakes nature of the regulation. For example, in Colombia and Pakistan, although schools are encouraged to display results in a public space, the lack of formal regulations or sanctions established by the central authority means that schools do not necessarily follow this recommendation. School leaders either assume that the public lacks the capacity to understand the information, or regard public accessibility to information as a threat to their position. Interestingly, in Colombia, private schools are said to more actively undertake the school performance review process recommended by the government, as the resulting increase in enrolments provides an incentive to improve school quality.

In terms of the accountability indicators, most of the country practices in SRCs have yet to establish effective mechanisms to further clarify roles and responsibilities for each stakeholder. Additionally, most countries continue to struggle with both the provision of information and linking school performance with clear consequences in terms of rewards and punishment.

*Table 3.2* further analyses school practices in terms of accountability by presenting the similarities and differences in accountability measures built into SRCs in the 14 countries, according to four dimensions developed below.

34. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a lot of Ugandan parents misinterpret the Free Primary Education Act and do not pay for textbooks or stationery. In such cases, pupils have to attend classes without adequate learning materials.

**Table 3.2 Further analysis of accountability approaches**

Country	Type of accountability	Level of accountability	Who is/are held accountable	Corruption	Consequences
<b>Brazil</b>	Pedagogical	National authority	Schools	NA	Technical and/or financial assistance to low-performing schools
<b>Colombia</b>	Pedagogical	National authority	Schools	NA	Financial rewards starting in 2016
<b>Ghana</b>	Pedagogical, management, and financial	National authority	Schools	Resource contributions to the schools	SRCs are a prerequisite for school capitation grants
<b>Guatemala</b>	Pedagogical and financial	National authority	Schools	School financial allocation	None
<b>Mexico</b>	Pedagogical	National authority	Schools	NA	None
<b>Tanzania</b>	Pedagogical	National authority	Schools	NA	None
<b>USA – Virginia</b>	Pedagogical	State authority	Schools	NA	Potential loss of accreditation and students
<b>India</b>	Pedagogical and financial	School	Schools and districts	Disbursement of school grant	None
<b>Indonesia</b>	Pedagogical and financial	School and local/district authority	School principals, teachers and parents; the local government	Teacher attendance, management of school operational fund, and disbursement of World Bank funds	District governments are encouraged to link teacher pay with teacher performance



Country	Type of accountability	Level of accountability	Who is/are held accountable	Corruption	Consequences
<b>Malawi – Dedza District</b>	Pedagogical, financial, and management	Local authority and school	Schools managers, head teachers, teachers, and communities	Financial management of the schools	Evaluation (but no tangible consequences)
<b>Nigeria – Delta Region</b>	Pedagogical and financial	School	Schools, teachers, and the local government	Teacher attendance	Officials are encouraged to make formal statements about school improvement (but no tangible consequences)
<b>Pakistan – Punjab Province</b>	Pedagogical, financial, and management	Local authority	Schools, school councils, and donor	Disbursement of school non-budgetary budget	None
<b>Rwanda</b>	Pedagogical, financial, and management	School	Ministry of Education, schools managers, parents, teachers, and students	Use of funds from capitation grants	None
<b>Uganda</b>	Pedagogical and Management	School and local authority	Head teachers, teachers, parents, and pupils	Teacher attendance	Potential budget adjustment based on performance

Hallak and Poisson (2007) state that ‘a workable, defensible accountability system requires the involvement of different stakeholders and a clear specification of who is accountable, to whom, for what and with what consequences’. On this basis of this definition of an effective accountability system, the accountability models are further categorized and described in line with the following dimensions:

- *Types of accountability emphasized in the SRCs based on their content.* The major types of accountability models found among the SRC cases include pedagogical accountability, financial accountability, and management accountability.
- *The level (of education stakeholders) at which accountability is ‘generated’.* In other words, who is responsible for initiating and implementing SRCs in terms of data collection, SRC distribution, and potentially imposing consequences.
- *The stakeholders held accountable according to the content of SRCs.* If an SRC focuses only on the performance of a school, then schools are held accountable. If an SRC also examines financial distribution by district governments, for example, then district governments are also held accountable.
- *Whether consequences are established as an integral part of the accountability model,* and if so, the nature of those consequences.

The findings of the analysis on approaches to accountability in SRCs in different countries are summarized in *Table 3.2*.

### 3.3 What do the accountability approaches reveal?

#### *Combination of models*

The SRC cases in the 14 countries featured in this report present many combinations of accountability models:

- *Pedagogical:* Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Tanzania, and USA-Virginia;
- *Pedagogical and financial:* Guatemala, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria-Delta Region;
- *Pedagogical and management:* Uganda;

- *Pedagogical, financial, and management:* Ghana, Malawi-Dedza District, Pakistan-Punjab Province, and Rwanda.

Pedagogical accountability is created when SRCs include data on student learning outcomes. As Hallak and Poisson (2007) note, education systems generally 'are held responsible for the quality of their products, namely students' knowledge, skills, behaviours and performance'. It is not surprising therefore that all the SRCs in this report focus either solely or partly on student learning outcomes in individual schools.

Financial accountability and management accountability are emphasized in countries where schools are held accountable for the correct use of their finances and effective management. In terms of financial accountability, the SRCs featured in this report focus mainly on the disbursement of school funds from central or local education authorities. For example, in Rwanda, the Ministry of Education is held accountable for the timely disbursement of capitation grants. In Nigeria, the local and central authorities are also held accountable for the provision of *free* primary education. In India, the government is held accountable for the disbursement of school grants.

Schools themselves can be also held accountable for the operation and allocation of school funds. For example, the Guatemala SRC reports the resource allocation of schools for each school programme, as well as the intended beneficiaries. In Indonesia, some teachers are demanding transparency in school operation funds from school headmasters through the SRC process. In Rwanda, the SRC assesses the effective use of capitation grants by schools, the transparency of usage, and the level of satisfaction among the community with regard to free access to education as a result of the grant.

Malawi's SRC presents a more comprehensive financial accountability model, as schools are held accountable for keeping up-to-date financial records and making financial documentation transparent and accessible. School management committees are held accountable for monitoring school expenditure. *Table 3.3* presents the financial section of a school feedback report.

**Table 3.3 The financial section of Malawi’s SRC**

6. Planning and organization	<b>Partially achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Availability of School Improvement Plan</li> <li>• School records kept on school premises and are easily accessible</li> <li>• No minutes of staff meetings</li> <li>• School records not updated</li> </ul>
7. Financial management	<b>Partially achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SMC monitors expenditures</li> <li>• The school has a cashbook</li> <li>• Little transparency in financial matters</li> <li>• No recruitment of auxiliary teachers, though there is a need</li> </ul>

Source: Link Community Development Malawi, [www.lcdinternational.org](http://www.lcdinternational.org).

The Malawi school feedback report also provides an example of a comprehensive management accountability model. Head teachers are held accountable for the supervision of teaching and learning, staff deployment and development, and the monitoring of staff attendance and punctuality. SMCs are also held accountable for the regular reporting of school matters to parents and the monitoring of financial expenditure.

In Pakistan, schools are held accountable for teacher hiring, as the SRC checks the number of teachers schools plan to hire versus the actual number of teachers hired. The SRC also holds school council members accountable for the number of meetings they hold. Ghana’s SRC holds community members accountable by checking the frequency of PTA meetings. In Rwanda, the SRC reports the level of involvement in school management of all education stakeholders, including teachers, parents, and pupils. Service providers including head teachers and local education authorities are also held accountable for school visits and contributions to school management. In Uganda, the working team debriefs the government about findings from community-generated SRCs, so as to facilitate the budgeting and policy planning session. This practice also increases government accountability for more reasonable budget allocations, as it provides more evidence for decision-making.

### *Primary actors*

According to the analysis of SRCs presented here, the primary actors held accountable are schools (including principals and teachers). However, in a number of cases local and central education authorities may also be held accountable. In Indonesia, for example, TNP2K encourages local governments to link teacher performance with teacher pay, thus making them potentially accountable for facilitating the hiring of qualified teachers. In Nigeria, LITE shares community perception survey results with local government agencies and encourages them to make formal statements about school improvement plans, thereby holding them accountable. In Rwanda, the Ministry of Education is accountable for the allocation of capitation grants. In Pakistan, the SRC reports the disbursement of non-salary financial resources for which it receives funding, thereby holding the donor (the World Bank) accountable.

In Uganda and Rwanda, accountability also extends to students in terms of participation in school management, regular school attendance, and (in Uganda) fulfilling their duties as pupils. These SRC practices recognize that student behaviour is an essential determinant of school performance, and provide the means for pupils to participate in the discussion and management of school matters.

### *Consequences*

The majority of countries studied in this report have not linked SRC results with concrete actions. The exceptions are Brazil, Colombia, Ghana, and the United States. Countries that implement 'soft' consequences are Indonesia, Malawi, Mexico, Nigeria, and Uganda.

The Brazilian government has linked financial rewards and technical assistance with school results through IDEB, providing the 1,000 lowest-performing municipalities with extra resources and the remaining low-performing municipalities with technical support. The Colombia Ministry of Education has also started linking financial rewards with school performance in its school excellence report. To further hold schools

accountable, the Ministry encourages schools to sign an ‘agreement to excellence’ action plan in coordination with local education offices following discussion among teachers and school staff. In the state of Virginia, the federal government requires schools to develop an improvement plan if they do not meet the minimum pass rate for one or more student subgroups. Schools that do not meet state accreditation standards are also subject to academic reviews and are required to submit a school improvement plan. In Ghana, preparation and availability of the SRC is a prerequisite for schools to receive a school capitation grant.

Among the bottom-up approaches, Malawi links the results of the school feedback report to school planning, with stakeholders deciding together on six priorities for the school improvement plan,<sup>35</sup> which is then evaluated the following year in the school performance review process. In Nigeria, the Citizen Report Card process involves government officials in the release of citizen scorecards, by encouraging them to make formal statements about their plans to improve public service delivery. In Indonesia, the TNP2K taskforce works closely with communities and district governments, with a view to encouraging governments to link teacher pay to teacher performance as scored by community members.

