



THE
DIFFERENT
ASPECTS
OF ISLAMIC
CULTURE

VOLUME THREE

*The Spread
of Islam
throughout
the World*

Editors: Idris El Hareir
and El Hadji Ravane M'Baye



UNESCO Publishing

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U N E S C O

P u b l i s h i n g

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PREFACE

UNESCO's Constitution identifies "ignorance of each other's ways and lives" as the cause, throughout history, of mistrust between the peoples of the world. Since its founding, UNESCO's message has been one of valuing difference and rejoicing in diversity; one of building understanding and dialogue, while fighting discrimination and upholding human rights.

UNESCO's Histories project is one of the hallmarks of this ambition. *The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture* makes a seminal contribution to exploring the richness of Islamic civilization, and its immense contribution to the history of humanity. It was at its nineteenth session, in 1976, that the General Conference of UNESCO authorized the Director-General to take the necessary measures to publish this work.

The scope of these volumes is broad. They document the theological foundations of Islam, the status of the individual and society in the Islamic world, the expansion of Islam and the way in which the rights of converted peoples were preserved, the fundamental contribution of Islam to education, science and technology; and the cultural achievements of Islamic civilization, through literature, philosophy, art and architecture.

These volumes show how over the centuries Islam has been a driving force for the rapprochement of cultures, and provided a framework within which diverse cultures could flourish and interact.

This creative diversity, anchored within universal spiritual and cultural references and values, offered fertile ground for the dynamic development of scientific knowledge, artistic refinement and intellectual exchange that marked all the great Islamic civilizations.

In the Middle Ages, the influence of Islamic civilization was felt throughout the world. From the China Sea to the Atlantic coast of Africa, people who embraced Islam adopted a set of cultural and spiritual references while preserving their own identity. Muslim thinkers and scientists, drawing on the rich heritage of Greece, developed their own worldviews and influenced the emergence of the European Renaissance. Muslim philosophers, geographers, physicists, mathematicians, botanists and doctors made influential contributions to the adventure of science. Averroes taught at the University of Padua in Italy; knowledge travelled with no heed across borders. Islamic culture developed a conception of the individual and the universe, a philosophy of life and art that has profoundly shaped our common history.

I wish to thank the eminent scholars from the Islamic world who have contributed to this Collection and guaranteed its high scientific standards. It is my hope that this Collection, of which this is the fourth volume to appear, will encourage a more informed understanding of Islam, its culture, values and civilization, and promote intercultural dialogue and the rapprochement of cultures. I am also determined that the scholarship in these volumes reach a wide audience, because it is essential that young generations take pride in their heritage, in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Irina Bokova". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial 'I'.

Irina Bokova
Director-General of UNESCO

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INTRODUCTION

Idris El Hareir

Volume III of *The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture* deals with the historical and geographical development of Islam since the birth of the Prophet in AD 570, the appearance of the Islamic message with the revelation, and the efforts of the Prophet, his Companions, the Rightly Guided (or Orthodox) Caliphs, and the Umayyad, 'Abbāsīd and subsequent Islamic states to spread Islam in the Arabian peninsula and adjacent lands such as Syria, Iraq, Persia, the Maghrib and al-Andalus until it reached all parts of the inhabited world.

The volume is divided into six sections. Section I is devoted to a discussion of the Prophet, his efforts to propagate Islam in Arabia and the universality of the message of Islam, which aspires to be a global religion for all humanity. It is likewise concerned with the emergence of the Islamic *umma*, the establishment of the articles of faith, the government of Medina instituted by the Prophet and the policy of brotherhood among the Arab tribes, resulting in a strong and solid unity that had an impact on the subsequent spread of Islam. Similarly addressed are the Prophet's *hijra* (emigration) to Medina, the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya and the factors leading to the conquest of Mecca referred to in *sūrat an-Naṣr* and *sūrat al-Fath* in the Qur'ān. Section I also discusses the Islamic message carried beyond the Arabian peninsula through the correspondence and delegations sent by the Prophet to the kings and rulers of neighbouring states, Chosroes (Khusrau) of Persia, the Byzantine emperor Heraclius, the ruler of Egypt al-Muqawqis and the shaykhs and princes of the Arab tribes. It also deals with the *rida* (apostate) movement following the death of the Prophet and relates how the first caliph, Abū Bakr, was able to eradicate it. Section I also discusses the Islamic conquests in Iraq and Syria, the completion of the conquest of the Arabian peninsula and the reunification of all the tribes under the banner of Islam.

Section II is divided into five chapters. The first deals with the subject of *jihād*, analysing and defining the concept, its conditions, duties, legitimacy and goals, and explaining the difference between *jihād* and wars of expansion and aggression against others. The second chapter

discusses Islam in Syria (ash-Shām) from the Mu'ta raid to the famous battle of Yarmūk in 13/634¹ which determined the fate of Byzantine rule in the region, the conquest of Jerusalem and Palestine and the whole of Syria. The third chapter discusses the Islamic conquest of Iraq and the role of the battle of al-Qādisiyya in bringing about the downfall of the Sāsānid empire. A chapter is also devoted to the Islamic conquest of Egypt, Nubia and the Sudan, under the leadership of 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ, and the resulting conquest of the Arab West begun by 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ and completed by 'Uqba ibn Nāfi' and subsequent leaders such as Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr together with Ṭāriq ibn Ziyād who conquered al-Andalus. Section II concludes with a discussion of the spread of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa through trade and cultural relations, by missionaries, traders and Sufi orders.

Section III examines the global dimensions of the spread of Islam and the administrative, judicial and financial systems that were introduced, specifically the system of governance – the caliphate or imamate – and the principle of consultation. It then focuses on the interaction of Islam with other civilizations and cultures. One chapter is devoted to the caliphate and the sultanates. Another is concerned with the spread of Islam in the Maghrib and discusses the states which arose in this region and their role in the propagation and consolidation of the faith. It also discusses the educational and cultural institutions which arose in the capitals of these states, such as Kairouan, Fez, Tiaret, Sijilmāsa, al-Mahdiyya, Marrakesh and so on, and the role these centres played in the spread of Islam in North Africa and the Mediterranean. The third chapter, focusing on al-Andalus, deals with the reasons behind the conquest of the region, the brilliant civilization that arose there during the era of the Umayyad state and the impact of that civilization on various aspects of scientific, economic and cultural life in Europe, the effects of which are still evident in Spain today. The chapter dealing with Iran discusses the arrival of Islam in that country and how in a short period of time the majority of Persians were converted to the religion and went on to build a Persian-Islamic civilization. A chapter is also devoted to Islam in Asia Minor and another to Islam in Afghanistan, where a number of states formed which played a significant role in the spread of Islam and Islamic civilization on the Indian subcontinent, such as the Sāmānids, the Ṣaffārids and the Ghaznavids. The final chapter deals with Islam on the Indian subcontinent, where states, principalities and sultanates were formed which likewise played an important role in the spread of Islam and Islamic civilization there.

1 Dates separated by a slash (/) are given first according to the Muslim lunar calendar (AH), and then according to the Christian calendar (AD).

Section IV studies the spread of Islam throughout the world. The first chapter, divided into two parts, deals with the external challenges to Islam, including the Crusades launched against the heart of the Islamic world – Syria and Egypt – and also the Mongol invasion of the Islamic East. The following chapters are devoted to the arrival of Islam in South-East and Central Asia, the Far East and the Balkans, where the religion was spread by missionaries, traders and Sufi orders.

The final two sections, V and VI, review the spread of Islam in Eastern and South-East Europe; North, Central and South America; and Australia, New Zealand and the neighbouring islands. They focus on the competition between the colonial powers over the Islamic world, their impact upon it, and the Western powers' attempts to impose their secular rule on the colonized countries, leading to the fragmentation of these countries despite the fact that the Islamic message is universal and calls for Muslim unity.

The Epilogue highlights the conclusions to be drawn from the appearance of Islam as a major world religion and the consequent emergence of a global civilization which has intermingled with other civilizations and influenced the heritage of humanity by its brilliant achievements in all aspects of life.

I should like to thank UNESCO for its management, sponsorship and patient and wise monitoring of this project over long years until it came to fruition. I also extend my profuse thanks, appreciation and recognition to the World Islamic Call Society and its Secretary General, Dr Mohammed Ahmed Sherif, for their continued material and moral support without which the project would not have reached its successful conclusion.

Finally, I should like to offer my appreciation and gratitude to the members and secretariat of the project's scientific committee for their great efforts and constant patience, which have borne fruit with the appearance in print of these volumes. May God bless them all on our behalf and on behalf of all Muslims and peace-loving peoples.

We trust that the publication of this and the other volumes will lead to an understanding of the tolerant message of Islam: compassion and equality among humanity and peace for all.

– I –

THE ADVENT
OF THE PROPHET AND
THE ISLAMIZATION
OF ARABIA

Chapter 1.1

THE PROPHET MUḤAMMAD AND THE UNIVERSAL MESSAGE OF ISLAM

Bahjat Kamil Abd al-Latif

According to Muslims, Islam is the religion that God revealed to MuḤammad so that he could undertake a general religious reform. God sent His apostle with Islam so that the different communities and peoples might become acquainted with each other and establish contacts. It was to be a universal religion that would unite humanity. Thus, He made as its fundamental principle a belief in the other apostles of God and all their books.¹ God said:

Those who follow the Messenger, the unlettered Prophet, whom they find mentioned in their own scriptures, in the Torah and the Bible, he commands them to do good and forbids them from evil, he makes lawful for them what is good and makes unlawful for them what is bad, he releases them from their heavy burdens and from the yokes that are upon them. Those who believe in him, assist him and follow the light that is sent down with him, these are the ones who will be successful.²

1 MuḤammad Farīd Wajdī, *al-Muḥḥaf al-mufassar*, Tunis, Dār al-kitāb al-‘arabī, 1985, Introduction.

2 *Al-A‘rāf*, 7:156. See also *al-Aḥqāf*, 6:12; *Yūnus*, 10:37; *Yūsuf*, 12:111; *Tāhā*, 20:133; *ash-Shu‘arā’*, 26:197; *Fāṭir*, 45:31–3; *al-A‘lā*, 87:18–19; MuḤammad ‘Izza Durūzī, *Sīrat ar-rasūl ṣallā Allāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam: ṣūra muqtabasa min al-Qur’ān*, Beirut, al-Maktaba al-‘aṣriyya, AH 1400, pp. 333–453.

THE ADVENT OF THE PROPHET
AND THE ISLAMIZATION OF ARABIA

Knowledge of this crucial issue benefits Muslims because it shows them to be the followers not of one religion among the other religions, but rather of the religion which brings together all the other religions. In this way, Muslims find within themselves a value of which they were previously unaware because they see themselves as universal human beings, not isolated individuals, following a religion which is for everyone: 'The religion before God is Islam.'³

Muslims will not be prejudiced against the other revealed religions since they have been instructed to believe in all of them:

The Messenger believed in what was revealed to him from his Lord, as do men of faith. All of them believe in God, His angels, His books and His apostles. 'We make no distinction between His apostles' [they say]. They say: 'We hear and we obey. We seek Your forgiveness our Lord, and to You is the end of all destiny.'⁴

Muslims will adopt a balanced view of the other religions: 'Thus We have made of you a community which is justly balanced so that you might be witnesses over the people while the Apostle is a witness over you.'⁵

So as to become acquainted with the nature of the Islamic mission and its historical development in its first home, Mecca, it is necessary to deal briefly with the geographic, economic, religious, political and social conditions that affected Meccan society in particular and the Arabian peninsula in general. We must deal with the difficulties and obstacles that faced the call to monotheism during the Meccan period. We must also reveal the physical and spiritual torment suffered by the first Muslims that forced the leader of the mission, the Prophet Muḥammad, to search for new places in which to spread Islam, to inform all the communities and peoples of it, so as to realize the words of God: 'We have sent you to all people to give them good tidings and to warn them.'⁶

Mecca is situated in a valley that has no agriculture. It lies in the midst of bare rugged mountains, which make its environment even harsher. To the east is the mountain of Abū Qubays while to the west it is bordered by the Qayqu'ān mountain. These two mountains extend in a crescent shape and surround Mecca. The low-lying area of the valley is known as al-Baḥḥā' and on this is situated the Ancient House (i.e. the Ka'ba) around which were the houses of the Quraysh (see Figure 1.1).⁷ The high ground

3 *Āl 'Imrān*, 3:19.

4 *Al-Baqara*, 2:285.

5 *Ibid.*, 2:143.

6 *Saba'*, 34:28.

7 D. A. King, 'Makka', in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1991, VI, p. 144.

THE PROPHET MUḤAMMAD
AND THE UNIVERSAL MESSAGE OF ISLAM

is known as al-Ma‘lāh and here were the simple houses of the ‘Quraysh of the Outskirts’ (*Quraysh az-ẓawāhir*), who were poor warlike Arabs living at either end of the crescent-shaped mountains.⁸ The only water in Mecca was the well of Zamzam, excavated along with other wells that had been dug by the inhabitants.⁹

The historical accounts agree that the first people to live in Mecca were the Amelikites. After them came the Jurhum, who were from the Qaḥṭānī tribe in Yemen¹⁰ and one of whom was taken in marriage by Ismā‘īl ibn Ibrāhīm (Ishmael, the son of Abraham). Arab genealogists ascribe the origins of the Quraysh to Ibrāhīm since they are said to descend from his son Ismā‘īl whom his father sent along with his mother to live in this barren valley:

O my Lord, I have made some of my offspring dwell in a valley without cultivation, by Your Sacred House, in order that they may establish prayer. So fill the hearts of some men with love for them and feed them with fruits so that they might give thanks.¹¹

Following this, the Khuzā‘a tribe usurped the rule of the Jurhum, then Quṣay seized power from the Khuzā‘a¹² with the assistance of the Banū Kināna and the Banū Quḍā‘a. Quṣay is said to have been the first to divide the Quraysh into clans and to distinguish between the ‘Quraysh of the Outskirts’ and the ‘Inner or Valley Quraysh’ (*Quraysh al-biṭāh*).¹³ This division was still in existence at the time of the appearance of Islam. Quṣay was also the first to become a ruler among the Quraysh and to gain the allegiance of his people. Thus, he was in charge of the keys of the Ka‘ba, feeding the pilgrims and supplying them with water, presiding over the Quraysh council, and appointing the Quraysh standard-bearer and commanding their army in times of war. He was honoured by the whole of Mecca.¹⁴ A poet says of him:

8 Akram Ḍiyā’-ad-Dīn al-‘Amrī, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya aṣ-ṣaḥīḥa*, Medina, Maktabat al-‘ulūm wa-l-ḥikam, 1413/1993, I, p. 77.

9 Abu-l-Walīd Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdallāh al-Azraqī, *Akhbār Makka*, ed. Rushdī aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Milḥis, Mecca, al-Maṭba‘a al-mājidīyya, 1357/1938, II, pp. 39ff., 214–27.

10 Ibid., I, p. 88; Jawād ‘Alī, *al-Mufaṣṣal fī tārikh al-‘Arab qabl al-islām*, Baghdad, Maktabat an-nahḍa al-‘arabiyya, 1980, III, pp. 12–14.

11 *Ibrāhīm*, 14:37.

12 Muḥammad ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*, Cairo, Dār at-taḥrīr, 1388/1968, I, Part 1, pp. 36ff.; al-Azraqī, *Akhbār Makka*, I, p. 92.

13 Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad ibn Ḥabīb, *al-Muḥabbar*, ed. Ilse Lichtenstadter, Beirut, Dār al-āfāq, n.d., pp. 167–8.

14 Sa‘īd al-Afghānī, *Aswāq al-‘Arab fi-l-jāhiliyya wa-l-islām*, Beirut, Dār al-fikr, 1392/1974, p. 97.

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Their father is Quṣay. He used to summon a council
In which God united all the tribes of Fihṛ.
They settled here even though water was scarce
And there was no one except the old men of the Banū ‘Amr.¹⁵

Quṣay confirmed the Arabs in their lifestyle since he viewed it as a religion in itself and something that need not be changed. He turned his house into both a consultative council for the Quraysh and also a government building, calling it *dār an-nadwa* (the council house).¹⁶ Quṣay wanted to instil fear of the Quraysh into the hearts of the Arabs so he imposed a tax upon them that was deducted from their assets every season.¹⁷

When Quṣay became very advanced in years he entrusted his son ‘Abd-ad-Dār with the duties of appointing the standard-bearer of the Quraysh, and feeding the pilgrims and supplying them with water. The Banū ‘Abd-ad-Dār and the Banū ‘Abd Manāf subsequently quarrelled over the honour of fulfilling these responsibilities; both gathered support and they were on the verge of war. The Banū ‘Abd-ad-Dār and their supporters concluded a treaty of alliance next to the Ka‘ba and were thus called the *Ahlāf* (the Confederates). The Banū ‘Abd Manāf and their supporters formed a coalition called the *Ḥilf al-Muṭayyabīn* (the Alliance of the Perfumed Ones).¹⁸

Eventually, the two parties agreed that the Banū ‘Abd Manāf would have responsibility for feeding and supplying the pilgrims with water while the tasks of holding the keys of the Ka‘ba, presiding over the council and appointing the standard-bearer of the Quraysh in times of war fell to the Banū ‘Abd-ad-Dār. This situation persisted until the appearance of Islam. In this way, leadership of the Quraysh remained in the hands of Quṣay’s offspring.

Due to the desert environment and the rocky terrain around Mecca, no agriculture was possible in the region. The inhabitants were thus forced to import the foodstuffs they needed from other places in the peninsula and

15 Al-Azraqī, *Akḥbār Makka*, I, p. 108.

16 Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd-al-Malik ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī-ad-Dīn ‘Abd-al-Ḥamīd, Cairo, Maṭba‘at al-madanī, 1383/1963, I, p. 82; Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥamīdullāh, Cairo, Dār al-ma‘ārif, 1959, I, p. 52; Khaḍir ‘Abbās al-Jamīlī, *Qabīlat Quraysh wa atharuhā fi-l-ḥayāt al-‘arabiyya qabl al-islām*, Baghdad, Maṭba‘at al-majma‘ al-‘ilmī al-‘irāqī, 1422/2002, p. 32.

17 When the pilgrimage season arrived, Quṣay would call out: ‘O people of the Quraysh, you are neighbours of God, the people of His House and of His sacred sanctuary. The pilgrim is the guest of God and a visitor to His House. He is the most worthy guest to receive honour. So provide food and drink for them during the pilgrimage until they depart from you.’ Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, I, p. 84. Al-Balādhurī attributes this saying to Hāshim. See al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, I, p. 60.

18 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, I, pp. 85–7; Ibn Ḥabīb, *al-Muḥabbar*, p. 166; al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, I, pp. 56–7.

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1.1 Miniature showing the ascension of the Prophet MuḤammad (© Tehran Museum of Contemporary Arts, Iran)

from abroad and to be content with what they earned from the pilgrims. This income was supplemented with profits from trade which guaranteed their livelihood, peace and security. Since their situation was not one to be envied, no one interfered with their way of life.¹⁹

Mecca was situated in the middle of the caravan route which ran parallel with the Red Sea (*Baḥr al-Qulzum*) between Yemen and Palestine. There were three routes into the town: one from Yemen, one which ran near the Red Sea by the port of Jeddah, and one leading to Iraq, Syria and Palestine (see Figure 1.2). Indeed, Mecca owes its survival and that of its inhabitants to its location. It was a focal point for all the caravans passing on their way from the south of the peninsula to ash-Shām (Syria-Palestine), or coming from ash-Shām on their way to Yemen.²⁰

At the end of the sixth century AD, the merchants of Mecca had come to monopolize all trade in the western part of the peninsula and they controlled the movement of goods between Yemen, Greater Syria and Iraq.²¹ They acquired an excellent reputation in mercantile activities and by virtue of being inhabitants of the holy sanctuary they held a special place in the hearts of the Arabs, who therefore showed neither them nor their trade any ill will: ‘Do they not see that We have made a safe sanctuary and that people



19 ‘Alī, *al-Mufaṣṣal*, III, p. 5.

20 *Ibid.*, I, p. 6.

21 William Montgomery Watt, *Muḥammad fī Makka*, translated from the original English by ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ash-Shaykh Ḥusayn ‘Īsā, ed. Aḥmad Shalaby, Cairo, al-Hay’a al-miṣriyya li-l-kitāb, 2002, p. 52.

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1.2 Main trade routes on the Arabian peninsula before Islam (© UNESCO)

are being snatched away from around them? Do they believe in that which is worthless and reject the grace of God?’²²

In order to safeguard the position of Mecca, its trade and its further development, Hāshim ibn ‘Abd Manāf ibn Quṣay ibn Kilāb ibn Murra (d. AD 524) made alliances with the neighbouring lands. He was the first to establish such treaties: ‘For the covenants [of security and safeguard enjoyed] by the Quraysh, Their covenants [covering] journeys by winter and summer, Let them worship the Lord of this House, Who provides them with food against hunger and security against fear.’²³

Aṭ-Ṭabarī (d. 310/922)²⁴ mentions that the sons of ‘Abd Manāf:

were the first to obtain an *‘iṣam* [charter or treaty] on behalf of the Quraysh. They went out from the sanctuary acquiring charters. Hāshim obtained a charter

22 *Al-‘Ankabūt*, 29:67; ‘Alī Muḥammad aṣ-Ṣallābī, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya : ‘arḍ waqā’i’ wa taḥlīl aḥdāth*, Beirut, Dār al-ma’rifa, 1428/2006, p. 26.

23 *Quraysh*, 106:1–4.

24 Dates separated by a slash (/) are given first according to the Muslim lunar calendar (AH), and then according to the Christian calendar (AD).

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for the Quraysh from the kings of Byzantium, ash-Shām and Ghassān, ‘Abd Shams obtained a charter from the Great Negus ... Nawfal obtained a charter from Chosroes ... al-Muṭṭalib obtained a charter from the kings of Ḥimyar ... Thus, God restored the fortunes of the Quraysh with the sons of ‘Abd Manāf and they are therefore called ‘the restorers’.²⁵

If this account is correct, it appears that the family of ‘Abd Manāf had a monopoly over trade and had become the biggest merchants in Mecca. With their policy of obtaining charters they were able to form business partnerships and on this basis they conducted their mercantile activities and made great profits.²⁶ In order to protect the transportation of goods between Mecca, ash-Shām, Iraq and Yemen, the family of ‘Abd Manāf made agreements with the tribesmen living along the Meccan trade routes and exercised control over the bedouin. Thus, they were able to travel freely and in peace and security from Mecca and the nearby markets to their intended destinations (see Figure 1.3).²⁷ In this way the localized and limited commercial activities of the Quraysh were transformed and came to embrace foreign parts. The tribe’s status grew and it established relations with the neighbouring lands.

This trade increased the prosperity of the inhabitants of Mecca and they became very wealthy. They were therefore eager to maintain the status of their town which brought them such opulence and almost unimaginable luxuries. Many of them were much given to wine drinking and found great satisfaction in enjoying the concubines and slaves whom they bought and sold. This made them more eager to do as they pleased and for the freedom of their town. They enjoyed nothing better than to gather and drink in the middle of Mecca around the Ka‘ba.²⁸ There were other well-known ways in which the Meccan merchants would relax. For example, they would go to places with mild temperatures situated on higher lands, such as the town of aṭ-Ṭā’if, so as to escape the heat of Mecca. In the evening they would make their way to a place called al-Uḡḡuwāna on the plane of al-Līṭ to talk while wearing colourful and perfumed clothes. Indeed, it was because of their fine clothes that their meeting place was called al-Uḡḡuwāna (‘Daisy’ or ‘Camomile’).²⁹

25 Muḥammad ibn Jarīr aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh ar-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad Abu-l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Cairo, Dār al-ma‘ārif, n.d., II, p. 252. See also Ibn Ḥabīb, *al-Muḥabbar*, pp. 162–3.


26 ‘Alī, *al-Mufaṣṣal*, III, pp. 70ff.

27 Al-Afghānī, *Aswāq al-‘Arab*, pp. 146ff.

28 Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal, *Ḥayāt Muḥammad*, Cairo, Dār al-‘ilm, n.d., p. 103.

29 Al-Azraqī, *Akhbār Makka*, II, p. 279; Jawād ‘Alī, *Tārīkh al-‘Arab fi-l-islām*, Beirut, Dār al-ḥadātha, n.d./Baghdad: Maktabat an-nahḍa al-‘arabiyya, 1983, p. 79.

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1.3 Tribal regions and alliances in the Arabian peninsula before Islam
(© UNESCO)

As for the majority of people in Mecca, they were called the *khadrā'* of the Quraysh, that is, 'the common folk who owned nothing'. It was even difficult for them to get bread made from barley, and their homes were constructed from branches or camel or goat skins and such like. This disparity in living standards inevitably led to alienation and envy between the two classes, the rich and the poor.³⁰

Mecca also had a class of people who were not as wealthy as the leaders and other members of the Quraysh but who were rich compared to the vast majority of citizens. This class was represented by usurers of independent means who gave loans to the needy at high rates of interest; by small merchants who engaged in foreign trade either with their own money, with other people's money or on credit; and by craftsmen who produced their own goods and managed their own businesses. They all possessed a number

30 See 'Alī, *Tārīkh al-'Arab*, p. 80, who describes the rich Meccans as 'severe, callous and coarse. They only think about themselves. They do not give anyone their due. They have no compassion or sympathy for the weak. They usurp the wealth of orphans, the powerless and the vulnerable. They are moved by no conscience nor affected by the pain of others.'

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of servants and slaves whom they bought from the slave markets to serve their master and work for him.³¹

The wealthy folk, those of standing and esteem, were the thinkers among the people and their spokesmen. Everything they said was good, and every word of wisdom or statement they uttered was acted upon. As for the masses, as the Qur'ān explains, they merely followed. They had no opinions and their voice was not heard. They did what they were told and obeyed their leaders and their betters: 'And they would say, "Our Lord, we obeyed our leaders and our betters but they led us on the wrong path. Our Lord, give them a double penalty and curse them with a great curse. "'³²

And: 'The weak say to those who are arrogant: "We followed you ..."'³³
And again: 'They will argue with each other in the Fire! The weak ones who followed will say to those who were arrogant: "But we followed you. Can you therefore take from us some share of the Fire? "'³⁴

Some of these leaders were extremely harsh and cruel. Thus, if a slave became old and weak and was no longer able to work, his master would neglect him and leave him to fend for himself. Such things inevitably had an effect on the lower classes and made them ask their gods to release them from their plight, improve their lot or at least help them retain some of their strength.³⁵

The worship of idols and graven images was particularly common among the Meccans and indeed throughout the Arabian peninsula. At a time when Mecca and the Arabs had achieved more renown than either during the pre-Islamic period or subsequently, there are reports that 'Amr ibn Luḥay acquired an idol called Hubal from a place called Hīt. He had it set up inside the Ka'ba and ordered people to worship and glorify it.³⁶ He was the first to change the true religion of Abraham. The Arabs in Mecca did as he ordered, followed him and did not challenge him, and thus erred greatly. On this, a poet from the Jurhum tribe who adhered to the religion of Abraham and Ishmael recited:

O 'Amr, do not commit injustices in Mecca. It is a sacred place.
Ask 'Ād where they are. And respect the people
And the Amelikites who had livestock in Mecca.

31 Watt, *Muḥammad fī Makka*, p. 52; 'Alī, *Tārīkh al-'Arab*, p. 80; al-Jamīlī, *Qabīlat Quraysh*, pp. 37–9.

32 *Al-Aḥzāb*, 33:67–8.

33 *Ibrāhīm*, 14:21.

34 *Ghāfir*, 40:47.

35 'Alī, *Tārīkh al-'Arab*, p. 86.

36 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, I, pp. 43–5; Abu-l-Qāsim as-Suhaylī, *ar-Rawḍ al-unuf fī tafsīr as-sīra an-nabawīyya l-Ibn Hishām*, Beirut, Dār al-fikr, 1409/1989, I, p. 151.

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God rebukes the Meccans for this idolatry in a number of verses in the Qur'ān. He says: 'Do not say for any lies that your tongues may utter: "This is lawful, and this is forbidden" so as to ascribe false things to God. Those who ascribe false things to God will never prosper.'³⁷

Only a few practices of the religion of Abraham remained, such as venerating the Ka'ba and circumambulating it, the major pilgrimage (*hajj*) and the minor pilgrimage (*'umra*), standing on Mount 'Arafat, spending the night in Muzdalifa and making sacrifice. But the Meccans also introduced practices that were alien to it. Thus, they used to go round the Ka'ba naked and raising their voices.³⁸ In the time of the Prophet there were 360 idols around the Ka'ba (see Figure 1.4). When Muḥammad came with monotheism and the religion of truth they rebuked him because of this, as stated in the Qur'ān: 'Has He made the gods into one God? This is truly a strange thing!'³⁹

The Arabs also venerated other structures alongside the Ka'ba which had their own custodians and people in charge of the keys. They made dedications to them, circumambulated them and made sacrifices to them.⁴⁰ The Qur'ān refers to these structures in the following verse: 'Have you not seen those who were given a portion of the Book? They believe in sorcery and in false idols.'⁴¹ The Qur'ān also contains a reference to those who worship the jinn: 'They will say: "Glory to You! You are our Protector and not them." But they worshipped the jinn. Most of them believed in these.'⁴²

In addition to the worship of idols, the Arabs also worshipped the stars and the planets, especially in Ḥarrān, Baḥrain and the desert, while in Yemen they worshipped the sun. This was encouraged by the fact that some of the sects of the Magians and the Persians entered Arab lands. A few of the Quraysh tribesmen adopted heretical views (*zandaqa*) that they acquired from Ḥīra. Elsewhere, Judaism was found among the Banū Kināna, the Banu l-Ḥārith and the Banū Kinda,⁴³ while Christianity had spread in the southern Arab lands and was adopted by some of the clans of the Quraysh, such as the

37 *An-Nahl*, 16:116; see also *al-An'ām*, 6:136–40; 'Imād-ad-Dīn ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa-n-nihāya*, ed. Aḥmad Abū Muḥim et al., Beirut, Dār al-kutub al-'ilmiyya, 1408/1988, II, pp. 173–5.

38 For more details, see Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, I, pp. 50ff.; Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya'qūb al-Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh al-Ya'qūbī*, Beirut, Dār ṣādir, 1379/1960, pp. 254–5.

39 *Ṣād*, 38:5. See also Ṣāliḥ Aḥmad al-'Alī, *Tārīkh al-'Arab al-qadīm wa-l-ba'tha an-nabawīyya*, Beirut, Sharikat al-maṭbū'at li-n-nashr wa-t-tawzī', 2000, p. 16.


40 Ibn Ḥabīb, *al-Muḥabbar*, pp. 315–19; Maḥdī Rizqallāh Aḥmad, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya fī daw' al-maṣādir al-aṣliyya: dirāsa taḥlīliyya*, Riyadh, Maṭba'at markaz al-malik Fayṣal li-l-buḥūth wa-d-dirāsāt al-islāmiyya, 1412/1974, p. 69.

41 *An-Nisā'*, 4:51, 60, 76. See also *al-Baqara*, 2:256–7; *al-Mā'ida*, 5:60; *an-Naml*, 27:36; *az-Zumar*, 39:17.

42 *Saba'*, 34:41. See also *aṣ-Ṣāffāt*, 37:158.

43 'Abdallāh ibn Muslim ibn Qutayba, *Kitāb al-ma'ārif*, ed. Tharwat 'Akāsha, Cairo, Maṭba'at dār al-kutub, 1960, p. 621.

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1.4 Main idols in pre-Islamic Arabia (© UNESCO)

1	Wad	12	Al‘uzzā	23	Dhu-l-Khalaṣa(h)
2	Fals	13	Nuhm	24	Ya‘ūq
3	Al-Ya‘būb	14	Suwā‘	25	Nasr
4	Bājir/Bājar	15	Sa‘d	26	Ri‘ām
5	Al‘uqayṣir	16	Dhu-l-kaffayn	27	‘Umyāns
6	‘Ab‘ab	17	Dhu-sh-Sharā	28	Marḥab
7	Dhu-l-ka‘bāt	18	‘Ā‘im	29	Yaghūth
8	Al-Muḥriq	19	Sa‘īr	30	Dhu-l-libā
9	Ruḍā	20	‘Īsāf	31	Zariḥ
10	Manāt	21	Nā‘ila(h)		
11	Allāt	22	Hubal		

Banū Asad ibn ‘Abd-al-‘Uzzā, along with some of the clans of the Quḍā‘a. Only a few wise and judicious Arabs continued to adhere to the true religion of Abraham.⁴⁴

The Qur‘ān provides a clear picture of the religious beliefs of the Meccans and the other Arabs. The polytheists knew God: ‘If you ask them who has created the heavens and the earth and subjected the sun and the moon, they will

44 Muḥammad Shukrī al-Alūsī, *Bulūgh al-arab fī ma‘rifat aḥwāl al-‘Arab*, ed. Muḥammad Bahjat al-Atharī, Cairo, Maṭābi‘ dār al-kitāb al-‘arabī, AH 1342, II, pp. 244ff. Among the followers of the true religion were Qus ibn Sā‘ida al-Iyādī, Zayd ibn ‘Amr ibn Nawfal, Warāqa ibn Nawfal, Umayya ibn Abī-ṣ-Ṣalt and Labīd Abī Rabī‘a.

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reply "God". How are they then deceived about the truth?'⁴⁵ But they ascribed partners to Him: 'They have set up idols as equal to God to mislead men from His path. Say: "Enjoy your power, but you are heading for hell!"'⁴⁶ Most of these partners were thought to be the daughters of God: 'They assign daughters to God! Glory be to Him, While they desire sons for themselves!'⁴⁷

They stated that the gods they were worshipping were not of the same status as the Almighty but were of lesser rank and position, and that they were intercessors with God for those who worship them:

Besides God they serve that which will neither do them harm nor benefit them. They say: 'These are the intercessors with God.' Say: 'Are you informing God of something He does not know in the heavens and on earth? He is far above the partners they ascribe to Him.'⁴⁸

Aside from the worship of idols and graven images which was practised in Arab lands and influenced their intellectual, cultural, social and economic structure, another prevalent feature of the Arabian peninsula was the tribal system based on the bonds of kinship since this constituted the principal means of ensuring survival in harsh desert conditions. The tribe was based on family relations whether on the male or the female side.⁴⁹

The tribe is a community of people who descend, or claim descent, from a common ancestor and who usually live in the same locality. The members of the tribe have joint responsibilities for defence and for paying blood money. Indeed, the distinguishing feature of the tribe is that all its members contribute to the paying of blood money. It is difficult to say how many tribes there were in the Arabian peninsula since they were not permanent entities but rather amalgamated to form larger units or became subdivided, diminished in size or disappeared altogether. Nevertheless, subgroups within the tribe always remained connected to the mother tribe through the blood relations of which they were very proud.⁵⁰ In Mecca, tribes, clans or families were usually referred to by the term 'Banū [sons of] such-and-such'. In this

45 *Al-'Ankabūt*, 29:61. See also *Yūnus*, 10:24; *an-Nahl*, 16:53-4; *al-Mu'minūn*, 23:84-9; *an-Naml*, 27:60-4; *Fāṭir*, 45:42.

46 *Ibrāhīm*, 14:30. See also *al-Baqara*, 2:165; *Yūsuf*, 12:106; *ar-Ra'd*, 13:16; *Saba'*, 34:33; *Ghāfir*, 40:12; *Fuṣṣilat*, 41:9.

47 *An-Nahl*, 16:57. See also *al-An'ām*, 6:100; *al-Isrā'*, 17:39-40; *Maryam*, 19:149-53; *az-Zukhruf*, 43:15-18.

48 *Yūnus*, 10:18. See also *az-Zumar*, 39:43.

49 Aḥmad Ibrāhīm ash-Sharīf, *Makka wa-l-Madīna fi-l-jāhiliyya wa 'ahd ar-Rasūl*, Cairo, Dār al-fikr al-'arabī, 1965, p. 23.

50 'Alī, *Tārīkh al-'Arab*, p. 91; al-'Alī, *Tārīkh al-'Arab al-qadīm*, p. 163.

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particular period of Meccan history, the words ‘Banū ‘Abd Manāf’ were often on people’s lips.⁵¹

The tribe was composed of original ‘pure’ members, allies and slaves. It held meetings which constituted the council and that every member could attend to voice his opinions. During these meetings there were debates on various subjects and discussions on issues of relevance to the tribe. Here also, poets would recite their verses, orators would display their talents and people would listen to wonderful stories and hear interesting pieces of news.

The men had authority over the house, women, and children before puberty,⁵² although women also had a very important role to play appropriate to their duties.⁵³ The tribe was led by one of its male members, a man who possessed some of the qualities that lent vigour to bedouin society, such as courage, chivalry, intelligence and generosity.⁵⁴

In short, in the period before MuḤammad received his prophetic mission, the Arabian peninsula was in religious, political, social and economic turmoil. Mecca has been described as:

an important centre in the Ḥijāz. It possessed a special sanctity and status in the world of finance and trade in the west of the peninsula. At that time it was controlled by pre-Islamic practices such as boasting of one’s genealogy and noble descent, of one’s wealth and standing. There was a common tendency for the strong to oppress the weak and for the rich to oppress the poor.⁵⁵

Ibn Ishāq states that God sent MuḤammad:

as a mercy for the worlds and for all people. He made a covenant for him with all the prophets He had sent before to believe in him, trust in him and help him against those who opposed him. He charged them to do the same with those who had faith in them and trusted them. They did what He had told them to do.⁵⁶

God says to MuḤammad:

Behold, God took the covenant of the prophets, saying: ‘I give you a Book and wisdom. A messenger comes to you confirming what is with you. Believe in him and offer him help.’ God said: ‘Do you agree to take this covenant as binding

51 Watt, *MuḤammad fī Makka*, p. 71.

52 For further details, see ‘Alī, *al-Mufaṣṣal*, III, pp. 298ff.

53 Al-‘Alī, *Tārīkh al-‘Arab al-qadīm*, pp. 171–2; aṣ-Ṣallābī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, pp. 27–9.

54 Al-Alūsī, *Bulūgh al-arab*, II, pp. 187–8; al-‘Alī, *Tārīkh al-‘Arab al-qadīm*, pp. 190, 191.

55 ‘Alī, *Tārīkh al-‘Arab*, p. 91; ash-Sharīf, *Makka wa-l-Madīna*, pp. 229–41.

56 MuḤammad ibn Ishāq, *Kitāb as-siyar wa-l-maghāzī*, ed. Suhayl Zakkār, Beirut, 1398/1978, p. 129.

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upon you?’ They replied: ‘We do.’ He said: ‘Then bear witness, and I am a witness with you.’⁵⁷

At the beginning of Muḥammad’s mission the message of Islam was based on three principles of faith. These were belief in God and His power (monotheism), belief that Divine Providence had chosen Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdallāh from among all humankind to be the Messenger of God to the people, and confirmation of the role of the archangel Gabriel in transmitting the divine message through revelation.⁵⁸

When the Prophet of God began to summon people to the word of Islam it was obvious that he would turn initially to his family, his clan and his friends because, as previously mentioned, Mecca was a tribal society. Appealing to his clan first might give him more chance of success as well as provide him with support and protection. Similarly, undertaking the mission in Mecca would certainly be advantageous since the town was an important religious centre and if it embraced Islam this would have a great influence on the other tribes (see Figure 1.5). This does not mean that in its initial stages the Islamic message was restricted to the Quraysh. On the contrary, as the Qur’ānic verses clearly state, the Quraysh were a first step towards delivering a universal message. God says: ‘It is nothing less than a message to all the worlds.’⁵⁹ This demonstrates that the idea of a universal message was present from the very beginning. God also says: ‘Praise be to God, the Lord of the worlds.’⁶⁰

The Qur’ān uses the term ‘worlds’ in the sense of ‘all-encompassing’ or ‘universal’ 73 times: 15 mentions occur in Medinan *sūras*, and 58 in Meccan *sūras*.⁶¹ Elsewhere, the Qur’ān addresses the human being (*al-insān*) in 65 *sūras*: 55 times in Meccan *sūras* and 10 times in Medinan *sūras*. God says: ‘We have created the human being [*al-insān*] in the best of moulds.’⁶² People (*nās*) are mentioned in 242 *sūras*: 115 times in Meccan *sūras* and the

57 *Āl ‘Imrān*, 3:81.

58 Hashim Yahya al-Mallah, *al-Wasīṭ fi-s-sīra an-nabawīyya wal-l-khilāfa ar-rāshida*, Mosul, Maṭba‘at jāmi‘at al-Mawṣil, 1991, p. 110.


59 *Al-Qalam*, 68:52; *at-Takwīr*, 81:27. See also ‘Imād-ad-Dīn ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘aẓīm*, Beirut, Dār wa maktabat al-hilāl, 1986, VI, p. 358.

60 *Al-Fātiḥa*, 1:2. See also Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr*, I, pp. 35–6. What is probably meant here by ‘the worlds’ is the world of human beings and the world of the jinn. See Jamāl-ad-Dīn ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-‘Arab*, eds Yūsuf Khayyāṭ and Nadīm Mar‘ashlī, Beirut, Dār lisān al-‘Arab, 1970, under ‘ayn lām mīm.

61 The *sūras* are *al-Fātiḥa*, 1:2; *al-An‘ām*, 6:45, 71, 86, 90, 162; *al-A‘rāf*, 7:54, 61, 67, 80, 104, 121, 140; *Yūnus*, 10:10, 37; *Yūsuf*, 12:109; *al-Ḥijr*, 15:70; *al-Anbiyā’*, 21:71, 91, 107; *al-Furqān*, 25:1; *ash-Shu‘arā’*, 26:16, 23, 47, 77, 98, 109, 127, 145, 164, 180, 192; *an-Nahl*, 16:8, 44; *al-Qaṣas*, 28:30; *al-‘Ankabūt*, 29:15, 28; *as-Sajda*, 32:2; *aṣ-Ṣāffāt*, 37:79, 87, 182; *Ṣād*, 38:87; *az-Zumar*, 39:75; *Ghāfir*, 40:64, 65, 66; *Fuṣṣilat*, 41:9; *az-Zukhruf*, 43:46; *ad-Dukhkhān*, 44:32; *al-Jāthiya*, 45:16, 36; *at-Takwīr*, 81:27, 29; *al-Muṭaffifūn*, 83:6. See Muḥammad Fu‘ād ‘Abd-al-Bāqī, *al-Mu‘jam al-mufahras li alfāz al-Qur’ān*, Beirut, Dār al-Andalus, 1364/1945, pp. 480–1.

62 *At-Tīn*, 95:4. See also ‘Abd-al-Bāqī, *al-Mu‘jam al-mufahras*, pp. 93–4.

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1.5 Internal alliances of the Quraysh

- Alliance of the Virtuous
 Alliance of the Perfumed Ones
 Alliance of the Bloodlickers
 Alliance of the 'Adiy and Sahn
 Alliance of the Sahn and Jumah

remainder in Medinan *sūras*: ‘Say: “O people, I am the Messenger of God for all of you.”’⁶³

At the same time, a number of verses in the Qur’ān indicate that the apostles and prophets were sent to their peoples to lead them from error into the light. They strove to achieve justice and to warn them of the penalty if they did not take heed of the summons. As God says: ‘We sent Noah to his people. He said: “O my people, worship God. You have no other god but Him. I fear for you the punishment of a terrible day.”’⁶⁴ He also says: ‘We sent Hūd to the people of ‘Ād, one of their own brethren. He said: “O my people, worship God. You have no other god but Him. Will you not fear God?”’⁶⁵

Muḥammad’s mission to his people contained both threats and promises, and he continued on his course summoning the servants of God one after the other while they obstinately refused to renounce their polytheism and their error. He told them who would receive a praiseworthy end in the hereafter. God says: ‘Say: “O my people, do whatever you can, and I will do my part.

63 *Al-A‘rāf*, 7:158. See also ‘Abd-al-Bāqī, *al-Mu‘jam al-mufahras*, pp. 726–9.

64 *Al-A‘rāf*, 7:59.

65 *Ibid.*, 7:65. See also *al-A‘rāf*, 7:67, 69, 73, 85, 93; *Yūnus*, 10:71, 84; *Hūd*, 11:28, 29, 30, 50, 51, 52; *al-Mu‘minūn*, 23:23; *an-Naḥl*, 16:46; *al-‘Ankabūt*, 29:36; *Yā Sīn*, 36:20; *az-Zumar*, 39:39; *Ghāfir*, 40:29, 30, 32, 38, 39, 41; *az-Zukhruf*, 43:51; *Nūh*, 71:2.

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You will know whose end is best in the hereafter. Certainly, the unjust will not prosper.”⁶⁶

After Muḥammad’s wife Khadīja, ‘Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib (his cousin who was raised in his house) and Zayd ibn al-Ḥāritha al-Kalbī (his *marwā* or client, and the first of his kind to become a Muslim)⁶⁷ had all embraced Islam, the Prophet took his message outside of his home. Abū Bakr ibn Abī Qaḥāfa was the first free man to believe in him and he belonged to the Banū Taym ibn Murra ibn Ka‘b ibn Lu‘ay ibn Ghālib ibn Fihr. Concerning him the Prophet said: ‘Everyone I summoned to Islam faltered, had to think about it and were reluctant, all except Abū Bakr ibn Abī Qaḥāfa. He did not turn away from it nor waver when I mentioned it to him.’⁶⁸ Ibn Hishām remarks:

Other people who embraced Islam at Muḥammad’s summons, as I have been informed, were ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān ibn Ka‘b ibn ‘Abd Shams ibn ‘Abd Manāf ... and az-Zubayr ibn al-‘Awwām ibn Khuwaylid ibn Asad ibn ‘Abd-al-‘Uzzā ... and ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn ‘Awf ibn ‘Abd ‘Awf ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥārith ibn Zuhra ... and Sa‘d ibn Abī Waqqāṣ ... ibn ‘Abd Manāf ibn Zuhra ... and Ṭalḥa ibn ‘Ubaydallāh ibn ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Amr ibn Ka‘b ibn Sa‘d ibn Taym ... God brought them to the Prophet when they responded to him and they embraced Islam and prayed.⁶⁹

One might have expected Islam to take root first in the clan to which the Prophet belonged and then in his tribe the Quraysh. From the list of the first Muslims, however, it is clear that the spread of Islam had nothing to do with clan or tribal affiliations. The members of the Banū Hāshim who responded to Muḥammad were no more numerous than those from the other clans of the Quraysh. Even though the Banū Hāshim were more sympathetic to him than anyone else, this did not mean that they embraced Islam. Indeed, the senior member of the clan and the strongest protector of the Prophet, Abū Ṭālib, died before becoming a Muslim.⁷⁰

It is noticeable that in its clandestine phase, Islam was evenly dispersed among the clans of the Quraysh without any one branch having more converts than the others. This went against the current norms of tribal life and deprived Islam from making full use of the structure and solidarity of tribalism to protect and disseminate the new message. At the same time, however, the Quraysh did not incite the other clans against Muḥammad since

66 *Al-An‘ām*, 6:135. See also Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr*, II, p. 478.

67 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat al-nabī*, I, pp. 164–5.

68 Ibn Ishāq, *Kitāb as-siyar*, p. 139; Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat al-nabī*, I, pp. 164–5; F. Buhl and A. T. Welch, ‘Muḥammad’, in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1993, VII, p. 364.

69 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat al-nabī*, I, p. 165; Ibn Ishāq, *Kitāb as-siyar*, p. 140.

70 *Al-‘Amrī, as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, I, p. 132.

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the missionary effort worked in the interests of the clan to which he belonged and increased its power at the expense of the other clans. Perhaps the fact that Islam was initially evenly spread helped to disseminate the religion among the many clans of the Quraysh since there could be no suspicion of partisanship (see Figure 1.6).⁷¹ Indeed, at this stage many Muslims did not belong to the Quraysh at all.⁷² This shows that Islam was not restricted to the Quraysh or Mecca or even the Arabs. From the very beginning, the message and its scope were clearly revealed, as seen in the Meccan verses of the Qur'ān which announce its all-embracing and universal nature: 'This is a message to the worlds.'⁷³ And: 'This is nothing less than a message to the worlds.'⁷⁴

The message of Islam was addressed to all humankind and came to put an end to political, moral and social decay, to destroy the spirit of tribalism and to build a society based on monotheism, social justice, an optimistic view of human potential and a belief that it is the believers and not the unbelievers who will reap the greatest reward.

The list of the first Muslims reveals that most of them were from the Quraysh. They did not belong to one clan, however, but were distributed among all the clans. Indeed, some of them did not belong to the Quraysh at all. Furthermore, the first Muslims were not drawn from the poor and needy but rather from those of average means. Similarly, as a number of Muslim writers and others have mentioned, most of them were not a mixture of the poor, the needy and slaves who wanted their freedom or to earn respect even though it was the last of these along with the *mawlās* who suffered the most.⁷⁵ It is probable that these, and perhaps some freed slaves, were to be

71 Thus, Abū Bakr aṣ-Ṣiddīq was from the Banū Taym, 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān was from the Banū Umayya, az-Zubayr ibn al-'Awwām was from the Banū Asad, Muṣ'ab ibn 'Umayr was from the Banū 'Abd-ad-Dār, 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib was from the Banū Hāshim, 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn 'Awf was from the Banū Zuhra, Sa'īd ibn Zayd was from the Banū 'Adī and 'Uthmān ibn Maz'ūn was from the Banū Jamaḥ.

The missionary activity was facilitated by the Prophet's clan whose members were descendants of 'Abd-al-Muṭṭalib, the Prophet's grandfather, and Wahb ibn Munabbih, his grandfather on his mother's side. The clan was connected by marriage to the other clans of the Quraysh and to the tribes that lived on the outskirts of Mecca and beyond. This guaranteed the Prophet protection from attack. For more information, see al-'Alī, *Tārīkh al-'Arab al-qadīm*, pp. 358–62.


72 Thus, 'Abdallāh ibn Mas'ūd was from the Banū Hudhayl, 'Utaba ibn Ghazwān was from the Banū Māzin, 'Abdallāh ibn Qays was from the Banū Ash'ariyyīn, 'Ammār ibn Yāsir was from the Banū Madhhaj, Zayd ibn Hāritha and aṭ-Ṭufayl ibn 'Amr were from the Banū Daws, 'Amr ibn 'Abasa was from the Banū Salīm and Ṣuhayb an-Namrī was from the Banū n-Namr from Qāsiḥ. See al-'Amrī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, p. 133; aṣ-Ṣallābī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, pp. 102–3.

73 *Ṣād*, 38:87.

74 *Al-Qalam*, 68:52.

75 Ṣāliḥ Aḥmad ash-Shāmī, *Min ma'īn as-Sīra*, Beirut, al-Maktaba al-islāmīyya, 1405/1984, pp. 35–6; Aḥmad, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, pp. 159–60.

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1.6 Tribes in the centre and north of the Arabian peninsula
in the era of the Prophet (© UNESCO)

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found among those who allied themselves with the Muslims. They may have been the ‘needy’ to whom az-Zuhrī (d. 230/845) was referring when he said: ‘Those men and the needy whom God wished to respond to Him did so until there were many who believed in Him.’⁷⁶ If we examine Ibn Hishām’s list of the sixty-seven men and women who first accepted Islam, we find that only thirteen of them were from the poor, the needy, *mawlās*, slaves and the common people.⁷⁷

From its very inception, the message of Islam showed great concern for the poor and the disadvantaged who often comprise the majority of the population, and it aimed to liberate them and raise their standing. This was perhaps one of the strongest incentives for accepting the call to Islam among those who were not bound by tradition. A large number of wealthy people and members of families from the Quraysh were also able to free themselves from the influence of tradition and thus responded to the call. Some of them defied their fathers, uncles and tribal leaders when they became followers of the new religion.⁷⁸

One indication of the power of Islam is that from the beginning those who responded to God’s summons were representative of so many different people, colours, religions and origins. Thus, they included idolaters, polytheists, Sabians, Jews, Magians and those who worshipped the stars. They also included nobles, paupers, the rich and the poor, leaders and followers, free men and slaves, men and women, the old and the middle-aged, adolescents and the young. There were Arabs, Abyssinians, Byzantines, white and black.⁷⁹

The response of these people, who knew the Prophet’s character and conduct, is the surest testimony to his sincerity and honesty. If a man is used to employing deception, this will be evident to his family, his wife and his servants, who will be well aware of his desires and aims. But if people offer him their wealth and their souls, and make the utmost effort to further his cause and disseminate his message, this indicates that he is genuine and is telling the truth.⁸⁰

76 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, III, Part 1, p. 166; al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, I, p. 115.

77 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat al-nabī*, I, pp. 164–9.

78 Durūzī, *Sīrat ar-rasūl*, pp. 173–4.

79 *Ibid.*, pp. 126–7.

80 The propagation of Islam passed through two very different phases, the Meccan and the Medinan phases. Each consists of a number of lesser stages with their own particular characteristics. Thus, the Meccan phase consists of three stages: (a) a period of clandestine activity which lasted for three years; (b) a period when the mission was made public in Mecca and which started at the beginning of the fourth year after its inception and continued until the end of its eighth year; and (c) a period when the call to Islam was directed outside of Mecca and which continued until the migration (*hijra*) to Yathrib (Medina).

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These people embraced Islam in secret. The Prophet used to meet with them and guide them to Islam even though this was done clandestinely.⁸¹ When news of Muḥammad's activities reached the Quraysh they did little about it, perhaps because they considered him to be merely one of those pious individuals such as Umayya ibn Abī-ş-Şalt, Qus ibn Sā'ida and 'Amr ibn Nufayl who talked about the divine and man's obligations to it. The Quraysh were, however, concerned that Muḥammad might become better known and have a wider influence. For this reason, they kept a close eye on the day-to-day progress of his mission.⁸²

After the great preparations undertaken by the Prophet to instruct his Companions and to create the first group organized on the basis of faith, worship and high moral values, the time came to make the mission public. This was called for by divine injunction: 'Admonish your closest kinsmen and be kind and gentle to the believers who follow you.'⁸³

The biographies of the Prophet mention that he gathered his tribe and clan and openly called on them to believe in One God and to be aware of the great torment awaiting them if they rejected him. The biographies also confirm that the Prophet addressed both groups and individuals. He said:

O Banū Ka'b ibn Lu'ay, save yourselves from the Fire. O Banū Murra ibn Ka'b, save yourselves from the Fire. O Banū 'Abd Shams, save yourselves from the Fire. O Banū 'Abd Manāf, O Banū Hāshim, O Banū 'Abd-al-Muṭṭalib, O Fāṭima ... I possess nothing for you from God but a mercy with which you will be blessed.⁸⁴

He ordered them to save themselves and he explained how all men are responsible for their fate. As he said these things, he stood facing his uncle Abū Lahab concerning whom *sūrat al-Masad* was revealed.

The Prophet disputed with his kinsmen over his mission. He explained to his closest relatives that it was belief in the message that formed the bond between them and that the usual bonds of kinship that underpinned Arab society had melted away in the heat of that warning sent by God.⁸⁵ With this, the Prophet had taken the first step towards destroying tribalism and replacing

81 See Aḥmad 'Umar, *Risālat al-anbiyā'*, Damascus, Dār al-ḥikma, 1418/1997.

82 Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Fiqh as-Sīra*, Alexandria, Dār al-'awda, 1408/1989, p. 112; Şafiyy-ad-Dīn al-Mubārakfūrī, *ar-Raḥīq al-makhtūm*, Mecca, Maktabat Nizār Muşṭafā al-Bāriz, 1424/2003, p. 56.

83 *Ash-Shu'arā'*, 26:214, 215.

84 Ibn Ishāq, *Kitāb as-siyar*, p. 146; aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, II, pp. 319–21; Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā'il an-nubuwwa wa ma'rifat aḥwāl šāhib ash-sharī'a*, ed. 'Abd-al-Mu'ṭī, Beirut, Dār al-kutub al-'ilmiyya, 1404/1985, II, pp. 181–2; 'Imād-ad-Dīn ibn Kathīr, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, ed. Muşṭafā 'Abd-al-Wāḥid, Beirut, Dār iḥyā' at-turāth al-'arabī, n.d., I, pp. 455–61.

85 Al-Ghazālī, *Fiqh as-Sīra*, pp. 113–14.

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it with the bond of Islam. This was the beginning of the end of the conflicts caused by individualism and tribalism based on egoism and blood relations.

After this, the Prophet continued to deliver his message for more than twenty years. He never rested, did not fall silent and had no life for himself or for his family. He never stopped calling people to God and never sank under the grave and onerous burden on his shoulders: the burden of deep faith in the world, the burden of all humankind, of the whole religion, of striving and expending effort in a variety of fields. His life was a never-ending struggle and from the time that he heard the summons of the Almighty and received the glorious commission nothing distracted him from his cause.⁸⁶

This period was followed by another stage. Now, the Prophet began to summon everyone he came across with their different tribes and homelands. He followed them to their councils, gatherings and meetings, during the pilgrimage seasons and during the rituals of the pilgrimage. He summoned free men, slaves, the strong and the weak, the rich and the poor, because the message was universal and for all men.⁸⁷ The divine order came:

Therefore expound openly that you are commanded, and turn away from the polytheists. We are sufficient for you against those who scoff; those who have another god besides the God. But they will learn. We know that you are distressed by what they say.⁸⁸

The Prophet's efforts were met with resistance, rejection, derision, prejudice, denial and conspiracy. The conflict intensified between MuḤammad and his fellows and between him and the holy men and leaders of idolatry. People in Mecca began to talk about what was going on and this was inadvertently of great benefit to MuḤammad's mission. On the other hand, those involved in the gossip and discussions included the most powerful and vociferous enemies of the mission, who spread malicious rumours about it among the tribes.⁸⁹

The Quraysh began to make preparations to put an end to the commotion that had suddenly flared up and that they feared might lead to the destruction of their traditions and heritage. Moreover, the leaders of idolatry realized that belief in One God to the exclusion of all other gods, and belief in prophethood and the Last Day, meant that they would have to

86 Sayyid Quṭb, *fi zilāl al-Qur'ān*, Beirut, Dār ash-sharq, n.d., VI, pp. 3740–65.

87 'Imād-ad-Dīn Khalīl, *Dirāsāt fi-s-sīra an-nabawīyya*, Mosul, Maṭba'at az-zahrā' al-ḥadītha, 1404/1983, p. 66; al-'Amrī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, p. 143; aṣ-Ṣallābī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, p. 121.

88 *Al-Ḥijr*, 15:94–7.

89 Aṣ-Ṣallābī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, pp. 121–2. The objections of the polytheists can be summarized as follows: they rejected monotheism, denied the hereafter, refused to acknowledge the Prophet of God and did not believe in the Qur'ān. For more details, see aṣ-Ṣallābī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, pp. 122–7.

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surrender all their authority. Thus, they would lose control over themselves and their possessions, not to mention over other people. They would be forced to relinquish their influence and their mastery over the Arabs based on their religious position. They would no longer be able to do as they pleased in the face of what God and His Prophet wanted. They would no longer be able to treat the common people unjustly and would have to stop perpetrating their evils. They understood the consequences and thus refused to accept the ‘scandalous’ situation that had nothing in its favour.⁹⁰ God said: ‘But man wishes to do wrong in the time before him.’⁹¹

The leaders of the Quraysh decided in their councils that they had no choice but to go to the Prophet’s uncle Abū Ṭālib and ask him to put a stop to his nephew’s activities. They hoped to make their request more persuasive and convincing by arguing that asking them to relinquish their gods and claiming that they were impotent and worthless was a gross insult to those gods, a terrible affront, and it brought discredit and disrepute on their forefathers who had first embarked on this course and worshipped them consistently over the years.⁹²

The leaders of idolatry were made yet more angry when the Qur’ān began to criticize their idol worship. This further alerted the Meccan rulers to the threat Islam posed to their economic and social interests, which were connected with polytheism and their custodianship of the idols.⁹³

The leaders of the Quraysh then began to harass the Prophet by organizing a propaganda war led by al-Walīd ibn al-Mughīra.⁹⁴ This was, however, unable to curtail the Prophet’s proselytizing activities. On the contrary, he managed to overcome the blockade imposed by his enemies, who were not content with merely turning the inhabitants of Mecca against him and twisting his words, but who also started receiving delegations in order to spread their ideas and to stop people listening to the Prophet and being won over by what he had to say.

The Prophet was singularly successful in propagating his message and he exerted a great influence over those with whom he spoke. Before even opening his mouth, the Prophet’s demeanour, character and dignity had an

90 Al-Mubārakfūrī, *ar-Raḥīq al-makhtūm*, pp. 58–9.

91 *Al-Qiyāma*, 75:5; Sayyid Quṭb, *fi zilāl al-Qur’ān*, VI, p. 3769; Buhl, ‘Muḥammad’, p. 364.

92 For more information on the stages through which Quraysh opposition passed, see Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat al-nabī*, I, pp. 170ff.; Ibn Sa’d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I, Part 1, pp. 134ff.; aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, II, pp. 323ff.; Ibn Kathīr, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, pp. 472ff.

93 Durūzī, *Sīrat ar-rasūl*, I, p. 189; Muḥammad Abu-l-Fawāris, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya: dirāsa taḥlīliyya*, Amman, Dār al-furqān, 1422/2001, pp. 155–63.

94 Among the false accusations levelled against the Prophet and mentioned in the Qur’ān are ‘madness’ (*al-Ḥijr*, 15:6), ‘sorcery’ (*Ṣād*, 38:4), ‘lying’ (*al-Furqān*, 25:4), ‘belief in myths’ (*al-Furqān*, 25:5) and that the Qur’ān was the work of man (*an-Naḥl*, 16:103). For more details, see al-Mubārakfūrī, *ar-Raḥīq al-makhtūm*, pp. 60–1.

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effect on those with whom he sat. Then when he spoke, he captivated his audience with his powerful logic – the product of a keen mind and profound feelings of love and serenity, and a sincere aim that the community be guided by revelations from God.⁹⁵ The most telling example of the Prophet's power to move people with the spoken word, his high moral standards and his ability to break through the iron walls that the rulers of Mecca tried to erect around him is the conversion to Islam of al-Azdī,⁹⁶ aṭ-Ṭufayl ibn 'Amr ad-Dawsī,⁹⁷ Abū Dhar⁹⁸ and 'Amr ibn 'Abasa.⁹⁹ The conversion of these men reveals that the mission was no longer confined to Mecca but had extended to the Arab tribes throughout the Arabian peninsula.

The leaders of idolatry were increasingly incensed by the activities of the Prophet and his Companions. The latter were therefore subjected to further harassment and began to find life intolerable in Mecca; they were being enticed away from their religion and thought that the Prophet was unable to protect them. As for the Prophet, even though he enjoyed the protection of his clan and his uncle Abū Ṭālib, he was not immune to the insults and hostility, attempts on his life, curses and slander, gossip and mockery, by all of which he was severely tested. But none of this swayed him or weakened his commitment and resolve to carry out his mission. This provided an excellent example for his Companions to follow and offered consolation when things became difficult for them and they were distressed or fearful.¹⁰⁰

In the face of this oppression, torment and derision, the Prophet said: 'Perhaps you should go to Abyssinia where there is a king who has treated no one with injustice. It is a land of truth. There, God will release you from

- 95 Aṣ-Ṣallābī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, p. 135, from 'Abd-al-'Azīz al-Ḥumaydī, *at-Tārīkh al-islāmī*, Alexandria, Dār ad-da'wa, 1997, I, pp. 127, 137.
- 96 Ḍammād al-Azdī belonged to the Azd Shanū'a. He was one of the Prophet's friends during the pre-Islamic era (*jāhiliyya*). He used to treat the sick and the ailing, practise magic and seek knowledge. He embraced Islam at the beginning of the Prophet's mission. See Abū 'Umar ibn 'Abd-al-Barr, *al-Istī'āb fī ma'rīfat al-aṣḥāb*, ed. Muḥammad al-Bajāli, Cairo, Maktabat an-nahḍa, 1960, II, pp. 751–2. For the implications of the conversion of Ḍammād, see aṣ-Ṣallābī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, p. 136.
- 97 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, I, p. 257. Aṭ-Ṭufayl went on to convert seventy or eighty families from the Banū Daws to Islam. See Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, I, p. 258.
- 98 Muḥammad ibn Ishāq, *Sīrat Ibn Ishāq*, ed. and annotated by Muḥammad Ḥamīdullāh, Fez, Ma'had ad-dirāsāt wa-l-abḥāth li-t-taqrīb, 1396/1976, p. 122. Abū Dhar said: 'I was a quarter of Islam. Three people embraced Islam before me and I was the fourth ...' See Ibn Kathīr, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, p. 447. A number of members of his family became Muslims at his hands.
- 99 He was a descendant of Imri'u-l-Qays ibn Buhtha ibn Sulaym. He became a Muslim in Mecca, returned to his country and then migrated to Medina after the battle of Khaybar. See Shihāb-ad-Dīn ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī, *al-Iṣāba fī tamyīz aṣ-ṣaḥāba*, Cairo, Dār nahḍat Miṣr, 1970, III, pp. 5–6.
- 100 Abū Shuhba, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, pp. 294–5. Regarding the trials of the Companions, see Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, I, pp. 209–22; as-Suhaylī, *ar-Rawḍ al-unuf*, II, pp. 67ff.

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your suffering.’¹⁰¹ While in his statement the Prophet referred to a just king in Abyssinia, this was not the sole reason and the only incentive for the emigration; it was also to look for a safe haven to continue the mission and a place in which to establish the Islamic state. This can be seen in that those who immigrated to Abyssinia were powerful and influential men among their kinsmen. They were not from the poor, the slaves and the weak, but were from among the notables.¹⁰² They were people of sound judgement and experience like ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān and his wife, Abū Ḥudhayfa and his wife, az-Zubayr ibn al-‘Awwām, Muṣ‘ab ibn ‘Umayr, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn ‘Awf and others.¹⁰³ One modern scholar considers that among the aims of the migration to Abyssinia was to promulgate the message of Islam, to highlight the stance of the Quraysh towards it and to convince people of the integrity of the Muslims’ cause, just as occurs at the present time when a political movement expounds its views and tries to win over public opinion. The migration to Abyssinia was also an attempt to acquire new territory for the mission. It was for these reasons that the first to go were the leading members of the Companions, to be joined later by the others. The organization of the undertaking was entrusted to Ja‘far ibn Abī Ṭālib.¹⁰⁴

The arrival of a Christian delegation to the Prophet while he was in Mecca was one of the fruits of the emigration. It indicates that the mission had found a secure new foothold outside Mecca, that Christians had begun to embrace Islam and that the call to Islam was addressed to all people. Ibn Ishāq remarks:

Then while the Prophet was in Mecca he was visited by twenty or so Christians who had heard about him from Abyssinia. They found him in the mosque, so they sat with him, spoke and questioned him ... When they heard the words of the Qur’ān their eyes streamed with tears. Then they accepted him, believed in him, trusted him and learnt from him what their books said about him ...¹⁰⁵

It appears that the leaders of the Quraysh were afraid of the political and economic consequences of the migration of the Muslims to Abyssinia and the

101 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, I, p. 213. For further information, see aṣ-Ṣallābī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, pp. 190–6; Buhl, ‘Muḥammad’, p. 364.

102 Sayyid Quṭb, *ft zilāl al-Qur’ān*, I, p. 29.

103 Abu-l-Fawāris, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, p. 172.

104 The choice of Abyssinia as the destination of the emigration indicates the Prophet’s strategic thinking. It shows his knowledge of the countries and kingdoms around him, the good and the bad, the just and the unjust. This knowledge helped him choose a home for his Companions.

105 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, I, p. 263. It is stated that the Christians were from Najrān. The following verses were revealed concerning them: ‘Those to whom we sent the Book before this do not believe. And when it is recited to them they say: “We believe in it for it is the truth from our Lord. Indeed, we have been Muslims before this.”’ (*al-Qaṣas*, 28:52–3)

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effect this might have on the conflict between them and the Muslims in Mecca.¹⁰⁶ According to an account by Ibn Sa‘d:

When the Qurayshis learnt how the Negus had honoured Ja‘far and his companions they were despondent. They became angry with the Prophet of God and decided to kill him. They also reached an agreement that they would not marry any of the Banū Hāshim, would not make pacts with them or even associate with them ...¹⁰⁷

This agreement was reached at the start of the month of al-Muḥarram four years after the beginning of Muḥammad’s prophetic mission. With time, this blockade or boycott was stepped up and the Qurayshis prevented the Banū Hāshim from receiving any supplies or provisions. The polytheists would not allow any food to enter Mecca or permit any to be offered for sale without immediately buying it up. Some Meccans, however, sympathized with the Banū Hāshim and the Banū-l-Muṭṭalib and gave them what little food they had. Meanwhile, the Prophet and his Companions went out during the pilgrimage season, meeting with the people and calling on them to embrace Islam. The Banū Hāshim, the Banū-l-Muṭṭalib and the Muslims withstood the boycott for three full years. This led to divisions among the Qurayshi leaders, some of whom supported the action while others did not and tried to have it stopped.¹⁰⁸

In this way the Islamic mission achieved a great victory in Abyssinia and among the tribes of the Azd, the Shanū’a, the Daws and the Ghifār. Moreover, the leaders of the Quraysh had failed to turn the Banū Hāshim and the Banū-l-Muṭṭalib against the Prophet. These tribes subsequently came to support Islam and the Prophet and became centres of power that could be mobilized at the crucial moment, providing reinforcements for the Islamic mission that extended beyond the borders of Mecca.

The three years of the boycott proved to be a very constructive and salutary experience for the up-and-coming generation, some of whom had also borne the pains of hunger, experienced fear, remained patient in the

106 Aṭ-Ṭabarī mentions that Abyssinia was ‘a place where the Quraysh did business. They traded there.’ See aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, II, p. 328.

107 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I, Part 1, pp. 139–40. One scholar considers that the migration to Abyssinia had the effect of tarnishing the reputation of the Quraysh with the rest of the Arabs and undermined their position regarding the Islamic mission and those involved with it. The Arabs prided themselves on their hospitality to strangers and their warmth towards their neighbours, and even competed against each other in this; but here were the Abyssinians outdoing the Quraysh and giving shelter to the nobles, the weak and the strangers whom the Quraysh had treated unjustly and thrown out. See Salmān al-‘Awda, *al-Ghurabā’ al-awwalūn*, ad-Dammam, Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 1412/1991, pp. 170–1.

108 Ibn Ishāq, *Sīrat Ibn Ishāq*, pp. 145–7; Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, II, pp. 251–3; aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, II, pp. 341–3; Abū Shuhba, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, pp. 384–6.

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1.7 Cave (Ghār) Hira' near Mecca,
as described by Ibn-Baṭṭūṭa
(© Aramco World Magazine)

face of adversity, kept their nerve and remained steadfast and resolute in times of crisis.

Similarly, the economic and social boycott worked to the advantage of the Islamic mission and those who disseminated it among the Arab tribes. News of Islam spread among the tribes during the pilgrimage season, while throughout the Arabian peninsula all eyes were focused on that mission whose leader and his Companions had withstood hunger, thirst and isolation for such a long time. People felt that the message was true, for if not, the Prophet

and his Companions would not have withstood all that pain and privation.¹⁰⁹

The blockade roused the anger of the Arabs against the unbelieving Quraysh because of their harsh treatment of the Banū Hāshim and the Banu-l-Muṭṭalib. It also elicited their compassion for the Prophet and his Companions. Thus, no sooner was the blockade lifted than people began to embrace the new religion and the word of Islam spread and was heard in all the lands of the Arabs. In this way the weapon of the economic blockade turned against those who wielded it and it proved to be an important impetus for the dissemination of Islam – precisely the opposite of what the idolaters' leaders had intended.¹¹⁰

Nevertheless, Mecca still represented an obstacle for the Islamic mission. After the death of the Prophet's uncle Abū Ṭālib and his wife Khadīja, the *sufahā'* (lesser people) among the Quraysh did their utmost to thwart him and his Companions and to stand in his way. Thus, it was hardly surprising that Mecca came to represent a serious threat to the Prophet and that he should go first to aṭ-Ṭā'if, then move among the tribes, then emigrate, all the while continuing to call humankind to God.¹¹¹

The Prophet strove to create a new centre for the Islamic mission and asked for the help of the Banū Thaḳīf, but they did not respond. Indeed, the

109 Aṣ-Ṣallābī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, p. 186; Amīn Duwaydār, *Ṣuwar min ḥayāt ar-rasūl*, Cairo, Dār al-ma'ārif, 1983, pp. 181–2; Buhl, 'Muḥammad', p. 364.

110 'Abd-al-Wahhāb Mujaḳbal, *al-Ḥarb an-naḳsiyya ḍidd al-islām fī 'ahd ar-rasūl fī Makka*, Beirut, 'Ālam al-kutub, 1406/1986, p. 1010; aṣ-Ṣallābī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, p. 186.

111 Abū Shuhba, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, p. 401; Duwaydār, *Ṣuwar min ḥayāt ar-rasūl*, pp. 193–8.

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young men of the tribe goaded him and threw stones at him. On his way back from aṭ-Ṭā'if he met a Christian called 'Adas who converted to Islam.¹¹²

The Prophet's choice of aṭ-Ṭā'if was a strategic move against the leaders of the Quraysh. They had had designs on it in the past and had attempted to annex it to Mecca. Many wealthy Meccans owned estates in aṭ-Ṭā'if and spent the summer there, and the Banū Hāshim and Banū 'Abd Shams were in permanent contact with the place. Thus, the Prophet's move to aṭ-Ṭā'if was planned in advance. He was able to find a foothold there before setting out and to identify a group of people who would help him. This alarmed the Quraysh and posed a direct threat to their security and economic interests. Indeed, it could have led to them becoming encircled and cut off from outside.¹¹³

After the Prophet had despaired of receiving any help from the Banū Thaqīf and thus had left aṭ-Ṭā'if and was on his way back to Mecca, he reached a place called Nakhla. There, as he was praying in the middle of the night, God sent some of the jinn to him. This is mentioned twice in the Qur'ān:

Behold, we sent some of the jinn to you listening to the Qur'ān. When they stood there they said: 'Listen!' Then when the recitation was finished they went back to their people to warn them of their sins. They said: 'O our people, we have heard a book which was revealed after Moses, confirming what came before it. It guides men to the truth and to the straight path. O our people, answer the one who calls you to God and believe in him. He will forgive you your sins and deliver you from a grievous torment.'¹¹⁴

Elsewhere, in *sūrat al-Jinn*, God says:

Say: It has been revealed to me that some jinn listened [to the Qur'ān]. They said: 'We have heard a wonderful recitation! It gives guidance to what is right and we have believed in it. We will never ascribe partners to our Lord.'¹¹⁵

This incident was further support for the Prophet. The verses that were revealed on this occasion also tell of the eventual success of the Prophet's mission and state that no power in the universe can come between him and this success: 'Anyone who does not listen to the one who calls us to God, he

112 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, II, p. 286; Muwaffaq Sālim Nūrī, *Fiqh as-sīra an-nabawīyya qirā'a siyāsiyya da'awīyya ḥarakiyya*, Damascus/Beirut, Dār Ibn Kathīr, 1427/2006, p. 117.

113 Aṣ-Ṣallābī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, p. 212.

114 *Al-Aḥqāf*, 46:29–31.

115 *Al-Jinn*, 72:1–2.

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cannot thwart [God's plan] on earth. There is no one to protect him besides God. Such a man wanders in clear error.'¹¹⁶ God also says: 'We think that we cannot thwart God throughout the earth, nor can we thwart Him by fleeing.'¹¹⁷

The *isrā'* (night journey) and the *mi'rāj* (ascension to heaven) were to increase the Prophet's confidence in his faith and his belief that God would show him the divine programme He had laid down for the dissemination of Islam on earth.

In the light of this support and these good tidings, the cloud of dejection, sadness and despair that had hung over the Prophet since he had been forced to leave aṭ-Ṭā'if as an outcast was lifted. He resolved to return to Mecca and to resume his original intention to propound Islam and deliver God's eternal message with renewed vigour, diligence and enthusiasm. One month later came the meeting with the delegation of the *Anṣār* (Helpers),¹¹⁸ which ultimately led to the triumph of the mission and the transfer of the Prophet's home from Mecca to Yathrib (Medina).

In mid -616, ten years after the beginning of Muḥammad's prophethood, the Prophet returned to Mecca to start spreading Islam among the tribes and individuals once again. As the pilgrimage season approached, people began to arrive in Mecca and the Prophet seized this opportunity to go to the tribes, one after the other, and tell them about Islam, calling upon them to embrace it. He would do this during both the trading and the pilgrimage seasons when the tribes congregated. In this way he conducted a clearly defined programme of missionary activity. Accompanied by Abū Bakr aṣ-Ṣiddīq, the specialist in Arab genealogy and history, they would seek out the most eminent people and the tribal leaders.¹¹⁹ According to az-Zuhrī, among the tribes that the Prophet approached and called upon to embrace Islam, and to whom he made himself known,¹²⁰ not a single one accepted what he had to say. Abū Lahab used to follow the Prophet about, saying to the people: 'Don't listen to him. He's a liar!'¹²¹

Ibn Iṣḥāq describes the manner in which the Prophet would approach the tribes and draw them to him.¹²² He used to introduce himself to them

116 *Al-Aḥqāf*, 46:32.

117 *Al-Jinn*, 72:12.

118 Al-Mubārakfūrī, *ar-Raḥīq al-makhtūm*, pp. 93–4; Nūrī, *Fiqh as-sīra*, p. 220.

119 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, II, pp. 287–9; Ibn Sa'd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I, Part 1, p. 145; Ibn Kathīr, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II, pp. 162ff.

120 They included the Banū 'Āmir ibn Ṣa'sa'a, the Banū Muḥārib ibn Khaṣfa, the Fazāra, the Ghassān, the Murra, the Ḥanīfa, the Salīm, the 'Abs, the Naṣr, the Banū-l-Bakā', the Kinda, the Banu-l-Ḥārith ibn Ka'b, the 'Udhra and the Ḥaḍārīma

121 Ibn Sa'd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I, Part 1, p. 115. To this list, Al-Maqrīzī adds the two tribes: the Qays and the Banū-l-Khaṭīm. See Aḥmad ibn 'Alī Al-Maqrīzī, *Imtā' al-asmā' bi-mā li-r-rasūl min al-abnā' wa-l-amwāl wa-l-ḥafada wa-l-matā'*, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākīr, Cairo, Lajnat at-ta'līf wa-t-tarjama wa-n-nashr, 1941, I, pp. 30–1.

122 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, II, pp. 287–9.

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and ask for their help, not merely on his own initiative but because it was an order from God. These tactics reflected the stage reached by the missionary activity. The Prophet refused to guarantee those prepared to help him that they would be granted any authority or power.¹²³

Just as the Prophet explained Islam to the tribes and delegations, so he explained it to individuals some of whom responded positively. Shortly after the first pilgrimage season, a number of men such as Suwayd ibn aṣ-Ṣāmit and Iyās ibn Mu‘ādh had declared their belief in him.¹²⁴ Prior to this ‘Abū Dhar al-Ghifārī, aṭ-Ṭufayl ibn ‘Amr ad-Dawsī and Ḍammād al-Azdī had already accepted Islam.

In AD 620, during the pilgrimage season eleven years after the beginning of MuḤammad’s prophethood, the Islamic mission planted seeds which quickly grew into tall trees whose green shade provided the Muslims with shelter from the intense heat of injustice and oppression for many years. Faced with the Meccans’ denial and rejection of God’s way, the Prophet wisely used to go to the tribes at dead of night so that none of the leaders of the polytheists could stop him. Ibn Ishāq relates:

When Almighty God wished to reveal His religion, honour His Prophet and fulfil the promise He had made to him, the Prophet went out in the season and met the people of the *Anṣār* and made himself known to the Arab tribes, as he did every season. While he was at Aqaba (in the neighbourhood of Mecca) he came across a group from the Khazraj whom God wished to bless. The Prophet told them about Islam and recited the Qur’ān. They responded to his summons in that they believed in him and accepted what he had informed them about Islam. They said: ‘We will leave our kinsmen. There is not a people who are more cruel and unjust than they. Perhaps God will unite them in you. We will go to them, call upon them to follow you and explain to them the religion we have accepted from you. If God unites them in this religion then there will be no one more worthy of esteem than you.’¹²⁵

Then the men returned to their home town. In total, there were six men from the Khazraj representing different clans within the tribe: two men from the Banu-n-Najjār, one from the Banū Zarīq, one from the Banū Salma, one from the Banū Ḥarām ibn Kafl and one from the Banū ‘Ubayd ibn Ghanam. This indicates the power of the message and shows that its principles received a positive response from the wise people. For the first time a whole group

123 See the Prophet’s conversation with the Banū ‘Āmir ibn Ṣa‘ṣa‘a (Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, II, p. 289) and with al-Muthannā ibn Ḥāritha (Abū Ḥātim MuḤammad ibn Ḥibbān, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya wa akhbār al-khulafā’*, Beirut, Mu’assasat al-kutub ath-thaqāfiyya, 1407/1987, pp. 99–101).

124 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, II, pp. 289–91.

125 *Ibid.*, p. 292.

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of people embraced Islam at the same time. Moreover, they came from a distant town that could serve as a base from which the Islamic mission could conduct its activities. Indeed, the men from the Khazraj had indicated their willingness to support this.

The Khazrajīs were pleased when they listened to their Jewish confederates in Yathrib telling them that a prophet would be sent at that time ‘whom we will follow and alongside whom we will fight you like the tribes of ‘Ād and Iram’.¹²⁶ When they returned to Yathrib they took the message of Islam with them and it spread to the point where there was not a house in which the Prophet was not talked of.¹²⁷ This demonstrates the crucial role played by these six men in calling people from the Khazraj and the Aws to Islam. The eleventh year after the announcement of Muḥammad’s prophethood was more blessed than any previous year: in that year alone, Islam spread further in Yathrib than it had done in the previous ten years in Mecca.¹²⁸

During the pilgrimage season one year after the first meeting between the Prophet and the people of Yathrib at Aqaba, a further twelve men met him there and gave him what is known as ‘the first pledge of Aqaba’. The fact that these twelve consisted of ten men from the Khazraj and two from the Aws indicates that the first delegation from the Khazraj who had embraced Islam a year earlier had primarily focused their energies on their fellow tribesmen but had also attracted some men from the Aws. This was the beginning of a union between the two tribes under the banner of Islam¹²⁹ and the end of the wars they had fought against each other, such as the battle of Bu‘āth.¹³⁰

‘Ubāda ibn aṣ-Ṣāmit (d. 34/654), one of the members of the delegation, related that the pledge made to the Prophet was that ‘we would not ascribe any partners to God, would not steal, not commit adultery, not kill our children, not tell any lies and not disobey him in what is good ...’¹³¹ The pledge was also called the ‘women’s pledge’ because it was the same as that sworn by the women to the Prophet after the conquest of Mecca.

The Prophet exerted all his energies in mobilizing the forces of Islam in Yathrib and no effort was spared to create a solid base on which to found the new state. The process took two years of missionary activity and organization.

126 Ibid., pp. 292–3; Ibn Ḥibbān, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, p. 103.

127 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, II, p. 293; Ibn Ḥazm, Abū Muḥammad, *Jawāmi‘ as-sīra an-nabawiyya*, Beirut, Dār al-kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 1403/1983, pp. 55–6; as-Suhaylī, *ar-Rawḍ al-unuf*, II, pp. 167–83.

128 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, II, p. 293.

129 Munīr Muḥammad al-Ghaḍbān, *al-Manhaj al-ḥarakī li-s-sīra an-nabawiyya*, Jordan, az-Zarqā’, Maktabat al-manār, 1404/1984, pp. 154–5.

130 Al-‘Amrī, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, p. 197; al-Ghaḍbān, *al-Manhaj al-ḥarakī*, p. 157; al-Mubārakfūrī, *ar-Raḥīq al-makhtūm*, p. 103.

131 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, II, p. 295, cf. Ibn Ḥibbān, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, pp. 118–19; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jawāmi‘*, pp. 56–7.

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The first ambassador of Islam, Muṣ‘ab ibn ‘Umayr (d. 3/625), played a pioneering role in this since the Prophet sent him to Yathrib at the head of a delegation to instruct the Muslims in the laws of Islam, to teach them the new religion and to ask them to encourage others to join their ranks. Muṣ‘ab, who was known as the ‘Qur’ān reciter’,¹³² achieved unparalleled success in converting people to Islam. This success was not limited to the common people and the poor, but also included the leaders of the community. Indeed, Muṣ‘ab attended to his task so diligently that until the battle of the Ditch in 5/627 there remained only a few houses in Yathrib whose inhabitants did not become Muslims.¹³³ Before the following pilgrimage season, Muṣ‘ab returned to Mecca taking with him an accurate description of the Muslims in Yathrib, their strength and capabilities, how Islam had penetrated all sections of the Aws and the Khazraj, and how the people were ready to make a new pledge and were able to protect and help the Prophet.¹³⁴

The account of Jābir ibn ‘Abdallāh (d. 78/697), one of those who became a Muslim and who went with a delegation of the *Anṣār* to see the Prophet at the second meeting of Aqaba, draws an accurate picture of how strong and powerful Islam had become in Yathrib. Jābir remarks:

God sent us to him from Yathrib. One of us would go to him and believe in him and the Prophet would recite the Qur’ān. Then he would return to his kinsmen and they would embrace Islam under his influence. This went on until there was no house in Yathrib that did not contain a group of people proclaiming Islam. Then we held a meeting in which seventy of us got together and said: ‘How long will we leave the Prophet walking around the mountains of Mecca afraid?’ So we went to him in the pilgrimage season...¹³⁵

In AD 622, during the pilgrimage season thirteen years after the beginning of the Prophet’s mission, seventy-three Muslim men and two Muslim women came from Yathrib to perform the rituals of the pilgrimage. They were among a group of other pilgrims from their people who were polytheists. When they arrived in Mecca they entered into private communications with the Prophet during which it was agreed that the two parties should meet at Aqaba in complete secrecy and under cover of darkness.¹³⁶

132 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, II, p. 296; al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā’il an-nubuwwa*, II, p. 437.

133 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, II, pp. 299–300; al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā’il an-nubuwwa*, II, p. 443; al-Mubārakfūrī, *ar-Raḥīq al-makhtūm*, p. 105.

134 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, II, p. 294; al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā’il an-nubuwwa*, II, p. 443.

135 Al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā’il an-nubuwwa*, II, p. 443; Shams-ad-Dīn Muḥammad adh-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-islām wa wafayāt al-mashāhīr wa-l-’a’lām wa-s-sīra (as-Sīra an-nabawīyya)*, ed. ‘Abd-as-Salām Tadmūrī, Beirut, Dār al-kitāb al-’arabī, 1409/1989, I, p. 298.

136 For further details regarding those present at the second meeting of Aqaba and who swore an oath to the Prophet, see Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, II, pp. 311–20; Ibn Ḥazm, *Jawāmi’*, pp. 58–66.

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Here was made the second pledge of Aqaba but this time it was done openly and in its final form it stated that all parties would together support Islam in peace and in war. The people of Yathrib then shook hands with the Prophet, swearing by the One God in whom they believed that they would protect and help him and that they would raise their weapons and defy any power on earth.¹³⁷ Before they returned to their homes, the Prophet chose twelve of them as deputies – nine from the Khazraj and three from the Aws – to supervise the progress of the Islamic mission in Yathrib, where Islam had found a home and where there were many who were well-versed in it. With his profound understanding of his task, the Prophet wanted to make them feel that they had not returned to him as strangers. He did not want to send someone else to Yathrib in their stead since they were people of Islam; they were his protectors and his helpers.¹³⁸

In this way the mission to spread the word of Islam gained great support in its new home in Yathrib. This success was soon to be crowned with a victory which, after the immigration (*hijra*) of the Muslims and the Prophet to Yathrib, led to the creation of a state and a society based on Islamic principles and the Islamic way of life.¹³⁹

The immigration to Yathrib also heralded the second stage of the Islamic mission: the Medinan period. During this time the ranks of the Muslims were united, they became more determined and began to build their state. It was a period of construction, effort and sacrifice, taking the message of Islam to all parts of the Arabian peninsula and beyond by means of letters sent by the Prophet to the kings and the chiefs of the neighbouring tribes. Meanwhile, Meccan society began to experience major internal divisions and fierce disagreements. It appears that some Meccan families tried forcibly to prevent their sons from participating in the emigration and attempted to entice them away from their new religion.¹⁴⁰ Similarly, the leaders of the polytheists put pressure on the *mawlās* (clients, including protégés and freed persons) and the weak to stop them from joining in.¹⁴¹ The emigration led to rifts among members of a single family when they had differing opinions about Islam. Thus, some women who persisted in their polytheism refused to accompany their Muslim husbands on their journey to Medina, and the Muslims were therefore ordered to divorce them: ‘Do not be guardians of unbelieving women.’¹⁴²

137 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, II, pp. 302–3; al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā’il an-nubuwwa*, II, p. 443, which offers a slightly different account; Khalīl, *Dirāsāt*, p. 132.

138 Khalīl, *Dirāsāt*, p. 132.

139 Nūrī, *Fiqh as-sīra*, p. 141.

140 Ibn Hishām, *Sīrat an-nabī*, II, pp. 326–7.

141 *Ibid.*, p. 436.

142 *Al-Mumtaḥana*, 60:10.

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Similarly, some believing Muslim women deserted their unbelieving husbands and travelled to Medina without them. The Qur'ān refers to them in the following:

O you who believe! When believing women come to you as emigrants, test them. God knows best as to their faith. Then if you ascertain that they are true believers, do not send them back to the disbelievers. They are not lawful wives for the disbelievers nor are the disbelievers lawful husbands for them. But give the disbelievers that which they have spent [as their dower].¹⁴³

The success of the Islamic mission in its struggle with the Qurayshi leaders, as seen in the momentous conquest of Mecca in 8/630, put an end to polytheism in the Arabian peninsula. For the first time, the Arab tribes were united under the banner of monotheism and believed in the Resurrection. For the first time in their history, the Arabs were convinced that they were followers of the final divine message, and that they were charged with disseminating this message to all humankind through conversation and persuasion or through struggle in the way of God (*jihād*): 'We have sent you only as a mercy for the worlds.'¹⁴⁴

Before the coming of the Prophet Muḥammad, the situation of the Arabs on the Arabian peninsula was one of corruption, anarchy and decline. The Qur'ān refers to this as follows: 'You were on the brink of the Pit of Fire and He saved you from it',¹⁴⁵ and: 'He takes them out of darkness into the light by His will. He guides them to a straight path.'¹⁴⁶

Muslims believe that Almighty God chose Muḥammad ibn 'Abdallāh the Qurayshī the 'Adnānī to be the last of His prophets and to convey His mercy to all humankind: 'Say O people: "I am sent to you all as the Messenger of God."¹⁴⁷ And that God chose the Arabs to be the bearers of this religion and to deliver it to the communities and the peoples: 'It is indeed the message for you and for your people and soon you shall be brought to account.'¹⁴⁸

For Muslims, Islam is a religion for all humankind. It is the religion of the whole world. Its first seeds were planted in the Prophet's house and from there it grew to embrace his family, his clan and his trusted friends. Those who followed it were subjected to all manners of privation, oppression and hostility, but the religious knowledge that the Prophet instilled in his Companions, their unconditional acceptance of the revelation and

143 Ibid.

144 *Al-Anbiyā'*, 21:107.

145 *Āl 'Imrān*, 3:103; Duwaydār, *Ṣuwar min ḥayāt ar-rasūl*, pp. 106, 115.

146 *Al-Mā'ida*, 5:16.

147 *Al-A'rāf*, 7:158.

148 *Az-Zukhruf*, 43:44.

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their forbearance, sincerity and steadfastness united them, strengthened their resolve and helped them to overcome their enemies who wanted nothing but wealth and status.

The Islamic mission then took its course and found a new home. It established a state which for the first time called for unity, equality and humanity. The principles, values and universal perspective of Islam are the qualities that encouraged its spread:

O mankind, We created you from a male and a female and made you into nations and tribes that you might know each other. The most honoured of you in the sight of God is the most righteous of you. God has full knowledge and is well-acquainted with all things.¹⁴⁹

Islam is, for Muslims, the last religion that God wanted for all humanity. Thus, the Qur'ān announces in the last verse revealed: 'This day I have perfected your religion for you, completed my favour upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion.'¹⁵⁰

149 *Al-Hujrāt*, 49:13.

150 *Al-Mā'ida*, 5:3. See also Maḥmūd Ḥamdi Zaqqūq, *al-Istishrāq wa-l-khalfiyya al-fikriyya li-ṣirā' al-ḥaḍārāt*, Cairo, Dār al-ma'ārif, 1977, p. 93.

Chapter 1.2
THE EMERGENCE
OF THE *UMMA*

Hashim Yahya al-Mallah

INTRODUCTION

When the Prophet Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdallāh made the *hijra* (emigration) to Medina, the town had no central authority responsible for the maintenance of security and order on account of the fierce tribal disputes among its inhabitants composed of the Aws, the Khazraj and the Jews. Members of the Khazraj tribe alerted the Prophet to this situation when he met them during the pilgrimage season in Aqaba, one year before the first pledge of Aqaba, saying:

We have left our people. There is no people who feel such hostility and malice towards each other. Perhaps God can bring them together through you. So let us go to them and invite them to follow this religion of yours. If God unites them in you, then there will be no greater man than you.¹

This indicates that the people of Medina were searching for a man who possessed the qualities needed to unite them and establish the foundations for security and order in their town. They found what they were looking for in the person of the Prophet Muḥammad, in whom they saw the qualities of the prophet whose imminent appearance had been talked about by the Jews of Medina. They were therefore eager to believe in and follow him before the Jews did so.² They also noted the Prophet’s neutral stance towards the disputing parties, which made him a suitable arbiter in settling their

1 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, ed. Muṣṭafā as-Saqqā et al., Cairo, 1955, I, p. 429.

2 *Ibid.*, pp. 428–9.

increasingly serious disagreements, particularly since he showed no bias in favour of any particular tribe in asserting its rule but rather relied on the spiritual authority issuing from Almighty God, the Lord of the Worlds.

The people of Medina thus found in the person of Muḥammad a man whose leadership they could accept to unite their ranks. They enthusiastically swore allegiance to him and invited him to their town. Likewise, they saw that the principles of the message of Islam, which advocates harmony and sound moral conduct, were consonant with the high ideals for which they were striving. They therefore placed their faith in Muḥammad and pledged total allegiance to him, inviting him and his Meccan followers to migrate to Medina where they could usher in a new era in the history of Islam.

The Medinans' acceptance of the religious and political authority of the Prophet was a profound turning-point in their lives and in the call to Islam. With the emergence of the political authority of the Prophet in Medina, the town was gradually transformed from a community riven with internal divisions into a political entity, the state of Medina, existing within the framework of an *umma/dawla* (religious community / political state). The first group of Muslims in Mecca was similarly transformed from a group persecuted for its faith and beliefs into the focal point of the fledgling *umma/dawla*.

In order to understand these changes in Medina, and in particular the related emergence of the *umma/dawla*, the nature of the Prophet's authority in both its religious and political dimensions must be discussed.

The nature of the Prophet's religious and political authority

For those who believe in the Prophet, his authority rests on his status as the Messenger of God from Whom he receives revelations. It is therefore their duty to listen to and obey him, since his instructions are in reality those of Almighty God which the Muslim may not ignore or fail to abide by. The Qur'ān says: 'Whoever obeys the Messenger obeys God'³ and 'We have not sent a Messenger but to be obeyed, in accordance with the will of God.'⁴

For the Muslims in Medina, the Prophet therefore became a religious or spiritual leader simply by virtue of their declaration of faith in him, which entailed religious considerations that precluded opposition to his orders and instructions. Given that the directives of Islamic law (*sharī'a*) are not based on the notion of a division between the religious and the secular, the spiritual

3 *An-Nisā'*, 4:80.

4 *Ibid.*, 4:64.

leadership of the Prophet soon developed to encompass religious life in all its political, economic, social and cultural dimensions. The Prophet therefore rapidly became the undisputed leader of the Muslims in all aspects of their lives, as is confirmed by the Qur'ān:

O you who believe, obey God and obey the Messenger and those charged with authority among you. If you differ among yourselves in anything refer it to God and His Messenger if you believe in God and the Last Day.⁵

It is apparent that the Medinan Muslims expressed their strong faith in the political and legislative authority of the Prophet when they pledged allegiance to him at the second pledge of Aqaba prior to his *hijra* (migration) to Medina. This was a voluntary contract by means of which those Medinans who gave their pledge declared their readiness to obey the Prophet and to protect and defend him in Medina.⁶ The pledge was not limited to offering the Prophet physical protection but also extended to safeguarding him as he gave his message to the people and to obeying his orders in all circumstances, favourable or otherwise. Thus, the pledge had far-reaching implications and allowed for a shift from merely defending the Prophet within Medina to launching attacks and fighting alongside him outside the town. Indeed, it seems that this eventuality was in the minds of the Medinan *Anṣār* (Supporters) as they gave their pledge of allegiance. Ibn Ishāq relates that al-'Abbās ibn 'Abāda addressed his fellow tribesmen as follows:

'O people of the Khazraj, do you realize to what you are committing yourselves in giving your pledge of allegiance to this man?' 'Yes,' they replied. He said: 'You are pledging that you will wage war against everyone. If you think that if you lose your property and your nobles are killed you would give him up, then do so now, for to do so later would bring you shame in this world and in the hereafter.'⁷

But the *Anṣār* nevertheless gave their pledge to the Prophet on the basis that they would enter paradise on the Day of Resurrection if they honoured their obligations to him.

Following the second pledge of Aqaba, the Prophet became not simply a messenger in whose prophetic mission the Medinan Muslims believed, but also a political leader whose orders were obeyed by all the *Anṣār*, including heads of families and clans from the Aws and Khazraj such as Sa'd ibn

5 *An-Nisā'*, 4:59.

6 Ṣāliḥ Aḥmad al-'Alī, *ad-Dawla fī 'ahd ar-rasūl*, Baghdad, Maṭba'at al-majma' al-'ilmī al-'irāqī, 1988, p. 69.

7 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, I, p. 446.

Mu‘ādh, Usyad ibn al-Ḥuḍayr and Sa‘d ibn ‘Abāda. The first order from the Prophet to the *Anṣār* was that they should appoint twelve leaders from among themselves to serve as representatives for their people in Medina and to administer their affairs so as to ensure that they remained united.

After the Prophet arrived in Medina, his religious and political authority was at first recognized only by those Meccans who had migrated to Medina with him (the *Muhājirūn*) and by the Medinan *Anṣār*. Nonetheless, the nature of the relationships and alliances between members of the Aws and Khazraj and the Jews in Medina meant that the Prophet’s political authority was extended, albeit within certain confines, to exercising some control over the other inhabitants of the town, namely the polytheists from the Aws and Khazraj, and the Jews. With the spread of Islam and the increasing strength of the Muslims, this control grew ever stronger to the point where the Prophet was the most powerful man in Medina and the town became a state wielding considerable political influence, a so-called *umma*.⁸ The Prophet was able to achieve this by means of a number of interrelated practical and legislative measures, as outlined below.

The immigration of the Prophet and his Companions to Medina and their settlement there

The Quraysh viewed the pledge of allegiance to the Prophet, the second pledge of Aqaba, as a retrograde step that would eventually result in war between them and the people of Medina. Indeed, even before finding out about the pledge, the Meccan polytheists had rebuked the Medinans, saying:

We have learnt that you have come to this man of ours in order to take him away from us and that you have promised him that you will fight us. By God, there are no Arabs with whom we are less inclined to go to war than you.⁹

The Medinans denied all knowledge of this.

On learning of the pledge of Aqaba, the leaders of the polytheists began to harass the Muslims and to entice them away from their religion.¹⁰ The Prophet therefore asked his Companions to emigrate with him to Medina, since God had given them brothers there and a place of safety. They departed in groups, one after the other, until they had all arrived in Medina, leaving

8 Al-Mallāḥ, Hāshim Yaḥyā, *al-Wasīṭ fi-s-sīra an-nabawīyya wal-l-khilāfa ar-rāshida*, Amman, Dār an-nafā’is, 2000, p. 283.

9 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, p. 448.

10 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, Muḥammad ibn Jarīr, *Tārīkh ar-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad Abu-l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Cairo, Dār al-ma‘ārif, 1967, II, p. 366.

behind in Mecca only those who had been ‘imprisoned or seduced’.¹¹ The migration to Medina took place over a period of two months and involved approximately seventy *Muhājirūn*.¹²

The sources indicate that when these *Muhājirūn* reached Medina (previously called Yathrib), they stayed on the outskirts of Qubā’ as guests of the *Anṣār*. The unmarried men stayed with Sa’d ibn Khaythama because he himself was unmarried,¹³ while most of the others stayed with the Banū ‘Amr ibn ‘Awf in Qubā’. Their lodgings were allocated on the basis of their tribal associations whereby all members of a particular clan stayed in the same place and with the same host.¹⁴ According to the modern scholar Ṣāliḥ al-‘Alī, supporting the *Muhājirūn* was not a heavy financial burden for those with whom they stayed, bearing in mind their small numbers, the way in which they were dispersed and the low cost of living.¹⁵

When the Prophet was assured that most of his Companions had left Mecca and were settled in Medina, he himself decided to leave in secret accompanied by Abū Bakr aṣ-Ṣiddīq, even though the leaders of the Quraysh had determined to stop him. His journey from Mecca to Medina took eight days and he arrived in Qubā’ on 12 Rabī’ I/24 September 622.¹⁶

Some sources state that the inhabitants of Medina were overjoyed at the Prophet’s arrival in their town and that about 500 *Anṣār* came out to greet him.¹⁷ Like most of the *Muhājirūn*, he stayed in Qubā’ as a guest of the Banū ‘Amr ibn ‘Awf for a period variously reported as lasting between four and twenty-three days, after which he left for Medina. There he stayed in the house of Abū Ayyūb, a member of the tribe of the Banu-n-Najjār, for seven months until the construction of his mosque and his wives’ houses was complete.¹⁸

Once the Prophet had arrived in Medina and settled there, the *Muhājirūn* moved from where they had initially stayed in Qubā’ and dispersed throughout Medina. According to some accounts, the *Anṣār* competed with each other to offer them hospitality. Al-Wāqidī, for example, remarks that the *Muhājirūn* left with the Prophet when he moved from the Banū ‘Amr ibn ‘Awf to Medina and that the *Anṣār* vied so much with each other to have

11 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, I, pp. 468, 480.

12 W. Montgomery Watt, *Muḥammad fī Makka*, trans. Sha’bān Barakāt, Beirut, al-Maṭba’a al-‘aṣriyya, n.d., p. 236.

13 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, I, p. 480.

14 Al-‘Alī, *ad-Dawla fī ‘ahd ar-rasūl*, p. 85.

15 Ibid., p. 84.

16 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, I, pp. 487, 491–2.

17 Ibn Sa’d, Muḥammad, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*, Beirut, Dār ṣādir, 1960, XII, p. 234; Ibn Kathīr, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, Beirut, Dār al-kutub al-‘ilmiyya, n.d., pp. 381–2.

18 Al-Balādhurī, Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥamīdullāh, Cairo, Dār al-ma’ārif, 1959, I, pp. 263, 267; Ibn Sa’d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I, p. 237.

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them as guests that they determined where every single one of them was to stay by casting lots with two arrows.¹⁹

The Prophet decided that the *Muhājirūn* could not live in the houses of the *Anṣār* indefinitely. He thus took steps to acquire land for distribution among the *Muhājirūn* so that they could build their own houses on it. Al-Balādhurī mentions that the Prophet ‘allotted areas for his Companions on what was no man’s land, as well as on pieces of land given to him by the *Anṣār*’.²⁰

The *Muhājirūn* were greatly moved by their treatment at the hands of the *Anṣār*. They expressed their profound respect for them when they told the Prophet:

O Messenger of God, we have never come across people who are so charitable with so little and who give so generously. They relieve us of our burdens and share with us all that is good, to the point where we are afraid lest they earn all God’s reward in the hereafter.

The Prophet replied: ‘You cannot praise and bless them enough.’²¹

It is clear from the above that the Prophet was extremely pleased with the attitude of the *Anṣār* towards their brothers the *Muhājirūn*, which was consistent with the Arab ideals and Islamic values that call for generosity, giving and solidarity. The Prophet evidently wanted to encourage these ideals and values so that they would form part of the system of regulations governing the relationships among the members of the new *umma*. But what steps did he take to achieve this?

CONFIRMING THE SINGLE ORIGIN OF HUMANKIND

In order to rise above divisive and partisan tribalism and confirm the single origin of humankind, the Meccan verses of the Qur’ān make it clear that all human beings are descended from a single ancestor, namely Adam. For this reason, the differences in colour and language among people and the division into male and female, clans and tribes, should not constitute barriers that prevent them from associating with each other and working together. The real standard that God uses to distinguish among people is their piety and faith in Him and their adherence to His commands as conveyed by the

19 Al-Wāqidī, Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, ed. Marsden Jones, Beirut, ‘Ālam al-kutub, 1984, I, p. 378.

20 Al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, I, p. 270.

21 Ibn Sayyid an-Nās, Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdallāh, *‘Uyūn al-athar fī funūn al-maghāzī wa-sh-shamā’il wa-s-siyar*, Beirut, 1986, I, p. 265.

prophets and messengers.²² Indeed, the Qur'ān has summarized all of these points in one of the Medinan verses:

O mankind, We created you from a man and a woman and made you into nations and tribes that you might know each other. The most honoured of you in the sight of God is the one who is most righteous. God has full knowledge and is acquainted with all things.²³

It is apparent from the above that the universal philosophy of Islam is based on the concept of the single origin of humankind, as confirmed by its assertion that the existence of differences and disparities among people is a law of human society, one of the laws of God. These differences should not be the occasion for boasting or feelings of superiority over others, however. On the contrary, they should be a reason for people to become acquainted with one another and achieve mutual understanding. This is the aim of the *umma* as announced by the Qur'ān²⁴ and is what the Prophet was working towards as he reorganized and reconstituted the internally divided society of Medina.

THE *MUHĀJIRŪN* AND THE *ANṢĀR*

It is well known that the first Muslims were members of various clans and tribes, in conformity with the social system operative on the Arabian peninsula at the beginning of Islam. These Muslims continued to maintain their tribal affiliations even though some tribes had adopted a hostile attitude towards those of their members who were Muslims, as in the case of the Quraysh and their stance towards the Prophet and his Meccan Companions. This attachment to a tribe was the cause of partisanship, which in turn led to divisions and bloody feuds, as occurred between the Aws and the Khazraj in Medina. The Prophet did not directly address this social system, however, as it was so deep-rooted and firmly established among the Arabs. Rather, he attempted to change it by upholding its positive values, including cooperation and solidarity among the members of a single clan, while at the same time renouncing the negative values such as the blinkered tribalism of the pre-Islamic period (*jāhiliyya*) whereby members of a clan were required to help each other in all matters, regardless of right or wrong.

Islam endeavoured to replace kinship ties with others based on religious belief and to reorganize society in accordance with the values and teachings

22 *Al-A'raf*, 7:10–43; *ar-Rūm*, 30:23.

23 *Al-Hujrāt*, 49:13.

24 Riḍwān, As-Sayyid, *al-Umma wa-l-jamā'a wa-s-sulṭa*, Beirut, Dār iqra', 1984, p. 27.

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of Islam. While this approach paved the way for the formation of new bonds, it also facilitated the coining of new terminology which competed with and superseded that associated with tribal identity. Hence, as we have seen, the Muslims from the Quraysh and other tribes who had emigrated from Mecca to Medina came to be known as the *Muhājirūn* (Emigrants), while the members of the Medinan tribes of the Aws and Khazraj who gave assistance to the *Muhājirūn* and welcomed them to their town were called the *Anṣār* (Helpers). Over time, these two names became a source of pride and honour for those who bore them. In some verses of the Qur'ān, the *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār* are praised and promised entry to paradise on the Day of Resurrection. For example:

God is pleased with the vanguard of Islam, the first of the *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār*, and with those who follow them in doing good deeds, and they are pleased with Him. He has prepared for them gardens under which rivers flow where they will dwell forever. This is the supreme attainment.²⁵

In the context of the Prophet's decision to distribute among the *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār* the booty he had seized from the Jewish tribe of the Banu-n-Naḍīr, al-Wāqidī makes some interesting comments which vividly depict the relationship between the two groups in Medina:

When the Messenger of God took booty from the Banu-n-Naḍīr he sent for Thābit ibn Qays ibn Shammās. 'Summon your people,' he told him. 'Do you mean the Khazraj?' Thābit asked. The Prophet replied: 'I mean all of the *Anṣār*.' So Thābit summoned the Aws and the Khazraj and the Prophet spoke. He praised God and glorified Him as appropriate, then he mentioned the *Anṣār* and the way they had treated the *Muhājirūn*, allowing them to stay in their homes and making a great impression upon them. Then he said: 'If you wish, I will divide between you and the *Muhājirūn* that which God has bestowed upon me from the Banu-n-Naḍīr. The *Muhājirūn* are living in your homes and sharing your wealth. If you wish, I will give some booty to them so that they can leave you.' At this, Sa'd ibn 'Abāda and Sa'd ibn Mu'ādh spoke up, saying: 'O Messenger of God, give the *Muhājirūn* some booty but let them remain in our homes as before.' The *Anṣār* called out: 'We are happy with this and approve of it.' The Prophet said: 'O God, have mercy on the *Anṣār* and their descendants.' Then he distributed the booty which God had bestowed upon him. He gave all of it to the *Muhājirūn*, with the exception of a small amount given to two men from the *Anṣār* who were needy.²⁶

25 *At-Tawba*, 9:100. See also *al-Anfāl*, 8:75.

26 *Al-Wāqidī*, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, I, p. 379.

This text makes it apparent that tribal names were still in use alongside the new Islamic names, even though the Prophet preferred to use the terms *Muhājirūn* and *Anṣār*. The text also reveals that a large number of *Muhājirūn* were still living in the homes of the *Anṣār* in 4/625–6. The Prophet therefore wished to use the booty seized from the Banu-n-Naḍīr to help them become independent of the *Anṣār*. Lastly, the text provides us with a wonderful description of the spirit of generosity and kindness that characterized the *Anṣār*'s treatment of their brothers the *Muhājirūn*, something which prompted the Prophet to ask God to bless them.

The fraternal bond (*muākhāh*) between the *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār*

In order further to strengthen the relationship between the *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār* and base it on principles consonant with the concept of the *umma*, the Prophet called upon them to form a *muākhāh* (fraternal bond). 'Let each of you take a brother in God,' he told them.²⁷ Ibn Sa'd makes it clear that the Prophet established a *muākhāh* between the *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār* such that they should 'treat each other with justice, support each other and take precedence over each other's blood relatives in matters of inheritance'. There were 90 men – 45 from the *Muhājirūn* and 45 from the *Anṣār*, although elsewhere it is stated that they numbered 150 *Muhājirūn* and 50 *Anṣār*.²⁸

Historians disagree as to the date when the *muākhāh* was made; it is reported that it occurred after the Prophet's mosque was complete or alternatively while it was being built, whereas Abū 'Umar dates it to five months after the Prophet's arrival in Medina.²⁹ It would appear that the bond was announced while the mosque was being built, perhaps five months after the *hijra*. Indeed, the Prophet made the alliance between the *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār* while he was in the house of Anas³⁰ and 'had the Prophet completed the construction of the mosque, he would have made the *muākhāh* in it since it was the most appropriate place to do such things'.³¹

Some scholars claim that the term *muākhāh* is an Islamic word for the old Arab system of *ḥilf* (tribal confederacy).³² Ṣāliḥ al-'Alī, on the other hand, considers that *muākhāh* differs from *ḥilf* in that it had a deeper impact on

27 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, p. 505.

28 Ibn Sa'd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I, pp. 238–9.

29 Ibn Sayyid an-Nās, *Uyūn al-athar*, I, p. 265.

30 Ibn Sa'd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I, p. 239.

31 Al-Mallāḥ, *al-Wasīṭ*, p. 291.

32 Ash-Sharīf, Aḥmad Ibrāhīm, *Makka wa-l-Madīna fi-l-jāhiliyya wa-'aṣr ar-rasūl*, Cairo, Dār al-fikr al-'arabī, 1965, p. 386.

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social organization and implied financial obligations.³³ Elsewhere, as-Suhaylī remarks that, by making a *muākhāh* between the *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār*, the Prophet hoped to alleviate the feeling of homesickness experienced by the *Muhājirūn* and to ‘compensate them for the loss of their families and clan members, as well as encourage them to support each other’.³⁴ This means that the aim of the bond was to tackle the social and economic problems facing the *Muhājirūn* in Medina.

Other contemporary scholars, however, think it unlikely that there was an economic motive behind the *muākhāh*, since the *Anṣār* had from the start provided lodgings in their homes for their brothers the *Muhājirūn*, acted generously towards them and looked after them in accordance with Arab tradition which requires that guests be treated hospitably. In addition to this are the Islamic values which require people within the *umma* to be responsible for each other. It should also be noted that many of the *Muhājirūn* had been merchants, a number of whom, such as Abū Bakr aṣ-Ṣiddīq and ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān, had brought money with them from Mecca to use in Medina. Hence, there was no pressing economic need for the Prophet to resort to such a bond between the *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār*.³⁵ Furthermore, a number of accounts indicate that the *muākhāh* was not exclusively used between the *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār*. Indeed, the same contract had been employed between members of the *Muhājirūn* themselves, first in Mecca³⁶ and then again in Medina.³⁷ What prompted the Prophet to do this?

Some scholars believe that the main reason for the Prophet’s use of the *muākhāh* was probably social, that is to say, it was a means of ensuring the unity of the new *umma* and establishing relationships between its members on the basis of absolute equality. This would eradicate the tribal concepts that divided individuals into a hierarchy of different groups, each possessing a higher status than the other. For example, the *mawlā* (client) who was a nominal member of a tribe, or the *ḥalīf* (confederate) who was allied to a tribe, had a higher status than the slave; the full member of a tribe by blood relations had a higher status than the *ḥalīf*, and so on. By establishing a *muākhāh* between the Muslims, the Prophet wished to abolish these divisions. This was particularly the case in Medina, where tribal conventions meant that the *Anṣār* considered the *Muhājirūn* to be their *ḥalīfs*, even though it was understood that the *ḥalīf* had a lower status than a full member of the tribe in that he lived under the latter’s protection. For this reason, the blood money

33 Al-‘Alī, *ad-Dawla fī ‘ahd ar-rasūl*, p. 86.

34 As-Suhaylī, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān, *Kitāb ar-rawḍ al-unuf*, Cairo, 1914, II, p. 18.

35 Al-‘Asalī, Khālīd ‘Nizām al-muākhāh fī ‘ahd ar-rasūl’, in *Dirāsāt fī tārikh al-‘arab*, ed. and with an introduction by ‘Imād ‘Abd-as-Salām, Baghdad, 2002, p. 62.

36 Ibn Sayyid an-Nās, ‘*Uyūn al-athar*, I, p. 264.

37 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I, p. 238.

payable for the killing of a *ḥalīf* was half that payable for the killing of a full member, and the full member took precedence over the *ḥalīf* in matters of inheritance and was not required to avenge his killing.³⁸

It was because of this inequality that the Prophet strove, by means of the *muākhāh*, to put an end to the divisions that tribalism imposed on the Muslims within the single *umma* and to establish relationships between them based on absolute equality, in accordance with God's words that 'the believers are brothers'.³⁹ Indeed, in some traditions the Prophet referred to the concept of complete parity between Muslims. For example, Abū Da'ūd and an-Nasā'ī record that he said: 'The lives of believers are equally valuable. They are one hand against others. The lowest of them can guarantee their protection.'⁴⁰

Finally, it is worth remarking that the Prophet abolished the system of alliances between members of the *umma* because Islam considers all Muslims to be brothers and therefore implicitly in alliance against their enemies, because they are a single *umma* distinguished from other people and because there are no separate confederations within Islam.⁴¹

THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROPHET'S MOSQUE AND HIS WIVES' HOUSES

Prayer is the oldest of the religious observances in Islam. It is next in importance to belief in God because it is a practical expression of the spiritual bond which ties man to his Creator. At the same time, prayer draws Muslims together so as to form a distinct community founded on unity of faith, a legal system and shared values.⁴² The Prophet and his Companions practised this religious observance from the earliest days of the Meccan period but were forced to pray in secret due to the persecution of the polytheists. For this reason, they did not attempt to identify a permanent place in Mecca to serve as a mosque in which they could gather and perform the ritual prayers.

When Islam spread to Medina before the Prophet's *hijra* there, the Muslims set aside certain places in which to congregate and openly undertake the religious duty of prayer. One of these places was a *mirbad* (a place where dates are put out to dry), which the Prophet chose as the site on which to build his mosque after his *hijra* to Medina. Ibn Sa'd states that the Prophet bought this *mirbad* for 10 dinars from two orphaned young men from the

38 Al-'Asalī, 'Nizām al-muākhāh', pp. 50–2.

39 *Al-Hujrāt*, 49:10.

40 Ibn ad-Dayba' ash-Shaybānī, 'Abd-ar-Rahmān, *Taysīr al-wuṣūl ilā jāmi' al-uṣūl min ḥadīth ar-rasūl*, Cairo, Maṭba'at Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1935, I, p. 63.

41 Al-'Asalī, 'Nizām al-muākhāh', p. 52; Riḍwān, *al-Umma*, p. 65.

42 Al-'Alī, *ad-Dawla fī 'ahd ar-rasūl*, p. 123.

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Anṣār. Before the arrival of the Messenger of God, one of the leaders of the *Anṣār* named As‘ad ibn Zurāra had constructed an unroofed walled structure which faced towards Jerusalem in which he and his fellow Muslims used to pray and perform the Friday service.⁴³

After buying this piece of land, the Prophet removed the trees and rubble from it and, with the assistance of his followers from the *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār*, began to build the mosque. The walls were made of unburnt bricks, the roof of palm fronds from which the leaves had been stripped and the pillars from the trunks of palm trees. The mosque covered an area of 100 square cubits, equivalent to 60 m². It faced towards Jerusalem, since at that time the Muslims still turned in that direction while performing their prayers.⁴⁴

Alongside the mosque the Prophet built houses for his wives. These were small rooms with low ceilings, made of unburnt bricks, the stalks of palm branches and the trunks of palm trees. The Prophet built the houses in this location so that he could come out and go straight into the mosque.⁴⁵ It is for this reason that legal requirements for the construction of mosques came to be established and that governors’ houses and administrative departments were situated next to mosques. The purpose of establishing a mosque is not only religious, that is to say, for the performance of prayer, but also political in that the mosque creates a bond between the members of the *umma*.⁴⁶

The sources state that it took approximately seven months to build the mosque and the houses and that the *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār* undertook the work voluntarily and very willingly. The Prophet worked alongside them, praising their enthusiasm in a celebrated line of poetry: ‘O God, there is no life but the life of the hereafter. So grant Your pardon to the *Anṣār* and the *Muhājirūn*.’⁴⁷

It was thus ordained that the mosque be built by a voluntary collective effort on the part of a group of Muslims from the *umma* and that it should become the centre of the spiritual, cultural, social and political life of the community. After the Prophet, the new leadership adopted the mosque as its headquarters and all matters of importance were settled there. It was also where Muslims gathered to discuss general issues of war and peace, receive tribal delegations and so on.⁴⁸

43 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I, p. 239.

44 Ibid., pp. 239–40; al-‘Alī, *ad-Dawla fī ‘ahd ar-rasūl*, p. 84.

45 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, p. 240.

46 Ash-Sharīf, *Makka wa-l-Madīna*, p. 386.

47 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, p. 240.

48 Ash-Sharīf, *Makka wa-l-Madīna*, p. 67.

The Constitution of Medina

In order to regulate relations between the inhabitants of Medina comprising the Aws and Khazraj tribes, the *Muhājirūn* and the Jews, and Muḥammad in his capacity as the Messenger of God and leader of the community, the Prophet prepared a document which in modern times has come to be known as the ‘Constitution of Medina’. The text has reached us in its entirety by way of Ibn Hishām’s *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya* and Ibn Sallām’s *Kitāb al-amwāl*. Some extracts are also contained in the works of a number of historians and traditionists.⁴⁹ Most scholars therefore consider it to be genuine, especially since it provides a particularly detailed description of the period during which it was written.⁵⁰

From a reading of the historical sources, it can be concluded that the Prophet composed the Constitution in AH 1, perhaps after instituting the *muākhāh* between the *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār* five months after the *hijra*. On the other hand, Ibn Hishām mentions the Constitution in the context of the building of the mosque and before dealing with the *muākhāh*.⁵¹ This date is not generally accepted amongst scholars, however, since the historical sources containing the Constitution make no mention of when the Prophet composed it. A number of scholars have proposed that it was written before the battle of Badr in AH 2, while others have suggested that it was written after it, since the Prophet’s position in Medina only became secure following his victory in that battle.⁵²

One scholar has suggested that the text in the form in which it has reached us was neither originally a single document, nor composed at one time. Initially, it was probably eight documents, written at different times, which were subsequently combined into a single text.⁵³

49 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, pp. 501–4; Ibn Sallām, Abū ‘Ubayd al-Qāsim, *Kitāb al-amwāl*, Cairo, Maṭba‘at Majāzī, 1353/1934, pp. 202–7; Muḥammad Ḥamīdullāh al-Ḥaydarabādī, *Majmū‘at al-wathā‘iq as-siyāsiyya li-l-‘ahd an-nabawī wa-l-khilāfa ar-rāshida*, Cairo, Maṭba‘at lajnat at-ta’līf wa-t-tarjama wa-n-nashr, 1956, pp. 15–21; M. Hamidullah, ‘The First Written Constitution of the World’, *The Islamic Review*, 1941, p. 477.

50 R. B. Serjeant, ‘The Constitution of Medina’, *Islamic Quarterly*, VIII, 1964, p. 3; al-‘Alī, *ad-Dawla fī ‘ahd ar-rasūl*, p. 104; ash-Sharīf, *Makka wa-l-Madīna*, pp. 75–7; al-Mallāḥ, *al-Wasīf*, pp. 293–4.

51 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, p. 501; Ibn Sallām, *Kitāb al-amwāl*, pp. 206–7; al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, I, p. 176; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, ed. Muḥammad Riḍwān, Beirut, Dār al-kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 1978, p. 30.

52 Julius Wellhausen, *The Arab Kingdom and its Fall*, trans. from the original German by M. Wier, Beirut, Khayats, 1963, p. 11; M. Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins Press, 1961, pp. 205–6; al-‘Alī, Ṣāliḥ Aḥmad, ‘Ṣaḥīfat ar-rasūl ṣall-Allāhu ‘alayhi wa-sallam li-ahl al-Madīna’, *Majallat majma‘ al-lughā al-‘arabīyya al-urdunīyya*, No. 64, Amman, June 2003, p. 15.

53 Serjeant, ‘The Constitution of Medina’, p. 5.

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The present writer considers that the opinions cited above are mere conjecture, since they are based on a number of suppositions none of which has been substantiated conclusively. We shall therefore deal with the Constitution as it is preserved in Ibn Hishām's *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, in the context of the events which took place during the first years after the *hijra*, and as a text composed by Muḥammad in his capacity as the Messenger of God and the leader of the nascent Islamic community, with a view to regulating relations between him, the *Muhājirūn*, the *Anṣār* and the Jews.

THE SINGLE *UMMA*

Before dealing with the Constitution in terms of its conception of the *umma* and the associated reforms, the meaning of the term *umma* must be explained as it has several meanings in Arabic. Indeed, dictionaries provide eight different definitions⁵⁴ and the Qur'ān uses it in six different ways in approximately sixty-four verses.⁵⁵

There are two main meanings of the term, however: 'a single community which embraces one religion' and 'a community of people to whom God has sent a messenger, whether they believe in him or not'.⁵⁶ It is apparent from the first paragraph of the Constitution that it uses the word *umma* in both these senses:

This is a document from Muḥammad the Prophet between the believers and Muslims from the Quraysh and Yathrib and those who associate with them. So join with them and strive with them. They are one *umma* distinct from other people.⁵⁷

The *umma* was thus not restricted to the *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār* who embraced one religion, Islam, but also included all those content to associate themselves with them, such as the polytheists of the Aws and Khazraj and the Jewish clans allied to them. The latter are those referred to in the second meaning of the term *umma*, something that the Constitution makes clear when it describes the Jews as 'an *umma* with the believers',⁵⁸ as Ibn Ishāq records, or 'an *umma* of believers', as stated in the account of Ibn Sallām.⁵⁹

54 Majd-ad-Dīn al-Fayrūzabādī, *al-Qāmūs al-muḥīṭ*, Beirut, Dār al-kitāb al-'arabī, 1983, IV, p. 76; Riḍwān, *al-Umma*, pp. 43–4.

55 Al-Ḥadīthī, Nizār 'Abd-al-Laṭīf, *al-Umma wa-d-dawla fī siyāsāt an-nabī wa-l-khulafā' ar-rāshidīn*, Baghdad, Dār al-ḥurriyya, 1987, p. 231.

56 Riḍwān, *al-Umma*, pp. 44–8.

57 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, p. 501.

58 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, p. 503.

59 Ibn Sallām, *Kitāb al-amwāl*, p. 204.

It is apparent from the above that the fledgling *umma* in Medina was a religio-political entity and differed from the tribe in that the latter is based on ties of blood, whereas the *umma* took religious faith and political allegiance as the basis for uniting its members. In this regard, it signified more than a religious community (*milla*). Thus, however defined in the Constitution, the *umma* was a combination of a single community of people professing the same religion and a community of people to whom God had sent a messenger whether they believed in him or not.

The new *umma* was the community (*jamā'a*) which consented to live within the framework of Islam and under the leadership of the Prophet, regardless of whether its members had come to believe in the message of Islam or had yet to do so. In this respect, the meaning of the word *umma* went beyond the dictionary definitions and indicated a political entity, hence being raised to the level of a state (*dawla*). Wellhausen refers to this when he remarks:

In the current circumstances in Medina, the religion came to possess great power of a predominantly political nature. The Prophet was therefore able to establish a community and create an unassailable authority. God was the emblem of the leadership of the state. What takes place with us today in the name of the king occurred then in the name of God. The army was called the 'army of God' and the rules and regulations were attributed to God. So it was that through faith in God, the Arabs became rulers without ever having previously conceived of such a thing ... Supreme power belonged to God Alone; but His representative, His Messenger, who was aware of His wishes and who was the one who realized them, was the Prophet. The Prophet was not simply someone who gave notice of the truth; he was also the sole legitimate political leader over the earth. No one could compete with his authority. There was no other prophet and there never would be.⁶⁰

The above shows that within Islamic thought, the word *umma* does not merely indicate any community of people or any religion; rather it came to designate a socio-political entity with a particular religious orientation. It is a 'single *umma* distinct from other people'. The *umma/dawla*⁶¹ as described in the Constitution had become a community open to all individuals and groups who wished to live within its framework. This facilitated its growth

60 Julius Wellhausen, *Tārīkh ad-dawla al-'arabiyya min zuhūr al-islām ilā nihāyat ad-dawla al-umawiyya*, trans. from the original German by Muḥammad 'Abd-al-Hādī Abū Rīda, Cairo, 1968, p. 8.

61 Old Arabic dictionaries are noticeably unaware of the current legal and political implications of the term *dawla*, which formerly meant the circulation of money or the ebb and flow of battle. The Qur'ān uses the term in these two senses. See al-Fayruzabādī, *al-Qāmūs al-muḥīṭ*, III, p. 377; *Āl 'Imrān*, 3:140; *al-Ḥashr*, 59:7.

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and development from the 'state of Medina' into a regional state which towards the end of the Prophet's life embraced most of the Arab tribes living on the Arabian peninsula. This was then to expand during the period of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and be transformed into a global power comprised of different peoples and tribes all living within the territory of Islam and under its system of regulations.

The *Muhājirūn* and the *Anṣār* formed the nucleus of the *umma* and occupied positions of leadership.⁶² The Constitution laid down a number of rules which regulated relations between them, as follows:

1. Insofar as relations between groups of Muslims within the *umma* were to be based on unity and mutual responsibility, those groups had to work together and offer mutual support in times of both peace and war.⁶³ They were also under an obligation not to abandon any of their number who had been taken prisoner by the enemy without attempting to secure his release through payment of a ransom.⁶⁴
2. In that the Constitution considered all Muslims to be equal in rights and duties, it gave them the right to grant protection to any stranger who appealed to them for help and obliged all Muslims to respect such arrangements.⁶⁵
3. It was not permitted for any Muslim to make an alliance with the client (*mawlā*) of another Muslim without the latter's permission. The aim of this was to avoid conflict and disagreement among the Muslims.
4. The murder of a Muslim was punishable by death unless the guardian of the murdered man gave his pardon and agreed to accept blood money.⁶⁶
5. All believers were to take responsibility for implementing the punishments meted out to criminals, even if the criminal was the son of one of them. There was consequently no possibility or justification for partisanship within the new *umma* or for maintaining the custom of exacting revenge.⁶⁷

The Constitution was not confined to laying down rules on relations between the Muslims as individuals but also laid down other rules on relations between them as members of tribal blocs insofar as it acknowledged the tribal and clan structures existing in Medina and regarded them as administrative units within the single *umma*. The *Muhājirūn* were therefore viewed as

62 Wellhausen, *Tārīkh*, p. 12.

63 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, p. 503.

64 *Ibid.*, p. 502.

65 *Ibid.*, pp. 502–3.

66 *Ibid.*, p. 503; Ibn Sallām, *Kitāb al-amwāl*, pp. 202–3.

67 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, p. 503.

one tribal unit alongside the other tribes in Medina, and the tribes in turn acknowledged the ultimate authority of Muḥammad as the Prophet leader of the *umma*.

Under the Constitution, the tribes had a duty to ensure that their members continued as before to work together and to provide mutual support, in addition to assuming joint responsibility for payment of the blood money needed to secure the release of any who had been taken prisoner. They were also obliged to help anyone burdened with debts to settle them and thus avoid becoming hostage to them.⁶⁸

THE *UMMA* AND THE JEWISH TRIBES IN MEDINA

The Constitution treats the Jewish tribes in Medina as a group within the *umma*. It does not refer to them specifically by tribe, such as the Banū Qaynuqā', the Banu-n-Naḍīr or the Banū Qurayza, but rather treats them as allies of the clans within the Khazraj and the Aws. It therefore speaks of the Jews of the Banū 'Awf, the Jews of the Banu-l-Ḥārith, the Jews of the Banu-n-Najjār and so on.⁶⁹ This has led some scholars to suggest that the terms of the Constitution do not include the Jews of the Banū Qaynuqā', the Banu-n-Naḍīr and the Banū Qurayza, but rather only small Jewish clans within larger tribes 'which had entered into alliance with the Aws or the Khazraj'.⁷⁰ The proponents of this view have not, however, supplied any text to corroborate their position. Neither have they provided the original names of these small Jewish clans, nor any information about their circumstances before or after the writing of the Constitution.

In fact, the early sources lead us to conclude that the Jews mentioned in the Constitution are identical to the Jewish tribes living in Medina, except that they are referred to in their role as allies of the Aws and the Khazraj. This is firstly because they were indeed their allies and secondly in order to show that in Medina the *Anṣār* had authority over the Jews.⁷¹

In his discussion of the Constitution, Ibn Sallām explains that at the time when the Prophet arrived in Medina the Jews mentioned in the document were formed into three groups: the Banū Qaynuqā', the Banu-n-Naḍīr and the Banū Qurayza. The first group, the Banū Qaynuqā', which acted treacherously and violated its peace treaty with the Prophet, was an ally of 'Abdallāh ibn Ubayy and was therefore expelled from Medina by

68 Ibid., p. 502; Wellhausen, *Tārīkh*, pp. 12–13.

69 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, p. 503.

70 Ash-Sharīf, *Makka wa-l-Madīna*, p. 394.

71 Al-Mallāḥ, *al-Wasīf*, pp. 302–3.

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the Prophet.⁷² Similarly, al-Wāqidī states that when the Prophet arrived in Medina:

all the Jews made a peace treaty with him and he wrote a covenant between them. The Prophet attached each group of Jews to their allies, established peace among them and imposed conditions on them, one of which was that they should not assist any enemy against him. After the Prophet achieved his victory over the Meccans at the battle of Badr and went to Medina, the Jews acted treacherously and violated the pact between them and the Prophet.⁷³

It is clear from the above that the Jews who were covered by the Constitution and who agreed to cooperate with the Prophet in accordance with its stipulations were the Jews of the Banū Qaynuqā', the Banu-n-Naḍīr and the Banū Qurayza. But what rights and duties did the Constitution determine in their regard?

1. The Constitution granted the Jews freedom to practise their religion. It states: 'The Jews have their religion and the Muslims have their religion, both their clients [*mawālī*] and themselves.'⁷⁴
2. The Constitution ensured that the Jews would be protected and treated impartially. It states: 'Any Jew who attaches himself to us will be assisted and treated equally. He will not be dealt with unjustly or persecuted by any group.'⁷⁵
3. If a Jew were to commit a crime against a member of the *umma*, the responsibility for it would lie with him alone.⁷⁶
4. In return for the rights mentioned above, the Constitution charged the Jews with a number of duties. Thus, it stipulates that the Jews should assist the Muslims against anyone engaged in fighting them: 'The Jews will be responsible for their own expenditure and the Muslims for theirs. They shall help each other against anyone engaged in fighting the people mentioned in this Constitution. The Jews shall contribute towards the cost of war as long as they are fighting alongside the believers.'⁷⁷
5. The Constitution states that the Jews must neither make an alliance with the Quraysh and their allies nor consent to protect their trade.⁷⁸ This was because the Quraysh were at war with the Muslims.

72 Ibn Sallām, *Kitāb al-amwāl*, p. 207; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 30.

73 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, p. 176.

74 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, p. 503.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibn Sallām, *Kitāb al-amwāl*, p. 207.

77 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, pp. 503–4.

78 Ibid., p. 504.

6. The Jews should not wage war or agree to fight any group of people without the approval of the Prophet.⁷⁹
7. Any serious disagreement arising among the Jews themselves or between them and the other inhabitants of Medina must be referred to the Prophet for adjudication.⁸⁰

THE PROPHET'S AUTHORITY TO LEAD THE *UMMA*

An examination of the Constitution of Medina shows that it was drawn up in order to realize the Qur'ānic principles of leadership and authority. The Constitution consequently states that the ruler of the *umma* is God because the final decision in all matters belongs to Him. As for the Prophet, he possessed the executive power in that he managed the affairs and orientation of the *umma* in accord with God's orders and prohibitions.⁸¹

The Prophet's powers were therefore clearly related to his leadership of the *umma* in conformity with the regulations laid down by the Constitution. These powers were as follows:

1. The central role taken by the Prophet in the leadership of the *umma* resulted from his position as the Messenger of God. It is for this reason that the Constitution designated Medina as a sacred place of peace.⁸² The issue of peace in Medina was thus afforded a religious dimension whose roots were found in the traditions and beliefs of the Arabs. For just as Mecca was a sacred place of peace in which fighting and bloodshed were forbidden, so also was Medina because it was the town of the Prophet.⁸³
2. The Constitution declared that the Prophet was the arbiter or judge before whom all disputes arising among the inhabitants of Medina were to be submitted: 'Whatever you disagree about, you must submit it before God and Muḥammad.'⁸⁴
3. In general, the Constitution granted the Prophet authority to take the final decision in declaring war against or making peace with the enemies of the *umma*.⁸⁵

The Prophet thus became leader of the people of Medina.

79 Ibid., p. 503.

80 Ibid., p. 504.

81 Al-Mallāḥ, *al-Wasīṭ*, p. 304.

82 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, I, p. 504.

83 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 22; al-'Alī, *ad-Dawla fī 'ahd ar-rasūl*, p. 109.

84 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, I, p. 503.

85 Ibid.

The Medinan state within the *umma*

The Prophet's successful organization of public affairs in Medina in accordance with the regulations in the Constitution provided the right conditions for the emergence of a state in Medina, that is, a city-state from the legal perspective. In terms of territory, people and leadership, all the basic elements needed to create a state were already in place in Medina. The only thing lacking was a final and compelling authority that could help to govern the town. Consequently, when the Prophet succeeded in convincing the people of Medina to accept and submit to his authority, as explained earlier, all the basic elements needed to create a state were in place and a city-state known as the *umma* emerged with all the characteristics of a state. These included a territory defined as the town of Medina and outlying areas, a people composed of *Muhājirūn*, *Anṣār*, the Jews and the polytheists of the Aws and Khazraj, a power in the form of the government of the Prophet, and full independence for the state in ruling over its people and its territory.

It should be noted that at this time the term *dawla* (state) did not have the legal and political significance it has today. The Qur'ān and documents written by the Prophet therefore use the word *umma* to mean state in that sense.⁸⁶ In other words, the *umma* was the equivalent in Islamic thought to what is currently known as a *dawla*.

As soon as the Prophet had completed his elaboration of the regulations governing the domestic affairs of the *umma* or state of Medina, he began to attend to its foreign policy with a view to countering the enemies of the *umma*, in particular the polytheists of Mecca. The Prophet was well aware that this required the members of the *umma* to be both physically and mentally prepared in case it was necessary to use force against those enemies. In fact, during the Meccan period, the Qur'ān was preparing the Muslims for such an eventuality. Some verses were revealed which permit Muslims to use force to counter injustice and aggression, for example:

And those who help each other when they are treated with oppression. The recompense for an injury is an equivalent injury. But if a person forgives and makes reconciliation, his reward will be from God. God does not love the unjust.⁸⁷

It was not long before the Qur'ān sanctioned the use of force by the Muslims in fighting against those who attacked them first: 'Permission is given those who wage war because they are wronged. God is Most Powerful to aid

86 Al-Mallāḥ, *al-Wasīṭ*, p. 307.

87 *Ash-Shūrā*, 42:38–41.

them.’⁸⁸ In his commentary on the Qur’ān, al-Qurṭubī states that this verse was revealed ‘during the Prophet’s *hijra* to Medina’.⁸⁹ As for its meaning, Ibn Ishāq says that it allowed Muslims to fight because they were being persecuted ‘and they had done nothing wrong to the people apart from worshipping God’.⁹⁰

It should be noted that the Qur’ān uses the phrase ‘*jihād* in the way of God’ to refer to the right of Muslims to fight their enemies. In Arabic dictionaries, the word *jihād* is defined as making a great effort in order to achieve a noble aim, such as working for the sake of God and spreading Islam.⁹¹ During the Meccan period, the Qur’ān uses the term to mean fighting the unbelievers with argument and informing them of the message of the Qur’ān. It states, for example: ‘Do not listen to the unbelievers, but strive [*jāhid*] against them with the utmost vigour,’⁹² that is, with the Qur’ān. During the Medinan period, the term was extended to mean exerting the utmost effort in fighting the enemy in a physical sense.⁹³

The Muslims were consequently well aware when they emigrated from Mecca to Medina that they had been treated unjustly by the polytheists and had the right to use force to repel such oppressors. It was for this reason that the Constitution of Medina includes a number of articles which refer to the polytheists of Mecca as the main enemies of Islam and also forbids the parties to the Constitution to offer protection to them or their trade. Similarly, some articles stress that the people of Medina should support each other in the event of war and in defence of the town.

The beginning of *jihād* against the Meccan polytheists

In *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, the military campaigns personally led by the Prophet against the polytheists are called *ghazwas*, while the military campaigns under the command of someone else chosen by the Prophet are called *sariyyas* or *ba‘ths*; these were usually on a small scale and designed to carry out reconnaissance and waylay trade caravans.⁹⁴

The early biographies of the Prophet differ regarding the date when Muslim military activities began. Al-Wāqidī and Ibn Sa‘d, for instance, state

88 *Al-Ḥaj*, 22:39.

89 Al-Qurṭubī, Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad, *al-Jāmi‘ li-ahkām al-Qur’ān*, Cairo, Maṭba‘at Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1952, XII, p. 68.

90 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, p. 468.

91 Al-Fayrūzabādī, *al-Qāmūs al-muḥīṭ*, I, p. 286.

92 *Al-Furqān*, 25:52.

93 *Al-Anfāl*, 8:72–5.

94 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, II, pp. 5–6.

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that the first *sariyya* to leave Medina was that commanded by Ḥamza ibn ‘Abd-al-Muṭṭalib, comprising thirty men half of them *Muhājirūn* and half *Anṣār*, at the end of the seventh month of AH 1.⁹⁵ It intercepted a Quraysh caravan returning from ash-Shām (Greater Syria) that was led by Abū Sufyān and accompanied by 300 horsemen. No fighting broke out, however, owing to the mediation of Majdī ibn ‘Amr al-Juhanī, an ally of both parties who went from one to the other until the confrontation was resolved.⁹⁶

As for Ibn Ishāq, Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, Ibn Ḥazm and others,⁹⁷ they consider that Muslim military activities began with the *ghazwa* of Abwā’, which was led by the Prophet in the month of Ṣafar, twelve months after his arrival in Medina. Composed entirely of *Muhājirūn*, the expedition was sent to halt a caravan of the Quraysh but was unsuccessful because the caravan fled. The Prophet nevertheless capitalized on the situation by concluding a peace treaty with Mukhshī ibn ‘Amr, the chief of the Banū Ḍamra, according to which the Prophet ‘would not raid the Banū Ḍamra and the Banū Ḍamra would not raid him. They would not gather their forces against him or assist any of his enemies. A written contract was drawn up between them.’⁹⁸ After this, the Prophet returned to Medina.

It is therefore clear that, in the view of Ibn Ishāq and those other biographers of the Prophet who agreed with him, the Prophet’s military activities began at the end of AH 1, a view that is further corroborated by aṭ-Ṭabarī.⁹⁹ It is moreover consistent with the course of events in Medina and with the Prophet’s desire to serve as a model of behaviour for all time, especially in affairs of great importance. It is inconceivable that the Prophet would have left the formulation of policy regarding fighting the enemy to his Companions while he sat in Medina merely waiting for news.

The Prophet evidently hoped that these military campaigns would demonstrate to the Quraysh that his new circumstances had made him a powerful man capable of imposing an economic embargo on their commercial caravans travelling to Greater Syria (ash-Shām). If they wished to continue their trade and protect the life of luxury that depended on it from the serious dangers awaiting them, then they had to acknowledge the Prophet and enter into negotiations with him to reach an agreement regulating relations between the two parties. At this early stage of the conflict, however, the Quraysh were not prepared to make any agreement, since they were unwilling to accept the

95 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, pp. 9–11; Ibn Sa’d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, II, p. 16.

96 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, p. 9.

97 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, I, p. 591; Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, *Tārīkh Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt*, ed. Akram al-‘Amrī, Najaf, Maṭba‘at al-ādāb, 1967, I, pp. 13, 20–1; Ibn Ḥazm, Abū Muḥammad ‘Alī ibn Aḥmad ibn Sa‘īd, *Jawāmi‘ as-sīra*, eds Iḥsān ‘Abbās and Nāṣir-ad-Dīn al-Asad, Cairo, n.d., pp. 100–1.

98 Ibn Sa’d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, II, p. 8.

99 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, II, pp. 402–3.

Prophet's conditions, most crucially recognition of the right of Muslims freely to practise their religion.¹⁰⁰

The peace treaty concluded by the Prophet with the chief of the Banū Ḍamra and the mediation of the Banū Juhayna between the Muslims and the polytheists during the raid of Ḥamza's *sariyya* both indicate that, through such activities, the Prophet aimed, *inter alia*, to demonstrate his power to the Arab tribes who either lived around Medina or whose homes lay alongside the trade routes. In so doing, he hoped to win them over to his side or at least ensure that they remained neutral in the conflict between him and the polytheists, which indeed proved to be the case.

The Muslims continued to launch their attacks on the Meccan caravans until the leaders of the polytheists ran out of patience and resolved to deal with the Muslims in a final and decisive battle, namely the battle of Badr. It was preceded, however, by a very serious incident in the form of a *sariyya* raid, known as the 'palm-tree *sariyya*', on a small caravan belonging to the polytheists. During this raid, which took place near Mecca during the sacred months, the Muslims killed one of the polytheists, took two men prisoner and looted the caravan. The attack served to enrage the polytheists and the Prophet's enemies insofar as it constituted a flagrant violation of the sanctity of the sacred months observed by the majority of Arabs. Indeed, the Muslims in Medina joined with the Meccans in condemning the attack.¹⁰¹ The Prophet therefore reprimanded the leader of the *sariyya*, 'Abdallāh ibn Jaḥsh, for his errant behaviour, saying: 'I did not order you to fight during the sacred months, halt the caravan and take two prisoners.' He also refused to take any of the proceeds of the attack.¹⁰²



1.8 The Green Dome of the Prophet's Mosque, Medina
(© Aramco World Magazine)

100 Sha'bān, Muḥammad 'Abd-al-Ḥay, *Ṣadr al-islām wa-d-dawla al-umawiyya*, Beirut, al-Maktaba al-ahliyya li-n-nashr wa-t-tawzī', 1983, p. 22.

101 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, I, pp. 601–4.

102 *Ibid.*, p. 604.

The Prophet subsequently received a revelation, consisting of a few verses, which explained that it was in fact the polytheists in Mecca who had violated the sanctity of the sacred months and the holy sites because of their lack of faith in Almighty God and their persecution of the Muslims in Mecca that had forced them to emigrate from their homes and flee with their religion. It was consequently the Muslims' right to counter the aggression of the polytheists and fight them, whether during the sacred months or not.¹⁰³ With this, the crisis was over and the Muslims continued their military activities until the battle of Badr took place.¹⁰⁴

The battle of Badr and those that followed affected the development of relations between the nascent *umma* and the polytheists, both in Mecca and throughout the Arabian peninsula. We shall therefore briefly discuss them here in the context of military conflict with the polytheists.

Military conflict with the polytheists

As part of the Prophet's policy of harassing the commercial caravans of the Quraysh travelling to and from ash-Shām, in Ramaḍān AH 2 he called upon his Companions to join him in a raiding party, or *ghazwa*, to attack one of the largest caravans on its way back from ash-Shām (Greater Syria).¹⁰⁵ When the leader of the caravan, Abū Sufyān, learnt that the Prophet had led his Companions out of Medina in order to attack it, he sent an urgent letter to the Quraysh asking them to come and defend the caravan, which comprised 1,000 camels and had been financed by the majority of the tribe.¹⁰⁶ Most of the Quraysh responded to this plea for assistance so as to protect their interests and also to exact revenge on the Muslims for their raid on one of their caravans during the sacred months. Although Abū Sufyān's caravan managed to escape and return safely to Mecca, the result of this incident was that the headstrong leaders of the Quraysh resolved to fight the Muslims in order to curb their activities and prevent them from attacking their caravans.¹⁰⁷

The only recourse available to the two sides was therefore military confrontation, which occurred at a place called Badr. The ensuing battle that bears its name took place on Friday 17 Ramaḍān AH 2. There were 950 men fighting for the polytheists and 314 Muslim fighters, that is, about one third of the number of polytheists. Nonetheless, victory was on the side of the

103 *Al-Baqara*, 2:217; al-Qurṭubī, *al-Jāmi'*, III, p. 46.

104 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, p. 604.

105 *Ibid.*, p. 607.

106 *Ibid.*, p. 609.

107 *Ibid.*; al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, I, p. 27.

Muslims owing to the unity of their leadership, their excellent organization and the strength of their faith.¹⁰⁸

By the standards of the time, the polytheists suffered severe losses during the battle: seventy were killed and a further seventy taken prisoner, while only fourteen were killed on the Muslim side. The polytheists killed included some of the most prominent Meccan leaders who opposed Islam.¹⁰⁹ It is therefore not surprising that this Muslim victory proved to be decisive and had a profound effect on the status of the Prophet and the Muslims in Medina, as well as on the status of the Prophet within the Arabian peninsula and among the Arabs in general.

It was difficult for the Quraysh to accept the defeat and they began to prepare for a counter-attack. To finance the battle, they set aside the proceeds of the caravan that had escaped the Muslims prior to the battle of Badr¹¹⁰ and gathered as many men as possible from the Quraysh and their allies until they had some 3,000 fighters.¹¹¹ They then set out to fight the Muslims at a place near Medina called Uḥud, after which the battle is named. There were 700 men in the Muslim army, that is, fewer than one quarter of the number in the army of the polytheists. This battle, which took place at the end of AH 3, inevitably ended in favour of the polytheists.¹¹²

This success encouraged the Quraysh to continue amassing resources and rallying allies so as to finish with the Muslims once and for all, especially since the Muslims had not been prompted by their setback at the battle of Uḥud to change their policy of attacking the Quraysh's caravans and tightening their blockade. The ambitions of the Quraysh were realized in AH 5, when they were able to organize a military expedition composed of some 10,000 fighters drawn from their own tribe and a number of allied tribes. Their advance was, however, halted by the Muslims on the outskirts of Medina, where they had dug a ditch to prevent the army from entering the town and engaging in skirmishes with the Muslims who formed a line of defence behind the ditch. After the polytheists had besieged Medina for some twenty days in terrible weather conditions, their solidarity began to crumble and their enthusiasm for the fight weakened. They were forced to retreat and to return disappointed after failing to achieve their aims.¹¹³

The Prophet considered that the failure of the Quraysh and their allies, the *Aḥzāb* (the Allies), in the battle at Medina heralded a crucial transformation in the balance of power in favour of the Muslims. 'The

108 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, pp. 612, 617, 646, 706–14.

109 *Ibid.*, pp. 706–14.

110 Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, I, pp. 199–200.

111 *Ibid.*, pp. 200–1.

112 Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, I, pp. 220–32; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II, pp. 122–43.

113 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, , pp. 215–23; al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, I, pp. 445–96.

Quraysh will not attack you again after this year,' he told his Companions, 'but you will attack them.'¹¹⁴ No doubt the Quraysh expected the Prophet to respond to their attack by launching a rapid counter-offensive, but what actually came surprised them in that it was of a completely different nature. In AH 6, the Prophet travelled to Mecca along with approximately 1,400 of his Companions, all clothed in pilgrim's garments so that they could perform the rituals of the minor pilgrimage ('*umra*) and demonstrate their great respect for the Ka'ba, the Sacred House of God, which was a holy place for both Muslims and Arab polytheists. This journey helped to lessen the hostility between the two parties and to open the way for peaceful negotiations. Indeed, this is what happened in the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya, when the Quraysh acknowledged the existence of the *umma/dawla* in Medina and began to deal with it on equal terms, with each side having the right to protect its own interests and defend itself.¹¹⁵

The Prophet's success in achieving the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya opened the way for him to spread Islam among the Arab polytheists over a wide area and to enhance the status of his state through the contracts and alliances that he made with them. In addition, the treaty offered him a good opportunity to settle accounts with the Jewish tribes who had been fiercely opposing him since AH 2. The manner in which this was done, the reasons behind it and its consequences are examined in what follows.

Conflict with the Jewish tribes

The Meccan verses of the Qur'ān reveal that Muḥammad was the prophet whom the Torah announced would come to guide humankind to the eternal religion.¹¹⁶ He therefore strove to confirm that his religious message was an extension of the previous messages delivered by Moses, Jesus and the other prophets.¹¹⁷ It was for this reason that whenever there was serious rivalry or conflict between the Jews and the Arabs in Medina, the Jews would warn that they were waiting for a prophet who would come and unite them and lead them to victory over their enemies.¹¹⁸ When Muḥammad arrived and announced his calling to the Medinans whom he met at Aqaba, they therefore declared their belief in him before the Jews were able to do so.¹¹⁹

114 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, II, p. 254.

115 *Ibid.*, pp. 308–21.

116 *Al-A'rāf*, 7:157–8.

117 *Al-A'lā*, 87:18–19; *Fāṭir*, 35:31.

118 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, I, p. 267.

119 *Ibid.*

Islam thus spread in Medina among the clans of the Aws and Khazraj, while the Jews refused to accept it on the grounds that the prophet for whom they were waiting would be an Israelite, as stated in their religion.¹²⁰ Nonetheless, when the Prophet immigrated to Medina, the Jews were obliged to have dealings with him in response to the request of their allies from the Aws and Khazraj, since the rules of alliance compelled the Jews to respect an ally's granting of sanctuary. Moreover, the Jews perhaps thought that the Prophet's ability to unite the people of Medina under his leadership and establish peace and stability would bring them some economic and political benefits. They therefore agreed to the terms of the Constitution of Medina and to becoming members of the nascent *umma*.

The rapid spread of Islam in Medina and the growth of the Prophet's power and authority made the Jews fear for their future, however, especially since Islam emphasized its difference from Judaism in a number of ways. For instance, the Muslims had originally faced towards Jerusalem during their prayers, but the Qur'ān instructed them to turn towards Mecca instead.¹²¹ The Muslims also adopted a form of call to prayer which differed from that used by the Jews.¹²² As for fasting, the Muslims were enjoined to fast during the month of Ramaḍān instead of during 'Āshūrā', when they would previously fast alongside the Jews.¹²³ All these changes occurred in AH 2, shortly before the battle of Badr.

The decisive victory of the Muslims over the Meccan polytheists at the battle of Badr made the Jews feel threatened and they began to be envious of the Muslims and to underplay the extent of their victory. They then began to cooperate with the *Munāfiqūn* (the Hypocrites), a group of polytheists from the Aws and Khazraj who pretended to be Muslims, opposed the Prophet and attempted to limit his power and influence in various ways. The Jews supplied the *Munāfiqūn* with information taken from the Jewish religious heritage so that they could use it in their arguments and harassment of the Muslims with a view to undermining their faith. The Qur'ān provides many descriptions of the arguments that took place between the Jews and the *Munāfiqūn* on the one hand and the Muslims on the other.¹²⁴ It is hardly surprising that this tense situation should lead to a clash between the Muslims and the Jews that resulted in armed conflict.

The Banū Qaynuqā' were the first Jewish tribe to be involved in a battle with the Muslims. This came about as the result of a fight between a Muslim and some Jews from the tribe who had molested a bedouin woman selling

120 Ibid., pp. 513–18.

121 *Al-Baqara*, 2:142–5; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, p. 550.

122 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, p. 508.

123 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, I, p. 417.

124 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, I, pp. 513–19; *al-Hashr*, 59:11–12; *al-Mā'ida*, 5:80–1.

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her wares in the market of the Banū Qaynuqā' and during the course of which a Jew and a Muslim were killed.¹²⁵ The Banū Qaynuqā' made no attempt to apologize for what they had done; on the contrary, according to al-Wāqidī, they renounced the covenant that bound them to the Muslims, acted aggressively and entrenched themselves in their stronghold. The Prophet had no choice but to declare war against them.¹²⁶

The Banū Qaynuqā' were known for their strength; reportedly, they were 'the bravest of the Jews'¹²⁷ and had 700 fighting men. They also had an unassailable fortress in which to position their defence during battle.¹²⁸ Furthermore, they were tied by a treaty of alliance to the Banū 'Awf from the Khazraj whose senior members included 'Abdallāh ibn Ubay, leader of the *Munāfiqūn* in Medina, who encouraged them to wage war against the Prophet and promised that he would fight alongside them.¹²⁹ As soon as war broke out with the Muslims, however, 'Abdallāh ibn Ubayy broke his promise and fifteen days later joined the Prophet in besieging the Jews. In the event, the Muslims prevailed and the Jews were allowed to leave Medina with their belongings for a remote place in ash-Shām called Adhra'āt.¹³⁰

As a result of the victory of the Muslims over the Banū Qaynuqā' and their expulsion from Medina, the Prophet's position was strengthened while that of his opponents from among the Jews and *Munāfiqūn* was weakened. Moreover, the economic circumstances of the Muslims, particularly the *Muhājirūn*, improved in that they were able to make use of the houses and possessions left by the Banū Qaynuqā' and now had a monopoly over the market in Medina.¹³¹

The victory of the Muslims at the battle of Badr and their expulsion of the Banū Qaynuqā' from Medina served to alarm and embitter the remaining Jews. Working alongside the *Munāfiqūn* in Medina, they continued to intrigue and plot against the Prophet. They were delighted when the Muslims were defeated by the Quraysh at the battle of Uḥud and waited for an opportunity to take revenge. That opportunity presented itself in AH 4, when the Prophet asked the Jews of the Banu-n-Naḍīr for help in paying the blood money of two of their allies who had been killed. The Jews used this occasion to formulate a plan to assassinate the Prophet and rid themselves of him, but the Prophet learnt of it and they fled from their homes. He sent them a warning telling them that, since they had violated the covenant between them, they

125 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II, pp. 47–8.

126 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, I, p. 177.

127 *Ibid.*, pp. 176–7.

128 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II, p. 48.

129 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, I, p. 178.

130 *Ibid.*, pp. 178–9; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II, pp. 48–9.

131 Al-Mallāḥ, Hāshim Yaḥyā, *Mawqif al-yahūd min al-'urūba wa-l-islām*, Baghdad, 1988, p. 48.



1.9 Holy Ka'ba in Mecca

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must leave Medina. After the Muslims had imposed an unrelenting blockade on them and burnt their plantations, they were forced to surrender and depart from Medina to live in the region of Khaybar, leaving their homes and plantations to the Muslims.¹³² This led to a further improvement in the economic circumstances of the Muslims, especially the *Muhājirūn*, and to a weakening of the position of the Jews of the Banū Qaynuqā' in Medina.

These developments led the Jews of the Banu-n-Naḍīr who had settled in Khaybar to try and mobilize a strong force composed of the polytheist Arab tribes under the leadership of the Quraysh and to attack the state of Medina. This was to result in the military expedition of the Allies (*Aḥzāb*) and the battle of the Ditch.

Ḥayy ibn Akḥṭab, chief of the Banu-n-Naḍīr, attempted to persuade the chief of the Banū Qurayza, Ka'b ibn Asad, to break his peace treaty with the Prophet and join the alliance. Aware of the seriousness of such a development, the Prophet tried to prevent Ka'b from doing so until the alliance's siege of Medina was over. As soon as the siege ended, the Prophet set out with the army that had been defending Medina and made for the Banū Qurayza in order to blockade its members and demand that they unconditionally submit to such punishments as were deemed appropriate for their actions. After some prevarication and resistance, they were forced to accept the judgement of Sa'd ibn Mu'ādh, chief of the Aws, since he was one of their allies. Sa'd's verdict was particularly severe, since they had violated their pact with the Muslims while the latter were in a very difficult and

132 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, I, pp. 363–77; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II, pp. 190–1.

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critical situation. He ordered that their menfolk be killed, their women and children be led into captivity and their possessions be taken as booty for the Muslims.

Most of the old sources indicate that the Prophet carried out the sentence.¹³³ Contemporary scholars, however, have adopted a variety of positions concerning this harsh and exceptional punishment inflicted on the Jews of the Banū Qurayṣa, ranging from justification and disapproval to doubt that it actually took place. The present writer finds himself in agreement with those who believe that the punishment may have been carried out on the leaders of the Banū Qurayṣa who reneged on their covenant with the Muslims. As for the other members of the tribe, however, they were given the sentence for captives set out in the Qur'ān, which is to say that they either had to pay a ransom or were treated mercifully and allowed to go free without any payment.¹³⁴

Once the Jewish presence in Medina was much reduced with the end of the three Jewish tribes there, the Prophet turned his attention to settling accounts with the Jews of Khaybar and the neighbouring Jewish settlements which had agitated against the Muslims and were preparing for an attack on Medina. The Prophet was assisted in this by his successful truce with the Meccan polytheists at al-Ḥudaybiya. In AH 7, he marched north at the head of an army composed of some 1,400 men. He effectively laid siege to the fortresses at Khaybar and made them submit one after the other to conditions that were relatively lenient. The Jews of Khaybar were allowed to remain in their homes and plantations provided that they agreed to acknowledge the authority of the Prophet and pay half of the proceeds from these plantations every year to the Muslims.¹³⁵ After being threatened with death, the Jews from the other settlements in Fadak, Wādi-l-Qurā and Taymā' also agreed to submit to the Prophet and be bound by the same duties as those accepted by the Jews of Khaybar.¹³⁶

So ended the armed conflict between the Jews and the Muslims, with the Jews becoming part of the single *umma* which began to widen its borders and exert its influence over most regions of the Arabian peninsula.¹³⁷ As a result of entering the nascent *umma*, the Jews became one of the *ahl adh-dhimma* ('people of the covenant'), that is, those peoples practising monotheism who lived under the protection of God and His Prophet in return for a commitment on their part to respect the rules and regulations of Islam and perform their obligations in accordance with the contracts between them and the Muslims.

133 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II, pp. 214–15, 234–40.

134 Al-Mallāh, *Mawqif al-yahūd*, pp. 57–9.

135 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, I, pp. 634–90; al-Mallāh, *Mawqif al-yahūd*, pp. 60–70.

136 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II p. 353; al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, I, p. 711.

137 Al-Mallāh, *al-Wasīf*, pp. 441–2.

The *ahl adh-dhimma* also included the Christians, who had a special treaty with the Muslims. In the following discussion, we shall throw more light on the circumstances of these Christians and their relations with the Muslims.

Peaceful relations between the Muslims and the Christians

As already mentioned, the Qur'ān stresses that the message of Islam is a confirmation and extension of the divine messages delivered by the former prophets and apostles, beginning with Abraham and concluding with Muḥammad ibn 'Abdallāh. From the time of the Meccan period, therefore, the Prophet also tried to establish good relations with the *ahl al-kitāb* ('people of the Book'), the Jews and the Christians.¹³⁸ For example, under persecution from the polytheists in Mecca, the first emigration of the Muslims was to Abyssinia, where they were well received and where the Christian king refused to surrender them to their people in Mecca when a delegation arrived demanding their return.¹³⁹

In contrast to the relationship between the Muslims and the Jews, the historical sources record no events that might indicate a conflict between the Muslims and the Christians on the Arabian peninsula during the time of the Prophet, possibly because there were no Christian colonies in the places where Islam was born, such as Mecca and Medina. However, this does not mean that discussions about religion did not take place between the Christians and the Muslims, in particular regarding the Christian doctrine of the Holy Trinity. Indeed, the Qur'ān describes some of these discussions.¹⁴⁰

During the later years of the Prophet's life, when the Muslims acquired a state in Medina and the *umma/dawla* began to expand and extend its influence over most regions of the Arabian peninsula, the Christian settlements agreed to submit to the authority of Islam and to live under its auspices according to a covenant with God and His Prophet. This was in exchange for an annual tax called *jizya* which was paid by those able to take up arms. As for the Islamic state, it promised in return to protect their persons, their possessions and their religion.¹⁴¹

The treaty drawn up by the Prophet for the Christians of Najrān is a good example of the treaties that established peaceful relations between the Muslims and the *ahl al-kitāb* (People of the Book, i.e. possessors of scriptures

138 *Al-Baqara*, 2:87–91; *Āl 'Imrān*, 3:1–4.

139 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, I, pp. 321–38.

140 Durūzī, Muḥammad 'Izza, *Sīrat ar-rasūl*, Cairo, 1948, I, pp. 147–63.

141 'Amāra, Muḥammad, *al-Islām wa-l-wahda al-qawmiyya*, Cairo, 1979, pp. 90–2.

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revealed by God), particularly the Christians. After mentioning their financial obligations with regard to the Muslims, the treaty goes on to say:

The people of Najrān and their dependants shall remain under the protection of God and Muḥammad the Prophet, the Messenger of God. Their persons, their religion, their lands, their possessions and their churches will remain safe. This treaty holds good for all people of Najrān, whether they are present or not. No bishop will be removed from his bishopric, no monk from his monasticism and no devotee from his devotions. I bear witness to this.¹⁴²

In his account of this treaty, al-Balādhurī adds that the people of Najrān were not obliged to fight alongside the Muslims, that they paid no tithe on their lands because it was the same as the alms tax (*zakāh*) paid by Muslims, and that no army would march over their lands. In other words, they enjoyed a kind of self-determination within the framework of the single *umma*.¹⁴³

The treaties that the Prophet granted to the people of Najrān and other Christians therefore formed the basis for relations between the Muslims and the Christians within the Islamic state. In essence, they confirm Islam's respect for the right of the Jews, the Christians and all other religions to enjoy freedom of worship and conscience, as well as its promise to protect them and their possessions and prevent any aggression against them, provided that they abide by the rights and obligations imposed upon them by the rules and regulations of the *umma*.

142 Ibn Sa'd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I, p. 308.

143 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 76.

Chapter 1.3

THE ISLAMIZATION OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

Bahjat Kamil Abd al-Latif

It is well known that the Quraysh were unable to triumph over the Muslims. Indeed, they were routed at the battle of Badr in 2/624 and were almost defeated during the initial stages of the battle of Uḥud but managed to regroup and achieve a limited victory shortly before the end of the fighting. The battle of the Ditch in 5/626 was the last attempt by the Quraysh to put an end to the Prophet and his fledgling state. In this battle, they utilized all their material and human resources and gathered their allies from the tribes of Ghaṭafān, Asad, Sulaym, Fazāra, Ashja‘, Banū Murra and Aḥābīsh.¹ With the assistance of the Jewish clan of Banū Qurayza, the Quraysh and their allies besieged Medina for almost one month in a major effort to break the united front within the city. When all the attempts of the Quraysh failed, however, they and their allies were forced to withdraw. The Qur’ān mentions this incident in God’s words: ‘Allah turned back the unbelievers for all their fury. They gained no advantage.’² As a result, the Muslims became convinced of the rightness of their cause and were assured that God was assisting, watching over and protecting them. This served to increase their faith and make them realize the importance of acting in unison and mutual support.

It also became clear to the Prophet that the Quraysh were unable to defeat the Muslims. ‘The Quraysh will never conquer you,’ he told his

1 Ibn Hishām, Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd-al-Malik, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī-ad-Dīn ‘Abd-al-Ḥamīd, Cairo, al-Maktaba at-tijāriyya, 1937, III, p. 230; Muḥammad ibn Manī‘ ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*, Cairo, Dār at-taḥrīr li-ṭ-ṭab‘ wa-n-nashr, 1969, I/II, pp. 47–53.

2 *Al-Aḥzāb*, 33:25.

Companions, ‘but you will conquer them.’³ On the basis of this realization and a thorough understanding of the circumstances of the Quraysh, the Messenger of God continued to summon people to accept Islam and to put pressure on the weakened Quraysh. He also forced their allies from the Arab tribes to abandon them, with the result that they eventually submitted to the nascent state in Medina, acknowledging its authority and acting in accord with its dictates.

The Prophet took a number of decisions, the outcome of which can be dealt with under three main headings: battles and military expeditions; the Prophet’s letters to kings, princes and leaders; and delegations from the Arab tribes.

Battles and military expeditions

Immediately after the failure of the Quraysh and their allies at the battle of the Ditch, the Muslims sent out a number of military expeditions over a wide area in order to inform the tribes about Islam, demonstrate the power of the Muslims, spread the religion and unite the Arabs within the framework of a new state. They were similarly very eager to spread the faith to other nations in accordance with the aim of the exalted prophetic mission of Islam: ‘We sent you as a mercy for all creatures.’⁴

The attacks and raids launched by the Muslims after the battle of the Ditch led to the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya in 6/628. In all, eighteen raids were launched, mostly directed at the tribes living in the vicinity of Medina and particularly those to the north, which represented the main threat to the security and stability of the state. Thus, the Prophet took part in a raid against the Banū Liḥyān, whose territories extended to the borders of the Ḥijāz, in order to avenge his Companions who had been killed in the raid on Bi’r Ma’ūna in AH 4. After the Banū Liḥyān had fled into the mountains, the Prophet and his forces marched to a place near Mecca called Kurā‘ al-Ghamīm to make the Quraysh listen to him, instil fear into them and show them how powerful he was.⁵

Although these attacks and raids had a variety of aims, they were all ultimately directed towards spreading Islam, extending its authority and continuing to put pressure on the Quraysh until they submitted. The raids launched against the tribes of Banū Sulaym, Banū Tha‘laba, Banū Asad and Qurṭā‘ resulted in the seizure of rich booty in the form of camels and goats,

3 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, p. 733; W. Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad at Medina*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1966, pp. 15–16.

4 *Al-Anbiyā’*, 21:107.

5 Al-Wāqidi, Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar ibn Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, ed. M. Jones, Beirut, Mu’assasat al-‘alamī li-l-maṭbū‘āt, 1384/1964, II, pp. 535–7; Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, pp. 56–7.

instilled fear into the hearts of the men of those tribes and demonstrated the strength of the new state.⁶

The aim of the raiding party of Zayd ibn Ḥāritha, which was sent to Wādī ‘Ays, some 6 km from Medina, in the month of Jumāda I 6/628, was to intercept a Quraysh caravan returning from ash-Shām. The party seized the caravan’s entire load and took a number of the men prisoner.⁷

The second raiding party under Zayd ibn Ḥāritha was sent out in Jumāda II of the same year in order to recover the possessions of Diḥya ibn Khalīfa al-Kalbī, a Companion of the Prophet, which had been stolen by the Banū Judhāma. Zayd’s group set upon the tribe and killed some of its members, after which they took others prisoner and drove away their livestock. The Prophet had apparently composed an earlier peace treaty for the Banū Judhāma and one of its leaders therefore went and showed him the treaty in question. As a result, the Prophet ordered Zayd ibn Ḥāritha to release the tribe’s womenfolk and return its possessions.⁸

In the month of Ramaḍān AH 6, Zayd ibn Ḥāritha led a third raid to the town of Umm Qarfa in Wādī-l-Qurā in order to recover Muslim merchandise plundered from one of his caravans *en route* to ash-Shām. Zayd’s force successfully recovered the Muslims’ possessions and spread fear and alarm among the neighbouring tribes.⁹

The raid of Karz ibn Jābir al-Fihri on the people of ‘Urayna in the month of Shawwāl 6/628 was also conducted on behalf of the Muslims, since a group of men from the clans of ‘Ukl (belonging to the tribe of Taym ar-Rabbāb) and ‘Urayna (from the tribe of Bajīla) had treacherously captured some of the Muslims working in the service of the Prophet of God.

Al-Fihri’s force caught up with them, surrounded them and took them prisoner. They were then taken back to Medina where they were tortured to death, a punishment concerning which the words of Almighty God were revealed: ‘The punishment of those who wage war against God and His Messenger and strive to spread corruption throughout the earth.’¹⁰

The military expedition of ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn ‘Awf in Sha‘bān 6/628 was designed to spread the word of Islam. It is reported that when the Messenger of God sent ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān to seek out the bedouin tribe of the Jandal, he said: ‘Attack in the name of Allah and for the sake of Allah. Fight those who do not believe in God, but do not be extreme in this. Do not

6 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, pp. 56–68. For more information on these raids, see al-‘Alī, Ṣālih Aḥmad, *ad-Dawla fī ‘ahd ar-rasūl*, Baghdad, Maṭba‘at al-majma‘ al-‘ilmī al-‘irāqī, 1988, pp. 249–50.

7 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, II, p. 63.

8 *Ibid.*, pp. 63–4.

9 *Ibid.*, pp. 65–6.

10 *Al-Mā‘ida*, 5:33; Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, II, pp. 67–8; Abu-l-Fidā’ Ismā‘il ibn ‘Umar ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr al-Qur’ān al-‘aẓīm*, Beirut, Dār wa maktabat al-hilāl, 1986, II, pp. 288–94.

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act treacherously and do not kill infants.’¹¹ The Prophet also said: ‘If they respond positively to you, then marry the king’s daughter.’ ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān was able to persuade the king to embrace Islam, along with many of his subjects, and married the king’s daughter as instructed by the Messenger of God.¹²

The raid of ‘Amr ibn Umayya aḍ-Ḍamrī came in response to the attempted assassination of the Prophet instigated by Abū Sufyān. ‘Umar and his men managed to enter Mecca at night and circumambulate the Ka‘ba. On learning of this, the Quraysh sent some of their men against ‘Umar, who killed two of them. On his way back to Medina, he came across another two men from the Quraysh who had been sent to find him, killed one of them and took the other prisoner.¹³ Two further military forces were dispatched to fight the *Munāfiqūn* (Hypocrites), who fabricated lies about the Messenger of God.¹⁴

It should be noted that all the raids, attacks and skirmishes that took place, including the two raids in which the Prophet took part, were invariably in response to hostility or to an act of aggression initiated by an enemy. These counter-measures had a profound effect in that scarcely had the year 6/628 ended than the Arab tribes around Medina and further afield came to look on the Muslims with awe and fear. The environment was now conducive to stability and the establishment of peace between the Muslims and their neighbours. Both sides could establish friendly relations by forgetting old scores, setting aside disputes, cooperating and joining forces for the sake of good, in peace and security under the banner of the religion of Islam, the aim of which is to worship God, the One, the Unique.¹⁵

THE TREATY OF AL-ḤUDAYBIYA

The Messenger of God continued on his course supported by revelations from God. In the month of Dhu-l-Qa‘ada 6/March 628, he set out for Mecca with the intention of performing the minor pilgrimage (*‘umra*). He called on the tribes living between Mecca and Medina to join him and a large number of people, most of whom had converted to Islam, did so. All the men, numbering approximately 4,000, wore the ritual garments and were in the state of

11 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, II, p. 64.

12 Ibid., I/II, pp. 64–5.

13 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, p. 360; Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, II, p. 68.

14 These were the military expeditions of ‘Abdallāh ibn ‘Atīk, which was sent to Abū Rāfi‘ Sallām ibn Abi-l-Ḥaqīq an-Nafarī, and of ‘Abdallāh ibn Rawāḥa, sent to Asīr ibn Zarrām al-Yahūdī. See Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, p. 746; Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, pp. 66–7.

15 Duwaydār, Amīn, *Ṣuwar min ḥayāt ar-rasūl*, Dār al-ma‘ārif, 1983, p. 452.

purification required by the pilgrimage. They took with them seventy camels and carried their weapons sheathed, since they had no desire to fight.¹⁶

The time was right and all the circumstances favoured such a visit: Medina was stable having been emptied of the Jews, the *Munāfiqūn* were rendered harmless and ineffectual after the departure of their supporters, and the desert Arabs had quietened down after realizing that the Muslims were well aware of their conspiracies. The Muslims now had the strength to protect their sanctuary and defend their religion. The awe-inspiring nature of Islam filled people's hearts and rocked their very souls after they saw how God defended and supported His Messenger.

The Quraysh were placed in an extremely difficult situation when the Prophet revealed his firm intention to perform the *'umra* and undertake its various obligations and rituals in a peaceful and dutiful manner. If they permitted him to perform the pilgrimage and visit their holy places, it would mean backing down in the face of his challenge, thereby undermining the people's belief in their assertions and in their resolve to fight him. They exclaimed: 'What if the Arabs learn that he has managed to come here while this state of war exists between us! By God, this can never be, as long as we have an eye to blink!'¹⁷ On the other hand, if the Quraysh did not allow the Prophet and his followers to visit Mecca, it would militate against their claims to be caretakers of the religious sanctuary who offered facilities to its visitors and pilgrims.

When news of the Prophet's journey reached Mecca, the polytheists were alarmed and wanted to prevent him from entering. They therefore dispatched an armed force which stationed itself outside the sanctuary. The Prophet, however, took another route from that usually taken by pilgrims until he reached al-Ḥudaybiya. Once there, the people of Mecca sent a delegation to him to warn him about the Quraysh and ask him to turn back. The most important of these men was al-Ḥulays ibn 'Alqama, leader of the Kināna tribe. When al-Ḥulays became convinced that the Prophet would not change his mind, he returned to the Quraysh and announced that the Kināna would no longer support them if they were intent on fighting him. He said:

O people of the Quraysh. By God, it was not for this that we became your allies. It was not for this that we attached ourselves to you. Will someone coming to glorify the sanctuary of God be prevented from doing so? By the One in Whose

16 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, pp. 574–5; Akram Diyā' -ad-Dīn al-'Amrī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya aṣ-ṣaḥīḥa*, Medina, Maktabat al-'ulūm wa-l-ḥikam, 1413/1993, pp. 434–5; W. Montgomery Watt, 'al-Ḥudaybiya', *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1971, III, p. 539.

17 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, p. 579.

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hand lies my soul, will you come between Muḥammad and what he has come to perform? Or shall we depart with the Aḥābīsh as one man?¹⁸

In fact, although the Quraysh showed signs of being determined to prevent the Prophet from visiting the Ka‘ba, their appetite for continuing the fight against him had begun to wane. This was because their leaders’ opposition to Islam was partly motivated by fear that Mecca would lose its religious status among the Arabs if the new faith were to spread – and now here was the religion of Islam, which had made Mecca the direction of prayer for all Muslims since AH 2, making Mecca the goal of both the *‘umra* and the *ḥajj* (the minor and the major pilgrimages respectively) in order to worship God and draw close to Him. There was consequently no reason to oppose it.¹⁹ Likewise, those Meccans who had accompanied the Prophet on his *hijra* (emigration) from Mecca to Medina (that is, the *Muhājirūn*, or Emigrants) had experienced difficulties in Medina and had relatives and friends in Mecca who no doubt felt sorry for them, sympathized with them and saw no reason to fight against them. This was in addition to a number of believers who lived in Mecca and hoped that the Muslims would emerge victorious.²⁰

Someone told the Messenger of God: ‘The Quraysh have called on the Aḥābīsh and those who obey them, including the women and children (‘*Ūdh al-matāfil*) to war. They have sworn by God that they will exert their utmost efforts to come between you and the Ka‘ba.’ He replied:

We have not come to fight anyone. We have come to circumambulate the Ka‘ba, but we will resist whoever prevents us from doing this. The Quraysh are people who have been harmed and exhausted by war. If they wish, I will conclude a treaty with them stating that they should not interfere in what is happening between me and other people, these being more numerous than the Quraysh. If the people follow me, then the Quraysh must choose between joining them or fighting them all. By God, I will strive until I am destroyed or God makes His cause victorious.²¹

It is apparent from this that the Prophet was prepared to fight anyone who prevented him from circumambulating the Ka‘ba and that he was offering a period of truce during which there could be peace. Both his religious

18 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, pp. 599–600; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, pp. 777–8.

19 Al-Mallāḥ, Hāshim Yaḥyā, *al-Wasīṭ fi-s-sīra an-nabawīyya wa-l-khilāfa ar-rāshida*, Mosul, Maṭba‘at jami‘at al-Mawṣil, 1991, p. 285.

20 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, p. 601.

21 *Ibid.*, p. 593; al-Bayhaqī, Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī, *Dalā’il an-nubuwwa wa-ma‘rifat aḥwāl ṣāḥib ash-sharī‘a*, ed. ‘Abd-al-Mu‘ṭī Qalā‘a Jī, Beirut, Dār al-kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 1405/1985, IV, p. 102.

motivation for going to Mecca and his readiness to accept a truce served to encourage the tribes of Thaḳīf and Kināna, allies of the Quraysh, to declare that they would not support the Quraysh if they wanted to wage war against the Messenger of God. The Prophet said: ‘Today, whatever conditions the Quraysh make in which they ask me to show kindness to kinsfolk, I will do it.’²²

It also seems that the Prophet was expecting to enter into negotiations with the Quraysh, although on some points he was not prepared to compromise. He came not for war, but rather to perform the *‘umra* and to offer the Quraysh an opportunity to make an agreement with him whereby they would leave him alone and refrain from opposing or fighting him for an agreed period of time. Indeed, this was to their advantage since the hostilities had weakened and injured them. The Prophet was therefore determined that nothing should stand in the way of his goal and lead to war, in particular the extremism of the polytheist Quraysh. He thus sent one of his Companions, Kharāsh ibn Umayya al-Khuzā‘ī, to the Quraysh to inform their nobles of his demands. The Quraysh wanted to kill Kharāsh, but the Aḥābīsh stopped them and allowed him to leave.²³

The warmongers among the Quraysh did not confine their attention to Kharāsh, having reportedly sent forty or fifty men to surround the Prophet’s camp and seize anyone they could. The men were caught, however, and brought before the Prophet who, after opening negotiations with a delegation from the Quraysh, pardoned them and allowed them to leave.²⁴

The Prophet then sent ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān to Mecca to conclude a truce with the Quraysh and ask them to allow the Muslims to visit the Ka‘ba. ‘Uthmān remained in Mecca for three days, during which time he informed the Quraysh that the Prophet had not come to wage war but to visit the Ka‘ba and glorify its sanctuary. When the Muslims received no further news of ‘Uthmān, they thought that he and the other Muslims who had entered Mecca with him had been murdered by the polytheists.

The Messenger of God decided that the Muslims should renew their pledge of allegiance. He sat under a lotus tree and the Muslims came up and swore that they would not flee if a battle broke out with the Quraysh. This was called the ‘pledge of Riḍwān’²⁵ (also known as the ‘pledge of the tree’) concerning which God said: ‘Allah was pleased with the believers when

22 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, pp. 775–6; Shams-ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn ‘Uthmān adh-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-islām wa-wafayāt mashāhīr al-‘alām (al-maghāzī)*, ed. ‘Umar ‘Abd-as-Salām at-Tadmurī, Beirut, Dār al-kitāb al-‘arabī, 1410/1990, p. 374.

23 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, p. 779.

24 Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, pp. 599–601. Ibn Ishāq states that the Messenger of God set them free immediately. See Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, pp. 779–80. See also adh-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-islām*, p. 386.

25 Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, p. 600; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, p. 780.

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they swore allegiance to you under the tree.’²⁶ On hearing this, the Quraysh became more amenable and resolved to reach an agreement to end their fighting and make peace with the Messenger. To that end, they sent Suhayl ibn ‘Amr at the head of a delegation to hold talks with the Prophet. ‘Go to Muḥammad’, they told him, ‘and make peace with him. The treaty must state that he withdraws from us for one year. By God, the Arabs must never say that he managed to enter among us.’²⁷

These negotiations resulted in the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya, which stated that:

1. The war shall cease for a period of ten years during which time the people will live in peace. They shall commit no acts of aggression against each other and there shall be no hostility between them, whether overt or covert.
2. Any person wishing to enter into a contract or covenant with Muḥammad may do so, as may any person wishing to enter into a contract or covenant with the Quraysh. The tribe of Khuzā‘a has entered into a covenant with the Messenger of God and the tribe of Bakr has done so with the Quraysh.
3. If a person from the Quraysh goes to Muḥammad without the permission of his patron, Muḥammad will send him back to them. If a follower of Muḥammad goes to the Quraysh, however, they shall not send him back to him. There is an agreement between us and there shall be no theft or treachery.
4. Muḥammad must return with his Companions to Medina during the current year and may enter among us next year and stay in Mecca for three days, carrying only sheathed weapons.
5. The Muslims may enter Mecca as individuals at any time for the *‘umra* or the *ḥajj* or for purposes of trade. Likewise, the inhabitants of Mecca shall have freedom of movement and may enter Medina *en route* to Egypt and ash-Shām for purposes of trade.²⁸

Some of the Companions considered the articles of the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya to be a significant compromise; in their opinion, the articles showed that the Prophet had consented to postpone what he had come to do, namely visit the holy sanctuary. They also believed that he had sanctioned unfair conditions in having agreed to send back anyone who appealed to him for

26 *Al-Fath*, 48:18.

27 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, p. 781; al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā’il an-nubuwwa*, IV, p. 105.

28 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, p. 600; Muḥammad Ḥamīdullāh al-Ḥaydarabādī, *Majmū‘at al-wathā’iq as-siyāsīyya li-l-‘ahd an-nabawī wa-l-khulafā’ ar-rāshidīn*, Beirut, Dār al-irshād, 1389/1969, pp. 58–63.

shelter while at the same time permitting the Quraysh not to send back anyone who appealed to them. Moreover, the Prophet had made a truce with the Quraysh after all they had done against Islam and the Muslims. An examination of the events, however, reveals that these complaints were not based on a clear understanding or thorough assessment of the essential nature of the agreement, as is evident from the following:

1. The Companions' claim that, in agreeing not to visit the Ka'ba, the Prophet was abandoning his motives for travelling from Medina to al-Ḥudaybiya is erroneous. In fact, the Prophet did not forgo his visit to the Ka'ba but merely postponed it until the following year after ascertaining from the Quraysh that it was his right to make the visit. This is indeed what happened in the following year when he undertook the *'umra*.²⁹ The Prophet consequently made no concessions. On the contrary, it was the Quraysh who did so in allowing the Prophet and his Companions to make their visit after having previously forbidden it and being very hostile to Islam.
2. Those who opposed the truce believed that, by agreeing to send back any of the Quraysh who appealed to the Prophet and yet allowing the Quraysh not to send back any of his followers who appealed to them, the Messenger of God had accepted something that was unfair and gave the Quraysh an advantage. There is nothing, however, to justify this argument, which is also inconsistent with the nature of the call to Islam, the essence of the faith and the penetrating insight of the Prophet. The Messenger of God could see no point in allowing anyone who did not wish to become a Muslim to stay with him, whereas any Muslim wishing to come to him would have done so with firm conviction in his heart and sincerity about Islam. To send back such a person to the Quraysh would not therefore remove his faith; on the contrary, he would instead be minded to increase the number of those who supported Islam among the ranks of the Quraysh, thereby weakening and creating problems for them.³⁰
3. The article concerning the Prophet's action of sending back to the Quraysh those Muslims who came to him without the permission of their patrons refers only to men and makes no mention of women. For

29 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, pp. 827–9; aṭ-Ṭabarī, Abū Ja'far Muḥammad ibn Jarīr, *Tārīkh ar-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad Abu-l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Cairo, Dār al-ma'ārif, 1960–70, III, pp. 23–5.

30 See the account of Abū Baṣīr and his companions in al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, pp. 624ff.; aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, II, pp. 638–9; al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā'il an-nubuwwa*, IV, pp. 107–8.

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this reason, the Prophet considered that this article did not apply to women.³¹

4. The fact that the Quraysh accepted the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya signalled their acknowledgement that the Prophet was on the same footing as them and an equal partner to the contract. It also showed that they recognized the power of the Prophet and the difficulty of putting an end to his activities. Consequently, they agreed to the treaty in order to establish peace in preference to a war that they were unable to pursue after all their failed attempts to defeat Islam and the Muslims.
5. The treaty was to be in effect for a period of ten years, but its articles did not account for all the eventualities that might arise with the passage of time. In fact, intertribal problems arose within less than two years, and this gave the Prophet a reason to rescind the agreement.³²
6. The twenty days that the Prophet spent in al-Ḥudaybiya were extremely eventful, with the ‘pledge of Riḍwān’ as the highlight in which the Muslims renewed their oath to the Prophet to be resolute and steadfast. This increased the authority and status of the Prophet and many Muslims consider it to be tantamount to the conquest of Mecca.³³ It is generally agreed that the verse ‘We made a clear conquest for you’ is a reference to al-Ḥudaybiya, which indicates that the Qur’ān considers the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya to be a ‘clear conquest’. Az-Zuhrī comments on this event, saying: ‘There was no earlier conquest in Islam more important than this.’³⁴ Ibn Hishām remarks: ‘The proof of what az-Zuhrī says is that the Messenger of God went to al-Ḥudaybiya with 1,400 men, while two years later during the conquest of Mecca he had 10,000 men with him.’³⁵
7. The treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya established peace between the two parties in place of a war which had by then lasted six years. It also guaranteed security and freedom for the people and encouraged a number of those who believed in Islam to make an open declaration of their faith. It also created more favourable circumstances for the Prophet to work towards spreading the religion. Al-Wāqidī refers to this when he says: ‘The treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya put an end to the war and made the people feel safe with each other. No one was afraid to talk about or embrace Islam.’³⁶

31 See the account of the departure of Umm Kulthūm bint ‘Uqba in Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, II / VIII, p. 168.

32 See the conquest of Mecca in Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, pp. 851ff.; aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, III, pp. 38–61; al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā’il an-nubuwwa*, V, pp. 3ff.

33 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, pp. 609–10.

34 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, p. 786. For details of the revealing of *sūrat al-Fath*, see *ibid.*, III, p. 784; Ibn Kathīr, *Tafsīr*, V, pp. 339–69.

35 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, p. 624; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, p. 786.

36 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, p. 624.

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8. One outcome of the position adopted by the Prophet, along with his renunciation of war, his desire for reconciliation, his patience and his perseverance, was that the Arab tribes which had not yet converted to Islam changed their view of the new religion and its advocate, instilling in them a reverence for and an appreciation of Islam that were previously non-existent. The influence of all these factors in attracting converts to Islam should not be underestimated, even though this might not always have been the main intention of the Prophet and the Muslims.³⁷
9. One consequence of the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya was that it put an end to the intrigues of the *Munāfiqūn*. The pagan tribes were scattered throughout the Arabian peninsula and the Quraysh continued to pursue their policy of self-interest and to concern themselves with trade, thus making no attempt to enter into alliances with those tribes. At the same time, the Muslims were broadening their cultural, political and military activities and their protagonists were successfully making pacts with numerous tribes and converting them to Islam.³⁸

For the Prophet, the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya was therefore clearly a political victory by means of which he was able to achieve peace without bloodshed and make great gains that enhanced the power of Islam and the vitality of his state. It also revealed the Prophet's desire to extend the call to Islam beyond the borders of Arabia and his resolve to pursue this policy with the same vigour for which he had been known before al-Ḥudaybiya, if not with even more determination and knowledge.³⁹

THE BATTLE OF KHAYBAR

After al-Ḥudaybiya came the battle of Khaybar, one of the most important military and political actions undertaken by the Muslims against the Jewish settlements in northern Arabia. Khaybar was the last of the great Jewish strongholds of fortresses and military bases. The Prophet was not unaware of this concentration of military might; indeed he had been keeping an eye on it before the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya. Before setting out for Mecca to perform the *'umra* that resulted in the treaty, he had taken two measures relating to Khaybar: first, in order to isolate the Jews of Khaybar, he had sent

37 An-Nadwī, Abu-l-Ḥasan 'Alī al-Ḥasanī, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, Ḥaydar, Dār ash-shurūq, 1403/1983, p. 243.

38 Al-Būṭī, Muḥammad Sa'īd Ramaḍān, *Fiqh as-sīra*, Damascus, Dār al-fikr, 1398/1978, p. 378; al-'Alī, *ad-Dawla fī 'ahd ar-rasūl*, I, p. 310.

39 Al-'Alī, *ad-Dawla fī 'ahd ar-rasūl*, I, p. 301.

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military detachments to strike the Arab forces which assisted or might join the Jews;⁴⁰ and, second, he had disposed of the Jewish leaders in Medina.⁴¹

The Prophet ordered the 1,400 Muslims who were with him at al-Ḥudaybiya to march to Khaybar and seize it because, as already mentioned, it was a fortified stronghold and a refuge for the Banu-n-Naḍīr and other tribes. To gain control of it would therefore put an end to the activities of the Banu-n-Naḍīr, split the tribal alliance which opposed the spread of Islam towards the north and force the Arab tribes to submit to the Islamic state. The Prophet sought to confront the Jews of Khaybar on their own, without assistance from neighbouring tribes. To this end, he used the element of surprise to cut off the route between the Ghaṭafān and the Jews of Khaybar at a place called ar-Rajī', thus preventing the Ghaṭafān from reinforcing the latter whom they supported against the Prophet.⁴²

The battle between the Muslims and the Jews began in the morning, when the Jews discovered the Muslims massed before their fortifications. With great resolve, the Muslims fought courageously and fiercely and were able to enter the impenetrable fortresses of Khaybar one after the other. The Jews were eventually obliged to sue for peace and the Prophet agreed to this.⁴³

The success of the Muslims in ending the power of the Jews at Khaybar forced the inhabitants of Fadak to go to the Prophet and ask him to spare their lives. Ibn Ishāq remarks:

God put fear into the hearts of the people of Fadak when they heard what had happened to the inhabitants of Khaybar. They therefore sent a delegation to the Messenger of God in order to sue for peace in exchange for half of Fadak.⁴⁴

A similar peace treaty was concluded with the Jews of Wādi-l-Qurā and Taymā'.⁴⁵ With this, the Prophet had completely neutralized the military, political and economic power of the Jews of the Ḥijāz.⁴⁶ The Jews were never again to constitute a political or a military force. They were merely inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula who exercised their rights within the framework of the Islamic state.

40 Ibn Sa'd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, pp. 88–90.

41 These were Abū Rāfi' Sallām ibn Abī-l-Ḥaḳīq an-Naḍrī and Asīr ibn Zārim. See Ibn Sa'd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, pp. 66–7; al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, pp. 566, 639–40.

42 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, p. 793; al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā'il an-nubuwwa*, IV, p. 197.

43 For further details, see al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, pp. 633–715; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, pp. 791–818; aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, III, pp. 16–19; Maḥmūd Shīr Khaṭṭāb, *ar-Rasūl al-qā'id*, Baghdad, Dār maktabat al-ḥayāh wa-maktabat an-nahḍa, 1960, pp. 198–202.

44 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, p. 706; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, p. 813.

45 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, p. 711; al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā'il an-nubuwwa*, IV, p. 200ff.

46 'Imād-ad-Dīn Ismā'il Khalīl, *Dirāsāt fi-s-sīra an-nabawīyya*, Mosul, Maṭba'at az-zahrā' al-ḥadītha, 1404/1983, p. 357.

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With the final conquest of Khaybar and the Muslim victory over the last stronghold of the Jews in the north of Arabia and over the remaining Jewish military bases, the state in Medina extended its authority to the north. The way was thus paved for the transformation of the Islamic state from one whose influence was confined to Medina and its inhabitants into a great state which sought to unite the cities of every region under its aegis and to spread Islam outside Arabia.⁴⁷ The booty seized at Khaybar also tangibly improved the financial situation of the Muslims and served to enhance their economic status by providing an uninterrupted annual income. After the conquest of Khaybar, ‘Ā’isha remarked: ‘Now we can eat our fill of dates,’ while ‘Abdallāh ibn ‘Umar said: ‘We were never full until we conquered Khaybar.’⁴⁸

THE BATTLE OF MU’TA

The Prophet continued to send armed forces to the tribes living around Medina and especially to the north. In the period between the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya and the conquest of Mecca, seventeen such detachments were sent to the tribes of Ḍamra, Ghifār, Sulaym, Muzayna, Aslam, Layth, Juhayna and Kināna. Of these detachments, two were sent between the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya and the battle of Khaybar, five between the battle of Khaybar and the ‘*umrat al-qaḍā*’ (the ‘*umra* of atonement) and seven between the ‘*umrat al-qaḍā*’ and the battle of Mu’ta. The remaining three were sent after the battle of Mu’ta. A number of leading Companions such as Abū Bakr, ‘Umar and ‘Alī were put in charge of these forces.⁴⁹

Continuation of the movement summoning people to Islam demanded the removal of all obstacles that would impede its spread and expansion beyond the borders of the Arabian peninsula. One such obstacle was represented by the Byzantine treaties of alliance with the Arab tribes living in the north of the peninsula, especially since the Byzantines had shown hostility towards the Prophet and the ambassador whom he had sent to al-Ḥārith the Ghassānid.⁵⁰ In the month of Jumāda I, 8/July 629, the Prophet dispatched a military force to Mu’ta (present-day Karak), near the Ghassānid

47 Al-Mallāḥ, *al-Wasīṭ*, p. 296. For information on the laws and regulations which were revealed concerning the attack on Khaybar, see Aḥmad Maḥdī Rizqallāh, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya fī daw’ al-maṣādir al-aṣliyya: dirāsa taḥlīliyya*, Riyadh, Markaz al-malik Fayṣal li-l-buḥūth wa-d-dirāsāt al-islāmiyya, 1412/1992, pp. 510–12.

48 Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad ibn Ismā‘īl al-Bukhārī, *al-Jāmi‘ aṣ-ṣaḥīḥ*, Istanbul, al-Maktab al-islāmī, 1399/1979, Kitāb ‘al-maghāzī’, Bāb ‘Khaybar’. For details as to how the booty from Khaybar was distributed, see Abū ‘Ubayd al-Qāsim ibn Sallām, *Kitāb al-amwāl*, rev. by Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Faqī, Cairo, Maṭba‘at Majāzī, 1353/1934, p. 114.

49 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, pp. 85–96; al-‘Alī, *ad-Dawla fī ‘adh ar-rasūl*, I, pp. 269–79.

50 Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, I, p. 403, II, pp. 752–3.

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seat of government and the Byzantine capital in ash-Shām. This constituted a serious threat to the Byzantines and their authority and shattered their belief that the Arabs were not bold enough to launch an attack against them or oppose them.⁵¹ It was also a show of Muslim strength to the Byzantines and the tribes neighbouring ash-Shām and served as a warning to those tribes which had acted treacherously towards the Muslims.

When the Byzantines learnt that Muslim troops were moving in their direction, they prepared a mighty army to fight them. A one-sided battle then ensued in which the Muslims showed their resolve, the strength of their faith and their determination to realize the aims of their humanitarian mission. Their three generals, Zayd ibn Hāritha, Ja‘far ibn Abī Ṭālib and ‘Abdallāh ibn Rawāḥa, were martyred one after the other. Following this, the Muslims agreed to appoint Khālīd ibn al-Walīd as their leader and he devised a brilliant plan which fooled the enemy and allowed him to withdraw safely and return with his army to Medina.

A study of the events in the biography of the Prophet reveals that the failure of the campaign of Mu‘ta had little effect on the strength of the Muslims and their policies regarding the northern tribes. The Prophet continued to send his military forces (resulting in such conflicts as the battle of Dhāt as-Salāsīl in Jumāda II, 8/October 629) to exact revenge on the tribes which had taken part in the battle of Mu‘ta (Lakhm, Judhām, Balqain, Balī, Ṭayy and ‘Udhra).⁵² Moreover, it was through the battles of Mu‘ta and Dhāt as-Salāsīl that the Prophet was able to demonstrate to the Arab tribes in northern Arabia and ash-Shām the existence and power of the Arab state, something that was to influence their future policies and alliances.⁵³

THE CONQUEST OF MECCA

There can be no doubt that the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya between the Muslims and the Quraysh was the first step towards the conquest of Mecca and the waning of the power of the Quraysh in the face of the greater and all-important power of Islam. Indeed, the Qur‘ān considers the treaty to have been a ‘clear conquest’ because of the positive results that ensued from it in a variety of fields. This was followed by the battle of Khaybar and the ‘*umrat al-qaḍā*’ in 7/628, both of which demonstrated the results of the friendship and

51 ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi-t-tārīkh*, Beirut, Dār ṣādir, 1386/1966, II, pp. 234–9; ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ash-Shujjā’, *Dirāsāt fī ‘ahd an-nubuwwa wa-l-khilāfa ar-rāshida: ru‘ya jadīda fī tārīkh ṣadr al-islām*, San‘a, Dār al-fikr al-mu‘āshir, 1422/2001, pp. 186–7.

52 Al-Wāqīdī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, pp. 770–1; Khaṭṭāb, *ar-Rasūl al-qā‘id*, pp. 206–7.

53 Al-Mallāḥ, *al-Wasīf*, p. 300; al-Būṭī, *Fiqh as-sīra*, pp. 271–5; Iranian Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Fiqh as-sīra*, Alexandria, Dār ad-da‘wa li-ṭ-ṭab‘ wa-t-tawzī‘, 1409/1989, pp. 409–15.



1.10 Folio of a single-volume Qur'ān, ninth century
(© National Library of Iran/ Islamic Republic of Iran)

mutual respect among Muslims, their determination and organization, their use of slogans from their religion and their strict adherence to their religious norms, as well as their true love and loyal attachment to their Prophet.

These qualities had a profound effect on the people of Mecca and they began to view the Muslims with awe and respect and to reflect seriously upon Islam. Many leading men from the Quraysh realized that they should cease their opposition to those who summoned them to Islam and called on them to embrace the religion.⁵⁴ They were encouraged in this by the fact that Islam had spread, with many people converting to it. The Prophet showed his exalted nature by welcoming those who embraced Islam, saying that Islam replaces all that precedes it.⁵⁵ The Muslims from the Quraysh known as the *Muhājirūn* thus came to occupy a position within the new dispensation commensurate with their loyalty to the state, their efforts to spread the word of Islam and their upholding of its values. Some people realized that the Messenger of God was in fact fighting against indifference and dissolution and not against Mecca and its people. Indeed, Mecca continued to be the direction of prayer for Muslims and the place to which they travelled for the pilgrimage. Anyone who accepts Islam still finds a welcome there.⁵⁶

This trend angered those Meccans who remained staunch opponents of Islam insofar as it warned of a likely outbreak of internal divisions among the leading members of the Quraysh. They therefore decided to violate the peace treaty and to instigate a conflict with the Muslims that might help to thwart their progress. These bigots made use of a dispute that had arisen between

54 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ and Khālīd ibn al-Walīd became Muslims. See al-Wāqīdī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, pp. 741ff.; al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā'il an-nubuwwa*, IV, p. 343.

55 Ibn Sa'd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, II, p. 252; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, pp. 860ff.; adh-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-islām*, pp. 543ff.

56 Al-'Alī, *ad-Dawla fī 'ahd ar-rasūl*, p. 304; Duwaydār, *Ṣuwar min ḥayāt ar-rasūl*, p. 528.

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the tribe of Bakr, an ally of the Quraysh, and the Khuzā‘a, who were allied to the Prophet, to provide the Bakr with men, weapons and mounts.⁵⁷

When the Prophet was certain of the situation, he ordered the people to undertake *jihād* and decided to carry out his plans in secret. He then announced that he was going to Mecca and instructed his followers to prepare themselves. ‘O God,’ he said, ‘keep spies and news from the Quraysh until we take them by surprise in their land.’⁵⁸

The efforts of those leaders of the Quraysh, such as Abū Sufyān ibn Ḥarb, who went to Medina requesting an extension to the peace treaty failed to convince the Prophet. He realized that it was by no means certain that the treaty would be renewed. It was therefore essential to adopt a radical approach and provide a demonstration of power that would undermine the morale of the Quraysh and sow dissension among them, while at the same time increasing the strength of the Muslims, improving their morale and reinforcing their faith and their love of the Prophet.

On 10 Ramaḍān 8/630, the Prophet set out at the head of an army which, by the time it eventually reached the outskirts of Mecca, comprised 10,000 men from Medina and the tribes of the Ḥijāz. He instructed his generals to fight only those who fought against them and ordered them to act with clemency.⁵⁹ The participation of so many Arab tribes was a sign of their realization that the Quraysh were weak and that Islam would triumph.⁶⁰

The Muslim army successfully entered Mecca on 20 Ramaḍān 8/630. The Prophet stood up to address his Companions: ‘Praise be to God Whose promise has been fulfilled, Who has rendered His servant victorious and Who alone has defeated the the *Aḥlāf* [the Confederates].’ He declared immunity from punishment for the people of Mecca and honoured Abū Sufyān, who had converted to Islam shortly before the conquest: ‘Whoever enters the house of Abū Sufyān will be safe, whoever stays behind his closed door will be safe and whoever enters the Holy Mosque will be safe.’⁶¹

The Prophet also granted the Quraysh a pardon. As they were gathered near the Ka‘ba waiting for his judgement on them, he said: ‘O people of the Quraysh, what do you think I should do with you?’ ‘Treat us well,’ they replied, ‘like a dutiful brother or a dutiful nephew.’ The Prophet said: ‘Go. You are free men [*ṭulaqā*].’⁶²

57 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, p. 783; Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, p. 134.

58 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, p. 857. For further information on the conquest of Mecca and the laws that were revealed as a consequence, see Ibn Kathīr, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, Beirut, Dār al-kutub al-‘ilmiyya, n.d., III, pp. 526ff.

59 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, p. 817; Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, p. 101; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, p. 859.

60 Al-‘Alī, *ad-Dawla fī ‘ahd ar-rasūl*, p. 306.

61 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, p. 863.

62 *Ibid.*, p. 870; Ibn Sallām, *Kitāb al-amwāl*, p. 107.

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The Prophet likewise proclaimed the end of polytheism and idolatry and sent someone to remove the traces of both from the Holy Mosque and the Ka‘ba and from around Mecca. He sent companies of men to the places of worship to smash the idols and even took part in this with his own hands while reciting: ‘Say, truth has now arrived and falsehood has perished, for falsehood is by its very nature bound to die.’⁶³ He also announced that immigration to Medina was to cease, that Mecca was sacred and that inside its precincts was a sanctuary in which killing, hunting and cutting down trees were forbidden. The pledge of allegiance was taken on faith, Islam and *jihād*.

The Prophet granted clemency to the people of Mecca and did not demand the surrender of possessions, including his own house which they had confiscated from the Muslims. He also confirmed a number of people in their posts associated with the Holy Mosque (the officer in charge of supplying water for pilgrims and the holder of the keys of Mecca)⁶⁴ and appointed one of the Quraysh as his deputy in Mecca. In so doing, he won over the hearts of the people of Mecca and drew them to Islam.⁶⁵ He permitted none of his troops, who included many bedouin Arabs, to seize booty from the Meccans in accordance with the well-known custom among the Arab tribes, compensating them instead by borrowing a sum of money from the Quraysh and sharing it out among his poorer followers.⁶⁶

The most significant outcome of these events, however, is that when Mecca was conquered, all the Arabs, who had been waiting for the end of fighting between the Muslims and the Quraysh, came together and declared their acceptance of Islam. Ibn Ishāq relates:

When Mecca was vanquished and the Quraysh yielded to him and they were conquered by Islam, and when the Arabs realized that they had no strength to fight or oppose the Messenger of God, they entered into the religion of God in droves, making their way to it from every quarter.⁶⁷

After the conquest of Mecca, a number of laws relating to the faith of the Muslims were revealed, including laws prohibiting the sale of alcohol and meat from animals not ritually slaughtered, ‘marriages of pleasure’ (*mut‘a*) and intercession in the divine statutes of God, as well as other laws that, for

63 *Al-Isrā’*, 17:81. See also Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, pp. 856ff.

64 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, pp. 835–6; Rizqallāh, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, p. 571.

65 Aḥmad ibn Yahyā ibn Jābir al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashrāf*, ed. Muḥammad Ḥamīdullāh, Cairo, Dār al-ma‘ārif, 1959, I, p. 529.

66 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, p. 882.

67 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, p. 985.

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example, precluded female heirs from receiving more than one third of an inheritance and shortened the ritual prayer.⁶⁸

In terms of its political and military implications, the conquest of Mecca meant the disappearance of the largest force opposing the Muslims. In turn, this allowed for the growth of the Islamic state, which could no longer be described as the state of Medina, since its territories had swollen to include the greater part of the Ḥijāz. This did not mean, however, that the state should remain within those boundaries, based as it is on religion: ‘We sent you as a mercy for all creatures.’⁶⁹ Its borders consequently lengthen and extend in line with the spread of Islam.

THE BATTLE OF ḤUNAYN

The inclusion of Mecca within the fold of Islam and the fact that it had been cleansed of idols, graven images and everything to do with polytheism incited fear and consternation among the Arab tribes, especially the Banū Hawāzin, whose territories extended to the south of Mecca, and the Banū Thaḳīf, who were the inhabitants of aṭ-Ṭā’if. Al-Wāqidī relates:

When the Messenger of God conquered Mecca, the nobles of Hawāzin gathered and the nobles of Thaḳīf gathered. They crowded together, thronged and clamoured until they said: ‘By God, Muḥammad has yet to come across someone who is skilled at fighting. So make yourselves ready and march to him before he marches to you!’⁷⁰

When the Prophet was certain that they were making preparations for war, he took steps to meet the situation and mobilized an army much larger than any that had taken part in previous battles. He supplemented the army that had seized Mecca with a further 2,000 Meccans who had converted to Islam after the conquest and whom he had called *ṭulaqā*.⁷¹ On 5 Shawwāl 8/630, the Muslim army set off for the battlefield in Wādī Ḥunayn and arrived there on 10 Shawwāl, with the Prophet keeping a careful watch on his enemy.

68 Al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā’il an-nubuwwa*, V, pp. 85–93; Ibn Kathīr, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, pp. 603–12; al-Būṭī, *Fiqh as-sīra*, pp. 417–23; al-‘Amrī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, pp. 484ff.; Rizqallāh, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, pp. 574–8.

69 *Al-Anbiyā’*, 21:107.

70 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, p. 885.

71 *Ibid.*, p. 889; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, pp. 891–2; al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā’il an-nubuwwa*, V, p. 121; aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, III, p. 73; Ibn Kathīr, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, p. 598; Nāẓim Zāhir al-Madghash, ‘Dawr muslimī al-faṭḥ min quraysh fi-l-islām ḥattā nihāyat al-‘aṣr al-umawī’, M.A. dissertation, University of Baghdad, College of Arts, 2004, pp. 143–8.

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Historical accounts confirm that the army of the polytheists under the command of Mālik ibn ‘Awf had preceded the Muslims to the battlefield and devised a plan to ambush the Muslims with volleys of arrows as they advanced down the steep sides of Wādī Ḥunayn.⁷² Consequently, no sooner had the Muslim forces entered the wadi than their enemies unexpectedly fell upon them *en masse*, which caused panic and disarray among the Muslims and forced them to withdraw with every man for himself. God thus disciplined those Muslims who were arrogant about their great numbers. In order to strengthen their faith, God made them taste the bitterness of defeat after the sweetness of the victory at Mecca. They should not be proud in victory nor distressed in defeat. Numbers can deceive and apparent power can be misleading. Success lies only in the hands of God, and to achieve it requires true faith in God and total dependence upon Him.

After the Muslims had rested for an hour, God renewed their confidence and the large, well-equipped army of their enemies was vanquished. The Muslims therefore received help, support and resources when they turned once again to their Lord and asked for His assistance. The victory was magnificent and the triumph glorious:

God made you victorious in many places and on the day of Ḥunayn. Behold, your great numbers amazed you. But they did not avail you at all. Although the land was wide it constrained you. Then you turned around in retreat. But God restored His calmness on His Messenger and on the believers. He sent down soldiers whom you did not see and punished those who disbelieve. Such is the reward of the unbelievers.⁷³

The Prophet and his Companions around him stood firm. The Muslim army recovered its resolve and attacked the Hawāzin and their allies, ultimately defeating them and collecting a great quantity of booty consisting of camels and livestock. They also seized children and took prisoners. After leaving all of these in al-Ju‘rāna, they continued to pursue the scattered remnants of the defeated army.⁷⁴

The vanquished troops from the Hawāzin and the Thaḳīf took refuge in their city, aṭ-Ṭā’if. Wishing to exploit the defeat that he had inflicted upon them, the Prophet ordered that they should be followed there and he laid siege to the city in the hope that they would submit and accept Islam. Aṭ-Ṭā’if was therefore surrounded and the grip tightened on the city. The Muslims used tank-like devices covered with leather to protect those inside them as

72 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, p. 893; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, p. 897.

73 *At-Tawba*, 9:25–6.

74 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, p. 73; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II, pp. 889ff.; Ibn Kathīr, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, pp. 610ff.

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they attacked the walls. Although the Muslims threatened to chop down the trees around the city and destroy the plantations, while promising to free anyone who surrendered to them,⁷⁵ the people of aṭ-Ṭā'if continued to hold out in the face of the siege, which lasted for almost three weeks.

Eventually, the Prophet decided to lift the siege and return to Medina. On the way, he stopped in al-Ju'rāna, where he distributed the booty seized after the battle of Ḥunayn in a manner that some of his Companions did not understand at the time.⁷⁶ The booty was given to the *ṭulaqā'* and bedouin in order to consolidate their loyalty to the Muslim community, since they had only recently converted to Islam and their faith was not yet firmly established in their hearts.⁷⁷

When the Prophet had finished distributing the booty, he left al-Ju'rāna with the intention of performing the *'umra*. He purified himself and donned the garments of the pilgrim, after which he entered Mecca, circumambulated the Ka'ba, performed the rituals and shaved his head. He returned to al-Ju'rāna on the same night and then continued on home to Medina, where he arrived in late Dhu-l-Qa'ada or early Dhu-l-Ḥijja AH 8.

The year 8/630 therefore ended with the conquest of Mecca. The insurmountable obstacle which had for so long blocked the road to progress and prevented further developments had finally been removed. Islam then spread far and wide in the land of Arabia and penetrated every region. Delegations of Arabs from all over the peninsula came submissively to Medina to announce to the Prophet that they had accepted Islam and were under his command. They entered Islam voluntarily and willingly.

THE BATTLE OF TABŪK: THE ARMY OF HARDSHIP
(*JAYSH AL-'USRA*)

Following the conquest of Mecca and the subjugation of the Hawāzin, the Islamic state expanded until it covered most of the Arabian peninsula up to the borders with ash-Shām and Iraq, and the Muslims came to be responsible for the administration of the state and for organizing the various aspects of government. There no longer remained any Arab power that could challenge the Muslims or wage war against them. Islam, however, is not the religion

75 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, p. 936; Ibn Kathīr, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, III, p. 657.

76 For details on the distribution of the booty, see al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, pp. 956–8; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, pp. 934–6; Ibn Kathīr, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, pp. 673–4. For the laws which resulted from the battles of Ḥunayn and aṭ-Ṭā'if, see al-'Amrī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, pp. 520–1; Rizqallāh, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, pp. 601–2.

77 Al-'Amrī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II, p. 512; Rizqallāh, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, p. 598; Bahjat Kāmil 'Abd-al-Laṭīf, 'al-Mu'allafatu qulūbuhum', *Dirāsāt islāmiyya*, VI, year 2, Baghdad, Bayt al-ḥikma, 1422/2001, pp. 64–82.

of the Arabs alone; on the contrary, it is universal: 'We have sent you to all people.'⁷⁸ It was therefore imperative to ensure that it could be freely disseminated outside the peninsula after having reached most regions within.

Extending Islam from its birthplace meant heading northwards, to the territories of ash-Shām which were under Byzantine control. This is where the battle of Mu'ta took place in AH 8, which focused the attention of the Arab tribes living by the northern borders between ash-Shām and Arabia on the new power that was beginning to expand its influence over the peninsula and unite its tribes under the banner of monotheism and the rejection of polytheism and idolatry. Islam therefore also began to spread among their ranks.

The Byzantine authorities were infuriated when they saw that the material and psychological power of the Muslims was increasing to the point where it began to constitute a serious threat to the Byzantine empire. The emperor therefore conscripted a large force of Byzantines and Arab tribesmen who were under the patronage of the empire. On learning of this, the Prophet set out to meet them with a view to enabling the continued spread of Islam, increasing the morale of the Arab tribes who had started to embrace the religion and erasing the negative impressions that still lingered in the minds of some Muslims after the battle of Mu'ta.⁷⁹

The Prophet began to mobilize a large army which he urged the Companions to finance in view of the distance it had to travel and the large numbers of polytheists it would face. He promised them that they would receive a magnificent reward from God and each man consequently made a contribution according to his means. Of all of them, 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān gave the most.⁸⁰ Despite the adverse conditions of heat and drought, the Prophet resolved to take the army as far as the borders of ash-Shām in order to embolden the Muslims and demonstrate to the Byzantines and the Arab tribes attached to them that the Muslims were capable of meeting them in battle and challenging them in their own area of influence.⁸¹

The Muslim army left Medina in the hot season of Rajab 9/July–September 630 and began to cross the arid desert. Had it not rained during their march, they would have been afflicted by terrible thirst. In order to avoid the oppressive heat, they covered the stages of the journey by night. When they eventually arrived at Tabūk, they found that it had been abandoned

78 *Saba'*, 34:28.

79 See al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, pp. 989–90; Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya'qūb al-Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh al-Ya'qūbī*, Beirut, Dār ṣādir, 1379/1960, II, p. 67; Ibn Kathīr, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, pp. 3–4.

80 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, p. 991; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, p. 953.

81 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, p. 943. For information on how the *Munāfiqūn* dampened the enthusiasm of the troops, see Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, pp. 943–4.

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by the Byzantines. The Prophet consequently stayed there for a few days⁸² during which time he successfully concluded a peace treaty with the chief of Ayla, Yuḥannā ibn Ru'ba, and the inhabitants of Jarbā', Adhraḥ and Dawmat al-Jandal.

It is clear from the accounts that the basis of the agreements made by the Prophet with these people was that they should retain their religions because they were 'people of the Book' (*ahl al-kitāb*), in other words, monotheists. On the other hand, in order to demonstrate their allegiance to the Islamic state, all men among them with sufficient means were obliged to give a certain sum of money every year in exchange for the protection of the state. They were not compelled to undertake *jihād* or to pay the alms tax (*zakāh*).⁸³

The conclusion of these treaties guaranteed the security of the northern borders of the Islamic state and further added to the sense of awe felt by the tribes towards Islam. They also served to focus attention on the northern borders, something that was subsequently to have major consequences during the Islamic conquests under the Rightly Guided Caliphs. On the other hand, on the basis of the provisions contained in these agreements, a number of Muslims apparently believed that *jihād* had come to an end and that they were now embarking on a life of peace and stability. The Prophet disabused them of this, saying: 'No group from among my community shall cease to fight in the way of truth until the appearance of the Antichrist.'⁸⁴

The psychological victory of the Muslims at Tabūk finally ended the hesitation of those Arabs who had not yet embraced Islam; after the Prophet had returned to Medina, Arab tribes began to make their way there and declare their conversion. Indeed, the people flocked to the religion of God in droves.

Revealed shortly after Tabūk, *sūrat at-Tawba* vividly describes the events of this time. The positions of the hypocrites (*Munāfiqūn*) and the hesitant became apparent and a number of laws were enacted to cover such issues as the combination of midday and afternoon prayers, and that of the evening and night prayers; the possibility whereby a person of lesser excellence may become an imam even when a person of greater excellence exists; the position of Islam regarding polytheists and parties to a contract; the cleansing of all traces of polytheism and idolatry from the Ka'ba; and the granting of a four-month period of grace before a threat is carried out.⁸⁵ The significance of these laws is evident from the fact that the Prophet instructed 'Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib to go to Mecca and announce them to the people on the Day of

82 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, p. 1003; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, p. 953.

83 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, p. 1057; aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, III, p. 109.

84 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, p. 1057; aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, III, p. 108.

85 For details of the laws resulting from the attack on Tabūk, see al-'Amrī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II, pp. 37–8; Rizqallāh, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, pp. 634–8.

Immolation (*yawm an-naḥr*) at Minā. The Prophet said: ‘No one shall act on my behalf unless from my family.’⁸⁶ Similarly, in AH 9, the Prophet appointed Abū Bakr aṣ-Ṣiddīq as leader of the pilgrimage to perform its rituals with the Muslims. He left Medina before *sūrat at-Taḥa* was revealed.⁸⁷ Abū Bakr thus performed the pilgrimage with the people and ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib was instructed to inform them of the verses of ‘disavowal’:

No disbeliever will enter paradise, and no polytheist will perform the pilgrimage after this year. No naked person shall circumambulate the Ka‘ba. Whoever has a contract with the Messenger of God shall honour it until the end of its stipulated period.⁸⁸

The Prophet allowed the people a four-month period of grace starting from the day on which he gave them permission to return to their homes or towns.

One scholar has commented on the historical circumstances attending the revelation of the verses which lay down the spiritual basis of the state after the last of the Prophet’s military actions:

In order for the state to be strong, it needed to have an all-encompassing system of spiritual beliefs that people could have faith in and defend with all their resources and might. And what system of beliefs is greater than faith in God Alone Who has no partners?⁸⁹

The Prophet’s letters to kings, princes and leaders

We referred above to the Prophet’s military and political activities that were designed to put pressure on the leaders of the Quraysh and make them submit to the new religion and abandon their idols and graven images. One outcome of the raids and military expeditions was that most regions of the Arabian peninsula yielded to the new state, embraced Islam and carried its banner willingly and in awe. The accounts reveal that most tribes became aware of the power of the new state and its lofty aims and so came forward and declared their allegiance to Islam and its state (see below under ‘Delegations from the Arab tribes’).


86 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, p. 972.

87 Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, pp. 1076–8; al-Būṭi, *Fiqh as-sīra*, p. 465.

88 Al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, p. 178; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, p. 973; Rizqallāh, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, p. 675.

89 Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal, *Ḥayāt Muḥammad*, Cairo, Dār al-qalam, n.d., pp. 473–4.

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1.11 Map of Mecca (© Hugh Kennedy)

The accounts similarly agree that the Prophet sent letters to the rulers and Arab tribal leaders in the neighbouring lands inviting them to accept Islam. These letters were sent after the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya in 6/628, although the sources differ as to the precise dates.⁹⁰ Apparently written at the same time as the Muslims were establishing themselves as a political and military power, the letters constitute a practical demonstration of the universal nature of the message of Islam, that universality to which the Qur'ānic verses revealed during the Meccan period testify.⁹¹ Furthermore, during the Prophet's emigration to Medina in the twelfth year of his prophetic mission, he announced that Persia and the Byzantine territories would be conquered and that the treasures of Chosroes would be seized.⁹²

The letters sent by the Prophet to the various regions after the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya correspond with the beginning of the spread of Islam among the people. They were not sent to any particular group or area, but rather in all directions. The Prophet had fifteen ambassadors whom he dispatched to the kings and princes, both Arab and non-Arab. Five were sent to non-Arab kings, two were sent to the Negus, king of Abyssinia, and one was sent to each of Heraclius, the Byzantine emperor, Chosroes, king of Persia, and al-Muqawqis, king of Egypt. The remaining ambassadors travelled to see the Arab kings and princes.⁹³ The Prophet chose his ambassadors from among those known for their commitment to Islam and for their eloquence, knowledge, good manners, patience, courage, wisdom, ingenuity and physical appearance.⁹⁴

There has been some criticism of the letters sent by the Prophet to Heraclius and Chosroes, in the sense that he invited these powerful leaders to embrace Islam in a way that could just as easily have resulted in their rejection and opposition to it at a time when he was not strong enough to meet them on the battlefield.⁹⁵ This argument is erroneous, however, since the Prophet did not fight the polytheists on the basis of strength of numbers and equipment, but rather with the power of faith, true belief, judicious leadership, planning and his trust and confidence in the might of his Lord. It was these which vanquished his enemies, the enemies of Islam, the religion of God.

90 Ibn Sallām, *Kitāb al-amwāl*, pp. 20–3; Ibn S'ad, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, p. 15; aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, II, pp. 644ff.

91 *Al-Anbiyā'*, 22:108; *al-Furqān*, 25:1; *Yūnus*, 10:72; *Hūd*, 11:29.

92 For the story of Surāqa ibn Mālik, see Aḥmad ibn 'Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī, *al-Iṣāba fī tamyīz aṣ-ṣaḥāba*, Cairo, Maṭba'at as-sa'āda, 1328/1910, II, p. 19.

93 Al-Ḥaydarabādī, *Majmū'at al-wathā'iq*, pp. 274ff.; Maḥmud Shīr Khaṭṭāb, *as-Sifārāt an-nabawīyya*, Baghdad, Maṭba'at al-majma' al-'ilmī al-'irāqī, 1409/1989, pp. 267ff.; Suhayl Ḥusayn al-Fatlawī, *Diblumāsiyyat an-nabī Muḥammad*, Beirut, Dār al-fikr al-'arabī, 2001, pp. 204ff.

94 Khaṭṭāb, *as-Sifārāt an-nabawīyya*, pp. 321–84.

95 Watt, *Muhammad at Medina*, p. 345.

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These letters may be seen as representing the first stage of cultural contact and the opening of a political dialogue with the rulers of those countries aimed at gaining their recognition of the new state and establishing relations based on mutual respect and equality, as in the case of the Prophet and the Quraysh after the signing of the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya. The letters were, moreover, the most acceptable and reasonable way of communicating the fundamentals of Islam to these rulers and tribal leaders, and through them to their subjects, and of informing them of that new power which had spread its influence over the people of the Arabian peninsula and united them through the principles, human values and spiritual orientation of Islam.

The reasons which led the Prophet to send his letters and the outcome of this can be summarized as follows:

1. God holds to account anyone who does not summon people to Islam and does not address kings, princes and tribal leaders, particularly since the message of Islam is meant for all people. It was therefore incumbent on the Prophet and his followers to relay this message to everyone by all means possible at that time.
2. Addressing the kings and princes served to assuage their anger and their hatred of Islam. Although they might well be intractable in their opinions, not to inform them of something or to make a request could have made them feel that they had not been treated with due respect. Even though refusing to accept Islam, some kings therefore treated the Prophet's ambassadors with great hospitality, replied to them with courtesy and sent gifts to Muḥammad.⁹⁶
3. The letters had an effect on even the most hostile of kings, such as Chosroes, by informing them that there was a power within the Arabian peninsula which threatened their authority in the region. Indeed, the Prophet had told his Companions of the imminent destruction of that authority.⁹⁷
4. The letters told the people that Islam was a religion of revelation, peace and love and was not intent on threatening or removing the king but was concerned with ordering good and forbidding evil. The letters therefore reassured the kings that they would still keep their thrones, even when they accepted Islam and ruled according to Islamic principles.⁹⁸
5. The letters demonstrated to the kings and princes that Islam was a civilized and contemporary religion that relied on peaceful methods

96 Ibn Sa'd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I, pp. 15, 16–17.

97 *Ibid.*, I/II, p. 16.

98 Rizqallāh, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, p. 525.

- of dealing with problems, disagreements and differences of opinion among countries.
6. The kings and princes were informed that Islam would enter their domains through them, which was the correct procedure in that they would be able to organize and arrange this themselves. The Prophet wrote to them confirming that they would remain in power, this being testimony to his realistic policy and the judicious way in which he handled matters.
 7. By means of his letters, the Prophet was able to gain an insight into the circumstances of the countries to which he sent his ambassadors and acquire knowledge about them.⁹⁹
 8. The diplomatic letters enabled the Islamic religion to become widespread and to reach many regions far from the centre of the state in Medina, a situation that was not the result of any other factor.
 9. One consequence of the success of the letters addressed to the kings and princes was that they continued to exchange letters even after they had accepted Islam. This became the most successful method of dealing with affairs and of informing other communities of Islamic principles.
 10. The act of sending messengers and summoning people to accept Islam outside the confines of Medina constituted the beginning of Islam as a universal religion. No longer was it considered to be a religion particular to the Arabs alone.¹⁰⁰
 11. Some rulers rejected Islam because they revelled in their own power and were proud and haughty, not because they were dissatisfied with the religion.
 12. The Prophet obtained a silver ring with which to seal his letters, thereby showing that it is permissible to use a seal with one's name inscribed on it.¹⁰¹

Delegations from the Arab tribes¹⁰²

The battle of Tabūk served to inform the tribes of northern Arabia about Islam and resulted in a number of peace treaties and the withdrawal of the Byzantines to their fortresses because they dared not face the Muslims. These events had a profound effect on the Arab tribes in the north and the

99 Al-Fatlawī, *Diblumāsiyyat an-nabī*, p. 230.

100 Ibid, pp. 229–30.

101 Rizqallāh, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, pp. 524–5.

102 For details regarding the Arab tribal delegations, see Ibn Sa'd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, pp. 39–49; Abū Zayd 'Umar an-Numayrī ibn Shabba, *Tārīkh al-Madīna al-munawwara*, ed. Muḥammad Fahīm Shaltūt, Jeddah, Dār al-Isfahānī, 1399/1979, I, pp. 499–599.

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south. Likewise, the Quraysh were greatly weakened due to the conflicts among them and the fact that a number of their most important men had joined the new state. They began to suffer from serious internal divisions and the other Arab tribes no longer feared their power and arrogance. The tribes therefore made their way to Medina to swear allegiance to the Prophet and to enter Islam, thereby strengthening the religion and participating in the construction of the new community based on monotheism and the renunciation of material and earthly desires.

Ibn Ishāq states that the reason why the powerful Arab tribes came forward to swear allegiance to the Prophet and convert to Islam at that time was that until then they had been waiting for a fight between him and the Quraysh. The Quraysh were the leaders and guides of the people, custodians of the Ka'ba and of the tombs of the sons of Ishmael, son of Abraham, something that the Arab chiefs could not deny. Moreover, it was the Quraysh who were preparing to wage war against the Prophet and oppose him. Consequently, when Mecca was conquered and the Quraysh submitted to the Prophet and were subjugated by Islam, the Arabs realized that they also were unable to oppose or fight him. They therefore embraced Islam, as God says, 'in droves, making their way to it from every quarter'.¹⁰³

Word of the new society began to spread and with it information about the life of those men who had put their faith in monotheism and created a religious and political entity based on love, friendship, justice, equality and obedience. News of their victories over their enemies also became known and the Arab tribes began to learn more about them.

The standing of the Islamic community was greatly enhanced by the conquest of Mecca and the end of the power of the Quraysh. The community had realized its objectives and extended its territory as far as the borders of Yemen and the eastern and northern areas of Arabia. This widening of influence, together with the elevated principles which lay behind it, served to persuade the Arab tribes to rally around the banner of the new community.¹⁰⁴ Consequently, after the Prophet's return from Tabūk at the beginning of 9/631, many Arab tribes from the various regions of the peninsula began to send delegations to Medina. Indeed, this time is called 'the year of delegations'. Although the oath of allegiance to Islam usually had to be made by each person individually, from the time of the pledge of Aqaba the Prophet had accepted the oath from delegations that he considered to be representatives of their people.

103 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, pp. 985ff.

104 Nizār 'Abd-al-Laṭīf al-Ḥadīthī, *al-Umma wa-d-dawla fī siyāsāt an-nabī wa-l-khulafā' ar-rāshidīn*, Baghdad, Dār al-ḥurriyya li-ṭ-ṭibā'a wa-n-nashr, 1987, p. 173.

Alongside the conquest of Mecca, the battles of Ḥunayn and Tabūk and the conversion of the tribe of Thaḳīf, the victories achieved by the new state since the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya convinced the Arab tribes that it was better for them to unite under the banner of the new religion. In so doing, they would rid themselves of the despotism of the Byzantines and the Persians and turn from the worship of idols and graven images to the worship of God, The One, The Unique, particularly since Muḥammad spared all those who came to him declaring their acceptance of Islam and their obedience to his authority.

Ibn Sa‘d and aṭ-Ṭabarī provide us with detailed lists of these delegations, of which there were about seventy.¹⁰⁵ It is apparent that most were composed of more than simply one individual. Although some tribes sent one man who would convert to Islam and then return to his people and ask them to do likewise,¹⁰⁶ in the majority of cases the delegations were composed of up to 10 men, while at other times they might consist of as many as 100 or more.

The Prophet received these delegations with great warmth, treated them with respect and made sure that they were comfortable in their lodgings in Medina. He would explain to them any matter concerning Islam that they wished to learn about and would then leave them to choose whether or not to convert to the new religion. He would also present them with gifts such as perfume and silver.¹⁰⁷

It is worth mentioning that some delegations, including those representing the tribes of Ashja‘ and Muzayna, had gone to Medina before the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya.¹⁰⁸ As for the Banū Sulaym, they had sent a delegation to the Prophet when he was on his way to conquer Mecca and a number of the delegates had gone on to take part in the conquest and in the battle of Ḥunayn and the siege of aṭ-Ṭā‘if.¹⁰⁹

Among the delegations reported to have gone to Medina after the conquest of Mecca, although without any mention of specific dates, are those from the tribes of Muḥārib, ‘Abs, Hilāl, ‘Āmir ibn Ṣa‘ṣa‘a, Ja‘da, Ṭayy, Judhām, Taghlib and Bakr ibn Wā‘il.¹¹⁰ Delegations from the tribes of Fazāra, Marra, Tha‘laba, Tamīm, Kilāb, Qushayr, al-Bakā’, Kināna, Thaḳīf, Bahrā’ and Bāhila arrived in AH 9 and from the tribes of Muḥārib and ‘Uqayl in

105 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, pp. 39–49, IV, p. 339; aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, III, pp. 96–100, 115–22, 130ff. For further details, see Rizqallāh, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, pp. 639–72, who states that seventy-six delegations went to Medina.

106 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, p. 219; al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā‘il an-nubuwwa*, V, pp. 374–7.

107 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I, pp. 56, 64, 66, 72, V, pp. 372, 373, 407. The houses in which the delegations were reportedly lodged included those belonging to the widow Bint al-Ḥārith, Sa‘d ibn ‘Abāda, Rāfi‘ ibn Thābit al-Balawī, Miqdār ibn ‘Umar, Bilāl ibn Rabāḥ and Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī. See Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, pp. 54, 56, 59, 61, 63, 65, 66, 71–2, 84, 85.

108 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, pp. 38, 48.

109 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, pp. 49–50.

110 *Ibid.*, p. 44.

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AH 10. The historical accounts refer to a number of delegations which went to Medina on the initiative of individuals and which, after embracing Islam, returned to the areas in which their tribes lived and were able to convert them. These delegations included those of the Banū ‘Uqayl, the Banū ‘Āmir and Muṭarrif ibn al-Kāhin.¹¹¹

A number of delegations, such as that from Najrān, concluded agreements with the Prophet.¹¹² Some delegations, such as those from the Banū Ḥanīfa and ‘Āmir ibn Ṭufayl, demanded to be put in charge and suggested that they delay destroying their idols.¹¹³ Prose and poetry competitions were organized by other delegations, including that of the Banū Tamīm¹¹⁴ about whom the *sūrat al-Ḥujrāt* was revealed,¹¹⁵ describing some of their insolent and offensive actions. For example, they would stand outside the Prophet’s room and call to him in a loud voice without asking his permission to enter. No doubt the *sūrat al-Ḥujrāt* was revealed in order to instruct Muslims in the correct way to address the Messenger of God, ensuring that they sought his permission before entering into his presence, did not demean each other and so on.¹¹⁶ The Prophet always directed the delegations to the straight path, the path of monotheism, and rarely made compromises on any of the basic principles of the faith, as he did with the delegations from the Banū Ḥanīfa and Kinda.¹¹⁷

The sources indicate that delegations continued to arrive in Medina throughout 10/632, proclaiming their allegiance, their acceptance of Islam and their desire to live under its jurisdiction. For his part, the Prophet welcomed them and pledged that he would support those of them who converted to Islam, accept the friendship of whoever was a friend of Islam and take the other monotheists (*ahl al-kitāb*) as his companions.

It is clear from the texts which preserve the words exchanged between the Messenger of God and the leaders of the Arab tribal delegations to Medina that the latter included tribes from the fringes of the northern, eastern and southern Ḥijāz and from the mountains of Najd, as well as others from the eastern part of the peninsula and Yemen. This testifies to the vast area that the Islamic state had come to encompass by peaceful means and on the initiative of the tribes themselves.¹¹⁸

111 Ibid., pp. 45, 46, 49.

112 Ibid., pp. 84–5; al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā’il an-nubuwwa*, V, pp. 382ff.; Ibn Kathīr, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, pp. 100–8; Rizqallāh, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, pp. 644–6.

113 Al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā’il an-nubuwwa*, V, pp. 330–3; Ibn Kathīr, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, pp. 92–100, 116–20.

114 Ibn Sa’d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, pp. 40–1.

115 Abu-l-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn Aḥmad al-Wāḥidī, *Asbāb an-nuzūl*, ed. Sayyid Aḥmad Ṣaqr, Cairo, Dār iḥyā’ al-kutub al-‘arabiyya, 1963.

116 Al-‘Amrī, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II, p. 542.

117 Ibn Sa’d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, pp. 63–4.

118 Al-‘Alī, *ad-Dawla fī ‘ahd ar-rasūl*, p. 337.

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The conversion of a delegation to Islam was tantamount to the conversion of the tribe it represented and the sources contain no mention of any tribe that remonstrated with its delegation on account of its conversion to Islam, which became a symbol of a tribe's connection with the Islamic state and the acceptance of its values.

The Prophet never imposed any onerous responsibilities or severe restrictions on those tribes which converted to Islam; they retained their identity and their lands, their leaders and their laws, as long as these did not conflict with the basic principles of Islam. The old arrangements and relationships persisted, whether between the clans and tribes or between the inhabitants of the villages and towns. Genealogy still played an important role in uniting groups of people, in conformity with the moral qualities that were valued, such as caring for relatives, strengthening the bonds of kinship, looking after neighbours, helping those in distress, keeping promises and showing generosity and courage.¹¹⁹

Within the space of about ten years, under the banner of Islam, the Prophet was able to achieve the political unification of the Arabian peninsula for the first time in its history, despite the spirit of individualism, the ingrained tribal feuding and the disputes of the pre-Islamic era (*jāhiliyya*). The unification was not superficial; on the contrary, it was a total integration and harmonization in spirit, mentality and behaviour. It therefore constituted a firm foundation on which to build the new community represented by the state of Islam, the authority of which was to extend as far as Asia, Africa and Europe in less than a century.

This state provided a solid framework for the cementing of social bonds based on a belief in God, The One, The Unique, the principles of the faith and a universal perspective on life. It was distinguished by its use of a single language and shared ideals concerning ways of behaviour and public welfare. As already indicated, these bonds were far superior to those restricted ties found within the tribe. They held sway over every individual, united all who shared the same faith, weakened the people's links with their corrupt past and replaced these with a global point of view: 'To God belong the East and the West. Wherever you turn, there is God's countenance.'¹²⁰

The individual was now able to act in accord with the highest ideal: 'The most honoured among you in the sight of God is he who is the most righteous.'¹²¹ With this, the nature of tribalism began to change as a result of more inclusive bonds based on religion, the adoption of new standards and new ways of doing things for the welfare of the community as a whole

119 Ibid.

120 *Al-Baqara*, 2:115.

121 *Al-Hujrāt*, 49:13.

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and not merely that of the tribe or its chief. Men no longer served in the army in order to achieve the personal aims of the rulers or acquire booty, for example, but rather out of a duty to further the interests of the community, that duty being the dissemination of Islam and the establishment of its basic principles. Similarly, resources were no longer used to satisfy purely personal desires, but instead out of a responsibility to serve the public interest that brought everyone together under the auspices of the new community.¹²²

The Prophet identified the features of the faith, stressing that its basic tenets should be fixed in people's hearts and that the correct moral standards and manner of conduct should be made known. In conformity with these aims, he sent teachers to the majority of tribes which had declared their acceptance of Islam so as to prepare them to receive the new faith and its ethical principles. These teachers instructed the tribes in how to recite the Qur'ān and explained the tenets and laws of the religion.¹²³

The historical accounts confirm that the Arabian peninsula became unified after 'the year of delegations' and that it possessed a single central authority to which everyone was subject and which they were obliged to obey. The community came to appreciate the concept of the Prophet's leadership and he guided them to what was best. This leadership is confirmed in the Qur'ānic verses in accordance with which obedience to the Messenger of God and those in authority is a requirement: 'O you who believe, obey God and obey the Messenger and those who have authority among you.'¹²⁴ The Qur'ān links obedience to the Prophet with obedience to God: 'He who obeys the Messenger obeys God.'¹²⁵

The religion of Islam was able to purify those within the community of all the corruptions of idolatry and the customs of the pre-Islamic era and to fill their hearts with the light of faith. It was able to cleanse all filth and graven images from the Ka'ba, which then became the direction of prayer for every Muslim, the sign of their unity and the symbol of their strength.

The time had arrived for the Prophet to let his Companions hear about the nature of the religion which he had brought to them so that they would then learn all the truths of Islam, understand its aims and take his words as a constitution on which to model their lives. To that end, a gathering place for all the Muslims was needed, together with the right opportunity, which arose in the month of Dhu-l-Qa'ada 10/632. During that year, the Prophet decided to perform the pilgrimage with the Muslims so as to instruct them in the rituals of both the *'umra* and the *hajj*, as well as the teachings of their

122 Al-'Alī, *ad-Dawla fī 'ahd ar-rasūl*, p. 333.

123 Ibn Sa'd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I/II, p. 38, I/III, p. 39; al-'Alī, *ad-Dawla fī 'ahd ar-rasūl*, pp. 339–40.

124 *An-Nisā'*, 4:59.

125 *Ibid.*, 4:80.

religion. As the Prophet had never before performed the *hajj* under Islam, many of the Muslims who heard about it made their way to Medina in the hope of joining him and emulating what he did.

Shaykh an-Nadwī explains the significance of the farewell pilgrimage (*hajjat al-wadāʿ*) in terms of the information and knowledge that it communicated:

[The Prophet] left Medina for the pilgrimage to the Kaʿba in order to meet the Muslims and teach them about their religion and its rituals, to bear witness that there is no god but God, to declare his faith, give his final testament and exact from the Muslims their pledge and covenant, and to wipe out, obliterate and trample underfoot all traces of the ‘time of ignorance’ before Islam [*jāhiliyya*]. This pilgrimage was the equivalent of a thousand sermons and a thousand lessons. It was a mobile school, a travelling mosque and a moving assembly in which the ignorant received knowledge and the heedless paid attention.¹²⁶

The accounts differ as to the number of those who went to Medina, with estimates ranging between 40,000 and 90,000. Whatever the actual number, it demonstrates how many people had accepted Islam and the extent to which the religion had spread throughout the Arabian peninsula, as well as the strength of adherence to its principles and values, the love that Muslims bore for the Prophet and their fervent desire to meet and learn from him directly. A similar number of people were waiting in Mecca to join the Messenger of God and to do as he did.

This pilgrimage is known as the farewell pilgrimage because it was the last that the Prophet performed and the last time that he and his followers came together. It is also known as the ‘pilgrimage of instruction’ (*hajjat al-balāgh*) because the Messenger of God instructed the people in the laws of God concerning the pilgrimage in terms of both what is said and what is done. Lastly, it is known as the ‘pilgrimage of Islam’ (*hajjat al-islām*) because there were no tenets or fundamental principles of Islam that were not explained by the Prophet during its course.

In his speech on Mount ‘Arafa, the Prophet established the bases of Islam and destroyed those of polytheism and the *jāhiliyya*. He confirmed the prohibition of those matters that the religious communities had agreed were prohibited, such as murder, theft and slander (‘Your blood and your wealth are forbidden to you’).¹²⁷ He repudiated and abolished the practices of the *jāhiliyya*, such as usury (‘Everything from the *jāhiliyya* was trodden under his

126 An-Nadwī, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, pp. 335–6.

127 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, pp. 1103ff.; an-Nadwī, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, p. 231.

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feet. The spilling of blood during the *jāhiliyya* was trodden under his feet').¹²⁸ The Prophet also told the people to treat women well and mentioned their rights, including those of being supported and clothed with kindness ('It is your duty to support them and to clothe them in kindness').¹²⁹

He instructed the Islamic community to adhere to the Book of God ('I have left for you something which, if you abide by it, will never let you go astray, that is, the Book of God and the customary practice [*sunna*] of His Prophet').¹³⁰ He asked them what they had to say and to what they bore witness. They replied: 'We bear witness that you have told us, have guided us and given us advice.' At this, the Prophet raised his hands to the sky and three times summoned God to bear witness to their words. He then told them to report their testimony to those who were absent.¹³¹

Thus, in AH 10 during the ceremonies of the *hajjat al-wadā'*, the Muslims received a complete description of their religion directly from the mouth of their Prophet.¹³² When the Prophet had concluded his speech and while he was still on Mount 'Arafa, God's words were revealed:

This day, those who do not believe have given up all hope of your religion. But do not fear them. Fear Me. Today I have perfected your religion for you. I have completed My favour upon you and have chosen for you Islam as your religion.¹³³

The Prophet returned to Medina while those who had been with him on the pilgrimage returned to their homes, happy and rejoicing at this encounter during which their Messenger had laid down the truths of their religion for them and pointed the way to that which would unite them and scatter their enemies.

After returning from the *hajjat al-wadā'*, the Prophet was struck down by illness. Two days before falling ill, he had given instructions for an army to be made ready to march to ash-Shām and he had appointed Usāma ibn Zayd ibn Hāritha as its commander. The ranks of the army included some of the most

128 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, p. 1103; al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā'il an-nubuwwa*, V, 'The Farewell Pilgrimage', pp. 432–52.

129 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, p. 1103; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, IV, p. 1023; al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā'il an-nubuwwa*, V, 'The Farewell Pilgrimage'.

130 Ibid.

131 For further details concerning the *hajjat al-wadā'*, see al-Bayhaqī, *Dalā'il an-nubuwwa*, V, 'The Farewell Pilgrimage'; Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *Zād al-ma'ād fī hady khayr al-'ibād*, eds Shu'ayb al-Arnā'ūt and 'Abd-al-Qādir al-Arnā'ūt, Beirut, Mu'assasat ar-risāla, 1404/1986, XII, pp. 101–311.

132 Abū Ḥātim Muḥammad al-Bustī ibn Ḥibbān, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya wa-akhbār al-khulafā'*, rev. and annotated by Sayyid 'Azīz Bey et al., Beirut, Mu'assasat al-kutub ath-thaqāfiyya, 1407/1987, p. 392. For information on the laws and principles laid down during the *hajjat al-wadā'*, see Rizqallāh, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, pp. 682–4.

133 *Al-Mā'ida*, 5:3.

senior Companions and *Muhājirūn*, among them Abū Bakr and ‘Umar. As a result of the Prophet’s illness, however, this campaign – the last he would organize – was delayed. He was to live only a further ten days, and he died on Monday, Rabī‘ I, 11 / June 632.¹³⁴

The Prophet had communicated his message, accomplished his charge and exhorted his community. He had unified the Arabian peninsula under the banner of monotheism and transformed the Arab tribes into a single community, under a single central authority, founded on the worship of the One Lord apart from Whom there is no god, the Creator of all things Who was not born nor did beget. The Prophet had prepared his Companions to continue to perform the charge, to undertake *jihād* for the sake of God and to unfurl the banner of Islam so that they could bear witness to the people and relate what their Prophet had told them: ‘Thus, We have made you a community justly balanced so that you might be witnesses to the people and the Messenger a witness to you.’¹³⁵

The Prophet thus entrusted his message to the community so that its members would pass it on from generation to generation. It is their task to preserve it, to act in conformity with it and to undertake *jihād* for its sake until it encompasses all the regions of the earth, covering every area and uniting all people in the perfect religion. It will have achieved the purpose of the final revelation that God intended for His servants when people live in accordance with that revelation, in peace and tranquillity, as stated in God’s words:

O you who believe, bow down, prostrate yourselves and worship your Lord. Do good so that you might prosper, and strive in His cause as you should. He has chosen you and has imposed no difficulties upon you in religion. It is the faith of your father Abraham. It is He Who has named you Muslims both before and at this time, that the Messenger may be a witness for you and you be witnesses for mankind. So establish prayer, give charity and hold fast to God. He is your Protector, the best of protectors, and your Helper, the best of helpers.¹³⁶

134 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, p. 1117; Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, IV, pp. 1056–7, 1063ff.

135 *Al-Baqara*, 2:142.

136 *Al-Ḥajj*, 22:77–8.

Chapter 1.4

THE HISTORICAL PROCESS OF THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

Abd al Wahid Dhanun Taha

The political situation in Arabia on the eve of Islam

At the beginning of the first/seventh century, the Arabian peninsula was bordered on the north-east by the Sāsānid empire and on the north-west by the Byzantine empire. Both empires had expansionist ambitions and their religious establishments were engaged in missionary work on behalf of their respective faiths. Because of its vital position in relation to these two empires, Arabia was destined to pay a high price for its independence. However, its relative isolation from the outside world due to the surrounding seas, harsh climate and rugged terrain enabled it to maintain its independence from foreign control, with the exception of several areas in the north and south-west. Drawn by the relatively moderate climate and good natural resources in those areas, both the Sāsānid and Byzantine empires sought to extend influence and control over them.¹

The Sāsānid empire controlled the north-eastern part of the peninsula and consolidated its influence by alliances with several powerful Arab leaders, in particular from the Tanūkh tribe, such as Mālik ibn Fahm, ‘Amr ibn Fahm and Judhayma al-Abrash. It acknowledged the authority of al-Abrash and allowed him autonomy in the region west of the Euphrates. The Sāsānids thus aimed to safeguard their western borders and prevent the bedouin entering Iraq, while also seeking to make use of al-Abrash in

1 Hashim Yahya al-Mallah, *al-Wasīṭ fi-s-sīra an-nabawiyya wa-l-khilāfa ar-rāshida*, Mosul, Maṭba‘at jāmi‘at al-Mawṣil, 1991, p. 19.

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their anticipated war with Byzantium.² The Byzantines employed a similar approach with several Arab tribes that had emigrated from Iraq, fleeing Sāsānid rule. These included the Tanūkh and Quḍā‘a clans whose support was sought by the Byzantine emperors in their struggle with Persia. With the exception of the Ghassānids, however, they did not recognize the tribes as constituting a state. The Ghassānids had emigrated from Yemen and actively supported Byzantium against Persia, prompting the former to confer grand official titles on the Ghassānid chiefs and recognize a measure of sovereignty in the areas they inhabited. The Byzantines used the Ghassānids to control the open Syrian borders and as a conduit for the expansion of their influence among the Arab tribes, as a buffer state between Syria and the Sāsānid empire and as support for their military operations against Persia.³

The Byzantines also sought control over Yemen through their allies the Abyssinians, who had first invaded Yemen in AD 340 and again in 525, during the reign of the Emperor Justinian I (r. 527–65). Under the leadership of Aryāṭ, the Abyssinians were able to overthrow the Ḥimyār state and relieve the Yemeni Christians in Najrān. These Christians were persecuted by the king of Ḥimyār, Dhū Nuwās, who was intent on converting them to Judaism. When they refused, he ordered a trench dug in which he had them burnt. The Ḥimyāris were ‘the owners of the ditch’ mentioned in the Qur’ān: ‘Destroyed were the owners of the ditch, of the fuel-fed fire, when they sat by it.’⁴

It should be noted that the Byzantine emperor’s interest in Yemeni affairs was not simply a matter of religion but also of protecting his country’s commercial interests, which had been put at risk by the hostile stance of Dhū Nuwās.⁵ These events took place at a time when the Ḥimyār state had been weakened, particularly after the discovery by Hipparchus of the seasonal winds and their role in navigation, which caused considerable losses to Yemeni trade. As a result, Yemen fell under Byzantine influence, thus posing a threat to Arabia on the one hand and opening a new front in the confrontation between Byzantium and Persia, particularly along the coasts of Oman and the Persian Gulf, on the other.⁶

2 Şāliḥ Aḥmad al-‘Alī, *Muḥāḍarāt fī tārikh al-‘arab qabla al-islām*, Mosul, Maṭba‘at jāmi‘at al-Mawṣil, 1981, p. 65.

3 Ibid., p. 56.

4 *Al-Burūj*, 85:4–6 (all translations of Qur’ānic verses are from Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran: An Explanatory Translation*, London, Everyman, 1992); see also Abū Ḥanīfa Aḥmad ibn Dāwūd ad-Dīnawūrī, *al-Akḥbār aṭ-ṭiwāl*, ed. ‘Umar Fārūq aṭ-Ṭabbā‘, Beirut, Dār al-arqam, 1995, pp. 60–1; al-‘Alī, *Muḥāḍarāt*, p. 56; Mumtāz al-‘Ārif, *al-Aḥbāsh bayna Ma’rib wa-Aksūm*, Sidon, al-Maktaba al-‘aṣriyya, 1975, p. 67.

5 Hashim Yahya al-Mallah, *al-Wasīṭ fī tārikh al-‘arab qabla al-islām*, Mosul, Dār al-kutub, 1994, p. 98.

6 Nizār ‘Abd-al-Laṭīf al-Ḥadīthī, *al-Umma wa-d-dawla fī siyāsāt an-nabī wa-l-khulafā’ ar-rāshidīn*, Baghdad, Dār al-ḥurriyya, 1987, p. 33.

The fall of the Ḥimyār state in Yemen was followed shortly afterwards by the collapse of the Arabian principality of Kinda, which was induced by the powerful forces of fragmentation. The principality had been formed on the northern borders of the peninsula from a broad alliance of tribes from between the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, in particular those of Asad, Kināna, Qays ‘Aylān, Numayr, Bakr and Taghlib, which were allied with the Yemeni tribe of Kinda.⁷ The emergence of this principality was of key importance owing to military and political considerations. It was also of historical significance in that the principality was formed at a juncture in history marked by military pressure on all fronts from the two great powers struggling for control over Arabia.⁸

The struggle between Byzantium and Sāsānid Persia focused essentially on control over trade routes and spheres of influence in Iraq. Byzantium was doing all in its power to strengthen its position between the Tigris and the Euphrates,⁹ while Persia was striving stubbornly for control over Syria and Egypt, in other words, over the land route from Arabia. The Arab allies of both empires – the Lakhmids (Munādhira) and the Ghassānids – were caught up in this struggle, particularly during the reign of the king of al-Ḥīra, Nu’mān ibn al-Mundhir (r. AD 506–53) and the Ghassānid king, al-Ḥārith ibn Jibilla (r. AD 528–56).

Each empire did all in its power to strike a blow against the other by damaging its international trade and acting through its Arab allies, the Lakhmids and the Ghassānids. These, however, had ambitions to be free of their dependency and sometimes resisted the military orders they were given. As a result, disputes broke out between Persia and the kings of al-Ḥīra, and between Byzantium and the Ghassānid princes,¹⁰ leading to the overthrow by Byzantium of Ghassānid authority in Syria and Persia’s capture and subsequent execution of Nu’mān ibn al-Mundhir, the king of al-Ḥīra.¹¹ The Persians also put an end to the period of independence achieved by the Yemeni leader, Sayf Dhī Yazīn, and established control over Yemen.

7 Gunnar Olinder, *Mulūk Kinda min banī Ākil al-Marār*, trans. from the original English by ‘Abd-al-Jabbār al-Muṭṭalibī, Baghdad, Dār al-ḥurriyya, 1973, p. 123; see also al-‘Alī, *Muḥāḍarāt*, p. 83.

8 Al-Ḥadīthī, *al-Umma*, pp. 31–2.

9 Arthur E. Christensen, *Īrān fī ‘ahd as-Sāsāniyyīn*, trans. from the English by Yaḥyā al-Khashshāb, Cairo, Maṭba‘at lajnat at-ta’līf wa-t-tarjama wa-n-nashr, 1957, pp. 437, 438, 451, 473, 474.

10 Asmahān Sa‘īd al-Jarw, *Mūjaz at-tārīkh as-siyāsī al-qadīm li-janūb shibh al-jazīra al-‘arabiyya*, Irbid, Mu‘assasat Ḥamāda, 1966, p. 267.

11 Ḥamza ibn al-Ḥasan al-Isfahānī, *Tārīkh sanā mulūk al-arḍ wa-l-anbiyā’*, Beirut, Maktabat al-Hayāh, 1961, p. 95; see also Christensen, *Īrān fī ‘ahd as-Sāsāniyyīn*, p. 435; Nina Viktorovna Pigulevskaia, *al-‘Arab ‘alā ḥudūd Bīzanṭa wa Īrān*, trans. from the original Russian by Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn ‘Uthmān Ḥāshim, Kuwait, al-Majlis al-waṭānī li-th-thaqāfa wa-l-funūn wa-l-ādāb, 1985, pp. 146, 250–1.

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These events, however, produced a powerful reaction among the Arabs of the Arabian peninsula, with several tribes, led by the Banū Shaybān, embracing the call of Nu'mān ibn al-Mundhir and the growing aspirations of the Lakhmids for independence. Around AD 610, the famous battle of Dhū Qār, a watering place between al-Kūfa and Wāsiṭ on the right bank of the Euphrates, took place against a Persian army. In this, the Arabs won a resounding victory about which the Prophet Muḥammad said: 'This was the first day the Arabs got even with the Persians. With me they were victorious.'¹²

The Prophet's remark shows that the Arabs of the Ḥijāz followed the course of the struggle between the Persians and the Lakhmids, and also between the Persians and the Byzantines, and were eager to hear news of their fellow Arabs. That they followed the course of the fighting between the Byzantines and the Persians is also confirmed by the fact that, when Persia triumphed over Byzantium in one of the series of battles between them, the polytheists of the Quraysh rejoiced, while the Muslims grieved, considering the Byzantines to be *ahl al-kitāb* ('people of the Book'). The Qur'ān indicates that the balance would change within a few years: 'The Romans have been defeated in the nearer land, and they, after their defeat, will be victorious within ten years. Allah's is the command in the former case and in the latter – and on that day believers will rejoice.'¹³

The battle of Dhū Qār had an enormous effect on Arab morale, for the simultaneous demise of the Lakhmids marked the beginning of a new era in Arab history. The Arabs felt a sense of superiority, having demonstrated that they were now a force to be reckoned with. The victory gave them motivation and confidence in themselves and their own capabilities. It was a victory to celebrate. They had shown that they could break the might of the Sāsānid Persian army, the greatest army of the age.¹⁴ That day marked the beginning of the heroic struggle that Iraq would subsequently witness during the Islamic conquests.

By the beginning of the first/seventh century, the two great powers had worn themselves out in the struggle, whereas the Arabs had clearly matured and reached a state of readiness, as demonstrated in their language and their interest in poetry and genealogy, as well as the developments in their social system. They had risen above tribalism and their development was taking a new form in which alliances now assumed greater importance. Moreover, involvement in local and international trade had given the Arabs real-world experience and the opportunity to become acquainted with the

12 Abū Ja'far Muḥammad ibn Jarīr aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh ar-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, ed. de Goeje, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1879–1901, I, pp. 1015–16; Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya'qūb al-Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh al-Ya'qūbī*, Beirut, Dār Muṣ'ab, n.d., I, p. 215; see also al-'Alī, *Muḥāḍarāt*, p. 71.

13 *Ar-Rūm*, 30:1–4.

14 Pigulevskaia, *al-'Arab*, pp. 147–8.

foreign cultures of neighbouring lands.¹⁵ Although the Prophet's mission had not yet widened to unite them within the firm and unbreakable bond of the new faith, the level of socio-economic development among the northern Arab tribes had reached a stage where the call of Islam could resonate directly among them and serve to consolidate the internal unity begun by the Prophet in Medina.¹⁶

Pre-Islamic religious beliefs of the Arabs of the Arabian peninsula

The Arabs of the Arabian peninsula, particularly those in the Ḥijāz, were not isolated from the civilizations familiar to those on the periphery, in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. This was clearly because of the unity of affiliation and culture, most notably the cultural interconnection between them and the Lakhmids and the Ghassānids in Iraq and Syria. Nor were they cut off from the two revealed religions of Judaism and Christianity. However, although both religions were widespread among the Arabs of Syria, Iraq and Yemen and, to varying degrees, in a few towns and villages of the Ḥijāz, they had been unable to attract the Arab masses, particularly the inhabitants of Najd and the Ḥijāz. The likelihood is that Judaism and Christianity were incapable of responding to the needs and aspirations to which the conditions of people's lives gave rise. Judaism had limited itself to the tribe of the Banū Isrā'īl and become a closed faith. Conversely, Christianity is a proselytizing religion but its association with the Byzantine empire and its transformation into an official religion meant that to embrace it was, for the Arabs, akin to accepting a form of subordination to a foreign power. Accordingly, most of the Arabs who embraced Christianity preferred to adopt different rites to those of the Byzantine Church.¹⁷

Polytheism was the religious faith of the majority of the Arabs prior to Islam. Despite their recognition of God as the Creator of the universe and of life, and as the Ruler of their affairs, they worshipped other gods and idols beside Him, as equals and partners to God, in the hope that these would intercede on their behalf or help bring them closer to Him.¹⁸ Several verses of the Qu'rān show that the polytheists believed their deities to be angels, the daughters of God, while others believed them to be spirits. They

15 Al-Ḥadīthī, *al-Umma*, p. 37.

16 Pigulevskaia, *al-'Arab*, p. 148.

17 Aḥmad Amīn, *Fajr al-islām*, Cairo, Maṭba'at lajnat at-ta'lif wa-t-tarjama wa-n-nashr, 1961, p. 25; Jawād 'Alī, *al-Mufaṣṣal fī tārikh al-'arab qabla al-islām*, Beirut, Dār al-'ilm li-l-malāyīn, 1977, VI, pp. 568, 588–91; see also al-Mallāḥ, *al-Wasīṭ*, p. 60.

18 *Ibrāhīm*, 14:30; *ar-Ra'd*, 13:16, 33.

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did not, however, worship unseen gods such as angels and spirits directly but instead erected idols on the ground as symbols that they proceeded to worship, making offerings and sacrifices in the hope that these would bring them closer to Him.

This shows that the religion of the polytheists was not simple idolatry based on the worship of numerous deities but rather a paganism that was edging towards monotheism or at a stage between belief in multiple deities and monotheistic belief. This creed appears to have been the product of a long interaction between ancient pagan beliefs and the monotheistic religions of the prophets and apostles, as well as several beliefs of a monotheistic character that had emerged in Yemen.¹⁹ As such, polytheism on the eve of the emergence of Islam was weakened and in retreat in the face of monotheism. In particular, individuals had appeared who rejected idol worship and advocated belief in the One God. These were the Aḥnāf, who summoned people to the monotheistic religion of the prophet Abraham and who included Waraqa ibn Nawfal, ‘Ubaydallāh ibn Jaḥsh, ‘Uthmān ibn al-Ḥuwayrith and Zayd ibn ‘Amr ibn Nafīl.²⁰ The Aḥnāf were not from the Quraysh alone but also comprised members of several other tribes, such as Umayya ibn Abī-ṣ-Ṣalt from the tribe of Thaḳīf, Qays ibn Sā‘ida from the Ayyād, Abū Qays Ṣarḥa ibn Abī Anas from the Banu-n-Najjār in Yathrib and Khālid ibn Sinān from the Banū ‘Abs.²¹

The existence of the Aḥnāf indicates that, in Arabian society on the eve of Islam, there was an enlightened vanguard of opposition to polytheism in search of the true religion (*ad-dīn al-ḥanīf*), which was subsequently represented by Islam. Consequently, despite the difficulty of the Prophet’s mission of spreading the principles of Islam and the opposition that he faced, he was operating within a society in which certain individuals were aware of some of the principles he set forth, in particular monotheism. Nevertheless, it appears that the Prophet derived little benefit from the achievement of the Aḥnāf movement, which adhered to a limited form of monotheism comprising no more than the call to worship God alone. The Aḥnāf did not bother with the arduous task of publicly declaring their beliefs and relations with their tribes were therefore cordial and non-confrontational.²²

The Prophet, however, perceived the nature and manifestations of the deficiencies in human relations. When God commanded him to proselytize,

19 Al-Mallāḥ, *al-Wasīf*, p. 62.

20 Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd-al-Malik ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, eds M. as-Saqqā, I. al-Abyārī and ‘A-Ḥ. Shalaby, Cairo, Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1955, I, p. 223.

21 Abū Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh ibn Qutayba, *Kitāb al-ma‘ārif*, Beirut, Dār al-kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 1987, pp. 35–7; Abu-l-Ḥasan al-Mas‘ūdī, *Murūj adh-dhahab wa-ma‘ādin al-jawhar*, ed. Mufīd Muḥammad Qamīḥa, Beirut, Dār at-turāth, 1986, I, pp. 67–71.

22 Jawād ‘Alī, *Tārīkh al-‘Arab fi-l-islām*, Baghdad, Maṭba‘at az-za‘īm, 1961, p. 49.

he grasped the importance of going beyond forms of mere contemplation, monasticism and asceticism to social action and the implementation of a process of change and development in the course of Arabian life. Addressing the people of Mecca, he called on them to declare that there is no god but God, these being words that 'If you utter them, you will have power over the Arabs and the Persians will yield to you.'²³ By addressing all the Arabs and not only the people of Mecca, the Prophet demonstrated the inclusiveness of his vision. He also linked the call to monotheism with the call to unity instead of division as a condition for liberation from backwardness and also from foreign occupation.²⁴

The tenets and basic prescriptions of Islam

Based essentially on the worship of God, monotheism is the fundamental tenet of Islam. Its principles are belief in God, the apostles, angels, revealed scripture and the hereafter, all of which represent the basic elements of the believer's faith. The call to monotheism is fundamental but it represented something of a revolution in the pagan beliefs of the majority of the inhabitants of Arabia, especially given that a paganism of sorts had crept into the other revealed religions. Thus, the god of the Jews had become an exclusively Jewish god, while Arabian Christianity was not reckoned to be true Christianity, with many of its adherents sharing the same practices as the Arab pagans. Some swore by the lord of Mecca and by the pagan Arab deities al-Lāt and al-'Uzzā. In the wake of its domination by Greek philosophy, the Christian faith had become abstruse, with each sect differing in the very essentials of belief. There is no doubt that disputation had shaken the foundations of the faith. Islam's call to monotheism and the worship of the One God was therefore a call to believe on the basis of reason.²⁵

The concept of monotheism is clearly and powerfully expressed in every one of the initial verses of the Qur'ān. Qur'ānic discourse deals with the issues of belief in the existence of God and His omnipotence as elementary truths that require no proof. Employing Qur'ānic verses at the start of his mission to explain the attributes and omnipotence of God and affirm His Oneness, the Prophet made no move to attack polytheism and its practitioners because the Islamic mission was still in its infancy and had very few followers. It was therefore wise to stress the positive aspects of the

23 Muḥammad ibn Sa'd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*, Beirut, Dār ṣādir, 1960, I, p. 202.

24 Al-Ḥadīthī, *al-Umma*, p. 13.

25 'Abd-al-Mun'im Mājid, *at-Tārīkh as-siyāsī li-d-dawla al-'arabiyya: 'uṣūr al-jāhiliyya wa-n-nubuwwa wa-l-khulafā' ar-rāshidīn*, Cairo, Maktabat al-anglu al-miṣriyya, 1975, p. 127.

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call and avoid referring to anything that might alienate the polytheists and drive them into opposition.²⁶

In its initial stages, Islam also emphasized belief in the hereafter, which, for the majority of Arabs, was not something easily imagined. It explained that God will resurrect people after death and hold them to account for their actions in this life. Discussion of the Resurrection, heaven and hell occupies a major part of the verses of the Qur'ān because most Arab polytheists did not accept the Resurrection and the existence of reward or punishment on that day.²⁷ They answered back, as the Qur'ān itself states: 'And they say: There is naught save our life of the world, and we shall not be raised [again].'²⁸ 'And they swear by Allah their most binding oaths [that] Allah will not raise up him who dieth.'²⁹ The Prophet sought to convince people to believe in the hereafter because it is the spur that drives human beings to control their actions and follow religious and ethical guidelines in their conduct, of their own accord, without the need for external coercion, since they will be justly held to account for their actions on the Day of Judgement and enter either heaven or hell accordingly.³⁰

At the start of the Islamic mission in Mecca, the Prophet was concerned to spread the tenets of the faith in Mecca itself (Umm al-Qurā and its environs), affirming the initial prescriptions of the new religion at the forefront of which is prayer (*ṣalāh*). Prayer is a manifestation of the devotion of human beings to their Creator and a religious duty. It is an appeal to God on their part for what they need, while also a means of giving thanks to God and revering Him for His greatness and the wonder of His creation. Prayer is a religious observance with its own prescriptions, although these differ in form from one law to another. The word means 'call', 'asking for forgiveness' and 'mercy'.³¹

Prayer in Islam was not legislated for all at one time; instead, its prescriptions were revealed gradually, first in Mecca and thereafter, following the Prophet's emigration, in Medina. Prayer is mentioned in a number of the Meccan *sūras* of the Qur'ān, such as *al-Mudaththir*,³² *al-Kawthar*³³ and *al-'Alaq*.³⁴ In the opinion of most scholars, the latter was the first *sūra* of the Qur'ān to be revealed. Verses 9–10 ('Hast thou seen him who dissuadeth a slave when he prayeth?') indicate that the Prophet had prayed since prophethood was

26 Al-Mallāḥ, *al-Wasīf*, p. 112.

27 Al-'Alī, *Muḥāḍarāt*, pp. 267–72.

28 *Al-An'ām*, 6:29.

29 *An-Naḥl*, 16:38.

30 Al-Mallāḥ, *al-Wasīf*, p. 113.

31 Jawād 'Alī, *Tārīkh aṣ-ṣalāh fi-l-islām*, Baghdad, Maṭba'at dīyā', n.d., pp. 6–7.

32 *Al-Mudaththir*, 74:43.

33 *Al-Kawthar*, 108:2.

34 *Al-'Alaq*, 96:10.

first revealed to him, although the prayer did not assume its final form of five daily prayers until some years later.³⁵ Before the command to pray five times a day was revealed, he kept nightly prayer vigil, spending the night preparing himself to carry the burden of the Islamic message.

Once the Prophet had settled in Medina, united with his fellow emigrants from Mecca who were joined by his supporters (*Anṣār*, or Helpers) in Medina itself, Islam began to take root and other new prescriptions were imposed such as fasting, the alms tax (*zakāh*) and the pilgrimage. The fast of Ramaḍān was imposed in AH 2 after the Muslim victory at the battle of Badr.³⁶ Ramaḍān is a month with an ancient holy significance to believers in the true religion and has great importance to Muslims, as it was during Ramaḍān that the revelation began and that the Muslims were victorious over the polytheists at Badr.³⁷

Fasting is an important religious duty involving abstention from food and drink and averting the hearing, sight, tongue, hands and feet from sinful acts between the times of dawn and dusk. It commences upon the sighting of the crescent moon of the ninth lunar month (Ramaḍān). It is regarded as equivalent to corporal alms-giving, in addition to being a spiritual devotion, a suppression of physical desire and a sign of the unity of feeling among all Muslims, who are conscious of being as one throughout the month and encouraged in their act of fasting to think of their brother Muslims living in poverty and deprivation. Fasting is known in other religions, such as Judaism and Christianity, but not with the same rules as those set out in Islam. As such, the Muslim fast is something special that enhances the distinctive religious identity of Muslims.

The *zakāh* was also imposed during the Medinan period, although scholars have debated the date of the revelation imposing it; some hold that the tax was imposed in AH 1, others that it was imposed in AH 2 and yet others that it was imposed at an even later time. Aṭ-Ṭabarī states that the obligatory donation of food at the end of Ramaḍān (*zakāt al-fiṭr*) was introduced in AH 2.³⁸ The word *zakāh* is derived from *zakā'*, meaning 'growth' and 'abundance'. In works of jurisprudence, it is used synonymously with 'charity' (*ṣadaqa*).³⁹ It will be observed that both *ṣadaqa* and its plural, *ṣadaqāt*, occur only in the Medinan *sūras* of the Qur'ān. Charitable donations were made to the groups mentioned by God:

35 'Alī, *Tārīkh aṣ-ṣalāh*, p. 23.

36 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, I, p. 1281.

37 Ṣāliḥ Aḥmad al-'Alī, *ad-Dawla fī 'ahd ar-rasūl*, Baghdad, Maṭba'at al-majma' al-'ilmī al-'irāqī, 1988, I, p. 139.

38 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, I, p. 1281.

39 See Abū 'Abdallāh Mālik ibn Anas, *Muwatta' al-Imām Mālik*, ed. 'Abd-al-Wahhāb 'Abd-al-Laṭīf, Beirut, Dār al-qalam, n.d., the chapter on the *zakāh*, sections on charitable dispensation of cattle and olives, pp. 119, 120.

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The alms are only for the poor and the needy, and those who collect them, and those whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to free the captives and the debtors, and for the cause of Allah, and [for] the wayfarer; a duty imposed by Allah. Allah is the Knower, Wise.⁴⁰

Taking the form of agricultural produce, material possessions, livestock and coins, charity is a religious obligation, even in the other revealed religions. In pre-Islamic times, the Arabs gave charity by leaving some of their livestock to the deities. Islam's concern with the *zakāh* is attributable to many factors, primarily the need to address social problems through a kind of social security. At the same time, it encourages kindness and compassion and has an important role in the dissemination of the religion and in the concept of *jihād*.⁴¹

The pilgrimage, imposed after AH 6, was another of the laws regulated by the Prophet in Medina. The pilgrimage is mentioned only in the Medinan *sūras* of the Qur'ān, in particular those revealed at a later date, suggesting that the noble Prophet did not participate in the pilgrimage with the Meccans during the early period of his mission as theirs was an idolatrous pilgrimage.⁴² It was undertaken at recognized times of the year and the circumambulation of the Ka'ba, the stone-throwing at Minā, the sacrifice and the ritual walk between aṣ-Ṣafā and al-Marwa can be traced to the time of the prophet Abraham, founder of *ad-dīn al-ḥanīf*. Islam, however, regulated this pilgrimage, eliminated the pagan element and required pilgrims to wear particular clothes.⁴³ Known as the farewell pilgrimage (*ḥajjāt al-wadā'*), the pilgrimage undertaken by the Prophet at the end of his life in AH 10 is regarded as the basis for the pilgrimage up to the present day.

In addition to being a religious duty for those Muslims who are able to make the journey to Mecca, the pilgrimage represents an annual opportunity to assemble in one place, particularly after enjoying the blessings of unity and stability. The noble Prophet affirmed this in the speech he delivered during the farewell pilgrimage, after explaining to the Muslims how to perform the pilgrimage rituals and instructing them in matters of religion. This pilgrimage represents the pinnacle of unity, strength and perfection attained by the Muslims in the 'era of the message'. The greatest single event on that occasion was the revelation to the Prophet of God that included the verse: 'This day have I perfected your religion for you and completed My favour unto you, and have chosen for you as your religion al-Islam.'⁴⁴

40 *At-Tawba*, 9:60.

41 Mājid, *at-Tārīkh as-siyāsī*, p. 91.

42 'Alī, *Tārīkh aṣ-ṣalāh*, p. 91.

43 Mālik ibn Anas, *al-Muwatta'*, pp. 145–6.

44 *Al-Mā'ida*, 5:3; see also Ibn Sa'd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, II, p. 188.

The Prophet's methods of spreading Islam

THE DISPATCH OF MISSIONARIES AND THE RECEPTION OF DELEGATIONS

At the same time as the Prophet was consolidating the structure of the new Islamic society through imposition of the above prescriptions, he was seeking – as he had been since his arrival in Medina – to spread Islam throughout the Arabian peninsula. Indeed, his tireless devotion to the task was evident while he was still in Mecca. He sent Muṣ'ab ibn 'Umayr, one of his earliest Companions, to Medina after the first pledge of Aqaba, ordering him to recite the Qur'ān and to give instruction in Islam to the Medinans. Muṣ'ab therefore came to be known in Medina as 'the reciter'.⁴⁵ Ibn Sa'd stated that Muṣ'ab ibn 'Umayr had been dispatched to Medina in response to a letter to the Prophet from the Medinan tribes of the Aws and Khazraj in which they asked him to send them someone to recite the Qur'ān.⁴⁶

Muṣ'ab's task in Medina went beyond reciting the Qur'ān and included spreading Islam and creating a firm base for missionary work in the town. It appears that he was concerned to spread the word among the Aws in particular; those who had already converted were largely from the Khazraj and he sought to win over the Aws in order to unify the Medinans. Muṣ'ab succeeded in convincing two leaders of the Aws – Usayd ibn Ḥuḍayr and Sa'd ibn Ma'ādh – to convert to Islam and the entire clan of 'Abd-ul-Ashhal consequently followed suit. Thereafter, Islam spread throughout the town, enabling the Muslims to practise their religion freely.⁴⁷

Following the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya and conquest of Mecca, the Prophet turned his attention to spreading Islam throughout the peninsula, not least because many tribes had begun to send delegations to find out about the new faith. Numerous delegations arrived from Yemen, especially during AH 8 and 9. The Prophet also wrote many letters to individuals, groups and tribes in Yemen, explaining the details of Islam, in particular those relating to the duties concerning the charitable donations of crops and livestock.⁴⁸ Following his return from the *ḥajjat al-wadā'*, he dispatched several commanders to the Yemeni provinces but was most anxious to send

45 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, I, p. 434.

46 Ibn Sa'd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I, p. 220.

47 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, I, pp. 436–7; 'Urwa ibn az-Zubayr, *Maghāzī rasūl Allāh*, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā al-A'ẓamī, Riyadh, Maktab at-tarbiya al-'arabī li-duwal al-khalīj, 1982, p. 124; see also Sir Thomas Arnold, *ad-Da'wa ila-l-islām*, trans. from the original English by Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan et al., Cairo, Maktabat an-nahḍa al-miṣriyya, 1971, pp. 44–5; al-Mallāḥ, *al-Wasīṭ*, pp. 175–7.

48 Al-'Alī, *ad-Dawla fī 'ahd ar-rasūl*, II, pp. 458–60.

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one of his Companions – Mu‘ādh ibn Jabal ibn ‘Umar ibn Aws – to the people of Yemen and the Ḥaḍramawt as a missionary and teacher. When he did so, the Prophet wrote to the people of Yemen stating: ‘I have sent you my best man.’⁴⁹ He relied greatly upon Mu‘ādh. Upon returning from the pilgrimage, he even appointed him, along with ‘Attāb ibn Usayd as governor, to instruct the Meccans in religion and teach the Qur’ān.⁵⁰ Ibn Ishāq notes that, when sending him to Yemen, the Prophet gave Mu‘ādh the following advice:

Be tolerant, not harsh; spread the word and do not alienate them. You are going to a people who believe in revealed scripture and they will ask you what the key to paradise is. Say that it is to testify that there is no god but God alone, without partner.⁵¹

As a teacher, Mu‘ādh travelled across the whole of Yemen and the Ḥaḍramawt.⁵²

In addition to Yemen, the Prophet was also in regular contact with other parts of Arabia, as indicated by the delegations that began to pour into Medina from all over the peninsula, particularly after the Tabūk campaign in AH 9, which became known as ‘the year of delegations’.⁵³ It should be noted that these delegations came to Medina voluntarily and that, in most cases, members spoke on behalf of their tribes. Most delegations declared their acceptance of Islam and pledged allegiance to the Prophet.

The arrival of these delegations and their pledges to the Prophet to embrace Islam helped to create a favourable climate for the dissemination of the religion among many of the tribes in the peninsula and to consolidate the bases of the new state. Returning to their tribes, these delegations called upon their people to convert. A delegation’s conversion to Islam was generally considered to signify the conversion of the tribe and there is no record of any tribe protesting against or opposing the conversion of its delegation.⁵⁴ Perhaps the clearest illustration of this is provided by the delegation of the Banū Sa‘d ibn Bakr. This tribe sent one of its members, Ḍammām ibn Tha‘laba, to the Prophet, who, despite being rudely questioned, nevertheless answered Ḍammām constructively. Ibn Sa‘d remarks:

49 See Shihāb-ad-Dīn ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī, *al-Iṣāba fī tamyīz aṣ-ṣaḥāba* (reproduced by offset from the Cairo edn), Baghdad, Maktabat al-muthannā, AH 1328, III, pp. 426–7.

50 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II, p. 500.

51 *Ibid.*, p. 590.

52 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, I, pp. 1853, 1982.

53 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II, p. 559.

54 Al-‘Alī, *ad-Dawla fī ‘ahd ar-rasūl*, I, p. 337.

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And so he returned to his tribe a Muslim. He cast down the idols and told his people what Islam enjoined and prohibited. By evening that day, there was not a single man or woman of the tribe who had not become Muslim. They built mosques and raised the call to prayer.⁵⁵

The reception of Arab delegations in Medina continued alongside the dispatch of religious missions to inform the unconverted Arab tribes about Islam. The Prophet was not compelled to declare war or fight against anyone as these missions were not disposed to use force.⁵⁶ On the contrary, several met with failure, as in the case of the mission sent to the Banū ‘Āmir ibn Ṣa‘ṣa‘a in AH 4. The leader of this tribe, Abū-l-Barrā’ ‘Āmir, had visited the Prophet in Medina and listened to his teachings but was nevertheless unwilling to embrace Islam. He did, however, display some measure of sympathy towards the new religion and asked the Prophet to send several of his followers to Najd in order to spread the teachings of Islam among the people of that region. In response, the Prophet sent seventy young *Anṣār*, known as reciters, to give instruction in the recitation of the Qur’ān and to gather at night for study and prayer. He placed al-Mundhir ibn ‘Amr in charge of the mission. However, when they arrived at Bi’r Ma‘ūna, a well belonging to the Banū Sulaym, they were set upon treacherously by the ‘Uṣṣayya, Ri‘l and Dhakwān clans of the Banū Sulaym and only three survived, despite the safe passage promised by Abū-l-Barrā’ ‘Āmir.⁵⁷

The second mission to meet with failure was that sent to ‘Aḍal and al-Qāra, two clans of al-Hawn ibn Khuzayma that had sent a delegation to the Prophet stating that they had some knowledge of Islam and requesting him to send a group of Companions to provide instruction, recite the Qur’ān and teach the prescriptions of Islam. In response, the Prophet dispatched ten of his men,⁵⁸ but as soon as they arrived at ar-Rajī’, a well belonging to the tribe of Hudhayl, near al-Hudā, between Mecca and aṭ-Ṭā’if and some 11 km from ‘Uṣfān, they were set upon treacherously and killed, that is, all except two who were taken prisoner and sold to the Meccans who subsequently killed them.⁵⁹

Despite these two examples of failure, the other early missions dispatched throughout Arabia by the Prophet were successful, especially after the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya and the pact with the Quraysh. Most of the Arab tribes had been awaiting the outcome of the conflict between the Prophet and the

55 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I, p. 299; see also Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II, pp. 573–4.

56 Arnold, *ad-Da‘wa ila-l-islām*, p. 54.

57 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, II, p. 52; see also Arnold, *ad-Da‘wa ila-l-islām*, pp. 54–5.

58 Ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, II, p. 55.

59 *Ibid.*, II, pp. 55–6; Shihāb-ad-Dīn Abū ‘Abdallāh Yāqūt ibn ‘Abdallāh al-Ḥamawī, *Mu‘jam al-buldān*, Beirut, Dār ṣādir, 1977, III, p. 29; al-‘Alī, *ad-Dawla fī ‘ahd ar-rasūl*, I, p. 340.

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Quraysh – the *ahl al-bayt* ('people of the house') and undisputed leaders and guides of the Arabian people. When Mecca was conquered and the Quraysh yielded to the Prophet and acquiesced to Islam, the Arabs realized they lacked the power to fight the Prophet. They therefore embraced the religion of God 'in droves', as He Himself said, turning towards it from every direction.⁶⁰

The Prophet began dispatching his governors, who were also missionaries, and they additionally collected the *zakāh* from the tribes that converted to Islam. The Prophet imposed no heavy demands or strict conditions on the tribes that converted. Indeed, they retained their own identity, lands, chiefs and systems of organization. The same applied to the cities and towns as long as they did not oppose the fundamental principles of Islam. Tribal affiliation remained strong among the communities, and the missionaries largely retained the moral values esteemed by the Arabs, such as looking after close relatives, strengthening blood ties, caring for neighbours, giving succour to the grieving, keeping promises and acting with generosity and bravery.⁶¹

The men dispatched to the various regions of Arabia were genuine missionaries who additionally collected the *zakāh*. They gave instruction and guidance, teaching the tribes to which they were sent to recite the Qur'ān and explaining the principles and teachings of Islam. The enthusiasm of these teachers, coupled with the simplicity, clarity and practicality of the principles of Islam and their close connection with the way people thought, was destined to promote the spread of Islamic ideas. The missionaries did not seek to limit the authority of tribal leaders; on the contrary, they cooperated fully with them and sometimes even placed themselves under their protection. As tax collectors, they distributed the wealth they collected among the poor of the region, sending to Medina only what was surplus to the needs of the local people.⁶²

However, the small number of missionaries and the short period of time they spent among the tribes were insufficient to instil in the latter the spirit and principles of Islam. Moreover, the rapid expansion of the state and the Prophet's difficulty in communicating personally with all new Muslims meant that time was needed to accustom people to upholding the tenets of the faith, particularly as the Arabs are noted for their conservative adherence to tradition. Nevertheless, by virtue of the new teachings of Islam, the features of tribalism began to be transformed into more far-reaching bonds based upon faith, strengthened by a new set of standards and new methods in the

60 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II, p. 560.

61 Al-'Alī, *ad-Dawla fī 'ahd ar-rasūl*, I, p. 377.

62 Aḥmad Ibrāhīm ash-Sharīf, *Makka wa-l-Madīna fī-l-jāhiliyya wa-'aṣr ar-rasūl*, Cairo, Dār al-fikr al-'arabī, 1965, p. 538.

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interests of the Islamic nation (*umma*) and not simply those of the tribe or its chief.

The *umma* developed bonds based upon a common faith, idea and outlook, strengthened by a common language and shared moral standards and interests beyond the limited ties of the tribe. The members of the *umma* became equal brothers, with piety the sole determinant of superiority. The unity of this *umma* derived from its belief in the One God, Lord of the heavens, with dominion over the earth, without equal, in whom all power resides and to whom humankind turns for refuge. It is He, hallowed be His name, who commands justice and fairness, forbids abomination and wickedness and to whose sacred commands all things are subject.⁶³

LETTERS TO THE RULERS OF NEIGHBOURING REGIONS AND STATES

Such was the situation internally. On the external level, the historical sources are agreed that, after the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya, the Prophet also began sending letters to the rulers of the neighbouring countries inviting them to embrace Islam.⁶⁴ In the opinion of one modern researcher,⁶⁵ this is consistent with the Prophet's political position following his successful neutralization of the Quraysh, when he became free to devote himself to spreading the message among the inhabitants of Arabia. It is also consistent with the universal message of Islam, which is to all humankind, as the Qur'ān affirms: 'And We have not sent thee [O Muḥammad] save as a bringer of good tidings and a warner unto all mankind.'⁶⁶ There are explicit verses in the Qur'ān to the effect that the Prophet's message is to all peoples: 'We sent thee not save as a mercy for the peoples';⁶⁷ 'Blessed is He Who hath revealed unto His slave the Criterion [of right and wrong], that he may be a warner to the peoples';⁶⁸ and 'I ask of you no wage therefor; my wage is the concern only of the Lord of the Worlds.'⁶⁹

The Prophet intended Islam to expand beyond the Arabian peninsula and its surrounding regions and the letters sent to the different regions following the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya are consistent with the principle of spreading Islam among all humankind, without being confined to a certain

63 Al-'Alī, *ad-Dawla fī 'ahd ar-rasūl*, I, pp. 338–40.

64 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, II, pp. 606–7; Ibn Sa'd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I, p. 258.

65 Al-Mallāḥ, *al-Wasīṭ*, p. 316.

66 *Saba'*, 34:28.

67 *Al-Anbiyā'*, 21:107.

68 *Al-Furqān*, 25:1.

69 *Ash-Shu'arā'*, 26:127.

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group or a specific area. These letters therefore include those sent to a number of the authorities and rulers of neighbouring states. As Ibn Hishām relates:

He dispatched Daḥiyya ibn Khalīfa al-Kalbī to Heraclius, emperor of Byzantium; ‘Abdallāh ibn Ḥudhāfa as-Sahmī to Chosroes, emperor of Persia; Ḥātib ibn Abī Balta‘a to al-Muqawqis, ruler of Alexandria; ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ as-Sahmī to Jaydar and ‘Ayyād, sons of al-Jalandī al-Azdī, king of Oman; Salīṭ ibn ‘Amr of the Banū ‘Amr ibn Lu‘ay to Thumāma ibn Athāl al-Ḥanafī and Hawdha ibn ‘Alī al-Ḥanafī, chiefs of the Yamāma; al-‘Alā’ ibn al-Ḥaḍramī to al-Mundhir ibn Sāwī, ruler of Bahrain; and Shujjā’ ibn Wahb al-Asadī to al-Ḥārith ibn Abī Shamr al-Ghassānī, ruler of the Syrian border country.⁷⁰

The biographies of the Prophet and several works on his traditions (*Ḥadīth*) have preserved many of the texts of these letters. These have been compiled by Muḥammad Ḥamīdullāh al-Ḥaydarabādī.⁷¹ Various orientalist and Arab scholars have examined and analysed these letters to shed light on their authenticity, their dates of dispatch and their significance. Although we are not concerned here with joining the debates that have arisen around the conflicting accounts of when the letters were sent,⁷² we shall nevertheless refer to some of the controversy stirred up by their content, lying as it does at the very heart of our study – namely, the historical process of the spread of Islam. The letters represent an important historical source relating to that process and show the Prophet’s thinking on how to convey the principles of Islam to the neighbouring regions.

There was little difference in the missionary activities directed at such peripheral regions of the Arabian peninsula as Yemen, Bahrain and Oman, since they were all part of Arabia, their rulers were Arab, they had limited authority and they were responsive to the Prophet’s call.⁷³ The basic contention concerns the content of the Prophet’s letters to Heraclius, Chosroes, the Negus, al-Muqawqis and the king of the Ghassānids. How could a wise and far-sighted statesman such as the Prophet call upon such powerful rulers to embrace Islam in a manner that might have alienated them or made them openly hostile at a time when he lacked the power to confront them militarily?⁷⁴ With the exception of Chosroes, all these rulers professed Christianity and ruled countries far from Medina, some of which, such as Abyssinia and Egypt,

70 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II, p. 607; see also Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal, *Ḥayāt Muḥammad*, Cairo, Maktabat an-nahḍa al-miṣriyya, 1968, p. 384.

71 Muḥammad Ḥamīdullāh al-Ḥaydarabādī, *Majmū‘at al-wathā’iq as-siyāsiyya li-l-‘ahd an-nabawī wa-l-khulafā’ ar-rāshidīn*, Cairo, Maṭba‘at lajnat at-ta’līf wa-t-tarjama wa-n-nashr, 1956, pp. 45-4.

72 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, I, pp. 1559–61.

73 Al-‘Alī, *ad-Dawla fī ‘ahd ar-rasūl*, I, p. 316.

74 William Montgomery Watt, *Muḥammad fi-l-Madīna*, trans. from the original English by Sha‘bān Barakāt, Beirut, al-Maktaba al-‘aṣriyya, n.d., pp. 520–1.

were geographically unconnected to the Arabian peninsula. Some ruled vast and powerful countries where the official languages did not include Arabic. Moreover, they were considered by the Qur'ān as 'people of the Book' and under no compulsion to embrace Islam.

Arguments such as these raise doubts concerning some of the details contained in the letters of which there are different versions, depending on the transmitters and the sources that quote them, thereby suggesting that the original texts may have been corrupted, whether intentionally or unintentionally. They cannot, however, serve as a basis for denying that the letters were ever sent. The link between Islam and Arab identity, coupled with the Prophet's concern to spread the faith among the Arabs, does not preclude expansion beyond the Arabian peninsula, especially given that the Prophet's vision was realistic and the spread of the faith among the Arabs was but an interim stage in its dissemination throughout the world. The basis of Islam, after all, is belief in the Oneness of God and worship of the One God, Lord of the heavens and the earth, the Creator and Master of all things.

The Prophet's principal objective in sending these letters was the creation of a climate of awareness at the international level, showing that Islam was not simply a religion of the Arabs or Arabia but the religion of humankind everywhere. The letters were tantamount to giving notice to the rulers to respond to the call of Islam or at least allow the missionaries to practise their activities freely and to talk to and be heard by their subjects so that people might choose their faith knowledgeably and without pressure or compulsion. While affirming the Muslim creed that there is no god but God, these letters indicate a diplomatic flexibility with regard to several aspects of the religious encounter between Islam and Christianity, one example being the letter to the Abyssinian Negus.⁷⁵ The letters wish the rulers prosperity in this world and the next if they embrace the new religion, which is simply the completion of the path trodden by Moses and Jesus. Reading between the lines, however, there are words and phrases in which the Prophet warns that, if they fail to respond, they will risk losing their positions and leadership.⁷⁶

The emissaries and letters were a novel sort of diplomatic endeavour. Indeed, they were the new religion's first activity in this field and complementary to the apostolic message. The effort was not in vain. The ancient world to which the Prophet was sent was by then standing upon fragile foundations that were threatening to collapse and the ancient religions were in decline and losing their hold over the people. The seriousness, simplicity and power of the Islamic message made it a phenomenon deserving of

75 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, I, p. 1569.

76 See 'Imād-ad-Dīn Khalīl, *Dirāsa fī s-sīra*, Beirut, Mu'assasat ar-risāla/Dār an-nafā'is, 1974, pp. 292–4.

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consideration and study and it was not difficult for far-sighted individuals to glimpse behind it the force that threatened to explode – something that was to happen very soon.⁷⁷

The Prophet certainly expected no rapid response to his call for these rulers to embrace Islam. There is no doubt, however, that his underlying intention was to make them aware of the establishment of the new Islamic state and advise them of its power, expanse, vigour and importance so that they might take these into account and deal with the Prophet rather than with the princes and chiefs scattered across the Arabian peninsula. In the initial phase of contact, these letters were also probably aimed at opening a political dialogue to obtain recognition for the new state and establish relations characterized by an element of equality.⁷⁸ In this respect, several of them bore fruit.

The Prophet's correspondence with the Negus suggested that the latter should improve the treatment of Muslims in his domain, which is in fact what happened. According to the account of Ibn Ishāq, as quoted by aṭ-Ṭabarī, this correspondence even led the Negus al-Aṣḥam ibn Abjar to embrace Islam.⁷⁹ However, there is a lack of evidence and other accounts to support Ibn Ishāq's claim. Perhaps the Negus's sympathetic attitude towards the Muslim emigrants and the apostolic message resulted in an overestimation of his favourable position to the point where he is made to declare his conversion.⁸⁰ The Prophet's correspondence with al-Muqawqis ended in the establishment of good relations, as testified by the latter's gift of Maryām the Copt, who bore the Prophet's son, Ibrāhīm.⁸¹

While the Prophet's endeavour bore fruit to some extent with the Negus of Abyssinia and al-Muqawqis of Alexandria, the same results were not achieved with the emperors of Byzantium and Persia or with the Ghassānid princes. Despite the consideration shown by Heraclius to the Prophet's emissary and the welcome given to the delegation, the emperor took no positive initiative in response to his call. This would appear to be nothing but political expediency on the part of Heraclius, who made it clear to Daḥiyya ibn Khalīfa al-Kalbī that he believed in the prophethood of Muḥammad, stating:

By God, I know that your master is a prophet sent by God, that he is the one for whom we have been waiting and who is to be found in our scripture. Were I not afraid of Byzantium, I would follow him.⁸²

77 Muḥammad 'Abdallāh 'Anān, *Mawāqif ḥāsima fī tārikh al-islām*, Cairo, Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1962, p. 208.


78 Al-'Alī, *ad-Dawla fī 'ahd ar-rasūl*, I, p. 321; al-Mallāḥ, *al-Wasīṭ*, p. 319.

79 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārikh*, I, pp. 1569–70.

80 Khalīl, *Dirāsa*, p. 290.

81 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārikh*, I, pp. 1561, 1591.

82 *Ibid.*, p. 1566.



1.12 Page of the *Futūḥ al-Ḥaramayn*, a guide to pilgrimage, Mecca, June 1582
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The response of Chosroes, son of Hormuz, was quite different and very undiplomatic; he tore up the letter delivered by ‘Abdallāh ibn Ḥudhāfa as-Sahmī in which the Prophet called on him to embrace Islam,⁸³ showing his arrogance and contempt for the Arabs of the peninsula whom he considered his slaves, as revealed by his remark: ‘This man is my slave and yet he writes to me!’⁸⁴

The reactions of the Ghassānid princes were even stronger. After reading the letter, al-Mundhir ibn al-Ḥārith ibn Abī Shamr al-Ghassānī, ruler of Damascus, responded to the Prophet’s emissary, Shujjā‘ ibn Wahb al-Asadī, with the words: ‘I shall march against anyone who would rob me of my domain.’⁸⁵ Al-Ḥārith ibn ‘Umayr al-Azdī, the Prophet’s emissary to the ruler of Buṣrā, met a tragic fate when he was murdered by Sharḥabīl ibn ‘Amr al-Ghassānī at Mu’ta. This deeply affected the Prophet and prompted him to dispatch a force of 3,000 men to punish the northern Arab vassals of Byzantium for their actions.⁸⁶

THE ACTIVATION OF MUSLIM MILITARY POWER AND POLITICAL
ACTIVITY IN THE NORTH OF THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

The principal goal of the above-mentioned campaign was to proclaim the power of the Islamic state and its ability to deter treacherous and hostile forces using the cover of Byzantine protection to engage in blatant acts of aggression. The force reached southern Syria, as far as the village of Mu’ta on the border of al-Balqā’, where it met a large Byzantine army reinforced by the Arab tribes of Lakhm, Judhām, Balqayn, Bahrā’ and Balī. Unable to stand its ground against this army, and after three of its commanders and a number of soldiers had been killed, the Muslim force withdrew and returned to the Ḥijāz.⁸⁷

These setbacks produced a strong reaction from the Prophet Muḥammad, who refused to describe those who withdrew from the battle as having fled but rather as men who had lived to fight another day against Byzantium and its Arab hangers-on.⁸⁸ He resolved to organize a large military force in AH 9 to advance to the Syrian border and break the psychological wall of fear created by the Byzantines, letting them and their client tribes know that

83 Ibid., pp. 1571–2.

84 Ibid., p. 1572.

85 Ibid., p. 1568.

86 Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar ibn Wāqid al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, ed. Marsden Jones, Beirut, ‘Ālam al-kutub, 1984, II, pp. 755–6; Ibn Sa’d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, II, p. 128.

87 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, pp. 764–5; Ibn Sa’d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, II, p. 130.

88 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, II, p. 765.

the Muslims were capable of waging war and challenging them in their own sphere of influence. This was essential after the Muslim defeat at Mu'ta. The Prophet was able to assemble an army of some 30,000 men for the expected confrontation with Byzantium,⁸⁹ reaching Tabūk, a region in northern Arabia under Byzantine authority, by the summer. The Muslims bivouacked there for twenty nights, but the Byzantine emperor, Heraclius, then at Ḥums, did not march against them.⁹⁰

The Prophet used his presence in the region to gain influence among the Christian villages and settlements that professed allegiance to the Byzantines. He made a pact with Ukaydir ibn 'Abd-al-Malik, lord of Dawmat al-Jandal.⁹¹ Yuḥannā ibn Ru'ba, governor of Īla (modern-day al-'Aqaba) came to him with the men of Jirbā' and Adhrūḥ and a peace treaty was signed requiring them to pay a fixed *jizya* (tax payable by non-Muslims).⁹² This was a material declaration of their commitment to the new Islamic state whereby they severed relations and ties with others. The treaty drawn up by the Prophet with Yuḥannā became a model for treaties with other Christian communities, granting them religious freedom and citizenship. It stipulated:

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. This is a covenant of security from God and Muḥammad, the Messenger of God, to Yuḥannā ibn Ru'ba and the people of Īla. Their ships and their journeys by land and sea shall be under the safe protection of God and Muḥammad, as shall the people of Syria and Yemen and the coastal dwellers who accompany them. His assets shall not protect the perpetrator of a crime and it shall be lawful to confiscate his wealth. It shall be unlawful to prevent them from using a well or a land- or sea-route that they wish to make use of.⁹³

The Prophet then returned to Medina, having won over a number of the Arab tribes of southern Syria and let the others know the extent of the power wielded by the new Islamic state. The campaign also delivered a crushing blow to the supremacy of the Byzantines in Syria, weakening their position and influence over the Arab tribes and shattering the Arab fear of Byzantium. It was a psychological victory that within a few years enabled the Arabs to transcend their old allegiance, move onto the offensive against the Byzantines in Syria and drive them into Asia Minor. The Tabūk campaign, as it came to be known, was one step in the Prophet's progression beyond the Arabian

89 Ibid., III, p. 1002.


90 Ibid., p. 1001.

91 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, II, p. 526.

92 Ibid., p. 525; al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, p. 1031.

93 Al-Wāqidī, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, p. 1031; see also Aḥmad ibn Jābir al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, ed. Muḥammad Riḍwān, Cairo, Maṭba'at as-sa'āda, 1959, p. 71.

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1.13 Folio of a single-volume Qur'ān, ninth century
(© Khalili Family Trust/Nour Foundation)

peninsula to the outside world and a precursor to the Islamic conquests in the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs.⁹⁴

The Prophet's reaction to the failure at Mu'ta was not limited to the Tabūk campaign. At the beginning of AH 11, following his return from the *hajjat al-wadā'* to Mecca, he mobilized a large army and gave its command to a young man, Usāma ibn Zayd ibn Ḥārith, whose father, Zayd ibn Ḥārith, was one of the three generals killed at Mu'ta. The dispatch of this army was also a reaction to Muslim suffering on that campaign. Usāma was ordered to strike with the cavalry against the border country of al-Balqā' and ad-Dārūm in Palestine,⁹⁵ but the death of the Prophet delayed the advance of the army. When Abū Bakr aṣ-Ṣiddīq assumed the caliphate, however, he resolved to see the campaign through, despite the insurrection of several Arabian tribes and the need for an army to protect Medina. As ordered by the Prophet, Usāma advanced to the borders of al-Balqā' and ad-Dārūm, taking the first steps along the path on which the Muslim conquerors would shortly march on their way towards Syria, carrying with them the teachings of Islam and

94 Khalīl, *Dirāsa*, p. 305.

95 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, II, p. 606; al-Wāqidi, *Kitāb al-maghāzī*, III, p. 1173.

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the call of the Prophet who had planned this policy before God called him into His presence.

THE IMPACT OF THE INSURRECTIONIST MOVEMENTS ON THE HISTORICAL PROCESS OF THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

Usāma's campaign provides the strongest evidence of the Prophet's desire to expand outside Arabia. The Prophet's letters to the kings and rulers of the neighbouring countries are likewise clear proof of his wish to spread Islam beyond the Arabian peninsula. Islam gave the Arabs direction and the new order provided the basis from which the faith began to gain ground.⁹⁶ With the death of the Prophet in AH 11, however, its expansion was temporarily stalled in view of the attitude of several Arab tribes towards the new regime in Medina. The Arabian peninsula had not yet been effectively unified within the framework of the *umma*, nor had Islam yet been embraced by all its population.⁹⁷ Several false prophets appeared in southern, eastern and central Arabia during the last years of the Prophet's life. These included al-Aswad al-'Ansī in Yemen, Musaylima the Liar in al-Yamāma and Dhū-t-Tāj Laqīṭ ibn Mālik al-Azdī in Oman.

We should not forget that many Arabian tribes had only declared their conversion to Islam in the sense of accepting the political authority of the Prophet and acknowledging the sovereignty of Islam in their territories at a relatively late date, which is to say after AH 9. This suggests that their acceptance of the new religion was superficial, the product of political considerations and of being swept along by a current that had by then become a vast movement.⁹⁸ The embrace of Islam by each member of the tribe and their grasp of its stipulations would have required considerable time and effort and could not have been accomplished in the short time during which the Prophet lived after these tribes had converted.⁹⁹

The causes of the revolt of several Arabian tribes against Medina have been summarized by one modern researcher as resulting from the pagan tribes' fear of the expansion of the authority of Medina, the Muslim tribes' opposition to the idea of submission to Medina and the desire of other tribes to end the hegemony of Medina represented by the treaties concluded with the

96 'Abd-al-'Azīz ad-Dūrī, *Muqaddima fī tārikh ṣadr al-islām*, Beirut, Dār al-mashriq, 1984, p. 44.

97 Elias Shoufani, *Al-Ridda and the Muslim Conquest of Arabia*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1973, p. 11.

98 Arnold, *ad-Da'wa ila-l-islām*, p. 60.

99 Al-Mallāh, *al-Wasīf*, p. 335.

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Prophet, as well as tribal solidarity in general and religious conservatism.¹⁰⁰ In addition, the Prophet's success and the heightened consciousness created by his mission were responsible for the emergence of false prophets eager for the same fame and seeking to acquire for themselves and their tribes the same status as the Prophet and the Quraysh.

It is not the aim of this chapter to add to the study of these movements but rather to understand their impact on the historical process of the spread of Islam. In short, they were scattered movements, each in its own geographic location, and distinct in terms of their origins, scale and demise. The actors were Arabian groups with different tribal ties, ways of life, motives and attitudes. These movements can be classified into three basic categories: the first includes the self-proclaimed prophets – al-Aswad al-'Ansī, Sajāḥ, Musaylima and Ṭulayḥa ibn Khuwaylid – who began their activities during the Prophet's lifetime; the second includes movements that rebelled against the central authority and refused to pay the *zakāh*, of which the insurgencies of the Banū Tamīm and several tribes in Najd and elsewhere on the Arabian peninsula were an expression; the third includes movements in Bahrain, Oman and the Ḥaḍramawt opposed to Islam and incorporation within the Islamic state.¹⁰¹

The Rightly Guided Caliph Abū Bakr aṣ-Ṣiddīq took a very determined stance against these movements, displaying no tolerance towards them. He focused his efforts on subjugating them with a Muslim army that fought out of conviction to execute a comprehensive design, directed by competent military commanders seeking to extend the central authority of Medina across the entire Arabian peninsula. In the absence of this authority, it would have been impossible to accomplish the spiritual message of Islam and the state could not have carried out its function and fulfilled its historic mission. At the same time, the struggle against internal insurgency was essentially the execution of the Prophet's plan for the final triumph of the Medinan state. The Medinans stood united and shoulder to shoulder with Abū Bakr, who also received staunch support from Mecca and aṭ-Ṭā'if, which were inhabited by the tribes of Quraysh and Thaqīf.¹⁰² These tribes had been among the most hostile to the Prophet but did not attempt to exploit the situation after his death, despite having only recently converted; they apparently realized that they had become irrevocably linked to the Medinan order.¹⁰³

Bedouin insurrectionists around Medina attempted to attack the town itself and the inhabitants were only able to repel them with considerable

100 Ad-Dūrī, *Muqaddima*, p. 42; see also Shoufani, *Al-Ridda*, p. 13.

101 Al-'Alī, *ad-Dawla fī 'ahd ar-rasūl*, II, p. 452.

102 'Izz-ad-Dīn Abu-l-Ḥasan ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi-t-tārīkh*, Beirut, Dār ṣādir, 1979, II, p. 342.

103 See Muḥammad 'Abd-al-Ḥayy Sha'bān, *Ṣadr al-islām wa-d-dawla al-umawiyya*, Beirut, al-Maktaba al-ahliyya li-n-nashr wa-t-tawzī', 1983, p. 32.

effort.¹⁰⁴ The Medinans were in an extremely critical situation, particularly after the departure of the expeditionary force under Usāma ibn Zayd to Syria. Nevertheless, the determination of the inimitable Abū Bakr transformed the perilous situation in Medina into a speedy victory. After the successful defence of the town, Abū Bakr took prompt measures to launch an offensive against the insurgents. He mobilized all his forces, consisting principally of men from Mecca, Medina, aṭ-Ṭāʿif and a number of neighbouring Ḥijāzī tribes, and expeditions were sent out in all directions.¹⁰⁵

Although the well-known *ridda* (apostasy) offensives suffered minor defeats, they quickly achieved a resounding and far-reaching success as a result of which the scales tipped in favour of the Muslims. Furthermore, those tribes which had remained on the sidelines, providing no assistance to the insurgents, joined the Muslim ranks and were rapidly mobilized against the insurgency.¹⁰⁶ Within a year of the Prophet's death, the majority of the insurgent tribes had been defeated.¹⁰⁷

The *ridda* wars had a positive impact on the historical process of the spread of Islam both inside and outside Arabia. Internally, the caliph Abū Bakr consolidated the unification of the peninsula. In that respect, he is considered to have completed the work of the Prophet, achieving the pinnacle of domestic political consciousness and the culmination of the trend towards cohesion that had appeared in weak and shaky form shortly before the emergence of Islam. The immediate effect of the *ridda* wars, prior to the unification of the Arabian peninsula, was the closing of ranks in Medina following the conflicts and rivalries in the wake of the election of Abū Bakr at the *Saqīfa* of the Banū Sāʿida.¹⁰⁸ Neither should we forget the impact of the *ridda* wars on social integration among the Arabs and the formation of a new society in Arabia. The armies of the caliphate were deployed to Yemen, Bahrain, Oman and Najd and were victorious. However, these armies not only achieved material victory but also, in the words of one modern researcher:

the destiny ordained for them on the path of unity. Not all soldiers returned to their own lands, societies and tribes; some remained in the new society they had created. There they mixed, intermingled and formed a common life unmediated by the tribe. The tribe was no longer the sole link between these men, which was now first and foremost the brotherhood of faith and bond of religion.¹⁰⁹

104 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, I, pp. 1872–4.

105 *Ibid.*, pp. 1887, 1923, 1930.

106 *Ibid.*, pp. 1962–80.

107 Shaʿbān, *Ṣadr al-islām*, p. 34.

108 Ad-Dūrī, *Muqaddima*, p. 44.

109 Shukrī Fayṣal, *al-Mujtamaʿāt al-islāmiyya fi-l-qarn al-awwal*, Beirut, Dār al-ʿilm li-l-malāyīn, 1978, p. 32.

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The accuracy of this view is indicated by aṭ-Ṭabarī, who reports that when al-‘Alā’ ibn al-Ḥaḍramī returned home from fighting the insurrectionists in Bahrain, several Medinans did not return with him but remained in Bahrain: ‘Al-‘Alā’ ibn al-Ḥaḍramī brought the army back with him, except for those who chose to stay.’¹¹⁰ The *ridḍa* wars likewise brought about extensive intermarriage between the members of the caliphate armies and women from the rebel areas. From this intermarriage, a new generation emerged that contributed to consolidating the unity of the Arabian peninsula.¹¹¹

The impact of the *ridḍa* wars on the historical process of the spread of Islam outside Arabia becomes clear from their link to the Islamic conquests, particularly on the battlefield against the Sāsānid empire in rural southern Iraq. Frictions in this area between Arabs and Sāsānids prompted the Muslim fighters to persuade the caliph to open the Iraq front.¹¹² It appears they were driven to this by the Sāsānid attempt to encourage several of the Arab tribes which had rebelled against Islam in Bahrain, particularly Bakr ibn Wā’il, to join ranks under the leadership of al-Mundhir ibn al-Nu’mān ibn al-Mundhir, known as ‘the Conceited’.¹¹³ The Muslim soldiers were then compelled to enter Iraq in pursuit of the insurgents, leading the caliph to realize that liberating the Arabs of Iraq from Persian rule would be a measure complementary to the *ridḍa* wars, which had as their objective the unification of the Arabs within the framework of the sovereignty and central authority of Islam.¹¹⁴ The Banū Shaybān had revealed the extent of Sāsānid weakness with their victory over the empire at the battle of Dhū Qār in approximately AH 610, which was discussed earlier in this chapter. Since then, they had been raiding the Iraqi border regions under Sāsānid rule at will, without orders from the caliphate in Medina.¹¹⁵ Having been informed of this, the caliph Abū Bakr inquired about their leader, al-Muthannā ibn Ḥāritha ash-Shaybānī, to be told: ‘That is a man of distinguished reputation, known ancestry and noble intent – he is al-Muthannā ibn Ḥāritha ash-Shaybānī.’¹¹⁶ Al-Muthannā came to Medina and requested that the caliph put him in charge of those of his tribe who had converted to Islam, his aim being to fight the Persians. The caliph gave his written agreement to the request, whereupon al-Muthannā

110 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, I, p. 1974.

111 See Fayṣal, *al-Mujtama‘āt al-islāmiyya*, p. 33.

112 See Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, *ash-Shaykhān*, Cairo, Dār al-ma‘ārif, 1969, pp. 87–88; al-Mallāḥ, *al-Wasīṭ*, p. 352.

113 See Abū Muḥammad Aḥmad ibn A‘tham, *al-Futūḥ*, Beirut, Dār al-kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 1986, I, p. 46; al-Isfahānī, *Tārīkh*, p. 95; Maḥmūd ‘Abdallāh Ibrāhīm al-‘Ubaydī, *Banū Shaybān wa-dawruhum fi-t-tārīkh al-‘arabī al-islāmī*, Baghdad, Dār ash-shu‘ūn ath-thaqāfiyya al-‘amma, 1984, p. 170; Aḥmad ‘Adil Kamāl, *aṭ-Ṭarīq ila-l-Madā’in*, Beirut, Dār an-nafā’is, 1977, p. 205.

114 Al-Mallāḥ, *al-Wasīṭ*, p. 354.

115 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 242.

116 *Ibid.*

returned home and called upon the members of his tribe to convert, which they did.

It appears that the caliph may have authorized al-Muthannā to instigate the war to liberate Iraq after the latter had explained the extent of Persian weakness and the readiness of the Arabs of the Persian Gulf region and southern Iraq to support him in fighting Persia. The caliph did not, however, allow al-Muthannā to undertake this risky action alone but wrote to the military commander Khālid ibn al-Walīd al-Makhzūmī ordering him to march to Iraq, and to al-Muthannā, ordering him to put himself under Khālid's command.¹¹⁷ So began the offensive on the Iraq front. We have already discussed Abū Bakr's decision to continue with the offensive by Usāma ibn Zayd on the Syrian front, the first in that glorious series of campaigns in which the Arabs swept through Syria, Persia and North Africa.

We thus find that the mission of the Prophet Muḥammad to his people unified them internally and gave them a global message that impelled them outwards to the neighbouring countries. The driving force of the new religion, the vigour of the Arab people, their motivation and their unity of purpose were the secrets of their success. The campaigns did not seek to spread the Islamic religion by the sword, as some non-Muslim historians have insinuated,¹¹⁸ but rather to spread the political authority of Islam and give people the choice between accepting the religion or paying the *jizya* and living within the new Islamic state. It cannot be denied that the central aim of the Islamic conquests was to spread the faith. They did not, however, extend to the point of coercing anyone to convert to Islam but instead attempted to put in place the objective conditions needed to help people make a free choice between conversion or paying the *jizya* and remaining within the new Islamic state.¹¹⁹ This understanding is consistent with the essence of the Islamic faith and the teachings of the Qur'ān, which explicitly states that there should be no compulsory conversion to Islam and that people are to be given the choice of deciding what is in their best interests in the light of their own ideas and convictions:

There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is henceforth distinct from error. And he who rejecteth false deities and believeth in Allah hath grasped a firm handhold which will never break. Allah is the Hearer, the Knower.¹²⁰

117 Ibid.

118 See Arnold, *ad-Da'wa ila-l-islām*, p. 64.

119 See al-Mallāḥ, *al-Wasīṭ*, p. 352.

120 *Al-Baqara*, 2:256.

– II –

THE FIRST STAGE
IN THE SPREAD
OF ISLAM

Chapter 2.1

JIHĀD IN ISLAM

Abd al-Salam Muhammad al-Sherif al-Alim

In order to discuss *jihād* we need to make a few introductory remarks in which we define the term and discuss the source of its legitimacy in Islam.

The definition of *jihād*

Jihād is a verbal noun. One says: ‘He engaged in *jihād* (*jāhada*) against the enemy *mujāhadatan* or *jihādan*’ and ‘He engaged in *jihād* for the sake of God.’ *Jihād* means to fight against enemies in the sense of exerting ‘effort’ (*jahd*), in other words, capacity and energy, or to do one’s utmost to repel the enemy.¹

According to *al-Mughrab*:

Jihād is a verbal noun. One says: ‘You fought [*jāhadta*] the enemy *jihādan* when you confronted him with great effort [*jahd*], or when each of you exerted effort, in other words, energy, in repelling the other.’ In Islam, the term subsequently came primarily to mean the fight against infidels or unbelievers.²

Jihād is a conative form implying the application of effort (*jahd*), that is, energy and hardship, to a person or a thing. *Mujāhid* is the active participle derived from the verb *jāhada*. A *mujāhid* is someone who wages a just war

1 Sa’dī Abū Jayb, *al-Qamūs al-fiqhī lughatan wa-ṣāṭilāḥan*, Damascus, Dār al-fikr, 1982, p. 71. See also Jamal-ad-Dīn ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-‘arab*, Beirut, Dar ṣādir, n.d., III, p. 135.

2 Naṣr ibn ‘Abd-as-Sayyid ibn ‘Alī al-Muṭarrazī, *al-Mughrab fī tartīb al-mu‘rib*, Beirut, Dār al-kitāb al-‘arabī, n.d., p. 97.

such that the enemy is afraid. The terms *jihād*, war (*ḥarb*) and attack (*ghazw*) each originally had the same meaning in the Arabic language, in other words, fighting (*qitāl*) the enemy. The term ‘war’ (*ḥarb*) is mentioned in the Qur’ān with the meaning ‘fight’ (*qitāl*).³ This shared meaning between the three words is that intended in the usage of the jurists (*fuqahā*’).

The definition of *jihād* as a term in Islamic law

Scholars of Islamic jurisprudence have defined *jihād* in a number of closely related ways. We shall choose the definition of Ibn ‘Arafa, a Mālikī scholar, according to whom: ‘[*Jihād*] is a Muslim’s fight against an infidel who does not have a pact with the Muslims, with a view to exalting the word of Almighty God or because the infidel has attacked him or entered his land.’⁴

In the definitions of *jihād* by scholars of jurisprudence, including the one just quoted, we notice the use of the term ‘infidel’ (*kāfir*) or ‘infidels’ (*kuffār*). In fact, the use of this word is not intended to restrict the meaning of the Qur’ānic passages concerning *jihād*, but is rather employed for emphasis. This must be so because: first, a fighter, both Muslim and non-Muslim, undertakes *jihād* against highway robbery or widespread corruption. Second, a long time ago jurists divided the world into a ‘House of War’ (*Dār Ḥarb*), in other words, the lands of the infidels who have not made peace with the Muslims, and a ‘House of Islam’ (*Dār al-Islām*). This division is dependent on circumstances, and is related to a particular time and place in the past, as indicated by Abū Ḥanīfa when he said: ‘At that time, Mecca was in the House of War’.⁵ Third, *jihād* is a general, comprehensive, universal term covering all the various kinds of endeavour and exertion of effort, including the expenditure of money, the endurance of hardship, and the suffering of adversity.

Many people have been deceived by the apparent meaning of the term, and think that *jihād* for the cause of God entails subjugating people to the faith and coercing them to embrace it. This is erroneous, since the motive for

3 See *al-Mā’ida*, 5:64, *al-Anfāl*, 8:7, *Muḥammad*, 47:4.

4 Muḥammad al-Ansārī ar-Raṣṣā’, *Sharḥ ḥudūd Ibn ‘Arafa*, Tunisia, AH 1350, p. 139.

5 What Abū Ḥanīfa means by saying that there is a House of Islam and another of unbelief is not strictly Islam and unbelief, but rather security and fear. This means that when only Muslims are secure and only non-Muslims are fearful, this is the *Dār al-Islām*; when only non-Muslims are secure and only Muslims are fearful, this is the ‘House of Unbelief.’ The idea is based on the notions of security and peace rather than Islam and unbelief, and accepting this division is quite reasonable. Otherwise, points of view change over time, and this division in fact no longer exists as most people in the world, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, are linked by international relations, good neighbourliness and the exchange of services and benefits, and this requires security and peace. The world has thus become a single ‘house’ and not two as determined by the early Muslim jurists.



2.1 Single-volume Qur'ān, twelfth century, Isfahan
(© Naser Khalili Foundation)

fighting is not unbelief or having a different religion, but rather aggression. The truth is that *jihad* simply means exerting effort and doing one's utmost. This is achieved first by peaceful means, and only when – if the situation necessitates fighting in order to defend Islam, and after confirming that the nature of the enemy requires this – there is no legal impediment to engaging in battle since it is a Muslim's duty to defend his religion, his land and his property. For this reason, Islam prefers to use the word *jihad* rather than *ḥarb* (war) because it denotes a natural struggle aimed at protecting the faith rather than achieving domination, influence and economic advantage.

In no way should *jihad* be understood as a hostile expedient against non-Muslims, as some orientalist and anti-Islamic bigots see it. These people have become accustomed to referring to *jihad* as 'holy war' to the point where the term has become synonymous with ill temper and maliciousness, with barbarity and bloodshed, as if Muslims represented a savage force waiting for a chance to swoop down on the whole world and destroy civilization and urban refinement. They say that non-Muslims would not be spared unless

they proclaimed their conversion to Islam, under compulsion and without reflection or careful examination. Even the most moderate among them claim that *jihād* is a form of missionary activity undertaken by either persuasion or force, that it is precisely equivalent to ‘war’ and is concerned with fighting infidels and the enemies of the faith.⁶

If we wanted to define *jihād* today, we would say: ‘*Jihād* is the exertion of effort and energy to fight in the cause of God and against the enemy with one’s spirit, property and tongue in defence of religion, faith and country.’ This definition gives the aims and objectives of *jihād*. It also indicates its means, the first of which is one’s spirit. Indeed, Islam has linked the *jihād* undertaken with one’s spirit to that undertaken with one’s property. We see this in the Qur’ānic verses concerning *jihād*, where being liberal with one’s property is given priority over exerting one’s spirit. Information has an important role to play in *jihād* in winning over public opinion, making the people aware of the true situation and calling them to God by means of evidence and proof rather than compulsion and coercion.

Definition of the term ‘enemy’ (*‘adūw*)

Since we have learnt that both in ordinary language and in legal terminology *jihād* means fighting against the enemy, what then is the ‘enemy’?

Some scholars consider that there are several kinds of *jihād*, which may be subdivided into a number of varieties and forms. Among these is fighting a patent enemy, which is called the lesser *jihād*; and fighting the baser self that incites to evil, the Devil, and the immoral and dissolute, which is called the greater *jihād*. Islam views all these as enemies to which the words of God apply: ‘And strive for God with the endeavour [*jihād*] which is His right.’⁷

As for the patent enemy, he is the soldier who enters our lands in order to wage a war of whatever form as an act of aggression against the religion and the faith or the homeland, property or persons with the aim of destroying Islam and its adherents. Such a soldier is an enemy as described by God in the Qur’ān: ‘My enemy and yours.’⁸ In such a situation, the enemy should be repelled by all the means allowed by international law and custom, in other words, by the hand, property, the tongue and the heart.

6 Wahba az-Zuhaylī, *Āthār al-ḥarb fi-l-fiqh al-islāmī*, Damascus, Dār al-fikr, 1998, p. 34.

7 *Al-Ḥaj*, 22:78.

8 *Al-Mumtaḥana*, 60:1.

As for fighting against one's base instincts, this means first of all learning the details of religion, then acting according to them, and finally teaching them. As for fighting the Devil, this means to repel the uncertainties he brings and the carnal appetites he extols. God said: 'The Devil is an enemy to you, so treat him as an enemy.'⁹ To treat the Devil as an enemy is an exhortation to exert every effort in waging war against him and fighting him, for he is an enemy who never tires of fighting humankind. As for fighting the sinful and the hypocrites, this is done with the hand, the tongue and the heart within the framework of commanding good and forbidding evil.¹⁰ This is because *jihād* against hypocrites is to be done through argumentation, explanation and propagation of the Qur'ān.

The origin of the legitimacy of *jihād* in Islam

At the beginning of the era of the Prophet, *jihād* was forbidden, since the Prophet initially ordered that one should only instruct and admonish, and refrain from harming the infidels so that they might work alongside the Muslims, and call them to God through wisdom and pious exhortation. On the other hand, the Muslims calling others to Islam were mercilessly attacked, and the Prophet and his Companions were harmed in a ruthless way. God therefore revealed to His Prophet verses that strengthened his and his Companions' resolve and bolstered their patience and forbearance. This is seen in God's words: 'Have patience with what they say and forsake them in a becoming manner'¹¹ and 'Be patient, for your patience is but from God. And do not grieve over them or distress yourself because of what they plot.'¹² The Muslims complained repeatedly to the Prophet about the polytheists, so he used to encourage them, offer them words of wisdom and say: 'Be patient, for I have not been ordered to fight.'

As a result of Muḥammad's teachings, the Muslims, especially the poor, the needy and those outside tribal networks, endured all kinds of suffering and distress, but this did not distract them from their religion or shake their convictions. Despite their small number and the poverty of many of them, they withstood like courageous heroes. We have not heard of any of them forsaking their religion or being tempted by the polytheists to abandon it.

9 *Fāṭir*, 35:6.

10 *Al-'amr bi-l-ma'rūf wa-n-nahy 'an al-munkar* ('commanding good and forbidding evil') is a Qur'ānic injunction which has been developed to encompass the general duties of Muslims to protect public morals and religious piety.

11 *Al-Muzzamil*, 73:10.

12 *An-Nahl*, 16:127.

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At the beginning of the second year after the *hijra*, permission came for the Muslims to fight if the infidels began the fighting, even though this had previously been forbidden in seventy-five verses. The first revelation legitimizing *jihād* in Islam was God's words: 'To those against whom war is waged, permission is given to fight because they are wronged. God is most powerful for their assistance.'¹³ The Qur'ān thus linked the legitimacy of *jihād* to the presence of aggression, this being left to the leader to assess.

Thus, permission came after prohibition. The style of the verse and what follows it indicate that it was the first of its kind to be revealed. Indeed, 'Abdallāh ibn 'Abbās stated: 'This is the first revelation giving permission to fight.'¹⁴ On the other hand, Ibn Jarīr at-Ṭabarī related, on the authority of Abū-l-'Āliya who was one of the Prophet's followers, that the first revelation giving permission to fight was God's words: 'Fight in the cause of God those who fight you. But do not transgress limits, for God does not love transgressors.'¹⁵ Other scholars maintain that the first such verse was God's words:

God has purchased from the believers their persons and their possessions, for theirs in return is the Garden of Paradise. They fight in the cause of God and kill and are killed; a promise binding on Him in truth, through the law, the Gospel and the Qur'ān.¹⁶

In the view of the present author, those who maintain that the first verse was the first to legitimize *jihād* are nearer to the truth, since this opinion has a sounder transmission and is more plausible. The second verse is primarily concerned with the regulation of combat, defining its boundaries and establishing its rules, and such matters are only relevant once *jihād* has been allowed. The third verse is more concerned with prompting and urging men to undertake *jihād*.

The Qur'ān made it licit to begin fighting outside the sacred months. Then, eight years after the conquest of Mecca, it was allowed without restriction by God's words: 'Go forth whether equipped lightly or heavily.'¹⁷

13 *Al-Haj*, 22:39–41.

14 See Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawiyya*, Beirut, Dār al-kitāb al-'arabī, 1998, II, p. 108.

15 *Al-Baqara*, 2:190.

16 *At-Tauba*, 9:111.

17 *Ibid.*, 9:41.

The reasons for *jihād* and the conditions and impediments governing it

THE REASONS FOR JIHĀD

The Qur'ānic verses contain the reasons and aims for which *jihād* was prescribed. Among the most important of these are:

1. *Protecting the summons of Islam*, so that the Prophet may deliver his message and eliminate what is forbidden, that is, associating others with God, the greatest of forbidden things. Whoever is aware of something forbidden and is able to eliminate it has a duty to do so. The proof of this is: 'And fight them until persecution is no more, and religion is for God.'¹⁸ The only ones exempted from this are children, women, monks, farmers and artisans, since it is not permitted to fight these even though they may be infidels. The reason for the duty of *jihād* is primarily to safeguard the call to Islam and to protect the religion from being seized by those who would destroy it. But it is not permissible to kill such as those with whom Islam has made a covenant; if a Muslim kills such a person, this is not *jihād*. Similarly, if a *dhimmī*¹⁹ revokes his covenant and goes to war, then fighting against him is not *jihād*.
2. *Countering tyranny and aggression*. Aggression is a direct or indirect attack against Muslims or *dhimmīs*, against their property, or against the summons to Islam or those who do the summoning. To come to someone's aid and to appeal for justice for the wronged against the oppressor are matters of human nature, are human rights which the divine laws of Islam and the positive laws enacted by human beings have established. God acknowledges these human rights when He says:

But indeed if any people help and defend themselves after a wrong has been done to them, against such there is no cause of blame. The blame is only against those who oppress men with wrongdoing and insolently transgress through the land defying right and justice. For such there will be a grievous penalty.²⁰

When the policies of reconciliation and forbearance are of no avail with the enemy, then force must be met with force and weapons with

18 *Al-Baqara*, 2:193.

19 A non-Muslim living in a Muslim country who is guaranteed security and freedom to practise his religion, often in return for payment of a special tax (*jizya*: see note 22 below).

20 *Ash-Shūrā*, 42:41–2.

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weapons. If not, even with the ability to achieve victory, one would remain silent and look the other way out of impotence, weakness and negligence. It is not just, right or fair for the enemy to be allowed to do as he pleases, and for the Muslim to be forbidden from fighting him. Recompense comes from acting. God spoke the truth when He established this principle, saying:

And those who, when an oppressive thing is inflicted upon them, are not cowed, but help and defend themselves. The recompense for an injury is an equal injury. But if a person forgives and makes reconciliation his reward is due from God, for God does not love those who do wrong.²¹

The Prophet allowed the use of force when there was no other alternative – as much as is necessary without excess or immoderation.

3. *Peace and the freedom of religious practice.* The law of *jihād* safeguards the spread of peace and security in the world, ensures that every religious person is able to practise his religion and that people respect the sacred things. Islam is the only religion which obliges its adherents to believe in all the prophets and in all the holy books revealed by God. Its book is the Qur'ān, which is testimony to and superior to the other holy books, since it has remained unadulterated by corruption and alteration. It was transmitted by the most stringent and verifiable methods, in other words, by an uninterrupted chain of relators, and this makes for certainty and conviction. Muslims respect the followers of the other religions since they possess instructions from their faith which restrain them from injustice, tyranny, bigotry and fanaticism. Indeed, the Prophet directed that the *dhimmi*s and those who have a covenant with the Muslims should be treated with kindness. This is attested by historical fact, since whenever Muslims had temporal authority they did not harm any *dhimmi* in the practice of his religion or in the conduct of his worldly affairs, nor did they do harm to any person, goods or possessions. But whenever Muslims had a reversal of fortunes and were overpowered, their enemies made them suffer all manner of tortures, including massacre, banishment, destruction and the violation of their sacred things.

The clearest testimony to this is the fact that Islam allows the adherents of a revealed religion either to embrace Islam or to keep their religion and pay the *jizya*.²² This tax is not designed to force them to

21 *Ash-Shūrā*, 42:39–40.

22 *Jizya*: an annual tax levied on the members of the other revealed religions (Christianity, Judaism) which they agree to pay in exchange for residing in a Muslim country.

embrace Islam or to be a means of oppression, but is rather supposed to be in exchange for the hospitality, protection, security and social and economic assistance that an Islamic country provides for non-Muslims. God alluded to this aim when He said: ‘Had not God repelled some people by others, cloisters, churches, synagogues and mosques in which God’s name is recited would have been pulled down. God will certainly aid those who aid Him. God is strong and mighty.’²³

4. *Defence of the country.* If the enemy attacks a Muslim country or makes plans to attack, then repelling him becomes a duty for all those directly involved, while others must provide them with support and assistance. As God said: ‘If they seek your aid in religion, it is your duty to help them, except against people with whom you have a mutual alliance.’²⁴ If the people of a Muslim country become afraid of an enemy, then the Muslims nearest to them must hasten to them and supply them with weapons and provisions.

This is because *jihād* is a religious duty for all Muslims. But they are individually absolved from this duty if a sufficient number of people undertake it. If this does not happen, however, then the individual duty remains.

5. *Defence of humanitarian principles.* These are the doctrines, laws, rules of conduct and morals which the Qur’ān introduced and which make the Qur’ān valid for every place and time. For Islam is a religion of compassion, guidance, truth, justice, kindness and charity. There is no doubt that all this requires *jihād* and struggling and striving with one’s person and wealth. This is what God referred to when He said: ‘They are those who, if we establish them in the land, perform regular prayers, pay the *zakāh* (charitable welfare tax), and command good and forbid evil. With God rests the end of all matters.’²⁵

In mentioning the fundamentals of religion in this verse, God also pointed to some further considerations. Thus, prayer is the most important form of physical worship, which purifies the soul and enhances the relationship between man and his Creator, and between man and his fellow humans. Payment of the *zakāh* is the most important aspect of worship with one’s property, which ensures a society based on cooperation and mutual responsibility. Commanding good and forbidding evil form the basis of all religious and worldly good. They are the pillars of all social and economic reform, and through them every evil is destroyed, society is enabled to thrive and is cleansed of

23 *Al-Ḥaj*, 22:40.

24 *Al-Anfāl*, 8:72.

25 *Al-Ḥaj*, 22:41.

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corruption. *Jihād* is the most important aspect of all worship; it is the pearl in its crown, the wall which safeguards all the principles and ideals introduced by Islam.

6. *Liberating prisoners.* When those undertaking *jihād* are unable to rescue prisoners by fighting, they must pay a ransom if they have the money. If both alternatives are possible, only one must be used. The money should come from the state treasury, but if this is not possible any deficit should be made up by all the Muslims, each according to his means. A wealthy prisoner must pay his own ransom.²⁶

Jihād remains lawful as long as the reasons for it remain in effect. The circumstances which make it permissible vary, and include protecting the freedom of religious practice, assisting the oppressed and engaging in self-defence.

THE CONDITIONS FOR UNDERTAKING *JIHĀD*

Those who are qualified to undertake *jihād* must be Muslims, have reached the age of maturity, be of sound mind, have the necessary strength and act in the cause of God. In order for *jihād* to be considered legal it must take place between Muslims and non-Muslims. It is not *jihād* when infidels fight other infidels since God's message was not addressed to non-Muslims. As noted above, the person undertaking *jihād* must have reached the age of maturity which, according to the legal scholars, is 18 years old. This is because by his nature a young person cannot usually withstand warfare. Similarly, the insane and the disabled are not liable to undertake *jihād*.

By 'strength' is intended ability, for *jihād* is a religious duty only for those who are able to undertake it. No *jihād* is imposed on a person who does not have the necessary ability required for it. This is because *jihād* is an exertion of effort, in other words, force and energy in fighting, or to do one's utmost in battle. How can someone who has no capacity put this to use and exert himself?²⁷

Like men, women also undertake *jihād* when this is necessary. In the biography of the Prophet we find the examples of Rufayda al-Anṣāriyya, Umm Sinān al-Islāmiyya, Umm Ziyād al-Ashja'iyya and other female Companions of his. They used to hand arrows to warriors, treat the wounded

26 Al-Qarāfī, Aḥmad ibn Idris, *adh-Dhakhīra*, Beirut, Dār al-gharb al-islamī, 1994, III, p. 387.

27 Al-Kāsānī, Abū Bakr ibn Mas'ūd, *Badā'i' aṣ-ṣanā'i' fī tartīb ash-sharā'i'*, Cairo, Maṭba'at al-amām, n.d., IX, p. 4301; al-Kitābī, *at-tarātib al-idāriyya*, Beirut, Dār iḥyā' at-turāth al-'arabī, n.d., II, pp. 113ff.

and sick, and go into battle themselves when circumstances dictated. Indeed, Umm Salīm took up a dagger at the battle of Ḥunayn, saying that if one of the enemy approached her she would rip open his stomach. Furthermore, in his *Ṣaḥīḥ*, al-Bukhārī has chapters entitled ‘The *Jihād* of Women’, ‘Women Attacking on the Sea’ and ‘Women Attacking and Fighting alongside Men.’ There is no disagreement among legal scholars that women should undertake *jihād*. It is the custom of Arab women to give encouragement and support and to be courageous and virtuous. If a woman is obliged to engage in *jihād* by herself, this is permissible insofar as the circumstances are deemed appropriate.

Jihād in Islam has an aim, which is to strive for the cause of God. This is a necessary condition for it to take place and about which there can be no compromise. God said: ‘Fight in the cause of God those who fight you. But do not transgress limits, for God does not love transgressors.’²⁸

Jihād is engaged in so as to exalt the word of God. Thus, if someone fights for material benefit, for wealth or out of fanaticism, this is not legitimate *jihād*. Whoever cannot undertake *jihād* with his body is not absolved from the duty to undertake it with his wealth.²⁹ This is because strength and ability may be manifested in the body or in wealth or in the wielding of arms. The Shāfi‘ī school debated whether *jihād* could be undertaken using stones, and concluded that this could not be done. The present author’s opinion is that stones may be effective weapons for those who have no money to buy arms for the defence of their country.

Impediments to *jihād*

1. *Parental restraint.* A son may not undertake *jihād* unless he has the permission of both his parents, or one of them if the other is dead, since to respect one’s parents is an individual religious duty (*farḍ ‘ayn*), and therefore takes precedence over a collective duty (*farḍ kifāya*). This is the case if there is not a general call to arms, for when this occurs as the result of the enemy attacking a Muslim country, then it becomes an individual duty for every single Muslim who is able to respond. As God said: ‘Go forth whether equipped lightly or heavily.’³⁰ A general call to arms is not met unless everyone participates in it, since this is a duty for each individual in the same way as fasting and prayer. In this situation it is admissible for a son to go into battle without his parents’

28 *Al-Baqara*, 2:190.

29 Ibn Taymiyya, Aḥmad, *Fatāwā Ibn Taymiyya*, Rabat, Maktabat al-ma‘ārif, n.d., XXVIII, p. 87.

30 *At-Tawba*, 9:41.

permission, as the right of the parents is subordinate to individual religious duties such as prayer and fasting. Legal scholars have differed as to whether the grandparents have the same right as the mother and father in forbidding a son from undertaking *jihād*.

Al-Ḥaṭṭāb³¹ held that both parents have an equal right of restraint, and that the non-Muslim father, like the Muslim father, may forbid his son from travelling when this involves danger, except as concerns *jihād*, since forbidding him from undertaking it could perhaps be because it is a law of Islam and not because of the nature of the task. It is also said that they have an equal right of restraint except when it is known that the aim of the non-Muslim father is to harm the religion, in which case he may not forbid his son from undertaking the duty.

Everything that exempts one from performing the pilgrimage also exempts one from undertaking *jihād*.

2. *Debt*. The debtor may not undertake *jihād* if his debt is due for immediate repayment except with the permission of the creditor. If, on the other hand, the debt will become repayable during the debtor's absence and he authorizes someone to settle it for him or if the debtor is poor, then he may leave without permission.³² This is because it is a man's right to recover a debt. It is a duty to settle a debt, and this duty is not fulfilled until the debt is repaid or the debtor is released from his liabilities. If there is a general call to arms, however, which applies to everyone who has the ability to respond, then the debtor may leave without permission.

Types of *jihād*

There are as many types of *jihād* as there are aims, objectives and purposes. These types include the lesser *jihād* and the greater *jihād*, the *jihād* of repelling the enemy, the *jihād* of seeking out the enemy, the offensive *jihād* and the defensive *jihād* and both of these together, the obligatory *jihād* and the voluntary *jihād*, and other varieties and kinds that have been described by the legal scholars, both ancient and modern.

The present author finds no need to divide *jihād* into offensive and defensive or both of them together, nor into obligatory and voluntary. We will therefore not deal with these since they are unimportant. We shall deal briefly and concisely with the other types of *jihād*. If a more exhaustive treatment is required, reference should be made to the comprehensive primary sources,

31 Al-Ḥaṭṭāb, Yahya ibn Muḥammad (d. 995/1587), a Mālikī jurist from Mecca.

32 Al-Qarāfī, *adh-Dhakhīra*, III, p. 395.

in other words, the books of jurisprudence, the biographies of the Prophet and the books dealing with his military campaigns.

THE LESSER JIHĀD

This is fighting in the cause of God whenever the conditions for *jihād* are fulfilled. The Prophet mentioned this when asked about it. The question was: ‘When a man fights out of bravery or out of fervour, which of these is in the cause of God?’ to which the Prophet replied: ‘Whoever fights so that God’s word is exalted, this is in the cause of God.’³³

Since *jihād* is to exalt the word of God, and all religion belongs to God, it is a duty to undertake that without which His word cannot be exalted, such as the defence and equipment of the country’s borders, the acquisition of materials for war and the training of fighters for combat. Garrisons for the defence of the borders are also a form of *jihād*, and are established such that the enemy does not attack Islamic territory for fear of being repelled. These are preferable to *jihād* since *jihād* results in the shedding of blood on both sides, whereas the use of garrisons results in sparing the blood of Muslims. If a garrison does not intimidate the enemy, it is not called a garrison in the parlance of legal scholars. Similarly, if the enemy attacks a garrison only once and does not return for many years, it is not a garrison.

Once the borders of the country and access routes have been secured, all the inhabitants of the country are exempted from *jihād*, and it becomes a supererogatory duty. That is, unless the enemy attacks another Islamic country, in which case everyone must offer assistance and support by joining them in battle so as to ward off the aggression and eliminate the tyranny.

THE GREATER JIHĀD

Among the traditions of the Prophet is the one where, after returning from one of his military campaigns, he is quoted as saying: ‘We have returned from the lesser *jihād* to face the greater *jihād*,’ in other words, the *jihād* against the human soul which incites to evil, the tyrannical soul that humankind is unable to reform and dispose towards kindness because it will practise only

33 This tradition is generally acknowledged as authentic. See Muḥammad ibn Isma‘īl aṣ-Ṣan‘ānī, *Subul as-salām: sharḥ bulūgh al-marām*, Beirut, Dār al-kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 2000, IV, p. 45. A tradition related by Muslim from Abū Mūsā says: ‘The Prophet was asked which was in the cause of God – when a man fought out of bravery, out of fervour or out of dissimulation? He replied: “Whoever fights so that God’s word is exalted, this is in the cause of God.”’

evil. The books on morals are replete with advice, guidance and the words of the wise and the scholarly as to how to curb the wilfulness of the soul, to restrain it from obeying the passions and following the carnal appetites wherever they may lead.³⁴

Wars, iniquity and aggression are nothing but the results of the craving, tyranny and oppression of the soul. Undertaking *jihād* against the soul and containing its outbursts are among the most difficult tasks that man faces in his life. Some of the diseases of the soul that man must strive to cure are hatred, envy, arrogance and selfishness, so that he may become pure in action and word, compassionate to human beings, seeking good for them and repelling evil from them. The person who can gain mastery over his soul by preventing it from doing injustice and harm and keeping it on the path of righteousness is a man of determination and resolution. This ability is, unfortunately, not found among the majority of people; on the contrary, we find most people incapable of reforming their souls. If someone is unable to reform his own soul, how can he be expected to reform the souls of others?

If people undertook *jihād* against their own souls they would not live in fear, anxiety and dread of a dark future which must certainly contain ill for humankind. Undertaking *jihād* against the soul tempers the material greed which can possess people if they do not resist it. In the first half of the last century there were two world wars which ravaged, caused destruction and spilt the blood of millions. If men undertook *jihād* against their souls, there would be no racism, no distinction between colours of the skin and races, and humankind would not be divided into different classes or into spheres of influence or exploitation.

Engaging in *jihād* with weapons might be for noble purposes such as defending religion, country, honour and dignity. It might also be for exploitative attacks and colonial expansion. The hypocrite may bear the hardship of *jihād* so as to satisfy some need within his soul, for some aim based on personal and material considerations and other cravings and inhumane and immoral purposes.

The Prophet was an exemplary model of *jihād* against the soul, as were his Companions whose souls were filled with unshakeable faith and forbearance. Their souls became free of all evil tendencies, and when this occurs the soul lives only for what is good and does not act in a way which brings evil and destruction on mankind.

Making the soul surrender to truth is one of the most difficult tasks for man. He will not be able to do this unless he has been educated in all the qualities of humaneness, nobility, virtue and high morals. The true

34 See al-Ghazālī, Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad, *Iḥyā' 'ulūm ad-dīn*, Cairo, Dār iḥyā' al-kutub al-'arabiyya, n.d., III, pp. 47ff.

Islamic education is that which accustoms man to fear God, to submit to His commands and prohibitions, and to be honest in his dealings, and this has a profound effect on the shaping of his personality. As regards the type of Islamic education that consists of delusions and superstitions, and which is followed by some who feign piety and godliness, this is not true education which creates persons of commitment. True education is that received by the Prophet's Companions, who were entrusted with positions of leadership in which they acted with justice, and who defended the religion and the state. The rich among them gave generously of both their wealth and persons in the cause of God, while the poor received every assistance and charity. Their belief in Islam was strong, and they were filled with its just principles from which they did not deviate. They undertook the war of *jihād* against the wicked tendencies of the soul which incite to worldly pleasures, encourage the acquisition of power and authority, and promote selfishness, even if this means trampling on the souls of the innocent.³⁵

Reforming the soul and putting an end to its worldly desires is an exacting *jihād* full of hardship, toil and the exertion of every effort, and only the strong can emerge victorious from this battle. God said: 'For those who are fearful of standing before their Lord and restrain their souls from worldly desires, their abode will be the Garden of Paradise.'³⁶ Despite the sinlessness enjoyed by the Prophet because of his status as a prophet, he did not cease to fight his noble soul through worship, addressing himself to the Creator, teaching his soul frugality and denying it the pleasures of the world. This is the best example of *jihād* against the soul, and concerns someone whose desires were virtuous and whose innermost thoughts were unsullied by evil.

THE JIHĀD OF REPELLING AND SEEKING OUT THE ENEMY

The preceding discussion has already mentioned the *jihād* of repelling the enemy; the example was given of when the enemy intends to attack the Muslims in any of their regions or countries. This kind of *jihād* is a duty for everyone insofar as they are able, with their persons and wealth, like the Muslims when they were approached by the enemy at the battle of Uḥud³⁷

35 Al-'Imrānī, 'Abd-al-Ḥayy, *al-Islām: dīn wa-dawla wa-nizām*, Morocco, al-Awqāf, n.d., pp. 165ff.

36 *An-Nāzi'āt*, 79:40-1.

37 A battle which took place in 3/625 between the Prophet Muḥammad and his Meccan adversaries, the latter emerging victorious.

and the battle of the Ditch.³⁸ It was the polytheists who mobilized their forces in Medina and opposed the Muslims. God did not permit any Muslim to be absent since it was compulsory to fight to protect the religion and human lives.

As for the *jihād* of seeking out the enemy, which is a voluntary undertaking, the Prophet gave permission not to take the initiative in meeting the enemy and pursuing him. He showed his dislike of this kind of *jihād* when he said: 'Do not desire to meet the enemy, but if you find them, be steadfast.'³⁹ Thus, the Prophet did not allow this kind of *jihād* without good cause, as was the case in all his military campaigns. If, however, the encounter takes place, then it is necessary to stand firm and persevere. The *jihād* of seeking out the enemy may result in provoking him, and the Prophet forbade this: 'Leave the Abyssinians as long as they leave you, and leave the Turks as long as they leave you.'⁴⁰

JIHĀD AS A COLLECTIVE DUTY

One of the greatest forms of *jihād* is that of commanding good and forbidding evil. However, this is not an individual but rather a collective duty which is fulfilled if a sufficient number of people attend to it, as the Qur'ān has indicated. Since *jihād* is a part of this, it is performed in a similar manner. But if no one undertakes it, then this must be made good by all who are capable of doing so insofar as they are able. *Jihād* is a duty for each person according to his or her ability.⁴¹

Thus, *jihād* is a collective duty except when it is specifically imposed on someone. It becomes a duty for each individual when, for example, the enemy advances towards a Muslim country or a general call to arms is issued by those with authority to make decisions for the community.

The importance and merit of *jihād*

The legal code of Islam contains the instruction to undertake *jihād*. Islamic law may, however, prescribe a duty which is a cause of hardship for the one

38 A battle which took place in 5/627 between Muḥammad and his Meccan adversaries in which Muḥammad had a ditch dug around Medina as a line of defence.

39 Al-Māziri, Muḥammad ibn 'Alī ibn 'Umar, *al-Mu'lim bi-fawā'id Muslim*, Beirut, Dār al-gharb al-islāmī, 1991, III, p. 11.

40 This tradition is related by Abū Dāwūd in *al-Malāḥim*: 'Forbidding an Attack on the Abyssinians and the Turks,' on the authority of the writer Abū Sikkīna. The chain of authorities is considered to be weak.

41 Ibn Taymiyya, *Fatāwa*, XXVIII, p. 80.

charged with it. It is not the intention of the law to introduce hardships, but rather to promote what is beneficial or eliminate a cause of corruption. Thus, chastisement and punishments result from forbidden acts and are a reprimand to the person who performs such acts. They prevent him from doing these things again, and constitute a warning to others not to do likewise. The pain and suffering of this punishment is equivalent to the pain and suffering of amputating a diseased hand or drinking unpleasant medicine. While the doctor does not intend to cause suffering by forcing a sick person to drink medicine or by surgically removing a malignant tumour from his body without which operation the person would not recover, compassion nevertheless requires that the patient be informed of the benefits of the medicine so that he may willingly drink it, and that it be mixed with honey so that the patient has a natural desire to drink it as well as a logical reason. *Jihād* is the same, and Islamic law is the greatest doctor.⁴²

If a small evil leads to great good, then it must be done. The Quraysh and the Arabs around them serve as examples and warnings since they were the worst of God's creatures and the most oppressive to the weak. They fought fierce battles among themselves, attacked each other, took each other prisoner, and acted impetuously without forethought or reflection. They were at the mercy of their predatory souls. In this, they were just like a diseased organ in the human body which must be surgically removed for the patient to recover. Thus, the Prophet launched a *jihād* against them and killed the most tyrannical and those with the most vicious nature, until God's command became apparent and they were led to Him. After this, they became righteous, pious and godly, their affairs were put in order, and their way of life became regular. If Islamic law did not contain *jihād*, the affairs of the Quraysh would not have changed for the better.

As regards the merits of *jihād*, these are derived from certain principles:

1. *Jihād* is consistent with the injunctions to do what is right and with inspiring people to this end. Striving to perform *jihād* results in the spread of compassion, while striving to thwart it results in the spread of adversity and abomination.
2. *Jihād* is an arduous task involving hardship, giving freely of one's person and wealth, leaving one's country and family, and renouncing worldly pleasures and desires. No one can undertake it unless they worship

42 Ash-Shāṭibī, Ibrāhīm ibn Mūsā, *al-Muwāfaqāt fī uṣūl ash-sharī'a*, Beirut, Dār al-ma'rifa, 1975, II, p. 149; ad-Dihlawī, Aḥmad Shah Waliyy-ullāh ibn 'Abd-ar-Raḥīm, *Hujjat Allāh al-bāligha*, Beirut, Dār al-ma'rifa li-ṭ-ṭibā'a wa-n-nashr, n.d., II, p. 170.

- God faithfully and sincerely, prefer the hereafter to this world and rely steadfastly on God.
3. *Jihād* is a supplement to and an acclamation of religion. Its goal is for all religion to belong to God, for the word of God to be the most exalted and for *jihād* to be binding on people when the conditions for it are present.
 4. Since *jihād* is pleasing to God and cannot usually be undertaken without the necessary physical and moral strength, it is a duty to seek God's pleasure by striving to acquire such strength in all its forms and varieties so that it may be applied to what is required. Whatever is needed to perform the duty is also a duty. God said: 'Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power.'⁴³
 5. *Jihād* is for the sake of the good of this world and the hereafter. If Muslims ignore *jihād* in the cause of God, they might be so consumed by mutual animosities that dissension arises between them, as is in fact occurring. If people occupy themselves with *jihād* in the cause of God, He will unite their hearts, bring them together and give them the courage to face their enemy and the enemy of God. But if they do not hasten to the cause of God, He will punish them; such punishment may be from Him, or may be at their own hands by oppressing each other.

If we observe all these principles, it will be revealed to us why the Prophet urged men to undertake *jihād*, and we will clearly see its merit. But these things only apply when the conditions for undertaking *jihād* are met and when its objectives are to exalt the word of God and to summon people to the true religion.

The relationship of *jihād* to prayer, fasting and the pilgrimage

Jihād is one of the great acts of worship and is therefore mentioned in the sections on worship in the majority of legal writings. The Shāfi'ī school, however, classifies it among the felonies because it is a punishment for unbelief. They thus view it from the perspective of the person subject to its action. The Mālikī school, on the other hand, views *jihād* from the perspective of the one undertaking it. Indeed, relating an action to the one who performs it is more logical than relating it to the one who undergoes it. The Ḥanafī school considers that *jihād* should be placed within the context of the biographies of the Prophet. The present author

43 *Al-Anfāl*, 8:60.

considers that it is more properly situated within the acts of worship than it is within felonies, biographies of the Prophet or his military campaigns. This is because *jihād* is one of the collective duties and there is a strong relationship between *jihād* and the other acts of worship such as prayer, fasting and the pilgrimage.

In addition to prayer being an act of worship performed in the proper manner at certain specific times of the day, it is also considered to be closely associated with the strength constantly required of a person in order to prepare him for total readiness and continual vigilance. This is because it is linked to physical strength which frightens and terrifies the enemy and makes him reflect carefully about each step he takes against the Muslims. Similarly, there is an intimate relationship between *jihād* and fasting, since both are based on the duty to do one's utmost in obedience to God. The Prophet said: 'The one undertaking *jihād* in the cause of God is like the devout man who fasts.'⁴⁴ The rationale behind this is that the devout man who fasts is superior to others since he is undertaking an arduous task in order to please God, and the person who engages in *jihād*, when his *jihād* conforms with the prescriptions of Islamic law, does likewise. *Jihād* is a pious deed; it is good to desire pious deeds, and the merit of independently undertaking them is well known. There is a pressing need to urge men to begin those preparations for *jihād* without which it cannot usually be performed, such as ensuring all types of strength.

The pilgrimage also constitutes practical training for *jihād*. Despite the short time devoted to performing its rituals, the individual receives training from what he does alone, what he does with others, and how the group he is with conducts itself. These lessons are applied in general military mobilization in our age. The individual becomes skilled in rapid mobilization, team work, acting in concert, obeying orders, and preparing himself for battle by setting aside the necessary provisions and weapons (like the pebbles used during the pilgrimage).⁴⁵ He is ready to advance towards the enemy (like the *jamrāt*),⁴⁶ to attack him, to rejoice at victory, and to express this joy by thanking God through worship and actions.⁴⁷

The individual notices all these things as he performs the ceremonies of the pilgrimage – that divine prescription which readies the soul and incites

44 Ad-Dihlawī, *Hujjat Allāh*, II, p. 171. The tradition was related by al-Bukhārī in his *Ṣaḥīḥ* in the chapter 'Jihād and the Biographies of the Prophet' under the section 'The Best of People is a Believer who Undertakes *Jihād* with his Person and his Wealth in the Cause of God.'

45 The stones thrown by Muslims during the pilgrimage (*ḥajj*), a ritual which represents the stoning of Satan.

46 The *jamrāt* (lit. 'pebbles') are three halts during the pilgrimage for pebble-throwing against Satan.

47 Al-'Ālim, 'Abd-as-Salām Muḥammad, *Dirāsāt qur'āniyya: al-manhaj wa-t-taṭbīq*, Cairo, Dār al-ḥikma, 2001, pp. 145ff.



2.2 Page of the Qur'an, northern India, first half of the seventeenth century
(© Naser Khalili Foundation)

in it a love for *jihād* in the cause of God and the homeland, which provides experience in the practical steps of *jihād*, and on a small scale allows one to experience them emotionally. These steps become ingrained in one's self in order later to be put into practice. When an individual obeys the command of his Lord, hastens to perform the pilgrimage and spends freely of the money he has been saving for many years, it is as if he were responding to the call for *jihād* when Muslim territories have been occupied or when an attempt is made to attack public institutions. He donates all the money he possesses so as to unite the hearts of Muslims and present a single front against the mutual enemy with all available resources.

This is not only the duty of men. Indeed, women and young people also participate in the effort. It is for this reason that the Prophet, when questioned on the subject, replied that there was a *jihād* for women, as in the tradition of 'Ā'isha: "Is there a *jihād* for women?" "Yes," he replied, "a *jihād* which

involves no fighting, in other words, the pilgrimage.”⁴⁸ From this we can deduce that the teachings of Islam are interdependent and based on each other in the same way as the walls of a building are built on foundations and the roof rests on top of the walls. The building symbolizes the importance of interconnectivity within Islamic society. This is a society which calls for strength and all that promotes it, and is determined to be ready and alert, not underestimating the power of the enemy, so that the souls of the enemies may be filled with respect, and so that a man may feel honour, dignity and happiness in his land.

The relationship between jihād and terrorism (*irhāb*)

After the events of 11 September 2001, the media began to describe *jihād* as terrorism and to link it to violence, sabotage and destruction. The debate continued, and many widely divergent opinions were offered as to the definition and nature of terrorism and its relationship to *jihād*. A great deal of effort was exerted, and much time was devoted to the subject, but with little result: we have still not managed to arrive at a precise definition of terrorism. If we examine the term ‘terrorism’ (*irhāb*) from a linguistic and Qur’ānic point of view, we find that the meaning of *rahba* and *rahb*⁴⁹ is ‘terror’ or ‘fear’ along with ‘caution’ and ‘unrest’. God said: ‘You are stronger than them because of the terror [*rahba*] [in their hearts],’⁵⁰ and ‘[Draw your hand close to] your side to guard against fear [*rahb*].’⁵¹ One may say ‘a time of fear [*rahb*]’, meaning panic. God also said: ‘[They used to call on us] with love and reverence [*rahab*],’⁵² and ‘to strike terror [*turhibūna*] into the enemy of God and your enemy,’⁵³ and ‘they struck terror into them [*istarhabūhum*],’⁵⁴ and ‘fear [*fa-rhabūni*] none but me.’⁵⁵ *Irhāb* may also be used in the sense of ‘driving away camels’, from the verb *’arhabtu* (‘I drove away’). Also related to this is *rahb*, which refers to a camel that is ridden.⁵⁶

48 This tradition is related by Ibn Māja and was originally taken from al-Bukhārī. See aṣ-Ṣan‘ānī, *Subul as-salām*, IV, pp. 42–3.

49 These Arabic words are linked semantically with the word for terrorism (*irhāb*).

50 *Al-Ḥashr*, 59:13.

51 *Al-Qaṣaṣ*, 28:32.

52 *Al-Anbiyā’*, 21:90.

53 *Al-Anfāl*, 8:60.

54 *Al-A’rāf*, 7:116.

55 *Al-Baqara*, 2:40.

56 Ar-Raghīb al-Isfahanī, *al-Mufradāt fī gharīb al-qur’ān*, Beirut, ad-Dār ash-shāmiyya, n.d., p. 204.

Az-Zamakhsharī also studied the term and noted the following: *rahaba* ('he was frightened'), *rahabtu* ('I was frightened'), the root of which is *rahba* and *rahb* ('fear'); *rahbūt*, which is a man whose enemy is afraid and terrified of him; *'arhabtu* and *rahhabtu* ('I terrified [someone]'); *istarhabtu*, which means 'I incited fear in him'; one says 'the donation will not be accepted if it incites terror [*irhāb*].'⁵⁷ Every dictionary gives more or less the same definitions.⁵⁸

Rahb is not the only term in the Qur'ān that means 'fear' or 'terror'. There are other terms, the most important of which are *hashiya*, *khāfa* and *ittaqā*. *Khashya*, *khawf*, *wajal* and *rahba* are close but are not synonymous in meaning.⁵⁹ As for *rahba*, this means doing one's utmost to run away from a hated thing. If you are afraid of someone, you will run away from him; except God, for if you are afraid of Him, you will run towards Him: the frightened man runs from his Lord to his Lord.

The term is used with particular reference to the Israelites when they neglected and broke the Covenant. The Qur'ān describes this as a lack of fear (*hashiya*) and apprehension (*khawf*). Similarly, in the story of Moses and the Pharaoh, when the latter expressed doubt about Moses' ability to perform miracles, he filled the Egyptians with terror and struck fear and alarm in their hearts. The root of this is *istirhāb*, which is 'an attempt to fill someone with terror and to seek to bring this about by inciting it'. What is meant is that they filled someone with fear (*arhabū*) as if they instilled fear in them by some strategy and struck great fear in their hearts.

While the term *irhāb* means both fear and apprehension, *jihād* means defence of one's person and country and controlling one's unruly soul. God has exacted a promise from all humankind in conformity with human nature to consider and reflect and to weigh everything with the intellect and proper insight rather than with passions and illusions.

It is clear from the foregoing that there is absolutely no connection between the words *jihād* and *irhāb* in view of the different contexts in which they are used. In its comprehensive and general meaning, *jihād* is a sacred act of worship of God in order to exalt His word, to propagate lofty principles and to oppose tyranny and oppression. Nonetheless, the term has not been left so vague that the reasons for it and its consequences are unclear. It does not mean killing and destruction, but rather the exertion of effort in the

57 Az-Zamakhsharī, Maḥmūd ibn 'Umar, *Asās al-balāgha*, Beirut, Dār al-ma'rifa, 1982, p. 181.

58 Ibn Manẓūr, *Lisān al-'arab*, p. 436; al-Jawharī, Ismā'īl ibn Ḥammād, *aṣ-Ṣiḥāh*, Beirut, Dar al-'ilm li-l-malāyīn, 1979, I, p. 140; see also Majd-ad-Dīn al-Fayrūzabādī, *al-Qāmūs al-muḥīṭ*, Beirut, 1983, under '*rahaba*'.

59 See 'Alam-ad-Dīn, Aḥmad Muḥammad, 'Adab at-tarḥīb fi-l-qur'ān al-karīm', *Majallat āfāq ath-thaqāfa wa-t-turāth*, Year 5, Nos 20-1, April 1998.

cause of God and in support of His religion. The Qur'ān has made it clear that Islam does not encourage violence.

Terrorism means provoking fear and terror, and is a term that all parties can use. Those who define *jihād* as holy war, a war waged to spread Islam and to turn people into Muslims, are mistaken. It is those who are vanquished and defeated who use terrorism, seeking an excuse for themselves, as did the Israelites and the Pharaoh even though this was to no avail. As they say: 'The one who is defeated must always have an excuse for it.'

Jihād and international relations

Relations between Muslims and others are either peaceful and harmonious or antagonistic and hostile. Islam views the first situation as the most natural and basic. In such a relationship, Muslims ask non-Muslims not to erect obstacles between them and their desire to summon to the true religion through conviction and consent rather than compulsion and force. God said: 'Invite all to the way of your Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching and argue with them in ways that are best.'⁶⁰ In this manner, the Qur'ān stipulates that summoning people to God should not be done by compulsion and force, but rather by argumentation and proof. If people had allowed the Qur'ān to spread through its argumentation and proof, and had they given the intellect full freedom and choice, not a single drop of blood would have been spilt in the cause of God, and its summons would have conquered people's minds and penetrated their hearts through peaceful and persuasive methods. God said: 'Let there be no compulsion in religion. Truth stands out clear from error.'⁶¹

The Qur'ān is an invitation to peace and allows those who follow it to associate freely with others and exchange all that is beneficial with them. It does not restrict them in this except insofar as required by Islamic law, such as the forbidding of certain kinds of dealings and relations, for instance usury, the marriage of an adherent of a revealed religion to a female Muslim, or the marriage of a male Muslim to someone who is not an adherent of a revealed religion, and so on.

Similarly, Islam does not forbid Muslims from forming relations which they consider to be beneficial, such as in trade, industry, tourism, science and culture, and which they organize in a manner which is clearly sound, which is consonant with the norms of society and which is not in conflict with the moral code of the Qur'ān.

60 *An-Nahl*, 16:125.

61 *Al-Baqara*, 2:256.

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The Qur'ān lays down the bases of peaceful relations when God says: 'God does not forbid, with regard to those who fight you not for your faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them, for God loves those who are just.'⁶² This verse permits Muslims to establish whatever relations they desire between themselves and those who do not attack their religion or country. Indeed, Muslims are allowed to make charitable gifts to such people.

This is the relationship of peace and harmony. As for the relationship of antagonism and hostility, Islam has considered this from several different perspectives:

1. War is an inevitable result of human society. Islam has therefore accepted it and has neither rejected it nor opposed people's natural disposition towards it. On the contrary, Islam has acknowledged that war is a necessary means of repelling aggression and preventing corruption in the world. It is aware that human nature and social practices often give rise to contention, injustice, the denial of truth, attacks on freedoms and discord in religion. Islam is a practical code which does not disregard reality or abandon itself to fantasies. Had Islam not acknowledged war and recognized it as a means of resisting and repelling aggression, the forces of evil and corruption, which are always assisted by those of tyranny and oppression, would have put an end to this humanitarian call from the outset, and humanity would have been deprived of its virtues in this world and the next. Indeed, the Qur'ān alludes to this with God's words: 'Had not God repelled one set of people by means of another, the earth would indeed be full of corruption. But God is full of bounty to all the worlds.'⁶³ This is how Islam views war, by acknowledging it and deeming it legitimate.
2. Regarding the reasons for war, Islam has viewed war in a way that is consistent with its objective of ensuring reform and equality between people. Thus, Islam does not permit *jihād* for the purposes of conquest and colonization. This is demonstrated by the fact that it does not approve of wars of oppression, tyranny and persecution, which have been and remain the result of greed, envy, exploitation and a desire to exercise power over the weak, to deplete resources and to beleaguer the servants of God. Islam considers every war of this sort to be an act of tyranny and aggression which should not be launched by a community which respects humanity and human rights. Islam has thus limited the war of *jihād* to logical and rational reasons and has circumscribed

62 *Al-Mumtaḥana*, 60:8.

63 *Al-Baqara*, 2:251. See also *al-Ḥaj*, 22:40.

its scope in such a way that it is consistent with it being a necessity according to circumstances.

3. In addition to these principles and concepts, Islam has established a set of detailed regulations for the war of *jihād* based on justice, compassion and respect for human rights. These regulations govern actions before, during and after the war of *jihād*, as follows:

BEFORE COMMENCING JIHĀD⁶⁴

Islam holds that *jihād* may not begin until an intention to commit an act of aggression against Muslims has been ascertained by the Muslims, who in turn have informed the aggressors that they intend to respond. This is similar to what in contemporary international law is known as a final warning. This is because there is a requirement, before commencing hostilities, to issue an appeal to those who have not been made aware of Islam. Legal scholars have various opinions regarding those who have already been made aware of Islam, but the correct approach is to notify them so as to be certain.

The notification takes the form of inviting them either to convert to Islam or to pay the *jizya* tax. If they respond positively, they are left alone, but if they do not, then war is waged against them.⁶⁵ By means of such notification, Muslims are informing them that they are not fighting them in order to seize their possessions or take their families prisoner. Thus, they might respond to and comply with the summons without needing to fight. To fight them before giving notification is a sin which merits the wrath of God.

THE REGULATIONS DURING JIHĀD

Islam does not use *jihād* to punish or destroy, and it is unacceptable for Muslims undertaking it to forget the duty to be kind and compassionate towards their fellow human beings. Indeed, justice and fear are from God. The Prophet has provided detailed instructions on how to ensure that war is conducted humanely.

64 For further information on this and the following issues, see the books of *Hadīth*, jurisprudence, biographies and military campaigns of the Prophet, especially the chapters on *jihād* in the different schools of jurisprudence.

65 Al-Qarāfī, *adh-Dhakhīra*, III, p. 404.

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Rules of conduct in case of jihād war

1. It is forbidden to kill women, children, old people, the disabled and the blind. It is also forbidden to kill monks, farmers and craftsmen who do not take up arms.
2. It is forbidden to destroy or burn, to cut down trees which are in fruit or to demolish buildings except when the enemy has started to use these as quarters, in accordance with the principle of like for like, as mentioned in God's words: 'The recompense for an injury is an equal injury.'⁶⁶ The Prophet gave instructions to one of his commanders, saying:

I am instructing you in ten matters: do not kill a woman, a child or an old person; do not cut down a tree which is in fruit or set fire to inhabited areas; do not wound a sheep or a camel except for food; do not burn a date palm or flood it; do not put people in chains or act treacherously.⁶⁷

3. In conformity with the principles of Islam concerning *jihād* which provide that non-combatants such as women, the weak and civilians shall not be attacked, Islam has stipulated that the aggressor community shall not be subjected to starvation or prevented from receiving vital supplies, even though this is permitted with respect to the aggressor army.
4. Safe conduct or a pledge of security (*amān*) may be granted, and there should be no conditions attached to this except to guarantee the safety of the Muslims, such as ensuring that the person granted safe conduct is not unassailable or powerful and shows no signs of seeking to cause dissension or of spying on the Muslims. The basis of this principle, in which is apparent a spirit of magnanimity not seen even among the developed nations today, is God's words: 'If one among the pagans asks you for asylum, grant it to him so that he may hear the word of God, and then escort him to where he can be secure.'⁶⁸
5. One of the customs of Islam during *jihād* is to protect messengers who act as mediators between the Muslims and their opponents, to be concerned for their safety, to treat them honourably, to take care of them until they return to their positions, and to refuse to keep them even if they defect from their own side. There are many examples of this in the biography of the Prophet; the best one is that related by Abū Rāfi', who says:

66 *Ash-Shūrā*, 42:40.