Consequences in accountability models serve an important function by providing direct incentives for education service providers to improve their services. However, such consequences may not necessarily lead to improvement, for example, if schools do not have access to the necessary expertise or resources. Conversely, schools may not necessarily require hard consequences to change their behaviours. In the state of Colima in Mexico, SRC practice focuses on providing professional assistance in the interpretation of student learning assessment results in the SRC, as well as guiding teachers through the pedagogical adjustments needed in accordance with the results. Research shows that these efforts alone help to improve school performance in terms of learning outcomes (de Hoyos, Garcia-Moreno, and Patrinos, 2015). Examples in Uganda and Malawi also show that greater community

35. Each school is supposed to develop a school improvement plan on an annual basis. The government provides basic guidelines, such as stipulating that schools ensure access, equity, quality, relevance, resources, etc.

involvement and increased pressure generated through public monitoring have the potential to improve schools.

### **3.4 The anti-corruption element of school report cards**

This section examines the potential for SRCs to assist in the fight against corrupt practices in school management. Hallak and Poisson (2007) define corruption in the education sector as the ‘systematic use of public office for private benefit, whose impact is significant on the availability and quality of educational goods and services, and, has a consequence on access, quality or equity in education’. Corruption is still rampant in education services in many developing countries. Transparency International notes that education is especially prone to corruption as the sector usually accounts for at least 30 per cent of a country’s national budget.<sup>36</sup>

To gauge the extent of corruption in the education sector for each country, the study referenced data from Transparency International’s largest public opinion survey, the Global Corruption Barometer 2013. This survey asked more than 114,000 people from 107 countries for their view on corruption in public sectors. *Figure 3.2* presents the data for most of the countries in this report and shows the percentage of respondents who perceived education as ‘corrupt or extremely corrupt’.<sup>37</sup> As can be seen, there is great variance by country. For example, while only 4 per cent of respondents in Rwanda perceived the education sector as corrupt, this figure rose to more than 70 per cent in Malawi and Tanzania.


In the countries reviewed for this study, SRCs are not used as an explicit anti-corruption tool. However, in a few cases it was possible to gain some insight into how countries may be using SRCs to enhance the integrity of the education process and decrease corruption in their education systems. According to Hallak and Poisson (2007), education planning and management presents a series of ‘major opportunities for corruption’, including finance, school construction, teacher behaviour, information

36. See [www.transparency.org/topic/detail/education](http://www.transparency.org/topic/detail/education).

37. Out of the 14 countries featured in this report, only Guatemala is not included in the Global Corruption Barometer.

systems, examinations, and the awarding of diplomas. The study identified SRC practices that demonstrate promising ways of combating corruption in three areas: finance, teacher behaviour, and information systems.

**Figure 3.2 Public perception of education corruption by country**



Source: Global Corruption Barometer 2013, Transparency International.

### *SRC practices to identify and prevent corruption in finance*

Corruption in school finance can occur at different levels. Education authorities may fail to disburse funding to schools adequately or in a timely manner, and schools in turn may not allocate the financial resources to the intended areas. School finance also consists of wage items and non-wage items. While corruption in wage items would elicit direct complaints from teachers, corruption in non-wage items can sometimes go unnoticed. 'Although schools typically know that they are entitled to some funding, school communities neither know exactly what they are entitled to receive, nor can accurately estimate the value of the in-kind support they get, since the resources reaching them are predominantly in-kind, without any



indication of monetary values' (Hallak and Poisson, 2007). Embezzlement of school operational funds has significant consequences, including delayed teacher payments, extra school fees for parents, and reduced funding to schools.

The countries featured in the report have deployed a variety of techniques in their SRC practices to prevent corruption at various levels. To identify and prevent funding leakages from the central level to schools, several SRCs have publicly posted information on the amount of funding schools are supposed to receive in comparison with the amount they actually receive. For example, India's Pratham SRC lists the number and percentage of schools that receive school improvement grants from the Indian government. The schools are entitled to three types of school improvement grant: a school maintenance grant for minor repairs and infrastructure maintenance, a school development grant for purchasing school and office equipment, and a teacher learning material grant (see *Table 3.4*). According to the SRC results, in 2013/2014, 4 per cent to 6 per cent of schools were unaware of the existence of these grants or whether they received them. In the Punjab Province of Pakistan, the SRC also holds one of their donors, the World Bank, accountable by including information on the disbursement and usage of the related non-salary budget for each school.

In Nigeria, the citizen report card verifies outcomes resulting from the disbursement of school funds by surveying parents about whether they pay for education. Under Nigerian education law, primary education is supposed to be free, with funding from the federal, state, and local government level.

In addition, several SRCs have worked to hold schools accountable for the proper allocation of resources, by making the usage and outcome of school funds more transparent. Guatemala's school profile lists the amount of school funding for specific school programmes, as well as the intended beneficiaries. Rwanda's community scorecard further examines the effective use of the capitation grant by including teachers' and parents' perception of funding outcomes, including the availability of qualified teachers and the community's degree of satisfaction with the level of access to free education.

**Table 3.4 School financing table of Pratham’s school report card, 2014**

SSA school grants	% Schools that report receiving SSA grants – full financial year							
	April 2011 to March 2012				April 2013 to March 2014			
	Number of schools	% schools			Number of schools	% schools		
Yes		No	Don't know	Yes		No	Don't know	
Maintenance grant	14 305	86.5	7.4	6.2	14 953	79.6	15.1	5.3
Development grant	14 165	79.0	13.9	7.1	14 870	67.5	26.0	6.5
Teacher learning material grant	14 319	89.1	6.7	4.2	14 685	17.8	78.0	4.3

Source: Pratham.


### *SRC practices to identify and prevent corruption in teacher behaviour*

Teacher absenteeism is perceived as a form of corruption, as teachers are not performing the duties for which they are paid. Teacher absenteeism also has direct consequences on student attendance and learning outcomes. One study found that ‘a 10 per cent increase in teacher absence is associated with a 1.8 per cent decrease in student attendance; and that a 20 per cent decrease in teacher attendance is associated with a 2 per cent decrease in test scores’ (Kremer *et al.*, 2005).

Some country cases highlighted promising ways of combating teacher absenteeism. For example, Indonesia’s SRC model addresses teacher absenteeism from multiple angles: it enhances the tracking of teacher attendance through self-reporting and social monitoring, works to change community perception regarding teacher behaviours, and encourages consequences linked to teacher behaviours. To enhance the monitoring of teacher attendance, Indonesia employs an innovative Android app, which requires each teacher to submit a photo of themselves at school on a daily

basis. The attendance record for each teacher is reported to the user committee and the district education office, and published to the entire village to enhance transparency in teacher behaviour. To further increase social pressure on teachers, members of the user committee monitor teacher attendance on a monthly basis. In order to overcome the traditional belief that teachers are authoritative figures that should not be challenged by communities, the taskforce also discloses the amount of allowances teachers receive in remote villages, so that community members feel more compelled to hold well-paid teachers accountable.

Figure 3.3 Android app for tracking teacher attendance in Indonesia



Source: Dewi Susanti, TNP2K.

### *SRC practices to identify and prevent corruption in information systems*

Another issue some SRCs intentionally address during the data collection process is corruption in information systems. According to Hallak and Poisson (2007), a notable form of malpractice in school management is the 'manipulation of school data, especially by the head teacher, in order to obtain more funds or special allowances'. When certain aspects of school-level information are linked with funding or punishment, school principals may have an incentive to either dishonestly report information, or collude with

data inspectors to fabricate information. For example, school enrolment numbers are often associated with funding, which can entice school principals to over-report these figures. SRC programmes can work to prevent this practice by making improvements to the design of the data reporting and inspection system.

Some countries have implemented processes specifically aimed at increasing data integrity and preventing corruption. In Pakistan, school inspectors rotate the schools they inspect each month to decrease the likelihood of collusion-based corruption. The school inspection date is also assigned randomly to help ensure that school observation data more closely reflects reality. In Malawi, data collectors dispatched to conduct school observations for school feedback reports also verify the accuracy of the enrolment information self-reported by schools. These innovative yet discreet elements of the school report card process offer interesting lessons on how deliberate consideration of corruption issues in education systems can lead to a better designed and more effective SRC system.

## Chapter 4

# Promising models and prevalent issues from country cases

This chapter focuses on two questions: What measures or elements of SRCs show particular promise for mobilizing communities or holding schools accountable? And what problems typically emerge in the implementation of SRCs and are worthy of special attention and discussion? Since none of the countries studied have been externally evaluated, the following discussion is based primarily on insights drawn from interviews or surveys with programme implementers and policy researchers.

### 4.1 Promising country models and elements for transparency and accountability

#### *Promising country models for transparency and accountability*

The 14 country cases featured in this report highlight a number of promising approaches for promoting transparency and accountability in education systems. In terms of transparency, the Uganda SRC provides a participatory model that allows indicators to be widely understood by the community. The SRC processes in Indonesia, Malawi, and Uganda incorporate all aspects of education (inputs, processes, and education outcomes), thereby expanding the wealth of available school-level information. In Malawi and Mexico, peers or pedagogical advisors provide technical assistance, demonstrating ways to make information *meaningful*, thereby enabling service providers to improve school practices.

SRC practices in Ghana, Malawi, Pakistan, and Rwanda incorporate pedagogical, financial and management aspects of accountability. Rwanda, in particular, features a promising outcome-based financial accountability

model that examines not only disbursements, but also the perceived effectiveness of school grants. Indonesia's innovative use of technology for reporting teacher attendance, combined with established monitoring systems in communities, also shows strong potential for promoting positive behavioural changes from service providers. Pakistan has also made significant efforts to prevent corruption in data collection and reporting, by randomizing both data collectors and inspection dates.