67 Cited by Muslim in the chapter on *jihād*, tradition No. 3.

68 *At-Tawba*, 9:6.

The Quraysh sent me to the Prophet, so I went to him. But Islam took root in my heart and I decided not to return to them. I said: ‘O Prophet of God, I will not go back to them.’ ‘I cannot break an agreement,’ he replied, ‘any more than I can hold back the cold. Return to them and if your heart still contains what it does now, you will come back to us.’⁶⁹

6. Among the laws of Islam concerning *jihād* are those dealing with the treatment of prisoners. The Prophet ordered that they be treated well and not harmed. Regarding prisoners, he said: ‘Treat them well in captivity’ and ‘Gather together the food you have and send it to them.’⁷⁰ The Qur’ān in general urges that prisoners should be treated with deference, and has made this an act of piety which is a mark of faith. God said: ‘For the love of God they feed the indigent, the orphan and the captive, saying: “We feed you for the sake of God alone. We desire no reward from you nor thanks.”’⁷¹

In the same way as Islam has laid down laws for the treatment of prisoners on the basis of kindness and compassion, it has also laid down laws concerning the spoils of war on the basis of justice and equality, and has established the right of possession of the person who seizes this booty, whether a Muslim combatant or not.

The means of concluding the jihād war

Islam earnestly strives to achieve peace and tranquillity in the world. It therefore requires all Muslims to embrace peace and not to follow in the footsteps of the Devil. God said to His holy Messenger: ‘But if they incline towards peace, you also incline towards it and trust in God.’⁷² This means accepting reconciliation, since the religion of Islam is like peace, which in turn entails reconciliation. At the beginning of his time in Medina, the Prophet concluded a pact with the adherents of the revealed religions (*ahl al-Kitāb*, ‘the people of the Book’). This treaty was the first stone in the building of the Islamic state, just as it was the first political relationship established by Islam. In it, Islam acknowledged the liberty to practise one’s faith and exercise freedom of opinion, and protected the peace and security of the

69 Related by Abū Dāwūd and an-Nasā’ī and deemed authentic by Ibn Ḥibbān. See aṣ-Ṣan‘ānī, *Subul as-salām*, IV, p. 67.

70 Related by Ibn Māja. See also Al-‘Ālim, ‘Abd-al-Salam al-Sherīf, ‘al-Ḥuqūq al-insāniyya li-asrā al-ḥarb fi-l-islām wa-l-qānūn ad-dawālī al-insānī, *al-Majalla ad-dawliyya li-ṣ-saalīb al-aḥmar*, Year 4, No. 19, May/June 1991, p. 224.

71 *Al-Insān*, 76:8–9.

72 *Al-Anfāl*, 8:61.

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Muslims, the sanctity of their lives and the inviolability of the town of Medina in which they dwelt.

The method of concluding a peace treaty in Islam is no different from the way this is done under international law. The Muslims only did so after the necessary negotiations between themselves and their opponents, as occurred in the treaty of al-Ḥudaybiya,⁷³ which marked a temporary cessation of hostilities.⁷⁴ This is known as a truce or an armistice. The treaty may also mark a permanent cessation of hostilities, as was the case regarding the people of Najrān.⁷⁵

Islam leaves it to the Muslims to assess what is to be gained from the various kinds of permanent or temporary treaties. One condition must, however, be met, and this is that the treaty must not infringe the basic statutes of Islam or conflict with its general revealed laws. The basis of this is: 'Every condition which is not in God's book is invalid.'⁷⁶ This is similar to what a modern state would say: 'Any treaty not in accordance with the Constitution is invalid.'

Related to peace treaties is Islam's establishment of the principle of *jizya*. This is a domestic tax that the state imposes on non-Muslims residing within its territories. Its purpose is not, as some people believe, to compensate for their failure to adopt Islam or for having their lives spared. It is a symbol of their submission and their refraining from inciting discord and obstructing the summons to God, and is a form of assistance to enable them to hold positions in government departments and receive promotion in the same way as Muslims. In return for this tax, Muslims also offer them protection from attacks against their persons, families and possessions.

The Islamic conquests were not religious wars aimed at destroying a different faith, but were rather a result of one of the reasons mentioned previously. Similarly, they were not inspired by greed for economic gain or in order to dominate and achieve supremacy, but rather to enable certain principles and ideals to prevail.

73 Az-Zuhaylī, *Āthār al-ḥarb*, p. 658.

74 The truce concluded at al-Ḥudaybiya in AD 628 more or less ended hostilities between the tribe of the Quraysh and the Muslims.

75 The Christian town of Najrān in Yemen, which submitted to the political control of the Prophet without abandoning Christianity.

76 The authenticity of this tradition is generally accepted. It was related by 'Ā'isha in the context of the story of Barāra.

Conclusion

In general, *jihād* is one of the principles of Islam which has found its place among the religion's doctrines and laws. In verses concerning *jihād* in the Qur'ān, God linked it to faith, and made it one of the signs thereof. The doctrine of *jihād* is distinguished by the clarity of its purpose, which is not worldly or material gain or to usurp a right or commit an act of aggression against someone. On the contrary, *jihād* was legitimized so as to keep the faith, exalt the word of God, summon people to the true religion, protect the freedom to propagate the Islamic message, defend the Muslims and prevent attack. When the person who undertakes *jihād* is fighting in the cause of God, he is aware that he is engaging in a war which is just and honourable in its objectives and means.

The Qur'ān is the only divine book which addresses humanity in general, so it is only natural that many of its verses should deal with international relations in order to stress the principles of peace and security, equality and justice, respect for human rights and law, the concluding of treaties and agreements and the need to abide by these in all circumstances and situations. The Qur'ān commands us to respect our adversary, forbids us from aggression, treachery and oppression, and instructs us to accept peace and a cessation of hostilities as soon as the enemy requests conciliation, even though this might be a ruse on his part to gain time pending a resumption of hostilities.

Chapter 2.2

ISLAM IN SYRIA (ASH-SHĀM)

Mohammad Nabih Aqil

The universality of the call

God addressed the Prophet with the words: ‘We have not sent thee save as a bringer of good tidings and a warner unto all mankind; but most of mankind know not,’¹ and: ‘Lo! it is naught else than a reminder for all peoples.’² With this, the call was made universal to all humankind and was no longer restricted to Mecca, Medina, the Ḥijāz or the Arabian peninsula.

The sources, such as Ibn Sa‘d, Ibn Hishām, aṭ-Ṭabarī and Ibn Ḥabīb, state that after his departure from al-Ḥudaybiya, the Prophet sent six of his Companions (*Ṣaḥāba*) to the kings and princes of the neighbouring states to summon them to Islam. These men carried letters bearing the Prophet’s seal and brought back the replies, some accepting and others rejecting the call. Ibn Sa‘d devotes a special section to this event in his *Ṭabaqāt* in which he states:

Upon his return from al-Ḥudaybiya the Prophet of God sent envoys to the kings, summoning them to Islam. Having written letters, it was said to him: ‘Prophet of God, kings will only read letters which are impressed with a seal.’ And so the Prophet of God had a silver ring made and had engraved upon it, over three lines: ‘Muḥammad, the Prophet of God’, and with this he stamped the letters. Six Companions then departed on the same day in the month of al-Muḥarram 7/628. Each of them could speak the language of the people to whom he was sent.³

1 *Saba’*, 34:28.

2 *Ṣād*, 38:87.

3 Muḥammad ibn Sa‘d, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*, Beirut, Dār ṣādir, 1957–60.



2.3 Courtyard of the Umayyad Mosque, Damascus (© G.Degeorge)

There are a few letters that, according to the sources, the Prophet addressed to Christian bishops and Christian and Jewish leaders, such as the letters to Bishop ʿAḡhāṭir, the Banū Janba (a Jewish tribe which lived at Maqna, near Ayla), Yuḥannā ibn Ruʿba, the leaders of the people of Ayla, al-Ukaydir, the Christian chief of Dawmat al-Jandal, the Jewish tribe of Banū Ghādiyā and the Jews of Jarbā and Adhraḥ.⁴ These letters contained recognition of the territories and towns under their control in exchange for a declaration of submission to the Prophet and payment of the *jizya* (poll tax on non-Muslims) or *zakāh* (charitable welfare tax, for those who had converted to Islam).

In addition to this group to whom the Prophet first wrote calling them to Islam, there was another group of kings and princes who themselves took the initiative and wrote to the Prophet before he wrote to them, declaring their submission to Islam. These included Farwa ibn ʿAmr al-Judhāmī, the Byzantine governor of ʿAmmān and Maʿān in the territory of al-Balqāʾ. Reports of the Prophet and information about the religion to which he was summoning people reached Farwa, and he converted to Islam. He wrote to the Prophet to inform him of this and sent many gifts, including a white mule, a horse, a donkey, fine clothes and a cloak of silk brocade embroidered with gold. When news of Farwa's conversion reached the Byzantine emperor, he demanded that he renounce Islam; when Farwa refused, the emperor had him imprisoned, then put to death and crucified.⁵

4 For these, see Ibn Saʿd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, I, pp. 264–91.

5 For the story of Farwa's conversion, see *ibid.*, I, p. 281.

The mission of Usāma ibn Zayd

The Prophet was confident of bringing the whole of Arabia under the banner of Islam. Deciding to go to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage (*ḥajj*), he called upon the Muslims to perform it with him. They responded and a large number of tribesmen arrived in Medina intent on performing the pilgrimage with him. On 25 Dhu-l-Qa‘ada 10/631, the Prophet left Medina accompanied by a large number of Meccan Emigrants (*Muhājirūn* – the original group that emigrated from Mecca to Medina with the Prophet), Medinan Supporters (*Anṣār* – the first Medinan followers of Islam) and tribesmen, in total numbering some 1,000 men. They arrived in Mecca and performed the pilgrimage. On the day on which the pilgrims stay at ‘Arafāt, the Prophet delivered his immortal address, which Muslims consider to be the constitution of their religion. He had scarcely finished when God revealed to His Prophet: ‘This day have I perfected your religion for you, completed My favour upon you, and chosen for you Islam as your religion.’⁶ The Prophet’s message was completed with the revelation of this verse. He recited it to the Muslims and it had a profound effect upon their souls. On this pilgrimage, the Prophet saw how the word of Islam was raised up and the edifice of idolatry collapsed. Not a single idolater attended the pilgrimage in the year AH 10.

The Ka‘ba and its holy artefacts became reserved exclusively for Muslims, who went unchallenged. When he returned to Medina with his Companions, the Prophet felt that there was no longer anything to fear from Arabia now that its towns had professed Islam, the tribal delegations had sworn allegiance to him, and his envoys had returned from its kings and princes bearing letters of allegiance and loyalty. However, he realized that his nascent state was threatened from the north, as the Byzantines had taken up positions in southern Syria. Thus, fearing the infiltration of the Byzantines or their agents into his state, the Prophet directed his attention towards ensuring the northern borders of his country and extending his authority to the border regions. To this end, just after his return from the pilgrimage, he ordered an army to be mobilized in order to attack the southern regions of Syria. This army was entrusted to the command of Usāma ibn Zayd ibn Ḥāritha and he ordered the cavalry to ride out along the border areas of al-Balqā’ and ad-Dārūm in Palestine.⁷

The Prophet urged people to join Usāma’s army, a call that was eagerly received by many of the leading *Muhājirūn* and *Anṣār*, or Companions

6 *Al-Mā‘ida*, 5:3.

7 Ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, ed. Muṣṭafā as-Saqqā, et al., Cairo, Maṭba‘at Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1936, section II, p. 606.

(*Ṣaḥāba*) such as ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, Abū ‘Ubayda ibn al-Jarrāḥ, Sa‘d ibn Abī Waqqāṣ, Sa‘īd ibn Zayd and Qatāda ibn Nu‘mān. Some disapproved of the Prophet’s appointing a man as young as Usāma to be in charge of them. But when reports of this reached the Prophet, he calmed their disquiet and declared that he was putting Usāma in charge in order to honour the memory of his father, the martyr of Mu’ta. Shortly afterwards, the Prophet was seized by the illness that was to take his life, but he was nevertheless anxious to make progress in preparations for the campaign, and he urged the people to obey their commander.

Usāma set up camp for his troops outside Medina and ordered his army to join him. However, he had barely finished his preparations for the advance when he learnt that the Prophet’s illness had worsened, so he delayed his departure in order to be near and comfort him. The Prophet passed away and Usāma’s mission was postponed until Abū Bakr assumed the caliphate.

The death of the noble Prophet

At the end of the month of Ṣafar 11/632, the Prophet was stricken by fever. His wives asked permission to nurse him in ‘Ā’isha’s house and he agreed. He ordered Abū Bakr to lead the people in prayer during his illness. On Monday 12 Rabī‘ I 11/632, he was united in death with God. However, Islam continued to spread all over the world.

The conquest of Syria

During the last period of the Prophet’s life, Syria (ash-Shām) and the route leading to it had been a matter of concern to him. This is clear from his military activities in the northern Ḥijāz and on the fringes of southern Syria (Dhāt Aṭlāḥ in 8/629, Mu’ta in Jumāda I 8/629 and Dhāt as-Salāsil and Tabūk in 9/630). The Prophet’s concern may be attributed to a number of factors. Topographically, Syria is a natural extension of the Arabian peninsula. Furthermore, Syria enjoys religious prestige, especially with regard to Jerusalem, which before Mecca was the place towards which Muslims first turned in prayer. Jerusalem was also the destination of the Prophet’s miraculous night journey (*isrā’*) and the starting point for his ascension through the heavens (*mi‘rāj*). In addition, numerous trading caravans visited Gaza and Basra in southern Syria, and many Arab tribes were located in this

region to which aṭ-Ṭabarī gave the name of the land of Quḍā‘a, meaning the land of Palestine.⁸

One of the Prophet’s political goals was the incorporation of the Arabian tribes within the Islamic state, once the political importance of the support of these tribes had become clear to him during his struggle with the Quraysh. It is natural therefore that he should have proceeded to extend his control beyond the Ḥijāz northwards to southern Syria, and that this should have required additional effort, especially as the Islamic state was facing serious competition from the Byzantine empire, which was seeking to create, or recreate, a powerful alliance with its tribal allies. The invasion of Syria in AD 611 by the Sāsānids, who went on to invade Egypt in 617 and remained there for a decade or more, was a serious threat to Byzantine supremacy there. The Sāsānid occupation also undoubtedly represented a considerable disruption of the regimes and arrangements that had characterized Byzantine rule since it put an end to the Ghassānid kingdom, which in turn ended the tribal alliances that the Byzantine empire had endeavoured to maintain in the Syrian desert. Given the changes taking place among the Syrian tribes, the rebuilding of these alliances was not an easy task.

During the Sāsānid occupation and attendant resistance, it was only natural that several tribal groups should have exploited the chaos resulting from the collapse of central authority to migrate to the wealthy, civilized regions. There is no doubt that new tribal alliances and bonds emerged under these new conditions, although it is impossible to describe the details of these changes. We thus see that just as the Prophet was trying to bring the Arab tribes in the north under the authority of the Islamic state, the Byzantine empire was endeavouring to conclude new alliances with these same tribes. Ensuring that the liberation movement spread north towards Syria was thus extremely important for political and strategic reasons, as well as religious and economic ones.

Usāma ibn Zayd’s mission was the first military action to take place in Syria in the time of Abū Bakr. It is well known that the declared aim of Usāma’s mission was the Prophet’s desire to take revenge on the killers of Zayd ibn Ḥāritha, Ja‘far ibn Abī Ṭālib and ‘Abdallāh ibn Rawāḥa, the martyrs of Mu’ta, and that Abū Bakr was simply seeking to carry out the Prophet’s wish, despite Medina’s problems as a result of the *ridda* (apostasy, rejection) wars. In reality, however, Usāma ibn Zayd’s mission was designed to probe the Byzantine enemy force and ascertain its condition and reactions. This was in preparation for achieving the goal of the first Islamic state, namely to march forward and unfold the fluttering banners of Islam across the earth,

8 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, Muḥammad ibn Jarīr, *Tārīkh ar-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad Abū-l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Cairo, Dār al-ma‘ārif, 1969, III, p. 48.


and to engage in *jihād* in order to spread the religion and liberate occupied Arab land. Accordingly, following the victories of the Arab army on the Iraqi front, Abū Bakr turned his attention to Syria in 13/634. He sent against it armies of loyal men who were above suspicion and who had stood solidly and faithfully alongside his government during the ordeal of the *ridda* wars. If we attempt to follow the various reports of these armies, we are faced with a flood of information, names and leaders. This is due, on the one hand, to the large number of missions, and on the other, to confusion between armies and reinforcements, and the occasional disregard for an accurate chronology.

Nevertheless, in the many accounts of the Islamic armies' battles in Syria, we may distinguish two phases. In the first phase, the focus was essentially on the activities of the Arab commanders in regions in which Arab tribes formed a majority of the population, rather than on the main Syrian cities. The account of Ibn A'tham al-Kūfī states that Abū Bakr ordered Abū 'Ubayda to limit his operations to the countryside, and not to attack the cities until ordered to do so by Abū Bakr.⁹ This explains the lack of attention paid by the Greek and Syriac sources to the successes of the Arab armies at this stage because, in their view, the Muslims did not represent a threat as they had not attacked the major cities of Damascus, Jerusalem, Gaza and Basra, or the many important coastal towns.¹⁰ In the second phase, the Islamic army met the Byzantine forces in major battles, ending with Islamic mastery over Syria, the expulsion of the Byzantines, and the opening of the route in the north to al-Jazīra (north-west Iraq) and beyond, and in the south the route to Egypt and beyond.

This second phase began when the caliph Abū Bakr ordered Khālid ibn al-Walīd to hand over command of the Arab forces in Iraq to al-Muthannā ibn Ḥāritha and to advance with a section of his army into Syria to support the Arab armies there. Aṭ-Ṭabarī mentions that upon receiving Abū Bakr's order, Khālid left al-Ḥīra in Rabī' al-Ākhir 13/634 and crossed the desert in the record time of not more than five days, reaching Syria and heading for Basra. There he joined forces with Yazīd, Shuraḥbīl and Abū 'Ubayda and took part in the peaceful conquest of the city, the first Syrian city to be conquered in Abū Bakr's time. They then marched south to support 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ at Wādī 'Araba. When the Byzantines became aware of this concentration of Arab military forces, they altered their plans and made for Ajnādayn, where they gathered their troops together into a single army. The Arab forces, however, were able to achieve a resounding victory over them in Jumāda I 13/634. The battle of Ajnādayn had an enormous impact on Byzantine morale and plans,

9 Ibn A'tham al-Kūfī, *al-Futūḥ*, Beirut, Dār al-kutub al-'ilmiyya, 1986, I, p. 124.

10 Fred Donner, *The Early Islamic Conquests*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 117–18.



2.4 Praying hall of the Umayyad Mosque, Damascus
(© G. Degeorge)

forcing them to retreat to Jerusalem where they began to make preparations to deal the Muslims a decisive blow.

Khālid ibn al-Walīd discovered that the Byzantines had mobilized their forces in a unified formation; if the Arabs wanted victory over their enemy, they needed to do the same. Accordingly, Khālid assembled the Arab commanders and several of their leading men and explained the danger of having a dispersed Arab military leadership and the importance of having a unified organization and structure rather than being spread out and relying on mutual support. They agreed with him and appointed him as their overall commander.¹¹ Following this, Khālid mobilized his army in a manner the Arab armies had never seen before. He set out with thirty-six or forty cavalry regiments, placing Abū ‘Ubayda al-Jarrāh in command of the centre, ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ in command of the right flank, with Shuraḥbīl ibn Ḥasana as second in command, and Yazīd ibn Abī Sufyān in command of the left flank. Each regimental commander was a highly capable man with experience of battle.

Fighting broke out between the Muslims and Byzantines at the famous battle of Yarmūk (13/634). The combat was ferocious and both sides fought valiantly. While the battle raged, a message arrived from Medina with news of the death of Abū Bakr, the pledge of allegiance to ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb as the new caliph, and an order for Khālid’s removal from command of the army fighting at Yarmūk and his replacement by Abū ‘Ubayda. In the event, however, Abū ‘Ubayda kept the order secret and Khālid continued the battle

11 For the text of the speech, see aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, III, pp. 395–6.

until he was victorious. The Muslims seized much booty, with a cavalryman's share being 1,500 dirhams.

Following the battles of Ajnādayn and Yarmūk, and the eventual assumption of command of the army by Abū 'Ubayda, the Arab-Islamic army advanced to lay siege to Damascus, whose inhabitants were growing increasingly concerned at the news of the Muslim victories and the losses in men and *matériel* inflicted by the enemy.

Given what the various sources have to say on the subject, the issue of which Muslim commander was actually in charge of the Arab army at the siege and conquest of Damascus remains undecided, and researchers have advanced a variety of opinions. In his articles on the caliphate for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, the orientalist M. Jan De Goeje holds that Khālid was in command on the day Damascus was conquered. This view may stem, on the one hand, from Khālid's military fame in previous wars, and, on the other, from the prominent role he played in the conquest of the city itself. Whether Khālid or Abū 'Ubayda was in charge, most of the accounts in the Arabic sources indicate that 'Umar removed Khālid from command immediately upon his assumption of the caliphate. There are only a few accounts which state that Khālid's removal came after the conquest of Damascus, and this is attributable to the fact that they place the conquest of Damascus prior to the battle of Yarmūk.

It is difficult for the modern researcher to arrive at a definitive position on this matter. Perhaps the most important points we can make are that Abū Bakr died after the victory at Ajnādayn when Khālid was in command, and that 'Umar assumed the caliphate when the Muslims had already secured their position in Palestine. Nevertheless, 'Umar found that the situation required the dispatch of reinforcements to armies fighting in a distant land, and this forced him to seek assistance from some of the *ridda* tribes. Perhaps the new development following 'Umar's assumption of the caliphate was that several leaders of the *ridda*, one of the most prominent of whom was Qays ibn al-Makshūḥ, took part in the conquest.¹²

'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb's removal of Khālid ibn al-Walīd, and his giving the command to Abū 'Ubayda, was perhaps due to the fact that the *ridda* commanders now taking part in the conquests would more readily accept the latter as commander than Khālid. This explanation might absolve 'Umar from the recurrent charge made against him that he dismissed Khālid because of animosity between them. In fact, it is another sign of 'Umar's administrative and political genius that in the new situation he chose as commander a person who could rally the fighting forces around him without his presence giving rise to dissent.

12 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, III, p. 448.

The attitude of Khālid ibn al-Walīd, who accepted the new situation, shows that he had a deep understanding of the reasons that prompted the caliph to take this decision, and was dedicated to the military and ideological mission he had assumed first as commander and subsequently as combatant. It likewise appears that Abū ‘Ubayda also had the wisdom to understand the reasons that had prompted this change in command, as he continued to play the formal role of commander while entrusting Khālid, who alone had all the requisite skill and knowledge, with effective military command. This dual role of both Abū ‘Ubayda and Khālid is, in the present author’s view, the reason for the contradiction in the original accounts regarding who the actual commander was at the conquest of Damascus. On the basis of this interpretation, the discussion below will adopt the point of view of the majority of accounts, which hold that Abū ‘Ubayda was the commander of the Arab forces that advanced to conquer Damascus.

Abū ‘Ubayda is said to have advanced as far as Marj aṣ-Ṣafar, on the plain some 20 km south of Damascus and east of Ṭabariyya. Here he learnt that the Byzantines had established themselves at Fiḥl (Pella), and at the same time, that the terrified Byzantine leadership of Damascus had appealed for help from the people of Ḥomṣ, who sent a contingent to assist them. Abū ‘Ubayda did not know which area to begin with, and thought it best to seek the advice of the caliph. He received a reply from ‘Umar which said:

Begin with Damascus, because it is the fortress of Syria. Tie down the people of Fiḥl with your cavalry, as well as the people of Palestine and Ḥomṣ. If God allows them to be conquered before Damascus, that would please us, but if conquest is delayed until after Damascus is conquered, let whoever seizes them remain in Damascus and rule them, while you and the other commanders advance to attack Fiḥl. If you conquer it, you and Khālid head for Ḥomṣ, leaving Shuraḥbīl and ‘Amr as commanders of Jordan and Palestine, with a governor and garrison for each town, until they leave their commands.¹³

The caliph’s reply contained a clear plan of action for Abū ‘Ubayda, who dispatched ten commanders to Fiḥl.¹⁴ They advanced from Marj aṣ-Ṣafar and encamped close to the town. When the Byzantines saw that the Arabs meant to attack them, they opened the irrigation channels around Fiḥl, turning the ground into mud. The Arabs were cut off, surrounded by water and the enemy, and news of what was happening could not reach their compatriots.

13 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, III, p. 438.

14 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, III, p. 438.

Abū ‘Ubayda marched on Damascus in al-Muḥarram 14/634, accompanied by the generals Khālīd ibn al-Walīd, ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ, Shuraḥbīl ibn Ḥasana and Yazīd ibn Abī Sufyān. They laid violent siege to Damascus, with infantry, catapults and mangonels.¹⁵ The city appealed for help to the Byzantine emperor, Heraclius, who supplied a force from Ḥomṣ. However, this force was unable to reach Damascus and, without reinforcements, the city’s leaders became convinced that they would be wiped out and their resolve weakened.

The sources are at variance regarding the precise circumstances of the conquest, just as they differ concerning the date and length of the siege. The majority opinion is that one section of the city was taken peacefully while another was seized by force. Ibn ‘Asākir provides the text of a letter written by Abū ‘Ubayda for endorsement by the Damascenes on the occasion of the conclusion of peace in which he stipulates their rights and duties.¹⁶ This letter is another subject of debate among historians.

Having conquered Damascus, Abū ‘Ubayda left Yazīd ibn Abī Sufyān and his cavalry in the city and with the rest of his generals marched to Fiḥl where, despite the water and mud, they won a brilliant victory against the Byzantines. The only Byzantines to escape were those who took flight. From Fiḥl, Abū ‘Ubayda departed for Ḥomṣ with Khālīd, leaving Shuraḥbīl and ‘Amr in Jordan and Palestine.

It appears that the battle of Yarmūk, the conquest of Damascus and the Arab victory at Fiḥl effectively handed the reins of power in Syria and al-Jazīra to the Muslims, as it enabled them to control the central region of Syria, protect their rear in the desert, and subsequently fan out both north and south. To the south, matters would be concluded with the capture three years later of Jerusalem in 17/638, and then Caesarea (Qayṣariyya), a coastal town whose position allowed the Byzantines to receive supplies by sea, which finally surrendered in 19/640.

In the north, the conquests continued after Ḥomṣ, with the Islamic armies able to take Ḥamāh, Shayzar, Qinnisrīn and Aleppo (Ḥalab), after which they took the Christian stronghold of Antioch (Anṭākiya). They subsequently headed east to al-Jazīra, which was the easiest of the lands to conquer as its people quickly agreed to pay the *jizya*.¹⁷ The geographical position of this region, between Iraq and Syria both of which were under Muslim control, made it easy to encircle it and for the armies in Syria and Iraq to supply one another. This was one of the major factors dictating the response of the people in the region to the Muslim advance. The strongest

15 Ibid.

16 Abu-l-Qāsim Ibn ‘Asākir, *Tahdhīb tārīkh Dimashq*, Beirut, Dār al-maṣīr, AH 1399, I, pp. 148–50.

17 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, IV, p. 53.

evidence for this comes from the account of Sayf, on the authority of as-Sarī, on the authority of Shu‘ayb, which states that when ‘Umar wrote to Sa‘d ibn Abī Waqqāṣ asking him to send al-Qa‘qā‘ and 4,000 troops to reinforce Abū ‘Ubayda when he was under threat from the Byzantines at Ḥomṣ, Suhayl ibn ‘Uday and his army followed the al-Farāḍ road until they reached Raqqa. The people of al-Jazīra had left Ḥomṣ for their villages when they heard of the massacre of the people of al-Kūfa. Suhayl made camp and surrounded them whereupon they sued for peace, realizing that they lay between Iraq and Syria and would not survive a war against either. They thus sent a delegation to ‘Iyāḍ ibn Ghanam, camped in the centre of al-Jazīra, who decided to accept it.¹⁸

The effect of the conquests on the spread of Islam

The Arab conquests that took place in the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (*al-Khulafā’ ar-Rāshidūn*) had a remarkable effect on the rapid dissemination of the Islamic religion and the Arabic language. Islam entered these lands with the Arab invasion, and it was not long before it came to predominate over the pre-existing religions and Muslims became the majority. However, it is certain that the Arab state, founded on the basis of the call to Islam and whose primary aim was to protect the religion and render it victorious, forced none of its non-Muslim subjects to abandon their own religions. The reason for this is that the Qur’ān accepts no compulsion in respect of religion. As God says: ‘There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is henceforth distinct from error. And he who rejecteth false deities and believeth in God hath grasped a firm handhold which will never break. God is the Hearer, the Knower.’¹⁹ Addressing His Prophet, God says: ‘And if thy Lord willed, all who are in the earth would have believed together. Wouldst thou compel men until they are believers?’²⁰ There are many other Qur’ānic verses which convey this idea. In the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the Arabs gave the peoples of the conquered lands three choices: Islam, paying the *jizya* or war. The call to Islam was the first step in the conquests, and the epitome and mission of the movement.

To spread Islam, the Rightly Guided Caliphs relied upon people following the example of the Muslims, in particular the warriors. They therefore issued strict moral instructions to the Muslim soldiery. The instructions of Abū Bakr to Usāma ibn Zayd are virtually without parallel

18 Ibid.

19 *Al-Baqara*, 2:256.

20 *Yūnus*, 10:99.

when compared with those of any king, governor or army commander throughout history, whether ancient or modern. Similarly, the Arab commanders in the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs were able to gain the trust of the local populations because of the policy of tolerance they pursued, realizing that a sense of security and the safeguarding of property are people's first requirements, and that it is these which create their horizons. If they have a secure environment, unperturbed by fear, they will have confidence in those who bear the message and admiration for what they believe in, and this admiration may be a pathway to participation and belief.

The Muslim commanders proceeded to settle Muslims in various regions, as was done by as-Simṭ ibn al-Aswad al-Kindī when he divided Ḥomṣ into districts for the Muslims to live in, settling them in all the areas abandoned by the locals or on deserted lots. When 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān appointed Mu'āwiya to be the governor of Syria and al-Jazīra, he ordered him to settle the Arabs in areas far from the towns and villages, and to permit them to work lands over which others had no rights.

With the spread of Islam, it became necessary to send scholars to instruct the newly converted Muslims in religious matters. Thus 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb sent Mu'ādh ibn Jabal, 'Abbāda ibn aṣ-Ṣāmit and Abu-d-Dardā' to Syria to teach the Qur'ān and to provide religious instruction. 'Abbāda took up residence initially in Ḥomṣ, Abu-d-Dardā' went to Damascus, and Mu'ādh to Palestine. Mu'ādh died in the year of the plague of Emmaus in the Jordan region of Syria in 18/639. 'Abbāda ibn aṣ-Ṣāmit subsequently went to Palestine, where he became the first judge. 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb ordered Mu'āwiya to appoint Abu-d-Dardā' as the first judge of Damascus, and he remained in that city until his death.

To 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb also belongs the credit for alerting Abū Bakr to the necessity of having a compilation of the Qur'ān made after the reciters were killed at the battle of al-Yamāma. Abū Bakr entrusted this delicate task to Zayd ibn Thābit. The pages remained with Abū Bakr until his death, passing to 'Umar and then to 'Umar's daughter, Ḥafṣa.

The caliph 'Uthmān ibn 'Affān ordered that the Qur'ān compiled in the time of Abū Bakr be copied and distributed to the major cities after Ḥudhayfa ibn al-Yamān told him of the variant readings among the Muslims and urged him to correct the Muslim community before it diverged like the Jews and the Christians. So 'Uthmān ordered the pages in Ḥafṣa's Qur'ān to be copied, and these copies were sent to the four corners of the Islamic state. He instructed that all other individual pages or volumes of the Qur'ān be burnt. Some people who sought to blame 'Uthmān for this decision were told by 'Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib that had 'Uthmān not taken this action, he would have done so himself. 'May God bless 'Uthmān on behalf of the Muslim

community,' said 'Alī. 'What he has done is a righteous act of piety. The credit due to him for bringing people back to a single reading is as great as that of Abū Bakr in compiling the Qur'ān.'

Administrative and financial organization under the Rightly Guided Caliphs

Upon the death of the Prophet, the caliph became the political head of the community and holder of the reins of temporal power. In Islam, the caliphate does not depend on a divine mandate, but rather on the will of the believers. The caliph was supposed to act in accordance with God's book and the practice (*sunna*) of His Prophet. In other words, he must obey and be subject to the law, in the same way as other individuals were. However, the caliph was not legally responsible to any person or secular institution. There were no legal restrictions to hold him to account or punish him if he erred or made a mistake. He thus enjoyed wide powers.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM

It is true that all the Rightly Guided Caliphs, and 'Umar in particular, usually sought advice from others concerning issues referred to them. However, they were not obliged to accept the views of those they consulted. They could reject or accept them as they were, or accept them in amended form. When the views of advisers differed, the caliphs chose which course to follow, and it was they who had to assume responsibility for these decisions, not the advisers. Furthermore, the choice of advisers was dependent upon the will of the caliph, rather than on a generally recognized law.

As head of state and controller of the administrative system, the caliph had the right to choose whomever he wished to handle the affairs of the administration and government. He was responsible for the actions of those he selected because they were subject to him and acted on his behalf.

In the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the administration was centralized. This did not become apparent during the caliphate of Abū Bakr, which lasted no more than two years and four months. It did, however, become clear during the caliphate of 'Umar. This centralization did not arise as a result of the caliph's desire to become involved in the affairs of each province; his concern was solely with the establishment of righteousness and justice in each region to which Islam extended. He believed deeply that the responsibility for this, first and last, was the caliph's. This is clear from the caliph's selection, strict control over, and holding to account of his governors,



2.5 Citadel of Aleppo (© UNESCO)

and in his linking the greatest possible number of governors directly to himself. It was he who appointed the governors of Mecca, aṭ-Ṭā'if, Yemen, al-Kūfa and Basra, and he who appointed the military commanders of Syria, Egypt, Bahrain, Mosul and Azerbaijan.²¹

The powers of the governor were dependent on the provisions contained in his letter of appointment, whether these included leading the prayer, the authority to conduct war or collecting the land tax (*kharāj*), or all three. The caliph 'Umar did not follow a set method; rather, his approach appears to have been dependent upon the personality of the governor and on the city. Thus, in al-Kūfa in 21 / 642, 'Umar appointed 'Ammār ibn Yāsir as leader of the prayer and of war, 'Abdallāh ibn Mas'ūd to the treasury and 'Uthmān ibn Ḥunayf to the *kharāj*;²² in Syria, he placed Mu'āwiya ibn Abī Sufyān in charge of the army and the *kharāj*; and in Jordan, Shuraḥbīl ibn Ḥasana in charge of the army and the *kharāj*.²³ In Egypt, 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ was both governor and in charge of the *kharāj* until 'Umar's assassination.²⁴ 'Umar appointed not only

21 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, III, p. 241; Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, ed. Muḥammad Riḍwān, Cairo, al-Maṭba'a al-miṣriyya, 1932, pp. 322–7; Abū Zakariyya al-Azdī, *Tārīkh al-Mawṣil*, Cairo, Dār iḥyā' at-turāth al-islāmī, 1387 / 1967, p. 18.

22 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, IV, p. 144; Abū Ḥanīfa Aḥmad ibn Dāwūd ad-Dīnawarī, *al-Aḥbār aṭ-ṭiwāl*, ed. 'Umar Fārūq aṭ-Ṭabbā', Beirut, Dār al-arqam, 1995, p. 129; Ibn Sa'd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt*, II, p. 3.

23 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, IV, p. 62.

24 Abū 'Umar Yūsuf ibn 'Abdallāh ibn Muḥammad ibn 'Abd-al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr wa-l-Maghrib*, ed. Anīs aṭ-Ṭabbā', Cairo, 1961, pp. 151–2; aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, IV, p. 241.

governors, but also *kharāj* agents, secretaries of government departments and judges.²⁵ In other words, commanders or governors did not have the wide powers they came to enjoy under the later Umayyads.

The governors and agents were directly responsible to the caliph for their actions, and were closely supervised by him. Nothing was hidden from him.²⁶ The caliph's knowledge of what his agents in distant lands were doing was the same as his knowledge of those who remained in his presence.²⁷ Likewise, it was 'Umar's practice and custom to take his agents on the pilgrimage with him each year to discuss policy, to isolate them from ordinary citizens and to give those with complaints an opportunity to make these known to him.²⁸ Thus, during 'Umar's time, his governors and agents had to give an account to him of all the measures and steps they took.

THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM

As various Persian and Byzantine regions were brought within the scope of the Islamic state, the wars waged by the Persian and Byzantine empires came to an end. As a result, the subjects of all faiths were able to devote themselves to pursuing their livelihoods. Such wars as occurred were either in distant borderlands or were limited, local conflicts in which only certain political groups took part and which, at any rate, did not have the aim of causing devastation as had been the case in the wars between the Persians and Byzantines. After a long-lasting truce, war broke out again between the Sāsānid and Byzantine empires in AD 502 and did not end until 591. Even more violent wars resumed at the beginning of the seventh century AD.²⁹

It is natural that these wars should have had an impact on the peoples of the two empires, people who had endured destruction and borne the burden of oppressive taxation. When the Islamic state expanded to include these regions within its domain, a financial system prevailed which may be said to have been unified apart from several minor differences dictated by regional circumstances. Islam abolished most previous taxes and retained just the *jizya* and the *kharāj* because these had both been present under the previous two regimes.

25 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, IV, p. 256; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 225; Ibn 'Abd-al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*, p. 178; Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, *Tārīkh Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt*, ed. Akram al-'Amri, Najaf, Maṭba'at al-ādāb, 1967, I, p. 158.

26 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, IV, p. 67.

27 Al-Jāhiz, Abū 'Uthmān, *at-Tāj fī akhlāq al-mulūk*, Beirut, ash-Sharika al-lubnāniyya li-l-kitāb, n.d., p. 168.

28 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, IV, pp. 165–6.

29 N. H. Baynes, *The Byzantine Empire*, London, Oxford University Press, 1932, pp. 40–1; H. G. Wells, *A Short History of the World*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1936, p. 157.

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The principal sources of income for the Persian empire were the property tax and personal tax.³⁰ However, the levying of these two taxes was imprecise, and their amounts were variable, with the result that in most cases when war broke out unexpectedly, the state lacked financial resources. It was thus forced to impose oppressive additional taxes the burden of which, according to Christensen, largely fell upon the rich western regions, especially Iraq.³¹ Furthermore, there were the regular taxes and gifts, known as *āyīn*, offered to the king on the festivals of Nawrūz and Mihragān, and war booty which, although irregular, was nevertheless substantial, and the taxes and donations imposed by the clerics on individuals.

With the arrival of Islam, these taxes were abolished, save for the *jizya* and the *kharāj*, as mentioned previously. In other words, taxation was simplified and the burden reduced. Also, equality between all was established in respect of the tax burden. This meant the abolition of the privileges enjoyed by special groups such as the aristocracy in Syria and Egypt, and the noble families, powerful individuals, priests, military leaders, secretaries and those in the service of the king who were exempt from payment of the *jizya* and other taxes.³²

The poll tax on non-Muslims (jizya)

The Rightly Guided Caliphs observed the same rules as those followed during the time of the Prophet. The Prophet had ordered that battle be done with the idol-worshipping Arabs until they embraced Islam, and that the *jizya* would not be accepted from them. Arab Christians and Jews were to be fought until they paid the *jizya* 'willingly, having been humbled'.³³ The Prophet accepted the *jizya* from these, as he did from the people of Yemen who were also Christians and Jews. The amount of the *jizya* was often 1 dinar per adult, which was what the Prophet imposed on the Christians and Jews in Yemen. The same was the case with the people of Ayla after the ruler sued for peace, with the proviso that each adult landowner pay 1 dinar per annum. Similarly, Abū Bakr accepted *jizya* from the people of al-Ḥīra, who were a mix of rich Arabs from the tribes of Tamīm, Ṭay', Ghassān and Tanūkh, when they were conquered peacefully by Khālīd ibn al-Walīd.

30 Ad-Dīnawarī, *al-Akhbār aṭ-ṭiwāl*, p. 7.

31 A. E. Christensen, 'Sassanid Persia', in S. A. Cook et al. (eds), *The Cambridge Ancient History*, XII: *The Imperial Crisis and Recovery (193–324 AD)*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1939, pp. 111–12; Daniel Dennett, *Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1950, p. 47.

32 Ad-Dīnawarī, *al-Akhbār aṭ-ṭiwāl*, p. 75.

33 *At-Tawba*, 29:9.

The *jizya* might be imposed upon several bodies jointly, as the Prophet did with the people of Taymā', Tabūk and Adhraḥ, reaching a settlement whereby 100 dinars would be paid each month of Rajab.³⁴ On several payers of *jizya* the Prophet also imposed the condition that they host Muslims, as he did with the people of Tabāla and Jarash.³⁵ The *jizya* would sometimes be paid in kind, as the Prophet did with the people of Maqna and Najrān, when he stipulated 1,000 suits of clothing (*ḥulla*) in the month of Ṣafar, and the same in the month of Rajab, the value of each *ḥulla* being 1 ounce of silver.

The Rightly Guided Caliphs followed these rules, and the *jizya* was thus sometimes applied jointly, as when Khālīd ibn al-Walīd reached a settlement with the people of al-Ḥīra for the payment of 100,000 dirhams (some sources say 80,000) per annum. This rule was followed in the case of most Iranian towns, and we notice that the *jizya* was not specified on a per capita basis, the matter rather being left to the local rulers. However, the Muslim commanders always stressed the need to impose the *jizya* upon the ruler to the extent of his ability to pay.³⁶

In the cases of the treaty of Jurjān and the treaty that 'Abdallāh ibn 'Āmir made with the leader of Herāt, Būshang and Bādghīs, we find the same wording, but observe that the *jizya* was not applied to those in the service of the Arabs: 'And those of you whose assistance we call upon, their tribute shall be in the form of their assistance instead of the *jizya*.'³⁷ This was also applied in the case of the treaty of 'Utba ibn Farqad with the people of Azerbaijan, and that of Surāqa ibn 'Umar with Shahr-Barāz and the people of Armenia.³⁸

In lands conquered by the Muslims by force and left by the caliph under the control of their rulers in exchange for the *jizya* and the *kharāj*, the *jizya* was imposed upon all who refused to convert to Islam in exchange for protection. This applied to Jews, Christians, Sabeans, Samaritans and even Magians, after 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn 'Awf had affirmed to 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb that he heard the Prophet saying: 'Legislate for them as for the people of the Book.'

'Amr ibn 'Awf, the ally of the 'Amr ibn Lu'ay tribe and who was at the battle of Badr with the Prophet, stated that the Prophet accepted the *jizya* from the people of Bahrain who were Magians.³⁹ In the time of the Rightly Guided

34 Ibid., p. 70.

35 Ad-Dīnawarī, *al-Akḥbār aṭ-ṭiwāl*, p. 244.


36 On the treaties with the Iranian towns, see Muḥammad Ḥamīdullāh, *Majmū'at al-wathā'iq as-siyāsiyya li-l-'ahd an-nabawī wa-l-khilāfa ar-rāshida*, Tehran, 1969, pp. 318–58, 360.

37 Ḥamīdullāh, *Majmū'at al-wathā'iq*, p. 361.

38 Ibid., pp. 363, 374.

39 Abū 'Ubayd al-Qāsim ibn Sallām, *Kitāb al-amwāl*, Cairo, Maṭba'at Majāzī, 1353/1934, p. 32.

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2.6 Map of the Umayyad caliphate in 750 (© Hugh Kennedy)

Caliphs, the *jizya* was only imposed on adult men,⁴⁰ not on women or children or those with no worldly possessions.⁴¹ The *jizya* varied in accordance with the affluence of the people of the region and their ability to pay. In this regard, Abū ‘Ubayd ibn Sallām comments that the Prophet imposed 1 dinar (then worth 10 or 12 dirhams) upon each adult in Yemen. This was less than what ‘Umar imposed upon the people of Syria and Iraq, the higher rate being due to the Yemenis’ greater affluence and ability to pay.⁴²

The *jizya* in Syria was initially a measure of wheat together with 1 dinar per capita; then ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb established it as 4 dinars on gold merchants and 40 dirhams on traders, taxing the rich heavily, the poor lightly and the middle classes moderately.⁴³ The first change made by the Arabs to the Byzantine system was when ‘Umar imposed the *jizya* upon all classes of society, ordering, according to Michael the Syrian, a census of personal wealth to be carried out in all parts of the state.⁴⁴ However, in Syria and al-Jazīra, the Arab commanders faced the issue of Arabs who refused to pay the *jizya* out of pride. Thus, Jabala ibn al-Ayham refused to pay and left Syria for Byzantine territory. ‘Umar was therefore forced to apply the *ṣadaqa* (charitable tax) on the Christians of the tribe of Taghlib, since when he sought to levy the *jizya* upon them, they fled. Zar‘a ibn an-Nu‘mān ibn Zar‘a at-Taghlibī told him:

They are an Arab tribe which disdains to pay the *jizya*, and they have a grievance. Do not let your enemy get the better of you. Double the *ṣadaqa* and make it a condition that their children do not become Christians.⁴⁵

In other words, double the *ṣadaqa* paid by Muslims was to be levied on everything, including the *zakāh* on camels, cattle, goats, crops and dates. Although double the *ṣadaqa* was imposed on the Banū Taghlib, men and women who paid this were treated equally, as it was not a head tax but a tax on property. It was similarly imposed upon everyone whether indebted or otherwise.⁴⁶ Although the tax on the Christians of the Taghlib tribe was double that which was levied on the land of Muslims, the method of levying the tax on their property was the same as that of the *kharāj*, as it was an alternative to the *jizya*. There is general agreement on this.⁴⁷

40 Ibid., p. 37.

41 Ḥamīdullāh, *Majmū‘at al-wathā‘iq*, p. 362.

42 Ibn Sallām, *Kitāb al-amwāl*, pp. 39–40.

43 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūh al-buldān*, p. 131.

44 Dennett, *Conversion*, p. 108.

45 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūh al-buldān*, p. 187; Ibn Sallām, *Kitāb al-amwāl*, p. 28; Abū Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh ibn Muslim ibn Qutayba, *Kitāb al-ma‘ārif*, Cairo, Dār al-ma‘ārif, 1960, p. 241.

46 Yaḥyā ibn Ādam, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, Cairo, 1928, p. 66.

47 Ibid., p. 67.

Leaving aside the Banū Taghlib, ‘Iyād ibn Ghanam in al-Jazīra imposed 1 dinar per capita, excluding women and children, plus 2 measures (*mudd*) of wheat, 2 measures (*qist*) of oil and 2 measures of vinegar, placing everyone on the same footing.⁴⁸

Al-Balādhurī’s account of the situation in the Sawād (middle and lower Iraq) agrees with that of Abū Yūsuf, to the effect that ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb ordered the imposition of 48 dirhams per capita on local landowners who rode horses and wore gold rings, and 24 dirhams per capita on their commercial agents,⁴⁹ and that ‘Uthmān ibn Ḥunayf took a census of the Sawād and concluded that there were 550,000 non-believers.⁵⁰

The land tax (kharāj)

The conquests created one major problem, namely what to do with the extensive lands conquered by the Muslims. After the conquest of Iraq, Sa‘d ibn Abī Waqqāṣ wrote to the Commander of the Faithful, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, informing him: ‘The people have asked that their spoils and what has been awarded them be divided among them.’⁵¹ After the conquest of Syria, Abū ‘Ubayda wrote to ‘Umar informing him that the Muslims had asked him to divide the towns, people and land, including plantations and crops, among them. He refused to do this until ‘Umar wrote back with his views.⁵² The troops that had come from Iraq and a group of Companions requested that ‘Umar divide up the conquered territories, as the palm groves had been; al-Balādhurī mentions a series of accounts all of which pertain to the era of ‘Umar, indicating the imposition of the *kharāj* on each cultivated field, by type of crop.⁵³ The accounts relating to the *kharāj* by Abū Yūsuf and Ibn Sallām indicate a difference in the amount of tax per cultivated field of the same crop type. This may be attributable to the varying fertility of the land from one place to another and the distance or proximity to market.

As regards Syria, all accounts relating to the conquest indicate the existence of a provisions tax (*rizq*, pl. *arzāq*) as well as the *jizya*. Since there are no clear indications with regard to the imposition of the *kharāj*, perhaps in this early period the *rizq* represented a tax on land. Moreover, accounts relating to the subsequent imposition of the *kharāj* are not readily available. On the basis of Abū Yūsuf’s account, it can be inferred that the measures

48 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 79.

49 Ya‘qūb Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, Cairo, al-Maṭba‘a al-amīriyya, AH 1303, p. 45; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 271.

50 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 270.

51 Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, p. 29; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 165; Abu-l-Faraj ibn al-Jawzī, *Tārīkh ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb*, Damascus, Maktabat as-salām, n.d., p. 112.

52 Ḥamīdullāh, *Majmū‘at al-wathā‘iq*, p. 316.

53 *Ibid.*, pp. 268–96.

instituted in Syria were perhaps similar to those instituted in the Sawād in Iraq in respect of the cadastral survey, the difference in the amount of tax per cultivated field of the same crop type, the method of irrigation, and the distance or proximity to market. Moreover, these measures were not imposed in one fell swoop, but gradually.⁵⁴

In Egypt, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb imposed the same system as in the Sawād, Syria and al-Jazīra, and land taken by force was treated in the same way as land taken peacefully. Al-Balādhurī relates three accounts regarding the *kharāj* imposed, indicating the resulting developments. The first account states that ‘Umar required all landowners to pay 3 measures (*ardab*) of wheat, 2 measures (*qisṭ*) of oil, 2 of honey and 2 of vinegar to the Muslims, to be collected by the tax department (*dār ar-rizq*) and distributed.⁵⁵ The second states that he established the *kharāj* in Egypt at a rate of 1 dinar and 3 *ardabs* of victuals (1 *ardab* equals 69.6 kg of wheat or barley). The third account states that during ‘Umar’s caliphate, after the first peace treaty, those paying the *jizya* settled on 2 dinars in place of the wheat, oil, honey and vinegar, and that ‘Umar imposed 4 dinars upon each man, which they were satisfied with and accepted.⁵⁶

It appears from these three accounts, in addition to the account of al-Ya‘qūbī, that the *jizya* was paid in cash while the *kharāj* was paid in both cash and kind.⁵⁷ In the Arab papyrus documents, the tax paid in kind is called a food tax, while in the Greek documents it is known as the *embole*. There is no doubt that the taxes were army booty.⁵⁸ ‘Umar thought that if the land in Iraq and Syria, with their non-Muslim populations, was shared out among the Muslim combatants there would be few human or material resources with which to defend the frontier outposts, and little left for the children and widows of the people of Syria and Iraq.⁵⁹ He therefore sought the advice of the *Muhājirūn*, who differed in their views. He then wrote to ten of the Medinan *Anṣār*, five from among the senior figures of the tribe of Aws and five from the tribe of Khazraj, explaining the situation and the advantage of leaving the land in the possession of its owners in exchange for the imposition of a land tax and a poll tax, a portion of which would go to the benefit of Muslim fighters and their children and descendants. They agreed with his view.⁶⁰

54 Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, p. 49.

55 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 216.

56 *Ibid.*, p. 218.

57 Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya‘qūb al-Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh al-Ya‘qūbī*, Beirut, Dār ṣādir, 1960, II, p. 154.

58 Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, p. 28.

59 *Ibid.*, p. 30.

60 *Ibid.*

Once he had decided to leave the land in the possession of its owners, ‘Umar had a land survey carried out, which produced a count of people, land, livestock, trees and palm trees. According to Theophanes, this was done in the thirtieth year of the rule of Heraclius (r. 610–41), The thirtieth year of Heraclius’ rule was 20/640, the year in which control was established over Syria and al-Jazīra, and when the Persian threat to Iraq had more or less disappeared. It thus became possible to regulate various administrative and financial matters. Theophanes’ account agrees with those of aṭ-Ṭabarī and Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt in that in 21/641 the caliph ‘Umar dispatched ‘Uthmān ibn Ḥunayf together with ‘Ammār ibn Yāsir and ‘Abdallāh ibn Mas‘ūd to survey the Sawād. Possibly a survey of Syria and al-Jazīra was carried out first. After the direct Persian threat was removed following the battle of Nahāwand in 21/642, ‘Umar went ahead with the survey of Iraq.⁶¹

The *kharāj* in Iraq was initially set at 1 dirham and 1 measure (*qafīz*) of wheat and barley on each cultivated or uncultivated field, without regard to other crops cultivated thereon.⁶² It was to be expected that the tax of 1 dirham and 1 *qafīz* of wheat and barley would be unacceptable to some farmers, given that certain lands were planted with fruit trees and other more valuable crops, and those who grew wheat on their land paid the same as those growing produce yielding a higher return. It was therefore necessary to impose a land tax on the basis of the type of crop. This is clear from the letter of Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdallāh ath-Thaqafī to al-Mughīra ibn Shu‘ba, the governor of the Sawād, stating: ‘We have accepted types of produce with a higher value than wheat and barley’ – mentioning mung beans, grapes, dates and sesame – ‘which have been taxed at a rate of 8 dirhams, and what was previously sent to the caliph in cash and kind has been abolished.’

Immediately after its conquest, Egypt began sending wheat to Medina, as it had previously done to Rome and later to Byzantium. In 21/641 ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb wrote to ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ informing him of the severity of conditions in Medina and ordering him to send food collected from the *kharāj*. Both food and oil were sent. This was stopped during the civil war in the time of ‘Uthmān, reinstated in the time of Mu‘āwiya and Yazīd and stopped again until the time of ‘Abd-al-Mālik ibn Marwān. It was then continued until the caliphate of al-Manṣūr.

‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb imposed the *kharāj* equally upon all men, women, children, clerks and slaves who by virtue of the land survey possessed land.

61 Ibn Khayyāt, *Tārīkh*, I, p. 146; aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, IV, p. 144.

62 Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, pp. 40, 51; Ibn Sallām, *Kitāb al-amwāl*, p. 58; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 269; Abu-l-Ḥasan al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām as-sultāniyya*, Beirut, Dār al-kitāb al-lubnānī al-‘arabī, 1990, p. 175.

This is clear from his statement about a woman landowner of Nahr al-Mālik when she converted: ‘Leave her with her land, on which she shall pay the *kharāj*.’⁶³

The accounts show that whoever converted to Islam in territory taken by force was a free Muslim and not required to pay the *jizya*.⁶⁴ However, the *kharāj* remained on the land, as it was Muslim booty.⁶⁵ Yaḥyā ibn Ādam, Abū Yūsuf and others base their statement that land taken by force was not relieved of the *kharāj* if its owner became Muslim on ‘Umar’s reply to a man who requested that, as he had become Muslim, the *kharāj* should be removed from his land: ‘Your land was taken by force,’ as well as his statement to a landowner of ‘Ayn at-Tamr who had converted: ‘We relieve you of the *jizya*, but your land belongs to the Muslims. We can either impose the *kharāj* upon you or make you its steward. That is as you wish.’⁶⁶

Those in territory taken by force who became Muslims had the choice either to stay on their land and pay the *kharāj*, or abandon it and have it seized by the imam for the benefit of Muslims. There was also the option of purchasing it from the Muslim treasury or taking out a lease, with the surplus going to the Muslims. It could also be bestowed as a fief to a rich Muslim. The Rightly Guided Caliphs resisted the idea of Muslims purchasing lands subject to the *kharāj*, whether compulsorily or voluntarily. ‘Umar and the Rightly Guided Caliphs who followed him preferred such lands to remain as endowments for the last of the Muslim veterans who were a force for *jihād* against those who had not converted.

In addition to the lands subject to the *kharāj*, there were lands whose owners were required to pay the tithe (‘*ushr*). These were lands that the Arabs had taken over or cultivated from wasteland which belonged to no one, and which had become overgrown.⁶⁷ The Arabs bestowed such lands as fief.⁶⁸ Additionally, all land distributed among those who had taken it as war booty was tithe land.

One of the results of the conquests was that much land in Iraq, Syria, al-Jazīra and Egypt was left without owners, as they had departed, or else it belonged to princes, clerics or nobles. ‘Umar decided to add such lands to the Muslim treasury. They were known as confiscated lands (*ṣāfiya*, pl. *ṣawāfi*), and were the exclusive property of the Muslims. They were also known as *qaṭī‘a* (pl. *qaṭā‘i*’, concessions made to private individuals

63 Ibn Sallām, *Kitāb al-amwāl*, p. 72.

64 Ibn Ādam, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, p. 7; Ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*, p. 154.

65 Ibn Ādam, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, p. 7; Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, p. 75; Ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*, p. 154.

66 Ibn Ādam, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, p. 34.

67 Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, pp. 75–6.

68 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 154.

on state lands) and were subsequently allocated as such to those who contracted for them. Concerning the feudal estates of Iraq, Abū Yūsuf notes that all former possessions of the Persian emperor Chosroes (Khusrau), his *marzbāns* (military governors of borderlands) or his relatives, which were thus not owned by anyone since their former owners had fled or had been killed in battle, and even all pools of water and forests, were given as fiefs by ‘Umar.⁶⁹ Abū Yūsuf states that the *ṣawāfi* were equivalent to unclaimed property with no inheritor, and that a ‘just imam’ had the right to decide their fate and could allocate them to whomever was sufficiently versed in Islam, without partiality. This was the case with regard to these lands in Iraq, where feudal estates might be subject either to the *‘ushr* or else to the *kharāj*, if irrigated from canals that were themselves subject to the *kharāj*.⁷⁰ The decision was the imam’s. The *‘ushr* was levied on the owners if it was necessary to dig canals, build houses and improve the land because such work was a considerable imposition upon the tenant of the estate.

‘Abdallāhi-bn Mas‘ūd, Khabāb, Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alyy and other Companions owned lands on which they paid the *kharāj*.⁷¹ Each of these estates was registered. When the land registry was burnt in the time of al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf, each tribe took land adjacent to its own.⁷²

Ibn ‘Asākir states that the lands owned by Byzantine nobles who had been killed or had fled became reserved exclusively for the benefit of Muslims as religious endowments for which the Muslim governor was responsible, as he was for their cultivation. These farms remained as religious endowments under the responsibility of the Muslim treasury, until the then governor of Syria, Mu‘āwiya, wrote to ‘Uthmān stating that what he levied as governor was not sufficient to pay for the provisions of the delegations of troops or the envoys of their commanders or the Byzantine envoys that visited him.⁷³ After Mu‘āwiya had assured ‘Uthmān that the farms neither belonged to the villages of non-Muslim subjects (*dhimmīs*),⁷⁴ nor were subject to the *kharāj*, ‘Uthmān confirmed it in writing.

When Mu‘āwiya became caliph, his *kharāj* agent in al-Kūfa, ‘Abdallāh ibn Darrāj, confiscated all the property of Chosroes and his family for the benefit of Mu‘āwiya. Mu‘āwiya wrote to ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Abī Bakr, asking him to do the same in Basra. The confiscated property delivered to him from Iraq and subordinate administrative regions amounted to 100,000,000 dirhams,

69 Ibn Ādam, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, p. 45; Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, p. 68; al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 272.

70 Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, p. 69.

71 Ibid., p. 73.

72 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 272.

73 Ibn ‘Asākir, *Tādhīb tārikh Dimashq*, I, p. 595.

74 Adherents of the other revealed religions, especially Christianity and Judaism.

including gifts and presents. Al-Ya‘qūbī states that Mu‘āwiya did the same in Syria and al-Jazīra as in Iraq, confiscating the lands of kings for the benefit of himself and bestowing them as fiefs to his family and inner circle.⁷⁵

The tithe or customs duty (‘ushr)

‘Ushr most closely resembles what we now call customs duty. Muslim merchants paid 2.5 per cent, non-Muslim subjects paid 5 per cent, and those from non-Muslim lands (*Dār al-Harb*, ‘the House of War’) paid 10 per cent.⁷⁶ ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb was the first to impose 10 per cent on merchants from such ‘hostile regions’ when a group of them wrote to him requesting that he allow them to enter Muslim territory in exchange for payment of 10 per cent. ‘Umar consulted with the Prophet’s Companions, and they advised him to agree.⁷⁷ From Mālik’s account, we understand that this tax was levied on foreign merchants. He states:

The practice was that non-Muslim subjects in their own lands who had reached a peace agreement with the Muslim authorities had only to pay the *jizya* unless they traded in Muslim lands, whereupon 10 per cent was levied upon them. But if they only traded in their own towns and went nowhere else, they had nothing to pay.⁷⁸

The method of levying the tithe on Muslims was similar to the *zakāh*, and the method of levying tax upon all non-Muslim subjects and those from hostile countries was similar to the *kharāj*.⁷⁹

From the above, it is clear that the two principal taxes levied in the conquered territories were the *jizya* and the *kharāj*. These were imposed upon *dhimmi*s, although *dhimmi*s who converted to Islam would be relieved of the *jizya*. The *kharāj* remained, especially in territories conquered by force since these were the right of Muslims. Religious scholars differed regarding territory conquered peacefully, given the absence in the era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs of any precedents on which to base a decision. Thus, Ibn Sallām reports an account from Yaḥyā ibn ‘Abdallāh ibn Bakīr, on the authority of Mālik, who said:

75 Al-Ya‘qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II, p. 234.

76 Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, p. 161.

77 Ibid.

78 Taqīyy-ad-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī al-Maqrīzī, *al-Mawā‘iz wa-l-i‘tibār bi-dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa-l-āthār*, Būlāq, Dār at-ṭibā‘a al-miṣriyya, AH 1270, II, p. 508.

79 Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, p. 161.

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Those conquered peacefully and who have become Muslim have the right to their land, but the land and property of those conquered by force belong to the Muslims because their land was conquered and became the right of the Muslims. Those conquered peacefully preserved their towns and themselves until a settlement was reached with them thereon.⁸⁰

Ibn Sallām also remarks that under this procedure, when people converted to Islam, their land must become subject to the *'ushr* because it had thus become the property of their faith. Yaḥyā ibn Ādam states that when people agreed to pay the *kharāj* on their land, there was no change in its status whether the owner became Muslim or a Muslim purchased it.⁸¹

Similarly, we have seen that 'Umar left lands in the possession of their owners because he realized that they would devote greater attention to its cultivation than the conquerors, given the latter's preoccupation with fighting on the one hand, and their lack of knowledge of agricultural matters on the other. The caliphs and governors were concerned with agricultural matters in countries where agriculture was the principal occupation, as was the case in Iraq, Syria and Egypt. 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb thus devoted attention to irrigation projects and to all affairs conducive to the welfare of the rural inhabitants.

80 Ibn Sallām, *Kitāb al-amwāl*, p. 155.

81 Ibn Ādam, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, p. 7.

Chapter 2.3

ISLAM IN BILĀD AR-RĀFIDAYN (IRAQ)

Abd al-Amir Hussain Amin

INTRODUCTION

The present chapter provides historical information on the conditions of Iraq within the framework of the Islamic state, and indicates some of the religious, cultural, economic, administrative and architectural influences of Islam on the life of the people there. This influence transformed Iraq into an Islamic centre that played an active role in the development of Islamic civilization. Indeed, Muslim cities like Basra, al-Kūfa, Wāsiṭ, Mosul and Baghdad were singularly important in intellectual life and in the spread of Islam.

After the conquest of Iraq, among the Muslim fighters there were a number of Companions (*Ṣaḥāba*) of the Prophet Muḥammad and readers of the Qur'ān (*qurrā'*) who bore the responsibility of spreading the principles of Islam in Iraq. Ibn Sa'd reports that 300 Companions known as *Aṣḥāb ash-shajara* (i.e. those who swore fealty to the Prophet under a tree) as well as seventy Companions who took part in the battle of Badr had settled in al-Kūfa.¹ Among these were 'Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib, Sa'd ibn 'Abī Waqqāṣ – the commander of the battle of al-Qādisiyya – and 'Abdallāh ibn Mas'ūd, who was an intimate of the Prophet. Following this, Arab tribes that had converted to Islam began to settle in Iraq, especially in Basra which was founded by the commander 'Utba ibn Ghazwān in 14/635.

1 Muḥammad ibn Sa'd, *aṭ-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā*, Beirut, Dār ṣādir, 1960, VI, p. 9.



2.7 Minaret of Sāmarrā'
(© J.C. Chabrier)

Basra

The establishment of Basra was a very important factor in the integration of Arab Muslims and other elements of society. It developed quickly because of its position on the Persian Gulf, which enabled it to control the trade arriving from different parts of the world. As a result, it produced many outstanding scholars. These included al-Ḥasan ibn al-Haytham (d. 354/965), a great scholar of mathematics and optics and among whose books is *al-Manāẓir* in which he records his theories and insights. Another great scholar of Basra was 'Amr ibn Baḥr al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868), who is considered the greatest critic and caustic writer among Arab Muslims. His works

include the well-known *al-Bukhalā'*, *al-Ḥayawān* and *al-Bayān wa-t-tabyīn*. Another famous Basran scholar was al-Khalīl ibn Aḥmad al-Farāhīdī (d. 170/786), who achieved renown for his work on the Arabic language and literature and was the founder of *al-'arūḍ* (the study of Arabic prosody). His most celebrated work is *Kitāb al-'ayn*. Basra was also the birthplace of the first Arab Muslim philosopher, Ya'qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī (d. 260/873), who lived there before moving to Baghdad, where he held an important position at the court of the 'Abbāsīd caliph al-Ma'mūn. Al-Kindī produced seminal works in fields such as medicine, philosophy, music, geometry and astronomy, writing 300 books and commentaries many of which were subsequently translated into Latin and other European languages.

As for the Mosque of Basra, this was host to a number of important scholars and it played a crucial role in the spread of Islam. It was there that the sect of the Mu'tazila, who believed in reason and free will, appeared as the result of a controversy between al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī and his disciples 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd and Wāṣil ibn 'Aṭā'.

Al-Kūfa

The Arabs founded the city of al-Kūfa in 17/638. It was initially constructed from reeds but when these caught fire the caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb ordered that it be rebuilt using mud bricks. The mosque was constructed in the middle of the city and beside it was the *dār al-imāra*, the governor’s residence. The city soon developed and became the centre of upper Iraq. Most of the population was from Yemen. Because of its importance, in 36/656 the caliph ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib made it his capital. Al-Kūfa became an important cultural centre and among its citizens were the great scholar Abū Ḥanīfa an-Nu‘mān ibn Thābit (d. 160/767), the grammarian ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Kisā’ī (d. 189/804) to whom the caliph Harūn ar-Rashīd (r. 170–93/716–39) entrusted the education of his two sons al-‘Amīn and al-Ma’mūn, the famous reader of the Qur’ān Ḥamza ibn Ḥabīb (d. 156/773) and the great poet al-Mutanabbī Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥusayn (d. 354/965). Since al-Kūfa was on the route of the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, especially for those travelling from Baghdad, it also became an important centre for trade and tourism.

Wāsiṭ

Another centre of Islamic culture in Iraq was Wāsiṭ, midway between Basra and al-Kūfa, which was built by al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf ath-Thaqafī (d. 86/705). The city developed rapidly and many scholars appeared there, especially during the ‘Abbāsīd period. Among these scholars were ‘Abd-al-Ghifār ibn ‘Abdallāh (d. 367/977) the most celebrated reader of the Qur’ān, and Abū ‘Alī Ḥasan ibn al-Qāsim Wāsiṭī (d. 468/1075), who was known as the *shaykh al-qurrā’* (leader of the Qur’ān readers) of Iraq and who taught many of the Qur’ān readers from that country and from Islamic cities elsewhere.²

Wāsiṭ also became a centre for the study of the Traditions (*Ḥadīth*) of the Prophet Muḥammad. The most famous traditionist there was ‘Abdallāh ibn Muḥammad, known as Ibn as-Saqqā (d. 373/1083). Similarly, some theologians, especially those of Shāfi‘ī *madhhab* (schools of Islamic law), appeared in Wāsiṭ and this helped to spread the school in the city during the ‘Abbāsīd period. Among the Shāfi‘ī theologians was the judge Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Īsā Wāsiṭī (d. 503/1109), while the most famous was Abū ‘Alī al-Ḥasan ibn Ibrāhīm al-Fārikī (d. 528/1133).

Important sciences such as mathematics, astronomy, medicine and pharmacy flourished in Wāsiṭ and many of the works written by scholars from the city received great attention in Europe. One example is the *‘Ajā’ib*

2 Shams-ad-Dīn adh-Dhahabī, *Ma‘rifat al-qurrā’*, Cairo, 1967, I, p. 344.

al-makhlūqāt of Abū ‘Imād-ad-Dīn Zakariyyā ibn Muḥammad al-Qazwīnī (d. 672/1283). De Sacy showed great interest in this book and published it, while Ruska studied it thoroughly and translated into German the part concerned with stones. Elsewhere, the French scholar Gustave Lebon remarked that al-Qazwīnī was one of the most famous Arab scholars dealing with natural history.³

Mosul

Mosul was conquered by the Arabs in 20/640 and was inhabited by the Arab tribes of Tamīm, Bakr, Khuzā‘a, Taghlib and Khazraj, who built the first mosque in the city. The first governor appointed there by the caliph ‘Umar was ‘Utba ibn Farqad.

Mosul was famous for its mosques and schools. One of the well-known cultural institutions there was Ja‘far ibn Ḥamdān’s *Dār al-‘Ilm* (House of Science), the oldest in the city. Yāqūt states that Ja‘far was a great jurist and had extensive knowledge of grammar, logic, argumentation and astronomy as well as being a good narrator.⁴

Mosul achieved high status in the Umayyad period, when a bridge was constructed to join the two sides of the city. Under Marwān II the city became the capital of the province of al-Jazīra. The mosque that later became known as al-Jāmi‘ al-‘Atīq (the Ancient Mosque) was also built at this time.⁵

Mosul played a distinctive cultural role and achieved great renown for its shaykhs, jurists,⁶ historians, men of letters and scientists. One of these eminent personalities was Iṣḥāq ibn Ibrāhīm al-Mawṣilī (d. 235/850), the famous courtier of caliphs who was a distinctive singer and was also knowledgeable in language, music, history and the religious sciences.⁷ Also from Mosul were Majd-ad-Dīn Abū-s-Sa‘dāt, the author of many books on the interpretation of the Qur’ān, *Ḥadīth*, grammar and arithmetic; the historian ‘Izz-ad-Dīn ibn al-Athīr (d. 630/1233), the author of *al-Kāmil fi-t-tārīkh* and *Usūd al-ghāba fī akhbār aṣ-ṣaḥāba*; and Ḍiyā’-ad-Dīn ibn al-Athīr (d. 637/1239), the celebrated author of *al-Mathal as-sā’ir fī adab al-kātib wa-sh-shā’ir*. Among the famous historians from Mosul was Ibn Shaddād, the author of *Tārīkh Ḥalab* and *Kitāb al-maḥāsīn al-yūsufiyya fī sīrat Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn*

3 Gustave Lebon, *Ḥaḍārat al-‘Arab*, trans. ‘Ādil Za‘ītar, Cairo, Maṭba‘at ‘Īsā al-Ḥalabī, 1948, p. 475.

4 Shihāb-ad-Dīn Yāqūt, *Mu‘jam al-udabā’*, ed. D. S. Margoliouth, Cairo, 1924, II, pp. 419–20.

5 Shihāb-ad-Dīn Yāqūt, *Mu‘jam al-buldān*, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus, 1866–7, IV, p. 684.

6 Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Maqdisī, *Aḥsan at-taqāsīm fī ma‘rifat al-aqālīm*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1906, p. 138.

7 Abu-l-‘Abbās Shams-ad-Dīn Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-‘ayān wa-abnā’ az-zamān*, Cairo, Maktabat an-nahḍa al-miṣriyya, 1948, I, p. 182.

al-Ayyūbī, while among the physicians was ‘Ammār ibn ‘Alī al-Mawṣilī, an expert optician.⁸

Many dynasties subsequently ruled Mosul, including the Ḥamdānids (906–98) and the ‘Uqaylids (996–1096). The most famous dynasty, however, was the Atābika (1127–1261), whose first *amīr* was ‘Imād-ad-Dīn Zankī, the founder of the Atābika state.

From the above, it is clear that scholarly activities within the Iraqi cities of Basra, al-Kūfa, Wāsiṭ and Mosul were highly instrumental in the development of the sciences and learning in general.

The establishment of Baghdad and its cultural institutions

The imperial capital Baghdad was built by the ‘Abbāsīd caliph al-Manṣūr as a new city in its design and aims. After careful investigation, the caliph chose the site for military reasons, without neglecting economic and strategic considerations. It continued to be the official residence of the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate for about half a century and although Harūn ar-Rashīd neglected it, his son al-Amīn as well as other ‘Abbāsīd caliphs showed great interest in the city. Baghdad’s commercial activities, and the wealth and size of its population, expanded rapidly and there was a host of new buildings. During the reign of al-Ma’mūn and subsequent caliphs the east side of Baghdad was much developed. Similarly, the west side of Baghdad, between Quṭrābl in the north and the Karkh quarter, also expanded.

The ‘Abbāsīds encouraged cultural life, the sciences and scholars and men of letters. During the caliphate of Harūn ar-Rashīd a centre of study and research was established known as the *Bayt al-Ḥikma* (House of Wisdom). This was a scientific institution where scholars such as Yuḥannā ibn Māsawayh used to hold their debates. Other scholars active there included the Christian Theodore Abū Qurra (d. 205/820), who engaged in many discussions with Muslims in the presence of the ‘Abbāsīd caliph al-Ma’mūn.⁹

Numerous mosques were built on both sides of Baghdad, for prayers as well as for scientific purposes, and in these students learnt the Arabic language, engineering and mathematics.

From the fifth/eleventh century onwards, Baghdad also became famous for its *madrāsas*, which were centres of teaching and study of the various sciences. One educational establishment was the Mustanṣiriyya, founded in

8 Ibn Abī ‘Uṣaybi‘a, *‘Uyūn al-anbā’ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā’*, Beirut, Maktabat al-ḥayāh, n.d., p. 549.

9 Philippe di Tarrazi, *Khazā’in al-kutub al-‘arabiyya fī-l-khāfiqīn*, Beirut, Wizārat at-tarbiya al-waṭaniyya wa-l-funūn al-jamīla, 1948, I, p. 54.

THE FIRST STAGE IN THE SPREAD OF ISLAM



2.8 Madrasa Al-Mustanşiriyya, Baghdad (© J.C. Chabrier)

630/1232, which was a great university providing students from all parts of Iraq with lodgings, free food, clothes and monthly allowances. All the various schools of theology were taught there in addition to disciplines such as mathematics, algebra and philosophy.

An institute for the teaching of the Qur'ān, the *Dār al-Qur'ān*, was attached to the Mustanşiriyya by the 'Abbāsid caliph al-Mustanşir. Thirty orphans were accepted there and provided with food and clothes. It was administered by a shaykh assisted by a demonstrator (*mu'īd*). The former received a monthly payment as well as a daily allowance of food.¹⁰ Large numbers of students who had learnt the Qur'ān by heart graduated from the *Dār al-Qur'ān*.

Another institute attached to the Mustanşiriyya was for the teaching of the Traditions of the Prophet. This was known as the *Dār al-Ḥadīth*. It employed a high level shaykh and a Qur'ān reader (*qāri'*) and had ten students who received money, food and clothes. *Ḥadīth* was read every Monday, Thursday and Saturday.¹¹ This institute played an important role in the study of *Ḥadīth*, its written sources and the different schools of thought.

In addition to the Mustanşiriyya, Baghdad had an institute where medicine was taught and which possessed all the necessary facilities for students.

While Muslim jurists (*fuqahā'*) taught the Islamic sciences in the Mustanşiriyya and other similar institutions, this does not mean that non-Muslims were forbidden from teaching. According to Ibn al-Athīr, the 'Abbāsid caliphs encouraged Christian and Jewish scholars who had their

10 Ibn al-Fūṭī, *al-Ḥawādith al-jāmi'a wa-t-tajārib an-nāfi'a fi-l-mi'a as-sābi'a*, Baghdad, AH 1351, pp. 58–9.

11 Ibid., p. 58.

own schools as well as monasteries for religious practices and study.¹² Indeed, Lebon remarks that the Muslims were very tolerant of other religions.¹³

The topography of other Muslim cities was very similar to that of Baghdad, and each had a mosque for prayers, religious duties and education, where scholars could meet and discuss matters of importance.

Financial institutions

After the Muslim conquest of Iraq, all transactions were conducted in accordance with the dictates of Islamic law, the *sharī'a*. Moreover, the financial institutions adopted in Iraq were those imposed by 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb in all the conquered provinces. The caliph made the Sawād (the area lying between al-Kūfa and Basra and around them) as a *fay'*, that is, land belonging to or granted to all Muslims. This entailed setting up a committee charged with surveying the lands of Iraq in order to estimate the *kharāj* (land tax). This was the first financial procedure of its kind to be undertaken in an Arab-Islamic state. Following this, a tax of 4 dirhams was imposed on each *jarīb*¹⁴ of wheat, 6 dirhams on palm trees, 2 dirhams on barley, 10 dirhams on grapevines and 5 dirhams on cotton. This financial measure was soon applied to all the provinces of the Arab-Islamic state.

In order to encourage farmers, the state provided financial subsidies. During the caliphate of al-Mutawakkil (r. 232–47/847–61), a loan of 10,000 dinars was given to cultivators in the district of Bāṣūrīn in Mosul.¹⁵ A similar loan was given to the farmers of Ṣulḥ and Mubārak in the area between Wāsiṭ and Basra. These cooperative initiatives on the part of the government helped promote agriculture and agriculturists.

The caliph al-Mu'taḍid (d. 289/901) showed great concern for agriculture and gave farmers loans to buy seeds.¹⁶ Similarly, the caliph al-Muqtadir's *wazīr* (chief minister), 'Alī ibn 'Īsā (d. 334/946), provided poor farmers with loans in the form of seeds the price of which was to be paid back after the harvest. He also repaired dams and dredged rivers. As a result of such measures, the fourth/tenth century witnessed an improvement in agricultural production. Ibn Miskawayh refers to this, noting that at that time in Baghdad 20 pounds of fine bread were sold for only 1 dirham.¹⁷

12 'Izz-ad-Dīn Abu-l-Ḥasan Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi-t-tārīkh*, Cairo, AH 1348, under the year 369.

13 Lebon, *Ḥaḍārat al-'arab*, p. 72.

14 A unit of measurement of land equal to 1,200 m².

15 Abū 'Alī at-Tanūkhī, *Nishwār al-muḥāḍara*, Damascus, 1930, VIII, p. 66.

16 Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Miskawayh, *Tajārib al-umam*, Cairo, Maṭba'at at-tamaddun aṣ-ṣinā'iyya, 1914, I, p. 28.

17 *Ibid.*, II, p. 165.

The 'Abbāsid state was also concerned with land reclamation, taking care of the irrigation network, dams and the distribution of water. Prior to the building of Baghdad, attention was focused primarily on Basra and al-Kūfa and elsewhere where lands affected by floods, especially in Wāsiṭ and Maysān in middle and southern Iraq, had been reclaimed. These efforts resulted in an increase in cultivated land and the attendant landlords. It also encouraged large numbers of farmers to emigrate to the reclaimed lands, and many agricultural centres subsequently appeared. This in turn led to an increase in agricultural production and the economic revival of Iraq.

As for the collection of taxes, in order to achieve social reforms the rulers of Iraq applied laws based on Islamic teachings. Abū Yūsuf's *Kitāb al-kharāj*, written for the caliph Harūn ar-Rashīd, shows how firm the intention was in Iraq to establish financial institutions in accordance with both prevailing circumstances and Islamic teachings. Indeed, the 'Abbāsid caliphs and their *wazīrs* carefully supervised tax collection and treated the taxpayers with justice and consideration. Thus, when the farmers complained about the tax collector to the *wazīr* 'Alī ibn 'Īsā, he ordered that the *kharāj* be collected by the method known as *muqāsama*, that is, by taking a proportion of the crop.¹⁸

Commerce

Under Islam, commerce flourished in Iraq. This was facilitated by the concern shown by the authorities for building roads, digging canals and wells, constructing bridges, establishing commercial stations along caravan routes and regulating markets. Although the first commercial centre in Iraq was perhaps Basra, Baghdad soon became a first-class market and the Tigris and the Euphrates became very important in the transportation of goods. Great merchants appeared and markets were full of foodstuffs, clothes, perfumes, copper and wooden goods and all that was needed in the new developing society.

The markets in Iraq were under government supervision. There was an official appointed by the caliph called the *muḥtasib* who enjoyed judicial and executive authority and had several assistants. Among the most important of the *muḥtasib*'s duties were to control weights and measures, to prevent people from gathering and obstructing the roads in the markets, to stop cheating and to supervise the bakers.¹⁹

18 Hilāl aṣ-Ṣābi, *Kitāb al-wuzarā'*, Cairo, Maktabat Īsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1958, p. 359.

19 Abu-l-Ḥasan al-Māwardī, *al-Aḥkām as-sulṭāniyya*, Beirut, Dār al-kitāb al-lubnānī al-'arabī, 1990, p. 231.

As a result of the increase in commercial activity in Iraq, and especially in Basra and Baghdad, banks appeared which offered loans to merchants. Since Islam prohibits usury, Muslim bankers were forced to combine their financial transactions with trade. Thus, they would sell to a debtor at a price higher than that which prevailed in the market in return for a postponed payment. The third/ninth century saw a turning-point in Iraqi banking: banks opened branches in Arab-Islamic provinces such as Egypt, Isfahan and Tustur, in coordination with their principal headquarters in Baghdad.

When gold and silver coins were subject to fraud in weight and purity of metal, merchants appealed to experienced money-changers to differentiate genuine from counterfeit coins. This caused the Ikhwān aṣ-Ṣafā' (the Brethren of Purity) to remark that one of the responsibilities of the money-changer was to fix the value of the dinar and dirham in circulation.²⁰ Indeed, money-changers offered practically all the services provided by modern banks. In addition to exchanging money, they extended loans, mediated between people and the government mint, and accepted deposits.²¹

Money-exchange bureaux used a method known as *saftaja*, that is, a bill of exchange which was a loan granted in one country and repaid in another, so that the lender benefits from transferring the money but avoids the risk because the borrower guarantees payment in the other country. This was a means of monetary remittance practised by Iraqi merchants and their agents abroad. Iraqi merchants also used cheques in their commercial transactions outside their country. Ibn Ḥawqal states that in the city of Audaghast in Morocco he saw a cheque of 42,000 dinars written between an Iraqi and a Moroccan merchant.²² The *saftaja* is considered to be the most developed method of conducting financial transactions and its influence is still seen today in the form of remittance or promissory notes.

Industry and crafts

Owing to the human and urban changes that occurred following the conquest of Iraq and during the caliphate of 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, including the arrival of large numbers of Arabs from Arabia, the population of Iraq increased in size. This coincided with the founding of new cities such as Basra, al-Kūfa and later on Wāsiṭ, Baghdad and Sāmarrā', in addition to the existing cities of Mosul, al-Ḥīra and Tikrīt. This situation led to additional

20 Anon., *Rasā'il ikhwān aṣ-ṣafā'*, Beirut, Dār ṣādir, 1957, I, p. 282.

21 'Abd-al-'Azīz ad-Dūrī, *Tārīkh al-'Irāq al-iqtisādī fi-l-qarn ar-rābi' al-hijrī*, Baghdad, 1948, p. 173.

22 Abu-l-Qāsim ibn Ḥawqal, *al-Masālik wa-l-mamālik*, Beirut, Maktabat al-ḥayāh, 1979, p. 65.

demands from the new society whose members had become rich due to their stipends and the share of the spoils they received.

During the third–fourth / ninth–tenth centuries, craftsmen in Iraq were producing goods that were distinctive in terms of technical accomplishment and artistic excellence. Meanwhile, some of those who came from the Hijāz or Yemen had experience in industry, which they developed.²³ Among Iraq's most famous industries was that of textiles the raw materials for which, such as cotton, flax, silk and wool, were readily available. Textile workshops were established both by individuals and by the government for the manufacture of official uniforms and for the cloth used to cover the Ka'ba in Mecca. The government workshops were known as *dūr aṭ-ṭirāz*.

Basra was famous for its clothing, especially *malḥafa's*, *rubuṭ* and *aksiya* made from flax and other materials, while al-Ubulla was well known for its fine clothes made of flax. Similarly, the Kūfan textile known as *khaz* had a good reputation. It was made of silk and wool and used for turbans. The headdress used nowadays in Iraq and known as *kūfiyya* derives from al-Kūfa. Elsewhere, al-Ḥīra was known for a textile called *muwashshā*, and for its clothes made of silk, while Wāsiṭ was famous for its thick cotton textile used for making curtains. As for Baghdad, it was renowned for its silk and woollen textiles. Sāmarrā' was famous for its *mutawakkiliyya* clothing named after the caliph al-Mutawakkil. Mosul was famous for its cotton, silk, wool and flax textiles as well as the cloth known as the mosul scarf: *al-wushāḥ al-mawṣilī*.

Among the important industries in Iraq during the Islamic period was the manufacture of construction materials such as unbaked mud bricks (*labin*) and baked bricks (*ājurr*) out of which Basra, al-Kūfa, Wāsiṭ, Baghdad and Sāmarrā' were built. In the latter half of the second / eighth century workers in this industry developed *ājurr* ornamented with plants, writing and geometric designs. The Iraqis also used plaster in building and decoration, while in Mosul marble was employed in the construction of mosques, schools and religious shrines.

The wood industry was also a distinctive feature of the Iraqi economy during the Islamic period. Wood was used extensively in buildings, especially in Baghdad and Sāmarrā'. It was used in the ceilings of the palaces belonging to caliphs and other wealthy persons, in the facades of buildings, in doors and windows as well as compartments, beds, chairs, tables and cupboards. Iraq was also well known for its ship industry, especially in Basra.

The production of ceramics was known in Basra and al-Kūfa and reached a high degree of sophistication, particularly in Sāmarrā' in the third /

23 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, Beirut, Dār al-hilāl, 1988, p. 255.

ninth century where lustreware known as *al-khazaf al-madanī* was produced. Under Islam the Iraqīs also successfully developed the glass industry, whose centres were Basra, al-Kūfa, Wāsiṭ, Baghdad, Sāmarrā' and Mosul. Bottles, glasses, cups, water jugs and plates, as well as medical and scientific instruments, were made. Due to the influx of workers brought from Basra by the caliph al-Mu'taṣim (r. 218–27/833–42), the industry flourished, especially in Sāmarrā' during the third/ninth century. The caliph also brought in artisans concerned with the manufacture of mats and pottery.²⁴

Another industry that arose in Iraq during the Islamic period was metalworking. Household goods such as candle holders, pots, trays and boxes were produced, in addition to scientific instruments for telling the time and making astronomical calculations such as sundials and astrolabes. Also manufactured were iron chains used for fastening bridges and fixing mills, agricultural equipment for ploughing and land reclamation, and gold and silver jewellery and ornaments. Basra and al-Kūfa were famous for manufacturing swords. Because of the importance of this industry, cities such as Baghdad, al-Kūfa and Mosul had a special market called the *sūq as-silāḥ* (weapons market). Subsequently, different kinds of weapons were developed in Iraq, including one that made use of fire and was used in battle. It is reported that the 'Abbāsīd caliph sent five specialists in that weapon along with oil and other materials to the Ayyūbid sultan Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn (Saladin) in order to help manufacture it for use against the Crusaders.²⁵

Perhaps the most distinctive industry in Iraq was that of paper. Previously, al-Kūfa had been known for its manufacture of leather laminae that were used especially in Yemen and aṭ-Ṭā'if. Sāmarrā' started the manufacture of a writing medium made from papyrus, called *qirtās*. This was available in Baghdad from the time of the caliph al-Manṣūr, and there was a special market devoted to its sale. During the caliphate of Hārūn ar-Rashīd the industry developed further. Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī remarked that during the 'Abbāsīd period paper was manufactured in Baghdad at a place known as the *Dār al-Qaz*.²⁶ After this, the use of laminae and *qirtās* decreased, especially after Hārūn ar-Rashīd forbade writing except on paper. To complement this development, the Iraqīs succeeded in manufacturing ink and the craft of book-binding appeared.

Due largely to religious considerations, the community of Iraq felt the need to manufacture instruments for measuring time, and water and sun clocks were made. A notable example of this is the wonderful clock that, according to the historical sources, the caliph ordered to be made and placed

24 Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya'qūb al-Ya'qūbī, *Kitāb al-buldān*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1891, p. 264.

25 Ibn al-Fūṭī, *Ḥawādith*, pp. 82–8.

26 Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghādāī, *Tārīkh Baghdād*, Beirut, Dār al-kitāb al-'arabī, n.d., I, p. 116.

on a wall opposite the school of the Mustanşiriyya in Baghdad in 630/1232. Apart from telling the hours astronomically, this famous clock specified the position of the sun and the moon at every hour in addition to displaying other mechanical curiosities.²⁷

Bridges

When Baghdad was founded in the time of the ‘Abbāsid caliph al-Manşūr, the two sides of the city were joined together by a bridge called the ‘first bridge’ (*al-jisr al-awwal*) or the Ruşāfa bridge (*jisr ar-Ruşāfa*). It was indeed the first bridge to be constructed in Baghdad. Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī relates that al-Manşūr had three bridges built, one of them exclusively for women. He also reports that the caliph al-Amīn built two bridges in southern Baghdad, in addition to two palaces near Bāb Kilwādhā, one of Baghdad’s eastern gates constructed in the fifth/eleventh century.²⁸ It is noticeable that the caliphs and other rulers during the ‘Abbāsid period occasionally changed the location of bridges for political or social reasons or because of war or other disturbances. Similarly, the increase in the number of bridges in Baghdad is evidence of the extension of the city and the increase in the size of its population.

In addition to the importance of bridges in transportation, in facilitating economic activities and in furthering relations between the populations living on either side of the river, during the ‘Abbāsid and following eras the people of Baghdad made use of the bridges as places for excursions and relaxation. The Arab explorer Ibn Baṭṭūṭa mentions that Baghdad had two bridges over which men and women crossed day and night, and also that they were destinations for recreation.²⁹ (This custom was revived when a modern governor of Baghdad, Namik Pasha, reconstructed the old bridge of Baghdad in 1902 and had coffee bars and booths for cigarette- and food-sellers built on both sides of the river for the convenience and enjoyment of the people.) The bridges were fashioned out of large boats fastened with iron chains. Nonetheless, strong winds often pushed them out of position, as happened with one bridge in the years 443/1052 and 448/1056. Workers did their best to bring it back to its original site, accompanied by singing and the beating of drums to celebrate the occasion.

27 For a detailed description, see Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *Riḥlat Ibn Baṭṭūṭa*, Cairo, 1938, I, p. 140.

28 Yāqūt, *Mu‘jam al-buldān*, II, p. 522.

29 Jamāl-ad-Dīn ibn Wāṣil, *Mufarrij al-kurūb fī akhbār Banī Ayyūb*, Cairo, Dār al-kutub al-miṣriyya, 1957, II, p. 314.

The administration

Following the conquest of Iraq, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb appointed Sa‘d ibn Abī Waqqāṣ and ‘Utba ibn Ghazwān as governors of al-Kūfa and Basra respectively. Both governors took the title *amīr*. Included among their duties were leading the prayers, judging in disputes, commanding armies and collecting taxes. Apart from the governor, there was also a collector of the land tax called the *‘āmil al-kharāj*, who was also responsible for many financial affairs.

The governor of al-Kūfa also had jurisdiction over Ḥamdān, Qazwīn, Rayy and Isfahan, while the jurisdiction of the governor of Basra also extended to Aḥwāz, Kirmān, Makrān, Sijistān and Khurāsān. Owing to the particular importance of Khurāsān, however, during the Umayyad period it was separated from the Basra governorship. This ultimately resulted in the governors of Basra and al-Kūfa appointing separate governors for Aḥwāz, Kirmān and Isfahan.

Because of the importance of Iraq, the caliph used to choose the most efficient men as governors. Thus, Mu‘āwīya at first appointed Ziyād ibn Abīhi as governor of Basra and then added al-Kūfa to his jurisdiction. He divided al-Kūfa into four divisions, and Basra into five divisions, each of which was administered by a tribal chief. Ziyād ibn Abīhi used al-Kūfa as the base of his governorship, leaving Basra for his deputy.³⁰

The judicial system (*al-qadā’*)

The institution of the judiciary was conducted according to Islamic law. Thus, the judge had to be well versed in the Qur’ān and the Traditions of the Prophet (*Ḥadīth*). Moreover, he was required to be just, faithful and scrupulous. The caliph appointed two judges, one in Basra and the other in al-Kūfa where he held his sessions in the mosque. Under the Umayyads, the judge (*qādī*) was appointed by the governor (*wālī*), although judges were occasionally appointed by the caliph himself: this was the case of ash-Sha‘bī, who was appointed judge of Basra by the caliph ‘Abd-al-Mālik ibn Marwān.³¹ In due course there came to be two *qādīs* in Baghdad.³² Moreover, owing to the development of the city, a post of *qādī al-quḍāt*, or chief *qādī*, was initiated for the first time.

Qādīs were completely independent in their authority. Thus, the caliph al-Ma’mūn was judged by the *qādī* Yaḥyā ibn Aktham in the presence of

30 Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā al-Balādhurī, *Ansāb al-ashraf*, Beirut, 1979, I, pp. 220, 255.

31 Ibn ‘Abd Rabbih, *al-‘Iqd al-farīd*, ed. A. Amin et al., Cairo, Lajnat at-tā’līf wa-t-tarjama wa-n-nashr, 1940, I, p. 16.

32 Ibn Miskawayh, *Tajārib*, II, p. 400.

his rival.³³ During the caliphate of ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, the *qāḍī* received a monthly salary of 100 dirhams, while under ‘Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib it became 600 dirhams.³⁴ The *qāḍī* would consult those of accepted knowledge and experience, in accordance with the teaching of the Qur’ān³⁵ and the *sunna* (customary practice of the Prophet).³⁶ He was assisted by a clerk (*kātib al-aḥkāṃ*), who wrote down all that was said in the council of the *qāḍī*, including the final judgement. Two copies of the judgement were made, one for the petitioner and one that was recorded in the official register (*dīwān al-qaḍā*). The caliph al-Mahdī established a special court called the court of *mazālim*, which had jurisdiction in cases involving abuses by state officials.

The police force (*shurṭa*)

The institution of the *shurṭa*, or police force, was closely related to the judiciary and was responsible for the implementation of the *qāḍī*'s judgements. The chief of the force, known as the *ṣāhib ash-shurṭa*, was required to be well educated in the religious and legal sciences and to be of strong character. The importance with which the ‘Abbāsids viewed the *shurṭa* can be seen in that of the four important men whom al-Manṣūr ordered should stand at his door, one was the *ṣāhib ash-shurṭa*.

The postal service (*barīd*)

The postal service was one of the institutions initiated by the Arab-Islamic state and it became important in the administration of government. Pigeons were used to carry the letters whose content was confined to state affairs. The ‘Abbāsids showed great concern for the *barīd*: one of its most important functions was to inform the caliph about senior officials, the concerns of the people, and general affairs of state. Indeed, it functioned something like an intelligence service. On one occasion, the head of the postal service (*ṣāhib al-barīd*) in the Ḥaḍramawt wrote to al-Manṣūr saying that the governor spent all his time hunting and the latter was dismissed from his post as a result.

33 Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqī, *al-Maḥāsīn wa-l-masāwi*, Leipzig, 1902, p. 533.

34 Muḥammad Kurd ‘Alī, *al-Idāra al-islāmiyya fī ‘izz al-‘arab*, Damascus, 1934, p. 63.

35 *Ash-Shūrā*, 42:38.

36 Abu-l-Ḥasan al-Māwardī, *Adab al-qāḍī*, Baghdad, Maṭba‘at al-irshād, 1971, I, pp. 260–1.

Chapter 2.4

ISLAM IN EGYPT, NUBIA AND THE SUDAN

Ahmad Shalaby

The initial spread of Islam into Egypt

There were three waves of Arab emigration from the Arabian peninsula into the surrounding countries, Egypt being one of these. Most historians are of the opinion that the ancestors of Mina, the founder of the first family of pharaohs, were Semites since hieroglyphs state that there were Africans and Semites in Egypt and that the latter gained ascendancy over the former.¹

Arab merchants travelled with their caravans to the north, south, east and west. Ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥakam remarks that ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ had already entered Egypt during the pre-Islamic period, had knowledge of the trade routes and had witnessed the country’s many splendours.² The delights of Egypt were well known to the Arabs from the accounts of those who had visited it. The Prophet himself is quoted as saying:

Whoever wishes to see the likes of the Garden of Paradise, let him gaze on the land of Egypt in the autumn [or ‘when everything is in bloom’] and on the gardens all along the banks of the river from Aswan to Rashīd, for these are uninterrupted and unbroken by anything; and let him gaze on the crops irrigated by water which lie between the mountains from the beginning of Egypt to its end.³

1 ‘Umar al-Iskandarī, *Tārīkh Miṣr ilā-l-fath al-‘uthmānī*, Cairo, 1912, p. 6.

2 Ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr wa-l-Maghrib*, Cairo, 1914, p. 46.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 16.

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‘Abdallāh ibn ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ is quoted as saying: ‘The Nile of Egypt is the king of Egyptian rivers and regions. It is the pearl in the crown of the country of Heraclius.’⁴

The Prophet expected that Egypt would be conquered and he informed the Egyptian Copts that this would be the case. ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb reported the Prophet’s words: ‘After I am gone God will conquer Egypt for you, so treat the Copts there with kindness.’ In another tradition the Prophet is quoted as saying: ‘God is with the Copts of Egypt. You will have dominion over them and they will be an instrument and helpers for you in the cause of God.’⁵

The Prophet spoke about the relationship by marriage between the Arabs and the Egyptians, saying: ‘When you conquer Egypt you should treat the Copts with kindness for they have a covenant of protection and are kin. The mother of the prophet Ismā‘īl emigrated from among them.’ Similarly, Abū Dhar relates that the Prophet said: ‘You will conquer a land in which the *qirāṭ* [a measure] is used. Treat its inhabitants with kindness since they have a covenant of protection and are kin.’⁶

THE PROPHET’S LETTER TO AL-MUQAWQAS INVITING HIM AND HIS PEOPLE TO ACCEPT ISLAM

After the enemies of Islam, namely the Jews and the tribe of Quraysh, had been neutralized by the power of the Muslims or through peace treaties, the Prophet lost no time in embarking on a new initiative to spread Islam to all areas of the Arabian peninsula and neighbouring territories. This occurred in 6/628 and 7/629 after the Jews were defeated in 5/627 and after the peace of al-Ḥudaybiya in 6/628. Aṭ-Ṭabarī relates that the Prophet went out to his Companions one morning and told them: ‘I have been sent as a sign of compassion to all the worlds and all the people, so undertake this on my behalf. May God have mercy on you.’⁷

We shall mention five important points regarding the letters that the Prophet sent to the kings and rulers:

1. The Prophet completely disregarded the colonizing, expansionist aims of the Byzantines and the Persians in regard to some Arab regions and sent letters directly to the governors of these regions. For example, he wrote to the Byzantine governor of Damascus and to al-Muqawqas,

4 Su‘ād Māhir, *Masājid Miṣr*, Cairo, al-Majlis al-‘alā li-sh-shu‘ūn al-islāmiyya, n.d., 1, p. 59.

5 Ibid., 1, p. 14.

6 Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, Cairo, al-Maṭba‘a al-miṣriyya, 1932, p. 13.

7 Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh ar-rusul wa-l-umam wa-l-mulūk*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1881, 2, p. 645.

the governor of Egypt. He also wrote directly to Bādhān, the Persian governor of Yemen, an event that is considered to be a bold step of great importance.

2. The Prophet's letters were phrased with great wisdom and skill since he merely offered an invitation without threats. He addressed the kings and rulers by their titles and acknowledged their status, assuring them that they would retain their authority under Islam. In such a way the Prophet confirmed that he was not seeking dominion. He also mentioned that there was an alms tax on the wealth of the rich, stressing, however, that alms and charity were not to be given to him or his family but rather were to be taken from the rich Muslims and given to the poor. In such a way he confirmed that he was not concerned about wealth.
3. The Prophet addressed each king according to his circumstances. Thus, if the king was a follower of one of the revealed religions, the Prophet would point out the connections between these religions. If not, the Prophet would mention the need for men to return to God and to relinquish worshipping anything other than He.
4. Messengers were chosen who knew the language of the person to whom they were sent.
5. Messengers continued to be sent from the time of the peace of al-Hudaybiya in 6/628 until the death of the Prophet.⁸

THE TEXT OF THE PROPHET'S LETTER TO AL-MUQAWQAS

As mentioned above, the Prophet wrote directly to the Byzantine governor of Egypt, al-Muqawqas. In this way he declared that he did not recognize the authority of Byzantium over Egypt while at the same time elevating al-Muqawqas' status and making him feel that he was in total control of the country. The Prophet also made the Egyptians feel more important by showing that they had control over their own affairs. The man entrusted with the Prophet's letter to al-Muqawqas was Ḥāṭib ibn Abī Balta'a and he delivered it to Alexandria, the capital of Egypt at that time. It reads:

In the Name of God the Compassionate the Merciful. From Muḥammad the Prophet of God to al-Muqawqas the leader of the Copts. Peace be upon he who follows the right path. I am summoning you to Islam. Embrace it and you will be saved. Thus, God will recompense you twice. 'O people of the Book, accept

8 Abū Ja'far Muḥammad aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh ar-rusul wa-l-umam wa-l-mulūk*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1881, 2, p. 645.

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a word that we can both agree upon: that we must not worship other than God nor make anything a partner of Him, that none of us must take others as their lords to the exclusion of God and that if anyone achieves power they should bear witness that they are Muslims.’⁹

When al-Muqawqas read the letter, he asked Ḥāṭib: ‘If your master is a prophet what prevents him from invoking God’s punishment against those who drove him out of his town?’ Ḥāṭib replied: ‘What prevented Jesus from invoking God against those who plotted to have him killed and thus have Him wipe them out?’ ‘You are a wise man who has come from a wise man,’ said al-Muqawqas.

After they had conversed and come to an understanding, al-Muqawqas summoned a scribe who could write in Arabic and asked him to write a reply to the Prophet. Ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥakam quotes the letter from al-Muqawqas to the Prophet. It reads:

To Muḥammad ibn ‘Abdallāh from al-Muqawqas, the leader of the Copts in Egypt. Peace be with you. I have read your letter and have understood what you mention and that to which you summon. I was aware that a prophet was in existence and had thought that he would appear in ash-Shām. I have treated your messenger with honour and have sent to you two servant girls who have a high reputation among the Copts along with some garments. I have also presented you with a female mule for you to ride and some honey. Greetings.

Ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥakam states that when Ḥāṭib delivered the Prophet’s letter to al-Muqawqas the latter kissed it, was deferential to Ḥāṭib and treated him with great hospitality. He pressed the letter to his chest and said:

This is a time in which will appear the prophet who is described in the Bible. He does not take two sisters in marriage or have them as slaves. He accepts gifts but does not accept charity. His first followers are from the poor. The seal of prophethood is between his shoulders.

He then sent the Prophet two sisters, Māriya and Sīrīn, who were of unparalleled beauty. They were from the Ḥafn tribe from the village of Anṣatā in the province of Munyā. The Prophet invited the two sisters to accept Islam and to bear witness to the two doctrinal formulae. Māriya promptly did this, so the Prophet chose her for himself. Shortly afterwards, Sīrīn also responded and the Prophet gave her to Ḥassān ibn Thābit.¹⁰

9 Ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*, pp. 40–3.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 42.

A FURTHER STEP IN THE SPREAD OF ISLAM INTO EGYPT

When the Muslims were eventually victorious in ash-Shām after the battle of Yarmūk (13/634), the Muslim army was divided into two. One section headed north under the command of Abū ‘Ubayda ibn al-Jarrāḥ accompanied by Khālīd ibn al-Walīd, while the other section headed south under the command of ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ and Shurḥabīl ibn Ḥasana. Meanwhile, Yazīd ibn Abī Sufyān remained in the region of Damascus to protect the gains the Muslims had made there. Abū ‘Ubayda and Khālīd ibn al-Walīd were able to gain control of Ḥoms, Ḥamāh, Qinnisirīn, al-Lādhiqiyya and Aleppo, while ‘Amr and Shurḥabīl managed to capture Acre, Ḥaifa and Jaffa.¹¹

Nothing remained before the Muslims apart from Jerusalem, which the Byzantines had been fiercely defending, killing many Muslims in the process. But the Muslims persevered and diplomacy played its role. Thus, they made contact with the Christians in the city who had suffered under Byzantine rule and who, like the Muslims, held Jerusalem in great esteem and did not want any further casualties on either side. The Byzantine commander Arṭabūn learnt of these diplomatic initiatives and, afraid of what they might lead to, fled to Egypt. The Christians requested a settlement on condition that the caliph himself should accept the surrender of the city and promise its inhabitants freedom of religious practice. ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ wrote to ‘Umar informing him of this and the caliph came and personally drew up a peace treaty, known as “Umar’s guarantee”.

The wars against the Byzantines in Palestine had cost the Muslims thousands of lives; this region therefore became very dear to them. Many souls were lost and much blood was shed.

Egypt

There are no natural borders between Palestine and Egypt. Thus, when ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ received ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb at Jābiyya in 18/639 he spoke to him in private and asked permission to continue his march towards Egypt. The caliph consented.¹² Al-Wāqidī states that immediately after the war in ash-Shām, ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb sent a letter to Abū ‘Ubayda in which he wrote: ‘If you read this letter of mine, then tell ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ to head for Egypt with his troops.’¹³

11 For more details, see Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar ibn Wāqid al-Wāqidī, *Futūḥ ash-Shām*, Cairo, AH 1302, pp. 111ff. See also al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 110.

12 Ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*, p. 46.

13 Al-Wāqidī, *Futūḥ ash-Shām*, 1, p. 22.



2.9 Mosque-Madrasa of Sultan Ḥassan Ar-Rifā, Cairo (© J.C. Chabrier)

This move was encouraged by the fact that the Byzantine armies that had retreated from Palestine had gathered in Egypt; thus conquering Egypt was a natural step without which the Muslim armies would have no safety or security in ash-Shām. We must therefore give no credence to the accounts which state that there was a disagreement between the caliph and his commander regarding an advance on Egypt. Moreover, ‘Amr could not have adopted the attitude towards the great caliph suggested by these accounts.

‘Amr marched across the Sinai desert until he arrived at ‘Arīsh, which he captured without any significant opposition. He then continued to Farmā, to which he laid siege for more than one month. The Copts played an important role in assisting the Muslims against the Byzantines and Farmā fell into Muslim hands in 19/640.

THE BATTLES OF BALBĪS AND UMM DUNAYN (AL-MAQAS)

The Muslims advanced towards Balbīs, which was occupied by a large Byzantine army under the command of Arṭabūn, who had fled from Palestine. There ensued a fierce battle for Balbīs which lasted for about one month and in which the Muslims were able to overcome the Byzantine forces and capture the city. It is said that the daughter of al-Muqawqas, the governor of Egypt

who had been appointed by the emperor Heraclius, was in the city at the time. When 'Amr took control of Balbīs he treated al-Muqawqas' daughter with respect and sent her back to her father honoured and esteemed. This was a judicious move which helped to consolidate relations between the Arabs and the Egyptians. From Balbīs the Muslim army continued towards Umm Dunayn, where a ferocious battle took place from which the Muslims emerged victorious.

THE FORTRESS OF BABYLON

The greatest battle took place in 20/640 at the fortress of Babylon, which the Muslims besieged unremittingly for six months and attacked day and night. When the battle became protracted 'Amr wrote to the caliph requesting reinforcements. In response, the caliph dispatched 4,000 men. He wrote to 'Amr saying: 'I have sent reinforcements of 4,000 men, each 1,000 being under the command of az-Zubayr ibn al-'Awwām, al-Miqdād ibn 'Amr, 'Ubāda ibn aṣ-Ṣāmit and Maslama ibn Mukhlid.'¹⁴

Under this pressure, al-Muqawqas requested that negotiations take place and sent a delegation to speak on his behalf. 'Amr's response was to keep the delegation waiting for two days so that they could assess the Muslims' strength for themselves. Then he ordered the delegation to return to al-Muqawqas and to offer him one of three choices: to embrace Islam, in which case the Egyptians would have the same rights and duties as the Muslims; to pay the *jizya* (poll tax on non-Muslims) in return for protection and state positions such as the police and the judiciary; or war.

Al-Muqawqas' messengers returned to him taking not only these three options but also a description of the army of Islam for the Egyptians. They said:

We have seen a people who hold death dearer than life and humility dearer than high rank. There is not one among them who desires or is greedy for worldly pleasures. They sit in the dust and their leader is like one of them. One cannot distinguish between the most elevated amongst them and the most humble, nor between the leader and the follower. When it is time for prayer not a single one of them is late. They wash their limbs with water and submit themselves to worship.¹⁵

14 Ibn 'Abd-al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*, p. 50.

15 Ibn 'Abd-al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*, p. 53.

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When al-Muqawqas heard this he replied:

If such people confronted the mountains they would uproot them. No one has the power to oppose them. If we are not able to reach a settlement with them while they are surrounded by the Nile, they will not offer us one later when they are strong enough to leave this place.¹⁶

He then responded to ‘Amr, asking for someone to act as mediator in the hope that this would lead to a peaceful solution for everyone. Eventually, a settlement was reached on the basis that all mature males in Egypt would pay the *jizya* at the rate of 2 dinars. This did not apply to women, the aged and children who had not yet reached puberty.¹⁷

ALEXANDRIA

After this, nothing stood in the way of the Muslims apart from Alexandria, the capital of Egypt at that time. They thus marched on it, conquering all the strongholds they encountered on the way. Since Alexandria was well fortified with walls and had access to the sea by means of which it could receive reinforcements from Constantinople, the Muslims stood before it for a long time.

When ‘Amr was unable swiftly to capture Alexandria, which therefore presented a threat to the Muslims, the caliph wrote him a sharply worded letter ordering him to advance on Alexandria without delay and to send forward the courageous men who had previously been sent to assist him.¹⁸ When ‘Amr received the letter from the Commander of the Faithful, he read it to the Muslims and they resolved to fight with determination and hope. They launched a ferocious attack against Alexandria and managed to penetrate its walls and put many of its soldiers to the sword. Some were able to escape to their boats on the river while many others were captured. The boats set sail taking those who had managed to reach them. Al-Muqawqas once again approached and, according to al-Wāqidī,¹⁹ made peace with the Muslims in 21/641 on the basis of certain conditions the most important of which were: first, to pay the *jizya* as before, this being much less than the Egyptians had paid to the Byzantines; second, freedom of religious practice; and, third, that the Byzantine garrison should depart, leaving some of their number with the Muslims to act as security against any further attack. In this way, Egypt came under the authority of the Islamic caliphate.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., p. 55.

18 For the complete text, see *ibid.*, p. 60.

19 Al-Wāqidī, *Futūḥ ash-Shām*, 2, pp. 45ff.

ISLAM IN EGYPT, NUBIA AND THE SUDAN

THE NEW CAPITAL OF EGYPT AND THE MOSQUE OF 'AMR

'Amr next devoted himself to social improvements. He had considered retaining Alexandria as the Muslims' capital in Egypt as a bastion against the Byzantines, but the caliph wrote to him saying that he did not want water between the caliph and a community of Muslims. 'Amr therefore headed east of the Nile and established the Islamic capital of Fuṣṭāṭ. In selecting an appropriate site for Fuṣṭat, 'Amr considered the geographic, strategic and social aspects. Thus, it was defended to the east by the Muqaṭṭam hills, which offered protection from the enemy and the Nile floods.²⁰

'Amr also began to build his mosque, the Mosque of 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ, which was to play an important role in the service and spread of Islam and propagating Islamic thought.²¹ It is also known as the Ancient Mosque because it is the foremost mosque.²² Al-Maqrīzī mentions that by the fourth/tenth century there were 110 circles of students in the Mosque of 'Amr, all led by leading scholars of law and the arts.²³ There were also circles of female students, which in the Fāṭimid period were under the tutelage of the preacher Umm al-Khayr al-Ḥijāziyya. This shows that the Ancient Mosque continued to fulfil its mission even after the establishment of al-Azhar. The mint was also situated in the Mosque of 'Amr.

THE ARAB CONQUEST OF EGYPT ENABLED THE EAST TO REGAIN ITS GLORY

When the Arab Muslims entered Egypt on their great migration, the indigenous population did not view them as foreign usurpers. The Islamic conquests represented a social and political revolution through which the East regained its bygone glory after 1,000 years of foreign rule. Through Islam, the East recovered its glorious past, not only in the realm of politics but also in the cultural sphere, where it was able to regain its intellectual superiority.²⁴

20 Māhir, *Masājid Miṣr*, 1, p. 61.

21 A separate study has been devoted to this. See Aḥmad Shalaby, *Tārīkh at-tarbiya al-islāmiyya*, Beirut, Dār al-khashshāf, 1954, pp. 112–63.

22 Ibn Duqmāq, *al-Intiṣār bi-wāsiṭat 'iqd al-amṣār*, Cairo, AH 1309, 4, p. 59.

23 Taqīyy-ad-Dīn Aḥmad ibn 'Alī Al-Maqrīzī, *al-Mawā'iz wa-l-i'tibār bi-dhikr al-khiṭaṭ wa-l-āthār*, Būlāq, Dār at-ṭibā'a al-miṣriyya, AH 1270, 4, p. 20.

24 Philip K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, London, Macmillan, 1940, pp. 194–8.

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AL-BIRDĪ DESCRIBES THE ISLAMIC CONQUEST OF EGYPT

The writings of al-Birdī, who lived during the period of the conquest, show that the Muslim conquerors were not merely military adventurers but were rather carriers of a culture. They were also powerful and organized warriors who used weapons of steel and lead, who attacked only those who opposed them and who showed great courage in the cause of a faith that they fervently embraced. Through them Egypt was liberated from Byzantine oppression and it welcomed the sons of the desert who called for religious freedom, as the records of al-Birdī reveal.²⁵

There are other documents from the time of the conquest which also testify that the Muslim conquerors protected the lives and possessions of the Egyptians and that they respected the character of that ancient country which issued from an ancient civilization. ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ took not a single item of church property.

A CIVILIZED ARMY

Within the ranks of ‘Amr’s army were a number of venerable Companions of the Prophet who found representations of people and animals and numerous statues in the temples. Nevertheless, these Companions did not deface the pictures or destroy the statues. This is because they were not objects of worship as the Arab idols had been in the period before Islam, but were artistic records of the history of the country and the collective memory of the community. This demonstrates the civilized nature of the Arab conquerors.

THE ARAB INFLUX INTO EGYPT

After the success of the conquering army and when the situation of Arab Muslims in Egypt became stabilized, the Arabs, especially those from the south-west and from the tribe of Qays, began to pour into the country.

The era of the governors (21–254/641–867)

During the first two and a half centuries of Islamic control, Egypt was ruled through governors appointed by the caliphs from the centre of the caliphate

25 Historical record 8/1/642 (end of Muḥarram AH 22).

in Medina, Damascus or Baghdad. There were thirty-six governors during this period, four of whom deserve a short mention.

‘AMR IBN AL-‘ĀṢ (21–27/642–47; 41–43/661–63)

The first period of the governorship of ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ lasted from the conquest of Egypt in 21/642 until 27/647, while the second period began during the time of Mu‘āwiya in 41/661 and ended with his death in 43/663. ‘Amr commanded the army that conquered Egypt, founded its capital Fustāṭ and recommenced digging the canal which connected the Nile with the Red Sea, naming it the Canal of the Commander of the Faithful (*Khalīj Amīr al-Mu‘minīn*).

Among ‘Amr’s approaches to social issues was his benevolent policy towards the non-Muslim Egyptians. Indeed, he gave the patriarch Benjamin a letter of protection and restored him to his seat thirteen years after his dismissal by the Byzantines. He similarly allowed him to manage the religious and administrative affairs of the church. ‘Amr encouraged the Muslims to mix with the original inhabitants and to intermarry.

‘Amr regulated the *kharāj* tax on a fair basis and reduced the proportion that was sent to Medina to enable him to complete the buildings he was constructing in Egypt. It is known that he used to postpone the collection of *kharāj* when this served the public good and that he would set the amount payable in accordance with the flooding of the Nile. In the contract ‘Amr drew up for the Egyptians, he specified that when the Nile floods fell short of their full extent the *kharāj* would be reduced accordingly.²⁶

One of ‘Amr’s great cultural projects was the building of his mosque, which rapidly became an important cultural centre and a courtroom for the judiciary. The most learned men, including Imam ash-Shāfi‘ī and aṭ-Ṭabarī, sat in its corners giving lessons.²⁷

‘ABD-AL-‘AZĪZ IBN MARWĀN (65/684)

‘Abd-al-‘Azīz ibn Marwān was the brother of the Umayyad caliph ‘Abd-al-Mālik ibn Marwān and had been designated his heir by their father Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam. However, ‘Abd-al-Mālik appointed his son al-Walīd to succeed him, followed by Sulaymān. ‘Abd-al-‘Azīz founded the city of Ḥilwān and made it the capital of Egypt after epidemics had spread through the former capital.

26 Ya‘qūb Abū Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-kharāj*, Baghdad, 1917, pp. 88, 101; Shihāb-ad-Dīn al-Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-ā‘shā fī shinā‘at al-inshā’*, ed. M. A. Ibrāhīm, Cairo, al-Maṭba‘a al-amīriyya, 1913, 13, p. 324.

27 Al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 2:255–6; Shihāb-ad-Dīn Yāqūt, *Mu‘jam al-udabā’*, Gibb Memorial Series, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1907, 6, p. 432.

‘ABDALLĀH IBN ‘ABD-AL-MĀLIK (75/694)

‘Abdallāh ibn ‘Abd-al-Mālik is renowned for his period in office, which witnessed the replacement of Coptic by Arabic as the language of government. This helped to spread Arabic throughout Egypt (see below).

AS-SIRRĪ IBN AL-ḤAKAM (200–05/815–20)

The importance of as-Sirrī ibn al-Ḥakam lies in his being the first governor to aspire to Egypt’s independence. With this aim in mind, he appointed his sons Muḥammad and ‘Abdallāh to succeed him, but the attempt failed.

Major events during the era of the governors

A number of significant events and developments during the era of the governors are of particular concern to scholars and historians. The most important of these were the burning of the library at Alexandria, the spread of Islam and the spread of the Arabic language, and the emergence of independence movements in Egypt.

THE BURNING OF THE LIBRARY AT ALEXANDRIA

As mentioned previously, Alexandria was the capital of Egypt before the Islamic conquest and was also a world centre of culture. As such, it had a great library with a huge collection of books on different sciences and arts. It is said that ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ set fire to the library on the orders of the caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, but this is not corroborated by scholarly research. It is certain, however, that Julius Caesar set fire to the great Ptolemaic library when he invaded Egypt in 48 BC. As for the small library that was subsequently created in the temple of Serapis, this was destroyed on the orders of Emperor Theodosius in about AD 389 and the library of Alexandria was destroyed after that. Thus, there was no important library in Alexandria at the time of the Islamic conquest.²⁸ Moreover, a contemporary writer on the Islamic conquest does not accuse the caliph or his governor of setting fire to the library, nor do previous trustworthy historians such as al-Ya‘qūbī, al-Balādhurī, Ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥakam, aṭ-Ṭabarī and al-Kindī and those who took

28 Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. J. B. Bury, London, Methuen, 1900, 6, p. 275.

2.10 Al-Azhar Minarets, Cairo (© G. Degeorge)

material from them such as Ibn al-Athīr, Ibn Taghrī Birdī and as-Suyūfī, even though their writings are considered to be the most reliable and accurate.

The first person to raise the issue of ‘Amr’s burning of the library was ‘Abd-al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī (d. 626/1229), but he gives no source for his information and only mentions it in passing. He describes the pillars of the cavalry garrison and the square surrounding it, adding that the square used to contain the gallery in which Aristotle and his followers sat and studied, the college built by Alexander the Great and the library that ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ set fire to on the orders of ‘Umar.²⁹ A Christian historian, Gregory Bar Hebraeus (Abu-l-Faraj ibn al-‘Ibrī), came across this information and disseminated it, turning it into an elaborate myth without it having any basis in fact. Indeed, it is well known that the Arabs preserved books of science and art and are the ones who brought to light the works of the ancient Greeks that the Christians considered to be heretical and fallacious.³⁰ There is another important consideration that supports the present author’s point of view: the accounts which attribute the burning of the library to the Arabs state: ‘John the grammarian confronted ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ about this library,’ but the John referred to here died thirty or forty years before the Arabs took



29 ‘Abd-al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī, *al-Ifāda wa-l-i‘tibār*, Damascus, Dār Qutayba, 1983, p. 28.

30 Gregory Bar Hebraeus (Ibn al-‘Ibrī), *Tārīkh mukhtaṣar ad-duwal*, Beirut, Catholic Press, 1890, pp. 175–6.

control of Alexandria, a fact that fundamentally undermines the veracity of the information.³¹

Muslim scholars deride the account of Gregory Bar Hebraeus, especially since it contains elements that make it highly implausible. For example, he says: “Amr began to distribute the books among the public baths in Alexandria and to have them burnt in the boilers. This went on for six months. I heard about it and was amazed.” Scholars consider that even if the caliph had instructed ‘Amr to burn the books, he would not have dispersed them among the boilers since the owners of the boilers would have been able to sell or keep them. Then again, the books were written on parchment and were therefore unsuitable for burning. And how can one accept that the burning lasted for 6 months when there were some 4,000 public baths in Alexandria?³²

Non-Arab historians have also discussed the accusation and rejected it. They remark that since ‘Abd-al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī mentions the accusation only incidentally while discussing the pillars of the cavalry garrison, perhaps he had heard something of the sort from the common people or those resentful of the Arabs. These historians include Gibbon, Butler and Sédillot, the last of these stating:

No looting whatsoever took place in Alexandria and it is thus impossible for us to believe that a calculated order was issued to do such an outrageous act. No modern historian of the conquest of Alexandria bothers with this information and history establishes that the two libraries of Alexandria were destroyed in the times of Julius Caesar and Theodosius.³³

This opinion is confirmed by Aurasius, who states that he found the library shelves empty of books when he visited Alexandria at the beginning of the fifth century AD.³⁴

On the basis of all the foregoing, the accusation that the Muslims burnt the library is unjust and groundless. The eminent scholar Muḥammad Kurd ‘Alī has recorded a number of statements from orientalist which conclusively absolve the Muslims from this accusation. First, Aftikos, the patriarch of Alexandria, despite having much to say about the Muslims’ seizure of the border towns of Egypt, does not utter a single word about ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ burning the library. Second, Irvin, Christon, Falin and others state that reports of the burning of the library and attributing this to the Muslims was not referred to by European scholars before *Mukhtaṣar ad-duwal* was

31 Alfred J. Butler, *The Arab Conquest of Egypt*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1902, pp. 401ff.

32 Ḥasan Ibrāhīm, ‘*Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ*, Cairo, 1926, pp. 114–15.

33 L. A. Sédillot, *Histoire générale des Arabes*, Rome, 1914, p. 150.

34 Muḥammad Kurd ‘Alī, *al-Islām wa-l-ḥadāra al-‘arabiyya*, Cairo, 1943, p. 65.

translated into Latin. Since then, some scholars have persisted in this view and have used it to attack the Muslims. Third, in *Crimes of the Europeans*, Foot and Ahlublur remark that it was Bishop Tayful who set fire to the library of Alexandria and not the Muslims. The religion of Islam does not permit the burning of books. And, fourth, according to Buna Muri:

We must correct a mistake that persisted throughout the Middle Ages, namely that the Arabs set fire to the library of Alexandria on the orders of the caliph 'Umar. The fact is that the Arabs during that era had great admiration for the sciences and arts of the Ancient Greeks so would not have done something like this. In fact, the library was burnt a long time before.³⁵

Commenting on the fervour with which some orientalists uphold the accusation without study or thorough examination, 'Alī remarks:

These orientalists persist in maintaining a groundless accusation. On the other hand, they are shown the reality of Cardinal Cisneros' burning of Muslims' books in the squares of Granada, but they hurriedly pass over this and attempt to acquit the cardinal of the crime. Western scholars have similarly written very little on what the Crusaders did to the library of Tarabulus, when Sinjil ordered the burning of the college books of which there were more than 100,000.³⁶

THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

The spread of the faith is also related to the sufferings of Egypt under Byzantine occupation in the pre-Islamic period. Studies on the circumstances of the conquest show that the population of Egypt cooperated in many spheres with the Arabs who were advancing to put an end to Byzantine rule. No sooner was the conquest achieved than Egyptians began to adopt the religion of Islam. Indeed, contemporary sources indicate that a number of Egyptians, including a monk from the Sinai monastery, became Muslims before the conquest was finally over. These offered great assistance to the Arabs in their advance.³⁷

The conquest of Egypt was hardly complete when an event occurred which had great significance for the spread of Islam in the country: a rebellion broke out against the Muslims in a village in Buḥayra. The ensuing battle between the inhabitants of the village and the Muslims ended with the

35 Muḥammad Kurd 'Alī, *al-Islam wa-l-ḥaḍāra al-'arabiyya*, Cairo, 1943, pp. 65ff.

36 Ibid.

37 Ḥannā an-Naqyūsī, *Tārīkh Ḥannā an-Naqyūsī*, Cairo, AH 1311, p. 585.

latter's victory and the capture of several families who were sent to Medina. But 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb was concerned that the struggle be against the Byzantines and not the Egyptians, so he treated the prisoners honourably, gave them their freedom and returned them to Egypt. He instructed that they should either adopt Islam and have the same rights and duties as Muslims or retain their religion and pay the *jizya*. 'Umar's attitude had a great effect on the captives and on all who heard of his treatment of them and many people embraced Islam.³⁸

The Egyptians were exhausted by the financial burdens imposed on them by the Byzantines: as well as leading to resentment, this created political, social and economic pressures. When the Arabs finally settled in Egypt, the difference between them and the Byzantines became apparent since the Arabs did not set themselves up as masters and did not treat the Egyptians as a vanquished people. On the contrary, the Egyptians experienced great religious and social freedom and economic reforms that were far removed from the previous oppression and tyranny, and this encouraged many of them to embrace Islam.

Naturally, and for many reasons, there were contacts between the Muslims and the Copts. As a result, the Copts became aware of Islam and from time to time groups of them would embrace the religion; these included Egyptians who had cooperated with the Muslims in defending the eastern regions of the country. This led to these groups mingling with the Muslim guards. Day after day the Egyptians showed their admiration for Islam and the Muslims and proclaimed that they would adopt the religion of God.³⁹ Integration also occurred in the cities since some Muslims settled in the Egyptian regions that had been evacuated by the Byzantines, especially Dumyāṭ and Rashīd. This encouraged the adoption of Islam and many Egyptians embraced it in those areas.⁴⁰

The Arab army contained numerous legal and other scholars, so when the Arab victory was achieved the sword gave way to intellectual endeavour and the call to Islam began to intensify and become more widespread as people flocked to enter the new faith. Several circumstances facilitated the spread of Islam. Among these was the fact that Christianity had not taken deep root among the inhabitants since most of them had converted after Constantine had granted it official recognition. It thus became the religion of the colonizer and the people did not wholeheartedly accept it. Hall remarks that since the inhabitants had changed their religion once, it was not difficult for them to do so again, and that in the two situations the stronger religion

38 Ibn 'Abd-al-Hakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*.

39 Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-Kindī, *Kitāb al-wulāḥ wa-l-quḍāḥ*, London, Gibb Memorial Series, 1912, p. 397.

40 Ibn 'Abd-al-Hakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*.

swept away the weaker one which conflicted with it.⁴¹ Moreover, Christianity was full of confusion, divisions and ambiguity and thus the belief of much of the population in it was shaken. They welcomed Islam when they became acquainted with it and found its principles easy to understand.

Then began the Arab migrations to Egypt. The Arabs loved water and the history and glories of Egypt were well known and much talked about in the region, as previously mentioned. Thus, the Arab tribes poured into Egypt. Conflict sometimes arose between them and the centre of the caliphate since they were obliged to work on the land, for example, and to mix with the Egyptians and this gave the Egyptians the opportunity to accept Islam and embrace it. A conflict occurred when the third caliph, 'Uthmān, was killed. Some people from the tribes of Lakhm and Judhām rebelled and refused to give their oath of allegiance to the new Commander of the Faithful, 'Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib, until he punished the murderers.⁴² They were eventually integrated within the Egyptian population.

Following this came the great Arab migration into Egypt at the time of the governor 'Ubaydallāh ibn al-Habḥāb during the caliphate of Hishām ibn 'Abd-al-Ḥakam. 'Ubaydallāh invited many groups of tribesmen from the Qays, the Banū Naṣr, the Banū 'Āmir, the Hawāzin and the Salīm, and settled them in Labīs and on the eastern border. They rapidly dispersed throughout the eastern regions of the Nile and mixed with the local population, Islam consequently becoming more widespread.⁴³

There were some attractive occupations that were only open to Muslims, and some Egyptians who aspired to these posts and were qualified for them doubtless embraced Islam to further their ambitions. This was particularly apparent during the caliphate of 'Umar ibn 'Abd-al-'Azīz, who instructed that administrative posts in Egypt should only be occupied by Muslims.⁴⁴ This led many people from the protected religions to convert to Islam and learn Arabic so that they could find employment in civilian positions. From that time onwards, the number of Muslims began to increase until in the third/ninth century Egypt became an Islamic country.⁴⁵

Butler addresses the notion that the *jizya* was one of the most important factors behind the Egyptians' adoption of Islam.⁴⁶ He remarks that this assessment is unreasonable and inaccurate since the *jizya* was a small sum, and if someone attempted to avoid paying it by adopting Islam he would

41 H. R. Hall, *History of the World*, London, 1907, 2, p. 304.

42 Ibn 'Abd-al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Miṣr*, p. 195.

43 Al-Kindī, *Kitāb al-wulāh*, p. 77.

44 Abu-l-Maḥāsin Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *an-Nujūm az-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr wa-l-Qāhira*, ed. T. G. Juynboll, Cairo, 1938, 1, pp. 210, 268.

45 Stanley Lane-Poole, *History of Egypt in the Middle Ages*, London, Methuen, 1892, p. 38.

46 Butler, *Arab Conquest*, pp. 340–1.

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have to pay the alms tax (*zakāh*) instead, which was a much larger amount. Thus, this notion has no basis in fact.⁴⁷ Moreover, the *jizya* was not paid by women and young people whereas *zakāh* was levied on their possessions.

One of the reasons leading to the spread of Islam was the fall of the Umayyads. Their followers and armies in Egypt subsequently became assimilated with the original inhabitants since their posts became obsolete, payments to them ceased and they had to find other work in order to survive. There was a similar situation during the time of the ‘Abbāsīd caliph al-Mu‘taṣim, when the Arabs were removed from the register of those receiving stipends and thus integrated with the people. By such means Islam and the Arabic language became ever more widespread.


THE SPREAD OF THE ARABIC LANGUAGE

As regards the spread of Arabic, the Arabs took two important steps. The first was to try to revive the indigenous languages, Armenian in Syria and Coptic in Egypt. This was to enable them to end the use of Greek (a remnant from the time of the Ptolemies) and Latin (used by the Byzantines). The Syrians and Egyptians welcomed the initiative and it was rapidly achieved. The second step was to promote the use of Arabic, something that was undeniably assisted by the spread of Islam. Although Christianity spread without an associated language, and Buddhism and Judaism did likewise, the spread of Islam helps to disseminate Arabic due to the importance of prayer and reciting the verses of the Qur’ān. Thus, we find that Arabic was in general use in the conquered regions approximately seventy years after the conquest.

There was a further reason behind the spread and consolidation of Arabic, even among the non-Muslims. This was the Arabization of the government departments during the caliphate of al-Walīd ibn ‘Abd-al-Mālik, when it became obligatory for bookkeeping and correspondence to be conducted in Arabic and for anyone applying for a government position to be fluent in the language. Thus, while the Arabs permitted anyone to enter public service regardless of their religion or faith, Arabic was the route to this employment. With the passage of time, some non-Muslims knew only Arabic; this resulted in the need to translate the Bible and other Christian works into Arabic for them.

Other factors behind the spread of the language were its range and purity, for it does not stagnate or stop evolving. It has absorbed words from Persian, Latin, Syriac, Hebrew, Coptic and Hindi and has ceased to

47 See Aḥmad Shalaby, ‘al-Jizya wa-l-kharāj’, in *al-Iqtiṣād fi-l-fikr al-islāmī*, Cairo, Maktabat an-nahḍa al-miṣriyya, 1998.



2.11 Detail of wooden panel, Madrasa and Khanqāh of Sultan Barqūq, Cairo
(© G. Degeorge)

use some Arabic words that were commonplace in the pre-Islamic era. It has also re-employed some Arabic words with meanings other than those they possessed before Islam. The Arabs have endeavoured to make their language universally applicable; thus it is a language of religion, of literature and of politics. According to Renan, Arabic immediately reached a state of perfection, versatility and richness such that one could say that it never passed through a stage of infancy.⁴⁸

An additional reason for the spread of Arabic in Egypt was the arrival of the Arab tribes who emigrated there and integrated with the local population. At the beginning of the Islamic period in Egypt, there was a large influx of southern Arabs; then, during the caliphate of Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam, many from the Qays tribe settled in the region of Balbīs and the surrounding areas in the southern province. Subsequently, in the third/ninth century, representatives from the tribe of Rabī‘a migrated and settled in Upper Egypt.

As mentioned previously, after the fall of the Umayyads and during the caliphate of al-Mu‘taṣim, the Arabs became largely assimilated with the Egyptians and began to work in agriculture, industry and commerce.

48 Quoted in ‘Alī, *al-Islām*, 1, p. 180.

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In this way and due to intermarriage, there was a substantial measure of integration and eventually it became difficult to distinguish between the original inhabitants and the incoming Arabs.

Arabic achieved a final victory when many Arabs emigrated from the desert and adopted a sedentary lifestyle in the affluent conquered cities. Since the language was widely used by the original population, in the fourth/tenth century men of the church had to write in Arabic if they wanted their followers to understand them.⁴⁹ Thus, Arabic spread as rapidly among the Egyptians as did Islam.

INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS

At the end of the first 'Abbāsid period (232/846), the centre of the Islamic caliphate weakened and some regions under its control began to strive for independence, especially those which had possessed a glorious and recognizable history before Islam. Although these regions had embraced the new religion and adopted its culture and civilization, they did not wish to be politically subservient, especially since the centre of the caliphate was controlled by those who did not represent Islam either culturally or in terms of its civilization. Egypt was one of the most prominent countries to take this course since its long pharaonic history went back thousands of years and had witnessed advances in many fields.

Islam received an enthusiastic welcome in Egypt and its ideas were embraced since it was an important addition to Egyptian civilization. However, the first centres of the caliphate, the Ḥijāz, Damascus and Baghdad, had begun to suffer from internal dissension and it became apparent that they were less able than Cairo to bear the responsibility of developing and propagating Islamic thought. Thus, these regions began to decline while Egypt advanced. It so happened that Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn came to Egypt at that time and found a great readiness for an independence movement aimed at regaining Egypt's political autonomy on the one hand and assuming responsibility for developing and propagating Islam on the other. The Ṭūlūnid state was the first of these independence movements, which were to continue throughout the Ṭūlūnid period, then under the Ikhshīdids, to be finally successful under the Fāṭimids.

After the Fāṭimids, the Ayyūbids nominally acknowledged the 'Abbāsid caliphate but the Muslim leadership fighting against the Crusaders took Egypt as a base. Thus, with the advent of the Mamlūks, the 'Abbāsid

49 George E. Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East*, London, Methuen, 1927, p. 37.

caliphate was transferred to Egypt after the Mongols had destroyed the caliphate in Baghdad.

The significant point is that independence movements began early in Egypt during the time of as-Sirrī ibn al-Ḥakam, whose sons governed Egypt after him. These movements were fully developed under the Ṭūlūnids and Egypt rapidly became the centre of power and learning for the entire Islamic world. The Egyptians had supported this move for independence since it first appeared. Thus, when the Ṭūlūnid state fell in 292/905 and Egypt once again became a province under the aegis of the caliphate in Baghdad, Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al-Khalanjī (an officer in the Ṭūlūnid army) rose in revolt. He incited an uprising against the ‘Abbāsīd governor ‘Īsā an-Nūsharī and was joined by many thousands of Egyptians. The rebels managed to defeat the governor and controlled Egypt for some eight months.⁵⁰ A modern historian describes the revolt as being ‘an articulation of the Egyptian desire for independence’.⁵¹ Shortly afterwards, the Ikhshīdīd state was established in Egypt, followed by the Fāṭimīds under whom Egypt became fully independent, as previously mentioned.

The trend towards independence was manifested in a number of important ways, which can be summarized as follows. First, the governor’s name began to be mentioned in the Friday sermon after that of the caliph. Second, the governor had his own name put on the coinage alongside that of the caliph. Third, an independent army was conscripted for Egypt. It was occasionally sent by the governor to fight a representative of the caliphate, as occurred against the caliph al-Muwaffaq during the Ṭūlūnid period and against Ibn Rā’iq under the Ikhshīdīds. Fourth, Egypt came to possess a powerful independent fleet. Fifth, the governor of Egypt began personally to appoint the judges and state officials. And, lastly, the principle of hereditary rule was adopted. Thus, the caliphal capital did not dispatch a new governor to the country on the death of an old governor.

The Ṭūlūnid state (254–92/868–905)

The Ṭūlūnid state traces its origins back to Ṭūlūn, who belonged to a family from Bukhārā in Turkistan. In 200/816, during the caliphate of al-Ma’mūn, Ṭūlūn was sent by Nūḥ ibn Asad as-Sāmānī as one of a party of captives to the caliph in Baghdad. The caliph found Ṭūlūn to be very knowledgeable and physically able and so appointed him head of his private guard. Thus,

50 Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *an-Nujūm az-zāhira*, 3, p. 152.

51 Ḥasan Maḥmūd, *Miṣr fī ‘ahd aṭ-Ṭūlūniyyīn wa-l-Ikhshīdiyyīn*, Cairo, 1972, p. 86.

Ṭūlūn achieved standing and paved the way for his son Aḥmad and his grandchildren to acquire glory and command. The Ṭūlūnid rulers were:

Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn (r. 254–70/868–84);
Khamārwayh ibn Aḥmad (r. 270–82/884–96);
Abū-l-‘Abbās Jaysh ibn Khamārwayh (r. 282–83/896);
Abū Mūsa Hārūn ibn Khamārwayh (r. 283–92/896–904); and
Shaybān ibn Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn (r. 292/905).

AḤMAD IBN ṬŪLŪN

Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn was born in 220/835 and received an excellent education at the hands of his father, who brought him up in the traditional way that the sons of Turkomen rulers were raised at that time. He trained him to be courageous, and taught him the military arts in Sāmarrā’ and the sciences of language and religion. Aḥmad received instruction in jurisprudence according to the school of the great Imam Abū Ḥanīfa an-Nu‘mān. He subsequently paid frequent visits to the scholars of Tarsus and acquired their knowledge and related Traditions from them. When his father died in 240/854, the caliph al-Mutawakkil entrusted Ibn Ṭūlūn with some of the duties that his father had previously undertaken. He was then given control over the administration of Damascus and the border posts.⁵²

After the deposition of the caliph al-Musta‘īn in 252/866, al-Mu‘tazz seized power, placed his predecessor under house arrest in Wāsiṭ and made Ibn Ṭūlūn one of the guards. The guards respected the status of their captive and thus did not supervise him closely, only requiring that he did not involve himself in any activities against the reigning caliph. But Qubayḥa, the mother of al-Mu‘tazz, was not satisfied with the imprisonment of al-Musta‘īn and resolved to have him killed lest he pose a threat to her son. Men from the court instructed Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn to murder al-Musta‘īn, but he refused and wrote to them to this effect.⁵³ This raised Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn’s standing in the eyes of eminent and learned men and he left Wāsiṭ for Sāmarrā’.

From the time of al-Mu‘taṣim, the ‘Abbāsids had employed Turks as governors of the most important provinces. The Turks, however, were keen to stay in the capital of the caliphate to enjoy its luxuries and also to remain in touch with the centre of power and influence. These governors would

52 Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *an-Nujūm az-zāhira*, 3, p. 4.

53 Abū Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh al-Balawī, *Sīrat Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn*, Cairo, Maktabat ath-thaqāfa ad-dīniyya, 1925, pp. 5–7, 40.

therefore appoint deputies to govern the provinces in their name while they remained in the capital.⁵⁴

Ibn Ṭūlūn's rise to power

Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn arrived in Egypt as a deputy of its Turkish governor, Bākbāk (or Baqbaq), who had married Aḥmad's mother after the death of his father. He had instructed Ibn Ṭūlūn to devote his attention to the capital and had not included Alexandria within his sphere of jurisdiction. When Bākbāk died, Ibn Ṭūlūn's father-in-law Yārjūkh wanted to be governor of Egypt. No sooner had he achieved this than Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn's son-in-law wrote to him saying: 'Take from yourself so as to give to yourself' and included Alexandria under his jurisdiction. This was in 256/870.⁵⁵ Ibn Ṭūlūn was renowned for his strength and reformist tendencies and his arrival in Egypt followed that of a group of governors known for their selfishness and frivolity. This is what endeared him to the people and created strong links between them. Ibn Ṭūlūn enjoyed good relations with the 'Abbāsid caliph and used to send him the rare objects and produce of Egypt. Thus, as soon as Yārjūkh died the caliph installed Ibn Ṭūlūn as governor of Egypt, where he continued his reforms and created a situation that would ensure his independence.⁵⁶

The expansion of Ibn Ṭūlūn's rule

At that time, several governors in ash-Shām were under the aegis of the 'Abbāsid caliphate. They included 'Abdallāh ibn Rashīd, the governor of the border posts, who was defeated in one of the battles with the Byzantines and taken captive. In 264/878 the caliph al-Mu'tamid instructed Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn to wage war against the Byzantines. He obeyed the order and set out from Egypt with a large army. He achieved a great victory and the esteem in which he was held enabled him to extend his influence as far as Tarsus and the Euphrates and to take Damascus from 'Alī ibn Āmajūr. In this way, Ṭūlūnid possessions came to comprise Egypt, ash-Shām, al-Jazīra and the regions around the border posts, this being acknowledged by the 'Abbāsid caliph.

Ibn Ṭūlūn also fought and was victorious against al-Muwaffaq, the caliph's brother and the person who held real power in the caliphate. He established the custom of cursing al-Muwaffaq from the pulpit as did his son Khamārwayh, thus indicating his complete independence from Baghdad.

54 Perhaps Harūn ar-Rashīd was responsible for this innovation when he appointed Ja'far al-Barmakī as governor of Egypt while at the same time keeping Ja'far with him. Thus, Ja'far delegated 'Amr ibn Mihrān to act in his place.

55 Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *an-Nujūm az-zāhira*, 3, p. 7.

56 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, 3, p. 1670.

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When a peace treaty was drawn up between al-Muwaffaq and Khamārwayh, it included a clause stating that control of Egypt and Syria up to Tarsus was to be in the hands of Khamārwayh and his sons for a period of thirty years.

THE END OF THE ṬŪLŪNIDS

The ṬŪlūnid state rapidly declined after Aḥmad ibn ṬŪlūn and his son Khamārwayh, although it appears that the ‘Abbāsīd caliph al-Mu‘taḍīd’s marriage to Khamārwayh’s daughter Qaṭar Hindī may have prolonged its existence somewhat. Thus, we find that following the death of al-Mu‘taḍīd and before him Khamārwayh, the caliph al-Muktafī was quick to dispatch an army to put an end to the ṬŪlūnids and particularly to stop the advance of the Qarāmiṭa. The army was under the command of Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān al-Kātib, assisted by a naval force which travelled down the Nile until it reached Fuṣṭāṭ. During the ‘Abbāsīd advance Abū Mūsā Hārūn was murdered by his men, leaving Shaybān ibn Aḥmad ibn ṬŪlūn as ruler of Egypt. Shaybān attempted to gather the armies around him to stop the ‘Abbāsīd advance but only a few men responded while the great majority joined Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān. Shaybān therefore had no choice but to surrender.

Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān took members of the ṬŪlūnid family captive and sent them to Baghdad in chains. He also confiscated their possessions along with those of their leaders and the wealthy. It seems that the caliph al-Muktafī accused his commander Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān of appropriating some of these possessions since he ordered his arrest and his property was seized. Thus, the ṬŪlūnid state came to an end in 292/905 and Egypt became an ‘Abbāsīd province once again.

ṬŪLŪNID CULTURE

Coinage, the office of the muḥtasib and the police force

As mentioned earlier, the ṬŪlūnids were the first independent rulers of Egypt. It is therefore not surprising that they should seek to buttress their power and make plans for regularizing political affairs and for economic stability. Among the most significant political initiatives undertaken by Aḥmad ibn ṬŪlūn to support his rule was to have his name mentioned after that of the caliph in the Friday sermon and to have it inscribed on the coinage. He selected the chamberlains, secretaries, assistants and the mounted escort and organized the police force so that he could rely on it to keep the peace

and maintain security. He similarly organized the judiciary and the office of the *muhtasib*, or market inspector, and personally appointed the judges since this was an important token of independence. One of the most famous judges was Bakkār ibn Qutayba, who refused to curse al-Muwaffaq from the pulpit when Ibn Ṭūlūn ordered it; this resulted in Ibn Ṭūlūn's having him thrown into prison.

The army and the navy

One sign of independence is the formation of an army and Ibn Ṭūlūn paid great attention to this. His troops numbered more than 100,000 men and included Sudanese, Turks, Arabs and Egyptians. This number was greatly increased under the rule of Khamārwayh. The Ṭūlūnid army was supplied with the most modern weapons known at the time.

The long coastline controlled by the Ṭūlūnids made it necessary for them to acquire a large naval fleet and Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn constructed a great number of ships in the Dār aṣ-Ṣinā'a on ar-Rawḍa island. His concern for maintaining a fleet was shared by his son Khamārwayh. Ibn Ṭūlūn had Acre fortified and established a free military base there. The tower that loomed over its walls was a symbol of strength: three centuries later it withstood two Crusader kings for two years, and in 1799 it withstood Napoleon's artillery fire.⁵⁷


A new capital

Another sign of Ibn Ṭūlūn's independence was his establishing of his own capital, al-Qaṭā'i', to the north of Fuṣṭāṭ. He had it constructed on the model of Sāmarrā', the 'Abbāsīd capital at that time. In it he built a large hospital, a magnificent mosque and numerous wonderful buildings. Al-Qaṭā'i' continued to flourish until the arrival of the 'Abbāsīd army under the command of Muḥammad ibn Sulaymān when it was destroyed and its buildings set on fire.

Economy and society

The Ṭūlūnids paid particular attention to the economic situation so as to ensure the welfare and independence of the state. They therefore encouraged industry, the most important of which was textiles. They also built workshops for the manufacture of weapons. Under their rule the manufacture of papyrus, soap, sugar and porcelain was similarly developed.

57 Philip K. Hitti, *History of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine*, London, Macmillan, 1943, 2, p. 187.



2.12 Dome of Sultan Qaitbay's mausoleum, Cairo (© G. Degeorge)

In the field of trade, Egypt and Syria continued their commercial activities by taking advantage of their geographic positions. They became a link for trade between East and West and would receive customs duties on the goods that passed through their territories; the duties occasionally amounted to considerable sums of money.

The Ṭūlūnids took a keen interest in agriculture; thus they took measures to ensure that the waters of the Nile were clean, built bridges and constructed irrigation canals. Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn also encouraged the peasants to gain ownership of the land and reduced their taxes. All this stimulated agricultural activity and led to a great increase in production.

As regards the social sphere, it appears that the Turks enjoyed high status under the Ṭūlūnids. Alongside these was the class of nobles who were treated with honour and respect by the people and the *amīrs*, and also a wealthy class of senior property owners and merchants. As for the general populace, their circumstances improved due to the stability and the rulers'

concern for them and for justice. People from the protected religions were similarly treated generously and well and this encouraged them to do their work enthusiastically and with peace of mind.

The state was eager to revive the Christian, Islamic and local festivals such as the Festival of Breaking the Ramaḍān Fast (*ʿĪd al-Fiṭr*) and the Festival of Immolation (*ʿĪd al-Aḍḥā*), Christmas and Epiphany and the Day of the Nile Inundation. The most prominent activity during these festivals was the display of horsemanship on which the Ṭūlūnids were very keen. They were also great patrons of architecture, the arts and the sciences; indeed, the Ṭūlūnid Mosque continues to bear witness to their concern for architecture and design. It is worth noting that its minaret is the oldest in Egypt, and that it is the only mosque in Egypt to be modelled on an Iraqi design. As for the other mosques, they are influenced to some extent by Greek architecture. The Ṭūlūnid Mosque was a school in which sat circles of students as well as prominent legal scholars and teachers who gave legal opinions and instructed. The Ṭūlūnid court was a centre that attracted poets and *littérateurs* and spread learning and a knowledge of the sciences.

After the fall of the Ṭūlūnids, Egypt once again became an ‘Abbāsīd province. This situation lasted for thirty-one years until the Ikhshīdid state gave Egypt its independence once again. The first governor of Egypt during this period was ʿĪsa ibn Muḥammad an-Nūsharī, who continued in his post for five years during which time the Ṭūlūnids made an unsuccessful attempt to regain power.⁵⁸

The Ikhshīdid state (323–58 / 945–69)

‘Ikhshīd’ was originally the title of the kings of Farghāna in Transoxiana. Muḥammad ibn Ṭaghj ibn Jaff was then awarded the honorary title by the caliph ar-Rāḍī in recognition of his services since he was a descendant of the royal family. Thus, the regime established in Egypt and Syria was known as the Ikhshīdid state.

Jaff, Ikhshīd’s grandfather, had relations with the ‘Abbāsīd caliphs al-Muʿtaṣim, al-Wāthiq and al-Mutawakkil, while Ṭaghj, Ikhshīd’s father, was in the service of the Ṭūlūnids during the rule of Khamārwayh. He enjoyed a prominent position at court and achieved some notable victories over the Byzantines. After the fall of the Ṭūlūnids the situation in Egypt went from bad to worse, while at the same time the Fāṭimids were sweeping towards it. The caliph ar-Rāḍī, who succeeded al-Qāhir, had no option but to put Muḥammad

58 Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *an-Nujūm az-zāhira*, 3, p. 152.

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Ṭaghj in charge of Egypt's affairs to act as a strong governor and thus thwart Fātimid ambitions and stabilize the country. He arrived in Egypt in 323/935 and began to establish his state. The Ḥijāz was subsequently added to the Ikhshīdid state and was to remain annexed to Egypt for several centuries.

There is a similarity between the events here and those already mentioned concerning the relations between the Ṭulūnids and Baghdad. The similarity lies in the intermarriages which took place between the Ikhshīdids and Ibn Rā'iq, and between the Ikhshīdids and the Ḥamdānids. This indicates that forging alliances by marriage played an important role in the world of politics.

The caliph al-Mutaqqī enjoyed a good relationship with Ikhshīd and he decided to accept his invitation to move to Egypt and rid himself of Turkish control. Although for various reasons this did not happen, the caliph was nevertheless eager to strengthen Ikhshīd both materially and culturally so that he could rely on him when the need arose. Thus, he extended Ikhshīd's power by appointing him and his sons after him as governors of Mecca and Medina in addition to Egypt and ash-Shām. This was to be for a period of thirty years. For many centuries, the strength of the Ḥijāz was dependent on the strength of Egypt.⁵⁹

Ikhshīd's character may be summed up in the words of Abu-l-Maḥāsīn ibn Taghrī Birdī:

Ikhshīd was a courageous, valiant, resolute and vigilant ruler. He was a capable organizer, well versed in warfare, generous to his troops, very powerful and so strong that one could hardly draw his bow. His subjects held him in the greatest esteem. He was elegant in his manner of riding and dress and his retinue rivalled that of the caliphate. He possessed 8,000 slaves. He was very concerned for his own safety. His slaves would therefore work in shifts to protect him while he slept and he would assign servants to stand by his tent. He would trust no one and so would go to the attendants' tent and sleep there.⁶⁰

Ikhshīd died in Damascus in 335/946 and was buried in Jerusalem.

AFTER IKHSHĪD

The Ikhshīdid state in Egypt was basically led by two people: the founder of the state, Muḥammad ibn Ṭaghj, and his successor Kafūr, originally a slave. (There were also two nonentities who played no prominent role in the

59 Hitti, *History of Syria*, p. 191.

60 Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *an-Nujūm az-zāhira*, 2, p. 230.

history of the state: Abu-l-Qāsim Anūjūr and Abu-l-Ḥasan ‘Alī, both sons of Ikhshīd.) Before Ikhshīd died he had made his commanders, troops and the leading citizens swear an oath of allegiance to the first of his sons. Thus, on his death, power devolved to Anūjūr, who was 14 years old at the time. Kafūr was appointed as his successor. Though Anūjūr remained in office for fourteen years, he never exercised any real authority. Kafūr continued to hold the reins of power with an iron fist, giving Anūjūr an allowance for his everyday needs. It is reported that Anūjūr at one time wished to take real control and showed signs of revolting against Kafūr. He made preparations to depart to ash-Shām, where he hoped to appeal to the garrisons for assistance. But his mother feared for his safety, informed Kafūr of his plans and tried to make peace between them. Anūjūr died shortly afterwards amid suspicions that Kafūr had poisoned his food.

After Anūjūr, his brother Abu-l-Ḥasan ‘Alī acceded to power. Although he was aged 21, Kafūr appointed himself as his legal guardian and usurped his authority. When Abu-l-Ḥasan took steps to remove his domineering guardian, Kafūr reacted forcefully and interposed himself between Abu-l-Ḥasan and the people, Abu-l-Ḥasan becoming a prisoner in his own palace. It is reported that he then died and, as was the case after the death of Anūjūr, suspicions were once again aroused that Kafūr had had him killed. Abu-l-Ḥasan had ruled for five years and a few months.

When Abu-l-Ḥasan died, Kafūr continued to administer the province for a further two years, as before with the help of the chief minister (*wazīr*), Ja‘far ibn al-Faḍl ibn al-Furāt. After a while Kafūr revealed a written oath of allegiance to himself from the ‘Abbāsīd caliph. He thus became the direct ruler of Egypt, Syria and the Ḥijāz.

AFTER KAFÜR

Kafūr died after ruling for two years and power devolved to Abu-l-Fawāris Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī ibn al-Ikhshīd, who was then aged 11. His legal guardian was al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Ubaydallāh ibn Ṭaghj, who assumed control and imprisoned the *wazīr* Ja‘far ibn al-Furāt. He was, however, incapable of governing properly, especially in the midst of the terrible famine which gripped the country. Thus, the people rose in revolt against him and he fled from Egypt to ash-Shām. This decline in Egypt, along with the accompanying decline within the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate, was among the factors that facilitated the Fāṭimid advance.

The Fāṭimid state (358–567/969–1171)

FĀṬIMID GENEALOGY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE

Some scholars challenge the genealogy of the Fāṭimids and doubt that they were the descendants of Fāṭima, the Prophet's daughter. We cannot accept this position for the following reasons:

1. The accusation is based on hearsay, since the first time doubt was raised when a group of people signed a resolution in 402/1012 stating that they had heard that the Fāṭimid line did not go back to 'Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib.
2. It is significant that this resolution was issued in 402/1012 even though the Fāṭimid state was established in Tunisia in 297/909, that is, more than one century before the resolution.
3. The doubt has no historical basis. Indeed, Ibn al-Athīr rejected it as did Ibn Khaldūn and Al-Maqrīzī. Ibn Khaldūn said it was an example of the prejudice from which historians may suffer.
4. When 'Ubaydallāh proclaimed his summons to the family of the Prophet, the 'Abbāsīd caliph attempted to seize him and wrote to Ziyādat-ad-Dīn al-Aghlabī in Africa instructing him to capture 'the 'Alīd rebel', thus acknowledging that he was a descendant of 'Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib.
5. Ash-Sharīf al-'Alawī, the scholar and genealogist, recited:

Why am I treated with contempt when I have a
sharp tongue and a fierce disposition?
Am I subjected to injustice in the land of the enemy
while in Egypt is the 'Alīd caliph?
His ancestors are also mine and his master is mine but
the great distance treats me with injustice;
My roots are intertwined with his: the lords of
all people Muḥammad and 'Alī.

Fāṭimid activity began in North Africa, where the Fāṭimid caliphs were:

'Abdallāh al-Mahdī (r. 297–322/909–34);
Abu-l-Qāsim al-Qā'im ibn al-Mahdī (r. 322–34/934–45);
al-Manṣūr ibn al-Qā'im (r. 334–41/945–52);
al-Mu'iz li-Dīnillāh ibn al-Manṣūr (r. 341–65/953–75); and
al-Mu'tazz, who arrived in Egypt in 362/972.

While the Fāṭimids were in North Africa they made many attempts to enter Egypt. Eventually Jawhar aṣ-Ṣiqillī was successful and he arrived there in 358/969.

JAWHAR AŞ-ŞIQLĪ

Jawhar paves the way for al-Mu‘iz’s reception

During Jawhar’s rule of Egypt (358–62/969–73) he was able to remove all obstacles, overcome all hardships and prepare for the caliph’s reception in a befitting and honourable manner. On his first evening in the country, Jawhar drew up plans for a new capital: he called it al-Mansūriyya and divided it into a number of districts. When al-Mu‘iz li-Dīnillāh entered Egypt, he renamed the city al-Qāhira al-Mu‘iziyya, that is, ‘the city of al-Mu‘iz which conquers and surpasses all cities’. On the same evening, Jawhar drew up plans for a magnificent palace as the caliph’s residence for when he arrived. He also built al-Azhar Mosque. Over each government department he appointed two officials: an Egyptian who oversaw the affairs of the Egyptians and a North African who was responsible for the North Africans whom Jawhar had brought with him.

The Fāṭimid period in Egypt is considered to be the most magnificent of Islamic eras, especially during its first period. It saw the consummation of trends towards independence since it witnessed Egypt’s total autonomy from Baghdad. Thus, Egypt began to compete with Baghdad; indeed, from that time onwards, it assumed the leadership of the Islamic world.

Jawhar and Shī‘ism

Jawhar strove to spread and consolidate Shī‘ism in Egypt. Initially, he published a document⁶¹ in which he bound himself to act justly, to reduce current taxation and to allow people to follow whatever school of thought they wished. When the situation was more stable, however, he prohibited the wearing of black, the colour of the ‘Abbāsids, and attempted to encourage the wearing of green, the colour of the family of the Prophet. Jawhar similarly ordered that the call to prayer should include the phrase ‘come to perform good works’ and that the Friday sermon should include blessings and salutations to the Imam ‘Alī al-Murtaḍā; Fāṭima the virgin; al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn, the grandsons of the Prophet; and the Rightly Guided Imams, the forebears of the Commander of the Faithful. He also restricted the holding of important positions to Shī‘īs from Egypt or North Africa. Thus, anyone with ambition hastened to proclaim their acceptance of Shī‘ism, indeed many became fanatical about it.⁶² The Fāṭimids in Egypt were aware that

61 See Taqīyy-ad-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī Al-Maqrīzī, *Itti‘āz al-ḥunafā’ bi-dhikr al-a’imma al-khulafā’*, Cairo, 1908, pp. 148–53.

62 Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1, p. 120.

they were dealing with a cultured people with a history of great intellectual achievements; they therefore softened their zeal for Shī'ism so as to ensure stability and peace, especially during the first period of their rule, and Sunnīs were not forced to conceal their activities under Fāṭimid rule.⁶³

Jawhar made many conquests and greatly expanded Fāṭimid domains. Thus, he annexed Nubia, while Mecca and Medina acknowledged Fāṭimid authority as did the Ḥamādanī *amīr*, the governor of Aleppo. After this, Jawhar decided that the time had come for al-Mu'iz to enter Egypt. He therefore wrote to him and al-Mu'iz left al-Manṣūriyya in Shawwāl 361/972, arriving in Ramaḍān 362/973 in al-Qāhira (Cairo), where he received the reins of power from Jawhar. He bestowed on his commander a golden robe of honour, girded him with a sword and presented him with 20 saddled horses and 50,000 dinars in appreciation of the success he had achieved and the services he had rendered to the state. But two swords cannot fit into the same scabbard, as the saying goes. It was therefore inevitable that Jawhar should disappear from the scene so that the caliph could enjoy all the limelight and glory. Jawhar was dismissed from government departments, from involvement in fiscal arrangements and from supervision of Egyptian affairs.⁶⁴ His star began to wane and after a short time he had disappeared from the Egyptian political arena.⁶⁵ But he still had some influence over the military: he commanded the Fāṭimid armies which destroyed Aftakīn and defeated al-Ḥasan, the ruler of the Qarāmiṭa (Carmathians), in ash-Shām in 365/976 and established Fāṭimid authority there. He returned to Egypt in 377/987, dying in Cairo in the same year.

AL-MU'IZ LI-DĪNILLĀH (R. 341–65/953–75)

When al-Mu'iz went to Egypt he took with him his family and also the bodies of his forebears. This indicates that he intended to make Egypt his capital from where he would rule the large empire of which he dreamt. For him, Egypt was not merely a land that he had brought under his authority, it was rather a centre to which the countries that yielded to him would be subordinate.

Al-Mu'iz's time in Egypt was short since he died three years after his arrival, but his period witnessed numerous reforms and the enactment of liberal and magnanimous laws. Thus, he released those of the Ikhshīdids and Kafūr's followers who had been imprisoned, and he promulgated justice and competent administration and put a check on the unruliness of his troops,

63 See Aḥmad Kāmil, 'The Efforts of the Sunnīs in Egypt during the Fāṭimid Period', PhD thesis.

64 Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1, p. 118.

65 'Alī Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, *Jawhar aṣ-Ṣiqillī*, Cairo, 1951, pp. 108–10.

forbidding them from remaining outside their barracks after sunset. He also abolished the system of farming out tax collection and made the taxpayer directly responsible to the state. He was extremely tolerant of the Christians and employed many of them in important posts. The covering for the Ka'ba that he ordered was the height of magnificence. He instructed that a map of the world be made from blue silk and had all the known countries marked on it.⁶⁶ In the light of these reforms, the period of al-Mu'iz was a thriving one during which the country became markedly more wealthy, peace and security prevailed and Cairo became an international centre of knowledge and learning.

Al-Mu'iz and methods for propagating Shī'ism

Al-Mu'iz was very active in the promotion and dissemination of Shī'ism and sought the services of scholars and poets to this end. The scholars would lecture the educated while the poets would speak to both the educated people and the general population about the principles of Shī'ism and the need to adopt it. Indeed, poetry was the equivalent of newspapers in those days. The Fāṭimids similarly inaugurated various Shī'i festivals with ceremonies and other formalities designed to reinvigorate the call to Shī'ism and establish it in people's hearts. The Shī'is celebrated six birthdays: those of the Prophet, 'Alī, Fāṭima, al-Ḥasan, al-Ḥusayn and the current Fāṭimid caliph. They also celebrated the anniversary of al-Ḥusayn's martyrdom at Karbalā' ('Āshūrā'), the festival of Ghadīr Khumm and others.⁶⁷ Al-Mu'iz li-Dīnillāh died in 365/975 and was succeeded by his son, al-'Azīz.

AL-'AZĪZ BI-LLĀH (R. 365–86/975–96)

Al-'Azīz came to power when he was 20 years old. Although still a young man, he loved hunting and was astute, noble and courageous. He governed the country wisely and with tolerance and commanded the army with bravery and boldness. Under his rule, the Fāṭimids in Egypt enjoyed their most splendid era. Al-'Azīz greatly extended Fāṭimid authority and his name was mentioned in the Friday sermon in all the countries lying between the Atlantic Ocean and the Red Sea in addition to Yemen, the Ḥijāz and Damascus, and even occasionally Mosul. The Egyptian caliphate not only competed with the caliphate in Baghdad but surpassed and overshadowed

66 Zakī Ḥasan, *Kunūz al-Fāṭimiyyīn*, Cairo, Dār ar-rā'id al-'arabī, 1940, p. 53.

67 On the Ismā'īliyya sect in Egypt and Fāṭimid efforts to propagate it, see Shalaby, *Tārīkh at-tarbiya*, pp. 378–420.

it. It acquired such power that it became the only large Islamic state in the eastern Mediterranean.⁶⁸

This expansion is perhaps what led al-‘Azīz to make the same mistake as that made by the ‘Abbāsīd caliphs before him and which caused them so many problems: he began to import Turks and black Africans and to rely on them in military affairs. This was in addition to the Berbers who had arrived with Jawhar and the caliph’s father. In this way, soldiers of different races came to Egypt; they were eventually to be the cause of unrest and the disintegration of the state when the caliphs found themselves unable to control or exert any authority over them.

The reforms of al-‘Azīz

Al-‘Azīz carried out some important social and cultural reforms. He began the construction of the mosque which his son al-Ḥākim completed and which was named after him. In the palace he built a great library containing hundreds of thousands of volumes. According to Abū Shāma, the library contained 2 million books on the different sciences and arts, such as jurisprudence, the Arabic language, Islamic Traditions, history, biographies, astronomy, religion and chemistry.⁶⁹ Al-‘Azīz also turned al-Azhar Mosque into a university where students could receive instruction and attend lectures.

Al-‘Azīz is attributed with having strengthened Shī‘ism, compelling the Egyptians to adopt it and obliging the judges to issue rulings in accordance with it. It is known that he was extremely tolerant of the people of the protected religions, however, perhaps owing to his marriage to two Christian women or to his greater fear of a Sunnī attack on Shī‘ism than one from the people of the Book. His chief ministers included Ya‘qūb ibn Killis, a Jew who converted to Islam and was very knowledgeable about the family of the Prophet, wrote on this subject and taught it at al-Azhar. It was he who advised al-‘Azīz to turn al-Azhar Mosque into a religious university.⁷⁰ There was also a Christian minister, ‘Īsā ibn Nuṣṭūrīs, who continued in his faith even though he occupied such an important post and who so favoured his fellow Christians that some Muslims rebelled against him. Other chief ministers included Munashshā the Jew. Al-‘Azīz’s physician and that of his

68 Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, pp. 734–5.

69 Shihāb-ad-Dīn Abū Shāma, *Kitāb ar-rawḍatayn fī tārikh ad-dawlatayn an-nūriyya wa-ṣ-Ṣalāhiyya*, Cairo, 1926, 1, p. 100.

70 Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 2, pp. 334–5.

son al-Ḥākim was a Christian called Abū-l-Faḥ Mansūr ibn Mu‘ashshar al-Miṣrī, who held high state office.⁷¹

Aware of the danger this policy represented, al-‘Azīz dissociated himself from the people of the protected religions and fined them considerable sums of money. He subsequently pardoned them due to the mediation of his daughter Sitt-al-Mulk and under the influence of his Christian wife.⁷² Al-‘Azīz died in Rajab 386/996 in Balbīs on his way to ash-Shām to attack the Byzantines.

AL-ḤĀKIM BI-AMRILLĀH (R. 387–411/996–1020)

We now turn to an ambiguous personality, that of al-Ḥākim bi-Amrillāh, the subject of much research by both Western and Arab scholars.

Al-Ḥākim succeeded to the caliphate at the age of 11, when he found himself the caliph of a great kingdom established by his father and grandfather. Barjawān at-Turkī was appointed as his legal guardian, but power was shared between Barjawān and al-Ḥākim’s sister, Sitt-al-Mulk. This legal guardianship, the conditions at court and the life of Shī‘ism were all aimed at instructing al-Ḥākim in particular fields of knowledge the most important of which, alongside philosophy and astronomy, was an exaggerated approach towards Shī‘ism. It was only natural that al-Ḥākim should also manage to study subjects other than Shī‘ism; these all had an influence on him. Thus, there were two paths open to al-Ḥākim. Although he might have wished to devote himself to the mild sciences and peaceful studies, the men of the court and the Easterners in charge of his education and upbringing were not permitted to encourage him in this direction: it might bring about the collapse of the Fāṭimid regime and with it the power of those of high rank in Egypt and the country would once again be incorporated within Sunnī rule.

A multiplicity of races at court and in society

Al-Ḥākim grew up surrounded by a court teeming with a variety of races – Berbers, Arabs, Egyptians, Turks and black Africans – all of whom had their own aims and orientations. The court also included people of many religions. Al-Ḥākim’s mother was a Christian as was his father’s other wife, the mother of his sister Sitt-al-Mulk. In addition there were Jews, Shī‘īs, Sunnīs, those who subscribed to no particular religion and

71 Bar Hebraeus, *Tārīkh*, p. 316. ‘Abd-al-Mun‘im Mājid states that the only person to bear the title *wazīr* under al-‘Azīz and al-Ḥākim was Ibn Killis. See his *Nizām al-Fāṭimiyyīn wa Rusūmuhum fī Miṣr*, Cairo, 1957, p. 48.

72 Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh ‘Anān, *al-Ḥākim bi-Amrillāh*, Cairo, Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1983, p. 81.

others who were extremely anti-religious. The court was a mirror image of Fāṭimid society with its tendencies, religions and schools of thought. Indeed, during al-Ḥākim's time Islamic society in general, and not just Fāṭimid society, had passed its prime. In Spain there was weakness and decay after the era of al-Manṣūr ibn Abī 'Āmir and his sons, and in Iraq the Buwayhids with their Shī'ism and their attack upon the 'Abbāsīd caliphs had become fragmented, though they were reluctant to join forces with the Fāṭimid Shī'īs.

Al-Ḥākim's economic activities

Al-Ḥākim was very preoccupied with trade. He ensured safety on the roads and put an end to thievery and fraud. He similarly maintained the integrity of weights and measures, and during his time the office of *muḥtasib* (market inspector) became an elevated position. Al-Ḥākim also turned his attention to the country's flourishing agricultural sector, to the Nile and its tributaries and to the introduction of several new farming methods. This interest led him to send for al-Ḥasan ibn al-Haytham, the natural scientist from Basra, who promised the caliph that he would control the flooding of the Nile which was the main reason behind the fertility of Egyptian soil.⁷³ (Some scholars maintain that al-Ḥasan ibn al-Haytham's scheme contained the kernel of the idea that eventually led to the construction of the High Dam in the twentieth century.) Ibn al-Haytham's plan did not come to fruition, however. The sources indicate that when he saw the magnificent Egyptian antiquities it occurred to him that if the scheme was achievable, then the ancient Egyptians would have thought of it, bearing in mind their expertise in sculpture and all fields of art and science.

In addition to al-Ḥasan ibn al-Haytham, al-Ḥākim's court contained a number of other scholars to whom reference will be made when dealing with Islamic culture under the Fāṭimids (see page 264).

Concern for justice within the judiciary

Al-Kindī maintains that al-Ḥākim wished to stop the judges from receiving illegal payments, so he ordered that the income, grants and feudal estates of al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī ibn an-Nu'mān be doubled on condition that he did not take 1 dirham of the people's money.⁷⁴ In al-Kindī's appendix it states that al-Ḥākim once permitted some men to give testimony on the basis of them being honest, but that the chief judge informed him that they did not

73 Carl Brockelmann, *Tārīkh ash-shu'ūb al-islāmiyya*, Cairo, 1937, 2, p. 194.

74 Al-Kindī, *Kitāb al-wulāh*, p. 297.

deserve this esteem and could not be trusted. So al-Ḥākim allowed the judge to examine them and to agree to whichever of them he saw fit, thus not abiding by his original opinion.⁷⁵ These texts clearly show that al-Ḥākim was sincere in his concern for the state, was able to carry its burdens and was a scholar who treated other scholars with deference.

The Dār al-Ḥikma (Hall of Knowledge)

Another of al-Ḥākim's outstanding achievements in the field of culture was his establishment of the *Dār al-Ḥikma* in 395/1005 when he was 20 years old. The *Dār al-Ḥikma* was a centre for advanced scientific studies in which the caliph assembled the leading scholars in all fields of art and science. He paid them large salaries and granted them the means to devote themselves exclusively to research, study and writing. He also annexed a huge library to the *Dār al-Ḥikma* which contained more books than any other library at that time. The caliph provided the students and readers attached to the *Dār al-Ḥikma* with an income sufficient to meet their needs and supplied them with paper and ink.⁷⁶ The *Dār al-Ḥikma* thus inherited, and even surpassed, the feverish scientific activity that had taken place at the *Bayt al-Ḥikma* (House of Wisdom) in Baghdad. When al-Ḥākim despaired of reforming the studies in al-Azhar, he left it to its zealous sectarianism and established the *Dār al-Ḥikma* in order to serve science unaffected by any ideological or political orientation.

AḶ-ZĀHIR IBN AL-ḤĀKIM

AḶ-Zāhir succeeded his father when he was only 16 years old, thus his aunt Sitt-al-Mulk ran the affairs of state. When she died, aḶ-Zāhir took the reins of power with the assistance of those chief ministers who had come to have influence. AḶ-Zāhir once again returned to the traditional methods of administration that his father had rebelled against. He was tolerant of the people of the protected religions and gave women freedom to do as they pleased. He was also concerned for agriculture but a famine had ravaged the country due to a low Nile and this impeded any agricultural reconstruction. During aḶ-Zāhir's time there were riots in ash-Shām against Fāṭimid rule but these were suppressed. Indeed, the Fāṭimid governors in ash-Shām were able to bring many other regions under aḶ-Zāhir's rule. AḶ-Zāhir died in 427/1036.

75 Ibid., appendix, p. 82.

76 Al-Maqrīzī, *Itti'āz*, 2, p. 56.

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AL-MUSTAŒIR (R. 427–87/1035–94)

Al-MustaŒir was 7 years old when his father aŒ-Zāhir died. The *wazīr* al-Jarjarā'ī was in effective control when the caliph died and so was the one who proclaimed that allegiance be sworn to al-MustaŒir. Al-MustaŒir remained in power for sixty years, longer than any previous Muslim caliph. It was a period that saw many movements, upheavals and changes. Power was transferred from the caliphs to the *wazīrs* and a period known as the 'era of authority of the *wazīrs*' ensued (see below).

The composition of the Fāṭimid army

Under al-MustaŒir, the Fāṭimid army was composed of many different races including descendants of the Berbers who had accompanied Jawhar and later al-Mu'iz, the Turks from whom al-'Azīz had sought assistance, members of the Banū Ḥamdān tribe who were in command of an Arab fighting force and Sudanese who had been brought by al-MustaŒir's Sudanese mother. The army also included some Egyptians who had begun to acquire their own position among the troops. All these races were divided and lacked any sort of unity. This resulted in much discord and disarray, with one group rebelling against another and causing the overthrow of those in authority. This chaotic situation also had an effect on agriculture, trade and the economy.

Contrasts under al-MustaŒir

Al-MustaŒir's rule was full of contrasts. Thus it witnessed the appearance of religious toleration followed by fanaticism. The whole country was at one time very prosperous, then came a great famine which led to revolts, theft and the eating of forbidden meats. This period also witnessed expansion over a large area, then a shrinking which resulted in many regions achieving independence. In the midst of these disturbances the caliph secretly summoned Badr al-Jamalī, the Armenian ruler of Acre, who brought his troops and took control of the situation, putting an end to the rebels. This ushered in the 'era of authority of the *wazīrs*'.

Al-MustaŒir was the eighth Fāṭimid caliph, taking into account those of Tunisia and Cairo. His predecessors were al-Mahdī, al-Qā'im, al-Manšūr, al-Mu'iz, al-'Azīz, al-Ḥākim and aŒ-Zāhir.

The caliphs in Cairo after al-Mustanşir

There were six caliphs in Cairo after al-Mustanşir:

Al-Musta‘lā ibn al-Mustanşir (r. 487–95/1094–1101);
Al-‘Āmir ibn al-Musta‘lā (r. 495–524/1101–30);
Al-Ḥāfiẓ ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Mustanşir (r. 524–44/1130–49);
Aẓ-Zāfir ibn al-Ḥāfiẓ (r. 544–49/1149–54);
Al-Fā’iz ibn aẓ-Zāfir (r. 549–55/1154–60); and
Al-‘Āḍid ibn Yūsuf ibn al-Ḥāfiẓ (r. 555–67/1160–71).

The era of authority of the *wazīrs*

BADR AL-JAMALĪ

The era of authority of the *wazīrs* began under Badr al-Jamalī who, as previously mentioned, had arrived by invitation, coming by sea with his troops. He deceived the Turks and the commanders of al-Mustanşir’s army by asking them for permission to go to the river harbour on the Nile – this was granted and he was given a warm reception. After a while he organized a large party for the commanders, to each of whom he appointed one of his own men who was to bring him the commander’s head. The plot was successful and on the following day Badr’s men stood before him, each holding the head of the commander he had been ordered to kill. At this point, Badr announced the task for which he had come and took command of the army and the administration of the country. For this reason he was called ‘Master of the Sword and the Pen’. He rapidly did away with the disruptive and quarrelsome races and when the capital and Lower Egypt fell under his authority he went to Upper Egypt and put an end to Sudanese influence, restoring peace and tranquillity to the country. He was able to recover many of the caliphs’ possessions that the troops had stolen or seized in place of their salaries. It is reported that in the presence of the caliph al-Mustanşir, a Qur’ān reader recited: ‘God has given you victory with Badr’ but did not complete the verse because the caliph and the *wazīr* gave him his reward.⁷⁷

Once again, life returned to normal. The farmers went back to their land and the merchants engaged in their trade. Badr exempted the latter from paying taxes while they resumed their activities and rebuilt their wealth. When taxes were subsequently reimposed, profits were higher than they had been before the period of hardship. Badr was, however, not able to regain

⁷⁷ Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1, p. 222.

control over ash-Shām due to his preoccupation with internal affairs and because of the appearance of the Seljūqs who expanded into the region.

Among the works of Badr al-Jamalī is the magnificent wall which surrounded Cairo, the renovation of the Zuwayla, Futūḥ and Naṣr gates and the construction of the Juyushi Mosque on top of the Muqattam hills and which is named after him since he had the title *Amir al-Juyush* (Commander of the Armies). Badr al-Jamalī died in 487/1095, the caliph al-Mustanṣir dying after him in the same year.

Al-Afḍal ibn Badr al-Jamalī

Badr al-Jamalī appointed his son al-Afḍal to succeed him. It was the custom during this period for the *wazīr* to be nominated by his predecessor, which indicates the degree of influence that the *wazīrs* came to enjoy. Al-Afḍal was not content to exercise the same authority and extensive powers as his father, to leave the government departments as they were and to allow the caliph some control. On the contrary, he embarked on a new path by transferring the departments to his own residence, assuming sole responsibility for organizing the banquets during the festivals and sitting at the head of committees to decide on the distribution of gifts.⁷⁸

Al-Mustanṣir died while al-Afḍal was still *wazīr*. Al-Afḍal strove to acquire total authority and therefore did not put Nizār, al-Mustanṣir's eldest son, on the caliphal throne but rather passed him by because of his mature outlook and appointed instead the much weaker al-Musta'li.

SHĀWAR AND ḌARGHĀM AND THE END OF THE FĀṬIMID CALIPHATE

Shāwar and Ḍarghām represent the final circle in the chaos which beset the Fāṭimid wazirate. Shāwar had authority in Upper Egypt and was feared by the *wazīr* al-'Ādil ibn Ṭala'i' ibn Ruzayk. Shāwar organized his forces and attacked Cairo, occupied al-'Ādil's palace, had him killed and made himself *wazīr*. He and his sons ruled tyrannically. As for Ḍarghām, he was a North African who witnessed the arrogance of Shāwar and the oppressive regime of his sons and thus revolted against him, deposed him and forced him to flee. But Shāwar sought the help of Nūr-ad-Dīn and urged him to conquer Egypt. In response, Ḍarghām sought assistance from the Crusaders. Both

78 Ḥasan Ibrāhīm, *al-Fāṭimiyyīn fī Miṣr*, Cairo, 1931, p. 230.

Nūr-ad-Dīn and the Crusaders responded positively and Egypt thus became the object of aggression from abroad.

Nūr-ad-Dīn sent three military expeditions against Egypt under the command of Shīrkūh along with his cousin Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn. Ḍarghām was killed in the first campaign, while Shāwar was killed in the second, as will be explained when dealing with the Ayyūbid dynasty (see below). Asad-ad-Dīn Shīrkūh took control of the wazirate of the caliph al-‘Āḍid but died soon afterwards to be replaced by Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn. Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn quelled the rioting of the Sudanese troops, killed their leaders and restored peace and security in the country. He then removed the caliph’s name from the Friday sermon and championed the cause of the ‘Abbāsīd caliph al-Mustaḍīr’. Al-‘Āḍid was sick and soon died, leaving Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn to claim independence for Egypt in the name of Nūr-ad-Dīn Zankī.

REASONS FOR THE FALL OF THE FĀṬIMID CALIPHATE

The reasons for the fall of the Fāṭimid caliphate are examined below.

1. *The Crusades.* The Crusades are thought to be the prime factor behind the fall of the Fāṭimid caliphate. All energies were directed towards ridding Islamic countries of the tyranny of the Crusaders and authority easily passed from one Muslim dynasty to another as long as this entailed deliverance from the Franks. This is seen in that some rulers voluntarily surrendered their territories to the sultan Nūr-ad-Dīn so that he could defend them from the attacks of the Crusaders. Because of Egypt’s strategic position and wealth, the Crusaders directed their attention towards it, realizing that their remaining in the emirates of ash-Shām was dependent on their control of Egypt. The Egyptians therefore welcomed any Islamic power which would remove the threat, and Nūr-ad-Dīn Zankī, the ruler of ash-Shām, was that hoped-for power. Thus, the Egyptians did not oppose annexation to him but rather supported it.
2. *Shī‘ite extremism.* Another reason for the fall of the Fāṭimids was their Shī‘ī fanaticism. This began to resurface and caused the Egyptians to support any movement that would restore Sunnism.
3. *The loss of North Africa.* The Fāṭimids expanded towards the east and somewhat ignored North Africa, where their original followers were located. This was one of the reasons that led to the loss of this region, in other words the loss of an important part of Fāṭimid power.
4. *Internal crises.* The authority of the *wazīrs*, the mixture of races in the army, the economic crises and the assumption of power by caliphs who

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were still children are among the factors that resulted in the decline of the state and its rapid end.

FĀṬIMID CULTURE

Al-Azhar

The Fāṭimids were very concerned with the scholarly movement in all its various forms. The most notable trend was the rationalization of Shī'ī thought and its wide dissemination, as mentioned previously. Ya'qūb ibn Killis provides a good example of this sectarian activity since, although he was preoccupied with affairs of the wazirate, he also found time to write books and treatises on the doctrines and legal aspects of the faith and asked the caliph al-'Azīz to turn al-Azhar Mosque into a Shī'ī university in which the principles of Shī'ism could be taught. Indeed, he himself held classes in al-Azhar in which he taught these principles. In time, al-Azhar expanded to include other forms of intellectual activity which eventually became more prominent than instruction in Shī'ism.

The court and da'wa sessions

The caliph occasionally used his residence to host a study group where prominent people would meet to study the basic principles of Shī'ism and the methods of propagating it. Among the important posts created by the Fāṭimids was that of the *dā'ī ad-du'āh*, or chief propagandist, similar to a minister of propaganda and information in the modern state. The post was occupied by those who were well versed in Shī'ī thought and were aware of the secret activities involved in its dissemination. The *dā'ī ad-du'āh* supervised the propagation and spread of Shī'ism in the capital and other regions through sessions, study groups, lectures and writings. The *dā'ī ad-du'āh* was frequently also the chief judge.