### *Promising elements for transparency and accountability*

#### *Inclusive and participatory approaches provide a true sense of ownership*

If implemented well, SRCs serve as a unique channel to encourage education stakeholders to make more informed decisions based on school-level data. To ensure the 'buy-in' of service providers and 'consumers', it is essential to ensure their participation throughout the entire SRC production and distribution process. For example, the SRC approach in Uganda creates a sense of ownership among community members, who feel they 'own' the entire school performance review process and possess decision-making power regarding which indicators will be used to gauge school quality. In the Malawi case study, community members developed a better sense of ownership and realized their right to information, as well as their power to realize positive change, through their engagement in the school planning process during school appraisal meetings with schools and educators.<sup>38</sup>

Inclusiveness is also vital to ensuring true participation. Small focus group discussions ensure the participation of community members whose voices may otherwise not be represented in a larger group discussion. In the Nigerian community scorecard case, the facilitator conducts focus group interviews in four groups, so that young men, young women, elder men, and elder women all have a say in rating the quality of public service delivery. In the Ugandan model, it is noteworthy that the inclusion of pupils helps to provide a more rounded perspective of actual performance in schools and

38. As interview results by Link Malawi show, community members demonstrate a better understanding of school quality issues and possess more knowledge regarding how they can better contribute to their children's education.

classrooms, as certain issues in the education process will be apparent only to learners.<sup>39</sup>

Buy-in from the government is also central to the success of SRC approaches, especially when school-level data feeds into school planning and budgeting processes. Malawi provides an example of an approach that involves government from the outset. The indicators in the school performance review are set by the district education office, which then uses the information from school-level data to guide school improvement plans. Once school-level results have been distributed, LINK produces reports on the whole district with the inclusion of good school practices for other schools to emulate. District meetings are held where the manager presents the results to all stakeholders, including staff from the Ministry, district council members, and school representatives, and then answers questions and receives feedback. The data collection and discussion element of the process feeds into the district education plan, which is produced every three years, with better information leading to better decision-making for the schools and the district as a whole.

In the Nigerian case, the report card utilizes the ‘demand side of governance’ by providing a channel for citizens to voice opinions, but also involves government from the outset. For example, the implementing body asks the government to select which communities will be asked to provide feedback. The project implementation timeline is also shared with the government, to ensure they are aware of the dates of data collection for report cards.

### *Management of expectations and actions*

As Barr *et al.* (2012) note, the management of expectations and actions is particularly important in the education sector. Education is a process that requires effort from multiple stakeholders, all of whom influence students’ learning. However, each actor’s willingness to contribute to the public good

39. In the case of Uganda, pupils reported pretending to be sick when late, in order to avoid corporal punishment. This helped to raise community awareness of the issue of corporal punishment.

depends on anticipation of willingness on the part of others. For example, when parents do not actively provide the stationery or textbooks necessary for student learning in the classroom, teachers may lose the incentive to function as effective instructors. Conversely, collaboration among all stakeholders creates incentives for them to further invest in resources or actions that improve education.

The Ugandan case provides qualitative examples of ways in which the participatory approach may contribute to the ‘coordination of expectations and actions’ (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2010). For example, teachers facilitate dialogues with parents to make sure they understand the importance of providing pupils with textbooks and stationery. Parents can also use these dialogues to express the need for school lunches, to avoid sending children to school with packed lunches that will spoil, as schools often lack refrigeration. Such dialogues sparked by the participation model help to motivate all stakeholders involved in student learning to coordinate efforts, adjust expectations, and increase their contributions.

The Malawi SPR model also generates concerted efforts for school improvement among schools, community members, and the district education authority. For example, discussions led to parents realizing the negative consequences of keeping children from school on market days, when they were expected to help their parents. Open discussion also helps schools form better strategies to work together with communities to address educational problems. For example, after the SRC highlighted a gender imbalance in schools, some schools developed strategies to visit households to educate parents on the importance of girls’ education.

### *Use a systematic approach*

Linking information with the *system* is an important aspect of amplifying the utility of school-level information. For example, in Malawi the school performance review is one component embedded in an organic cycle of school planning, budgeting, and improvement. The information from Uganda’s community score card also feeds into the school budgeting process



by engaging policy-makers and encouraging them to make more evidence-based decisions.

*Emphasize simplicity in design*

In order to achieve transparency, it is important to present information in a way that is simple and understandable. For example, the indicators in the Uganda CVA report card are represented by ‘smiling face’ graphics rated on a scale from one to five. These simple graphics helps the key information to stand out. Both Colombia and Tanzania use colour coding, ranking, and dashboards to help indicate the effectiveness of schools in a quick and easy manner.

**Figure 4.1** Group of men discussing the community report card in Uganda



Source: World Vision Uganda.

## 4.2 Issues and hurdles

The interview process identified a number of issues and hurdles shared by more than one country. Many of these problems echo the literature findings.

### *Lack of accountability measures*

As noted in the previous section, most SRCs lack effective measures to establish accountability. In Colombia, although the central government established a 'Day of Excellence', not all schools follow through with implementation due to a lack of consequences. In several bottom-up approaches, community members gain a better understanding of school quality through active participation, but may not have sufficient leverage to change the behaviour of teachers and principals.

### *Lack of incentives*

Several of the interviewees cited lack of incentive as a major challenge in implementing SRCs. In some cases, parents may not possess a sufficiently accurate understanding of school quality to demand better service. In Pakistan, a survey showed that more than 90 per cent of parents were satisfied with the status of education. Similarly in Colombia, more than 80 per cent of parents were satisfied with education quality according to a survey result. Some parents may not view improvements to education services in the community as their responsibility. LITE's community survey, for example, indicated that the majority of the parents believed such improvements were the domain of the government and oil companies.<sup>40</sup>

40. In the delta region, oil companies often use corporate social responsibility programmes to help build schools. The companies usually sign a global memorandum of understanding devoting a grant for infrastructure building in the communities. There is therefore some confusion about responsibility over education development. Citizen report cards and accompanying meetings also serve as a means to raise citizen awareness of education problems and educate them about the distribution of responsibilities in the education sector.

### ***Lack of capacity***

The more participatory the implementation process for school report cards, the greater the capacity-building effort required. For example, setting up indicators to define and measure teacher quality has proved challenging for some villages in the Indonesia Community Scorecard programme. While some villages have devised specific and measurable indicators, others vaguely define teaching quality as teachers being able to ‘set more homework’.

### ***Challenge to conventional wisdom***

One hurdle in Indonesia is that villagers are not accustomed to challenging and confronting teachers, who are considered figures of authority at the community level. However, by providing more transparent information about the amount of allowances teachers receive, community members become aware for the first time of the benefits teachers enjoy and therefore feel more entitled to demand better service.

## **4.3 A proposed framework for implementing effective school report cards**


The literature has proposed various theories of change. It is possible to suggest a theory of change that incorporates lessons learned from the field, lessons from research studies, and new empirical evidence, to guide future implementation of school report cards.

### ***The chain-of-action in information-for-accountability models***

*Figure 4.2* illustrates the chain of action needed in a successful SRC model and key points worth considering for each step.

*Figure 4.2* illustrates the five steps needed to implement effective school report cards, in order to generate accountability and transparency, and change the behaviour of service providers in education.

**Figure 4.2 Theory of change for effective school report cards**



*Step 0: Motivation*

In the formal sanctions and rewards model, motivation comes from pressure on education authorities to demonstrate results in education quality. In the public participation model, motivation comes from demands for better education from the community.

*Step 1: Data collection*

Since availability of information is a key element, the first step is to collect data on school quality. In the formal sanctions and rewards model, the content of school report cards is usually drawn from EMIS data and standardized assessment results. In the public participation model, local organizations and community members usually conduct data collection themselves.

*Key aspects* include whether the contents of the school report cards are relevant, accurate, collected frequently enough, and whether the data-collection process ensures data integrity.

### *Step 2: Data distribution*

After the data on school quality have been collected, the next step is to distribute the information to key audiences. In the formal sanctions and rewards model, SRCs are distributed mainly to schools and central authorities. In the public participation model, SRCs are usually disseminated at community meetings where data are actively discussed and then shared with regional or national authorities.

*Key aspects* include whether the data are presented in an easily understandable format, and whether data distribution reaches a wide range of audiences.

### *Step 3: Key participants take action*

For both models to work, key participants need to take action based on the information they receive from the SRCs. In the formal sanctions and rewards model, the central authority establishes consequences based on school results, rewarding high-performing schools and punishing low-performing ones. Some central agencies may also provide schools with technical assistance. In the public participation model, community members are encouraged to put pressure on schools by actively monitoring school performance and management, as well as actively contributing to the education of their children.

*Key aspects* include whether the key participants have the will to undertake action to increase accountability upon receiving SRC information, and whether the key participants have the capacity to take the appropriate actions.

### *Step 4: Service providers change behaviours*

For school report cards to be effective, it is critical that schools and teachers undertake action to improve the management and performance of their services. In the formal sanctions and rewards model, schools implement actions because of the high-stakes consequences established by central authorities. In the public participation model, schools implement actions because they are monitored by the public, and are incentivized by the

community's increased willingness to fulfil their role in improving children's learning outcomes.

*Key aspects* include whether schools face sufficient pressure to change, whether the consequences established carry high or low stakes, and whether schools have adequate resources to make the necessary changes.

*Box 4.1* presents a checklist with questions present and future SRC implementers should ask in order to form a more systematic understanding of the design and potential effectiveness of their programmes.

#### **4.4 A comparison of two models**

This section further illustrates the chain of action for the two models of information-for-accountability approaches and compares their advantages and disadvantages (see *Figures 4.3 and 4.4*).

##### *Comparison*

###### *Public model*

*Advantages:* the public model provides more leeway in data collection, its indicators better reflect community demand, the information is more understandable to the public and more actively discussed in meeting formats, it generates incentives for schools, and it facilitates concerted efforts from all stakeholders as schools and parents discuss each other's needs and expectations.

*Disadvantages:* the public model suffers from a potential lack of pressure due to a lack of consequences, and unlike the central ministry, communities often lack the resources to punish or reward schools according to their quality.

###### *Formal sanction or reward model*

*Advantages:* the formal sanction or reward model generates systematic pressure on schools, and the central authority has more capacity to offer technical assistance to low-performing schools.

**Box 4.1 Checklist for a systematic understanding of SRC programmes and potential effectiveness**

1. Who decides what kind of information to collect? What is the data source?
  - Is the data collection process participatory?
  - Is information in school report cards relevant?
2. Who collects the data?
  - How frequently is the data collected?
  - Can data integrity be guaranteed? (School self-collection may lead to collusion.)
3. How is the information presented and distributed?
  - Can those with low reading skills easily understand the data?
  - Are data distributed to the wider public and the right audience?
4. Will stakeholders (consumers and education authorities) take action based on the information provided? And, if so, what kind of action?
  - Do stakeholders have enough will to demand the necessary improvements in services?
  - Do stakeholders have the capacity to demand the right kind of action to be taken by service providers?
5. Will service providers improve the service upon receiving the information and demands?
  - Does the information provide enough accountability? Does increased transparency increase pressure on service providers? Are clear links established between performance and reward and punishment?
  - Do the service providers have adequate resources to improve service delivery? (For example, teacher absenteeism will remain an issue in the absence of sufficient accommodation.)
6. Does the environment at large support the 'information-for-accountability' approach?
  - Do service providers have the autonomy and resources to make the changes?


Source: Authors.

*Disadvantages:* the formal sanction or reward model suffers from a lack of flexibility, as the content of school report cards is usually limited to test scores and enrolment data, and a lack of transparency, as not all members of the public are aware of or will access the online reports.

**Figure 4.3 Chain of action in public participation model**



**Figure 4.4 Chain of action in formal sanction or rewards model**





## Chapter 5

# Lessons learned and policy suggestions

The results of this study echo several conclusions arrived at over approximately two decades of SRC use. These can be summed up as follows.

*Little rigorous research has been undertaken on results and key factors.* SRCs are part of a complex web of factors influencing education amid a multi-stakeholder environment. This creates difficulties when trying to ascertain their specific impact. The research does suggest, however, that SRCs are an increasingly widely used tool developed as a result of pressure for the decentralization of authority and increased parental involvement in education.

*Pressures in the social sector are prompting stakeholders to demand more information about schools and schooling.* Democratic political systems tend to be huge consumers of information. Improved communication and global information flows are leading to an almost uniform rise in expectations for services, especially regarding education.

*Increased emphasis on 'data-driven decision-making' has led more SRCs to emphasize comparisons, often at multiple levels.* Key examples include Brazil, Colombia, Malawi, Pakistan, and Uganda. These comparisons can in turn lead to changes in inputs (Brazil), improved budgeting (Malawi), and revised funding (Uganda).

*School report cards are a complex undertaking.* Whatever the specific aim of a report card (e.g. inform a market, enable formal sanctions, or increase participation), the implementation of SRCs requires a careful approach that depends on several factors:

- *Motivation.* In more centrist governments motivation is manifest through political leadership, while in more decentralized or democratic systems it is manifested through the popular will. In either case, clarity

of motivation and consistency continue to matter. For example, in one state in Brazil, SRCs were stopped as soon as the state minister of education was replaced. However, the experiment led to a nationwide SRC effort with broad national support.

- *Clarity and simplicity of information.* The more comprehensive and notable SRC efforts provide information that can be easily understood whether in illustration, simple graph, or chart form. Many clearly cater not only to the literate, but also to illiterate parents and communities. Standout approaches in this regard include Malawi, Pakistan, and Uganda. In addition, the information appears to be provided at predictable times and is based on a degree of legitimacy that varies by country. Many developing countries are still struggling with the integration of bottom-up information through both formal and informal channels and top-down information that comes through highly formal and often slower information systems. Top-down information is usually essential for effective comparisons, but often requires trusted, reliable, and organized education information systems.
- *Participation and inclusion.* These appear to be important elements in the longer-term adoption of SRCs. Participation in the actual process of developing, understanding, and acting on SRC information at multiple levels has been found to be essential to increasing understanding, particularly at the community and school levels. This is because such participation plays an essential role in the buy-in process, which often includes awareness of the capacity-building needs of the intended audience. Many audiences, particularly those who are illiterate, may lack a full understanding of what certain indicators mean. The question most often encountered first when introducing a SRC to a community is, ‘What does this mean?’ The second question is frequently, ‘What can I do about it?’ Uganda appears to have had the most experience in addressing these questions. Pakistan also has long experience in this area, even with a top-down approach.

Ensuring participation is often a much more costly process than simply surveying, measuring, and disseminating information. Some

countries have not invested the extra time and funds needed to ensure participation and understanding. A few countries have attempted to increase participation by using existing civil and political mechanisms – in part to reduce costs but also to increase legitimacy. Uganda and Pakistan appear to have used this approach.

- *Systemic approach.* A systemic approach that links the capability of a central authority (e.g. access to resources, information capacity, a more unified political resources/vision) with the recipients' power (e.g. personal awareness of education needs, increasing desire for information, potentially strong desire to improve) is important to the most effective of the SRC initiatives reviewed in this study. Efforts that are not systematic risk losing sustainability and reducing impact. Colombia appears to have understood this need in recent years.

*Transparency and accountability.* This review indicates that SRCs operate very much within the framework of 'information providing transparency'. Providing the public with more information that is accurate and simply presented can be considered transparency. Almost all efforts to date to create full accountability have had mixed results. Accountability is clearly the most difficult part of any systemic change because it can be affected by the same multiplicity of factors that affect education.

*Accountability for corruption.* As stated in *Chapter 3 (Section 4)*, most SRCs focus on student learning outcomes instead of corruption. However, SRCs can examine issues such as teacher behaviours and school financing, implement deliberate data-collection processes that ensure data integrity, and help communities understand, monitor, and discuss education practices that are prone to corruption. This makes SRCs a powerful tool for increasing transparency and accountability and combating corruption.

*Formal sanctions.* According to the index of accountability analysis undertaken for this study, formal sanctions help to establish more effective consequences, while the participatory approach helps to clarify roles and responsibilities and provides more incentives for all stakeholders to

contribute to education. It appears that the combination of both provides the most promising course to improving accountability.

Moving forward, the following suggestions can be made for SRC designers and implementers:

- Create mechanisms to encourage and ensure public discussion of information, as such debate has the potential to hold educators accountable, even in the absence of harsh sanctions (top-down SRCs, in particular, face challenges of adequate data distribution and discussion).
- Present SRC data in meaningful ways by incorporating graphic elements, as well as comparisons with standards and other schools, and within the school over time.
- Distribute information in a timely and relevant manner.
- Provide school leaders with technical assistance by sharing best practices from schools with similar socioeconomic backgrounds or through guidance from peers or pedagogical advisors.
- Make community members and local education authorities responsible for distributing information on school performance, rather than school principals, who may have less incentive.
- Incorporate more anti-corruption elements into SRCs, such as sharing information on potentially corrupt practices and promoting community monitoring and dialogue.

## Annex A: Interviewee list

The country case findings are based on surveys and/or interviews with the following individuals:

**Brazil:** Sonia Dias, Center for Studies and Research, Culture and Community Action (CENPEC)

**Colombia:** Horacio Alvarez, Inter-American Development Bank

**Ghana:** Kwame A. A. Agyapong, Project Coordinator, Global Partnership for Education Grant, Ghana Education Service; Fred Kweku, Global Partnership for Education Grant, Ghana Education Service; Mama Laryea, Senior School and Community Engagement Advisor, USAID Ghana Partnership for Education – Learning, FHI 360

**Guatemala:** Ericka Hernández, Director, Planning Office, Ministry of Education, Guatemala; Mónica Flores, Director, Directorate General of Accreditation and Certification, Ministry of Education, Guatemala; Patricia Hernández, Technical Advisor, Bilingual and Intercultural Education Office, Ministry of Education, Guatemala

**India:** Savitri Bobde, Head of Assessment, Pratham

**Indonesia:** Dewi Susanti, Lead Research Specialist, Teachers' Performance and Accountability Initiative, National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K)

**Malawi:** Kate Armstrong, Acting Malawi Programme Director, Link International

**Mexico:** Rafael E. de Hoyos, Senior Economist, Human Development, World Bank

**Nigeria:** Jerry Nwigwe, Senior Programme Manager, LITE-Africa; Austen Bisina, LITE-Africa

**Pakistan:** Ayesha Khan, World Bank Pakistan; Minahil Asim, former Programme Officer with PESRP, Stanford Graduate School of Education

**Uganda:** Judith Nakamannya, Advocacy Coordinator, World Vision Uganda

**United States:** Adria Gallup-Black, Associate Director of Research, FHI 360 School and Community Services

## Annex B: Survey questions

**Which country with school report cards are you describing in this survey?**

**What is the name of the school report card?**

- School card
- School report card
- School profile
- Other (if so, please enter the name in the text box below)

.....

**How long has the school report card been in use?**

**When did its use begin?**

**What is the content of the school report card? (You can select multiple answers)**

- School inputs (e.g. the number of students, teachers, textbooks, expenditures)
- Education processes (e.g. repetition and dropout rates, parental and community involvement, school safety)
- School outputs (e.g. promotion and graduation rates, test scores)
- Student and parental satisfaction with the school
- Other .....

**What is the data source for the school report card?**

- Inspection groups
- Existing information systems (e.g. EMIS) national or regional data

- Self-assessment by school
- Standardized testing systems
- Parent and community survey results
- Other .....

**What are the audiences for the school report card? (You can select multiple answers)**

- Central government/Ministry of Education
- Sub-national education/financial authority
- Parent and community
- School
- Other .....

**What types of comparison are allowed in the school report card? (You can select multiple answers)**

- None
- National or regional standard
- Other schools
- School, with itself
- Other .....

**How often is the school report card distributed? (e.g. once per year)**

**How are the results of the school report cards distributed? (You can select multiple answers)**

- Internal discussion with the school
- External discussion with the public



- Public communication channels (if so, enter the form of communication below, e.g. radios, newspapers, graphics, etc.)

.....

- Other .....

**How is the school report card used? (You can select multiple answers)**

- Feedback to schools
- Community and parent engagement (e.g. dialogue sessions)
- Reward and punishment
- Standard creation and goal-setting for schools
- Allocation of resources
- Other .....

**What is the underlying motivation for the use of the school report card? (You can select multiple answers)**

- Political initiative
- Local civic group demands
- School accreditation
- Decentralization process
- Link to funding
- Legislative requirement
- Other .....

**Has the school report card helped improve school management and performance, and/or reduce corruption in the education system? If so, how?**

**What factors affect the effectiveness of the school report card? (You can select multiple answers)**

- Capacity of the audiences to act upon information
- Capacity to produce accurate and timely data
- Comprehensibility of data (presentation of data)
- Political will
- Other .....