The Fāṭimids also encouraged Shī'ī poets to make their verses known to the people. At that time poetry played a similar role to that of today's newspapers. While scholarly study groups and sessions were aimed at educated people, poetry was the means of propagating Shī'ism among the general public.

Scholars of astronomy, pharmacy and medicine, and historians

Aside from Shī'ism, the Fāṭimids also concerned themselves with serving other branches of science and learning. Indeed, we have already referred to the *Dār al-Ḥikma*, founded by al-Ḥākim, and how it was a centre of

culture and intellectual activity. Al-Ḥākīm was also interested in other studies and graced his court with ‘Alī ibn Yūnus, one of Egypt’s most illustrious astronomers, and al-Ḥasan ibn al-Haytham, a leading Muslim natural scientist and an expert on optics to whom are attributed no fewer than 100 works on mathematics, astronomy, philosophy and medicine.⁷⁹ His most famous book is *Kitāb al-manāẓir*, which was translated into Latin and printed in 1572. He had a major influence on the diffusion of the science of optics in the Middle Ages and most of the writers on this subject at that time based their work on Ibn al-Haytham’s book. Traces of this book may also be seen in the works of Roger Bacon, Leonardo da Vinci and Johann Kepler. Indeed, Ibn al-Haytham proposed an alternative theory to that of Euclid and Ptolemy, who said that the eye sends out visual rays to the object of vision, by maintaining that on the contrary rays are sent from the object of vision to the eye. In some of his experiments he came close to inventing the magnifying lens.⁸⁰

Among other scholars during this period was ‘Ammār al-Mawṣilī, the author of a book on the diseases of the eye called *al-Muntakhab fī ‘ilāj al-‘ayn*, a section of which is available in manuscript form in the Escorial library.⁸¹ A number of physicians and philosophers also achieved fame. One of the most prominent was ‘Alī ibn Riḍwān, chief physician at the court of the caliph al-‘Azīz and who wrote many books on philosophy and logic.

Historians who achieved fame during the Fāṭimid period include Ibn Zūlāq and Ibn Munjib aṣ-Ṣayrafī, the author of *al-Ishāra ilā man nāla al-wizāra*.

The navy and shipyards

The Fāṭimids inherited the Aghlabid navy. When they arrived in Egypt they realized the importance of strengthening their navy since they were under constant threat from that of the Byzantines. Al-Mu‘iz li-Dīnillāh and his successors therefore constructed shipyards for the building of warships on ar-Rawḍa island, in Alexandria and in Dumyāṭ. Some of these ships were anchored in the ports of ash-Shām such as Acre, Tyre and Asqālān, and also in ‘Īdhāb on the Red Sea. Al-Mu‘iz also established a shipyard in Maqṣ where 600 ships were built. The Fāṭimid fleet was under the authority of ten commanders under the *Amīr* of the Fleet. The fleet had a substantial budget.⁸²

79 Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a, *‘Uyūn al-anbā’ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭṭibā’*, Beirut, Dār al-kutub al-‘ilmiyya, AH 1299, 3, pp. 91ff.; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 2, p. 127.

80 Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, pp. 744–5.

81 Ibid.

82 ‘Alī Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, *Miṣr fī-l-‘uṣūr al-wuṣṭā*, Cairo, Maktabat an-nahḍa al-miṣriyya, 1951, pp. 322–3.

The Fāṭimids also devoted particular attention to those industries connected with equipping, providing war *matériel* to and expanding the armies which constituted the main pillar of support for the state.

Civil industries

Among the civil industries which prospered during the Fāṭimid period was the production of textiles, which were of outstanding quality and beauty, Dumyāt being particularly famous for this. Egyptian textiles were exported to Iraq and elsewhere. Perhaps one reason for the concern with textiles was the Fāṭimid custom of presenting garments to all state officials in winter and summer. For this purpose al-Muʿizz li-Dīnillāh established a building known as the *Dār al-Kiswa* (Hall of Clothes): here textiles were produced in accordance with the posts of those who would be granted the clothes, including ministers and judges. The Fāṭimids also founded a building called the *Dār ad-Dībāj* (Hall of Brocade) for the manufacture of silk. In 516/1122 the money set aside to finance the production of clothes in the *Dār al-Kiswa* amounted to 600,000 dinars. Clothing was presented to the *amīrs*, ministers and nobility during the Festival of Immolation (*ʿĪd al-Aḍḥā*); thus this festival became known as the 'Festival of Clothes'.⁸³ The caliphs would compete with each other in bestowing gifts on senior officials of state, al-ʿAzīz reportedly saying: 'I like to see people's prosperity on display, to see them wearing gold, silver and jewels, and to know that they have horses, estates and landed property.'⁸⁴

The caliphs were keen on the embellishment and embroidery of cloth with gold thread and sometimes with silver. The covering of the Kaʿba and the garments of senior officials were ornamented with magnificent embroidery. This practice even extended to carpets, rugs, tents and the sails of boats. One of the articles at al-Mustanṣir's court that rebels seized during the disturbances was the canopy of the caliph aḏ-Ḍāhir: made from gold thread and set upon silver posts, it was worth 14,000 dinars.⁸⁵

Crafts

During this period the Egyptians were particularly concerned with the production of metals, especially gold and silver. They liked to engrave and inscribe wood and inlay it with various precious stones. They were also extremely interested in the manufacture of glass and porcelain and in decorating these important products with wonderful patterns. The Fāṭimid

83 Ibid., p. 374.

84 Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *an-Nujūm az-zāhira*, 1, p. 418.

85 Ḥasan, *Kunūz al-Fāṭimiyyīn*, p. 63.

legacy includes various kinds of bowls and a marvellous collection of golden vessels with unique engravings and porcelain ware with wonderful patterns, all of which bears witness to the glory and splendour of the age.

THE FĀṬIMID LEGACY

Of all Egyptian eras, the Fāṭimid period has left the richest legacy. These accomplishments cover a long and extensive period, the most important being the city of al-Qahira, which before the arrival of al-Mu‘iz was called al-Manṣūriyya.

Al-Azhar

The most important Fāṭimid monument is arguably al-Azhar, which played a major role in the service of Islam and the Muslims. It is now over 1,000 years old, its foundations being laid in 359/971 and opening for prayer in 361/973. ‘Alī ibn an-Nu‘mān sat there teaching in 365/976, then Ya‘qūb ibn Killis turned it into a university in 378/988 and designated it an institute of learning. The chief judge and the Islamic market inspector also used to convene their sessions in al-Azhar.

For most of its history, al-Azhar has provided amenities for those seeking knowledge. No sooner would the student arrive at al-Azhar than he would find all his problems solved, for the dormitories gave him somewhere to live, the rations ensured that he had something to eat and all the classes were open to him so that he could choose the subject that best suited him.

Shī‘ī law was taught at al-Azhar by the family of an-Nu‘mān. There were also lessons in Islamic law taught by al-Musabbiḥī al-Miṣrī, and in Islamic Traditions taught by al-Qaḍā’i. The latter also gave instruction in knowledge of the prophets (*anbā’ al-anbiyā’*), which today is the science known as comparative religion and is considered to be an improvement on the previous methods of teaching such information. Grammar was also taught there, two of the greatest instructors being Ibn Bābshādh and ash-Shātibī. Medicine was similarly taught, instructors in this subject including al-Ḥasan ibn al-Khaṭīr and ‘Abd-al-Laṭīf al-Baghdādī.

With the passage of time, al-Azhar attracted the attention of the caliphs and the Egyptian sultans, in particular the Fāṭimid caliphs and the Mamlūk sultans. Thus it became the recipient of numerous religious endowments and they added extra dormitories, decorated its prayer niches, presented it with pulpits and expensive candelabrum and covered it with the most exquisite and beautiful ornamentation. It began to suffer from neglect, however, under the Ayyūbids and the Ottomans.

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Al-Azhar contained twenty-nine dormitories for students from Upper Egypt, from the Levantine and from the north, in addition to students from Mecca and Medina, Jaffa, Sulaymāniyya, North Africa and Turkey, Kurds, Indians and those from ash-Shām. It had thirteen prayer niches, six minarets, seven sundials for telling the time and nine gates, the most important of which were al-Muzayyinīn, al-Maghāriba, al-‘Abbāsī and al-Jawharī.

Other mosques

Among the most important Fāṭimid mosques was that of al-Ḥākīm, which was founded and completed by al-‘Azīz who also prayed there and gave the Friday sermons. It was, however, al-Ḥākīm who built its wings, carpeted and decorated it and thus it was named after him. This mosque was situated outside the original walls of Cairo, so when Badr al-Jamalī built his wall he included the mosque within it next to al-Futūḥ gate. Al-Ḥākīm had a tomb built there under his supervision in which he was to be interred, but he was murdered and his body hidden so he was not buried in the mosque. Al-Ḥākīm’s Mosque is also called al-Anwar Mosque.

Other mosques built under the Fāṭimids include that of aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Ṭalā’i’ ibn Ruzayk. Among the many tombs is that of al-Juyūshī. Other Fāṭimid remains include the forbidding walls of Cairo and its gates: al-Futūḥ, an-Naṣr and Zuwayla.

FĀṬIMID POSSESSIONS

During the period when the Fāṭimids flourished, their possessions extended from the ‘Āṣī river in ash-Shām up to the borders of Morocco, and from Khartoum in the Sudan up to Asia Minor. Thus their jurisdiction greatly exceeded that of other contemporary empires.

The Ayyūbid state (564–648 / 1169–1250)

ORIGINS OF THE AYYŪBIDS

The Ayyūbid dynasty was of Kurdish descent. Shādī was Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn’s grandfather and is the earliest member of the family of whom much is

known.⁸⁶ He lived in Dawīn in Azerbaijan near to al-Karkh and was one of the best and most resolute of men. He had a friend called Bahruz whom he treated like a brother. It so happened that Bahrūz committed some crime for which he was punished and which afterwards prevented him from staying in Dawīn. So he emigrated to Iraq, where he worked in the service of the Seljūq sultan Maḥmūd ibn Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn. Bahrūz rose to prominence at the court so the sultan appointed him governor of Baghdad and bestowed on him the town of Tikrīt as a fief. But in his glory Bahrūz did not forget his childhood friend Shādī, and he summoned him and his family and made him ruler of Tikrīt in his name. Shādī brought his two sons with him, Shīrkūh and Najm-ad-Dīn Ayyūb, Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn's father and the person to whom the Ayyūbid family traces its origins.

After a while Shādī died and his eldest son Najm-ad-Dīn took over his position. However, a disagreement broke out between Shīrkūh and a member of Bahrūz's retinue residing in Tikrīt which ended in Shīrkūh killing the man. This angered Bahrūz who dispatched a new ruler to Tikrīt, ordering Najm-ad-Dīn to hand over authority to him and to leave Tikrīt taking his family with him. Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn was born in Tikrīt, reportedly on the same night that his family and kinsmen began their exodus from the town.⁸⁷ Perhaps Bahrūz's reaction was not merely due to Shīrkūh's attack on one of his retinue, but also because he was aware of Najm-ad-Dīn and his family's growing power and felt threatened by the close relationship that was developing between the family and the inhabitants of Tikrīt.

As soon as Najm-ad-Dīn left Tikrīt in 532 / 1138 he made for Mosul, where he intended to seek the assistance of a friend named 'Imād-ad-Dīn Zankī.⁸⁸ Thanks to the hospitality of 'Imād-ad-Dīn, the Ayyūbid family prospered, Najm-ad-Dīn and his brother Shīrkūh becoming powerful leaders. 'Imād-ad-Dīn was subsequently killed, leaving his sons to argue among themselves. His son Nūr-ad-Dīn managed to defeat his brothers and with the help of the Ayyūbids took over his father's position. After a while he added Damascus to his possessions. It was there that Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn grew up and acquired his knowledge of Arabic and Islam. Indeed, his Arabic was the height of eloquence and clarity. In addition to committing the Qur'ān to memory and learning about Islamic law, he also applied himself to horsemanship, hunting, archery and other chivalric activities.

86 Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 2, p. 376. Ibn Khallikān provides a genealogy for him which goes back to Adam, but it is not trustworthy.

87 Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1, pp. 84–5.

88 Qadrī Qala'jī, *Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn al-Ayyūbī*, Damascus, 1934, pp. 28–9.

THE AYYŪBIDS IN EGYPT

As already noted, Nūr-ad-Dīn took control of Aleppo and then Damascus. He next hoped to extend his authority over Egypt so as to surround and defeat the Crusaders, to use Egypt's wealth to further his plans and finally to propagate Sunnism there instead of the Shī'ism of the Fāṭimids.

The chaos within the wazirate in Egypt caused by the conflict between Shāwar and Ḍarghām under the caliph al-'Āḍid provided Nūr-ad-Dīn with an opportunity to interfere in the country's affairs. He launched three military campaigns against Egypt, all under the command of Asad-ad-Dīn Shīrkūh along with his cousin Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn. During the first campaign (559/1164), Ḍarghām was killed. In the second campaign (562/1167), Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn was surrounded by the Byzantines and the Crusaders and eventually rescued by Nūr-ad-Dīn. In the third campaign (564/1169), Shāwar was killed on the orders of the caliph and the office of *wazīr* fell to Shirkūh. The latter, however, died two months later and the office devolved to Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn. The collapse of the Fāṭimid state ensued, as described above. Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn stopped mentioning the name of the Fāṭimid caliph in the Friday sermon and replaced it with the names of the 'Abbāsīd caliph and Nūr-ad-Dīn. The caliph al-'Āḍid died shortly afterwards and Egypt returned to the Sunnī fold.

Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn establishes his authority

Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn's rule over Egypt began in 564/1169 but he did not overthrow the Fāṭimid caliphate until 567/1171. This means that for three years authority in Egypt was effectively in the hands of Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn without this being formally acknowledged by the Fāṭimid caliph. At the same time, the caliph was under the control of Nūr-ad-Dīn Zankī and one of his military commanders. It was for this reason that Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn used to mention both the caliph's and Nūr-ad-Dīn's names in the Friday sermon. It was also why he plotted to rid himself of them both. His first task, however, was to establish his authority over the country.

Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn began by treating the people with justice, kindness and generosity. He showed tolerance towards the followers of Shī'ism who were spread all over the land, and was even-handed in his treatment of the adherents of the various religions. Indeed, his outstanding characteristic was religious tolerance. He allowed the Copts absolute freedom of religious expression, thus earning their loyalty – to the extent that Aḥmad Zakī Pasha states that they hung pictures of Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn in their churches. Pasha adduces other evidence to support this, including a report that the poet 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Andalusī visited Egypt at this time and was amazed at the

Copts' love for Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn. He subsequently composed a long poem on the subject, including the line: 'Inside the temples they have put a picture of you which they believe in as they do the persons of the Trinity.'⁸⁹

Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn also exerted himself on behalf of the Egyptian people as a whole. He removed all injustices, reduced the heavy burden of taxation and issued orders stating that taxes in Egypt should be levied with compassion and understanding. The people therefore took him to their hearts. He also freely spent the money that Asad-ad-Dīn Shīrkūh had collected, and asked al-‘Āḍid for something he could offer to the people: the caliph obliged, whether willingly or otherwise.

At that time Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn took a firm position against the Crusaders and violently rebuffed their attack on Dumyāṭ. He was not, however, in the position of defender for long and soon began to attack the Crusaders in their castles. Thus began a new phase in the history of the Crusades, with the Franks being on the defensive whereas before they had been the attackers. Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn frequently seized booty from them in his attacks, but gave an assurance of safety to Muslim merchants and to Muslim land.

The Egyptians were therefore won over by Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn, revered him and accepted him as their leader and commander. They supported him and rallied around his flag and in this way enabled him to move towards achieving his objectives.

The deposition of al-‘Āḍid

Al-‘Āḍid was stripped of his authority and became nothing more than a name mentioned in the Friday sermon next to that of Nūr-ad-Dīn the Sunnī, who preached in the name of the ‘Abbāsīd caliphs. Power in Egypt fell into the hands of Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn, who was similarly a Sunnī. This was an incredible development. No sooner did Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn sense that his power was secure than he decided to put an end to what remained of the Fāṭimids, especially since Nūr-ad-Dīn Zankī occasionally urged him to do as much. Al-‘Āḍid was ill at the time and in retirement in his residence, and it is said that Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn hesitated over announcing his deposition and the fall of the Fāṭimid caliphate. He therefore suggested to a follower that he do this in one of the mosques to see what the reaction would be among the population. As he found that little commotion was aroused, Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn ordered all the preachers to make the announcement the following Friday. This was in 567/1171.⁹⁰

When al-‘Āḍid died, Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn remained in mourning for three days, then took possession of his palace. He distributed some of the goods in the

89 Quoted by Qadrī Qala‘jī, *ibid.*, p. 43.

90 Abū Shāma, *Kitāb ar-rawḍatayn*, 1, p. 294.

palaces among the people and his followers and freed several slaves. He had al-‘Āḍid’s family moved to a secret place, appointed someone to look after them and bestowed gifts upon them. Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn put his *wazīr* al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil in charge of the palace library: he retained some of the books, burnt some which dealt with an extreme form of Shī‘ism and sold others the proceeds from which he placed in the treasury.⁹¹ Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn did not, however, move to the caliph’s residence but rather remained in the *wazīr*’s apartments. Such behaviour on the part of Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn attracted many new converts to Islam.

Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn then proceeded to execute the plans which followed the overthrow of the Fāṭimids and the annexation of Egypt to the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate. He thus mentioned the name of the ‘Abbāsīd caliph al-Mustaḍīr bi-Llāh in the Friday sermon, dismissed the Shī‘ī judges and appointed a Shāfi‘ī judge in Cairo who then appointed Shāfi‘ī judges in all the countries.⁹² Al-Maqrīzī states that Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn delegated the office of judge to Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn ‘Abd-al-Mālik ibn Darbās ash-Shāfi‘ī and that he appointed only those judges who followed the Shāfi‘ī school of law to act on his behalf in Egypt. Thus Shī‘ism began to wane until it had completely disappeared in Egypt. Among the institutes established by Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn in this regard are the Shāfi‘ī schools that he built in Egypt: these include the Nāṣiriyya school next to the Ancient Mosque and those of al-Qamḥiyya, as-Suyūfiyya and an-Nāṣiriyya in the cemetery below the Muqaṭṭam hills (al-Qarāfa). There were also the aṣ-Ṣalāḥiyya schools in Jerusalem and Damascus.⁹³

FĀṬIMID DEPENDANTS

Movements led by dependants of the Fāṭimids arose against Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn. The first was under the leadership of a black eunuch nicknamed Mu’taman al-Khilāfa (Confidant of the Caliphate),⁹⁴ while the second was led by the poet ‘Imāra al-Yamanī. But Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn easily defeated these movements and killed both Mu’taman and ‘Imāra.

91 Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 1, p. 383.

92 ‘Izz-ad-Dīn Abu-l-Ḥasan Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi-t-tārīkh*, Leiden, Brill, 1851, under the events for AH 567.

93 Al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 2, pp. 363–5; Aḥmad ibn ‘Abd-al-Wahhāb an-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab*, Cairo, Dār al-kutub, 1923, 3, p. 10. See also Shalaby, *Tārīkh at-tarbiya*, pp. 104–5.

94 ‘Imād-ad-Dīn ibn Shaddād, *al-Maḥāsin al-yūsufiyya*, Damascus, 1937, p. 47.

BETWEEN ṢALĀḤ-AD-DĪN AND NŪR-AD-DĪN

When Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn rid himself of the Fāṭimids, he was obliged also to rid himself of the control of Nūr-ad-Dīn Zankī in order to achieve total power. Nūr-ad-Dīn was, however, aware that Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn had begun to work more for his own ends than for the authority that had sent him to Egypt. Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn thus continued to operate on two fronts: on the one hand, he buttressed his power and strengthened his position, while on the other hand he maintained the friendly relations between himself and Nūr-ad-Dīn – indeed, he mentioned him in the Friday sermon, had his name inscribed on the coinage and sought to appease him with gifts and precious works of art.⁹⁵ Perhaps the first stirrings of suspicion in Nūr-ad-Dīn's mind were caused by the request he received from Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn asking that his father be sent to him. This was followed by similar requests, such as sending his brothers and other kinsfolk. Nūr-ad-Dīn understood from this that Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn wanted to strengthen his position, consolidate his power and establish himself in Egypt, but he did not object to Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn's family joining him so as not to reveal his fear of his commander.⁹⁶

Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn subsequently prepared to face his future relations with Nūr-ad-Dīn, with the strong possibility of war being declared against him if his political measures were unsuccessful. He began to construct a great citadel on one of the summits of the Muqaṭṭam hills to which he could transfer his private residence and the government departments and in which he would be secure if danger approached. He also began to build walls around the large Islamic centres in the region of Cairo, that is, Fustāṭ, al-‘Askar, al-Qaṭā’i and Cairo itself. He also gave important positions in the army and the civil administration to his family and his closest followers so as to make a human line of defence in addition to the fortresses and walls.

It is noticeable during this period that while Nūr-ad-Dīn was making plans to receive Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn in Palestine, the latter was trying to avoid the meeting for fear that Nūr-ad-Dīn was about to overthrow him or seize him while he was far from Egypt, his fortified haven. Nūr-ad-Dīn made repeated attempts to meet Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn and Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn repeatedly tried to avoid this. On one occasion, Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn set out to launch an attack against the Franks in the town of Shūbak in Palestine, hoping to regain it from them and restore the trade route between Egypt and ash-Shām. The campaign was successful but when he learnt that Nūr-ad-Dīn was approaching to offer him

95 Jamāl-ad-Dīn ibn Wāṣil, *Mufarrij al-kurūb fī akhbār Banī Ayyūb*, Cairo, al-Maktaba al-‘aṣriyya, 2004, p. 50.

96 Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt*, 2, p. 381.

assistance, he quickly returned to Egypt. This shows how Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn's actions could arouse Nūr-ad-Dīn's suspicions.

Nevertheless, Nūr-ad-Dīn wanted to be sure of the situation, so he wrote to Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn ordering him to gather the Egyptian soldiers and to march with them on the Franks' position in Kurk, stating that he would advance from the north to assist him in the battle. Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn accepted the order at first, then changed his mind, claiming that his departure would give the Shī'īs an opportunity to organize opposition against him. This excuse was not, however, acceptable to Nūr-ad-Dīn and the situation became critical. It then became known that Nūr-ad-Dīn was intending to advance on Egypt to reclaim it from his insubordinate commander, so Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn gathered his family to ask their advice as to what should be done.

His cousin, Taqīyy-ad-Dīn 'Umar, said: 'If Nūr-ad-Dīn comes we should fight him and prevent him from entering Egypt.' Other family members agreed with him. But Najm-ad-Dīn Ayyūb, Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn's father, vociferously rejected the idea saying: 'If Nūr-ad-Dīn comes we should get off our horses and kiss the ground in front of him. If he orders me to cut off my son's head I will do it. This country belongs to Nūr-ad-Dīn and if he wants to dismiss Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn we should willingly accede to this.' Najm-ad-Dīn then advised his son to write to Nūr-ad-Dīn saying: 'I have learnt that you wish to start moving in order to recover Egypt from me, but what need is there of this? Let the master send a representative who will put a cord around my neck and lead me to you. There is no one here who disregards you.' Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn wrote these words, and Nūr-ad-Dīn's spies wrote to him telling him what they had heard Najm-ad-Dīn say. The situation calmed down and relations improved.⁹⁷ Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn did not have to wait long, however, as Nūr-ad-Dīn died in 569/1174, leaving Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn free of his dangerous opponent.

AFTER NŪR-AD-DĪN

The death of Nūr-ad-Dīn was a significant loss to this important region during a critical period, for he was a great man who bore down on the Franks and inflicted many defeats on them. There was no one who could easily take his place. His son Ismā'īl, who succeeded him, was only 11 years old and his protection and supervision led to conflict among the ambitious. Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn described the situation to the 'Abbāsid caliph in the gravest terms, saying:

We have learnt that the kingdom of Nūr is beset by division and conflicting opinions, disunity and chaos. Every fortress has its own master and every area

97 Ibid., 2, p. 385.

has someone who strives to control it. The Franks have built strongholds from which they attack the Islamic regions and harass the countries of ash-Shām. The leading *amīrs* of Nūr's states have all been imprisoned, punished and oppressed.⁹⁸

The 'Abbāsid caliph lent his support and Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn marched on ash-Shām in 570/1175 after concluding a truce with the Franks. He finally entered ash-Shām after a number of battles from which he emerged victorious. Ash-Shām yielded to him between 570/1175 and 572/1177 and he extended his authority as far as Mosul. He then gained control of Aleppo in 579/1183 after the death of Ismā'īl (the son of Nūr-ad-Dīn) in 577/1181, and thus extended his authority from the Nile to the Euphrates apart from the strongholds of the Franks. Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn treated the defeated *amīrs* with magnanimity, made peace with some of them and gave them money and feudal estates. Finally, the 'Abbāsid caliph wrote to him awarding him control of Egypt and ash-Shām.

ṢALĀḤ-AD-DĪN EXTENDS HIS KINGDOM

Mention has already been made of the building of Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn's kingdom on the ruins of that of Nūr-ad-Dīn Zankī, but Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn was more ambitious than this. To the kingdom he had inherited from Nūr-ad-Dīn he wanted to add other kingdoms and regions that Nūr-ad-Dīn had not ruled, and indeed he managed to realize this dream during his rule of Egypt. The most important territories were those he regained from the Franks in ash-Shām, causing them such losses that his fame spread far and wide. This crushing defeat opened the way for Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn's successors to complete his mission.

The battle of Ḥiṭṭīn against the Crusaders

Among the most important battles against the Crusaders in which Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn acted as commander and which dealt them a severe blow was that of Ḥiṭṭīn. It is one of the most celebrated battles in the history of the world and occurred on 24–25 Rabī' II 583/3–4 July 1187. Ḥiṭṭīn is a plain in the mountains in the vicinity of Lake Tiberius near Jerusalem. The Frankish soldiers numbered 20,000 men under the command of the king of Jerusalem, Guy de Lusignan, who was assisted by Arnāṭ (Reginald of Châtillon), the commander of al-Karak fortress. The Muslims defeated this army, the majority of the soldiers being killed while the remainder surrendered. Most of the commanders and nobles also met their deaths. Those surrendering dismounted from their

98 Ibn Shaddād, *Mahāsīn*, p. 67.

horses, handed over their weapons and sat submissively on the ground, among them being the king of Jerusalem and Arnāṭ.

Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn offered thanks to God. He then allowed the king to be given a drink of iced water. The king passed the cup to Arnāṭ, who drank with the intention of honouring his host with the drinking of water as is the Arab custom. But Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn said: 'I have not given permission for you to drink water' and then went on to remind Arnāṭ of his crimes, the breaking of his promises and his plunder of Muslim caravans. Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn's sister had been in one of these caravans and when Arnāṭ had seized it he had said: 'Ask Muḥammad the Prophet to release you.' Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn gave him the choice of accepting Islam, and when he refused Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn struck him a blow on the shoulder. He was then finished off by the servants and soldiers. At this, the king became alarmed, but Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn reassured him by saying: 'A king does not kill a king.' The battle of Ḥiṭṭīn caused Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn's name to strike fear in the hearts of the Crusader soldiers and commanders and it was no longer considered a disgrace for anyone to flee before him.

After the battle, Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn took control of Acre, an-Nāşiriyya, Qayşāriyya (Caesarea), Ḥaifa and Sidon. He subsequently liberated Jerusalem after the surrender of its inhabitants, who were then obliged to pay a small *jizya* tax. There was no massacre after this surrender as had occurred when the Crusaders seized Jerusalem some ninety years earlier, when the streets ran with Muslim blood. Indeed, Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn granted an amnesty to several Christian soldiers when their wives pleaded with him for mercy.⁹⁹ This resulted in the spread of Islam even among the Christians. Thomas Arnold has provided a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the conversions to Islam among the Crusaders.¹⁰⁰

A FURTHER EXTENSION TO ŞALĀḤ-AD-DĪN'S KINGDOM

During Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn's period as ruler of Egypt, not only was the Holy Land regained from the Franks; his kingdom was extended to include other regions. He sent his brother Ṭūrān Shāh to the North African coast, where he was able to gain control of the coasts of Ṭarablus and Tunisia and as far as the city of Qabis, taken from the Normans in 568/1173. Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn then sent his brother to Nubia and the Sudan and gained control of these. He subsequently sent him to Yemen, which he occupied and added to his domains in 569/1173. Another area that yielded to Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn was the Ḥijāz which, as previously

99 Extracted from al-'Imād al-Isfahanī, *al-Fath al-qasīy fi-l-fath al-qudsī*, Beirut, Dār al-kutub al-'ilmiyya, 2003; Ibn Wāşil, *Mufarrij al-kurūb*; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi-t-tārīkh*; Abū Shāma, *Kitāb ar-rawḍatayn*; and Qala'jī, *Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn*.

100 Thomas Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*, London, Constable, 1896, pp. 77ff.

mentioned, had been under the authority of whoever was in power in Egypt since the time of the Ikhshīdids.

ṢALĀḤ-AD-DĪN'S MEN

The family of Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn al-Ayyūbī produced a number of outstanding men in the fields of politics and war; they provided him with much-needed assistance in the tasks he undertook. His father, Najm-ad-Dīn al-Ayyūbī, was considered to be a man of wisdom and stature. He played an important role in stabilizing the situation, indeed in strengthening relations between his son and Nūr-ad-Dīn, as we have seen. Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn's brothers had command over his armies and achieved many victories for him in battles against the Crusaders and in Yemen and North Africa. Of all his brothers, al-'Ādil Sayf-ad-Dīn and Ṭūrān Shāh merit the highest regard.

Another of Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn's men was his *wazīr* Bahā'-ad-Dīn Qarāqūsh, a heroic character who accompanied Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn in battle and built the wall of Cairo, the Mountain Citadel (the citadel of Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn) and the canals at Giza. He was governor of Acre when the city was conquered by the Crusader armies and was taken prisoner and ransomed to Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn for 10,000 dinars. There were many stories about his oppression and tyranny, but there is no evidence to support the accusations. Also among Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn's men was the famous writer al-'Imād al-Isfahanī, who had previously served Nūr-ad-Dīn. He subsequently accompanied Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn in all his military campaigns and composed a history of the conquest of Jerusalem called *al-Fath* or *al-Fath al-qasiy fi-l-fath al-qudsī*, which is written in such a lucid style that it is considered one of the most useful documents dealing with this great conquest. He also composed a large collection of poetry, his greatest poems being those that describe the wars of the Crusades. He translated from Persian *Futūr zamān aṣ-ṣudūr wa ṣudūr zamān al-futūr* by Anūshirwān ibn Khālid on the history of the Seljūqs.

Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn's men also included Bahā'-ad-Dīn ibn Shaddād, who wrote *Sīrat Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn*; al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil, who served under the Fāṭimids and was subsequently employed in Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn's administration; and the cavalryman Usāma ibn Munqidh, who had served under Nūr-ad-Dīn before Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn and who wrote *Kitāb al-i'tibār* in which he recounts his adventures in times of war and peace, especially while in exile.¹⁰¹ Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn's men were all members of the distinguished elite and they helped the great man to realize his ambitions.

101 Usāma ibn Munqidh, *Kitāb al-i'tibār*, Beirut, Dār al-fikr al-ḥadīth, 1988, *passim*.

ŞALĀḤ-AD-DĪN'S PERSONALITY

In their discussion of ŞalāḤ-ad-Dīn, Western commentators stress that he was a Kurd with the intention of divorcing him from the Arabs, but this is a fallacy whose distortion of the truth must be exposed. Many nationalities came together and were integrated within Islamic society. Even those who initially remained unassimilated such as the Mamlūks, the Buwayhids and the Seljūqs eventually dissolved into that vast ocean. Whoever tried to remain isolated would meet their fate in the middle of the turbulent seas.

ŞalāḤ-ad-Dīn al-Ayyūbī was born on Arab soil, grew up in the Arab deserts, was raised on Islamic traditions and his life developed according to an Arab and Islamic model. Arab culture was his delight; he embraced it and it flourished at his court and during his time. Most of his soldiers were Arab and even though some were of other races, Arabic was spoken by all. Islamic culture was the melting pot in which all these people fused together: they were characterized by it and fought for its sake.¹⁰²

ŞalāḤ-ad-Dīn was influenced by and in turn influenced the people among whom he lived and over whom he eventually became leader. An examination of the qualities and characteristics of ŞalāḤ-ad-Dīn shows that they are a mixture of the gallantry of the Arabs and the magnanimity of Islam. Among ŞalāḤ-ad-Dīn's personal gifts were skilful command, capable political leadership, a love of forgiveness, sincerity to friends and generosity to the enemy along with great kindness, abundant knowledge, the encouragement of learning and patronage of scholars. Indeed, Western writers and rulers have celebrated ŞalāḤ-ad-Dīn and his conduct in the same way as the Muslims, for his humanitarian values caused great astonishment among Westerners at a time when such things were virtually unknown.

As regards ŞalāḤ-ad-Dīn's heroism, his bearing of hardships and his planning for success, these defy description. He created a wide breach in the Frankish front which was not repaired after him but rather grew wider under his successors until the lofty edifice built by the Franks on our good lands came crashing down.

Very few Muslim *amīrs* can equal ŞalāḤ-ad-Dīn's total lack of concern for personal gain and his absolute devotion to the service of the state and his subjects. Even his enemies have to acknowledge his chivalry and magnanimity when dealing with his defeated adversaries.¹⁰³ An indication of ŞalāḤ-ad-Dīn's indifference to worldly things and his lack of desire for personal gain is his distributing among his Muslim followers all the treasures that fell into his hands from the Fāṭimid palaces at the fall of the caliphate

102 Qala'jī, *ŞalāḤ-ad-Dīn*, p. 55.

103 Brockelmann, *Tārīkh*, 2, p. 232.

without keeping anything for himself.¹⁰⁴ And when Ismā‘īl ibn Nūr-ad-Dīn died and Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn took over as ruler, he refrained from taking any of his wealth, leaving it all to Nūr-ad-Dīn’s family. Similarly, when the mighty sultan himself died he left behind him only 47 dirhams and a single piece of gold¹⁰⁵ and no houses or land. He used to say: ‘If we keep our houses then we keep all that they contain, but if we lose them then everyone loses what they own and the enemy takes possession of it.’¹⁰⁶ The legacy of Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn continues to be an inestimable treasure both in the East and the West. Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn died in 589/1193 at the age of 55.

ṢALĀḤ-AD-DĪN’S SUCCESSORS

The seeds of decay in Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn’s state were already apparent before 589/1193, but his death accelerated the process. His extensive kingdom rapidly lost its cohesion and became divided between his sons, his brothers and other branches of the family. He had left his eldest son al-Afḍal in overall charge of the sultanate and given him Damascus and southern Syria, while he had given Egypt to his son al-‘Azīz, Aleppo to his son aḏ-Zāhir and Iraq and the areas of Bakr to his brother al-‘Ādil. Other members of his family had taken control of Hamah, Ḥomṣ, Baalbek and Yemen. But rifts quickly appeared between them and this led to a weakening of the state and a diminution of its activities.

In this way, the state was already divided in the time of Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn through his awarding his brothers and other members of his family the most influential governorships and posts. But they all accepted his authority, proclaimed their subordination and did not have the power to move towards independence. Perhaps Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn believed that by giving them authority he was protecting the sultan al-Afḍal and that they would all support him and remain subject to him, together forming a powerful Islamic bloc. But this was not to be the case and adversity soon took the place of unity. Al-Afḍal was not Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn and did not possess or even approximate his military and administrative talents.

The overall balance of power tipped against al-‘Ādil’s competitors and he was able to extend his authority over most parts of Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn’s kingdom. He took Damascus from al-Afḍal in 592/1196 and seized control of Egypt from al-Manṣūr ibn al-‘Azīz in 596/1200. Nothing remained in ash-Shām

104 Hitti, *History of Syria*, 2, p. 241.

105 Al-Mālik al-Mu’ayyad Abu-l-Fidā ‘Imād-ad-dīn Ismā‘īl Abu-l-Fidā’, *al-Mukhtaṣar fī akhbār al-baṣhar*, Cairo, AH 1325, 8, p. 9.

106 Muḥammad ibn Taqīyy-ad-Dīn ibn Shāhanshāh, *Dhayl an-nawādir*, Damascus, 1917, p. 219.

apart from Aleppo, which remained under the jurisdiction of Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn's descendants until 658/1260. In approximately 597/1201 al-ʿĀdil extended his authority to include the north of Iraq and appointed some of his sons to govern it in his name. Al-ʿĀdil died in 615/1218 and his sons inherited control of his kingdom, which was divided into many regions as had occurred on the death of Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn.

Authority in these regions remained in the hands of al-ʿĀdil's sons until the fall of the Ayyūbid state and did not pass from them as it had done with Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn's sons. The exception to this was an-Nāṣir Yūsuf, a descendant of Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn, who was the ruler of Aleppo and who annexed Damascus in 648/1250 when the Ayyūbids fell and the Mamlūk state arose in Egypt. The city was, however, subsequently recovered by the Mamlūks. As for Hamah, Ḥomṣ and Yemen, these were under the jurisdiction of *amīrs* from the Ayyūbid family who were all descendants of Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn's cousins.

With the fall of al-Afḍal in 592/1196, Egypt once again became the official centre of Ayyūbid authority under al-ʿĀdil's sons, most of whom succeeded in extending their influence into Syria. Ayyūbid power in Egypt lasted until 648/1250. Then the way was open for the Mamlūks whom aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Najm-ad-Dīn Ayyūb had purchased and made his private property and retinue. He subsequently dismissed most of his own leaders and replaced them with Mamlūks. Although they displayed the utmost devotion to their master, they were unable to continue in their posts after his death because of aṣ-Ṣāliḥ's son Ṭūrān Shāh. They therefore allied themselves with Shajarat-ad-Dur, aṣ-Ṣāliḥ's wife who shared their descent, and with her they plotted against Ṭūrān Shāh and killed him. With this, the Mamlūks rose to power in 648/1250.

When the Mamlūks seized Egypt, Damascus and Aleppo were also under their control for ten years until the Mongols swept through these cities in 658/1258 on their wave of destruction. It was only after the battle of ʿAyn Jālūt that the Mamlūks were able to reassert their authority over Damascus and Aleppo.

Among the sultans of Hamah, mention should be made of the great historian Abu-l-Fidā', who ruled from 710/1311 until 723/1332. As for the Ayyūbid sultan in the Ḥijāz, in 625/1277 he moved to the Rusūlid state in Yemen.

CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE AYYŪBID STATE

This section will attempt to answer two important questions. First, was Ayyūbid activity limited to military campaigns or did they concern themselves with culture? And, second, in Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn's struggle did he

strive for personal glory? In response to the first question, we may state that the military activities of the Ayyūbids did not distract them from cultural affairs. Indeed, in Egypt and Damascus they imitated Nūr-ad-Dīn in opening schools so as to encourage people to adopt the Sunnī school of thought after having lived through some two centuries of Shī'ism. There were so many Ayyūbid schools that they achieved their aims in a very short time. This period is also characterized by the fact that princes, princesses, merchants and other inhabitants, even servants, were involved in the foundation of schools and the sponsorship of learning.¹⁰⁷

Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn made a major contribution to building work in both Jerusalem and Cairo. In Jerusalem he is credited with the renovation of al-Aqṣā Mosque, which the Crusaders had used as a palace. He not only decorated it with mosaics and marble but also had a magnificent pulpit erected which remained until it was burnt in a criminal act in August 1969. As for Cairo, there Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn built the towering citadel which bears his name and began the construction of the city's protective wall.

In response to the second question – whether Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn strove for personal glory – it is likely that all commanders and leaders have personal ambitions or aspirations, but a leader's skill is manifested in his ability to harmonize this ambition with the expectations of the people he leads. Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn was able to do this since the Arab world was becoming united (it was disunity which caused disaster and the Crusader occupation) and the Islamic world was forming a single movement to oppose the single movement of the Crusaders and regain the usurped lands. The Arab world and the Islamic world found in Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn the finest articulation of these hopes.

AYYŪBID MONUMENTS IN EGYPT

There are few remains of the Ayyūbid state due to its preoccupation with the wars against the Crusaders on the one hand and its efforts to encourage the country to adopt Sunnism on the other. The most important monument is the citadel of Şalāḥ-ad-Dīn al-Ayyūbī, an architectural masterpiece that has undergone many alterations. Another monument is the tomb of Imam ash-Shāfi'ī, who died in Egypt in 204/820 but whose tomb was built during the Ayyūbid period, perhaps as a corollary to the spread of Sunnism and the honouring of Sunnī scholars. The Ayyūbids also constructed a number of schools that were extensions of those of Nūr-ad-Dīn Zankī in ash-Shām; these in turn were extensions of the schools of the Seljūq *wazīr* Nizām-ul-Mulk in Iraq and Iran. Remains of these Ayyūbid schools are still to be found in Egypt.

107 See Shalaby, *Tārīkh at-tarbiya*, p. 121.

As for the non-material traces of Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn, these are related to his indifference to wealth and his heroic battles that defeated the Crusaders. These are legacies that generations of Muslims will never forget, and Muslim scholars will always hope that leaders and presidents continue to imitate them if they wish to be remembered with affection and be assured of God's pleasure and that of the generations which follow. They are a wonderful legacy before which all other legacies pale.

From the Ayyūbids to the Mamlūks (648–923/1250–1517)

The Crusaders' expeditionary force under the command of Louis IX managed to occupy Dumyāṭ and headed for Cairo. Aṣ-Ṣāliḥ marched to meet them and took up position in al-Manṣūra. But when he fell mortally ill there, Khalīl's mother and the ruler's concubine, Shajarat-ad-Dur, sent a message requesting the assistance of Ṭūrān Shāh, the brother of aṣ-Ṣāliḥ. Aṣ-Ṣāliḥ died during the ensuing battle between the Egyptian army and the Crusaders. Shajarat-ad-Dur kept his death secret, however, and continued to issue orders in his name. The Egyptian army under the command of the Mamlūks was extremely capable. The battle raged in the alleys and streets of al-Manṣūra. Some 1,500 Franks were killed and many were taken captive, including Louis IX himself who was sent in chains to the residence of Fakhr-ad-Dīn Ibrāhīm ibn Luqmān where he was imprisoned.¹⁰⁸ After the battle was over Ṭūrān Shāh arrived, received authority to rule from Shajarat-ad-Dur and announced the death of aṣ-Ṣāliḥ.

SHAJARAT-AD-DUR

As we have seen, Shajarat-ad-Dur was intelligent, resolute and loyal during this delicate situation. She therefore hoped that Ṭūrān Shāh would look upon her favourably, but instead he was alarmed and began to entertain doubts about her trusteeship of his father's wealth. He also noticed signs of envy among the Mamlūks and thus revealed his intention to curb their defiance and began to threaten them. It is reported that as he drank wine he would line up some candles in front of him and in his drunkenness would take his sword and hit them one by one, repeating: 'This is what I do to the Baḥriyya.' Every time he struck a candle, he would mention the name of one of his

108 Taqiyy-ad-Dīn Aḥmad ibn 'Alī Al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb as-sulūk fī ma'rifat duwal al-mulūk*, Cairo, AH 1170, 1:356; Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *an-Nujūm az-zāhira*, 6, p. 367.

commanders.¹⁰⁹ Eventually, seventy days after Ṭūrān Shāh acceded to power, Shajarat-ad-Dur and the Mamlūks conspired to have him killed.

The Mamlūks then agreed that Shajarat-ad-Dur should rule the country, which she did for approximately three months.¹¹⁰ But the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate would not accept a woman as ruler, Al-Maqrīzī stating that the caliph sent a message to the Mamlūks which read: ‘If you are running short of men then let us know and we will send you some.’¹¹¹ As a result, Shajarat-ad-Dur decided to renounce the Egyptian throne; she married ‘Izz-ad-Dīn Aybak and vacated the throne in his favour. Aybak did not, however, possess a strong personality and this shows that Shajarat-ad-Dur merely used him as a front behind which she exercised real power. But Aybak wanted to rule without her and a conflict ensued between them which led to Shajarat-ad-Dur plotting to have Aybak killed. Before she could carry out her plans, however, she was killed by Aybak’s son.

We must mention one further name before concluding our discussion of the Mamlūks – the Ayyūbid child al-Ashraf Mūsā, the son of Ṭūrān Shāh, whom the Mamlūks appointed as legitimate sultan with Aybak as his legal guardian. But Aybak soon set him aside and assumed complete control. With the removal of al-Ashraf and Aybak’s monopoly of power to the exclusion of Shajarat-ad-Dur, Ayyūbid rule in Egypt came to an end and that of the Mamlūks began.

It was around this time that an-Nāṣir Yūsuf al-Ayyūbī, the governor of Aleppo, advanced and annexed Damascus. In 648/September 1250 he marched on Egyptian territory in order to put an end to what he considered a Mamlūk revolt against his family. This resulted in a battle between the Ayyūbids and the Mamlūks in 648/February 1251 from which the Mamlūks eventually emerged victorious. The ‘Abbāsīd caliphate, however, sensed the danger of the Tatar advance on Iraq that was threatening the Islamic world and thus intervened between the Ayyūbids and the Mamlūks. An agreement was reached in 651/April 1253 which stipulated that the Mamlūks should have control over Egypt and Palestine up to the river Jordan and including Gaza, Jerusalem and the coast, while the rest of ash-Shām should belong to the Ayyūbids.¹¹²

But the Tatars advanced, destroyed the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate and continued on towards ash-Shām. An-Nāṣir Yūsuf al-Ayyūbī, the governor of Aleppo, soon announced his submission to the Tatars and sent his son to Hülagü with a message to this effect together with some gifts. But Hülagü was overwhelmed by his desire to spill blood and wreak havoc and so declared that an-Nāṣir’s not attending was a personal insult. He then marched on

109 Al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb as-sulūk*, 1, p. 359.

110 Abu-l-Fidā’, *Mukhtaṣar*, 3, p. 190; Al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 2, p. 327.

111 Al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb as-sulūk*, 1, p. 368; ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān as-Suyūṭī, *Ḥusn al-muḥāḍara fī akhbār Miṣr wa-l-Qāhira*, Cairo, AH 1321, 2, p. 39.

112 Al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb as-sulūk*, 1, p. 386.

THE FIRST STAGE IN THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

Aleppo and razed it to the ground. After this, Hülagü made for Damascus, which met the same fate. Nothing halted his forward advance except the Egyptians at the battle of 'Ayn Jālūt (see below). With the defeat of the Tatars at the hands of the Mamlūks, ash-Shām and Egypt once again came under one rule and the blockade around the Crusaders was renewed.

The Baḥriyya Mamlūks ruled for 132 years during which time the Burjiyya Mamlūks whom Qalāwūn had purchased and housed in the citadel tower remained far removed from the struggle for power. When, however, the situation became unsettled under the rule of an-Naṣīr's grandsons due to minors acceding to power, the bedouin revolts and the rebellions of the governors in ash-Shām, the Burjiyya Mamlūks threw themselves into the turmoil. Thus, Barqūq became guardian of Ḥājjī, the grandson of an-Naṣīr, who was still a 9-year-old boy, and managed to persuade the 'Abbāsid caliphate, the judges and the *amīrs* to depose the child sultan and to hand power over to himself in return for restoring stability and security to the country. With this, power passed from the Baḥriyya to the Burjiyya Mamlūks.

THE METHODS OF CONFERRING AUTHORITY

Bearing in mind what has been said above regarding the sultans of the two Mamlūk states, it is clear that the Baḥriyya Mamlūks tried to imitate their masters the Ayyūbids in their system of hereditary transmission of authority. Indeed, az-Zāhir Baybars inaugurated the system of heirs apparent when he nominated his sons as his successors. Although Baybars did not manage to ensure that rule remained in his family, Qalāwūn was successful and rule continued within his line for a century until the fall of the Baḥriyya Mamlūks, as dealt with above.

It appears that the system of hereditary succession ultimately failed; thus the Burjiyya Mamlūks did not actually subscribe to it even though most of the sultans attempted to nominate their sons as successors. The other Mamlūks would feign acceptance of this, offer their allegiance and swear an oath, and indeed abide by this when the sultan died. But they soon tired of a child sultan and would depose him and install whoever from their number emerged triumphant. This is apparent from an examination of the list of Burjiyya Mamlūks. On this subject, and after quoting the list of Burjiyya Mamlūks, Lane-Poole notes that there were never more than two rulers from the same family and for this reason there is no such thing as a family tree of the sultans.

This situation among the Burjiyya Mamlūks led to increasing conflict between them and there was an unceasing struggle for power, which would be further fuelled when the throne was empty or when a sultan's child succeeded him. This led to some intelligent Mamlūks scorning the office of

sultan and striving not to attain it because of the potential risks involved. Among those who renounced the position was the *amīr* Azbak, who was put forward for the position but swore that he would rather divorce his wife than accept it. Similarly, when the sultan Qāyitbāy was ill he refused to appoint his son Muḥammad as successor.

The appointment of a hereditary ruler did not result from notions of democracy; on the contrary, it was a result of the personal ambition that caused every Mamlūk to feel that he was suitable for the office. Thus, this period was one of conspiracies, deeds under the cover of darkness and vile betrayals. Such a state of affairs generally prevailed in feudal societies throughout the Middle Ages, since power and the ownership of feudal estates went hand in hand for whoever managed to seize them through conspiracy and violence; just as the feudal lord gained these things, so he lost them in the same manner.

THE MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SULTANS

Several sultans played no role worthy of mention, while many others were infants and children who were little more than fronts behind which conflicting forces ruled. Thus, the following discussion will be restricted to those sultans who played an important role in history.

Az-Zāhir Baybars

In the victory that Quṭuz achieved over the Tatars at the battle of ‘Ayn Jālūt, he was assisted by his army commander az-Zāhir Baybars. We will therefore pass over Quṭuz and focus our attention on Baybars, who is considered one of the most eminent Mamlūk sultans: he rose to prominence in the struggle with the Tatars, founded the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate in Cairo and struggled to recover Baghdad from the Tatars (see below). For the time being, however, we will concentrate on other aspects of this great sultan.

Baybars was an energetic administrator, constantly working to improve his country’s affairs and increase its resources. He dug irrigation canals and renovated castles, established institutes and built mosques. He held a high position among the *amīrs* of Egypt such that they stood in awe of him and feared his strength and none of them dared enter into his presence without his permission. He was so courageous that his heroism and gallantry became proverbial. He was a model of the just ruler, personally sitting in judgement in the civil courts and showing compassion to the poor and needy. His government was despotic but nonetheless enlightened. Baybars laid the foundations of the Mamlūk state, devised its methods of government and

created many of the important posts. He addressed himself to the army and made improvements to the Egyptian fleet after it had declined during the final years of the Ayyūbid state. He also reformed the judicial system by appointing judges from all four schools of Islamic law to make rulings in legal cases. He similarly enacted a number of laws to raise moral standards in Egypt. Thus, he forbade the selling of alcohol, closed the inns and sent many corrupt individuals into exile.¹¹³

Among his outstanding achievements was his destruction of the Assassins in Syria, a sect which abused values and principles and which extended its activities to include plotting and assassination until it represented a grave danger. In Syria, Baybars wiped out this sect for ever.¹¹⁴ Then in 674/1275 he turned his attention to Nubia, where there were the stirrings of an uprising against the treaty linking it to Egypt. Baybars was able to quell the unrest despite those who refused to be subjected to the text of the treaty. (This is examined in more detail below.)

Under Baybars, Egyptian jurisdiction extended from the Euphrates to the Ḥijāz and the south of the Arabian peninsula and also included ash-Shām, Jerusalem, Sawākin and other places on the Red Sea. The desert Arabs and many Mongol sultans submitted to Baybars' authority and he exchanged ambassadors with the Byzantine empire. Baybars built a mosque in Constantinople and the Mongol khan sent him his daughter in marriage.

Baybars paid great attention to the sciences and learning, and to the renovation of the irrigation canals and agriculture. He was not excessive in the levying of taxes even though he had many wars to finance. On the contrary, he reduced them to the lowest possible amount needed to finance his great projects.¹¹⁵ Among the monuments he left behind are his mosque in al-Ḥusayniyya (aḏ-Zāhir Mosque) and Qalāwūn's hospital in an-Naḥḥāsīn.

As for the severity and tendency to act treacherously that are occasionally attributed to him, these are perhaps due to the prevailing circumstances.

Qalāwūn

Three years after the formation of the Baḥriyya Mamlūk state, Qalāwūn rose to power and the sultanate remained in his family until the fall of the state. He was successful in his struggle against the Crusaders and the Tatars. Here, however, we shall deal with other aspects of his career.

Qalāwūn followed the same path as Baybars in his concern for justice, his management of the country's affairs and gaining the favour of the people.

113 See Ḥasan, *Miṣr fi-l-'uṣūr al-wuṣṭā*, p. 165.

114 On this sect see Aḥmad Shalaby, *Mawsū'at at-tārīkh al-islāmī wa-l-ḥaḍāra al-islāmiyya*, Cairo, Maktabat an-naḥḍa al-miṣriyya, 1984, 8, pp. 118–22; Hitti, *History of Syria*, 2, p. 247.

115 Al-Iskandarī, *Tārīkh Miṣr*, p. 234.

As previously mentioned, he acquired the Circassian Mamlūks and it seems that he lived safely under their protection since he did not often resort to bloodshed. Qalāwūn is credited with many great buildings among the most important of which are the mosque, tomb and hospital that he constructed on a piece of land belonging to the small Fāṭimid palace to the west of al-Mu‘iz li-Dīnillāh Street in an-Naḥḥāsīn. The site of the hospital is today occupied by an eye clinic build by the ministry of religious endowments in 1915.

Qalāwūn had three sons worthy of note: ‘Alā’-ad-Dīn, Khalīl and an-Nāṣir. ‘Alā’ was an excellent man and was universally loved. His father therefore considered appointing him as ruler in his place. It is reported that his brother Khalīl was jealous of him and so poisoned him, and that because of this murder Qalāwūn did not nominate Khalīl as his successor. When Qalāwūn heard about the affair he said: ‘I will not give Khalīl authority over the Muslims.’¹¹⁶ Nor did Qalāwūn appoint his third son because of his youth, but rather left the decision to the Muslim leaders. This was a wise course of action which reflects favourably on him. Nonetheless, Qalāwūn was succeeded by his son Khalīl (al-Ashraf Khalīl), who went on to play an important role in destroying the remnants of the Crusader armies.

An-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn

An-Nāṣir Muḥammad was Qalāwūn’s third son and acceded to power after his brother al-Ashraf Khalīl. He ruled on three separate occasions. The first time was when he was 9 years old, his rule lasting for only one year after which the reins of power were seized by Kitbughā and then al-Manṣūr for four years. The period of their rule was full of civil unrest and discord. After this, an-Nāṣir was returned to power but he had still not come of age, that is, reached 14 years old, so the *amīrs* looked down on him. Although this time he ruled for ten years, he was still faced with the *amīrs*’ disdain that had dogged him since the beginning of his sultanate. He was therefore forced to go to al-Karak, leaving behind him the life of conspiracies, intrigues and contempt. Baybars al-Jāshnakīr (Baybars II) then seized power for one year.

The people were aware that an-Nāṣir was a more trustworthy and capable ruler than Baybars, however, so they wrote to him asking him to return. He therefore came back and assumed authority for the third time. This time he began his rule having reached the age of maturity, and indeed was in the prime of life since he was now in his mid-30s. This period of rule lasted for thirty years and was, in addition to its long duration, full of the most glorious deeds. We will leave aside the important role that an-Nāṣir played against

116 Al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb as-sulūk*, 4, p. 745.

the Tatars and the Crusaders and refer to some of his reforms and initiatives. Under an-Nāṣir, Cairo was the centre of a vast united empire which extended its authority over Yemen and the Ḥijāz in addition to Egypt and ash-Shām and whose representatives addressed the kings of Asia and Europe.

An-Nāṣir's activities were not limited to wars and military expeditions but also included social affairs and building projects. He therefore involved himself with the country's domestic concerns. Among his several recorded initiatives, he put a ceiling on prices so that the poor would not suffer; abolished many of the taxes that the population were obliged to pay and replaced these with others levied on the extremely wealthy; strictly enforced the prohibition on drinking alcohol; maintained public morals; was actively engaged in the propagation of the sciences and learning; and was greatly interested in the art of building and Arabic engraving. An-Nāṣir was responsible for creating the canals that connected the citadel to the Nile even though this has been falsely attributed to Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn. He had a canal dug joining Alexandria to the Nile and constructed a major road along the Nile which also served as a drainage channel when the river was in flood.¹¹⁷

Other sultans

The sultans after an-Nāṣir are hardly worthy of mention except Sultan Ḥasan ibn an-Nāṣir, who built the great school known today as the Mosque of Sultan Ḥasan next to the citadel.

As for the Burjiyya Mamlūks, there are none worth pausing over. Their era was one of discord and agitation and there were so many changes of sultan that occasionally one of them would rule for only a night, a few days or months.

Among the Circassian Mamlūks, mention might be made of Barsbāy, possibly the strongest ruler among them although perhaps not the best. We might also mention Barqūq, Jaqmaq and Qāyitbāy who had the longest periods of rule and who left some great monuments behind them, the most important of which include the mosques of Barqūq and Qāyitbāy and the fortress of Qāyitbāy in Alexandria.

Apart from internal unrest, other reasons for the lack of stability during this period were repeated incursions into Egypt by the bedouin Arabs, Frankish pirate attacks in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, the discovery of the route round the Cape of Good Hope and Ottoman–Mamlūk rivalry which eventually led to the fall of the Mamlūk state and the inclusion of Egypt and Syria within the Ottoman empire.

117 Al-Iskandarī, *Tārīkh Miṣr*, p. 236.

THE 'ABBĀSID CALIPHATE IN EGYPT

The restitution of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate in Egypt was one of the most significant events under the Mamlūks. The caliphate in Baghdad had been destroyed in 656/1258 by the Tatar troops under the command of Hülagü and the 'Abbāsīd caliph had been killed. Two years later aẓ-Zāhir Baybars rose to power and soon had the idea of re-establishing the 'Abbāsīd caliphate. Thus in 659/1261 he summoned Abu-l-Qāsim, one of the 'Abbāsīds who had managed to flee from the Mongol attack. Aẓ-Zāhir held a large council attended by the judges, men of religion, *amīrs* and leading personalities and in it confirmed the genealogy of the new arrival. Those present then gave their oath of allegiance to Abu-l-Qāsim as the caliph of Islam and the Muslims, with the honorary title al-Mustanşir bi-Llāh. The people of various classes then gave their oath of allegiance. After these formalities and ceremonies had been concluded, the caliph appointed aẓ-Zāhir Baybars as ruler of all the countries in the caliph's name and the ruler of all those countries which might be conquered with the help of God through either the preaching of Islam or the sword. The coinage was inscribed with the names of the caliph and the sultan and they were mentioned in the Friday sermon in the mosques.¹¹⁸ With this act Baybars had sanctified and glorified the throne of the Mamlūks and their rule became legitimate.

Baybars then became even more ambitious and hoped that he might recover Baghdad from the Mongols, especially since he had recently inflicted a crushing defeat on them at 'Ayn Jālūt in 658/1260. He therefore prepared a large army under the command of the 'Abbāsīd caliph and dispatched it to regain the capital of the caliph's forefathers. But the Mongols confronted and destroyed them. When Baybars learnt that the caliph had been killed he grieved for him and then summoned another 'Abbāsīd, Abū-l-'Abbās Aḥmad. After his genealogy had been confirmed, allegiance was sworn to him as before. Then the new caliph repeated the formality of giving Baybars control over the Islamic countries. Baybars realized that it would be more advantageous for him to keep the caliph in Cairo so that he could be the conduit for Baybars' wishes. This was more expedient than sending him to Baghdad in the event of a victory over the Mongols: in Baghdad the caliph would act differently to how he would act in Cairo or would be under the control of other forces such as those which dominated the 'Abbāsīd caliphs during the second 'Abbāsīd period.

Thus, the 'Abbāsīd caliphate was reborn in Cairo and remained there throughout the rule of the Bahriyya and Burjiyya Mamlūks. But it had no

118 Al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb as-sulūk*, 1, p. 450; Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Iyās, *Badā'i' az-zuhūr*, Cairo, AH 1311–12, 1, p. 101.

real power or authority and no influence on political affairs. Its only task was to sanction the authority of whoever achieved this with his sword. The ‘Abbāsid caliphate continued in Egypt until the Ottoman conquest.

THE MAMLŪKS AND THE TATARS

While the Ayyūbids had paved the way for the Mamlūks to achieve victory over the Crusaders, this was not the case with the Mongols. On the contrary, numerous powers in Asia and Europe had fallen before the Mongols’ destructive advance. The Mamlūk victory over them at ‘Ayn Jālūt and afterwards was thus seen as safeguarding world civilization which, if not for Egypt and the Mamlūks, would be on the point of collapse and would be trampled under the feet of the Mongols who devastated every city and country they came to.

‘Ayn Jālūt

‘Ayn Jālūt, situated between Baysān and Nablus, witnessed one of the most momentous battles in history. Both the warlike Kitbughā and the tumultuous Egyptian army made their way there and met on 10 Ramaḍān 658/3 September 1260. Quṭuz had already prepared an ingenious battle plan. He arrived after the main bulk of his army under the command of Baybars and hid with the remainder of his troops behind some nearby hills. Kitbughā entered the fray with his full force, and when the battle had reached its height Quṭuz emerged from his hiding place and surrounded the Mongol army. It was a ferocious battle which began at dawn and continued until midday. It is reported that Quṭuz was aware of some anxiety among his troops as the battle was underway so he took off his helmet, threw it to the ground and shouted: ‘For Islam!’ He then rushed forward, fighting with defiance and ferocity until the Mongols were totally defeated, their soldiers either being killed, wounded or taken captive. When it became clear that the Egyptians were victorious, some Mongols asked their commander to escape with his life, but he refused and continued to fight alone until his horse fell and he was taken prisoner. When he stood before Quṭuz he cursed and reviled him, and so was put to death.¹¹⁹

Baybars, who had become sultan of Egypt, did not become intoxicated with the victory he had achieved with Quṭuz at ‘Ayn Jālūt. Rather, he pursued the Mongols towards the north until he inflicted another defeat on them at

119 Ibn Taghrī Birdī, *an-Nujūm az-zāhira*, 7, p. 79.

ISLAM IN EGYPT, NUBIA AND THE SUDAN

Caesarea in Asia Minor, thereby regaining the kingdom of the Byzantine Seljūqs previously held by the Mongols.¹²⁰

Results of the victory at 'Ayn Jālūt

The consequences of the Mamlūk victory at 'Ayn Jālūt can be summarized as follows:

1. It led to the reunification of Egypt and Syria, since some Syrian provinces had rejected the Egyptian sultans after the establishment of the Mamlūk state.
2. It is considered to be a victory for civilization: it saved humanity from those barbarians who, had calamity not overtaken them, would have spread their destruction and would not have been easily prevented from further damaging the world and humankind.
3. It put an end to the idea prevalent among the Christian countries that the Mongol army was invincible.
4. It hastened the withdrawal of the Crusaders from ash-Shām.
5. It saved Egypt and its antiquities from the devastation that accompanied a Mongol victory.
6. Egypt's reputation was enhanced because of the victory it achieved over the Mongols and the Crusaders.
7. The defeat encouraged the Mongols to act in a more civilized manner. They thus considered converting to Islam, and indeed many of them did.

THE MAMLŪKS AND THE CRUSADERS

When the Mamlūks were victorious at 'Ayn Jālūt, they reunified Egypt and Syria, or at least restored the blockade surrounding the Crusaders; thus this event was a consummation of the great victories which had begun with Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn al-Ayyūbī. The Mamlūks toppled the principalities of Antioch and Tarabulus and the remaining part of the kingdom of Jerusalem. The most important Mamlūks to play a role in these wars were aẓ-Zāhir Baybars, Qalāwūn and al-Ashraf Khalīl, who was responsible for the fall of Acre, the destruction of other Crusader strongholds, the surrender of the countries that remained under their control and the end of the era of the Crusaders in the East.

120 Al-Iskandarī, *Tārīkh Miṣr*, p. 213.

THE END OF MAMLŪK RULE

The destruction of the Mongols in Iraq and western Asia resulted in two great powers coming face to face: the Ottomans in Asia Minor and the Safavid state in Persia. Although they were both Islamic powers, the Safavids were extremist Shī'ites while the Turks were Sunnīs and this represented a very significant difference between them. Due to its geographic position, the Mamlūk state came between these two powers. There had been a long struggle between the Ottomans and the Safavids from which the former had eventually emerged victorious. Thus, Selim I entered Iraq in 918/1512. The Mamlūk sultan at the time, Qānṣūh al-Ghūrī (r. 906–22/1501–16), was accused by Selim of siding with the Safavids and of offering a safe haven to some of the political refugees from among the Ottoman *amīrs* who were rebelling against him. Selim therefore made preparations for an attack on Egypt. He managed to bribe some of al-Ghūrī's followers such as Khayr Bay, the governor of Aleppo, and Jān Birdī al-Ghazzālī, the governor of Hamah. The Janissary army used weapons which were able to throw fire over large distances whereas the Mamlūks still depended on the bravery of their troops. When the battle finally took place at Marj Dābiq in 922/1516, Qānṣūh al-Ghūrī and his men displayed enormous courage but the decisive moment occurred when the treacherous Khayr Bay, who commanded the left flank, was put to flight with his men. The Mamlūks were then overtaken by calamity, Qānṣūh was killed and the Ottoman army seized his men and possessions.¹²¹

Ṭūmān Bay acceded to the sultanate after Qānṣūh. He met the Ottoman army at ar-Rīdāniyya (al-'Abbāsiyya) in 922/1517 but was also betrayed by some of his followers and suffered a defeat. Ṭūmān Bay then appealed to two bedouin leaders, Ḥasan ibn Mar'ī and his brother Shukrī, over whom he had some control. Although they swore that they would not betray him they soon handed him over to Sultan Selim the Conqueror, who had him hanged on Zuwayla gate in April of the same year. With this, the Mamlūk state came to end and Ottoman rule began in Egypt.

EGYPTIAN CULTURE UNDER THE MAMLŪKS

Trade and money

The Mamlūk state profited greatly from its geographic position after the fall of the Crusader principalities and the Mongol destruction of the overland routes. Egyptian and Syrian merchants became middlemen in this lively

121 Ibn Iyās, *Badā'i'*, 3, pp. 44ff.

trade, putting up large amounts of capital and employing agents in Aden, the Persian Gulf, India and the Far East.

Agriculture

Most of the Mamlūk sultans paid particular attention to irrigation canals and bridges. Agriculture flourished during times of peace, but the periodic disturbances led to a reduction in agricultural activity since the peasants were generally ill-treated and neglected. When the Mamlūks concerned themselves with agriculture, this was due to their desire to gain more wealth. As for the hard-working peasant, however, he only received from the produce of the land what was sufficient to meet his daily needs. He lived under subordination in the Mamlūk state and was totally under the power of the great landowners.

Industry

A number of industries thrived at this time such as textiles, the manufacture of metal vessels, glassmaking and leatherwork, and Egypt gained a wide reputation in these fields. There was also the manufacture of weapons and ships. Similarly well known during this period were industries involving intricate craftsmanship and the art of fine ornamentation. Some wonderful examples of metalwork, copper instruments, glass vessels and wooden containers have come down to us from that period. Particularly noteworthy are the copper instruments, flower vases, jugs, plates, candelabra, censers and covers for the Qur'ān, all of which are highly decorated and ornamented.¹²²

Monuments and buildings

Architecture thrived under the Mamlūks, as is evident from the magnificent schools, mosques and hospitals with which Cairo, Alexandria and elsewhere are adorned up to the present time. The design and ornamentation of these structures reveal the progress made in this field. Reference has already been made to the most significant buildings of the Bahriyya Mamlūks. Under the Burjiyya Mamlūks, the most important monument is the dome of Yashbak ad-Dawādār, which was constructed during the sultanate of Qāyitbāy and whose site is today known as al-Fadāwiyya dome. Yashbak often received Sultan Qāyitbāy in the dome and it was a place where the sultans would rest and relax on their way to and from Cairo. The *amīr* Azbak had a large palace in the area named after him, al-Azbakiyya.

122 Hitti, *History of Syria*, pp. 287–8.

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The Mamlūks also concerned themselves with building mosques, particularly Sultan Qāyitbāy who was responsible for a number of them, including the Mosque of al-Kharq (al-Khalq) gate, the mosque and *Sabīl* (i.e. basin for the provision of water for free public use) of al-‘Abbāsiyya and the mosque in as-Saḥrā’. He also built a school and a tomb in the eastern part of the cemetery below the Muqaṭṭam hills (al-Qarāfa). Famous mosques include that of al-Mu’ayyad next to az-Zuwayla gate and which used to contain a large library, the Mosque of al-Ghūrī near al-Azhar and another one built by al-Ghūrī behind the citadel square. He was also responsible for building the double-towered minaret of al-Azhar.¹²³ Indeed, numerous mosques were built throughout the Mamlūk period. An early monument is the Mosque of Qāhir at-Tartār (Quṭuz) in al-Qaṣīr, a village in Fāqūs, while the monuments of Sultan al-Ghūrī – especially his minaret and his school in Ghūriyya – date from the end of the period. Between these are many other mosques, some of the most important including the Mosque of az-Zāhir Baybars in az-Zāhir quarter, the mosque and dome of Qalāwūn in an-Naḥḥāsīn, the Mosque of Sultan Ḥasan in the citadel, the Mosque of Barqūq and the Mosque of Qāyitbāy.

The Mamlūks also turned their attention to schools. Thus, al-Barqūq built his school in Bayn al-Qaṣrayn; during the time of Sultan Faraj, the *amīr* Jamāl-ad-Dīn al-Astādār built al-Jamāliyya school which is named after him; while al-Ashraf Bārsbāy built three schools, one in Siryāqūs, the second in Cairo known as al-Ashrafiyya and the third in as-Saḥrā’ in which he was buried.

Islam among the Mongols

One of the cultural legacies of the Mamlūk period was the spread of Islam among the Mongols after their defeat at ‘Ayn Jālūt and subsequent battles. On this subject, Arnold remarks:

There is no event in the history of Islam that for terror and desolation can be compared to the Mongol conquest. Like an avalanche, the hosts of Jīngis Khan swept over the centres of Muslim culture and civilisation, leaving behind them bare deserts and shapeless ruins where before had stood the palaces of stately cities, girt about with gardens and fruitful corn-land ... But Islam was to rise again from the ashes of its former grandeur and through its preachers win over these savage conquerors to the acceptance of the faith.¹²⁴

123 ‘Abd-al-Wahhāb ‘Izām, *Majālis aṣ-Ṣultān al-Ghūrī*, Cairo, Maṭba‘at lajnat at-ta’līf, 1954, pp. 23ff. See also Ḥasan ‘Abd-al-Wahhāb, *Tārīkh al-masājid al-athariyya fī Miṣr*, Cairo, Dār al-kutub al-miṣriyya, 1952, 1, pp. 121–2.

124 Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam*, pp. 185, 186.

Science and learning

The Mamlūk period in Egypt was blessed with some outstanding personalities and scholars in various fields of intellectual endeavour. In the following, some of these scholars are mentioned in roughly chronological order according to the dates of their deaths.

The great physician Ibn Abī Uṣaybi‘a (d. 668/1269) studied medicine with his father in Damascus and then moved to al-Bīmāristān an-Nāṣirī (the Nāṣirī hospital and medical centre) in Cairo to complete his studies. His biographical dictionary *‘Uyūn al-anbā’ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā’* contains the biographies of 400 physicians. ‘Alī ibn an-Nafīs (d. 687/1288) was a head physician in Qalāwūn’s hospital.

Ibn Khallikān (d. 681/1282) was the most eminent writer of biographies in Islam. In his great book *Wafayāt al-ā’yān*, he collected 860 biographies of leading personalities and scholars. This book is considered a major source for researchers. Ibn Khallikān’s work encouraged two contemporary writers to follow in his footsteps: al-Kutubī al-Ḥalabī (d. 764/1363), who completed Ibn Khallikān’s work with his *Fawāt al-wafayāt* which contains 506 biographies; and aṣ-Ṣafadī (d. 764/1363), who wrote a book entitled *al-Wāfi bi-l-wafayāt* containing 14,000 biographies. Ad-Dimashqī (d. 726/1326) wrote *Nukhbat ad-dahr fī ‘ajā’ib al-barr wa-l-baḥr*.

One of the most eminent scholars of religion and law was Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328); he objected to the sanctifying of saints and giving them votive offerings. His school was subsequently adopted by the Iṣlāḥiyyīn in Najd.

Among the historians and biographers of the period was Abu-l-Fidā’ (d. 732/1332), whose writings were greatly admired. His friend Ibn Nabāta al-Miṣrī (d. 767/1366) was an outstanding poet.

The scholar Ibn Faḍlallāh al-‘Umrī (d. 749/1349) occupied the post of Master of the Seal (*Ṣāhib al-Khātīm*) in the Mamlūk court in Cairo. He is the author of *Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār*.

Legal scholars include as-Subkī (d. 756/1355); born in Manūfiyya, he was the leader of the Shāfi‘ī school of law at the time. Among his writings are *Ṭabaqāt ash-shāfi‘iyya* and *Shifā’ as-sāqim fī ziyārat khayr al-anām* in which he quotes Ibn Taymiyya.

Ibn Khaldūn (d. 807/1405), the great historian and social scientist, was the first to state that historical events are the result of economic, geographic and certain other factors and that it is necessary to study these as part of historical inquiry.

Other intellectuals of the time include Muḥammad ibn ‘Īsā ad-Damīrī (d. 704/1305), the author of *Ḥayāt al-ḥayawān*; Ibn Duqmāq al-Miṣrī (d. 809/1406), the author of *al-Intiṣār li-wāsiṭat ‘iqd al-amṣār*; and al-Qalqashandī (d. 821/1418), the author of the great compendium *Ṣubḥ al-ā’shā fī ṣinā’at al-*

inshā'. The great Egyptian historian Al-Maqrīzī (d. 845/1442) wrote *al-Khiṭaṭ was-Sulūk Wittī 'āz al-ḥunafā* and *Risāla 'an an-nuqūd*. The Imam of the age Ibn Ḥajar al-'Asqalānī (d. 852/1449), who was born in Egypt, was the author of *ad-Durar al-kāmina fī 'ulamā' al-mi'a ath-thāmina*, *Tārīkh aṣ-ṣahāba* and *al-Fathḥ al-bārī fī sharḥ aḥādīth al-Bukhārī*. Al-'Aynī (d. 855/1451) was born in Aleppo but became a teacher and a judge in Cairo. He was fluent in Turkish and Arabic, which helped in the writing of his great compendium, *'Iqd al-jumān fī tārikh ahl az-zamān*. Ibn Taghrī Birdī (d. 874/1469) was an illustrious Mamlūk historian; his book *an-Nujūm az-zāhira* is one of the most famous dealing with the history of Egypt and Cairo. Another scholar during this period was as-Sakhāwī (d. 902/1496), the author of a number of books among the most important of which is *aḍ-Ḍaw' al-lāmi' fī 'ulamā' al-qarn at-tāsi'*. His student and peer Imam as-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505) was the author of numerous compendia, particularly on Qur'ānic studies. Finally, Ibn Iyās (d. 930/1523) was the author of *Badā'i' az-zuhūr*, which deals with the history of Egypt.

Other Mamlūk scholars

In the foregoing we have mentioned a number of historians who emerged from the ranks of the Mamlūks and who were involved in the recording of history. It was not only historical studies, however, that encouraged some Mamlūks to renounce power and authority so that they could enter the ranks of the learned. Indeed, many Mamlūks such as the *amīr* 'Alam-ad-Dīn Sinjar and Tamr ibn 'Abdallāh ash-Shihāb took up the study of the legal sciences. Others such as Shihāb-ad-Dīn ibn Balbak and Sultan Qānṣūh al-Ghūrī turned to the arts. They also became involved in mathematics, astronomy, medicine and chemistry.

A number of courageous soldiers distinguished themselves by writing works on military affairs. These include 'Imād-ad-Dīn al-Yūsufī (d. 758/1357), the author of *Kashf al-kurūb fī muqaddimat al-ḥurūb*, and Sayf-ad-Dīn al-Mārdīnī (d. 779/1378), the author of *Bughyat al-qāṣidīn fī-l-'amal bi-l-mayādīn*.

Islam in Nubia and the Sudan

The Sudan, lying to the south of Egypt, used to be known by the Egyptians as Nubia, or 'the Land of Gold'.¹²⁵ Nubia extends south from Aswan as far as Khartoum, then east up to the borders of Ethiopia and west to include Kordofan and large areas of Darfur. The part of Nubia that belongs to Egypt

125 Muḥammad 'Awaḍ Muḥammad, *as-Sūdān ash-shamālī*, Cairo, 1954, p. 284.

is situated between Aswan and Wadi Halfa and is called Lower Nubia. The remaining part belongs to the Sudan and is called Upper Nubia.

Christianity entered this area from Egypt and spread rapidly throughout Nubia and as far south as Sōba. In about the sixth century AD two Christian states were formed in these regions: Makuria in the north, with its capital at Dungula; and 'Alawa in the south, whose capital was Sōba.

Since one part of Nubia belonged to Egypt while another part belonged to the Sudan, Islam spread from Egypt into Lower Nubia which was under its control. From there it moved to Upper Nubia which was under Sudanese control. Islam similarly pervaded the Bija, Kordofan and then Darfur, going as far as the Southern Sudan.

Thus, when Islam entered Egypt it started to move south. Then came the role of the military campaigns which resulted in peace and the *Baqṭ* treaty which dealt with commercial and economic exchange between the north and the south. This treaty remained the basis of dealings between the north and south of the Nile valley until the Mamlūk period, when the kings of Makuria started to rebel against the treaty after the pattern of the Crusaders who also helped their co-religionists in their wars against Egypt. In response, az-Zāhir Baybars invaded the kingdom of Makuria, defeated its kings and assumed the right to replace them with whomever he saw fit.¹²⁶ The next Mamlūk sultan after Baybars grew up in these regions.

At this time, large numbers of Arabs were pouring into the region and they were becoming more powerful and increasing in number while in the East the Crusader castles were falling. All this paved the way for a great change in the region, for Arab blood and the Arabic language were spreading and the Christian ally had disappeared. The country then passed through a period of political unrest and anxiety since most of the incoming Arabs were from bedouin tribes whose occupation was grazing animals. When these Arabs became more powerful, they installed over the country a chief of the tribes in accordance with their custom on the Arabian peninsula. In this way the state of Makuria fell and was replaced by a tribal system professing Islam.

As for 'Alawa in the south, its clash with Egypt was significantly less violent since the state of Makuria was situated between them. For this reason, it did not experience the same volume of emigration as the north. This allowed Makuria to survive for a long time and to maintain its independence despite the large number of Arabs and Muslims living there.

Finally, the Funj and the 'Abdallāb advanced and destroyed Sōba, seized the kingdom and extended their authority to the north, subjugating

126 Al-Maqrīzī, *Khiṭaṭ*, 1, pp. 202ff.; 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, Cairo, AH 1274, 4, p. 300.

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the tribes which had replaced the state of Makuria. In place of the two states they established an Islamic kingdom in AD 1505 and built Sinnar as its capital. This state was called the Funj¹²⁷ (see below).

According to the Sudanese writer Makki Shubayka, in the Middle Ages Nubia more or less comprised what is now known as Northern Sudan, for it extended from Aswan up to the confluence of the Blue and White Niles where Khartoum is situated today. It then extended to include regions in the Blue Nile basin to the east up to the borders of Abyssinia, and large areas of Kordofan and Darfur.¹²⁸

The ancient Egyptians used to call this region Khanat, that is, 'the southern lands', since the Nile valley was to the north and the south was the kingdom of the Pharaohs.¹²⁹ Then the word 'Nubia' was coined at the beginning of the Ptolemaic period in around 200 BC, apparently in connection with the name of the people who lived there. With the passage of time, this area began to have close dealings with the northern regions of the valley or, as in the majority of instances, even united with them at their own instigation or that of the north. The geographic separation between the two regions did not militate against their close cultural and social ties. This can be seen in the many shared customs and dialects.

Let us move back a little in time and mention that during the caliphate of 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb the Islamic armies under the command of 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ had poured over the Suez isthmus into Egypt. They overcame Byzantine resistance and were welcomed by the Egyptians since they had liberated them from Byzantine rule. Every conquering army that entered northern Egypt always extended its conquests to the south as far as Aswan, and the Muslims did likewise. To the south of Aswan were the Nubian kingdoms which had commercial and cultural links with Egypt. Therefore, when the Islamic armies stopped at Aswan they were obliged to safeguard the trade route and their southern borders.

An Islamic detachment under the command of 'Uqba ibn Nāfi' entered Nubia in 20/641, but a clash between them and the northern Nubians prevented the Muslims from penetrating deeply into the territory. It appears that the two sides reached a truce. But no sooner had 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ departed from Egypt, leaving 'Abdallāh ibn Abī as-Sarḥ in charge, than the Nubians broke the truce and the new governor was obliged to dispatch an army against them. This time the army was able to penetrate deeply into the kingdom of Makuria and went as far as its capital Dungula in 31/652.

127 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, 6, p. 199.

128 Makkī Shubayka, *as-Sūdān 'abr al-qurūn*, Cairo, Dār ath-thaqāfa, 1976, p. 16.

129 E. A. W. Budge, *History of Ethiopia, Nubia and Abyssinia*, Newhaven, Yale University Press, 1955, 1, p. 1.

They laid siege to the city and bombarded it with mangonels until King Qalīdūrūth requested a settlement.¹³⁰

The Muslims stipulated their conditions to the king. On the Muslim side, the commander pledged that his troops would not fight against the Nubians, and stated that the people of Nubia could pass through Muslim territories but not settle there. As far as the Nubians were concerned, they had to offer protection to any Muslim or person from the protected religions who visited their country until his departure. They similarly had to maintain the mosque that the Muslims built in Dungula, keep it clean, light its lamps, treat it with respect and not prevent anyone from praying in it. They were also obliged to pay a high rate of *jizya* tax every year. When the king drew attention to the impoverished state of the country and their need for Egyptian aid, the Muslims willingly supplied them with annual consignments of grain and clothes.

This settlement is referred to in the Arabic sources as the *Baqṭ* treaty, a term which is perhaps derived from the Byzantine *paetum* (agreement). The Muslims were content with this treaty, which secured their southern borders, gave Muslim merchants freedom of movement within Nubian territory and established the practices of their religion in the midst of the capital. The relationship between the Islamic state and the Christian kingdom of Makuria continued for about six centuries on the basis of this treaty.

During the Ayyūbid period, the Nubian commanders took advantage of Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn al-Ayyūbī's preoccupation with his battles against the Crusaders and revolted against Egyptian control. However, Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn sent his brother Ṭūrān Shāh, who quelled the insurrection and re-established Egyptian authority over Nubia and the Sudan.

The sources tell us for the first time about an incursion undertaken in 105/725 by the Bija, a people living in the desert between the Nile and the Red Sea in Upper Egypt. The Muslims repulsed the attack and Ibn al-Ḥabḥāb made peace with them by means of a treaty which stipulated that the Bija had to hand over 300 small camels, that they were permitted to pass through the countryside as merchants but not settle there, that they should not kill any Muslim or person from a protected religion and that they should not offer refuge to the Muslims' slaves.¹³¹

During the Mamlūk period, the relationship between north and south was still based on the *Baqṭ* treaty. Islam had spread among the people in Nubia and groups of Arabs had emigrated from the north to the south as a

130 Shubayka, *as-Sūdān*, p. 18.

131 Shubayka, *as-Sūdān*, p. 20.

result of various pressures.¹³² Nonetheless, the Nubia kingdoms remained Christian, particularly the kingdom of 'Alawa.

Under the Mamlūks, and especially during the rules of Baybars, Qalāwūn, al-Ashraf Khalīl and an-Nāṣir, the sultans wished to strengthen the tie between Egypt and Nubia, so they sent a number of expeditionary forces there which brought about the fall of the Christian kingdoms and the founding of an Islamic state. After the destruction of the Tatars and the Crusaders, Baybars considered marching to the south and eradicating Christianity there in order to safeguard the Egyptian borders and rid himself of some Nubian kings whose sympathy lay with the Crusaders.

During the era of Baybars, a man called Shakanda in Lower Nubia was striving to regain the throne of Makuria after having been deposed by his brother Dāwūd. Baybars took this as an opportunity to put an end to Dāwūd and equipped a large army which marched into Lower Nubia, ousted Dāwūd and installed Shakanda as king in Dungula in 674/1276. A treaty was drawn up which re-established the link between Egypt and Nubia and made the sultan of Egypt the sultan of the entire Nile valley. Makuria thus became a part of the sultanate of Egypt and Egypt regained the 'high regions' and the 'regions of the mountains'.¹³³

Shakanda was killed in the same year that Baybars died. A prince called Birik then seized the throne of Nubia, ignoring the fact that the appointment of a king required the agreement of Cairo. At this time authority in Egypt had passed to Qalāwūn, who dispatched an army to do away with Birik, who was then replaced by another prince called Semāmōm. This action served to convince the kings of Makuria in Upper Nubia of the power of the sultanate of Egypt and its rulers' determination to maintain their position south of the Nile valley.

Semāmōm took advantage of the death of Qalāwūn and organized another revolt against Egyptian control, withholding the *jizya* and other taxes that he was obliged to pay under the terms of the treaty. Al-Ashraf therefore sent a large military force against him from which Semāmōm fled as was his custom. The army continued until it arrived at 'the land of elephants, monkeys,

132 When the Umayyad state fell, many Umayyads and their helpers escaped. Some went to Nubia either by way of Egypt or the Red Sea. Similarly, a large number of Arabs migrated to Nubia when the state of Aḥmad ibn Ṭulūn was established in Egypt. One of the leaders of the tribe of Rabī'a called Abū-l-Makārim Hibbat Allāh enjoyed the favour of the Fāṭimid caliph al-Ḥākim bi-Amrillāh because he had put an end to the rebel Abū Rakwa. Al-Ḥākim conferred on Hibbat Allāh the honorary title Kanz ad-Dawla ('Treasure of the State') and the tribe of Rabī'a came to be known as the Banū Kanz. The Banū Kanz enjoyed a high status in southern Egypt in the area of Aswan, but al-'Ādil Sayf-ad-Dīn al-Ayyūbī attacked them and they also fled to Nubia.

133 Muṣṭafā Mas'ad, *al-Islām wa-n-Nūba*, Cairo, Maktabat al-anglu al-miṣriyya, 1966, pp. 149–50; see also Al-Maqrīzī, *Kitāb as-sulūk*, II/2, p. 623.

wild boar, giraffes and ostriches', that is to say, Egyptian authority arrived in southern Sudan. As for Semāmōm, he hid himself away and was never heard of again. The Egyptian authorities installed a new king called Boudemma, one of the princes who had previously been held captive in Egypt.¹³⁴

After this, an-Nāṣir Muḥammad was to play a role. During his time the Christian king of Nubia was called Karanbas – he was destined to be the last in the line of Christian kings. In 716/1316 he rejected Egyptian authority and refused to honour the *Baqṭ* treaty. At this, an-Nāṣir decided that the time had come to install a Muslim ruler over Nubia, especially since the number of Muslims there had increased. The sultan therefore used Karanbas' rebellion as an opportunity to send an armed force under the command of the *amīr* 'Izz-ad-Dīn Aybak, accompanied by a Nubian Christian called 'Abdallāh Barashanbū who had been raised in Egypt where he had converted to Islam. An-Nāṣir believed that appointing 'Abdallāh Barashanbū as king would put the relations between Egypt and the Sudan on a new footing. But when King Karanbas became aware of an-Nāṣir's intentions, he sent his nephew Kanz-ad-Dawla ibn Shujjā'-ad-Dīn to the sultan with a letter which read: 'If our master the sultan intends to give a Muslim authority over the country, then this man is a Muslim and he is my nephew. Rule passes to him after me.' An-Nāṣir did not pay any attention to this, however, and went ahead with the appointment of Barashanbū as king.

A number of military actions then ensued, resulting in the installation of Kanz-ad-Dawla. He subsequently went on to encourage the spread of Islam and his rule witnessed the consolidation of Arab influence in the region, for he was of pure Arab origin and was a Muslim while his mother was from the family of Nubian kings. The Muslims soon built a large mosque on the ruins of the Christian church in Dungula in 821/June 1418. With this, Christianity disappeared from the kingdom of Makuria. The adoption of Islam in the region ushered in a new era in the relations between Makuria and Egypt, one of friendship, affection and cultural and commercial exchange.

THE KINGDOM OF FUNJ

The kingdom of Funj in southern Sudan was founded by 'Amāra Dunqas from the Funj tribe, which traces its ancestry back to the Umayyads. 'Amāra was assisted in this by another Arab leader called 'Abdallāh Jammā' from the Qawāsima Juhayniyya tribe. The kingdom was founded in 921/1515 after their army had invaded Sōba, which at that time was riven by internal rivalries. These divisions within Sōba had religious origins. Large numbers

134 Shubayka, *as-Sūdān*, p. 36.

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of Arab Muslim tribes had marched against the state of Makuria, overturned it and formed a number of independent emirates professing Islam. After this, Islam had penetrated into all parts of the Christian kingdom of 'Alawa. This paved the way for an Islamic alliance that would put an end to this state and transform 'Alawa and Makuria into one country, that is, the Sudan with the eastern regions (Bija) and the west (Kordofan and Darfur).

Thus, the end of the kingdom of 'Alawa, and the Funj and the 'Abdallāb's seizure of it along with the territories of the state of Makuria (which the tribal regime had previously overthrown), was an official declaration that a single state had been established in the Sudan. This was facilitated by the fact that Islam and Arab blood had already infiltrated into all these regions.

The Funj kingdom comprised all the territories of Makuria and 'Alawa in addition to the Bija territory lying between the Nile and the Red Sea. This resulted in the inclusion of Kordofan in the time of Muḥammad Abū Likaylik, followed by Darfur.¹³⁵ In this way, the north and south of Nubia along with the kingdom of 'Alawa embraced Islam. This is one of the legacies of the Mamlūk period.¹³⁶

NUBIAN CULTURE

Nubia has a rich culture which embraces the arts of house building, music, singing and all other spheres of life. There are also the towering temples and fascinating monuments that were flooded by the waters of the Aswan Dam, and then the High Dam, and which forced the Nubians to move to what is known as New Nubia. With the aid of UNESCO, Egypt was able to recreate the Nubian way of life. A broad hill not far from the original site of Nubia was chosen as the site on which to build houses modelled on those of the Nubians. All the monuments which had been situated on Nubian land were transported there.

135 'Aṭīya al-Qūṣī, *Dawlat al-kunūz al-islāmiyya*, Cairo, Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1983, *passim*.

136 'Abd-al-Mun'im Abū Bakr, *Bilād an-Nūba*, Cairo, 1957, p. 36.

Chapter 2.5

THE ISLAMIZATION OF AFRICA

El Hadji Ravane M'Baye

INTRODUCTION

Barbary – for several centuries a Roman province of Africa and known to the Arabs as Ifrīqiya from its Latin name – belonged to the Christian world until the end of antiquity. Apart from Numidia and Tripolitania, which were governed directly by Rome, the Barbary provinces were romanized to varying degrees. They were considered regions of lesser importance, consisting only of the areas suitable for cultivation, that is, the Mauritanian provinces. Thus, the Maghrib that was to receive the message of Islam was composed of two parts: the towns, which belonged to the Christian and Latin world, and the mountains and deserts where the Berbers lived.

There were major revolts by Berber nomads, but for centuries Rome always managed to control them. However, its domination collapsed before the advancing Luwata of Nafousa. Theological disputes further weakened Byzantine power. The Council of Carthage in AD 525 recorded the suffering of the African Church during the century following the death of St Augustine and the disputes over the nature of Christ that caused a schism in the Christian world. Monophysitism opened the Byzantine era in Africa, while monotheism was regarded as a heresy.

Following in the footsteps of Asians from the Indian subcontinent, the Arabs also took an interest in Africa. They sailed from the southern shores of the Arabian peninsula and settled all along the east coast, in places such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya and Zanzibar. Africa had been coveted for centuries for various reasons – economic, political and religious – and was also a refuge for fugitives and persecuted peoples, particularly Jews, but its destiny changed with the advent of Islam.

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From 610 onwards the Prophet Muḥammad preached the new religion, Islam, in Mecca, the site of the Ka‘ba – the major shrine of the Arabian peninsula – and the commercial crossroads of western Arabia. Less than a dozen or so years later, he was recognized as a great religious and military leader by most of the Arab tribes that had responded favourably to his call. He laid the foundations of the new community through active proselytizing in the regions of Arabia. Once he had conquered the whole of the Arabian peninsula, he asserted the universality of the new religion by calling on Heraclius, the emperor of Byzantium, and Chosroes, the king of Persia, to embrace it. Although Islam was still confined within the boundaries of Arabia when the Prophet died in 632, barely ten years later many provinces belonging to Byzantium and Persia, including Egypt, had come under its control.

The second quarter of the seventh century witnessed unprecedented religious and political upheavals in the Middle East, Europe and Africa. The Byzantines were defeated by the Persians, but would win a victory of their own, as announced in the Qur‘ān.¹ In 628 Byzantium inflicted a crushing defeat on Sāsānid Persia and recaptured Syria and Egypt. Between 636 and 641 the Muslim army defeated the Persians and brought Islam to Syria, Iraq and Palestine. This paved the way for the distant prospect of Islamizing Africa according to a plan whereby Egypt would be conquered as a prelude to the Islamization of North Africa (or Barbary) and lead on to that of sub-Saharan Africa.

How did Islam spread? What obstacles did it encounter? To what extent did it improve the lives of those who embraced it? An attempt will be made in the following pages to answer these questions, beginning with the Islamization of North Africa.

The Islamization of North Africa

The military victories over Byzantium and Persia encouraged ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ, the brilliant general who commanded one of the four armies that had conquered Syria, to invade Egypt – at that time under Byzantine control – in order to bring it under Islam. Egypt’s surrender began at Memphis, situated at the southern apex of the Delta on the west bank of the Nile. Memphis was the first capital of the ancient pharaonic empire that had become Christian under the name ‘Babylon’ and was to become Muslim under the name ‘Fusṭāṭ’. The hostility of the population to Byzantine rule meant that ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ met little resistance. As the chronicler Michael the Syrian puts it: ‘It was of no small benefit for us to be delivered from the cruelty of the Romans

1 *Ar-Rūm*, 30:2–3.

[Byzantines], their wickedness, anger and cruel zeal towards us, and to find ourselves at rest ...'

The Christian community was given genuine autonomy and its places of worship were protected. Philippe Conrad observes that the persecution of the Monophysites and the tax burden weighing on Egypt combined to foster hostility to the Byzantines, and this explains the relative ease with which the Arabs managed to take over the country. Conrad goes on to remark:

The Coptic population of Alexandria, led by its Monophysite patriarch, Benjamin, submitted to the conquerors, thus showing that they preferred Arab control to the Byzantine yoke ... [T]he commander, 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ, granted the emperor's representative, Patriarch Kyros, the right for Christians to maintain their religious autonomy in return for tribute.²

Nubia, which had been Christianized very early on, was forced to sign a treaty with the new master of Egypt stipulating that it could maintain its religious autonomy by means of an annual exchange of Nubian slaves for wheat, barley and Egyptian horses. It was, however, only towards the end of the thirteenth century that Islam spread to Nubia by means of the Arab traders who passed through it. Marriages between Arabs and Nubians played a decisive role in the population's conversion to Islam. The kings of Nubia (Dungula) even became vassals of Egypt. From 1319 onwards Nubia steadily declined under the influx of Arab elements of the Juhayna tribe who penetrated as far as Abyssinia and Darfur.

Once Egypt had been taken in 641, its governor 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ sent his commander 'Uqba ibn Nāfi' on a reconnaissance mission to Cyrenaica (Barqa) and Tripolitania. He signed an agreement with these two provinces under which they would maintain their autonomy by paying an annual tax to the governor of Egypt. According to the early Arab historians Ibn 'Idhārī, al-Bakrī and Ibn al-Athīr, the amount was calculated on the basis of 1 dinar per adult. 'Uqba took advantage of his mission to go into the desert as far as Fezzan and Zawila in the Maghrib. Al-Bakrī refers to Zawila as a slave market. There, 'Uqba carried out his mission of Islamization. On his return, his report to 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ opened up an unexpected prospect: the conquest of Ifrīqiya. In a letter to the caliph 'Umar requesting permission to undertake this task, the governor wrote: 'Thanks be to God we have conquered Tripolitania and a distance of only nine days separates us from Ifrīqiya. If the Commander of the Faithful would authorize its conquest ...'³

2 Philippe Conrad, 'L'Égypte et la vallée du Nil, de la conquête musulmane au califat fatimide', at <http://www.clio.fr/BIBLIOTHEQUE>, Dec. 2003.

3 See Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, Cairo, Dār al-kutub al-'ilmiyya, AH 1318, p. 266.

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2.13 Mosque, Dogon country, Mali (© UNESCO)

In his reply, as related by Ibn ‘Idhārī, the caliph, who was well aware of the stakes and fully appreciated the risks, categorically advised against pursuing the operation in these words: ‘No! It is not Ifrīqiya; it is a country that divides and deceives. It is treacherous. No one shall undertake its conquest while I am alive.’ The governor abandoned the plan, but as ‘Uqba was still in the desert, where he had been well received by the Berbers as the propagator of Islam, many Berbers of the Luwata, Nafousa and Nafza tribes were converted by him.

The caliph ‘Umar was assassinated in 644 and replaced by ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān, who dismissed ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ as governor of Egypt and replaced him with his half-brother, ‘Abdallāh ibn Sa‘d. Eager to undertake the conquest of Ifrīqiya, the new governor asked for the caliph’s permission. Reluctant to authorize what his predecessor had categorically rejected, ‘Uthmān consulted the Companions of the Prophet. As they were in favour, in 647 he gave his permission.

That same year, Gregory the Patrician, who had been appointed governor of the ancient Roman province of Africa by the Byzantine emperors Heraclius and Constantine II, threw off their authority. The following year, 648, he proclaimed himself king and transferred the capital from Carthage to Sbeitla. At the head of an army of 20,000 men, the governor ‘Abdallāh ibn Sa‘d marched to Ifrīqiya, which Gregory the Patrician was defending with an army of 120,000 men. After military operations had begun, something unexpected happened: one night, Gregory was assassinated in his palace by ‘Abdallāh ibn Zubayr, a Muslim commander accompanied by about thirty men. Gregory’s assassination considerably weakened Byzantine power in

Africa. The governor of Egypt renegotiated the terms of the agreement with Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. In future, the towns each had to pay the governor of Egypt 300 quintals of gold every year in return for their autonomy.

Attempts to spread Islam were suspended or at least experienced an extended pause for about eight years from 648 to 656, the year of the assassination of the third caliph, 'Uthmān. There were widespread disturbances that would have major political and religious consequences for the caliphate. 'Uthmān's successor 'Alī faced a strong challenge from Mu'āwiya, the governor of Syria, who laid claim to the caliphate. The subsequent act of arbitration between 'Alī and Mu'āwiya, which was either a trick or a genuine attempt to find a solution to the conflict, had the opposite effect of creating an acute political crisis at the apex of power. During the seven-year reign of the fourth caliph, 'Alī, the crisis tore the social fabric apart, causing two successive civil wars among the Muslims that resulted in 70,000 deaths.

One result of this breakdown in social order was the assassination of 'Alī. Three caliphs in succession had therefore been murdered at a time when the most decisive phase of the Islamization of Africa was already firmly under way. After 'Alī's assassination, Mu'āwiya became caliph and pursued the process of Islamization. He dismissed 'Abdallāh ibn Sa'd, the governor of Egypt appointed by 'Uthmān, and, so as to ensure the success of the operation, replaced him with 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ, the courageous military commander who had conquered Egypt and been appointed governor by the caliph 'Umar. 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ, who had pushed the process of Islamization as far as Cyrenaica and Tripolitania fifteen years earlier, was now to resume the operation.

When 'Amr ibn al-'Āṣ died in 665, Mu'āwiya restricted the governor of Egypt's jurisdiction by removing the Maghrib from his authority and governing it directly from Damascus. A serious political problem arose when the emperor Constantine II denounced the agreement between the governor of Egypt and the towns of Cyrenaica under which each town had to pay 300 quintals a year for its autonomy.

Taking advantage of the weakness of the Byzantine empire, Mu'āwiya decided to conquer Carthage, the empire's capital in the Maghrib. He appointed a new governor of Egypt, Mu'āwiya ibn Hudayj, and gave him the task of pushing Islamization beyond Carthage. According to Ibn 'Idhārī, with only 10,000 men he routed the Byzantine army of 30,000 men and captured the town of Sous.⁴ Since the Byzantine army was the main obstacle facing the Muslim army and could prevent any advance on land, one of the military

4 See Abū-l-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn Abī Zar', *Rawḍ al-qirtās fī akhbār mulūk al-Maghrib*, Rabat, Dār al-manṣūr li-ṭ-ṭibā'a, 1973.

commanders, ‘Abd-al-Mālik ibn Marwān, decided to pursue the Byzantines by sea. He took his fleet to Sicily, which he occupied for a month in 667, before returning to Ifrīqiya to take Bizerte and the island of Djerba.⁵

As these military conquests had not succeeded in spreading Islam in accordance with the plan he had devised, Mu‘āwiya appointed to Ifrīqiya a former military commander-in-chief, the brave commander and committed proselytizer, ‘Uqba ibn Nāfi‘. Now governor of Ifrīqiya for the first time, ‘Uqba devised an Islamization plan that took his military concerns into account. He decided to establish a military base to serve as headquarters. In 670 he built Kairouan, the essential purpose of which was to protect his army from Byzantine attacks from the Mediterranean coast and hostile Berbers coming from the desert. According to Charles André Julien, it was also designed to protect the route connecting Ifrīqiya with Egypt. Military victories in the region enabled ‘Uqba to take a number of towns, including Ouadane, Fezzan and Gafsa.

Without a military base, ‘Uqba’s predecessors had been forced to return to Egypt at the end of every campaign, despite the distance. By establishing the base at Kairouan, ‘Uqba formed the nucleus of a town with public services, a mosque, a market and so on. It was the beginning of an urban centre in the middle of the desert and the Berbers came and settled there.

As if wishing to put a temporary halt to the work of Islamizing Barbary, in 674 Mu‘āwiya dismissed ‘Uqba after he had governed Ifrīqiya for barely five years. According to Ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥakam, he was removed because Maslama ibn Mukhallad, the governor of Egypt, had maligned him in order to have his slave, Abū-l-Muhājir Dīnār, appointed in his place. As an astute politician, the latter sought to make peace with the Awraba Berbers, the strongest of the Barani tribes. This was the tribe whose chief was the famous Kusaila, a highly respected Christian. In 679, no longer fearing an attack from the Awraba, the new governor took Tlemcen and attacked Carthage. A year later, Mu‘āwiya died.

The new caliph, Mu‘āwiya’s son Yazīd, held ‘Uqba in great esteem on account of his faith and exemplary conduct as a great proselytizer and he appointed him governor of Ifrīqiya. Apparently as a means of taking revenge, ‘Uqba humiliated his predecessor, Abū-l-Muhājir Dīnār, by enlisting him in his army for the great battle against the Berbers. Assisted by the Berber tribes, including the Zenet, Luwata and Miknas, he took Carthage and Monastir and drove out the Berbers’ Byzantine allies who had raised a line of defences at

5 Abū ‘Ubayd al-Bakrī, *al-Mughrab fī dhikr Ifrīqiya wa-l-Maghrib*, Baghdad, Maktabat al-muthannā, n.d.

Tahert. According to Ibn 'Idhārī, he annihilated them all.⁶ Nothing could stop 'Uqba. He continued his advance and arrived in the western or Far Maghrib (present-day Morocco) in 682.

'Uqba was the first Muslim to set foot in the Far Maghrib. He went to Tangier, where its ruler, Julian, proposed a peace plan, and to Volubilis (present-day Fez), which was ruled by the Masmuda. He then advanced to the furthest extremity of Sous, Hamad and Massa and found himself at the Atlantic Ocean. According to Ibn 'Idhārī, he allowed his horse to walk a few metres into the ocean and then exclaimed: 'Lord! If the sea had not stopped me ...!'

'Uqba subsequently learnt that a rebellion had broken out in Ifrīqiya – an insurrection by Kusaila's Berbers. In order to reach the area, he made a tactical return to Tangier and went on to Tahuda in the Aurès mountains, where he decided to establish his military base. To 'Uqba's great surprise, Kusaila ben Lemzen marched against him at the head of 50,000 Awraba Berbers, while he had only 5,000 men. In 683 or, according to Hussein Munis, 684, 'Uqba died in the resulting ambush along with his lieutenant Abū-l-Muhājir.

Disappointed by the Berber resistance and advance, 'Uqba's deputy in Ifrīqiya, Zuhayr ibn Qays, decided to evacuate his troops and return to Cyrenaica, even though 'Uqba's companions did not approve of the decision. Kusaila occupied 'Uqba's headquarters in 684, wiping out forty years of Islamization and conquest. The caliph Yazīd, who had appointed 'Uqba as governor of Ifrīqiya, died in the same year and his successor Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam died a year later.

Drawing conclusions from the disaster that followed 'Uqba's death, the great soldier 'Abd-al-Mālīk ibn Marwān decided that the Maghrib should not be lost that easily. He appointed Zuhayr ibn Qays and assigned to him the task of recapturing Kairouan from Kusaila. The new governor faced two major obstacles: the Byzantines in Carthage and the Berbers, led by Kusaila, in Kairouan. Because of the great threat these enemies posed to the Muslim forces, 'Abd-al-Mālīk sent an army from Damascus in 687. In order to mount a stronger resistance, Kusaila took up a position in the mountains, while the Muslim governor Zuhayr took the strategic decision to camp outside Kairouan. He negotiated a tactical truce with the Byzantines in order to be able to lead his whole army against the Berbers. The battle took place in the Mamma valley. Kusaila, the legendary leader, was killed and the Berbers were pursued and annihilated. Zuhayr went back to Kairouan and prepared

6 Abū 'Abdallah ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-Mughrib fī akhbār al-Andalus wa-l-Maghrib*, Beirut, Maktabat sādir, 1950, I, p. 24; 'Izz-ad-Dīn Abu-l-Ḥasan ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi-t-tārīkh*, Beirut, Dār ṣādir, 1386/1966, IV, p. 46.

to return to Cyrenaica. However, in 687 the Byzantines, with whom he had signed a truce, ambushed and killed him.

By now, almost all the leaders of both the Muslim army and the Berbers were dead and the Byzantines therefore no longer had reason for concern. The Maghrib enjoyed four years of peace as a result of the serious political turmoil affecting the caliphate in Damascus, with the war between the caliph and ‘Abdallāh ibn az-Zubayr. This came to an end when the caliph ‘Abd-al-Mālik was finally victorious in 690.

In order to recover what had been lost in the Maghrib, ‘Abd-al-Mālik sent an army of 40,000 men commanded by Ḥassān ibn Nu‘mān. Ḥassān followed Abū-l-Muhājir’s example by making a tactical peace with the Berbers in order to be better able to deal with the Byzantines. He gained the upper hand, killed large numbers of them and captured and sacked Carthage. Those who escaped fled to Sous and al-Andalus. Ḥassān then decided to destroy Carthage. To his great surprise, however, the other great Berber tribe, the Batr – led by its chief Dāhiya, the daughter of Mātiya who was also known as Kāhina, the queen of the Aurès mountains – attacked him and was victorious, taking a great many prisoners and forcing Ḥassān and his army to retreat to Cyrenaica. This was the Muslim army’s second major defeat in Ifrīqiya.

To prevent any possibility of the Muslim army returning, Kāhina had all traces attesting to the presence of the Arabs and Muslims destroyed.⁷ Many of the queen’s Christian and Berber followers disapproved of this savage reaction, however, and went over to Ḥassān. Thus, through her actions Kāhina produced a crisis within her army. In order to turn this insurrection to his advantage, the Byzantine governor attacked Carthage in 697, killing and pillaging according to al-Bakrī.⁸ While Kāhina reigned as mistress of Ifrīqiya, the remnants of the Muslim army returned to Cyrenaica with the governor Ḥassān to await the reinforcements promised by the caliph ‘Abd-al-Mālik.

The reinforcements arrived in 700. The army, whose main objective was to kill Queen Kāhina, advanced to the Aurès mountains. Pursued by Ḥassān, Kāhina asked him to spare her two sons. In 701 she was killed at the place known as ‘Kāhina’s well,’ this marking the end of resistance in the near or eastern Maghrib. Ifrīqiya had been pacified.

The army then marched on Carthage for the second time with the aim of finishing off the Byzantines, most of whom had taken ship during the night to return to Sicily. In order to prevent any Byzantine attack from the sea, the governor built a new town dominating Carthage some 12 km to

7 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-Mughrab*, V, p. 36.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 37.

the east: Tunis. He made it a maritime base with an arsenal, a great mosque, a governor's residence, a military post and a university (Zeitouna University).

All Berber and Byzantine resistance had now been overcome. The governor applied himself to matters such as the administrative organization of Ifrīqiya, the dissemination of Islam, religious instruction and the teaching of Arabic. As a result of his policy of integration, Berber chiefs occupied senior positions in the administration and Ifrīqiya became an Islamic state. In 706, however, the governor of Egypt, 'Abd-al-'Azīz ibn Marwān, dismissed Ḥassān as the result of a disagreement.

Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr was now appointed governor of Ifrīqiya. He was a courageous and very able military leader who, according to Ibn 'Abd-al-Ḥakam, had been stripped of the governorship of Iraq for serious misconduct.⁹ Under the new governor, the whole of the Maghrib apart from the western part became Muslim. Historians emphasize Mūsā's great thirst for booty and his contemptuous attitude towards the Berbers. However, such exactions and discrimination violated Islamic law, and they were a significant factor in the slow pace of Islamization in Ifrīqiya. Indeed, the *jizya* (poll tax on non-Muslims) was imposed on Berbers who had converted to Islam even though it was meant to be paid only by members of other revealed religions who wanted religious autonomy. As if to legitimize this infringement of the law, many of those holding power under the Umayyads and 'Abbāsids referred to the Berbers as *mawālī*, a derogatory term for non-Arab converts to Islam.

Such treatment led to a great many Berber revolts and rebellions. It also explains the spread of dissident movements, in particular Khārijism and Shī'ism, which came from the East and rapidly advanced into Ifrīqiya where they spread and became permanently established. Thus, over time, Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr's policy fostered the arrival in Barbary of dissident Arab movements led by the Khārijites and Shī'ites.¹⁰ On the death of the caliph 'Abd-al-Mālik in 705, Mūsā advanced as far as Tangier and captured it. He left behind his former slave Ṭāriq ibn Ziyād to organize the teaching of Islam. In 711 he entrusted this task to some twenty celebrated teachers. The Maghrib was entirely Islamized.

Following the completion of the Islamization of the Maghrib in 710, serious political and religious problems arose throughout the region. These were essentially doctrinal disputes between the Khārijites, Shī'ites, Ḥanafīs and Mālikīs. These disputes, which had a significant influence on Islamization, had one thing in common: they were a reaction to the Arab rulers' policy of oppression, persecution and humiliation. The reactions of

9 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 94; Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-Mughrab*, I, p. 29.

10 Ḥusayn Mu'nis, *Fath al-'Arab li-l-Maghrib*, Cairo, 'Ālam al-ma'rifa, 1972, p. 47.

the peoples targeted – the Ṣanhāja in Ifrīqiya and the Zenet in the Maghrib – took different forms.

THE KHĀRIJITE MOVEMENT

The Khārijites and Shī‘ites followed a strategy of dividing up power. Thus, they both created states in order to oppose the rulers. The Khārijites established three states, in the eastern, central and western Maghrib, where power was held by the Rustumid, Midrārid and Ibādī dynasties. The more politically powerful Shī‘ites founded the Fāṭimid, Zīrid and Ḥammadid dynasties, which will be discussed later.

The Khārijite movement originated in the East as a result of the split between the fourth caliph ‘Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib and Mu‘āwiya ibn Abī Sufyān, who was then governor of Syria (ash-Shām). Mu‘āwiya refused to recognize ‘Alī’s authority and accused him of involvement in the assassination of the third caliph, ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān.

Part of ‘Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib’s army considered that the arbitration that followed the wars between the two men was unjust because it was not to ‘Alī’s advantage. They broke away from the other Muslims and came to be known as Khārijites. They believed that all authority other than God’s was unjust and should be opposed, that every Muslim guilty of a mortal sin was an infidel and that any just and honourable Muslim could perform the duties of the Imam, the supreme leader of the community (*umma*). Their efforts had little impact because of the almost complete lack of any central authority able to harmonize theory and practice. They split into several tendencies, including the Najadī, Ṣufri, Azraqī and Ibādī, which led to the end of their hegemony in Baḥrain, the Ḥaḍramawt and Yemen in 691. Several of the caliphs, including ‘Abd-al-Mālik ibn ‘Abd-al-‘Azīz, endeavoured to follow a policy of openness and integration towards them, but in vain. In the end, the caliph Marwān ibn Muḥammad had no difficulty in eliminating the movement in Iraq, the Ḥijāz and Yemen. By the late first late seventh century, the movement had almost completely disappeared in the eastern Islamic world.

The Khārijite leaders subsequently came to prefer preaching Islam and taking part in political organization to revolts and secessionist wars. They moved away from the capital of the caliphate to North Africa, where the Berbers, suffering Umayyad exactions and attracted by the democratic aspects of their teaching, eventually embraced it.

After the Khārijites’ defeat in the east, two main tendencies continued to fight ideological battles in the Islamic world and North Africa, where the Ṣufri and Ibādī Khārijites settled after the battle of Nahrawan in 658. The Khārijites took advantage of the Umayyad governors’ exactions and

persecution of the Ṣufrī Berbers of the western Maghrib to proclaim a revolt. Like the Ibādīs, they rebelled in the first decade of the second AH/eighth century. When both tendencies sought to take control of Kairouan, they ended up fighting each other. This weakened them and enabled Ibn al-Ash‘ath to defeat them in 750. The Ṣufrīs and Ibādīs then withdrew to the edge of the Sahara, where the former founded the state of Sijilmāsa and the latter Tahert. It should be noted that of all the branches of Khārijism the Ṣufrīs were the most sectarian and intransigent.

After heresy and revolt, Barbary was the scene of a heretical movement founded in the mid-eighth century by a former Ṣufrī Khārijite, Salih ben Tarif. A fugitive in Kairouan after the defeat of the Khārijites, he returned to the western Maghrib, where he founded the kingdom of Barghwata at Tamesna on the Atlantic coast between Salé and Azemmour. This kingdom lasted until the middle of the twelfth century. According to Ibn ‘Idhārī and al-Bakrī, Salih was a Jew and a native of Salé. The dynasty produced a Qur’ān in Berber with *sūras* having Qur’ānic and biblical titles. The leaders of the dynasty were all prophets. As regards the practice of worship, there were prayers five times during the day and five during the night. The annual fast took place during a month other than Ramaḍān.

Sijilmāsa experienced rapid economic development, with the planting of palm groves and the digging of irrigation canals. This soon transformed the population’s way of life as they ceased to be nomads and became settled. Internally, however, the policy of the Banū Midrār was based on ethnic and religious factors that failed to prevent tribal conflicts and religious differences.

The Jews controlled the economic life of the country by working the gold and silver mines in Dra. The Mu‘tazilites sent their *zakāt* (alms tax) to their leader in Tahert, who used it as he saw fit. Just like the Khārijite minority in Sijilmāsa, the Ibādīs played an important role in the political life of the Midrār dynasty.

Another Ibādī state to emerge in the Maghrib was that of the Banū Rustum, founded by ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Rustum al-Fārisī al-Ibādī, to whom the Berbers swore allegiance. For doctrinal and political, as well as geographical reasons, they did not always enjoy good relations with the Aghlabids. As Sunnīs, the Aghlabids were vassals of the ‘Abbāsids and symbolized their influence and presence in Ifrīqiya, where Mālikīsm showed its hostility to all heretical sects. Similarly, their relations with the Idrisids were always tense. The Idrīsids were Zaydī Shī‘ites and had expansionist designs on the territory of the relatively weak Rustumid state. Although they did not share the same beliefs, the Rustumids had peaceful relations with the Umayyads of Spain. This was for purely political and strategic reasons, since both states were hostile to the ‘Abbāsids, Aghlabids and Idrīsids.

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The establishment of the Fāṭimid caliphate in 909 led to the disappearance of the independent states, including the Midrārid and Rustumid states. The countries of the Maghrib experienced the growth of Fāṭimid propaganda after the arrival there of Abū ‘Abdallāh ash-Shī‘ī in 893. He spread his Shī‘ite doctrine among the Kotāma Berbers and raised an army that enabled him to confront the Aghlabid state in 902. His influence spread rapidly.

The Fāṭimids also used the Hilalians, pagan descendants of ‘Āmir ibn Hilāl, who had attacked Mecca in 630, against all their enemies. They had become Shī‘ite Muslims and migrated to Egypt, where they settled until the Fāṭimid caliph unleashed them against the Zīrids, whom he wanted to punish for their alliance with the ‘Abbāsids. They swept into North Africa in the eleventh century, invading Tunisia and Algeria. They fought the Zīrids on the orders of the Fāṭimid caliph in Cairo, al-Manṣūr. They are also blamed for destroying the agricultural civilization of the regions they conquered, thereby causing a return to nomadism.

In order fully to carry out the mission of Islamization by establishing Islam among the newly converted Berbers, the Umayyad caliph ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd-al-‘Azīz assigned the task of teaching Islamic law to a mission composed of some ten eminent Sunnī jurists.

During the previous century, from 705 to 800, political and doctrinal problems had led to widespread conflicts in order to gain or retain power. In the south of the western Maghrib the Banū Midrār dynasty, consisting of Ṣufrī Khārijites, was established at Sijilmāsa among the Zenet and Miknas Berbers, two tribes of the Batr federation. Sijilmāsa was the main crossroads of trade in southern Morocco, a cultural centre of a very high order and superior to other Islamic capitals, including Fez and Basra. Contrary to what is widely believed, its inhabitants were not all Ṣufrī Khārijites, since the population included a significant proportion of Mālikīs.

MĀLIKISM

This school of jurisprudence founded by Imam Mālik ibn Anas, known as the ‘sage of Medina’, was one of the most decisive factors in the Islamization of Africa, which explains why it is the dominant school almost throughout the continent. It is characterized by its firm attachment to the *Sunna* (normative custom and practice of the Prophet), its scrupulous respect for devout theologians of the past and its rejection of scholastic disputes. Its teaching was disseminated in Ifrīqiya from the middle of the eighth century, more precisely from 731, by Abu-l-Ḥasan and ‘Alī ibn Ziyād, who had been with Mālik in Medina. Its widespread dissemination was delayed because the Umayyad and then ‘Abbāsīd rulers chose the Ḥanafī school as the state doctrine. The

struggles between the various schools of jurisprudence intensified, particularly during the caliphate of Abū Ja‘far al-Manṣūr (r. 753–74).

The establishment of Mālikīsm also involved the migration of several hundred families from Ifrīqiya to the western Maghrib in response to the call of the Idrīsids, who advocated a moderate form of Islam based on the Qur’ān and the *Sunna*. Many families from al-Andalus also responded to this call. All these went to Fez, as did a great many scholars who decided to leave Muslim Spain and settle there. Among them was the eminent scholar Asbagh, who had the privilege of disseminating Mālikīsm in that city from 839 onwards. In addition, the world’s first university, al-Qarawiyyīn University, was established there in 859.

However, this peace was soon disturbed by the Rāfiḍī Shī‘ites, who exploited the chauvinism of the Ṣanhāja Berbers of the eastern Maghrib against their traditional adversaries, the Zenets of the central and western Maghrib. These Shī‘ites did not hesitate to use force to impose their beliefs on the population, who were protected only by the Umayyads of al-Andalus and the much-feared Zenets. Doctrinal disputes were particularly conspicuous during the period 800–909, the two dates corresponding respectively to the coming to power of the Aghlabid dynasty and the departure of the Fāṭimids for Egypt.

In order to establish his authority over Ifrīqiya, in 787 the ‘Abbāsīd caliph Harūn ar-Rashīd appointed as governor Ibrāhīm ibn al-Aghlab, the son of one of his former military commanders. Two years later, when the caliphate was facing serious political problems in the East, Ibrāhīm seized the opportunity to declare independence. This was the beginning of the Aghlabid dynasty, the first Sunnī dynasty in the Maghrib. Its power grew until all the states on the Italian coast were paying a poll tax to it. Internally, however, it faced constant rebellions that were religious or social according to whether they were instigated by the Khārijites, the Berbers or others.

The Aghlabids acted ruthlessly, even against the Sunnī religious authorities such as the *qāḍīs* (judges). The Mālikī scholars were not spared persecution and the most appalling physical punishment. The scholar al-Buhlūl ibn Rashīd, who is said to have died in prison in 799 after being whipped, is an eloquent example. At that time Ifrīqiya, which was the most important province of the Maghrib, was the scene of much persecution and cruelty against the Mālikīs. The Ibāḍī Shī‘ites were quite powerful and feared. The Aghlabid princes in power favoured the Ḥanafīs and Mu‘tazilīs at the expense of the Mālikīs.

The first signs that doctrinal disputes and struggles were giving way to a more peaceful atmosphere conducive to the introduction of Islam came

with the appointment to the judiciary between 840 and 858 of a number of Mālikī scholars, including the renowned Saḥnūn.

The decline of the Aghlabid dynasty's authority began around 875 with the loss, to the Byzantines in particular, of some of the regions it had controlled. Weakened by an insurrection of Berber tribes, the Fāṭimids dealt the final blow. As the situation continued to deteriorate, the Fāṭimids left the Maghrib for Egypt in 909, never to return. With this, the Idrisid dynasty came to an end. Backed by the Umayyads of al-Andalus, the Zenets became almost the sole rulers. They soon threw off the authority of the Umayyads and remained in power until the rise of the Almoravids in 1069. The turning-point occurred in 909 with the death of Abū 'Abdallāh the Shī'ite, killed by al-Yasa' ibn al-Muntaṣir, who eliminated the power of the Banū Midrār on which the Shī'ites of Ifrīqiya depended. Mālikīsm now emerged from its state of marginalization.

When Muḥammad ibn al-Faṭḥ ibn Maymūn came to power, he publicly proclaimed his support for Mālikīsm. This freed Islam in the Maghrib from the influence of sects and doctrines that had been in conflict for a century. It was the beginning of the emergence of the *Sunna* and Mālikīsm. The advance of Islam was not a linear process as the various sects that tried to gain the upper hand were no more than insurgent movements. Mālikīsm, which had been a factor for unity and social peace in al-Andalus, was to play a leading role in the consolidation phase of Islamization. Historians have noted that Mālikīsm reached al-Andalus at a quite early date. It had already arrived in Ifrīqiya in Mālik's own lifetime, but those in power sought to suppress it in favour of Ḥanafism.

According to Muḥammad Ḥasan Shuraḥbīlī, two aspects of the rise of Mālikīsm in Muslim Spain should be emphasized: its influence as a doctrine (*madhhab*) that was practised, and the influence of *al-Muwaṭṭa'*, the work written by Mālik ibn Anas, the founder of the Mālikī school, on which the whole doctrine is based.

The arrival of Mālikīsm coincided with the accession to the caliphate in Spain of Hishām ibn 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān ad-Dākhil, who reigned from 788 to 796.¹¹ The school did not, however, achieve stability and full expansion until the time of Saḥnūn ibn Sa'd at-Tanūkhī, particularly when the caliph Muḥammad ibn al-Aghlab, the *amīr* of Ifrīqiya, appointed him to the judiciary (840–54).

11 For more information regarding the date and circumstances of the rise of Mālikīsm in Muslim Spain, see al-Qāḍī 'Iyāḍ, *Tartīb al-madārik wa-taqrīb al-masālik li-ma'rifat a'lām madhhab Mālik*, Rabat, Wizārat al-awqāf, 1983, pp. 26, 27; Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Maqqarī, *Naḥḥ at-ṭīb min ghuṣn al-Andalus ar-raṭīb*, ed. Iḥsān 'Abbās, Beirut, 1968, pp. 230–3.

During Mālik's lifetime many intellectuals from North Africa went to Medina to receive instruction from him, as his school had become a socio-legal system that had gained the adherence of a large number of Muslims in the Orient, Asia and elsewhere.

The introduction into Muslim Spain of Mālik ibn Anas' work *al-Muwaṭṭa'* is attributed to al-Ghāzī ibn Qays, while the dissemination of the doctrine is said to be the work of Ziyād ibn 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān Shabtūn. Both men had met Mālik ibn Anas in Medina during and after the time he was writing the work. The arrival of Mālikīsm led the Muslims of Spain to abandon the Awzā'ī doctrine, which had been virtually a state doctrine up to that time.

The influence acquired by Mālikīsm in Muslim Spain and its adoption by the Umayyad *amīrs* there was the result of a number of factors. These included journeys by Spanish scholars to Medina in order to return to their roots at the cradle of the Revelation, Ziyād's wide dissemination of the doctrine, Hishām's close relations with Mālik's main disciples and the mutual admiration that Mālikīs and Hishām felt towards each other, with the latter saying: 'The sage of Medina [Mālik] is enough for us.'

However, rivalry continued between the Umayyads of Spain and the 'Abbāsīd caliphs of Baghdad, where Ḥanafism was the official state doctrine from the Orient to Ifrīqiya. Other important factors include the caliph Abū Ja'far al-Manṣūr's wish that all Muslims should adopt a single doctrine, that is, that of Mālik ibn Anas, based on *al-Muwaṭṭa'*, and the rivalry between Iraqīs and the people of Medina. This change in favour of Mālikīsm was also the result of the Spaniards' distrust of what they saw as the Iraqi jurists' excessive 'modernization' of *fiqh* (Islamic law or jurisprudence), the influence of their bedouin roots still being very strong. The same factors account for the fact that Mālikīsm also supplanted the Rāfiḍī doctrine in Spain. The Rāfiḍīs were Shī'ites who were prepared to resort to violence and persecute the adherents of other doctrines in order to maintain their supremacy.

The rivalry and conflict between Mālikīsm and Ḥanafism now took a new turn and became a struggle between Sunnism, represented by the Mālikī '*ulamā'*' (scholars learned in the Islamic legal and theological sciences) and followed by the population, and the Rāfiḍī Shī'ites who tried to impose their doctrine by force and persecution. One victim of this was the distinguished scholar Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī, the renowned author of the *Risāla* on Mālikī law.

The persecution of Mālikīsm only came to an end with the intervention of al-Mu'iz li-Dīnillāh ibn Badīs as-Sanhājī, who preached in favour of Mālikīsm. He put an end to both Shī'ite and Ḥanafī influence in around 1265. It was then that Mālikī influence in North Africa expanded rapidly. Prior to this, where Khārijism, Shī'ism and Ḥanafism predominated, it had been the official doctrine of the Aghlabid state to choose judges and other

legal officials from among the former and exclude the Mālikīs, who in fact rejected all forms of injustice. Thus they appointed only those people who agreed to support their doctrine.

The Idrīsid dynasty also contributed significantly to the dissemination of Mālikīsm by involving its scholars in political and diplomatic decisions. Idris II appointed a Mālikī scholar, ‘Umar ibn Muṣ‘ab al-Azdī, to select the site where the second Idrīsid capital, Fez, was to be built. He also sent Abu-l-Ḥasan ‘Abdallāh ibn Mālik al-Anṣārī al-Khazrajī to purchase the land for the city.

Mālikīsm subsequently became the state doctrine of the Midrār dynasty, founded at Sijilmāsa in 757 with the aid of Zenet and Berber elements who had initially embraced the doctrine of the Ṣufrī Khārijites that was the antithesis of Sunnism. Ṣanhāja Berbers, blacks from the Sudan and a great many fugitives from Córdoba (following the persecution to which they had been subjected by the *amīr* al-Ḥakam ibn Hishām ar-Rabadī) arrived in Ifrīqiya. Ibn Khaldūn believed these to be the founders of Sijilmāsa. Most of them had some knowledge of the country as the Midrārid *amīrs* had long had close economic, trading, cultural and political relations with the Umayyad rulers in Córdoba. These relations had continued since the accession of ad-Dākhil and his grandson, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān II. Ibn ‘Idhārī said of the latter: ‘The kings of the Maghrib served him and recognized his authority in both Tahert and Sijilmāsa.’

With the execution of al-Yasa‘ ibn al-Muntaṣir (r. 883–909) by Abū ‘Abdallāh ash-Shī‘ī, the Banū Midrār were overthrown and Sijilmāsa fell into the hands of the Shī‘ites. However, they then lost it to Muḥammad ibn al-Faṭḥ ibn Maymūn al-Amīr (r. 943–60) whose accession marked the Midrārids’ return to power. The Sunnī Mālikī doctrine then supplanted Shī‘ism in the west of Africa and the Ṣufrī-Khārijite doctrine that his ancestors had adopted was abandoned. However, the dynasty again lost power, this time to Ma‘ād ibn Ismā‘īl ash-Shī‘ī, who sent Jawhar aṣ-Ṣiqḷī (the Sicilian) to fight Muḥammad ibn Faṭḥ (ash-Shākir). He besieged Sijilmāsa for three months before capturing it and imprisoning Muḥammad.

The good relations between the emirates of Sijilmāsa, Tahert and Córdoba assisted the dissemination of Mālikīsm since they fostered cultural ties, dialogue between scholars and fruitful exchange on the political and economic levels. The Sijilmāsi population opted for Mālikīsm, which became dominant through the action of the *amīr* Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ash-Shākir at the expense of Rāfiḍī Shī‘ism, which exploited the chauvinism of the Ṣanhāja of the central and eastern Maghrib against Sunnī Mālikīsm in the western Maghrib. The author of *an-Nubūgh al-maghribī* wrote in this connection:

At that period the Mālikī school was firmly established not only as a legal doctrine, but also as a theological school, since strong commitment to its legal method and its theological method, consisting in the application of the *Sunna* and the rejection of any philosophical speculation and interpretation, was also evident.¹²

The Almoravids, who brought about the political, religious and doctrinal unification of the Maghrib, made Mālikīsm the official state doctrine. They also took decisive action to spread Islam to sub-Saharan Africa.

THE ALMORAVID MOVEMENT

At the beginning of the fifth/eleventh century, North Africa was the scene of a major socio-political upheaval that weakened the established order. A reformist Salafi movement which had emerged among the south Saharan tribes that had converted to Islam sought to unify the desert tribes that had always been sworn enemies of each other.

On his return from Mecca, Yaḥyā ibn Ibrāhīm, one of the leaders of the Ṣanhāja tribe, was looking for a scholar of Islamic law in North African religious circles who would be capable of teaching Islam to the members of his tribe. The living conditions in the desert made this a difficult task, but he was lucky enough to meet ‘Abdallāh ibn Yāsīn whom he thought would be able to carry out such a task. ‘Abdallāh was pious, devout and well versed in Islam. In order to root out the Zenets’ pagan customs, he withdrew to a river (the Senegal) with his pupils and founded a *ribāṭ* there, a fortification where he instructed and trained them in asceticism. Part of his tribe, the Lamtuna, decided to join him and little by little the group expanded.

Initially, ‘Abdallāh ibn Yāsīn preferred to spread Islam by peaceful means – through preaching and persuasion – but when he encountered resistance, in 1042 he placed himself at the head of his men, attacked the surrounding tribes and forced them to embrace Islam. He tried to expand his activities well into the south of the continent, as far as Senegal, Ghana and elsewhere. He spread Islam and the use of the Arabic language and unified the Maghrib and Spain for almost a century by making them a single state with its capital in Marrakesh.

When the Almoravids came to power, they put an end to the tribal system in the Maghrib. They ruled over the peoples from the Atlantic coast

12 For the factors which facilitated the entry and spread of Mālikīsm in Africa and the Maghrib, see Muḥammad ibn Ḥasan Shuraḥbīlī, *Ṭaṭawwur al-madhhab al-mālikī fi-l-gharb al-islāmī*, Muhammadiyya, Maṭba‘at fuḍāla, 2000, p. 626.

right to the heart of the continent. ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān Khaḍir quotes Thomas Arnold as writing: ‘What needs to be emphasized in the history of the spread of Islam is the emergence of the Murābiṭūn as a powerful popular movement that drew a large number of Berber tribes into the Islamic *umma*.’¹³ They displayed staunch faith and determination in the Islamization of the Sudan. Indeed, it was their support that enabled the Almoravids, commanded by Yūsuf ibn Tashfīn, to found Marrakesh in 1062. Yūsuf, the ‘Commander of the Faithful’ in the Maghrib, became the second leader of the Almoravid state, which successfully disseminated Islam in sub-Saharan Africa. He gave considerable impetus to the advancement of learning and supported and encouraged scholars. He was himself a scholar known for the soundness of his references (*riwāya*). During Yūsuf’s time, towns such as Timbuktu, founded on the banks of the Niger in the fifth/eleventh century, became influential centres of culture and learning.

The Islamization of sub-Saharan Africa

After subjugating the Berber states in the west, the Muslims reached the Atlantic. They established themselves in Spain and induced the peoples of the North African coast to give up their attachment to Christianity and convert to Islam. The conquest did not take place without resistance, however, particularly from the peoples of the Atlas mountains.

Principalities were established in Algeria and Morocco so that, from the Indus to the Atlantic, a great trading area was formed in which Arab and Berber merchants were able to travel freely to trade their goods using a gold currency, the dinar. Trade routes also developed to West Africa (the Tekrour, Sokoto, Macina and Toucouleur empires), East Africa (Kanem Bornu and Ethiopia) and Central Africa. Theocratic empires in which Islam developed at an early date also emerged.

The trans-Saharan trade routes¹⁴ that began to be established in the eighth century enabled Muslim caravans and missionaries to spread the religious, political and social values of Islam, but they gained little foothold among the animist black peoples. This continued to be the case until the arrival of the Almoravids, who took control of the gold trade and spread Islam to the whole of West Africa by waging a holy war against the pagan peoples in the eleventh century. The Almoravid armies took their campaign as far

13 ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān Khaḍir, *al-Islām wa-l-muslimūn fī Ifrīqiya ash-shamāliyya*, Jeddah, ‘Ālam al-ma’rifa, 1986, p. 211, quoting Thomas W. Arnold, *The Spread of Islam in the World: A History of Peaceful Preaching*.

14 See map, p. 344.

as the kingdom of Ghana, whose fame and importance were based on the exploitation of its gold and salt mines on the Niger in Upper Senegal.

Africa was the cradle of traditional or animist religions whose main feature was the lack of any clear division between the spiritual and natural worlds and therefore between the human spirit and its environment. Although there were a great many African religions, almost all of them stressed the existence of a god or a single creator surrounded by spirits inhabiting nature, trees and water courses, representing the ancestral spirits that had founded the family or clan. Such traditional African beliefs are still found in some Christian Baptist movements. Syncretic groups spread throughout Africa, particularly into the south and centre of the continent, where they remain powerful.

THE GREAT AFRICAN EMPIRES

Mali was a vassal of Ghana, but little is known about the origins of these countries. It is likely that they began modestly as no more than what historians have generally referred to as tribal chieftaincies. They were a meeting-point between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa and begin to appear in accounts of travels by Arab historians in the eighth century. The histories of Mali and Ghana are known from oral tradition and the accounts of Arab writers and travellers, many of them geographers and historians, who described their wealth and the splendour of their rulers' courts. Although extensive, structured and hierarchically organized states emerged on their territory very early on and their fame spread beyond the borders of Africa when, as a result of a shift in world trade, the Atlantic replaced the trans-Saharan routes, these great political entities in the interior of the Sahel began to decline.

The early emergence of these states in the Niger loop (the bend of the Niger) was a result of the social stability fostered by the presence of Islam which broke down many barriers, thus creating the conditions for social development and, therefore, economic prosperity. This prosperity was also based on the combination of a number of beneficial factors: the wet, mild climate favourable to both raising livestock and farming, the proximity of a large number of mines which for centuries supplied the Middle East and Europe with gold, in particular for minting coins, and above all, from the thirteenth century onwards, the expansion of trans-Saharan trade in which the successive states played an active role since they were ideally located at the junction of various trade routes. Beginning in the eighth century, trade fostered the spread of Islam in the region through proselytization by Muslims and the prestige of wealthy and educated Muslim merchants.

THE FIRST STAGE IN THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

Most of the authors of classical Arabic sources on the empires of the Sudan and the Sahel, along with their works, are listed below. Some of them lived in the places they wrote about. These are the most important sources on Africa, written between the ninth and the fifteenth century:

Ibn Faḍlallāh Shihāb-ad-Dīn al-Umarī (1301–97), *Masālik al-abṣār fi mamālik al-amṣār*.

Abū ‘Ubayd al-Bakrī (1030–94), *al-Mughrab fi dhikr bilād Ifrīqiya wa-l-Maghrib*.

Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad al-Idrīsī (1100–66), *Nuzhat al-mushtāq fi-khtirāq al-āfāq*.

Abū-l-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn Abī Zar‘ (d. 1310), *al-Anīs al-muṭrib bi-rawḍ al-qirtās fi akhbār mulūk al-Maghrib wa-tārīkh madīnat Fās*.

Ibn Baṭṭūṭa (1304–78), *Tuḥfat an-nuzzār fi gharā’ib al-amṣār*.

‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥakam (803–71), *Futūḥ Miṣr wa-l-Maghrib*.

Ibn Ḥawqal (938–88), *al-Masālik wa-l-mamālik*.

Ibn ‘Idhārī (d. 1312), *al-Bayān al-mughrib fi akhbār al-Andalus wa-l-Maghrib*.

‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406), *Kitāb al-‘ibar*.


Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī (1179–1229), *Mu‘jam al-buldān*.

The Ghana empire and Tekroun

Islam is thought to have arrived in Ghana in the eighth century, brought by Arabs who travelled to and fro across Africa. According to the *Tārīkh as-Sūdān*, Ghana was founded in the fourth century by Berbers who established control over the black population. Although the existence of their very first kings has not been established with any certainty, the Arab chroniclers estimated that the kingdom had had a succession of twenty or thirty kings. The inhabitants were Soninke farmers, the forebears of the present-day Sarakolle. The Soninke, who specialized in the kola trade, were referred to as Wangara. They were the driving-force in economic life and they organized caravans to the southern forests from where they brought back kola, nuts, gold, palm oil, ivory and precious woods in exchange for smoked fish, cotton fabrics and copper articles.¹⁵

It was in 734 that the Arabs first reached Ghana, where the Berber kings were still in power. The Arab occupation of the Maghrib favoured the gold and slave trade between Ghana and Sijilmāsa. However, at the end of the eighth century, they were overthrown by a Soninke called Kaya Maghan

15 On the central role of gold, which was much desired by the European nations, which rushed to the Sudan, see UNESCO, *General History of Africa*, Paris, UNESCO Publishing, 1987, Volume IV, pp. 693–710.



2.14 The Ghana empire at the beginning of the eleventh century (© UNESCO)

Cissé ('master of gold'), who unified all the Soninke a few years later. The country roughly corresponded to the gold-bearing region of Bambouk and had its capital at Koumbi-Saleh (now in Mauritania). Between the eighth and eleventh centuries the Arab sources describe a powerful and prosperous state in the western Sudan between the Middle Senegal and the Niger loop.

Who were the founders of Ghana? According to the historians, neither a racial group nor white stock founded the empire. It should be noted, however, that according to Ibn 'Abd-al-Ḥakam, the Arabs of Sous undertook an expedition against the Sudan–Ghana in about 734. In the mid-eighth century they opened a caravan route between Sijilmāsa and Awdaghost in present-day Mauritania, digging wells all along the route at the most strategic points.

Two towns grew up in this region where the Arab-Berber camel-drivers and the Wangara donkey-drivers from the south met: Ghana and Awdaghost. Al-Bakrī, describing the larger of these two centres, identifies Ghana with Koumbi-Saleh. Stressing the spread of Islam in Ghana and the increase in the number of socio-professional groups and social classes to which it gave rise, al-Bakrī states: 'The Muslims occupied the most senior positions; they acted on behalf of the king, who chose his treasurer and most of his ministers from among them, which gave them considerable prestige.'¹⁶

Similarly, al-Bakrī reports the conversion to Islam of the first black king, Waar Diabi, who died in 1040. Regarding him, Joseph Cuoq notes:

16 See Joseph Cuoq, *Histoire de l'islamisation de l'Afrique de l'Ouest: des origines à la fin du XVI^e siècle*, Paris, P. Geuthner, Librairie Orientale, 1984, p. 12.

THE FIRST STAGE IN THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

He was the first Sudanese king known to have become a Muslim. By that time Islam had therefore clearly reached one of the tribes of the Senegal river. His conversion was probably due to the Lamtuna since his son fought with them against the Juddāla in 1056–7.¹⁷

In the ninth century, the kings of Ghana extended their authority throughout the region of Galam, over Tekrou, Djenné and Timbuktu. As for the Berbers in Awdaghost, they later revolted against Tounka, the king of Ghana, and put him to death. Some time around 990, a successor of the murdered king conquered the kingdom of Awdaghost and placed it under black authority.

Thus, in sub-Saharan Africa, while some succeeded in spreading Islam by persuasion and patience, others sought to do so by force of arms. The Islamization of sub-Saharan Africa, especially the part known as the Sudan, was fostered by various factors, particularly the conversion to Islam of African kings and sovereigns and the expansion of Arab-Islamic teaching and culture that they encouraged. Another no less important factor was, perhaps, *jihād*, used by some conquerors to disseminate Islam and establish theocratic states in Africa in general and the Sudan in particular.

The scientific and cultural links that the Sudanese monarchs established between sub-Saharan Africa and Egypt, on the one hand, and North Africa, on the other, also contributed significantly to the introduction of Islam into these regions, but also, and above all, of Arab-Islamic culture *tout court*. The Arabic language was a medium and means of communication not only between scholars and students, but also between African states and the Muslim states of the Arab East and the Maghrib and with the rest of the world.

However, none of this would have been possible without the involvement of Arab merchants and travellers who, through trade, also acted as teachers and missionaries, playing a significant role in the dissemination of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa. Also important were the African students who went to study in Muslim countries with the aid and assistance of African rulers who saw this as a way of developing Islamic learning in their kingdoms. Yet another factor was the books and scholars the rulers brought from the East and the Maghrib in order to disseminate, develop and refine Arabic and religious teaching methods in their countries, as is reported in historical works such as *Tārīkh al-fattāsh* and *Tārīkh as-Sūdān*.

The brief information about the country provided by Arab geographers refers to a pagan Ṣanhāja prince ruling at Awdaghost and to a Ṣanhāja Berber who, in the tenth century, had twenty kings under his authority. A century later, al-Bakrī reports that a black ruled the town in 1054, the date when the

17 Ibid.

Almoravids conquered Ghana, although government was left in the hands of its king, the Toukan Meni, known as the 'King of Gold', who derived his income from the gold and merchandise that passed through his territory. In 1077, however, the king's successor was unable to prevent the Almoravids from sacking Ghana. Nevertheless, they first set their Berber brothers of the Adrar in Mauritania 'on the right path', before returning northwards, reinforced by warriors enlisted in Senegal, and taking Sijilmāsa in 1053 and Awdaghost in 1054.

Historians have noted the problems often encountered by conquerors over the centuries. This was similarly the case for the foreign conquerors who invaded Africa in order to control it and appropriate its wealth. The problems were often caused by ignorance of the country and the languages spoken there. Generally, however, an invader's success depended solely on the strength or weakness of the country invaded. All this can be seen in the Almoravid conquest of the Ghana empire¹⁸ when it began to display signs of decline. It was in 1054 that Almoravid forces invaded the Ghana empire, attacking Koumbi-Saleh, its commercial capital. They met fierce resistance, however, and the town was besieged for twenty-two years before the empire fell. In 1087, eleven years after the fall of Koumbi-Saleh, the Cissé dynasty tried to regain power, but the empire was already too fragmented, the peoples and tribes of which it was composed being bitterly at odds with each other. The Cissés' unsuccessful attempts to regain their authority lasted for a century. Later, a Soussou tribe that had always been hostile to the Soninke managed to take power.

From Ghana right up to the last empires, the various elements – local, indigenous races and foreigners or former conquerors – seem to have been integrated into social life on the basis of a shared religion. While there were conflicts between different groups, sharing the same religion and intermarriage ultimately resulted in strong ties that centuries of living side-by-side only strengthened further. Thus, according to al-Bakrī, the Muslim city of Ghana was a great metropolis where merchants and caravan-travellers lived in close harmony with the various sections of the population. The same was true of Awdaghost, captured in 1054, the year that saw the rise of the Ṣanhāja at the expense of the Soninke. It was a town where, 'through their conversion to Islam, the inhabitants became part of a broader political whole in which the Soninke of Ghana were associated with the Mulathhimūn'.¹⁹ It should, however, be noted that Ghana had already been open to Islam even before the arrival of the Almoravids.

18 See map, p. 323.

19 Cuoq, *Histoire*, p. 54.

THE FIRST STAGE IN THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

While Yūsuf ibn Tashfīn was conquering Morocco, Abū Bakr ibn ‘Umar went south to fight the blacks and captured the capital of Ghana in 1077. This was the end of that important black kingdom. The survivors helped to reinforce the other Sarakolle kingdoms of the south at a time when the victors were strengthening their hold on the borders of the Sudan. This was the very first phase of the Islamization of Ghana.

Towards the middle of the eleventh century the Wagadou – or Ghana – empire reached its apogee. It had two capitals: al-Ghāba, the seat of government where the king, ministers and religious leaders lived, and the empire’s economic capital, Koumbi-Saleh. The latter was considered to be one of the most important markets of its time. In addition to salt and gold, on which it had a virtual monopoly, it produced livestock, wheat, grapes, ivory and valuable gems. Al-Bakrī, who visited the town in 1081, is among the historians who described the kingdom, especially its administrative capital which he said was surrounded by a great wall with the royal palace in the middle where the king received his official guests, and the court where disputes were heard.

Since historians and researchers generally regard Africa as the continent of mystery and animist religions, it is only logical to examine how Islam, a revealed religion professing the oneness of God (*tawḥīd*), managed to establish itself in lands where animist religions had been shaping ideas and attitudes for thousands of years. When Africans embraced Islam, however, they worshipped according to the established rules. As historians have noted, mosques and Qur’ānic schools were built everywhere in a Sudano-Sahelian architectural style worthy of the name. Whatever the nature of African religious practice, however, some local customs deriving from traditional religions were preserved. One example of this is that when people approached their king they knelt and sprinkled dust on their heads according to their customary form of greeting. The Muslims, however, greeted him by clapping their hands.

Islam could not therefore fail to include a certain degree of syncretism on account of the strength of long-standing local traditions. Nonetheless, kings made great efforts to change their subjects’ outlook by adopting the customs and forms of enthronement of the caliphs and other commanders of the faithful by receiving, when they were crowned, a seal, a sword and a Qur’ān sent by the Commander of the Faithful in Egypt, who formally recognized them as head of all the faithful who came to them.

Although such integration and intermingling had beneficial religious, commercial and social effects, it nevertheless gave rise to value judgements on both sides. Since Islamization had left some local customs intact, the negative view that a pious orthodox Muslim might have is typified by Muḥammad Aqit who, according to his biographer, had to leave Macina for

Walata out of hatred for the Peul, who surrounded the place where he was living, and for fear that his children might intermarry with them.

These peoples were therefore imbued with the commercial, technological and cultural, as well as religious, influence of the Arab-Berber world and it was this that bound them together. As Cuoq observes:

From the conquest of Ghana in 1076–77 up to the first upheavals caused by Ibn Tumert's Almohads (1221–30) in Morocco, it can be said that, despite limited internal revolts, for a long period peace and prosperity reigned throughout the Almoravid empire in both the North and the South. Al-Zuhrī was probably referring to this period when he mentioned the chiefs of Ghana who passed through Andalusia on their way to Mecca.²⁰

According to al-Bakrī, Waar Diabe, the king of Tekrou, was the first king in the Sudan to embrace Islam. He is even said to have been in close contact with 'Abdallāh ibn Yāsīn and Yaḥyā ibn Ibrāhīm, who had taken refuge at his court in order to seek men and assistance to fight the Berbers who had so far been deaf to their preaching.

The location of the kingdom of Tekrou is a matter for debate, some identifying it with a region of Lower Senegal. It is sometimes even identified as Walata or Niger. It is, however, always described as a country that had been entirely and profoundly Islamized. Islam seems to have been introduced there in around 1040. Islamic law was also applied. The inhabitants were Muslims because the sovereign's religion was usually adopted by his subjects. Thus, in the eleventh century Tekrou was a highly Islamized state that accepted the rigorous legalist doctrine of the Murābiṭūn long before Ibn Yāsīn preached there. Cuoq believes, moreover, that the people of Tekrou acquired their knowledge of Islam through the influence of the Goddāla for whom they transported the salt extracted from the Awlil salt marshes along the Senegal river. The relations between Waar Diabe's state and the Lemtuna and Goddāla were so close that one of his sons, Lebbi, fought against them alongside Yaḥyā ibn 'Umar at the battle of Tabfarilla in 1056, sixteen years before his father's death. According to al-Qalqashandī, Tekrou was a trading centre where the desert caravans met to buy wool, copper, gems, gold dust and slaves.

20 Cuoq, *Histoire*, p. 54.

ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

If Europe, with its triangular system of trade, only sought profit using its alleged 'civilizing mission' as a cover, the same can be said of all the other foreign military forces that travelled throughout sub-Saharan Africa in search of gold and salt. This was the case as early as the eighth century as regards the gold of Senegal and Mali or, quite simply, the gold of the Sudan, which was universally coveted. Aghlabid Tunis used it to mint its first dinars in 804. The gold held a fascination for the Western Muslim dynasties, which sent missions along the caravan routes. The sole aim of all these expeditions was to gain access to gold, copper and salt. At that time, a camel-load of this precious product, gold, was worth 3.5 *mithqāls* in Ouadane, 7 in Tichitt and 100–120 in Timbuktu.

The search for gold was an important issue for the Portuguese, who from the sixteenth century had learnt that it was available in the western Sudan. From around 1440 onwards, a new type of ship, the caravel, made it easier for them to sail to the coasts of Africa. The author of the *Esmerelda* reports among other things that: 'The Alarves and Aznecs bring gold and black slaves from Jalofo and Mandingue to Arguin.' The Portuguese also set about capturing slaves, but King Alfonso V (r. 1438–95) forbade them to do so, ordering them rather to seek alliances, his intention being to convert the people to Christianity. When the Portuguese began to divert one of the main gold routes which, until the sixteenth century, had previously gone to the Maghrib, they caused a drop in the supply of gold and quite serious political disturbances, with the result that the Moroccan dynasties, the Merinids and the Wattassids, experienced an unprecedented economic crisis. The Marabout and Sherifian movements thrust the Saadians into the history of Morocco.

The Almoravid currency, which was minted in pure gold, was highly sought after in the western Mediterranean and Europe. The Ḥafṣids exported gold to Europe. Muslim gold coins first circulated in Europe before Christian inscriptions were added to them. This shows that before they were able to mint such coins themselves, the European states began by imitating Islamic dinars. The aim of this policy was to create confidence among the surrounding states in the value of their currencies. The Sahara was therefore a crossroads for the gold that passed through it to the Maghrib. Gold coins were minted in Marseilles (1227), Genoa and Florence (1252), and Venice from 1284 onwards. The minting of gold coins reached Northern Europe in the first half of the fourteenth century.²¹

21 On the extent of the gold trade in Africa and commercial links between Africa and Europe, see UNESCO, *General History of Africa*, Volume IV, pp. 706ff.

THE ISLAMIZATION OF AFRICA



2.15 The Mali and Kanem empires c. 1350 (© UNESCO)

The Mali empire and Kanem Bornu

Mali had previously been a vassal of Ghana, but in 1203 it took advantage of the latter's decline to assert its position in the region under the command of Dossou. It was Soundiata Keita, however, who asserted the empire's power by ending Ghana's hegemony in the early thirteenth century, defeating his rival, Soumara Kante, at Kirina in about 1235. He unified the clans of a vast region that was to become the Mali empire. It was a confederation of three independent allied states (Mali, Macina and Wagadou).

When Soundiata's son, Mansa Ouli, died, he was succeeded by a series of kings who were unable to maintain the position in which Soundiata Keita and Mansa Ouli had left the kingdom. In about 1307 Kankou Moussa took power and restored the empire to its former glory by gaining control of the salt and gold route that crossed the desert and by annexing other territories as far as the Atlantic Ocean to the west, the Taghaza salt mines to the north, and to the east where he annexed the Tekedda region where there were rich

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copper mines whose exploitation constituted one of the foundations of the empire's economy.

From 1285 to 1300 Mali was ruled by Sakoura, a freed slave of the royal family, who extended Mali's power. His armies conquered all the territory between the Atlantic around Gambia and the Gao region. The peace that reigned in this vast empire attracted Mediterranean merchants who traded intensively there. However, Sakoura was killed in the Tadjowa country in eastern Chad when he was returning from the pilgrimage to Mecca.

Islam entered Mali in the early thirteenth century as a result of the work of missionaries recruited from among the Arab and Berber Muslim merchants. The method was the same as that used in Ghana. Islam was established first in the royal palace and then extended to the people with the assistance of the sovereigns, who encouraged the development of Arab-Islamic learning and culture. The emperors of Mali were among the African kings who did most to promote the growth of Islam in their kingdom through the many measures that they took in this field. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa describes the fervour with which the Muslims performed their religious duties in mosques full of the faithful who competed with each other in their religious ardour and enthusiasm in order to be in the front rows.

Kankou Moussa

In about 1312 Kankou Moussa, a son of Abū Bakr II, better known as Mansa Moussa, came to power. Under the direct or indirect authority of Mali, most of the savannah countries from the mouth of the Gambia to the Hausa lands, the south Saharan Tuaregs, the peoples of the gold-bearing regions and the great Soninke and Songhay vassals obeyed the kings in Niani. Only the Dogons and the Mossi states maintained their independence, fiercely resisting both the spread of Islam and Malian authority.

Kankou Moussa went to Mecca, an event widely reported by historians, taking with him between 10 and 12 tons of gold for his travelling expenses, and arriving in Cairo with thousands of richly dressed slaves each of whom carried an ingot of gold. He returned from Mecca with a retinue of scholars, artists, learned men, jurists and merchants, who established strong economic and cultural ties between Egypt and Timbuktu and who provided the whole of the Nigerian Sudan with officials in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It was this journey that was described by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, who visited Mali in 1352–53. Moussa also took advantage of this journey to buy a great many Arabic and Islamic books with which to re-establish the libraries the Mossi had destroyed. The books covered various linguistic, literary and scientific fields. Timbuktu, Walata and Djenné became influential centres of Islamic learning that attracted students from throughout the world. It was there

that Arabic became one of West Africa's languages of learning, culture and writing.

The major towns – Timbuktu (which had a population of 100,000 at that time), Djenné, Gao and Walata – were important economic and religious centres. Their mosques, Qur'ānic schools and universities, where scholars from the Maghrib such as Ahmed Baba stayed, enjoyed a very high reputation. Ahmed Baba, a highly respected scholar born in Arouane, studied in Sankore. He was one of the scholars whom the Moroccans deported to Morocco, where, according to the *Tārīkh al-fattāsh*, he stayed for 'six months short of twenty years'. He returned and settled in Timbuktu, where he lived for another twenty years before his death on 22 April 1627. His library contained 1,600 bound volumes that were seized by the Moroccans. During his captivity in Morocco he wrote most of his books, which deal with various Islamic disciplines. He was one of the many African Muslim scholars produced by Arab-Islamic culture and the very valuable works he left to posterity are the clearest evidence of the level of learning attained by Islamic culture in the Sudan at that time.²²

Walata, in particular, situated in the midst of the Sahara, was of major strategic, political and commercial importance for the empires that emerged in the subregion. It was under Mansa Moussa that it gained importance as an urban centre. A garrison town, with some degree of autonomy, it became the most important city in Mali and had a resident governor who represented the emperor. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, who travelled across the Sahara for two months to visit it, mentions its importance as a trading centre.²³

However, the large number of mosques and schools in the Mali empire, and the intense religious fervour mentioned by historians such as Ibn Baṭṭūṭa and al-'Umarī, did not prevent some aspects of local traditions from mingling with Islamic elements. This syncretism was first noticed by the royal authorities. Historians report, for example, the manifest impiety of a certain Sonni Alī, whose mother was a Hausa, and who continued the Songhays' animist customs.

In a sense Islam lived side-by-side with African customs and cultures, which it never succeeded in entirely eliminating. However, this did not prevent the advance of Islam (both faith and worship) as a result of the action of the Malian kings who supported the religion in general, and the Sudanese scholars who went in search of knowledge to Egypt and other countries of the Arab East and then returned to their countries to disseminate it widely. Timbuktu, Gao and Djenné played a leading role in this activity.

22 Maḥmūd Ka't, *Tārīkh al-fattāsh*, Paris, Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient, Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1964, p. 307.

23 UNESCO, *General History of Africa*, Volume IV, pp. 671–2.

Decline of the Mali empire

At its apogee in the fourteenth century, the Mali empire included all the territories between the Sahara, the forests to the south, the Atlantic Ocean and the Niger loop. Its power was based on salt and gold whose deposits were near Mandé. The gold enabled the various Mansa of Mali to conduct a wide-ranging expansionist policy through the purchase of equipment for their powerful cavalry in North Africa.

Mali's decline came with the death of King Souleiman. His son, Kassa, reigned for only nine months and power then passed to Mari Diata II, the son of Mansa Maghan. Anarchy broke out throughout the empire. Vassals such as the Songhay rebelled and declared themselves independent, while in about 1400 the Mossi invaded as far as lake Debo. By the end of the fifteenth century, Songhay attacks had reduced Mali to the western territories, from the Niger to the Atlantic, where the Portuguese had just arrived. According to Hubert Deschamps, Mali unsuccessfully sought an alliance with them against its enemies.²⁴ In the fourteenth century disputes over the succession along with independence movements further weakened Mali, which became the weak prey of its rapidly developing neighbour, the Songhay.

Initially, Kanem and Bornu were separate states, but the wars of expansion waged against Bornu by the kings of Kanem resulted in Bornu's annexation. Bornu was located in the eastern Hausa country and eastern Chad, though its influence reached as far as the Sudan and the Sahara. Its population was a mixture of Arab, Hamitic and black elements who had lived in Bornu for centuries.

Islam reached the kingdom of Kanem in the eleventh century. Kanem controlled a number of tribes, from the Sudan in the east, up into Egypt and Nubia. Al-Bakrī notes that it also had relations with Ḥafṣid Tunisia, to which it sent an embassy in 1237. However, the kingdom fell into decline in the fourteenth century as a result of repeated attacks by the Bulala tribes. This was one of the reasons why, when Kanem regained its power, its king, 'Uma ibn Ādūs, moved the capital to Bornu territory and it is this 'federation' that is known as Kanem-Bornu.

Kanem produced fabrics that the weavers called '*dendi*'. The coinage was copper-based. Kanem adhered to the Mālikī rite and a 'Mālikī school' was built there to encourage Islamic learning.²⁵ Al-'Umarī describes its inhabitants as being 'strict in the practice of their religion', although the animist background was strong among the Kanembu of Bornu and remained

24 Ka't, *Tārīkh al-fattāsh*, p. 307.

25 See Ḥasan Ahmed Ibrāhīm, *Intishār al-islām fi-l-qarra al-Ifriqiya*, Cairo, Maktabat an-nahḍa al-miṣriyya, 1984, pp. 131ff.

so for a very long time. When one of their kings, Muhammad Dunāma, was ordered by the *faqīh* (theologian) Mabarma not to take more than four wives, he repudiated those that were over this number. The *faqīh* gave the same order to the Bornu chiefs, some of whom complied while others did not. It should also be noted that the peoples of Kanem-Bornu wished to end their geographical isolation by developing economic and even political relations with distant countries. According to Cuoq: ‘For these peoples, entry into the *Dār al-Islām* [House of Islam] represented progress away from animism.’²⁶

The Songhay empire

Songhay had been a vassal of Mali but gained its independence by establishing an empire. The former capital, Kukia, was abandoned in favour of Gao which was in a better situation in the bend of the Niger, one of the most important trans-Saharan trade routes. Its drier climate suited the Mediterranean merchants better than the more southerly Kukia. Gao was the place of investiture of the Dia, whose traditions had strong animist undertones. Trade



2.16 The Songhay empire (© UNESCO)

26 Cuoq, *Histoire*, pp. 251–6.



2.17 Manuscript from Timbuktu
(© UNESCO)

was based on salt, of which the Sorko had the monopoly on the river. It was transported to centres connected with the gold and kola markets.

An impenetrable veil hangs over the centuries between the introduction of Islam in 1000 and the coming to power of the Sonni dynasty in the thirteenth century. The Sonni had awaited their time patiently, watching the decline of Mali, which was already far advanced by the end of the fourteenth century. The Songhay empire expanded rapidly under the Sonni dynasty. Once it had freed itself of Mali's control, it embarked upon wars of conquest of its own.

Two emperors particularly

distinguished themselves in the epic history of the Songhay empire: Sonni Alī Ber and Askia Muḥammad.

According to the histories of the time, the Sonni king Madogo, who reigned around 1400, was a persecutor of Muslims. No one and nothing could defeat him. 'Always the conqueror, never conquered', wrote the author of the *Tārīkh al-fattāsh*. He could not have been worse, if far less commendable, than many other kings of Mali who succeeded him. But he was wrong to attack the Muslim scholars of Timbuktu. Clearly perceiving the dangers threatening his kingdom, he decided to eliminate them. Fighting in turn the Tuareg, the Peul, Mali and Islam, he vanquished all his enemies and extended his control all along the river Niger.

Sonni Alī Ber (Sonni Alī 'the Great'), who reigned from 1464 to 1492, conquered Timbuktu (then in the hands of the Tuareg) and incorporated Macina into his empire. Askia Muḥammad defeated Sonni Alī Ber in 1492, replaced the title 'Sonni' with 'Askia', consolidated the Songhay empire and gave it an even more complex organization than that of the Mali empire.

Askia Muḥammad

When Askia Muḥammad came to power he did the exact opposite of his predecessor, and Islam and the scholars regained their former influential position in the country. Honours and power were bestowed upon them and Askia chose his advisers from among their number. He made the pilgrimage to Mecca at the beginning of his reign and in 1496/7 had himself invested as caliph of Tekrou. In order to ensure the spread of Islam, he continued his predecessor's military conquests by leading a *jihād* against the infidels to the south of Muslim Mali and the Peul to the west, and annexed most of the Hausa country to the east. By about 1516 Songhay extended almost to Chad and Senegal, but it was not to survive much longer. Revolts in distant provinces and Askia Muḥammad's blindness were serious obstacles to any attempt to remedy the situation.

Askia was succeeded by his brother, Ishaq (r. 1539–49), whose reign was marked by terror. He successfully fought off Morocco's designs on the Teghaza salt marshes. During Askia el-Hajji's reign (1582–86) the Moroccans again attacked Songhay and occupied Teghaza in 1585. The last Askia of Gao, Ishaq II (1588–91), was responsible for the ending of his own reign and of the empire through his failure to perceive the threat posed by Morocco and its expansionist ambitions, which became manifest in 1590 with the Djouder expedition.

Askia Muḥammad could have destroyed the enemy before they reached the Niger, but all he did was organize his defences near his capital, Gao. Moroccan firearms do not wholly explain his defeat at the battle of Tondibi in 1591, as political and economic factors also played their part. The sudden end at Tondibi sounded the death knell of the Songhay empire and the southern Sudan, where anarchy prevailed until the nineteenth century. The defensive wars that the Muslim states waged against the conquerors were no less savage than those they engaged in against animist groups. All the forces of Songhay had gathered at Tondibi to fight the Moroccans. It is variously said that there were 12,000 cavalry, 30,000 infantry and 18,000 cavalry. According to the author of *Tārīkh al-fattāsh*, there were 9,700 infantry.

From the beginning of the Almoravid movement in the early eleventh century until the late sixteenth century, the military strategy used in battles and wars was rudimentary. The African states were military states that lived on war, but their weapons were of inferior quality²⁷ and they mainly relied on sabres, lances, cavalry and the bravery and recklessness of their soldiers. According to Sékéné Mody Cissoko:

27 On the colonial methods of war that tended to make heroes out of the colonial military leaders, see Jean Suret-Canale, *Afrique Noire: géographie, civilisations, histoire*, Paris, Éditions sociales, 1973, p. 272.

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2.18 Qairouan Mosque, Tunisia
(© G. Degeorge)

The traditional weapons had not changed; they used bows and arrows, sabres, knives and above all lances. The army had no firearms. Morocco, which was in contact with Songhay, had had muskets and cannon for years, but there is no record of such arms being imported into Songhay before the Djouder expedition in 1591.²⁸

It was these new weapons that enabled the Moroccans under the command of al-Manşūr to bring about the fall of Gao and Timbuktu. Despite the climate and the death of many soldiers in the desert, the heroic resistance of the Songhay army was remarkable.

Gunpowder was not yet used in warfare. It was only in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that Africans first became acquainted with

gunpowder and the musket through the Moroccans, who used them during their military campaigns in sub-Saharan Africa to which they had been attracted by gold and ivory.

Throughout human history, invaders have often met fierce resistance from the peoples they seek to conquer and the Arab-Berber invasion of sub-Saharan Africa was no exception in the resistance it encountered. Difficulties also arose in their attempts to spread Islam. The administration and armed forces of the countries they invaded were well organized. This was the case with the Ghana, Mali and Songhay empires: 'The leaders of Songhay were well-versed in the art of war. They were very brave and daring and experts in military tactics.'²⁹

28 Sékéné Mody Cissoko, *Tombouctou et l'Empire Songhay: épanouissement du Soudan Nigérien au XV^e-XVI^e siècles*, Dakar, Abidjan, 1975, p. 108.

29 Ibid., quoting Ka't, *Tārīkh al-fattāsh*, p. 146.

In addition to all these forces confronting the invaders there were others: heat, the desert, ignorance of the terrain and lack of water. It will be recalled that Ghana was beginning to show signs of weakness when it was invaded by the Almoravids in 1054, but Koumbi-Saleh, at that time the commercial capital of the empire, put up fierce resistance for twenty-two years before the Almoravid forces managed to take it. Eleven years after the fall of the town in 1087, the fierce and courageous Cissé dynasty, of Soninke origin, tried to take power in Ghana several times despite the presence of the Almoravids. By now, however, the empire was already fragmented, each tribe and ethnic group preferring to fight for itself since a centralized indigenous power was desperately lacking.

The Moroccans, who wanted to control all the regions south of the Sahara, encountered the same problems. The desert was a natural barrier that held up their advance considerably. In order to conquer the African empire, al-Manṣūr, the sultan of Morocco, placed Pasha Djouder at the head of an army of almost 4,000 men. Cavalry and infantry had to march for six months with their supplies to reach the Songhay empire, three-quarters of them dying in the desert. It is worth making two observations at this point: first, this was a case of one Muslim state invading another, flouting the Qur'ānic prohibition on believers fighting against each other; and, second, the Moroccans used the services of a non-Muslim, Djouder, against their fellow Muslims. The slow spread of Islam in Africa can in many cases be attributed to the expansionist and colonial aims that lay behind the conquerors' actions. Cuoq remarks:

The Arabs were foreigners in these deserts and probably did not know the routes, wells or staging-posts. In such circumstances, any expedition was bound to be risky. They could certainly draw on the services of guides, who were readily available, but the best guide is of little help when the local population is hostile.³⁰

The quarter of the army that survived was certainly in a sorry state, but its firearms enabled it to defeat the Songhay whose bows, swords and lances were rudimentary weapons in comparison with Moroccan logistics.³¹ Since they were unable to take up the succession of the Askias, the Moroccans confined themselves to governing Gao and Timbuktu, guaranteeing communications with Djenné and fighting the Tuareg, the Peul and the Bambara. They subsequently intermarried with the local population and founded the Arwa group, which exists to this day.

30 Cuoq, *Histoire*, p. 5.

31 See Joseph Jawān, *al-Islām fī mamālik wa amārāt Ifrīqiya as-sawdā'*, trans. Mukhtār as-Suwayfī, Cairo, Dār al-kitāb al-miṣrī, 1984.

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During the period of the great empires, these countries played a significant role in strengthening the world economy through the gold that they supplied before the discovery of America. Their collapse was followed by the emergence of the Ashanti country, where traditional societies federated so as to be able to respond to European demands. With the disappearance of the three empires, the slave trade and *jihād* by the Peul were to continue from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, leading many ethnic groups to migrate to West Africa.

Another form of resistance more akin to indifference than hostility can also be noted: the Africans' attachment to their traditional cultures and religions. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, for example, was shocked and appalled to see men and women mixing together. According to Cuoq, such curious behaviour:

shows the strength of Tuareg customs in this milieu, in which women have inconceivable freedom. They may even receive men in their homes. This gave rise to a distinct genre of courtly literature in which [a gallant knight] declares his love to a beautiful woman.³²

The wealth and privileges amassed by the upper classes were such that they were above the law. There was therefore one law for the rich and another for everyone else. The middle class was comparatively small. The *qāḍīs*, imams and teachers were 'officials' paid by the sultan's court. The merchants, most of whom were foreigners, also belonged to the middle class. The state ensured that they were properly treated. The sultans also took care to protect minorities, who were treated as equals of the indigenous population because they were believers. They worked in harmony with the local people. The lower classes were more numerous than either of the other two, accounting for more than half the population. Askia Muḥammad was accompanied by 1,500 people when he went on the pilgrimage to Mecca. Another class, made up of those who engaged in various professions, was no less important, although it was quite small on account of the limited number of professions that were practised.

While some people embraced Islam voluntarily, others did so under the influence of the social milieu in which they lived; at the royal court, the king's conversion led *ipso facto* to that of his subjects. The Mossi and Dogon always obstructed the spread of Islam in this part of the world. They were fiercely attached to their traditional religions and customs and, moreover, lived on high plateaux that were difficult to access.

32 Cuoq, *Histoire*, p. 93.

The author of *Mamlakat Singhāy* notes that:

in large Sudanese towns like Timbuktu, Gao, Walata, Djenné and others there lived a sizeable Maghribi population consisting for the most part of merchants, jurists and teachers. Most of them had married Muslim Sudanese women. They had chosen to settle down alongside their Muslim brothers.³³

These remarks eloquently demonstrate how cosmopolitan the towns were. The same could equally be said of societies like those of the Mali and Ghana empires, whose social customs do not seem to have been very different from those of the Songhay empire.

Songhay society was divided into clans or classes. This classification did not, however, prevent social mobility based on individual merit, so it was not a closed society. It was the openness of this society that allowed a slave returning from the pilgrimage to Mecca to have his hands kissed by high-ranking nobles. A slave's status was also a function of that of his master. Slaves of the upper class were superior to those of the middle class. Whatever their class, individuals enjoyed freedom of movement and were at liberty to practise whatever profession they wished.

The trans-Saharan trade routes went through Taoudenni, a place of great strategic importance because of its salt mines. At the end of Askia Muḥammad's reign in 1528, the Songhay empire included most of Mali, Niger and Senegal.³⁴

The Comoros Islands – southern Africa

Islamization reached quite distant places, such as the Comoros Islands, where Arab-Shirazians (mixed groups of Arabs and Iranians) arrived in the twelfth century with their slaves and introduced Islam. The Comoros (*Juzur al-Qamar*) are an archipelago of small islands: Mayotte, Anjouan and Grande Comore. They are situated to the north of the Mozambique channel between Madagascar and continental Africa.

The first mosque was built on Mayotte, in the town of Ghigoni (Tsigoni), in 1566. The population is entirely Muslim. They are Sunnīs, and very attached to their religion. Teaching of the Qur'ān and the Arabic language began quite early, unlike southern Africa itself where the fact that access was difficult delayed Islamization for several centuries.

33 Jamīla Imḥammad Takayak, *Mamlakat Singhāy al-islāmiyya fī 'ahd al-Askiya Muḥammad al-Kabīr 1493–1528*, Tripoli, Markaz jihād al-libiyyīn li-d-dirāsāt at-tārīkhiyya, 1998.

34 See map, Appendix IV.

Jihād and the brotherhoods

By the sixteenth century, the age of the great Sudan-Sahelian empires (Ghana, Mali, Songhay) was over. They had had the merit of bringing into being vast communities where schools and places of worship were established, peace and social justice were strengthened and economic development was consolidated. It was in this peaceful environment that a new type of proselytism appeared that was essentially pacific: the mystic brotherhood. The conversion of those living in the towns was the natural outcome of this economic and social change. The founding brotherhood, the Qādiriyya order, spread rapidly in sub-Saharan Africa through the nomadic Kunta Berbers who had joined it very early on.

In the wake of the official Islam that the Almoravids and missionaries had spread in the sub-Saharan regions and states, the Islam of the brotherhoods soon made its way to sub-Saharan Africa via North Africa where some of the orders had been established. These orders were to be found in a great many Muslim countries, but were particularly strong in Egypt, the Sudan, Algeria, Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa. It was through the Kunta Berber nomads that from the mid-sixteenth century onwards the Muslim religious orders (*turuq*) began to establish themselves in West Africa through the preaching of spiritual values by the Qādiriyya, who found fertile ground in the peoples of the Niger loop.

In the Muslim empires of Ghana, Mali and Songhay, Islam had been a state religion and the sovereigns themselves had done much to foster its dissemination. However, by the early seventeenth century, after the empires had disappeared, the situation was different and a new phase of Islamization began. The missionaries were individuals who, at first in complete anonymity, burst into the history of West Africa. They saw that Islam had still not reached certain remote areas or had been diverted for other purposes and decided to take up the torch by making themselves leaders of a brotherhood or resorting to *jihād*, or in some cases doing both. Inevitably, new forms of resistance appeared, particularly among the peoples who had always remained firmly attached to animism, as in the case of the Mossi, Dogon and Bambara in the Niger loop.

It was at this time, between the seventeenth and the nineteenth century, that reform movements using mystical and individual, rather than military, methods emerged with the aim of restoring official Islam in sub-Saharan Africa. Theocratic states emerged among the Peul and Mandinka. These included those of Usman Dan Fodio, between 1804 and 1810, Muhammed Bello in 1817, and el-Hadji Omar Futiyyu Tall from 1854. Thus, between 1804 and 1810, Usman Dan Fodio, with Peul support, led a religious movement in the Hausa country that overthrew the Hausa leaders and established the



2.19 Great Mosque of Djenné, Mali (© G. Degeorge)

Sokoto empire in northern Nigeria. He then tried to invade Bornu, but met fierce resistance from the local religious leaders. Shortly after his death, his son, Ahmed Bello, took over and extended his father's empire, fostering the conversion to Islam of other peoples in Nigeria.

Another theocratic state was established in the Massina by Sheikhou Ahmadou, a Peul marabout who launched a *jihād* against the animist Bambara, who had established an independent state after the fall of the Mali and Songhay empires. The Bambara, who lived on both sides of the Niger from Bamako to the region of Djenné and Massina, had for a long time been subjects of the Mandinka and vassals of the Songhay. They became independent some time in the mid-seventeenth century in two separate states: one, with its capital at Ségou, lay between the Niger and the Bani rivers; the other, Kaarta, was in northern Upper Senegal. Both were governed by the Coulibaly family.

The Peul, who were scattered throughout the Sudan, established several kingdoms in the nineteenth century. They are said to have founded the kingdom of Tekroun in the ninth century, where the Diago dynasty reigned until the tenth century. They were followed by the Manna, who held power around the thirteenth century and were converted to Islam by

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the Almoravids. The Tondyon dynasty followed in the fourteenth century and the Koli Tenguela in Senegal in the sixteenth century.

THE PEUL EMPIRE OF SOKOTO

Usman Dan Fodio was one of the Muslim African conquerors of West Africa. He founded a theocratic state in the late eighteenth century. He was a reformer and, after his pilgrimage to Mecca, he unified the Hausa peoples who had lived in north-western Nigeria since the tenth century and established a number of city-states (Biram, Daura, Katsina, Zaria, Kano and Gobir). He incited these Hausa-speaking peoples to rebel against their pagan kings, especially the kings of Gobir. He launched a campaign of Islamization, swept away the Hausa and Yoruba states in southern Nigeria and established a theocratic state with its capital at Sokoto in north-western Nigeria. This empire lasted until the beginning of the twentieth century.

THE PEUL EMPIRE OF MASSINA

Massina, situated on a flood plain between Timbuktu and Djenné, was another Muslim empire. From 1818 to 1853 it occupied present-day Niger and included a number of ethnic groups. Its founder, Sheikhou Amadou, was a great scholar who learnt the Qur'ān at an early age. The title of *shaykh* (spiritual leader) was conferred on him by Usman Dan Fodio, the eminent Muslim and scholar who established an immense Peul empire in Nigeria in the early nineteenth century. Sheikhou Amadou embarked on an active campaign of proselytization that resulted in victory over the animist coalition, thanks to the Muslim groups that responded to his call for support.

The empire of Massina, whose capital was Hamdallahi, expanded rapidly in the delta in predominantly Peul areas. Everything in the extensive empire complied with Qur'ānic precepts. It was populated by Peul, Dogon, Nooron, Banmanan, Sorogo, Somono, Biva and Songhay. Merchants, farmers, fishermen and craftsmen, all governed by Islamic law, lived there in harmony and contributed to its development.

After thirty years of expansion, however, it began to show signs of weakness. The war against the Masassi decimated Sheikhou Amadou's troops. When Sheikhou Amadou died in 1844, his son, Amadou Sheikhou, succeeded him but, in 1862, his grandson, Amadou, was confronted by the armies of el-Hadji Omar Tall. Two Muslim armies fought each other, as

they had at the battle of the Camel and when the Songhay fought Sultan al-Manṣūr's army.

Following the approval by Massina's community of believers of his plan to Islamize Massina, Amadou Ḥāmmadi Boubou, or Sheikhou Amadou, presented his Muslim aims so cogently that all the believers who wanted to see the spread of Islam rallied to his cause. The Dina, based on the Qur'ān, was born.

THE TOUCOULEUR EMPIRE

The history of the western Sudan is in part that of a struggle between Arab-Berbers of the Sahara and Sudano-Sahelian peoples. There has always been conflict over the Sahel and the Middle Niger valley, where the Songhay and the Berbers fought each other.

When the Bambara kingdom of Ségou and the Massina empire disappeared, el-Hadji Omar Tall arrived with his army in 1861. El-Hadji Omar Tall was born at Halwār (Senegal) in 1797. After completing his Qur'ānic education he went on to study Arab-Islamic sciences and performed the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1826. In 1850, after an absence of more than ten years during which time he visited many capitals including those of Sokoto and Bornu, he began a *jihād* in Fouta Djallon. In Senegal he came up against French colonial forces. After being defeated at the siege of Fort Medina in 1857, he moved eastwards.

El-Hadji Omar Tall accused the Bambara of animism or, at least, syncretism and attacked their kingdom, taking Ségou in 1861. He then marched on Massina, captured its capital, Hamdallahi, converted a large part of the population and introduced the Tījāniyya order. His activities had a strong impact on West and Central Africa. He died at Déguimbéré, near Bandiagara, in 1864 and was succeeded by his nephew, Tidiani Tall, who moved the capital to Bandiagara.

Fearing a revival of the *jihād* conducted in these areas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, France, the colonial power, acted ruthlessly against the successors of the armed missionaries. It was the beginning of a new era.

Conclusion

When the Arabs left the Arabian peninsula to conquer the world, they did so in order to spread Islam to all the peoples on earth. After half a century, however, the movement was experiencing political, social and cultural

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problems that slowed it down considerably, when they did not halt it altogether.

Claiming to be universal, Islam arrived in Africa, spreading from the Nile to the Atlantic along the Mediterranean coast. Islamization made slow headway on account of the changes of political regimes and the various forms of foreign or indigenous resistance the Arab-Berber armies encountered – for example, from the Byzantines, as successors of the Romans, whose presence in Africa was mainly intended to make the north of the continent a granary for their empire and, incidentally, a Christian land. Berber revolts and apostasy were another, in this case centrifugal, obstacle.

Introduced into sub-Saharan Africa by the Berbers in the eighth century, Islam is intimately linked with the history of the continent. Among the factors that facilitated its dissemination, that of trans-Saharan trade was by far the most important. *Jihad*, travel and the religious orders were also not insignificant factors. Overall, the Islamization of Africa changed local customs and Islam made a considerable contribution to cultural, political and social development through its flexibility and the simplicity of its beliefs and practices.



2.20 Main trade routes from the tenth to the sixteenth century (© UNESCO)

– III –

UNIVERSAL DIMENSIONS
OF THE SPREAD
OF ISLAM

Chapter 3.1

THE ‘ABBĀSID CALIPHATE AND THE AGE OF THE SULTANATES

Clifford Edmund Bosworth

The ‘Abbāsīd caliphate had come into being with the triumph in AD 749 of the *da‘wa*, or propaganda campaign, which had been instigated by two intriguers and organizers of genius, Abū Salama al-Khallāl in al-Kūfa and Abū Muslim al-Khurāsānī in eastern Persia. This had been essentially an Arab movement, and had taken advantage of tribal and social discontent among the Arabs settled in Khurāsān who had become in many ways assimilated to their Persian environment and had come under the financial control of the local Persian landowners. It had also utilized messianic religious hopes current among various groups of ‘Alid sympathizers in Iraq, such as the Hāshimīyya, partisans of the caliph ‘Alī’s son Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥanafiyya and the latter’s son Hāshim, who had been working for the overthrow of the preceding Umayyad dynasty of caliphs and the establishment of an unspecified caliph–imam from the Meccan clan of Hāshim (*ar-riḍā min āl Muḥammad*). This latter hope came to fruition in the revolution of 746–50, but not as the partisans of ‘Alī, his so-called ‘party’ or *shī‘a*, expected; instead, it was another branch of the Hāshimite clan, that of the Prophet’s paternal uncle al-‘Abbās, who adroitly seized power, basing their claim on the superiority of a male-line connection with the Prophet over a female-line one through Fāṭima, the wife of ‘Alī, i.e. over the ‘sons of the daughter’.¹

The ‘Abbāsīd caliphate which was now inaugurated, with its capital after 763 at Baghdad, and which was to endure in Iraq until the Mongol

1 M. A. Shaban, *The ‘Abbāsīd Revolution*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 138–67; Moshe Sharon, *Revolt: The Social and Military Aspects of the ‘Abbāsīd Revolution*, Jerusalem, Hebrew University Press, 1983, pp. 51ff; Hugh Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphs*, London/New York, Longman, 1986, pp. 124–33.

invasion of 1258 (and as a pale shadow of its former self in the Egypt of the Mamlūks until 1517),² was in some ways an internal revolution in the Arab ruling class, the substitution of the rule of one Meccan clan for another. Like their Umayyad predecessors, the ‘Abbāsids continued to be regarded as ‘Commanders of the Faithful’ (*Amīr al-Mu‘minīn*), this being seen by the Islamic jurists as a general function of rule inseparable from the caliphate, the succession to the temporal heritage of the Prophet. Hence when in the tenth century the Spanish Umayyad *amīr* ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān III (r. 912–61) adopted the title ‘Commander of the Faithful’ for himself, this was tantamount to proclaiming his total independence of the Baghdad caliphate; whereas the title ‘Commander of the Muslims’ (*Amīr al-Muslimīn*), first adopted by the North African Almoravids in the eleventh century, was held to imply a lesser authority which did not infringe on the caliphs’ supremacy.³

The ‘Abbāsids and their publicists, however, also claimed that their rule was more reinforced by, and more consonant with, the Islamic religion than the previous regime had been; a true caliphate, *khilāfa*, rather than the mere kingship, *mulk*, which had been (somewhat unjustly) imputed to the Umayyads by pietistic, orthodox Sunnī circles and by the deeply hostile Shī‘a. Now the caliphs and their mouthpieces skilfully projected an image of the ‘Abbāsids as imams or religious leaders, ‘patterns, exemplars’, for the community who would guide the believers to spiritual salvation as well as securing their temporal well-being. The rulers cultivated the ‘*ulamā*’, the body of Sunnī religious lawyers and traditionists, and were deferential to them on most occasions. The endeavours, however, of caliphs like al-Ma‘mūn, al-Mu‘taṣim and al-Wāthiq (r. 813–47) to require adherence to the new theological and philosophical doctrines of the Mu‘tazilite sect (see below), which aroused the implacable hostility of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, the representative of conservative, literalist views amongst the religious scholars, were an exception to this. More frequently, however, the Sunnī religious leaders lacked the moral prestige and were not independent enough of state patronage and favour to oppose the caliphs’ will.