**Is there a link to a sample of the school report card?**

- Yes (if yes, please provide the URL of the sample below) .....
- No

**Are there any other comments on school report cards you would like to share?**

**Contact Information**

- Name
- Organization
- Email
- Phone
- Country

## Annex C: School report card samples

### Brazil: IDEB 2013

Early years of elementary school											
Approval rate							Proof Brazil				
Year	1	2	3	4	5	P	Mathematics		Portuguese Language		N
							Average proficiency	Standardized proficiency	Average proficiency	Standardized proficiency	
2005	-	61.2	90.2	82.4	94.3	0.80	161.8	3.9	149.2	3.6	3.76
2007	-	66.1	67.3	66.7	90.5	0.71	171.7	4.3	161.5	4.1	4.18
2009	-	70.4	72.9	72.9	71.7	0.72	164.5	4.0	152.3	3.8	3.87
2011	-	-	85.2	87.1	82.6	0.85	170.8	4.2	146.7	3.6	3.89
2013	-	-	-	-	76.0	0.76	150.4	3.4	150.4	3.7	3.57

# Colombia: School Excellence Report 2015





**ESTABLECIMIENTO EDUCATIVO**  
**CENT EDUC DIST GIMNASIO SABIO CALDAS**

**BÁSICA PRIMARIA**

## REPORTE DE LA EXCELENCIA 2015

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Afirmar que queremos elevar la calidad educativa del país es fácil de decir, pero para realmente lograrlo, es indispensable que sepamos dónde estamos, a dónde queremos llegar y, sobre todo, cómo lo vamos a conseguir.

Todas estas preguntas deben enfocarse en lo más importante: cómo y qué tanto están aprendiendo nuestros estudiantes. Por eso, desde hoy contamos con una nueva herramienta que nos permitirá medir cómo vamos a nivel de colegio, entidad territorial y país: el Índice Sintético de Calidad Educativa.

Con el Índice, cada colegio sabrá con certeza cómo está en cada uno de sus niveles: Básica Primaria, Básica Secundaria y Media. La interpretación es muy sencilla: se trata de una escala de 1 a 10, siendo 10 el valor más alto que podemos obtener.

---

### EL ÍNDICE SINTÉTICO DE NUESTRA INSTITUCIÓN

*La escala de valores es de 1 a 10 siendo 10 la más alta.*



5,8

**NAL** 5,1  
*Promedio nacional (Primaria)*

**ETC** 6,0  
*Promedio Entidad Territorial Certificada (Primaria)*

El índice sintético de nuestra institución es:

1,54



PROGRESO

+

2,58



DESEMPEÑO

+

0,94



EFICIENCIA

+

0,72




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
5,8

1

## Colombia (cont.)



## Colombia (cont.)



## Colombia (cont.)



# Ghana: School Report Card 2011–2012



REPUBLIC OF GHANA

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION GHANA EDUCATION SERVICES


School Report Card

A.T.T.C. DEMONSTRATION KG/PRIMARY

District Adansi North Region Ashanti 2011-2012 3rd Term

## Enrolment

Class	Boys	Girls	Total
JHS1	20	30	50
JHS2	25	30	55
JHS3	23	24	47
P6	30	30	60




## Pupil Performance


Class	Average Grade Local Language	No. of pupil 50% or Above	Average Grade English	No. of pupil 50% or Above	Average Grade Mathematics	No. of pupil 50% or Above
JHS1	55	15	60	20	60	20
JHS2	60	13	60	12	65	14
JHS3	50	15	50	15	50	15
P6	50	20	60	10	50	5



## Ghana (cont.)

**Class Attendance**


Class	Boys Attendance	Girls Attendance	Total	Expected Attendance	
JHS1		42	50	92	68
JHS2		55	45	100	68
JHS3		50	40	90	68
P6	100	100	200	120	



## Ghana (cont.)

## Pupil Attendance

Class	Student Name	Expected Attendance	Attendance
JHS1	Jame Badu	65	60
JHS1	Mavis Adingano	65	59
JHS2	Richard Okafor	65	60
JHS2	Doris Marmeley	65	62





## Number of Textbooks

Class	No. of Pupil	Local Language	Ratio of Pupil to textbook	English	Ratio of Pupil to textbook	Mathematics	Ratio of Pupil to textbook	Total
JHS1	50	20	2	20	2	20	2	60
JHS2	55	20	2	22	2	20	2	62
P6	0	20	0	25	0	20	0	65
JHS3	47	40	1	40	1	40	1	120

## Ghana (cont.)

Teacher Info

Class	Days Present	Days Absent With Permission	Days Absent Without Permission	Unit Covered Local Language	Unit Covered English	Unit Covered Maths
JHS2	59	5	4	4	5	6



## Ghana (cont.)

**Receipt of Grant**

Type Of Grant	Trenche	Date	Amount	Total
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**School Enviroment**

Insert For Teachers	Cs Visit	Sch Open Days	Instructional Days	
60	3	68	60	
1	2	68	60	

**School Meeting**

Type Of Meeting	Meeting Number	Number Attended
PTA Meeting	41116	40
PTA Meeting	41117	0
Staff Meeting	41116	50
SMC Meeting	41120	30

**Spam Meeting**

Support	Type Of Support	Amount
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**SEA Result**

Subject	Result	Year
English	90	2011
English	90	2011

## Malawi: School performance review – school feedback report

Name of school	Zone
Date of data collection	District
SPR team names	

This report summarizes observations made at your school during the school performance review visit. We hope it will help you identify strengths and weakness in your school. We ask your school to share this report with staff, SMC, PTA, and the school community. We invite your school to use this and other relevant information to plan for future improvements (i.e. to develop or review and implement a School Improvement Plan).

The following points may help you to interpret the table that follows:

- The first column describes the indicators that were used to evaluate the school;
- The second column provides an evaluation of performance on a four-point scale – Fully Achieved, Achieved, Partially Achieved, Not Achieved;
- The third column provides the key points of evidence that support the overall judgement for each indicator;
- At the end of each category, recommendations for improvement are stated.

Evaluation	Overview	Explanation
<b>Fully achieved</b>	Major strengths	Performance is characterized by overall strength. There are few weaknesses, if any. Such a school could be treated as a role model as exemplary to others.
<b>Achieved</b>	Strengths outweigh weaknesses	Performance is characterized by a number of strengths. There are weaknesses but these do not have a significant adverse effect on the school.
<b>Partially achieved</b>	Some important weaknesses	There are some strengths, but there are also important weaknesses that have a significant effect on the school.
<b>Not achieved</b>	Major weaknesses	There are major weaknesses that require immediate action. These have a very significant negative effect on the performance of the school.

## Malawi (cont.)

At the end of the report some recommendations are made that will help to prioritize your actions for school improvement.

Remember that the District Office, PEA, LCD, and other NGOs are all there to assist you with school improvement and that it is important that the school community plays a central role in the development and activities of the School Improvement Plan.

INDICATOR	EVALUATION	EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT EVALUATION
<b>Teaching and learning</b>		
1. Resources and physical classroom environment	<b>Achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Well-swept classrooms.</li> <li>• Most learners seated at desks.</li> <li>• Most chalkboards are well maintained.</li> <li>• No learning centres.</li> </ul>
2. Lesson preparation and planning	<b>Not achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No lesson plan available in most classes.</li> <li>• No evidence of thorough lesson preparation.</li> <li>• Records are not kept up to date.</li> </ul>
3. Teaching and learning process	<b>Partially achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Good relationship between teachers and learners.</li> <li>• Good questioning activities.</li> <li>• In effective TALULAR.</li> <li>• Lack of confidence in subject knowledge.</li> </ul>
4. Classroom management	<b>Achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Display of class timetables in most classrooms.</li> <li>• Good behaviour promoted.</li> <li>• Learners are seated orderly.</li> <li>• Books not distributed to learners.</li> </ul>
5. Assessment and record keeping	<b>Partially achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Learners are praised for correct answers.</li> <li>• Marking of learners written exercises.</li> <li>• No promotion of homework.</li> <li>• No attendance registers.</li> </ul>

## Malawi (cont.)

INDICATOR	EVALUATION	EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT EVALUATION
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Have all plans ready before each school day.</li> <li>• Update attendance registers.</li> <li>• Distribute the available books to learners.</li> <li>• Administer homework regularly.</li> </ul>	
<b>Leadership and management</b>		
6. Planning and organization	<b>Partially achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Availability of SIP.</li> <li>• School records kept on school premises and are easily accessible.</li> <li>• No minutes of staff meetings.</li> <li>• School records not updated.</li> </ul>
7. Financial management	<b>Partially achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SMC monitors expenditure.</li> <li>• The school has a cashbook.</li> <li>• Little transparency in financial matters.</li> <li>• No recruitment of auxiliary teacher though there is a need.</li> </ul>
8. Management of material resources	<b>Achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Well-cared for and maintained school buildings and grounds.</li> <li>• Clean and well-maintained school latrines.</li> <li>• Well-protected environment.</li> <li>• No reliable source of clean and safe water.</li> </ul>
9. Supervision of teaching and learning	<b>Partially achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lessons follow the timetable.</li> <li>• No monitoring of the assessment.</li> <li>• No documented classroom observation.</li> <li>• Availability of master timetable.</li> </ul>
10. Staff deployment and development	<b>Partially achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Head teacher is involved in teaching.</li> <li>• Deployment of teachers' matches with training experience.</li> <li>• No monitoring of staff attendance and punctuality.</li> <li>• Irregular school CPDs.</li> </ul>
11. Access, equity, and retention	<b>Partially achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Guidance and counselling is offered to learners.</li> <li>• Sufficient number of boys' and girls' latrines that are used effectively.</li> <li>• No programme to support special needs of children.</li> <li>• Lack of role models.</li> </ul>

## Malawi (cont.)

INDICATOR	EVALUATION	EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT EVALUATION
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Plan and conduct regular staff meetings and CPDs.</li> <li>Handle financial matters transparently and accountably.</li> </ul>	
<b>School governance</b>		
12. Community management of the school	<b>Achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SMC is adequately trained.</li> <li>SMC regularly reports school matters to parents.</li> <li>SMC monitors financial expenditure.</li> <li>Irregular SMC meetings.</li> </ul>
13. School-community relations	<b>Achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High level of meaningful participation by community in school planning.</li> <li>Community shows great interest in school affairs.</li> <li>No meaningful fundraising for the school.</li> </ul>
14. Community support for teaching and learning	<b>Achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Parents are happy with the behaviour of the teachers.</li> <li>Parents and the community ensure that learners stay in school.</li> <li>Community accounts for all the school funds.</li> <li>No action to improve teaching and learning.</li> </ul>
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Come up with plans to recruit auxiliary teachers.</li> <li>Revamp mother group.</li> </ul>	
<b>Child-friendly school</b>		
15. Rights-based and inclusive school	<b>Achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Boys and girls are treated equally.</li> <li>Learners are involved in drafting SIP.</li> <li>Availability of trusted teacher to give confidential advice and support.</li> <li>No guidance and counselling by mother group.</li> </ul>
16. Effective school	<b>Achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Clean classrooms.</li> <li>Regular attendance by teachers.</li> <li>Good behaviour by learners.</li> <li>Inadequate textbooks.</li> </ul>



## Malawi (cont.)

INDICATOR	EVALUATION	EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT EVALUATION
17. Safe, protective, and health-promoting school	<b>Partially achieved</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Learners are safe when travelling to and from school.</li> <li>• Enough latrines that are clean and offer privacy to learners.</li> <li>• No hand-washing facilities.</li> <li>• Most learners do not eat in the morning.</li> </ul>
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS</b>		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Insist on hand-washing habit.</li> <li>• Plan for purchasing additional textbooks in subsequent SIPs.</li> </ul>	

Overall category of school:

**Partially achieved****KEY STRENGTHS TO BUILD ON:**

- Adequate clean latrines.
- Community participation in development projects.
- Availability of woodlot.
- Availability of most records and displays in the head teacher's office.

**3 KEY RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- Head teacher should ensure regular, adequate, and effective planning by all teachers.
- All school stockholders should be involved in SIP drafting implementation and monitoring.
- Distribute the available books to learners for use at home.

**Signature of receipt****Head teacher:** .....**SMC chair:** ..... **PTA chair:**.....**SPR team representative:**..... **Date:** .....*LCD Malawi, 2013*


# United States: Virginia School Report Card

## Federal Annual Measurable Objectives

Under federal requirements, Virginia is required to establish annual measurable objectives (AMOs) for proficiency in reading and mathematics test participation and performance for all subgroups. In addition, schools with a graduating class must meet federal graduation requirements for all subgroups of students. The table below displays whether or not the subgroups represented at the school met federal AMOs. More detailed federal AMO data are available in this report card. **Schools with one or more subgroups not meeting a minimum passing rate target— and not identified as a Title I Priority or Title I Focus school — are required to implement an improvement plan. Title I Priority and Focus schools have additional requirements.**

Federal Annual Measurable Objectives		
Participation	2014-2015	
	Reading	Mathematics
All Students	YES	YES
Gap Group 1 - Students with Disabilities, English Language Learners, Economically Disadvantaged Students (unduplicated)	YES	YES
Gap Group 2 - Black Students	TS	TS
Gap Group 3 - Hispanic Students	YES	YES
Asian	TS	TS
Economically Disadvantaged	TS	YES
Limited English Proficient	TS	TS
Students with Disabilities	YES	YES
White	YES	YES
Performance	2014-2015	
	Reading	Mathematics
All Students	YES-MP	YES-MP
Gap Group 1 - Students with Disabilities, English Language Learners, Economically Disadvantaged Students (unduplicated)	YES	YES-MP
Gap Group 2 - Black Students	TS	TS
Gap Group 3 - Hispanic Students	YES	YES-MP
Asian	TS	TS
Economically Disadvantaged	TS	TS
Limited English Proficient	TS	TS
Students with Disabilities	YES-MP	YES-MP
White	YES-MP	YES-MP
Federal Graduation Indicator (FGI)	2014-2015	
All Students	-	-
Gap Group 1 - Students with Disabilities, English Language Learners, Economically Disadvantaged Students (unduplicated)	-	-
Gap Group 2 - Black Students	-	-
Gap Group 3 - Hispanic Students	-	-
Asian	-	-
Economically Disadvantaged	-	-
Limited English Proficient	-	-
Students with Disabilities	-	-
White	-	-
Key: YES = Met objective YES-3YR = Met objective based on the 3 year average result YES-5YR = Met objective with 5-year FGI YES-6YR = Met objective with 6-year FGI YES-R10 = Met objective by reducing failure rate by at least 10 percent YES-MP = Maintain Progress: Current year pass rate equal to prior year's pass rate, or stayed within 5% YES-CI = Continuous Improvement: Met starting pass rate (which exceeds Year 6 pass rate) and made continuous improvement as compared to prior year NO = Did not meet objective TS = Too small, objective not evaluated due to too few students * = Data not yet available - = No data for group N/A = Not applicable		

## United States (cont.)

 **Virginia Department of Education • www.doe.virginia.gov**

**McKinley Elementary**  
1030 N McKinley Rd, Arlington, VA 22205

**Arlington County Public Schools**

**Principal: Mr. Colin Brown**  
(703) 228-5280

**Superintendent: Dr. Patrick K. Murphy**  
(703) 228-6010

The Commonwealth of Virginia is committed to providing a quality education for all students. The Virginia School Report Card provides transparent information about the performance of Virginia's schools. School accreditation and federal accountability ratings for a specific school year are based on student achievement on tests taken during the previous academic year.

2014 - 2015 Summary of Accountability Results		
State Accreditation Status	Federal Accountability	
Fully Accredited	Title I Priority: No	Title I Focus: No

### State Accreditation Results for All Students

This table summarizes the data used in calculating the state accreditation status of the school and is reported for the "all students" group.

Subject	Accreditation Benchmark	2012 - 2013		2013 - 2014		2014 - 2015		Met Accreditation Benchmark
		1 Year	3 Year	1 Year	3 Year	1 Year	3 Year	
English	75	95	97	91	95	91	92	YES
Mathematics	70	91	96	90	93	92	91	YES
History	70	95	97	96	97	99	98	YES
Science	70	95	98	97	97	93	95	YES

Key: YES = Met objective based on current year results  
 AB = Met objective based on Alternative Benchmark  
 - = No data for group  
 \* = Data not yet available

3YR = Met objective based on the 3 year average result  
 NO = Did not meet objective  
 < = A group below state definition for personally identifiable results  
 N/A = Not applicable

### Proficiency Gap Dashboard for Federal Accountability

Under Virginia's approved Elementary and Secondary Education Act waiver application, schools must meet increasing targets — referred to as Annual Measurable Objectives (AMOs) — in reading and mathematics for all students, three "Proficiency Gap Groups," and other subgroups in order to meet federal accountability requirements. Schools have three ways to meet the AMOs: test results from the most recently completed school year, test results based on a three-year average, or by reducing the failure rate by 10 percent. High schools must also meet the federal graduation indicator for all groups. "Proficiency Gaps" report the differences in performance of traditionally underperforming student subgroups as compared with established AMOs. The AMOs vary by Proficiency Gap Group based on performance of students in each group on SOL tests administered in 2013-2014; however, AMOs in reading and mathematics will increase annually until 2017-2018 when the reading objective will be 78 for all groups and the mathematics objective will be 73 percent for all groups.

	Reading			Mathematics		
	AMO Target	AMO Result	Met AMO Target	AMO Target	AMO Result	Met AMO Target
All Students	69	91	YES	66	91	YES
Gap Group 1 - Students with Disabilities, English Language Learners, Economically Disadvantaged Students (unduplicated)	59	81	YES	57	70	YES
Gap Group 2 - Black Students	57	<	TS	56	<	TS
Gap Group 3 - Hispanic Students	60	75	YES	60	84	YES

Key: YES = Met objective based on the current year result  
 TS = Too small, objective not evaluated due to too few students  
 NO = Did not meet objective  
 - = No data for group  
 N/A = Not applicable

3YR = Met objective based on the 3 year average result  
 RT10 = Met objective by reducing failure rate by at least 10 percent  
 < = A group below state definition for personally identifiable results  
 \* = Data not yet available

Detailed student performance data for all subgroups, including state and federal graduation data, are available on subsequent pages.

## United States (cont.)

**School - Fall Membership**

School membership (enrollment) is reported on September 30 of each school year.

School - Fall Membership			
Grade	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014
PK - Pre-Kindergarten	3	15	13
KG - Kindergarten	75	113	81
01 - Grade 1	113	81	106
02 - Grade 2	87	113	76
03 - Grade 3	77	85	106
04 - Grade 4	70	76	81
05 - Grade 5	79	73	73
Total Students	504	556	536

Key: < = A group below state definition for personally identifiable results  
 - = No data for group  
 \* = Data not yet available

**Advanced Program Information**

The percentage of students enrolled in advanced programs is a key indicator of school quality at the secondary level.

School - Advanced Program Information			
Program type	2011-2012	Count / Percentage	
		2012-2013	2013-2014
	-	-	-

Key: < = A group below state definition for personally identifiable results  
 - = No data for group  
 \* = Data not yet available

## United States (cont.)

## Percentage of Students Passing and Tested in English Reading and Mathematics

Only student subgroups represented are listed.