This process of claiming divine support for their secular power was displayed externally by the ‘Abbāsids’ adoption of honorific titles (*laqabs*), which emphasized their authority as being based on divine aid and guidance, their reliance on God or expressed messianic hopes – for example, al-Manṣūr,

2 For an overview see C. E. Bosworth, ‘Empire of the Caliphate’, in *Encyclopaedia Britannica; Macropaedia*, III, pp. 623–45, Chicago, London, Allen & Unwin, 1974.

3 Sir Thomas Arnold, *The Caliphate*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1924, pp. 42–54; Emile Tyan, *Institutions de droit public musulman*, I: *Le califat*, Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1954–56, pp. 221ff; see also the articles H. A. R. Gibb, ‘*Amīr al-Mu‘minīn*’, A. J. Wensinck, ‘*Khalīfa*’, and D. Sourdel, ‘The History of the Institution of the Caliphate’, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–.

'he who is made victorious [by God]'; al-Mahdī, 'he who is guided [by God]', with messianic overtones of the one who will return to earth before the end of the world and restore the reign of justice and peace; and al-Mutawakkil, 'he who places his dependence [upon God]' – and by their displaying on ceremonial occasions insignia of rule which underscored the continuity of their authority with the time of the Prophet and the first caliphs, such as Muḥammad's cloak (*burda*) and staff (*qaḍīb*) and the Qur'ān copy of the murdered third caliph 'Uthmān.⁴

In this way, the 'Abbāsids could indeed be regarded as successors (*khulafā'*, *khalā'if*) of the Prophet, carrying out Muḥammad's charge for the spiritual and material welfare alike of the Muslim community; protecting the frontiers of the *Dār al-Islām*, the 'Abode of Islam', and extending them by *jihād* against the unbelievers; ensuring the supremacy of the *sharī'a* including the canonical performances of the *ṣalāt al-jum'a*, corporate worship, and the *hajj*, the pilgrimage to the Holy Places (both of these institutions being often led, in earlier times at least, by the caliph personally); and in general maintaining Sunnī orthodoxy against dualist and other heresies (*zandaqa*), against radical equalitarian movements like that of the Khārijites and against the seductive image of an authoritative, infallible, charismatic imam as put forward by the Shī'a, now excluded from any hope of securing political power within the caliphal heartlands (see below). Thus it could be claimed with some plausibility by the 'Abbāsīd apologists that their rule rested on a broad base of *ijmā'*, the validating consensus of the greater part of the *umma*, the community of Muslims, and the caliphs were substantially successful in projecting an image of themselves as divinely supported rulers legitimately carrying on the Prophet's heritage.

However, actual succession to power within the dynasty was governed by purely practical, family considerations, so that their authority acquired a self-perpetuating momentum, reinforced by the concept that their power derived from God alone, since Islamic law was never able to define, much less to enforce, explicit limits to the caliphs' powers, nor was it able to specify clearly the circumstances in which a right of resistance to an unjust but lawfully appointed power might be envisaged. In this way, the old idea (which had only been tentatively put into practice in the time of the Rightly Guided Caliphs) that the Muslim community or its leading members in the form of a *shūrā*, or consultative body, should elect the caliph fell generally into the background.

4 Tyan, *Institutions*, I, pp. 473–512; D. Sourdel, 'Questions de ceremonial "abbaside"', *Revue des Études Islamiques*, XXXVIII, 1960, pp. 121–48; B. Lewis, 'The Regnal Titles of the First 'Abbāsīd Caliphs', in *Dr. Zakir Husain Presentation Volume*, New Delhi, Maktaba Jamia, 1968, pp. 13–22; C. E. Bosworth, 'Lakab', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–.

In ‘Abbāsīd practice, a caliph normally appointed one or more successors to his authority during his own lifetime as heirs presumptive, with the designation of *walī al-‘ahd*, or ‘bearer of the covenant [of succession to authority]’. Usually, this succession was vested in the caliph’s own sons, although there was no idea of primogeniture and the succession might still go to a brother or cousin or nephew; hence succession disputes were far from uncommon. Nevertheless, there might at times be a reversion to something like the former principle of consultation and election on the odd occasions when a caliph died without having formally designated an heir, as in 847 when al-Wāthiq died and an informal council of the *wazīr*, the chief judge and some of the senior commanders of the Turkish military guard nominated his half-brother al-Mutawakkil.⁵

The ‘Abbāsīds speedily consolidated their power after their final military victory in 750, disposing of their original aides for achieving power, Abū Khallāl and Abū Muslim, who might have turned their newly acquired faculty of king-making against the caliphs themselves. They hunted down members of the former Umayyad dynasty so that only one member of the dynasty of consequence, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān, escaped to North Africa and in 756 was able to found the Umayyad emirate in Spain.⁶ The progeny of the first two ‘Abbāsīd caliphs, as-Saffāḥ (r. 749–54) and al-Manṣūr (r. 754–75), elbowed aside other members of the ‘Abbāsīd family ambitious for their share of power. The Khārijites, wedded to the principle of choosing the caliph on the bases of personal piety and leadership qualities and not on those of blood or descent, and with a rigidly exclusivist view of the saved community, remained hostile. They raised sporadic revolts in rural Iraq and western Persia, but more seriously, in Khurāsān and Sistān, where much of the countryside remained under Khārijite control until the middle years of the ninth century, after which Khārijism as a major force gradually declined, leaving only vestigial communities which lingered on in Afghanistan for a while and which still survive today in Oman and North Africa.⁷

Equally intransigent were the Shī‘a whose hopes of succession to executive power and control of the caliphate had been dashed in 750. The

5 Tyan, *Institutions*, I, pp. 243–352; R. Levy, *The Social Structure of Islam*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1957, pp. 281–3.

6 E. Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire de l’Espagne musulmane*, I: *La conquête et l’émirat hispano-umayyade (710–912)*, Paris, Maisonneuve, 1950, pp. 91–104; M. A. Shaban, *Islamic History: A New Interpretation AD 750–1055 (AH 132–448)*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 2–8; Kennedy, *The Prophet*, pp. 129–30.

7 C. E. Bosworth, *Sistān under the Arabs, from the Islamic Conquest to the Rise of the Saffarids (30–250/651–864)*, Rome, IsMeo, 1968, pp. 87–100; A. K. S. Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam. An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Political Theory: The Jurists*, London, Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 21–7; T. Lewicki, ‘al-Ibāḍiyya’, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–.



3.1 'Abbāsid Palace, Baghdad (© UNESCO)

numerous progeny of 'Alī's two sons Ḥasan and Ḥusayn frequently broke out in rebellion during the early 'Abbāsid period, over lands ranging from the Ḥijāz to northern Afghanistan. The ineffectiveness of these claimants' attempts contributed to the mood of frustration and anger, with its emphases on martyrdom and suffering, which was to become a cardinal feature of Shī'ism and which brought about a cycle of yet more futile revolts and deaths.⁸ The Shī'ites were at this time very much a minority faction. They had as yet no distinctive theological or legal system of their own: these were only to be elaborated from the tenth century onwards when Shī'ism secured its first significant political successes with the establishment of the Fātimid caliphs in Egypt and the Būyid *amīrs* in western Persia and Iraq.⁹ But the intense emotion engendered for the 'Alid house and its misfortunes were from an early period onwards to crystallize eventually into a distinctive form of Islam, separate from the Sunnī majority. This Shī'ite form of Islam recognized (as did Sunnism) the Qur'ān and the *sunna* as bases of the faith, but substituted for the more democratic principle of *ijmā'* (the consensus of the community) the more authoritarian one of obedience to the infallible Imam from the line of 'Alī; extremist groups of Shī'a (*ghulāt*) even elevated the

8 M. G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam, I: The Classical Age of Islam*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1974, pp. 372–84; Syed Husain M. Jafri, *Origins and Early Development of Shī'a Islam*, London, Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 58ff, 289ff; Moojan Momen, *An Introduction to Shī'ī Islam*, Oxford, George Ronald, 1985, pp. 23ff.

9 Hossein Modarressi Tabataba'i, *An Introduction to Shī'ī Law: A Bibliographical Study*, London, Ithaca, 1984, pp. 7, 32ff; Momen, *Introduction*, pp. 76–83.

imams, because of their sinlessness, to a position above that of the humanly frail and fallible Muḥammad himself.¹⁰

The Sunnī-Shī'ite division was early recognized by the 'Abbāsīd caliphs as a source of weakness and potential disunity within the community of Islam. Already al-Mahdī (r. 775–85) had attempted, although in vain, a *rapprochement* with the moderate Shī'a. The Mu'tazilite movement which arose in the later eighth and early ninth centuries had certain theological and philosophical tenets in common with the Shī'a, such as the idea of a created Qur'ān and of a necessarily just God, and the caliphs patronizing the movement may have seen these aspects of Mu'tazilism as bridging, eirenic ones between the two tendencies in Islam. Certainly, al-Ma'mūn (r. 813–33) at one point during his caliphate (in 817) nominated the Eighth Imam of the Shī'a, 'Alī ar-Riḍā, as his heir, possibly hoping to widen the field of capable candidates for the succession to include members of the house of 'Alī as well as those of al-'Abbās. Other caliphs later in the century, such as al-Muntaṣir (r. 861–62) and al-Mu'taḍid (r. 892–902), showed favour to the 'Alids, restoring to them confiscated properties and allowing pilgrimages to the shrines of their martyrs;¹¹ but over the years the breach widened rather than narrowed, especially as a sharp orthodox reaction set in, led by such figures as Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal in the ninth century and Abu-l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī in the following one, against Mu'tazilism and pro-Shī'ite tendencies.

In the period 750–861 the 'Abbāsīd caliphate was at the zenith of its power. Except for localized sectarian rebellions, there was, broadly speaking, peace across the caliphal lands, and a state of rough equilibrium prevailed also along the eastern Anatolian and northern Mesopotamian frontiers with Islam's ancient rival, the Byzantine empire; in many ways, the caliphate was now a territorially saturated state. The building of a new capital at Baghdad by al-Manṣūr in place of that of the Umayyads in Syria reflected a more eastwards orientation of the caliphate and a greater openness to influence from the East, above all from the Persian cultural world, and this openness encouraged considerable migrations into Iraq and the capital of Persian and Central Asian scholars, literary figures, craftsmen and artisans, etc. These latter classes were, as former subject peoples, still technically only *marwālī*, or clients of the Arabs, but now demanded, as equal members with the Arabs in the religious community of Muḥammad, a corresponding social and political equality within the caliphate; on a literary and cultural plane, these

10 Tyan, *Institutions*, II: *Califat et sultanat*, pp. 368–493; Jafri, *Origins*, pp. 300–4; M. G. S. Hodgson, 'Ghulāt', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–.

11 D. Sourdel, 'La politique religieuse du calife 'abbaside al-Ma'mun', *Review des Études Islamiques*, XXX, 1962, pp. 27–48; R. Glagow, *Das Kalifat des al-Mu'taḍid billāh (892–902)*, Bonn, 1968, pp. 159–201; C. E. Bosworth, 'al-Muntaṣir billāh', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–.

aspirations engendered the movement of the Shu'ūbiyya, that of the *shu'ūb* or 'nations', echoing Qur'ānic phraseology, in which the Shu'ūbīs asserted the equal value, if not indeed the superiority, of their own national contributions to Islamic life and society.¹²

In the medical, scientific and philosophical fields, the ninth and tenth centuries were ones when, largely through the intermediacy of Christian Syriac- and Arabic-speaking scholars, the achievements of the ancient Greeks were brought into the general ambit of Islamic learning. These processes of borrowing and adaptation from the older Persian, Greek and even Indian cultures were to continue into the eleventh century independent of the political and military decay of the caliphate, and all these currents of thought and research contributed to the rich fabric of Islamic civilization. The centrifugal political tendencies within the caliphate – which will be described below – may at times have helped rather than hindered these processes by providing a greater spread of opportunities for the exponents of the new cultural and artistic trends, for many of the provincial governors or rulers, although they might be of servile or barbarian origin, were anxious to attract savants, *littérateurs*, craftsmen, etc. to their local capitals, thus deriving glory from them as patrons and Maecenases.

Hence we find the philosopher Fārābī (d. 950) at the court of the Ḥamdānid ruler of Aleppo, Sayf-ad-Dawla; the Khwārizmian polymath al-Bīrūnī (d. after 1050) at the court of the Turkish Ghaznavids in Ghazna; the philosopher, scientist and physician Ibn Sīnā (d. 1038) at the court of the Daylamī ruler in Isfahan, 'Alā'-ad-Dawla ibn Kākūya; and the Nestorian Christian physician and theologian Ibn Buṭlān (d. 1066) at various points in his life at the courts of the Mirdasids in Aleppo, the Fāṭimids in Cairo and other petty rulers in Syria.¹³ Only when Islamic knowledge – for reasons that are not entirely clear – began in the twelfth century to become rigid and

12 On early 'Abbāsid civilization in general, see A. Mez, *The Renaissance of Islam*, trans. Salahuddin Khuda Bakhsh and D. S. Margoliouth, Patna, Jubilee Print and Publishing House, 1937; D. and J. Sourdel, *La civilisation de l'Islam classique*, Paris, Arthaud, 1968. For the Shu'ūbiyya, see Ignaz Goldziher, 'The Shu'ūbiyya' and 'The Shu'ūbiyya and its Manifestation in Scholarship', in *Muslim Studies*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1967–71, I, pp. 137–98; H. A. R. Gibb, 'The Social Significance of the Shu'ūbiyya', in S. J. Shaw and W. R. Polk (eds), *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1962, pp. 62–73.

13 On the process of the reception of this learning into Islam, see the general studies of De Lacy O'Leary, *How Greek Science Passed to the Arabs*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949; G. E. von Grunebaum, *Classical Islam: A History 600–1258*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1970; and D. M. Dunlop, *Arab Civilization to 1500*, London, Longman, 1971. For the efflorescence of Islamic culture in the tenth century, see Mez, *Renaissance of Islam*; and Joel L. Kraemer, *Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: The Cultural Revival during the Būyid Age*, Leiden, Brill Academic Publishers, 1986.



3.2 Madrasa Al-Mustanşiriyya, Baghdad (© G. Degeorge)

unreceptive to outside influences were these fertilizing currents stopped and a period of sterility and hostility to innovation set in.¹⁴

At the same time as these new cultural and scientific trends became discernible in the early ‘Abbāsid caliphate, so forces for change were at work in the political and military fields. The increased role of Persians within the state as secretaries and financial officials not only popularized older, pre-Islamic Persian cultural elements in *adab* (polite learning), but also had an effect on current ideas of statecraft and political philosophy. The Persian origins imputed to the *wazīr*, who now became the caliph’s chief executive officer, are probably misattributed, since this office seems to have developed naturally from the indigenous Arab administrative tradition, and it was within this last that a family of *wazīrs* like the famous Barmakids, despite their Persian origins, functioned.¹⁵ But pre-Islamic Persian, specifically Sāsānid, ideas of kingship and official procedure were introduced through translations from Pahlavi or Middle Persian and through other channels. Thus there eventually emerged what might be termed a Perso-Islamic

14 For an attempt to throw light on this phenomenon, see R. Brunschvig and G. E. von Grunebaum (eds), *Classicism et déclin culturel dans l’histoire de l’Islam. Actes du symposium international d’histoire de la civilisation musulmane (Bordeaux 25–29 juin 1956)*, Paris, 1957.

15 See D. Sourdel, *Le vizirat ‘abbāside de 749 à 936 (132 à 324 de l’Hégire)*, Damascus, Institut Français de Damas, 1959–60, I, pp. 41–61.

conception of royal power and sovereignty which was an amalgam of the earlier Islamic, religiously based views outlined above and of Persian doctrines of the divine ruler, with his characteristic use of *siyāsa*, expediency, and *realpolitik*. Existing trends within the early 'Abbāsid caliphate made this grafting process an easy one, given the already overwhelming, centralized power of the caliphs, exercised throughout their dominions by a numerous bureaucracy of scribes and tax collectors and controlled by a network of state postal and intelligence officers, the *ṣāhib barīds*.

This greater stress on expediency as a motive behind human conduct and political action gradually took shape, if only admitted tacitly. As E. I. J. Rosenthal has said: 'Justice and equity are not conceived as absolute moral values and demands, but rather as politically useful and necessary in the interests of state and ruler.'¹⁶ On the literary level, these Persian influences can be seen in the quite extensive genre of 'Mirrors for Princes', manuals of statecraft written in both Arabic and Persian; the series of these began in the earliest years of the 'Abbāsid caliphate with the works of Ibn al-Muqaffa' (d. c. 756), translator of numerous Pahlavi works, and continued until the eleventh century and after in those of writers like Kay Kāwūs ibn Iskandar (d. towards the end of the eleventh century), Niẓām-ul-Mulk (d. 1092) and Iranian al-Ghazālī (d. 1111). In all these treatises, Sāsānid monarchical attitudes and practices are extolled, in addition to purely Islamic ones, while in an author like the Seljūq *wazīr* Niẓām-ul-Mulk forceful, despotic monarchs like the Būyid 'Aḍud-ad-Dawla and the Ghaznavid sultan Maḥmūd are held up as exemplars for the effective and successful ruler.

In general, these 'Mirrors for Princes' recognize that the *khilāfa* of the Rightly Guided Caliphs and the golden age of the first generations of Muslims was the best of all forms of political organization but that it had passed away, to be replaced by a rougher world no longer characterized, as backward-looking writers saw it, by universal piety and justice. Hence a strong injection of monarchical authority, which had at times to be guided by expediency, was necessary if the Muslim community, the *jamā'a*, was to be preserved from godless tyranny or from anarchy; the 'restraining power' exercised by the ruler over society in order to prevent men from tyrannizing over or killing each other is what the fourteenth-century writer Ibn Khaldūn calls the *wāzi'* or *ḥukm wāzi'*, necessary because of men's propensity towards evil.¹⁷

Militarily, the 'Abbāsid caliphate underwent a profound transformation during the ninth century, and this was to have a perceptible, causal effect on

16 E. I. J. Rosenthal, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968, p. 68.

17 *Ibid.*, pp. 67–83, 87–8; Arnold, *The Caliphate*, pp. 70–4; A. K. S. Lambton, 'Concepts of Authority in Persia: Eleventh to Nineteenth Centuries AD', *Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies* (London), XXVI, 1988, pp. 95–8.

the formation of provincial centres of power in the ninth and tenth centuries, concurrent with the political impotence and dissolution of the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate as a universal authority in the Islamic world. During the revolutionary upheavals of 746–50, the first ‘Abbāsīds had relied upon troops recruited in Khurāsān, mainly local Arab tribesmen settled there but also with some Persian *mawlā* elements, the so-called *Abnā’ ad-Dawla* (‘Sons of the Dynasty’). This had entailed relegating to the background the troops on which previous caliphs had relied, Arab warriors from Syria, Egypt, Iraq, etc. (originally, in the period of the great conquests, these had been the *levée en masse* of the Arab nation), and in the course of the first half of the ninth century, these troops virtually disappeared from the Muslim armies. The Arab caliphs of the early ninth century now became reluctant to rely on the *Abnā’*, who had largely settled in Baghdad and who in al-Ma’mūn’s time made the capital a focus for discontent against the caliph and what were seen as his Persophile policies.

Hence his brother and successor al-Mu‘taṣim (r. 833–42) intensified the process of replacing the old Arab and Arabo-Persian troops by a fully professional army of military slaves (*ghilmān*, *mamālīk*) recruited from Berbers, black Africans, Armenians, Slavs, Greeks, etc., but above all from the Turks of the South Russian and Central Asian steppes. Not only were these steppe-dwellers famed for their hardiness and their skill as mounted archers but it was believed that, uprooted as they had been from their pagan backgrounds and raised in the *Dār al-Islām* as Muslims, lacking local ties and loyalties, they would be able to give unfettered obedience to their masters the caliphs and other great men of state. Events did not always happen thus; the murder of al-Mutawakkil in 861 by some of these Turkish slave guards heralded a period of near-anarchy in Sāmarrā’ (whither al-Mu‘taṣim had moved his capital in order to shield his Turkish troops from their unpopularity in Baghdad, the result of their violent behaviour) and Baghdad. Turkish generals made and unmade caliphs, and reduced the holders of the caliphal office to ineffectiveness before al-Mu‘taḍid temporarily restored control towards the end of the century.¹⁸

This weakening at the centre of the caliphate was soon exacerbated by two serious and prolonged internal rebellions. From 869 to 883 lower Iraq and southern Khuzistan were paralysed by the revolt of the Zanj, black agricultural slaves working in these regions and manipulated, it seems,

18 See Levy, *Social Structure*, pp. 416–21; C. E. Bosworth, ‘Barbarian Invasions: The Coming of the Turks into the Islamic World’, in D. S. Richards (ed.), *Islamic Civilisation 950–1150*, Oxford, Cassirer, 1973, pp. 1–16; D. Ayalon, ‘Preliminary Remarks on the Mamlūk Military Institution in Islam’, in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (eds), *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, London, Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 44–58.

by outside interests.¹⁹ Not long after the Zanj were quelled, much of the Syrian desert and most of the Arabian peninsula fell under the control, for something like two centuries, of the extremist Shī'ite sectaries, the Carmathians (Qarāmiṭa), who were bold enough in 930 to attack the holy city of Mecca and carry off the Black Stone from the Ka'ba, retaining it for twenty years.²⁰ Chaos in Sāmarrā' and Baghdad, a series of generally weak caliphs in the later ninth and the tenth centuries, and massive expenditure on armies necessary to combat the Zanj and Carmathians, caused a financial crisis for the caliphate at a time when many of its outlying provinces were falling away from 'Abbāsīd control under ambitious governors, some of them of servile origin, or local claimants to authority, who often rose to power as representatives of local feeling against Arab and caliphal control and against state centralization in general. Although, as is stated below, many of these provincial rulers protested their loyalty to the caliphate and to the 'caliphal fiction', as it was increasingly becoming, the practical effects were the same in many cases: a cutting-off or at least a diminution of the inflow of revenue from the provinces, accentuating the caliphate's financial distress and widening the Persian Gulf between caliphal claims to universal authority and the day-to-day reality of caliphal impoverishment and ineffectiveness. It is to these historical processes, and especially to the elaboration in practice, and eventually in constitutional law, of the idea of the sultan or sultans exercising power at the side of the caliphs, that we must now turn.

The 'Abbāsīds had never managed to extend their authority over the entire Islamic world, and specifically, over the extreme Muslim West, for, as noted above, a fugitive Umayyad had escaped to North Africa and in 756 founded what became a powerful emirate in al-Andalus, which was to endure for nearly three centuries before dissolving into a fragmentation more acute than that of the 'Abbāsīd lands in the central and eastern territories of the caliphate.²¹ In adjacent North Africa, another refugee, this time the Ḥasanīd Idrīs ibn 'Abdallāh, in 789 founded a Shī'ite principality among the Berbers of Morocco, based in Fās; whilst in what is now Algeria, Khārijites of the Ibāḍiyya sub-sect in 761 founded an imamate at Tahart which claimed the allegiance of all the Khārijite groups in North Africa and the Sudan. Principalities whose governing ethos was Shī'ite- or Khārijite-inspired were necessarily hostile to the idea of the 'Abbāsīds as exacting a

19 Theodor Nöldeke, 'A Servile War in the East', in *Sketches from Eastern History*, trans. John Sutherland Black, Edinburgh, Adam and Charles Black, 1892, pp. 146–75; A. Popovic, *La révolte des esclaves en Iraq au IIIe/IXe siècle*, Paris, Geunther, 1976.

20 W. Madelung, 'Fatimiden und Baḥrainqarmaṭen', *Der Islam*, XXXIV, 1959, pp. 34–88; W. Madelung, 'Karmaṭī', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–.

21 William Montgomery Watt and Pierre Cachia, *A History of Islamic Spain*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1965, pp. 30–90.

universal obedience from the Muslims, and by the end of the eighth century, all Islamic lands west of what is now Tunisia were subtracted irretrievably from ‘Abbāsīd control.²²

In practice, the province of Ifrīqiya, corresponding to Tunisia, also ceased after 800 to be directly controlled by the caliphs, for in that year Harūn ar-Rashīd gave it to Ibrāhīm al-Aghlab in return for an annual tribute; the Sunnī Aghlabids held power there and in Sicily hereditarily for over a century, although in this case as largely autonomous governors who regarded themselves as faithful vassals and nominees of the ‘Abbāsīds, whose supremacy they acknowledged in the bidding prayers of the sermon (*khutba*) of the Friday noon prayer though not on their coins.²³ Processes like these, and the corresponding ones in the lands further east which are described below, were reflections of the fact that the central apparatus of state in Baghdad was not yet sufficiently developed to control such a vast expanse of territory as the ‘Abbāsīds had inherited at a time when the dynamism of the earlier caliphs had subsided: distances were too great, communications too extended, retribution for rebelliousness on the peripheries too slow and uncertain, for effective control by the most energetic and dedicated of caliphs, and some system of delegated authority and autonomy for the provinces would in any case have been necessary.

For the central and eastern lands of the caliphate, the Ṭāhirid governorship of Khurāsān (821–73) is often regarded as the first loosening of caliphal control in these regions. It seems likely that the Ṭāhirids were a family of arabized Persian stock from eastern Khurāsān who for four generations served the caliphs as governors for the whole East (embracing in theory not only Khurāsān but also Sistān and Transoxiana), achieving a reputation with posterity for their just rule here.²⁴ This reputation was also a reflection of the fact that the Ṭāhirids respected fully the rights of the caliphs in their lands, regularly forwarding taxation and gifts to the ‘Abbāsīds (many of the Turkish slave guards of the caliphs – on which see below – came through their intermediacy as part of the stipulated tribute) and retaining the caliphs’ names in the *khutba* and on the coins that they minted; these last are little different from those of other ‘Abbāsīd governors, and we know of coins minted at this time in places which were undoubtedly

22 Georges Marçais, *La Berbérie musulmane et l’Orient au Moyen Âge*, Paris, Éditions Montaigne, 1948, pp. 101–29.

23 Watt and Cachia, *History*, pp. 57–101; Oleg Grabar, *The Coinage of the Ṭūlūnids*, New York, American Numismatic Society, 1957, pp. 51–73.

24 W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, trans. T. Minorsky and C. E. Bosworth, London, Luzac & Co., 1968, pp. 207ff; C. E. Bosworth, ‘The Ṭāhirids and Ṣaffārids’, in R. N. Frye (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975, IV, pp. 90–106; Mongi Kaabi, *Les Ṭāhirides au Khurāsān et en Iraq IIIème H./IXème J-C*, Tunis, 1983.



3.3 Manuscript of the Qur'ān, Istanbul, seventeenth century
(© Khalili Family Trust/Nour Foundation)

within the Ṭāhirid governorate but which do not mention their names at all.²⁵ The caliphs, for their part, seem to have retained such faithful and respectful vassals because the Ṭāhirids gave firm government and combated Shī'ite outbreaks in the East at a time when the caliphate in Iraq was showing the first signs of instability, at the same time respecting the 'caliphal fiction' whereby all lesser human authority could only be viewed as stemming from a specific act of delegation of power by the caliph himself as temporal representative of God on earth.

A parallel phenomenon can be observed in Egypt. In 868 the Turkish slave general Aḥmad ibn Ṭulūn became governor there, and aided by the 'Abbāsids' preoccupation with the Zanj wars, built up a large army and fleet, extending his power into Palestine and Syria.²⁶ As with the Ṭāhirids, the hereditary principle appears here with the succession of Aḥmad's son Khumārawayh and then the latter's sons, recognized willy-nilly by the

25 Grabar, *Coinage*, pp. 54–6.

26 Zaki M. Hassan, *Les Tulunides: Étude de l'Égypte musulmane à la fin du IX^e siècle*, Paris, Établissements Busson, 1933.



3.4 Abbāsīd gold dīnār of Caliph al-Mahdī
(© Khalili Family Trust/Nour Foundation)

caliphs, although the weakness of the last Ṭulūnids and their inability to keep at bay the Carmathians in Syria enabled ‘Abbāsīd armies to regain direct control over Egypt in 905; however, they were only able to exercise this for some thirty years until a further line of governors, again originally of Central Asian Turkish origin, the Ikhshīdids, succeeded in establishing autonomous power in Egypt and southern Syria (935–69). Then with the appearance in Egypt in 969 of the Fāṭimids (see below), the rich and lucrative land of Egypt passed for ever out of ‘Abbāsīd hands.

Like the Ṭāhirids in Khurāsān, the Ṭulūnids made no claim to independent power; their autonomy was likewise that of faithful subordinates, giving precedence to the ‘Abbāsīds in the *khutba* and *sikka* (the iron stamp or die used for stamping coins). Exactly how governors like the Aghlabids and Ṭulūnids themselves viewed their relationship to the caliphal central power can only be inferred from a study of their titulature and their self-description on coins and the officially manufactured *ṭirāz* textiles, since we do not possess from this period any constitutional treatises such as that composed by Abu-l-Ḥasan al-Māwardī (d. 1058) in the early eleventh century or analyses of the contemporary situation such as Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) made in the later years of that century. It does, however, appear that all the provincial governors, in East and West alike, were careful to have their actions sanctioned by the religious authorities of their lands, not as a mere formality but because they saw themselves as having a recognizable role with the structure of the caliphal ideal and because they regarded their rule as in conformity with the general consensus of the legal and theological scholars.²⁷

It was otherwise with regard to certain sectarian leaders and local adventurers who attained power in outlying parts of Persia and the Arabian peninsula and who deliberately rejected, for religious or secular reasons, the overall supremacy of the caliphs and their delegating role in the legitimizing of power. In the remote regions of northern and north-western Persia – regions

27 Grabar, *Coinage*, pp. 5–7, 28ff.

with a difficult topography and that were climatically unattractive to the Arabs – Islam had been late in penetrating, and older Persian religious ideas, seen in the movement of the Khurramiyya rebels in the early ninth century and in the survival of Zoroastrianism, had remained strong there, allied to a particularly firm anti-Arab feeling on the part of the local populations. Towards the end of the eighth century 'Alids of the family of Zayd ibn Ḥasan ibn 'Alī took shelter in the mountains of Daylam and the Elburz region. After 864, these regions and much of the Caspian coastland rebelled openly against caliphal control under the leadership of a Ḥasanid who adopted the title of *ad-Dā'ī ila-l-Ḥaq* ('He who Summons to the Truth') and who rejected totally the 'Abbāsīd claim to the caliphate, regarding this as founded on deception and injustice. The Zaydī state there did not survive beyond the mid-tenth century, but it had a lasting effect as a stimulus to the implantation of Shī'ism there, this creed being adopted by the Daylamī Būyid *amīrs* (see below), whose rise was to be important for the circumscription of caliphal power and freedom of action in the tenth and early eleventh centuries (and over a much longer time span, it was perhaps not without significance that in the fourteenth century the Safavid movement was to develop within a north-western Persian environment that had long been sympathetic to the house of 'Alī and eventually to transform virtually the whole of Persia into a Shī'ite land).²⁸

Another Ḥasanid found asylum in the remote Yemeni highlands of south-western Arabia during al-Ma'mūn's reign, and from c. 860 onwards lines of Zaydī imams based on Ṣa'da and beginning with the line of Rassids began a 1,100 years' tenure of power, again with an ideology which, while not as strongly opposed to the legitimacy of the first three caliphs of Islam and the early doctors of the faith as the mainstream Twelver or Ja'farī Shī'a and the extremist Ismā'īlīs, nevertheless rejected the legitimacy of the 'Abbāsīds as caliph-imams.²⁹

These religiously inspired outbreaks against 'Abbāsīd authority were limited in geographic extent. The constituting by military force of the vast if, as events turned out, transient empire of the Ṣaffārīds was a more serious blow to the territorial integrity of the caliphate. Arising out of the Sunnī vigilante bands formed in Sistān to combat the Khārījites there,³⁰ the sons of the coppersmith (*ṣaffār*) al-Layth, led by Ya'qūb and then, after his death in 879,

28 W. Madelung, 'The Minor Dynasties of Northern Iran', in R. N. Frye (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran, 4: The Period from the Arab Invasion to the Saljūqs*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 206–12.

29 R. Strothmann, 'Zaydiyya', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–; Lambton, *State and Government*, pp. 28–32; Momen, *Introduction*, pp. 49–51.

30 Theodor Nöldeke, 'Yakūb the Coppersmith and his Dynasty', in *Sketches from Eastern History*, trans. John Sutherland Black, Edinburgh, Adam and Charles Black, 1892, pp. 176–206; Bosworth, *Sistān*, pp. 112ff.

by ‘Amr, speedily extended from their home base in Sistān in all directions, but – most significantly for the ‘Abbāsids – northwards into Khurāsān, where Ya‘qūb overthrew the Ṭāhirid line of governors, and westwards into Kirmān, Fars, Khuzistan and almost to Baghdad itself. The occupation of Fars and Khuzistan, to be held fairly continuously by the Ṣaffārīds for some forty years, deprived the ‘Abbāsids of two rich provinces the loss of whose revenues was keenly felt in Baghdad; the caliphs made strenuous efforts to recover them, but they were only to enjoy their resources once again for two decades before the Būyīds appeared on the scene in southern Persia.

The significance of the Ṣaffārīds was that they were the first major power openly to show their contempt for the ‘Abbāsids and for the caliphal concept on pragmatic, secular grounds: that the ‘Abbāsids were an Arab dynasty with no right to impose their domination over the Persian lands and to draw out of them revenue for purposes which did not benefit Persia, and that in any case they had become enfeebled and incapable of asserting their universal authority so that superior human vigour and military might would deservedly triumph.³¹ In some ways, the Ṣaffārīds embodied the local interests of their home province Sistān over and against ‘Abbāsīd policies of attempted centralization and the extraction of revenue, a sign that, on these eastern peripheries of the Islamic world as well as on the western ones, deference to the idea of the universal caliphate was in places wearing thin. A local history of Sistān puts into Ya‘qūb ibn al-Layth’s mouth words expressing his hatred and mistrust of the ‘Abbāsīds, denouncing their ingratitude to faithful servants of the dynasty from Abū Salama to the Barmakīds.³² Such attitudes were sufficiently revolutionary for the orthodox Sunnī historians to denounce the Ṣaffārīds as plebeian upstarts wishing to overthrow the ideal of an ordered, hierarchical Muslim polity, openly following the dictates of *realpolitik* without regard for religious considerations. Hence they contrast these subversive doctrines with the orthodox behaviour, consonant with the ideals of the deferential and obedient Islamic society, shown by such lines as the Ṭāhirīd governors and the Sāmānīd *amīrs* who were to succeed the Ṣaffārīds in Khurāsān (see below).

This family of the Sāmānīds sprang from the *dihqān* class of Persian landowners in Soghdia to the north of the Oxus river, and built up their power as local governors in Transoxiana and northern Afghanistan for the Ṭāhirīds. Since they were equally dedicated with the latter, their suzerains, to the preservation of the existing constitutional and social structure of the eastern Islamic lands, several of the Sāmānīd *amīrs* are described in glowing

31 Bosworth, ‘Ṭāhirīds and Ṣaffārīds’, pp. 108–29.

32 Anon., *Ta’rīkh-i Sistān*, ed. M. S. Bahār, Tehran, 1314/1935, pp. 267–8; English trans. by Milton S. Gold, *The Tārikh-e Sistān*, Rome, IsMeo, 1976, p. 213.

terms for their orthodoxy and piety and for their fidelity to their caliphal masters. They ended the rule of the base-born Ṣaffārīds in Khurāsān (900) and reduced the remaining *amīrs* of that line in Sistān to vassal status.³³ They fulfilled by proxy – acting in this wise as the caliphs' agents – the caliph–imam's duty of *jihād* by organizing raids into the Inner Asian steppes against the Turks.

Not only did these raids bring in a steady stream of Turkish slaves, on which the military bases of the caliphate and other states of the central and eastern lands came increasingly to rest (see below), but it was during the period of Sāmānid florescence in the tenth century that the Islamic faith spread north-westwards from Khwārazm in Central Asia to the Bulgars on the middle Volga and that it first came to be implanted within the steppes among such Turkish tribes as the Qarluq (very probably the nucleus of the Qarakhanid confederation which was to rule over western and eastern Turkestan in the eleventh and twelfth centuries). Above all – and most significant for the future history of the central and eastern Islamic lands during these same centuries (see below) – the Sāmānid period saw the conversion of the Oghuz or Ghuzz, from a component clan of whom sprang the family of Seljūq ibn Duqaq, founders of the Seljūq dynasty (see below).³⁴ The distance of Transoxiana and the Sāmānid capital Bukhārā from Iraq meant that the *amīrs* could show themselves as faithful servants and deputies of the distant caliph without incurring any significant obligations such as the forwarding of regular tribute.

The constitutional position of the Sāmānids' supplanters in Khurāsān, the Turkish Ghaznavids (who in 998 divided the Sāmānid dominions with the Qarakhanids, the latter taking over Transoxiana, the lands north of the Oxus), was similar to that previously fulfilled by the older Persian dynasty. The line of Sebūktigin and Maḥmūd originated from the slave guard of the Sāmānid *amīrs*, and like the Sāmānids – indeed, much more so, given their socially equivocal, barbarian servile background – they cultivated the image of rigidly orthodox Sunnī monarchs, theoretically subordinate to the 'Abbāsids. Sebūktigin never assumed any title higher than that of *amīr*, which had of course been that of his Sāmānid lieges, and it was only Maḥmūd, master by conquest of the most powerful empire ever known in the eastern Islamic world, who adopted the title *sulṭān* (sultan) for court usage and in epistolary and diplomatic style; it does not come fully into usage on

33 R. N. Frye, 'The Samānids', in R. N. Frye (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975, IV, pp. 136–61.

34 Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 254–7; W. Barthold, *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie Centrale*, Paris, Maisonneuve, 1945, pp. 47–63.

Ghaznavid coins till the mid-eleventh century, well after Maḥmūd's death (on the significance of these titles, see below).³⁵

The Ghaznavid rulers sedulously sought grants of honorific titles and validation of their successions to rule from the 'Abbāsids; forwarded to Baghdad rich gifts from the booty taken on their Indian campaigns; and proclaimed their Sunnī orthodoxy and zeal in ferreting out such heresies as the Ismā'īlism of certain localities in northern India and the Shī'ism of the former Būyid territories of northern Persia.³⁶ Clearly, although the executive power of the 'Abbāsids was at this point only beginning to recover from its nadir of the later tenth century, the propaganda value to the Ghaznavids of securing caliphal validation for their rule still counted for much in such crises of the state as succession disputes and in securing a broad basis of agreement for, or at least, tolerance of, sultanal power among the orthodox classes of *'ulamā'* and urban notables, classes particularly influential in strongly Sunnī regions like Transoxiana and Khurāsān. Conversely, it seems that the moral backing of the Ghaznavids, now glowing with prestige as the hammers of infidels in India even if geographically distant from Iraq, was of some value to the 'Abbāsids in their struggle to preserve some freedom of executive action over and against the pressures of the Būyid *amīrs* (see below).

We must, however, go back a few decades to examine events in the heartlands of the caliphate. During the early tenth century, the 'Abbāsids became more and more politically and financially beleaguered, with local governors or other claimants to power controlling most of the former caliphal territory outside central Iraq and with a consequently shrinking tax base and a shortfall in revenue exacerbated by the expenditure on warfare against the Zanj and the Carmathians. The caliph ar-Rādī (r. 934–40), contemplating a bankrupt treasury, was obliged in 936 to hand over supreme military and financial power to a Turkish commander in Iraq, Muḥammad ibn Rā'iq, who now assumed the title *Amīr al-Umarā'* (Supreme Commander). This award was probably partly intended to demonstrate Muḥammad ibn Rā'iq's primacy over other local commanders, but it also symbolized the de facto existence of something like a dual system, with the *amīr* exercising political and military power and leaving to the caliph only his moral and spiritual authority as head of the Sunnī Islamic world.³⁷ It was true that the caliphs had during the early decades of the century withdrawn from much of the

35 C. E. Bosworth, 'The Titulature of the Early Ghaznavids', *Oriens*, XV, 1962, pp. 215ff.

36 C. E. Bosworth, 'The Imperial Policy of the Early Ghaznavids', *Journal of the Central Institute of Islamic Research, Karachi*, I/3, 1962, pp. 60–6.

37 D. Sourdel, 'Ibn Rā'ik' and 'Khalīfa', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–.

practical direction of affairs, leaving this to their *wazīrs*, whilst retaining, however, the prerogatives of holding to account and dismissing these *wazīrs*.

The reality of the 'supreme emirate' as the directing power in the state at this time was sealed very shortly afterwards by the establishment in all of the Persian lands (except the Caspian coastlands and Khurāsān) and in Iraq of the Būyids, mountaineers from Daylam in north-western Persia, who followed the Zaydī form of Shī'ism brought to that region by 'Alid *dā'īs*, or missionaries. In 945 Aḥmad ibn Būya, subsequently enjoying the *laqab* of *Mu'izz-ad-Dawla* conferred by a complaisant caliph, entered Baghdad and assumed the designation of *Amīr al-Umarā'*.³⁸ It must have seemed not impossible that the Būyids would realize the dream of generations of 'Alid claimants and sweep away the 'Abbāsīd usurpers in favour of an imam from the house of 'Alī (who would presumably re-emerge from his *ghayba*, or occultation). The Būyids were in many ways enthusiastic Shī'ites, enforcing observance of Shī'ite festivals and other practices, and it was under their aegis and patronage that the process of the elaboration of Shī'ite law and theology began;³⁹ but they were also realists. They knew well that Shī'ites were only a small minority in a sea of Sunnism and that any attempted abolition of the Sunnī caliphate would provoke a violent reaction; nor had Shī'ism as yet developed a body of legal and constitutional dogma which could underpin and render viable in the long term a Shī'ite-directed caliphate–imamate. They preferred to retain the 'Abbāsīds under their tutelage, and the remaining decades of the tenth century marked the lowest ebb in the practical, executive power of the caliphs.

Even so, the fiction was maintained that the power of the *amīrs* was a delegation of the caliph's authority, and the caliph retained, at least in theory, the right to appoint his own agents.⁴⁰ How much of this power he could in reality exercise varied inversely with the forcefulness of the controlling Būyid *amīrs* themselves: little during the emirates of outstanding rulers like 'Aḍud-ad-Dawla (r. 949–83) and his son Bahā'-ad-Dawla (r. 998–1012), but rather more in the subsequent years of the early eleventh century when the *amīrs* were of lower calibre. Thus the resultant rise in the 'Abbāsīds' effective power was favoured by the Būyids' need in practice for orthodox Sunnī support against other Shī'ite powers like the Ḥamdānīds of Syria and al-Jazira, but above all, against the vigorous and aggressive rival Fāṭimid caliphs who had taken over Egypt and Syria (see below) and were clashing with the *amīrs* over respective spheres of influence, including Iraq and Arabia.

38 Heribert Busse, *Chalif und Grosskönig: Die Buyiden im Iraq (945–1055)*, Beirut/Wiesbaden, 1969, pp. 30–5, 159ff.

39 Heribert Busse, *Chalif und Grosskönig: Die Buyiden im Iraq (945–1055)*, Beirut/Wiesbaden, 1969, pp. 418–31.

40 Arnold, *The Caliphate*, pp. 61–9.

Hence when the Būyid *amīr* of Iraq Jalāl-ad-Dawla (r. 1025–44) wanted to assume the ancient pre-Islamic Persian title of *Shāhanshāh* ('King of kings'), as other members of his dynasty had done in the Persian lands, he had to secure caliphal help in order to achieve this against widespread orthodox opposition in Iraq to what sounded in pious Muslim ears like blasphemy.⁴¹

It is thus true to say that there was not at this time any clear-cut separation of functions between the caliphs and the *amīrs*, with the former exercising 'spiritual power' and the latter 'temporal power', as with the Pope and Emperor in medieval Christendom. At all times, the caliphs considered themselves entitled (if not able in practice) to intervene in the conduct of day-to-day affairs, whilst the Būyids similarly did not hesitate to impose their will in spiritual matters. Nor does a study of official titulature at this time support the idea of a separation of powers. *Laqabs* ending in *-dawla* (state) (e.g. *Rukn-ad-Dawla*, *Yamīn-ad-Dawla*) had been current since the early tenth century and were used by the Būyids and early Ghaznavids alike; those ending in *-dīn* (religion) and *-milla* (religious community) (e.g. *Nizām-ad-Dīn*, *Nāṣir-ul-Milla*) appear later, in particular, with the coming to power in the mid-eleventh century of the Great Seljūqs. But usage here does not seem to correspond in any direct way with how the bearers of such titles saw their own sphere of power. All one can say is that titles of all kinds tended to become generalized from the top ranks of society downwards, with a consequent debasement of meaning and loss of any real significance, a process of vulgarization deplored in the eleventh century by authors like Hilāl-uṣ-Ṣābi', al-Bīrūnī and Nizām-ul-Mulk.⁴²

The Fāṭimids have been mentioned more than once. From a base in North Africa, Ismā'īlī Shī'ite *ḍā'īs* had been at work promoting the claims of the Fāṭimids (whose true descent remains obscure), and the religious and military dynamism engendered there carried the Fāṭimids to power in Egypt and Syria in 969. They were able to set up a powerful and culturally splendid empire of two centuries' duration, directed by the Fāṭimid rulers as caliph-imams of the true line of 'Alī and stigmatizing the 'Abbāsids as usurpers, whose subversion was their avowed aim. They thus decisively marked themselves off from other Islamic dynasties that were de facto independent of the 'Abbāsids but continued to acknowledge their nominal subordination to the all-dominating caliph. In fact, the Fāṭimids were not the only potentates in the Muslim West to assume the title of caliph at this time.⁴³ The Spanish Umayyad 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān III adopted it, in addition to that of 'Commander

41 H. F. Amedroz, 'The Assumption of the Title Shāhanshāh by Buwaihid Rulers', *Numismatic Chronicle*, ser. 4, V, 1905, pp. 393–9; Bosworth, 'Lakab'.

42 Bosworth, 'Titulature', pp. 210–14, 215–16; Bosworth, 'Lakab'.

43 See Tyan, *Institutions*, II, pp. 493ff.; M. Canard, 'Fāṭimids', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–.

of the Faithful' (see above) in 928, in part as a counterblast to Fāṭimid claims; and even the petty Midrārid princes of Sijilmāsa in the Moroccan Sahara assumed the title.⁴⁴ The entire Muslim West was of course remote from Iraq, and the appearance of local caliphates there was not surprising; only when the Fāṭimids made themselves a mighty power in the Near East were the 'Abbāsids directly threatened both ideologically and militarily.

The problem was a graver one for the constitutional theorists. At first, many of them, their eyes fixed on the ideal rather than the reality, refused to recognize that there was any problem at all. Al-Māwardī averred that there could not be two caliph-imams at the same time, thus rejecting an earlier orthodox Sunnī Ash'arī view that there could be two of them if they were in widely separated lands; he was doubtless reflecting the refusal of the Baghdad 'Abbāsids to admit the claims of the Umayyads in Córdoba and, above all, of the more immediately menacing Fāṭimids of Cairo.⁴⁵ Later, however, the theorists were forced to concede the possibility of more than one caliph-imam existing at the same time, provided that they were geographically separated; and the rival views here, of those who recognized the practicalities of the situation and those who clung to the ideal of the caliphate one and indivisible, were discussed by Ibn Khaldūn.⁴⁶

With the appearance in Baghdad of the Seljūq leader Toghrīl Beg in 1055, the 'Abbāsids were formally released from their tutelage under the Shī'ite Būyids although, as we have seen, this tutelage had been much lighter in the first half of the century. The ensuing Seljūq domination over most of the eastern and much of the central Islamic lands as far west as Syria and Anatolia was of a different social and political nature from that of previous regimes which had arisen from either the local ruling and landowning classes or else from non-local military slave commanders whose power was based, at least initially, on *force majeure* rather than any consensus or basis of common interest.

The Seljūqs were a Turkish family. They did not hold the exalted title of khans, but were lesser chiefs of a section of the Oghuz tribe, the Qirūq, who, by wearing down Ghaznavid control of eastern and northern Persia, made themselves heads of a tribal confederation that speedily overran much

44 See Charles Pellat, 'Midrār, Banū', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954.

45 H. A. R. Gibb, 'al-Māwardī's Theory of the Caliphate', in Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk (eds), *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1963, pp. 156–7.

46 Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, trans. from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal, New York, Pantheon Books, 1958, I, pp. 392–4.

of the Middle East.⁴⁷ They rolled back the once-mighty Ghaznavid empire into eastern Afghanistan and northern India; they terminated the power of the Būyids in Persia and Iraq by 1062, together with that of various petty Daylamī, Kurdish and Arab dynasties; they defeated the Byzantine emperor at Malazgird in 1071 and began the overrunning of Anatolia, what was henceforth to constitute a special branch of the dynasty, the Seljūqs of Rūm; they extended their suzerainty over Arab and Turkmen principalities in Syria and pushed back the Fāṭimids; above all, they established themselves in Iraq and thus began a necessarily close relationship with the caliphs there.⁴⁸ The ‘Abbāsids, for their part, now had to adjust to a relationship with a great Seljūq empire which at its apogee under sultans like Alp Arslan (r. 1063–72) and Malik Shāh (r. 1072–92) came to extend, either by direct rule or through vassals, from eastern Turkestan to Yemen.

In their struggle against the established powers of the Persian lands, the Seljūq leaders Toghril Beg, Chaghrī Beg and Mūsā Yabghu as early as 1035 called themselves on documents, in a depreciatory fashion, ‘clients (*mawālī*) of the Commander of the Faithful’,⁴⁹ although such expressions were conventional enough; but once in occupation of the capital of Khurāsān, Nīshāpūr (1038–39), Toghril is said by later sources to have styled himself *as-Sultān al-Mu‘azzam* (‘Exalted Sultan’) and to have adopted the *laqab* of *Rukn-ad-Dunyā wa-d-Dīn*.⁵⁰ But such titles could only have had any practical significance when the Seljūqs were actually ensconced in Iraq, and when the question of the constitutional relationship between the incomers and the Baghdad caliph, and of any de facto division of power, required definition in the light of the caliph al-Qā’im’s (r. 1031–75) confirmation of Toghril’s title of sultan.

In practice, the change from the old emirate of the Būyids to the new sultanate of the Seljūqs was not all that great. The Seljūqs had secured general approval for their extension of power over Persia and beyond from the orthodox Sunnī classes of urban notables and ‘*ulamā*’,⁵¹ and the Seljūqs were to take a lead in furthering the counter-movement of Sunnī orthodoxy against the previous successes of political Shī‘ism in the shape of the Būyids and Fāṭimids. Aided by a class of *wazīrs*, secretaries and officials who followed the most intellectually reputable of the Sunnī law schools, the Ḥanafī and Shāfi‘ī ones, and the corresponding Ash‘arī theology, the

47 C. E. Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids, their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran 994–1040*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1963, pp. 221–6; C. E. Bosworth, ‘The Political and Dynastic History of the Iranian World (AD 1000–1217)’, in R. N. Frye (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975, V, pp. 15–18.


48 Bosworth, ‘Political and Dynastic History’, pp. 18–23, 42–53.

49 Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, pp. 241–2, 267.

50 *Ibid.*, pp. 267–8.

51 For the case of Nīshāpūr, see Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, pp. 252–66.

THE 'ABBĀSID CALIPHATE AND THE AGE OF THE SULTANATES



3.5 Plan of Damascus during the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk periods
(© Hugh Kennedy)

Seljūq sultans and their servants aided the revival of orthodoxy in the central and eastern lands by, among other things, promoting the already-existent movement for the foundation of Sunnī *madrasas*, or colleges, in which a class of orthodox administrators and religious leaders could be trained, thereby combating the influence of the Shī'ite centres of learning founded by the Fāṭimids in Cairo for the training of Ismā'īlī *dā'īs*.⁵² Seljūq policies like these for the furthering of orthodoxy were obviously in general harmony with the cause of the 'Abbāsids as spiritual and moral heads of the Sunnī world, although in regard to the minor detail of legal affiliation, the caliphs and their ministers tended in the later eleventh and twelfth centuries to favour the Ḥanbalī law school, influential in Baghdad.

52 G. Makdisi, 'Muslim Institutions of Learning in Eleventh-Century Baghdad', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XXIV, 1961, pp. 1–56; see C. E. Bosworth in R. N. Frye (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975, V, pp. 70–4; J. Pedersen and G. Makdisi, 'Madrasa', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–, pp. 47–9.

Where some friction arose was in the practical adjustments of secular power in Iraq between a socially exalted, proudly Arab line of ‘Abbāsīd caliphs (although the proportion of genuine Arab blood in their veins, after generations of liaisons with non-Arab slave concubines, must have been infinitesimal), whose political power had been starting to rise again with the enfeeblement of the last Būyids, and a vigorous wave of Turkish incomers, freemen but untutored barbarians, who had taken advantage of the moral approval of the caliphs in their rise to power in Iraq but who were now determined to enjoy that power as fully as possible. In Baghdad in 1058, Toghrīl received a fresh string of grandiloquent honorifics from al-Qā’im, and the caliph took in marriage a daughter of Chaghri Beg’s; but when Toghrīl himself aspired to marry an ‘Abbāsīd princess, that was a very different thing socially.

The caliph held out as long as possible, but since the Seljūqs exercised military control in central Iraq, with a *shihna* (military governor) stationed in the capital with a powerful garrison, and furthermore threatened to sequester the caliph’s personal domains, the latter had grudgingly to acquiesce.⁵³ The overwhelming power and prestige of a sultan like Malik Shāh (r. 1072–92) continued to circumscribe the caliph’s freedom of action: in 1087 one of Malik Shāh’s daughters was married to al-Muqtadī (r. 1075–94), but there had been frequent tensions between the sultan and his *wazīr* Nizām-ul-Mulk on one side and the caliph and his *wazīrs* of the Ibn Ṭāhir family on the other. At the very end of his reign, in 1092, Malik Shāh came to Baghdad, planning to make it his winter capital, and even seems to have contemplated deposing al-Muqtadī and installing his infant grandson – the product of the liaison between his daughter and the caliph – as caliph in al-Muqtadī’s stead. These intentions were, however, cut short by the sultan’s death in the same year.⁵⁴

From this time onwards, the Great Seljūq sultanate was racked by succession disputes, seen in the fact that during the twelfth century there were often two or more rival sultans. This allowed a corresponding rise in power for the caliphs, who made themselves a distinct military force in Iraqi and western Persian affairs so that there was actually warfare in 1135 between the Seljūq sultan Mas‘ūd ibn Muḥammad and the caliph al-Mustarshid. After Mas‘ūd’s death in 1152, the Seljūq *shihna* in Baghdad was permanently expelled and the sultan’s palace and estates there were confiscated by the caliph al-Muqtafī (r. 1136–60).⁵⁵

53 G. Makdisi, ‘The Marriage of Ṭughril Beg’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, I, 1970, pp. 259–75; Bosworth, *Cambridge History of Iran*, V, pp. 47–9.

54 Bosworth, *Cambridge History of Iran*, V, pp. 99–101; G. Makdisi, ‘Les rapports entre calife et sultān à l’époque saljūqide’, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, VI, 1975, pp. 235–6.

55 Bosworth, *Cambridge History of Iran*, V, pp. 128, 167–8.

The later years of the century were marked by a continued rise in the political and military effectiveness of the 'Abbāsids, as noted by contemporary historians; Ibn al-Athīr states in his obituary notice of al-Muqtafī that 'he was the first caliph to obtain sole power over Iraq, to the exclusion of any sultan, since the time when the Daylamīs [sc. the Būyids] first appeared'.⁵⁶ With an-Nāṣir (r. 1180–1225), the caliph became a central figure in the diplomacy and politics of the age. He paid little attention to the Crusaders in the Levant coastlands, but was intensely concerned with events in the East, where a new power, that of the sultans of the line of Khwārazm Shāhs, had arisen. The authority of the Great Seljūqs became ever more restricted after 1152, with much of Persia, eastern Anatolia and Transcaucasia in the hands of local lines of Atabegs, that is, Turkish slave commanders who had originally been the tutors and protectors of young Seljūq princes sent out as nominal governors of these provinces, but who had then arrogated actual power largely to themselves.

The Khwārazm Shāhs sprang from the Turkish slave guards of the Seljūqs, sent to govern the Central Asian province of Khwārazm, and they followed the Seljūqs in eventually claiming the title of sultan for themselves (see below). From being purely a local power north of the Oxus, in the later twelfth century they adopted an aggressive and expansionist policy, killing the last Great Seljūq sultan in 1194, sweeping away the Seljūq sultanate and, with this barrier down, militarily threatening the caliphs. An-Nāṣir built up his moral and spiritual authority through his patronage of the *futuwwa* (chivalric orders), bringing together in them both Sunnīs and moderate Shī'ites, but now he faced the full blast of Khwārazmian imperialism. The shah 'Alā'-ad-Dīn Muḥammad (r. 1200–20) adopted as part of this onslaught on the 'Abbāsids a pro-Shī'ite policy, supporting 'Alid claims to the caliphate and proclaiming the illegitimacy of 'Abbāsid rule. Against the shahs, an-Nāṣir encouraged rival dynasties of the East like the Ghūrīds and, allegedly, the assassination activities of the Ismā'īlīs, although the insinuation in the sources that he urged on the Mongols to attack the Khwārazmian rear seems baseless. Certainly, the Khwārazmian empire disintegrated under Mongol attacks in the years after 1217, but the 'Abbāsids themselves were only spared for another 40 years before the Mongol Hülegü sacked Baghdad in 1258, killing the caliph and ending, together with the 500 years' rule there of the 'Abbāsids, the effective existence of the caliphate.

The age of the Great Seljūqs is, as has been shown, associated with the institution of the sultanate and the title 'sultan'. Originally, this last word had denoted (as in frequent Qur'ānic and *Ḥadīth* usage) the abstract concept of 'power' and 'dominion', and the transition to its becoming attached to

56 Cited in *ibid.*, p. 167.

the actual holder of that power or dominion was a gradual one which is hard to document precisely.⁵⁷ It seems to have been used thus informally in the ninth and tenth centuries and in compounds like the *laqab* of *Sulṭān-ad-Dawla* borne by one of the eleventh-century Būyids;⁵⁸ but al-Māwardī in the early eleventh century did not know the title and the institution of the sultanate as formal ones, and in the title of his constitutional treatise *al-Aḥkām as-sulṭāniyya* it is used adjectivally as something like ‘the juridical bases of power’. ‘Sultan’ only became a formal designation and a regular sovereign title in the mid-eleventh century with the Great Seljūqs and the later Ghaznavids, so that it soon became the highest title after the caliphal ones to which a Muslim prince could aspire.⁵⁹ Consequently, lesser princes could no longer call themselves sultans at the official level and that of protocol (although in informal usage, the term could be used for holders of power at almost any level, from even the caliph himself downwards). It was only with the palpable decline of the Great Seljūqs that the Khwārazm Shāhs started to call themselves sultans, but the caliph an-Nāṣir refused to recognize this;⁶⁰ and on their coins and in official documents, the Ayyūbids who followed the Fāṭimids in Egypt and Syria bore official titles combined only with *malik* (king), e.g. *al-Malik al-Kāmil*. In the thirteenth century, ‘sultan’ denoted absolute political independence, and only after the fall of the Baghdad caliphate (see above) did an increasing number of potentates claim the title for themselves.

In practice, the power of the sultans of the eleventh century and after, vis-à-vis the caliphs, was analogous to that held by the *amīrs* of the tenth century, as Ibn Khaldūn states by defining them both as holders of control over the caliphate.⁶¹ Where the control had been achieved by *force majeure*, traditionally minded jurists could only regard it as a usurpation of caliphal authority, for the caliph alone had power to delegate this.⁶² Nevertheless, there was the reality of contemporary circumstances. Al-Māwardī was forced to contemplate the possibility that a caliph–imam might remain in office even if dominated by an outside force, provided that force’s actions were in accordance with the *sharī‘a*. He was also constrained to contemplate, in the face of Fāṭimid Shī‘ite strength, the possibility of the caliph–imam’s deposition by rebellious Muslims, in which case, he seems reluctantly to

57 See Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1988, p. 35; J. H. Kramers, ‘Sulṭān’, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1st edn, ed. M. Th. Houtsma, et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1913–.

58 See K. V. Zettersteen, ‘Sulṭān al-Dawla’, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1st edn, ed. M. Th. Houtsma, et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1913–.

59 See Makdisi, ‘Les rapports’, pp. 230–2.

60 Kramers, ‘Sulṭān’.

61 Ibn Khaldūn, *The Muqaddimah*, II, pp. 5, 11.

62 Gibb, ‘al-Māwardī’s Theory’, pp. 162–4.

have concluded, the validating community would either have to recognize the new, victorious caliph–imam or choose another one altogether.⁶³ At all events, ‘emirate by seizure’ and the assumption of the title of sultan, even by Sunnī princes who otherwise professed their loyalty to the ideal of the caliph as overall moral and religious authority, were accomplished facts.⁶⁴

Accordingly, various thinkers living under the Seljūqs in the later eleventh century had to examine the new, de facto relationship of caliph and sultan. Al-Ghazālī tried to resolve the conflict between religiously buttressed authority and secular power in the practical direction of affairs, at a time when the caliph on the whole retained the first but not the second. al-Ghazālī’s thought here developed within several of his works concerned with the problems. In one of these, the *Iqtīṣād al-i’tiqād*, he tries to incorporate the sultanate as an essential element of the Sunnī caliphate–imamate by explaining that, even when the sultan had come to dominate the caliph–imam, as was happening during his own time, this had to be authenticated by an act of *bay‘a* (fealty) on the part of the great men of state (corresponding to the *shūrā* in early Islam and the consensus of the community) and approved by the ‘ulamā’; the whole process would thus take place under the aegis of the *sharī‘a*.⁶⁵ Elsewhere, in his *Nasīḥat al-mulūk*, al-Ghazālī concentrates on the sultan’s coercive function (*shawka*) as being in accordance with the divine will and God’s requirement that there should be firm government on earth in which religion could flourish, reflected in the tradition that the sultan was God’s shadow here on earth.⁶⁶

This concept of the ruler’s power was treated at length in the ‘Mirrors for Princes’ literature, and especially in the *Sīyāsat-nāma* of the *wazīr* Nizām-ul-Mulk, which merits particular attention as an exposition of the contemporary situation as seen by a religiously trained practical statesman. For Nizām-ul-Mulk, the question to be resolved was how kingship exercised by the ruler as God’s representative on earth, in imitation of the divine scheme of government in heaven (a concept familiar in many ancient Near Eastern cultures, including the pre-Islamic Persian one), could be incorporated into the framework of Islam. For him, the reality of the sultan’s power in Seljūq

63 Ibid., p. 160.

64 On the general topic of the relationship of the caliphate to the sultanate in these times, see Tyan, *Institutions*, II, pp. 80–206.

65 L. Binder, ‘al-Ghazālī’s Theory of Islamic Government’, *The Muslim World*, XLIV, 1954, pp. 229–41; Lambton, *State and Government*, pp. 107–29; Carole Hillenbrand, ‘Islamic Orthodoxy or Realpolitik? Al-Ghazālī’s Views on Government’, *Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies*, XXVI, 1988, pp. 87–90; Lambton, ‘Concepts of Authority’, p. 97.

66 F. R. C. Bagley, *Introduction to al-Ghazālī’s Book of Counsel for Kings (Nasīḥat al-Mulūk)*, London, Oxford University Press, 1964, pp. li–lvi. A classical study of the concept of the ruler as the shadow of God on earth is Ignaz Goldziher’s ‘Du sens propre des expressions Ombre de Dieu, Khalife de Dieu, pour désigner les chefs dans l’Islam’, *Revue de l’histoire des religions*, XXXV, 1897, pp. 331–8.

times was such that he could assert that the sultan is chosen by God, without the intermediacy of the caliph or approval by any kind of ratifying body, and that the sultan is therefore responsible to God alone. It also means that no holder of such power has any prescriptive right to it; what God has given He can take away. Nor does the sultan bear any charismatic qualities like the Sunnī caliph–imam, let alone the Shī‘ite infallible imam.⁶⁷

Dominating all Nizām-ul-Mulk’s thought was the fear of anarchy in state and society, a fear expressed by numerous earlier writers, often with copious citation of traditions and aphorisms to the effect that 100 years with an unjust prince were preferable to a single day of mob rule. Such attitudes, rejecting any possibility of resistance to a tyrannical ruler, however insupportable, grew stronger in succeeding centuries and contributed to the image in the minds of the eighteenth-century *philosophes* and similar thinkers of an Islamic East as sunk in an unchanging despotism exercised over passive, oppressed populations.

Meanwhile, the question of the three-cornered relationship of God, caliph and sultan was being resolved in the later Islamic Middle Ages by the development of the theory that the seizure of power itself gave authority and legitimacy. Thus a writer like the Syrian Shāfi‘ī ibn Jamā‘a (d. 1333), writing after the extinguishing of the caliphate by the Mongols, transfers to the sultans and de facto rulers the concepts of authority worked out by earlier writers active when the caliphate–imamate had still been in existence, even if this last had been compelled to share real power with *amīrs* and sultans; whilst another Syrian, the Ḥanbalī Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), held the view that, whilst the imamate of the Prophet Muḥammad had been divinely instituted and that of the Rightly Guided Caliphs only slightly less so, there was no divine command regarded the permanence of the caliphate in any single line, since the *sharī‘a* demands obedience to God and the Prophet only.⁶⁸

67 Rosenthal, *Political Thought*, pp. 81–3; Lambton, ‘Concepts of Authority’, p. 98.

68 Rosenthal, *Political Thought*, pp. 43–61; Lambton, *State and Government*, pp. 138–51.

Chapter 3.2

ISLAM IN THE MAGHRIB (21–641/1041–1631)

Idris El Hareir

INTRODUCTION

‘Maghrib’ is a geographical term that the Muslim Arabs gave to the region extending from Alexandria in the east up to the Atlantic Ocean in the west.¹ In ancient times this region was known by the Greeks as Aleppo or Libya. The Byzantines used the term ‘Ifrīqiya’ to refer to modern-day Tunisia and it subsequently came to apply to the whole of the African continent. Muslim historians and geographers divided the region into three areas: al-Maghrib al-Adnā (the Near Maghrib), al-Maghrib al-Awsaṭ (the Middle Maghrib) and al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā (the Far Maghrib). Al-Maghrib al-Adnā included the lands extending from Alexandria up to Ṭarābūlus (modern-day Tripoli) in the west. Indeed, Alexandria used to be called the ‘gateway to the west’. Al-Maghrib al-Awsaṭ extended from Tripoli to Bijāya, while al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā extended from Tāhart (Tiaret) to the Atlantic Ocean.²

It appears that the Muslim geographers were influenced by references in the Qur’ān to the east and the west – ‘The Lord of the two Easts and the two Wests’, ‘The Lord of the East and the West’, ‘The East and West of the earth’, ‘The Lord of the Easts’³ – and used these terms to define territorial boundaries. They disagreed, however, over the definition of the word ‘west’.

1 Ibn Ḥawqal, Abu-l-Qāsim, *Kitāb ṣūrat al-arḍ*, Beirut, Maktabat al-ḥayāt, 1979, p. 63. See also Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, *Mu‘jam al-buldān*, Beirut, 1958, I, p. 228.

2 Al-‘Abbādī, Aḥmad Mukhtār, *fī tārikh al-Maghrib wa-l-Andalus*, Beirut, Dār an-nahḍa al-‘arabiyya, 1978, pp. 9–11.

3 The Qur’ānic references are, respectively, *ar-Raḥmān*, 55:17; *ash-Shu‘arā’*, 26:28; *al-‘A‘rāf*, 7:137; and *al-Muzzammil*, 73:9; see also *aṣ-Ṣāffāt*, 37:5.

Some geographers used it to indicate the lands extending from Egypt to al-Andalus (Muslim Spain), including all the islands under Muslim control in the western Mediterranean such as Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, Mallorca and Menorca. Others, especially during the early years of the 'Abbāsid caliphate, considered that it covered an area from Greater Syria (ash-Shām) through Egypt and up to al-Andalus. Most Muslim historians and geographers, however, considered that the 'west' extended from Alexandria westwards as far as the Atlantic Ocean.⁴

At the same time that the Arabs became united under the banner of Islam and inflicted crushing defeats on the Sāsānid and Byzantine empires, completely destroying the former and forcing the latter to retreat from Greater Syria and Egypt, the lands of the Maghrib were suffering politically, religiously, socially and economically from the conflicts which shook the Byzantine capital, Constantinople. In AD 602 the Byzantine emperor Maurice (r. 582–602) was killed in a bloody coup led by a general called Phocas, who then became emperor (r. 602–10). Heraclius, the commander of the Byzantine army, did not approve of the coup and refused to give his support to Phocas. He was joined by those who objected to the new emperor and they made the Maghrib their headquarters.⁵

Heraclius' first action was to stop food supplies such as wheat being transported from the Maghrib to the Byzantine state. He then chose his youngest son, also called Heraclius, as his successor as emperor. In 608 Alexandria was seized by the Maghribī army under Heraclius' nephew Nicetas whom he had appointed as commander. At the same time, Heraclius the younger led a Maghribī naval fleet which went on to capture Constantinople in 610 and to depose Phocas. In this way Heraclius the younger (r. 610–41) was crowned emperor of the Byzantine state.⁶

Under Heraclius the Maghrib became an important centre for the Byzantines and it witnessed considerable development in agriculture and construction. It was not long, however, before it was the scene of religious discord, particularly when Heraclius gave his support to a new sect claiming that Jesus Christ possessed one will, which was both divine and human. The promulgator of this doctrine was Sergius, the patriarch of Constantinople, and his followers were known as the Monothelites. Heraclius thought that all Christians would accept Sergius' doctrine and so in 638 he made an official proclamation endorsing it. This provoked a violent storm of protest in the

4 Ḥusayn Mu'nis, *Ma'ālim tārikh al-Maghrib wa-l-Andalus*, Alexandria, Dār al-mustaqbal, 1980, p. 19.

5 Sālim, *As-Sayyid 'Abd-al-'Azīz, al-Maghrib al-kabīr*, Beirut, Dār an-nahḍa al-'arabiyya, 1981, II, pp. 73–4.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 74.

Christian world and led to numerous religious conflicts, the most notable of which occurred in the Maghrib.⁷

Maximus, the bishop of the Maghrib, led the opposition to the Monothelites and enjoyed wide support. Meanwhile, a delegation of clergymen from Egypt arrived in the region and called on people to join a new Christian sect which claimed that Jesus Christ possessed only a single nature, that is, Monophysitism. This sect was supported by Constantine III, the son of Heraclius the younger, and he permitted them to conduct their activities in the Maghrib. This angered the adherents of Catholicism, however, who announced their secession from the empire.

Constance II acceded to the throne in 641 and championed the Monothelites. In response, Bishop Maximus incited the tribes in the Maghrib to revolt against the emperor and to install Patriarch Gregorios (called 'Jarjīr' in the Islamic sources) on the throne. The patriarch had a great popular following in the Maghrib and the people rallied around him. In 646 Gregorios declared independence from the Byzantine empire and gave himself the title 'emperor'. He championed the Catholic Church, had his name inscribed on the coinage and transferred his capital from Qartāj (Carthage) to Subaitla (modern Sbeitla) in the interior far from the sea and out of reach of the Byzantine fleet.⁸

It is certainly the case that these religious and political disturbances within the Byzantine state, and specifically in the Maghrib, facilitated the Muslim conquest of the Maghrib, particularly when the inhabitants became aware of how tolerant the Muslims were of the other monotheist religions. There were other reasons for the conquests, however. First, the Muslims were eager to implement the policy of disseminating Islam and extending the territory of the Islamic state. Second, they wanted to take advantage of the military and political weakness of the Byzantine state after the famous battle of Yarmūk in 13/634 in which the Muslims achieved a decisive victory over the Byzantines. The Muslims capitalized on this great military success by advancing into Egypt and then on to Barqa (the modern city of al-Marj) in the east of the present-day Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to safeguard Egypt's western borders. And, third, they hoped to benefit from the unstable internal situation in the Maghrib caused by the struggle for power between the Byzantine emperors and their governors.⁹

7 Al-'Arīnī, *ad-Dawla al-bīzanṭiyya*, Beirut, Dār an-nahḍa al-'arabiyya, 1982, pp. 132–3.

8 Ibid., p. 144; Sālim, *al-Maghrib*, II, pp. 77–8.

9 El Hareir, Idris, 'al-Futūḥāt fi-l-Maghrib wa-l-Andalus', in *al-Kitāb al-marjī' fī tārikh al-umma al-'arabiyya*, Tunisia, al-Munazzama al-'arabiyya li-t-tarbiya wa-th-thaqāfa wa-l-'ulūm (ALECSO), 2005, II, pp. 320–2.

The stages of the Muslim conquest of the Maghrib

The Muslim conquest of the Maghrib passed through a number of stages: the first, which was the most important, continued for some seventy years from 21/641 to 91/711 and can be divided into seven military campaigns. An Arab-Islamic administration was subsequently formed which was contemporaneous with the Umayyad regime and the beginning of the 'Abbāsids. Following this, the Maghrib was divided into states each of which, as we shall see, played a prominent role in the ongoing consolidation and spread of Islam in the region, in Europe and also in sub-Saharan Africa.

The first campaign directed against the Maghrib occurred in 21/641 under the leadership of 'Amr ibn al-Āṣ, who saw further conquests to the west of Egypt as far as Barqa and Ṭarāblus as necessary in order to protect Egypt's western borders. He began by sending out exploratory raids and then personally led a Muslim army to gain control of Barqa which, according to the historians, capitulated peacefully because the inhabitants hated the Byzantines who burdened them with heavy taxes.¹⁰

After this, 'Amr ibn al-Āṣ divided his army into two parts. He placed one part under the command of 'Uqba ibn Nāfi' who headed for Fazzān, and specifically to Zuwayla the regional capital, which he captured without encountering any opposition. The principal reason behind this move was to cut off any supplies or reinforcements that the south might send to assist the coastal cities. As for the second and larger part of the army, this was led by 'Amr ibn al-Āṣ himself. He marched to the city of Barnīq (present-day Benghazi), then to Ajdābiya, Sirte, Libda and Tripoli, which he besieged for one month before conquering it. He then moved on to the city of Ṣabrāta, which also fell without offering any resistance. Meanwhile, 'Amr ibn al-Āṣ dispatched a military force under the command of Bisr ibn Arṭa'a to the region of Waddān over which he gained control in 23/643.¹¹

When 'Amr ibn al-Āṣ had completed the conquest of Ṭarāblus, he wrote to the caliph 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (r. 13–24/634–44) informing him of his success and asking him for permission to invade Ifrīqiya (present-day Tunisia). He wrote:

God has granted us Ṭarāblus and there are only nine days between us and Ifrīqiya. If the *Amīr al-Mu'minīn* ['Commander of the Faithful'] considers it

10 Ibn 'Abd-al-Ḥakam, 'Abd-ar-Rahmān, *Futūḥ Ifrīqiya wa-l-Andalus*, ed. Anīs aṭ-Ṭabbā', Beirut, Dār al-kitāb al-lubnānī, 1964, pp. 28–9.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 30. See also Al-Balādhurī, Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, ed. Muḥammad Riḍwān, Cairo, al-Maṭba'a al-miṣriyya, 1932, pp. 225–7; Ibn al-Abbār, Abū 'Abdallāh, *al-Ḥulla as-siyarā'*, ed. Ḥusayn Mu'nis, Cairo, ash-Sharika al-'arabiyya li-ṭ-ṭibā'a wa-n-nashr, 1963, p. 41.

appropriate that we invade it and that God should let it fall into our hands, then this will happen.

The caliph responded by ordering that the conquests must stop at this point out of concern for the souls of the Muslims who had travelled so far from the central Islamic lands and into regions so recently acquired and in which Islam was not yet established. ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ obeyed the caliph’s order and returned to Egypt after appointing ‘Uqba ibn Nāfi‘ as governor of Barqa and Ṭarāblus. ‘Uqba worked ceaselessly to disseminate and consolidate Islam in the area and Barqa became an important base for Islam and the centre of missionary activity to spread the religion throughout the Maghrib.

When the caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb died, he was succeeded by ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān (r. 24–35/644–55), who removed ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ from the governorship of Egypt and replaced him with ‘Abdallāh ibn Abī Sarḥ.¹² ‘Uthmān consulted with the senior Companions of the Prophet and decided to continue the programme of conquest in the Maghrib. He therefore gave permission for the governor of Egypt to mobilize a large army, which included many of the leading sons of the Companions such as ‘Abdallāh ibn az-Zubayr, Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam, Mughīra ibn al-‘Abbās ibn ‘Abd-al-Muṭṭalib, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, ‘Abdallāh ibn ‘Amr ibn al-‘Āṣ, ‘Abdallāh and ‘Ubaydallāh the sons of ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, and ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Abī Bakr aṣ-Ṣiddīq. It was called the army of the ‘Abdallāhs because so many of those in it were called ‘Abdallāh (‘servant of God’), ‘Ubaydallāh (‘little servant of God’) or ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān (‘servant of the Merciful’).¹³

The Muslim army under ‘Abdallāh ibn Abī Sarḥ numbered 20,000 men. They marched from Egypt to Barqa, where they joined forces with ‘Uqba ibn Nāfi‘. They then moved on to Ṭarāblus and from there to Qābis, where in 28/648 they clashed with the Byzantine army under the command of Gregorios near Subaiṭla. The Byzantines were defeated and their commander was killed. After concluding a peace treaty with the inhabitants of Ifrīqiya, the Muslims retraced their steps to Barqa and then Egypt.¹⁴ The reason why ‘Abdallāh ibn Abī Sarḥ did not follow up on his victory at Subaiṭla was because he had learnt that the southern borders of Egypt were being threatened from Nubia.¹⁵

Following the great civil strife that culminated in the assassination of ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān in 35/655, the Islamic state was involved in no further

12 Ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Ifrīqiya*, p. 30; Al-Balādhūrī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 227.

13 Ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Ifrīqiya*, p. 30; Al-Balādhūrī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 223.

14 Al-Balādhūrī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 228.

15 Kamāl as-Sayyid Abū Muṣṭafā, *Muḥāḍarāt fī tārikh al-Maghrib wa-l-Andalus*, Alexandria, Markaz al-iskandariyya li-l-kitāb, 2003, p. 16.



3.6 Madrasa Al-ʿAṭṭarīn, Fez (© G. Degeorge)

wars of conquest including in the Maghrib. They did not resume until the caliphate of Muʿāwiya ibn Abī Sufyān (r. 41–61/661–80), who appointed one of his aides, Muʿāwiya ibn Ḥudayj, as commander of an army of 10,000 men. Some of the most prominent sons of the Companions such as ʿAbdallāh ibn az-Zubayr, ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān and ʿAbdallāh ibn ʿUmar were in this army. It also included many of the nobles of the Quraysh.¹⁶ Ibn Ḥudayj conquered the cities of Sūsa, Qābis and Banzart and forced the Byzantines to retreat to their ships anchored at sea. He also led a campaign against Sicily in 46/667. Ibn Ḥudayj was, however, unable to continue his conquests since in 50/670 the caliph Muʿāwiya dismissed him from his post and replaced him with ʿUqba ibn Nāfi.¹⁷

ʿUqba ibn Nāfi played no part in the terrible civil war which shook the Islamic state, preferring to remain neutral until things settled down. He renewed his activities after ʿAmr ibn al-ʿĀṣ became governor of Egypt for the second time and made him commander of a Muslim army with Barqa as his military and administrative headquarters.¹⁸ From the city of Sirte, ʿUqba ibn Nāfi sent expeditionary forces to the oases in the region of Fazzān such as

16 Ibn ʿAbd-al-Hakam, *Futūḥ Ifrīqiya*, pp. 64–74.

17 *Ibid.*, p. 46.

18 Al-Bakrī, Abū ʿUbayd, *al-Mughrib fī dhikr bilād Ifrīqiya wa-l-Maghrib*, Algiers, al-Maṭbaʿa al-ḥukūmiyya, 1857, p. 13.

Waddān, Kawwār and Ghadāmis. He then set out with his army for Qafṣa and then on to Kairouan, where he decided to build the first Islamic capital city in the Arab Maghrib.

THE FOUNDING OF KAIROUAN (50/670)

Kairouan (Qayrawān), which means ‘tent’, was founded for a number of reasons the most important of which are as follows. First, it was designed to implement the Islamic state’s programme of establishing garrison cities on the pattern of Basra, Kufa and Fustāṭ. Second, it was to be a military supply base from which campaigns could be directed and in which troops arriving from the east or returning from the far west could recuperate. And, third, it was to be a platform for the spread and consolidation of Islam.¹⁹

‘Uqba ibn Nāfi’ decided that Kairouan should be situated far from the coast and away from the Byzantine fleet. In reply to his companions, who thought that the city should be near the sea so as to act as a coastal defence, he said: ‘I am worried that the ruler of Constantinople will fall upon it by surprise and take it. But make sure that sailors can find their way there once they have been informed of the route.’²⁰

The choice of the site of Kairouan was based on its fulfilling the requirements for Muslim cities, including the availability of pasture, firewood, building materials, natural defences and so on. Kairouan and its mosque were the focus of a number of miracles attributed to ‘Uqba ibn Nāfi’ and some of the Prophet’s Companions and Successors who helped build the mosque. ‘Uqba earned the respect and praise of the Muslims because he did not participate in the terrible civil war and because of his well-known efforts to disseminate Islam in the Maghrib.

The city of Kairouan played a crucial role in the spread of Islam not only in the Maghrib but also in the lands south of the Sahara, in Sicily, Corsica and al-Andalus. Numerous military expeditions set out from there for these places accompanied by religious scholars, Qur’ān reciters and missionaries.

In 55/654 the caliph Mu‘āwiya ibn Abī Sufyān dismissed ‘Uqba from the governorship of Ifrīqiya and the Maghrib and replaced him with Abū-l-Muhājir Dīnār (in office 55–62/654–81). He gave ultimate jurisdiction over the region to the governor of Egypt, Maslama ibn Mukhlid al-Anṣārī. The sources quickly pass over the period of Abū-l-Muhājir’s governorship but mention

19 El Hareir, ‘al-Futūḥāt’, p. 322.

20 Ibn ‘Idhārī al-Marrākushī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib fī akhbār al-Andalus wa-l-Maghrib*, ed. E. Lévi-Provençal, Beirut, Dār ath-thaqāfa, 1967, I, pp. 9–11.

that he led a campaign which broke the alliance between the Byzantines and the tribe of the Awraba. He also took a military force as far as Tilmisān (Tlemcen). The caliph Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwiya (r. 61–64/680–83) dismissed him, however, and reinstated ‘Uqba ibn Nāfi‘ (in office 62–64/681–82). Yazīd also separated the governorship of the Maghrib from Egypt. ‘Uqba ibn Nāfi‘ arrived in Kairouan at the head of a Muslim army which included twenty of the Prophet’s Companions.

‘Uqba mobilized an army of 1,500 men and, accompanied by the previous governor Abū-l-Muhājir Dīnār, set off for the Maghrib. He appointed Zuhayr ibn Qays al-Balawī to deputize for him in Kairouan while he was away. In 62/681 ‘Uqba led a campaign to Ṭanja (Tangier). He then continued on to the city of Walīla, where he concluded a peace treaty and made an alliance with Julian, the ruler of Sabta (Ceuta). Following this, ‘Uqba went to as-Sūs al-Aqṣā (the southernmost province of present-day Morocco), eventually reaching the Atlantic Ocean. Many people embraced Islam at his hands.

In 63/682 ‘Uqba divided his army into two groups. The largest group returned to Kairouan by one route while ‘Uqba took another route with the smaller group. When ‘Uqba and his men reached Tāhūdā near Baskara they were ambushed by a large detachment of soldiers under the command of Kusayla, the chief of the Awraba tribe and an apostate from Islam. The ensuing unequal battle resulted in the death of ‘Uqba and his companions who, according to Islamic sources, numbered 300 men.²¹ News of the death of ‘Uqba and his men at Tāhūdā resonated throughout the Maghrib and the East. When Zuhayr ibn Qays heard of it, he withdrew from Kairouan and went to Barqa to wait for reinforcements from the caliph in Damascus.

‘Uqba’s death coincided with the death of the caliph Yazīd ibn Mu‘āwiya. Yazīd was succeeded by his son Mu‘āwiya II who, however, after ruling for only forty days, also died. This was followed by a period of crisis for the Umayyad caliphate and by revolts against it, the most serious of which was that led by ‘Abdallāh ibn az-Zubayr in the Ḥijāz. The critical situation and conflicts were only finally overcome with the accession to the caliphate of ‘Abd-al-Malik ibn Marwān (r. 65–87/685–705).

‘Abd-al-Malik had twice before taken part in the conquest of the Maghrib and was aware of the importance of the region for Islam and also of the sacrifices that had been made in occupying it. He therefore made haste to mobilize a large army and to supply it with all that it would need. Zuhayr ibn Qays al-Balawī, who was still stationed in Barqa, was put in command. Zuhayr successfully defeated the Byzantines and their ally Kusayla, who was

21 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, pp. 23–4. See also Al-Mālikī, Abū Bakr, *Riyāḍ an-nufūs*, ed. Ḥusayn Mu’nis, Cairo, Maktabat an-nahḍa, 1951, pp. 22–5.

killed at the battle of Mams to the south of Kairouan in 69/688. In this way the Muslims recovered what they had lost in Ifrīqiya.²²

After completing his task in Ifrīqiya, Zuhayr decided to return to the East. When he arrived at the city of Darna (in present-day eastern Libya), he was ambushed by the Byzantines and killed along with seventy of his men. To this day their tombs are to be found in Darna in the graveyard of the Companions.

Following Zuhayr's death the Maghrib was once again thrown into turmoil. 'Abd-al-Malik prepared another large army of 40,000 men and placed it under the command of Ḥassān ibn Nu'mān al-Ghassānī, a senior Umayyad military officer. Ḥassān's plan was to strike the Byzantines in the city of Qarṭāj, which they had taken as a base for their naval fleet, and also to launch an attack on their allies from the Zanāta tribe, which was led by a woman called Dāhiya bint Mātiya or simply al-Kāhina ('the soothsayer'). After numerous battles Ḥassān was able to defeat the Byzantines, to destroy their base in Qarṭāj and to put an end to al-Kāhina and her army.²³

Following these victories, Ḥassān turned his attention to organizing the administration of Ifrīqiya. He divided it into administrative districts and created government departments (*dīwāns*), he arranged the land tax (*kharāj*) and posted governors to the various regions. He also made efforts to spread the word of Islam and founded the Zaytūna Mosque. He built a naval base on the site of the present city of Tunis, a residence for the government and barracks for the troops. He sent religious scholars to the different regions and encouraged the use of Arabic. He conscripted the local inhabitants into the army and accorded them the same treatment as the other soldiers so that he came to have a large and enthusiastic army. The people rushed to embrace Islam. In this way Ḥassān ibn Nu'mān conquered the Maghrib both militarily and spiritually and he was able to turn all the lands of Ifrīqiya to Islam. It seems, however, that he thought it best to separate jurisdiction over Ifrīqiya from Egypt and this led to a clash with the very powerful governor of Egypt, 'Abd-al-'Azīz ibn Marwān, the caliph's brother, who conspired against Ḥassān and had him dismissed from the governorship of Ifrīqiya in 85/704.²⁴ That same year, 'Abd-al-'Azīz appointed Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr to replace him.

Once Mūsā had arrived in Kairouan, he began the conquest of the remainder of the region. He ordered the capture of all the castles and fortresses that had not yet been seized, he raided Sicily, Sardinia and Malta, and he subdued all the tribes which had still to acknowledge the authority of Islam. In 86/705 Mūsā launched a great campaign against

22 Al-Mālikī, *Riyāḍ an-nufūs*, p. 29; Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, p. 31.

23 El Hareir, 'al-Futūḥāt', pp. 325–7.

24 Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, p. 31.

the Far Maghrib (al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā) and seized most of the cities there. The ensuing widespread confusion allowed him to impose his authority over all the Maghrib. He then continued the programme of spreading Islam through missionary activity and chose seventeen religious scholars who were to instruct the people in the true religion. Many people became Muslims at the hands of these scholars. The only places in the Maghrib not subject to Muslim authority were Sabta and Malīla, which were ruled by Julian the Goth who had concluded peace treaties with the Muslims.²⁵

The programme of disseminating Islam and the Arabic language, alongside the gradual conversion to Islam of the inhabitants of the Maghrib, gaining their participation in military campaigns and granting them equal status with the Arabs, eventually resulted in the peoples of the Maghrib becoming integrated with the new conquerors and emerging as a significant force within the Muslim army which went on to occupy al-Andalus.²⁶

The Umayyad caliph al-Walīd ibn ‘Abd-al-Malik (r. 86–96/705–15) dismissed Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr as governor of the Maghrib. When al-Walīd died he was succeeded by Sulaymān ibn ‘Abd-al-Malik (r. 96–99/715–18), who appointed Muḥammad ibn Yazīd al-Qurashī (in office 97–100/716–19) to the governorship. Muḥammad was a pious man who governed with justice and fairness and under him the lands of the Maghrib enjoyed a period of peace and security. Among his achievements was the completion of the conquest of the inner regions of the Far Maghrib and some of the neighbouring islands. His distribution of booty to the soldiers taking part in the military campaigns won him their affection and had a great influence on the new waves of people converting to Islam.²⁷

During the reign of the caliph ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd-al-‘Azīz (r. 99–101/717–19), who was renowned for his tolerance and sense of justice, Ismā‘īl ibn ‘Ubaydallāh ibn Abi-l-Muhājir Dīnār was appointed as governor of the Maghrib (in office 100–01/718–19). Ismā‘īl was one of the most able Umayyad governors. He instituted many reforms and followed the programme of disseminating Islam and the Arabic language among the tribes of the Maghrib. The caliph sent him in the company of ten of the Prophet’s Successors, all scholars and men of culture, who were charged with teaching the religion of Islam. They were distributed around the regions of the Maghrib. Due to this policy most of the tribes of the Maghrib converted to Islam, leaving only isolated pockets where this was not the case. Indeed, some historians believe that under Ismā‘īl ibn ‘Ubaydallāh ibn Abi-l-Muhājir Dīnār all the people of the Maghrib had become Muslim.²⁸ The French historian Georges Marçais remarks: ‘In less

25 Ibid., p. 39.

26 El Hareir, ‘al-Futūḥāt’. pp. 326–9.

27 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, pp. 43–6.

28 Ibid., p. 48.

than one century the great majority of sons of Christians had embraced Islam with such zeal that they sought martyrdom. The final conversions took place during the first two centuries after the emigration (*hijra*).²⁹

Following the death of the just caliph ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd-al-‘Azīz, the Umayyads changed their policy regarding the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects who vehemently opposed their rule. They resorted to violence against these groups, forcing them to seek sanctuary in the remotest regions of the empire. Some of them found their way to the Maghrib, where they propounded their ideas and made propaganda against the Umayyads. This development coincided with the outbreak of tribal conflict within the Islamic society, the most well-known example of which was the bitter struggle between the Arabs of the North and those of the South, or the Qaysīs and the Yamanīs, which undermined the unity of the Muslims.

Within this context, and in order to crush any opposition to the Umayyad regime, the caliph Yazīd ibn ‘Abd-al-Malik (r. 101–05/720–23) rejected the gentle and tolerant approach and appointed as governor of the Maghrib Yazīd ibn Abī Muslim, a severe man who was a supporter and chief of police of al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yusūf (in office 75–95/694–714). Yazīd ibn Abī Muslim emulated his companion al-Ḥajjāj and acted imperiously, intimidating the people and treating them with contempt. He was also extremely avaricious. The historian Ibn ‘Idhārī refers to him in the following terms: ‘He was unjust and tyrannical so his guards rose up against him and killed him within one month of his becoming governor.’³⁰

Another historian, Ibn Khaldūn, notes a relationship between the assassination of Yazīd ibn Abī Muslim, the governor of the Maghrib, and the beginning of Khārijī activity in the region.³¹ The ideas of the Khārijīs were warmly received by many of the tribes in the Maghrib, especially when compared with the unfair preference of the Arabs, the oppression of the governors and the conflict between the Northern and the Southern Arabs which had started to take root in the region. We see evidence of this latter conflict with ‘Ubayda ibn ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān as-Sulamī, who was governor of the Maghrib from 109/727 to 114/732. He was a Qaysī, that is, a Northern Arab, and so fanatical that the caliph Hishām ibn ‘Abd-al-Malik dismissed him and appointed ‘Ubaydallāh ibn al-Ḥabḥāb (in office 116–23/734–42) in his stead. But ‘Ubaydallāh was also a Qaysī, like his predecessor, and this caused the tribes from the region of as-Sūs al-Aqṣā to rebel against him. They were supported by the doctrines of the Khārijīs and the Shī‘īs, who used the

29 Georges Marçais, *La Berberie musulmane et l’orient au moyen âge*, Paris, Aubier Édition Montaigne, 1946, p. 125.

30 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, p. 48; ar-Rafīq al-Qayrawānī, *Tārīkh Ifrīqiya wa-l-Maghrib*, ed. al-Munjī al-Ka‘bī, Tunisia, Rafīq as-Saqāṭī, 1968, p. 99.

31 Ibn Khaldūn, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, Beirut, Dār al-kitāb, 1950, VI, pp. 220–1.

people's grievances over the despotic nature of Umayyad rule as a context for demanding justice and equality in accordance with Islamic law. These demands were readily taken up by many of the tribes in the Maghrib.

The Khārijī Ṣufriyya sect were successful in propagating doctrines first sown in the Middle Maghrib (al-Maghrib al-Awsaṭ) by 'Abdallāh 'Ikrima ibn 'Abdallāh, who was a companion of the Ibādī propagandist Salama ibn Sa'īd, the first Ibādī to reach the Maghrib.³² It is evident that the activities of the Khārijīs in the Middle Maghrib gained them considerable support from the inhabitants of the region such that we see Maysara al-Madgharī, the chief of the Madghara tribe, leading a violent revolt against the Umayyad administration in 122/740. Muslim historians from various periods, such as Ibn 'Abd-al-Ḥakam (187–257/803–71), aṭ-Ṭabarī (224–304/839–923) and Ibn 'Idhārī al-Marrākushī (seventh/thirteenth century), all agree that the revolt broke out in response to the oppressive policies of the Umayyad governor 'Ubaydallāh ibn al-Ḥabḥāb and his deputy 'Umar al-Murādī (in office 116–22/735–40) along with the inability of the Umayyad caliph Hishām ibn 'Abd-al-Malik to intervene and put a stop to the injustices.³³

Before announcing the revolt against the Umayyad administration in the Maghrib, Maysara al-Madgharī attempted to prove to 'Ubaydallāh ibn al-Ḥabḥāb and his deputy how iniquitous their policy was. When he failed to convince them of this, he led a delegation of twenty tribal leaders to Damascus in order to present their grievances directly to the caliph. He was, however, not able to meet the caliph so they submitted their complaints to al-Abrash, the caliph's chamberlain. When they returned to the Maghrib in 122/740, they announced the revolt against the Umayyad caliphate and allegiance was given to Maysara as the imam of the Khārijī Ṣufriyya sect. They then marched on the city of Ṭanja with a large army composed of the tribes of Ghamāra, Miknāsa and Barghawāṭa, and killed its governor 'Umar al-Murādī.³⁴

Rebellion and anarchy spread throughout the Maghrib. The caliph Hishām ibn 'Abd-al-Malik attempted to suppress it and sent troops one after the other. The battles were fierce, with the upper hand passing back and forth between the rebels and the government forces. The most well-known encounter was the battle of *al-Ashrāf* (the Nobles) in 123/741 in which the caliphal army was defeated. This led to violent uprisings in every region which consumed many

32 Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, p. 50. See also Idris El Hareir, 'The Rustamid State 144–296/762–909', PhD dissertation, Department of History, University of Utah, 1979, pp. 17–18.

33 Ibn 'Abd-al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Ifrīqiya*, p. 94. See also Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, p. 52; Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, VI, pp. 220–1; Abū Ja'far Muḥammad aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh ar-rusul wa-l-umam wa-l-mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad Abu-l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Cairo, Dār al-ma'ārif, 1963, III, p. 47; Idris El Hareir, 'al-Kiyānāt al-mustaḥilla fi-l-Maghrib wa-l-Andalus', in *al-Kitāb al-marjī' fī tārikh al-umma al-'arabiyya*, III/1, Tunisia, al-Munazzama al-'arabiyya li-t-tarbiya wa-th-thaqāfa wa-l-'ulūm (ALECSO), 2005, pp. 203–5.

34 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, IV, pp. 254–5; Ibn 'Abd-al-Ḥakam, *Futūḥ Ifrīqiya*, p. 94.

of the caliphate's human and material resources. This was one of a number of events that weakened the Umayyad state and contributed to its overthrow in 132/750 by the 'Abbāsīd revolution in the East. The 'Abbāsīds tried to extend their authority over the Maghrib but they too were unsuccessful.

A number of independent principalities were formed in the Maghrib. They are briefly mentioned below in chronological order.


The Banū Wāsūl (or Banū Midrār) in Sijilmāsa (138/756)

The reasons for the founding of this small state and others like it lie in the violent conflict which flared up among the Muslims over the Islamic caliphate after the battle of Şiffīn in 37/657 between the caliph 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (r. 35–40/655–60) and Mu'āwiya ibn Abī Sufyān, the governor of Syria (in office 18–40/638–61). An estimated 1,200 of 'Alī's troops are said to have dissociated themselves from him when he accepted arbitration with Mu'āwiya since they believed that it was obligatory to wage war against him. 'Alī was thus forced to fight them in order to bring them back into the ranks of the caliphal army. Their slogan was 'judgement belongs to God alone'. From this point they began to oppose the appointment of any caliph not decided by consultation. They were responsible for a plot which resulted in the assassination of 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib in 40/660. They were known as the Khārijīs ('those who go out') because they 'went out', or renounced their allegiance to the caliph.

The Khārijīs became divided into twenty sects each one of which became further divided into other small sects which fought against each other and against the Sunnīs and the Shī'īs. Among these sects were the Ibāḍiyya and the Şufriyya which, as we shall see, were to play a role in the history of the Maghrib.

Following the rebellion of the Khārijī Şufriyya in the Middle Maghrib and the Far Maghrib in 122/740 under Maysara al-Madgharī, referred to above, one of the leaders of the rebellion called 'Īsā ibn Yazīd al-Aswad, along with 4,000 of his followers, withdrew to the region of Sijilmāsa. Also with him was Abu-l-Qāsim Samkū (or Samghūn) ibn Wāsūl ibn Waşlān al-Miknāsī, who was a wealthy man and chief of the Miknāsa tribe. It is clear that the Şufriyya Khārijīs took advantage of the declining fortunes and subsequent collapse of the Umayyad caliphate in 132/750,³⁵ and the establishment by 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān ad-Dākhil of an Umayyad emirate in al-Andalus in 138/756,

35 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, VI, p. 130; Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, p. 156; An-Nāşirī, Aḥmad as-Salāwī, *al-Istiḳṣā' li-akhbār duwal al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā*, eds Ja'far and Muḥammad an-Nāşirī, Casablanca, Dār al-kitāb, 1954, I, p. 124; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, Muḥammad Lisān-ad-Dīn, *A'māl al-a'lām fī man būyi'a qabl al-iḥtilām min mulūk al-Islām*, ed. Aḥmad Mukhtār al-'Abbādī, Casablanca, Dār al-kitāb, 1964, III, p. 138.



3.7 Detail of ceramic panel, Madrasa Al-'Aṭṭarīn, Fez (© G. Degeorge)

to announce their own state in Sijilmāsa in the same year.

Forty leaders of the Khārijī Ṣufriyya agreed to the election of 'Īsā ibn Yazīd al-Aswad as imam and the new state was created. In 140/757 they started to build their capital, the city of Sijilmāsa. The historical sources report that 'its construction was completed, its walls were built, water was carried in channels and disbursed to every area and numerous date palms were planted'.³⁶ 'Īsā al-Aswad ruled as imam for fifteen years until 155/772, when his people became dissatisfied with him and sentenced him to death. The Ṣufriyya then elected Abu-l-Qāsim Samkū (Samghūn) ibn Wāsūl, also called al-Midrār, as their new imam. Samghūn was chief of an important branch of

the Miknāsa tribe; he was a very wealthy man and one of the leaders of the Khārijīs. In addition, his father was one of those known as the 'bearers of knowledge' or 'transmitters of learning' (*ḥamalāt al-'ilm*) from among the Khārijīs. He travelled to Medina seeking knowledge and became a student of Abū 'Abdallāh 'Ikrima ibn 'Abdallāh, the *maawlā* (client) of 'Abdallāh ibn 'Abbās. It appears that 'Ikrima was himself a member of the Miknāsa tribe in the Middle Maghrib. Ibn Khallikān remarks that he 'was originally from the Berbers of the Maghrib ... He upheld the views of the Khārijīs and died in 105/724.'³⁷

36 Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A'māl al-a'lām*, III, p. 139; Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, p. 156; an-Nāṣirī, *al-Istiḳṣā'*, I, p. 124.

37 Ibn Khallikān, Abu-l-'Abbās Shams-ad-Dīn, *Wafayāt al-a'yān wa-anbā' az-zamān*, ed. Iḥsān 'Abbās, Beirut, 1968, III, pp. 265–6. See also Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, VI, p. 130; an-Nāṣirī, *al-Istiḳṣā'*, I, p. 125.

To avoid conflict with the ‘Abbāsids, from the very beginning of his rule Abu-l-Qāsim Saḡhūn adhered to a policy of political pragmatism by giving official recognition to the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate and preaching from the pulpit of the Mosque of Sijilmāsa in the name of Abū Ja‘far al-Manṣūr (r. 136–58/754–75) and then in the name of his son al-Mahdī (r. 158–69/775–85).

Abu-l-Qāsim died in 168/784 and was succeeded by his son Ilyās, who was known as *al-Wazīr*, i.e. ‘the Minister’ (r. 168–74/784–91). But the people of Sijilmāsa rebelled against him, deposed him and chose instead his brother al-Yasa‘ (r. 174–208/791–823). He was given the honorific ‘the Victorious’ (*al-Manṣūr*) or ‘the Triumphant’ (*al-Muntaṣir*). Al-Yasa‘ is considered to be the real founder of the state of the Banū Wāsūl, or the Midrārīds as they are also known, because of his notable achievements during his long reign of three decades.³⁸ Ibn ‘Idhārī describes al-Yasa‘ in the following terms:

[He was] a tyrant and stubborn, who overcame all the Berber tribes that opposed him and defeated and subjugated them. He proclaimed the doctrines of the Ṣufriyya and took one fifth of the mines at Dara‘. He became very powerful at that time.³⁹

His reign was also one of security and stability and he was responsible for building palaces and workshops. Under al-Yasa‘, the city of Sijilmāsa developed significantly due to its important location on the caravan route between the Maghrib and the lands to the south of the Sahara. Ibn Ḥawqal offers the following description:

It is a well-positioned city. Its citizens are honourable and produce outstanding work. It stands on a river which floods in the summer like the Nile ... and its water is used for agriculture also like in Egypt. The city has date palms and gardens. The inhabitants are a noble and prosperous people who differ in both appearance and character from the people of the Maghrib. They are knowledgeable, discreet, reliable, handsome, chivalrous, generous and forbearing. The buildings in the city are tall like those of Kufa, and the palaces have high doors.⁴⁰

Ibn Ḥawqal, who lived in the fourth/tenth century and who visited Sijilmāsa and saw how it had grown, goes on to say that when he was in Audaghust he saw a money order worth 42,000 dinars belonging to a merchant from Sijilmāsa called Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abdallāh given to him by a merchant

38 El Hareir, ‘al-Kiyānāt’, p. 207.

39 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, p. 157.

40 Ibn Ḥawqal, *Kitāb ṣūrat al-ard*, p. 95.

from Audaghust. Ibn Ḥawqal remarks that he had never seen or heard anything of its like in the East, and that when he told the story in Iraq, Fās (Fez) and Khurāsān the people were amazed. This clearly demonstrates the advanced nature of business transactions and the extent of trade links between the state of the Banū Wāsūl and sub-Saharan Africa. Ibn Ḥawqal also provides evidence of the prosperity of Sijilmāsa, the capital of the Banū Wāsūl, when he reports that in 307/920 half the income of the Fāṭimid state, whose armies had seized Sijilmāsa in 296/909, came from there.⁴¹

Al-Yasa' was succeeded by his son Midrār (r. 208–53/823–68). Midrār had married Arwā, the daughter of 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Rustum, the imam of the Rustumid state in Tāhart (144–71/762–88). She had given birth to a son called Ibn ar-Rustumiyya. Midrār also had another son, known as Ibn Taqiyya, from a second wife called Taqiyya. Towards the end of their father's life, rivalry broke out between the two brothers over the succession to the throne and this eventually led to war. Ibn ar-Rustumiyya emerged victorious, deposed his father Midrār and seized the emirate. However, the people of Sijilmāsa rose up against him because he had usurped his father's place and also because of his poor conduct. In his stead they chose his brother Ibn Taqiyya, also called Maymūn, who ruled Sijilmāsa from 253/868 to 263/876.

Ibn Taqiyya was succeeded by his son Muḥammad (r. 263–70/876–83), who, according to Ibn Khaldūn, was an Ibādī. Muḥammad was in turn succeeded by his uncle al-Yasa' II (r. 270–89/883–902). During his reign, 'Ubaydallāh al-Mahdī and his son Abu-l-Qāsim arrived in Sijilmāsa. It was during this period that the emirate fell into the hands of a Fāṭimid army under the command of Abū 'Abdallāh the Shī'ī, who seized Sijilmāsa and killed al-Yasa' II in 297/909.⁴²

THE EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE BANŪ WĀSŪL

It is possible to understand the external relations of the state of the Banū Wāsūl from the circumstances of its growth and the stance it took vis-à-vis the other principalities which arose in the Maghrib such as the Aghlabids and the Rustumids in Tāhart and the Idrīsids in Fās, as well as the Umayyads in al-Andalus, the territories south of the Sahara and the 'Abbāsids.

The relationship of the Banū Wāsūl with the Aghlabids was one of hostility. This was because the Aghlabids represented the 'Abbāsīd state and functioned as an obstacle to the westward advance of the Khārijīs and

41 Ibn Ḥawqal, *Kitāb ṣūrat al-arḍ*, pp. 96–7.

42 Ibid., p. 131; Al-Bakrī, *al-Mughrib*, p. 150; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A'māl al-a'lām*, III, p. 145.

the Shī'īs. As for the Rustumids, relations were cordial with them because they held the same basic ideology, that of the Khārijīs, even though the Banū Wāsūl followed the Ṣufriyya sect while the Rustumids were Ibādīs. But they were in general agreement and so formed an alliance to fight their common enemy the 'Abbāsids and their followers the Aghlabids.

Relations with the Idrīsids were hostile because the Idrīsids were 'Alawīs who believed that they had more right to rule and to possess the caliphate than others and fought against those who believed otherwise.

Despite their ideological and political differences, the Banū Wāsūl formed an alliance with the Umayyads in al-Andalus against their common enemies the Idrīsids and the 'Abbāsids with their allies the Aghlabids. They had a shared interest in opposing the common enemy and the Banū Wāsūl received military and material assistance from Granada.⁴³

The relations of the Banū Wāsūl with the lands to the south of the Sahara were always amiable and peaceful so as to maintain the brisk trade in gold and salt from the south and manufactured products and weapons from the north. Perhaps the best example of the strength of trade relations between them is the comment, quoted earlier, made by the geographer Ibn Ḥawqal when he visited Sijilmāsa and Audaghust. Trade with sub-Saharan Africa also led to the spread of the Arabic language and Islam into places such as Mali and Ghana.

The Rustumid state (144–296/761–909)

The ideology of the Rustumid state was based on the ideas of the Ibādīs, whose name derives from 'Abdallāh ibn Ibād al-Murrī at-Tamīmī, one of the founders of the sect. He was a contemporary of the Umayyad caliph 'Abd-al-Malik ibn Marwān (r. 66–87/685–705).⁴⁴ The historians of this sect attribute the arrival of the Ibādiyya in the Maghrib to Salama ibn Sa'īd, who originated from Basra in Iraq. It is possible that Ibn Sa'īd came as a missionary to spread the doctrines of the sect in the Maghrib since at that time such activities were part of an extensive movement to disseminate Ibādī ideas throughout the Muslim world. Ibn Sa'īd arrived in Kairouan at the beginning of the second/eighth century and successfully conscripted four men who have become well known – 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Rustum, 'Aṣim as-Sadrātī, Ismā'īl ibn Dirār al-Ghadāmsī and Dā'ūd al-Qabalī an-Nafzāwī. After instructing them himself, Ibn Sa'īd sent them to Basra to learn more

43 El Hareir, 'al-Kiyānāt', pp. 211–12.

44 Al-Baghdādī, 'Abd-al-Qāhir, *al-Farq bayn al-firaq*, ed. A. N. Nādir, Beirut, Dār al-mashriq, 1970, p. 103.

about the doctrines of the sect. There, they studied under Abū ‘Ubayd Muslim ibn Abī ‘Ikrima at-Tamīmī, the leader of the Ibāḍiyya. While in Basra they were joined by another man called Abū-l-Khaṭṭāb ‘Abd-al-’A’lā ibn as-Samḥ al-Mu‘āfirī al-Ḥimyarī.⁴⁵

After the five men had studied and trained for two years, Abū ‘Ubayd at-Tamīmī ordered them to return to the Maghrib and charged them with establishing an imamate wherever they could get the backing of the tribes. He informed them that the imam was the afore-mentioned Abū-l-Khaṭṭāb al-Mu‘āfirī and the judge ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Rustum. The Ibāḍī sources from the Maghrib refer to these five men as the ‘bearers of knowledge’ (*ḥamalāt al-‘ilm*).⁴⁶

The efforts of Ibn Sa‘īd and the *ḥamalāt al-‘ilm* bore fruit and they attracted many tribes in Ifrīqiya and Ṭarāblus and established a state. This was an Ibāḍī imamate under the leadership of Ismā‘īl ibn Ziyād an-Nafūsī, who temporarily gained control of Ṭarāblus and Fās in 132/750 and who was later killed in a battle with the Umayyad authorities. The majority of followers of the Ibāḍiyya, however, remained loyal to the original cause and in 140/757 they elected Abū-l-Khaṭṭāb al-Mu‘āfirī as their imam. Al-Mu‘āfirī successfully gained control of Ṭarāblus and then with his supporters he advanced on Kairouan, seizing Qābis *en route*. He appointed ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Rustum as governor of Kairouan. At this time, the Ibāḍī imamate included Ṭarāblus, Ifrīqiya and the Middle Maghrib.⁴⁷

Meanwhile, the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate (which succeeded that of the Umayyads) was busy consolidating its authority in the East. Once the ‘Abbāsīd caliph Abū Ja‘far al-Manṣūr had dealt with his internal problems, he turned his attention to the Maghrib: he appointed one of his most prominent generals, Muḥammad ibn al-Ash‘ath al-Khuzā‘ī, as governor of Egypt and the Maghrib and ordered him to crush the Khārijī rebellion. Ibn al-Ash‘ath sent two armies but they were defeated by the Ibāḍīs. He then took personal command of a strong army and defeated the Ibāḍīs in the region of Tāwarghā’ near present-day Maṣrāta in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. This battle claimed the lives of the Ibāḍī imam Abū-l-Khaṭṭāb al-Mu‘āfirī along with many of his supporters. Following this, Ibn al-Ash‘ath marched on other cities in Ifrīqiya including Kairouan in 144/761 where he forced the governor, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Rustum, to flee to the mountains south of Oran.⁴⁸

45 Ash-Shammākhī, Abu-l-‘Abbās Aḥmad ‘Uthmān, *Kitāb as-siyar*, Cairo, Dār al-kutub, No. 796, fol. 28; Al-Warjalānī, Abū Zakāriyā Yaḥyā ibn Abī Bakr, *Kitāb as-sīra wa-akhbār al-‘a’imma*, Cairo, Dār al-kutub, No. 9030, fol. 50; Ad-Darjīnī, Abu-l-‘Abbās Aḥmad, *Ṭabaqāt al-ibāḍiyya*, Cairo, Dār al-kutub, No. 12561, , fol. 8.

46 Ash-Shammākhī, *Kitāb as-siyar*, , fol. 28.

47 El Hareir, ‘The Rustamid State, pp. 29–30.

48 *Ibid.*, pp. 31–2.

The Muslim historians offer various accounts of the origins of ‘Abd-ar-Raḥman ibn Rustum, the founder of the Rustumid state, but they all agree that he was of Persian descent and that his ancestor was a *maawlā* (client) of the caliph ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān. Perhaps he was related to a Persian general who was killed at the battle of al-Qādisiyya in 15/637.⁴⁹ Whatever the truth of the matter, when Ibn Rustum fled from Kairouan and sought refuge in the Atlas mountains he was joined by about sixty tribal chiefs who had escaped from the battle with him and who now gave him their allegiance as the imam.⁵⁰ Wishing to put an end to Ibn Rustum’s state while it was still in its infancy, Ibn al-Ash‘ath led an army and surrounded the mountains. But the wildness of the region, the spread of smallpox among his troops and disputes between him and his aides caused him to withdraw and to return to the East.

Ibn Rustum decided to imitate his predecessors and build a capital city for his state. To this end, he dispatched a group of scouts to select the best location for the city: they settled on the site of Tāhart (modern-day Tiaret in Algeria) at the end of the Tell Atlas mountains on the river Mīna. It was in the middle of the fertile plain of Sarsū and near a dense forest which could supply wood for construction and fuel. The site was also a focal point for commercial activity between the agricultural north, the mercantile south and sub-Saharan Africa.⁵¹

Under ‘Abd-ar-Raḥman ibn Rustum, the Rustumid state enjoyed peace and stability and consequently economic life flourished. Many of the persecuted peoples of the Islamic East and al-Andalus sent delegations to the state. The influx of scholars, merchants and craftsmen resulted in its rapid growth. At the beginning of Ibn Rustum’s rule he received assistance from the Khārijīs of Basra, who sent a number of consignments of money which strengthened the Rustumid state both economically and militarily.

When Ibn Rustum sensed his approaching end, he emulated the caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb and chose an electoral council of seven men including his son ‘Abd-al-Wahhāb. On Ibn Rustum’s death, his son was elected as the new imam. He was supported by the powerful Zanāta tribe (to which his mother belonged) and also by the Persians living in Tāhart who were mostly wealthy merchants.⁵²

The decision to elect the imam ‘Abd-al-Wahhāb (r. 171–208/788–820) was not unanimous, however, since he was not the most learned of the

49 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, VI, pp. 225–6; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, p. 196.

50 Al-Warjalānī, *Kitāb as-sīra*, fol. 11; ash-Shammākhī, *Kitāb as-siyar*, fols 31–2; ad-Darjīnī, *Ṭabaqāt*, fol. 15; Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, VI, pp. 246–7.

51 El Hareir, ‘The Rustamid State’, pp. 50–1.

52 Al-Warjalānī, *Kitāb as-sīra*, fol. 14; ash-Shammākhī, *Kitāb as-siyar*, fol. 36; ad-Darjīnī, *Ṭabaqāt*, fol. 11.

candidates nor the most worthy. Thus, opposition arose to him led by Yazīd ibn Fandīn, who created problems for ‘Abd-al-Wahhāb and tried to restrict his authority by setting up a consultative council which worked alongside him and to which he had to refer before making any decision. The group of dissidents led by Yazīd ibn Fandīn were called the *nukkār* (‘rejecters’) since they rejected the imamate of ‘Abd-al-Wahhāb ibn Rustum. The situation eventually resulted in a civil war which claimed the lives of a great number of people.⁵³ ‘Abd-al-Wahhāb’s rule was subject to another serious disturbance when the Wāṣiliyya sect rebelled against him, incited by the Idrīsids in Fās. The imam was, however, able to subdue them and the Rustumid state then entered a period of calm and stability.

‘Abd-al-Wahhāb died in 208/824 and was succeeded by his son Aflaḥ (r. 208–40/824–55) whose reign was peaceful. Aflaḥ was in turn followed by his son Abū Bakr (r. 240–41/855–57). At the time, Aflaḥ’s eldest son al-Yaqzān was a prisoner of the ‘Abbāsids in Baghdad after being captured while performing the pilgrimage. When he was released he returned to Tāhart and took over the imamate (r. 241–81/856–95).⁵⁴ Throughout al-Yaqzān’s long reign the Rustumid state enjoyed peace and security. There were no disturbances apart from the temporary occupation of Ṭarāblus by Ibn Ṭulūn, who eventually returned to Egypt after the Rustumids defeated and expelled him from the city.

During the period 281–94/895–907 the imam in Tāhart was Abū Ḥātim Yūsuf. His rule was witness to a civil war caused by the rebellion of his uncle Ya‘qūb ibn Aflaḥ. This was followed by a further war over the succession to the imamate. Yet another war broke out between Abū Ḥātim and the Aghlabids which depleted the human and economic resources of the two states and facilitated their overthrow by the Fāṭimids, as we shall see.⁵⁵

When Abū Ḥātim died in 294/907 he was succeeded by his brother al-Yaqzān, who remained in power until 296/909. Under al-Yaqzān there were both internal and external disturbances because of Fāṭimid missionary activity in the Maghrib led by Abū ‘Abdallāh the Shī‘ī. In 296/909 Abū ‘Abdallāh successfully destroyed the Rustumid state (killing the imam al-Yaqzān) and added it to Fāṭimid domains.

The Rustumid state maintained good relations with the Ṣufriyya imamate in Sijilmāsa, with the Umayyad caliphate in al-Andalus and also with the lands south of the Sahara where there was profitable trade for both parties. As for relations with the Idrīsids, the Aghlabids and the ‘Abbāsids, they were always hostile.

53 Ibn aṣ-Ṣaghīr al-Mālikī, *Dhikr ba’d al-akhbār fi-l-’imma ar-rustumiyyīn*, ed. A. de C. Motylinski, Algeria, 1905, pp. 23–33.

54 Ibid.

55 El Hareir, ‘al-Kiyānāt’, p. 215.

The Rustumids played a crucial role in the dissemination and consolidation of Islam in the Maghrib and in sub-saharan Africa. They sent missionaries and religious scholars throughout the region to spread the word of Islam. One of the most important bases for this activity was the oasis of Warjala.

Alongside the constant aggression of their neighbours the Aghlabids and the Idrīsids, and the Fātimid attack in 296/909, there was another reason for the fall of the Rustumid state. This was their leaders' lack of respect for the Khārijī tenet that the imam must be elected through consultation. When the Rustumid imams acceded to the imamate, they attempted to make it a hereditary position like the Umayyads and the 'Abbāsids. This lost them popular support and made the people feel that they had merely exchanged one form of tyranny for another.

The Idrīsīd state (172–296/788–909)

The Idrīsīd state was named after its founder, Idrīs ibn 'Abdallāh ibn Ḥasan ibn al-Ḥasan ibn 'Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib. It arose out of a contest for the caliphate among those who thought that they were more deserving of it after the death of the Prophet. 'Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib and his sons and descendants considered that they had a legitimate claim to the office of caliph and became known as the 'Alawīs or occasionally the Shī'īs. They fought their cousins descended from 'Abdallāh ibn 'Abbās, the Prophet's uncle. The 'Alawīs and the 'Abbāsids were sometimes together referred to by the terms *Āl Muḥammad* (the family of Muḥammad) or *Āl al-bayt* (the family of [the Prophet's] house).

Under the leadership of 'Abdallāh as-Saffāḥ (r. 132–36/750–54), the 'Abbāsids were able to seize the caliphate. Both the 'Abbāsids and the 'Alawīs had revolted against the Umayyads under the vague slogan *li-r-riḍā min āl al-bayt* ('for the satisfaction of the Prophet's family members). The 'Alawīs thought that they were the ones intended by this, so when as-Saffāḥ became caliph the 'Alawīs felt that they had been cheated and mounted a series of rebellions. One of the most notable occurred in 145/762 under the leadership of Muḥammad ibn 'Abdallāh, known as *an-Nafs az-Zakiyya* ('the Pure Soul'), against the 'Abbāsīd caliph Abū Ja'far al-Manṣūr. It ended in failure. It was followed somewhat later by another rebellion during the reign of al-Mahdī (r. 169–70/786–87) led by al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī ibn al-Ḥasan al-Muthannā ibn 'Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib. Although al-Ḥusayn managed to gain control of Mecca and Medina, the 'Abbāsids defeated him in 169/786 at the well-known battle of Fakhkh near Mecca. Idrīs ibn 'Abdallāh, also a great-grandchild of al-Ḥasan, escaped from the battle and in the company of his *mawla* Rāshid made his way to the city of Walīla (present-day Qaṣr Far'ūn in Morocco), where

he was welcomed by the chief of the Awraba tribe, Iṣḥāq ibn ‘Abdallāh. The latter helped Idrīs to establish the Idrīsīd state in 172/789.⁵⁶

Idrīs ibn ‘Abdallāh’s position became secure in Walīla, the capital of Jabal Zarhūn in as-Sūs al-Aqṣā, and within six months he had successfully implanted his ideas among the tribes living there. Due to his eloquence and rhetoric he was able to influence the tribes, especially when they learnt how closely related he was to the Prophet. Important tribes such as the Zanāta, the Luwāta, the Zawāwa, the Miknāsa and the Ghamāra gathered around him, gave him their allegiance and recognized him as their imam. From these, Idrīs created a strong army with which he launched attacks against Tāmasna, Shāla and Tādālā. Within these regions there were still small areas which had not yet embraced Islam, however. Following this, Idrīs marched against the Khārijīs in Tilmisān. He seized the city, was recognized as imam and added it to his domains. In this way, Idrīs ibn ‘Abdallāh was able to establish a powerful state in the Far Maghrib.⁵⁷

Idrīs’s success in establishing an ‘Alawī state in the Far Maghrib angered the ‘Abbāsīd caliph Hārūn ar-Rashīd (r. 170–93/786–809), who was concerned that the imam might advance towards the East, especially after he had gained control of Tilmisān. Since it was difficult for the caliph to send an army all the way from Baghdad, he devised an alternative plan to get rid of Idrīs: the caliph sent one of his most reliable men, Sulaymān ibn Jarīr ash-Shammākh, who assassinated Idrīs with some poisoned perfume.

Idrīs died leaving behind him a concubine called Kanza, who was seven months pregnant. When she gave birth to a boy who closely resembled his father she called him Idrīs. While still a child, Idrīs was recognized as his father’s successor and was given the title Idrīs II. During his rule the state grew larger and more powerful and became very influential.⁵⁸ However, this did not prevent the ‘Abbāsīds from plotting against it, sometimes by fomenting internal dissension and sometimes by waging war against it through its allies the Aghlabids in Ifrīqiya.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF FĀS (FEZ) (172/788)

It was essential for Imam Idrīs ibn ‘Abdallāh to build his own capital so as to achieve the same standing as the other Muslim rulers in the Maghrib and the

56 Ibn al-Athīr, Abū-l-Ḥasan ‘Alī al-Jazarī, *al-Kāmil fi-t-tārīkh*, ed. ‘Abd-al-Wahhāb an-Najjār, Cairo, Idārat aṭ-ṭibā’a al-munīriyya, 1928, VI, p. 50; Ibn Abī Zar’, ‘Alī ibn ‘Abdallāh, *al-Anīs al-muṭrib bi-rawḍ al-qirṭās fī akhbār mulūk al-Maghrib wa-tārīkh madīnat Fās*, Rabat, Dār al-manṣūr li-ṭ-ṭibā’a, 1973, pp. 19–25.

57 Ibn Abī Zar’, *al-Anīs al-muṭrib*, pp. 11–25; an-Nāṣirī, *al-Istiḳṣā’*, I, p. 156.

58 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, IV, p. 26.

East who had preceded him. There were other pressing reasons too, including the fact that the city of Walīla had become very overcrowded. Moreover, Walīla was no longer a safe place for the imam to live after the disturbances caused by the influx of numerous dissident Arabs from the ‘Abbāsīd state, from the Umayyad emirate in al-Andalus and from the small principalities in the Near Maghrib and the Middle Maghrib.⁵⁹

Accounts differ as to how Idrīs’s capital came to be called Fās. Some claim that it was given this name when an axe (*fa’s*) was found during building work, while others state that it was named after an ancient city called Sāf that had stood on the same site and that this name was read backwards and became Fās. In the local language, the words *asyaf* and *sāf* mean ‘river’ and some historians think the latter word is the most likely origin of Fās since it is based on linguistic evidence.

Idrīs II extended Fās to the south, building a mosque there in 193/808 which became known as the ‘Mosque of the Nobles’ (*Masjid ash-Shurafā*). The city began to develop rapidly and people made their way to it both from the Mashriq (East) and from Ifrīqiya. In particular, in 202/817 numerous groups arrived from al-Andalus after the battle of ar-Rabaḍ in Córdoba, expelled by the Umayyad *amīr* al-Ḥakam ibn Hishām (r. 180–206/796–821) because they had conspired against him. Idrīs II welcomed them and settled them in their own area known as the *‘adwat al-Andalusiyyīn* (the Andalusian quarter).⁶⁰

Idrīs II died in 213/828 under somewhat mysterious circumstances. He had designated his son Muḥammad (r. 213–21/828–36) to succeed him. In accordance with instructions given to Muḥammad by his grandmother Kanza, the new imam divided the offices of state among his eight older brothers. As for the four brothers who were younger than him, they remained under the care of their grandmother. This situation led to quarrels and rivalry, which in turn resulted in civil war and the brothers becoming so weak that they easily fell into the hands of their enemies.

Throughout its long history, the city of Fās has played a prominent role as one of the Maghrib’s principal Islamic centres and it has produced scholars and craftsmen in all fields. It has retained its religious significance up to the present day. From its schools graduated many of the learned and the religious scholars who made great contributions to the dissemination of Islam in Ifrīqiya and its consolidation both within and outside the Maghrib.

Idrīsīd relations with Muslim Spain, with the ‘Abbāsīds and their allies the Aghlabīds, and with their neighbours the Khārījīs in Sijilmāsa and Tāhart, were generally hostile – as ‘Alawīs, the Idrīsīds believed that only they had a legitimate right to the caliphate and that the others had usurped

59 Al-Qayrawānī, *Tārīkh Ifrīqiya*, pp. 214–15.

60 Ibn Abī Zar’, *al-Anīs al-muṭrib*, p. 45.

it. This led to wars which wasted economic and human resources and paved the way for the Fāṭimid conquest. The Idrīsid *amīrs* continued to rule from Fās until the Fāṭimids arrived in 305/917, occupied the city and added it to their state. The Fāṭimid capital was initially Kairouan, but this changed to al-Mahdiyya after its construction was completed in 308/920.⁶¹

The Aghlabid state in Ifrīqiya (184–296/800–909)

There were several consequences of the ongoing conflict between the Umayyad caliphate, the Khārijīs and the Shī‘īs in the Middle Maghrib and the Far Maghrib and which still raged under the ‘Abbāsids who inherited the Umayyads’ problems. One of these was that the ‘Abbāsīd caliphs had to acknowledge their inability to be an effective power in the region after the severe losses they incurred in the numerous revolts against them. Given this situation, it was astute of them to accept the existence of a buffer state in Ifrīqiya (the Near Maghrib) located between their possessions in Egypt and the West: Hārūn ar-Rashīd approved of this after being alarmed by the success of the Khārijīs and the Shī‘īs in establishing three states, as we have seen. Some conditions had to be met, however, before the buffer state could be created. Thus, the Near Maghrib was to be granted independence from the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate, even though it was nominally subservient, provided that it paid an annual sum of money to the state treasury and that the name of the ‘Abbāsīd caliph was mentioned in prayers and inscribed on the coinage. It was also stipulated that the succession was to be made hereditary among the descendants of the Aghlabids.

The first Aghlabid ruler was Ibrāhīm ibn al-Aghlab (r. 183–96/800–11),⁶² a senior officer of the ‘Abbāsīds who went to the Maghrib to fight the Khārijīs and the Shī‘īs. After taking Kairouan as his capital, Ibrāhīm then began to build administrative headquarters some 5 km from the city at a place known as al-Qaṣr al-Qadīm (the Old Palace), which he renamed al-‘Abbāsiyya to demonstrate his allegiance to the ‘Abbāsīds. Here, he housed his government departments and his guard. Ibrāhīm also created a naval force which enabled his successors to conquer Sicily and other islands in the Mediterranean. He also undertook construction work and built canals, water cisterns, palaces and irrigation channels.

The Aghlabid state faced a number of disturbances and revolts but, with the help of the caliph Hārūn ar-Rashīd, it always managed to overcome them. One of the most serious of these was the uprising of the

61 Ibn Abī Zar‘, *al-Anīs al-muṭrib*, pp. 50–4, 79–81; El Hareir, ‘al-Kiyānāt’, pp. 217–21.

62 Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi-t-tārīkh*, VI, pp. 62–3; al-Bakrī, *al-Mughrib*, p. 28.

3.8 Zaytūna Mosque, Tunis
(© G. Degeorge)

Hawwāra tribe in the region of Ṭarāblus: they had been incited by ‘Abd-al-Wahhāb ibn Rustum, the imam of the Rustumids. Around this time Ibrāhīm ibn al-Aghlab died and was succeeded by his son ‘Abdallāh (r. 196–201/811–16). It therefore fell to ‘Abdallāh to make a truce with the Rustumid state since, while the Aghlabids still held on to Ṭarāblus, the Rustumids had taken control of everywhere else.⁶³

At first ‘Abdallāh ibn Ibrāhīm mostly acted in the same fair and equitable manner as his father, but he soon changed into a despot. The historian Ibn ‘Idhārī records that he ‘perpetrated



all manner of iniquities in Ifrīqiya’. On ‘Abdallāh’s death, he was succeeded by his brother Ziyādatallāh (r. 201–23/816–37). Ziyādatallāh is the most famous of the Aghlabid *amīrs* due to his cultural and military achievements, the peace and prosperity that Ifrīqiya enjoyed under his rule, and his legacy of buildings in Kairouan, al-‘Abbāsiyya, Tūnis, Sūsa and Munastīr. Moreover, Ziyādatallāh had an extremely powerful army which enabled him to quell any rebellion directed against him.

The most important event that occurred under Ziyādatallāh was the conquest of Sicily in 212/827. The *amīr* prepared a large naval fleet of 200 vessels and placed it under the command of the judge, Asad ibn al-Furāt. There were a number of reasons for this venture, including the ending of the truce between the Aghlabids and the Byzantines, the desire to spread the word of Islam in Europe, and Ziyādatallāh’s wish to show the inhabitants of Ifrīqiya that he was a ruler who fought in the way of God. It was also

63 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, p. 95; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi-t-tārīkh*, VI, p. 329.

opportunistic in that it took advantage of a mutiny led by the commander of the Byzantine fleet, who invited the Aghlabids to seize the island and promised to lend them assistance. Thus, in 212/827 the Aghlabids were able to impose their authority on Sicily and it remained under their control until the fall of the Aghlabid state.⁶⁴

When Ziyadatallāh died in 223/837, he was succeeded by his brother Abū ‘Aqqāl (r. 223–26/837–40). Abū ‘Aqqāl’s short reign was relatively peaceful and he removed many unfair practices in the state. He attempted to curry favour with the religious scholars and continued the programme of conquest in Sicily and southern Italy. Abū ‘Aqqāl was succeeded by his son Abu-l-‘Abbās Muḥammad (r. 226–42/840–56). Abu-l-‘Abbās tried to extend his sphere of influence to the detriment of the Rustumid state and there were frequent border disputes between them. Abu-l-‘Abbās was followed by his son Abū Ibrāhīm Aḥmad (r. 242–49/856–63). Ibn ‘Idhārī refers to Abū Ibrāhīm with great respect and says of him that he was ‘humble, a fighter against injustice and an enthusiastic commissioner of public works who built water cisterns and aqueducts’.⁶⁵ On Abū Ibrāhīm’s death, he was succeeded by his brother Ziyadatallāh II who, however, died in 250/864 while still a boy. Ziyadatallāh II was succeeded by his nephew Abū-l-Gharānīq Muḥammad Aḥmad (r. 250–61/864–74), who was very interested in building and architecture. He built castles and watchtowers along the coast from Barqa in the east up to western Tūnis.

When Abū-l-Gharānīq died, he was succeeded by his brother Ibrāhīm ibn Aḥmad (r. 261–89/874–901). Ibrāhīm is considered to be one of the most illustrious of the Aghlabid *amīrs* because of the splendid buildings he created. In 263/876 he founded the city of Raqāda, where he built a mosque and a palace called al-Faṭḥ. He also completed construction of the great mosque in Tūnis, the walls of Sūsa and water cisterns in Kairouan.⁶⁶ In the first few years of his reign Ibrāhīm was a just and equitable ruler, but he subsequently became a despotic and bloody tyrant from whom even his relatives were not safe. His rule witnessed the appearance of the Fāṭimid missionary Abū ‘Abdallāh the Shī‘ī, who successfully propagated Fāṭimid ideology among the members of the Kutāma tribe. Later, Ibrāhīm’s character changed once again and he resumed his earlier role as a just ruler. He ordered the cessation of all unfair practices, granted pardons to prisoners and distributed money to the poor. Eventually, he led a military campaign to southern Italy and while there he was stricken with illness and died. He was buried in Palermo in 289/901.⁶⁷

64 Ibn al-Abbār, *al-Hulla as-siyarā*, VI, p. 285.

65 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, pp. 107–14.

66 Ibid., pp. 116–37.

67 Ibid., p. 132.

Ibrāhīm was succeeded by his son Abu-l-‘Abbās (r. 289–90/901–02) and it was during his reign that the Aghlabid state began to show the first signs of decline. Abu-l-‘Abbās was killed and his place was taken by his son Ziyāda III (r. 290–96/902–09). Ziyāda’s reign was a troubled one. In 292/904 Abū ‘Abdallāh the Shī‘ī seized control of Saṭīf and Ṭubna. Despite the *amīr*’s attempts to halt the Shī‘ī advance, he failed and was forced to flee to Egypt in 296/909.⁶⁸ The Fāṭimids took Kairouan and Raqāda without a fight and the Aghlabid state ceased to exist.

The establishment of the Fāṭimid state in the Maghrib (296–358/909–68)

The Fāṭimid state was established in the Maghrib only after a number of futile and unsuccessful attempts on the part of the ‘Alawīs and those who came to be known as the Shī‘īs following the death of the caliph ‘Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib in 40/661. Thus, the appearance of a Shī‘ī state in the Maghrib was a tumultuous event and a totally new departure in the history of Islam.

The historians called this state ‘Fāṭimid’ due to its descent from Fāṭima az-Zahrā’ (‘the Radiant’), the daughter of the Prophet, wife of ‘Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib and mother of al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn, and also in honour of the Prophet’s family. The establishment of the state was preceded by an extensive and concentrated propaganda campaign which had two stages: preparation and armed confrontation.

Preparation

Yemen was a safe haven for Shī‘ī missionary activity due to its hostile terrain and distance from the centre of the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate. It was also near to Mecca and Medina, the focal point of pilgrims, and to the Maghrib which was not totally under ‘Abbāsīd control. Khārijī ideas had reached the Maghrib during the Umayyad period and these prepared the people to rise up against the caliphate. As was said at the time, the Maghrib was a fertile ground in which to sow the seeds of revolt against the ‘Abbāsīds. Ja‘far aṣ-Ṣādiq, the imam of the Ismā‘īlī Shī‘īs, also stated as much when he told the missionaries al-Ḥalawāni and Abū Sufyān, whom he sent to the Maghrib: ‘The Maghrib is uncultivated ground. So go and plough it until its master arrives.’

When al-Ḥalawāni and Abū Sufyān died, the leading Shī‘ī missionary in Yemen, Rustum ibn Ḥawshab al-Kūfī, delegated the task of conducting Shī‘ī propaganda activities there to Abū ‘Abdallāh the Shī‘ī. With this aim in

68 Ibid., pp. 117–48.

mind, Abū ‘Abdallāh travelled to Mecca, where he met with a group of leaders from the Kutāma tribe⁶⁹ who happened to be performing the pilgrimage and to whom he set forth his ideas. Finding these ideas convincing, they invited him to go to the Maghrib with them and promised to help him. From the Kutāma, Abū ‘Abdallāh created a powerful army with which, beginning in 296/909, he destroyed the small states of the Maghrib referred to above.

Armed confrontation

The second stage in the propaganda campaign that preceded the establishment of the Fāṭimid state was that of armed confrontation. This stage began in 289/901 and ended with the fall of Maghribī states such as the Aghlabids, the Rustumids, the Idrīsids and the Banū Wāsūl in Sijilmāsa. In 296/909, Abū ‘Abdallāh the Shī‘ī defeated the Aghlabids under Ziyāda III, who fled to Egypt. Following this, Abū ‘Abdallāh entered Raqāda and Kairouan and in this way put an end to the Aghlabids, vassals of the ‘Abbāsids.⁷⁰

After the victory over the Aghlabids, Abū ‘Abdallāh wrote to ‘Ubaydallāh al-Mahdī, the leader of the Ismā‘īliyya, who at that time resided in the village of Salmiyya in Syria, inviting him to come to the Maghrib and assume the office of imam or Fāṭimid caliph. ‘Ubaydallāh al-Mahdī left Syria disguised as a merchant for fear that the ‘Abbāsids, who had recently learnt of the invitation, might seize him. He managed to depart safely and reached Kairouan. From there he went to Sijilmāsa, where he revealed his true identity. He was thrown into prison and remained incarcerated until finally set free by Abū ‘Abdallāh.

Following the fall of the Aghlabid state, Abū ‘Abdallāh the Shī‘ī advanced towards the Rustumids in Tāhart. He killed their ruler and annexed the Aghlabid state to his own domains. From Tāhart he marched to Sijilmāsa, forcing the last Banū Wāsūl *amīr*, al-Yasa‘, to flee. He then released ‘Ubaydallāh al-Mahdī and his son Abu-l-Qāsim from prison and introduced the former to his army saying: ‘This is my master and your master. He has fulfilled his promise, asserted his claim and has revealed himself.’

Accompanied by ‘Ubaydallāh al-Mahdī, Abū ‘Abdallāh left Sijilmāsa and made his way to Kairouan, arriving there in 297/910. There, ‘Ubaydallāh was finally acknowledged as caliph and given the honorifics *al-Mahdī* (‘the Rightly Guided’) and *Amīr al-Mu‘minīn* (‘Commander of the Faithful’). He had his name inscribed on the coinage and appointed his supporters to senior positions in the government. ‘Ubaydallāh also proclaimed the supremacy

69 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, IV, p. 65; Al-Maqrīzī, Taqīyy-ad-Dīn Aḥmad, *Itti‘āz al-ḥunafā’ bi-dhikr al-a‘imma al-khulafā’*, ed. Jamāl-ad-Dīn ash-Shayyāl, Cairo, 1948, p. 57.

70 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, IV, p. 71.

of Shī‘ī doctrine and ordered the judiciary to make their judgements only according to this and not on the basis of any other theological school. This resulted in violent confrontations between him and the Sunnīs in the Maghrib.⁷¹

‘Ubaydallāh al-Mahdī faced a number of serious problems which almost put an end to his rule. One of these involved the founder of the state, Abū ‘Abdallāh the Shī‘ī, who wanted to keep the reins of power in his own hands, thus usurping the position of his master al-Mahdī. This led to conflict between them which ended with the assassination of Abū ‘Abdallāh in Dhu-l-Ḥijja 298/910. Following this, some of Abū ‘Abdallāh’s supporters declared al-Mahdī deposed and a number of fierce battles took place between them from which al-Mahdī eventually emerged victorious. In 300/912 the inhabitants of Ṭarāblus revolted against al-Mahdī and expelled the governor Māqnūn al-Ijābī. Al-Mahdī responded quickly by dispatching both an army overland and a naval fleet. Ṭarāblus was blockaded, order was restored and a fine of 300,000 dinars was imposed on the city.⁷²

THE FOUNDING OF AL-MAHDIYYA (30/913)

When ‘Ubaydallāh al-Mahdī considered the many rebellions against him and the fact that the people had not accepted his Shī‘ī ideology, he resolved to build a capital for himself and for his supporters in which to house his weapons and troops. Other considerations were the same as those behind the establishment of any Islamic city – historical permanence, emulating one’s predecessors and ensuring security. The last of these issues was of particular importance for al-Mahdī. Ibn Khaldūn quotes him as saying: ‘I have built this city as a sanctuary for the Fāṭimids,’ and when he had finished the construction of al-Mahdiyya, he is reported to have said: ‘Today I have safeguarded the Fāṭimids.’⁷³

In fact, the people of the Maghrib felt disappointed and deceived by ‘Ubaydallāh al-Mahdī since they discovered the falseness of Abū ‘Abdallāh’s claims and assurances that al-Mahdī was just and that he would do away with tyranny and establish equality and that goodness would prevail. It became clear to them that there was no difference between the Fāṭimids, the Umayyads and the ‘Abbāsids in the way they ruled. They were merely despots and the promises they made were nothing but mirages. Moreover, the Fāṭimids had offended the sensibilities of the Sunnīs in the Maghrib

71 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, pp. 152–3.

72 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, IV, p. 78.

73 *Ibid.*, pp. 79–80.

by compelling them to follow a theological school based on cursing the Companions and wives of the Prophet and alien religious notions such as declaring the infallibility and divine nature of the imam and changing the words of the *adhān*, or call to prayer.

Added to all this was the imposition of a variety of taxes; indeed, the Fāṭimids showed the utmost artistry in devising these and forcing people to pay them. They had a special tax for pilgrims and in order to collect it they obliged the pilgrims from the Middle Maghrib and the Far Maghrib to travel via al-Mahdiyya even though the city was on the coast and not on the shortest route. The people of the Maghrib also considered ‘Ubaydallāh al-Mahdī, who had killed the founder of his state, Abū ‘Abdallāh the Shī‘ī, to be just like Abū Ja‘far al-Manṣūr who killed Abū Muslim al-Khurāsānī.⁷⁴

From the very first, it was obvious that the aim of the Fāṭimids was not to settle in the Maghrib but rather to exploit its human and economic resources to enable them to move to the East and seize the caliphate – this could only be done by occupying Mecca and Medina, the ‘cradle of the religious community and the gathering place of the Arabs’. Thus, it was said of the Fāṭimids when they were in the Maghrib that they were ‘like someone whose body is going to the West while their face is looking to the East’. In 301/911 ‘Ubaydallāh al-Mahdī mobilized an army under his son Abu-l-Qāsim, assisted by Ḥubāsa ibn Yūsuf al-Kutāmī, which successfully seized control first of Barqa and then of Alexandria. It then advanced towards the sea but was met by an army sent by the ‘Abbāsids under the command of Mu’nis al-Fatā which defeated the Fāṭimids and forced them to return to the Maghrib in 309/921.⁷⁵

Al-Mahdī also tried to extend his authority over al-Andalus. He sent some of his missionaries and spies there in an attempt to take it from the Umayyads, the traditional enemies of the ‘Alawīs, but he came up against the powerful *amīr* ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān an-Nāṣir (r. 300–50/912–61). In 316/928 ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān also declared that he had assumed the title ‘caliph’ and distributed an official proclamation to this effect throughout the Islamic world. Thus, the Islamic world had three caliphs at the same time. In this way, the Fāṭimids helped to sow further divisions in the Islamic world. No one prior to them had had the audacity to declare themselves as caliph out of a concern for Muslim unity.

The Umayyads in al-Andalus fiercely resisted Fāṭimid designs on their country by employing the self-same tactics. They created disagreements among the tribes of the Maghrib and occupied the cities of Ṭanja, Malīla and

74 Sa’d Zaghlūl, ‘Fatra ḥāsima min tārikh al-Maghrib’, *Majallat kulliyat al-ādāb wa-t-tarbiya*, I, Benghazi, al-Jāmi‘a al-lībiyya, 1985, p. 230; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, p. 186.

75 Zaghlūl, ‘Fatra ḥāsima’, pp. 230–1, 239, 241; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, pp. 171–3.

Sabta in order to thwart any invasion. They also strengthened their naval fleet, kept a close eye on the Spanish coast and sent propagandists to Egypt and the Maghrib to counter Shī'ī ideology.⁷⁶

Al-Mahdī tried to seize Egypt three times but every attempt ended in failure. Indeed, Egypt was only finally conquered in the time of the caliph al-Mu'izz li-Dīnillāh. Al-Mahdī died in 322/933 and was succeeded by his son Abu-l-Qāsim (r. 322–34/933–45), who took the honorific *al-Qā'im bi-Amrillāh* ('He who Advocates the Cause of God'). Al-Qā'im was a fanatical adherent of Shī'ism and his policies earned him the resentment of the people of the Maghrib, who revolted against him. The most notable of these revolts was that led by Abū Yazīd Mukhlid ibn Kaydād ('the man of the donkey') which lasted for fourteen years and received material and military support from 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān an-Nāṣir, the caliph of al-Andalus.⁷⁷

Ibn Kaydād belonged to the Yafran clan of the Zanāta tribe. His father originated from Tāwar to the south of Tūnis and worked as a merchant trading with the Sudan. Ibn Kaydād was born in the Sudan to a woman from the Hawwāra tribe. While still a young man, he had joined the sect of the Ibādī Khārijīs. At first he lived in Tāhart, the capital of the Rustumids, but then moved to a village called Taqyūs near Qasṭīliyya (the oasis region of Chaṭ el-Jerīd in modern Tunisia),⁷⁸ where he began to learn the Qur'ān and to persuade people to adopt Shī'ism.

In 322/933, when Ibn Kaydād had attracted a sufficient number of followers, he revolted against 'Ubaydallāh al-Mahdī and then against his son al-Qā'im under the slogan 'defence of the truth' (*ad-difā' 'an al-ḥaq*). By 343/935 he had managed to take control of most of the cities of Ifrīqiya. He then laid siege to al-Mahdiyya, which would have fallen into his hands had he not made the mistake of showing preference to certain of the tribes supporting him and thus creating divisions within his ranks.⁷⁹ These divisions enabled the new caliph Abū-ḡ-Zāhir Ismā'īl (r. 334–41/945–52), who had succeeded his father al-Qāsim, to defeat and capture Ibn Kaydād in 336/947 and to have him executed. In celebration of his victory, Abū-ḡ-Zāhir was given the title *al-Manṣūr* ('the Victorious'). However, his preoccupation with suppressing the revolt of Ibn Kaydād prevented Abū-ḡ-Zāhir from making any attempt to invade Egypt.

When Abū-ḡ-Zāhir al-Manṣūr died, he was succeeded by his son al-Mu'izz li-Dīnillāh (r. 341–65/952–75). It was during al-Mu'izz's reign that the Fāṭimids managed to extend their authority over Egypt. This was facilitated largely by the precarious internal situation in Egypt following

76 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, IV, pp. 303, 310.

77 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, IV, p. 84.

78 Ibid., p. 84.

79 Ibid., p. 89.

the death of the powerful governor Muḥammad ibn Ṭaghj the Ikhshīdid in 334/945, along with low flood levels of the Nile which led to nine years of famine. An additional factor was the death of Kafūr the Ikhshīdid in 357/967. The ‘Abbāsīd caliphate was experiencing similarly difficult circumstances as a result of Turkish officers seizing the reins of power in Baghdad and this prevented them from helping to defend Egypt against the Fāṭimid invasion.⁸⁰

In 355/965 al-Mu‘izz began to make preparations to send his army to Egypt. He collected money and had wells dug all along the route from Kairouan to Barqa. Perhaps the village of al-‘Izziyyāt to the south of Darna in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya which bears his name was one of the way stations he had constructed. In 358/968 al-Mu‘izz dispatched a large army of 500,000 men under the command of Jawhar aṣ-Ṣiqillī. Jawhar first headed for Alexandria, which fell to him without offering any resistance. He then continued his advance to al-Fuṣṭāṭ, which sued for peace. In 358/968 Jawhar began to build the city of al-Qāhira and in 362/972 the Mosque of al-Azhar. In 362/972 al-Mu‘izz li-Dīnillāh moved to Egypt via the coast, carrying the remains of his forefathers and relatives with him lest they be exhumed after his departure. Shortly before leaving, he appointed Balkīn ibn Zīrī ibn Manād aṣ-Ṣanhājī, also called Abū-l-Futūḥ Yūsuf, as governor of the Maghrib and ‘Abdallāh ibn Yakhliḥ al-Kutāmī as governor of Barqa and Ṭarāblus.⁸¹

The Maghrib under the Zīrids (Banū Zīrī) (359–555/969–1160)

The Fāṭimids pursued a divisive policy regarding the tribes of the Maghrib and pitted them one against the other. They created rivalry between them so as to weaken them, break their morale and ensure their continued loyalty to the Fāṭimid caliphate. It was in this context that Balkīn ibn Manād led a number of military campaigns against the people of the Middle Maghrib and those of the Far Maghrib and entered into hostilities with the powerful Zanāta tribe, which was obliged to seek assistance from the Umayyad caliphate in al-Andalus.

In 367/977 the new Fāṭimid caliph al-‘Azīz bi-Llāh (r. 365–86/975–96) placed Barqa and Ṭarāblus under Balkīn’s jurisdiction. When Balkīn died in 373/983 his position was taken by his son Abū-l-Futūḥ Manṣūr ibn Balkīn (in office 373–86/983–96), who followed his father in realizing the objectives

80 Ibid. p. 99; Jamāl-ad-Dīn ash-Shayyāl, *Miṣr fi-l-‘aṣr al-fāṭimī*, in *Mawsū‘at al-ḥaḍāra al-miṣriyya*, II/VI, Cairo, 1956, p. 429.

81 Al-Maqrīzī, *Itti‘āz al-ḥunafā’*, p. 147; Sālim, *al-Maghrib*, II, pp. 635–7.

of the Fāṭimids. The caliph al-‘Azīz confirmed Abū-l-Futūḥ’s governorship of the Maghrib and he remained in the service of the Fāṭimids until his death in 386/996.

Abū-l-Futūḥ ibn Balkīn was replaced by his youngest son, the 12-year-old Naṣīr-ad-Dawla Bādīs. Under Naṣīr-ad-Dawla the Zīrids faced many domestic problems, the most serious being internal divisions within the Zīrid house itself. Thus, Naṣīr-ad-Dawla’s uncle Ḥammād organized a revolt against him and refused to give his allegiance to the Fāṭimids, acknowledging the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate instead. This resulted in war between the two parties, which ended with Naṣīr-ad-Dawla eventually defeating his uncle. When Naṣīr-ad-Dawla died in 406/1015 his generals decided to replace him with his son al-Mu‘izz, who was just 8 years old. With this, peace was established between the two factions within the Zīrid family. Ḥammād took control of the Middle Maghrib while al-Mu‘izz took Ifrīqiya, thus forming two Zīrid states.⁸²

Relations between the Fāṭimids and the Zīrids worsened because of the caliphate’s interference in their affairs on the one hand, and on the other because the Banū Ḥammād acknowledged the ‘Abbāsīds. This situation led to open conflict between the two branches of the Zīrid family, which resulted in 433/1041 in al-Mu‘izz ibn Bādīs renouncing his allegiance to the Fāṭimids and his secession from them. The ‘Abbāsīd caliph al-Qā’im bi-Amrillāh (r. 422–76/1031–85) officially confirmed his appointment as ruler of all the Maghrib. Al-Mu‘izz pursued a policy which he called ‘purification’ (*taṭhīr*) against the supporters of the Fāṭimid state to which thousands of Shī‘īs fell victim. The green flags of the Fāṭimids were burnt and in 443/1051 the black flags of the ‘Abbāsīds were raised in their stead. Many Shī‘īs were forced to emigrate from the Maghrib to Egypt. The Fāṭimid caliph responded by sending the Banū Hilāl and the Banū Salīm to the Maghrib to attack al-Mu‘izz in his own country.⁸³

The Banū Hilāl and the Banū Salīm in the Maghrib

The Banū Hilāl and the Banū Salīm belonged to the Northern Arabs, that is, the Muḍar, and originated from the Ḥijāz; the Banū Hilāl from near aṭ-Ṭā’if; and the Banū Salīm from around Medina. They used to make frequent journeys to Mesopotamia and Greater Syria and took part in the Islamic conquests. In the struggle over the caliphate they joined the ranks of the caliph ‘Ali ibn

82 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, VI, pp. 319–21; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, pp. 230, 239, 247.

83 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, IV, p. 29; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, p. 274.

Abī Ṭālib. They later supported the Carmathians (Qarāmita) and harassed the pilgrims and merchants. After the defeat of the Carmathians by the Fāṭimids, the Banū Salīm and the Banū Hilāl went to Egypt, specifically to the east of the Nile in Upper Egypt, and began to fight each other, thus undermining the peace and stability of the region.⁸⁴

When al-Mu‘izz ibn Bādīs revoked his allegiance to the Fāṭimids in the Maghrib and acknowledged the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate in Baghdad, the Fāṭimid caliph al-Mustanṣir bi-Llāh (r. 427–78/1035–86), on the advice of his *wazīr* Abū-l-Ḥasan Muḥammad al-Yāzūrī, resolved to attack the insubordinate al-Mu‘izz. The caliph hoped to kill two birds with one stone by also ridding himself of the troublesome Banū Salīm and Banū Hilāl in Upper Egypt. In the eight years from 446/1054 to 454/1062, Egypt suffered from a severe drought due to a fall in the level of the Nile. This was followed by a plague that is the subject of many terrible and horrific stories. The ensuing economic crisis encouraged the Banū Salīm and the Banū Hilāl to embark on their celebrated westward march to the Maghrib, which at that time enjoyed a better economic situation.⁸⁵

To persuade the Arabs of the Banū Salīm and the Banū Hilāl to emigrate to the Maghrib, the Fāṭimid caliph gave each tribesman a camel and money and helped them cross from the east to the west bank of the Nile. He also instructed them to rule the Maghrib instead of al-Mu‘izz. Yāzūrī told them: ‘I have given you the Maghrib and the rule of al-Mu‘izz ibn Balkīn aṣ-Ṣanhājī the runaway slave. You will want for nothing.’ He then wrote to al-Mu‘izz saying: ‘I have sent to you horses and put brave men on them so that God might accomplish a matter already enacted.’⁸⁶

The Banū Salīm and the Banū Hilāl travelled westwards until they arrived at Barqa, which they found almost empty of its inhabitants who were from the Zanāta tribe which al-Mu‘izz had mostly destroyed. Up to the present time, many of the springs, valleys and plains still bear the names of the leaders and branches of this tribe. The Banū Salīm settled in Barqa while the Banū Hilāl continued on to Ṭarāblus and then Ifrīqiya. In 443/1051 they clashed with al-Mu‘izz’s army at the battle of Ḥaydarān near Kairouan and inflicted a resounding defeat on it. Indeed, the Banū Salīm and the Banū Hilāl successfully destroyed the Zīrid state and most of its cities, sparing only the Atlantic coastal strip at al-Mahdiyya.⁸⁷

There were a number of consequences of the migration of the Banū Salīm and the Banū Hilāl. First, it led to a series of protracted wars that resulted in human and economic devastation in the Maghrib and the disruption of peace

84 Al-Maqrīzī, *Itti‘āz al-ḥunafā’*, pp. 221–4.

85 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, VI, p. 31.

86 Ibid., IV, p. 131, VI, pp. 30–1.

87 Ibid., IV, p. 131, VI, p. 33; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, pp. 292–3.

and stability. Second, it led to the eventual collapse of the Zīrid state. Third (a positive consequence) was the Arabization of the Maghrib due to the arrival of what some sources estimate at around 1 million Arabs, who assimilated and intermarried with the indigenous peoples. Finally, the Vikings in Italy took advantage of the decline of the Zīrid state and in 516/1122 attacked and seized Sicily. They then raided some of the coastal cities of Ifrīqiya such as al-Mahdiyya in 480/1088 and 489/1097, islands such as Qawṣara, Jarba (Djerba) and Qarqana, and the city of Ṭarāblus in 532/1137 and 541/1146. Indeed, the Viking raids assumed the character of a crusade and contributed to the emergence of the Almoravids.⁸⁸

The Almoravids (*al-Murābiṭūn*)

The Almoravids belonged to the Ṣanhāja tribe, which controlled the principal trade routes between the northern Maghrib and sub-Saharan Africa. At the beginning of the fifth/eleventh century, the leader of the tribe was Yaḥyā ibn Ibrāhīm al-Jaddālī, who came from one of the branches of the Ṣanhāja. In 427/1035 Yaḥyā went to perform the pilgrimage and to seek knowledge. On his return journey he passed by Kairouan, where he met the *faqīh* (jurist) Abū ‘Imrān Mūsā al-Fāsī whom he asked to provide him with a scholar to instruct his tribe in the true Islamic religion. So Abū ‘Imrān gave him a letter to take to a student of his called Wajjāj ibn Zallū al-Lamṭī, who lived in the town of Nafīs near Tūnis. After reading his teacher’s letter, Wajjāj chose a religious scholar from the Ṣanhāja called ‘Abdallāh ibn Yāsīn al-Jazūlī. ‘Abdallāh ibn Yāsīn and Yaḥyā ibn Ibrāhīm left for the region of the Lamtūna tribe. But when ‘Abdallāh began to apply Islamic law as is necessary, the Lamtūna tribe rose up against him and drove him out. So he left, accompanied by Yaḥyā ibn ‘Umar and his brother Abū Bakr ibn ‘Umar and a group of loyal tribesmen who wanted to stay with him. They eventually settled on an island thought to lie on the river Senegal, where they built a retreat (*ribāṭ*) for worship and for the religious, military and particularly Islamic instruction of their followers. It is because of this that they were given the name *Murābiṭūn* (‘those who stay in a *ribāṭ*’).⁸⁹

When ‘Abdallāh ibn Yāsīn had attracted some 1,000 followers who were spiritually and militarily prepared, committed and loyal and who had been transformed from mere camel-herders into a formidable force of brave soldiers, he went to do battle with the Jaddāla tribe to make them accept his

88 Sālim, *al-Maghrib*, II, p. 671; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi-t-tārīkh*, IX, pp. 10–12.

89 Aḥmad Maḥmūd Ḥasan, *Qiyām dawlat al-Murābiṭīn*, Cairo, Maktabat an-nahḍa, 1957, p. 142; Ibn Abī Dīnār, Muḥammad ibn al-Qāsīm, *al-Mu’nis fi akhbār Ifrīqiya wa-Tūnis*, Tunisia, Ṭaba‘at Tūnis, AH 1286, p. 102.

teachings. Then he attacked the tribes of the Lamtūna, Masūfa, Lamṭa and others. From these tribes ‘Abdallāh ibn Yāsīn created the Almoravid army with which he marched to the Maghrib. In 445/1053 he seized Sijilmāsa and Dar‘a, then he advanced to Tāfilalt to fight the Zanāta. In this battle in 447/1055 the leader of the Ṣanhāja, Yaḥyā ibn ‘Umar, was killed and was succeeded by his brother Abū Bakr ibn ‘Umar. Following this, the Almoravids went to the south-east of the Maghrib and in 449/1057 occupied the city of Aghmāt. They then marched to the western Rīf mountains and during the ensuing battles the *faqīh* ‘Abdallāh ibn Yāsīn was killed in 450/1058. In 452/1060 Abū Bakr ibn ‘Umar left his cousin Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn in charge of the Maghrib while he himself made for the Sahara to resolve problems that had arisen among the branches of their tribe.⁹⁰

THE FOUNDING OF MARRAKESH

Like the other Muslim rulers in the East (Mashreq) and the Maghrib, in 454/1062 Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn established a city which was to function as the Almoravid capital and as a military base in the southern Maghrib. This was Marrakesh, which was situated midway between the Far Maghrib and the lands of sub-Saharan Africa, rich in resources such as gold and salt.⁹¹ Marrakesh was destined to play a prominent role in the history of the Maghrib and al-Andalus, in the dissemination of Islam in Ifrīqiya and in the defence of Islam in Europe and especially Spain. Indeed, up to the present time it still occupies a venerable place in the hearts of the people of the Maghrib since it was the capital of the two most important states in the history of the region, that is, the Almoravids and the Almohads.

Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn completed the Almoravid capture of the most important cities of the Far Maghrib, adding Fās in 455/1063 and the region of Ghamāra in 460/1067. In 465/1072 he became leader of all the Ṣanhāja and of the Almoravid state. He allocated positions in government to his sons and relatives and the leading men. During the rule of Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn, the Almoravid state emerged as the sole power in the Arab Maghrib. He began to have designs on al-Andalus and thus added the strategically important Sabta and Ṭanja to his domains.⁹²

Al-Andalus was in a critical political situation, especially after the collapse of the Umayyad caliphate in 399/1008 and the period of anarchy that

90 Ḥasan, ‘Ali Ḥasan, *al-Ḥaḍāra al-islāmiyya fi-l-Maghrib wa-l-Andalus: ‘aṣr al-Murābiṭīn wa-l-Muwahḥidīn*, Cairo, Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1980, pp. 22–5; Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, VI, pp. 377–9.

91 Sālim, *al-Maghrib*, II, pp. 702–5.

92 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, VI, pp. 379–80; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A‘māl al-a‘lām*, p. 236.

began in 422/1030. These events were followed by the division of the country into small emirates, which fought and competed with each other and were known as the ‘petty kingdoms’ (*aṭ-ṭawā’if*). This encouraged the Spaniards to announce the beginning of the *Reconquista*, leading to the occupation of Toledo in 478/1085. Concerned for their fate, the petty kingdoms appealed to the Almoravids to save them from the Spanish attacks, they themselves being unable to do so due to their internal divisions.⁹³

Despite his power, and in order to preserve Muslim unity, Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn did not give himself the title of caliph. He was content to call himself the *Amīr al-Mu’minīn* and to swear allegiance to the ‘Abbāsid caliph al-Muqtadī b-illāh (r. 467–87/1075–97), adopting the colour black as the emblem of his state.⁹⁴

The Almoravids in al-Andalus

The fall of Toledo to Alfonso VI (r. 457–502/1065–1109) in 478/1085 had serious repercussions in both al-Andalus and the Maghrib. With Alfonso’s policy of enticement and threat, the enormous tribute he imposed and his humiliating treatment, the rulers of al-Andalus – including their most senior representative, Muḥammad al-Mu’tamid ibn ‘Abbād (r. 460–83/1067–90) – could see no alternative but to ask the Almoravids for help despite their fear of them. Thus, after much discussion among themselves and between Muḥammad ibn ‘Abbād and his sons, it was finally decided to send a delegation to Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn asking for military aid. Ibn Tāshfīn agreed to this on condition that they surrendered Algeciras to him to use as a military base. Muḥammad ibn ‘Abbād agreed to these terms and personally led a delegation to meet Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn and to sign a contract in which he relinquished control of Algeciras to the Almoravids.⁹⁵

The Almoravids mobilized their troops, amassed their equipment and crossed the Strait of Gibraltar into al-Andalus, where the people gave them a warm and friendly welcome. Supported by forces belonging to the *amīrs*, the Almoravids under Muḥammad ibn ‘Abbād advanced and met the army of Alfonso VI at the famous battle of Zallāqa (Sagrajas) in 479/1086 in which the Spaniards suffered a crushing defeat and lost all their men save for

93 Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Maqqarī, *Nafḥ aṭ-ṭīb min ghuṣn al-Andalus ar-raṭīb*, ed. Muḥammad ‘Abd-al-Ḥamīd, Cairo, 1949, VI, p. 88.

94 Ḥusayn Mu’nis, ‘Sab’a wathā’iq jadīda ‘an dawlat al-Murābiṭīn wa-ayyāmihim fi-l-Andalus’, in *Shaḥīfat al-ma’had al-miṣrī li-d-dirāsāt al-islāmiyya bi-Madrīd*, Madrid, 1954, II, pp. 66–8.

95 Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A’māl al-a’lām*, pp. 245–6; anon., *al-Ḥulal al-mawshiyya fī dhikr al-akhbār al-marrākushiyya*, Tunisia, AH 1329, p. 28.

300 knights and the king, who fled wounded from the battlefield to Toledo.⁹⁶ Among the consequences of this battle was that it released the Muslims of al-Andalus from the pressure that Alfonso was putting on them, made him reconsider his programme for the reconquest of Spain and forced him to seek the help of the kings of Europe which, in turn, prepared the way for the wars of the Crusades. The battle also enhanced the reputation of the Almoravids as a powerful military force in the Islamic world and enabled them to study the situation in al-Andalus at close range.

The Almoravids crossed the strait a second time in order to help the Muslims when, in 481/1088, the Spaniards threatened the east of the country by seizing the castle of Aledo. The Almoravids laid siege to the castle, but when this became protracted and problems arose in the Maghrib they were forced to lift it and return home.

The Almoravids crossed over into al-Andalus on a third occasion, this time to put an end to the *amīrs* of the petty kingdoms who were continually fighting amongst themselves and conspiring with the Spaniards both against each other and against the Almoravids. Thus, in 483/1090 Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn did away with all the petty kingdoms, added al-Andalus to his state and ruled it directly through governors appointed by himself.⁹⁷

THE COLLAPSE OF THE ALMORAVIDS

A number of factors contributed to the collapse of the Almoravid state. One of these was the numerous wars in which the Almoravids became involved in the Maghrib, and especially in al-Andalus, which cost them many of their troops and generals. Also, once the troops had settled in al-Andalus their previously rough-and-ready living conditions became quite comfortable. Similarly, the revolts which arose against the Almoravid state in its last days led to a serious recession in the economy. Perhaps the most important reasons for the fall of the Almoravids, however, were the emergence of the Almohads who waged continuous war against them and the revolt of the people of al-Andalus and their renewed coalition with the Christians. All these circumstances contributed to the final collapse of the Almoravid state in 541/1146.

96 Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A'māl al-a'lām*, pp. 242–3; anon., *al-Ḥulal al-mawshiyya*, p. 43; Joseph Ashbach, *Tārīkh al-Andalus fī 'ahd al-Murābiṭīn*, trans. Muḥammad 'Anān, Cairo, 1958, p. 80; al-'Abbādī, *fī tārikh al-Maghrib*, p. 319.

97 Sālim, *al-Maghrib*, II, pp. 727–32.

The Maghrib under Almohad (*al-Muwaḥḥid*) rule

THE GROWTH OF THE ALMOHADS AND THEIR RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY

From its beginnings the Almohad state was characterized by the religious ideology upon which it was based and which it continued to summon people to accept. This was the doctrine of the absolute unity of God (*tawḥīd*), which was propounded by the originator of the movement, Muḥammad ibn Tūmart, whose followers became known as the *Muwaḥḥidūn* ('those who declare God to be One') because they were united in their belief in the unity (*waḥda*) of God. It is true that they did not bring anything new to Islam but rather emphasized something already within it. Ibn Khaldūn remarks: 'Ibn Tūmart chose this name in contrast to the Almoravids, who anthropomorphized God and insisted on a literal interpretation of the Qur'ānic text.'⁹⁸

Ibn Tūmart was born in 485/1092 and brought up in a pious family in a small village called Ījlī in the region of as-Sūs. His father was a tribal chief. Ibn Tūmart belonged to the Hargha tribe, one of the branches of the Maṣmūda, although he used to claim that he was descended from al-Ḥasan ibn 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, that is, from the family of the Prophet.⁹⁹ Ibn Tūmart spent his childhood as a student in the village religious schools memorizing the Qur'ān. In 501/1107 he decided to travel to the East to acquire more knowledge and to perform the pilgrimage. In al-Mahdiyya he met with some of the religious scholars, in Baghdad he learnt the fundamentals of religion from Abū Bakr ash-Shāshī and the science of *Ḥadīth* from Shaykh 'Alī Mubārak, and in ash-Shām he met Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī.¹⁰⁰

When Ibn Tūmart returned from the East, he embraced a religious conviction drawn from the concept of 'ordering good and forbidding evil' (*al-amr bi-l-ma'rūf wa-n-nahy 'an al-munkar*). This was by no means a new concept but was rather taken from the very heart of Islam, that is, from the Qur'ān. With this conviction, Ibn Tūmart came up against the beliefs of the Muslims in the Maghrib which were completely different from his own. He argued and disputed with the Almoravid religious scholars over several issues relating to the interpretation of some verses from the Qur'ān and other matters to do with people's conduct. As a result, he was banished from a number of cities. He went to extremes in his application of 'ordering good

98 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, VI, p. 229; Ibn Abī Dīnār, *al-Mu'nis*, p. 109.

99 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, Beirut, Dār al-fikr, n.d., pp. 26, 27; Al-Baydhaq, Muḥammad, *Akhbār al-mahdī Ibn Tūmart*, ed. E. Lévi-Provençal, Paris, 1928, p. 21; Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, VI, p. 226.

100 Muḥyi-d-Dīn 'Abd-al-Wāḥid al-Marrākushī, *al-Mu'jib fī talkhīṣ akhbār al-Maghrib*, ed. Muḥammad al-'Aryān, Cairo, 1958, pp. 178, 179.

and forbidding evil' and spoke about free thinking and about not abiding rigidly to the text of the Qur'ān. Indeed, he reached the point where he claimed that all those who disagreed with him were unbelievers, particularly the Almoravids, and accused them of seeing God in human terms.¹⁰¹

In 514/1120 Ibn Tūmart arrived in Marrakesh, where he began to promulgate his views. He quarrelled with the religious scholars, who refused to accept them, and was consequently thrown out of the city by the Almoravid *amīr*. Previously, in Mallāla, he had met 'Abd-al-Mu'min ibn 'Alī, who became one of his closest pupils and disciples and who was destined to become the real founder of the Almohad state.

After leaving Marrakesh Ibn Tūmart settled in the city of Tīnmall, which became the headquarters of his missionary activity and where he received the support of the Maṣmūda tribe whom he told that he was the awaited Messiah (*al-Mahdī al-Muntaẓar*). From this tribe he formed a large army under the command of 'Abd-al-Mu'min ibn 'Alī. Ibn Tūmart then gave himself the title *Amīr al-Mu'minīn* and the Maṣmūda followed him blindly. In 524/1129 he gathered his troops and addressed them, saying: 'Go to those apostates, those who have renounced their religion and who call themselves *Murābiṭūn* [Almoravids].' But in the ensuing battle of al-Buḥayra, the Almohad army suffered a crushing defeat from which only a few escaped, including 'Abd-al-Mu'min ibn 'Alī. This was a terrible blow to Ibn Tūmart and he died soon afterwards, his supporters concealing the news of his death for three years.¹⁰²

THE UNIFICATION OF THE MAGHRIB AND AL-ANDALUS UNDER THE ALMOHADS

After the death of Ibn Tūmart the next Almohad caliph was 'Abd-al-Mu'min ibn 'Alī (r. 524–58/1129–62), who continued fighting the Almoravids, successfully put an end to their rule in the Maghrib and al-Andalus and then united both countries under his own authority. In this way, 'Abd-al-Mu'min created a powerful state which controlled a vast area extending from Barqa and Ṭarāblus in the present-day Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the north of Muslim Spain and to western Sudan.

In 537/1141 the Almohads seized the castle of Wahrān, which was the residence of Tāfshīn ibn 'Alī who had become *amīr* of the Almoravids in that same year. Then in 539/1144 they attacked Wahrān itself and were able to occupy it and kill Tāfshīn. They continued their advance to Fās, laid siege to it and stormed it. Indeed, the Almoravids had become demoralized

101 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, VI, pp. 228–9.

102 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, VI, pp. 228–9.

after the death of their leader Tāshfīn and soon afterwards both Miknāsa and Salā also fell. It was also at this time that ‘Alī ibn ‘Īsā, the commander of the Almoravid fleet in al-Andalus, announced that he was defecting to the Almohads. In 541/1146 the Almohads under ‘Abd-al-Mu’min ibn ‘Alī occupied the Almoravid capital Marrakesh and killed Ibrāhīm ibn Tāshfīn, the last Almoravid *amīr*.¹⁰³

The governors in al-Andalus took advantage of the weakness of the Almoravids and their preoccupation with the fight against the Almohads by making their regions independent. The Spaniards also capitalized on the situation by attacking and seizing control of a number of Muslim cities and castles. The Almohads quickly sent reinforcements to ‘Alī ibn ‘Īsā (the governor of Cádiz), who had joined them, and in 541/1146 to Aḥmad aṣ-Ṣūfī (the governor of Mértola), who in the name of the Almohads was able to capture a number of cities in al-Andalus such as Badajoz, Silves, Seville and Málaga. By the end of 541/1146 the majority of *amīrs* in al-Andalus had sworn allegiance to the caliph, ‘Abd-al-Mu’min ibn ‘Alī.¹⁰⁴

In 549/1154 the Almohads captured Granada and laid siege to Almería. In 552/1157 they inflicted a crushing defeat on the Spaniards. Then in 555/1160 the caliph ‘Abd-al-Mu’min crossed the Strait of Gibraltar to al-Andalus, organized its administration and made moves to expel the Spaniards from the places they had only recently taken when the Almoravid state was weak.¹⁰⁵ Following this, he made for the Near Maghrib and the Middle Maghrib and seized Bijāya and the castle of the Banū Ḥammād.

Meanwhile, the Vikings had captured al-Mahdiyya, Ṣafāqis and Sūsa. In 538/1143 they attacked Ṭarāblus. They were not able to seize the city on the first attempt but their second attempt was successful and they occupied it in 541/1146. As a result of these developments, the Muslims in Ifriqiya sought the help of the caliph ‘Abd-al-Mu’min, who responded by leading an army of 100,000 men which overwhelmed the Vikings and drove them out of the coastal cities. In 555/1160 ‘Abd-al-Mu’min entered al-Mahdiyya, while Ṭarāblus announced its surrender. Thus, all the Maghrib submitted to the authority of the Almohads.

In 558/1162 ‘Abd-al-Mu’min fell ill and died in Salā. His body was taken to Tīnmall, where it was buried next to the tomb of Ibn Tūmart.¹⁰⁶ ‘Abd-al-Mu’min was succeeded by his son Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf (r. 558–80/1162–84), who was

103 Al-Marrākushī, *al-Mu‘jib*, p. 303; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, Muḥammad Lisān-ad-Dīn, *al-Iḥāṭa fī akhbār Gharnāṭa*, ed. Muḥammad ‘Inān, Cairo, Dār al-ma‘ārif, 1955, p. 461; Ibn Abī Zar‘, *al-Anīs al-muṭrib*, II, p. 93; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, IV, p. 104.

104 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, VI, p. 480; al-Baydhaq, *Akhbār al-mahdī*, p. 126.

105 E. Lévi-Provençal, *Majmū‘at rasā’il muwahḥidiyya*, Rabat, 1941, pp. 9–14; al-Maqqarī, *Nafh aṭ-ṭīb*, VI, p. 206.

106 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, VI, pp. 364, 471; al-Marrākushī, *al-Mu‘jib*, p. 307; al-Baydhaq, *Akhbār al-mahdī*, p. 121.

faced with a number of problems in the Maghrib and al-Andalus, including a coalition between Ibn Mardanišh and the Spaniards that attacked Córdoba. Abū Ya‘qūb dispatched an Almohad army under the command of his brothers Abū Sa‘īd and Abū Ḥafṣ, the religious leader of the Almohads, which defeated Ibn Mardanišh and his allies in 561/1165. In 566/1170 Abū Ya‘qūb himself crossed over to al-Andalus and led his army as far as Santarém in the south of present-day Portugal. He returned again in 571/1175 and went to Seville, where he ordered the construction of many buildings including the great mosque, the bridge, the palace (Alcazaba) and quays along the river Guadalquivir.

The Spanish and the Portuguese repeated their attacks against al-Andalus and forced Abū Ya‘qūb to return again in 579/1183 to fight the Portuguese at Santarém. In the battle the caliph was struck with a poisoned arrow and died from his wound the following year. His body was carried to Tīnmall, where it was buried next to his father’s.¹⁰⁷

ABŪ YŪSUF YA‘QŪB AL-MANŠŪR
(R. 580–95/1184–98)

Abū Yūsuf al-Manšūr succeeded his father as caliph of the Almohads and followed him in defending the Muslims in al-Andalus against the attacks of the Spaniards and their allies the Portuguese. Abū Yūsuf also quelled the insurrection of the Banū Ghāniya, a branch of the Almoravids who had fled from the island of Mallorca. They formed a coalition with the Arab tribes of the Banū Hilāl, the Banū Salīm and a group of slaves led by Qārāqūsh that had rebelled against Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn (Saladin) al-Ayyūbī. They managed to gain control of the Near Maghrib, thus forcing the caliph to lead an army against them in 582/1186 to break the coalition.

A coalition of the Franks, the English, the Dutch and others under Alfonso VIII the king of León (r. 1158–1214) was formed against al-Andalus and they occupied the city of Silves, seemingly as part of the wars of the Crusades which began in the Muslim East in 491/1097. When Abū Yūsuf al-Manšūr learnt about this, he made preparations to cross over into Spain to repel the attack. Upon his arrival in Seville, he ordered that a fortress be built on the Guadalquivir called Ḥiṣn al-Faraj, a name it still bears today (i.e. Aznalfarache). From Seville, the caliph headed for Córdoba and then on to a place called al-Arāk (Alarcos) near Qal‘at Rabāḥ (Calatrava), arriving there in 591/1194. It was in Alarcos that a fierce battle took place from which the Almohads emerged victorious. Among the Spanish dead were three bishops,

107 Al-Marrākushī, *al-Mu‘jib*, pp. 249, 256, 261.

seventeen priests and a large number of knights, including the cavalry commander Gonçalo Viegas.¹⁰⁸ King Alfonso VIII, however, managed to escape.

The Muslims were able to regain many of the fortresses and castles that the Spaniards had taken from them. In 592/1195 Abū Yūsuf al-Manṣūr launched an attack on Toledo in an attempt to retake it, but when this proved unsuccessful because of its impregnable position he concluded a ten-year truce with the Spaniards. He then returned to the Maghrib, where he died in Marrakesh in 595/1198.¹⁰⁹

EVENTS IN AL-ANDALUS AND THE DEFEAT OF THE ALMOHADS
AT THE BATTLE OF LAS NAVAS DE TOLOSA (AL-‘UQĀB)
(609/1212)

Abū Yūsuf was succeeded as Almohad caliph by his son Muḥammad an-Nāṣir (r. 595–610/1199–1214). Muḥammad faced a number of rebellions by remnants of the Almoravids in the Near Maghrib led by Yaḥyā ibn Ghāniya who, taking advantage of the Almohads' preoccupation with al-Andalus, seized most of Ifrīqiya. Elsewhere, Alfonso VIII was exerting all his power to avenge his defeat at Alarcos. He began to fortify his castles and to urge the Christians to join ranks and wage a crusade against the Muslims in al-Andalus. When he felt ready to revoke the truce with the Almohads, he attacked and destroyed the cities of Jaén and Baeza. In response, Muḥammad an-Nāṣir mobilized a large army and in 607/1210 crossed over into al-Andalus.¹¹⁰

When Alfonso realized the seriousness of the situation, he sent several delegations to Pope Innocent III, who in turn sent religious envoys to all the kings and princes of Europe calling on them to wage war against the Muslims in al-Andalus. This resulted in a great multitude of volunteers of different European nationalities gathering around Alfonso in Toledo. With this force behind him, Alfonso marched on al-Andalus and seized Calatrava. Meanwhile, the Almohad armies were advancing towards Alfonso. Shortly before the battle took place, however, their military preparations were thrown into disarray by a violent disagreement between the Almohads and Muslim detachments from al-Andalus; this resulted in Muḥammad an-Nāṣir dismissing their generals regardless of the fact that they were the

108 Al-Marrākushī, *al-Mu‘jib*, p. 282; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, IV, p. 160; Ibn Abī Dīnār, *al-Mu‘nis*, p. 116; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A‘māl al-a‘lām*, p. 309.

109 Az-Zarkashī, Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad, *Tārīkh ad-dawlatayn al-muwahḥidiyya wa-l-ḥafṣiyya*, Tunis, AH 1289, p. 11; Ibn Abī Zar‘, *al-Anīs al-muṭrib*, II, p. 167; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, IV, p. 183.

110 An-Nāṣirī, *al-Istiqṣā’*, II, p. 220.

men most familiar with the methods and strategies of the Spaniards. Thus, in 609/1212 Alfonso and his allies were able to inflict a crushing defeat on the Almohads at what the Spanish sources call the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. The Spaniards went on to capture a number of villages, cities and important military bases. As for Muḥammad an-Nāṣir, he returned dejectedly to Seville and thence to the Maghrib and Marrakesh, where he died in 610/1213.¹¹¹

THE COLLAPSE OF THE ALMOHAD STATE

The battle of Las Navas de Tolosa had a number of important consequences for al-Andalus and the Maghrib. Thus, the Spaniards were able to gain control over most of the country apart from Granada, which continued to resist Spanish expansion until 898/1492 under the Banū al-Aḥmar or Banū Naṣr (the Nasrids).

After the death of the last Almohad caliph Abū-l-‘Alā’ Idrīs, known as Abū Idrīs, in 630/1232, the Maghrib became divided and three new states were formed under the Hafsids, the ‘Abd al-Wadids and the Marinids.

The Hafsīd state (627–943/1229–1536)

The Hafsids (Ḥafṣīs, or the Banū Ḥafṣ) are descendants of Shaykh Abū Ḥafṣ Yaḥyā ibn ‘Umar al-Hantānī from the tribe of the Maṣmūda. He was one of the ten disciples of Ibn Tūmart, the originator of the Almohads. The real founder of the Hafsīd state, however, was Abū Zakariyā, who established it in Ifrīqiya in 675/1276. The reason for his declaring independence from the Almohad caliph al-Ma’mūn was the latter’s denial of the infallibility of the imam al-Mahdī ibn Tūmart, his repudiation of Almohad religious and political ideology and his murdering a large number of Almohad scholars in Marrakesh and Tīnmall.¹¹²

The Hafsids ruled the Near Maghrib for some three and a half centuries, and under Abū Zakariyā the region made great progress and achieved wide renown. Indeed, part of al-Andalus announced that it was placing itself under Hafsīd control, which also extended over the larger part of the Middle Maghrib. The Hafsīd state opened its domains to emigrants from al-Andalus and in this way exerted a great influence on Spanish economics, architecture and culture.

111 Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A’māl al-a’lām*, p. 270; an-Nāṣirī, *al-Istiḳṣā’*, II, p. 224.