Student Subgroup	Type	2011-2012			2012-2013			2013-2014			Current Year AMO
		Passed	Tested	Not Tested	Passed	Tested	Not Tested	Passed	Tested	Not Tested	
<b>English Performance</b>											
All Students	School	93	100	0	91	100	0	91	100	0	69
	Division	89	100	0	80	100	0	82	100	0	69
	State	89	100	0	75	100	0	74	100	0	69
Female	School	-	-	-	93	100	0	93	100	0	-
	Division	-	-	-	82	100	0	84	100	0	-
	State	91	100	0	77	100	0	78	100	0	-
Male	School	-	-	-	89	100	0	89	100	0	-
	Division	-	-	-	78	100	0	80	100	0	-
	State	87	100	0	72	100	0	71	100	0	-
Black	School	58	100	0	<	<	<	<	<	<	57
	Division	79	100	0	63	100	0	67	100	0	57
	State	80	100	0	59	100	0	58	100	0	57
Hispanic	School	92	100	0	82	100	0	75	100	0	60
	Division	79	100	0	62	100	0	64	100	0	60
	State	84	100	0	65	100	0	65	100	0	60
White	School	96	100	0	95	100	0	96	100	0	75
	Division	97	100	0	93	100	0	94	100	0	75
	State	93	100	0	82	100	0	82	100	0	75
Asian	School	82	100	0	80	100	0	94	100	0	60
	Division	91	100	0	81	100	0	84	100	0	60
	State	95	100	0	87	100	0	87	100	0	60
American Indian	School	-	-	-	<	<	<	<	<	<	-
	Division	-	-	-	85	100	0	88	100	0	-
	State	88	100	0	72	100	0	72	100	0	-
Two or more races	School	-	-	-	94	100	0	92	100	0	-
	Division	-	-	-	88	100	0	90	100	0	-
	State	91	100	0	78	100	0	78	100	0	-
Students with Disabilities	School	70	100	0	64	100	0	62	100	0	42
	Division	66	100	0	52	100	0	53	100	0	42
	State	66	99	1	43	99	1	43	99	1	42
Economically Disadvantaged	School	78	100	0	60	100	0	54	100	0	59
	Division	77	100	0	58	100	0	60	100	0	59
	State	81	100	0	59	100	0	59	100	0	59
Limited English Proficient	School	90	100	0	67	100	0	50	100	0	52
	Division	76	100	0	53	100	0	56	100	0	52
	State	80	100	0	54	100	0	54	100	0	52
Gap Group 1 - Students with Disabilities, English Language Learners, Economically Disadvantaged Students (unduplicated)	School	74	100	0	67	100	0	61	100	0	59
	Division	76	100	0	61	100	0	63	100	0	59
	State	80	100	0	59	100	0	59	100	0	59
Gap Group 2 - Black Students	School	56	100	0	<	<	<	<	<	<	57
	Division	79	100	0	63	100	0	67	100	0	57
	State	80	100	0	59	100	0	59	100	0	57
Gap Group 3 - Hispanic Students	School	92	100	0	82	100	0	75	100	0	60
	Division	79	100	0	62	100	0	64	100	0	60
	State	84	100	0	65	100	0	65	100	0	60
<b>Mathematics Performance</b>											
All Students	School	90	100	0	89	100	0	91	100	0	86
	Division	79	100	0	81	100	0	83	100	0	86
	State	68	99	1	71	99	1	74	99	1	88
Female	School	-	-	-	88	100	0	93	100	0	-
	Division	-	-	-	82	100	0	85	100	0	-
	State	70	100	0	73	100	0	76	100	0	-
Male	School	-	-	-	89	100	0	90	100	0	-
	Division	-	-	-	80	100	0	82	100	0	-

## United States (cont.)

		2011-2012			2012-2013			2013-2014			
	State	67	99	1	70	99	1	72	99	1	-
Black	School	58	100	0	<	<	<	<	<	<	56
	Division	60	100	0	65	100	0	70	100	0	56
	State	52	99	1	55	99	1	60	99	1	56
Hispanic	School	84	100	0	82	100	0	84	100	0	60
	Division	65	100	0	68	100	0	70	100	0	60
	State	61	99	1	64	99	1	67	99	1	60
White	School	94	100	0	90	100	0	93	100	0	70
	Division	91	100	0	92	100	0	92	100	0	70
	State	75	100	0	77	100	0	80	100	0	70
Asian	School	73	100	0	87	100	0	88	100	0	82
	Division	84	100	0	84	100	0	88	100	0	82
	State	87	100	0	80	100	0	90	100	0	82
American Indian	School	-	-	-	<	<	<	<	<	<	-
	Division	-	-	-	74	100	0	66	98	2	-
	State	65	99	1	67	99	1	71	99	1	-
Two or more races	School	-	-	-	100	100	0	96	100	0	-
	Division	-	-	-	89	100	0	90	100	0	-
	State	71	99	1	74	99	1	77	99	1	-
Students with Disabilities	School	64	100	0	61	100	0	59	100	0	49
	Division	50	100	0	49	100	0	53	99	1	49
	State	40	99	1	41	99	1	43	99	1	49
Economically Disadvantaged	School	59	100	0	65	100	0	68	100	0	57
	Division	62	100	0	65	100	0	69	100	0	57
	State	54	99	1	57	99	1	61	99	1	57
Limited English Proficient	School	85	100	0	71	100	0	68	100	0	53
	Division	66	100	0	65	100	0	68	100	0	53
	State	59	99	1	59	99	1	62	99	1	53
Gap Group 1 - Students with Disabilities, English Language Learners, Economically Disadvantaged Students (unduplicated)	School	68	100	0	65	100	0	70	100	0	57
	Division	64	100	0	66	100	0	69	100	0	57
	State	54	99	1	57	99	1	61	99	1	57
Gap Group 2 - Black Students	School	58	100	0	<	<	<	<	<	<	56
	Division	60	100	0	65	100	0	70	100	0	56
	State	52	99	1	55	99	1	60	99	1	56
Gap Group 3 - Hispanic Students	School	84	100	0	82	100	0	84	100	0	60
	Division	65	100	0	66	100	0	70	100	0	60
	State	61	99	1	64	99	1	67	99	1	60

Key: < = A group below state definition for personally identifiable results  
 - = No data for group  
 \* = Data not yet available

## United States (cont.)

## Other Academic Indicators

Only student subgroups represented are listed.

Student Subgroup	Type	2011-2012		2012-2013		2013-2014	
		Passed	Tested	Passed	Tested	Passed	Tested
<b>Writing Performance</b>							
All Students	School	100	100	91	100	89	95
	Division	93	95	85	95	84	95
	State	89	97	76	97	75	97
Female	School	-	-	94	100	86	97
	Division	-	-	89	96	88	96
	State	93	97	81	98	81	98
Male	School	-	-	88	100	90	93
	Division	-	-	82	94	80	95
	State	86	97	71	97	70	97
Black	School	<	100	<	100	<	100
	Division	84	95	70	95	69	97
	State	82	97	61	98	60	97
Hispanic	School	<	100	<	100	100	75
	Division	86	87	72	88	70	90
	State	86	90	70	91	69	91
White	School	100	100	93	100	91	100
	Division	98	99	95	99	95	99
	State	92	99	82	99	81	99
Asian	School	<	100	<	100	<	100
	Division	95	92	88	92	86	92
	State	96	95	89	95	89	96
Two or more races	School	-	-	<	100	<	100
	Division	-	-	89	100	91	100
	State	92	98	79	99	79	99
Students with Disabilities	School	100	100	55	100	50	92
	Division	73	89	57	91	53	93
	State	61	85	41	95	39	95
Economically Disadvantaged	School	<	100	<	100	<	69
	Division	63	66	69	87	67	89
	State	61	95	61	95	59	95
Limited English Proficient	School	<	100	<	100	<	50
	Division	84	82	65	78	60	79
	State	82	81	56	79	54	79
Gap Group 1 - Students with Disabilities, English Language Learners, Economically Disadvantaged Students (unduplicated)	School	100	100	64	100	63	83
	Division	65	88	70	89	67	90
	State	80	95	59	95	58	95
Gap Group 2 - Black Students	School	<	100	<	100	<	100
	Division	84	95	70	95	69	97
	State	82	97	61	98	60	97
Gap Group 3 - Hispanic Students	School	<	100	<	100	100	75
	Division	86	87	72	88	70	90
	State	86	90	70	91	69	91
<b>History Performance</b>							
All Students	School	95	99	98	99	99	99
	Division	86	97	87	97	86	97
	State	85	98	85	99	84	98
Female	School	-	-	97	100	99	99
	Division	-	-	86	97	85	97
	State	84	99	84	99	84	99
Male	School	-	-	99	99	99	100
	Division	-	-	88	97	89	96
	State	86	99	86	99	85	98
Black	School	<	100	<	100	<	100
	Division	70	87	74	98	78	87
	State	74	99	74	99	73	99

## United States (cont.)

Student Subgroup	Type	2011-2012		2012-2013		2013-2014	
		Passed	Tested	Passed	Tested	Passed	Tested
Hispanic	School	95	91	95	95	100	94
	Division	74	94	74	93	73	92
	State	79	95	79	95	78	93
White	School	95	100	98	100	99	100
	Division	96	99	96	99	97	99
	State	90	99	90	99	89	99
Asian	School	<	100	<	100	100	100
	Division	88	95	89	95	90	95
	State	94	97	94	98	94	97
American Indian	School	-	-	-	-	<	100
	Division	-	-	80	91	84	84
	State	84	99	83	99	83	98
Two or more races	School	-	-	100	100	100	100
	Division	-	-	94	100	94	100
	State	88	99	87	99	87	99
Students with Disabilities	School	78	100	92	96	90	100
	Division	66	96	64	96	66	95
	State	61	86	60	98	58	98
Economically Disadvantaged	School	93	89	94	94	100	94
	Division	70	93	70	93	71	92
	State	74	98	74	98	73	97
Limited English Proficient	School	100	89	94	94	100	94
	Division	72	91	69	89	67	86
	State	75	91	72	89	70	86
Gap Group 1 - Students with Disabilities, English Language Learners, Economically Disadvantaged Students (unduplicated)	School	86	96	93	98	94	97
	Division	73	94	74	94	74	92
	State	74	98	74	97	73	97
Gap Group 2 - Black Students	School	<	100	<	100	<	100
	Division	70	97	74	98	76	97
	State	74	99	74	99	73	99
Gap Group 3 - Hispanic Students	School	95	91	95	95	100	94
	Division	74	94	74	93	73	92
	State	79	95	79	95	78	93
<b>Science Performance</b>							
All Students	School	95	99	97	99	91	99
	Division	82	98	84	98	84	96
	State	91	99	81	99	80	98
Female	School	-	-	99	100	91	99
	Division	-	-	83	98	83	97
	State	91	99	80	99	80	99
Male	School	-	-	96	98	91	100
	Division	-	-	84	98	84	96
	State	91	99	81	99	80	98
Black	School	<	100	=	100	<	100
	Division	82	98	88	97	87	98
	State	82	99	65	99	64	99
Hispanic	School	100	90	100	86	81	96
	Division	84	94	88	94	85	91
	State	85	95	71	95	70	93
White	School	95	100	98	100	94	100
	Division	98	100	96	100	95	100
	State	95	100	88	99	87	99
Asian	School	<	100	92	100	<	100
	Division	92	97	83	97	86	95
	State	95	98	90	98	91	97
American Indian	School	-	-	=	100	<	100
	Division	-	-	71	80	61	90
	State	81	99	78	98	61	97
Two or more races	School	-	-	<	100	90	100