112 An-Nāṣirī, *al-Istiḳṣā’*, II, p. 225.

At first, the Hafsīd state under al-Mustanşir was stable and trade relations developed with the Italian principalities and other places in the Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa. Towards the end of his rule, however, disturbances broke out that undermined his authority. Al-Mustanşir died in 675/1276 and was succeeded by Abū ‘Aşīda and then by his brother Ḥakam ibn Ḥafş. But the Hafsīd *amīrs* quarrelled amongst themselves, thus weakening the Hafsīd state both politically and militarily and leading to power struggles.¹¹³

During the time of Abu-l-‘Abbās, the Hafsīd state recovered some of its power and in 792/1390 the *amīr* successfully repulsed a Christian attack on al-Mahdiyya. Abu-l-‘Abbās was succeeded by his son Abū Fāris, who sent a military expedition to the islands of Malta and Jarba. He also seized Tilmisān. The Hafsīd state under Abū Fāris enjoyed a period of stability, prosperity and strength. He was also able to regain control of the regions that had seceded from the state, that is, Tauzar, Qafşa and, in 803/1401, Ṭarāblus. In 813/1412 he went on to reclaim Baskara and al-Jazā’ir (Algiers).¹¹⁴

When Abū Fāris died in 834/1434 he was succeeded by his youngest son, al-Mustanşir. Under al-Mustanşir’s reign conflict broke out among his uncles, who began to fight each other for control of the emirate. The rebellious uncles were eventually overcome by Abū ‘Imrān ‘Uthmān, who ruled the emirate in 850/1449. Following Abū ‘Imrān’s death, anarchy once again returned to Ifrīqiya following a Spanish attack on the coast and the secession of a number of tribes. It was not long before the Hafsīd state fell under the control of the Ottomans in 982/1574.¹¹⁵

The state of the ‘Abd al-Wadids (or the Zayyanids) in the Middle Maghrib (633–962/1235–1554)

The ‘Abd al-Wadids (Banū ‘Abd-al-Wād), also known as the Zayyanids (Banū Zayyān), belonged to the well-known Zanāta tribe. One of their leaders, Yaghamsasīn ibn Zayyān, achieved renown for the important role he played in establishing the Wadid state. In 624/1227 he had served as Almohad governor of Tilmisān, but soon after the fall of the Almohad state he declared his region independent. The ‘Abd al-Wadids encountered a number of difficulties, including Hafsīd intimidation in their capacity as

113 An-Nāşirī, *al-Istişā’a*, II, pp. 288–300, 320–3.

114 *Ibid.*, pp. 398–400.

115 Sālim, *al-Maghrib*, II, pp. 875–9.

heirs of the Almohads. Indeed, for a period of time the Hafsids were able to impose their authority over the Middle Maghrib and were acknowledged by the 'Abd al-Wadids. In the West, the latter were exposed to attacks from the Marinids, who, in 737/1336 under Abū-l-Ḥasan al-Marīnī, laid siege to Tilmisān. Abū-l-Ḥasan successfully captured the city and added it to Marinid domains, where it remained for eleven years.¹¹⁶

In 570/1174 the 'Abd al-Wadids threw off Marinid control and remained independent, governing their own affairs until the Marinid *amīr* Abū 'Inān ibn al-Ḥasan took over Tilmisān in 735/1352. The two parties then concluded a treaty stating that the 'Abd al-Wadids could rule over the Middle Maghrib on condition that they accepted the authority of the Marinids. One famous 'Abd al-Wadid ruler of the Middle Maghrib during this period was Abū Ḥamw 'Alī ibn Abī Zayyān under whom the state flourished thanks to political stability, economic prosperity and trade relations with sub-Saharan Africa.¹¹⁷

The end of the ninth/fifteenth century witnessed a period of disturbances and widespread anarchy resulting from the attacks of the Hafsid ruler Abū-l-Fāris 'Abd-al-'Azīz, who launched an offensive against Tilmisān in 870/1465 and destroyed its walls. Nonetheless, the 'Abd al-Wadid state managed to withstand Hafsid aggression until the Spaniards entered the course of Maghribī history with their capture of Bijāya in 910/1504, Wahrān in 914/1508 and then al-Jazā'ir, which suffered an artillery barrage forcing the inhabitants to seek the help of the Ottoman Turks.¹¹⁸

The Marinid state (663–796/1269–1393)

The Marinids (Banū Marīn) belonged to the Zanāta tribe, which had played a prominent role in the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in al-Andalus when they proved themselves to be courageous warriors. Their leader Maḥyū Abū Bakr was killed in the battle and his place was taken by his son 'Abd-al-Ḥaq. When the Almohad state collapsed after their defeat at Las Navas de Tolosa, 'Abd-al-Ḥaq began to have designs on seizing power. He led his army and in 613/1216 defeated the Almohads. He was killed, however, the following year in a skirmish with the Hilālī Banū Ribāḥ. 'Abd-al-Ḥaq was succeeded by his son Abū Sa'īd 'Uthmān, who began working to overthrow the Almohad state. However, he was killed in 614/1217. The Marinid leaders continued trying to usurp Almohad power and finally achieved this under the *amīr*

116 Sālim, *al-Maghrib*, II, pp. 872–4.

117 *Ibid.*, pp. 873–4.

118 *Ibid.*, pp. 474–5.

Abū Bakr ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥaḡ, who captured Miknās in 643/1245 followed by Fās in 648/1250.

In 668/1269, during the reign of Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥaḡ, the Marinids entered Marrakesh. This date is thought to mark the beginning of the Marinid state. They are called Marinids because of their descent from their ancestor Marīn ibn Wartājan az-Zanātī. They are also known as the Waṭṭāsiyyūn, a name derived from that of their ancestor Waṭṭās ibn Fajūs ibn Jarmāṭ ibn Marīn.¹¹⁹

The Marinids directed their energies towards al-Andalus and gave crucial assistance to the Ahmarid state in Granada against the Castilians, which enabled the Ahmarids to hold out against the Spanish *Reconquista* for longer. In 668/1269 the *amīr* Ya‘qūb ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥaḡ left Fās at the head of an army, crossed over into al-Andalus and inflicted a number of defeats on the Spaniards. In 674/1275 he returned to Fās, where he began construction of the nearby al-Madīna al-Bayḡā’ (‘the White City’). He crossed over into al-Andalus to fight the Spaniards a total of four times; on the last occasion in 684/1285 he fell ill and died in Algeciras.

Ya‘qūb ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥaḡ was succeeded by his son Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf, who pursued his father’s policy of defending al-Andalus. He travelled to the country on a number of occasions and fought several battles against the Spaniards. When Ya‘qūb ibn ‘Abd-al-Ḥaḡ died, he was succeeded by his son Abū Thābit ‘Āmir (r. 706–08/1306–08).

During the reign of Abū Sa‘īd ‘Uthmān ibn Ya‘qūb (r. 731/1330), the Marinids extended their authority over the Middle Maghrib. They also crossed into al-Andalus in response to a request from the governor of Granada. When Abū Sa‘īd died he was succeeded by his son Abū-l-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn ‘Uthmān, who seized Tilmisān in 737/1332. He also captured Tūnis in 748/1347 after defeating its Hāfsid *amīr*. To these gains he subsequently added Barqa and Ṭarāblus. In this way, the Marinids united all of the Maghrib under one administration.¹²⁰

When weak rulers rose to power, both the Near Maghrib and the Middle Maghrib seceded from the Marinid state and it shrank to its original borders. The Marinids suffered a series of disasters as a result of Spanish and Portuguese pressure on Sabta in 818/1417 followed by other coastal regions. In 876/1474 the Spanish and Portuguese occupied Aṣīlā, and in 869/1465 they occupied Ṣāfī, Azmū and Ṭanja. Thus, the Marinid state lost many of its possessions while Marrakesh, Dar‘a, as-Sūs and ar-Rīf seceded from it. Finally, in 956/1549, Fās fell into the hands of the Sharīfī Sa‘dīs.¹²¹

119 Sālim, *al-Maghrib*, II, pp. 865–8.

120 *Ibid.*, pp. 869–70.

121 Muḡammad al-Fāsī, ‘al-Maghrib’, in *Tārīkh Ifrīqiya al-‘ām*, *The General History of Africa*, VI, Paris, UNESCO, 1997, pp. 241–4.

The Sa'dīs (Sa'dids) in the Far Maghrib (956–1041/1549–1631)

The Sa'dīs belonged to the Sharīfī Arabs and were descended from Ḥalīma as-Sa'diyya, the Prophet's wet nurse. The reason for the emergence of the Sa'did state was the Spanish-Portuguese programme of *Reconquista* against al-Andalus and the lands of the Maghrib. When the Marinid state found itself unable to withstand this onslaught, the people of the Maghrib turned to the much-respected *mawlā* Muḥammad ibn 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān, who lived in Dar'a, and asked him to lead them in the liberation of the coastal cities occupied by the Portuguese and the Spanish. Muḥammad accepted the invitation and was proclaimed an *amīr* with the name *al-Qā'im bi-Amrillāh*. In view of his advanced years, however, he left actual command to his sons. After achieving some victories against the occupation, they gradually laid the foundations of Sa'dī family rule over the Far Maghrib. Rulers from the Sa'dī family successfully freed many of the ports of the Maghrib from Spanish and Portuguese control while at the same time striving to unite the Far Maghrib under their leadership and put an end to the last few remaining Marinids in Fās.

When al-Qā'im bi-Amrillāh died in 1517 he was succeeded by his sons Muḥammad ash-Shaykh and Aḥmad al-A'raj, who managed to liberate Asafi and Azmūr from the Portuguese. Over the period 956/1549 to 957/1550 the next *amīr*, Muḥammad al-Mahdī, was able to recover Aṣīla and al-Qaṣr aṣ-Ṣaghīr (Ksar es-Seghir). Only Ṭanja, Sabta and Mazghān remained under occupation. The victories achieved by the Sa'dīs were a painful blow for the Portuguese who, when they could no longer continue the fight alone, appealed to France for military aid. However, since France already had problems of its own with Germany, it was unable to respond.

The death of Muḥammad al-Mahdī was followed by a power struggle among his sons. In furtherance of their aims, some of them allied themselves with the Ottomans while others made alliances with the Spaniards and the Portuguese. The two brothers Aḥmad and 'Abd-al-Malik turned to al-Jazā'ir. As for their brother 'Abdallāh al-Ghālib, who was eventually to accede to the throne (r. 956–82/1557–74), he asked the Spaniards for help.

'Abdallāh al-Ghālib was succeeded by al-Mutawakkil. However, in 984/1576 'Abd-al-Malik, with Ottoman support, usurped his nephew al-Mutawakkil's rule. As soon as he gained power, he made an alliance with the Spaniards. As for the deposed al-Mutawakkil, he took refuge with the Portuguese. King Sebastian welcomed him and provided him with an army with which to regain his throne in the Maghrib in return for permission to expand Portuguese influence there.

Meanwhile, ‘Abd-al-Malik was hoping for assistance from the Spaniards who, however, were reluctant to fulfil their promise of support until he had signed an agreement with them. In spite of this, ‘Abd-al-Malik encountered the Portuguese forces along with supporters of al-Mutawakkil and the two sides met – the Maghribīs under ‘Abd-al-Malik and the Portuguese under King Sebastian, assisted by al-Mutawakkil – in August 986/1578 in Wādī al-Makhāzin. The decisive battle that ensued ended with the defeat of the Portuguese and the death of King Sebastian, al-Mutawakkil and 26,000 of their men.¹²² The battle of the Three Kings, or Wādī al-Makhāzin, was a turning-point in the history of Portuguese-Maghribī hostilities because it put an end to Portuguese interference in the affairs of the Far Maghrib.

When ‘Abd-al-Malik died he was succeeded by his brother Aḥmad al-Manṣūr, known as *al-Manṣūr adh-Dhahabī* (‘the Golden Conqueror’, r. 986–1012/1578–1603). As a result of the Sa’dī victory at the battle of the Three Kings, they acquired military renown and an international reputation as defenders of Islam. This great victory also led to stability in the Far Maghrib. The Maghrib remained independent and was the only country in the Arab world that did not fall under the control of the Ottoman caliphate. The Sa’dīs continued to rule over the Maghrib until 1041/1631, when they were succeeded by the Sharīfī ‘Alawīs who are still in power to this day.¹²³

122 Al-Fāsī, ‘al-Maghrib’, pp. 246–52.

123 Ibid., p. 256.

Chapter 3.3

ISLAM IN AL-ANDALUS AND THE MEDITERRANEAN ISLANDS (91–898/710–1492)

Idris El Hareir

The term ‘Andalus’

‘Andalus’ was originally derived from ‘Andalūs’, which was a name for the Vandal (or Wandal) tribes that swept across Europe and finally settled in southern Spain. The Arabs arabized this as ‘Andalus’ and then used it to refer to the Iberian peninsula. The term continued to be applied to the whole of Spain until the end of Muslim rule in 898/1492 when it was restricted to southern Spain, which is still known by this name (i.e. Andalusia).¹

The internal situation in Spain prior to the Islamic conquest

During the period of the Umayyad caliphate, when the political problems of the Islamic state had been resolved and it had extended its authority over all the Maghrib, there was domestic strife between the nobles and the clergy within Spanish society. The brutal persecution of the Jews under King Egica

1 Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Ḥimyarī, *Ṣifat jazīrat al-Andalus*, ed. E. Lévi-Provençal, Beirut, Dār al-jīl, 1988, pp. 2–4; Ibrāhīm Baydūn, *ad-Dawla al-‘arabiyya fī Isbānyā min al-fath ḥattā suqūṭ al-khilāfa*, Beirut, an-Nahḍa al-‘arabiyya, 1986, p. 66; Idris El Hareir, ‘al-Futūḥāt fi-l-Maghrib wa-l-Andalus’, in *al-Kitāb al-marjī‘ fī tārikh al-umma al-‘arabiyya*, Tunisia, al-Munazzama al-‘arabiyya li-t-tarbiya wa-th-thaqāfa wa-l-‘ulūm (ALECSO), 2005, II, p. 329; Aḥmad Mukhtār al-‘Abbādī, *fī tārikh al-Maghrib wa-l-Andalus*, Beirut, Dār an-nahḍa al-‘arabiyya, 1978, p. 17; Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh ‘Anān, *Dawlat al-islām fi-l-Andalus: duwal aṭ-ṭawā’if*, Cairo, Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1997, pp. 51–5.

(d. AD 702) led to a religious, social and economic crisis in the country. When Egica died he appointed his son Witiza (or Ghayṭsha according to the Arabic sources) to succeed him. Witiza attempted to enact some reforms in the country but this angered the nobles and the clergy who began to conspire against him. Although he was able to uncover their plans and thwart them, he nonetheless died in mysterious circumstances and Rodrigo, the duke of the region of Bética and Córdoba, was accused of his murder. Witiza was succeeded by his son Actula but he ruled for only a short time before being deposed by Rodrigo.² The sons of Witiza sought refuge with a friend of their father called Count Julian, the governor of Ceuta.

Thus, shortly before the Islamic conquest the internal situation in Spain was in turmoil and the country had many problems. At the same time that Spain was suffering from this instability, chaos and religious persecution, the Maghrib was experiencing a wave of intense religious fervour which expressed itself in a desire to spread Islam under a single administration led by Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr, who was assisted by Ṭāriq ibn Ziyād. These circumstances resulted in the conquest of Spain.

The Islamic conquest of Spain

Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr and his general Ṭāriq ibn Ziyād were keeping an eye on the situation on the other side of the strait while their ally Julian provided them with information. When King Witiza's sons sought refuge with Julian, he advised them to ask the Muslims to help them take revenge on Duke Rodrigo, the murderer of their father and the man who had usurped their throne. After Julian had proposed to Ṭāriq ibn Ziyād that he should launch an attack against Spain and promised to lend him assistance, Ṭāriq handed the sons over to Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr in Kairouan in his capacity as governor. Mūsā then sought the permission of the Umayyad caliph in Damascus, al-Walīd ibn 'Abd-al-Malik (r. 86–102/705–20). The caliph gave his permission for the conquest of Spain to begin but ordered that it take place in gradual stages out of concern for the Muslims' safety. 'Send raiding parties, see what happens and gather information about it,' he told Ibn Nuṣayr. 'Do not risk the lives of Muslims in a sea of terrors.'³

2 Khālid aṣ-Ṣūfī, *Tārīkh al-'arab fi-l-Andalus: fath al-wulāh*, Benghazi, al-Jāmi'a al-lībiyya, n.d., pp. 64–70; 'Abd-al-'Azīz Sālim, *Qurṭuba hādīrat al-khilāfa fi-l-Andalus*, Beirut, Dār an-nahḍa al-'arabiyya, 1971, II, pp. 264–5.

3 Abū 'Abdallāh al-Ḥimyarī, *ar-Rawḍ al-mi'tār*, Beirut, Maktabat Lubnān, 1975, p. 8; Ibn 'Idhārī al-Marrākushī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib fī akhbār al-Andalus wa-l-Maghrib*, II, pp. 4–5; anon., *Akhbār majmū'a fī tārīkh al-Andalus*, ed. E. Lafuente, Madrid, 1867, p. 6; Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Maqqarī, *Nafḥ at-ṭīb min ghuṣn al-Andalus ar-raṭīb*, ed. Iḥsān 'Abbās, Beirut, 1968, I, p. 237.

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In accordance with the caliph's instructions, and with the consent of Julian the governor of Ceuta, it was agreed that the latter should launch the first raid on Spain. This was on the one hand so that he could show his resolve and his loyalty to the Muslims, and on the other in order to show himself to be the enemy of the Visigothic King Rodrigo and to gauge the reaction of the Spaniards. A second raid was led by Ṭarīf ibn Mālīk al-Mu'āfirī in 91/710. He landed on the southernmost tip of the peninsula, where the city of Tarifa still bears his name. This military force consisted of 150 horsemen and 400 soldiers all of whom were transported on ships provided by Julian.⁴

Due to the success of the campaign against Tarifa, Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr decided to commence operations for the conquest of Spain and chose Ṭāriq ibn Ziyād as leader of the first wave of conquerors. Ṭāriq led an initial force of 7,000 soldiers, subsequently augmented by a further 5,000 men. The army was transported on seven ships that Ṭāriq had captured in the Mediterranean, in addition to ships provided by Julian and some others belonging to the Muslims. These ships transported the men, horses, supplies and *matériel* from the coast of Morocco to Spain.⁵

On 5 Rajab 94/April 711 Ṭāriq's forces landed on the mountain (*jabal*) which now bears his name (*jabal Ṭāriq*, or Gibraltar). He immediately began to build a fortification known as the *sūr al-'Arab*, or 'wall of the Arabs', and to extend his authority over the adjoining region which was called *al-Jazīra al-Khaḍrā'* ('the Green Island', or Algeciras). When he had secured the landing site for his troops, he began to send increasingly large raiding parties over to the coast of Spain. After seizing the citadel of Cartuja, he set off northwards in the direction of Córdoba. On the way, Ṭāriq was opposed by a Visigoth force under the command of one of Rodrigo's nephews, but the latter was quickly overwhelmed and defeated and his soldiers retreated to Córdoba.⁶

When the Arab-Muslim forces landed in Spain, Rodrigo was in the Basque region in the north of the peninsula launching a counter-offensive against the Frankish king. After learning that the Muslims had arrived in the south, he decided to hasten back to his capital Toledo to announce a general mobilization. He gathered a large army estimated by the Islamic sources at between 40,000 and 100,000 men. King Rodrigo asked King Witiza's sons, who had remained with him, to offer him all the help they could in repelling the Muslim assault. He placed one of them on the right wing of the Spanish army and the other on the left. It seems, however, that Julian had been in

4 Anon., *Akhbār majmū'a*, pp. 6–8; 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, Beirut, Dār al-kitāb, 1958, IV, p. 254; El Hareir, 'al-Futūḥāt', pp. 330–1.

5 Anon., *Akhbār majmū'a*, pp. 6, 7; Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, p. 6; El Hareir, 'al-Futūḥāt', p. 331.

6 Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, p. 8; Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Qūṭiyya, *Tārīkh iftitāḥ al-Andalus*, ed. Ibrāhīm al-Abyārī, Beirut, Dār al-kutub al-islāmiyya, 1982, p. 9.

touch with them and that they had agreed to desert their positions and to join the Muslims at an opportune moment so as to take their revenge on King Rodrigo, whom they considered had usurped their father's throne.⁷

THE BATTLE OF GUADALETE

The Muslim army under the command of Ṭāriq ibn Ziyād met the Spanish army under the command of King Rodrigo at Guadalete near the city of Sidonia on 28 Ramaḍān 92/19 July 711. The ensuing fierce struggle continued for eight days: it ended with the victory of the Muslims, the defeat of the Spaniards and the death of King Rodrigo. This battle put an end to the power of the Spanish army and opened the way for Muslim control over all the principal Spanish cities.⁸ The victory also raised the morale of the Muslims and encouraged them to send more of their forces to Spain. Thus in Ramaḍān 93/June 712 Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr, followed by an army of 18,000 men, crossed the strait, which subsequently became known as the Strait of Gibraltar. He headed for the cities of Sidonia, Carmona, Seville, Mérida, Niebla and Baja, that is, towards western Spain. At the same time, Ṭāriq ibn Ziyād, accompanied by Count Julian, was moving north towards Toledo after they had agreed to disburse their troops in small detachments so as to seize Spanish cities such as Córdoba, Regio and Granada. These were all easily conquered.⁹

Once Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr had taken control of the cities of western Spain, he sent a message to Ṭāriq ibn Ziyād inviting him to meet him at Talbira. There, they reached an agreement to move together on Zaragoza, which they took by force. They then continued their march towards Coimbra, the Basque country and the area of Asturias. Next they conquered the city of Barcelona near the borders with the land of the Franks.

Around this time, in 95/714, Muḡhīth ar-Rūmī arrived from Damascus carrying an order from the caliph al-Walīd ibn 'Abd-al-Malik to cease the military operations in Spain and for Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr and Ṭāriq ibn Ziyād to return to Damascus.¹⁰ Mūsā obeyed the caliph's order to return to the capital of the caliphate. But before leaving he made administrative arrangements for Spain and chose his son 'Abd-al-'Azīz ibn Mūsā as governor, assisted by Ḥabīb

7 Anon., *Akhbār majmū'a*, p. 7; Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-muḡhrib*, II, p. 8; al-Maqqarī, *Nafh at-ṭīb*, I, pp. 216, 241.

8 El Hareir, 'al-Futūḡhāt', pp. 330–2; 'Abd-ar-Raḡmān ibn 'Abd-al-Ḥakam, *Futūḡh Ifrīqiyyā wa-l-Andalus*, ed. Anīs at-Ṭabbā', Beirut, Dār al-kitāb al-lubnānī, 1964, pp. 94–6; Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-muḡhrib*, II, p. 12.

9 Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-muḡhrib*, II, p. 12.

10 Al-Maqqarī, *Nafh at-ṭīb*, I, pp. 276–7; El Hareir, 'al-Futūḡhāt', p. 333.

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ibn ‘Ubayda ibn ‘Uqba ibn Nāfī and Ayyūb ibn Ḥabīb al-Lakhmī. Seville was to be the administrative capital of the country. Mūsā also appointed his son ‘Abdallāh ibn Mūsā as governor of the Maghrib.

Periods of Muslim rule in Spain

Historians divide Muslim rule in Spain into five periods: the era of the governors (91–138/710–55), the Umayyad state (138–422/755–1030), the petty kingdoms (422–84/1030–91), the Almoravids and the Almohads (483–633/1090–1235) and the Banū Naṣr (the Naṣrids) in Granada (635–898/1238–1492). We shall deal with each of these in what follows.

THE ERA OF THE GOVERNORS (91–138/710–55)

The era of the governors began with the Muslim conquest of Spain in 91/710 and lasted until the establishment of the Umayyad state in 138/755. During this period twenty-two governors held office. The first was ‘Abd-al-‘Azīz ibn Mūsā ibn Nuṣayr (95–97/713–15), who organized the administration of Spain and completed the conquest of the eastern part of the country, in particular the cities of Murcia and Tudmir.¹¹ At this time Spain was administered directly either by the governor of the Maghrib or from Damascus.

‘Abd-al-‘Azīz’s governorship did not last long and he was soon assassinated as a result of a plot devised by some of his aides. Following this, Spain went through a period of political turmoil and the office of governor passed back and forth between two opposing groups: the Northern Arabs and the Southern Arabs, that is, the Qaysīs and the Yamanīs. This struggle swept away the unity of the Umayyad caliphate in all areas under its authority, especially in the Maghrib and Spain.¹²

Perhaps the most important and well-known of the governors of Spain at that time is ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān al-Ghāfiqī, who held the office twice, from 102/720 to 103/721 and from 113/731 until 115/733. His campaign against France is possibly the reason for his fame since he crossed the Pyrenees with a large Muslim army and made his way as far as Bordeaux. The campaign was to destroy a coalition against the Muslims in Spain formed between Duke Odo, the ruler of Aquitaine in the south of France, and Manuza, the ruler of northern Spain. After successfully crushing the coalition, al-Ghāfiqī

11 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, IV, p. 118; al-Maqqarī, *Nafh at-ṭīb*, II, p. 263.

12 El Hareir, ‘al-Futūḥāt’, p. 341; Shakīb Arslān, *Tārīkh ghazawāt al-‘arab fī Faransā wa-Swīsrā wa-Īṭālyā wa-jazā’ir al-Baḥr al-Mutawassīṭ*, Beirut, Maktabat al-ḥayāh, 1983, pp. 117–19; aṣ-Ṣūfī, *Tārīkh al-‘arab*, pp. 243–4.

decided to strike Duke Odo in his own country, so he launched an attack against his capital Bordeaux and seized it. The Muslim army continued its advance until it reached Poitiers, which also fell. It then went on to Tours, the holy city which contains the tomb of St Martin. This caused Duke Odo to seek the support of Charles Martel, the Merovingian mayor of the palace of Austrasia in the land of the Franks, who sensed the imminent threat that the Muslims posed to his country. Martel readied a large army to encounter the Muslims at Poitiers. It was here that a decisive battle took place which continued for several days without either side gaining the upper hand. Eventually, the Franks were able to kill ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān al-Ghāfiqī, the commander of the Muslim army, and this forced them to retreat back into Spain during the night.

Regardless of what is said about the consequences of the Frankish victory at the battle of Poitiers (114/732), or the battle of the Highway of the Martyrs (*Balāṭ ash-Shuhadā’*) as it is also called, it did not put an end to Muslim raids on France. Thus, in 116/734 the Muslims once again attacked the south of the country and captured the cities of Lyon and Narbonne, where they remained until 142/759. They also seized the region of Provence and Arles in 120/737 and entered St Tropez in 276/889. It was the circumstances of the Muslims in Spain which caused them to expand into Western Europe.

There are four main conclusions that can be drawn from the battle of Poitiers. First, it was the last serious attempt by the Muslims to conquer the land of the Franks. Second, Charles Martel became a hero in Europe and from that time onwards was given the nickname ‘the Hammer’. Third, Europeans saw the battle as a symbol of religious and political triumph, and from that day France became the centre from which originated most military operations and armies directed against the Muslims. And, finally, some European historians and academics believe that the Frankish victory spared Europe from the Muslim threat.¹³

During this period the Umayyad caliphate was experiencing a wave of racist hostility aimed at the non-Arabs, or so-called *mawālī*. This horrible conflict first erupted between the Northern Arabs and the Southern Arabs. It consumed the human and economic resources of the state, made it incapable of realizing its plans for conquest, encouraged its enemies both domestic and foreign to wage war against it, and eventually led to its decline and fall. The conflict spread throughout all the Umayyad territories, including Spain.

During the period 114–16/732–34 ‘Abd-al-Malik ibn Qaṭan al-Fihri became the governor of Spain. He is described by some historians as a ruthless tyrant and for this reason he was removed from office. But he returned in

13 Philip K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, London, Macmillan, 1970, pp. 500–1; Gustave Lebon, *Ḥaḍārat al-‘arab*, trans. ‘Adil Zu‘aytar, Cairo, Maṭba‘at ‘Īsā al-Ḥalabī, 1948, pp. 383–4.

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121–23/738–40. His period of governorship saw the great rebellion which broke out in the Maghrib against the Umayyad administration for political reasons alluded to above.¹⁴

When the Umayyad army was defeated by the Khārijīs at the battle of the *Ashrāf* (the descendants of the Prophet's grandsons), some of the Umayyad soldiers managed to escape. They fled to Ceuta, where they were subjected to a prolonged siege by an army under the command of Balj ibn Bashir. When the rebellion spread to Spain, the governor 'Abd-al-Malik ibn Qaṭan needed the assistance of Ibn Bashir's forces in Ceuta. So he transferred them to Spain and with them was able to crush the rebellion against him. But this same army mutinied against Ibn al-Qaṭan and he was killed. His place was taken by Balj ibn Bashir from 123/740 to 124/741. Balj's governorship did not last long before he died in battle. He was succeeded by Tha'laba ibn Salāma, but the caliph dismissed him due to his poor management and inefficient administration of the country.¹⁵ The caliph then appointed Abū-l-Khaṭṭār Ḥusām al-Kalbī (in office 125–27/742–44) as his replacement. Abū-l-Khaṭṭār attempted to put an end to the tribal conflict between the Northern and the Southern Arabs and to make a number of administrative reforms. But he in turn soon threw himself into the conflict on the side of the Yamanīs and clashed with the leader of the Qaysīs, aṣ-Ṣumayl ibn Ḥātim, who defeated him at the battle of Segunda in 127/744. Abū-l-Khaṭṭār was succeeded by Thawāba ibn Salāma al-Judhāmī, who similarly did not last long in office before dying in 129/746.

The governorship of Spain passed into the hands of Yūsuf al-Fihri (127–38/744–55) with the connivance of aṣ-Ṣumayl ibn Ḥātim, who wanted to put an end to the influence of the Yamanīs by choosing a governor who was from the tribe of the Quraysh and who had spiritual authority in the Maghrib and Spain because of the standing of his grandfather, 'Uqba ibn Nāfi' al-Fihri. Nonetheless, effective power remained in the hands of aṣ-Ṣumayl, it being said: 'Yūsuf has the title, but aṣ-Ṣumayl has the command [*rasm*],' that is, real authority.¹⁶

As a result of the struggle between the Northern and the Southern Arabs, Spain began to descend into anarchy until eventually 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Mu'āwiya ad-Dākhil ('the Incomer') arrived, seized power and established the Umayyad emirate in 138/755.

14 El Ḥareir, 'al-Futūḥāt', pp. 338–9; Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, pp. 30–5.


15 Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, pp. 30–2.

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 33–5.

THE UMAYYAD STATE (138–422/755–1030)

Umayyad rule in Spain occurred in two stages – the emirate and the caliphate – and represents the most splendid and progressive period of Muslim control there. The first stage lasted from 138/755 until 316/929, during which time Spain was an independent emirate that controlled its own affairs and was not subservient to the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate. The second stage was from 316/929 to 422/1030, when Spain became an Islamic caliphate like the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate in Baghdad and the Fāṭimid caliphate in al-Mahdiyya.

After the ‘Abbāsīds had destroyed the Umayyad state in 132/750, they began vigorously and remorselessly pursuing those Umayyad *amīrs* and their followers who were still alive. For this reason, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Mu‘āwīya ibn Hishām ibn ‘Abd-al-Malik ibn Marwān ibn al-Ḥakam decided to flee to the Far Maghrib, accompanied by his *mawlā* (client) Badr. ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān chose the Far Maghrib for a number of reasons which can be summarized as follows. First, the Maghrib was at a great distance from the control of the ‘Abbāsīd state and the country was experiencing a Khārījī rebellion against the Umayyad administration. Second, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān’s mother, who was called Rāḥ, was from the Nafza tribe from the far north of the Far Maghrib and it was only natural that he should flee to his maternal uncles seeking their assistance and protection. Third, many supporters and *mawālī* of the Umayyads were found in Spain and they would doubtless



3.9 Plan of the Mosque of Córdoba (© G. Degeorge)

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welcome the Umayyad *amīr*. Finally, the Islamic sources mention that the caliph Hishām ibn ‘Abd-al-Malik (‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān’s paternal grandfather) had laid claim to Spain in the name of the sons of Mu‘āwīya ibn Hishām, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān’s father.¹⁷ For these reasons, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Mu‘āwīya fled to the Far Maghrib and began to travel around its different territories to discover whether it was possible to establish a state there or not.

‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān stayed for a while with his uncles from the Nafza tribe, which at that time lived on the Mediterranean coast opposite Spain. He then sent his *mawlā* Badr with letters for the leaders and supporters of the Umayyads so as to gauge their reaction to his crossing over to Spain and the possibility of them offering him assistance. By such means, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān was also able to study the situation in Spain more closely. Badr initially made contact with the most powerful leaders of the Northern Arabs, aṣ-Ṣumayl ibn Ḥātim and Yūsuf ibn ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān al-Fihri. When he suggested the idea that his master the *amīr* ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān should come to Spain, aṣ-Ṣumayl said to those present: ‘He is from a people who, if one of them urinated on this peninsula, we would all drown in his urine. The first sword that will be drawn against him is mine.’¹⁸ The Arabs of ash-Shām did not want ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān to come to Spain even though the Umayyads were related to the Northern Arabs.

Thus, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān decided to address himself to the Southern Arabs, who welcomed him in order to spite their opponents the Northern Arabs who had triumphed over them at the battle of Segunda in 127/744. In 138/755 ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān crossed over into Spain, becoming known as *ad-Dākhil* (‘the Incomer’), and landed at a place called Almuñécar. He then proceeded to the castle of Torrox, the main centre of Umayyad support. There, he established his military headquarters from which to direct his campaigns. Following this, on 9 Dhu-l-Ḥijja 138/May 755, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān advanced to Córdoba, where he engaged with Yūsuf al-Fihri and aṣ-Ṣumayl ibn Ḥātim at the battle of Musara. ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān emerged victorious and was declared *amīr* of Spain.¹⁹

‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān (r. 138–72/755–88) faced a number of difficulties during his rule. One of these was the agitation fomented by the deposed *amīr* Yūsuf al-Fihri and his ally aṣ-Ṣumayl ibn Ḥātim. However, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān managed to avert the danger by means of subterfuge, intimidation and threats until he was finally able to have the two men killed. The most

17 Anon., *Akhbār majmū‘a*, p. 27; al-Maqqarī, *Nafh at-ṭīb*, I, p. 312; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, pp. 40–2.

18 Anon., *Akhbār majmū‘a*, pp. 38–9; al-Maqqarī, *Nafh at-ṭīb*, IV, pp. 29–30; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, p. 64.

19 Al-Maqqarī, *Nafh at-ṭīb*, IV, p. 32; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, p. 69; anon., *Akhbār majmū‘a*, p. 45.

serious problem, however, and one which almost put an end to his rule, was the interference of the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate in the affairs of Spain. Thus, in 149/766, the ‘Abbāsīd caliph Abū Ja‘far al-Manṣūr sent al-‘Alā’ ibn Muḡhīth al-Yaḡṣubī to incite a rebellion against ‘Abd-ar-Raḡmān and to assume the office of governor of Spain. But the attempt failed and al-Yaḡṣubī was killed.²⁰ ‘Abd-ar-Raḡmān continued to consolidate his authority but no sooner did he quell one revolt than another arose in its place. The most serious revolt was that organized by a number of his relatives in 163/780.

Although ‘Abd-ar-Raḡmān spent most of his rule struggling to overcome those who rebelled against him, he nevertheless achieved much in the field of reconstruction. He set in place Spain’s administrative system, dividing the country into districts or provinces. With his energy and will-power, ‘Abd-ar-Raḡmān was also extremely successful in restoring order to the country, such that the ‘Abbāsīd caliph Abū Ja‘far al-Manṣūr called him ‘the Hawk of the Quraysh.’²¹

‘Abd-ar-Raḡmān devoted much of his attention to the city of Córdoba. He ensured that it was well organized and in 170/785 he built a large mosque there known as the Great Mosque of Córdoba at a cost of 80,000 dinars. The geographer al-‘Umarī describes it in the following terms:

It is a large mosque and has no peer among the mosques of the Muslims in its construction and ornamentation, its length and its breadth ... The eye is dazzled and the heart is transported by the perfection of its design, its different hues and sections ... Every pillar has a base and a capital made of marble. Between the tops of the pillars are remarkable arches in which are set further arches made of carved stone of excellent craftsmanship.

Elsewhere, al-Ḥimyarī remarks:

The mosque has a *qibla* [a niche in the wall to indicate the direction of prayer] which defies description. It is of the finest workmanship. Its ornamentation is stunning and it contains mosaics and tinted gold. There is a minaret on the northern side of the mosque which is remarkable in form and wonderful in construction. It is 100 cubits high.²²

20 Anon., *Akhbār majmū‘a*, p. 54; Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, IV, p. 122; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-muḡhrib*, II, p. 77; al-Maqqarī, *Nafḡ at-ṭīb*, I, p. 311.

21 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-muḡhrib*, II, p. 88; anon., *Akhbār majmū‘a*, p. 68; Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, IV, p. 122.

22 Ibn Faḡlallāh Shihāb-ad-Dīn al-‘Umarī, *Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār*, ed. Aḡmad Zakī, Cairo, 1924, p. 212; al-Ḥimyarī, *ar-Rawḡ al-mi‘ṭār*, p. 155.

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‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān also established a large number of other institutions such as the administrative headquarters on the outskirts of Córdoba called Raṣāfat Hishām. He similarly took a keen interest in the gardens; in their midst he constructed a palace that he called the palace of Damascus, or as it was alternatively known, the *munya* (palace) of Raṣāfa. This latter name has continued to be used for the site up to the present time, with Arrizafa being the name of a village near Córdoba.²³

Relations between ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān and Charlemagne

Among the revolts against the rule of ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān was an uprising in Zaragoza. Although the *amīr* was able to suppress it, in 168/814 one of the instigators, Sulaymān ibn Yaḡzān, made his way to the Frankish court and had an audience with Charlemagne. He suggested that the king occupy Zaragoza, explaining the ease with which it might be conquered and promising to assist him. As a sign of his good intentions and sincerity, Sulaymān handed over to him Tha‘laba, one of ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān’s generals whom Sulaymān had taken captive.

Charlemagne seized this opportunity to strike at the Muslims in Spain and in 161/778 he prepared his army and crossed into Spain. Things did not, however, turn out as expected since the ruler of Zaragoza, al-Ḥusayn ibn Yaḡyā al-Anṣārī, refused to open the gates of the city to Sulaymān, thus forcing Charlemagne to lay siege to it. When the siege became drawn out and protracted, and when Charlemagne learnt of troubles in his own country, he decided to lift the siege and return to whence he had come. As the rear part of the Frankish army was travelling through the Roncevaux pass, it was ambushed by the Muslims. Many of Charlemagne’s men were killed, including the Palatine Count Anselmus, Egginhard the mayor of the palace, and Roland who has been immortalized in European legend as a symbol of chivalry in the well-known *Song of Roland*.²⁴

‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān died in 172/788 after appointing his son Hishām (r. 172–80/788–96) as his successor. ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān had organized the military situation within the country for his son and there were therefore few problems apart from the rebellions of his brothers Sulaymān and ‘Abdallāh which, however, Hishām was eventually able to resolve peacefully. As regards building work, Hishām completed the construction of the Great Mosque of Córdoba.

Hishām ibn ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān was succeeded by his son al-Ḥakam (r. 180–206/796–821). The rule of this *amīr* was characterized by numerous

23 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, IV, p. 124; anon., *Akhbār majmū‘a*, p. 59.

24 E. Lévi-Provençal, *Histoire de l’Espagne musulmane*, Paris, Maisonneuve, 1950, pp. 82–3.

disturbances and uprisings and by his lack of regard for the religious scholars (*fuqahā'*), which angered them and led to their opposition. Al-Ḥakam created a strong army and formed a private guard of slaves consisting of 5,000 men – 3,000 of whom were infantry and 1,000 cavalry – all permanently garrisoned in front of his palace.²⁵

One of the most significant events during al-Ḥakam's rule was the first Rabaḍ (the southern suburb of Córdoba) rebellion in 189/804, led by the religious scholars who were dissatisfied with his conduct and method of rule. They had begun to convene secret meetings with the object of deposing the *amīr* and he had therefore ordered the arrest of the ringleaders and the execution of seventy-two of them. The Rabaḍ quarter rose in rebellion for a second time in 202/817 under the leadership of the well-known religious scholar Yaḥyā ibn Yaḥyā al-Laythī. This forced al-Ḥakam to remove all the quarter's inhabitants and to deport them from Spain. Many of them went to Fās, where they settled in a district known as the 'Andalusian quarter'. The majority of them, however, went to Alexandria in 212/827 and stayed there under the leadership of the religious scholar Abū Hafṣ al-Bulūṭī. They were subsequently expelled from Alexandria and made their way to Crete, where they established an Islamic republic which lasted until 350/961. As for the Rabaḍ quarter in Córdoba, al-Ḥakam turned this into a plantation which lasted until the beginning of the fourth/tenth century. Meanwhile, relations between the Umayyad emirate and the Franks remained hostile. The Franks occupied Barcelona in 183/799 but al-Ḥakam was able to regain the city in 199/815.²⁶

When al-Ḥakam died he was succeeded by his son 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān, known as *al-Awsaṭ* ('the Middle One') (r. 206–38/822–52). 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān's period of rule witnessed the flourishing of Spain in a number of fields due to the maturing of Islamic civilization both in the East and in that country. 'Abbāsīd culture also found its way to Spain. Similarly, relations developed with the Byzantine empire in response to the 'Abbāsīd-Frank alliance against Spain and the Viking attacks on the west coast. These latter attacks were also the main reason for the growth of the Spanish fleet and an increase in ship-building.

Despite the hostility between the 'Abbāsīds and the Umayyads, there was no cessation of their cultural, economic and social relations, nor of

25 Al-Maqqarī, *Nafh at-tīb*, I, p. 320; Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, p. 118; Lisān-ad-Dīn ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A'māl al-a'lām*, ed. E. Lévi-Provençal, Beirut, Dār al-makshūf, 1956, p. 14; anon., *Akhbār majmū'a*, p. 68.

26 'Abd-al-Wāhid al-Marrākushī, *al-Mu'jib fī talkhīṣ akhbār al-Maghrib*, ed. Muḥammad al-'Alamī, Casablanca, Dār al-kutub, 1978, p. 19; Aḥmad ibn 'Abd-al-Wahhāb an-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab*, Cairo, Dār al-kutub, 1923, XXII, p. 31; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A'māl al-a'lām*, pp. 15, 16; Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, pp. 109, 111, 115.

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the movement of people between the Islamic East and the Spanish West. Thus, we see scholars, poets, craftsmen, merchants and students travelling between the two regions easily and without hindrance. Perhaps the most celebrated of these was the Baghdadi singer and musician Ziryāb, whose full name was ‘Alī ibn Nāfi‘ and whose patronymic was Abū-l-Ḥasan. He lived at the ‘Abbāsid caliph al-Mahdī’s court and then later at the court of ar-Rashīd before moving to Spain. When Ziryāb arrived in the Maghrib he contacted the *amīr* al-Ḥakam, who invited him to come to Spain. After the death of al-Ḥakam, Ziryāb was welcomed by the *amīr* ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān, who made him his favourite singer. Ziryāb had a great influence on music, singing and social life in general and his innovations in these fields became known as the ‘Principles of Ziryāb.’²⁷

During the reign of ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān, all details regarding the organization of the emirate were completed. The *amīr* formed a council of ministers (*wazīrs*) and chose someone to head it (the *ḥājib*). The council was composed of five ministers who were allocated a particular place in which to convene their meetings. Each member was awarded a monthly salary of 300 dinars.

As to the achievements of ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān, Ibn al-Abbār remarks:

The *amīr* ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān was the one who brought to perfection the splendour of rule and the organization of government in Spain. He clothed the emirate in the majesty of the caliphate and the ministers appeared during his time.²⁸

On the subject of this unique development of the system of ministers, Ibn Khaldūn has the following to say:

As for the Umayyads in Spain, at first they used the name *wazīr* [minister] with its original meaning. Then they divided the functions of the *wazīr* into a number of parts and for each function they appointed a particular *wazīr*. Thus, they appointed a *wazīr* in charge of government finances, another for official correspondence, another to take care of the needs of those who had been treated unjustly and another to look after the affairs of those who lived in the border regions. A house was given to them in which they sat on carpets spread out for them and carried out the orders of the ruler, each in his own particular jurisdiction. One of the *wazīrs* was appointed as liaison officer between the *wazīrs* and the caliph. He had a higher status than the others since he was in constant contact with the ruler. His seat was higher than those of the other

27 Al-Maqqarī, *Nafh at-ṭīb*, I, pp. 120–4; Ibn al-Qūṭīyya, *Tārīkh iftitāḥ al-Andalus*, p. 89.

28 Abū ‘Abdallāh ibn al-Abbār, *al-Ḥulla as-siyarā*, ed. Ḥusayn Mu’nis, Cairo, ash-Sharika al-‘arabiyya li-ṭ-ṭibā‘a wa-n-nashr, 2003, VI, p. 250; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, p. 121.

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wazīrs. He was distinguished with the title *ḥājib* [chamberlain]. This situation continued until the end of their reign.²⁹

‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān was concerned with public safety and organized the security of the cities of Spain. In each city he appointed officials called the *ṣāḥib al-madīna* (‘the one in charge of the city’) and the *ṣāḥib as-sūq* (‘the one in charge of the market’). He divided the police force into the ‘supreme police’ and the ‘middle police’, each having its own particular jurisdiction and dealing with specific groups within society according to income and social status.

‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān also took an interest in scholarship. His reign saw the rise to fame of ‘Abbās ibn Farnās, the ‘wise man of Spain’, who was a distinguished and remarkable scholar in the fields of chemistry, mathematics, astronomy, grammar and music. One of Ibn Farnās’s most significant discoveries was the manufacture of glass from a special type of stone that was found in Spain at that time. He was also the first to make an instrument called a *minqāla* for telling the time. In the field of astronomy, Ibn Farnās constructed a dome inside his house on which was an image of the sky, the stars, the clouds and so on. He had a chemistry laboratory in which he conducted experiments. When one of Ibn Farnās’s neighbours noticed that coloured water was leaking out of his house into the street, they accused him of sorcery and complained to the *amīr* who, however, exonerated him knowing that he was a scientist who was engaged in various experiments. Indeed, the *amīr* encouraged him with an award of 300 dinars and some clothes.³⁰ Ibn Farnās achieved renown above all other scholars for his famous attempt to fly.

Perhaps the distinguishing feature of ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān’s reign was in the field of foreign relations, which were conducted by Spain’s most famous foreign minister, Yaḥyā ibn Ḥakam al-Ghazāl (156–250/722–816). He served five Umayyad *amīrs*, beginning with ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ad-Dākhil and ending with Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān al-Awsaṭ. He referred to this in a line of poetry:

I met four kings in Egypt – and the fifth is the one we are now with.

Al-Ghazāl was a poet of eloquence in the full meaning of the term. He was also handsome and energetic and was thus given the nickname ‘the gazelle’ (*al-ghazāl*). It is common knowledge that these qualities were required for Muslim diplomacy. Indeed, an oral tradition on the authority of the Prophet

29 ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, Beirut, Dār al-fikr, n.d., pp. 239–40.

30 Al-Maqqarī, *Nafh at-ṭīb*, IV, p. 345.

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3.10 The great Almoravid state after the conquest of al-Andalus (© UNESCO)

Muḥammad quotes him as saying: ‘If you send a messenger make sure he is handsome and of good standing.’ Certainly, these characteristics qualified Yaḥyā al-Ghazāl to be an ambassador for the Umayyad emirate in Spain.

One of the most important diplomatic missions undertaken by al-Ghazāl was his journey to Byzantium during the reign of Emperor Theophilus (r. 828–42). Theophilus was extremely hostile to Islam and had begun to harass the ‘Abbāsid caliphate, attacking the city of Zabtara in 222/837. The ‘Abbāsid caliph al-Mu‘taṣim (r. 218–27/833–42) personally led a fierce counter-attack against him and destroyed the cities of Ankara and Amorium, the emperor’s birthplace.³¹ Immediately following this defeat, Theophilus sent a delegation to Córdoba with the idea of forming a coalition against the ‘Abbāsid state, thus taking advantage of the antagonism between the Umayyads and the ‘Abbāsids. The Byzantine delegation was led by a Greek called Kartiyus who was fluent in Arabic. They arrived in Córdoba in 225/840 and were warmly received by ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān. The *amīr* accepted gifts from the Byzantines and responded in kind. Following this, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān

31 Al-‘Abbādī, *fī tārikh al-Maghrib*, p. 142.

dispatched Yaḥyā al-Ghazāl on a diplomatic mission to Constantinople by way of the Mediterranean. He was given a friendly welcome by the Byzantine emperor.

Theophilus had sought the assistance of ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān in fighting both the Aghlabids who had conquered Sicily and the Spanish Muslim adventurers who had captured the island of Crete. While ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān shared the Byzantines’ anger with the ‘Abbāsids, he excused himself from attacking the Aghlabids. Similarly, he considered the capture of Crete to be outside his jurisdiction and he left it to the Byzantine emperor to reclaim the island.³² ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān also dispatched Yaḥyā al-Ghazāl on a diplomatic mission to the king of the Vikings bearing gifts and asking that they cease their raids on the coast of Spain.

Yaḥyā al-Ghazāl had a long life, reaching the age of ninety-nine. He refers to this in a line of poetry written shortly before his death in which he says to himself:

Why do I not fade away as I am ninety years old
And seven and a following two?³³

As regards ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān’s relations with the Franks and the kingdoms of northern Spain, these were always hostile. This was also the case with the Vikings who raided the cities on the west coast in 230/844, who fought with the Muslims and whom ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān was able to drive back only after suffering heavy losses. The Viking raids led the Spanish to enlarge their fleet and fortify the coastal cities, building walls around them and constructing strong castles and watchtowers all along the coast.

In 214/829, during ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān’s reign, Sicily was conquered. The Balearic Islands of Ibiza, Mallorca and Menorca were conquered in the same year.³⁴

Islam in Sicily (212–484/827–1091)

The Muslims had been considering an invasion of Sicily from the time they began the conquests of the Near Maghrib. The governor Mu‘āwīya ibn Ḥudayj (in office 45–50/665–70) sent a military expedition to attack the island in 46/667.³⁵ Similarly, the governor ‘Ubaydallāh ibn al-Ḥabḥāb (in office

32 Ibid., p. 143.

33 Aṣ-Ṣūfī, *Tārīkh al-‘Arab*, p. 230.

34 Ibn ‘Idḥārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, pp. 126–34.

35 Ibn ‘Idḥārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, p. 54.

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116–23/734–40) sent an army there in 122/739 but he recalled it since it was needed to suppress a revolt in the Far Maghrib.

The main invasion of Sicily took place under the Aghlabids during the reign of the *amīr* Ziyādatallāh (r. 201–23/816–37). He sent a fleet of 200 ships which set sail from their base in Tunisia under the command of Asad ibn al-Furāt, the judge of Kairouan. The ships, which landed at Palermo on Rabī‘ I 212/827, carried 700 horses and 10,000 soldiers, including high-ranking officers from among the Arabs, the Berbers and the Spanish. In this enterprise, the Aghlabids took advantage of a dispute between Eufemius, the commander of the Byzantine fleet, and the Byzantine emperor. Eufemius approached the Aghlabids and urged them to attack the island, promising that he would help.³⁶

Despite the political differences between the Umayyad emirate in Spain and the Aghlabids who were allies of the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate, the Muslims in Spain also took part in the conquest of Sicily by sending a fleet under the command of Aṣḥabā‘ ibn Wakīl. According to Ibn al-Athīr, there was a total of 300 Umayyad and Aghlabid ships.³⁷ The Aghlabids were subsequently to extend their control over the whole island; indeed, their conquests came to include southern Italy and Corsica.

When the Aghlabid *amīr* Abū-l-Gharānīq was in power, the ruler of Sicily, Muḥammad ibn Khafāja, sent a fleet which attacked the island of Malta and annexed it to Africa. The Aghlabids’ position on Malta was more secure and untroubled than it was on Sicily and their influence there can still be seen today.³⁸

In the era of the Fāṭimid state Malta was ruled by the family of Abū-l-Ḥasan, the Kalbids (336–431/947–1040),³⁹ and this family continued to govern the island until it fell to the Vikings in 484/1091. Indeed, the cultural high-point of Sicily occurred under the Kalbid dynasty and from there the Islamic sciences passed into Europe. Even after the island was taken by the Vikings, the Islamic administrative and financial system remained intact for a long time.

Following the death of the *amīr* ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān the emirate passed to his son Muḥammad (r. 238–73/852–86), who continued the policies of his father. He was faced with the ongoing rebellion in Toledo, which received support from the Spanish kingdoms in the north of the country. Despite Muḥammad’s victory over the rebels, the city continued to trouble the Umayyad *amīrs*

36 Ibn al-Abbār, *al-Ḥulla as-siyarā’*, VI, p. 285; Ibn ‘Idḥārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, I, p. 103.

37 ‘Izz-ad-Dīn Abū-l-Ḥasan ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī-t-tārīkh*, Beirut, Dār al-kitāb al-‘arabī, 1965, V, p. 118.

38 Muḥammad an-Najjār and Aḥmad Mujāhid, *Futūḥāt al-islām*, Cairo, Maktabat an-nahḍa, 1967, p. 52; Amīn el-Ṭayyibī, *Dirāsāt fī tārīkh Ṣiqilliya-l-islāmiyya*, Dār Iqra’, 1990, pp. 17-19.

39 Al-Ṭayyibī, *Dirāsāt*, p. 18.

throughout their reign. Muḥammad also faced an insurrection led by one of the Muladis (Mūladī) (i.e. Christians who had converted to Islam) called ‘Amr ibn Ḥafṣūn: in 267/880 he seized the castle of Bobastro between Málaga and Ronda. Although the Umayyad *amīr* was able to defeat ‘Amr and take him to Córdoba as his prisoner, he managed to escape and rebelled again.⁴⁰

In 245/859 the Vikings repeated their raids on the Spanish coast with a fleet of sixty-two ships. They began in Galicia and then travelled down to the south, where they clashed with the Spanish fleet which was able to capture two of the Viking ships. The Vikings then attacked Seville for the second time, then Algeciras and the Maghrib coast. Following this, they raided the city of Murcia, but in this naval encounter they lost forty ships because the Spanish fleet was prepared to meet them after the first Viking raid in 230/844.⁴¹

Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān adopted an administrative policy based on justice and equity and he ruled with much deliberation, insight and forbearance. He did not malign anyone and it was said of him that ‘he neither listened to a slanderer nor paid heed to anyone sowing dissension’. He gave careful consideration to all matters and did not like calumny. He used to say to his chamberlain: ‘He who acts in haste often makes mistakes’ and ‘Haste is often the father of regret’ and ‘I am not one to rush things.



3.11 Entrance of the Mosque of Córdoba
(© G. Degeorge)

40 Al-Ṭayyibī, *Dirāsāt*, p. 155; Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, IV, p. 132; an-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*, XXII, p. 56; Ibn al-Qūṭayya, *Tārīkh iftitāḥ al-Andalus*, pp. 109–10.

41 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, p. 145; Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, II, p. 130; an-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*, XXII, p. 53.

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If I were, then you would be the first to perish.⁴² Many illuminating tales are related about him in this regard. The administrative procedures adopted by Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān reveal the developed, highly sophisticated and unique nature of government under the Umayyads in Spain.

Muḥammad was succeeded by al-Mundhir (r. 273–75/886–88). Throughout his brief reign al-Mundhir was occupied with fighting ‘Amr ibn Ḥafṣūn, whose rebellion had begun to assume a nationalistic character and was aimed at putting an end to Arab rule in Spain. Ibn Ḥafṣūn used to say:

How often has the sultan treated you harshly, robbed you of your wealth and made you carry more than you can bear? And how often have the Arabs humiliated you and treated you like slaves? I want to avenge you and release you from your slavery.⁴³

Ibn Ḥafṣūn received a great deal of support because of his love for the people and he succeeded in occupying a number of villages and castles.

Al-Mundhir died while still fighting ‘Amr ibn Ḥafṣūn. He was succeeded by his brother ‘Abdallāh ibn Muḥammad (r. 275–300/888–912). Like his brother before him, ‘Abdallāh spent all his rule trying to defeat Ibn Ḥafṣūn, who had become emboldened and gained more notoriety following the death of al-Mundhir while he was besieging him in the castle of Bobastro. Indeed, he saw al-Mundhir’s death as a gift of Fate. Even though ‘Abdallāh ibn Muḥammad led many military campaigns against Ibn Ḥafṣūn, he was never able to subdue him and the rebellion continued unchecked. This was due, on the one hand, to Ibn Ḥafṣūn’s capable leadership and, on the other, to the serious situation that had arisen in the Maghrib as a result of the establishment of the Fāṭimid state, which was hostile to the Spanish Muslims.

Other contributing factors were Ibn Ḥafṣūn’s courage and his opportunism, for he employed every means to achieve his objective. Thus, he sometimes appealed to the ‘Abbāsids or made contact with the Aghlabids or, later, the Fāṭimids in Africa, and received their assistance and political and religious support. When these avenues proved unproductive, he turned to the king of Coimbra and offered him his allegiance in exchange for military backing for his revolt. To prove his loyalty and devotion to the king, Ibn Ḥafṣūn went so far as to declare that he had renounced Islam and embraced Christianity. But this caused him problems and harmed him both politically and religiously since he was seen as an apostate; he was abandoned by his allies the Aghlabids and the Fāṭimids and also by many of his supporters

42 Anon., *Akhbār majmū‘a*, p. 73; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A‘māl al-a‘lām*, p. 22; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, p. 160.

43 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, p. 172.

both inside and outside Spain. He became a legitimate target of attack and many men from the Maghrib came to fight him. Ibn ‘Idhārī remarks: ‘Many people denounced him ... and all Muslims thought that waging war against him was a form of *jihād*. In summer and winter he was pursued by those who fight for the sake of God.’⁴⁴

In addition to the rebellion of Ibn Ḥafṣūn, ‘Abdallāh was faced with a number of other uprisings in various cities. Perhaps the most accurate way to describe the situation is in the words of the historian Aḥmad ibn ‘Abd-al-Wahhāb an-Nuwayrī:

‘Abdallāh’s days were full of great civil strife. So many revolts broke out against him that he kept control only of the city of Córdoba. The inhabitants of Seville and Sidonia opposed him and there was no city that did not rise against him.

Regarding the economic effect of these uprisings, an-Nuwayrī also remarks:

Abdallāh’s supporters became fewer and he was deserted by the *mawālī* and those who had attached themselves to him and to his predecessors. His wealth was reduced because of the dissent of the city folk and their refusal to pay his taxes.⁴⁵

The most serious upheaval after the revolt of Ibn Ḥafṣūn was the fight that broke out in Seville between the Arabs, the Muladis and the Christians. The Arabs were divided into three ‘houses’, or families, the Banū ‘Abdah, the Banū Khaldūn and the Banū Ḥajjāj. The *amīr* used to switch his support between these groups until eventually the family of the Banū Ḥajjāj was able to decide the struggle in its favour, take control of Seville by force and overcome its opponents.⁴⁶

‘Abdallāh ibn Muḥammad died in 300/912 and passed the emirate on to his grandson, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad (r. 300–50/912–61), whom he believed was intelligent, strong-willed and courageous, all qualities demanded by the situation in Spain during those difficult times. As soon as ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān took over the emirate, he formed a council of ministers with nine members headed by a chamberlain (*ḥājib*), or first minister, in the form of his *mawālā* Badr ibn Aḥmad. The *amīr* issued a public proclamation to the people of Spain explaining his programme of government, which was

44 Ibid., p. 210; Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, IV, p. 134.

45 An-Nuwayrī, *Nihāyat al-arab*, XXII, p. 59.

46 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, p. 162; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A‘māl al-a‘lām*, p. 35.

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to be based on a policy of praise and threat, enticement and intimidation. The proclamation incited the opponents of Umayyad rule since the *amīr* circulated it around the various regions of Spain, asking for the oath of allegiance and submission to his authority. In fact, the policy was very successful and it served to identify those against whom ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān should immediately move. Inevitably, Ibn Ḥafṣūn was the first on the list. The *amīr* personally led a military force and succeeded in gaining control of seventy of the fortresses and castles that Ibn Ḥafṣūn had previously seized. As for the castle of Bobastro, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān subjected it to an impenetrable and protracted blockade.

The *amīr* then turned his attention to Seville, which had fallen into the hands of the Banū Ḥajjāj. In 301/913 he sent a military detachment against them led by the commander of his police force. Although Ibn Ḥafṣūn provided reinforcements, the commander was able to take the city and to defeat Ibn Ḥafṣūn’s men. Ibn Ḥafṣūn was himself forced to flee and eventually sued for peace and asked for a pardon. In 306/919 he acknowledged the authority of ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān III and made his way to Córdoba, where he remained until his death later that year.⁴⁷ Although some of his sons attempted to continue the insurgency they were ultimately unsuccessful. In this way, Ibn Ḥafṣūn’s rebellion came to an end in 315/918, having lasted for fifty years.

The quelling of Ibn Ḥafṣūn’s rebellion enabled ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān III to unite Spain. He suppressed the rebels who came to him in submission, subjecting themselves to his authority. Peace was restored all over Spain and led to increased prosperity and construction. The *amīr* celebrated his victory over Ibn Ḥafṣūn and the other rebels by bestowing upon himself the honorific *an-Nāṣir li-Dīnillāh* (‘the Victorious for the Religion of God’).

Although ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān an-Nāṣir was able to defeat the rebels inside Spain, he nonetheless faced a number of dangers from outside the country as a result of the establishment of the Fāṭimid state in North Africa in 296/909 which wanted to seize control of Spain. In order to thwart Fāṭimid designs on Spain, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān took a number of measures including the following:

1. He declared himself to be the caliph of the Muslims so as to show the Spanish Muslims that he was just as deserving of the office as the ‘Abbāsids or the Fāṭimids, and especially so since his ancestors had previously been caliphs in Damascus. It also gave his rule legitimacy. He therefore announced on 2 Dhu l-Ḥijja 316/929 that henceforth he should be addressed by the title *Amīr al-Mu’minīn* (‘Commander of the Faithful’).

47 Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A‘māl al-a‘lām*, pp. 32–3.

2. ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān built a strong naval fleet to deter any possible attacks from the Fāṭimids. He occupied the Maghrib ports of Ceuta, Melilla and Tangier to stop Fāṭimid forces from crossing into Spain. He also fortified the cities situated on the Strait of Gibraltar.
3. He spread dissension in the Far Maghrib and entered into an alliance with opponents of the Fāṭimid regime such as remnants from the Idrīsids and the Khārijīs, along with their leader Abū Yazīd ibn Kaydād (the ‘man of the donkey’).
4. He instigated a vigorous propaganda campaign against the Shī‘ī sect, both in the Maghrib and in Spain.
5. He allied himself with enemies of the Fāṭimids such as King Hughues, the king of Italy, the Byzantine emperor and the Ikhshīdids in Egypt.⁴⁸

The caliph ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān an-Nāṣir and the Fāṭimids attacked each other’s coastal cities in the Maghrib and Spain but without achieving any decisive victory. The Fāṭimid threat finally disappeared when they turned their attention towards Egypt and transferred their caliphal headquarters to Cairo in 362/972.

The second danger facing an-Nāṣir was represented by the small Spanish states in the north of the country. He sent a number of punitive military expeditions against these kingdoms, the first being directed against King Ordoño II of León, who in 301/913 had attacked the city of Jubera and killed its Arab ruler Marwān ibn ‘Abd-al-Malik and a large number of inhabitants. Ordoño II had then attacked the city of Mérida in 305/916, destroying the Umayyad garrison there and killing its commander Aḥmad ibn Abī ‘Abdihi. Thus, in 308/920 ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān an-Nāṣir led his army against an alliance of King Ordoño II and Sancho the king of Navarre and defeated them. In 311/923 King Sancho attacked and occupied the castle of Viguera, brutally massacring the inhabitants. This had a profound effect on Córdoba. ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān was obliged to avenge this massacre by launching a counter-offensive in 312/924 in which he devastated large areas of the Basque countries.⁴⁹

As a result of treachery, the Spaniards were able to inflict a crushing defeat on ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān’s forces at the battle of the Ditch (or Alhandega) near the city of Simancas. Some of his Arab commanders let down their comrades by deserting their posts. Several historians state that they left the battlefield at the beginning of the fight in order to avenge the death of the Umayyad general Najda aṣ-Ṣiqillī, who fell during the battle. Whatever

48 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, p. 198; al-Maqqarī, *Nafh at-ṭīb*, I, p. 353; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A‘māl al-a‘lām*, pp. 29–30; Ibn al-Abbār, *al-Ḥulla as-siyarā’*, I, p. 198.

49 Al-Maqqarī, *Nafh at-ṭīb*, I, p. 363.

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3.12 Alhambra Palace, Granada (© G. Degeorge)

the case, some 300 of them were executed by ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān.⁵⁰ The defeat did not, however, undermine ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān’s determination. He launched a counter-attack and was able to triumph over the Spaniards in 344/955, forcing King Ordoño III to sue for peace. In 347/958 Queen Toda came to Córdoba with her grandson, the deposed King Sancho, to ask for ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān’s help in restoring Sancho to the throne.⁵¹

The Viking raids on Spain ceased during the reign of ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān an-Nāṣir after he built a strong Umayyad naval fleet consisting of various kinds of warships based in Seville and Almería. Indeed, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān was very eager to acquire new ships and to enlarge the fleet so as to protect Spain from the Fāṭimids and the Spaniards as well as the Vikings. Ibn Khaldūn notes that the fleet comprised 200 ships and that with these ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān was able to prevent supplies from the Maghrib from reaching ‘Umar ibn Ḥafṣūn and to put a stop to Viking attacks on the Spanish coast.⁵²

Due to his military power and administrative skills, ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān became a sanctuary and the only real sovereign authority among the rulers in Spain. The kings of Europe sought his friendship and delegations arrived from Byzantium and from Otto, the Holy Roman Emperor. The caliph gave

50 Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A‘māl al-a‘lām*, pp. 36–7.

51 Ibid., pp. 365–6; al-‘Abbādī, *fī tārikh al-Maghrib*, pp. 199–200.

52 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, IV, p. 180.

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all these leaders a magnificent and stately reception in his palace in Madīnat az-Zahrā' ('the City of Flowers') in Córdoba (see below).⁵³

'Abd-ar-Raḥmān attached great importance to building work. This was possible due to the wealth he had acquired and to the stability with which Spain was blessed during his long reign. Córdoba flourished, with various kinds of crafts and numerous buildings, and there was an increase in luxury and prosperity. Indeed, Córdoba surpassed even Baghdad and Constantinople. The city had some 500,000 inhabitants and contained splendid houses and palaces, hotels, baths, markets, beautiful mosques and paved streets. The most outstanding building was the large mosque, which 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān extended. In particular, in 340/951 he added its very tall gilded minaret known as 'an-Nāṣir's minaret'.⁵⁴



3.13 The petty kingdoms and Christian kingdoms of Spain after the fall of Toledo in 478/1058 (© UNESCO)

53 Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, p. 213; al-Maqqarī, *Nafh at-ṭīb*, I, pp. 324, 341, 344; Salim, *Qurṭuba*, pp. 65–7.

54 Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, II, pp. 228–33.

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In 325/935 ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān began to build a new city some 8 km north-west of Córdoba which he called Madīnat az-Zahrā’. The city was well planned and designed to contain all the institutions of the state. For its construction, the caliph acquired some 10,000 workmen and engineers from many countries. Over a period of seventeen years, he spent one third of the state’s revenues on the project. The work was supervised by the heir to the throne, al-Ḥakam, and the architect Maslama ibn ‘Abdallāh. The city was provided with water from the mountains which was transported for a distance of 80 km in aqueducts of beautiful stonework.⁵⁵

When ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān an-Nāṣir died in 350/961, he was succeeded by his 40-year-old son and heir al-Ḥakam II al-Mustaṣṣir (r. 350–66/961–76). As a result of his father’s organization of Spain and his putting an end to civil strife, al-Ḥakam’s reign was generally one of stability and well-being. Al-Ḥakam lived off the political, cultural and military capital that his father had left him. He took an interest in science and learning and invited many scholars to Spain. He built numerous Qur’ānic and religious schools, seventeen of which were in Córdoba.

On al-Ḥakam’s death, he was succeeded by his youngest son Hishām II (r. 366–99/976–1008), who was 12 years old at the time. Hishām was put under the care of Muḥammad ibn Abī ‘Āmir, whose official position was ‘Director of Affairs of the Heir to the Throne’. The men in the royal palace were, however, divided into two opposing camps. The first championed the cause of al-Mughīra, the brother of the deceased caliph al-Ḥakam, and was led by the army commander Ghālīb ibn ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān. The second camp wanted to abide by al-Ḥakam’s designation of his son as his heir and was led by the chamberlain Ja‘far al-Muṣṣhafī, with the support of Ibn Abī ‘Āmir and his father the *amīr* Ṣubḥ. With the assassination of al-Mughīra, this latter group became successful. Ibn Abī ‘Āmir arranged for the oath of allegiance to be given to Hishām, who in turn appointed Ja‘far al-Muṣṣhafī as *ḥājib* and Ibn Abī ‘Āmir as his *wazīr*.

Once the second camp had successfully achieved its objective and carried out al-Ḥakam’s instructions, and after the young *amīr* had become caliph with the title Hishām al-Mu‘ayyad, a violent clash ensued between the *ḥājib* Ja‘far al-Muṣṣhafī and the *wazīr* Ibn Abī ‘Āmir. Ibn Abī ‘Āmir was eventually able to remove al-Muṣṣhafī and the commander Ghālīb ibn ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān and to become *ḥājib* and the most important person on the Iberian peninsula. He then formed a state within a state called al-‘Āmiriyya. He did not, however, abolish the Umayyad caliphate. Ibn Abī ‘Āmir remained in the office of *ḥājib*

55 Idris El Hareir, ‘Mulūk at-ṭawā’if bi-l-Andalus’, in *al-Kitāb al-marjī’ fī tārikh al-umma al-‘arabiyya*, Tunisia, al-Munazzama al-‘arabiyya li-t-tarbiya wa-th-thaqāfa wa-l-‘ulūm (ALECSO), 2005.

but concentrated all authority in his own hands. He continued the policy of the earlier caliph ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān an-Nāṣir and made Spain into a powerful state. He led fifty-seven military campaigns against the Spanish kingdoms and because he was always triumphant in these he was awarded the honorific *al-Manṣūr* (‘the Victorious’). Ibn Abī ‘Āmir ruled Spain with an iron fist from 366/976 to 392/1002. He did not allow the caliph to play any part in affairs of state but rather kept him in seclusion in his palace.⁵⁶

When Ibn Abī ‘Āmir died, the office of *ḥājib* passed to his eldest son ‘Abd-al-Malik al-Muẓaffar (in office 392–99/1002–09), who continued his father’s policy with regard to the Spanish kingdoms in the north. He was, however, a friend of the people and he released a number of prisoners and instituted some reforms which generally alleviated the situation in Spain. On the other hand, he permitted the Slavic slaves to become involved in the politics of the state, something that was subsequently to have dire consequences.

‘Abd-al-Malik al-Muẓaffar died in 399/1009 and was succeeded by his brother ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān, who was nicknamed Shanjūl (‘little Sancho’). He was a conceited young man who was not content with being merely the *ḥājib* and so forced the caliph Hishām al-Mu’ayyad to declare him his heir as well. This step, along with Shanjūl’s bad character and poor conduct, angered the inhabitants of Córdoba, the Umayyad family and the intelligentsia and they took advantage of his absence from the city to rise against him. They stripped him of the office of *ḥājib*, deposed the caliph Hishām and installed an Umayyad, one of the grandsons of ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān an-Nāṣir called Muḥammad ibn Hishām, giving him the title *al-Mahdī* (‘the Rightly Guided’). Immediately afterwards, in 399/1009, Córdoba descended into anarchy, leading to the destruction of Madīnat az-Zahrā’. As for Shanjūl, he was killed on his return to the city.

During 399–422/1009–30 Spain passed through a period of instability, with a number of elements fighting each other for control. The Northern Arabs (the Muḍiriyya), under the command of the Umayyads, were the first to rise in rebellion against ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān Shanjūl the ‘Āmirid, who was from the Southern Arabs (the Yamaniyya), because of his attempt to seize the caliphate. A violent struggle erupted between them and the Slavs, a powerful body of slaves who had been brought to work as guards and had been in service since the reign of ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān an-Nāṣir. Ibn Abī ‘Āmir al-Manṣūr had increased their number and employed them as his personal guard. Some of them subsequently rose to be commanders in the army, to occupy senior administrative posts and to become leaders of various tribes from the Maghrib. These forces began to fight each other and Spain returned to the state of internal division and mayhem it had previously known during the reign

56 Al-‘Abbādī, *fī tārikh al-Maghrib*, pp. 255–6.

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
3.14 Court of the Lions in the Alhambra Palace, Granada
(© G. Degeorge)

of the *amīr* ‘Abdallāh. This struggle for the caliphate led to the destruction of Córdoba and other cities.

There were more Umayyad caliphs during this period than there had been *amīrs* since the beginning of the Umayyad state in Spain.⁵⁷ The caliph al-Mahdī (Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd-al-Jabbār ibn ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān an-Nāṣir) derived his authority from the popular (though opposing) groups which supported him in his revolt against the ‘Āmirids. But he failed to reconcile these groups and they descended into armed conflict. Thus began a violent struggle for Córdoba which ultimately led to its destruction.

In 422/1030 Muḥammad ibn Jahwar, who through his cunning had managed to gain control of the situation in Córdoba, abolished the Umayyad caliphate, deposed Hishām III al-Mu‘tamid ‘alā Allāh and expelled all the Umayyads from Córdoba.⁵⁸ Spain became divided into small kingdoms which competed and fought each other and weakened the influence of Islam. These political entities, known as the petty kingdoms (*ṭawā’if*), lasted from 422/1030 to 484/1091.

A number of factors contributed to the decline and fall of the Umayyad state in Spain. These include: first, the loss of racial unity, since the inhabitants of Spain were a mixture of Goths, Spaniards, Jews, Arabs, Berbers and so on, with their different faiths and political and religious affiliations; second, tribal conflict between the Northern and the Southern Arabs, which undermined Arab ruling power; third, the emergence of Slavs who served in the army, which led to jealousy and competition with the Arab soldiers;



⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 153.

⁵⁸ Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A‘māl al-a‘lām*, pp. 149–80; al-Marrākushī, *al-Mu‘jib*, p. 96.

fourth, conflict between members of the ruling Umayyad family; fifth, the geography of Spain, with its barren mountains and valleys, which served as a natural defence for the rebels; and, finally, continuous interference from the Spanish kingdoms in the north, especially after the declaration of the policy of *Reconquista*.

THE PETTY KINGDOMS (*ṬAWĀ'IF*) (422–84/1030–91)

The term *ṭawā'if* indicates those regions within Spain under the authority of kings, governors or other kinds of ruler after the fall of the Umayyad caliphate in 399/1008. It is not used here in its usual meaning of sects (*ṭawā'if*) or other kinds of religious grouping. Nor were the rulers of the petty kingdoms 'kings' in the ordinary sense. They were rather governors or rulers who imposed their authority over certain regions following the decline of central government in Córdoba. They were not the heads of religious or racial groups. Moreover, they did not adopt the title *malik* (king) even though they gave themselves honorifics such as *al-Mu'taḍid*, *al-Mu'tamid*, *al-Musta'in*, *al-Murtaḍī*, *al-Mu'tamid b-illāh*, *al-Mustazhir* and *al-Mustakfi*. They had previously been *wazīrs*, men of influence, generals in the army, judges, magistrates and commanders who, with varying degrees of success, managed to gain control of the cities and regions under their jurisdiction when the Umayyad caliphate collapsed.⁵⁹

Following the breakdown of central government – in other words, the caliphate – there were three main groups of people in Spain:

1. The first group consisted of the general populace, that is, the original inhabitants and those who had settled in Spain and become assimilated within Spanish society even though they might initially have been Arabs, North Africans or Sicilians. This group was led by the Banū 'Abbād in Seville, the Banū Jahwar in Córdoba, the Banū Hūd in Zaragoza, the Banū Najīb in Almería, the Banū Birzāl in Carmona, the Banū Khazrūn in Arcos, the Banū Nūḥ in Morón and 'Abd-al-'Azīz ibn Abī 'Āmir in Valencia.
2. The second group was represented by Maghribī tribes such as the Ṣanhāja and the Zināta, who had arrived with the wave of conquests. It also included tribes that had been brought by al-Manṣūr ibn Abī 'Āmir such as the Banū Zīrī of the Ṣanhāja and the Idrīsid and 'Alawī Banū Hammūd.

⁵⁹ Aḥmad Mukhtār al-'Abbādī, *aṣ-Ṣaqāliba fī Isbāniyā wa-'alāqātuhum bi-ḥarakat ash-shu'ūbiyya*, Madrid, 1953, p. 153; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A'māl al-a'lām*, pp. 252–3.

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3. The third group was composed of those Slavs who had settled in eastern Spain. They had originally been slaves who were brought from the Slavic regions or from other European countries. They were used as guards and servants in the royal palaces. They gradually rose in rank and occupied positions in the government until they became a powerful force within Umayyad society. Their numbers increased during the reign of the caliph ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān an-Nāṣir and under the ‘Āmirid dynasty and they became *wazīrs*, military commanders and senior officials of state.⁶⁰ With the collapse of the Umayyad caliphate in Spain these Slavs, like other influential groups, took part in the plots and conspiracies that were rife in Córdoba and elsewhere. The most prominent leader of the Slavs in those dark days was Jayrān al-‘Āmirī. The Slavic slaves were forced to leave Córdoba and they moved to eastern Spain, where they established a number of emirates that formed a coalition called the ‘Slavic ‘Āmirid state’ since most of its members had been slaves of al-Manṣūr ibn Abī ‘Āmir and his sons such as Mujāhid al-‘Āmirī who ruled Denia, Almería, Murcia, Valencia, Xátiva and the Balearic Islands and invaded Sardinia and whose naval fleets controlled the western Mediterranean.⁶¹

Each of these three groups maintained that they had a legitimate claim on the caliphate. Thus, the Banū ‘Abbād in Seville claimed that the caliph Hishām II al-Mu‘ayyad (deposed in 399/912) had appeared among them and issued a decree appointing Ibn ‘Abbād as *ḥājib* over Spain. It is also reported that Ibn ‘Abbād found a carpet-maker called Khalaf al-Ḥuṣari who closely resembled Hishām al-Mu‘ayyad and declared him to be the caliph and *ḥājib*. Then al-Mu‘taḍid ibn ‘Abbād announced his death in 455/1063 and produced a document which stated that before he died he had appointed him as his successor over Spain.⁶²

The ‘Āmirid slaves did something similar: in 405/1014 they chose one of the Umayyads, the *faqīh* (religious scholar) Abū ‘Abdallāh ibn al-Walīd al-Mu‘ayyī, gave him the title *al-Muntaṣir b-illāh* and put his name on the coinage and the flags. He was soon accused of plotting against them, however, and was deposed and sent into exile. He made his way to Baghdad, where he taught boys until his death in 432/1040.⁶³

As for the Maghribī tribes, they chose an Idrīsīd called ‘Alī ibn Ḥammūd, the governor of Tangier and Ceuta. He subsequently gained control of


60 Al-‘Abbādī, *fī tārikh al-Maghrib*, pp. 255–6.

61 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, p. 155.

62 Lisān-ad-Dīn ibn al-Khaṭīb, *al-Iḥāṭa fī akhbār Gharnāṭa*, ed. Muḥammad ‘Anān, Cairo, Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1973, I, p. 477.

63 *Ibid.*, pp. 465–6.

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3.15 The Rustumid state (© UNESCO)

Málaga, marched on Córdoba and killed the Umayyad caliph Sulaymān ibn al-Ḥakam al-Musta‘īn in 407/1016, thus founding the Ḥammūdid state.⁶⁴

Eventually, these three groups became divided into twenty-six small independent states known as the ‘petty kingdoms’ which competed and fought against each other. The most important of these political entities, in the chronological order of their establishment, are dealt with below.

The Banū Manād in Granada and Málaga (403–83/1012 –90)

The Banū Manād originated from the famous Ṣanhāja tribe of central North Africa. Their leader Zāwī ibn Zīrī ibn Manad arrived in Spain in 391/1000 during the reign of al-Manṣūr ibn Abī ‘Āmir, who received him and his fellow clansmen with honour. With the collapse of the Umayyad caliphate in 399/1008, Zāwī ibn Zīrī came to play a prominent role in what Ibn ‘Idhārī al-Marrākushī has called the ‘rebellion of destruction’⁶⁵ in Córdoba, which forced the caliph Sulaymān al-Musta‘īn to try to disperse the conflicting groups throughout the various regions of Spain.

Zāwī ibn Zīrī and his followers from the Ṣanhāja tribe settled in Elvira and founded the city of Granada. Zāwī managed to defeat Jayrān al-‘Āmirī

64 ‘Abdallāh ibn Bulqīn, *Kitāb at-tibyān*, ed. E. Lévi-Provençal, Cairo, 1955, p. 17; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, p. 263; Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, VI, pp. 157–9.

65 Ibn Bulqīn, *Kitāb at-tibyān*, p. 73.

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and the Umayyad caliph al-Murtaḍā when they attacked him but he wanted to return to the Maghrib. Before his departure in 411/1020, he designated his nephew Ḥabbūs ibn Māksan as his successor. Ḥabbūs organized the small kingdom and completed the construction of Granada. This laid the foundation of the state. When Ḥabbūs died in 428/1036 he was succeeded by his son Bādīs, who was given the honorific *an-Nāṣir li-Dīnillāh* ('the Victorious for the Religion of God'). Bādīs was the most powerful of the rulers of the petty kingdoms in southern Spain but he became involved in fights with his neighbours and associates and made an alliance with the Christians to help him take revenge on the Muslim *amīrs* who opposed him.⁶⁶

Bādīs entered into hostilities with Zuhayr al-ʿĀmirī, the ruler of Almería, and defeated him in 429/1038. As a result of this victory, he was able to extend his authority over the western part of the Almería emirate. Bādīs also defeated the Banū ʿAbbād in 431/1039 and this enhanced his status among the other rulers of the petty kingdoms. In 446/1053 he annexed Málaga and Algeciras, thus finally putting an end to the emirate of the Banū Ḥammūd.⁶⁷ When Bādīs died in 465/1073, the chiefs of the Ṣanhāja tribe chose his grandson ʿAbdallāh ibn Bulqīn to replace him.

Ibn ʿAbbād took advantage of these events and attacked the city of Jaén, which was under the control of the Banū Zīrī, seizing it in 466/1074. He then advanced towards Granada, thus forcing ʿAbdallāh ibn Bulqīn to appeal to the Castilian king Alfonso VI for assistance. Alfonso agreed to send ʿAbdallāh military aid in return for 20,000 *mithqāls* of gold. With reinforcements from Alfonso, ʿAbdallāh set off towards the territories of the Banū ʿAbbād and was able to regain the castle of Cabra to the south-west of Jaén. But when he refused to pay Alfonso the agreed tribute, the king marched on Granada at the head of a large army. Once again, Ibn ʿAbbād took advantage of the situation and entered into negotiations with Alfonso. They agreed to launch a joint attack on Granada with the city going to Ibn ʿAbbād while Alfonso was to take all the wealth from it that he could. In addition, Ibn ʿAbbād paid Alfonso 50,000 dinars. These negotiations were undertaken by Ibn ʿAbbād's famous *wazīr*, the poet Abū Bakr ibn ʿAmmār.⁶⁸

But the *amīr* ʿAbdallāh ibn Bulqīn also came to an understanding with Alfonso according to which he would pay the king an annual tribute of 10,000 *mithqāls* of gold and would cede to him some of the castles situated

66 Ibid.

67 Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Aʿmāl al-aʿlām*, pp. 235, 236; Abū-l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Abī Zarʿ, *al-Anīs al-muṭrib bi-rawḍ al-qirṭās fī akhbār mulūk al-Maghrib wa-tārīkh madīnat Fās*, Rabat, Dār al-manṣūr li-ṭ-ṭibāʿa, 1973, p. 155.

68 ʿAnān, *Dawlat al-islām*, pp. 265–70; Ibn ʿIdhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, pp. 221–3; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *Aʿmāl al-aʿlām*, p. 170.

to the south-west of Jaén. When Alfonso received these he sold them to Ibn ‘Abbād.⁶⁹

In his book of memoirs, ‘Abdallāh ibn Bulqīn mentions that he learnt from Count Sisnando that Alfonso’s policy with regard to Spain was to weaken the country, to wait until there were no longer any funds or manpower and then to seize it without incurring any losses.⁷⁰ Despite this threat, ‘Abdallāh quarrelled with his brother Tamīm ibn Bulqīn, the ruler of Málaga, over their joint borders and their mother had to intervene to stop them fighting.

It was only when Spain was shaken by the terrible disaster and catastrophic event of Toledo falling into the hands of Alfonso in 478/1085 that the rulers of the petty kingdoms came to their senses and asked the Almoravids for help.

The emirate of Granada lasted until the Almoravids added it to their state in 483/1090. They captured ‘Abdallāh ibn Bulqīn and imprisoned him in Aghmat, where he died.⁷¹

The Banū Hūd (Hūdids) in Zaragoza (408–503/1017–1212)

Zaragoza, or *ath-Thaghr* (‘the Frontier Post’) as it is sometimes called, was the most significant of the petty kingdoms due to its location as a barrier between the Spanish kingdoms and the other small states in the north-east of the peninsula. In addition to Zaragoza, these states included Bobastro, Lérida, Tortosa, Tudela, Tarragona, Huesca and Braga. They had initially been under the control of an Arab family called the Banū Tujīb (the Tujībids) under the leadership of Abū Yaḥyā Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān at-Tujībī. The Banū Tujīb continued to rule there, sometimes renouncing their allegiance to the central government in Córdoba while at other times submitting to its authority as happened during the reigns of the caliphs ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān an-Nāṣir and al-Manṣūr ibn Abī ‘Āmir. Although the Banū Tujīb conspired against al-Manṣūr he nevertheless appointed one of them, Yaḥyā at-Tujībī, as governor of Zaragoza, a post which he held until his death in 408/1017.

Al-Manṣūr then replaced Yaḥyā with his son al-Mundhir ibn Yaḥyā at-Tujībī, who was given the titles *al-Ḥājib Dhū Ri’āsatayn* (‘Chamberlain with Two Powers’) and *al-Manṣūr* (‘the Victorious’). Al-Mundhir was involved in the upheavals that followed the collapse of the Umayyad caliphate and formed alliances with the Spanish *amīrs* and kings. When he died in 414/1023 he was succeeded by his son Yaḥyā, who was given the

69 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, pp. 277–83; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A’māl al-a’lām*, p. 178.

70 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, pp. 223–4; ‘Anān, *Dawlat al-islām*, pp. 20–2.

71 ‘Anān, *Dawlat al-islām*, pp. 320–332.

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honorific *al-Muzaffar* ('the Triumphant') and who ruled until 420/1029. He in turn was succeeded by his son al-Mundhir, who was given the title *Mu'izz-ad-Dawla* ('the Strengtheners of the State') and who was murdered in 430/1039 as a result of a conspiracy by his relatives. After *Mu'izz-ad-Dawla*, control of Zaragoza passed in 431/1039 to Sulaymān ibn Muḥammad al-Musta'in, the founder of the Banū Hūd dynasty in Zaragoza.⁷²

Sulaymān ibn Hūd entered into conflict with the Banū Dhī n-Nūn (the Dhu n-Nūnids), the rulers of Toledo, over Guadalajara (*Wādī al-Ḥajāra*), which lay within the possessions of the Banū Dhī n-Nūn. Sulaymān was able to defeat the army of Toledo and this forced the Dhu-n-Nūnid governor of Toledo, al-Ma'mūn, to appeal for help to Ferdinand I of Castile: the king stipulated that in return for military aid, Sulaymān must swear allegiance to him and give him money. On this basis, Ferdinand dispatched an army which destroyed the territories of Zaragoza. At this, the Banū Hūd had no choice but to attempt to undermine the arrangement the king had made with the Banū Dhī n-Nūn by making contact with him and also agreeing to send him money. The governor of Toledo, al-Ma'mūn, responded by forming an alliance with King García of Navarre. In this way, the rulers of Zaragoza and Toledo began to plot against each other and to seek the assistance of their common enemy, who was delighted to be able to weaken the Muslims while at the same time taking their money, which could then be used to destroy them. And this is indeed what eventually happened.⁷³

Sulaymān ibn Hūd made a grave mistake when he divided the emirate of Zaragoza among his five sons, since this led to internal conflict and ultimately to the intervention of the kings of Spain. The conflict became restricted to two of the brothers, Aḥmad al-Muqtadir and Yūsuf Ḥuṣām-ad-Dawla, with the former managing to gain control of Tortosa. The Vikings took advantage of the chaotic situation and in 456/1064 seized the strategically important city of Bobastro, brutally slaughtering the Muslim inhabitants. This enraged Muslims throughout Spain.⁷⁴ Nine months later the Muslims were able to relieve the city from Viking occupation.

The emirate of Zaragoza was situated between the Spanish kingdoms of Aragon, Navarre and Castile; these kingdoms had designs on it and began to fight each other for possession. This caused al-Muqtadir to seek the help of a number of Spanish mercenaries under the command of Rodrigo Díaz, otherwise known as El Cid, or *El Campeador* ('warrior who excels in the battlefield'), who went on to play a major role in the occupation of a number of Muslim cities, particularly in eastern Spain (see below).

72 Ibn al-Abbār, *al-Ḥulla as-siyarā*, II, p. 99.

73 'Anān, *Dawlat al-islām*, p. 83.

74 Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, pp. 211–13, 234–7.

Al-Muqtadir made the same mistake as his father and divided Zaragoza between his two sons. He gave Zaragoza and its districts to his eldest son Yūsuf al-Mu'tamin, and Lérida, Tortosa and Denia to his youngest son al-Mundhir. As soon as al-Muqtadir died in 474/1081, war broke out between the two brothers. Al-Mu'tamin appealed to El Cid and his mercenary army for help, while al-Mundhir turned to the king of Aragon and the *amīr* of Barcelona. In 478/1085 the two sides met in battle at the castle of Almanar, near Lérida, resulting in the defeat of al-Mundhir and his allies.

When al-Mu'tamin died he was succeeded by his son al-Musta'in, who had to deal with the ambitions of Alfonso VI and his siege of Zaragoza. The city would have fallen to Alfonso had it not been for the appearance of the Almoravids, who forced him to lift the siege and to meet them at the battle of Zallāqa (Sagrajas) in 479/1086 in which Alfonso and his allies were defeated.⁷⁵

Al-Musta'in began to make plans to seize Valencia from his uncle al-Mundhir. He faced the threat of the Spaniards from the north and the Almoravids from the south. When al-Musta'in was killed at the battle of Valtierra in 503/1110, he was succeeded by his son 'Abd-al-Malik, who was given the title *'Imād-ad-Dawla* ('Pillar of the State'). 'Imād-ad-Dawla was drawn into confrontation with the Almoravids who, towards the end of 503/1110 under the command of General Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥājj, captured Zaragoza, expelled the Banū Hūd and annexed the city to their state.

The Banū al-Aḫṭas (Aḫṭasids) in Badajoz (413–88/1022–95)

This emirate was situated to the north of the emirate of the Banū Hūd in Seville and was separated from it by the Sierra Morena. It covered a large area extending westwards from the emirate of Toledo at the river Guadiana up to the Atlantic Ocean. That is, it occupied approximately all of Portugal up to the city of Beja in the south. The capital of the emirate was Badajoz.

During the disturbances after the demise of the Umayyad caliphate in Spain (399–422/1008–30), the region was ruled by Sābūr al-Fārisī, one of the slaves of al-Manṣūr ibn 'Āmir, assisted by 'Abdallāh ibn Muḥammad ibn Salama al-Aḫṭas. When Sābūr died in 413/1022, 'Abdallāh ibn al-Aḫṭas took power. He belonged to the Miknasa from the Maghrib and was very experienced and shrewd in matters of government and administration.⁷⁶

Al-Aḫṭas became involved in a dispute with his neighbour Abu-l-Qāsim ibn 'Abbād over control of the city of Beja. A ferocious battle took place

75 Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A'māl al-a'lām*, p. 184; Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, pp. 238–9.

76 Al-Marrākushī, *al-Mu'jib*, pp. 41–2; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A'māl al-a'lām*, pp. 184–5; Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, p. 336.

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3.16 Citadel of Jaén, Spain (© G. Degeorge)

between the two men, resulting in the defeat of al-Afṭas and the capture of his son Muḥammad, who remained incarcerated until 425/1034 by Muḥammad al-Barzālī, the ruler of Carmona and ally of Ibn ‘Abbād. When the forces of the Banū ‘Abbād (under the command of Ismā‘īl ibn ‘Abbād) had penetrated into the territories of the emirate of the Banū al-Afṭas in 425/1034, the Afṭasids laid an ambush and were able to kill most of them.

‘Abdallāh ibn al-Afṭas died in 437/1045 and was succeeded by his son Muḥammad, who was given the honorific *al-Muzaffar* (‘the Triumphant’). A series of battles took place between al-Muzaffar and al-Mu‘taḍid ibn ‘Abbād, the most important of which occurred in 439/1047 and in which al-Mu‘taḍid’s forces suffered a resounding defeat.⁷⁷ Al-Mu‘taḍid responded by attacking the city of Niebla in 422/1050: he inflicted heavy losses on the forces of Ibn al-Afṭas, killing 3,000 of his best horsemen and a number of his uncles. Al-Mu‘taḍid’s troops ravaged the territories of the Banū al-Afṭas, burning and destroying. The Afṭasid emirate could not have saved itself from falling to Ibn ‘Abbād had it not been for the intervention of Abū-l-Walīd ibn Jahwar, the ruler of Córdoba, who in 443/1051 acted as mediator between the two emirates, ended the war and established peace between them.⁷⁸

77 Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A‘māl al-a‘lām*, pp. 176–7.

78 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, pp. 220–78, 282.

The Banū al-Afṭas were involved in many battles against al-Ma'mūn, the ruler of Toledo. No sooner had they emerged from these than they faced the advance of King Ferdinand (Fernando), who seized control of the city of Braga in present-day northern Portugal. The Spaniards also attacked the city of Santarém. But after negotiations, Ferdinand agreed to recall his troops in return for an annual tribute of 5,000 dinars. Later, however, he changed his mind and in 456/1064, on the advice of his Mozarab chief minister Sisnando, he attacked the city of Coimbra. Ferdinand besieged the city for six months until its governor Rānda finally surrendered. He then took control of the city and enslaved its Muslim population. As a result, Ibn al-Afṭas accused Rānda of treason and ordered his execution. The Afṭasid emirate was only saved from falling to the Spaniards by the death of Ferdinand and the conflict that persisted for a number of years among his heirs.⁷⁹

After the death of al-Muẓaffar in 461/1068 he was succeeded by his son Yaḥyā, who was given the title *al-Manṣūr* ('the Victorious'). During al-Manṣūr's reign a dispute arose between him and his brother 'Umar. When 'Umar appealed to the ruler of Toledo for help against his brother, al-Manṣūr was in turn obliged to seek the assistance of the Banū 'Abbād. These disagreements could have destroyed the Afṭasid emirate if al-Manṣūr had not died in 464/1072 and been replaced by 'Umar, who was given the honorific *al-Mutawakkil* ('the One who Trusts [in God]').

Due to his knowledge, determination and the resolute stance he took against the Spaniards, al-Mutawakkil became one of the most illustrious and famous rulers of the petty kingdoms and under him the Afṭasid emirate enjoyed peace and security. But he began to interfere in the affairs of Toledo when in 472/1079 its citizens asked him to oust their *amīr* Yaḥyā ibn Dhī n-Nūn al-Qādir and he seized control of the city for six months.⁸⁰

Alfonso VI began to threaten al-Mutawakkil and demand that he surrender some of his fortresses and castles. Rather than submit to this intimidation, al-Mutawakkil dispatched his famous judge Abū-l-Walīd al-Bājī at the head of a delegation which travelled around Spain in order to create a united front against the king and his plans to reconquer the country. Alfonso had also threatened al-Mu'tamid ibn 'Inān and so he and al-Mutawakkil agreed to ask the Almoravids to defend Spain; they subsequently joined forces at the battle of Zallāqa (Sagrajas). However, when al-Mutawakkil realized that the Almoravids had ambitions to impose their authority over the peninsula, he entered into negotiations with the Christians and gave them three of his cities, Lisbon, Sintra and Santarém. This enraged the Muslims in the capital Badajoz and they appealed to Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn to

79 Ibid., pp. 252–3, 261–7, 305.

80 Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, p. 282.

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intervene. He responded by sending a military force that occupied Badajoz and captured al-Mutawakkil and his two sons. In this way, Badajoz was finally added to the Almoravid state after seventy-five years of Aftasid rule.

The Banū Dhī n-Nūn (Dhu n-Nūnids) in Toledo (427–78/1035–85)

The emirate of the Dhu n-Nūnids is considered of great importance due to its strategic location in the northern mountains of Spain. This region was known as the ‘central frontier zone’ because it lay on the borders with the Spanish kingdoms and acted as a barrier in the north of the Muslim state against Spanish attacks.

After the collapse of the Umayyad caliphate in Córdoba in 399/1008, the region witnessed a period of disturbance and anarchy until ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Dhī n-Nūn was able to take control in 427/1035. He came from the Hawwāra tribe in the Maghrib. The family of the Banū Dhī n-Nūn appeared on the stage of world history at the time of al-Manṣūr ibn Abī ‘Āmir. Ibn al-Khaṭīb remarks concerning them: ‘They had no authority or renown except during the reign of al-Manṣūr ibn Abī ‘Āmir. At this time ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn Dhī n-Nūn rose to prominence as one of al-Manṣūr’s followers.’

When the ‘Āmirid dynasty came to an end, Ibn Dhī n-Nūn made his way to the ‘high frontier zone’, that is, Toledo and seized control of the region of Cantabria and the castle of Cuenca. Finally, he advanced on Toledo in 427/1035, captured it and appointed Ismā‘īl ibn ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān as its governor. Ibn Dhī n-Nūn died in 435/1043 and was succeeded by his son Yaḥyā Ismā‘īl, who was given the title *al-Ma’mūn* (‘the Reliable’).⁸¹

Al-Ma’mūn depended on a group of competent ministers and aides to help him run his state. These included Abū Bakr al-Ḥadīdī, al-Ḥājj ibn Maḥqūr, Ibn Labbūn and Ibn Sa‘īd. Under al-Ma’mūn the emirate expanded in size until it came to include Valencia. He ruled for thirty-three years and the period of his reign was generally one of peace, security and prosperity even though he engaged in futile conflicts with the Banū Hūd in Zaragoza, the Banū ‘Abbād in Seville and the Banū Jahwar in Córdoba. These fights were extremely destructive and forced the rulers to seek the help of their common enemy the Spaniards against each other.

The conflict between the Banū Hūd and the Banū Dhī n-Nūn began over the region of Guadalajara. The two sides clashed in a fierce battle in 436/1044 from which the Banū Hūd emerged victorious. This forced al-Ma’mūn, the ruler of Toledo, to reach an agreement with Ferdinand I of Castile in which al-Ma’mūn acknowledged the king’s authority in return for military assistance. Thus, Ferdinand dispatched a military force which attacked the

81 Ibid., pp. 252–3, 261, 267, 305.

territories of the Banū Hūd, destroyed their crops and took some Muslim captives. Meanwhile, al-Ma'mūn also formed an alliance with the Banū 'Abbād in order to receive military assistance against the Banū Hūd.⁸²

As for Sulaymān ibn Hūd, he was similarly obliged to enter into talks with Ferdinand for military aid, the king providing him with reinforcements in return for a large sum of money. Al-Ma'mūn's response was to form another alliance with García of Navarre, who attacked the lands of the Banū Hūd next to his borders and occupied the castle of Calahorra in 437/1045. At the same time, Ferdinand attacked Toledo, destroyed its plantations and demolished a number of its castles.⁸³

When Ferdinand's attacks on Toledo became more persistent, a delegation from the city went to him to negotiate and to sue for peace. The king imposed a number of impossible conditions on them: they responded by telling him that if he did not leave them alone they would appeal to the Almoravids for help. He replied:

As for your intention to summon the Berbers, you are always saying this to us and threatening us with it. But you cannot do it because of their animosity towards you. We will withstand you and we do not care which of you comes against us. We are only asking for our country which you took from us when you first arrived here a long time ago. You have settled where it pleased you. But we have triumphed over you now. So go to your shores and leave us our country. There is no good in your living among us after today. We will never leave you alone until God judges between us.⁸⁴

Despite Ferdinand's clearly stated objective, the conflict between the Banū Hūd and the Banū Dhī n-Nūn went on for three years and only came to an end with the death of Ibn Hūd in 438/1046. It was an unnecessary war which enabled the Spaniards to humiliate the Muslims and destroy their lands. Al-Ma'mūn was not content with having designs on the possessions of the Banū Hūd; he also coveted the emirate of Badajoz. A war of attrition ensued in which neither of the two sides achieved a decisive victory but which consumed their resources and subsequently facilitated their takeover. After this, al-Ma'mūn turned his attention to Valencia, which was ruled by his brother-in-law 'Abd-al-Malik ibn 'Abd-al-'Azīz ibn Abī 'Āmir, and took it from him in 457/1064.

When Ferdinand died in 458/1065 a struggle for the throne broke out among his sons and one of them, Alfonso, went to Toledo and lived there

82 Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A'māl al-a'lām*, pp. 158–9.

83 'Alī ibn Bassām ash-Shantarīnī, *adh-Dhakhīra fī maḥāsīn ahl al-jazīra*, Cairo, 1939, p. 131.

84 Ash-Shantarīnī, *adh-Dhakhīra*, pp. 130–5; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A'māl al-a'lām*, p. 181.

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under al-Ma'mūn's protection. During his stay he became acquainted with the situation in Toledo, its defensive arrangements, its weak points and so on.⁸⁵

In 462/1070 al-Ma'mūn tried to seize Córdoba from the Banū Jahwar. The attempt failed, however, because of the intervention of the Banū 'Abbād. But al-Ma'mūn devised a plan and in 467/1074 was able to enter the city amid great celebrations.

After the death of al-Ma'mūn he was succeeded by his grandson Yaḥyā, who was given the honorific *al-Qādir* ('the Powerful'). During al-Qādir's reign the fortunes of the Banū Dhī n-Nūn worsened and they were attacked by Ibn Hūd, who seized Cantabria from them. As a result, al-Qādir appealed to Alfonso VI of Castile for help. The king was willing to respond to al-Qādir's request on payment of an enormous sum of money. Al-Qādir agreed to the terms but the inhabitants of Toledo rose up against him, forcing him to flee and to seek refuge with Alfonso. The people of Toledo then appointed al-Mutawakkil ibn al-Aḩas as their ruler. But al-Qādir returned with an army composed of Christians, expelled al-Mutawakkil and in 472/1081 resumed his position as ruler of Toledo.⁸⁶

Alfonso VI continued to beleaguer Toledo and he adopted a policy of attempting to undermine the city's economy and causing havoc and ruin within it. When he saw that it was weak he ordered his troops to besiege it. The siege lasted for nine months and none of the rulers of the petty kingdoms came forward to help apart from al-Mutawakkil, the ruler of Badajoz, whose forces were, however, defeated. Finally, the inhabitants of Toledo were forced to enter into negotiations. They sent a delegation to Alfonso, who refused to meet it and passed it on to his *wazīr*, Sisnando the Mozarab. Sisnando had been raised in Seville and was shrewd and well acquainted with the affairs of Spain and its rulers.⁸⁷

After some disagreements between the delegation from Toledo and the Castilians, it was decided that the city with all its palaces and bridges should be surrendered to Alfonso VI, that the congregational mosque should remain in the hands of the Muslims, that any Muslim wishing to leave the city should be allowed to do so, that the possessions and religious freedom of those Muslims who remained should be safeguarded and that al-Qādir and his family and aides should take all their belongings and move to Valencia. In 478/16 May 1083 al-Qādir left Toledo, unmourned by the population. His position as ruler was taken by Sisnando. In this way Toledo fell after

85 Ibn al-Khaṩīb, *A'māl al-a'lām*, pp. 152–3; Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, pp. 194–5, 314–15; 'Anān, *Dawlat al-islām*, p. 33.

86 Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, pp. 197–9; Ibn al-Khaṩīb, *A'māl al-a'lām*, p. 154.

87 Ibn ḩazm, 'Risālat nuqaṩ al-'arūs', *Majallat kulliyat al-ādāb*, Cairo, Cairo University, December 1953, pp. 83–4.

thirty-seven years of Muslim rule, and from that time it became the capital of the kingdom of Castile.⁸⁸

The main significance of the fall of Toledo is that it represented the real beginning of the regaining of Spain from the Muslims, a process called the *Reconquista*. It enhanced the reputation of Alfonso among the other European kings and he came to be given the title emperor. It also raised the morale of the Spaniards and gave them the confidence to fight the Muslims. Similarly, the fall of Toledo made a great impression on the rulers of the petty kingdoms and they began to reassess the danger that threatened them and to fear that they would suffer the same fate. As a result of this, and after much hesitation, they decided to seek the help of the Almoravids.

The Banū ‘Abbād (‘Abbāids) in Seville (414–84/1023–91)

The Banū ‘Abbād originated from the descendants of the kings of Ḥīra, the Lakhmids. Their ancestor ‘Aṭṭāf arrived in Spain with what was known as the Balj vanguard (named after Balj ibn Bishr al-Qushayrī), which crossed over into the country after being besieged in Ceuta in 124/741 in accordance with an agreement made with ‘Abd-al-Malik ibn Qaṭan, the ruler of Spain at that time. During the troubles that followed the collapse of the Umayyad caliphate, the Banū ‘Abbād began to rise to prominence. Their grandfather Abū-l-Walīd Ismā‘īl ibn ‘Abbād was the judge of Seville and also held a number of other positions, including the chief of police. Thanks to his status and family background he was able to take control in Seville along with two other leaders, the *faqīh* Abū ‘Abdallāh az-Zubaydī and the *wazīr* Abū Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh ibn Maryam. The citizens of Córdoba chose these three men to manage the affairs of Seville. However, because of his personality, wealth and reputation, Ibn ‘Abbād was the most popular of them and he eventually became both judge and ruler of Seville at the same time. It was said of him that he became ‘the man of the West’, that is, of western Spain. In 414/1023, when Ibn ‘Abbād was advanced in years, he stepped down in favour of his son Abu-l-Qāsim Muḥammad.⁸⁹

Muḥammad ibn ‘Abbād ran the affairs of Seville and is considered to be the real founder of this small state. He began to extend his emirate at the expense of his neighbours the Banū-l-Afṭas in Badajoz and the Banū Ḥammūd in Málaga, fighting a number of debilitating wars against them which destroyed both the Muslims’ military might and their economies. Had

88 ‘Anān, *Dawlat al-islām*, pp. 38–9.

89 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, pp. 208–11, 234, 240; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A‘māl al-a‘lām*, p. 155.

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they preserved these, they might have been able to defend their lands from the Spaniards who were advancing from the north of Spain.

One example of Muḥammad ibn ‘Abbād’s cunning was that when he saw the Ḥammūdīd forces increasing in power on the basis of their ‘Alawī origins, he took advantage of the disappearance of Hishām III al-Mu‘ayyad (about whom there had been no news since he had been deposed in 399/1008 in Córdoba) by finding someone who closely resembled him and then announcing in Seville that the caliph Hishām had reappeared and had appointed him as *ḥājib* over Spain. Muḥammad ibn ‘Abbād hid the false caliph in a palace far away from the people.⁹⁰ However, Ibn Ḥazm dismisses this account when he remarks: ‘It is a fabrication. Nothing like this has ever occurred in history.’ Regarding the division of Spain into small states and the existence of four caliphs at the same time, Ibn Ḥazm also says:

It was a scandalous state of affairs. Nothing in the world has ever happened like this where four men, only three days’ travel apart, were each calling themselves the *Amīr al-Mu‘minīn* and being addressed as such all at the same time.⁹¹

Muḥammad ibn ‘Abbād began his plans for expansion by annexing the cities neighbouring Seville such as Carmona, ruled by Yaḥyā al-Mu‘talī, which he placed under the control of his ally Muḥammad al-Barzālī. He then occupied it and added it to Seville. Following this, he took Écija and Lisbon. A coalition was formed against him composed of the ruler of Granada and the ruler of Málaga and Carmona, who were both alarmed by Ibn ‘Abbād’s expansionist policies. In 431/1039 this coalition defeated Muḥammad ibn ‘Abbād’s army and killed his son Ismā‘īl. When Muḥammad died in 433/1042 he was succeeded by another son called Abū ‘Umar ibn ‘Abbād al-Mu‘taḍid.⁹²

Al-Mu‘taḍid ibn ‘Abbād (r. 433–60/1042–67) continued his father’s expansionist policy against the emirates in the west of the peninsula and was involved in fierce battles, including those of Niebla (445/1053), Saltes, Cantrabia and Silves. Prior to this he had extended his authority over Córdoba. He then annexed the small emirates lying to the east of the Guadalquivir, that is, Málaga, Algeciras, Granada, Ronda, Sidonia and Arcos. At the same time that al-Mu‘taḍid was expanding his emirate at the expense of his neighbours, he was paying tribute to the Spanish king Fernando I and after him to his son Sancho. Al-Mu‘taḍid died in 460/1067 and was succeeded by his son Muḥammad al-Mu‘tamid ‘al-Allāh (r. 460–83/1067–90).⁹³

90 Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A‘māl al-a‘lām*, pp. 161–2; Ibn ‘Idhārī al-Marrākushī, *Mulūk aṭ-ṭawā‘if*, Beirut, Dār ath-thaqāfa, n.d., pp. 74–80.

91 ‘Anān, *Dawlat al-islām*, pp. 20–1; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A‘māl al-a‘lām*, p. 147.

92 ‘Anān, *Dawlat al-islām*, p. 22.

93 Reinhart Dozy, *Nazarāt fī tārikh al-islām*, Jubail, Maktabat Bībilūn, 2005, p. 11.

Al-Mu'tamid ibn 'Abbād was the most illustrious of the 'Abbādid rulers and of the petty kingdoms as a whole. His claim to fame lies in his protracted struggle against the Spanish kings and his appeal to the Almoravids to help him resist the *Reconquista*. This is in addition to his renown in the fields of poetry, the arts, warcraft and politics. Like his father before him, al-Mu'tamid was involved in a series of battles with the rulers of the other small Spanish states over expansion and control. These conflicts led him to ask the Spanish kings for help against some of the *amīrs* of the petty kingdoms who were in competition with him.

While he was ruler of Silves, al-Mu'tamid had become acquainted with the poet and *wazīr* Abū Bakr ibn 'Ammār, who subsequently achieved renown at al-Mu'tamid's court. Ibn 'Ammār showed extraordinary aptitude and ability in implementing al-Mu'tamid's expansionist policies, in dispatching his various embassies to conduct negotiations, and in devising plans. But he soon changed his allegiance and loyalty to his master and began to conspire against him with his enemies. Al-Mu'tamid eventually had Ibn 'Ammār thrown into prison. The poems he wrote in praise of al-Mu'tamid and apologizing for his actions were of no avail and he was executed in 437/1084. These poems are, however, considered to be among the greatest ever written in Spain under the Muslims.

Despite the strength and expansion of the 'Abbādid state and its ability to wage war against its Muslim neighbours, it nevertheless started to pay tribute to the king of Castile in 455/1063. This was in order to avoid war with the Castilians. Alfonso VI was remorseless in exacting money from the rulers of the petty kingdoms. His policy was to impoverish them, and frighten and terrorize them with persistent attacks until their economies collapsed, at which point he would deliver the final blow. It was with this in mind that Alfonso launched an attack on Seville, laid siege to it for three days and destroyed the surrounding farms and plantations before eventually withdrawing.⁹⁴

The Spanish attacks on the petty kingdoms, especially after the occupation of Toledo, forced al-Mu'tamid and some of his fellow rulers to seek assistance from the Almoravids in order to fight and defeat Alfonso at the battle of Zallāqa (Sagrajas) in 479/1086.

The 'Abbādid state continued until 484/1095, when it was absorbed by the Almoravids. Al-Mu'tamid was captured and thrown into prison in Agmat, where he remained until his death in 488/1095.

94 Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, p. 186.

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The Banū Jahwar (Jahwarids) in Córdoba (422–62/1030–69)

The founder of the Jahwarid state was Abū-l-Ḥazm Jahwar ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Ubaydallāh ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Yūsuf ibn Bakht ibn Abī ‘Abdihi al-Fārisī (r. 422–35/1031–43). The ancestor of the Banū Jahwar was a *mawla* of the Umayyad caliph ‘Abd-al-Malik ibn Marwān who had crossed into Spain with the Balj vanguard after the defeat inflicted on the caliphal forces at the battle of the Nobles. This army, which had been besieged in Ceuta by the Khārijīs, was brought from there by the governor of Spain, ‘Abd-al-Malik ibn Qaṭan, since he needed their help to suppress a revolt that had broken out against him. The army then took control of Córdoba.

The grandfather of the Jahwarids was Yūsuf ibn Bakht, a supporter of ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ad-Dākhil, the founder of the Umayyad dynasty in Spain. Throughout the period of Umayyad rule, the Banū Jahwar occupied important posts within the state such as *ḥājibs*, secretaries, *wazīrs* and military commanders.⁹⁵

Ibn Jahwar played a prominent role during the anarchy in Córdoba following the fall of the Umayyad caliphate by maintaining security and order and protecting the city from destruction and ruin. This earned him the respect and esteem of the citizens. He became their revered leader and was elected as ‘a chief of the community and head of the city’.⁹⁶

Abū Ḥazm Jahwar followed what is considered to be a unique policy for his time since he did not arrogate all power to himself in making decisions but rather gathered his senior commanders and leaders and consulted them on all matters. He spoke on their behalf and only made a ruling with their consent. He used to say: ‘It is not my prerogative to make decisions. This is rather the jurisdiction of the consultative council. I am nothing but an executor of its orders and decrees.’⁹⁷ When anything was asked or desired of him, he would reply: ‘It is not in my power to give or to deny. This is for the community to do. I am merely its representative.’ And if something made him feel uneasy or he wished to embark on a particular course of action, he would summon his council and ask their advice. Similarly, when he received any correspondence he would only consider it in the name of his ministers.⁹⁸

This unique small state is known in Islamic history as the ‘Government of the Community’ (*Ḥukūma li-l-Jamā‘a*); it was a singular form of consultative rule in an age of individualism and autocracy. One of its principal characteristics was that the leader could divorce himself from any

95 ‘Anān, *Dawlat al-islām*, p. 22.

96 Ibid., p. 23; Dozy, *Nazarāt*, pp. 14–15.

97 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, pp. 237, 240–1.

98 Ibid., pp. 256–7.

responsibility for the failure of a particular policy or plan while receiving praise and gratitude for any success. Nonetheless, Ibn Jahwar did adopt a successful policy when dealing with the difficult circumstances which troubled Córdoba. One of his first priorities was to attend to matters of security. Thus, he put an end to civil unrest by meeting the people concerned, by persuading the local leaders, appeasing them and winning them over to his side. He reached an agreement with them on a programme of security measures for the city and for establishing order and stability. To this end he distributed weapons to the heads of the merchant quarters, organized the city guards, reformed the judiciary and propagated justice.⁹⁹

As regards the economy, Ibn Jahwar adhered to the wise and unprecedented policy of reviving the economic situation in Córdoba by providing loans for the merchants, craftsmen and farmers so as to enable them to work. These loans were repaid to the state treasury without interest. He also reduced taxes, kept a close eye on public finances and encouraged trade relations. These policies bore fruit and in a very short time there was an improvement in both the economic situation and the standard of living. The city was restored to its previous flourishing state and the merchants who had fled during the civil war returned.¹⁰⁰

For twelve years Ibn Jahwar ruled the small state of Córdoba on the basis of his balanced policies. During this time the city attracted many political leaders from the peninsula who came as refugees seeking sanctuary and a place to live in peace and security. Among these were ‘Abdallāh ibn Sābūr, the *amīr* of Lisbon, who was deposed by Ibn al-Aftas, the ruler of Badajoz; ‘Abd-al-‘Azīz the Elder, the ruler of Niebla and Saltés island, who was expelled by Ibn ‘Abbād, the ruler of Seville; and al-Qāsim ibn Ḥammūd, the ruler of Algeciras, who was also driven out by Ibn ‘Abbād.¹⁰¹

Upon the death of Abū-l-Walīd ibn Jahwar in 435/1044, he was succeeded by his son Abū-l-Walīd Muḥammad ibn Jahwar. At first, Abū-l-Walīd adopted his father’s method of government, confirmed his father’s aides in their posts and chose the historian Ibn Ḥayyān and the poet Ibn Zaydūn to assist him in the administration. However, Abū-l-Walīd soon changed this moderate policy and designated as heir to the throne his son ‘Abd-al-Malik, who conducted himself badly and ruled like a tyrant. ‘Abd-al-Malik was given two titles, *al-Manṣūr b-illāh* (‘the Victorious by God’) and *aḏ-Zāfir b-illāh* (‘the Triumphant by God’). Such names were borne by the rulers of the petty kingdoms even though they did not always deserve them.

99 Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A’māl al-a’lām*, pp. 150–1; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, pp. 257–61.

100 Anon., *al-Ḥulal al-mawshiyya fī dhikr al-akhbār al-marrākushiyya*, Tunisia, AH 1337, p. 98.

101 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, VI, pp. 187–8; Ibn Abī Zar‘, *al-Anās al-muṭrib*, p. 99.

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In 440/1048 Abū-l-Walīd appointed as supervisor of the affairs of Córdoba his *wazīr* Ibrāhīm ibn as-Saqqā', one of the most loyal and skilful *wazīrs* in the Jahwarid state. When al-Mu'tamid ibn 'Abbād wanted to annex Córdoba to his emirate, Ibrāhīm ibn as-Saqqā' stood in his way. Al-Mu'tamid therefore went to Abū-l-Walīd and convinced him that his *wazīr* was conspiring against him. Believing this to be true, Abū-l-Walīd imprisoned Ibrāhīm and had him executed in 455/1063. In this way, Córdoba lost its most important and most experienced *wazīr*.¹⁰²

In addition to being responsible for the death of his *wazīr*, Abū-l-Walīd made a further mistake by dividing authority between his two sons 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān and 'Abd-al-Malik. This created rivalry and conflict between the brothers, which in turn led to the appearance of those who had designs on Córdoba. Thus, al-Ma'mūn ibn Yaḥyā ibn Dhī n-Nūn, the ruler of Toledo, made a rapid advance towards Córdoba with his forces. This caused 'Abd-al-Malik to appeal for help to his ally Ibn 'Abbād, the ruler of Seville, who responded by sending two armies, one under the command of Khalaf ibn Najjāḥ and the other under the command of Muḥammad ibn Marīn. They were given orders to occupy Córdoba and add it to the kingdom of the 'Abbāids. Al-Ma'mūn realized that he was too weak to oppose Córdoba and Seville and so retreated to Toledo. At this point, and according to the agreed plan, the 'Abbāids entered Córdoba, occupied it and in 462/1069 added it to their kingdom. The Banū Jahwar were transported to Saltés island on the Odiel river, and with this the Jahwarid state came to an end forty years after it began. It was the first of the petty kingdoms to fall. Al-Mu'tamid ibn 'Abbād appointed his son Sirāj-ad-Dawla as ruler of Córdoba and it became part of their kingdom.¹⁰³

In such a way did the petty kingdoms in Spain fight and make alliances against each other in order to gain control of the country. They did not refrain from seeking the assistance of their common enemy Ferdinand I of Castile and after him Alfonso VI even though Islamic law explicitly prohibits this. When Toledo fell to Alfonso VI, with whom many of the Muslim rulers had dealings, indeed paying him tribute, and when they saw that their fate was to be similar to that of the citizens of Toledo, they were obliged to ask for the help of their co-religionists, the Almoravids: they immediately responded by sending a force under the command of the *amīr* Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn.

102 Ibn Abī Zar', *al-Anās al-muṭrib*, p. 104; Joseph Ashbach, *Tārīkh al-Andalus fī 'ahd al-Murābiṭīn wa-l-Muwahḥidīn*, trans. Muḥammad 'Anān, Cairo, Lajnat at-ta'līf, 1940, pp. 117–18.

103 Ibn 'Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, p. 582; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi-t-tārīkh*, XI, p. 13; al-Ḥimyarī, *Ṣifat jazīrat al-Andalus*, p. 23.

THE ALMORAVIDS (*AL-MURĀBITŪN*) AND THE ALMOHADS
(*AL-MUWAḤḤIDŪN*) (483–633/1090–1235)

The Almoravids (483–541/1090–1156)

After the Almoravids had united the Maghrib with some of the territories lying to the south of the Sahara, they were sooner or later bound to turn their attention to Spain. This was especially the case following the collapse of the Umayyad caliphate and the division of the country into the petty kingdoms, which fought each other and were threatened by the Spaniards who occupied Toledo in 478/1085.

Thus, in response to a request for aid from the rulers of the petty kingdoms headed by al-Mu'tamid ibn 'Abbād, the Almoravids, who had been keeping an eye on developments, crossed into Spain. After transporting their troops across the Strait of Gibraltar they headed directly to Zallāqa (Sagrajas), supported by military units from Seville under the command of Ibn 'Abbād and from some of the other petty kingdoms. There, in 479/1086, the Almoravids inflicted a painful defeat on Alfonso VI. Following this victory, they retreated to the Maghrib with raised morale and an enhanced reputation not only in the Maghrib and Spain but throughout the entire Muslim world.

The Almoravids crossed over to Spain again in 481/1088, in what is known as the 'second crossing', in response to persistent complaints from the leading men and scholars of Spain that the Spaniards under El Cid were gaining the upper hand in eastern Spain. El Cid was a Spanish adventurer prince in command of a company of mercenaries who would offer their services to whoever paid them. They were part of the forces of Alfonso VI but they quarrelled with him and he dismissed them, only to take them back after his defeat at Zallāqa. They then began to cause havoc in eastern Spain, specifically in the regions of Valencia, Almería and Lorca, and were able to seize the castle of Aledo.

The Almoravid forces laid siege to the castle of Aledo with the help of some of the rulers of the petty kingdoms, including Ibn 'Abbād, 'Abdallāh ibn Bulqīn (the ruler of Granada) and Ibn Rashīq (the ruler of Murcia). When the siege became prolonged and some disturbances occurred in the Maghrib, in addition to the conflicts and conspiracies which broke out among the rulers of the petty kingdoms taking part in the siege, Ibn Tāshfīn was obliged to lift it and return home.¹⁰⁴ He went back to the Maghrib having revised his opinion about the *amīrs* of the petty kingdoms.

104 Ibn Abī Zar', *al-Anīs al-muḥrib*, p. 123; Muḥammad al-Baydhaq, *Akhbār Ibn Tūmart*, Paris, E. Lévi-Provençal, 1928, pp. 100–99, 126.

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Less than one year later, at the beginning of 483/1090, Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn prepared his army to cross over the straits to Spain for the third time. On this occasion, his journey was in response to a request from one of the rulers of the petty kingdoms, or rather on his own behalf after deciding to remove the weak *amīrs* of Spain. Indeed, it seems that there were a number of reasons which made him take this step, including the following:

1. Ibn Tāshfīn was influenced by the disgraceful conduct of the *amīrs*, their weak religious faith, their inability to defend their territories and their corrupt governments. He was also concerned that if he left them to their own devices, they would be occupied by the enemy.
2. Some letters intended for Alfonso VI had fallen into Ibn Tāshfīn's hands: they asked for the king's friendship and promised to join him against the Almoravids.
3. Supplies had been cut to the Almoravid army, which Ibn Tāshfīn had left protecting eastern Spain.
4. Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn learnt of a number of *fatwās* (formal legal judgements) issued by the religious scholars of Spain and the Muslim East, such as al-Ghazālī and Abū Bakr aṭ-Ṭarṭūshī, who decreed that it was necessary to depose the rulers of the petty kingdoms in order to preserve Muslim unity.¹⁰⁵
5. There was perhaps also a strategic reason in that Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn was afraid that if Spain fell into the hands of the Spaniards, they would then pose a threat to the Far Maghrib.

The Almoravid forces, led by Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn and accompanied by the senior Almoravid commanders, crossed over into Spain and overthrew all the Muslim *amīrs* either by taking them prisoner or killing them – all, that is, apart from Ibn Hūd, the ruler of Zaragoza, whom Ibn Tāshfīn allowed to remain in his place. Ibn 'Abbād and his family and 'Abdallāh ibn Bulqīn and his brother Tamīm were captured and taken to the Maghrib, where they spent the rest of their lives. In this way Spain was added to the Almoravid state, which now extended from the southern Sahara to the north of Spain.

The Almoravids inherited an onerous legacy in Spain and they bore responsibility for its defence. Indeed, their sixty-year stay in Spain was spent in conflict with the Spaniards. Their commander Ibrāhīm ibn Ishāq al-Lamtūnī managed to defeat the Spaniards led by Alvar Fáñez in southern Spain. Similarly, the general Dāwūd ibn 'Ā'isha successfully retook the castle of Aledo. In 475/1101, under the command of Muḥammad ibn Mazdalī, the Almoravids retook Valencia and the castles scattered throughout eastern

105 Al-Maqqarī, *Nafh at-ṭīb*, VI, p. 207; al-Idrīsī, *Nuzhat al-mushtāq*, p. 198.

Spain. They also triumphed over the forces of Alfonso VI at the battles of Cuenca and Malagón. In 501/1107, during the time of ‘Īsā ibn Yūsuf, they defeated Alfonso VI at Uclés and killed his only son, Prince Sancho, a large number of his generals and about 23,000 of his soldiers. Seven counts also fell in the battle and for this reason it became known as the battle of the Seven Counts.¹⁰⁶

In 503/1109 ‘Alī ibn Yūsuf crossed over to Spain, swept into the region of Toledo and seized some of the castles there, including those of Madrid and Guadalajara. The following year, the *amīr* Sīr ibn Abī Bakr attacked in the west of the peninsula and gained control of Badajoz, Sintra, Santarém, Porto, Évora and Lisbon.

In 511/1117 Alfonso ‘the Warrior’ (r. 1104–34) launched an attack on the Almoravid forces in front of the walls of Zaragoza, resulting in the Almoravids’ eventual retreat from the city in 514/1120. This was followed by a number of Almoravid defeats at the hands of Alfonso, who in 519/1125 managed to make his way through Spain until he arrived near Granada. This encouraged the Mozarabs to join forces with him. But in a fiercely contested battle, the Almoravid army of Ibn Ghāniya and Ibn Mardanīsh led by Yaḥyā ibn ‘Alī ibn Tāshfīn defeated and killed Alfonso.¹⁰⁷ In this way the Almoravids mounted a heroic defence of Spain. But despite their repeated victories over the Spaniards, they lost many of their soldiers and much of their power and wealth. This made it relatively easy for the Almohads to put an end to their rule in the Maghrib and Spain.

The Almohads (541–633/1147–1235)

After many battles, the Almohads finally triumphed over the Almoravids. In 539/1145 they attacked the castle of Oran and killed Tāshfīn ibn ‘Alī, the Almoravid *amīr*. From there they advanced on Fās and occupied it. The morale of the Almoravids was low after the death of their *amīr* and so a series of cities in the Maghrib, such as Meknès and Sala, were allowed to fall to the Almohads. The commander of the Almoravid naval fleet in Spain, ‘Alī ibn ‘Īsā, announced his allegiance to the Almohads and in 541/1147 ‘Abd-al-Mu’min ibn ‘Alī seized Marrakesh, the Almoravid capital, and killed Ibrāhīm ibn Tāshfīn, the last of the Almoravid *amīrs*.¹⁰⁸

With the collapse of the Almoravid state, the regional governors and rulers in Spain became independent and there was a return to the old

106 Al-Marrākushī, *al-Mu’jib*, pp. 249, 261–6.

107 Ibid., p. 282; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, IV, p. 160; Ibn Abī Dīnār, *al-Mu’nis fī akhbār Ifrīqiyyā wa-Tūnis*, Tunis, Maṭba‘at ad-dawla at-tūnisiyya, n.d., p. 116.

108 Abū ‘Abdallāh az-Zarkashī, *Tārīkh ad-dawlatayn al-muwahḥidiyya wa-l-ḥafṣiyya*, Tunis, AH 1289, p. 11; Ibn Abī Zar‘, *al-Anīs al-muṭrib*, p. 167; Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, IV, p. 183.

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divisions and conflicts. They began to ask the Spanish kings for help against each other. The Spaniards took advantage of the situation and started to put pressure on the Muslims, which in turn forced them to appeal to the Almohads in the Maghrib.

After unifying the Maghrib under their authority, it was only natural that the Almohads should turn their attention to Spain. In this they had the same task as the Almoravids in their defence of the Spanish Muslims. In 541/1147 ‘Abd-al-Mu’min ibn ‘Alī dispatched an army to Spain that captured Niebla, Baja, Badajoz, Seville and Málaga. He then sent a number of other armies which seized Cantabria, Cádiz, Silves, Jaén and Córdoba. In 549/1154 the Almohads conquered Granada and inflicted a defeat on an alliance under Alfonso VII, who died a few years later in 552/1157.¹⁰⁹ Also because of Spain, the Almohads were involved in three major battles against the Spaniards: they were victorious in the battles of Santarém (580/1184) and Alarcos (591/1195), but suffered a defeat at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (609/1212).

- The battle of Santarém (580/1184)

The reason for this battle was Alfonso Henriques’ (called ‘Rīq’ in the Islamic sources) threat to take control of the south-west of the peninsula, especially after he had already seized some of the castles near Badajoz, including Trujillo, and then advanced and laid siege to that city.

The Almohad caliph Abū Ya’qūb Yūsuf ibn ‘Abd-al-Mu’min ‘Alī mobilized a large army and crossed over into Spain, where he laid siege to Santarém. With the arrival of winter, the Almohads decided to lift the siege until the weather improved. When the Portuguese noticed that the caliph had positioned himself at the back of the retreating army, they launched a surprise attack and killed a number of senior Almohad officers. The caliph was struck in the stomach with a poisoned arrow and died from his wound two days later on 7 Rajab 580/1184. The Almohads carried their caliph’s body to Tinmal, where he was buried next to his father ‘Abd-al-Mu’min and Ibn Tūmart.¹¹⁰

The Almohad caliphate passed to Ya’qūb al-Manṣūr (r. 580–95/1183–98). He faced disturbances in the north-eastern Maghrib stirred up by remnants of the Almoravids and led by the Banū Ghāniya with the collaboration of an adventurer from Egypt called Qārāqūsh. After al-Manṣūr had managed to crush the revolt near Gabès in 583/1187, he turned his attention to Spain.

109 Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *A’māl al-a’lām*, p. 270; Abu-l-‘Abbās Aḥmad as-Salāwī, *al-Istiḳṣā’ li-akhbār duwal al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā*, ed. Ja’far an-Nāṣir and Muḥammad an-Nāṣirī, Casablanca, 1937, II, p. 224.

110 Ibn ‘Idhārī, *al-Bayān al-mughrib*, III, pp. 322, 430–6; Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, IV, p. 171; Ibn Abī Zar’, *al-Anīs al-muṭrib*, p. 183.

The Almohads had made a truce with the Spaniards in 586/1190 but it had expired in 591/1195. They did not want to renew it because Alfonso VIII had attacked a number of the Muslim cities and castles in northern Spain and also because al-Manṣūr wished to avenge the death of his father. There were therefore a number of factors which led to the battle of Alarcos.

- The battle of Alarcos (591/1195)

In 591/1195 the Almohad caliph Ya'qūb al-Manṣūr crossed over into Spain with a large army. He went first to Seville, then advanced to Córdoba, Calatrava, and then on to Alarcos on the river Guadiana – near the site of the earlier battle of Zallāqa (Sagrajas) – where Alfonso VIII (r. 1158–1214) was camped with a vast number of Spaniards and European volunteers. Al-Manṣūr delivered a rousing speech to his troops before the battle and then launched a ferocious attack on the Castilian army. The result was a crushing defeat for the Spaniards in which 30,000 soldiers lost their lives. Alfonso VIII fled to Toledo, pursued by al-Manṣūr, who surrounded him but was unable to break through the city's natural defences.¹¹¹

The battle of Alarcos had devastating consequences for both sides. The Spaniards' heavy losses on the battlefield included seventeen priests and three bishops. Much of the cavalry based at Calatrava was destroyed and the administrative head of Évora, Gonçalo Viegas, was killed along with the Portuguese volunteers. As for the Almohads, 20,000 of them were killed. They were, however, able to regain the castles previously captured by the Spaniards such as those of Malagón, Caracuel and Calatrava in addition to seizing an enormous quantity of booty including horses, precious stones and weapons.

In 592/1195 al-Manṣūr laid siege to Toledo. On the way there he attacked the castle of Montánchez but was unable to capture it. He did, however, gain control of Valencia. The following year, al-Manṣūr once again went to Toledo and although he could not advance deep into Castilian territory he forced Alfonso VIII to sue for peace. After the two sides had agreed to a ten-year truce, al-Manṣūr returned to Marrakesh, where he died and was buried in 595/1198.¹¹²

- The battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (al-'Uqāb) (609/1212)

There were numerous reasons, both internal and external, for the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. These include revenge for the defeat at Alarcos, the defeats inflicted on the Crusaders in the Islamic East by Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn

111 An-Najjār, *Futūḥāt al-islām*, pp. 390–1.

112 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'ibar*, IV, p. 172; al-Maqqarī, *Nafḥ at-ṭīb*, III, p. 210; Ibn al-Khaṭīb, *al-Iḥāṭa*, I, p. 397.

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(Saladin) al-Ayyūbī, the summons of Pope Innocent III to fight the Muslims in Spain, his inciting of the Christians and his declaration that all those who responded to his call and went to wage war in Spain would be granted an absolute pardon for their sins. Furthermore, a delegation of priests and archbishops travelled around France and Italy trying to enlist volunteers and collecting money and weapons for the cause.

When the volunteers from Castile, Aragón, León and Porto and the knights from France, Germany and Lombardy had assembled around Alfonso VIII, he marched with them over the Sierra Morena and seized the castle of al-‘Uqāb near the town of Santa Elena. Alfonso’s army was estimated to comprise some 110,000 men while the Muslim army had 100,000. The Almohad armies advanced to the plain of al-‘Uqāb, led by the caliph Muḥammad an-Nāṣir (r. 595–610/1199–1214), and blocked the passes through the mountains. Spanish history has not recorded a more fearsome and bloody struggle than the battle which ensued between the two sides. The Almohads suffered a terrible defeat in which they lost most of their army. Muḥammad an-Nāṣir fled with a detachment of horsemen to Seville and from there to Marrakesh, where he died in 610/1214, still grieving over what had befallen him.¹¹³

The battle of Las Navas de Tolosa had very grave consequences for the Muslims and the Almohad state since the Spanish-European coalition came to occupy most of Spain and all that remained to the Muslims was Granada and its environs in the south of the country. The Almohad state in the Maghrib was split into three parts and thus just fifty years after its founding lost its political unity.

As for Spain, it once again became divided as it had been during the era of the petty kingdoms. Three main emirates were formed out of it – the emirate of the Banū Hūd in Murcia, the emirate of the Banū Zayyān in Valencia and the emirate of the Banū al-Aḥmar (Banū Naṣr) in Granada. The family of the Banū Zayyān fell to the Christians in 636/1238. They were followed by Seville in 646/1248, while Córdoba had already fallen in 633/1236.¹¹⁴ Nothing could withstand the Spanish advance and the *Reconquista* apart from Granada, which held out until 898/1492.

113 Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘ibar*, VII, pp. 260–2; as-Salāwī, *al-Istiqṣā’*, II, pp. 65–6.

114 An-Najjār, *Futūḥāt al-islām*, p. 398.

THE BANŪ NAṢR (NAṢRID) (OR BANŪ AL-AḤMAR)
IN GRANADA (635–898/1238–1492)

At the time of the collapse of the Almohad state in Spain, and with the Spanish cities beginning to fall one after the other into the hands of the Spaniards, there appeared a brave Arab commander called Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf ibn Naṣr, also known as Ibn al-Aḥmar, who was a descendant of one of the Prophet's companions called Sa'd ibn 'Abāda al-Khazrajī. This fearless commander was able to save some of Spain and to found the emirate of Granada, which withstood the Spanish advance against it for two and a half centuries.

The most important factors which helped Granada to hold out for so long are the following: first, the strategic and economic importance of the city, which was located near to enemies of the Spaniards in the Maghrib; second, the creation of a fighting force of well-trained men who went to Granada from the cities seized by the Spaniards; third, the arrival of numerous craftsmen, scholars and wealthy people from the Spanish cities that had fallen to the Spaniards and who helped Granada to flourish both economically and culturally; fourth, the formation of a military coalition between Granada and the state of the Banū Marīn in the Maghrib which provided substantial aid, thus enabling Granada to hold out against the Spaniards; and, finally, the Spaniards' preoccupation with consolidating their authority in the Spanish cities they had occupied, and the clashes between them over control of those cities.¹¹⁵

The greatest ruler from the Banū al-Aḥmar was Abū-l-Walīd Ismā'īl, who acceded to the emirate of Granada in 713/1314. He conducted himself better than the others and was the most capable administrator. During his reign the Spaniards marched on Granada with a large force led by Don Pedro and Don Juan, both heirs of Alfonso XI of Castile. They were accompanied by a detachment of English volunteers under the command of one of their princes. On 20 Rabī' II 718/1318 the people of Granada repelled this attack in a bloody battle in which the Spaniards and their allies were defeated, losing twenty-five of their princes including the two heirs to the throne and the English prince and forfeiting a large quantity of booty to the Muslims.¹¹⁶

Another ruler was Abū-l-Ḥajjāj Yūsuf ibn Abi-l-Walīd Ismā'īl, who acceded to power when he was 16 years old and became one of the greatest of the Naṣrid *amīrs*. He enlarged the famous Alhambra (al-Ḥamrā') palace in Granada by adding numerous extensions. During Abū-l-Ḥajjāj's reign

115 Ibid., pp. 399–400.

116 An-Najjār, *Futūḥāt al-islām*, p. 402; anon., *Akhbār al-'aṣr fī mulūk Banī Naṣr*, Göttingen, 1863, pp. 13–14.

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the Spaniards mobilized a large army to attack Granada; he asked the Banū Marīn ruler of the Maghrib, Abū-l-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn ‘Uthmān, for help and in 741/1340 Abū-l-Ḥasan crossed over into Spain at the head of an army. However, the Spaniards defeated the Granada–Maghrib alliance and Abū-l-Ḥajjāj was forced to make peace with them. Abū-l-Ḥajjāj was assassinated in 755/1354 while praying during the festival to mark the end of Ramaḍān (*‘Īd al-Fiṭr*).¹¹⁷

The next Naṣrid ruler of Granada was al-Ghanī b-illāh. During his reign Ibn Khaldūn went to Granada, where al-Ghanī appointed him *wazīr* and made him an ambassador in negotiations with the Spaniards. Ibn Khaldūn remained with al-Ghanī b-illāh for three years and then travelled to Egypt, where he died in 808/1406.

When the Spaniards found themselves unable to launch a direct attack on Granada, they resolved instead to occupy Gibraltar so as to prevent any reinforcements from reaching the city from the Maghrib.¹¹⁸

The decline and fall of Granada


Conflicts raged within the ruling Naṣrid family and this resulted in the break-up and eventual collapse of the emirate. Abū-l-Ḥasan ‘Alī acceded to power after conspiring against and deposing his father with the help of the Banū Sarrāj. He married a Spanish woman called Isabella or, as she is referred to in the Islamic sources, Thurayyā the Byzantine. Abū-l-Ḥasan’s first wife, Fāṭima, bore him two sons called Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad al-Aṣghar (the elder of the two) and Abū-l-Ḥajjāj Yūsuf. It was expected that Abū ‘Abdallāh would become heir to the throne but Thurayyā the Byzantine (also known as the Morning Star, *Kawkab aṣ-Ṣabāḥ*) persuaded Abū-l-Ḥasan to change the succession in favour of her own two sons, Sa‘d and Naṣr. Indeed, she went so far as to persuade him to imprison Fāṭima and her children in one of the castles until the time was ripe for them in Granada. She even planned to kill Fāṭima and her sons.¹¹⁹

While these power struggles were taking place in the palace of Granada, a plan was being drawn up to unite the two most important Spanish kingdoms in which Isabella, the queen of Castile, would marry

117 Anon., *Akhbār al-‘aṣr*, pp. 402–3; Muḥammad ‘Abdallāh ‘Anān, *Nihāyat al-Andalus*, Cairo, Maktabat al-Khānjī, 1997, pp. 220–1; Idris El Hareir, ‘al-Ghazw al-islāmī fi-l-Andalus’, in *al-Kitāb al-marjī‘ fī tārikh al-umma al-‘arabiyya*, Tunisia, al-Munazzama al-‘arabiyya li-t-tarbiya wa-th-thaqāfa wa-l-‘ulūm (ALECSO), 2008, pp. 27–35.

118 Anon., *Akhbār al-‘aṣr*, p. 50; al-Maqqarī, *Nafḥ at-ṭīb*, II, pp. 615–17; ‘Anān, *Nihāyat al-Andalus*, pp. 238–9.

119 Anon., *Akhbār al-‘aṣr*, p. 31; al-Maqqarī, *Nafḥ at-ṭīb*, II, pp. 613–14.



3.17 Alcázar Palace, Seville (© G. Degeorge)

Ferdinand, the king of Aragon. This union would result in the formation of one kingdom and a single united front against the Muslims in Granada.

One night the *amīra* Fāṭima and her sons managed to escape from prison with the help of the Banū Sarrāj. The people of Granada were amazed at her bravery and daring, but Abū-l-Ḥasan was angry and plotted to kill her son Abū-l-Ḥajjāj in Almería. As for her other son, Abū ‘Abdallāh, he fled to Guadix and declared open revolt against his father. The cities of Almería and Granada and some villages gave their allegiance to him, thereby forcing Abū-l-Ḥasan to flee from Granada and to take refuge with his brother Muḥammad az-Zaghal, the ruler of Málaga.

Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad succeeded to the emirate of Granada in 887/1482 and this was acknowledged by the majority of cities apart from Málaga, which remained under the control of his father and uncle. When Abū ‘Abdallāh attacked the Castilian city of Lucena, he was defeated by the Spaniards and taken prisoner. After this, his father Abū-l-Ḥasan once again

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ruled Granada until his death in 890/1485, when he was succeeded by his brother Muḥammad az-Zaghal.¹²⁰

It appears that the Spaniards were afraid of the power of Muḥammad az-Zaghal and thus planned with their prisoner Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad to attack him. They supplied Abū ‘Abdallāh with money, weapons and men and promised to reinstate him in his position in Granada. With the help of the Spaniards, Abū ‘Abdallāh was indeed able to expel his uncle Muḥammad az-Zaghal from the city and once again to assert his authority. Meanwhile, the Spaniards mobilized a large army and launched an attack on Málaga, Ronda and some of the castles under the control of Muḥammad az-Zaghal. After a bitter fight they were able to seize them in 893/1487. Az-Zaghal tried to get help from the Maghrib and from the Islamic East but only received a response from the sultan of Egypt, al-Ashraf Qaytbey, who sent a threatening letter to King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella informing them that he would severely punish the Christians in Jerusalem. Ferdinand and Isabella replied that they only wanted to liberate Spain from the foreigners. As for the Ottomans who had conquered Constantinople in 857/1453, they were unable to offer any assistance since they had their own problems to deal with.¹²¹

The Spaniards continued their advance on the cities that remained under Muslim control. They seized Almería and Almuñécar, which were the last remaining sea ports held by the Muslims and the link with the Maghrib. By these means the Spaniards cut the connection by which supplies reached Granada and thus tightened the cordon around the city and isolated it from the Maghrib. Muḥammad az-Zaghal was surrounded in Guadix and was forced to surrender and leave for the Maghrib.

Thus, Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad took part in overthrowing his uncle, thinking that the Spaniards would honour their agreement with him and fulfil their promise that they would give him the territory under his uncle’s control. However, they killed the people, enslaved the women and children and told their ally Abū ‘Abdallāh to surrender Granada to them. It was only after a while that he became aware of their treachery.

Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad arranged a meeting in Granada with his senior military commanders. They rejected Ferdinand’s request for their surrender, resolving instead to fight to the end. When the Spaniards learnt of this they burnt the crops in the fields around Granada and Málaga. In this atmosphere of grief and tension a brave general came to the fore called Mūsā ibn Abi-l-Ghassān, who refused to allow the Muslims to have their hands tied in this way, as he put it, ‘like sheep waiting for the slaughter’.

120 Anon., *Akhbār al-‘aṣr*, p. 50; al-Maqqarī, *Nafh at-ṭīb*, II, pp. 615–16.

121 Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, p. 556; Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Story of the Moors in Spain*, London/New York, T. Fisher Unwin, 1889, p. 280.

He galvanized the people to launch a furious attack on the blockade surrounding Granada until he reached Almuñécar, from where the fighters from the Maghrib could pour down on Granada. This encouraged the Muslims under Spanish control to regain the castles near to them. It was, however, only a temporary victory.¹²²

When Ferdinand and Isabella returned to Granada in 896/1491, the decision to capture it had been taken and they had raised a large army of 50,000 men supplied with siege equipment. The army blockaded the city for seven months and in the process founded another city nearby called Santa Fe, or 'City of the Holy Faith'. Despite the best efforts of the cavalry officer Mūsā ibn Abi-l-Ghassān, hunger achieved what the sword could not. When the people lost the will to continue fighting, they asked Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad to negotiate with the Spaniards. As for the Arab commander Mūsā ibn Abi-l-Ghassān, he refused to enter into any negotiations, delivering his celebrated speech:

The time has not yet come to talk of surrender. Our supplies are not exhausted. Indeed, we still have great resources of power, and miracles often happen. That is our strength. I prefer to be counted among those who perished in defence of Granada rather than among those who stood by and witnessed its surrender. In this way the king of the Christians will learn that the Arabs were born for the war horse and the spear. If someone wants to take our swords then let him take them, but let him pay a heavy price for this. As for me, I prefer a tomb under the rubble of Granada where I die defending it rather than the most splendid of palaces that we might gain from submitting to the enemies of religion.¹²³

Most of Abū 'Abdallāh's counsellors did not, however, share Mūsā's opinion. He therefore departed angrily for his house, equipped himself for battle and went out to fight the Spanish hordes. He continued fighting until he was killed. As for Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad, he entered into negotiations with Ferdinand and Isabella and finally agreed to surrender on certain conditions, which included: freedom of worship for the Muslims, freedom of conduct and the protection of their possessions; that Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad and his followers should be allowed to leave Granada and to live in the Sierra Nevada; and the handing over of Granada to Ferdinand and Isabella.¹²⁴

So Abū 'Abdallāh and his family and followers left their red palace, overwhelmed by feelings of defeat, failure and eternal dishonour. They were

122 Anon., *Akhbār al-'aṣr*, p. 50; *al-Maqarrī, Nafh at-ṭīb*, II, pp. 615–17; 'Anān, *Nihāyat al-Andalus*, pp. 238–9.

123 Anon., *Akhbār al-'aṣr*, p. 31; *al-Maqarrī, Nafh at-ṭīb*, II, pp. 613–14.

124 Anon., *Akhbār al-'aṣr*, p. 50; *al-Maqarrī, Nafh at-ṭīb*, II, pp. 615–16.

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accompanied by tears and heartfelt sighs for a ruler who had been destroyed by pointless differences and foolish conflicts. Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad wept as he left Granada for his place of exile and his mother, the courageous Fātima, said to him:

Weep like a woman for a lost kingdom
Which you could not take care of like a man.

But as usual, King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella did not keep their promises to Abū ‘Abdallāh and soon expelled him from Spain. He went to the Maghrib, where he lived in Fās until his death in 930/1523.

A number of important events following the fall of Granada are still remembered by Muslims today:

1. There was a collective expulsion of the Muslims and Jews from Spain despite the promises of Ferdinand and Isabella to grant the Muslims freedom of worship if they surrendered Granada. Some sources estimate that approximately 500,000 people were expelled. Other sources calculate the number of Muslims killed in the period from the fall of Granada in 1492 until the beginning of the seventeenth century AD to be about 3 million. No one was spared the killing and banishment, even those of Spanish descent known as the Moriscos.
2. The enforced mass migrations from Spain resulted in a change in the social, economic and political order in the greater Maghrib.¹²⁵
3. The expulsion of the Muslims from Spain led to revenge being taken on those who had expelled them from their homes. This was done by launching attacks both against Spain and against Spanish interests in the Mediterranean. It resulted in what is known as ‘the *jihād* of the emigration’, or ‘piracy on the high seas’. This led to the intervention of the Ottomans and their appearance in the western Mediterranean and eventually to Ottoman control of North Africa up to the borders of Morocco.
4. The Spanish occupied cities on the coast of North Africa such as Ceuta, Tangier, Oran, Tunis and Tripoli, and a naval war broke out between the Ottoman empire, Spain, Portugal and other countries.
5. The expulsion of the Muslims led to the union of Spain and Portugal. It was also the beginning of the age of exploration, which is considered to have resulted in the modern colonization of Africa and Asia and the ‘discovery’ of the Americas and their colonization. In turn, this led to

125 Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, p. 556; Lane-Poole, *The Story of the Moors*, p. 280.

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the expansion of the slave trade and the transportation of millions of Africans to the Americas.

6. The flourishing Muslim trade between the Far East and the countries of the Middle East, which used to export goods on to Europe, came to an end. The changing of trade routes from the ancient world to the new world, and the diversion of old routes between the southern Sahara and the Maghrib to the Mediterranean, also resulted in a stagnation of trade in Muslim countries. This in turn led to a lack of financial resources, which had an effect on scientific and military programmes and various other activities. While there were great improvements in Europe's economic, scientific and industrial situation, the opposite is true for the Islamic world. The outcome was the modern colonization that was imposed on these weak countries from the beginning of the seventeenth century, the consequences of which are still felt in various fields up to the present time.

Chapter 3.4

ISLAM IN IRAN

Sadegh Aenehvand

Iran from the beginning to the Islamic conquest

The country known today as the Islamic Republic of Iran constitutes the greater part of the expanse of land known to geographers as the Iranian plateau in Asia. This elevated plain, some 2.6 million km² in area,¹ is bounded on the south by the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, and on the north by the Caspian Sea (Sea of Māzandarān or Khazar), the Kura river and the Khwārazm desert. On the west it is bounded by the western foothills of the Zagros mountains and the Arwand river basin. On the east it is bounded by the western Pamir mountains and the Āmū Daryā (Oxus) river basin.

This vast territory is surrounded on all sides by mountains. In the east rise parallel ranges known as the Sulaymān mountains, while in the north are the Alborz mountains, which run from east to west. These mountains are, in the west, separated from those of Armenia. They run southward from the Caspian Sea linking up, through the Kūh-i Bābā mountains, with the Hindu Kush, which in turn are connected to the Himalayas, the world's highest mountains. To the west of the plateau are the Zagros mountains of Kurdistan, which run from north to south and then turn from south to east, where they meet the Gulf of Oman.

The present-day Islamic Republic of Iran occupies some 63 per cent, or about two-thirds, of this vast area.² It forms a triangular plateau between two lowland areas, one by the Persian Gulf in the south and the other by the Caspian Sea in the north. It constitutes a bridge between Central and

1 Sayyid Husayn Naṣr, Aḥmad Mustawfī and ‘Abbās Zaryāb (eds), *Atlas-i Tārīkhī-yi Īrān*, Tehran, Tehran University, 1350/1931, p. 1.

2 Ḥasan Pīrniyā and ‘Abbās Iqbāl, *Tārīkh-i Īrān az āghāz tā inqirāz-i Qājāriyya*, Tehran, Kitāb-furūshī-yi Khayyām, n.d., p. 2.



3.18 Sassanid Palace, Īwān Madā'en, Iraq (© J.C. Chabrier)

western Asia, and forms a highland connecting the plains of inner Asia with the plateaux of Asia Minor and Europe.³

According to Greek, Roman, Aramaic and Armenian texts, rock inscriptions, indications in the Old Testament, and a number of antiquities discovered in Iran and neighbouring countries, Iranian history began with a group of Iranians from the south and west who had come down from the Caucasus mountains to the Iranian plateau, and then split up into distinct groups such as the Aryans (Āriya), the Medes (Māda) and the Persians (Pārsa). In 708 BC Median tribes established the first historical Iranian state in Media, in the city of Ecbatana (Hāgmatāna, now Hamadān). Deioces (Daya-ukku) was the founder of this nation. He was followed by Phraortes (Fravartish, Kshathrita), Cyaxares (Hovakh-shatra) and Astyages (Ishto-vigo). During the century and a half of their rule, they conquered the powerful Assyrian empire and built a vast nation stretching from the south of Iran to part of Asia Minor. Cyrus (Kūrush), the son of Cambyses (Kambūjiya), from the tribe of the Persians, conquered Ecbatana in 550 BC. He ruled the Median empire and founded the Achaemenid (Hakhāmanishiyā) empire that lasted 220 years from the middle of the sixth century until the fourth century BC. The kings of this dynasty were Cyrus, Cambyses, Darius (Dārayavahush > Dāryavaush > Dāryūsh) I, Xerxes (Khshayārshā), Ardashīr I, Xerxes II, Ardashīr III, Arsaces

3 Roman Ghirshman, *Īrān az āghāz tā islām*, trans. Muḥammad Mu'īn, Tehran, Bungāh-i tarjuma wa nashr-i kitāb, 1349/1930, p. 1.

(Arshak) and Darius III. In 330 BC Alexander the Great invaded Iran, seized Persepolis (Takht-i Jamshīd) and put an end to the Achaemenid dynasty. After him another dynasty, the Arsacids or the Parthians, came to rule Iran. In AD 224 Artabanus (Ardavān), the last of the Arsacid kings, was defeated by Ardashīr I, whose victory established the Sāsānid dynasty in the same year. Thirty-four kings reigned in succession in the Sāsānid dynasty and the line ended in 22/652 when the Muslims conquered Iran.⁴

Iran during the time of the Prophet

The regions under the control of the Sāsānids, as stated in the records of Shāpūr I written in three languages and preserved in the shrine of the Zoroastrians, included Fars, Khūzistān (Susiana), Mayshān, Asūristān (Assyria, Iraq), Hatra (northern Iraq), Arabistān (northern Iraq), Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Machelonia, Arrān, Balāshkān, Patīshkhvārgar (regions in the mountains of Māzandarān), Mād (the mountainous area), Hyrcania (Gurgān), Marw, Herāt, Abar-shahr, Khurāsān, Kirmān, Sijistān, Tūrān, Balūchistān, Mokrān, Paratān, India (the mouth of the Indus river), Kūshān-shahr as far as Pēshāwar and Tāshqand (Tashkent), Sughd as far as Kāshghar, and Mazun (a region of Oman).⁵

Sāsānid Iran and the Christian Byzantine empire were engaged in a constant struggle from the beginning. This struggle between East and West continued without reaching any decisive conclusion, however. Due to the fierce wars that Khusrau Parvīz embarked upon, which were aimed at rapidly achieving specific goals, he was forced to relinquish control over all his possessions in the Eastern Roman empire. He was driven back to the heart of the empire, Ctesiphon (al-Madā'in) on the banks of the Tigris, and was forced to accept a peace settlement that entailed the loss of his crown and authority and ultimately led to his death on 29 February 628.⁶ The wars of Khusrau Parvīz had lasted from 603 to 627.⁷ They were followed by continuous unrest and disputes within the Sāsānid state, with people vying to gain control of the government, a situation that led to a severe weakening of the Iranian state.

After the deposition and murder of Khusrau Parvīz, a period of instability and disorder began in Sāsānid Iran. The son of Khusrau Parvīz, Siroes (Shīrōē), known as Kavādh (Qobād) II, succeeded him on the throne.

4 Naşr, *Atlas*, pp. 1–2; Pīrniyā, *Tārīkh-i Īrān*, pp. 12–179.

5 Naşr, *Atlas*, map no. 8.

6 Bertold Spuler, *Tārīkh-i Īrān dar qurūn-i nukhustīn-i islāmī*, trans. Jawād Falāṭūrī, Tehran, Bungāh-i tarjuma wa nashr-i kitāb, 1349/1930, pp. 5–6.

7 Pīrniyā, *Tārīkh-i Īrān*, p. 222.

Because of the lack of trust within the Sāsānid government, he had all his brothers killed. But he himself died of the plague after ruling only a little over two years. Following his death his son, Ardashīr III, who was 7 years old at the time, was placed on the throne. However, Shahr-Barāz, having raised the banner of revolt against the government, seized the throne. After only two months, with the appearance of Khusrau ibn Kavādh, he lost both the throne and his life. Asia Minor, Egypt and Syria passed out of the hands of the Sāsānids and came under the control of the Byzantines. Similarly, in 629, the Khazars wrested Armenia from Sāsānid control and took possession of it.


After Shahr-Barāz, Khusrau III, the grandson of Hurmuz IV, ascended the throne. He was succeeded by Javānshīr, the son of Khusrau Parvīz. Before long, Pūrāndukht, the daughter of Khusrau Parvīz, seized power, but she lost the throne after only seventeen months owing to internal disturbances and repeated defeats. She was succeeded by Jushtāsp, the *mamlūk* (slave) of the brother of Khusrau III. After him Āzarmīdukht, the second daughter of Khusrau Parvīz, ascended the throne. However, Rustam Farrukh Hurmuz, the governor of Khurāsān, soon toppled her from power.

The next four years saw a succession of twelve kings, each of whom was either deposed or assassinated by his successor. Among these were Hurmuz V (d. 631), Khusrau IV (d. 631), Fīrūz II (d. 631), Khusrau V (d. 631) and Yazdgird III (d. 632), all of whom, except the last, rose to power and fell within a single year. The accession of Yazdgird III to the throne coincided with the Muslim conquest of Iran at the time of ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, the second caliph. With the battle in 21/642 of the ‘Victory of Victories’ at Nihāwand (see below), Iran came under the banner of Islam.

Sāsānid rule and the weakness of its rulers

In the Sāsānid period the people were divided into four large groups: religious leaders (*āsrōvān*), warriors (*artēshtārān*), civil servants, and farmers and craftsmen (*vāstaryōshān* and *hutukhshān*). They were further divided into subclasses, each with its own leader. The Sāsānid administrative order was such that it was not possible to rise from one class to another within the hierarchy of authority.

Despite its apparent order, Sāsānid society was beset by internal disturbances and aimlessness. The period was characterized by social divisions which, over time, gave rise to groups of disgruntled individuals within each class. The society was thus tending towards fragmentation and dissolution as a result of growing weakness, oppression and corruption. There were great differences between the ruling class, or the nobility, and



3.19 Vakil Mosque, Shiraz (© G. Degeorge)

the masses. As stated by the author of the *Letter of Tansar*, the higher classes distinguished themselves from the masses by their clothing, vehicles, houses, gardens, wives and servants. Blood, race and wealth were the most important factors in class distinction.⁸ Thus, Iranian society of the period was characterized by the following features: sectarian unrest and religious differences; political instability, the overwhelming influence of the nobility and religious leaders, and the lack of an experienced and strong-willed ruler who could seize the reins of power and undertake reforms; the collapse of military capability after the unprofitable wars of Khusrau Parvīz; the poverty and indigence of the people, whom Khusrau Parvīz forced to pay heavy taxes and provide troops for the cavalry and infantry; increasing oppression and injustice; and the collapse of agriculture, trade and manufacturing.⁹

8 'Abd-al-Ḥusayn Zarrīn Kūb, *Tārīkh-i Īrān ba'd az islām*, Tehran, Mu'assasat-i intishārāt-i Amīr Kabīr, 1353/1934, pp. 161–2.

9 Pīrniyā, *Tārīkh-i Īrān*, p. 230.



3.20 Siyehpol Bridge, Isfahan (© G. Degeorge)

The Islamic conquest of Iran

Before examining in detail the wars that led to the conquest of Iran, let us briefly consider the factors that contributed to the Muslim victory. We shall endeavour to steer clear of the emotions, impassioned explanations and interpretations with which Arab and Iranian historians of the past have dealt with these events, and avoid adding to or detracting from historical facts. We shall seek to restrict ourselves to what has been conveyed by trustworthy historians of the past and the present, whether Arab or non-Arab Muslims, or non-Muslim orientalists.

While the swift victory of the Muslim Arabs over such a vast empire as that of the Sāsānids is considered by historians as something of a miracle, it is nevertheless possible to confirm and substantiate it in a scholarly fashion by means of sound historical documents, without detracting from its miraculous nature.

We see in the texts of some Arab and Iranian historians, both early and modern, passages which ascribe this great religious event to national and racial characteristics. However, we shall leave aside such interpretations and rely solely on established facts upon which historians agree. In the following we will highlight the factors that led to the victory of Islam in that day and age, and which brought Sāsānid Iran into the Islamic fold. Indeed, there is little doubt that it was the collective feeling that Islam provided of

mass involvement in the dissemination of a universal message that led to the Muslims' success in these great historical events.

Concerning the role of Islam, a contemporary Muslim historian writes:

The Islamic faith may well have been unique in pursuing the popular dimension in the Middle Ages in order to ensure cohesion with the ruling 'establishment', giving precedence to the public interest over the interests of individuals, particularly in that brilliant, early period. Muslim fighters were so oblivious of self that it was as if they melted into the 'group'. They were politicized, committed combatants, so to speak, and that was the secret of their success and victory. Nothing made them feel that they were being forced to participate in a battle whose causes were unknown to them, as had often been the case in the past. Rather, they had a mature awareness of events and were thus actively involved in both their causes and their effects.¹⁰

The message carried by the Arab Muslims was that all humanity would win and prosper in the world, and they believed in that message. It was this firm belief which prompted them to relinquish all material interests and to confront the difficulties and hardships hampering the delivery and dissemination of the message.

Shukrī Fayṣal remarks:

As for the faith of Islam, its brilliance illuminated all aspects of the spirit, and its vivacity penetrated all corners of the soul. These somnolent Arabs were as if collectively galvanized by this earthquake which struck a chord with them that was at once sentimental, rational and passionate. While thanks to the new revelation of Islam they had entered a state of vigilant alertness, they did not view Islam with narrow introspection, nor did they receive it from the Prophet or his messengers as though it were something to be merely kept in their houses or tents. Even less did they regard it as a creed which was meant for boastful display, as had been the case with earlier creeds adopted by some of the tribes. No tribe or group felt that this religion belonged to them alone. Quite the contrary; there was among the Arabs a kind of long-term participation in the new faith. And there was a consensus on the need to respond to it and join it. There was a burnishing of all the gifts and powers of the soul. This was underlaid by a burgeoning awareness which meant that people were not content to withdraw into the new creed, but rather sought to take it beyond its initial narrow confines to other Arab regions to the east and west.¹¹

10 Ibrāhīm Bayḍūn, *Takawwun al-ittijāhāt as-siyāsiyya fi-l-islām al-awwal min dawlat 'Umar ilā dawlat 'Abd-al-Malik*, Beirut, Dār iqra', 1405/1984, p. 40.

11 See Shukrī Fayṣal, *Ḥarakat al-fath al-islāmī fi-l-qarn al-awwal*, Dār al-'ilm li-l-malāyīn, 1952, pp. 13–14.

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In support of this claim, we quote here a discussion between a representative of the Muslim army in Iraq and the leader of the Sāsānid forces, Rustam Farrukh-zād:

Rabī' ibn 'Āmir went out to attack Rustam. When he approached, Rustam said: 'What has brought you here?' Rabī' replied: 'God has sent us. God has brought us here to turn those who so wish away from the worship of other men and towards the worship of God, from the confines of the world to the expanse of the world, and from the iniquity of religions to the justice of Islam. He has sent us with His religion to His people so that we may call them to Him. Whoever accepts this from us we accept it from him, and we return. And we leave him to oversee his own land without us. We always fight whoever refuses, so that we may attain God's promise.' Rustam said: 'What is God's promise?' Rabī' replied: 'Heavenly paradise is destined for whoever dies in the course of fighting those who refuse, and victory for whoever survives.'¹²

FACTORS BEHIND THE CONQUEST


Whoever examines carefully a nation that yesterday was composed of disparate, quarrelling people is surprised to find that in a short period it became a vigorous nation which vanquished the Eastern Roman Byzantine empire and the Sāsānid Persian empire. Naturally, there were specific factors in this conquest that emboldened the Arab Muslims and helped them to sweep away the power of the two empires.

Three main factors led to the victory of the Muslim Arabs in their conquests: moral factors, skills and expertise, and historical factors. The moral factors are rooted in the blessings arising from their having accepted Islam. The factors relating to skills and expertise concern the ability of the Arabs to endure difficulties and the hardships of the desert and to acquire martial skills, and their courage in battle. The historical factors were numerous, given the weakness of the Byzantines and the Iranians, the disputes among them and the grievances voiced by the people of these two nations.

Moral factors

The Arab Muslims were encouraged by their belief in the truth of the call to which they had responded, by their belief that they were conquering the world for the sake of the religion, that God was calling upon them to spread

12 Abū Ja'far Muḥammad ibn Jarīr aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh ar-rusul wa-l-mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad Abū-l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Cairo, Dār al-ma'ārif, 1969, III, p. 520.



3.21 Shaykh Lotfollāh Mosque's dome, Isfahan
(© G. Degeorge)

the faith of Islam throughout the world, and that any of them who died would be martyrs destined to enjoy endless rewards in heaven. They were also emboldened by the teachings of Islam that counselled brotherhood, mutual support, unanimity and the abandonment of tribal dissension.

They were also assisted by their belief in fate and predestination, that human beings only died when their time came, when death would not be halted even if they were lying in their own bed. If, on the other hand, their time was yet to come, no evil would be able to touch them even if they were at the point of the sharpest sword. This belief was firmly established among the Muslims and was the cause of most of their apparent valour in their famous battles. They were also aided by the foremost men of early Islam with regard to war, administration, resourcefulness, wisdom and government, and by piety and purity of intention. Success was also facilitated by the justness, gentleness, abstemiousness and even-handedness of the Muslims.

The Arab Muslims were further aided by the fact that they allowed people to remain as they were. Whenever they conquered a land, they would ensure that the social order was preserved. They would not interfere in the inhabitants' religious life, social life, their civil or judicial precepts or

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in the management of their affairs. Being conquered by Muslims was not a burden upon the conquered.

Skills and expertise

What helped the Arab Muslims to follow this difficult path was their bedouin background, which had accustomed them to a hard life, to thirst and to hunger. Similarly, they were aided by their expertise in horsemanship and archery, in which they were more skilful than the Byzantines and the Persians.

The Arab Muslims were also assisted by the fact that the basis of warfare among the Arabs was the preservation of a line of retreat. They would only engage the Persians or the Byzantines with great circumspection. For the Arabs, maintaining the line of retreat was easy: as they advanced they would always keep the desert to their rear as a sanctuary. If they were defeated, the Byzantines or the Persians were not able to pursue them there.

Historical factors

The Arab Muslims were encouraged by the weakness of the Byzantines and the Persians after the wars they had fought among themselves just before the advent of Islam. This was followed by the oppression and exploitation of the citizenry, by anarchy and divergences of beliefs and opinions that led to regression and dissolution.

Religious differences, self-enamoured kings and the imposition of heavy taxes all led to the collapse from within of the Sāsānid empire. As stated above, there was a wide gap between the people and the government, and this gap made it difficult for the empire to defend itself against an external enemy. Moreover, the government was exhausted by the successive wars with its neighbours, especially the Byzantine empire to the west and the Turkish tribes to the east. These wars made it necessary to levy heavy taxes which oppressed the people. The people were not able to express their discontent in a climate of absolute power, for hereditary rule is based on the principle that kings rule by divine mandate, and thus the kings were completely isolated, or very nearly so, from the citizens.¹³

The subject populations' desire for revenge against their rulers was another factor working to the Muslims' advantage. Seeking to flee from evil and oppression, many of them yearned to see the authority of Byzantium

13 Aḥmad Muḥammad al-Ḥūfī, *Tayyārāt thaqāfiyya bayn al-'arab wa-l-furs*, Cairo, Dār naḥḍat Miṣr li-ṭ-ṭibā'a wa-n-nashr, 1398/1977, p. 86.

or Persia replaced by the authority of Islam.¹⁴ Similarly, the Muslims were supported by allies of the Arabs, such as the Ghassānids in Syria and the Lakhmids (Mundhirids) in Iraq, neither of whom was well-disposed towards the Byzantines or the Persians as they were both under their domination.

The course of the Islamic conquest

At the beginning of 12/633, under the leadership of al-Muthannā ibn Ḥāritha ash-Shaybānī, the Muslims entered Sāsānid Iraq. In the same year they captured al-Ḥīra, the capital of the Lakhmids.¹⁵ With the fall of al-Ḥīra, the key to Iraq fell into their hands and they were able to advance in military formations towards the Tigris and to seize numerous fortresses, large and small, along the way.¹⁶

Moreover, with the fall of al-Ḥīra, the way lay open for the Muslim army to enter the south of Iraq and the plateau of Khūzistān. Khālid commanded al-Muthannā to conquer Shūshtar and sent another Arab commander to conquer al-Uballa. He himself set out to capture cities alongside the Euphrates, including the city of Anbār which functioned as a depot for provisions for the Iranian army.¹⁷ In Rabī' I 13/May 634, on the orders of the caliph, Khālid moved in the direction of Syria. Some historians have said that this was in the beginning of the month of Ṣafar of the same year, but it appears that the first date is correct.

When 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb became caliph, he appointed Abū 'Ubayd ath-Thaqafī as commander of the Iraqi front, and ordered al-Muthannā to serve under his command. However, al-Muthannā, Khālid's second-in-command, was one of the leaders of the tribe of Bakr ibn Wā'il and more knowledgeable about the situation in Iraq. Therefore, when Abū 'Ubayd appeared, there was agitation on the Iranian front.

After Yazdgird III came to the throne, Rustam Farrukh-zād, the leader of the Sāsānid forces, undertook a number of unsuccessful missions, though he was able to thwart the Muslim advance to some extent.


A battle occurred between the Iranians and the Muslims at Qussu-n-Nāṭif in which the Muslims were routed and Abū 'Ubayd was killed. The battle of the Bridge, as it is known, took place in Ramaḍān 13/November 634.

14 'Umar Riḍā Kaḥḥāla, *al-'Ālam al-islāmī*, Damascus, al-Maktaba al-hāshimiyya, 1377/1957, I, pp. 18–21.

15 Ilya Pavlovich Petrushevsky, *Islām dar Īrān*, trans. Karīm Kashāvarz, Tehran, Intishārāt-i Payām, 1363/1943, p. 40.

16 Spuler, *Tārīkh-i Īrān*, p. 9.

17 Pīrniyā, *Tārīkh-i Īrān*, p. 48.



3.22 Single-volume Qur'ān, probably from Isfahan, AD 1689-1690
(© Khalili Family Trust/Nour Foundation)

The caliph sent Jarīr ibn 'Abdallāh al-Bajalī to the Iraqī front, to which reinforcements were being sent from Medina. In 14/635 Yazdgird III sent Mihrān ibn Mihr Bandād al-Hamadānī at the head of a group of twelve commanders to face Jarīr. In the ensuing battle at an-Nukhayla, the Persians were routed and Mihrān was killed. Historians have named this the battle of an-Nukhayla, or the Day of Mihrān. The Muslims then conquered the left bank of the Euphrates as far as the borders of Ctesiphon (al-Madā'in), the Sāsānid capital. Eighteen months after the battle of an-Nukhayla, the Muslims made ready to attack Ctesiphon on the left bank of the Euphrates.

The caliph appointed Sa'd ibn Abī Waqqāṣ az-Zuhrī as commander-in-chief of the army in Iraq. When Sa'd arrived there, al-Muthannā died from his wounds. Sa'd encamped at al-Qādisiyya, some 30 km south-west of Kufa. Yazdgird hastened to reorganize his scattered forces. He entrusted the command to Rustam Farrukh-zād, the governor of Khurāsān, and sent Fīrūzān and Bahman Dhu-l-Ḥijāb as reinforcements. Rustam was apprehensive

regarding the outcome of the battle and so attempted to resolve the matter by negotiation. Although at Rustam's suggestion Sa'd sent messengers calling upon the Sāsānid king to negotiate, Yazdgird's indifference to them and his refusal to accept Islam only served to aggravate matters.

The battle of al-Qādisiyya took place at the end of 14/635 and ended with a Muslim victory. Rustam was killed and the Sāsānid army was scattered and fell back to Ctesiphon. Moreover, the Iranian national flag, the *darafsh-i kāwiyān*, fell into the hands of the army of Islam. The Arab Muslims were able to push back the remnants of the Iranian army, who had gathered near Babylon and were compelled to take refuge in the mountains to the east. Hurmuzān, the commanding general, made his base at Ahwāz. As for the Muslim armies, after crossing the Euphrates by way of Kūthī, they headed towards Ctesiphon.

When Yazdgird realized that he was incapable of defending his ancestors' capital, together with his senior officers, women, and what valuable possessions from the treasuries they were able to carry, he made for the western mountains of the Iranian plateau where they established themselves at Ḥulwān. At this time, plague and drought spread among the Iranians with devastating effect. Finally, in Ṣafar 16/March 637 Ctesiphon fell to the Muslims. Even in the mountains of Kirmānshāh (Qarmīsīn), Yazdgird was powerless to defend himself and after sustaining two attacks on Jalūlā and Ḥulwān by Jarīr ibn 'Abdallāh al-Bajalī, he fled to Isfahan. Thus, the Muslims came to control the Iraqī lowlands and the alluvial plains of the Tigris (the Sawād). From these points they invaded the strongholds of the Iranian interior, seizing Mosul and Tikrīt in one direction and Kirmānshāh in the other.¹⁸

After the battle of Jalūlā, the Muslim armies advanced with determination and greater caution. The first penetration and conquest of actual Iranian territory occurred in 19/640 at the hands of 'Alā' al-Ḥaḍramī, who attacked the islands of Abarkāwān and the shores of Fars from the sea. He advanced as far as Iṣṭakhr near Persepolis (Takht-i Jamshīd).

'Utba ibn Ghazwān set out from Basra to deliver provisions by sea to the Muslims in Fars. As he proceeded along the Kārūn river he captured Ahwāz, upon which Hurmuzān fled from the city to Rām-Hurmuz. Following the fall of Ahwāz, Aydha also fell to the Muslims. The battle between the Muslims and the Sāsānids took place near the city of Shūshtar at the head of the Kārūn river. After the fall of Shūshtar, Hurmuzān was captured and taken to Medina.

Part of the Muslim army advanced to Jundīshāpūr, and another part to Shūsh. Jundīshāpūr was captured peaceably through negotiations, but

18 Pīrniyā, *Tārīkh-i Īrān*, pp. 47–53; Spuler, *Tārīkh-i Īrān*, pp. 9–13.



3.23 Safavid gold ashrafi with Shī'i Kalima, AH 918
(© Khalili Family Trust/Nour Foundation)

Shūsh was seized through military action. In that country nobles and *mawālī* (non-Arab 'clients' of Islam) came to the fore who embraced Islam. As Paul Horn states: 'From the point of view of religion the Iranians did not feel an aversion towards the Arabs; rather they entered Islam in droves.'¹⁹ The capture of Khūzistān opened the gates to the conquest of Iran, beginning with Fars, one of the country's central provinces.

The 'Victory of Victories', or the battle of Nihāwand

Yazdgird III gathered his army from Qūmis (today's Dāmghān, Simnān and Bisṭām), Hamadān and other regions. He entrusted the command of this army, which had assembled on the outskirts of Nihāwand, to Fīrūzān. On the Muslim side, 'Umar an-Nu'mān ibn al-Muqarrin was appointed commander for the battle, together with Jarīr ibn 'Abdallāh al-Bajalī, Ḥudhayfa ibn al-Yamān and al-Mughīra ibn Shu'ba. After a fierce confrontation on the outskirts of Nihāwand, and despite the fact that 'Umar an-Nu'mān was killed, the Sāsānid forces fled after suffering great losses and Fīrūzān was killed.

The battle of Nihāwand lasted for three days. The Sāsānid soldiers had come from all regions, even from as far as the borders of India. When their leaders feared that they might flee, they chained the soldiers to each other to prevent them from doing so. This victory, which took place in 21/642, was achieved only by dint of the Muslims giving their utmost and sacrificing themselves in great numbers. There is no doubt that this triumph, which the Muslims called the 'Victory of Victories', prompted them to take the firm decision to conquer the entire Iranian plateau.

In the year of the victory at Nihāwand the Muslim army, under the command of Abū Mūsā al-Ash'arī, captured the rest of western Iran, including Sīrwān, Dīnawar and Ṣaymara. A group of Muslim army commanders in the camp of Abū Mūsā were ordered to march on Qum, Kāshān and Isfahan.

19 Paul Horn, *Tārīkh-i mukhtaṣar-i Īrān az awwal-i islām tā inqirāz-i Zaydiyān*, trans. Ṣādiq Riḍā Zādeshaḥīq, Tehran, Maṭba'at-i majlis, 1314/1896, pp. 9–10.

They captured these cities in the years 22–24/642–44. In the same period the Muslims also captured Rayy, Qūmis, Zanjān and Azerbaijan, while in the south, the region of Jīruft and the island of Hurmuz fell in the years 29–30/650–51.

Under the leadership of Rabīʿ ibn Ziyād al-Ḥārithī, the Muslim army continued its advance from Sīrjān in the region of Kirmān towards the north-east across the Salt Desert (Dasht-i Lūt) to Zarang, where it gained control as far as the environs of Qandahār and the district of Rukhkhaj. In this way, Islam entered the regions of Bust, Zābul and Kabul. The Muslims' conquest of south-east Iran enabled them to approach the north-east, which was the second most important region in the country.



3.24 Amir-Chakhmāgh Mosque and Bāzār, Yazd (© G. Degeorge)

Al-Aḥnaf ibn Qays attacked from the region of Ṭabas, then he turned north towards Marw Shāhjān, the location of Yazdgird's headquarters. Other leaders of the Muslim army attacked Nīshāpūr, Bayhaq and Nasā in the north-west. They then headed towards Sarakhs in the north. Yazdgird III fled by way of Marw-rūd, requesting assistance from the *khāqān* (ruler) of Turkistān, the governor of Sughd and the emperor of China in order to recover the territory of Iran. Although the rulers of Central Asia bore no love towards Iran, their fear of the Muslims prompted them to send forces to support it. However, they were too weak to be effective against the Muslims.

Yazdgird was defeated at the battle of Balkh. Following a dispute between him and his generals over whether to seek an accord with the Muslims or with China, the generals plundered his treasuries and seized his money, whereupon he took refuge with the *khāqān* of Turkistān. Finally, in 31/651 Yazdgird was killed near Murgh-āb – by a miller, according to the most reliable reports.

UNIVERSAL DIMENSIONS OF THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

The conquest of Iran by the Muslim Arabs, and Iran's submission to the rule of the Muslim caliph, had a number of consequences. Among these was the fact that several Muslim Arab tribes, both nomadic and sedentary, moved to Iran *en masse*.²⁰ Similarly, with the arrival of Muslim Arabs in Iran, which became stable once again under the administration of the Islamic caliphate, the need for a common means of communication encouraged people rapidly to learn Arabic, the language of Islam. Arabic thus replaced Pahlavī (Middle Persian) as the official language of religion and government.

According to Ṣāliḥ Aḥmad al-'Alī:

One of the most important results of the battle of Nihāwand and the collapse of the Sāsānid resistance was that the Arabs fanned out on the Iranian plateau and completed their conquest of the Iranian regions and cities with ease. There was thus a need to reorganize their forces in order to ensure peace and security on the Iranian plateau, and to defend its far-flung borders.²¹

Once they had completed their conquests and ensured stability, the Arabs adopted Iran as a homeland. In his *Futūḥ al-buldān*, al-Balādhurī states:

As for Azerbaijan, al-Walīd ibn 'Uqba settled Arabs from the 'Aṭā' and the Dīwān tribes there ...²² When Imam 'Alī became caliph, he appointed al-Ash'ath ibn Qays to be governor of Azerbaijan ... and a group of Arabs from the 'Aṭā' and Dīwān tribes entered Ardabīl and settled there ...²³ The Muslims, under the leadership of al-Barā' ibn 'Āzib, had invaded Qazwīn during the caliphate of 'Umar. Al-Barā' took 500 Muslim soldiers, including Ṭulayḥa ibn Khuwaylid al-Asadī. Imam 'Alī sent to Daylam between 4,000 and 5,000 men, most of whom were companions of ar-Rabī' ibn Khuthaym.²⁴

The Arab immigrants settled in the region of Jibāl, including Qum, Karaj, Abū Dulaf, Sāwa, Kāshān and Āba.

Al-Balādhurī also reports:

Ziyād ibn Abī Sufyān became governor of Basra in the year 45/665, and appointed *Amīr* ibn Aḥmar as governor of Marw; *Amīr* was the first

20 Petrushevsky, *Islām dar Īrān*, p. 43.

21 Ṣāliḥ Aḥmad al-'Alī, *Imtidād al-'arab fī ṣadr al-islām*, Beirut, Mu'assasat ar-risāla, 1403/1982, pp. 32–3.

22 Ibid., p. 33, quoting from al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*.

23 Ibid.

24 Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā ibn Jābir al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, ed. 'Abdallāh Anīs aṭ-Ṭabbā' and 'Umar Anīs aṭ-Ṭabbā', Beirut, Manshūrāt mu'assasat al-ma'ārif, 1407/1986, p. 451.

to settle Arabs in Marw ...²⁵ In 51/671 Ziyād appointed Rabī' ibn Ziyād al-Ḥārithī as governor of Khurāsān. He gathered around himself about 50,000 men from the two garrison towns of Kufa and Basra, and settled them this side of the river [the Āmū Daryā, or Oxus].²⁶

Iranian governments and dynasties after the Muslim conquest

In view of the fragile military situation and the lack of stability and calm in Khurāsān, in 205/820 the 'Abbāsīd caliph al-Ma'mūn sent the famous general Ṭāhir ibn al-Ḥusayn, an Iranian of Arab origin, to be governor of the region. In his first sermon at Friday prayers after his arrival in Nīshāpūr, Ṭāhir omitted to mention the name of the caliph, thereby declaring his independence. Despite the fact that he died soon after his declaration, Ṭāhir must be considered the first founder of an independent Islamic dynasty in Iran.

After Ṭāhir, al-Ma'mūn appointed Ṭāhir's son Ṭalḥa to occupy his father's position. The Ṭāhirīds thus became the first dynasty, and were self-governing with regard to the management of their internal affairs while at the same time being subordinate to the 'Abbāsīd caliphate.

Science and civilization in Islamic Iran

If we compare Iran during the Islamic period and during the Sāsānīd period, we find a great difference between the two. The level of progress during the Islamic period can only be attributed to the Islamic faith, and the fact that Islam respected science and scientists, and provided ample opportunities for scientific research to all sections of Muslim society.

In our remarks on the science and civilization of Islamic Iran, it is not our intention to separate that country from the rest of the Islamic world, or to attribute to the Iranians qualities making them superior to other Muslim populations. Rather, the aim is to show the extent of the Iranians' love for and devotion to Islam and their participation in the great Islamic civilization. Once they embraced the true religion of Islam, the Iranians considered themselves part of the wider Islamic nation and they supported Islamic rule in various fields. For example,

25 Al-'Alī, *Imtidād al-'arab*, p. 50.

26 Ibid.

in the case of the apostasy that occurred in Yemen, the Iranians sided with the Muslims. They offered their expertise in administration and social organization to the Islamic caliphate, in particular with regard to organizing the payment of the troops' wages and running the *dīwān* (government department) responsible for their welfare. Furthermore, they translated those parts of old Iranian laws that were not contrary to Islamic precepts but were of benefit to Muslims. Nor must we overlook the contribution of Iranian Muslims to the building of the grand edifice of Islamic civilization with regard to architecture, ornamentation, music, and the compilation of calendars and astronomical tables.