## United States (cont.)

Student Subgroup	Type	2011-2012		2012-2013		2013-2014	
		Passed	Tested	Passed	Tested	Passed	Tested
	Division	-	-	92	100	89	100
	State	93	99	85	99	83	99
Students with Disabilities	School	74	100	95	95	64	100
	Division	75	95	60	95	57	94
	State	70	98	51	98	51	97
Economically Disadvantaged	School	92	88	<	89	74	96
	Division	81	94	85	93	65	91
	State	83	98	67	97	66	97
Limited English Proficient	School	100	87	<	83	75	94
	Division	81	92	61	91	59	85
	State	79	91	61	90	59	87
Gap Group 1 - Students with Disabilities, English Language Learners, Economically Disadvantaged Students (unduplicated)	School	82	95	97	94	72	98
	Division	83	95	88	95	66	92
	State	83	98	67	97	66	97
Gap Group 2 - Black Students	School	<	100	<	100	<	100
	Division	82	98	68	97	67	98
	State	82	99	85	99	64	99
Gap Group 3 - Hispanic Students	School	100	90	100	86	81	96
	Division	84	94	68	94	68	91
	State	85	95	71	95	70	93

Key: < = A group below state definition for personally identifiable results  
 - = No data for group  
 \* = Data not yet available

## United States (cont.)

**Non-Assessment-Based Other Academic Indicators**

NCLB requires schools, school divisions and states to make progress in additional areas, such as science, history, writing, attendance and graduation. Only student subgroups represented are listed.

Other Academic Indicators				
Student Subgroup	Type	2011-2012 Percentage	2012-2013 Percentage	2013-2014 Percentage
<b>Attendance Rate</b>				
All Students	School	97	96	97
	Division	96	96	96
	State	96	95	96
Black	School	95	97	98
	Division	96	96	97
	State	95	95	96
Hispanic	School	97	95	97
	Division	95	95	96
	State	95	95	95
White	School	97	97	97
	Division	96	96	97
	State	95	95	96
Asian	School	95	96	98
	Division	96	96	96
	State	97	97	97
Students with Disabilities	School	96	96	97
	Division	95	95	96
	State	94	94	94
Economically Disadvantaged	School	95	97	98
	Division	96	95	96
	State	95	94	95
Limited English Proficient	School	96	97	98
	Division	96	95	96
	State	96	95	95
Gap Group 1 - Students with Disabilities, English Language Learners, Economically Disadvantaged Students (unduplicated)	School	-	96	97
	Division	-	95	96
	State	-	94	95
Notes: #Attendance Rate: average daily attendance percentage				
Key: < = A group below state definition for personally identifiable results - = No data for group * = Data not yet available				

## United States (cont.)

**Assessment Results at each Proficiency Level by Subgroup**

The Virginia Assessment Program includes Standards of Learning (SOL) tests and other statewide assessments in English, history/social science, mathematics, and science. The tables below provide information for the three most recent years on the achievement of students on these tests, including percentages of students who demonstrate proficiency and advanced proficiency. Annual accountability ratings are based on achievement during the previous academic year or combined achievement from the three most recent years. **Only student subgroups represented are listed.**

Assessment Results at each Proficiency Level by Subgroup		2011-2012				2012-2013				2013-2014			
		Adv	Prof	Pass	Fail	Adv	Prof	Pass	Fail	Adv	Prof	Pass	Fail
<b>English: Reading</b>		<b>Grade 3</b>											
<b>All Students</b>	School	49	40	89	11	38	59	96	4	39	54	93	7
	Division	44	44	87	13	27	51	78	22	28	55	83	17
	State	38	48	86	14	19	53	72	28	16	53	89	31
<b>Female</b>	School	52	28	79	21	42	56	98	2	44	52	96	4
	Division	49	40	89	11	30	51	81	19	30	56	86	14
	State	42	46	88	12	21	55	75	25	18	55	73	27
<b>Male</b>	School	48	48	95	5	32	62	95	5	36	56	92	8
	Division	38	47	86	14	25	51	76	24	26	55	81	19
	State	34	49	83	17	17	52	69	31	15	50	86	34
<b>Black</b>	School	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	<
	Division	20	54	74	26	13	50	63	37	12	52	85	35
	State	23	53	76	24	10	47	57	43	7	45	52	48
<b>Hispanic</b>	School	42	50	92	8	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	<
	Division	27	52	79	21	12	48	80	40	15	51	86	34
	State	29	51	79	21	16	48	64	36	14	46	80	40
<b>White</b>	School	50	41	91	9	48	52	100	0	42	54	96	4
	Division	57	37	94	6	39	52	90	10	35	57	92	8
	State	46	45	90	10	23	57	79	21	20	57	77	23
<b>Asian</b>	School	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	<
	Division	43	50	93	7	19	58	77	23	26	63	89	11
	State	48	44	92	8	28	57	85	15	27	56	83	17
<b>American Indian</b>	School	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<	<	<	<
	Division	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<	<	<	<
	State	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	54	85	35
<b>Two or more races</b>	School	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	64	36	100	0
	Division	53	35	88	12	38	49	88	12	37	51	87	13
	State	40	48	88	12	19	55	74	26	17	55	73	27
<b>Students with Disabilities</b>	School	38	23	62	38	10	80	90	10	29	50	79	21
	Division	25	39	64	36	14	42	56	44	20	41	61	39
	State	24	42	66	34	13	34	47	53	13	31	44	56
<b>Economically Disadvantaged</b>	School	10	70	80	20	<	<	<	<	10	50	80	40
	Division	23	53	76	24	9	46	55	45	15	50	85	35
	State	25	53	77	23	11	48	59	41	9	45	55	45
<b>Limited English Proficient</b>	School	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	<	<
	Division	27	51	78	22	12	48	60	40	18	52	70	30
	State	25	51	77	23	15	47	62	38	15	44	59	41

(Extract showing results for English reading for Grade 3. The same information is provided for Mathematics, Science, History, and Social Science for Grade 3, English reading and Mathematics for Grade 4, English reading, English writing, Mathematics and Science for Grade 5, and Mathematics for Grade 7.)



## United States (cont.)

**Percentage of Core Academic Classes Taught by Teachers Not Meeting the Federal****Definition of Highly Qualified**

Virginia recognizes the importance of teacher quality in raising student achievement. This table provides the percentage of core academic classes taught by teachers teaching outside of their area of endorsement.

Percentage of Core Academic Classes Taught by Teachers Not Meeting the Federal Definition of Highly Qualified			
School type	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014
<b>School</b>			
This school	0	0	0
<b>Division</b>			
All Schools	2	2	2
High Poverty	0	1	1
Low Poverty	2	2	2
<b>State</b>			
All Schools	2	1	1
High Poverty	3	2	2
Low Poverty	1	1	1

Notes:  
 - High poverty means schools in the top quartile of poverty in the state.  
 - Low poverty means schools in the bottom quartile of poverty in the state.  
 - FCLE defines core academic subjects as: English, reading or language arts, mathematics, science, foreign languages, civics and government, economics, art, history and geography.

Key: < = A group below state definition for personally identifiable results.  
 - = No data for group  
 \* = Data not yet available

**Provisionally Licensed Teachers**

This table reports the percentage of teachers teaching with provisional or provisional special education credentials.

Provisionally Licensed Teachers			
Credential type	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014
<b>Division</b>			
Provisional	5	5	4
Provisional Special Education	1	1	0
<b>State</b>			
Provisional	4	5	5
Provisional Special Education	1	1	1

Key: < = A group below state definition for personally identifiable results.  
 - = No data for group  
 \* = Data not yet available

**Teacher Education Attainment**

This table reports the percentage of teachers with bachelor's, master's, or doctorate degrees by highest degree earned.

Teacher Education Attainment			
Degree type	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014
<b>School</b>			
Bachelor's Degree	35	31	30
Master's Degree	61	65	66
Doctoral Degree	4	4	4
<b>Division</b>			
Bachelor's Degree	26	26	26
Master's Degree	71	70	71
Doctoral Degree	3	3	3
<b>State</b>			
Bachelor's Degree	40	40	41
Master's Degree	57	57	56
Doctoral Degree	1	1	1

Key: < = A group below state definition for personally identifiable results.  
 - = No data for group  
 \* = Data not yet available

## United States (cont.)

### School - School Safety

Virginia's accreditation standards require school report cards to include information about school safety. The Offense Categories that are listed are the same as the offense categories defined in the Safe Schools Information Resource (SSIR) available on the VDOE Web site.

School - School Safety			
Offense Category	2011-2012	2012-2013	2013-2014
Weapons Offenses	<	<	<
Offenses Against Student	<	<	<
Offenses Against Staff	<	<	<
Other Offenses Against Persons	<	<	<
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Other Drug Offenses	<	<	<
Property Offenses	<	<	<
Disorderly or Disruptive Behavior Offenses	-	<	-
Technology Offenses	-	*	-
Other Offenses	-	-	-

Key: < = A group below state definition for personally identifiable results  
 - = No data for group  
 \* = Data not yet available

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## About the Book

In an era of growing public access to information, how can data be better used to encourage transparency and accountability in the education sector? This study looks at the case of school report cards (SRCs), examining various models and conditions in which they have succeeded in involving stakeholders and motivating them to make changes, and positively impacted the level of transparency and accountability in education systems.

Based on an in-depth review of 14 school report card initiatives from around the world, the study uses a comparative approach to examine the impact of factors such as information dissemination methods, formal or participatory approaches, reward or punishment mechanisms, and the incorporation of anti-corruption elements. It also looks at how, and to what extent, SRCs have been adapted to specific contexts, and explores some innovations introduced by stakeholders into the SRC process to reduce corruption.

The book includes the formulation of an index which aims to help policy-makers and programme implementers clearly identify which elements of school-level information can lead to increased accountability and transparency, and, as a result, make informed decisions about how to make the best use of SRCs to improve integrity in education.

## About the Authors

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