Clearly, what paved the way for the Iranians' participation in Islamic civilization was Islam alone. While a few remnants from the Sāsānids, or groups who still believed in the old Iranian laws in some parts of the country, engaged in movements against the Islamic government and Islam, such individuals or groups should not be held against the Iranian people. Similarly, some instances of partiality and favouritism, especially in the Umayyad era, resulted in low-level rearguard actions by adherents of the previous creed in Iran, but this was unrelated to Islam in Iran, and was in any case merely concerned with specific issues for a short period of time.

The following gives some examples of prominent individuals who arose among the Iranians after the advent of Islam and who made significant contributions to the great Islamic civilization.

During the period of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (*al-Khulafā' ar-Rāshidūn*) and the Umayyads, there were a number of prominent Iranian Muslims among whom were Salmān al-Fārisī, an honoured Companion of the Prophet Muḥammad whose fame needs no elaboration, Nāfi' ad-Daylamī (d. 117/735), Ibn Kathīr (d. 120/737), Wahb ibn Munabbih (d. 110/728) and Ṭā'ūs ibn Kaysān (d. 104/722 or 106/724).

Khurāsān was one of the most important centres of scientific learning in Iran at the end of the Umayyad and beginning of the 'Abbāsīd periods. It was colonized by 50,000 Arabs and their families, who settled in a number of its cities and towns. Among them were a number of Companions of the Prophet, including Burayda ibn al-Ḥuṣayb, Abū Barza, 'Abdallāh ibn Khāzim (all of whom were converts to Islam), al-Ḥakam ibn 'Amr al-Ghifārī and Qutham ibn al-'Abbās. There was also Muqātil ibn Sulaymān al-Balkhī (d. 150/767), who is among the earliest writers of Qur'ānic commentaries. Other prominent scholars of Khurāsān include 'Abdallāh ibn al-Mubārak (d. 181/797), the first Islamic author in Marw and Khurāsān. An-Naḍr ibn Shamīl (d. 203/818) was the first to expound the *sunna* (customary practice of the Prophet) in Marw and Khurāsān and he wrote books of unprecedented scholarship.



3.25 Page from the Shāh Tahmāsbī edition of *Shāhnāmeh*, epic Persian poems by Ferdowsi, seventeenth century (© Tehran Museum of Contemporary Arts)

Most of the writers of the six ‘sound’ (*ṣaḥīḥ*) collections of *Ḥadīth* (sayings of the Prophet) were either from Khurāsān or from Transoxiana, or *Mā warā’ an-nahr* (‘What is beyond the river [Oxus]’). Nīshāpūr was one of the foremost centres for the study of *Ḥadīth* until the fourth/tenth century.²⁷

The scientific movement in Islamic Iran reached its peak at the same time as the great Islamic civilization reached its own peak in the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say that these centuries in Iran were the most brilliant of that age in view of Iran’s scientific renaissance. This may have been due to the competition that arose among the rulers of the principalities at that time, each of whom went to great lengths to gather around himself the most celebrated scholars of the day to adorn his court and inspire young people to outdo the achievements of the scholars of old.²⁸ For example, ‘Aḍud-ad-Dawla ad-Daylamī (d. 373/983) gathered at his court theologians, linguists, physicians and mathematicians. Thus, from the beginning of the fourth/tenth century and later, we find the names of a great number of scholars of religion and *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), scholars such as Abu-r-Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī (362–440/972–1048) of Khwārazm, and Abī ‘Alī ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, 370–428/980–1036) of Balkh. In every locality, especially in Bukhārā and Nīshāpūr, major libraries were at the disposal of scholars. For example, in 447/1055 the *wazīr* of the last Būyid ruler in Fars established a great library in Fīrūzabād.

The Sāmānids and Būyids paid particular attention to scholarship and treated scholars with great generosity, granting them opportunities and meeting their material needs. Under the Sāmānids, it was even said that Khurāsān was a paradise for scholars and that its main city, Nīshāpūr, was the greatest centre of science in Iran during that age.

Similarly, the Ziyārīds cultivated the sciences and scientists in Ṭabaristān. No less devoted to science was the principality of Khwārazm, with its three princes in Khīwa. Under the patronage of the third prince, who was toppled from power by Maḥmūd of Ghazna in 408/1017, was a select group of philosophers and scientists. Foremost among them were al-Bīrūnī, Ibn Sīnā, Abū Sahl al-Masīḥī, the physician Ibn al-Khammār and the mathematician Abū Naṣr ibn

27 Ṣāliḥ Aḥmad al-‘Alī, *Dirāsāt fī taṭawwur al-ḥaraka al-fikriyya fī ṣadr al-islām*, Beirut, Mu’assasat ar-risāla, 1403/1983, p. 154.

28 Shawqī Ḍayf, *Tārīkh al-adab al-‘arabī: ‘aṣr ad-duwal wa-l-imārāt*, Cairo, Dār al-ma‘ārif, 1983, V, p. 521.

‘Irāq. Maḥmūd of Ghazna subsequently acquired these scholars from Ma’mūn Khwārazm.²⁹

What gave rise to this flourishing scientific movement was the establishment of schools and scientific centres in a number of cities. Nīshāpūr was the first and foremost of these cities, inasmuch as during the middle of the fourth/tenth century the school of Abū Ḥafṣ al-Faqīh was founded there. One of its teachers was Ibn Shāh-Wayh (d. 361/974). At the end of the century another school was built there for the great *Ḥadīth* scholar Ibn Fūrak (d. 406/1015). A further school was called the *Dār as-Sunna* (House of the *Sunna*). Numerous other schools were built in the first half of the fifth/eleventh century, including one for Abū ‘Uthmān aṣ-Ṣābūnī Shaykh al-Islām (d. 449/1058). In addition, there were four other schools: the Bayhaqiyya *Madrassa*; the *Madrassa* of Astarabādī (d. 440/1048), built for the followers of the Shāfi‘ī school; the Sa‘diyya *Madrassa*, built by Prince Naṣr ibn Sebük-Tegin; and a school built for Abū Ishāq al-Asfarāyīnī.³⁰

After the founding of the Seljūq dynasty, in the days of Alp-Arslan and the government of Nizām-ul-Mulk aṭ-Ṭūsī, special scientific centres were founded in Iran with a new form of administration called the Nizāmiyya. Following their advanced studies, students entered one of the Nizāmiyya schools, where most students also boarded, taking advantage of funds from various religious foundations (*waqfs*). They studied the most advanced sciences and arts of the day, and received the highest scientific degrees from senior professors. Each school had a library called the *khizānat al-kutub* (book-treasury) whose supervisor, called the *khāzin* (treasurer), was chosen from among the senior scholars and men of letters. The highest rank in the school was that of *mudarris* (teacher), who was chosen by the Seljūq sultan himself. Each teacher had one or more assistants called *mu‘īd* (tutor) or *wā‘iz* (preacher).

Among the Nizāmiyya schools, mention must be made of that of Isfahan which belonged to the Khujand family. Also noteworthy was the Nizāmiyya school of Nīshāpūr, which was entrusted to the imam of the two Holy Places (Mecca and Medina), Abu-l-Ma‘ālī al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), the teacher of Iranian al-Ghazālī. The Nizāmiyya schools of Balkh and Herāt were also founded in the Seljūq era. In addition to the famous Nizāmiyya schools in Nīshāpūr, Isfahan, Balkh and Herāt, mention also should be made of others in Āmul, Ṭabaristān, Khwāf and Marw.³¹ It is of some interest to note that Western universities are

29 Ibid., p. 522.

30 Ibid., pp. 522–3.

31 Nūrullāh Kasā‘ī, *Madāris-i nizāmiyya wa ta’sīrāt-i ‘ilmī wa ijtimā‘ī-ye ān*, Tehran, Mu’assasat-i intishārāt-i Amīr-i Kabīr, 1363/1943, pp. 229–44.

modelled on the Islamic Nizāmiyya schools and on al-Azhar University in Cairo.³²

In summary, the zeal and dedication of Iranians to Islam and the Islamic sciences throughout the fourteen centuries of Islamic history are unparalleled both in Islam and among the Persians. Islam helped to reveal the abilities and talents of such individuals as Ibn Sīnā, Fārābī, the mathematicians Khayyām, Khwāja Naṣīr-ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī, al-Ghazālī, Ṣadr-ul-Muta'allihīn, and hundreds of scholars of the natural sciences, mathematics, geography, medicine, literature, philosophy and gnosis.³³

32 Jalāl-ad-Dīn Humā'ī, *al-Ghazālī-nāma*, Tehran, Kitāb-furūshī-yi Furūghī, 1363/1943, pp. 131–40.

33 Murtaḍā Muṭahharī, *Khidamāt-i mutaḳābil-i islām wa Īrān*, Tehran, Intishārāt-i Ṣadrā, 1418/1997, pp. 104, 317.

APPENDIX I. SCHOLARS IN IRAN

Since the aim of this chapter is to present a concise overview of Islam in Iran, it is not practical to refer to all the Iranian Muslim scholars who played a role in the building of Islamic civilization. Nonetheless, mention might be made of the following scholars.

THE FOURTH AND FIFTH/TENTH AND ELEVENTH CENTURIES

IN *TAFSĪR* (QUR'ĀNIC EXEGESIS): among the most prominent scholars of *tafsīr* were Muḥammad ibn Jarīr aṭ-Ṭabarī (d. 310/922), who wrote the well-known book of *tafsīr*; Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī (d. 303/915); 'Abdallāh as-Salām al-Qazwīnī; and Abū Zayd al-Balkhī (d. 322/933).

IN THE STUDY OF *HADĪTH*: Abū 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān an-Nasā'ī (d. beginning of the fourth/tenth century); Abū Ḥātim Muḥammad ibn Ḥabbān as-Samarkandī (d. 354/965); Abū Ya'qūb al-Qarrāb as-Sarakhsī (d. 429/1037); Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Mundhir an-Nīshāpūrī (d. 316/928); Abū Bakr ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1066); and Abū Nu'aym Aḥmad ibn 'Abdallāh al-Isfahanī (d. 430/1038).

IN *FIQH* (RELIGIOUS JURISPRUDENCE): 'Abd-al-Ghāfir ibn 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān ad-Dīnawī; Muḥammad ibn Jarīr aṭ-Ṭabarī; Muḥammad ibn al-Qaffāl ash-Shāshī (d. 365/975); Abū-l-Lays Muḥammad as-Samarkandī (d. 373/983); Abū 'Alī Ḥasan ibn al-Qāsim aṭ-Ṭabarī (d. 305/917); Aḥmad ibn 'Umar ibn Surayḥ (d. 306/918); Abū Ishāq al-Marwazī (d. 340/951); 'Abdallāh ibn Dā'ūd as-Sijistānī (d. 316/928); and Abu-l-Qāsim 'Umar ibn Ḥusayn al-Kharaqī (d. 334/945).

IN RHETORIC: Abū Ḥāmid al-Asfarāyīnī (d. 406/1015); Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn aṭ-Ṭīb al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1012); Ibn Fūrak al-Isfahanī (d. 406/1015); Abū 'Alī Muḥammad ibn 'Abd-al-Wahhāb al-Jubbā'ī (d. 303/915); Abū Ḥāshim al-Jubbā'ī (d. 429/1037); Abū Zayd Aḥmad Sahl al-Balkhī (d. 332/943); Abu-l-Qāsim 'Abdallāh ibn Aḥmad al-Ka'bī al-Balkhī (d. 319/931); Abū 'Abdallāh Ḥusayn 'Alī al-Kāghadī (d. 399/1008); Qādī 'Abd-al-Jabbār al-Mu'tazilī al-Asad al-Ābādī (d. 415/1024); and Abū Maṣṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944).

PROMINENT INTELLECTUALS: Abū Zayd Aḥmad ibn Sahl al-Balkhī (d. 322/933); Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā ar-Rāzī (d. 313/925); Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Fārābī (d. 339/950); Abu-l-Ḥasan Shahīd ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Balkhī (d. 325/936); Abū 'Alī al-Khāzin Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ya'qūb,

known as Ibn Miskawayh (d. 421/1030); Abu-l-Faraj ‘Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn Hindū (d. 410/1019 or 420/1029); Abū ‘Alī al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Abdallāh ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1036); Abū ‘Ubayd ‘Abd-al-Wāḥid ibn Muḥammad al-Jūzjānī; Abu-l-Ḥasan Bahmanyār ibn Marzbān (d. 458/1065); Abū Manṣūr al-Ḥusayn ibn Ṭāhir ibn Zīla al-Isfahanī (d. 440/1048); and Abū ‘Abdallāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Ma‘ṣūmī (d. 420/1029).

IN MATHEMATICS: Abū-l-Wafā’ Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā ibn Ismā‘īl ibn al-‘Abbās al-Būzjānī (d. 387/997); Abū-l-Faṭḥ Maḥmūd ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Qāsim al-Isfahanī (d. fourth/tenth century); Abū Ja‘far al-Khāzin al-Khurāsānī (d. between 349/960 and 360/970); Abū Sahl Wījan ibn Rustum al-Kūhī aṭ-Ṭabaristānī (d. fourth/tenth century); Abū Sa‘īd Aḥmad Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd-al-Jalīl as-Sanjārī (d. fourth/tenth century); Abū-l-Ḥusayn ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn ‘Umar aṣ-Ṣūfī ar-Rāzī (d. 376/986); Abu-l-Ḥasan Kūshyār ibn Labān al-Bāshahrī al-Jīlī (d. end of the fourth/tenth century or beginning of the fifth/eleventh century); Abū Naṣr al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī al-Qumī (d. 387/997); Abū-l-‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad as-Sarakhsī (d. 346/957); Abu-l-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn Aḥmad an-Nasawī (d. fifth/eleventh century); and Abu-r-Rayḥān Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Bīrūnī al-Khwārazmī (d. 440/1048).

IN MEDICINE: Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā ar-Rāzī; Abu-l-Ḥasan Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad aṭ-Ṭabarī; Abū Manṣūr al-Ḥasan ibn Nūḥ al-Qamarī al-Bukhārī (d. fourth/tenth century); ‘Alī ibn ‘Abbās al-Majūsī al-Ahwāzī (d. 384/994); Abū Sahl ‘Īsā ibn Yaḥyā al-Jurjānī (d. 403/1012); Abū ‘Alī ibn Sīnā; Shāpūr ibn Sahl al-Jundī ash-Shāpūrī (d. 255/868); and Abū Manṣūr Mufawwaq ibn ‘Alī al-Harawī.

IN CHEMISTRY: Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā ar-Rāzī; Qāḍī Abu-l-Ḥasan ‘Abd-al-Jabbār ibn Aḥmad al-Ḥamdānī (d. 415/1024); Abū-l-Ḥākim Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd-al-Malik ibn ‘Abd-al-Malik aṣ-Ṣāliḥī al-Khwārazmī al-Kāsī (d. fifth/eleventh century); and Abū ‘Alī ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037).

IN GEOGRAPHY: Abu-l-Qāsim Muḥammad ibn Khurdādhbih; Abū Zayd al-Balkhī; Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad al-Fārsī al-Iṣṭakhrī; Abū ‘Abdallāh Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Jayhānī; and Abu-r-Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī.

IN LITERATURE: al-Jawharī Fārābī; Abū Sa‘īd al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Abdallāh as-Sīrāfī (d. 368/978); Abū ‘Alī al-Ḥasan ibn Aḥmad al-Fārsī (d. 377/987); Ismā‘īl ibn ‘Abbād known as aṣ-Ṣāḥib ibn ‘Abbād (d. 385/995); Abū-l-Ḥusayn Aḥmad ibn al-Fāris ar-Rāzī (d. 390/999); Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Azharī al-Harawī (d. 370/980); Abū ‘Amr Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm

az-Zawzanī (d. 374/984); Abū-l-Ḥusayn ‘Alī ibn ‘Abd-al-‘Azīz al-Jurjānī (d. 366/976); and ‘Abd-al-Qāhir ibn ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān al-Jurjānī (d. 474/1081).

FROM THE FIFTH/ELEVENTH CENTURY TO THE SEVENTH/
THIRTEENTH CENTURY

IN *TAFSĪR*: Abu-l-Faḍl Muḥammad ibn Ṭayfūr as-Sajāwandī al-Ghaznawī (d. 560/1164); Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1065); Abu-l-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Kiyāhrāsī aṭ-Ṭabarī (d. 504/1110); Quṭb-ad-Dīn ar-Rāwandī (d. 573/1177); Abū-l-Faṭḥ Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd-al-Karīm ash-Shahrastānī (d. 548/1153); Abū ‘Abdallāh Fakhr-ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 606/1209); Abu-l-Qāsim Maḥmūd ibn ‘Umar az-Zamakhsharī al-Khwārazmī (d. 538/1143); Abu-l-Qāsim ‘Abd-al-Karīm al-Qushayrī an-Nīshāpūrī (d. 465/1072); Iranian Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī aṭ-Ṭūsī (d. 505/1111); Rashīd-ad-Dīn Abu-l-Faḍl ibn Sa‘īd Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd al-Maybudī (d. sixth/twelfth century); Abū Muḥammad Rūzbahān ibn Abī-n-Naṣr ash-Shīrāzī ad-Daylamī (d. 606/1209); Ibn Shahrāshūb as-Sarawī al-Māzandarānī (d. 583/1187); Amīn-al-Islām aṭ-Ṭabrisī (d. 548/1153); Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan aṭ-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067); Abū-l-Futūḥ Jamāl-ad-Dīn al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad ar-Rāzī; al-Farrā; al-Baghawī (d. 516/1122); Abu-l-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn Aḥmad al-Wāhidī an-Nīshāpūrī (d. 468/1075); and Abu-l-Faḍl Ḥubaysh ibn Ibrāhīm at-Tiflīsī (d. 629/1231).

IN THE STUDY OF *ḤADĪTH*: Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqī (d. 458/1065); Taqīyy-ad-Dīn ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān ibn aṣ-Ṣalāḥ ash-Shahrazūrī (d. 643/1245); Abū Manṣūr ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib aṭ-Ṭabrisī; and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī aṭ-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067).

IN *FIQH*: Fakhr-al-Islām Abū-l-‘Asr ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥusayn al-Bazadawī (d. 482/1089); Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad as-Sarakhsī (d. between 483/1090 and 500/1106); Abu-l-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn Abī Bakr al-Murghīnānī (d. 593/1196); ‘Abd-al-‘Azīz Aḥmad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Ḥulwānī (d. 448/1056); al-Ḥasan ibn Manṣūr al-Uzjandī, known as Qāḍī Khān (d. 592/1195); Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Alī ash-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083); Muḥammad ibn al-Muwaffaq al-Khabūshānī (d. sixth/twelfth century); and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan aṭ-Ṭūsī.

IN RHETORIC AND PHILOSOPHY: Nāṣir ibn Khusrau al-Qabādiyānī; as-Sayyid Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044); Abu-l-Qāsim al-Ḥusayn ibn Muḥammad al-Isfahanī, known as ar-Rāghib al-Isfahanī (d. 502/1108); ‘Abd-al-Jalīl ibn al-Ḥusayn ar-Rāzī (d. sixth/twelfth century); Murtaḍā ibn Dā‘ī al-Ḥusnī ar-Rāzī (d. sixth/

twelfth century); al-Juwaynī, the imam of Mecca and Medina (d. 478/1085); ‘Imād-ad-Dīn al-Kiyāhrāsī (d. 504/1110); Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī aṭ-Ṭūsī (d. 505/1111); Abū-l-Faṭḥ Muḥammad ibn Abi-l-Qāsim ‘Abd-al-Karīm ash-Shahrastānī (d. 480/1087); Fakhr-ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar ar-Rāzī (d. 606/1209); Shihāb-ad-Dīn ‘Umar as-Suhrawardī (d. 632/1234); Farīd-ad-Dīn ‘Umar ibn Ghīlān al-Balkhī (d. first half of the sixth/twelfth century); Abū-l-‘Abbās al-Faḍl ibn Muḥammad Lūkarī al-Marwazī (d. sixth/twelfth century); Quṭb-az-Zamān Muḥammad ibn Abī Ṭāhir aṭ-Ṭabasī al-Marwazī (d. 539/1144); Abū-l-Faṭḥ ibn Abī Sa‘īd al-Fundūrajī; Abū-l-Faṭḥ As‘ad ibn Muḥammad ibn Abi-n-Naṣr al-Mayhanī (d. between 520/1126 and 527/1132); Abū-l-Faṭḥ ‘Umar ibn Ibrāhīm al-Khayyāmī an-Nīshāpūrī (d. between 509 and 517/1115 and 1123); Abū Sa‘d Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Ghānimī; and Zayn-ad-Dīn ibn Sahlān as-Sāwī.

IN MATHEMATICS: Bahā’-ad-Dīn Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Abī Bishr al-Kharaqī al-Marwazī (d. 533/1138); Sharaf-ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī; Abū-l-‘Abbās al-Faḍl ibn Ḥamad al-Lūkarī; al-Khayyām an-Nīshāpūrī; Abu-l-Ḥasan ‘Alī ibn Zayd al-Bayhaqī, known as Ibn Funduq (d. 565/1169); ‘Ayn-az-Zamān Abū ‘Alī al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī al-Qaṭṭān al-Marwazī (d. 548/1153); Abū Ḥātim al-Muzaffar al-Isfazārī (515/1121); and Zahīr-ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Mas‘ūd al-Mas‘ūdī al-Ghaznawī (d. sixth/twelfth century).

IN MEDICINE: Sharaf-az-Zamān Muḥammad al-Īlāqī (d. 536/1141); Ibn Abi-ṣ-Ṣādiq an-Nīshāpūrī (d. second half of the fifth/eleventh century); and as-Sayyid Ismā‘īl al-Jurjānī (d. 531/1136).

IN LITERATURE: Badī‘ Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Ḥusayn ibn Ibrāhīm an-Naṭanzī (d. between 497/1103 and 499/1105); Abu-l-Faḍl Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Mīdānī an-Nīshāpūrī (d. 517/1123); Abu-l-Faḍl Ḥubaysh ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad at-Tiflīsī (d. sixth/twelfth century); Abū ‘Abdallāh al-Ḥusayn ibn Aḥmad az-Zawzanī (d. 486/1093); Maḥmūd ibn ‘Umar al-Qāḍī az-Zanjī Sanjarī; Jārullāh az-Zamakhsharī; Abū Ja‘far Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Maqarrī al-Bayhaqī (d. 544/1149); Abū-l-Faṭḥ al-Muṭarrizī al-Khwārazmī (d. 610/1213); Najm-ad-Dīn Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar ibn Muḥammad an-Nasafī (d. 462/1069); ‘Abd-al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī (d. 471/1078 or 474/1081); Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf as-Sakkākī al-Khwārazmī (d. 626/1228); Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar ar-Rādūyānī (d. end of the fifth/eleventh century); and Rashīd-ad-Dīn Waṭwāṭ Muḥammad al-‘Amrī al-Kātib al-Balkhī.

FROM THE SEVENTH/THIRTEENTH CENTURY TO THE EIGHTH/
FOURTEENTH CENTURY

IN *TAFSİR*: ‘Abdallāh ibn ‘Umar ibn Muḥammad ash-Shīrāzī al-Bayḍāwī, known as al-Qādī al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286); Sa‘d-ad-Dīn Mas‘ūd ibn ‘Umar at-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1389); ‘Afīf-ad-Dīn ibn Sa‘īd ibn Mas‘ūd al-Kāzarūnī (d. eighth/fourteenth century); Abū ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān as-Sullamī; Najm-ad-Dīn al-Kubrā; Najm-ad-Dīn Dāya; Shaykh Abū Bakr ‘Abdallāh ibn Muḥammad ar-Rāzī (d. 654/1256); and Ṣadr-ad-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 673/1274).

IN THE STUDY OF *HADĪTH*: Abū Sa‘īd al-Ḥasan ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqī (d. eighth/fourteenth century); and Abū Muḥammad ad-Daylamī (d. eighth/fourteenth century).

IN *FIQH*: Tāj-ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Urmawī (d. 656/1258); Jalāl-ad-Dīn al-Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338); Jamāl-ad-Dīn Yūsuf al-Ardabīlī (d. 776/1374 or 799/1396); and Abu-l-Qāsim ‘Abd-al-Karīm ibn Muḥammad al-Qazwīnī (d. 623/1226).

IN RHETORIC: al-Qādī al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286); ‘Abdallāh ibn Muḥammad, known as ash-Sharīf al-Farghānī (d. 743/1342); Shams-ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Bahā’-ad-Dīn Yūsuf al-Kirmānī (d. 786/1384); Khwāja Naṣīr-ad-Dīn Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad aṭ-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1273); Rukn-ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al-Jurjānī (d. second half of the seventh/thirteenth century); and ‘Imād-ad-Dīn al-Ḥasan ibn al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Āmulī (d. seventh/thirteenth century).

IN REASONING: Naṣīr-ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūsī; Quṭb-ad-Dīn ash-Shīrāzī (d. 710/1310); Shams-ad-Dīn Muḥammad al-Āmulī (d. 753/1352); Najm-ad-Dīn ad-Dabīrān (d. 675/1276); Afḍal-ad-Dīn ibn Nāmāwar al-Khūnajī (d. 649/1251); Quṭb-ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Buwayhī ar-Rāzī (d. 763/1361); Shams-ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ashraf al-Ḥusaynī as-Samarkandī (d. c. 600/1203); Athīr-ad-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 663/1264); Burhān-ad-Dīn Abu-l-Faḍl an-Nasafī (d. 684/1285); Bābā Afḍal al-Kāshānī (d. 606/1209, 667/1268 or 707/1307); Rafī‘-ad-Dīn al-Jīlī (d. 641/1243); and Shams-ad-Dīn Khusrau ash-Shāhī (652/1254).

IN MUSIC: Ṣafiyy-ad-Dīn al-Urmawī (d. 693/1293); Yaḥyā ibn Aḥmad al-Kāshī (d. eighth/fourteenth century); Mawlānā Mubārak-Shāh (d. eighth/fourteenth century); Fakhr-ad-Dīn al-Khujandī; and ‘Abd-al-Qādir al-Marāghī (d. 838/1434).

UNIVERSAL DIMENSIONS OF THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

IN MATHEMATICS: ‘Alā’ al-Munajjim al-Khwārazmī; Niẓām al-A‘raj al-Qumī an-Nīshāpūrī; Maḥmūd ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar al-Jaghminī (d. 745/1344); Kamāl-ad-Dīn at-Turkumānī; and Mīr Sayyid ash-Sharīf al-Jurjānī.

IN MEDICINE: Ibn an-Nafīs al-Qurashī of Transoxiana (d. 687/1288); Muhadhdhab-ad-Dīn ad-Dakhwār (d. 628/1230); Abū-l-Faṭḥ al-Iskandarī; Abu-l-Faḍl ibn Kūshak; Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad (d. 690/1291); Sadīd-ad-Dīn al-Kāzarūnī (d. eighth/fourteenth century); Jamāl-ad-Dīn Muḥammad al-Aqṣarānī (d. 779/1377); Burhān-ad-Dīn Nafīs ibn ‘Awaḍ al-Kirmānī; and Najīb-ad-Dīn as-Samarkandī (d. 618/1221).

IN GEOGRAPHY: ‘Abd-al-Karīm ibn Muḥammad ar-Rāfi‘ī al-Qazwīnī (d. 623/1226); Zakariyyā al-Qazwīnī (d. 682/1283); and Ḥamadallāh al-Mustawfī (d. 740/1339).

IN LITERATURE: Abū-n-Naṣr al-Farāhī as-Sajizī (d. 640/1242); Qādī Abū Ṭāhir Majd-ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ya‘qūb al-Kāzarūnī al-Fīrūzabādī (d. 817/1414); Zayn-ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (d. 768/1366); Raḍī-ad-Dīn al-Astarabādī (d. 687/1288); Rukn-ad-Dīn al-Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad al-Astarabādī (d. 717/1317); Niẓām al-A‘raj; ‘Izz-ad-Dīn Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abd-al-Wahhāb az-Zanjānī (d. 655/1257); Jamāl-ad-Dīn al-Ardabīlī (d. 647/1249); Maḥmūd ibn ‘Umar al-Khūjandī (d. 700/1300); Tāj-ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Asfarā‘īnī (d. 684/1285); Jamāl-ad-Dīn ‘Abdallāh ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥusaynī (d. 776/1374); Ḥusām-ad-Dīn al-Mu‘adhdhinī al-Khwārazmī (d. eighth/fourteenth century); Khaṭīb al-Qazwīnī (d. 739/1338); Muḥammad ibn Muẓaffar Fāḍil al-Khalkhālī (d. 745/1344); Sharaf-ad-Dīn ar-Rāmī at-Tabrīzī (d. 695/1297); Maḥmūd ibn ‘Umar an-Najātī an-Nīshāpūrī (d. first half of the eighth/fourteenth century); and Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī al-Khwārazmī.

FROM THE EIGHTH/FOURTEENTH CENTURY TO THE TWELFTH/EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

IN FIQH: Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥāj Muḥammad as-Sakkākī aṭ-Ṭabasī (d. tenth/sixteenth century); Qādī Sa‘īd al-Qumī (d. 1103/1691); al-Mullā Muṣṭafā al-Qārī’ at-Tabrīzī; Muḥammad Mu‘min al-Qārī’ (d. twelfth/eighteenth century); Muḥammad ibn Muḥsin ibn Samī’ al-Qārī’; al-Mullā Mūsā al-Hazāra‘ī (d. eleventh/seventeenth century); Muḥammad Riḍā an-Naṣīrī aṭ-Ṭūsī (d. eleventh/seventeenth century); Muḥy-ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muṣliḥ-ad-Dīn al-Qūjawī (d. 951/1544); Qādī Zakariyyā ibn Muḥammad al-Anṣārī (d. 926/1519); Muṣṭafā ibn Sha‘bān as-Sarwarī (d. 969/1561); Muṣliḥ-ad-Dīn Muḥammad al-Lārī (d. 979/1561); Ibn Ṣadr-ad-Dīn ash-Shirwānī (d. 942/1535);

Nūr-ad-Dīn ibn Nūrullāh ash-Shirwānī (d. 1065/1654 or 1095/1683); Qāḍī Ṣāliḥ al-Qarabāghī (d. 1073/1662); Mahdī Fukārī as-Shīrāzī (d. 975/1567); Bahā'-ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Abd-as-Ṣamad al-'Āmilī al-Isfahanī (d. 1031/1621); Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Riḍā al-Qumī; 'Alī ibn al-Ḥusayn; Nūr-ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Murtaḍā (d. eleventh–twelfth century/seventeenth–eighteenth century); Shams-ad-Dīn Muḥammad al-Gīlānī, known as al-Mullā Shamsā (d. eleventh/seventeenth century); Muḥammad Mu'min ibn Shāh Qāsim as-Sabzawārī (d. between 1070/1659 and 1077/1666); Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad, known as al-Muqaddas al-Ardabīlī (d. 993/1585); Muḥammad 'Alī al-Astrābādī (d. 1028/1618); Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan aṭ-Ṭabasī (d. tenth/sixteenth century); Shāh Qāḍī al-Yazdī; Muḥammad Sa'id al-Qahbā'ī (d. 1092/1681); Mīr Siyyid Ibrāhīm al-Qazwīnī (d. 1149/1736); Mullā Ṣadrā ash-Shīrāzī (d. 1050/1640); Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ al-Kāshānī (d. 1091/1680); Mīr Sayyid Abū-l-Faṭḥ Muḥammad ibn Abī Sa'id al-Ḥusaynī ash-Sharīfī (d. 950/1543); Abu-l-Maḥāsin al-Ḥusayn ibn al-Ḥasan al-Jurjānī (d. tenth/sixteenth century); al-Mullā Faṭḥallāh al-Kāshānī (d. 988/1580); and Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd Dihdār.

IN THE STUDY OF *HADĪTH*: Muḥammad Taqī ibn Maqṣūd 'Alī al-Isfahanī, known as al-Majlisī (d. 1070/1659); and Mullā Muḥammad Bāqir al-Majlisī (d. 1110/1698).

IN RHETORIC AND PHILOSOPHY (SAFAVID PERIOD): Qāḍī Nūrallāh ash-Shūshtarī (d. 1019/1610); Mīr Muḥammad Bāqir Dāmād (d. 1041/1631); Ṣadr-ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ash-Shīrāzī, known as al-Mullā Ṣadrā; Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ al-Kāshānī (d. 1091/1680); Mullā 'Abd-ar-Razzāq al-Lāhījī (d. 1072/1661); Jamāl-ad-Dīn al-Khūnsārī; 'Alā'-ad-Dīn 'Abd-al-Khāliq Qāḍī-zāda al-Kararūdī; Qāḍī Sa'id al-Qumī (d. 1103/1691); Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn Manṣūr ad-Dashtakī ash-Shīrāzī (d. 948/1541); Shams-ad-Dīn Muḥammad al-Khafrī (d. 942/1535); Muṣliḥ-ad-Dīn al-Lārī (d. 979/1571); Mīrzā Jān Bāgh an-Nawī (d. 994/1585); Abu-l-Qāsim ibn Mīrzā Beg, known as Mīr al-Findiriskī (d. 1050/1640); Mullā Masīḥ ash-Shīrāzī (d. 1115/1703 or 1127/1715); Mīrzī Muḥammad ash-Shirwānī; al-Mīrzā 'Alī Riḍā al-Ardakānī, known as at-Tajallī (d. 1085/1674); and Mullā Rajab 'Alī at-Tabrīzī (d. 1080/1669).

IN MATHEMATICS: 'Abd-al-'Alī al-Bīrjandī (d. 934/1527); Shams-ad-Dīn Muḥammad al-Khafrī (d. 942/1535); Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn Manṣūr ad-Dashtakī (d. 948/1541); Muḥammad Bāqir al-Yazdī (d. second half of the eleventh/seventeenth century); and Bahā'-ad-Dīn al-'Āmilī (d. 1031/1621).

UNIVERSAL DIMENSIONS OF THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

IN MEDICINE: Sulṭān ‘Alī al-Gunābādī; Yūsuf al-Harawī (d. 950/1543); Nūr-ad-Dīn ash-Shīrāzī; Muẓaffar ibn Muḥammad al-Ḥusaynī al-Kāshānī, known as al-Ḥakīm ash-Shifā’ī (d. 963/1556); al-‘Imād aṭ-Ṭabīb ash-Shīrāzī (d. 984/1576); Kamāl-ad-Dīn al-Gīlānī; al-Ḥakīm Mu’min (d. 1105/1693); Muḥammad Masīḥ aṭ-Ṭabīb; Muḥammad Hāshim aṭ-Ṭahrānī; Niẓām-ad-Dīn Aḥmad al-Gīlānī; and Muḥammad Abū Ṭālib az-Zāhidī al-Gīlānī.³⁴

34 Zabīḥullāh Ṣafā, *Tārīkh-i adabīyāt dar Īrān*, Tehran, Tehran University, 1362/1943, the sections on the sciences in vols 1–4.

APPENDIX II. INDEPENDENT RULERS AND DYNASTIES IN IRAN³⁵

THE ṬĀHIRID DYNASTY

1. Ṭāhir ibn al-Ḥusayn (Dhu-l-Yamīnayn) (205/820)
2. Ṭalḥa ibn Ṭāhir (207/822)
3. ‘Alī ibn Ṭāhir (207/822)
4. Abdallāh ibn Ṭāhir (214/829)
5. Ṭāhir II ibn ‘Abdallāh (230/844)
6. Muḥammad ibn Ṭāhir ibn ‘Abdallāh (248/862)
7. Ṭāhir III ibn Muḥammad (259/872)
8. Aḥmad ibn ‘Abdallāh (261/874)

THE ṢAFFĀRID DYNASTY

1. Ya‘qūb ibn Layth (274/861)
2. ‘Amr ibn Layth (265/878)
3. Ṭāhir ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Amr (287/900)

THE SĀMĀNID DYNASTY

1. Naṣr ibn Aḥmad (261/874)
2. Ismā‘īl ibn Aḥmad (279/892)
3. Aḥmad ibn Ismā‘īl (295/907)
4. Naṣr II (Naṣr ibn Aḥmad) (301/913)
5. Nūḥ ibn Naṣr (321/933)
6. ‘Abd-al-Malik I ibn Nūḥ (343/954)
7. Manṣūr ibn Nūḥ (350/961)
8. Nūḥ II (Nūḥ ibn Manṣūr) (365/975)
9. Manṣūr II (ibn Nūḥ II) (387/997)
10. ‘Abd-al-Malik II (ibn Nūḥ II) (389/998)

THE ‘ALAWID DYNASTY (IN ṬABARISTĀN)

1. Al-Ḥasan ibn Zayd (250/864)
2. Muḥammad ibn Zayd (270/883)
3. An-Nāṣir Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī al-Uṭrūsh (301/913)
4. Al-Ḥasan ibn al-Qāsim (304–16/916–28)

35 Dates refer to the beginning of the period of rule.

UNIVERSAL DIMENSIONS OF THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

THE JUSTĀNID DYNASTY (IN DAYLAM)

1. Marzbān ibn Justān (189–252/804–66)
2. Wahsūdān ibn Justān (290/902)
3. ‘Alī ibn Wahsūdān (307/919)
4. Marzbān ibn al-Ḥasan (420/1029)
5. Kāmṛū Daylamī (430–34/1038–42)

THE MUSĀFIRID OR MARZBĀNID DYNASTY (IN AZERBAIJAN, ARĀN AND ṬĀRAM)

1. Marzbān I (ibn Muḥammad) (346/957)
2. Justān ibn al-Marzbān (346/957)
3. Wahsūdān II (ibn Muḥammad) (349/960)
4. Ibrāhīm I (349/960)
5. Marzbān II (ibn Ismā‘īl) (355/965)
6. Ibrāhīm II (ibn Marzbān) (387/997)

THE DĀBŪYID DYNASTY (RULERS OF ṬABARISTĀN AND GĪLĀN)

1. Gīl ibn Gīlānshāh (25/645)
2. Dābūy ibn Gīl (40/660)
3. Khūrshīd I (ibn Gīl) (56/675)
4. Farkhān ibn Dābūy (90/708)
5. Dādburzmīhr Farkhān (103/721)
6. Sārwiya ibn Farkhān (116/734)
7. Khwūrshīd II (ibn Dādburzmīhr) (116/734)

THE BĀDŪSBĀNID DYNASTY (IN THE TWO GROUPS OF NŪR AND KUJŪR)

1. Bādūsbān I (ibn Jīl) (40/660)
2. Khūr-zād ibn Bādūsbān (75/694)
3. Bādūsbān II (ibn Khūr-zād) (105/723)
4. Shahriyār I (ibn Bādūsbān) (145/762)
5. Wandād Umīd (ibn Bādūsbān) (175/791)
6. ‘Abdallāh ibn Wandād (207/822)
7. Farīdūn ibn Qārin ibn Shahriyār (241/855)
8. Bādūsbān III (ibn Farīdūn)
9. Shahriyār II (ibn Bādūsbān) (259/872)
10. Hazār Sandān ibn Bandād ibn Shīr-zād (274/887)
11. Shahriyār III ibn Jamshīd ibn Dīwband (286/899)

12. Shams-al-Mulūk Muḥammad ibn Shahriyār (327/938)
13. Istwāndād Abu-l-Faḍl ibn Muḥammad (354/965)

THE BĀWANDID, QĀRINID DYNASTIES (IN MĀZANDARĀN)

The first dynasty

1. Bāw (45/665)
2. Balāsh (59/678)
3. Surkhāb I (ibn Bāw) (67/686)
4. Mihr Mardān ibn Surkh-āb (110/728)
5. Surkh-āb II (ibn Mihr Mardān) (135/752)
6. Shirwīn I (ibn Surkhāb) (155/771)
7. Shahriyār I (ibn Sharwīn) (181/797)
8. Shāpūr ibn Shahriyār (210/825)
9. Qārin ibn Shahriyār (222/836)
10. Rustam I (ibn Surkh-āb ibn Qārin) (253/867)
11. Sharwīn II (ibn Rustam) (272/885)
12. Shahriyār II (ibn Sharwīn) (318/930)
13. Dārā ibn Rustam ibn Sharwīn (355/965)
14. Shahriyār III (ibn Dārā) (358/968)
15. Rustam II (ibn Shahriyār) (396/1005)

The second dynasty

1. Ḥusām-ad-Dawla, Shahriyār ibn Qārin (466/1073)
2. Najm-ad-Dawla, Qārin ibn Shahriyār (503/1109)
3. Shams-al-Mulūk, Rustam ibn Qārin (511/1117)
4. ‘Alā’-ad-Dawla, ‘Alī Shahriyār (511/1117)
5. Shāh Ghāzī, Rustam ibn ‘Alī (534/1139)
6. ‘Alā’-ad-Dawla, Ḥasan ibn Rustam (567/1171)
7. Ḥusām-ad-Dawla, Ardashīr ibn Ḥasan (567/1171)
8. Shams-al-Mulūk, Rustam ibn Ardashīr (602/1205)

THE ZIYĀRID DYNASTY (IN GURGĀN AND ṬABARISTĀN)

1. Mardāwīj ibn Ziyār (315/927)
2. Ḥahīr-ad-Dawla Abū Manṣūr Wushmgīr ibn Ziyār (322/933)
3. Ḥahīr-ad-Dawla Abū Manṣūr Bīsūtūn ibn Wushmgīr (356/966)
4. Shams-al-Ma‘ālī Abu-l-Ḥasan Qābūs ibn Wushmgīr (366/976)
5. Fulk-al-Ma‘ālī Manūchīhr ibn Qābūs (403/1012)
6. Abū Kālījār Anūshīrwān ibn Manūchīhr (420/1029)

UNIVERSAL DIMENSIONS OF THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

7. Dārā ibn Qābūs (424/1032)
8. Anūshīrwān ibn Manūchihr (second reign) (426/1034)
9. Iskandar ibn Qābūs (434/1042)
10. Kaykā'ūs ibn Iskandar (441/1049)
11. Jihānshāh ibn Kaykā'ūs (462/1069)

THE BÜYID (BUWAYHID) DYNASTY

1. 'Imād-ad-Dawla Abu-l-Ḥasan 'Alī (320–38/932–49)
2. Rukn-ad-Dawla Abu-l-Ḥasan (338–66/949–76)

THE BÜYID DYNASTY (IN BAGHDAD)

1. Mu'izz-ad-Dawla Abu-l-Ḥasan (334/945)
2. 'Izz-ad-Dawla Abū Maṣṣūr Bakhtiyār (353/964)
3. 'Aḍud-ad-Dawla Abū Shujā' Fanā' Khusrau (367/977)
4. Ṣamṣām-ad-Dawla Abū Kālījār Marzbān (372/982)
5. Sharaf-ad-Dawla Abu-l-Fawāris Shīrdil (376/986)
6. Bahā'-ad-Dawla Abū-n-Naṣr Fīrūz (379/989)
7. Sulṭān-ad-Dawla Abū Shujā' (403/1012)
8. Musharrif-ad-Dawla Abū 'Alī al-Ḥasan (412/1021)
9. 'Imād-ad-Dīn Abū Kālījār Marzbān (435/1043)
10. al-Malik ar-Raḥīm Abū-n-Naṣr Khusrau Fīrūz (440/1048)
11. Jalāl-ad-Dawla Abū Ṭāhir (496/1102)

THE BÜYID DYNASTY (IN FARS AND KHŪZISTĀN)

1. 'Imād-ad-Dīn Abu-l-Ḥasan 'Alī (322/933)
2. 'Aḍud-ad-Dawla Abū Shujā' Fanā' Khusrau (338/949)
3. Sharaf-ad-Dawla Abu-l-Fawāris Shīrdil (372/982)
4. Shams-ad-Dawla Abū Kālījār Marzbān (380/990)
5. Bahā'-ad-Dawla Abū-n-Naṣr Fīrūz (388/998)
6. Sulṭān-ad-Dawla Abū Shujā' (403/1012)
7. Musharrif-ad-Dawla Abū 'Alī al-Ḥasan (412/1021)
8. 'Imād-ad-Dīn Abū Kālījār Marzbān (415/1024)
9. al-Malik ar-Raḥīm Abū-n-Naṣr Khusrau Fīrūz (440/1048)

THE BÜYID DYNASTY (IN KIRMĀN)

1. Mu'izz-ad-Dawla Abu-l-Ḥasan Aḥmad (324/935)
2. 'Aḍud-ad-Dawla Abū Shujā' Fanā' Khusrau (338/949)
3. Shams-ad-Dawla Abū Kālījār Marzbān (372/982)

4. Bahā'-ad-Dawla Abū-n-Naşr Fīrūz (388/998)
5. Qawām-ad-Dawla Abu-l-Fawāris (403/1012)
6. 'Imād-ad-Dīn Abū Kālījār Marzbān (419/1028)
7. Abū Manşūr Fūlād Sitūn (440/1048)

THE BÜYID DYNASTY (IN THE JIBĀL MOUNTAINS)

1. Rukn-ad-Dawla Abū 'Alī al-Ḥasan (335/946)
2. 'Imād-ad-Dīn Abu-l-Ḥasan 'Alī (420/1029)

THE BÜYID DYNASTY (IN HAMADĀN, RAYY AND ISFAHAN)

1. Mu'ayyid-ad-Dawla Abū Manşūr Būya (366/976)
2. Fakhr-ad-Dawla Abu-l-Ḥasan 'Alī (373/983)
3. Shams-ad-Dawla Abū Ṭāhir (382/992)
4. Majd-ad-Dawla Abū Ṭālib Rustam (387/997)
5. Samā'-ad-Dawla Abu-l-Ḥasan (412/1021)
6. Kākūyān (Banū Kākūyān in Isfahan and Hamadān) (412/1021)

THE BÜYID DYNASTY (IN OMAN)

1. 'Aḍud-ad-Dawla Abū Shujā' Fanā' Khusrau (363/973)
2. Shams-ad-Dawla Abū Kālījār Marzbān (372/982)
3. Bahā'-ad-Dawla Abū-n-Naşr Fīrūz (388/998)

THE GHAZNAVID DYNASTY

1. Alp-Tegin (351/962)
2. Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm ibn Alp-Tegin (352/963)
3. Bilge-Tegin (355/965)
4. Böri (362/972)
5. Sebük-Tegin Nāşir-ad-Dīn (366/976)
6. Ismā'īl ibn Sebük-Tegin (387/997)
7. Maḥmūd Yamīn-ad-Dawla (388/998)
8. Jalāl-ad-Dawla Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd (421/1030)
9. Nāşir Dīnallāh Mas'ūd I (ibn Maḥmūd) (421/1030)
10. Second reign of Jalāl-ad-Dawla Muḥammad (short period) (432/1040)
11. Mas'ūd II (ibn Mawdūd) (432/1040)
12. Shihāb-ad-Dawla Abū Sa'd Mawdūd ibn Mas'ūd (440/1048)
13. 'Alī Abu-l-Ḥasan Bahā'-ad-Dawla (ibn Mas'ūd I) (440/1048)
14. 'Abd-ar-Rashīd 'Izz-ad-Dawla ibn Maḥmūd (440/1048)

15. Toghril (444/1052)
16. Farrukh-zād Jamāl-ad-Dawla ibn Mas'ūd (444/1052)
17. Ibrāhīm Zāhīr-ad-Dawla ibn Mas'ūd (451/1059)
18. Mas'ūd III 'Alā'-ad-Dawla ibn Ibrāhīm (492/1098)
19. Shīr-zād Kamāl-ad-Dawla ibn Mas'ūd (508/1114)
20. Arslan Sulṭān-ad-Dawla ibn Mas'ūd (509/1115)
21. Bahrām Shāh Yamīn-ad-Dawla ibn Mas'ūd (512/1118)
22. Khusrau Shāh Mu'izz-ad-Dawla ibn Bahrām (547/1152)
23. Khusrau Malik Tāj-ad-Dawla ibn Khusrau Shāh (555/1160)

THE KĀKŪYID DYNASTY (IN ISFAHAN AND HAMADĀN)

1. 'Alā'-ad-Dawla Abū Ja'far Muḥammad ibn Dushman-Ziyār ibn Kākūya (398/1007)
2. Zāhīr-ad-Dīn Abū Manşūr Farāmurz (433/1041)
3. 'Alā'-ad-Dawla Abū Kālījār Garshāsp (Hamadān and Nihāwand) (443/1051)
4. Abū Manşūr 'Alī ibn Farāmurz (469/1076)
5. 'Alā'-ad-Dawla Abū Kālījār Garshāsp II (488/1095)

THE SELJŪQ DYNASTIES

The Great Seljūq dynasty

1. Rukn-ad-Dawla Abū Ṭālib Ṭoghril Beg (429/1037)
2. 'Aḍud-ad-Dīn Abū Shujā' Alp-Arslan (455/1063)
3. Jalāl-ad-Dīn Abū-l-Faṭḥ Malik Shāh (465/1072)
4. Naşīr-ad-Dīn Maḥmūd (485/1092)
5. Rukn-ad-Dīn Abū-l-Muẓaffar Berk-Yaruq (487/1094)
6. Malik-Shāh II (498/1104)
7. Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn Abū Shujā' Muḥammad (498/1104)
8. Mu'izz-ad-Dīn Abū Ḥārith Sanjar (511–52/1117–57)

The Kirmān Seljūqs

1. Arslan-Shāh (393/1002)
2. 'Imād-ad-Dīn Qara-Arslan Qawurd Beg (433/1041)
3. Kirmān-Shāh (465/1072)
4. Ḥusayn (467/1074)
5. Rukn-ad-Dīn Sulṭān-Shāh (467/1074)
6. Tūrān-Shāh (477/1084)
7. Īrān-Shāh (490/1096)

8. Mughīth-ad-Dīn Muḥammad (536/1141)
9. Mughīth-ad-Dīn Ṭoghrīl-Shāh (551/1156)
10. Bahrām-Shāh (562/1166)
11. Arslan-Shāh (562/1166)
12. Turkān-Shāh (562/1166)
13. Muḥammad II (583/1187)

The Seljūqs in Iraq and Kurdistan

1. Mughīth-ad-Dīn Maḥmūd (511/1117)
2. Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn Dā'ūd (525/1130)
3. Ṭoghrīl I (526/1131)
4. Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn Mas'ūd (527/1132)
5. Mu'īn-ad-Dīn Malik-Shāh (547/1152)
6. Muḥammad (548/1153)
7. Sulaymān-Shāh (554/1159)
8. Arslan-Shāh (556/1160)
9. Ṭoghrīl II (573/1170)

The Seljūqs of Syria and Rūm (Anatolia) have been omitted here since they were not within the territory of Iran.

THE BĀṬINID OR ISMĀ'ILĪ DYNASTY (ALAMŪT, THE FORTRESS OF DEATH)

1. Ḥasan aṣ-Ṣabāḥ (483/1090)
2. Kiyā Buzurg-Umīd Rūdbārī (518/1124)
3. Muḥammad I ibn Buzurg-Umīd (532/1137)
4. Ḥasan II ibn Muḥammad (557/1161)
5. Nūr-ad-Dīn Muḥammad II ibn Ḥasan II (561/1165)
6. Jalāl-ad-Dīn Ḥasan III ibn Muḥammad II (607/1210)
7. 'Alā'-ad-Dīn Muḥammad III ibn Ḥasan III (618/1221)
8. Rukn-ad-Dīn Kūr-Shāh (653/1255)

THE SHIRWĀN-SHĀHID DYNASTY

The first dynasty

1. Yazīd ibn Mazīd ibn Zā'idat Shaybānī (ambassador of the 'Abbāsīd caliph Harūn ar-Rashīd to Armenia) (183/799)
2. Khālīd ibn Yazīd ibn Mazīd (209/824)
3. Muḥammad ibn Khālīd (209/824)
4. Haysām ibn Khālīd (209/824)

UNIVERSAL DIMENSIONS OF THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

5. Muḥammad ibn Haysām (209/824)
6. Haysām ibn Muḥammad (209/824)
7. ‘Alī ibn Haysām (300/912)
8. Abū Ṭāhir ibn Fūlān ibn Muḥammad (305/917)
9. Muḥammad ibn Abī Ṭāhir (337/948)
10. Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad (345/956)
11. Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad (370/980)
12. Yazīd ibn Aḥmad (381/991)

The second dynasty (in Shamākha)

1. Manūchihr ibn Yazīd (418/1027)
2. Abū Manṣūr ‘Alī ibn Yazīd (425/1033)
3. Qubādh ibn Yazīd (435/1043)
4. Bukht Naṣar ‘Alī ibn Fūlān ibn Yazīd (441/1049)
5. Sālār ibn Yazīd (441/1049)
6. Farīburz ibn Sālār (455/1063)
7. Farīdūn ibn Farīburz (455/1063)

The third dynasty

1. Manūchihr (903/1497)
2. Al-Qāṣ (the Sermonizer) Mīrzā ibn Ismā‘īl (945/1538)
3. ‘Abdallāh Khān (958/1551)
4. Farrukh Khān (1043/1633)
5. Rustam Khān (1045/1635)
6. Khusrau Sulṭān (1051/1641)
7. Mihr ‘Alī Khān (1066/1655)
8. Manūchihr Khān (1067/1656)

The fourth dynasty

1. Faṭḥ ‘Alī (1180/1766)
2. ‘Askar ibn Muḥammad Sa‘īd (1203/1788)
3. Qāsim Khān (1203/1788)
4. Muṣṭafā Khān (1212/1797)

THE KHĀQĀNID DYNASTY

1. Abū-l-Muẓaffar Manūchihr ibn Kisrān (550/1155)
2. Akhistān I ibn Manūchihr (556/1160)
3. Farrukh-zād I ibn Manūchihr (566/1160)

4. Garshāsp ibn Farrukh-zād (575/1179)
5. ‘Alā’-ad-Dīn Farīburz ibn Garshāsp (622/1225)
6. Akhistān II ibn Farīburz (649/1251)
7. Farrukh-zād II ibn Farīburz (680/1281)
8. Kay-Qubād ibn Farrukh-zād (717/1317)
9. Kay-Kā’ūs ibn Kay-Qubād (745/1344)
10. Hūshang ibn Kay-Kā’ūs (774/1372)
11. Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad Darband ibn Kay-Qubād (784/1382)
12. Khalīlallāh I ibn Ibrāhīm (821/1418)
13. Farrukh Sīr ibn Khalīl (869/1464)
14. Bahrām Beg ibn Farrukh Sīr (906/1500)
15. Ghāzī Beg ibn Farrukh Sīr (907/1501)
16. Maḥmūd ibn Ghāzī (908/1502)
17. Ibrāhīm II ibn Farrukh Sīr (908/1502)
18. Khalīlallāh II ibn Ibrāhīm II (930/1523)
19. Shāh-Rukh ibn Farrukh Mīrzā (942/1535)
20. Burhān ‘Alī ibn Khalīlallāh (951/1544)
21. Mīrzā Abū Bakr ibn Burhān (951/1544)

THE SALGHURID ATABEGS (IN FARŚ)

1. Muẓaffar-ad-Dīn Sonqur ibn Mawdūd (543/1148)
2. Muẓaffar-ad-Dīn Zangī ibn Mawdūd (543/1148)
3. Tekele ibn Zangī (570/1174)
4. Ṭoghrīl ibn Sonqur ibn Mawdūd (590/1193)
5. Sa’d I ibn Zangī (599/1202)
6. Abū Bakr Qutluḡ Khān ibn Sa’d (628/1230)
7. Sa’d II ibn Qutluḡ (658/1259)
8. Muḥammad ibn Sa’d I (658/1259)
9. Muḥammad Shāh ibn Salghur Shāh (660/1261)
10. Saljūq Shāh ibn Salghur Shāh (661/1262)
11. Ābish Khātūn bint Sa’d II (663/1264)

THE HAZĀR-ASPID DYNASTY (IN LURISTĀN AND ĪZAJ)

1. Abū Ṭāhir ibn Muḥammad (543/1148)
2. Nuṣrat-ad-Dīn Hazār-Asp ibn Abī Ṭāhir (600/1203)
3. Tekele ibn Hazār-Asp (650/1252)
4. Shams-ad-Dīn Alp Arghun ibn Hazār-Asp (657/1258)
5. Yūsuf Shāh I ibn Alp Arghun (673/1274)
6. Afrāsiyāb I ibn Yūsuf Shāh (687/1288)
7. Nuṣrat-ad-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Alp Arghun (696/1296)

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8. Rukn-ad-Dīn Yūsuf Shāh II ibn Aḥmad (723/1323)
9. Muẓaffar-ad-Dīn Afrāsiyāb II ibn Yūsuf (740/1339)
10. Shams-ad-Dīn Hūshang ibn Fūlān ibn Yūsuf (756/1355)
11. Aḥmad (780/1378)
12. Abū Sa'īd (815/1412)
13. Ḥusayn (820/1417)
14. Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn (827/1423)

THE AZERBAIJAN ATABEGS (IN ARDABİL)

1. Shams-ad-Dīn Eldigüz (531/1136)
2. Shams-ad-Dīn Abū Ja'far Muḥammad Jahān Pahlawān ibn Eldigüz (568/1172)
3. Muẓaffar-ad-Dīn Qizil Arslan ibn 'Uthmān ibn Eldigüz (581/1185)
4. Nuṣrat-ad-Dīn Abū Bakr ibn Muḥammad (587/1191)
5. Muẓaffar-ad-Dīn Uzbek Pahlawān ibn Muḥammad (607–22/1210–25)

THE SARBADĀRS (in Khurāsān and Dāmghān)

1. 'Abd-ar-Razzāq Ibn Faḍlallāh (737/1336)
2. Wajih-ad-Dīn Mas'ūd Ibn Faḍlallāh (738/1337)
3. Āi Tīmūr Muḥammad (744/1343)
4. Isfandiyār (746/1345)
5. Faḍlallāh (747/1346)
6. Shams-ad-Dīn 'Alī (748/1347)
7. Yaḥyā Karrābī (753/1352)
8. Ḍahīr-ad-Dīn (757/1356)
9. Ḥaydar al-Qaṣṣāb (760/1358)
10. Luṭfallāh (760/1358)
11. Ḥasan Dāmghānī (761/1359)
12. 'Alī al-Mu'ayyid (766/1364)

THE KHWĀRAZM SHAHS

The first dynasty

1. Abū Sa'īd Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad (356/967)
2. Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad (385/995)
3. Ma'mūn ibn Muḥammad (385/995)
4. Abu-l-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn Ma'mūn (387/997)

5. Abū-l-‘Abbās Ma’mūn ibn Ma’mūn (390/999)
6. Abū-l-Ḥārith Muḥammad ibn ‘Alī ibn Ma’mūn (407/1016)

The second dynasty

1. Altıntash (408/1017)
2. Hārūn ibn Altıntash (423/1031)
3. Ismā‘īl ibn Altıntash (425/1033)
4. Shāh Malik (429/1037)

The third dynasty

1. Anush-Tegin Gharcha (470/1077)
2. Quṭb-ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Anush-Tegin (490/1096)
3. Atsız ibn Muḥammad (521/1127)
4. Īl Arslan ibn Atsız (551/1156)
5. Sulṭān Abu-l-Qāsim Muḥammad ibn Īl Arslan (568/1172)
6. Abū-l-Muzaffar Tekish ibn Īl Arslan (589/1193)
7. ‘Alā’-ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Tekish (596/1199)
8. Jalāl-ad-Dīn Minkabirtī ibn Muḥammad (617/1220)

THE MONGOL OR ILKHANID DYNASTY

1. Hülegü (654/1256)
2. Abaqa (663/1264)
3. Aḥmad Tegüder (680/1281)
4. Arghun (683/1284)
5. Geikhatu (690/1291)
6. Baydu (694/1294)
7. Ghazan Muḥammad (694/1294)
8. Öljeitü Khudā-banda Muḥammad (703/1303)
9. Arpa-Ke’ün (736/1335)
10. Mūsā (736/1335)

THE JALĀYIRID OR ILKHANID DYNASTY (IN IRAQ AND AZERBAIJAN)

1. Tāj-ad-Dīn Shaykh Ḥasan al-Kabīr (736/1335)
2. Shaykh Uways ibn Ḥasan (757/1356)
3. Jalāl-ad-Dīn Ḥusayn ibn Uways (776/1374)
4. Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Uways (784/1382)
5. Bāyazīd ibn Uways (in Kurdistan) (786/1384)
6. Shāh Walad (813/1410)

UNIVERSAL DIMENSIONS OF THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

7. Tandu (814/1411)
8. Maḥmūd ibn Walad (814/1411)
9. Uways ibn Walad (818/1415)
10. Ḥusayn ‘Alā’-ad-Dawla (827/1423)

THE MUẒAFFARID DYNASTY (IN FARS, KIRMAN AND KURDISTAN)

1. Mubārīz-ad-Dīn Muḥammad ibn al-Muẓaffar (713/1313)
2. Quṭb-ad-Dīn Shāh Maḥmūd (759/1357)
3. Jalāl-ad-Dīn Abu-l-Fawāris Shāh Shujā‘ (765/1363)
4. Mujāhid-ad-Dīn Zayn al-‘Ābidīn (786/1384)
5. ‘Imād-ad-Dīn Aḥmad (in Kirmān) (786/1384)
6. Nuṣrat-ad-Dīn Yaḥyā (in Yazd) (789/1387)
7. Shāh Manṣūr (in Isfahan) (789/1387)

THE KART DYNASTY (IN BALKH, GHAZNA, SARAKHS AND NĪSHĀPŪR)

1. Rukn-ad-Dīn ibn Shams-ad-Dīn (677–82/1278–83)
2. Shams-ad-Dīn Muḥammad I (684/1285)
3. Fakhr-ad-Dīn ibn Rukn-ad-Dīn (684/1285)
4. Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn ibn Rukn-ad-Dīn (706/1306)
5. Shams-ad-Dīn II ibn Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn (729/1328)
6. Ḥāfiẓ ibn Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn (730/1329)
7. Mu‘izz-ad-Dīn Ḥusayn ibn Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn (732/1331)
8. Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn Pīr ‘Alī II ibn Mu‘izz-ad-Dīn (772/1370)

THE TĪMŪRID DYNASTY

1. Tīmūr-i Lang (Temür) Quṭb-ad-Dīn (771/1369)
2. Khalīl (807/1404)
3. Shāh-Rukh (807/1404)
4. ‘Alā’-ad-Dawla Ulugh-Beg ibn Shāh-Rukh (850/1446)
5. Rukn-ad-Dīn ‘Abd-al-Laṭīf ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Shāh-Rukh (853/1449)
6. ‘Abdallāh ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Shāh-Rukh (854/1450)
7. Abū Sa‘īd Muḥammad ibn Mīrān-Shāh (855/1451)
8. Aḥmad ibn Abī Sa‘īd (872/1467)
9. Maḥmūd ibn Abī Sa‘īd (899/1493)

THE QARA-QOYUNLU DYNASTY (IN AZERBAIJAN)

1. Qara-Muḥammad Türemish ibn Bayrām Khwāja (780/1378)
2. Abū-n-Naşr Qara-Yūsuf Noyan ibn Muḥammad (790/1388)
3. Pīr Budaq (810/1407)
4. Iskandar ibn Yūsuf (823/1423)
5. Muẓaffar-ad-Dīn Jahān-Shāh ibn Yūsuf (841/1437)
6. Ḥasan ‘Alī (872/1467)

THE AQ-QOYUNLU DYNASTY (IN AZERBAIJAN)

1. Bahā’-ad-Dawla Qara-Yoluq (780/1378)
2. Nūr-ad-Dīn Ḥamza (839/1435)
3. Mu‘izz-ad-Dīn Jahān-gīr (848/1444)
4. Uzun Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī (858/1454)
5. Khalīl ibn Uzun Ḥasan (883/1478)
6. Ya‘qūb ibn Uzun Ḥasan (884/1479)
7. Bāisunqur ibn Ya‘qūb (896/1490)
8. Rustam ibn Maqṣūd (897/1491)
9. Aḥmad ibn Maḥmūd (902/1496)
10. Murād ibn Ya‘qūb (903/1497)
11. Alwand ibn Yūsuf (905/1499)
12. Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf (906/1500)

THE SAFAVID DYNASTY

1. Shāh Ismā‘īl I (907/1501)
2. Shāh Ṭahmāsp I (930/1523)
3. Ismā‘īl II (984/1576)
4. Muḥammad Khudā-banda (985/1577)
5. Sulṭān *Amīr* Ḥamza (985/1577)
6. Shāh ‘Abbās (989/1581)
7. Shāh Şafī (1038/1628)
8. Shāh ‘Abbās II (1052/1642)
9. Sulaymān I (1077/1666)
10. Ḥusayn (1105/1693)
11. Ṭahmāsp II (1135/1723)
12. ‘Abbās II (1144/1731)
13. Sulaymān II (1163/1749)
14. Ismā‘īl III (1163/1749)
15. Sulṭān Ḥusayn II (1163/1749)
16. Muḥammad Shāh Abū-l-Faṭḥ (1200/1785)

UNIVERSAL DIMENSIONS OF THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

THE AFGHĀN DYNASTY

1. Maḥmūd ibn Mīr Ways (1135/1722)
2. Ashraf ibn ‘Abdallāh (1137/1724)
3. Āzād Khān (1166/1752)

THE AFSHĀRID DYNASTY

1. Nādir Shāh (1148/1735)
2. ‘Ādil Shāh (1160/1747)
3. Ibrāhīm (1161/1748)
4. Shāh-Rukh (1161/1748)
5. ‘Alī Murād Khān Bakhtiyārī (1163/1749)

THE ZAND DYNASTY

1. Karīm Khān (1163/1749)
2. Abū-l-Faṭḥ Khān (1193/1779)
3. Muḥammad ‘Alī (1193/1779)
4. Ṣādiq Khān (in Shīrāz) (1193/1779)
5. ‘Alī Murād Khān (1195/1780)
6. Ja‘far Khān (1199/1784)
7. Luṭf ‘Alī Khān (1203/1788)

THE QĀJĀR DYNASTY

1. Āqā Muḥammad Khān (1200/1785)
2. Faṭḥ ‘Alī Shāh (1212/1797)
3. Muḥammad Shāh (1250/1834)
4. Nāṣir-ad-Dīn Shāh (1264/1847)
5. Muẓaffar-ad-Dīn Shāh (1313/1895)
6. Muḥammad ‘Alī Shāh (1324/1906)
7. Aḥmad Shāh (1327/1909)

THE PAHLAWĪ DYNASTY

1. Riḍā Pahlawī (1304/1886)
2. Muḥammad Riḍā Pahlawī³⁶ (1320–75/1902–55)

36 Horn, *Tārīkh-i mukhtaṣar-i Īrān*, pp. 112–31; Pīrniyā, *Tārīkh-i Īrān*, pp. 754–864.

Chapter 3.5

ISLAM IN ASIA MINOR

Ahmet Yağar Oçak

INTRODUCTION

Islam was born as a monotheistic religion at the beginning of the seventh century AD in the region of Arabia known today as the Ḥijāz. As part of a systematic programme of conquest, the religion expanded in a very short time to encompass many ancient centres of civilization of the old world such as Egypt, Iraq and Persia. This was one of the most important and striking events in history. The Arab conquerors who organized these conquests had identified with Islam and considered it a ‘religion born in their midst’. Based on the religious ideology of *jihād* and *ghazāh*, they established a state whose foundations had been laid during the lifetime of the Prophet Muḥammad. It was a great political entity encompassing all the territories that had been the cradle of civilization. This political entity grew first into the Umayyad empire and then into that of the ‘Abbāsids. Even though Arabs represented the dominant ethnic group, these empires included an extremely heterogeneous and interesting range of nationalities.

Included among the lands within Islam’s sphere of influence was Asia Minor, in which the modern-day Republic of Turkey was established. In ancient times this land was known as Anatolia (‘Land of the Rising Sun’). Later, in Roman and palaeochristian times, it was called Asia or Asia Minor, Bilād ar-Rūm (‘The Lands of Rome’) by the Arabs and, since it had been conquered by Turks, as Turchia by Europeans in late medieval times. In some periods these lands have also been known by the names of the Roman and Byzantine provinces they included. Among these, the names Anatolia and Rūm gave rise to the names of two large provinces of classical Ottoman times: Eyalet-i Anadolu and Eyalet-i Rum.

Today, Turks use both the ancient term Anatolia and the medieval term Turchia for Anadolu and Türkiye respectively. They never use the terms Asia Minor and Bilād ar-Rūm. ‘Anadolu’ has geographic connotations, while ‘Türkiye’ has political, ethnic and cultural connotations. The ancient Roman term of Asia Minor is preferred by Western historians in particular.

During its history, Asia Minor has seen a succession of political, ethnic, socio-cultural and religious transformations – Hellenization, Romanization, Christianization and Islamization. The present chapter deals with the Islamization period or, to be more precise, it examines when, how and by whom Islam was brought to these lands and how it developed there.¹

Asia Minor in pre-Turkish times: a short review

The period most closely related to the diffusion and development of Islam in Asia Minor is the Eastern Roman Christian period or, as it has been called more recently, the Byzantine period. When the Turks entered Asia Minor as invaders in the eleventh century, these lands were part of the Byzantine empire. The long-standing political conflict between Byzantium and the Sāsānid empire in Persia was a continuous cause of wars. Regardless of who the victor was, both sides were inevitably weakened. The battles were not fought for territorial expansion, but rather in order to control the East–West trade routes and the related commercial gain. In addition, continuous wars of succession within the Byzantine empire gave rise to frequent changes in the ruling dynasty and a weakening of the state. By the time the Turks had

1 Up to the present time, there have not been many monographs analysing all aspects of the history of Islam in Asia Minor. We can, however, mention some articles written at the beginning of the twentieth century by the famous German historian Franz Babinger and the Turkish scholar Fuad Köprülü, and books by one Western and two Turkish researchers: F. Babinger, ‘Der Islam in Kleinasien: Neue Wege der Islamforschung’, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, LXXVI, Leipzig, 1922, pp. 126–52; F. Köprülü, ‘Anadolu’da İslâmiyet: Türk istilasından sonra Anadolu tarih-i dinisine bir nazar ve bu tarihin menba’ları’, in *Darülfünun Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, Istanbul, 1338/1922 (as can be seen from the subtitle, ‘A Look at the Religious History of Anatolia and its Sources’, when writing this article, Köprülü used and listed many sources that were not known to Babinger. Even though the article analyses only the Sufi aspect of Islam in Asia Minor, its perspective is more wide-ranging than Babinger’s article); pp. 183–235 of Köprülü’s *Türk Edebiyatında İlk Mutasavvıflar* [The First Sufi in Turkish Literature], Ankara, 1976, can be considered a short introduction to the history of Islam in Asia Minor; S. Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century*, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, University of California Press, 1971 (although this work is somewhat partial at times, it is the most detailed research on the subject up to the present time); O. Çetin, *Selçuklu Müesseseleri ve Anadolu’da İslâmiyet’in Yayılışı* [Seljûq Institutions and the Spread of Islam in Anatolia], Istanbul, Marifet Yayınları, 1981.

penetrated into Anatolia, the Byzantine empire had long since forgotten the glorious days of Justinian (r. 527–65) and Heraclius (r. 610–41).²

The acceptance of Christianity as the official religion, and its subsequent protection by the Roman emperor Constantine the Great (r. 311–37) in the fourth century, gave rise to one of the most important historical transformations in the Mediterranean area: the expansion of Christianity on the basis of the political strength of the Roman empire. This accelerated with the increasing importance of Constantinople and culminated with the subdivision of the empire in 395 after the death of Emperor Theodosius. By that time, Asia Minor was part of the Eastern Roman empire and officially a Christian country. This process created three differences between the two halves of the former Roman empire: the political centre of the Western empire was Rome, its language Latin, and Catholicism its official religion; on the other hand, the political centre of the Eastern empire was Constantinople, its language Greek and its official religion Orthodoxy. In this way, the former Roman empire had become two completely separate entities, each declaring the other to be heretics.³

Due to the complex ethnic structure of this region, not all the local population was Orthodox. Moreover, many small Churches were established. To discourage the development of these Churches, the Byzantine central authorities tended to oppress them from the financial, political and religious points of view and to tax them heavily. This policy proved to be counter-productive, however, since the leaders of the Churches aided and abetted foreign invaders and fought alongside them against the Byzantines. The stance taken by these ‘heretical’ Churches was also seen during the raids into Asia Minor by Muslim Arabs during Umayyad and ‘Abbāsid times. This situation was reflected in the epics describing these conflicts, known as *Dhu-l-himma* by the Arabs and as *Battal-nama* by the Turks.⁴

2 For the Byzantine political situation before the Turkish invasion, see V. Ostrogorsky, *Histoire de l'état byzantin*, Paris, Payot, 1956; A. A. Vasiliev, *Histoire de l'empire byzantin*, Paris, Éditions A. Picard, 1969; L. Brehier, *Vie et mort de Byzance*, Paris, Albin Michel, 1969.

3 The first chapter of the above-mentioned work by Vryonis provides short but concise information about the political, administrative, economic and social situation in Byzantine Asia Minor before the Turkish conquest. See Vryonis, *Decline*, pp. 1–68.

4 On these epics, see M. Canard, ‘Delhemma, Seyyid Battal et Omar al-No'man’, *Byzantion*, XII, 1937, pp. 186ff; H. Ethe, *Die Fahrten des Sajjid Batthal*, Leipzig, 1871; G. Husing, *Zur Rostahmsage-Sajjid Battal*, Leipzig, J. C. Hinrichs, 1913; P. N. Boratav, ‘Battal’, in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Istanbul, II, pp. 344–51; I. Melikoff, ‘al-Battal’, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–, I, pp. 1101–4. These last two articles also provide a detailed bibliography.

Islam in Asia Minor: political, ethnic, social and religious transformations

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Theoretically, the Arab invasion during Umayyad times could be seen as the beginning of the penetration of Islam into Asia Minor. But this does not mean that it had gained a substantive foothold by then, and even less that it had become widespread there. The process by which Islam spread and gave rise to a culture and a set of traditions that would eventually constitute the cultural identity of the majority of the population began with the Turkish settlement of this region during the eleventh century. The entry of the Turks into Asia Minor led to the Islamization of the area.

Islamization could be described as the process that began with the spreading of Turkish settlements in Asia Minor in the twelfth century and the establishment of the Seljūq state. The process itself consisted in the creation, with state support, of a set of social and cultural values, of religious organizations, of the development of various branches of the arts (literature, music, architecture), of the sciences and of a legal system. This process encompassed four transformations – political, ethnic, social and religious – which were still active as late as the sixteenth century, the period of the Ottoman empire's greatest strength. In what follows, the Islamization of Asia Minor will be analysed from the point of view of these four transformations.

Political transformation: the settlement of a Muslim Turkish population and Turkish states

TURKISH INVASION AND SETTLEMENT

The conversion to Islam of the Turks began at the time of the Umayyads. The Turks came face to face with Muslim Arabs for the first time in the mid-eighth century on the eastern frontier of the Umayyad empire. In 'Abbāsīd times, Turkish slaves made their first appearance in the centre of the empire; their use, first as servants at court and then as soldiers and even as commanders in the army, became commonplace during the reign of the caliph al-Mu'taṣim (r. 833–42). Later, they constituted the entire commanding class of the army and in time they took over the administration of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate.⁵

5 A useful monograph based on the principal sources concerning the role of Turks in the 'Abbāsīd empire is H. D. Yildiz, *İslâmiyet ve Türkler* [Islam and the Turks], Istanbul, İstanbul Üniversitesi Publications, 1976.

A succession of Muslim Turkish states that was to culminate in the Ottoman empire began in the 960s with the establishment of the first Muslim Turkish state by the Karahanlıs (Qarakhanids). This ensured the Islamization of Central Asia, the Middle East and even the Balkans and had profound effects on the history of these regions. With the conversion to Islam of the Turks began one of the greatest transformations in their history. Bernard Lewis describes this transformation very well:

A distinguishing feature of Turkish Islam, from its very beginning, is the completeness with which the Turks surrendered themselves to their new religion. Partly because of the simple intensity of the faith as they encountered it on the frontiers of Islam and heathendom, partly because their conversion to Islam at once involved them in *jihād* against their own heathen kinsmen, the converted Turks sank their national identity in Islam as the Arabs and Persians had never done.⁶

Thanks to the Muslim Oghuz Turks of south-west Asia, who from 1037 conquered all of Persia, and to their Great Seljūq empire, for the first time in its history the Muslim Middle East was dominated by a nomadic nation of the steppes. When Toghril Beg conquered Baghdad in 1055, ridding the 'Abbāsid caliphate of the influence of the Shī'ite Būyids, the Muslim Turks established a dominion over Muslim lands that was to last for many centuries.⁷ This also introduced a unique revolution into the Middle East – the increasing militarization of Muslim states. Before long, the Seljūqs had wrested control of Syria and Palestine from the Fāṭimids and a major part of Asia Minor from the Byzantines, thus consolidating their hold over the Middle East. Due to its nomadic and militaristic character, this empire was of a kind never seen before.

The first step in the Islamization of Asia Minor was thus completed. The political, ethnic, social and religious developments within this process were an appendix to the Great Seljūq empire in Asia Minor and would bring with them the greatest changes ever witnessed in these lands. Politically, it

6 B. Lewis, *The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years*, New York, Touchstone edn, Simon & Schuster, 1997, p. 88.

7 According to Claude Cahen, the Turks' invasion of the Middle East and Asia Minor, and the consequent introduction of a new ethnic group into these regions, has not received the attention it deserves from Western historians and this is unfortunate, since the invasion was as important, from a world perspective, as the Germanic, Slav and Arab invasions. See C. Cahen, 'Le problème ethnique en Anatolie', *Cahier d'Histoire Mondiale*, II, 1954–5, pp. 347–62. On the Seljūq empire in Persia, see M. A. Köymen, *Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu Tarihi* [History of the Great Seljūq Empire], I: *Kuruluş Devri* [The Period of Foundation], Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1989; M. A. Köymen, *Büyük Selçuklu İmparatorluğu Tarihi* [History of the Great Seljūq Empire], II: *İkinci İmparatorluk Devri* [The Period of the Second Empire], Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1984.



3.26 Aya Sophia, Istanbul (© G. Degeorge)

meant that the frontiers of the Byzantine empire were pushed back almost to the Aegean Sea; from an ethnic point of view, the Muslim Oghuz Turks (Turkomans) had moved into Asia Minor; from a social point of view, a totally different social order was introduced; and from a religious point of view, there was Islamization and the introduction into Asia Minor of symbols related to Islam.

In a sense, the Turkish invasion of Asia Minor was not part of the programme of conquest and expansion of the Great Seljūq empire, but was more the inevitable consequence of political developments in Persia.⁸ Proof of this can be found in the battle of Manzikert (1071) between the Seljūq sultan Alp Arslan and the Byzantine emperor Romanos Diogenes.⁹ This was not a battle initiated by the Seljūq sultan with the aim of conquering Asia Minor, but rather a defensive strategy against an attack by Romanos Diogenes upon the sultan, who was returning from a raid on Fāṭimid territory. This is clear from the conditions of the treaty signed between the parties. In the event,

8 This point of view has been analysed in detail in C. Cahen, 'La première pénétration turque en Asie Mineure (seconde moitié du XI^{ème} siècle)', *Byzantion*, XVIII, 1946–8, pp. 5–67. See also C. Cahen, *La Turquie pré-ottomane*, Istanbul, Institut Français d'Études Anatoliennes d'Istanbul, 1988, pp. 83–5, and the English translation *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, trans. J. Jones-Williams, New York, Taplinger Publications, 1968, p. 103; O. Turan, 'Selçuklu Kervansarayları' [Turkey in the Seljūq Era], *Bellesten*, X, 1946, pp. 37–44.

9 See C. Cahen, 'La campagne de Manzikert d'après les sources musulmanes', *Byzantion*, IX, 1934, pp. 613–42; Turan, 'Selçuklu Kervansarayları', pp. 27–31; Vryonis, *Decline*, pp. 96–103.

even though the Byzantine emperor was captured by the sultan, he was later released with no loss of territory or privileges.

The conquest of Asia Minor was more the consequence of the Seljūq administration's wish to find a place where the Turkoman clans that were pouring into Persia from Central Asia could settle but also be kept under control. These clans were continuously fomenting trouble but, up to that time, the Seljūqs had turned a blind eye to their marauding of the Byzantine province of Asia Minor. Thus, following the battle of Manzikert, Turkoman lords like Artuq, Saltuq, Danishmend and Mengujek established principalities in Asia Minor. The Artuqids were in Mardin, Harput and environs, the Saltuqids were in Erzurum, the Danishmendids were in the area encompassing Tokat, Niksar and Malatya, and the Mengujeks were around Erzincan and Sivas.¹⁰ The Danishmendid conquests in Asia Minor were especially admired by the Turks of those days and gave rise to epics known as *Danishmendnama*.¹¹

However, the Turks who managed to establish a permanent state covering almost all of Asia Minor, excluding the area of the Aegean and the Marmara seas, were the lords related to the Great Seljūq dynasty reigning in Persia. Among these, Kutlamish (or Kutalmish) had tried to take over the Great Seljūq throne, but having been unsuccessful had been exiled from Persia and banished to Asia Minor. In 1081 Sulayman, son of Kutlamish, conquered the Byzantine city of İznik (Nicaea) and made it his capital; three years later he also conquered Antakya. Not having dismissed the idea of settling his accounts with his cousins in Persia, he did not intend to stay on in Asia Minor indefinitely. On the other hand, the administration in Persia was equally adamant that he should not return.¹²

Thus, not only had the battle of Manzikert not been fought with the aim of conquering and settling Asia Minor, but the Turkish lords who had been obliged to settle there because of political competition and conflict had no

10 Disregarding a few articles on these states, there are only two monographs on the subject, both written by Turkish historians: O. Turan, *Doğu Anadolu Türk Devletleri Tarihi: Saltuklular, Mengüçükler, Sökmenliler, Dilmaçoğulları ve Artuklular'ın Siyasi Tarih ve Medeniyetleri* [The History of the Eastern Anatolian Turkish States: Political History and Civilization of the Saltuqs, Mengujeks, Sökmenlis, Dilmaçlis and Artuqids], Istanbul, Turan Press, 1973; F. Sümer, *Selçuklular Devrinde Doğu Anadolu'da Türk Beylikler* [Turkish Principalities in Eastern Anatolia during Seljūq Times], Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1990.

11 See Ş. Akkaya, 'Kitab-i Melik Danişmend Gazi: Eine Türkische Historischer Heldenroman aus der Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts', in *Proceedings of the Twenty-second Congress of Orientalists*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1957, pp. 432–5; I. Melikoff, *La geste de Melik Danişmend: étude critique du Danişmendnâme*, I: *introduction et traduction*; II: *édition critique*, Paris, Maisonneuve, 1960. See also I. Melikoff, 'Danishmendides', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–, II, pp. 110–11.

12 See A. Z. V. Togan, *Umumî Türk Tarihine Giriş* [Introduction to General Turkish History], Istanbul, 1970, pp. 202–3; Vryonis, *Decline*, pp. 103–33.

intention of staying. Nevertheless, political conditions made it necessary for the Turkomans, who had been banished from Persia, to settle in Asia Minor permanently.¹³ By making İznik his capital, Sulayman son of Kutlamish had laid the foundations of the state of the Seljūqs of Rūm. The Turks had irreversibly settled in Asia Minor.

THE SELJŪQS OF RŪM

The real penetration and spread of Islam in Asia Minor occurred under the Seljūqs of Rūm. Since in those days Muslim sources called Asia Minor ‘Bilād ar-Rūm’, referring to the fact that these were the lands of the Eastern Roman empire, the Seljūq state founded there has been called the Seljūqs of Rūm. Turkish historians, however, have generally preferred the terms ‘Anatolian Seljūq state’ or ‘Seljūq state of Turkey’.

The contribution of the Seljūqs of Rūm to the dissemination of Islam in Asia Minor and to its settlement by Turks has been of the utmost significance. The creation of this Turkish state was fraught with difficulties since it had to compete, on the one hand, with the Byzantine empire and, on the other, with the Danishmendids, who also established a Turkish state that dominated a large part of central and eastern Asia Minor.

During the reign of Qilijarslan I, the son of Sulayman, the sultan had to fight the Byzantines, the Danishmendids and also the Crusaders. He had to submit to the Crusaders, who laid siege to İznik in 1096, and was forced to retreat back east. In 1106 Qilijarslan took Malatya from the Danishmendids and conquered Mavsil in 1107, but he was defeated by the *amīr* Chavlu and drowned in the Habur river. His son Mas‘ūd took Konya from the Crusaders and made it his capital. Later, Qilijarslan II continued the fight against the Crusaders and at the same time decisively vanquished the Byzantines in 1176 at Myriokephalon (Karamıkbeli). With this war, the Turkish presence in Asia Minor became definitive and ended the dreams of the Seljūqs of Rūm of regaining Persia. Another important development at this time was Qilijarslan II’s conquest of the Danishmendid state, thanks to which more than two-thirds of Asia Minor fell under the domination of the Seljūqs of Rūm.¹⁴

Before his death, Qilijarslan II followed the ancient Turkish tradition and subdivided his country among his sons. The Third Crusade in 1190 coincided with the ensuing struggle for supremacy among these three *sahzadas*. Nevertheless, the Seljūqs were able to defend their country against

13 C. Cahen, ‘Notes pour l’histoire des Turcomans d’Asie Mineure au XIII^{ème} siècle’, *Journal Asiatique*, CCXXXIX, 1951, pp. 335–54.

14 For the various phases of the history of the Seljūqs of Rūm, see the above-mentioned monographs by Cahen and Turan.

this attack. Finally, Ghiyās-ad-Dīn Kaykhusrau I managed to vanquish his other brothers and become the sole Seljūq sovereign. During this period, in 1204, the Crusaders of the Fourth Crusade took Constantinople, founded a Latin state and forced the Byzantine administration to take refuge in İznik and its environs.

During the reign of İzz-ad-Dīn Kaykawus I (r. 1210–20) and especially during that of his brother Ala-ad-Dīn Kayqubad (r. 1220–37), the Seljūq state in Rūm developed both politically and economically. With its conquest of Sinop on the Black Sea and Antalya on the Mediterranean, it gained two important commercial ports. Thanks to the resultant income from international commerce, the Seljūqs of Rūm could further raise the already satisfactory social and economic conditions of Asia Minor.¹⁵ It was during this period that the famous Sufis Shihāb-ad-Dīn Suhrawardī from Baghdad and Muḥyi-d-Dīn al-‘Arabī from Muslim Spain (al-Andalus) arrived in Anatolia.

Unfortunately, the period of relative affluence did not last. The Seljūqs of Rūm started to decline during the reign of the capricious and incapable Ghiyās-ad-Dīn Kaykhusrau II. Following the great Turkoman revolt (the Babai revolt) of 1240,¹⁶ which was an important turning-point in the development of Islam in Asia Minor, the Mongols invaded Asia Minor. This marked the end of the Seljūqs of Rūm.¹⁷

The Vatican State tried to take advantage of the situation and sent Franciscan and Dominican missionaries to convert the pagan Mongols and restore Christian supremacy in Asia Minor. Among these missionaries, the Dominican Simon of Saint-Quentin has left writings full of interesting observations concerning contemporary social and religious life in the region.¹⁸ Meanwhile, the Byzantine administration in İznik reconquered Constantinople in 1261, putting an end to the Latin state. This period saw a rapid succession of political and social crises in the former Seljūq territories of Asia Minor and it was under such circumstances that Mawlānā Jalāl-ad-Dīn ar-Rūmī lived in Konya (see more on ar-Rūmī below).

15 See Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, pp. 155–68, and *La Turquie pré-ottomane*, pp. 114–20; Turan, *Doğu Anadolu Türk*, pp. 395–402.

16 On this revolt, which from many points of view occupies a very important place within the context of Turkish history, see Köprülü, ‘Anadolu’da İslâmiyet’, pp. 303–11. The above-mentioned book by Cahen also contains some information on this revolt, but for more detailed information, see C. Cahen, ‘Babai’, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–, I, pp. 843–4; Turan, *Doğu Anadolu Türk*, pp. 420–6; A. Y. Ocak, *La révolte de Baba Resul ou la formation de l’hétérodoxie musulmane en Anatolie au XIII^{ème} siècle*, Ankara, Société d’Histoire Turque, 1989. The latter work includes a detailed bibliography on the subject.

17 See Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, pp. 269–79, and *La Turquie pré-ottomane*, pp. 227–50; Turan, *Doğu Anadolu Türk*, pp. 427–57.

18 This very important Latin work is Simon de Saint-Quentin, *Historia Tartarorum* [History of the Tartars], ed. Jean Richard, Paris, Paul Geuthner, 1965.

TURKOMAN STATES AND THE OTTOMAN ERA

With the domination of the Mongols that began in 1277, the Turkoman clans were forced to migrate towards Byzantine lands in the west. There, they founded several small independent states that the Byzantines had neither the inclination nor the means to fight. These states included the Mentеше, the Aydinoghlu, the Karesi and the Germiyan.¹⁹ Of these, the Mentеше and the Aydinoghlu fought successfully against the Byzantines and the Venetians in the Aegean area.²⁰ The *Dasitan-ı Ghazi Umur Pasha* was a rhyming epic about Umur Bey of the Aydinoghlu and reflects the *jihād* and *ghazāh* tradition of these principalities.²¹

One of these principalities – established by the Ottomans (Osmanlı Beyliği) adjacent to the Byzantine empire – would evolve into the empire of Sulayman the Magnificent in the sixteenth century. With its favourable geostrategic position near the Byzantine empire and the successful policies of its first sultans Osman, Orhan and Murad, the Ottoman principality was at the beginning of that century already on its way to rapidly becoming an empire. It had become a beacon that attracted many people, both for spiritual reasons like waging a *jihād* and for material reasons like acquiring loot. Due to the political and economic weaknesses of the Byzantines and the other Christian states of the Balkans, it was able to expand into Asia Minor and into the Balkans. In this way it consolidated its military, administrative and socio-economic strengths.²²


In May 1453 a young and energetic sultan who had just ascended the throne, Mehmed II, conquered Constantinople and made it his capital. Thus, he not only put an end to the once-glorious Byzantine empire, but also became its successor, gaining great notoriety in the Western world in the process. The fall of Constantinople – the political and spiritual centre of Orthodox Christianity – to the Ottomans opened a totally new era, not just

19 For the only monograph analysing the collective history of these Turkoman states, see İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Anadolu Beylikleri ve Akkoyunlu, Karakoyunlu Devletleri* [Anatolian Principalities and the Aqqoyunlu (The White Sheep) and Karaqoyunlu (The Black Sheep) States], Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1998. See also C. Cahen, 'Les principautés turcomanes au début du XIV^{ème} siècle d'après Pachimère et Grégoras', *Tarih Dergisi (Mélanges I. Hakkı Uzunçarşılı)*, XXXIX, 1979, pp. 111–16. For additional individual monographs written by both Western and Turkish historians, see P. Wittek, *Das Fürstentum Mentesch: Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 13.–14. Jahrhunderts*, Istanbul, Universum Druckerei, 1934.

20 See particularly E. A. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Mentеше and Aydin (1300–1415)*, Venice, Library of the Hellenic Institute, 1983.

21 I. Melikoff-Sayar, *Le Destân d'Umur Pacha*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1954.

22 Many monographs have been published about the Ottoman empire since Joseph von Hammer. Nevertheless, as far as the classical age is concerned (which in the context of this chapter is of the most relevance), see H. İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300–1600*, London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1973.



3.27 Ottoman Tughra from the sixteenth century which resulted from joining the name of a sultan with that of his father, followed by the traditional Turkish title Khan (© Khalili Family Trust/Nour Foundation)

for the Western Christian world, but also for the Islamic world. The main feature of this new era was the fact that the Christian heritage of Rome had been added to the Muslim political heritage of the Ottoman empire. With this conquest, the young sultan Mehmed II not only acquired the title of *Fātih* or *Abū-l-Fath* ('the Conqueror'), but also created a centralized militaristic empire that would remain the strongest entity in either East or West until the beginning of the eighteenth century.²³ He had conquered the formerly Byzantine lands of Asia Minor and the Balkans and thus had merged the political traditions of classical Islam and Rome in a single political force.

Mehmed II dreamt of dominating the whole world and organized all his activities with this in mind. He implemented many reforms in the fields of politics, administration, finance and economics. He conquered the Trebizond (Pontus) Byzantine state and the Akkoyunlu (Aq-Qoyunlu) Turkoman state which had played a leading role in the affairs of both eastern Asia Minor and Persia.²⁴ He also expanded his dominions into the Balkans. Mehmed's successors continued these conquests and put an end to any hope the newly

23 See F. Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time*, trans. R. Manheim, ed. W. C. Hickman, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1978; H. İnalcık, *Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tedkikler ve Vesikalar I* [Research and Documents on the Times of the Conqueror], Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1987; H. İnalcık, 'Mehmed II', in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, Istanbul, VII, pp. 506–35; H. İnalcık, 'Mehmed II', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–, VI, pp. 978–81; S. Tansel, *Osmanlı Kaynaklarına Göre Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in Siyasî ve Askerî Faaliyeti* [The Political and Military Activities of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror according to Ottoman Sources], Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1985.

24 On the Akkoyunlus, see J. E. Woods, *The Aqqoyunlu Clan, Confederation, Empire: A Study in 15th/9th Century Turco-Iranian Politics*, Minneapolis/Chicago, Bibliotheca Islamica, 1976.

founded Shī‘ite Safavid state may have had of controlling Asia Minor.²⁵ They also conquered the domains of the Egyptian Mamlūks, which up to that point had been the most influential and prestigious state in the Islamic world.

By that time the Ottomans ruled over the most powerful, developed and vast empire in either East or West. The Ottoman empire subsumed the many bickering Balkan states; under its authority, their populations enjoyed a long period of peace that modern Ottoman historians call the *Pax Ottomana*. Unfortunately, however, the Ottomans paid a very high price for this and had to fight long wars on both the western and eastern fronts, squandering their manpower and economic potential. By the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the empire had reached its natural limits and a slow decline had set in.

Ethnic transformation: Muslim Turks and indigenous populations

We do not have exact historical and statistical information concerning the ethnic demographic structure of Asia Minor before the arrival of the Turks.²⁶ Nevertheless, there was almost certainly a decrease in the population as a result of the Muslim Arab raids. The greater part of the population was made up of Christians who could mostly be considered Greek (*Rūmī*) and who were mostly employed in the agricultural sector. In general, they must have spoken and written some sort of Greek with traces of the ancient languages of Asia Minor. On the other hand, most of the population of eastern Asia Minor was made up of Orthodox Armenians and Monophysite Yaqubis. Further south there were Assyrians (Syriac-speaking Christians).²⁷

Although modern Turkish nationalist historians claim that the battle of Manzikert was fought with the aim of settling Asia Minor and making

25 B. Kütükoğlu, ‘Les relations entre l’empire ottoman et l’Iran dans la seconde moitié du XVI^{ème} siècle’, *Turcica*, VI, 1975, pp. 128–45; H. Sohrweide, ‘Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien und seine Rückwirkungen auf die Schiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert’, *Der Islam*, XLI, 1965, pp. 95–223; E. Eberhard, *Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden im 16. Jahrhundert*, Freiburg, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1970; I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr, ‘La règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l’empire ottoman’, *Turcica*, VI, 1975, pp. 34–49; G. E. Caretto, ‘Appunti per Sunniti e Sciiti nell’area ottomana’, in *La bisaccia dello sceicco: omaggio ad A. Bausani*, Venice, 1981, pp. 165–70; A. Allouche, *The Origin and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict (1500–1555)*, Berlin, Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983, p. 197; J. L. Bacque-Gramont, *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins (1514–1524)*, Paris/Istanbul/The Netherlands, Historisch-Archaeologisch Institut Istanbul, 1987; J. Aubin, ‘La politique orientale de Selim Ier’, *Res Orientales (Itinéraires d’Orient : Hommages à Claude Cahen)*, VI, 1994, pp. 197–216.

26 This problem has been analysed in depth by C. Cahen in his ‘Le problème ethnique en Anatolie’, *Cahier d’Histoire Mondiale*, II, 1954–5, pp. 347–62. Vryonis (*Decline*, pp. 143–93) has made a detailed study, on a regional basis, of the ethnic structure and its transformation.

27 See note 4 above.

it a ‘motherland’, we have seen that this was not the case. It is, however, true that the ancestors of the present-day Turks of Turkey, the Oghuz Turks (Turkomans), who had only recently converted to Islam, started settling in this region after the battle. Subsequently, it did indeed become their ‘motherland’. The important point is that the great majority of the newcomers were Muslim Oghuz Turks. These populations, who had been banished from the Persian territories of the Great Seljūq empire, had no difficulty finding suitable areas to settle. In particular, the central and eastern parts of Asia Minor had areas suitable for their flocks of sheep, both for the winter and in the cool highlands for the summer.


The Orthodox Byzantines did not oppose this advance towards the western parts of Asia Minor because they were already familiar with the Kuman (Kipchaq) and Oghuz Turks who had come from the Balkans and, having converted to Christianity, were recruited by the Byzantine army as mercenaries. Moreover, the Byzantines had had their assistance during the frequent internal conflicts within their empire. In addition, non-Orthodox minorities, who hated the Byzantines, not only did not oppose but even welcomed the arrival of the newcomers because, even though they were occupying their lands, these incomers did not interfere in their religious affairs. Both these factors must undoubtedly have made it easier and quicker for the Turks to conquer and settle in Asia Minor.²⁸

Turkish historians and an older generation of Western historians differ on several points concerning the Turkish settlement of Asia Minor. The main disagreement is over the population density of these newcomers, while a second difference of opinion concerns whether all the Turks or only some of them were nomadic. When examined carefully, however, it is clear that much of this conflict is a reflection of anti-Turkish prejudice in Western public opinion and a reaction to this by the Turks.

Historians divide the Turkomans’ arrival and settlement in Asia Minor into two phases: before and after the Mongol invasion.²⁹ The first phase followed the battle of Manzikert, when great numbers of Turkomans entered and settled in Asia Minor. Not all of them were nomads, since they included Muslim groups who had started to lead sedentary urban lives while still in Central Asia. These urban groups settled in the cities of Asia Minor, where they continued to practise their arts and professions. As early as this first phase, Turks had become the dominant majority in the region. The second

28 Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, p. 204, and *La Turquie pré-ottomane*, p. 164.

29 For example, see M. H. Yinanç, *Türkiye Tarihi, Selçuklular Devri: Anadolu’nun Fethi* [The History of Turkey, The Seljūq Period: The Conquest of Anatolia], Istanbul, 1944, pp. 166–9; C. Cahen, ‘La première pénétration turque en Asie Mineure’, *Byzantion*, XVIII, 1948, pp. 68–9; Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, pp. 143–54, and *La Turquie pré-ottomane*, pp. 101–9; Togan, *Umumî Türk Tarihine*, pp. 191–200; Turan, *Doğu Anadolu Türk*, pp. 1–44, 213–16.



3.28 Dome of the Selimiye Mosque, Edirne (© G. Degeorge)

phase is characterized by great waves of migration, which started at the same time as the Mongol invasion and originated from Transoxiana (*Mā warā' an-nahr*), Khwārazm, Azerbaijan and Arran. During this phase, many urban Turks also came to Asia Minor together with nomads.³⁰ This was the period of İzz-ad-Dīn Kaykawus I and Ala-ad-Dīn Kayqubad I.

It has been claimed that Turks arrived in Asia Minor long before the battle of Manzikert.³¹ Indeed, some contemporary Turkish archaeologists assert that there was a proto-Turkish presence in Asia Minor in the period before Christ. Although new archaeological finds may confirm this thesis, there is as yet no convincing evidence.³² On the other hand, Western historians like Claude Cahen are more conservative and state that during the first phase ethnic Turks did not yet form the majority of the population of Asia Minor, even

30 See F. Sümer, 'Anadolu'ya Yalnız Göçebe Türkler mi Geldi?' [Was it Only Nomadic Turks that Came to Anatolia?], *Belleten*, XXIV, 1960, pp. 567–95.

31 See, for example, R. N. Frye and A. Sayili, 'Selcuklular'dan evvel Orta Şarkta Türkler' [The Turks in the Middle East before the Seljūqs], *Belleten*, X, 1946, pp. 97–131.

32 V. Sevin, 'Mystery Steale: Are Stone Images Found in Southeastern Turkey Evidence of Early Nomads and a Lost Kingdom?', *Archeology*, July/Aug. 2000, pp. 47–51; V. Sevin and A. Özfirat, 'Hakkari Stellery: Doğu Anadolu'da Savaşçı Çobanlar' [Warrior Shepherds in Eastern Anatolia], *Belleten*, CCXLIII, 2001, pp. 501–18.

though they were quite numerous. According to Cahen and other historians, Turks became a majority in the area only after the Mongol invasion, in other words from the thirteenth century.³³

From the time of the Third Crusade in 1189 led by Frederick Barbarossa, Western sources begin to use the term 'Turchia' for Asia Minor.³⁴ This shows that by then Asia Minor had become a Turkish land and that the parallel processes of Turkification and Islamization had begun. Especially as far as the rural areas were concerned, this process was undoubtedly begun by nomadic Turkomans. On the other hand, the situation in the cities was a little different and should be analysed in the context of the process of Islamization, which is different from Turkification (see below).

In conclusion, no precise information exists regarding the absolute numbers and percentages of Turks in the region at this time and it is unlikely that any will be found. If there had been *tahrir defterleri* (provincial surveys) in Seljūq times, as there were in the later Ottoman period, we should have more precise information. Such documents must have been prepared by Seljūq and also by Mongol (Ilkhanid) administrations in the thirteenth century, if only for tax-collecting purposes, but for unknown reasons these have not been preserved. Even though there are no concrete data confirming whether the Turks were still a minority before the Mongol invasion, it is an incontrovertible historical fact that after this event they gradually became a majority.

Another obscure point regarding the ethnic and demographic basis of the diffusion of Islam in Asia Minor revolves around the question of whether all Turks that came to the region during these two waves were Muslims. Historical sources confirm that the great majority of them were Muslims, albeit with differing periods of conversion, but that there were also some Uyğur and Kıpçak Turks who were still Buddhists (or more probably Manichaeans) along with other groups which had converted to the Nestorian sect of Christianity while still in Central Asia. This explains why as late as the sixteenth century Ottoman *tahrir defters* (imperial chancery registers) mention people with Turkish names but who are Christians. Although Western and Turkish historians have advanced a number of differing theories about these populations, it is almost certain that they were Nestorian Turks who converted to Christianity while still in Central Asia.

It is clear from the above example that, a few exceptions notwithstanding, most of the Turks in Asia Minor were Muslims. On the other hand, most of the local population were Christians of various denominations, with the exception of a few who had converted to Islam. In urban settlements, in particular, these two religious groups – who by now were living in close

33 Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, pp. 143–54, and *La Turquie pré-ottomane*, pp. 101–9.

34 See Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, p. 145, and *La Turquie pré-ottomane*, p. 103.

proximity – were intermarrying. Although there are no precise data, it is not hard to imagine that Christian girls married into Muslim families, thus creating a mixed population. There are references to such a trend in epics like the *Battalnama* and the *Danişmendnama*. In turn, these mixed marriages must have influenced conversions to Islam.

Another aspect of this ethnic intermingling, with special relevance to modern-day events, was the presence in Asia Minor of a Kurdish population. The Kurds live in an area (referred to in early Islamic sources as ‘Kurdistan’) that encompasses parts of Persia, present-day Iraq and Asia Minor. The great majority of Kurds converted to Islam during the Arab conquests. Consequently there must have been Turks who, having settled in Kurdish majority areas, became Kurds, in the same way that Kurds living in Turkish majority areas became Turks. The process is still continuing at the present time.

Social transformation: villages and peasants, cities and citizens

PROBLEMS AND OBSERVATIONS

As already stated, a significant number of Turks who migrated to Asia Minor followed a nomadic lifestyle. Nevertheless, some of them gradually settled in the villages of the Anatolian steppes that had been abandoned by their Byzantine inhabitants or were still partially settled by Byzantines. Most of these villages still exist today and are easily recognizable by their names, even if they have gradually metamorphosed over the centuries. The newcomers also founded their own villages, again easily recognizable by their names.³⁵ As for the first group of villages, there is information concerning them as far as Byzantine times are concerned,³⁶ but unfortunately not as relates to the Seljūqs of Rūm or the Turkoman principalities of Asia Minor. It is thus not possible to give a definitive picture of the socio-economic structure, populations or economic activities of the villages of this period. It is only from Ottoman times onwards that information exists concerning almost

35 On this subject, see especially Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dahiliye Vekaleti, *Son Teşkilât-ı Mülkiyede Köylerimizin Adları* [Names of Our Villages in the Administrative Organization], Istanbul, 1928; C. Türkay, *Başbakanlık Arşivi Belgelerine Göre Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Oymak, Aşiret ve Cemaatler* [Tribes and Tribal Subgroups in the Ottoman Empire according to Documents in the Prime Ministerial Archive], Turkey, İşaret Library, 2001.

36 For example, see L. Brehier, ‘La population rurale au IX^{ème} siècle d’après l’hagiographie byzantine’, *Byzantion*, I, 1924, pp. 177–90; G. Roillard, *La vie rurale dans l’empire byzantin*, Paris, Librairie d’Amérique et d’Orient, 1953; M. Kaplan, ‘Les villageois aux premiers siècles byzantins (VI^{ème}–X^{ème}): une société homogène?’, *Byzantinoslavica*, 1982, pp. 202–17; M. Kaplan, *Les hommes et la terre à Byzance du VI^{ème} au XI^{ème} siècle: propriété et exploitation du sol*, Paris, Publication de la Sorbonne, 1992.

every village. Indeed, thanks to the *tahrir defters* (imperial chancery registers) even the names and numbers of taxpayers are known. Studies carried out during the last fifteen years or so have provided detailed information and related data on the subject.³⁷

As for the cities, a treasure trove of source material is nowadays available to historians wishing to conduct research into the medieval cities of the classical age of Islam, like Cairo, Damascus, Aleppo, Baghdad, Basra, Bayhaq, Tabriz, Marw, Balkh, Bukhārā and Samarkand. A great deal of information is available in chronicles and travel accounts about these cities that were the metropolises of their times. Works were written in medieval times that focused on most of these cities. On the other hand, very little information is available concerning the cities of Asia Minor under the Seljūqs and the Turkoman principalities. Another problem lies in the fact that the current state of these cities is far removed from that in the Middle Ages. The only source of particular value we possess is the *riḥla* of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, a fourteenth-century traveller from the Maghrib (western North Africa) who wrote about Asia Minor at the time of the principalities.³⁸

As in the case of the villages, the Ottoman period is very rich in source material for the cities. In addition to the *tahrir defters*, the *awqaf defterleri* (religious foundation registers) and the *shar'iyya sijills* (*qāḍī*'s court registers), there are many more archival documents covering the period. Nevertheless, there are no Ottoman sources dealing with the Muslim cities of Asia Minor that correspond to European city administration, church or monastery archives which provide so much information about the socio-economic, religious and cultural situation of medieval and later times in cities and towns. Similarly, there are many problems with the Ottoman sources, the main one being that there is very little pre-Ottoman and Ottoman information concerning religious institutions and communities because these registers were simply administrative instruments set up for practical purposes.

37 The following are examples, among many others, of these studies: N. Göyünç, *XVI. Yüzyılda Mardin Sancağı* [The Sub-province of Mardin in the Sixteenth Century], Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991; F. Emecen, *XVI. Asırda Manisa Kazası, XVI. Yüzyılda Mardin Sancağı* [The Sub-district of Manisa in the Sixteenth Century], Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1989; İ. Miroğlu, *Kemah Sancağı ve Erzincan Kazası (1520–1566)* [The District of Kemah and the Sub-district of Erzincan], Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1990; M. Öz, *XV ve XVI yüzyıllarda Canik Sancağı* [The District of Canik in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries], Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999; M. İlhan, *Amid (Diyarbakır), 1518 Detailed Register*, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2000; H. Doğru, *XV ve XVI Yüzyıllarda Eskişehir ve Sultanönü Sancağı* [Eskişehir and the District of Sultanönü in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries], İstanbul, Afa Yayınları, 1992.

38 This important source has been published more than once in the Arab world and in Turkey, in both the original version and translations. One of the best editions is *Muhadhdhab riḥlat Ibn Baṭṭūṭa: tuḥfat an-nuzzār fī gharā'ib al-amṣār wa-'ajā'ib al-'asfār*, ed. A. al-Awāmīrī and M. A. al-Mawlā, Cairo, 1933. The writer provides very interesting information concerning some of the cities of Asia Minor.

An understanding of the religious, social and cultural structures of the cities of Asia Minor during Turkish times rests in great part on a knowledge of their historical origins. It must also be kept in mind that, though there may have been some similarities, the cities of Asia Minor differed from European cities in terms of both social and physical structures. A study of the information provided by Henri Pirenne on medieval European cities clearly reveals the differences.³⁹

VILLAGES AND PEASANTS

The physical and social aspects of the Turkish settlement of Asia Minor that substantially changed the ethnic and religious structure of the rural areas concern the villages and cities in which these newcomers lived. When studying the Turks in the rural areas, it is important to understand the concept of 'nomad'. As has already been mentioned, the great majority of Turks were from the Muslim nomadic Oghuz clans called Turkomans.⁴⁰ They settled in the river valleys of central Asia Minor that greatly resembled their ancestral lands in the steppes of Central Asia. Even though we call them nomads, they were not people who lived throughout the year in tents, following their flocks of goats and sheep and their herds of cattle and camels. They spent the winter in shelters that they found in abandoned villages or that they had built themselves. They spent part of the year working their fields. Toponymic research shows us that they gave the name of their Turkoman clan or of their political-religious chiefs to the villages that they founded.⁴¹


With the arrival of spring, some of these Turkomans were left behind to till the fields while the remainder migrated to highlands where they could find pastures for their herds and flocks, and where they would live until winter in tents made by themselves. Most of these villages probably lacked a mosque – or when a mosque did exist, it was presumably a very simple structure built of mud-brick or stone. The *madrasas* (Islamic schools) of the cities were unknown in these small communities.

The Mongol tribes that invaded Asia Minor in 1246 were added to the Turkish communities that inhabited the rural areas. Almost all the Mongols were pagans who gradually converted to Islam. As with the Turkomans, the Mongols also settled in the steppes of Asia Minor, founding villages and adopting a semi-nomadic lifestyle. Many villages in the area between Sivas

39 For a comparative study of the structure of medieval cities, see H. Pirenne, *Les villes du Moyen Age*, Brussels, Pirenne, 1927.

40 The best work so far about the Oğuz clans of Asia Minor is F. Sümer, *Oğuzlar (Türkmenler), Tarihleri-Boy Teşkilatı-Destanları* [The Oghuzes (Turcomans): Their History, Tribal Organizations and Legends], Istanbul, Ana Publications, 1980.

41 See note 35 above.



3.29 Historical area of Suleimaniye, Istanbul
(© UNESCO/Dominique Roger)

and Eskişehir in present-day Turkey were founded by Mongols and still bear the names given to them at that time.⁴²

One must also consider the indigenous rural populations of Asia Minor. Naturally, when the Turks first arrived, the Christian peasants abandoned their villages to seek refuge in the western areas. But as time went on and they saw the policies of the Seljūqs of Rūm, they slowly began returning to their former villages. Indeed, some of the sultans showed great pragmatism and, with the aim of repopulating these villages, not only invited their former inhabitants back from Byzantine lands but also offered them, in addition to their former villages,

42 See A. Y. Ocak, 'Emirci Sultan ve Zâviyesi: XIII. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Anadolu (Bozok)'da bir Babaî Şeyhi' [Emirci Sultan and His Hospice: A Babai Shaykh in Anatolia (Bozok) in the First Half of the Thirteenth Century], *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*, IX, 1978, pp. 130–208.

agricultural equipment, goods, animals and seeds and declared them exempt from taxes for fifteen years.⁴³ These policies quickly had the desired effect and the Byzantine peasants began to return to Seljūq-administered lands.

CITIES AND CITIZENS

Urban transformation

Almost all the cities of Asia Minor had been transferred in ancient times to the Romans, then from the Romans to the Byzantines and then, from the eleventh century, from the Byzantines to the Turks, beginning from the east and proceeding towards the west. In Christian times, all these cities had a physical and social structure that was very different to that of ancient times.

Some of the Turks settled in the Byzantine cities of Asia Minor, including famous cities of the Roman and Byzantine eras such as Konya (Iconium), Amasya (Amaseia), Sivas (Sebasteia), Kayseri (Cesarea), Kırşehir (Mocissus), Eskişehir (Dorilaeum) and Ankara (Ancyranum). The theory that the Turkish invasion damaged the area and paralysed commercial activities has been refuted by Cahen. According to him, even though it cannot be denied that the first arrival of the Turks did indeed cause a great upheaval, these areas subsequently became more prosperous than before.⁴⁴ For example, when the cities of Sinop and Antalya were conquered by Ala-ad-Dīn Kayqubad I, great care was taken to revitalize them economically by conceding commercial privileges to Venetian and French merchants.⁴⁵ The Seljūq sultans of Rūm were aware that their political survival in the new land depended on the strength of commercial activity and thus they built caravanserais (fortified inns) at regular intervals along trade routes where caravans could find lodgings. This ensured the safety of these routes. Some of the inns are still standing.⁴⁶ Similarly, the Seljūqs paid particular attention to the reconstruction of the cities and towns, and built mosques, *madrasas* (schools), *tekkes* (dervish lodges), bazaars, *hammams* (communal baths) and so on, owned by religious foundations. They did not concern themselves only with previously established cities, but also built new ones like Alâiye, Akşehir and Kubadiye.

43 O. Turan, 'Hıristiyanları tehcir ve iskân siyaseti' [Forced Deportations of Christians and the Settlement Policy], in *Türk Cihan Hâkimiyeti Mefkûresi Tarihi* [History of the Turkish Ideal of World Domination], Istanbul, Turan Neşriyat Yurdu Publications, 1969, pp. 156–7.

44 Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, p. 189, and *La Turquie pré-ottomane*, p. 148.

45 Turan, *Doğu Anadolu Türk*, pp. 395–6.

46 K. Erdmann and H. Erdmann, *Das anatolische Karvansaray des 13. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin, Gebr. Mann Verlag, 1961–76 ; O. Turan, 'Selçuklu Kervansarayları' [The Seljūq Caravanserais], *Belleten*, X, 1946, pp. 471–96.

Structural characteristics

In terms of physical characteristics and social and economic organization, these cities were not very different from other Muslim cities of the Middle East and over time these similarities increased. In other words, they became cosmopolitan cities like Cairo, Damascus, Aleppo, Baghdad, Basra, Bayhaq, Tabriz, Marw, Balkh, Bukhārā and Samarkand, with many different ethnic, religious, social and professional groups and a governing bureaucracy. Christian, Jewish and Muslim communities lived side by side. Nevertheless, because of their close commercial ties with Persia and the Arab world, their Islamic characteristics were strengthened. The Turks, who came from the Central Asian areas of Transoxiana and Khwārazm, brought with them the traditions of the cities from which they had originated. These relations with the great urban centres of Central Asia were still alive in Ottoman times.

One of the aspects differentiating the cities of Asia Minor from other Muslim cities was the presence in Seljūq and Ottoman times of Sufi-like corporatist organizations, called Akhilik, which probably originated from western Persia. The fact that the medieval Muslim organization of *futuwwa* played an important part in the creation of Akhilik can be seen in that Akhis frequently used the Sufi texts called *futuwwatnama*. The Akhilik was a corporatist organization of merchants and artisans of the cities of Asia Minor and since it had quasi-Sufi characteristics, Akhis could only be Muslims.⁴⁷ Not much is known about their history until Mongol times during the second half of the thirteenth century, when a certain Akhi Evren lived. The most detailed information comes from the end of the fourteenth century and for this we are indebted to the celebrated traveller Ibn Baṭṭūṭa.⁴⁸ The Akhis were influential in the administration of cities during times when central authority was weak and they were particularly strong during the period when the Ottoman empire was in the process of consolidating its power.⁴⁹

47 Even though the relationship between Akhilik and the *futuwwa* organization of medieval Islam is known, except for Asia Minor and Persia this institution is not present anywhere else in the Muslim world. It was particularly strong in Asia Minor between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries. For detailed information about Akhilik, see Köprülü, *Türk Edebiyatında*, pp. 207–16; Köprülü, 'Anadolu'da İslâmiyet', pp. 386–7; O. Turan, *Les origines de l'empire ottoman*, Paris, E. de Brocard, 1935, pp. 128–9; C. Cahen, 'Sur les traces des premiers Akhis', in O. Turan (ed.), *Mélanges Fuad Köprülü*, Istanbul, Osman, 1953, pp. 81–91; Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, pp. 105–200, 337–41, and *La Turquie pré-ottomane*, pp. 154–60, 316–20. Many books about Akhilik have been published in Turkey during the last twenty years, but these will not be mentioned since they are all of an apologetic nature.

48 Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *Muhadhhab*, 1, pp. 223–63.

49 Köprülü, *Les origines*. Some of the more recent Turkish historians have given exaggerated descriptions of this phenomenon.



3.30 Ottoman gold sultani, AH 926 (© Khalili Family Trust/Nour Foundation)

Social structure

The majority of the Muslim population living in the cities of Asia Minor was made up of Turks. This was due to immigration, which accelerated from the beginning of the thirteenth century. Even though Turkomans generally settled in rural areas, some contemporary Mongol (Ilkhanid) sources mention Turkomans who lived in urban areas like Sivas and made a living from commerce.⁵⁰

Naturally, there were also scientists, merchants and bureaucrats of Arab and Persian origin in big cities like Konya, Sivas and Kayseri. Ibn Baṭṭūṭa mentions that when he toured the cities of Asia Minor in the fourteenth century, he spoke to scholars and bureaucrats of Arab and Persian origin.⁵¹ The leading personalities living in the cities of both the Seljūqs of Rūm and the Ottomans included imams, *kātib*s (secretaries), *mu'adhhdhins* (callers to prayer), *muftī*s and *qāḍī*s (judges) who had both temporal and religious duties, *mudarris* (teachers at *madrasas*), *sayyids* and *sharīf*s who were descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad, and finally shaykhs and dervishes of the Sufi orders, which were widespread institutions in those days.

During the time of the Seljūqs of Rūm and the Ottomans, non-Muslims – that is, Greeks, Armenians and a few Jews – were also present in differing numbers in cities of Asia Minor like Izmir, Konya, Bursa, Sivas and Kayseri. From Ibn Baṭṭūṭa we learn that in some cities the Greeks were a majority, while in others (especially in eastern Asia Minor) the Armenians made up the majority.⁵² Jews were present in commercial centres like Konya, Antalya, Sinop and Sivas.⁵³ Bursa's importance increased after the Ottoman conquest, so much so that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries it had become

50 For example, see Zakariyya ibn Muḥammad al-Qazwīnī, *Āthār al-bilād wa akhbār al-'ibād*, Beirut, Dār ṣādir, 1960.

51 Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *Muhadhhab*, 1, pp. 224–62 *passim*.

52 Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *Muhadhhab*, 1, p. 239.

53 T. Baykara, *Türkiye Selçukluları Devrinde Konya* [Konya during the Period of the Seljūqs of Turkey], Ankara, 1985, p. 137.

a city with international characteristics where, in addition to the Turkish Muslim population, there were Arab and Persian Muslims, Greeks, Jews and Armenians. These populations lived in small urban districts called *mahalles*, which did not exist in medieval European cities, but were the backbone of the structure of typical Muslim cities of the Middle East. Each *mahalle* had its own mosque (a *jāmi'* or a smaller *masjid*) and a *tekke*. This administrative structure continued throughout the Ottoman empire and up to the present time.⁵⁴

Centres of Muslim life: foundations and related institutions

The most common historical documents regarding the Islamization of Asia Minor are those dealing with the properties of *waqfs* (religious foundations) created in the Turkish cities. The principles behind these foundations and their practices have been the backbone of Muslim religious and social institutions since the times of the 'Abbāsids. Even though similar institutions had been present in this region before the introduction of Islam, it was only in Muslim times that 'rich people donated a part of their wealth for the benefit of the poor, with no compensation, just for the sake of gaining God's approval and that this was institutionalized with a set of rules'.⁵⁵ Of course, other factors may also have played a role. Almost certainly, considerations like the long-term prestige of the individual or family making the donation were important.

The foundations were created with the aim of building and running institutions with social functions, known by the general name of *imaret* and including institutions such as *madrasas*, *shifakhanas* (hospitals), *jāmi'*s or *masjids*, *zāwiyas* (dervish convents, also called *takiyyas* or *khaniqas*), *hammams*, *aşevīs* (kitchens feeding the poor) and *kervansarayıs* (caravanserais). A foundation might also have the aim of providing poor students with scholarships or poor people with treatment, supporting converts to Islam (*muhtadīs*) or providing shelter and treatment for sick animals. In general, the institutions present in Seljūq and Ottoman cities consisted of a financial-administrative system for the provision of various social services. Ottoman archives are full of documents that detail how they functioned, the most important of which are the *evkaf defterleri* (religious foundation registers) kept on a *sanjak* basis, which

54 Any one of the monographic studies concerning Ottoman districts (*sancak*) will provide information about the *mahalle* system. See previous notes.

55 See, for example, L. Milliot, *Introduction a l'étude du droit musulman*, Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1953, pp. 547ff; F. Köprülü, 'Vakıf Müessesesinin Hukuki Mahiyeti ve Tarihi Tekamülü' [The Legal Nature of the Institution of *Waqf* and its Historical Development], *Vakıflar Dergisi*, II, 1942, pp. 1–36; C. Cahen, 'Réflexions sur le waqf ancien', *Studia Islamica*, XIV, 1961, pp. 37ff; B. Yediyildiz, 'Vakıf', in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, XIII, pp. 153–72; B. Yediyildiz, *Institution du waqf au XVIII^e siècle en Turquie: étude socio-historique*, Ankara, Éditions Ministère de la Culture, 1990; R. Peters, 'Wakf', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–, XI, pp. 59–63.

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was the administrative unit of the Ottoman empire, in the same way that nowadays it is the *il* (province) in the Republic of Turkey.

Due to the important role played by these institutions in the functioning of society, a complex legal system was created for their regulation. This legal system accepted their legitimacy and also protected non-Muslim foundations in a Muslim country. When a Byzantine territory was conquered by the Seljūqs of Rūm, all the Christian foundations tied to churches or monasteries continued their existence and retained their autonomy. The Ottoman empire continued this approach, and it persists up to the present time.

There is no statistical information regarding the number of *jāmi's*, *masjids*, *madradas*, *zāwiyas* and *turbas* that existed in the cities of Asia Minor under the Seljūqs of Rūm and the Turkoman principalities. From the point of view of archival sources, we are more fortunate as far as the Ottoman empire is concerned. Thanks to the studies carried out at the level of the administrative unit – *sanjak* – for the Ottoman classical age, there are records for most of these institutions, including those that no longer exist.⁵⁶ It should be borne in mind, however, that some of the institutions for which Ottoman records exist were actually founded in previous eras and simply continued to operate into Ottoman times.

Likewise, due to the lack of information about the socio-cultural history of these religious institutions, we are still not sufficiently aware of their contribution and function in the propagation of Islam in Asia Minor and in the formation and successive development of Islamic culture. Thus, there are many unanswered questions concerning the contribution of *jāmi's*, *masjids*, *madradas* and *zāwiyas* to the life of Muslim communities in Asia Minor during the times of the Seljūqs, the Turkoman principalities and even the Ottomans.

The mosque has been the main element of Muslim cities since the very beginning of Islam. A mosque is not just a place of worship, but also a social institution where various topics including politics are debated, news coming from other cities or countries is disseminated and scholars speak on a variety of subjects. In other words, it may be defined as a 'forum'.⁵⁷ During the Middle

56 The following data are an example of the numbers of institutions in various regions of Asia Minor:

	Mardin	Manisa	Kayseri	Erzincan	Harput
<i>jāmi'</i>	8	4	3	6	4
<i>masjid</i>	33	20	2	6	14
<i>madrada</i>	2	9	5	3	10
<i>zāwīya</i>	6	20	10	9	4
<i>turba</i>	7				

57 On this subject, see J. Pedersen, R. Hillenbrand and J. Burtonpage, 'Masdjid', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–, VI, pp. 644–703.

Ages, mosques were even used as temporary shelters for needy people. The same is true for the mosques of Asia Minor in Seljūq and Ottoman times.

Among the religious and social institutions of the cities and towns of Asia Minor at this time were those housing Sufis and their guests. Apart from the usual term *jāmi'*, they were also referred to as *takiyya*, *darga*, *asitana*, *khaniqa* or *buq'a*, according to their dimensions and functions. They were basically the same, the only difference being the religious order they served. At certain times and in certain circumstances, these institutions played a much more important role in the Islamization of Asia Minor than did the more conventional mosques. Especially in rural areas, the dervishes would work in their fields and care for their animals during the day and in the evening they would engage in *samā'* rites and *dhikr* meetings or hold classes for junior dervishes (*murīd*) on Sufism.⁵⁸ There are many extant documents relating to these institutions during Ottoman times, and we will later examine their role in the process of Islamization in the cities and villages where Muslims and Christians lived side by side.

Religious transformation: the introduction and propagation of Islam in Asia Minor

AN OVERVIEW OF CHRISTIANITY IN ASIA MINOR DURING PRE-ISLAMIC TIMES

Over the millennia, in both the pre-Roman period and that of Roman domination, Asia Minor was a place where many colourful pagan cults developed. These were shaped by various external influences and took on unique characteristics. By the time Asia Minor became part of the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) empire, Christianity had long since been present there. Nevertheless, during the first centuries the official Orthodox version of Christianity did not spread to the remotest corners of Asia Minor. Even during the sixth century, when the Byzantine empire was at the height of its power, Christianity had not completely erased all the various idolatrous cults and had only managed to influence people's religious beliefs superficially. Not only did the idolatrous cults of ancient deities still exist, but the beliefs of many of the Christians went little further than a simple acknowledgement of the Trinity (God, Jesus and the Holy Ghost). The only difference from previous cults was that beliefs related to ancient deities were transferred

58 On these Sufi institutions, see A. Y. Ocak and S. Faruki, 'Zaviye', in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, XIII, pp. 476–88.

to Christian saints. The missionaries understood early on that the only way to convert people was to accept their existing beliefs and, by way of a reinterpretation, apply them to Christianity. This gave birth to many popular religious beliefs that were a mixture of idolatry and Christianity.⁵⁹

Some of these versions were originally dualist Churches which, having been declared heretics by the Zoroastrian Sāsānid empire, had been banished from Persia. They had taken refuge in Asia Minor, where they had formally converted to Christianity but kept their Manichaean beliefs. The most important of these was Paulicianism, which was influential in the birth of Bogomilism in Bulgaria in the ninth century. There were also denominations deriving from Orthodoxy, like the Monophysite Yaqubis or the Nestorians who had split because of theological differences concerning Jesus Christ, and the Assyrians and Gregorians.⁶⁰

As a result of these mixtures, as the centuries went by, some independent denominations were born in addition to the more traditional denominations of Asia Minor like the Greek Orthodox, the Gregorians and the Assyrians. Even Greek Orthodoxy changed over time, spawning new sects like the Yaqubis and the Nestorians which developed from the philosophical schools of ancient Greece. These were considered heretical by mainstream Orthodoxy and by the Byzantine administration, which identified itself with Orthodox Christianity. Meanwhile, as a result of the conflict between Persia and the Byzantine empire, Persia was engaged in propaganda for Zoroastrianism in Asia Minor. In addition, adherents of religions like Mazdaism and Manichaeism, which were born in Persia as a reaction to Zoroastrianism, took refuge in Asia Minor. All these factors profoundly influenced the complex structure of religion in Asia Minor. The religions of Persian origin gave birth to influential dualist (good versus evil) churches like Marcionism (called Marika in Islamic sources), Paulicianism (called Bawlaqiyya or Bayāliqa in Islamic sources) and Thondrachism.⁶¹

Against all these religious deviations, the Byzantine empire chose to strengthen the Greek Orthodox sect in Asia Minor by trying to impose it by force. As a result, these lands saw many conflicts of a religious nature and

59 Ostrogorsky, *Histoire*, pp. 76–7; J. Jarry, *Hérésies et factions dans l'empire byzantin*, Cairo, L'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale, 1968, pp. 154–5.

60 On Orthodoxy and other denominations within the Byzantine empire, see O. Clement, *Byzance et le Christianisme*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1964; J. Guillard, 'L'hérésie dans l'empire byzantin des origines au XII^{ème} siècle', *Travaux et Mémoires de l'Institut d'Ethnologie*, I, Paris, 1965, I, pp. 299–324; Jarry, *Hérésies*; W. E. Kaegi, *Army, Society and Religion in Byzantium*, London, Variorum Reprints, 1982; R. Janin, *La géographie ecclésiastique de l'empire byzantin*, III: *Les églises et les monastères*, Paris, Institut Français d'Études Byzantines, 1969.

61 See H. Ch. Peuch, *Le Manichéisme*, Paris, Payot, 1949, pp. 64–5; H. Ch. Peuch, 'Le Manichéisme', in *Histoire des Religions*, II, Paris, Gallimard, 1972, p. 630; S. Runciman, *Le Manichéisme médiéval*, Paris, Payot, 1949, pp. 14–16, 20, 37–47; Ostrogorsky, *Histoire*, pp. 295–6.

when the Turks started gradually to penetrate and settle in Asia Minor it was in a confused state. The central and eastern regions, in particular, were characterized by the presence of many smaller Churches and denominations that had been born out of a reaction to mainstream Orthodoxy and were widespread among the non-Greek population for various political, social, economic and cultural reasons. All these conflicts undoubtedly favoured the Turks' conquests and consequent settlement. As previously mentioned, the local populations who were religiously repressed and had to pay many taxes were reluctant to help the Byzantines resist the Turkish advance.

POLITICAL POWERS AND RELIGION

The state and the Muslim population

The claims by some earlier and contemporary historians (not specialists in Turkish history) that the Seljūqs and the Ottomans followed a policy of forced Islamization in Asia Minor has been refuted both by Western historians like Claude Cahen, Bernard Lewis and Marshall G. Hodgson and by Turkish historians like Fuad Köprülü and Osman Turan.

At the end of the eleventh century, Turkification and Islamization were continuing across a vast area extending from the frontiers of the Byzantine empire to Persia and from the Black Sea coast to the frontiers of the Ayyūbid state. The western section was occupied by the Seljūqs of Rūm, the central section by the Danishmendids, and the eastern section by entities such as the Mengüjekli, Saltuqlu and Artuklu principalities. Each of these states had a religious policy that they applied in their own domains.⁶² The two main actors of these policies were the Muslims and the non-Muslims.

The settlement policies of these states consisted in settling Turks, whether nomadic or sedentary, in the valleys, plains and highlands of eastern, south-eastern and central Asia Minor, with the aim of making them productive members of society. With this objective in mind, which was of paramount importance for them, they made use of the institution of the *waqf* (religious foundation). Even though we do not know the exact dates of the creation of these institutions, as time went by they were established in areas increasingly towards the west as the Turkish advance progressed. On the basis of the extant works of architecture, we can see that the first areas to be settled by Turks, and consequently to be Islamized, were around Lake Van, the inner part of the great arch-shaped bend of the Kızılırmak (Halys) river.

62 See note 10 above.



3.31 Mawlānā Jalāl-ad-Dīn ar-Rūmī's Shrine, Konya (© J.C. Chabrier)

These states ruled over a large population of Muslim subjects the majority of whom were Turks. As in the case of the Great Seljūq state, whose successors they were to some extent, they all followed the Sunnī branch of Islam. The claim by F. Babinger that the Seljūqs of Rūm were Shī'ite has never been convincingly proved and indeed has been refuted by F. Köprülü.⁶³ The Seljūq sultans in Rūm had been instructed in high Sunnī Islamic culture and knew both Arabic and Persian very well. The sultans and their subjects were neither overly conservative nor bigots, so much so that at the time Arabs doubted that the Turks were real Muslims.⁶⁴

These rulers made the utmost effort to attract scientists, scholars, Sufis, poets and writers of Turkish, Arabic and Persian origin to their courts. For example, the Seljūqs of Rūm managed to attract Persian and Arab scholars such as 'Abd-al-Majīd Ismā'īl al-Harawī (d. 1142), Muḥammad Ṭalaqānī (d. 1217), Yūsuf Sa'īd as-Sijistānī (d. 1241/2) and 'Umar al-Abharī (d. 1265). In the city of Ahlat in the Sökmenli principality, 'Abd-aş-Şamad 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān (d. 1145), a scholar of *fiqh* (jurisprudence) became famous. There were also Turkish scholars who, after having studied in Seljūq *madrasas* in Asia

63 Babinger, 'Der Islam in Kleinasien', pp. 130, 146–7.

64 Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, p. 204, and *La Turquie pré-ottomane*, p. 164.

Minor, settled in various Arab countries. All these and other factors greatly strengthened the Sunnī administration.

The Ottoman empire inherited this tolerant Sunnī policy. They even tolerated Sufi orders like the Qalandariyya and the Bektashiyya (even though they stood in clear contrast to Sunnism) and cooperated with them in the conquest of the Balkans. This continued until the beginning of the sixteenth century, when the Safavid dynasty of Persia began to propagandize for the Shī'ite sect in Asia Minor. This propaganda was immensely successful among non-Sunnī rural sections of the population that were experiencing the burden of taxation and settlement policies.⁶⁵ The social, religious and even economic unravelling caused by this propaganda caused the Ottoman administration to take drastic precautions. As a result, a socio-religious class called the Qizilbashlik, which already existed, gained strength. This non-Sunnī class instigated revolts that were bloodily repressed.⁶⁶ The conflict did not disappear over the centuries and was inherited by the Turkish Republic, recently manifesting itself under different guises.⁶⁷

The state and non-Muslims

It is necessary here to dwell on the policies followed by the Seljūqs of Rūm, the Turkoman principalities and the Ottomans concerning the non-Muslim populations. Although not as numerous as they had been earlier, significant numbers of non-Muslims such as Orthodox Greeks, Gregorian Armenians, Georgians, Assyrians, Nestorians and Monophysite Yaqubis still lived in these states. Turkish administrators were conscious of the fact that, if they were to maintain law and order, they had to protect the non-Muslim communities, since the newly arrived Turks were mostly nomadic or semi-nomadic and could not actively participate in the more productive sectors of society. The integrity of the economic and financial structure depended on peace prevailing among all communities.

65 Eberhard, *Osmanische Polemik*, pp. 128–63; J. Aubin, 'La politique religieuse des Safavides', in *Le Shiisme Imamite (Colloque de Strasbourg 1968)*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1970, pp. 236–43; Caretto, 'Appunti', pp. 165–70.

66 On this subject, see H. Sohrweide, 'Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien und seine Rückwirkungen auf die Schiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert', *Der Islam*, XLI, 1965, pp. 95–223.

67 Even nowadays, and especially since 1989, many Kızıldaş writers calling themselves Alevî have been writing in ways that encourage these historical conflicts. For an analytical study of these publications until 1990, see A. Y. Ocak, 'Alevîlik ve Bektaşîlik Hakkındaki Son Yayınlar Üzerine Genel Bir Bakış ve Bazı Gerçekler' [An Overview of Recent Publications on Alevism and Bektashism and Some Facts], *Tarih ve Toplum*, No. 91, 1991, pp. 20–5, and No. 92, 1991, pp. 115–20. Thus, the orthodox and unorthodox facets of Islam in Asia Minor live on in our times.

After his raid in the Menderes valley in western Asia Minor in 1196, for example, the Seljūq sultan of Rūm, Ghiyās-ad-Dīn Kaykhusrau I, brought many Greek peasants to the Akşehir area and had them settle there. Not only did he provide them with land and agricultural implements; he also gave them a long-lasting tax exemption.⁶⁸ In the east, the Artuklu monarch Balak Ghazi deported the Gerger Armenians who had revolted against him, but settled them in favourable circumstances in Hanazit and did not restrict their religious freedom. The reign of Najm-ad-Dīn (r. 1152–76), another Artuklu monarch, was characterized by the prosperity of his Christian subjects. Similarly, the reigns of *Amīr* Saltuq (r. 1145–76) of the Saltuqids and Sökmen II (r. 1128–83), lord of Ahlat, were prosperous times for the Christians of eastern Asia Minor.

The example of the Danishmendids is even more striking. Even though this dynasty was attached to the ideology of *jihād* and *ghazāh*, as shown in the epic *Danishmendnama* that narrates their struggle, they were extremely tolerant of their Christian subjects. Indeed, the contemporary historian Michael the Assyrian reported that the Christians were grief-stricken when Gümüshtekin Ahmad Ghazi died in 1104.⁶⁹ As mentioned previously, as a result of the repression they had suffered under the Byzantines, the non-Orthodox Christians in particular had not been especially hostile to the Turks since the very beginning of the conquest and they viewed the Turkish advance as a just retribution against their overlords.

Since the Seljūqs of Rūm and the Turkoman principalities were more flexible in their application of the principles of *ahl adh-dhimma* ('people of the covenant') than other Muslim countries, they were able to include their non-Muslim subjects within their economic and social structure. This realistic and equitable policy undoubtedly strengthened these states. Another positive effect had been to annul any Byzantine claim to be the protector of Christians, since the Christian subjects of the Turkish dynasties did not consider the Byzantine empire as a protector and refuge.

Nevertheless, the Mongol invasion that began in 1246 changed the situation of the Christians of Asia Minor. When the Mongols conquered the Seljūq lands of Asia Minor they were still pagans, and they remained as such for another twenty years without interfering in the affairs of Muslims or Christians. Among the two religious groups, they preferred the alliance of the Christians against the Muslim Seljūqs who were, after all, their adversaries. The Armenians in particular attempted to gain advantage from an alliance with the Mongols. The same kind of considerations caused the

68 See note 43 above.

69 See M. Le Syrien, *Chronique*, trans. J. B. Chabot, Paris, 1905, p. 195; M. D'edesse, *Chronique*, translated from the original Armenian by E. Dulaurier, Paris, Durand, 1858, p. 256.

Mongols to court the friendship of the Greeks and to recruit Georgians into their army. As a result, the Christians were able to gain privileges that they tried to use against the Turks – for example, several bishoprics that had been abolished by the Turks were re-established. This state of affairs continued until the Mongols began to convert to Islam.

When Ghazan Khan converted to the Sunnī branch of Islam in 1296, similar conversions among the nomadic Mongol tribes accelerated. Since their arrival these tribes had been pursuing nomadic lives in the steppes of Asia Minor, but after their accepting Islam under the leadership of Turkoman elders they began to settle and adopt a sedentary lifestyle.

The Muslim population, religious tendencies and sects

The consolidation of Sunnism in Asia Minor

The fact that governments followed policies favouring Sunnism has been interpreted by some present-day historians as a policy of forced conversion, but this does not seem to have been the case. It is, however, certain that these policies had strengthened the state from the time when the Seljūq dynasty reigned in Persia. One factor influencing the Turks towards Sunnism since the tenth century, when they gradually began to convert to Islam, must have been their close contacts with Sunnī areas of Central Asia like Transoxiana. They quickly adapted to their new religion and adapted it to their own culture.

As a result of the historical developments referred to above, the majority of Muslims in Asia Minor were Sunnīs. The cities and towns, in other words urban areas with a more developed written culture, were predominantly Sunnī and, naturally enough, the villages in close contact with these places were also Sunnī. It is almost certain that in Seljūq and Ottoman times the Ḥanafī branch was the dominant school of law among the Sunnīs of Asia Minor, especially among scholars and in the juridical system, while in the east and south-east the Shāfi‘ī branch had a great influence. No other branches of Sunnism, such as the Ḥanbalīs or the Mālikīs, managed to gain a foothold in Asia Minor. Although there were Ḥanbalī or Mālikī scholars and Sufis in Asia Minor from time to time, these were only temporary presences. This was not just that the first sect the Turks came into contact with had been the Ḥanafī, but also because its doctrine, being more rational and practical, was better suited to their social structure.

Shī‘ism in Asia Minor

There are few sources on the currents and sects other than Sunnism in Asia Minor under the Seljūqs and the Turkoman principalities. Although recent

research has thrown some light on the subject, much remains obscure.⁷⁰ It has been known for some time that many of the nomadic Turkomans who came to Asia Minor in the thirteenth century had beliefs that were at variance with Sunnism and that these people were influential in political and social currents in addition to Sufism. Because of the dearth of documentary sources, one can only try to reconstruct the substance of these currents on the basis of a few documents and present-day situations. For example, after their conversion to Islam the Turkomans may have preserved some of the beliefs of pre-Islamic times that were tied to the cult of ancestors, the cult of the Celestial Divinity, various natural cults, Shamanism, Buddhism, Manichaeism, Mazdaism, Mazdakism and other ancient Asian religions.⁷¹

Notwithstanding the official pro-Sunnī policies of the governments, there were Shī'ī-Ismā'īlī influences among the nomadic tribes (a neglected fact that was considered almost impossible until now). Since the eleventh century, the Turkomans living in northern Syria and south-east Asia Minor had lived in close proximity with the Ismā'īlīs.⁷² Thus, at the beginning of the thirteenth century the Arab traveller al-Jawbarī journeyed extensively in this region and claimed that 'Alī's soul had entered his body without his receiving any negative reaction.⁷³ Also noteworthy was the strong messianic belief prevalent in the Babai revolt of 1240 and in other revolts against Mongol rule in Asia Minor, including the Jimri revolt.⁷⁴ One might even say that after the conversion of the Ilkhanid monarch Oljaytu Khudabanda (r. 1304–17) to the Imāmiyya sect, an environment suitable for the propagation of Shī'ism in Asia Minor had been created. This came to an end, however, when the Ilkhanids returned to Sunnism shortly thereafter. Notwithstanding the Shī'ī-Ismā'īlī influences, these Turkomans were never really Shī'ites; they merely maintained their pre-Islamic beliefs beneath an Islamic veneer. It was for this reason that the Bektashī and Qizilbash currents would spread among them in the fifteenth century, giving rise to Islamic heterodoxy in Asia Minor.⁷⁵

70 This question is analysed in C. Cahen, 'Le problème du Shiisme dans l'Asie Mineure Turque pré-ottomane', in *Le Shiisme Imamite (Colloque de Strasbourg 1968)*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1970, pp. 115–29.

71 On this subject, see A. Y. Ocak, *Alevî ve Bektaşî İnançlarının İslâm Öncesi Temelleri* [Pre-Islamic Foundations of Alevi and Bektashi Beliefs], Istanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2000, p. 312. An attempt has been made in this work to analyse the subject within the framework of the sources and of modern research.

72 See F. Daftary, *The Isma'ilis: Their History and Doctrine*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 356, 374.

73 See 'Abd-ar-Rahīm 'Umar al-Jawbarī, *al-Mukhtār fī kashf al-asrār wa hatk al-astār*, Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library (Karaçelebizâde Collection), nr. 253, fol. 46b.

74 Ocak, *La révolte de Baba Resul*, pp. 75–80.

75 On this subject, see especially J. K. Birge, *The Bektashi Order of Dervishes*, Hartford, Hartford Seminary Press, 1937, p. 291; I. Melikoff, *Hadji Bektach: un mythe et ses avatares: genèse et évolution du Soufisme populaire en Turquie*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1998.

Aside from this, there is no concrete evidence that either Ismā‘īlī or Imāmī Shī‘ism had spread in Asia Minor in this period, notwithstanding any partial influences these sects may have had in the region. Consequently, there have been no communities of believers in these sects in later times.

Other sects include the Yazīdiyya, which became involved in political events in eastern and oriental Asia Minor during the second half of the thirteenth century. This sect originated from the ‘Adawīyya, which was founded in the twelfth century by Shaykh ‘Adī ibn Musāfir (d. 1162) with the aim of opposing the fanaticism of Shī‘ism and defending the Umayyad caliphs, in particular Yazīd I. The Yazīdiyya became a strongly heterodox sect, with ancient local beliefs. It was followed by Kurds of the mountains of south-eastern Asia Minor. The sect became known as the Yazīdiyya, named after the caliph Yazīd, during the time of the grandchildren of Shaykh ‘Adī. The followers, known as Yazīdīs, formed an alliance with the Turkomans and fought the Mongols in Asia Minor. The characteristics of the Yazīdiyya of today were formed at the end of the fourteenth century.⁷⁶ No signs of the presence of this sect have ever been encountered outside south-eastern Asia Minor.

Mystical aspects of Islam in Asia Minor: Sufism and the religious orders

THE INTRODUCTION AND SPREAD OF SUFISM IN ASIA MINOR

Shaykhs and dervishes of various religious orders, following different Sufi currents, began appearing in Asia Minor at the beginning of the thirteenth century, when most of the region had been conquered and the political and social situation had begun to stabilize. These religious orders found an environment conducive to their development and the states gained spiritual support that would strengthen and legitimize them in the eyes of the population. These Sufis, shaykhs and dervishes differed in appearance, spoke different languages and wore different clothes. They followed the

76 Mehmed Şerefeddin, ‘Yezidiler’, *Dar al-Funun İlahiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, I/3, 1926, pp. 1–35; R. Lescot, *Enquête sur les Yezidis de Syrie et du Djebel Sindjar*, Beirut, Mémoires de l’Institut Français de Damas, 1938; S. S. Ahmed, *The Yazidis: Their Life and Beliefs*, ed. Henri Field, Miami, Coconut Grove, 1975; M. Aydın, ‘Yezidiler ve İnanç Esasları’ [The Yazidis and their Beliefs], *Belleten*, LII, 1988, pp. 923–53; M. Van Bruinessen, ‘Religion in Kurdistan’, *Kurdish Times*, IV, Nos 1–27, 1991; J. Guest, *Survival Among the Kurds: A History of Yazidis*, London, Kegan Paul International, 1993.

previously mentioned waves of migration and settled in both urban and rural areas. It is for this reason that, as in the case of other Muslim countries, Turkish Sufism had two different but parallel faces: one 'elevated' and the other of a more popular nature. The more 'elevated' and urban Sufi spheres reflected a moralistic character based on the concepts of *zuhd* (asceticism) and *taqwā* (piety). Muḥyi-d-Dīn al-'Arabī (d. 1241), his successor Ṣadr-ad-Dīn al-Qunāwī (d. 1274), their disciples, the Qādiriyya and the Rifā'iyya Sufi orders are all examples of this trend.

The second group reflected the Sufi conception present in Khurāsān and environs, and thus they were known as the Khurāsānīs. This group has been highly influential in Middle Eastern Sufism, and in particular the Sufism of Asia Minor – even today, there are many people who locate their spiritual roots within this group. There were many subgroups. Its most important representatives were Awḥad-ad-Dīn al-Kirmānī (d. 1237), who came to Asia Minor; Fakhr-ad-Dīn al-'Irāqī; Bahā'-ad-Dīn Walad (d. 1238), the father of Mawlānā Jalāl-ad-Dīn ar-Rūmī; Burhān-ad-Dīn Muḥaqqiq at-Tirmidhī (d. 1240); and Najm-ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (Daya) (d. 1256).

The shaykh and dervish members of religious orders following these Sufi currents were active in important cities of the time, such as Ahlat, Erzurum, Bayburt, Sivas, Tokat, Amasya, Kırşehir, Kayseri and Konya. They gave rise to the colourful Sufi environment of thirteenth-century Asia Minor. These shaykhs and dervishes must have aroused great interest among the people as, wearing their colourful costumes, they went about public places such as squares and markets preaching, chanting hymns, organizing enthusiastic rites in their *tekkes* and *zāwiyas* and expressing different interpretations of concepts such as creation, God, humanity and the universe.

From this process developed a 'popular Islam' based on principles that the more orthodox *madrasa* environment considered to be *khurāfa* (superstition) or *bid'a* (innovation). This popular Islam included epics and legends related to saints (*awliyā'*) and, unlike the Islam centred on canonical law of the *madrasas*, revolved around the cult of saints. As in the case of all other Muslim countries, these two kinds of Islam lived side by side for centuries, but in a state of continuous competition. This popular Islam, based on the cult of saints, is still strong in modern-day Turkey with all its characteristics intact.

RELIGIOUS ORDERS AND OTHER SUFI SPHERES

It is clear from all this that Sufism arrived in Asia Minor through the migrations of the early thirteenth century. The Seljūqs of Rūm had a strong foothold in Asia Minor and the Mongols invaded first Central Asia and then

Persia and Iraq, pushing many Sufis, shaykhs and dervishes towards the region. Many of the Sufi personalities were members of Asian and Iraqi urban Sunnī orders like the Kubrawiyya, the Suhrawardiyya, the Rifā'iyya and the Qādiriyya. Members of non-Sunnī orders, both rural and urban, such as the Ḥaydariyya, the Qalandariyya and the Wafā'iyya, also migrated to Asia Minor.⁷⁷

The religious orders that began to spread across Asia Minor at the beginning of the thirteenth century can be divided into two main groups: those within the framework of Sunnism and those without. These trends depended on the cultural environment in which the orders emerged and spread. For example, the orders that appeared in centres of learning like Transoxiana, Khwārazm, Persia, Syria and the great cities of Iraq tended to be Sunnī. On the other hand, orders that appeared in rural areas outside the sphere of strong Islamic influence, where ancient Indian and Persian mystical beliefs or ancient Turkish beliefs were still strong, tended to be outside the framework of orthodox Sunnism.

The orders of this second group were more successful among the nomadic or semi-nomadic Turkoman communities that came to Asia Minor with the waves of migration in the thirteenth century. This was because these communities had only recently converted to Islam and their nomadic lifestyle militated against their faith being anything more than a superficial set of beliefs, in contrast to more sedentary people. These people saw Sufism as a lifestyle rather than a way to attain abstract mystical aims. Orders like the Ḥaydariyya, the Qalandariyya and the Wafā'iyya mixed many elements drawn from pre-Islamic beliefs and traditions.

The Kubreviye order was brought to Asia Minor by Sa'd-ad-Dīn al-Ḥamawī, Sayf-ad-Dīn Bakharzī and Baba Kamal-i Khojandi, all disciples of Najm-ad-Dīn Kubrā (d. 1221).⁷⁸ Accompanied by their disciples, they sought refuge from the Mongols in Asia Minor. Najm-ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī (Daya) and

77 On the Ḥaydariyya and the Qalandariyya, see Köprülü, 'Anadolu'da İslâmiyet', pp. 299–302; A. Y. Ocak, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Marjinal Sûfilik: Kalenderîler* [Marginal Sufism in the Ottoman Empire: The Qalandarîs], Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1999, p. 271; A. T. Karamustafa, *God's Unruly Friends: Dervish Groups in the Later Period 1200–1550*, Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1994. On the Wafā'iyya, see A. Y. Ocak, 'The Waf'ai Order during and after the Period of the Seljuks of Turkey: A New Approach to the History of Popular Sufism in Turkey', *Mesogeios*, 2003.

78 On Najm-ad-Dīn and the Kubrāwiyya, see Nūr-ad-Dīn Jāmī, *Nafahāt al-uns*, trans. L. Chelebi, Istanbul, AH 1270, pp. 475–9; Taqiyy-ad-Dīn as-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt ash-shāfi'iyya al-kubrā*, Beirut, n.d., V, p. 11; H. Algar, 'Nadjm ad-Dīn Kubrā', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–, V, pp. 300–1; K. Haririzada, *Tibyān wasā'il al-ḥaqā'iq*, Istanbul, Süleymaniye Library (Collection of İbrāhīm Efendi), nr. 432, III, fols 79–85; H. Corbin, *L'Homme de Lumière dans le Soufisme Iranien*, Paris, Édition Presence, 1971, pp. 95–147; M. Mole, 'Les Kubrawis entre Sunnisme et Shiisme aux VIII^{ème} et IX^{ème} siècle de l'Hégire', *Revue des Études Islamiques*, XXIX, 1961, pp. 61–142; E. G. Browne, *A Literary History of Persia*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1956, II, pp. 491–4.

Bahā'-ad-Dīn Walad were particularly influential in the propagation of the Kubreviye in the region.

Najm-ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī arrived first in Kayseri, where he was received by 'Alā'-ad-Dīn Kayqubad I. Later, he went to Sivas, where he wrote his famous work, *Mirṣād al-'ibād*.⁷⁹ Bahā'-ad-Dīn Walad initially settled in Karaman and from there he went on to Konya, where he remained. Being an eminent scholar, he managed to attract many disciples and was influential in the spiritual development of his more famous son, Jalāl-ad-Dīn Muḥammad.⁸⁰ It appears that his *halife* (successor) Burhān-ad-Dīn Muḥaqqiq at-Tirmidhī, who accompanied him from Balkh, was equally successful in attracting a large following.

The Suhrawardiyya order, founded by Abu-n-Najīb as-Suhrawardī (d. 1167) and developed and propagated by his nephew Abū Ḥafṣ Shihāb-ad-Dīn 'Umar Suhrawardī (d. 1234), was especially strong in Asia Minor. Among as-Suhrawardī's works, the *'Awārif al-ma'ārif* was very well known; it was among the most popular books on Sufism in Asia Minor and was influential in shaping public opinion of the time and in the thought of future Sufis.⁸¹ Indeed, even though some of these Sufi orders were not as widespread as the Rifā'iyya and Qādiriyya orders, the works written by their founders served to shape Sufism throughout the Ottoman era.

In the following centuries, two other important orders close to the Sunnī sect and with their origins in Asia appeared – the Naqshbandiyya and the Khalwatiyya. These were very influential from political, social and religious points of view, both in the Turkoman principalities and in the Ottoman empire, Asia Minor and the Balkans. They are still strong at the present time.⁸²

79 Jāmī, *Nafaḥāt al-uns*, pp. 491–2; Corbin, *L'Homme de Lumière*, pp. 154–64; H. Landolt, 'Stufen der Gotteserkenntnis und das Lob der Torheit bei Najm-e Razi', *Eranos-Jahrbuch*, XLVI, 1977, pp. 175–204; H. Algar, 'Najm ad-Dīn Rāzī Dāya', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–, VII, pp. 870–1.

80 A. Aflākī, *Manāqib al-'arīfīn*, ed. Tahsin Yazici, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1959, I, pp. 48, 176.

81 On Shihāb-ad-Dīn 'Umar Suhrawardī and his order, see Jāmī, *Nafaḥāt al-uns*, pp. 526–7; H. Ritter, 'Die vier Suhrawardi', *Der Islam*, XXV, 1938, pp. 36–8; A. Hartmann, 'al-Suhrawardi', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–, IX, pp. 778–82.

82 On the Naqshbandiyya, see Hamid Algar's numerous articles and D. Le Gall, *The Ottoman Naqshbandiyya in the Pre-Mujaddidi Phase*, Michigan, 1996; M. Gaborieau, A. Popovic and Th. Zarcone (eds), *Naqshbandis: cheminements et situation actuelle d'un ordre mystique musulman*, Istanbul/Paris, Éditions Isis, 1990. For the Khalwatiyya, see especially H. J. Kissling, 'Aus der Geschichte des Chalvetijje-Ordens', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft*, CIII, 1958, pp. 233–89; N. Clayer, *Mystiques, état et société: les Halvetis dans l'air balkanique de la fin du XV^{ème} siècle à nos jours*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1994; F. De Jong, 'Khalwatiyya', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–, IV, pp. 991–3.

In addition to the religious orders that had come to Asia Minor from outside the region, there were others that were born locally, beginning from the end of the thirteenth century. The most noteworthy is the Mawlawiyya, or Jalāliyya as it was then known. During the fourteenth century, after the death of Mawlānā Jalāl-ad-Dīn ar-Rūmī and at the time of his son Sultan Walad and his grandson Ulu Arif Chelebi, the Mawlawiyya spread very rapidly among the Turkoman principalities of western Asia Minor. This urban religious order gained influence during the Ottoman empire from the mid-fifteenth century and spread during the seventeenth century. Its most glorious age was during the seventeenth and following centuries.⁸³



3.32 Detail of ceramic panel, Bayazid Mosque, Istanbul (© G. Degeorge)

Another local religious order that was at least as important as the Mawlawiyya in the history of Asia Minor, and even more widespread, was the Bektashiyya. This order developed in a completely different social environment and had a different interpretation of Sufism. Although it took its name from the thirteenth-century Turkoman Shaykh Haji Bektash-i Wali, it had no direct relationship with him. From the sixteenth century, when it was officially founded, it became the most influential

83 See Thaqib Dede, *Safina-i Nafisa-i Mawlawiyan*, Cairo, AH 1283; A. Gölpınarlı, *Mevlânâ'dan Sonra Mevlevîlik* [Mawlawism after Mawlānā], Istanbul, İnkılâp Kitabevi, 1953; E. Vitray-Meyerovitch, *Mystique et poésie en Islam: Djalâl-ad-Dîn Rûmî et l'ordre des derviches tourneurs*, Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1972; T. Yazici and F. De Jong, 'Mawlawiyya', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–, VI, pp. 883–8. Even though the history of the Mawlawiyya has been analysed in articles and various works, the best source on this subject remains the above-mentioned book by A. Gölpınarlı.

religious order in the rural areas of the Balkan and Asia Minor provinces of the Ottoman empire.⁸⁴

INFLUENTIAL SUFI PHILOSOPHERS IN ASIA MINOR

Muḥyi-d-Dīn al-‘Arabī and waḥdat al-wujūd (wahdet el-vüçud)
(the unity of existence)

Having lived in Konya, the capital of the Seljūq state in Rūm, until 1223, Muḥyi-d-Dīn al-‘Arabī accepted the invitation of the Ayyūbid prince al-Malik al-Ashraf to settle in Damascus, where he lived until his death in 1241. He also wrote some of his works there.⁸⁵

The concept of *waḥdat al-wujūd* (or *wujūdiyya*) that first appeared, albeit unsystematically, in the doctrines of Sufis like Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī (d. 874) and Junayd al-Baghdādī (d. 910) gained systematic theosophical qualities thanks to Muḥyi-d-Dīn al-‘Arabī, even though he never used this specific term. It has been frequently confused with pantheism. It is, however, a complex concept that can briefly be summarized as ‘everything in the universe is a manifestation of God and since He is the real or absolute being everything else is but a reflection of Him’. Thanks to Muḥyi-d-Dīn al-‘Arabī’s vast knowledge in the fields of philosophy, *kalām* (theology), *fiqh* (jurisprudence), *Ḥadīth*, *tafsīr* (Qur’ānic commentary), literature and *jifr* (occult sciences), the concept of *waḥdat al-wujūd* gained the status of a complex system that has influenced Sufi thought up to the present time.

It is for this reason that, in addition to Muḥyi-d-Dīn al-‘Arabī’s two most famous works *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* and *al-Futūḥāt al-makkiyya* and more than 100 other works and pamphlets, many later treatises have also been ascribed to him. Since the meaning of many of the expressions he used was obscure, numerous Muslim scholars and conservative Sufis accused him during his lifetime of being a *zindīq* (heretic) and a *mulḥid* (atheist). His title of *ash-shaykh al-akbar* (the greatest shaykh) was distorted into *ash-shaykh al-akfar* (the most

84 See note 76 above and S. Faroqhi, *Der Bektaschi Orden in Anatolien (vom späten fünfzehnten Jahrhundert bis 1826)*, Vienna, Sonderband der Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, 1980; R. Tschudi, ‘Bektashiyya’, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–, I, pp. 1161–3.

85 On Muḥyi-d-Dīn al-‘Arabī, see O. Yahya, *Histoire et classification de l’oeuvre d’Ibn Arabī*, Damascus, Institut Français de Damas, 1964; H. Corbin, *L’imagination créatrice dans le Soufisme d’Ibn Arabī*, Paris, Flammarion, 1958; M. Chodkiewicz, *Le sceau des saints, prophétie et sainteté dans la doctrine d’Ibn Arabī*, Paris, Gallimard, 1986; M. Chodkiewicz, *Un océan sans rivage*, Paris, Édition du Seuil, 1992; W. C. Chittik, *Ibn Arabī’s Metaphysics of Imagination: The Sufi Path of Knowledge*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1989; see also A. Ateş, ‘Ibn al-‘Arabī’, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–, III, pp. 707–11.

infidel shaykh), but despite this he did not lose the great respect he enjoyed among all classes of people.

Şadr-ad-Dīn al-Qunāwī – Muḥyi-d-Dīn al-‘Arabī’s adopted son and successor and also a famous Sufi – was responsible for his father’s prestige in Asia Minor by writing commentaries explaining and making accessible his work.⁸⁶ Thanks to Şadr-ad-Dīn, Muḥyi-d-Dīn al-‘Arabī’s thought influenced all kinds of people living in Seljūq Asia Minor, both Sunnī and non-Sunnī, and belonging to both the upper and lower classes.

There were also other representatives of the *waḥdat al-wujūd* school of thought in Asia Minor. The most important of these were Mu’ayyad-ad-Dīn Jandī, Sa’d-ad-Dīn al-Farghānī and ‘Afīf-ad-Dīn at-Tilmisānī. These and their disciples established *zāwiyas* in cultural centres such as the cities of Konya, Sivas and Erzincan. By teaching their ideas to other disciples, writing commentaries of existing works and composing new works, they disseminated the school of *waḥdat al-wujūd*. Thus, the entire Middle East was influenced by this school of thought, and it spread even further. Of greater significance is the fact that Muḥyi-d-Dīn al-‘Arabī’s thought was influential not only within the context of ‘higher’ Sufism, but also within popular Sufism. It is interesting that such a complex theosophical doctrine should gain so much popularity at a lower level.

Not only was Muḥyi-d-Dīn al-‘Arabī’s thought still influential during Ottoman times among both Sufis and the population in general;⁸⁷ it was also the catalyst for certain social movements like the Malāmī movement of the sixteenth century, which was present throughout the Ottoman empire.⁸⁸ The Malāmī movement is still current in some intellectual circles today.

Mawlānā Jalāl-ad-Dīn ar-Rūmī and divine love

After Muḥyi-d-Dīn al-‘Arabī, the Sufi current that gained the most popularity in Asia Minor was Mawlānā Jalāl-ad-Dīn ar-Rūmī’s transformation of the concept of *waḥdat al-wujūd* into a passionate divine love that became the centre of everything. Even though he has been frequently studied and

86 Jāmī, *Nafahāt al-uns*, pp. 632–4; W. C. Chittik, ‘Sadr ad-Din Qunawi on the Oneness of Being’, *International Philosophical Quarterly*, XXI, 1981, pp. 171–84.

87 On this, see H. Z. Ülken, ‘École Vudjudite et son influence dans la pensée turque’, *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, LXII, 1969, pp. 195–208; M. Tahrali, ‘A General Outline of the Influence of Ibn Arabī on the Ottoman Era’, *Journal of the Muḥyi ad-Din Ibn Arabī Society*, XXVI, 1999, pp. 43–54; M. Chodkiewicz, ‘Réception de la doctrine d’Ibn Arabī dans le monde ottoman’, in A. Y. Ocak (ed.), *Sufism and Sufis in the Ottoman Empire*, Ankara, Turkish Historical Society Publications, 2003.

88 See A. Y. Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zindiklar ve Mülhidler Yahut Dairenin Dışına Çıkanlar* [Atheists and Heretics in Ottoman Society or Those who Went Astray out of the Circle], Istanbul, Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 2003, pp. 251–327.

many publications about him have appeared, very few have adopted a sufficiently scholarly approach.

When still a small child, Mawlānā Jalāl-ad-Dīn ar-Rūmī fled from the Mongol invasion with his father Bahā'-ad-Dīn Walad. He received an excellent education in the current centres of learning, Damascus and Aleppo, and became an expert in canonical matters, and in particular in the field of *fiqh*. While acquiring an awareness of Sufi doctrine from his father, he also expanded his more conventional knowledge. This profound understanding of orthodox doctrine had a deep influence on his conception of Sufism, which never strayed far from Sunnī Islam.⁸⁹

Ar-Rūmī began by teaching in a *madrasa* and later, under the influence of a passionate Qalandarī dervish called Shams-i Tabrizi and the Sufi teachings of his father, he embarked on a life of mysticism. This must also have been due to his innate and very strong mystical instincts, otherwise Shams-i Tabrizi and his father could not have influenced him so profoundly. The strength of this innate tendency towards mysticism in ar-Rūmī's character is clearly visible, in all its phases, in the celebrated collection of biographies, the *Manāqib al-'arīfīn*.

Thanks to his vast knowledge and sincere beliefs, ar-Rūmī had a great effect on both Muslims and non-Muslims and also attracted intellectuals and senior members of the administration, including the ruler himself. Ar-Rūmī was also linked by strong ties of friendship to other famous Sufis of the time such as Ṣadr-ad-Dīn al-Qunāwī. In this way he expanded his circle of acquaintances and spread his conception of Sufism across all of Seljūq Asia Minor. Ar-Rūmī was popular not just among the more learned classes, but also among classes with different approaches to Islam who considered him to be a saint (*walī*).

Ar-Rūmī's works like the *Mathnawī*, *Diwan-ı kabîr*, *Fihî ma fih* and *Ruba'îyyat*, which explain his conception of Sufism, were not known just among the learned classes, even though they were written in Persian;⁹⁰ thanks to Sufis like Yunus Emre and Ashiq Pasha, they were also known to the Turkomans. Ashiq Pasha, a famous fourteenth-century Turkoman Sufi poet who defended the use of Turkish in Asia Minor versus Persian and Arabic, was inspired by ar-Rūmī when writing his *Gharibnâma*. Yunus Emre also greatly admired ar-Rūmī and admitted to having been influenced by him.

89 On Mawlānā Jalāl-ad-Dīn ar-Rūmī and his school of Sufism, see A. Gölpınarlı, *Mevlânâ Celâleddîn*, Istanbul, İnkılâp Kitabevi, 1959; B. Firuzanfar, *Zindagani-i Mawlânâ Jalâl ad-Dîn Muhammad*, Tehran, AH 1354; Meyerovitch, *Mystique et poésie*; A. Schimmel, *The Triumphal Sun: A Study of the Works of Jalaloddin Rumi*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1993; A. Bausani, 'Djalâl ad-Dîn Rûmî', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954-, II, pp. 404-8.

90 Ar-Rūmī's works have been printed many times in many different languages and thus need not be listed here.

Another famous contemporary Turkoman Sufi influenced by ar-Rūmī was Haji Bektash-ı Wali.

Ar-Rūmī did not establish a religious order during his lifetime, but after his death in 1273, and especially after the accession of his son Sultan Walad to the rank of *halife* (successor), the Mawlawiyya order started to take shape. It developed further and was consolidated under the Turkoman principalities after the fall of the Seljūqs of Rūm.⁹¹

Haji Bektash-i Wali, Yunus Emre and Ashiq Pasha: popular Sufism in Asia Minor

Another important Sufi in Asia Minor during Seljūq times was the above-mentioned Haji Bektash-i Wali (d. 1271). The fact that his name almost never appears in contemporary sources would indicate that he did not have a very large circle of acquaintances during his lifetime. The fame that Haji Bektash-i Wali enjoys nowadays is due to the Bektashī religious order. The Bektashiyya was founded at the beginning of the sixteenth century, but its origins are much older. It was probably during the fourteenth century that Haji Bektash acquired the aura of sainthood around which the religious order carrying his name was created. At the present time, the Bektashīs and Qizilbash venerate him not for his real persona, but rather for his sainthood. According to them, Haji Bektash was the reincarnation of ‘Alī.⁹²

Another important Sufi who not only influenced the Sufism of Asia Minor but remained influential throughout the following centuries was Yunus Emre (d. 1310). He lived in a rural area, was a great Turkoman shaykh and may be considered as a follower of Ahmad Yasawi (d. c. 1167). Emre was still in his youth when Haji Bektash was an old man. Not only have works like his *Dīwān* and *ar-Risāla an-nushiyya* survived up to modern times,⁹³ but also many works imitating him which were written in later ages by poets who admired and were influenced by him. Like ar-Rūmī, by whom he was influenced, Yunus Emre was a believer in the concept of *waḥdat al-wujūd*. His easily understood and melodic poems describing this concept contributed greatly to its diffusion in Asia Minor.

91 See note 85 above.

92 This subject has been studied in detail in the following work, which should be seen as a reference: I. Melikoff, ‘La divinisation de Ali chez les Bektachis-Alevis’, in A. Y. Ocak (ed.), *From History to Mythology: Ali in the Popular Muslim Beliefs*, Ankara, Turkish Historical Society Publications, 2003.

93 A. Gölpınarlı, *Risalat al-Nushiyya ve Divan* [The *Risāla an-nushiyya* and the *Dīwān*], Istanbul, 1965; M. Tatçı, *Yunus Emre Divanı: İnceleme, Metin* [The *Dīwān* of Yunus Emre: Study and Text], Ankara, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1990; M. Tatçı, *Risaletü'n-Nushiyye: Tenkitli Metin* [The *Risāla an-nushiyya*: Critical Edition], Ankara, Ministry of Culture Publications, 1991.

Ashiq Pasha is a very interesting Sufi due to the turbulent time of widespread social, political and religious crisis in Asia Minor in which he lived. He was a Turkoman Sufi and a descendant of Baba İlyas who in 1240 had revolted against the Seljūqs of Rūm. Ashiq Pasha received a good education and was greatly influenced by the cultural-spiritual environment generated by ar-Rūmī, Yunus Emre and Akhi Awran. It was perhaps because of his rather dubious past that he dedicated his whole life to Sufism. He was opposed to the diffusion of Persian and Arabic in Asia Minor and supported the use of Turkish. These ideas are reflected in his long work, the *Gharibnama*.⁹⁴

Interaction among Muslims and Christians and popular Islam

THE CONTRIBUTION OF SUFISM TO POPULAR ISLAM

One of the greatest transformations in Islam was the increased role of Sufism in the way that people perceived the religion. This perception was a direct result of the spread of the religious orders. In many parts of the Muslim world, the most typical transformation was the emergence of the cult of saints among the common people. Even villages and towns would have at least one or two saints' mausoleums. The same is true of all the cities and towns of Asia Minor, and indeed the mausoleums of Sufi elders have become the most famous shrines in some cities. This is a defining characteristic of settlements in Asia Minor and is a sign of their ancient past.⁹⁵

Mausoleums can be considered religious shrines when all characteristics of popular Islam are visible and where certain pre-Islamic cults find new expression. The way that popular Islam manifests itself in mosques is totally different from the way it exists in these shrines. While the popular Islam seen in mosques is closer to orthodox Islam, that seen in the tombs and mausoleums of saints is closer to pre-Islamic beliefs. That is why – as in all other Muslim countries – the religious scholars of Asia Minor have, since

94 On Ashiq Pasha and his works, see F. İz, 'Ashiq Pasha', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954–, I, pp. 689–99. His work has been published as *Aşık Paşa, Garib-nâme*, ed. Kemal Yavuz, Ankara, Türk Dil Kurumu Publications, 2000.

95 This subject has been very well analysed, on the basis of concrete data, in F. W. Hasluck (ed.), *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans of Konya*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1929. In addition to this, see Vryonis, *Decline, passim*. As for the Ottoman period, an important article is Ö. L. Barkan, 'İstilâ Devrinin Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri ve Zâviyeler' [The Colonizing Turkish Dervishes of the Periods of Invasion and the Dervish Convents], *Vakıflar Dergisi*, II, 1942, pp. 279–353.

the times of the Seljūqs of Rūm, declared a sort of ‘cold war’ against these beliefs, described by them as *khurāfa* (superstition) or *bid‘a* (innovation). The dervishes have always won this war.

Each mausoleum is visited for a different aim and has a different set of customs⁹⁶ – these are sometimes more respected than the official injunctions and prohibitions of Islam. People are apprehensive that the spirit of the person entombed could somehow punish them for a lack of respect. Thus, even strict Muslims may occasionally be afraid of ignoring the sanctity of such a shrine.

MUSLIMS, CHRISTIANS AND A COMMON SOCIAL LIFE

The Turks who entered Asia Minor as conquerors soon became its new inhabitants. Once the first conflicts were over, the different parties in the region began to get to know each other and to recognize each other’s legitimacy. The Turks had no intention of getting rid of the Christians, nor did the Christians wish to stamp out the Turks. As the years went by, the various groups in cities and in rural areas began to discover each other’s cultures, and especially their languages and religions. It was only the nomadic Turkomans who kept their distance from both Muslim city-dwellers and Christians. The urban and rural dwellers, Turks, Greeks, Armenians, Assyrians and others, quickly came to realize the inevitability and usefulness of coming into contact with each other during routine urban life, commercial life, celebrations, religious festivities and many other occasions. The fact that the Seljūq sultans were tolerant of their non-Muslim subjects – to a degree that attracted the criticism of the Arabs – was partly a result of the similarities each side perceived in the other’s religion. As already mentioned, the Christians of Asia Minor were influenced by ancient pagan cults. The same was true for the way in which the popular version of Islam was perceived in these regions. The manner in which both religions were ready to embrace similar superstitions was a factor in the *rapprochement* among people of different faiths.⁹⁷

It was natural that after a long period of living together there should be cultural interaction between Muslim Turks and Greeks, Armenians and other Christian communities. However, the nature and degree of this exchange have always been the subject of controversy among Western and Turkish historians. Inevitably, the degree of exchange depended on the relative political and cultural strengths of each party.

96 Very interesting present-day examples are cited in H. Tanyu, *Ankara ve Çevresinde Adak ve Adak Yerleri* [Sacrifice Practices and Places in Ankara and its Environs], Ankara, Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1965.

97 Vryonis, *Decline*, pp. 223–44.

UNIVERSAL DIMENSIONS OF THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

The oft-repeated theory of some Western historians that the Turks were a primitive tribe when they first arrived in Asia Minor has been refuted by modern Islamology and Turcology. As the famous Turkish historian Fuad Köprülü puts it, Turks arrived in Asia Minor ‘as a community that had combined the all-encompassing Muslim civilization with their own culture and traditions’.⁹⁸ Thus they did not simply disappear within the Christian culture of Asia Minor that carried within it traces of ancient pagan cults. Indeed, this was never a possibility. Nowadays, even Muslim or Christian Turkish citizens who do not consider themselves ethnic Turks mostly know Turkish in addition to their own languages, and most Muslims consider themselves as such, even if they follow their own religion superficially. Thus, the question is not whether this cultural exchange is enough to change the substance of the Turks’ culture, but rather whether there is an exchange of customs at the level of daily life. When looked at from this point of view, it becomes clear that there has been a reciprocal interaction encompassing certain customs, regional cults and beliefs. Mixed marriages and conversions have strengthened the trend.

COMMON CULTS: PILGRIMAGES TO SHRINES AND SEASONAL FESTIVITIES

When the Turks settled in Asia Minor, they encountered both pre-Christian and Christian cults, beliefs and customs. Since the Turks had only relatively recently converted to Islam, and consequently their beliefs were still rather superficial, the nomadic and semi-nomadic communities and even the sedentary urban classes adopted some of these cults. The most common were seasonal festivities (spring–summer) like the *Hıdrellez* (*Khādir-İlyas*) and the Muslim *awliyā’* cult corresponding to the Christian cult of saints. F. W. Hasluck’s studies have reached some interesting conclusions. He notes that in the same way that the preservation of pagan deities as ‘Christian saints’ by the inhabitants of Asia Minor made the process of Christianization a gradual process, so the preservation of Christian saints made the process of Islamization a similarly gradual process. For example, some early Christian saints, and particularly martyrs, were considered by Turks to be *awliyā’* and in this way their tombs (*maqām*) became shrines common to both religions.⁹⁹

To encourage conversions, the shaykhs and dervishes of non-Sunnī religious orders like the Bektashīs generally made extensive use of the cults of saints among non-Muslim communities. Over the years these cults became

98 See Köprülü, *Türk Edebiyatında*, p. 191.

99 See Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam*.

cults of *awliyā'*, with certain shrines being objects of pilgrimage for both Christians and Muslims. For example, around Ürgüp, St Kharalambos was venerated also by the Bektashīs, around Amasya Sts Theodor and George were venerated as Baba İlyas, while the Sari Saltıq cult mixed with the cult of Sts Spiridon and Nicolas.¹⁰⁰

Another aspect of the bicultural nature of the religious and social environment in the cities and villages of the Seljūqs of Rūm, of the Turkoman principalities and of the Ottomans was the common seasonal festivities. The most striking example of these was the summer festivity celebrated by Christians as Aya Yorgi (Hagios Georgios, or St George) and by Muslims as *Hıdrellez* (*Khaḍir-İlyas*) on the same day (6 May) and in similar ways. This coincidence had probably been present since the days of the Seljūqs of Rūm. Turks used to call the green areas dedicated to Aya Yorgi, which generally included a church dedicated to the same saint, *Hıdırlık* and used them to celebrate *Hıdrellez*. The legends of Aya Yorgi have blended with the *Khaḍir-İlyas manaqib*.¹⁰¹

CONVERSION (*IHTIDĀ'*) AND APOSTASY (*IRTIDĀD*)

The subject of conversion and apostasy constitutes an important aspect of the socio-religious history of Asia Minor, and is also a favourite concern of Western historians. The slightly exaggerated theses, beginning with Gibbon and partly continued by Hasluck and later by Speros Vryonis, demonstrate the importance of the subject. The response by modern Turkish historians to these theses has, with some recent exceptions, been nothing more than a nationalistic reaction. This is unfortunate, because the importance of the cultural interaction between Muslims and Christians who have been living side by side in Asia Minor since the last quarter of the eleventh century, from the point of view of an awareness of past events and of the present-day situation, is self-evident.

As already mentioned, immediately after the battle of Manzikert in 1071, the Turks began the conquest of Asia Minor, moving from east to west. The non-Muslim communities of the conquered regions either fled and took refuge in areas still held by the Byzantine empire or, being disillusioned with the Byzantines, remained where they were. As the situation stabilized,

100 On these, see Vryonis, *Decline*, p. 362; H. Dernschwam, *Hans Dernschwam's Tagebuch: Einer Reise Nach Konstantinopel*, ed. F. Babinger, Munich, Verlag von Duncker und Humboldt, 1923, p. 202; J. Deny, 'Sary Saltıq et le nom de la ville de Babadaghi', in *Mélanges Emile Picot*, Paris, Librairie Damascène Morgand, 1913, II, pp. 12–14.

101 A. Y. Ocak, 'XIII–XV Yüzyillarda Anadolu'da Türk-Hıristiyan Dinî etkileşimler' [Turkish-Christian Religious Interactions in Anatolia in the Thirteenth to Fifteenth Centuries], *Bellekten*, CCXIV, 1991, pp. 661–73.

most of those who had fled returned to their former lands. It was therefore inevitable that an exchange of religions between the communities should take place and continue under the Seljūqs of Rūm, the Turkoman principalities and the Ottomans. However, only rarely do Western and Christian sources mention *irtidād* (conversion from Islam to Christianity). This is understandable, since in most places and circumstances, conversions from the religion of the politically and culturally submissive community in favour of the dominant are more frequent. Nevertheless, the opposite has also occurred from time to time.

The same sociological processes took place in Asia Minor. Since the time of the Seljūqs of Rūm, there have been Christians in the cities of Asia Minor who have converted to Islam (*ih̄tidā'*, or 'finding the truth') under the influence of a variety of political, economic, psychological and religious factors. This phenomenon was reflected in thirteenth-century epics like the *Battalnama*, the *Danishmendnama* and the *Saltıqnama*. The only documentary evidence of historical value concerning the first conversions consists of a handful of records in chronicles. From the fifteenth century onwards, however, there are many Ottoman archival sources on the subject. Among these, mention might be made of the *qadı sicilleri* (*qāđī*'s court registers) and the *mühimme defteri* (imperial chancery registers). From these records, we learn the names of the converts (*muhtedī*), their social origins, their family structure and their professions both before and after conversion.¹⁰²

There were many reasons for the conversions that occurred after the establishment of Turkish authority. Numerous factors ranging from attempts to gain political and economic strength to sincere religious inspiration may have played a part. Up to the present time, no records concerning forced conversions by the state have been found. Nevertheless, it is true that the Turks provided incentives of various kinds to converts, while the Byzantine empire was not able to provide any kind of support or protection to Christians. In other words, one of the main factors behind conversion was the relative political weakness of Christians vis-à-vis the Muslims in Asia Minor.

Many of the conversions took place under the influence of the Sufi orders. Indeed, this is still generally true today. There is much documentation on the subject, such as the *awliyâ manaqib* (hagiographical narratives on the

102 The following are examples of this: B. and L. Bennasar, *Les Chrétiens d'Allah: l'histoire extraordinaire des renégats (XVIe et XVIIe siècles)*, Paris, Perrin, 1989; O. Çetin, *Sicillere Göre Bursa'da İhtida Hareketleri ve Sosyal Sonuçları (1472–1909)* [Conversions to Islam in Bursa and their Social Consequences according to the Qāđī's Court Registers], Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Publications, 1994; K. Çolak, 'XVI. Yüzyılda İstanbul'da İhtida Hareketleri' [Conversions to Islam in Sixteenth-century Istanbul], PhD thesis, Ankara, Hacettepe University, Department of History, n.d.

lives of saints), which can provide interesting insights into conversions, but only when confirmed by official records. For example, the *Manāqib al-‘ārifīn* and the *Wilāyatnâme-i Haji Bektash* mention conversions that took place in the circles of ar-Rūmī and Hadji Bektash.¹⁰³

As for the number of conversions, there is nothing that indicates that these took place *en masse*. The records only refer to individual conversions of people of high social rank. These records were mostly kept in the capital. Conversions of ordinary people in the provinces were ignored as unimportant. No hasty conclusions should be reached therefore concerning the numbers involved; we should neither assume that conversions were rare nor that there were mass conversions.

Religious conversions did not occur only in the shape of *ihtidā’*. Even though much less frequent, there were also cases of *irtidād*. These took place particularly in the more remote areas, especially among newly converted Muslims or nomadic Turks not yet converted to Islam.

At the time of the Mongol domination of Asia Minor in the thirteenth century, the Islamization of the nomadic Mongols began with the tribes converting to Islam as they gradually started to lead sedentary lives. These Mongols remained in Asia Minor, mixed with Turkomans and assimilated with ethnic Turks. As a result, they also adopted the Turkish language to which they added some Mongol words.

THEOLOGICAL COMPARISONS AND DEBATES: FAQĪH-PRIEST AND DERVISH-FRIAR

The presence of two religions in Asia Minor had another result in addition to those referred to above: the lively theological debates and exchanges of information between priests and *faqīhs* and friars and dervishes which began under the Seljūqs of Rūm and continued during the first few centuries of Ottoman rule. The fact that these began in early times can be seen from their inclusion in thirteenth-century epics like the *Battalnama*, the *Danishmendnama* and the *Saltıqnama*.

The young sultan İzz-ad-Dīn Kaykawus II, who was related to the Byzantine imperial dynasty through the maternal line, used to organize debates between priests and Muslim theologians in his palace.¹⁰⁴ It is also

103 A study of these and similar hagiographic works created in Asia Minor is A. Y. Ocak, ‘Bazı Menâkıbnâmelere Göre XIII.–XV. Yüzyıllardaki İhtidâlarda Heterodoks Şeyh ve Dervişlerin Rolü’ [The Role of Heterodox Shaykhs and Dervishes in Conversions to Islam in the Thirteenth to Fifteenth Centuries according to some Manaqibnamas], *Osmanlı Araştırmaları* [Journal of Ottoman Studies], II, 1981, pp. 31–42.

104 Aflākī, *Manāqib*, II, pp. 123–5.

known that Jalāl-ad-Dīn ar-Rūmī frequently visited a monastery near Konya called Ak Manastır or Dayr-i Eflâtun, where he held theological debates with Christians and Muslims and even priests from Constantinople.¹⁰⁵ It is even said that ar-Rūmī once scolded a Muslim merchant who insulted a Christian colleague and told him to apologize. The fact that Haji Bektash-i Wali used to exchange opinions with Christians in general, and priests from the Ürgüp area in particular, is mentioned in the *Wilâyatnâme-i Haji Bektash-i Wali*. It is noteworthy that many of the hagiographic legends concerning Haji Bektash included in this fifteenth-century work (which is the only hagiographic source on him) are adaptations from the Bible.¹⁰⁶

The second Ottoman sultan, Orkhan Ghazi, also organized similar debates.¹⁰⁷ In the fifteenth century Borkludje Mustafa, a close acquaintance of Shaykh Badr-ad-Dīn, used to hold theological discussions with the priests on the island of Chios.¹⁰⁸ Other similar examples are to be found in the life of Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror who, after seizing Constantinople, appointed Gennadios Scholarios as patriarch and even had him write a book on Christian theology. Some Latin writers and Byzantine intellectuals like Georgios Trapezuntios and Georgios Amirutzes presented similar works to Sultan Mehmed.¹⁰⁹

All this is important because it shows that the processes of Islamization and Turkification, which began with the settlement of the Turks in Asia Minor, were not the result of religious fanaticism, but rather they were characterized by moderate and productive relations between the two communities. As a result, Islam and Christianity lived peacefully side by side in Asia Minor throughout the period of the Ottoman empire.

105 Ibid., *passim*.

106 See A. Y. Ocak, *Kültür Tarihi Kaynağı Olarak Menâkıbnâmeler: Metodolojik Bir Yaklaşım* [Manaqibnames as Sources for Cultural History: A Methodological Approach], Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Publications, 1997, addenda III–VI.

107 For example, see Vryonis, *Decline*, pp. 421, 426; M. Balivet, 'Byzantins Judaïsants et Juifs Islamisés', *Byzantion*, LII, 1982, pp. 24–41.

108 M. Balivet, 'Derviches turcs en Roumanie latin: quelques remarques sur la circulation des idées religieuses au XV^{ème} siècle', *Byzantinische Forschungen*, XI, 1987, pp. 239–55. The French historian Michel Balivet has concentrated on these theological debates in Asia Minor and has studied them on the basis of documentation found in archives in Salonika, Venice and the Vatican State. The following are his works on this subject: *Roumanie byzance et pays de Rûm: histoire d'un espace d'imbrication Gréco-Turque*, Istanbul, Les Éditions Isis, 1994; *Les Turcs au Moyen-Age: des Croisades aux Ottomans*, Istanbul, Les Éditions Isis, 2002.

109 On these texts and their commentary, see M. Balivet, *Pour une concorde islamo-chrétien: démarches byzantines et latines à la fin du Moyen-Age*, Rome, Pontificio Istituto di Studi Arabi e d'Islamistica, 1997.

Chapter 3.6

ISLAM IN AFGHANISTAN

Abdallah Salem al -Zelitny

Afghanistan is a continental country that forms the north-eastern part of the great Iranian plateau. It is chiefly mountainous and the chain of mountains slopes downwards towards the south. For this reason, the southern areas have, throughout history, provided an easy route for the movement of armies and the transport of goods between East and West.

These areas were not known as 'Afghānistān' until after the mid-eighteenth century. During the Middle Ages, the term 'Khurāsān' was more commonly used to describe the political and administrative region that today comprises both Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. As for the term 'Afghāns', which refers to one of the ethnic groups that make up the country, this appears to be very old, for the Indian astronomer Varāha Mihira, in the early sixth century AD, referred to the 'Afkānā' tribe that inhabited the northern areas of the Sulaymān mountains. The same name was also used by the Chinese traveller Xuan Zang (Hsüan Tsang, Hsüen Tsang) in connection with his trip to India in the seventh century.¹

In addition to the original inhabitants of the country, Afghanistan was settled by numerous Tājīk and Iranian peoples and Turkic and Mongol tribes, as well as the Iranian-Indian inhabitants of the Hindu Kush mountains. There were also tribes of Arab origin in the centre of the country whose presence goes back to the early stages of the Islamic conquest.²

Pashto (Pakhto, Pushtu), one of the ancient Iranian languages, is dominant among the people of Afghanistan, followed in importance by

1 W. K. Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 59.

2 G. Morgenstierne, 'Afghān', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1960, I, p. 217.

Modern Persian. Despite its age, Pashto was influenced by the incoming Arabic language in words and expressions, and came to be written in the Arabic alphabet, using thirty-eight letters, similar in that respect to Persian.³

Afghanistan before the Islamic conquest

In ancient times, Afghanistan was known as 'Āryana' after the Aryan tribes that migrated and settled there. They founded various centres of civilization the most famous of which is the city of Balkh, then known as Bactria.⁴

The country then came under Persian influence under the emperor Cyrus (Qūrush). The Greeks, however, soon competed with the Persians; during his fierce campaigns in the East (Asia), Alexander of Macedonia was able to incorporate this country into his empire. The Greek presence lasted for nearly two centuries during which time the country came under Greek artistic and cultural influence, to the extent that the *polis* (free city-state) of Greek civilization found its way into Afghanistan through the settlements that remained after the waning of Greek political and military power.⁵

The Greek period was followed by a large influx of Iranian tribes into Afghanistan. Thus, the country was plundered by several Sāsānid governments in the west and middle of the country, as well as by Mongol-Turkic elements and even Chinese elements in the north and north-east. In addition, self-governing elements known as the Ḥayāṭila (Hephthalites, White Huns) founded a kingdom in the province of Zābulistān.⁶

There was a variety of religions in ancient Afghanistan. It was there that the Hindu religion arose before moving to India. In fact, the oldest Hindu sources indicate that the city of Balkh was the centre of this faith.⁷ Also said to have been from Balkh was Zoroaster, who founded the Manichaean religion with its central belief in the struggle between good and evil.⁸ Buddhism, too, became current in Afghanistan after Afghan kings from Kūshān adopted it following its spread there from its source in India.⁹ Recently unearthed archaeological remains point to the considerable geographical spread attained by Buddhism; a huge statue of Buddha standing in the mountains

3 Salāḥ-ad-Dīn as-Saljūqī, *Afghānistān*, Cairo, Maktab al-isti'lāmāt wa-ṣ-ṣaḥāfa, 1960, p. 112.

4 R. Ghirshman, 'Afghānistān', in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1960, I, pp. 225–6.


5 Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan*, pp. 19–20.

6 Ghirshman, 'Afghānistān', p. 226.

7 As-Saljūqī, *Afghānistān*, p. 17.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 17.

9 Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan*, pp. 21–3.



3.33 Map of Afghanistan (© UNESCO)

of the valley of Bamyān was destroyed by the Taliban in March 2001.¹⁰ Thus it might be said that on the eve of the Islamic conquest, Afghanistan was the scene of a struggle between two religions – Buddhism and Zoroastrianism – with a limited Hindu presence, and that political unity was lacking, the country’s administration being divided among various governments unlinked by ethnic or religious ties.

The spread of Islam in Afghanistan

The Islamic *da‘wa* (‘call’, or missionary activity) in Afghanistan needed to remove its greatest impediment, namely, Sāsānid rule. In the first half of the seventh century, the Sāsānid empire was going through its most troubled period. No fewer than ten kings had ascended the throne in merely four years,¹¹ the large-scale wars upon which the empire embarked consumed all its material and human resources and it also suffered from internal strife and external interventions in those struggles. It became quite feasible to ascend

10 C. E. Bosworth, ‘Ghazna’, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1960, II, p. 1048.

11 Arthur Christensen, *Īrān fī ‘ahd as-sāsāniyyīn*, trans. Yahyā al-Khashshāb, Beirut, Dār an-nahḍa al-‘arabiyya, n.d., p. 480, from the original French *L’Iran sous les Sassanides*, Copenhagen, Levin and Munksgaard; Paris, P. Geuthner, 1936.

the throne with foreign assistance. The clergy, too, intervened in the state's policies and administrative matters.¹² The social policies adopted planted the seeds of bitter hatred in people's hearts. Especially detested was the class system that made the country's rule the preserve of a particular class, making the people serfs who were tied to the land and subject to forced labour. The ordinary masses were forced to follow the armies ignominiously on foot, without any kind of pay.¹³ In short, these unfortunate circumstances undoubtedly served the Muslims and helped them to achieve speedy victories, causing the peoples under Sāsānid rule to welcome Islam as a religion and the conquerors as liberators and saviours.

As Islam is a universal religion, Islamic sources mention that among the various kings and princes the Prophet addressed, inviting them to join Islam, was Khusrau (Chosroes; *khusrau* means king) of Persia in 6/627. The message to Khusrau was carried by 'Abdallāh ibn Hudhāfa ibn Qays ibn 'Uday ibn Sa'd ibn Sahn,¹⁴ and included a direct invitation to Islam, reading in part:

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. From Muḥammad, the Prophet of God, to Khusrau the great ruler of the Persians. Peace be upon those who follow the true religion and who believe in God and His Prophet, testifying that there is no god but God alone, who has no associate, and that Muḥammad is His servant and Prophet. I call you with God's *da'wa*, for I am God's Prophet to all people, and I warn all who are alive, may the word prevail over the unbelievers, that if you become a Muslim, you will be saved, but if you refuse, you will have the sins of the *majūs*.¹⁵

The sources add that Khusrau's response was violent: he tore up the Prophet's letter and ordered the governor of Yemen to bring the master of this *da'wa* in chains to his court immediately.¹⁶ However, internal circumstances affecting Sāsānid rule prevented this. In the face of this refusal, the Muslims had little choice but to fight and wage war, not to force conversion to Islam, but to break down the obstacles and barriers impeding the *da'wa* and cutting people off from it, denying the new movement the opportunity of coming into direct contact with the people.

The battle of Nihāwand (21/642), at which the Muslims decisively defeated the Persians, marked the beginning of the Muslim armies'

12 Christensen, *Īrān*, pp. 472, 480.

13 Ibid., pp. 305–6.

14 'Abd-al-Malik ibn Hishām, *as-Sīra an-nabawīyya*, ed. Muṣṭafā as-Saqa et al., Cairo, Maṭba'at Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1936, IV, p. 254; Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa-n-nihāya*, Beirut, Maktabat al-ma'ārif, n.d., IV, pp. 268–9.

15 Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, pp. 268–9.

16 Ibid., pp. 268–9.

penetration of all provinces of the Persian empire. After this victory, the caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (r. 13–23/634–44) allowed the Muslim armies to continue their march eastwards.¹⁷ For this purpose, seven military regiments were formed each of which was given responsibility for one of the Persian empire’s provinces. Al-Aḥnaf ibn Qays was able to defeat the king of the Persians, Yazdgird III, at the gates of the city of Balkh, which fell, as had Herāt, Nīshāpūr and Marw.¹⁸ Before long, the region from the Hindu Kush mountains to Nīshāpūr was in the hands of the Muslims.¹⁹

The caliph ‘Umar, disturbed and concerned by this expansion that he had initially permitted, ordered the Muslims to halt and to be satisfied with what they had already attained.²⁰ ‘Umar’s intuition was justified, for what he feared came to pass and most of these provinces rebelled after his death. This caused the caliph ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān (r. 23–35/644–56) to order his deputy in Basra, ‘Abdallāh ibn Amīr ibn Kurayz, to march yet again on Khurāsān. Ibn Kurayz took Sistān and reconquered Nīshāpūr, Herāt, Balkh, Ṭukhāristān and Jūzjān. One of the Muslim regiments reached Zābulistān and Kabul and conquered them.²¹ But these successes were followed by a period in which Muslims became preoccupied with their civil wars – known as the Great Dissension – so the cities of Afghanistan rebelled again.

When the Umayyad caliphs came to power they continued the conquests. During the rule of Mu‘āwiya ibn Abī Sufyān (41–60/661–80), the Muslim armies went beyond the point that ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb had stipulated for them.²² In addition to military action, however, Mu‘āwiya understood the importance of human and cultural communication with the inhabitants of these provinces. He thus encouraged a number of Arab tribes to acquire estates and to settle there, turning their military camps into vibrant cities.²³

Campaigns continued throughout the Umayyad period in response to the repudiation of treaties by local authorities, for both Herāt and Balkh breached the peace with the Muslims. Thus, Qays ibn al-Haytham marched to Balkh and destroyed its temple called ‘Naw-Bahār’.²⁴ The same thing occurred in the city of Herāt, where the *ratbīl* – the local title of the governor

17 Abū Ja‘far ibn Jarīr aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh al-umam wa-l-mulūk*, Cairo, al-Maṭba‘a al-ḥusayniyya al-miṣriyya, AH 1326, IV, p. 263.

18 Muḥammad al-Khuḍarī, *Itmām al-wafā’ fī sīrat al-khulafā’*, Cairo, al-Maktaba at-tijāriyya al-kubrā, 1964, p. 114.

19 Abu-l-‘Abbās Aḥmad ibn Jābir al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, Beirut, Dār al-ma‘ārif, 1987, pp. 567, 575.

20 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, IV, p. 264.

21 Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī-t-tārīkh*, Cairo, al-Maṭba‘a al-matīriyya, AH 1353, III, pp. 64–5.

22 Abū Sa‘īd ‘Abd-al-Ḥayy al-Jardīzī, *Zayn al-akhbār*, trans. ‘Afāf Zaydān, Cairo, Dār aṭ-ṭibā‘a al-muḥammadiyya, 1982, p. 172.

23 Ibid., p. 173.

24 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 576.

of Kabul and Zābulistān (Ibn al-Athīr calls him the *zanbīl*)²⁵ – breached his treaty with the Muslims, benefiting from the spread of factionalism among the Arab tribes inhabiting Khurāsān.²⁶ But he soon sued for peace in return for an annual payment of the *jizya* (poll tax on non-Muslims), which he paid to the governor of Sistān, according to an agreement with al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf ath-Thaqafī, the administrator of the eastern part of the Islamic state.²⁷

Names should read:

al-Aḥnaf ibn Qays, ‘Aṣim ibn ‘Amr, al-Ḥakam ibn ‘Amr at-Taghlibī, Khurāsān, Nīshāpūr, Marw, Balkh, Kabul, Ghazna, Panjāb, Zābulistān, Qandahār, Bust, Ghūr, Zaranj, Kirmān, Makrān, Sind, Quṣḍār, Sistān, Helmand Rūd

While this chapter has thus far focused on wars and military actions, one must not conclude that the spread of Islam in this region was accomplished solely by military means. The truth is that Muslims endeavoured to be exemplary in their faith and did not force their religion on anyone. On the contrary, people embraced Islam voluntarily and freely because of the justice and equality inherent in its teachings. They became aware of positive changes in their lives with the arrival of the conquerors: class distinctions were abolished, people were granted freedom of religion, the peasants were freed, and many of the inhabitants gained economic and social advantages.²⁸

According to al-Balādhurī, in the treaties they signed with local governors the Muslims committed themselves to ensuring the inhabitants’ freedom of worship and the protection of their lives and possessions.²⁹ The difference in treatment as compared with that of the Persian *khusraus* was noted by the people, and this added to their admiration for the conquerors,³⁰ so that some of them actively participated in the early Muslim campaigns.³¹ When Yazdgird attempted to regroup and mobilize his forces afresh in order to engage the Muslims, he did not find much enthusiasm among the *dihqāns* (local rulers). Indeed, he was subsequently killed at their hands.³²

25 Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi-t-tārīkh*, V, p. 367. The difference between *ratbīl* and *zanbīl* in Arabic script is minimal: two dots over the second letter (*ratbīl*) or one dot over the first letter and one dot over the second letter (*zanbīl*).

26 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 560.

27 Ibid., pp. 562–3.

28 W. Barthold, *Tārīkh al-ḥaḍāra al-islāmiyya*, trans. Ḥamza Ṭāhir, Cairo, Dār al-ma’ārif, 1966, p. 97.

29 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, pp. 546, 550, 593.

30 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, IV, p. 266.

31 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 572.

32 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, V, pp. 71–3.



3.34 Advance of Muslim troops in Afghanistan (© UNESCO)

When the caliphate passed to ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd-al-‘Azīz (r. 99–101/717–20) – known for his desire for peace and his concern for the lives of Muslims – he began by urging the governors of all regions to propagate Islam wisely and on the basis of good advice. He wrote to the governor of Khurāsān, al-Jarrāḥ ibn ‘Abdallāh al-Ḥakamī, asking him to exempt from the *jizya* those who had converted to Islam.³³ ‘Umar also urged that the lists of the *dīwān al-‘aṭā* (office of salaries and pensions) should include all the *mawālī* (non-Arab ‘clients’) who embraced Islam – given that local populations had

33 Ye. A. Belyaev, *al-‘Arab wa-l-islām wa-l-khilāfa*, trans. Anīs Furayḥa, Beirut, ad-Dār al-muttaḥida li-n-nashr, 1973, p. 310. The English edn of this work is *Arabs, Islam and the Arab Caliphate in the Early Middle Ages*, trans. Adolphe Gourevitch, Pall Mall/New York, Praeger, 1969, from the original Russian *Araby, islam i arabskij khalifat v ranneje srednevekov’je*, Moscow, 1965.

themselves participated in the conquest – and treat them the same as Arabs, who were eligible for welfare from the *bayt al-māl* (state treasury).³⁴ Similarly, when ‘Umar heard the claim of the governor of Khurāsān that the people of the country could only be set on the right path by means of the sword, he removed him from power.³⁵ These measures had a decisive influence on the conversion of the people of Khurāsān to Islam.³⁶

Another action of ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd-al-‘Azīz with important social and economic dimensions, and which encouraged people to enter Islam, was his freeing of those who were living in slavery and bondage under the old Sāsānid feudal laws.³⁷ On his orders, these people became landowners with full rights to buy, sell and bequeath their land, in exchange for paying the ‘*ushr* (tithe), a tax levied on all people equally.³⁸ This affected large sectors of Khurāsānī society, for Zoroastrianism had previously imposed a class system which ensured that each class remained within tight boundaries, making it impossible to move from one class to another. Peasants and manual labourers, who made up the absolute majority of society, especially suffered from these oppressive class policies,³⁹ a fact which made them quicker than others to convert to Islam and more responsive to it.

The freeing of peasants resulted in the mass migration of rural inhabitants to the cities,⁴⁰ which no doubt led to economic and social crises as a result of the loss of these productive sectors. These crises should not be seen in a solely negative light, however, since they arose as a result of the liberation of the peasants and their obtaining the freedom to travel and settle wherever they wished. All later attempts to return the peasants to the countryside failed.⁴¹

With the conquest of Khurāsān and the conversion of its inhabitants, Islam gained new blood and youthful energies burning with enthusiasm and zeal. The Arabs gave these new forces the title of *mawālī* (‘clients’). The term *mawālā* (sing. of *mawālī*) does not mean a slave or serf, but rather an ally linked through the tie of *walā*’ (allegiance, or ‘clientage’) to an ally, each being a *mawālā* to the other. Arabs practised this social convention in the pre-Islamic period when the bond of *walā*’ was no less strong than that of blood or kinship. While the Arabs gained leadership over the conquered countries during the early stages of the conquest, it was no more than a

34 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, p. 599.

35 Ibid., p. 600.

36 Ibid., p. 600.

37 ‘Abd-al-‘Azīz ad-Dūrī, *Muqaddima fi-t-tārīkh al-iqtisādī al-‘arābī*, Beirut, Dār at-ṭalī‘a, 1980, pp. 43, 146.

38 Ibid., p. 62.

39 Christensen, *Īrān*, p. 307.

40 Ad-Dūrī, *Muqaddima*, pp. 40–1.

41 Ibid., pp. 40–1.

spiritual and moral leadership, and did not, in essence, imply sovereignty. Neither the Qur'ān nor the *sunna* (customary practice of the Prophet) allows the supremacy of one race over another.

After the death of 'Umar ibn 'Abd-al-'Azīz, the conquered lands saw the return of some undesirable measures, including the imposition of the *jizya* on Muslims as well as other harsh treatment. But these were isolated events, the consequence of the behaviour of certain *wālīs* (governors) and *dihqāns* (grandees), and not state policy.⁴² Even after 'Umar, there were caliphs who endeavoured to halt such oppressive measures and encouraged officials to deal with the people amicably and gently. One such caliph was Yazīd ibn al-Walīd ibn 'Abd-al-Malik (r. 126/744).⁴³

A major reason behind the Muslims' desire to ensure security and strengthen the Islamic presence in the eastern parts of Afghanistan was the fact that it had become a line of defence for the Islamic armies on their way to India. It was through these lands that the armies were supplied with equipment and ammunition.

Towards the end of the Umayyad era, Islam had spread throughout nearly all of Khurāsān. In particular, the 'Abbāsīd propagandist Abū Muslim al-Khurāsānī succeeded in bringing into the fold of Islam many of the people of Khurāsān and their *dihqāns* (leaders), both as a result of his propaganda for the new movement and because he promised to act according to the principles of equality and brotherhood for which the 'Abbāsīd *da'wa* stood.⁴⁴

The success of the 'Abbāsīd revolution had positive results for it appeared as the victory of the Muslim people of Khurāsān and the success of the call to Islam. While some groups opposed the Umayyads and hence the Islamic presence as a result of a few inadequate policies adopted by some Umayyad caliphs or their agents, there was no longer any justification for such opposition following the great wave of liberation unleashed by the 'Abbāsīds, for the 'Abbāsīd revolution sought to liberate all people once and for all. In addition, the participation of the *mawālī* in the revolution brought many of them to the fore and they attained eminent positions in the new state.

All this helped to spread Islam and establish it firmly. The limited numbers of 'Abbāsīd troops redeployed to Khurāsān indicate that the whole region had converted to Islam, that the upper classes (including the feudal classes) had embraced Islam of their own free will and that the Sunnī school

42 Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi-t-tārīkh*, IV, p. 202.

43 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, IX, pp. 31–2.

44 Ad-Dūrī, *Muqaddima*, pp. 56–7.

and majority consensus had become the doctrine of all Khurāsānīs.⁴⁵ The people of the country were enthusiastic converts: they shouldered the burden of conquest and invasion and the spreading of Islam to Central Asia, which the Muslim armies had not yet reached.⁴⁶

There were pockets of resistance to the Islamic tide, such as the *zandīls* of Kabul and Sistān, who persisted in renegeing on the agreements they had signed and attacking Muslim positions.⁴⁷ This prompted the ‘Abbāsīd caliphs to send armies against them. Thus, al-Faḍl ibn Yaḥyā al-Barmakī marched at the head of an expedition to the *shāhbār* (royal court) of Kabul and burnt the idols it contained. At this, the king of Kabul made a semblance of being both Muslim and obedient, but it seems for only a limited period.⁴⁸ Al-Faḍl is credited with another achievement: he succeeded in forming a large army, comprising approximately 500,000 local men, which he called the ‘*Abbasīyya*.⁴⁹ The size of this army reflects the considerable extent to which Islam had spread among the people of Khurāsān.

The caliph al-Ma’mūn (r. 198–218/813–33) was wise and far-sighted and thus saw that a centralized system in a state of vast proportions imposed a heavy burden on central government. He therefore preferred to adopt a decentralized administrative system in the eastern part of the caliphate. In the year 205/820 he appointed his military leader Ṭāhir ibn al-Ḥusayn to administer the eastern Muslim world from Khurāsān and to make that province’s rule hereditary within his family. In their heyday, the Ṭāhirids provided valuable services to the caliphate, helping to achieve political stability, eliminating heretical movements, maintaining the security of the frontiers with India, and repelling the attacks of Turkic tribes from Central Asia and spreading Islam among them.⁵⁰ This period was one of prosperity and progress. Peace reigned in Khurāsān, and the cities of Marw, Nīshāpūr, Herāt and Balkh acquired great importance, becoming centres of civilization to which Muslims travelled in order to imbibe knowledge and culture.

While the caliphate lost its unity by allowing the establishment of independent entities, such as the Ṭāhirid state, this development nevertheless had some positive aspects. It made the rulers of these entities responsible for maintaining the Islamic presence and for expanding its base, ensuring contentment and tranquillity among some groups that aspired to

45 I. P. Petrushevsky, *al-Islām fī Irān*, p. 118. The English edn of this work is *Islam in Iran*, trans. Hubert Evans, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1985, from the original Russian *Islam v Irane v VII–XV veka* [Islam in Iran in the Seventh to Fifteenth Centuries], Leningrad, 1966.

46 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, pp. 572, 606.

47 *Ibid.*, pp. 604–6.

48 Al-Jardīzī, *Zayn al-akhbār*, p. 206.

49 Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī-t-tārīkh*, V, p. 99.

50 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, VII, p. 226.

independence and who bitterly resented being ruled by foreign forces and being administered by other countries that determined their fate. These groups subsequently hastened to participate actively at all cultural, political and social levels. Indeed, their enthusiasm for the cause of Islam and its glorious heritage made them loath to prefer any other culture or heritage. It is true that these groups did not forget their own heritage and culture, but they endeavoured to purify and rectify them and to present them in new guises that did not offend or contradict the core of Islamic belief. This purified past became intermeshed with the new arrival, forming a new Islamic mould, which is the definition of Islamic culture in its broadest sense. The Ṭāhirid prince ‘Abdallāh ibn Ṭāhir (r. 213–30/828–44) epitomized the deep attachment to the cause of Islam and its heritage when he banned the narration of ancestral stories in his presence, preferring instead contemporary topics concerning the reality and glories of Islam.⁵¹

During this period, a Persian dynasty from Balkh, the Sāmānids, rose to prominence. The Ṭāhirids sought their help and some of the members of the Sāmānid dynasty were appointed to positions of authority. This period also saw the rebellion of Ya‘qūb ibn al-Layth aṣ-Ṣaffār against the authority of the caliphate. He gained control of Bust and Sistān, which became the centre of his domain. Ya‘qūb fought and killed the *ratbīl* (*zanbīl*) of Kabul and entered Ghazna and sacked it. He also fought Abū Manṣūr, the ablest son of Muḥammad Khāqān, the king of Gardēz,⁵² destroying the buildings of Balkh constructed by Dā‘ūd ibn al-‘Abbās ibn Hāshim ibn Māhjūr.⁵³ These two names indicate that Islam had spread among the local governing families. Ya‘qūb ibn al-Layth also subdued Bamyan, Herāt and Zābulistān, thus tightening his control over all Afghanistan. His most famous act was to enter Nīshāpūr and destroy the rule of the Ṭāhirids there in 259/872.⁵⁴ Ya‘qūb was intoxicated by these successive victories, and set his heart on Baghdad, the capital of the caliphate, with the aim of removing the caliph al-Mu‘tamid. His dreams were soon to be shattered, however, when his army was routed on the banks of the Euphrates. This defeat so saddened him that it is said he died of a broken heart in 265/878.⁵⁵

It is noteworthy that despite their nationalist garb and the ethnic aims generally attributed to them, these Ṣaffārīds did not find great support among the people. Rather, aṣ-Ṣaffār’s fighters and supporters soon joined the

51 C. E. Bosworth, ‘The Tahirids and Persian Literature’, *Iran*, 1969, pp. 103–4; Barthold, *Tārīkh al-ḥaḍāra al-islāmiyya*, p. 102.

52 Al-Jardīzī, *Zayn al-akhbār*, p. 221.

53 *Ibid.*, p. 222.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 224.

55 Al-Jardīzī, *Zayn al-akhbār*, p. 225.



3.35 The Great Mosque of Herāt (© G. Degeorge)

caliphal armies when they saw aṣ-Ṣaffār take up arms against the caliph,⁵⁶ the symbol of the Islamic *umma* (community of believers) and its beliefs, and the defender of the faith.

Despite the fact that Ya‘qūb ibn al-Layth aṣ-Ṣaffār took a number of steps which constituted a revival of racist and chauvinist tendencies, he indirectly helped to combat elements that were hostile to Islam. In an attempt to ingratiate himself, one of his gifts to the caliph was a group of fifty silver and gold idols that he had seized in his conquest of Kabul and ar-Rukhkhaj (ar-Rukhudh, ar-Rukhwadh).⁵⁷ He also played a significant role in *jihād* for Islam. Indeed, some consider Ya‘qūb to have been the first Muslim *mujāhid* who worked to spread Islam in the eastern part of what is now Afghanistan and as far as the Indus valley, even before the Ghaznavids and the Ghūrīds.⁵⁸

When control of Khurāsān fell to the Sāmānīds in 261/874, a new and glorious era began in the history of Afghanistan. Its cities become centres of civilization, both producing and attracting scholars and men of letters whose thought and creativity contributed to the development and flourishing of Islamic civilization. Despite the shift of the administrative and political centre

56 Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fi-t-tārīkh*, VI, p. 8.

57 Ibid., V, p. 363.

58 ‘Abbās Iqbāl, *Tārīkh Irān ba’d al-islām*, trans. Muḥammad ‘Alā’-ad-Dīn Manṣūr, Cairo, Dār ath-thaqāfa, 1990, p. 107.

of gravity of the Sāmānids, with their capital at Bukhārā, to Transoxiana (*Mā warā' an-nahr*, 'What is beyond the river [Oxus]'), that shift did not affect or diminish the cultural splendour of the cities of Afghanistan. On the contrary, it was supported and encouraged by the Sāmānids, who provided resources, patronage and support for the symbols of Islamic culture. This concern was rooted in the Sāmānids' desire to buttress their political position in the Islamic world, and first and foremost with the 'Abbāsīd caliphate.

The Sāmānids were Persians from the city of Balkh and were said to be descended from the Persian king Bahrām Gūr. The caliph al-Ma'mūn appreciated this noble lineage and instructed his governor in Khurāsān to favour them and to entrust them with the government of some parts of Transoxiana. Following the fall of Ṭāhirid rule in Khurāsān, and with the encouragement of the 'Abbāsīd caliphs, Sāmānid dominion soon extended to all Transoxiana and Khurāsān. The Sāmānid realm was known for justice and reforms, thereby winning the goodwill and admiration of Muslims. It is a rare contemporary writer or historian of this state who does not praise it or wax eloquent in describing its glorious exploits and achievements.

During the Sāmānid era, Afghanistan assumed an Islamic character. These developments are described by travellers who visited the region during this time. Al-Maqdisī, who visited some of the cities of Afghanistan such as Balkh, Ghazna, Sistān, Herāt and others around the end of the fourth century AH, speaks about the diversity of *madhhabs* (schools of Islamic law) and the proliferation of *ṭā'ifas* (factions and sects) and their disagreements.⁵⁹ While these remarks might at first sight give a negative impression of these provinces, they are nevertheless evidence that Islam had become firmly rooted among the inhabitants such that they were capable of *ijtihād*. Now that Islam had effectively been embraced, the issue that occupied people was choosing the *madhhabs*, and this could only be done through careful study of the religion, its *fiqh* (jurisprudence) and its *sharī'a* (revealed canonical law).

Al-Maqdisī does not fail to point out that this was one of the most glorious regions, one of the richest in distinguished and learned men, a source of goodness, a centre of learning, a secure buttress and formidable fortress of Islam, and that 'the people of Khurāsān are most learned in religious matters, staunch defenders of what is right, keenly aware of good and evil and closer than any others to the land and customs of the Arabs'.⁶⁰ The country had also acquired many excellent qualities:

59 Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Maqdisī, *Aḥsan at-taqāsīm fī ma'rifat al-aqālīm*, Beirut, Dār iḥyā' at-turāth al-'arabī, 1987, pp. 260–2.

60 *Ibid.*, p. 235.

It surpasses all other provinces in learning and jurisprudence. Its reciters have wonderful speech. They are very wealthy ... Their customs differ from those of the Arab provinces in most things, for instance, the callers to prayer have a dais in front of the *minbar* from which they call the prayers musically and melodically, reciting their prayers without a text ...⁶¹

Al-Maqdisī goes on to describe the administrative and judicial systems, which he terms *rusūm*, and claims that they are unrivalled in the lands of Islam. According to him, a special costume was reserved for the *fuqahā'* (jurists) and other eminent figures which distinguished them from the semi-learned who, when appointed as full jurists, were required to wear this special attire.⁶² These customs demonstrate clearly that the province had well-established customs which matched, and even exceeded, those of other provinces among whose people Islam had earlier taken root.

As for social conditions, Muslim geographers and travellers indicate that Islam had become the faith of the majority of the people. The efforts of the local governors and rulers had succeeded in spreading Islam widely, especially in situations where people controlled their own affairs and when rule was entrusted to individuals from the same origins as the local inhabitants. As for the minority that clung to their old beliefs, they withdrew into a few remote villages and avoided the public gaze.⁶³

The Arab tribes that had settled during the earlier phase of the conquests had extensive influence because they were present in numerous Khurāsānī cities and villages and had intermarried with the Khurāsānīs. This resulted in a new class of *muwalladūn* ('half-breeds'), who had Arab fathers and Khurāsānī mothers. Ya'qūbī lists the Arab tribes inhabiting Khurāsān, states their historical and geographical origins and describes the location of their settlements.⁶⁴ To this list we might add the group of descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad through his cousin and son-in-law 'Alī who acquired an eminent status among the population and enjoyed great respect and esteem.⁶⁵ The people were attached to this group because of its blood ties with Yazdgird, the last Sāsānid king. Furthermore, it was widely rumoured among the people that Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī had married one of Yazdgird's daughters thereby mingling, it was said, the purest Persian blood and the noblest Arab blood. It was indeed thanks to the efforts of the

61 Al-Maqdisī, *Aḥsan at-taqāsīm*, pp. 257–8.

62 Ibid., pp. 257–8.

63 Fathī Abū Sayf, *Khurāsān: tārikhuhā as-siyāsī wa-l-ḥaḍārī*, Cairo, 1994, p. 219.

64 Aḥmad ibn Wāḍiḥ al-Ya'qūbī, *Kitāb al-buldān*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1891, pp. 278–80.

65 Aḥmad Amīn, *Fajr al-islām*, Beirut, Dār al-kitāb al-'arabī, 1969, p. 104.



3.36 Shrine attributed to 'Alī, Mazār-i-Sharīf, Great Mosque of Herāt
(© G. Degeorge)

ashrāf (descendants of the Prophet through 'Alī) that many of the notables of Khurāsāni society adopted Islam.⁶⁶

When the cities of Afghanistan became part of the Islamic world, they experienced a brilliant and unprecedented flowering, as attested by every visitor to those parts. Muslim writers spoke effusively of the glories, beauty and size of these cities, the orderliness of their buildings and the diversity of their markets and other facilities. In short, the Islamic conquest of Afghanistan contributed greatly to the progress of city life and the renaissance of the cities.⁶⁷

Among the cities mentioned by Muslim writers is Herāt, with its four gates and its Great Mosque without equal in all of Khurāsān, and its famous markets, flourishing villages and interconnected gardens.⁶⁸ Balkh was the largest of the cities of Khurāsān, with as many as twelve gates and numerous mosques, the Great Mosque at its centre, 'bustling with people all day long'.⁶⁹ It also boasted many markets, orchards and gardens, all so flourishing that

66 Amīn, *Fajr al-islām*, p. 104.

67 Barthold, *Tārīkh al-ḥadāra al-islāmiyya*, p. 67.

68 Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm al-Iṣṭakhri, *al-Masālik wa-l-mamālik*, ed. Muḥammad Jābir al-Ḥīnī, Cairo, Dār al-qalam, 1960, pp.149–51.

69 *Ibid.*, pp. 155–6.



3.37 Tomb of Bābur, Kabul (© G. Degeorge)

the city well deserved its epithets ‘the mother of the country’ and ‘Balkh the magnificent’.⁷⁰ It had a considerable influence on the advancement of Muslims with regard to religion, economic activity and scholarship. From Balkh came the Barmakids, chief ministers to the ‘Abbāsid caliphs. Indeed, the names of many scientific and literary notables are connected with Balkh. Al-Iṣṭakhrī, for instance, considered its people to be the most outstanding that Khurāsān had produced in the fields of *fiqh*, religion, *naẓar* (philosophical speculation) and *kalām* (scholastic theology).⁷¹ He also remarked that Ghazna was unrivalled in wealth and commerce, being the main staging post on the way to India.⁷²

One consequence of the spread of Islam in Afghanistan was the diffusion of the Arabic language. After the Umayyad caliphs, starting with ‘Abd-al-Malik ibn Marwān, began to Arabize the government offices and administrative bodies, it became necessary for anyone wanting a government position to learn Arabic. Quite rapidly, however, the Muslims of Afghanistan went beyond their basic need for Arabic – a need connected to reading the Qur’ān and endeavouring to understand the religion – and began to participate actively in the intellectual renaissance and scholarship of the Islamic cultural milieu. In various fields of knowledge, a number of names

70 Ibid., pp. 155–6.

71 Ibid., p. 158.

72 Ibid., p. 157.

became prominent, such as al-Balkhī, as-Sarakhsī, al-Abīwardī, al-Harawī, al-Bustī and al-Ghaznavī, which suggests that their bearers were from cities in Afghanistan. These men were transmitters of *Ḥadīth* (the Traditions of the Prophet), *fuqahā'* (jurists) and scholars.

A well-known scholar of the *sharī'a*, literature, philosophy, geography and history was Aḥmad ibn Sahl al-Balkhī, a native of Balkh. He travelled from his native city to Baghdad, where he stayed for eight years. He wrote some sixty books in various fields and was nicknamed the Jāhiz of Khurāsān.⁷³ Also from Balkh was Abu-l-Qāsim 'Abdallāh ibn Aḥmad al-Ka'bī, whose followers became known as 'Ka'bid'. He was a Mu'tazilite and was proficient in *kalām*. These two scholars are credited with laying the foundations of the philosophical movement in the region that was to provide a framework for the great philosopher Abū 'Alī al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Abdallāh ibn Sīnā (Avicenna). He was originally from Balkh, but moved to Bukhārā during the reign of the *amīr* Nūḥ ibn Naṣr as-Sāmānī (331–43/942–54).⁷⁴ Ibn Sīnā excelled in both medicine and philosophy. He communicated with many of the scholars of his era and acquired wide renown. His book *al-Qānūn fi ṭ-ṭibb* was well known everywhere.

The cities of Afghanistan were also famous for a number of poets and writers connected with the Sāmānid state and who are mentioned by ath-Tha'ālibī.⁷⁵ One of the most celebrated was Muḥammad ibn Mūsā al-Ḥaddādī al-Balkhī. It was said: 'Balkh gave birth to four: Abu-l-Qāsim al-Ka'bī in theology [*ilm al-kalām*], Abū Zayd al-Balkhī in rhetoric [*balāgha*] and composition, Sahl ibn al-Ḥasan in Persian poetry and Muḥammad ibn Mūsā in Arabic poetry.'⁷⁶ One of the greatest writers that Bust produced was the poet and writer Abū-l-Faṭḥ al-Bustī, a highly cultivated polymath. He participated in politics and communicated with sultans and princes.⁷⁷

The city of Herāt was the birthplace of the philologist Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn al-Azhar, who travelled to Iraq and then to the Ḥijāz and Najd. He spent many years visiting villages and rural and desert regions to collect rare linguistic material from living speakers. His efforts resulted in a ten-volume work upon which Ibn Manṣūr relied in composing his great dictionary, the *Lisān al-'arab*.⁷⁸ Another Afghānī philologist was Abū 'Amr Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad az-Zawzanī, from the city of Zawzan.

73 Shihāb-ad-Dīn Yāqūt, *Mu'jam al-udabā'*, Cairo, Maṭba'at al-Muskī, 1930, III, p. 64.

74 Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqī, *Tārīkh ḥukamā' al-islām*, ed. Muḥammad Kurd 'Alī, Damascus, Maṭbū'at majma' al-lughā al-'arabiyya, 1946, pp. 52–3.

75 For more on this topic, see Abū Manṣūr 'Abd-al-Malik ibn Ismā'īl ath-Tha'ālibī, *Yatīmat ad-dahr fī maḥāsīn ahl al-'aṣr*, ed. Muḥammad 'Abd-al-Ḥamīd, Cairo, Maktabat al-Ḥusayn at-tijāriyya, n.d. [1956], pp. 345–53.

76 Shihāb-ad-Dīn Yāqūt, *Mu'jam al-buldān*, Tehran, Maktabat al-Asadī, 1965, I, p. 712.

77 Aḥmad Amīn, *Zuhr al-islām*, Cairo, Maṭba'at Khalaf, 1958, I, pp. 284–5.

78 Amīn, *Zuhr al-islām*, I, p. 273.



3.38 The 65 m-tall Minaret of Jam, Ghūr province of Afghanistan, twelfth century (© UNESCO)

According to Yāqūt, Zawzan was known as ‘Little Basra’ because of the many scholars and writers it produced.⁷⁹

Amongst other prominent scholars and artists, mention might be made of the major Afghānī Persian-language poets ‘Unṣurī from Balkh, ‘Asjadī from Herāt and Farrukhī from Sistān, who were all in contact with contemporary rulers and kings. There was also the outstanding geometrician and mathematician Abu-l-Wafā’ al-Būzjānī from the town of Būzjān, between Herāt and Nīshāpūr.⁸⁰ In the field of jurisprudence, there was the eminent Ḥanafī judge Abū Sa‘īd as-Sijzī, who visited many regions throughout the Islamic East, acting as a judge.⁸¹

It is noteworthy that the Persian language became pre-eminent during this period due to the support of the Sāmānid rulers, who recast it in the Arabic alphabet and used it for administration and at court. Many compilations and other works appeared in Persian, without denigrating Arabic, which continued to hold a distinguished place among the country’s Muslims.

79 Yāqūt, *Mu‘jam al-buldān*, II, p. 958.

80 Al-Bayhaqī, *Tārīkh ḥukamā’ al-islām*, p. 84.

81 Yāqūt, *Mu‘jam al-buldān*, III, p. 41.

Despite the cultural development and the active scholarship taking place in the cities of Afghanistan during the Sāmānid era, political conditions in the middle of the fourth/tenth century were not ideal. The Sāmānids had relaxed their control, leaving other families to take advantage of the situation: they turned the country into fiefdoms and statelets whose only connection to the central authority was the acknowledgement they paid to the Sāmānids in the *khutba* (Friday sermon).⁸² During this period, Afghanistan was divided among the family of Abū Dā'ūd in Balkh, the last Ṣaffārīds in Sistān, the Farghānīds in Jūzjān and other Turkish leaders in Bust and Ghazna.⁸³ The situation was the same in Kabul, where the city's importance for the Hindus encouraged them to hold on to it.⁸⁴ The last Hindu king there was Jayapāla (Jaypāl Shāhī), who was contemporary with the rise of the Ghaznavid state.⁸⁵

The establishment of the Ghaznavid state in 366/977 was an important event in the history of Afghanistan. The relationship of this dynasty to Afghanistan began when a Turkic leader called Alp-Tegin sought refuge in the city of Ghazna at the head of a group of followers fleeing from the Sāmānid armies. At that time, Ghazna was an obscure city that had not previously played any political or cultural role. Indeed, it was little more than a minor commercial centre on the road from Transoxiana and Khurāsān to India. Certainly, it was no rival for Kabul. Being so far from Bukhārā, the authority of the Sāmānid central government in Ghazna was weak and this encouraged Alp-Tegin to seize the city. After failed attempts by the Sāmānids to return Ghazna to their fold, Alp-Tegin's resistance forced them to accept the *fait accompli* and cede Ghazna to him in 350/961.⁸⁶ This victory was the starting point for the establishment of an independent entity.

Subsequently, in 366/977, one of Alp-Tegin's slaves, Sebük-Tegin, managed to win the throne of Ghazna.⁸⁷ Sebük-Tegin's accession to power did not merely mean the beginning of a new dynasty, but also that a new political path had been embarked upon, this being an attempt to build an extensive state. Ghazna, a small Afghan city, formed its nucleus and centre, and in this period became known far and wide. From the first, Sebük-Tegin set about expanding his rule at the expense of the rajas of India. He achieved one victory after another and his stature rose rapidly. The tribes of Khalj (Khilj) and the Afghans feared him and they abandoned their rebellious natures and defiance and undertook to show him obedience and loyalty.⁸⁸

82 Al-Maqdisī, *Aḥsan at-taqāsīm*, p. 263.

83 W. Barthold, *Turkistan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, London, Luzac & Co., 1968, p. 233.

84 Al-Iṣṭakhrī, *al-Masālik*, p. 157.

85 As-Saljūqī, *Afghānistān*, p. 74.

86 For more on Alp-Tegin's movement, see Abū 'Alī Ḥasan Nizām-al-Mulk, *Siyāsat-nama*, trans. H. Darke, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960, pp. 112–18.

87 Abū Naṣr 'Abd-al-Jabbār al-'Utbi, *Tārīkh al-Yamīnī*, Cairo, 1886, I, p. 8.

88 *Ibid.*, I, p. 14.

It is noteworthy that during this period the name ‘Afghān’ became prominent among Muslim historians for the first time.⁸⁹

Despite the fact that Sebük-Tegin’s pure Turkic genealogy and Turkistānī origin are beyond doubt, Afghans consider him the first Muslim Afghan king.⁹⁰ He was able to expand his conquests and spread Islam to all the provinces of Afghanistan, even beyond the Hindu Kush. One of his significant achievements was the conquest of Kabul, the city that had remained the symbol of the Hindu presence in Afghanistan. Sebük-Tegin eliminated that presence and gave the city an Islamic character.

Sebük-Tegin was succeeded by his son, Sultan Maḥmūd (r. 388–421/998–1030), who is considered to be one of the greatest conquerors in Islamic history. Sultan Maḥmūd inherited a state that was calm and peaceful as a result of his father’s successful campaigns in the adjacent regions. The most important of Maḥmūd’s achievements in the consolidation of Islam in Afghanistan, especially on its eastern borders, were his successive campaigns against the province of Ghūr, a mountainous region overlooking Herāt. Thanks to the province’s geography and rugged terrain, its inhabitants felt a sense of security, independence, even of isolation. They maintained their pagan religion despite being surrounded on all sides by regions where Islam was well established.⁹¹ The early Muslim generals avoided becoming involved in the internal affairs of this province, perhaps sensing the futility of directing any military campaigns against it in view of its secure location and rough terrain. In fact, Sultan Maḥmūd himself passed twice or three times along the edges of the Ghūr region without venturing far inside it.⁹²

Serious interest in conquering the province of Ghūr began in 411/1020, when Maḥmūd led an army that included a number of elephants. Although he was victorious, his victory was inconclusive because the people were able to manoeuvre the army and transfer their defensive lines to easily defendable positions, entrenching themselves in mountain fortresses and setting ambushes in mountain defiles and passes. But Sultan Maḥmūd employed a new strategy suited to the situation: he distributed his army throughout the mountain passes and used mangonels to attack fortifications and castles. He was victorious in several battles, with the Ghūrīds in continuous retreat until their leader, Darmīsh Bit, was forced to surrender. Maḥmūd accepted this and appointed his own agents to govern Ghūr.⁹³

89 Ibid., II, p. 82.

90 As-Saljūqī, *Afghānistān*, p. 23.

91 Al-Iṣṭakhrī, *al-Masālik*, pp. 153–4.

92 Abu-l-Faḍl Ḥusayn al-Bayhaqī, *Tārīkh al-Bayhaqī*, trans. Yaḥyā al-Khashshāb, Cairo, al-Maktaba al-anglu-miṣriyya, 1956, p. 125.

93 Ibid., p. 123.



3.39 Tomb of Maḥmūd the Ghaznavid, Ghazna (© G. Degeorge)

Maḥmūd next undertook the task of conquering India and conducted some seventeen campaigns there, crossing deserts, wastelands, plains and mountains. While in its first four centuries in India, Islam may be considered a transient phenomenon, Sultan Maḥmūd's campaigns ensured a solid Islamic presence there and a policy of conquest and dissemination of the religion and its civilization. This was also the policy pursued by his successors, as well as by the later Islamic states that arose in Afghanistan. There thus emerged a new Islamic entity and a proud cultural edifice.

The Indian conquests of Sultan Maḥmūd brought him wide fame and the appreciation and respect of Muslims, but made him the subject of a negative campaign by some Hindu and Western historians who depicted him as a fanatical warrior who indulged in plunder, looting and bloodshed. But a fair historian sitting in impartial judgement, avoiding whims and passions and taking into account the fact that Maḥmūd was the product of his era and environment, would no doubt conclude that most of their verdicts are unjustified.

The impact of the Ghaznavid presence in India was great, for the sultans of Ghazna did not merely wield the sword but also endeavoured to carry Islam to numerous Indian castes that were despised, rejected and discriminated against. These castes accepted Islam once they became aware

that it was based upon justice, equality and solidarity among human beings. Sultan Maḥmūd was also known for sending missionaries and preachers to teach those who had been led to Islam.⁹⁴ One of the most famous of these was Shaykh Ismā‘īl, who came from Bukhārā to Lahore (Lāhawr) in 396/1005. He held study circles and classes of religious instruction and in this way guided many of the people of Lahore to Islam.⁹⁵

If we imagine the centres of Islamic civilization as a chain, with each link interlocking with the previous one, then the cities of Afghanistan such as Ghazna, Balkh and Herāt may be seen as the links to which the centres of Islamic civilization in India were connected, and hence the bridge over which the Islamic cultural heritage passed to India.

The Ghaznavids took the Persian language to India, Persian becoming, alongside Arabic, the language of science and culture among Indian Muslims. Persian literature flourished. With the passage of time, the Urdu language was born, this being a mixture of Hindi, Persian and Arabic. Many Muslim scholars travelled to India, studying Indian conditions and intellectual traditions. They benefited from disciplines in which the Indians excelled, such as mathematics, astronomy, geometry and philosophy. Before long, distinguished Muslims, whose names (such as Dihlawī, Lāhawrī, Ajmīrī and Sindī) leave little doubt as to their Indian origins, began to make important contributions to both science and literature.

In the field of art, there was a reciprocal influence between Indians and Muslims. Thus, through the Ghaznavids there was an Indian influence on Islamic architecture. Also during this era, we begin to see a mixture of Indian and Persian architectural styles. The arrival of Indian influence in Ghazna marked the beginning of the emergence of Indo-Islamic art, which subsequently spread to numerous regions in the Islamic East.⁹⁶

Sultan Maḥmūd was known for his great devotion to literature and the sciences. He was at pains to outdo his peers and rivals in the number of scholars and men of letters in his entourage, so much so that whenever news of an individual who excelled in any particular art reached his attention he would have him brought immediately to Ghazna.⁹⁷ A number of writers and scholars came to the court at Ghazna, including famous Muslim intellectuals such as Bīrūnī, ‘Unṣurī, ‘Asjadī, Farrukhī, ‘Utbī, Bayhaqī and others. It was said that when Sultan Maḥmūd travelled, 400 poets accompanied him in his

94 Al-‘Utbī, *Tārīkh al-Yamīnī*, p. 20.

95 W. Thomas Arnold, *ad-Da‘wa ila l-islām*, trans. Ḥasan Ibrāhīm Ḥasan et al., Cairo, Lajnat at-ta’līf wa-t-tarjama wa-n-nashr, 1947, p. 314, from the original English *The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith*, London, Constable & Co., 1913.

96 André Godard, *Syria*, 6, Paris, 1925, pp. 58–9.

97 Nizāmī ‘Arūḍī (as-Samarkandī), *Chāhār maqāla (al-Maqālāt al-arba‘a)*, trans. ‘Abd-al-Wahhāb ‘Izām, Cairo, Lajnat at-ta’līf wa-t-tarjama wa-n-nashr, 1949, p. 81.

caravan.⁹⁸ The cultural renaissance of the cities of Afghanistan thus benefited from the encouragement and patronage of Maḥmūd and his successors, as well as from Ghazna's political and administrative ascendancy during the Ghaznavid era.

As the Ghaznavid state began to decline, there arose alongside it a new state in the Ghūr mountains which had been immersed in the Islamic tide during the Ghaznavid era. It was not surprising that an Islamic state should be established by the people of Ghūr who, like the Ghaznavids, performed great service in the dissemination of Islam.⁹⁹ For example, Shihāb-ad-Dīn al-Ghūrī (569–602/1173–1206) campaigned throughout India, beginning with the Punjab (*panj-āb* means 'five rivers' in Persian) and ending with Bengal, and achieving continuous victories over a period of thirty years. Shihāb-ad-Dīn was just as enthusiastic as Sultan Maḥmūd in his love of *jihād* and loyalty to Islam. The Ghūrīds are credited with conquering the city of Delhi (Dihlī) and making it the capital of Muslim India for many centuries. Shihāb-ad-Dīn entrusted the rule of Delhi to one of his followers, Quṭb-ad-Dīn Aybak, builder of the Great Mosque and of the lighthouse known as the Quṭb-minār.¹⁰⁰

It can be argued that the real Islamic rule of India began with the Ghūrīd era, for the conquerors ceased to think in terms of invasion and return, but rather in terms of settlement and permanent residence on the Indian subcontinent. In this way began the administrative and political separation between Afghanistan and India. Despite the fact that many of the dynasties and states that ruled India originally hailed from the Afghan regions, they nevertheless remained settled in India and assumed an Indian identity. They saw Afghanistan merely as a staging post on the way to India.

Like the other eastern areas of the Islamic state, the cities of Afghanistan faced the ordeal of the Mongol invasion in which mosques, palaces and buildings were destroyed. Afghanistan was incorporated into the Mongol empire and the Mongols made Ghazna a base from which to launch attacks on India. Later, the Mongol empire broke up and was divided among the sons and grandsons of Genghis Khan, with Afghanistan falling to the Īlkhānid Mongol dynasty.¹⁰¹ Eventually, the Mongols converted to Islam and became builders of culture and civilization and the cities of Afghanistan began to flourish once again and to resume their cultural role.

98 Ibid., p. 81.

99 For more information on the rise of the Ghūrīd state, see 'Abd-al-Mun'im an-Nimr, *Tārīkh al-islām fi-l-Hind*, Cairo, Dār al-'ahd al-jadīd li-ṭ-ṭibā'a, 1959, p. 97; Aḥmad as-Sādātī, *Tārīkh al-muslimīn fī shibh al-qārra al-hindiyya*, Cairo, Maktabat nahḍat ash-sharq, n.d., p. 86.

100 Fraser-Tytler, *Afghanistan*, p. 27.

101 As-Sādātī, *Tārīkh al-muslimīn*, p. 497.

As the Mongol period was drawing to a close, a Tājik Afghan dynasty managed to rule the country for nearly 200 years.¹⁰² This Afghan dynasty constituted the last attempt to establish an independent Afghan state until the mid-eighteenth century.

Nevertheless, Afghanistan was the source of many dynasties that ruled India, thus leaving a clear imprint on the history of that country. By way of example, we might mention the Afghan Khaljī (Khiljī) dynasty and its famous sultan ‘Ala’-ad-Dīn (r. 696–712/1296–1317), nicknamed Alexander II, who won many victories in India and reached areas where the Muslim armies had never gone before. Other dynasties include the Tughluqids and the Lōdids. Indeed, one might even say that most of the famous dynasties that ruled India, making cultural and military contributions over several centuries, were originally from Afghanistan. All these dynasties were instrumental in spreading Islam and uniting the Muslim ranks.¹⁰³

At the beginning of the tenth/sixteenth century, Kabul saw the foundation of a state that was destined to play an important role in the region’s history – the Mughal empire (932–1273/1526–1857). In 932/1526 Bābur, the founder of the Mughal empire, left Kabul and headed for India, thereby inaugurating an era of active participation in the history of the Indian subcontinent and of cultural achievements in various fields. His successors were intent on being patriotic Indian leaders and little by little their political and administrative ties with Afghanistan began to wane.¹⁰⁴

Subsequently, the Afghan tribes aspired to independence and a member of the Abdālī tribe, Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī, founded a state in the mid-eighteenth century¹⁰⁵ that was to be the first Afghan national state in the modern period.

102 For more on the various Muslim states in India, see an-Nimr, *Tārīkh al-islām*; also as-Sādātī, *Tārīkh al-muslimīn*.

103 As-Sādātī, *Tārīkh al-muslimīn*.

104 Ibid., pp. 175–300.

105 M. Longworth Dames, ‘Afghānistān’, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1960, I, p. 230.

Chapter 3.7

ISLAM ON THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT

Sayyid Rizwan Ali Nadwi

The sources

Any study of the spread of Islam in the Indian subcontinent over the last thirteen centuries requires a multitude of sources in various languages, including Arabic, Persian, Urdu and English. The earliest printed source on the conquest of Sind in the early eighth century AD has so far been considered to be the *Futūḥ al-buldān* by al-Balādhurī (d. 279/892). The present writer, has however, discovered an even earlier source, namely, the *Tārīkh Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt*. This is in the form of annals and is indeed the first history book to be compiled in Arabic in this form. Moreover, it contains a great deal of material on the conquest of Sind. The author, Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt (d. 240/854), was a disciple of Abu-l-Ḥasan al-Madā'inī (d. c. 235/850), the great Arab historian, a prolific writer and the earliest Arab historian of the conquest of Sind and its governors. Al-Madā'inī wrote three works, no longer extant, on the conquest of Makrān, the Indian frontier, and the governors of India. All subsequent Arab authors of the third/ninth century such as Ibn Khayyāt, al-Balādhurī, al-Ya'qūbī and aṭ-Ṭabarī relied on al-Madā'inī. Among these, only Ibn Khayyāt was his disciple and his account of some expeditions is at variance with al-Balādhurī, the most detailed Arabic source on the subject.

The second main (and most widely used) source concerning the spread of Islam on the Indian subcontinent is the Persian work the *Fathnamah*, also known as the *Chach nāma*, by 'Alī ibn Ḥāmid al-Kūfī. This is a translation from a work in Arabic by some unknown author of the third or fourth century AH. 'Alī al-Kūfī travelled from Iraq to Sind in the early thirteenth century AD,

settled there and found the book in the possession of a prominent Arab family of Bukhkhār. He translated it in around 613/1216. It was first used (and partly and imperfectly translated into English from a manuscript) by Sir Henry Elliot.¹ Somewhat later, it was fully translated by Qilich Beg and published in 1900. The first edition of the Persian text was edited by Dr U. M. Daudpota and published in Delhi in 1939, while a second improved edition with annotations by N. A. Baloch appeared in 1983. According to Baloch, the *Fathnamah* was the first book of history to be written in India.

Since the *Fathnamah* is the only source on the Chachs, the ruling dynasty of the Hindu Brahmans in pre-Islamic Sind, it is commonly known as the *Chach nāma*. It contains the account of the conquest of Sind by Muḥammad ibn Qāsim, but in much greater detail than is found in the earlier Arabic sources mentioned above. It also contains some fictitious stories and other errors. Nonetheless, it has been widely relied upon by British Indian and Pakistani historians as far as the early phase of the conquest of Sind is concerned. In contrast to the *Fathnamah*, al-Balādhurī provides accounts of events up to the middle of the third century AH, that is, a century and a half after the conquest of Muḥammad ibn Qāsim.

In addition to the historical material mentioned above, Islamic mystical literature is also a fruitful source, and this has been consulted to reveal the progress of the conversions to Islam on the subcontinent.

The arrival of Islam on the subcontinent

Islam arrived on the Indian subcontinent in three distinct stages and into three different regions. It first came into the remote western part of Balochistan and Sind (two provinces in the south and south-east of modern-day Pakistan) in the late first/late seventh and early eighth centuries. It then arrived in Malabar on the west coast of India (the present state of Kerala) in the third/ninth century. Finally, it was introduced into the far north-western part of the subcontinent (the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan) in the early fifth/eleventh century.

Since the emergence of Islam on the subcontinent in the first and third stages was due to military campaigns of the Arabs and Turks, it is well recorded. The details of the second stage are not so well documented because during this time Islam was disseminated by the Arab traders and seafarers who settled in the various coastal cities of south-western and eastern India. According to the conjectural evidence and traditional lore of

1 See H. M. Elliot and J. Dawson, *The History of India as Told by its Own Historians*, London, Trübner & Co., 1867.




3.40 The Great Mosque of Delhi (© G. Degeorge)

the region recorded centuries later by travellers and historians, Islam was introduced here during the lifetime of the Prophet and the four Rightly Guided Caliphs (*al-Khulafā' ar-Rāshidūn*) in the late first/seventh century. The Islamization of South India took place much later, when Islamic rule was established there. We shall discuss this after dealing with the first and third stages, which eventually led to the conquest and Islamization of the entire subcontinent.

The first encounter

The first clash between the Arabs and the rulers of the Indian subcontinent took place in 15/636 during the caliphate of 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb – that is, just four years after the death of the Prophet – when the young and energetic governor of Bahrain (the eastern province of Arabia) and Oman, 'Uthmān ibn al-'Āṣ ath-Thaqafī, sent two naval expeditions to the west coast of India and Sind. The first force, under the command of 'Uthmān's brother al-Ḥakam, was dispatched to Thāna and Bharoch, while the second, under the command of another brother, al-Mughīra, was sent to the port of



3.41 Akbar Bridge, Delhi (© G. Degeorge)

Debal Sind.² Al-Balādhurī offers some information about these expeditions but does not provide any details. Nevertheless, it is obvious from his brief remarks that the second expedition was successful.³

As to the reasons for these expeditions, we might infer from the centuries-old maritime commercial relations of the Arabs of Yemen and the Persian Gulf with those parts of the Indian subcontinent that pirates had probably threatened Arab commerce and, therefore, the newly appointed governor of the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf had sent the expeditions to protect the sea routes.⁴ At this time, pirates were active in the Arabian Sea and operated in the ports mentioned above. One major act of piracy directed against the Umayyad caliph drew the wrath of his governor of Iraq, al-Ḥajjāj. He launched a massive invasion against Sind in 93/711–12 to avenge the captured Muslim men and women and put an end to the acts of piracy perpetrated by the Hindu rulers of Sind. Terrified by this invasion, the pirates in the port of Saraswat of Gujrat had to beg the conqueror of Sind, Muḥammad ibn Qāsim, for peace.⁵ Later, during the Umayyad and early

2 Thāna, which was a flourishing sea port for centuries before the founding of Bombay by the British, is now an insignificant nearby fishing port, and Bharoch also exists in the north of Bombay. Debal, some 64 km north of Karachi in present-day Pakistan, has been in ruins for centuries.

3 Aḥmad ibn Yahyā al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-buldān*, Cairo, 1956, p. 530.

4 This is also the view of the modern Indian historian of Sind, Abū Zafar Nadwi, in his *Tārīkh-e-sindh*, India, Darul Mosannifin, 1947, p. 23.

5 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 539.

‘Abbāsīd caliphates, the Arab governor of Sind launched large-scale military and naval operations aimed at eliminating pirates known as ‘meds’ who were active in the Indus delta and the Arabian Sea.⁶

It must be pointed out that the first naval expedition to the west coast of India was sent by the governor of Oman on his own initiative, as the Arabs were not a naval power during that early period. When informed of this adventurous expedition, the pious and considerate caliph ‘Umar issued a stern warning to the governor, saying: ‘Had they perished in that venture, I would have taken the lives of as many from among your own tribe.’⁷ The caliph’s warning clearly implies that the expedition in question was successful. Evidence of its success can likewise be seen in the fact that for the next seventy-five years Arab maritime commerce was not threatened by Indian pirates in the Arabian Sea. We have discussed this episode in detail since it brought the Indian powers face to face with Arab military might and opened up a chapter of conflict and a power struggle between the two which ultimately led to the subjugation of Sind. This is dealt with below.

The conquest of Balochistan and Sind

The conquest of Persia was completed during the caliphate of ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān (r. 23–35/644–56). Arabs took the banner of Islam to the far south-eastern provinces of Sijistān (present-day southern Afghanistan) and Kirmān bordering the regions of Balochistan and Makrān, comprising the province of Balochistan in modern-day Pakistan.⁸

The caliphate of ‘Ali ibn Abī Ṭālib was marred by internal wars, but at least in the east the onward march of Islam continued. It is interesting to note that the first attempt to establish a foothold for Islam on the mainland of the subcontinent was made by a band of volunteers fired with religious zeal: with ‘Alī’s permission, a chieftain by the name of al-Ḥārith ibn Murrah al-‘Abdī, along with his 1,000 warriors, advanced into the territory of Balochistan. Pushing forward from Kirmān through the adjacent Makrān in the east, they penetrated deep into Kaikān or Qīqān (present-day Qallat). In a lightning raid they attacked this principal town of Balochistan and occupied it, taking a large number of prisoners. But the victory seems to have been somewhat short-lived. Threatened by a much larger force sent by the overall sovereign of Sind, al-Ḥārith and his men were forced to retreat with their prisoners.

6 Ibid., pp. 544, 545.

7 Ibid., p. 530.

8 This is according to the most reliable early source, the *Futūḥ al-buldān* of al-Balādhurī, and prior to him, the *Tārīkh* of Khalīfa ibn Khayyāṭ. Aṭ-Ṭabarī’s account of the conquest of these regions during the caliphate of ‘Umar is not valid.

They were later attacked by the enemy in a mountain pass and most of them perished along with their commander.⁹

At the time of this first armed clash between Arabs and the local population in Balochistan, the region was under the control of the strong and vast kingdom of Sind. This extended from the borders of Kirmān and Sijistān in the west to the borders of Rājistān in India in the east, and from present-day lower Punjab (including the ancient city of Multan and its district) in the north to the coast of Makrān in the south. Thus, it comprised Sind, Balochistan and lower Punjab. The rulers of the kingdom of Sind were a dynasty of Hindu Brahmans known as Chachs. The kingdom was divided into four regions governed by local rulers under the authority of the king, whose capital was the city of Aror on the east bank of the river Indus. The region in north-western Sind and northern Balochistan known as Budhia was presided over by a Buddhist ruler. The kingdom of Sind was usurped by a Hindu Brahman Chach, a Buddhist, in around AD 630.¹⁰ The third ruler of the kingdom was Dāhir, the ambitious son of Chach.¹¹

It was at this time, and during the stable reign of the first Umayyad caliph Mu'āwiya ibn Abī Sufyān and his successors, that a sustained effort was made by Muslims to conquer Makrān. Four expeditions were sent by the caliph, one after another from 44/664 to 50/670, to subdue the region of Balochistan (known to the Arabs of that time as Makrān). However, the Arabs met with stiff resistance in the mountains of Kaikān and Qandābīl (Gandava in north-east Balochistan) from the valiant Balochi fighters. Four Umayyad commanders lost their lives during these bitterly fought campaigns. Eventually, Sinān ibn Salama al-Hudhalī succeeded in conquering eastern Makrān and establishing himself there in around 50–53/670–72.¹² From that time it became a territory of the Umayyad caliphate and Arabs settled there. Nevertheless, other governors appointed to this newly established border province were still obliged to fight the rebellious tribes in Kaikān and Qandābīl in the north-east.

In 78/697 al-Ḥajjāj, the powerful viceroy of Iraq and the eastern part of the caliphate, appointed Sa'īd ibn Aslam al-Kilābī as governor of Makrān. Sa'īd was, however, killed by two Arab rebels known as the 'Ilāfī brothers

9 Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt, *Tārīkh Khalīfa ibn Khayyāt*, ed. A. Z. 'Umarī, Beirut, Khayyāt, 1977, p. 191. This episode is also described by al-Balādhurī, who states that al-Ḥārith attacked in AH 39 and was killed, along with his men, in AH 42 (*Futūḥ*, p. 531).

10 'Alī ibn Ḥāmid al-Kūfī, *Fathnamah* (also known as *Chach nāma*), ed. N. A. Baloch, Islamabad, 1983, p. 34; Elliot and Dawson, *History of India*, p. 151.

11 Al-Kūfī, *Fathnamah*, pp. 35–49. This book in Persian is our only early source regarding the rulers of pre-Islamic Sind.

12 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 531–3; al-Kūfī, *Fathnamah*, pp. 56–60.

who usurped the territory from him.¹³ Al-Ḥajjāj therefore sent a new governor accompanied by a strong force to quell the revolt. This was achieved after the killing of one brother, but the other brother, Muḥammad al-‘Ilafī, fled, along with 500 of his men, to Dāhir, the king of Sind in Aror.¹⁴ This event marked a turning-point in the history of the region. Al-Ḥajjāj made repeated appeals to Dāhir to hand over the insurgents to the caliphate only to be refused on each occasion.

Subsequently, in approximately AD 708, some Muslim men – together with women whose merchant husbands had died in Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka) – were captured by Sindi pirates of Debal (Deval in Hindi) while returning to Iraq; they were carrying gifts sent by the king of Ceylon to the Umayyad caliph al-Walīd. This act of piracy angered not only al-Ḥajjāj but the caliph as well. The furious al-Ḥajjāj demanded the return of the gifts and the release of the captured Muslim women and men. Once again, Dāhir refused, this time on the pretext that he had no control over the pirates. Consequently, two military expeditions were sent to Debal against Dāhir, one of them by sea. Both of these failed, however, and their commanders were killed during the fighting.


It was at this point that the historic Arab invasion of Sind took place under the command of the famous and very young commander Muḥammad ibn Qāsim ath-Thaqafī. He succeeded in his well-planned attack on Debal and the fortified city fell to him in 93/October 711. The fall of Debal, Sind’s main port city, was the beginning of the end, for within some two and a half years it resulted in the fall of the vast kingdom of Sind.

According to a considered and well-executed plan, Muḥammad ibn Qāsim first subjugated the western part of Sind, which was mostly populated by Buddhists who were unhappy with the Hindu domination. With his wise policy and kind treatment, he succeeded in securing the cooperation or neutrality of the Buddhists in the coming great battles against Dāhir and his successors in the eastern part of Sind.

This first phase of the conquest of Sind took some six or seven months since Muḥammad ibn Qāsim’s policy was to consolidate his control of the subjugated regions before further conquests by his small military force of 12,000 men (6,000 foot soldiers and 6,000 horsemen). This force was somewhat depleted due to the deployment of some troops in garrisons in the conquered

13 Al-Kūfī, *Fathnamah*, pp. 35–49.

14 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 534; al-Kūfī, *Fathnamah*, pp. 64–7; Sir Wolseley Haig (ed.), *The Cambridge History of India (AD 711–1288)*, New Delhi, Cain & Co., 1987, III, p. I. The writer of the article on the conquest of Sind, Sir Wolseley Haig, makes no mention of the ‘Ilafi chief and his men taking refuge with Dāhir, the main political cause for the invasion of Sind. He relates the episode of piracy along with some biased and inaccurate stories to malign Muslims.



3.42 Portrait of young Mughal Emperor Jahāngīr (© Khalili Family Trust/ Nour Foundation)

cities, the loss of life in previous battles and an epidemic of scurvy. It was only when Muḥammad received a reinforcement of 2,000 cavalry from Iraq and some 4,000 men from the Jut tribe of Swistan that he undertook the task of completing his mission.

The second phase of the conquest of eastern Sind, across the great river Indus, began with the battle of Rāwar in the south against Dāhir himself whose forces and main cities in the region were still intact. This first major battle was fought on the planes of the city of Rāwar in June 712. Dāhir's much larger force, including a corps of war elephants,¹⁵ was defeated and the king killed on 20 June 712.¹⁶ The remnant of Dāhir's army along with his elder son Jaisinh¹⁷ fled to the nearby fort of Rāwar, which was immediately besieged by the Muslims and captured after some fighting. Jaisinh fled to the strongly fortified city of Brahmanabād in the north.

This was the first great victory of the Muslims on the Indian subcontinent. The Sindi forces put up fierce resistance to Muḥammad

ibn Qāsim's advance, however, and he had yet to complete his conquest of Sind by besieging many cities and fighting bloody battles. City after city fell

15 Dāhir's forces and those of the Muslims are variously reported by early and modern historians. Non-Muslim historians tend to assess the size of the Muslim force as much greater than Dāhir's. Elsewhere, according to a modern Hindu historian of India, Prof. K. S. Lal, Dāhir had under him 50,000 horses (along with infantry), while the Muslim forces did not exceed 20,000 in total. See K. S. Lal, *Early Muslims in India*, New Delhi, Books and Books, 1984, pp. 14, 19.

16 Al-Kūfī, *Fathnamah*, p. 137; Lal, *Early Muslims*, p. 20.

17 His name is variantly written as 'Jaisia' or 'Jaisingh', but 'Jaisinh' is the correct form according to a modern authority on Sind, Dr Baloch.

to him, albeit slowly. At the end of AD 712, after a siege of some six months, he was able to seize the major city of Brahmanabād. The following year, the ancient city of Multan – the largest city and a religious centre – was subdued after a siege of two months. In between these two successes, Muḥammad ibn Qāsim subjugated many other cities either by force or peaceful submission. After the fall of Multan, his victory was complete and extended up to the borders of the kingdom of Kashmir, that is, the farthest frontier of Dāhir's kingdom in the north.

Having accomplished the task of conquering Sind and putting its affairs in order, Muḥammad ibn Qāsim, with a force of 50,000 troops, now intended to take the banner of Islam into India. With the permission of al-Ḥajjāj, he therefore sent a force of 10,000 cavalry to conquer and receive the submission of Kannauj.¹⁸ Once the army had left Multan for Kannauj, however, Muḥammad was recalled by the new caliph, Sulaymān (r. AD 717–20),¹⁹ who had appointed a new governor in Sind. The military campaign against Kannauj was thus abandoned and the conquest of northern India was delayed for another three centuries (this is discussed below).

Conversions to Islam in Sind

The conquest of Sind opened the way for the spread of Islam in this western part of the Indian subcontinent. The young conqueror Muḥammad ibn Qāsim, besides being an extraordinary military commander and a wise and kind administrator, was also a devout and enthusiastic Muslim, although not fanatical. His benevolent conduct towards the people of the newly conquered lands, his keeping of the pledges he made to the people, Buddhists and Hindus alike, his granting of religious freedom, leaving their temples intact, respecting their priests, not burdening them with exorbitant taxes apart from the minor annual *jizya* (poll tax), treating them as protected people (*dhimmīs*) just like the people of the Scriptures and the Magians (Zoroastrians) of Persia, his consideration towards traders, artisans and farmers in particular – all this would have inclined the local population to Islam, and indeed many embraced Islam willingly.

18 Al-Kūfī, *Fathnamah*, p. 185; Elliot and Dawson, *History of India*, p. 207.

19 Sulaymān had a personal grudge against al-Ḥajjāj, who had died earlier, so he took revenge on the governors appointed by him. Ibn Qāsim was tortured by the new governor of Iraq and died in the prison in Wāsiṭ. The story of his infidelity to the caliph al-Walīd and his subsequent arrest and death by placing him in raw cowhide, narrated in al-Kūfī's *Fathnamah* and followed by Elliot and Dawson's *History of India* and Haig's *Cambridge History of India*, is an absurd fiction.

Conversions to Islam took place in Debal, Brahmanabād, Aror and Multan. The swelling of Muḥammad ibn Qāsim's army to 50,000 cavalry, as stated earlier, is a clear indication of these conversions. He had come to Sind with a total force of only 17,000 men and many of these were killed during the numerous battles while a few thousand others were stationed in garrisons in the conquered cities and towns. Thus, a great many of the 50,000 soldiers who appeared after the conquest of Multan must have been local converts to Islam. No doubt the army contained some units from the allied Jut tribe, but obviously Muḥammad ibn Qāsim could not have depended on a majority non-Muslim force in his intended conquest of Kannauj. Moreover, there are some specific instances of local people converting to Islam, as follows:

1. A man called Gela, the jailor of Debal, was the first to embrace Islam.²⁰ The Arab prisoners who were released after the fall of Debal gave evidence of his kind treatment and service to them during their captivity. He must have been impressed by the purity of their faith, their godliness, forbearance and conduct during their imprisonment, and so he embraced Islam at the hands of Muḥammad ibn Qāsim himself. Gela was honoured by the young Arab conqueror and was entrusted with the civil administration of Debal under the new military governor of the city. Gela is the person who is mentioned by his Muslim name of *Mawlā Islām* ('Client of Islam') and who, according to the author of the *Chach nāma*, travelled as an interpreter with the Syrian emissary of the conqueror to Dāhir before the battle of Rāwar.²¹ He must have learnt Arabic from his Arab captives during their two years in jail.
2. During Muḥammad ibn Qāsim's siege of Swistan, the Channa tribe of Sind sent an agent to spy on the Arabs who had conquered Debal and the city of Nerūn. When the spy saw them offering their prayers, led by their general, with humility and discipline and reported it to the chief of his tribe, the whole tribe embraced Islam.²²
3. When Sayakar, Dāhir's chief minister, heard of the general amnesty announced by Muḥammad ibn Qāsim during his siege of Brahmanabād, he came out of hiding and embraced Islam. He was honoured by the conqueror, and in view of his sincerity and loyalty was made the chief civil executive of the conquered territory. According to the author of the

20 For the story of the jailor's conversion to Islam, see al-Kūfī, *Fathnamah*, p. 80.

21 Ibid., pp. 101-2.

22 Mir Ma'sum, *Tārīkh-e-Ma'sumi*, annotated by N. A. Baloch and trans. into Urdu by A. Rizvi, Hyderabad, Adabi Board, 1959.

Chach nāma, Muḥammad ibn Qāsim greatly relied on him in matters of civil administration.²³

4. It appears from the capitulation of Brahmanabād that a number of civilians, especially merchants, embraced Islam.²⁴ Frustrated with the long siege of the city, and the flight of Jaisinh to the neighbouring Indian territory, they opened one of the city's gates to the besieging army.
5. After the conquest of Brahmanabād, where Muḥammad ibn Qāsim stayed for quite some time in order to organize the affairs of the conquered territories, he settled some Arab chiefs in the neighbouring town of Ashbahar along with 300 Arab workers and their families.²⁵ These people may well have inspired the non-Muslim local population to embrace Islam.
6. It is recorded that in every city that Muḥammad ibn Qāsim conquered, such as Debal, Nerūn, Aror and Multan, he built mosques for the Arab troops stationed there. There is no mention of the troops being segregated in purpose-built garrison towns like Kufa and Basra, so the local population were able to watch the Muslim soldiers frequenting the mosques and must have been impressed by their piety, thus encouraging some of them to convert to Islam.

Besides this, the intermingling of a subjugated people with the members of a victorious power generally leads to the former adopting the creed and manners of the latter. This was also a factor in the spread of Islam among the people of Sind both in the early period and subsequently. It must be remembered that no case of forcible conversion to Islam among the people of Sind has ever been reported, even by modern non-Muslim historians. It is of interest to note that the majority of those who converted to Islam during this early phase were Buddhists, who were considered as social inferiors under the political domination of Hindus. Since Islam offered them equal rights, a good number of them preferred to embrace Islam.²⁶

A modern Hindu historian of India observes:

The early recall of Muḥammad ibn Qāsim had put a brake on this Islamization of Sind. His policy of restricted toleration, proselytization, iconoclasm, construction of places of Muslim worship and dissemination of Muslim

23 Al-Kūfī, *Fathnamah*, p. 151. According to al-Kūfī, he was made chief minister (*wazīr mufawwad*). See also Lal, *Early Muslims*, p. 2, who gives the minister's name as Sisakar.

24 Lal, *Early Muslims*, p. 158.

25 Ibid., p. 166.

26 Lal, *Early Muslims*, p. 27.

religious lore had all gone enthusiastically when his career came to a sudden close and his work was cut short with his life.²⁷

This observation is only partly true. We shall see in what follows that, in spite of a very brief setback to the cause of Islam in Sind immediately after Muḥammad ibn Qāsim's recall, the safe haven he had gained for the religion remained undisturbed and expanded further within India.

Sind during the Umayyad and 'Abbāsīd caliphates

After its conquest by the Arabs, Sind became a province of the caliphate, initially under the Umayyads in Damascus and then the 'Abbāsīds in Baghdad. Governors were sent regularly from the caliphate to the new province. The indiscreet and revengeful policy of the new caliph Sulaymān towards Muḥammad ibn Qāsim, and the latter's unceremonious recall to Iraq and subsequent torture and death, caused a commotion in the recently conquered territory of Sind. Dāhir's sons, Jaisinh and Chach, who were watching the affairs of their lost kingdom from a neighbouring Indian kingdom, took advantage of the situation, returned to Sind and regained control of Brahmanabād.²⁸ The first Arab governor of Sind had died within eighteen days of his arrival; the second, Ḥabīb, could only establish himself in the capital Aror through force. But Jaisinh remained in control of Brahmanabād and the central part of Sind, east of the Indus.

After the death of Sulaymān, the new pious and just caliph 'Umar II (r. 717–19) pursued a policy of pacification in the newly conquered territories. He invited the former rulers of Sind to embrace Islam and offered them the chance to retain control over their kingdoms under the sovereignty of the unified caliphate, with the full rights and obligations of Muslims. Jaisinh and his brother accepted the invitation and converted to Islam.²⁹

During the short caliphate of 'Umar II, the caliph's new governor treated Jaisinh with respect and two and a half years of calm prevailed in Sind. This provided a conducive atmosphere in which Islam could spread among the masses and the ruling elite alike. But after the death of this uniquely benevolent and pious caliph, and during the caliphate of Yazīd II (r. 719–23), the situation in Sind worsened again. Because of Yazīd's quarrels with some

27 I. H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-Continent (610–1947)*, Karachi, Ma'arif, 1977, p. 36.

28 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 540.

29 Ibid.

of his generals who had taken refuge in western Sind³⁰ and the resultant instability in Sind, Jaisinh had become independent in Brahmanabād.

It was not until the long reign of the next caliph, Hishām (r. 723–42), that a strong, resolute and forward-looking governor, Junayd, was sent to Sind. Junayd (in office 725–29) was the most able and enterprising general after Muḥammad ibn Qāsim. He not only regained control of eastern Sind after defeating the rebel Jaisinh in a naval battle on the Indus, but also launched a massive campaign to conquer central India. After Dāhir's sons were captured and killed on account of their apostasy and rebellion,³¹ Junayd marched to Keraj (Kheda in present-day Surat, India), which had previously submitted to Muḥammad ibn Qāsim but had lately broken its pledge. He reconquered it and sent his generals to the interior of India, where they seized the cities of Marmad, Mandal, Danaj, Māliyah,³² Malwa and as far as the famous religious and cultural city of Ujjain.³³ Meanwhile, he himself subdued the cities of Bailman (Bhilmala) and Jurz (Gujra) in present-day Rājistān. The city of Bhroach in the modern state of Saurashtra, which had first been attacked nearly a century earlier, was also seized. After leaving small garrisons in these cities, Junayd returned to Sind. Thus, Islam was introduced into central India as early as c. AD 727. The conquest of all these cities, belonging to several kingdoms, is reported by the early Arab historians.³⁴ It is also confirmed by a modern Hindu historian of India, R. C. Majumdar, who has based his research on the Nausori plates of the Gujrat Chalukya king Pulakesiraja dated AD 738.³⁵

Junayd was subsequently recalled by the caliph to assume the governorship of the turbulent province of Khurāsān. His successor in Sind, Tamin, was a weak man. In his short period of office (729–30), during which tribal feuds arose among the Arabs, the commanders garrisoned in the conquered areas of India withdrew to Sind and never returned.³⁶ According to some old Indian inscriptions, the Arabs were defeated by the rajas of two kingdoms.³⁷ This part of India would be conquered some six centuries later by Turkish rulers during the period of the Delhi Sultanate (see below).

30 For details, see *ibid.*

31 *Ibid.*, p. 541.

32 *Ibid.*

33 For the identification of these Indian cities mentioned in the *Futūḥ al-buldān* of al-Balādhurī, see *al-'Usoor*, Vol. 2, Part I, 1987, pp. 137–49; R. C. Majumdar, *The Arab Invasion of India*, a supplement to the *Journal of Indian History*, Vol. 10, Part 1, Lahore, Sh. Mubarak Ali, 1931, p. 41.

34 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 541; Aḥmad ibn Abī Ya'qūb al-Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh al-Ya'qūbī*, Beirut, Dār ṣādir, 1379/1960, II, p. 316.

35 Majumdar, *Arab Invasion*, p. 41.

36 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 542; al-Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II, p. 317.

37 Majumdar, *Arab Invasion*, p. 41.

The Arabs' withdrawal from the conquered cities of India had an effect on the unruly people of Sind, that is, the Hindus, who once again revolted against their Arab rulers. Soon, the Arabs were left with no secure foothold apart from Kutch (Qaṣṣa in Arabic).³⁸ The new Arab governor of Sind, al-Ḥakam (in office 730–38), was therefore obliged to build a city to the east of the Indus on the eastern bank of one of its estuaries. This was called al-Maḥfūza³⁹ ('the Safe Place') and it became an Arab settlement and the governor's headquarters. From here al-Ḥakam launched attacks on the rebellious people to subdue them. These eventually proved successful and he was able once again to conquer Sind, or at least its eastern region.

In about AD 733 al-Ḥakam ordered his lieutenant 'Amr, the son of Muḥammad ibn Qāsim, to build the city of al-Manṣūra on the west bank of the estuary of the Indus. Al-Manṣūra became the capital of Sind and for several centuries was a great political and cultural metropolis.⁴⁰ 'Amr was subsequently appointed the governor of Sind (in office 738–42) after al-Ḥakam was killed while suppressing a revolt in Kaikān.⁴¹ Once these two cities had been built in Sind, the Muslims felt safe again.

However, all this took place at a time when the Umayyad caliphate was troubled by intertribal strife between the Muḍarīs and Yamanīs throughout its vast territories, Sind being among them. Exploiting this precarious situation, a final effort was made by the local insurgent elements. A Hindu chief, who was proclaimed raja, besieged al-Manṣūra, but the governor 'Amr, with a timely reinforcement of 4,000 troops from Iraq, attacked the camp of this impostor king at night and annihilated his forces.⁴²

'Amr was the last effective Umayyad governor. In AD 750, after 'Amr's governorship had come to an end, the Umayyad caliphate was brought to an end by the 'Abbāsīd revolution. During the last turbulent years under the Umayyads, Sind was governed by an adventurous Arab chief. However, after an initial setback, in 752 the 'Abbāsīds brought the province under their control. After eliminating the self-proclaimed governor Manṣūr, the 'Abbāsīd governor Mūsa ibn Ka'b (in office 752–58) asserted 'Abbāsīd authority in the Muslim capital of Sind, al-Manṣūra. He fortified and enlarged the city and reorganized the affairs of the province.⁴³

38 Ibid., p. 542; al-Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II, p. 317.

39 Al-Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II, p. 543.

40 Ibid. The city is described by many Arab geographers such as al-Mas'ūdī, al-Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Ḥawqal, who visited it in the tenth century AD. For a modern detailed description and history, see M. H. Pathan, *Sind: Arab Period*, History of Sind Series, Vol. 3, Hyderabad, 1978, pp. 245–78; for its excavation and remains, see A. N. Khan, *al-Manṣūrah*, Karachi, Dept of Archaeology and Museums, Government of Pakistan, 1990.

41 Al-Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II, p. 324.

42 Ibid., p. 317.

43 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 543; al-Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II, p. 358.



3.43 Jahāngīr's Palace, Agra (© G. Degeorge)

Calm and order prevailed and a new era began, free of Arab tribal rivalries and any revolt by indigenous non-Muslim elements. Due to the concerted efforts and vigour of able 'Abbāsīd governors, Sind, unlike Muslim Spain and the Maghrib, was to remain part of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate for over a century. Had the governors not been vigilant and loyal to the cause of Islam, the political entity of Sind might well have disintegrated. A later governor, Hishām ibn 'Amr (in office AD 768–73), even ventured to expand Muslim power into greater Kashmir and India. Indeed, he raided the territory of Kashmir (northern Punjab), an offensive which early Arab historians portrayed as a victory.⁴⁴ That this campaign was checked by the powerful king of Kashmir, Laliladatya, however, is confirmed by a modern Indian historian.⁴⁵

Hishām's novel military initiative was his series of naval expeditions to the upper west coast of India. He first sent a reconnaissance expedition to the port of Bhārbhut (the Bārbud of Arab historians) after which he personally led a successful major expedition to another port, Gandhar, in the same region. He occupied the port, built a mosque there⁴⁶ and after asserting his authority returned to his base in Sind. This was during the caliphate of al-Manṣūr (r. 753–74). A third and larger naval expedition to the port of Bhārbhut was sent in 779 by the next caliph, al-Mahdī, who himself came from the famous Iraqī port of Basra. The expedition was composed of 9,200 men, including 2,500 volunteers, under the command of 'Abd-al-Malik ibn

44 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 543; al-Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh*, II, p. 373.

45 Majumdar, *Arab Invasion*, p. 42.

46 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 544.

Shihāb.⁴⁷ Although the outcome was a success, it was not without a great loss of Muslim life, first because of an epidemic of mouth disease and then as a result of a heavy storm in the Persian Gulf while the army was on its homeward journey.⁴⁸

As usual, the early Arab historians do not supply the reasons for these expeditions, but it is evident from the circumstances that they were launched as a punitive action against the new Hindu kingdom of Rastarkota, which had made life intolerable for the Muslim community long settled there.⁴⁹ This explains why the Muslims destroyed the Hindu temples and built mosques in their stead, actions quite contrary to their normally tolerant behaviour in Sind. It is also the reason why they always returned home after the conclusion of each campaign. Following this, Muslim traders were no longer molested by the Hindu kingdom. Indeed, even when the short-lived Muslim kingdom of Sindān (c. AD 813–41)⁵⁰ was destroyed by the Hindu kingdom of that region, the mosques where congregational Friday prayers were held and the caliph of Baghdad was remembered in the sermons were left intact.

In 304/916, a century and a half after the last successful expedition, the famous Arab historian and traveller al-Mas‘ūdī visited the city of Chimore: he found 10,000 Muslims living there whose religious and legal affairs were managed by a Muslim *qādī* (judge), designated locally as ‘Hunarmand’.⁵¹ Thus, during the early ‘Abbāsīd caliphate, Islam was well-established in Sind. During the caliphate of al-Ma‘mūn (r. 813–33), one of the powerful governors of Sind, Mūsā al-Barmakī, safeguarded the eastern frontier from external threat by defeating a prince of Gujrat;⁵² while another governor, ‘Imrān ibn Mūsā, chastised the unruly and ever-rebellious Juts of Kaikān by subduing them and building a garrison town named al-Baydā’ (‘the White City’) to control the region permanently.⁵³

Nonetheless, the ‘Abbāsīds did not rule Sind for long. After the last powerful and able caliph, al-Mu‘taṣim, the caliphate was subject to instability and weakness under the sway of the caliph’s powerful Turkish guards. Taking advantage of this unstable situation, an ambitious Arab chief in Sind, ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd-al-‘Azīz al-Habbārī, seized power in al-Manṣūra. Thus, an independent Arab state in Sind was born in 247/861 and lasted for

47 Abū Ja‘far Muḥammad aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh ar-rusul wa-l-umam wa-l-mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad Abu-l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Cairo, Dār al-ma‘ārif, 1964, VIII, pp. 116, 128, which gives a detailed description of the expedition.

48 Aṭ-Ṭabarī, *Tārīkh*, VIII, pp. 116, 128; Majumdar, *Arab Invasion*, p. 43.

49 Nadwi, *Tārīkh-e-sindh*, pp. 141–4.

50 For this kingdom, see Q. A. Mubārakpūrī, *Arab States in India*, Karachi, 1967, pp. 32–49 (in Urdu).

51 Abu-l-Ḥasan al-Mas‘ūdī, *Murūj adh-dhahab wa-ma‘ādin al-jawhar*, Cairo, 1964, I, p. 210.

52 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 544.

53 Ibid.

169 years until it was eliminated by Sultan Maḥmūd of Ghazna. Some thirty-five years after the formation of this petty kingdom, the independent Arab principality of Banū Sāma came into existence in Multan and this lasted until AD 861. In around 951, during the period of the disintegration of Sind, two more principalities, Ma'dāniyya and Tūraniyya, were formed respectively in Makrān and present-day upper Balochistan by the Arab chiefs there. These survived for some 140 years until they were incorporated into the kingdom of the powerful Ghūrīds of Afghanistan and northern India.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, Sind, which, as we have seen, was Islamized during the Umayyad and early 'Abbāsīd periods, continued to be a predominantly Islamic territory throughout the centuries, and it is now the second largest province of Pakistan. During the first four centuries, its social and cultural life retained a distinctly Arab character. Many prominent Arab geographer-travellers of the fourth/tenth century such as al-Mas'ūdī, al-Iṣṭakhrī, Ibn Ḥawqal and al-Maqdisī visited the capitals of the above-mentioned principalities and described them in detail in their books. According to them, al-Manṣūra and Multan were large, flourishing cities, and Arabic, along with the native language, was spoken and understood in the markets.


Islam had an enormous cultural impact on Sind. The Muslim converts there soon learnt Arabic and the Qur'ān from their Arab brethren, and many of them travelled to the seats of learning in the Arab world such as Basra, Kufa, Damascus, Baghdad and Medina, where they acquired higher religious education in *tafsīr* (Qur'ānic exegesis), *Ḥadīth* (Traditions of the Prophet), *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) and, of course, Arabic. They then returned to their native land, where they disseminated this learning. Thus, cities such as al-Manṣūra, Multan and Debal became centres of Islamic learning in Sind, whose cultural environment was completely transformed. Many people of this new Islamic land who excelled in Islamic religious sciences were known by their attributed names such as Sindī, Multānī, Manṣūrī, Debalī and so on. The Arabic biographical and geographical dictionaries have preserved their names and achievements.⁵⁵ The most prominent among them were the poet Abū 'Aṭā' as-Sindī, who lived in Kufa during the late Umayyad period,⁵⁶ and Abū Ma'shar as-Sindī (d. 170/787), a celebrated traditionist and biographer of the Prophet.

The transfer of knowledge was by no means a one-way process. Thus, during the interaction between Arabs and the people of Sind, the Arabs

54 See Mubārakpūrī, *Arab States*, which is the first and only book on these four Arab kingdoms. For the Habbārid kingdom, see Pathan, *Sind*, pp. 225–43.

55 See, for example, *Kitāb al-ansāb* by as-Sam'ānī, *Mu'jam al-buldān* by Yāqūt, and *Rijāl as-Sind wa-l-Hind* by Q. A. Mubārakpūrī. See also Pathan, *Sind*, pp. 315–27.

56 For this poet and others of Sind, see the present author's *Arabic Language and Literature in Indo-Pak Sub-Continent Throughout the Ages*, Karachi, University of Karachi, 1995.



3.44 Humayun's Tomb, Delhi (© G. Degeorge)

benefited from the Indian sciences of mathematics, astronomy and medicine. Indian classical literature dealing with these sciences was transmitted through the people of Sind to Baghdad and translated into Arabic during the early 'Abbāsīd period and subsequently.⁵⁷ The most famous of these Sanskrit works was Brahmagupta's (d. AD 628) *Sidhanta*, a book on mathematical astronomy. For some three centuries, it continued to have a tremendous influence on Arab thought and led to the development of this science among the Arabs. Indian numerals were also borrowed by Arabs during the same period, and with certain modifications they were introduced into Europe where they are known as Arabic numerals.

Islam gradually spread among the people of Sind through contact with the Arabs who had settled there. The egalitarian principles of Islam, in addition to the purity and simplicity of the faith and the Muslims' rational approach to life, must have impressed Hindus and Buddhists and touched their hearts. Cases of mass conversion to Islam during this period are not reported in history, but whenever a prominent personality embraced the religion it was duly recorded. We come across two such cases. The first was during the caliphate of al-Mu'taṣim (r. AD 833–41), when the king of a city known as Asifan in northern Punjab embraced Islam at the hands of some Muslim traders there.⁵⁸ The second concerns a Hindu raja named Mahrug who ruled over lower Kashmir. In 270/883 he wrote to al-Habbārī, the ruler of an independent Arab kingdom in Sind, at al-Manṣūra, asking him to send some Muslim scholars who could explain Islam to him. Thus, an Iraqi Arab

57 For these Indian works, see Ibn an-Nadīm, *al-Fihrist*, ed. Gustav Flügel, Leipzig, F. C. W. Vogel, 1871, pp. 270–1.

58 Al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 545.

who had an excellent command of the native languages was sent to the raja's court. He stayed there for three years and translated the Qur'ān into either Hindi or the Sindi language. The raja subsequently embraced Islam, but kept it secret in order to remain on his throne.⁵⁹ This translation of the Qur'ān, over 1,120 years ago, was the first in an Indian language.

There is no reason to doubt the conversion of these two Indian rulers to Islam. Much later, in the thirteenth century AD, historians recorded similar cases of the individual conversion to Islam of some Mongol rulers.⁶⁰ What the above instances indicate is that Islam had taken roots in greater Sind and had begun to attract some prominent individuals in northern Punjab during the ninth century AD. It was subsequently to overwhelm all the north-west of the subcontinent in the tenth century after the Ghaznavid conquest.

Islam in the north and north-west: the conquests of the Ghaznavids and the Ghūrīds

The history of Islam on the Indian subcontinent after the conquest of Sind by the Arabs is, in fact, the story of two brilliant rulers of the small kingdoms of Ghazna and Ghūr. The first was Sultan Maḥmūd of Ghazna,⁶¹ and the second Muḥammad Ghūrī. Maḥmūd reigned during the early part of the eleventh century AD (997–1030) while Ghūrī ruled, under the titular sovereignty of his elder brother, during the latter part of the twelfth century (1173–1206).

Subuktagin (r. 977–97) was the first of the early Turkish rulers of Ghazna to gain a foothold for Islam in the extreme north-west of the subcontinent. In two major battles that took place in 987 and 991, Subuktagin inflicted crushing defeats on King Jaipal of the powerful Hindu Shahi kingdom of north-west India (Punjab and the North-West Frontier) up to Kabul,⁶² and was able to occupy territories from Kabul to Peshawar.⁶³ Jaipal was allowed to retain his capital Waihand near Peshawar, and peace prevailed in the region for ten years until the death of Subuktagin in 997.

The real founder of Muslim rule in the north-west of the subcontinent was Subuktagin's son Maḥmūd, a champion of Islam in India and the builder of an empire which extended over the whole of Afghanistan, the greater part

59 Buzurg ibn Shahryār, *'Ajā'ib al-Hind*, Leiden, 1886, p. 4, quoted in S. S. Nadwi, *Arab wa Hind ke ta'alluqat*, Karachi, 1976, pp. 241–2.

60 See Rashīd-ad-Dīn Faḍlallāh, *Jāmi' at-tawārīkh*, Cairo, Dār an-nahḍa al-'arabiyya, 1960, Vol. 2, Part 1.

61 For his life and achievements, see M. Nazim, *The Life and Times of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna*, Lahore, Khalīl & Co., 1973.

62 For this kingdom, see *ibid.*, App. I, pp. 194–6.

63 V. D. Mahajan, *The Muslim Rule in India*, New Delhi, S. Chand & Co., 1962, p. 20; Nazim, *Life and Times*, pp. 29–30.

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of Persia and Transoxiana, Punjab and Sind. His main achievement, however, was to bring the vast regions of north-west India into the fold of Islam.

Maḥmūd led seventeen successful expeditions into the subcontinent from AD 1000 to 1025 against his foes Jaipal and his successors and their confederates in northern and central India.⁶⁴ In 1001 near Peshawar, in his first encounter with Jaipal, his father's arch-enemy, Maḥmūd defeated him despite his much larger force and took him prisoner along with his fifteen sons and grandsons. But he did not have him killed. On the contrary, he allowed Jaipal to go back to his kingdom after concluding a peace treaty the terms of which included the payment of a huge ransom together with the taking of two hostages from his family. The defeat proved to be so humiliating, however, that Jaipal burnt himself to death after returning to Punjab.

From this, we can see that Maḥmūd was not the tyrant and blood-thirsty Muslim fanatic who waged *jihād* against the Hindus of India as depicted by the biased Hindu and British historians. The arrogant rulers of the Hindu Shahi kingdom, along with many Indian rajas, had earlier forced him and his father to take up arms against them. Thus, had he executed Jaipal, no blame would have been levelled against him. Moreover, he also treated kindly Jaipal's grandson, Sukhpal, who had embraced Islam and was known by his Muslim name Nawāsa Shāh. Sukhpal was made governor of Multan and Punjab, but later apostatized and rebelled against Maḥmūd in AD 1008. He was subsequently defeated by the sultan at Multan and was taken into captivity. Maḥmūd likewise did not have him executed.⁶⁵

After fighting several battles against Jaipal's son Anandpal, his grandsons and their allies, Maḥmūd was finally able to destroy the Hindu Shahi kingdom and subjugate the whole of Punjab. Lahore was made the seat of the Ghaznavid governors in north-west India. Sultan Maḥmūd also led a number of strong expeditions against the kings of Kalinjar, Kannauj, Gwalior, Ajmer, Kashmir and Baran in northern India who had collaborated with the Hindu Shahi kingdom and he achieved resounding victories against them. One of them, Hardat the raja of Baran (present-day Bulandshar), offered his submission and in 1018 is said to have embraced Islam along with 10,000 of his followers.⁶⁶

The most important of Maḥmūd's expeditions was against Somnath on the coast of Gujrat in 1026. There, he conquered the famous and strongly

64 For these expeditions, see Nazim, *Life and Times*, pp. 86–122; Mahajan, *Muslim Rule*, pp. 21–6.

65 Nazim, *Life and Times*, p. 98; Mahajan, *Muslim Rule*, p. 22.

66 Nazim, *Life and Times*, p. 107.

fortified temple and broke the idol of Mahadeva's linga into pieces.⁶⁷ Maḥmūd's task in his Indian expeditions was not an easy one since he was obliged to fight at a distance from his base in Ghazna against the much larger forces of the Indian kings and he had to subdue some seemingly impregnable forts. Due to his conquests in India, the caliph in Baghdad conferred on him the title 'sultan', and he became the first independent ruler to hold this title. In addition to Maḥmūd's frequent expeditions to India and his victories there, he also seized vast territories in Persia and Transoxiana.

Maḥmūd was not merely a great conqueror, however, but also a passionate patron of learning, literature and the arts. He adorned his court with a galaxy of eminent Persian poets, literary figures and scientists, and he built many beautiful mosques, *madrāsas* (Islamic schools), palaces and gardens in Ghazna. This provided the model that was subsequently followed by the sultans of Delhi and the Mughal emperors in Muslim India.

As to the spread of Islam among the Indian people during the reign of Maḥmūd and his successors, the historical sources report a flow of religious scholars and Sufis (Muslim mystics) into Lahore, which grew into a metropolis under the Ghaznavids. They settled in that city and in others in Punjab mainly in order to preach Islam and to disseminate Islamic learning. The first such scholar was Shaykh Ismā'īl, who came to Lahore from Bukhārā in AD 1005 and settled there. He was accomplished in *tafsīr* and *Ḥadīth*. According to a nineteenth-century commentator, Shaykh Ismā'īl's sermons were so effective that in three consecutive Friday speeches 1,750 locals embraced Islam. He lived for fifty years in Lahore and died in 338/1046.⁶⁸

Another well-known religious luminary was 'Alī Hujwīrī (d. AD 1072), popularly known as Data Ganj Baksh and one of the earliest writers on Islamic mysticism. He came from Ghazna during the reign of Sultan Mas'ūd (r. 1030–40), the son of Maḥmūd. Among Hujwīrī's several books, the *Kashf al-mahjūb* is the most famous and the earliest work on mysticism in Persian. He also built a mosque in Lahore. Many people embraced Islam at his hands including, most prominently, Rai Raju, the governor of Lahore during the reign of the Ghaznavid sultan Mawdūd (r. 1040–48).⁶⁹ 'Alī Hujwīrī's shrine in Lahore is still revered today.

67 This was a phallic representation of the linga of Mahadeva, the chief god of the Hindus. For a description, see Nazim, *Life and Times*, App. M, pp. 209–12. This temple with the aforementioned idol was rebuilt and consecrated after the partition of India under the auspices of Mr Patel, interior minister of India.

68 Ghulām Sarwar, *Khazīnat al-aṣfiyā'*, Lahore, 1990, III, p. 170; Sir Thomas Walker Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith*, Lahore, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1961, p. 284.

69 Prince Dara Shikoh, *Safīnat al-awliyā'*, trans. into Urdu from the original Persian by M. A. Lutfi, Karachi, Nafis Academy, 1975, pp. 209–10; M. Ikram, *Aab-e-Kauthar*, Lahore, Thaqafat-e-Islamiyya, 1982, pp. 76–81.

Religious scholars and Sufis continued to arrive in Punjab and Sind and to play a crucial role in preaching Islam and converting the local people. Also among their ranks were such as Sultan Sakhī Sarwar, Yāwūb Zanjānī and Aḥmad Tirmidhī, who came to Lahore during the twelfth century AD and through their preaching and piety converted thousands of people in Lahore and other parts of Punjab to Islam.⁷⁰

In AD 1159 a dynasty from Ghūr in Afghanistan replaced the Ghaznavids there. The Ghaznavid ruler Khusrau Shāh moved to Lahore, which became the capital of their diminished kingdom in north-west India. After Khusrau Shāh's death in Lahore, the last Ghaznavid ruler Khusrau Malik was vanquished and captured in 1186 by Muḥammad Ghūrī, the most brilliant and famous sultan of the Ghūrīds (r. 1155–1206). He followed the example of Sultan Maḥmūd as far as the conquest of northern India was concerned.

Muḥammad Ghūrī, the younger brother of the Ghūrīd sultan Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn and a sort of co-ruler (r. 1173–1202), extended Muslim rule in India from Punjab to Delhi and other parts of northern India. Prior to his occupation of Lahore, and before any military encounter with the powerful Rajput Hindu kings of northern India, he had brought Sind under his control and destroyed the heretic Ismā'īlī ruler of Multan and the Hindu raja of Uch near the modern city of Bhawalpur. In 1191 he conquered the Hindu fort of Bhatinda, the last retreat of the Hindu Shahi remnants, and placed it under the command of a governor with a small contingent. The most powerful among the Hindu Rajput kings, Prithvi Raj Chauhan, the king of Delhi and Ajmer, arrived with a huge army to attack Ghūrī.⁷¹ The sultan, who was on his way back to Ghazna, hurriedly returned. But he was not sufficiently prepared to meet such an enormous force and thus was defeated at this first battle of Tarjan in 1191. In the words of a modern Hindu historian: 'The Muslims were overpowered by sheer weight of numbers.'⁷²

The following year, Muḥammad Ghūrī set out from Ghazna well-prepared to meet Prithvi Raj. At the second battle of Tarjan in 1192, the sultan was able to rout the much larger force of Prithvi Raj (estimated to be 300,000 cavalry, 3,000 elephants and a large number of infantry) and the 150 allied Rajput princes.⁷³ Prithvi Raj was captured and put to death. This was Muḥammad Ghūrī's most resounding victory and a very decisive one since, following this, no Hindu king could effectively stand against him. In quick succession, he captured all the cities of the Chauhan kingdom up to Ajmer, where he appointed Prithvi Raj's son as a vassal ruler. Leaving his Turkish

70 Ikram, *Aab-e-Kauthar*, pp. 82–6.

71 According to Lal, *Early Muslims*, p. 46, and Mahajan, *Muslim Rule*, p. 39, there were 200,000 horses and 3,000 elephants.

72 Lal, *Early Muslims*, p. 46.

73 *Ibid.*, p. 47.



3.45 Mughal gold muhūr with portrait of Jahāngīr, AH 1020
(© Khalili Family Trust/Nour Foundation)

general Quṭbuddīn Aybak in charge of the conquered territories, he left for Ghazna.

The following year, 1193, Muḥammad Ghūrī went again to India and conquered the second largest kingdom, that of Kannauj, thus extending Muslim power as far as Banaras (Varanasi) in the north-east. His viceroy in India, Aybak, subdued the remaining cities of the region and in 1192 made Delhi his capital. Aybak competently managed the affairs of the new possession of the Ghūrīds in northern India. He conquered some new regions and extended Muslim power up to Bengal in the east and Gujrat in the south.

Bengal was subjugated by a Khaljī Turk general, Muḥammad ibn Bakhtiyār, in 1204. The following year, Ibn Bakhtiyār even ventured to conquer Tibet with an army of 10,000 cavalry. But this expedition was a miserable failure due to the difficult and hazardous route, poor planning and the hardness of the mountain people. It was a disaster and the conqueror of Bihar and Bengal paid for it with his life.⁷⁴

Muḥammad Ghūrī led his last campaign in India in late 1205 in order to crush the revolt of the Hindu Khokhar tribe of Punjab. He was successful in this, using his own and Aybak's force, but on his return journey to Ghazna he was assassinated by a member of the Hindu Gakkhar tribe near Rawalpindi in present-day Pakistan. He was buried there. A new tomb has recently been built over his grave and in this, a Muslim country of the subcontinent, sleeps eternally one of the two builders of Muslim power in India.

As for the spread of Islam during this period, the missionary process that had started under the Ghaznavids at the hands of the Sufis continued under Ghūrīd rule and subsequently. It gained momentum with the arrival in Delhi in 1186–92 of Khawajah Mu'īnuddīn Chishtī of Sijistān, the most prominent Sufi on the subcontinent.⁷⁵ After having travelled widely in the

74 On this campaign, see I. H. Qureshi (ed.), *A Short History of Pakistan*, Karachi, University of Karachi, 1967, p. 29.

75 Muhammad Qāsim Firishhta, *Tārīkh-e-Firishhta*, Lucknow, 1281/1865.

Muslim world, he arrived in India and settled in Ajmer. Thousands of the people of Rajputana and other areas were impressed by his preaching, his saintly character and his miraculous deeds and embraced Islam.⁷⁶ Mu'īnuddīn Chishtī died in Ajmer in 1233. His tomb there is the most revered Muslim shrine on the subcontinent.

A succession of Mu'īnuddīn Chishtī's disciples and their successors in the Chishti Sufi order carried on his mission of spiritual purification and preaching. Among these, the most famous is Quṭbuddīn Ka'kī, from Kesh in Transoxiana, who settled in Delhi. During the thirteenth century AD, a disciple of Quṭbuddīn Ka'kī called Farīduddīn Ganj-e-Shakar of Multan settled in Ajudhan (Pak Patan) and converted sixteen tribes of Punjab to Islam, including the tribes of the Sial, the Khokaran and the Sain.⁷⁷ Another prominent Sufi, Baha'uddīn Zakariyyā of Multan (b. AD 1172), who belonged to the famous Sufi Suhrawardiyya order of Baghdad, carried out his missionary activities in Multan and Sind. His family originally came from Khwārazm in Transoxiana. The missionary work of the Muslim mystics continued during the later Delhi Sultanate period.

The Delhi Sultanate (AD 1206–1526)

After the death of Muḥammad Ghūrī, his kingdom in Ghazna, Multan and Delhi was divided into three kingdoms and his viceroys in these places declared themselves independent. The Delhi Sultanate under Quṭbuddīn Aybak became the first independent Muslim state on the subcontinent. It lasted for over three centuries. In all, five dynasties of Turks, Sayyids and Afghans ruled Muslim India, as follows:

- Slaves (Turks) (1206–90)
- Khaljīs (Turks) (1290–1320)
- Tughlaqs (Turks) (1320–1412)
- Sayyids (of Arab origin) (1414–43)
- Lodhis (Afghans) (1451–1526)

The aim of this chapter is not to present the political history of the Muslims on the subcontinent. Suffice it to say that during the major part of this period the whole subcontinent was Islamized. These various dynasties produced some very capable sultans who, through their political genius, not only

76 For various views regarding the year of his arrival and his mission, see Ikram, *Aab-e-Kauthar*, pp. 196–208.

77 K. A. Nizami, *Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India during the Thirteenth Century*, Delhi, Idara-i-Adabiyat, 1961, p. 321.

protected the Sultanate from internal and external threats but also added extensive territories to the possessions of the early Turkish sultans. The most prominent among these sultans was ‘Allā‘addīn Khaljī (r. 1295–1315) who, along with his able commander Kafūr, conquered the Deccan, the southern part of India.

During these three centuries of the Sultanate, various sultans achieved renown for their administration of justice, development of resources, religious tolerance and patronage of learning and the arts. Indeed, Muslim civilization in India developed to such a degree that Delhi came to rival the former great centres of Islamic civilization such as Damascus, Baghdad, Bukhārā and Cairo. The most outstanding rulers were Shamsuddīn Iltumish, Ghayāthuddīn Balban, ‘Allā‘addīn Khaljī and Firoz Shah Tughluq. Their most remarkable achievement was to unite India – which prior to Muslim rule had been divided into 100 or more small principalities – into a single large and powerful kingdom.⁷⁸


Eminent men of learning, scientists, engineers, poets, saints and ‘*ulamā*’ (scholars) thronged to the courts of these sultans from the Muslim world, and especially from Transoxiana, Persia and Iraq after the barbaric Mongol invasion of these countries. It is to the credit of Sultan Balban and ‘Allā‘addīn Khaljī that they checked the numerous attacks of the Mongol hordes and saved India from the devastation they had earlier wrought in western Asia and Russia. During this period the vast kingdom of Muslim India became a part of the Islamic world. It was recognized by the ‘Abbāsīd caliphate, and envoys were exchanged between Baghdad and Delhi during the reign of Shamsuddīn Iltumish (r. 1210–35),⁷⁹ and later on between Muḥammad Tughluq (r. 1324–51) and the ‘Abbāsīd caliphs in Cairo.⁸⁰

Sufi missionary activities continued during the Sultanate period, and most of the sultans held the Sufis in high esteem and enjoyed good relations with them. Although the main sphere of Sufi activities was the spiritual guidance of their Muslim disciples, they also undertook the preaching of Islam among local non-Muslims. Mention has already been made of one prominent Sufi shaykh of this period, Farīduddīn Ganj-e-Shakar, and his

78 For the achievements of these sultans, see the contemporary and original works on them such as Sirāj Minhāj, *Tabqāt-e-Nasirī*, translated into Urdu from the original Persian by P. G. R. Mehr, Lahore, Urdu Science Board, 1985; D. Baranī, *Tārīkh-e-Firuzshahi*, trans. into Urdu from the original Persian by Dr S. Moinul Haq, Lahore, Urdu Science Board, 1991; and modern works such as K. S. Lal, *History of the Khaljis AD 1290–1320*, New Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal, 1967; Agha Mahdi Husain, *The Rise and Fall of Muhammad bin Tughluq*, London, 1938; and general histories such as M. Habib and K. A. Nizami, *A Comprehensive History of India*, Vol. 5: *The Delhi Sultanate (1206–1526)*, Delhi, People Publishing House, 1970; R. C. Majumdar (ed.), *The History and Culture of the Indian People*, Vol. 6: *Delhi Sultanate*, Bombay, Bharatiyn Vidya Bhavan, 1990.

79 Minhaj, *Tabqāt-e-Nasirī*, I, p. 795.

80 Husain, *Rise and Fall*, p. 169.



3.46 Taj Mahal, Agra (© UNESCO)

proselytizing activities among many Hindu tribes. It is unfortunate that many of the books written about the lives of Sufis in India are mainly concerned with their character, miraculous deeds and spiritual teachings. Nevertheless, glimpses of their proselytizing activities are found here and there.

The greatest Sufi preceptor of this period was Shaykh Nizamuddīn Auliya in Delhi. He had many prominent disciples, including Nasīruddīn Chirāgh who propagated Islam and its spiritual values in Delhi, Oudh, Punjab and Gujrat. Another, Akhi Sirājuddīn, carried out the same mission in Bengal, and a third, Khawajah Burhānuddīn Gharīb, spread Islam in the Deccan in South India.⁸¹ Prince Dara Shikoh (d. 1659) states that Burhānuddīn Gharīb was sent by Shaykh Nizamuddīn to Daulatabad in the Deccan along with others of his disciples in order to spread Islam. Indeed, as a result of their preaching, many people there converted to the faith.⁸²

Another eminent Sufi shaykh of this period was Sharfuddīn Yahya Manīri (d. 1380), who settled in Bihar in the east. After debating with him, some Hindu yogis were so overwhelmed that they embraced Islam on the

81 Sayyid Sabahuddin Abdarraḥmān, *Bazm-e-Sufia*, India, Azam Garh, 1971, p. 277.

82 Shikoh, *Safīna*, p. 137.

spot.⁸³ A third prominent Sufi shaykh called Jalāluddīn Bukhārī (d. 1383) is known to have converted many Hindus of Sind. One Hindu woman who embraced Islam at his hand became a very devout believer; she would offer prayers throughout the night and often travelled to Mecca to circumambulate the Ka‘ba for her spiritual satisfaction. Whenever Jalāluddīn Bukhārī came from his abode at Uch to Delhi, many non-Muslims would embrace Islam at his hand on the way.⁸⁴

Another great Sufi shaykh of the fourteenth century AD who led many Hindus of the district of Oudh in the north to embrace Islam was Ashraf Jahāngīr Simnāni of Kachaucha.⁸⁵ He came from Simnān in Persia and, after becoming the disciple of a Chishti shaykh called ‘Ala’ulhaq in Bengal and receiving his spiritual education from him, he was directed by his preceptor to go and settle in Oudh. There he was welcomed by both the ruler and the ordinary people alike and soon gained prominence through his preaching and spiritual guidance. At a place known as Bhadwand, a Hindu yogi who claimed to have the power to fly contested Shaykh Ashraf. The yogi was so overwhelmed by the shaykh’s piety and spirituality, however, that he disclaimed all his yoga powers, burnt his religious books and embraced Islam along with his 5,000 followers. After his conversion, the yogi became known as Baba Kamāl Pandit.⁸⁶ Shaykh Ashraf used to go to various nearby towns and villages to provide spiritual and moral guidance and thousands of people benefited from his preaching and teachings. On one such journey, he visited the ancient Hindu religious city of Banaras (Varanasi), where he entered into debate with some high priests of the Hindu temples. They were so impressed by his miraculous performance that 1,000 Hindus accepted Islam.⁸⁷

The above are just a few examples which show that the Sufis played an important role in spreading Islam throughout the subcontinent.⁸⁸ This preaching of Islam by the Sufis and religious scholars continued until late in the nineteenth century and was greatly facilitated by the establishment of Muslim rule in India. From the earliest times, the Sufis carried out their missionary activities among the masses individually and without fanfare. Thus, they were not noticed and mentioned by historians and biographers.

83 Abdarraḥmān, *Bazm-e-Sufia*, p. 408.

84 Ibid., p. 506.

85 He was earlier a prince of Simnān (western Persia). For his extraordinarily eventful life, see Mehboob-e-Yazdani, *Lata’if-e-Ashrafi*, Delhi, AH 1295; Abdarraḥmān, *Bazm-e-Sufia*, pp. 516–57.

86 Abdarraḥmān, *Bazm-e-Sufia*, p. 528, quoting Yazdani, *Lata’if*.

87 Ibid., p. 532.

88 For more examples, see Sir Thomas Walker Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith*, London, Constable, 1896; 2nd edn, 1913. Several reprints have been published by Ashraf Publications of Lahore, Pakistan.

The former were concerned with the rulers, their kingdoms and conquests, while the latter were fond of relating the personal qualities of the Sufi masters, their piety, sayings and miraculous deeds, rather than their achievements in spreading Islam.

The reason for the Sufis' success was their message of equality and Muslim brotherhood set against the caste-ridden nature of the society and superstitious beliefs in various deities, idols, rivers, trees and animals. Thus, by accepting Islam, the downtrodden masses of *shudras* (the menial working classes), who laboured under the Hindu law of Manu Sumurti, were elevated to equal status with other Muslims. Islam was attractive to them and large numbers of them embraced it. The pure and ascetic life of the great Sufis and their love of all human beings were additional factors in their ability to inspire non-Muslims to embrace the religion.


The spread of Islam in the South

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, Islam was introduced into the south of the subcontinent by maritime Arab traders from Yemen and the Persian Gulf. These Arabs had been great seafarers since the pre-Islamic era and were involved in the trade between East and West. They sailed from the ports of Yemen and the Persian Gulf, laden with merchandise from Egypt, Syria and Persia, made for the west and east of India, and then proceeded through the strait of Malacca to China and Canton. On their return journey, they brought merchandise from China and India which was then exported from Arabia to western Asia, Egypt and Europe. To facilitate this vast trade, they established colonies on the west and east coasts of India and in Canton.⁸⁹ The Arabs were the masters of the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean until the emergence of the Portuguese in the region. In fact, the Arab sea captain Ibn Mājid was the first person to guide Vasco da Gama to the western ports of India.

When Islam prevailed over the whole of Arabia during the lifetime of the Prophet Muḥammad, these Arab traders became Muslims. Their seafaring and maritime trade continued, but, under the teachings of the Qur'ān, a fundamental change occurred in their business dealings which involved a strict adherence to honesty, truthfulness and fair dealing. It can well be imagined that this change in morals and business ethics of the formerly pagan Arab traders would have much impressed the local Indians.

We have earlier seen that the first Arab naval expedition to India was sent in AD 636 to two ports on the west coast with the aim of protecting the

89 Tara Chand, *Influence of Islam on Indian Culture*, Lahore, Book Traders, 1979, p. 30.



3.47 Single-volume Qur'ān from the sixteenth century, Colconda or Haidarabad (© Khalili Family Trust/Nour Foundation)

interests of Arab traders and settlers. The first specific documentary evidence of the establishment of Muslims on the west coast of India comes from the eighth century AD: in the old Muslim graveyards of Mayyat Kannu in the city of Kollam in Malabar, one of the tombs bears an inscription recording the death of a certain Ali ibn Udthumān ('Uthmān) in AH 166 (AD 782).⁹⁰ After providing this vital piece of information, the renowned South Indian scholar, Dr Tara Chand, goes on to remark:

Henceforth Muslim influence grew rapidly. For over a hundred years the Muslims had been established on the Malabar coast. They were welcomed as traders and apparently facilities were given to them to settle and acquire lands and openly practise their religion. They must have entered upon missionary

90 Ibid., p. 33.

UNIVERSAL DIMENSIONS OF THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

efforts soon after settling down, for Islam is essentially a missionary religion and every Musulman is a missionary of his faith.⁹¹

Commenting on the prevalent conditions in the region, and the progress of Islam, the same author asserts:

This was a time when a conflict between Buddhism, Jainism and neo-Hinduism had agitated the minds of the people of the South. Politically, too, it was a period of unsettlement and upheavals. In these unwholesome conditions, people were naturally prone to accept new ideas from whatever quarter they came. Islam appeared on the scene with a simple formula of faith, well defined dogmas and rites and democratic theories of social organization. It produced a tremendous effect and before the first quarter of the ninth century was over the last of the Cheraman Perumal kings of Malabar, who reigned at Kodungallur, had become a convert to the new religion.⁹²

According to an eminent and earlier scholar from the South who has based his research on old Arabic manuscripts and the views of British writers, the conversion of Cheraman Perumal to Islam took place secretly in 210/25 August 825 at the hands of some Arab Sufis or other missionaries who were visiting the region. The raja was named Abdarraḥmān Sāmīrī. After entrusting the affairs of his kingdom to a state functionary, he then travelled secretly with them to Mecca in 827. Abdarraḥmān arrived in the port of Zafār in Yemen, where he fell ill and died four years later.⁹³ Before his death, however, he advised his three Arab companions to return to Malabar and to preach Islam there. He also gave them a letter concerning the government of his dominion and the reception of these Muslims. After some time, the three missionaries, Mālik ibn Dīnār, Sharaf ibn Mālik and Mālik ibn Ḥabīb, landed at Kodungallur, the capital of the deceased convert king with his letter to his viceroy. According to Tara Chand, 'They were treated hospitably and were permitted to build mosques. As a consequence, mosques were erected at eleven places on the Malabar Coast.'⁹⁴

The traditional ceremonies at the coronation of the Zamorin (the name of the kings of Malabar) up to the early twentieth century, such as his being crowned by a Mapilla (a native Muslim of Arab origin) and being shaved

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid., p. 34, relates the story of his conversion in detail.

93 H. S. A. Qadiri, *Malibar*, Hyderabad, 1928, pp. 24–5. Compare Qadiri's story of the conversion of the king (pp. 22–4) with that of Tara Chand. The learned author Qadiri does not give a convincing reason for the king being stranded for four years in Yemen. In the view of the present writer, it was due to the revolt of Muḥammad ibn 'Abdallāh Ziyād against the 'Abbāsīd caliphate in AD 821 and his declaring himself independent. As a result, the route to Mecca was closed for a few years.

94 Chand, *Influence*, p. 34. See also Qadiri, *Malibar*, pp. 25–6. Qadiri identifies the coastal towns where the mosques were built. See *Malibar*, pp. 37–9.

and dressed like a Muslim, testify to the truth of the story of Abdarraḥmān Sāmīri's conversion. Muslims had evidently acquired great importance in the ninth century AD. Among the privileges showered upon them was their being designated by the name of Mapilla (or Moplah), which means either 'a great child' or 'a bridegroom', and was considered a title of honour. Likewise, they were trusted by the kings of Malabar and supported them against their enemies.⁹⁵

Another prominent person in Malabar who embraced Islam was Nair, the chief minister of Kannaur, in the early thirteenth century AD. He became known as Ali Raja. He remained the minister and admiral of the petty Hindu kingdom of Kolattivi. Ali Raja and his family were later to enjoy great respect on account of his maritime trading activities and his wealth.⁹⁶

When Mālik ibn Ḥabīb and his descendants settled in Malabar, other Muslim traders from Yemen and Iraq also came and settled there. As a result of their preaching, the local populace began to embrace Islam and the Muslim population increased significantly. When the famous Arab historian al-Mas'ūdī visited this region of India in AD 916, he found over 10,000 Muslims of Arab origin in Chimore (modern-day Chaul), and when Ibn Baṭṭūṭa visited the region in the fourteenth century he found all the west and east coasts to be densely populated by Muslims.⁹⁷ Indeed, Arab Muslims had settled on the east coast of India in the late seventh century AD. These were Hāshimite immigrants from Iraq who had migrated to this area because of their persecution by the Umayyad governor al-Ḥajjāj. They are called 'Labbes' locally.

The Muslims started their proselytizing as soon as they settled in some numbers. In the early eleventh century AD, a Muslim saint of Hāshimite origin by the name of Nather Wali came from Turkistan to Trichinopoly and settled there. He converted a large number of Hindus to Islam. His tomb at Trichinopoly bears the date of his death as 417/1039. Nather Wali's successor was Sayyid Ibrāhīm Shāhid of Medina, who in 1204 led a militant mission to the Pandia kingdom of the region. He defeated the Pandia king and ruled for over twelve years, but was eventually overthrown and slain. This was the first example of Muslim rule on the east coast of India. A disciple of Nather Wali by the name of Baba Fakhruddīn converted the raja of Pennukonda and built a mosque there. He also converted a whole tribe there to Islam.⁹⁸

95 Chand, *Influence*, p. 35; Qadiri, *Malibar*, pp. 37–9. Chand provides details of the privileges, while Qadiri discusses the term 'Mapilla' in detail.

96 Qadiri, *Malibar*, pp. 33–5; Chand, *Influence*, p. 36.

97 Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *Riḥlat Ibn Baṭṭūṭa*, Cairo, 1958, II, pp. 108–16.

98 Chand, *Influence*, p. 40; Qureshi, *A Short History*, pp. 6–7, in which the date given for Nather Wali's death is wrong.



3.48 Vakil Khān Mosque, Lahore (© G. Degeorge)

A Muslim saint called Ali Yar Shah, along with some traders, arrived in Madura in AD 1050; they preached Islam and built a mosque there. Coromandal in the extreme south was given the Arabic name ‘Ma‘bar’ (‘crossing point’) by the Muslims. It extended from Koullam to Nellor (near Madras).⁹⁹ In the thirteenth century Muslim trade, especially in horses, had become so extensive that an agency was established by Malik-ul-Islam Jamāluddīn, ruler of the Persian island of Kis. He exported 10,000 horses annually from Persia to Coromandal and their total value amounted to 2,200,000 dinars. Jamāluddīn’s brother Taqiyy-ad-dīn aṭ-Ṭībī was the agent at Kayal; along with this port, he also controlled two others.¹⁰⁰

Thus, before the conquest of the South by Sultan ‘Ala’addīn Khaljī’s commander Kafūr in AD 1311, the Muslims on the west and east coasts of India were well established. They lived under the rule of various Hindu kings and enjoyed full religious freedom, having their own *wādis* and many congregational mosques. All this was due to their control of the merchant navy and maritime commerce.

In the early fourteenth century the whole of the South was Islamized when it became part of the Delhi Sultanate of the Khaljīs. In around 1347,

99 Chand, *Influence*, pp. 40–1.

100 *Ibid.*, pp. 41–2.

due to the misguided Deccan policy of Sultan Muḥammad Tughluq, an independent Muslim kingdom arose in the South by the name of Bahmanid: it was to rule for almost two centuries. After a century, this large Muslim kingdom was split into five petty kingdoms ruling areas such as Ahmad Nagar, Bijapur and Golkunda.¹⁰¹ Some of them continued during the period of the Mughal empire until the last two were subdued by the great Mughal emperor Aurangzeb in 1680 and 1672, and the whole subcontinent was unified within a single Muslim empire.

The impact of the spread of Islam in the South by Arab traders and Sufis can still be seen on the west and east coasts of India. Thus, in the states of Kerala, Karnataka and Madras, Muslims are prosperous and they live in peace and security. Arabic is taught in government secondary schools in Kerala. The Shāfi'ī school of Islamic *fiqh* is prevalent there. They have a great number of institutions dealing with education and welfare and are indeed much better off than the Muslims of the north.

The Mughal empire (1526–1857)

With the advent of Babur (r. 1526–30), a new and glorious era of Muslim history dawned on the Indian subcontinent. Babur became the master of Muslim India by defeating the last feeble Lodi sultan of Delhi, Ibrāhīm, and his Rajput ally Rana Sanga of Mewar, in a series of great battles in Panjpat and Khanwa in 1526 and 1527. This enabled Babur to establish himself at Agra, the capital of the last Lodi sultans. Through his conquest and the disunity among Muslims of the subcontinent, however, Muslim rule in India threatened to disintegrate and the ambitions of some Rajput kings were kept alive for another three centuries.

Babur was the most illustrious figure in Muslim India. He was an empire builder and the founder of the most brilliant Muslim civilization there.¹⁰² Although his early death meant that he ruled for little more than five years, his progeny boasted a succession of outstanding rulers: Humayun (r. 1530–40; 1555–56), Akbar (r. 1556–1605), Jahangir (r. 1605–27), Shah Jahan (r. 1628–58) and Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707). Apart from an interlude of fifteen years, during which the Afghan chief Sher Shāh Sūri dislodged Humayun (Babur's son) from the throne and forced him to seek temporary refuge in Iran, the

101 For these kingdoms, see Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Muhammedan Dynasties*, Karachi, Pak Publishers Ltd, 1969, pp. 290–6.

102 In addition to being a great warrior, he was a poet, a cultural and social historian and a builder of beautiful buildings and gardens. For a biography, see his memoirs written originally in Chaghatay Turkik and translated into Persian, then into other languages including English.

descendants of Babur continued to rule India until the emergence of British power there in the eighteenth century. The British banished the last Mughal emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar in 1857 and thus brought an end to Muslim rule in India.

Each of the Mughal emperors was a luminary in his own right. Thus, Akbar established the best civil administration on the subcontinent. He also reunited India, except for the South, into a single political entity after eliminating many local small kingdoms that had sprung up during the time of Muḥammad Tughluq. This task was completed by his grandson Aurangzeb. Jahangir was a patron and a critic of the fine arts and was also an eminent prose writer, as testified by his memoirs. Shah Jahan was a great builder and a connoisseur of architecture. The subcontinent's most beautiful and magnificent monuments were built by him, in Delhi, Agra and Lahore. The Taj Mahal at Agra stands as a living testimony to this.

Aurangzeb Alamgir was the model of an ideal Muslim monarch and an outstanding patron of the *sharī'a* (Islamic law). The compendium of Muslim law known as the *Fatāwa-i-Alamgiri* was prepared under his personal supervision and is still used by Muslim jurists on the subcontinent. Aurangzeb was a devout Muslim, a brave and resolute warrior and an extremely vigilant ruler. He accomplished what no other Mughal emperor, even his great-grandfather Akbar, could achieve: the conquest of the Deccan in South India and the unification of the entire subcontinent into one great political entity. According to his famous Hindu biographer, Sir J. N. Sirkar:

Under him the Mughal Empire reached its greatest extent, and the largest state ever known in India from the dawn of history to the rise of the British power was formed. From Ghazna to Chittagong, from Kashmir to the Karnatak, the continent of India obeyed one sceptre. Islam made its last onward movement in India in his reign.¹⁰³

Aurangzeb was unique among all the Muslim rulers of India because of his piety, political resolve, military genius and administrative qualities. He has been much maligned by Hindu and British colonial historians, but admired by conscientious Muslims over the ages.¹⁰⁴

Throughout Mughal rule, excluding the last decades of Emperor Akbar, relations between religious scholars, Sufis and the Mughal emperors were cordial. Indeed, religious scholars and mystics were much revered by the last

103 Mahajan, *Muslim Rule*, p. 134.

104 For his character and a refutation of the false accusations against him, see Zahiruddin Faruki, *Aurangzeb and his Times*, Delhi, Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, 1980, Chs 23 and 24.

two great emperors, Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb. The Muslim community continued to expand without any coercion.

After Aurangzeb's death in 1707, the Mughal empire underwent a gradual but persistent decline until it finally collapsed in 1857. The various factors that contributed to this decline and fall may be summarized as follows: first, Aurangzeb's weak and incompetent successors; second, the continuous wars of the Hindu Maratha rulers against the Mughals; and, third, the intrigues of the British East India Company and their rising power until they became virtual rulers by the end of the eighteenth century.

The authority of the Mughal emperor was confined to Delhi, and later, in the early nineteenth century, to the sprawling Red Fort at their old capital. In 1857 Muslims along with some Hindu elements rose up against British rule under the flag of the nominal Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar. The revolt was ruthlessly crushed, the ageing emperor was banished to Burma and his sons were killed. The Mughal empire was abolished and India became a colony of the British empire. In this way, 650 years of Muslim rule of India came to an end.

During British rule in India in the nineteenth century, Christian missionaries worked to convert the local people to Christianity. Muslims accepted the challenge and in addition to countering the missionary work and attacks on Islam, they continued their preaching of Islam with vigour.

In the early nineteenth century, a great Sufi activist, Sayyid Ahmad Rai Bareilwi (1786–1830), made his name as a reformer, a preacher of Islam and the Muslim liberator of the North-West Frontier region from Sikh rule through his *jihād* movement. In 1821, while travelling to make the pilgrimage at Mecca with a large number of his followers, he stayed for three months at Calcutta. During that period, his chief disciple, Maulana Abdul Hayyi, used to give sermons every Tuesday and Friday. Following his speech, ten to fifteen Hindus would convert to Islam.¹⁰⁵ Sayyid Ahmad Rai Bareilwi's main reformist work was among Muslims, and he was tremendously successful in this. As a result of his preaching, hundreds of thousands of Muslims renounced their superstitions and false religious practices. Local Hindus were also impressed by the honesty and piety that he and his followers displayed, and thousands of them converted to Islam. This zeal for spreading Islam among non-Muslims continued until the late nineteenth century. Details of this were collected by Sir Thomas Walker Arnold in his monumental work, *The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith*.¹⁰⁶

105 S. Abu-l-Hasan Ali Nadwi, *Sirat-e-Sayyid Ahmad Shaheed*, Karachi, 1987, II, p. 326. This renowned scholar of India informed the present writer in a letter that some 40,000 people were converted to Islam at Sayyid Bareilwi's hand.

106 Sir Thomas Walker Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith*, London, Constable, 1896; 2nd edn, 1913.

The birth of Pakistan

Muslims ruled India for over six centuries until the British deprived them of their authority and took over. After the failure of the War of Independence in 1857, the Muslims were persecuted by the British colonizers and discriminated against. Nonetheless, they faced the new situation with patience and fortitude and succeeded in preserving their identity as a nation. Under the flag of the Muslim League, they played an active role in the independence movement during the first half of the twentieth century.

After an interval of nearly one century, Muslims once again ruled over the Muslim majority provinces in the west and east of the subcontinent when it was partitioned in August 1947. Thus was born Pakistan, which comprised four provinces in the west and one, East Bengal, in the east. In 1971 East Pakistan seceded from Pakistan and became the independent Muslim state of Bangladesh. However, the entire west of the subcontinent – where Islam first emerged in the early eighth century AD and then in the early eleventh century – still constitutes the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

– IV –

THE SPREAD OF ISLAM
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

Chapter 4.1 (a)

THE CRUSADES IN THE PERIOD AD 1096–1291

Işin Demirkent

The Crusades were a military movement which started in Europe at the end of the eleventh century AD with the expressed aim of recovering the Holy Sepulchre but with the actual political objective of taking possession of the Near East. The movement covers a period of nearly 200 years, beginning in 1096 with the First Crusade and culminating in 1291 with the expulsion of the Latin Christians from Acre, their last stronghold in the East. During this period nine major campaigns took place with minor expeditions in the interludes. Later, all warfare against the Turco-Islamic world was interpreted as crusading.

The Crusader movement started with the call of Pope Urban II at an open-air meeting of ecclesiastics and laymen during the Council of Clermont. In his address, he told Western Christians that participating in a war to save their co-religionists in the East from the oppression and cruelty of the Turks was a glorious duty from a religious point of view. Those who wished to join were to take a vow and carry the sign of the Cross on their clothes. Anyone who made a vow but did not go to Jerusalem was to be excommunicated. Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy was the first to take the vow, and he was soon followed by many others.

Indeed, over the ensuing days and weeks the Pope's summons was received with great joy and enthusiasm. Among those who decided to join were Count Raymond of St Gilles of Toulouse, Hugh of Vermandois, Godfrey of Bouillon, Duke of Lower Lorraine and his brothers Eustace and Baldwin, Duke Robert of Normandy, Stephan of Blois, the count of Champagne and Robert II, the count of Flanders. Similarly, the Normans of Southern Italy rallied to the call under their ruler Bohemond and his nephew Tancred. Not only nobles and knights but people from all walks of life showed great interest in the undertaking. The Pope told everyone to

prepare for the long journey and announced 15 August 1096 as the date of departure. The leaders who were to march East were responsible for raising funds for the necessary provisions and weapons and so started mortgaging or selling their properties.

As in the West, preparations were also under way in the East. The Byzantine emperor, Alexius I Comnenus, who had demanded a limited number of mercenaries from Europe to fight against the Turks, had great misgivings when he learnt that instead, large armies were gathering and preparing to move east. Despite their probable good intentions, such great multitudes moving through the empire were sure to cause many problems. He therefore took immediate measures to find provisions and to ensure control of these masses during their passage through his lands.

The Crusade of Peter the Hermit

While preparations in both West and East were continuing, one of the most influential preachers summoning people to take the Cross was a monk called Peter the Hermit, who impressed listeners with his fiery sermons. A multitude consisting of mostly French, but also Germans and Italians, rallied to his call. The first army under Peter's leadership started out in May 1096. It was very difficult to control and after terrible violence and plunder on its march through Hungary and Byzantine lands, it finally arrived in Constantinople on 1 August 1096. The emperor Alexius decided to keep this horde on the outskirts of Constantinople until the great armies commanded by the counts arrived. However, it proved impossible to impose discipline, and theft and pillage continued unabated. Finally, on 6 August, the emperor moved the Crusaders to the Anatolian shore, where he settled them in the Civetot headquarters in the vicinity of Yalova and advised them to wait there until the arrival of the Crusader armies.

The Crusaders had no intention of heeding the emperor's admonishment and continued to pillage and to kill anyone who hindered them, Christian and Muslim alike. Their success against defenceless people only made them more daring. A French Crusader group entered the territory of the Turkish Seljūq state and headed for the Seljūq capital Nicaea, plundering the surrounding villages. The appetites of the Germans were whetted by the rich spoils brought back by the French. A German-Italian group, plundering and sacking all the way, managed to take Xerigordon fortress near Nicaea. On hearing the news, Kilij Arslan I, the Seljūq sultan, sent his men to recapture the fortress. The Turkish army arrived outside Xerigordon on 29 September and laid siege to the fortress. The Crusaders surrendered after one week. In the meantime, information was obtained as to the fate

of the Germans. The Crusaders decided to start an assault on the Turks to avenge Xerigordon. On 21 October over 20,000 Crusader soldiers marched out from Civetot. On 17 October the Turks left Nicaea and began waiting for the Crusaders on the road from Civetot to Nicaea. On arriving in the thickly forested Dracon valley, the Crusader army was ambushed by the Turks. The panic-stricken Crusaders tried to retreat to their headquarters but could not escape the pursuing Turks. The very few survivors were brought back to Constantinople in ships sent by the emperor.

The First Crusade (1096–99)

The great Crusader armies, commanded by nobles, began arriving in Constantinople in the autumn of 1096. With the coming of the leaders, Emperor Alexius realized that their true ambition was to establish states for themselves in the East. Wishing to avert the threat this represented to the Byzantine empire, he demanded that, in accordance with Western tradition, the knights should take an oath of allegiance and vassalage to him. This entailed the return to him of former Byzantine territory that the Crusaders would reclaim from the Turks, and also that the Crusader states founded outside the frontiers of the empire should acknowledge the Byzantine emperor as the highest authority. In return for this promise, the emperor was to provide all necessities to the Crusaders on their campaign and also provide them with a Byzantine force to accompany them.

The leader of the first French contingent to arrive in Constantinople, Hugh of Vermandois, consented to the emperor's conditions. However, when Godfrey of Bouillon, leading the French army of Lower Lorraine, arrived and refused to take the oath, a skirmish between the Byzantine forces and the Crusaders broke out. Although the Crusaders assaulted the city walls, they were defeated and Godfrey was obliged to surrender and to take the oath of vassalage. His army was moved to the Anatolian shore and settled in the Pelecanum headquarters.

Later, the Norman armies commanded by Bohemond, and after them the southern French armies under the leadership of Raymond of St Gilles, arrived at Constantinople. Accompanying Raymond was Adhemar, bishop of Le Puy, as the papal legate. At more or less the same date Robert of Flanders, and following him Robert of Normandy and Stephan of Blois, also arrived with their forces. After extracting oaths of vassalage from them, Alexius assisted their armies in crossing over to the Anatolian shore.

In 1097 the Crusader armies arrived on the outskirts of Nicaea. Sultan Kilij Arslan was in the east of his realm fighting to take Melitene. His previous victory against the forces of Peter the Hermit had misled him

regarding the strength of the Crusaders. He returned swiftly to save Nicaea from the siege but was outnumbered and could not break through the enemy lines to enter the city. After violent fighting he was forced to withdraw. Losing all hope of help from outside, the garrison in Nicaea surrendered the city to the Byzantine emperor on 19 June 1097. A few days later, on 26 June, the Crusaders, joined by the Byzantine forces under the command of Taticius, started advancing on Dorylaeum. Kilij Arslan ambushed them in Dorylaeum, but was unaware that they had divided into two groups and were marching with an interval of one day between them. His ambush was therefore unsuccessful and he was attacked by the second group that arrived on 1 July. Realizing that he did not have the resources to inflict a decisive defeat on the Crusaders, or even to halt their march, Kilij Arslan evacuated the regions ahead of them, set fire to the fields and filled up the wells.

From Dorylaeum, the Crusaders advanced towards Philomelium, Iconium and Heraclea. From there they marched over Germanicea and Coxon and finally arrived outside Antioch on 20 October 1097. Meanwhile Godfrey's brother, Baldwin, and Bohemond's nephew, Tancred, had broken away from the main army in Heraclea and passing through the Cilician Gates had gone down to Cilicia and wrested the cities of Tarsus, Adana and Mamistra from the Turks. Baldwin, who wished to establish an independent state for himself in the East, made an agreement with the Armenians and went to Edessa. After overthrowing the Armenian ruler of the city, Thoros, while the main Crusader army was still besieging the city outside the walls of Antioch, on 10 March 1098 Baldwin succeeded in founding the first Crusader state in Edessa.

Antioch was surrounded by strong walls and was well defended by the Turks. In spite of reinforcements from the Genoese, the help of an English fleet and the support of the patriarch of Jerusalem who happened to be in Cyprus at the time, the siege – which lasted for months – did not bring any notable success. In May 1098 consternation spread among the Crusaders when they learnt that the Seljūq sultan Berkyaruk was sending a huge army commanded by the governor of Mosul, Kerbogha, that numerous local rulers had joined in, and that this army was approaching. Panic broke out at the headquarters and many Crusaders, among them Count Stephen of Blois, deserted the army and made their way home. Meanwhile, Bohemond reached an agreement regarding the surrender of the city with an Armenian convert by the name of Firouz, and proposed to the leaders that Antioch should be relinquished to whosoever managed to take it.

Later, with the help of Firouz, Bohemond managed to put some of his forces into the city through the Tower of the Two Sisters. On 3 June 1098, when the gates were opened, the Crusader army stormed into the city, massacring the Muslim population and plundering everything in sight.

They were nevertheless unable to take the inner fortress. At this point, the armies of Kerbogha arrived outside Antioch. After squabbling over who was to rule the city, the leaders finally came to an agreement and, advancing from the city on 28 June, they confronted the armies of Kerbogha. Kerbogha had not been able to maintain complete authority over his men and after a number of disagreements many local rulers had taken their forces and departed. Kerbogha continued fighting with his remaining forces but was unable to defeat the Crusaders and was obliged to retreat. With his retreat the inner fortress fell.

Later, the struggle among the leaders for possession of Antioch ended in a victory for Bohemond. Bohemond remained there, but Raymond set out with his men towards Jerusalem while the other leaders joined the main army marching south. Many died of pestilence during this period, among them Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy.

Near Beirut, the Crusaders entered territory belonging to the Fāṭimids, enemies of the Seljūqs. The 'Abbāsids had taken Jerusalem from the Seljūqs in 1098. The Crusaders arrived outside Jerusalem on 7 June 1099 and besieged the city, soon receiving aid such as food and other provisions by ships coming from Jaffa. The army attacked on 13–14 July. The following day, Godfrey's men stormed part of the northern ramparts near the Gate of Flowers and entered the city, opening the Gate of the Column. While the Crusaders were pouring into the city, some of the Muslim population tried to take refuge in the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqṣā Mosque. Others fled towards the southern quarters of the city. On surrendering the Tower of David to Count Raymond, the governor Iftikhār-ad-Dawla was permitted to leave the city with his men.

After taking Jerusalem, the Crusaders went on an unprecedented and violent rampage. All the Muslims in the city were massacred. Tancred assaulted the Dome of the Rock and pillaged it. Everyone who had taken refuge in al-Aqṣā Mosque was slaughtered. On the pretext that the Jews had aided the Muslims, all the city's synagogues were set on fire and the Jews perished in their sanctuaries. In this way, three years after setting out, the Crusaders had finally realized their ambitions. An important factor in their success was that the rulers of the Muslim-Turkish world were disunited and feuding and did not realize the critical nature of the situation and the need for a united front.

After the sack of Jerusalem, the Christian leaders decided that it should be ruled not by an ecclesiastical but rather by a secular authority. Under the title *Advocatus Sancti Sepulchri*, Godfrey of Bouillon was appointed ruler. On his death on 18 July 1100, his brother Baldwin was summoned from Edessa and on 24 December 1100 was proclaimed king. Thus, Jerusalem did not become an ecclesiastical state but rather a feudal kingdom.

Crusader states in the East

During the First Crusade and subsequently, the Crusaders founded states in Edessa, Antioch, Jerusalem and Tripoli. What follows is a brief history of these states up to the start of the Second Crusade.

THE COUNTY OF EDESSA (1098–1144)

At the invitation of the Armenians of Edessa, Baldwin of Boulogne came to the city and, having deposed the ruler Thoros by deceit, declared himself sovereign. Thus, on 10 March 1098, the county of Edessa became the first Crusader state in the East. Shortly afterwards, Baldwin also captured a number of fortresses in the region, as well as Samosata and Sadruj, and extended the territory of his county. On the death of his brother Godfrey, however, he turned over rule of the county to his cousin Baldwin of le Bourg, while he himself went to Jerusalem to become king.

Although the second count of Edessa, Baldwin of le Bourg (1100–18), was not able to expand the frontiers of the county he did manage to protect it against Turkish assault. His cousin Joscelin of Courtenay joined him in 1102 and provided him with great support. When King Baldwin died in 1118, Baldwin of le Bourg ascended the throne of Jerusalem and left the rule of Edessa to Joscelin. After Joscelin's death in 1131, his son Joscelin II became ruler but on 24 December 1144 'Imād-ad-Dīn Zengi conquered Edessa and put an end to the Christian county.

Nonetheless, under Joscelin II, the Crusaders managed to survive to the west of the Euphrates, with Turbessel as their centre, until 1150. Eventually, in that year, Joscelin was captured by Nūr-ad-Dīn Zengi and died in a dungeon in Aleppo. His wife sold what land was left of the county of Edessa to Byzantium and departed from the region.

THE PRINCIPALITY OF ANTIOCH

When the first ruler of Antioch, Bohemond, was captured by the Danishmend *amīr* in August 1100, his place was taken by his nephew Tancred. Bohemond was eventually freed and three years later, in 1104, he returned to Europe and persuaded Pope Paschal II to undertake a new crusade. But instead of going East with the army he had recruited, he assaulted the Byzantine city of Dyrrhachium. The attack was unsuccessful and Bohemond was forced to take an oath of vassalage for Antioch to the emperor. He returned to Italy, where he died in 1111. Tancred, who had become ruler of Antioch,



4.1 Dome of the Mausoleum of Sultan Qaitbay, Cairo (© G. Degeorge)

overlooked his uncle's oath and refused to acknowledge the authority of Byzantium. When he died in 1112, he was succeeded by his cousin Roger of Salerno. The Normans received a crushing blow in the battle on 28 June 1119 (Ager Sanguinis) against the Ortoqid prince Ilghazi and Roger died in the fight. Until the arrival of Bohemond's son, Bohemond II, in 1126, Antioch was ruled by Baldwin, king of Jerusalem. The rule of Bohemond II (who married Alice, the daughter of King Baldwin II) was short-lived for he died in the battle against the Danishmend in 1130. His wife became regent for his daughter Constance but when Constance married in 1136, her husband Raymond of Poitiers took over the rule of the principality. His rule ended with his death in 1149 in the battle against the ruler of Aleppo, Nūr-ad-Dīn.

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THE KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM

King Baldwin I, who was crowned on Christmas Day 1100, managed to extend the territory of the state of Jerusalem by taking the coastal region of Palestine with the help of Venetian and Genoese fleets. Arsuf, Caesarea, Haifa, Jaffa, Acre and Beirut were added to the kingdom's territories and in return for their help the Venetians and Genoese were rewarded with quarters in each city. The Galilee region was conquered and fortified with castles. Despite this wave of conquest, attempts to push the frontiers further east were not successful. During the reign of Baldwin II, who ascended the throne of Jerusalem (r. 1118–31), Tyre was taken.

In this era, the Orders of the Knights Templar and Hospitallers were established as military-religious foundations. They developed rapidly and settled in strategic places in the country, serving in the royal armies. When Baldwin II died, Fulk of Anjou (who had married Baldwin's daughter Melisende) became king (r. 1131–43). His policy was more to protect and keep the borders intact than look for new conquests. This was a wise policy because his reign coincided with the period when the power of 'Imād-ad-Dīn Zengi was swiftly on the rise and all the Crusader states were threatened by the Islamic world which had rallied to the call of Zengi. When Fulk died his son Baldwin III was proclaimed king but because he was underage his mother Melisende took over the rule of the kingdom.

THE COUNTY OF TRIPOLI

The county of Tripoli was the fourth Crusader state to be established in the East. Although Raymond, count of Toulouse, had tried very hard to conquer Tripoli, the city was only taken by Raymond's successors in 1109 after his death in 1105. The county was ruled first by Bertrand, then by his son Pons. Pons was killed in a battle against the Muslims in 1137 and was succeeded by his son Raymond II.

The Crusades of 1101

News of the conquest of Jerusalem caused great excitement and joy in Europe and Pope Paschal II organized a campaign to reinforce the number of Crusaders in the East. There were three separate armies under the command of counts and men of the Church. The first of these arrived in Constantinople in the spring of 1101 and crossed over to Anatolia, where it was annihilated by Seljūq and Danishmend forces near Mersivan. The second army was

defeated as soon as it left Iconium, and the third was defeated near Heraclea in August 1101. The leaders and the very few others who managed to survive made their way to Jerusalem the following year. Nothing of military value had been obtained by this venture, and the campaign to provide more manpower and enhance the might of the kingdom of Jerusalem was in ruins.

From the Turks' perspective, however, the success of 1101, which represented the first great victory against the Crusaders, was proof of their power in Anatolia. From now on, the road leading from Constantinople to Syria was closed to Byzantium and the Crusaders. In 1147/48 and 1190 Crusader armies tried to force their way along this road, but their efforts ended in failure. From this time on, these armies had to travel around Anatolia, by sea.

The overwhelming success of 1101 also brought relief to the Islamic world in Syria. If the Crusader armies, comprising hundreds of thousands of men and outnumbering the local population, had realized their aspirations, the Crusaders would not have been satisfied with the coastal strip but would have penetrated into Syria and would perhaps have been able to seize Aleppo and Damascus. Thus, the annihilation of the Crusader armies in Anatolia in 1101 protected the Syrian Muslims from a much greater threat. In addition, the defeat of the Crusaders in 1101 increased the already existing suspicion and hostility between Byzantium and the Crusaders and in the Western world. Attempts to blame the Byzantine emperor for the defeat aroused feelings of anger and hatred and any hopes Byzantium had of reclaiming land in Anatolia were lost.

The Second Crusade

The news of the Turkish conquest of Edessa on 24 December 1144 was a terrible shock for Europe, so at the end of 1145 Pope Eugenius III issued a summons for a new crusade. On 31 March 1146 the fiery preaching of St Bernard of Clairvaux in Vézelay incited thousands to take the Cross. King Louis VII of France and the German king, Conrad III, also answered the call. In May 1147 Conrad set out with a very large army and arrived in Constantinople the following September. The Byzantine emperor, Manuel Comnenus, displeased by such a venture and apprehensive about the new troubles that were sure to arise, made an alliance with Sultan Mas'ūd.

Before the French Crusader army had time to arrive, the Germans were transported over to the Anatolian shore. Conrad, not heeding the emperor's warning, turned east from Nicaea and entered Turkish territory, his intention being to follow the route previously taken by the First Crusade. As long as his soldiers were on Byzantine territory they made good time, unmolested and in

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comfort. On entering Turkish territory, however, they experienced a shortage of food and water, and on 25 October they were attacked by the Seljūq army. After a short battle, the German Crusader army perished. Conrad, who had lost nine-tenths of his men, retreated and fled to Nicaea.

In the meantime, the French army had arrived in Constantinople, crossed into Anatolia and arrived in Nicaea in early November. The two kings, who met in Nicaea, decided to join forces in the march down south and went to Ephesus via Balikesri and Pergamum–Smyrna. Conrad fell ill and returned to Constantinople. Manuel received him warmly and a close friendship was born between them. In March 1148 Conrad sailed to Palestine with a Byzantine fleet and landed in Acre.

The French advance from Ephesus to Attalia was difficult, and all along the way they were forced to ward off Turkish attacks and to face the harsh winter conditions. They finally arrived in Attalia in early February. From there, King Louis and his knights sailed to Antioch, while the infantry attempted to march through the Cilicia region and to reach Antioch. Prince Raymond of Antioch was hoping, with the help of the French Crusaders, to assault Aleppo, the stronghold of Nūr-ad-Dīn Zengi, who dominated the land from Edessa to Hama and had come to represent a great threat to Antioch. King Louis, however, was anxious to go to Jerusalem as soon as possible, and so was reluctant to comply with Raymond's plans.

Once all the Crusaders had arrived in Palestine, Queen Melisende of Jerusalem and her son King Baldwin III had a meeting with the German and French kings in Acre on 24 June 1148, and the decision was taken to launch a campaign against Damascus. The city was undoubtedly a coveted prize, but the *amīr* of Damascus, Unur, who feared the power of Nūr-ad-Dīn, did all he could to remain an ally of the kingdom of Jerusalem and was ready to cooperate. Nevertheless, Unur had a feeling of deep foreboding about the enterprise and was naturally obliged to ask Nūr-ad-Dīn for support. Nūr-ad-Dīn lost no time in marching towards Damascus. The campaign was not only the wrong decision but was also badly managed. On 28 July, after a five-day siege, the Crusader army was forced to retreat. This was a great blow to the prestige of the Crusaders. Conrad immediately left Palestine, travelled to Constantinople, and after an alliance with the emperor against King Roger of Sicily he returned to Germany in 1149.

After staying in Jerusalem until early summer 1149, Louis set out with feelings of extreme enmity and rancour for the emperor Manuel and met Roger in Italy. The two kings immediately made plans for a crusade to Constantinople to take revenge on Manuel but the scheme did not come to fruition. As a result, the Western dream of taking Constantinople was postponed for at least half a century. On the other hand, the failure of the campaign gave the Islamic world confidence and courage.

The forty years following the Second Crusade marked the rise in power of the Islamic world. Against the Muslim forces, which had belatedly come together under first Nūr-ad-Dīn's and then Saladin's leadership, neither the venture of Baldwin III (who took Ascalon in 1153 and extended the frontiers to the south) nor his brother Amalric's long years of struggle to take Egypt brought much advantage to the kingdom of Jerusalem. Meanwhile, during this period Nūr-ad-Dīn succeeded in dominating Damascus (1154) and then Egypt (1169). In 1174, after the deaths of Nūr-ad-Dīn and Amalric, not only the kingdom but also the borders of the states of Antioch and Tripoli were surrounded by Muslims rallying under one flag.

Over the next thirteen years the kingdom of Jerusalem went into decline. Amalric's son and successor, Baldwin IV, suffered from leprosy. The question of a regent for the young king caused discord and two opposing factions struggled for power: Raymond III, count of Tripoli, first became regent but in 1176, Joscelin III, the king's uncle and leader of the rival group, took over. The young king's disease was taking its toll and he produced no heir. Thus in 1177 his sister Sibylla's son Baldwin was proclaimed heir to the throne. In the meantime, Sibylla's husband had died and she had married Guy of Lusignan. This marriage aggravated the strife among the barons. A royal faction was formed by the queen mother Agnes of Courtenay, her brother Joscelin, her daughter Sibylla and the Lusignans. They were opposed by the Ibelin family, Reynald of Sidon, Raymond of Tripoli and some other barons.

In addition to this internal discord, the kingdom of Jerusalem failed to receive the expected aid from the West. The year 1176 was a turning-point in the fortunes of Byzantium and it found itself in no position to help. The Seljūq sultan Kilij Arslan II had defeated the Byzantine army commanded by Manuel at the battle of Myrioccephalum in September 1176. This was a great disaster reminiscent of the battle of Manzikert a century earlier. With the death of Manuel in 1180, any hopes the kingdom had of joint ventures with Byzantium vanished.

As for Saladin (Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn), he was almost at the zenith of his power. In 1185 Baldwin IV died and Baldwin V (who was still a child) became king of Jerusalem with Raymond, count of Tripoli, as regent. In order to ensure the continuance of the kingdom, and with the approval of all the barons, Raymond made a four-year truce with Saladin. However, when Baldwin V died in 1186, the royal faction abolished the regent Raymond and crowned Sibylla queen. In turn, Sibylla crowned her husband Guy and made him king of Jerusalem.

Guy advocated making peace with the Muslims, but the ruler of Kerak, Reynald of Châtillon, was reluctant to abandon the raids against them which he had pursued for years. In late 1186 he attacked a Muslim caravan, thus violating the peace agreement. In response to this outrageous act,

Saladin proclaimed war on the kingdom of Jerusalem. In the spring of 1187, while Saladin was recruiting his army in the Hawran region, King Guy called all his nobles and knights, together with their forces, to Acre. Saladin crossed the river Jordan near Sennebra and on 2 July arrived at Kafr Sebt. Following this, a part of his army attacked Tiberias and conquered the city. However, the countess of Tripoli, Eschiva, put up a fight in the inner fortress.

The royal army established its headquarters in Sephoria on 2 July. The following day, it set out for Tiberias having received a call for help. Meanwhile, Saladin settled his army in the vicinity of Hattin (Arabic Ḥaṭṭīn or Ḥiṭṭīn). On 4 July, after a day's march, the Muslims besieged and attacked the royal army. The Crusader infantry's attempts to break through the siege failed, and despite the energy and enthusiasm of the knights and the cavalry they were ultimately defeated. Nearly all the kingdom of Jerusalem's army perished. Only Raymond, count of Tripoli, Reynald of Sidon and Balian of Ibelin managed to make their escape. King Guy's life was spared but Reynald of Châtillon, the Templars and the Hospitallers were all executed. Thus, the Holy Cross fell into the hands of the Muslims.

Following this defeat, Tiberias, Acre, Jaffa, Beirut, Ascalon and Gaza were taken one after the other. Then, on 2 October, Jerusalem itself surrendered. Saladin was merciful to the people of Jerusalem and allowed them to depart after paying a nominal ransom. He also freed thousands of people, who found sanctuary in Tripoli, Tyre and Antioch. The Orthodox and the Jacobites, however, remained in the city.

In 1188 Saladin continued his conquests and by the end of 1189 he had reclaimed all the territory of the kingdom except Tyre. Of the county of Tripoli and the principality of Antioch, only the capitals and a few towns remained.

The Third Crusade

The Muslim capture of Jerusalem had a great impact in Europe. This event was followed by the arrival in Sicily of the archbishop of Tyre, Josias. He had been sent by the Crusaders, who met in Tyre under the leadership of Conrad of Montferrat in order to ask for urgent help from the West. In response to the call, the king of Sicily, William II, immediately sent a fleet to the coast of Syria. From Sicily, Josias travelled on to Rome.

Pope Urban II is said to have been so saddened by the bad news that on 20 October he died from grief. His successor, Pope Gregory VIII, issued an encyclical calling for a new crusade. However, two months later he also died. While the new Pope Clement III contacted the German emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, Archbishop Josias travelled to the courts of the kings



4.2 Bayazid Mosque, Istanbul (© G. Degeorge)

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of France and England. The monarchs were willing to embark on a new crusade but due to unrest and various problems in their own lands they were not in a position to set out immediately.

Finally, in May 1189, the German emperor Frederick Barbarossa set out with a huge army and crossed the Balkans into Byzantine territory. He was not, however, made welcome for there were misunderstandings and disagreements between him and the Byzantine emperor, Isaac II Angelus, which nearly culminated in war. Nonetheless, Frederick crossed the Dardanelles with his army without further delay and marched south into Anatolia.

Sultan Kilij Arslan II had misgivings about facing such a large force; therefore, rather than engage in open battle, he adopted the cunning tactic of following the army and harassing the soldiers. Hunger, thirst and harassment by the Turks resulted in heavy losses in the German army. Frederick managed to enter Iconium, which had been evacuated by the sultan, but he could not remain long and soon marched his army over the passes of the Taureses mountains towards Seleucia, arriving there on 10 June 1190. However, as Frederick was crossing the river at Seleucia, he was drowned. The army dispersed, leaving only a small force commanded by his son Frederick which managed to reach Tyre. In this way, the succour that the Eastern Crusaders were expecting was lost.

Some time before the new crusade, the difficult situation in the East had slowly been improving. Conrad of Montferrat, who came to Tyre two weeks after the battle of Hattin, undertook the defence of the city, resisted Saladin and was able to reinforce his army with the successive fleets arriving from Europe. He refused, however, to pay homage and obey King Guy, whom Saladin had freed in 1188. To show his power and authority, Guy took a daring step and besieged Acre. Saladin was taken unawares, for while he was bringing his army to Acre the Crusaders, who had laid siege to the city, had already started receiving aid from the West. Saladin was thus unable either to enter the city or break the Crusader siege. The struggle, which continued until the autumn of 1190, was in vain and there was no positive outcome.

Around this time, Queen Sibylla died in an epidemic. The throne passed to her sister Isabella and Guy's crown was in danger. Those who opposed Guy took their chance and Conrad was married to Isabella and proclaimed king. However, Guy did not relinquish his claim to the crown while the situation prevailed at the Crusaders' headquarters. First the French king Philip II, then later the king of England Richard I, arrived at the headquarters in Acre by sea. On his way, Richard had taken Cyprus. Under the onslaught of all the Crusader armies, the Acre garrison – without Saladin's permission – surrendered on 11 July 1191. Although Saladin was greatly troubled by this

defeat, he nonetheless complied with the peace conditions by accepting the exchange of prisoners and the return of the Holy Cross.

Disputes about the division of Acre had already begun while the Crusaders were entering the city. King Richard of England insulted the Austrian Duke Leopold and angered the French King Philip, resulting in the latter two rulers returning to their countries. Furthermore, when Saladin freed the first group of prisoners, Richard complained that all the nobles listed had not been freed and refused to release the Muslim prisoners. All the discussions and bargaining were to no avail and on 20 August 1191 Richard, who was anxious to proceed to Jerusalem, had all the survivors in the Acre garrison – 2,700 men, women and children – slaughtered. The massacre inevitably put an end to peace negotiations.

Although Richard was victorious at the battle of Arsuf, took Jaffa as a base and in 1192 seized Daron, he never managed to capture Jerusalem. Meanwhile, he was recalled to his own country. Finally, on 2 September 1192, he made a five-year peace pact with Saladin and left the East. His journey home was not without mishap since he was detained by Leopold and handed over to the German emperor Henry VI; he did not reach England until March 1194.

The campaign to reclaim Jerusalem was also in vain even though the conquest of Acre ensured the continuation of the kingdom. Henry of Champagne, who married Isabella after the assassination of King Conrad, was proclaimed king while Guy was given rule of Cyprus. Indeed, the longest-lasting success of the Third Crusade was the conquest of Cyprus. In later years it became important not only as a base but also as an independent kingdom.

Soon after the end of the campaign, on 13 March 1193, Saladin died. With the division of power among his sons, his brothers and other family members, the unity of Islam was also disrupted. Dissension within the Ayyūbid dynasty prevented the Muslims from taking positive measures against the Crusaders who still remained around Acre, which was named the kingdom of Jerusalem.

Since the Ayyūbids generally preferred to live in peace with the Crusaders, King Henry was once again able to establish order in the kingdom. In 1194 Guy died and his brother Amalric of Lusignan became king of Cyprus. In 1197 he was crowned as such by the German emperor Henry VI. Meanwhile, although Bohemond III, who still ruled Antioch and Tripoli, was harassed by the Cilicia Armenian ruler Leo II, he nevertheless managed to maintain an independent state. As for Leo, he had ambitions to increase his power. Like Amalric, he applied to Henry VI and the Pope and in 1198 was crowned king.

The Fourth Crusade

Despite all the many problems faced by the Western Church, Innocent III, who became Pope in 1198, decided to organize a new crusade to the East – he firmly saw this as a duty of the papacy. He dispatched legates and letters calling on all the distinguished leaders of Europe to join this venture. Many men of the Church, and especially Fulk of Neuilly, were given the responsibility of preaching a new crusade, rousing people with their sermons. In 1199 the Pope levied a new tax to raise funds for the campaign (this tax later became a papal income tax). At a tournament organized by Thibald III, count of Champagne, in 1199, the French knights took the Cross and preparations for the crusade got under way under his leadership.

In order to obtain transport, negotiations with Venice started; indeed, the involvement of Venice was to change the fate of the crusade. It was decided that the main target would be Egypt, which by this time had become the centre of the Islamic world. But a campaign to Egypt was detrimental to Venetian trade. Thus, the doge of Venice, Enrico Dandolo, who was extremely hostile to Byzantium, was of the opinion that a campaign to Constantinople rather than Egypt would be much more advantageous for Venice. Despite the differences of opinion, an agreement was reached whereby Venice would receive money in return for ships, and the conquests would be equally shared.

Thibald died in 1201. Boniface, the marquis of Montferrat, who replaced him as leader of the campaign, came to an agreement with Enrico Dandolo and Venice took over the initiative for the plans. In the summer of 1202 the Crusader army gathered in Venice but did not live up to expectations. The money that Venice was to receive for transporting the soldiers was insufficient. Eventually, instead of the Crusaders paying, they agreed to help Venice capture the Hungarian Christian city of Zara: it was seized and destroyed on 15 November 1202.

While still in Zara, the Crusaders heard from Alexius (the son of the former emperor Isaac II, who had been dethroned by his brother Alexius III), who promised them that if they helped him become emperor instead of his uncle he would pay off their debt to Venice and would also support their campaign. The Crusaders were quick to accept the offer. The Crusader fleet arrived near Constantinople on 24 June 1203, the emperor Alexius III fled and Alexius IV ascended the throne together with his father. However, he could not find the money he had promised to pay the Crusaders. The inhabitants of Constantinople were extremely fearful and apprehensive since the Crusaders were attacking the surrounding villages and pillaging everything in sight. When Alexius IV was overthrown by the furious population, the Crusaders

took the uprising as an insult and a challenge and decided to assault and take the city.

Constantinople fell on 13 April 1204 and the victorious Crusaders began to massacre and plunder just as they had done in the atrocities in Jerusalem in 1099. Constantinople, the city that had been the glorious centre of Christendom for 900 years, lost its wealth, its art treasures and all its splendour, never to be recovered. The Crusaders set up a rule in Constantinople under the name of the Latin empire, which was to last for fifty-seven years (1204–61). Baldwin of Flanders was elected emperor, while the first Latin patriarch of Constantinople to be appointed was the Venetian Thomas Morosini. As for the Byzantine territory, this was shared between the Crusaders and the Venetians, with the Venetians taking the coastal cities which were important for maritime trade, and the Crusaders setting up states in Thessalonica, Greece and the Peloponnese. The Byzantine dynasty that fled from Constantinople founded two states in Epirus and Nicaea (which had not fallen to the Crusaders) as an extension of Byzantium. The Latin empire had to confront these two states as well as the Bulgarian tsar and it finally fell to the Byzantine state of Nicaea on 25 July 1261. This campaign brought no relief to the Crusaders in Palestine nor posed any threat to the Muslims.

The Fifth Crusade

After the Fourth Crusade, Pope Innocent started to make plans for a new campaign. However, more urgent than aid to the East was a problem he had to solve in Europe. A Christian movement that had its roots in southern France and opposed the policy of the Pope had to be suppressed and the offenders taught a lesson. (Because it began in the city of Albi, its followers were known as Albigensians). In 1208, as a duty of faith, the Pope called on all Christians to take up arms against the Albigensians: the following year, they were attacked by Christians led by the archbishop of Citeaux. There were no exceptions – people were massacred regardless of age, gender or social status. The Albigensians defended themselves, however, and the war of Christian against Christian, with the Pope's blessing, lasted for twenty years.

Meanwhile, preachers were giving sermons to rouse and incite the people for a new crusade. Even children were affected by the call and in 1212 thousands of children from France and Germany set out to save the Holy Land. Although they managed to march up to the harbours of Marseille, Genoa and Brindisi, either the ships they boarded sank or they were captured and sold into slavery. Nothing definite is known of their fate.

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The Pope was making great efforts to prepare for the new crusade. At the Lateran Council of 1215, he promised a remission of all sins to those who would take the Cross and join the campaign. New taxes were exacted to provide funds to support the venture. After the death of Innocent, the new pope Honorius III carried on with his predecessor's plans. The Fifth Crusade began in 1217.

Emperor Frederick II had also taken the Cross but had obtained the Pope's permission to postpone his journey because of turmoil and unrest in his country. In 1218 a Crusader army, mostly made up of Germans, arrived in Acre; then, under the command of John of Brienne (with the title king of Jerusalem), they set sail for Egypt. The Crusaders were planning to oust the Muslims from the Nile delta, besiege them in Suez and Acre, and in this way reclaim Jerusalem. On 24 August they took the tower of Damietta. In September a new Crusader army, commanded by Pelagius, Cardinal of St Lucia, arrived. In February 1219 al-Adiliya fell to the Crusaders, causing great consternation. The Ayyūbid ruler al-Kāmil sued for peace, offering to give up Jerusalem in return for the evacuation of Egypt. King John of Brienne and very many Crusaders readily accepted this offer, but Pelagius refused.

On 5 November 1219 the Crusaders took Damietta. This success emboldened Pelagius and he now believed that he could take all of Egypt. However, the Crusaders were obliged to remain in Damietta for more than a year while Pelagius waited for Emperor Frederick to arrive. Finally, encouraged by the large army sent by Frederick in July 1221, Pelagius ordered his men to advance on Cairo. But it was the season of the Nile floods and when the water rose, the Muslims opened the sluices and inundated the land through which the Crusaders were planning to march. On 28 August Pelagius was forced to ask for a truce. The Crusaders agreed to evacuate Egypt and made an eight-year peace pact. Prisoners were exchanged and on 8 September the whole Crusader army surrendered Damietta and left Egypt. The Fifth Crusade had started with great aspirations but ended with no gains whatsoever. Indeed, in addition to the loss of a great number of men and much equipment, it resulted in a loss of prestige for the West.

The Sixth Crusade

The failure of the Fifth Crusade placed a heavy responsibility on Emperor Frederick II. In addition, in 1225 he had married the daughter of John of Brienne, Queen Jolande of Jerusalem; therefore, as king of the Crusader state, he was obliged to go on the expedition he had been delaying for years. Even so, when the armies of the Sixth Crusade were setting out, Frederick again stayed behind due to illness. When the Pope refused to accept his excuse and

excommunicated him, a strange situation arose: in June 1228 he travelled to the East as an anathematized Crusader and, since the death of his wife, no longer as king of Jerusalem but rather as regent to his child son, King Conrad.

Despite this state of affairs, Frederick was of the opinion that all authority in the East was his by right – a view not shared by the barons of the East, however. They were ready to confirm his rule of Cyprus but insisted that he could only have a role in Acre as regent to his son Conrad. Also, news of Frederick's excommunication had spread and many who had supported him in the past now refused to accept his authority.

However, even if all the Crusaders in the East had joined him, Frederick could still not have recruited a strong enough force to challenge the Muslims. He therefore tried diplomacy. Negotiations over Jerusalem started with Sultan al-Kāmil with whom Frederick was on good terms. According to the terms of the agreement signed on 18 February 1229, Jerusalem, together with a strip of land extending to Jaffa, was given over to the Crusaders. The Dome of the Rock and al-Aqṣā Mosque were to be left in the possession of the Muslims and they were to retain their right to enter the city freely and to worship there. Thus, without a fight, the Crusaders had managed to reclaim Jerusalem through diplomacy. The Muslim reaction was one of horror and desperation. The Christians felt that, although the agreement seemed positive, it would be impossible to put into practice since the region was not easy to defend.

On 17 March Frederick entered Jerusalem but because he was still under excommunication the patriarch had forbidden any religious practice and church masses in the city. No men of the Church attended the ceremony at the church of the Holy Sepulchre and Frederick had to place the crown on his head himself. Shortly afterwards he departed from Jerusalem. He went first to Acre, then returned to Europe.

When Frederick was eventually pardoned by the Pope in 1230, his legal power in the East was strengthened. In 1231 he sent an army to the East under the command of Riccardo Filangieri. The order that Frederick wished to establish in the East through his men brought discord and chaos to Jerusalem and Cyprus. His notions of authority in the East were unacceptable to the local barons, who had their own ideas on the law of monarchy. Supported by a council in Acre, the barons appointed John of Ibelin as governor and confronted the emperor's representative, Filangieri. The Genoese sided with the barons, while the German military order, the Pisans and Bohemond, ruler of Antioch, supported Filangieri. The Templars and the Hospitallers as well as the Venetians remained neutral. Finally, the disagreement turned into civil war. The barons emerged victorious in Cyprus and in 1233 Henry I was proclaimed king. Even after

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4.3 Kiraly Frodu Hamam, Budapest (© J.C. Chabrier)

the death of John of Ibelin in 1236, however, the strife in Syria continued. In 1243 the council in Acre, claiming that Frederick's son was absent from Jerusalem and had thus forfeited his right as king, refused to take the oath of allegiance to Conrad; instead they appointed the queen mother Alice as regent.

The victory of the barons did not bring stability to the kingdom; on the contrary, it caused constant quarrels and discord. This was dangerous for the future of the kingdom because new powers were emerging in the Islamic world and the Muslims were growing ever stronger. On the death of Sultan al-Kāmil in 1238, his son aṣ-Ṣāliḥ Ayyūb became ruler. The ten-year truce ended in 1239 and the expeditions of Thibald, the king of Navarre and count of Champagne, and Richard of Cornwall brought no visible benefits.

During this time, the Khwarizmī Turks, under pressure from the Mongols, moved to al-Jazīra. They were supported by the sultan of Egypt and were invited to attack Palestine and fight the Crusaders. The pact made in 1244 between Jerusalem and Damascus did not stop the Khwarizmī Turks, who, with the help of Egypt, took Jerusalem and sacked the city. Now, the Crusaders completely lost Jerusalem. In the same year the royal army of Acre, which had joined forces with Ḥomṣ and the Ayyūbid rulers of Damascus, was hopelessly defeated in a battle near Gaza against the Egyptian army commanded by Baybars. Thus, all the advantages that had been gained for the kingdom in the past by diplomacy were lost for ever. Despite the divided and weakened rule of the Crusaders, due to the discord among the Ayyūbids and the Mongols, the emergent regional power, they managed to maintain a foothold in the East for some time to come.

The Seventh Crusade

In 1245 Pope Innocent IV called for a council in Lyon in order to solve the Church's internal problems and find a solution to the difficult situation that had arisen due to Emperor Frederick. In the meantime, urgent calls for help were coming from the East. The Pope was in no position to respond to these pleas, but when King Louis IX of France announced that he would lead a new crusade, the Pope was ready to support him. Unlike Frederick, Louis was a good ruler and fighter and he believed that a crusade was the will of God. His preparations continued for three years. Peace was made with England and Frederick's support was obtained. Agreements were reached with Genoa and Marseille for the transport of the army.

In August 1248 Louis set out for the East with his wife, his brothers and a host of French nobles and knights. He arrived in Cyprus on 17 September and was joined there by the barons of Acre, the Knights Templar and the Hospitallers. After much discussion, it was once more decided that the target of the expedition should be Egypt. However, the season was not yet suitable, thus leaving time and opportunity to begin negotiations with the Ayyūbid rulers. But Louis was not willing to negotiate and insisted that he had come to fight the Muslims. Finally, in May 1249 the Crusader fleet sailed from Cyprus. The Muslims could not withstand this large army and so took sanctuary in the Mansoura region, evacuating Damietta and allowing it to fall to the Crusaders.

Louis became yet more confident when his brother Alfonso of Poitiers arrived with reinforcements from France. With the death of Sultan aṣ-Ṣāliḥ and the resulting turmoil in Cairo, the Crusaders resolved to march on the city. In February 1250 the vanguard of the army, commanded by the king's brother Robert of Artois, crossed the canal near Baḥr aṣ-Ṣaghīr and launched a surprise attack on the Muslim headquarters. The Muslims were taken unawares and many were killed, only a few managing to escape and to take refuge behind the walls of Mansoura. Without waiting for the main army, and wishing to capture Mansoura and annihilate the Egyptian army, Robert began to pursue the fleeing soldiers. However, the commander of the army, Baybars, ambushed the Crusaders who entered Mansoura and killed nearly all of them. The Egyptian forces attacked the Crusader army that had crossed the canal time and time again but were forced to retreat to Mansoura when success evaded them. Louis eventually emerged victorious but he had to pay a heavy price.

Meanwhile, the sultan's son, Turānshāh, who had arrived from Syria, suppressed the upheaval and managed to restore order in Cairo. He immediately confiscated the ships carrying provisions to the Crusaders from Damietta. In a short time the Crusaders became destitute due to hunger and

pestilence. Finally, Louis decided to withdraw his army into Damietta. He also sent legates to Turānshāh offering Damietta in exchange for Jerusalem, but the offer was refused. After this, on 5 April, the retreat commenced.

The Mamlūks in Mansoura also pursued the Crusaders and took all the leaders prisoner, including King Louis, thus ensuring the unconditional surrender of the army. In addition to handing over Damietta, Louis was only able to save himself and his army by paying 1 million Byzantine gold coins. Damietta surrendered in May 1250 and the king was freed. Louis left Egypt the same day to travel to Acre. He stayed there for four years and then returned to France, his crusade having brought no relief whatsoever to Jerusalem.

In 1252 the German emperor Conrad died, the title of king of Jerusalem passed to his son Conradin and again the kingdom was ruled by appointed regents. During this period trade rivalry between the Venetians, the Genoese and the Pisans caused civil war in the kingdom. Elsewhere, the Mongols commanded by Hulagu entered Iraq and in 1258 captured Baghdad, thus putting an end to the 'Abbāsīd caliphate. The surge of the Mongols towards the south was halted in 1260 by the Mamlūk sultan Qūṭuz, who had put an end to Ayyūbid rule in Egypt in 1250 and had become ruler, and who now defeated the Mongols at the battle of 'Ayn Jālūt. Later in the same year Baybars killed Qūṭuz, thus becoming the Mamlūk ruler of Egypt.

Baybars reduced the Eastern kingdom to only a few coastal cities. In 1265 he took Caesarea, Ḥaifa and Arsuf. In 1266, while the Safed and Galilee region was being conquered, a second Mamlūk army marched against the Armenian king Hethoum, who was allied with the Mongols. The Mamlūks defeated the Armenians in August 1266 and after destroying the cities of Adana, Tarsus, Mamistra and Sis, returned with much loot and many prisoners. Taking Jaffa and Beaufort castle in 1268, Baybars arrived outside Antioch and following a short siege he captured the city on 18 May. The loss of Antioch was a terrible blow for the Christians and resulted in a rapid decline in the power of the Crusaders in the East.

The Eighth Crusade

King Louis IX of France had started preparations for a new crusade in 1267 and three years later he was ready to set out. Despite his intentions, his brother Charles of Anjou, who had been supported by the Pope against the Hohenstaufen and was now ruler of Sicily, convinced the king to divert the crusade to Tunis rather than other areas of the Middle East. On 18 July 1270 King Louis disembarked with his large army outside Carthage. Deceived by his brother Charles's assurance that the Hafsid *amīr* Mustanşir

was friendly to the Christians and would readily convert to Christianity, Louis thought that asserting authority over Tunis would be of strategic help for the Crusader enterprise. But Mustanşir had no such intentions. On the contrary, he had fortified the capital and had prepared it for defence before the Crusaders' arrival. In the event, however, he was not obliged to fight since a sudden epidemic broke out in the Crusaders' headquarters, resulting in the death within one month of thousands of soldiers and knights, together with King Louis and many nobles. Charles of Anjou arrived with the Sicilian fleet and took the survivors back to Italy.

The end of Crusader power in the East

With the annihilation of this Crusader army in Tunis, the hopes of the Eastern Crusaders who had been constantly expecting aid from Europe were finally extinguished.

Baybars, thinking that he would have to defend Egypt against the armies of the French king, had spent the year 1270 in waiting. Now, in 1271, he marched on Syria again and took the fortresses of Safita, Krak des Chevaliers and Montfort. All that was left to the Crusaders were a few cities on the coast. Concurrently, internal adversity and discord within the kingdom continued. After the death of Conradin in 1268, Hugh III, the king of Cyprus, was crowned king of Jerusalem. Nevertheless, neither the efforts of the new king nor those of Edward, the king of England's son who had come with his army to Acre in 1271, were able to bring about unity in the kingdom. In 1272 Edward returned home. In 1276 King Hugh departed from the kingdom, where there was constant turmoil and discord, and went back to Cyprus.

Charles of Anjou, the king of Sicily, had for a long time been striving to extend his power over the Eastern Mediterranean and finally in 1277, with the support of the Pope, he bought this right. Following this, as king of Jerusalem, Charles sent a representative to Acre. Upon Charles's death in 1285, the barons in the East proclaimed Henry II, the king of Cyprus, as their ruler.

Meanwhile, Baybars' death in 1277 had brought temporary relief to the Crusaders. The Mongols and the Armenian King Leo III were also helping the kingdom to enforce its authority, but in 1279 Qalāwūn ascended the Mamlūk throne and in 1281 defeated the Mongols, who once again had entered Syria. The Mongols retreated behind the Euphrates. Then Qalāwūn took the fortress of Markab. The Ilkhan of Persia, Arghun, also had misgivings about the kingdom's weakness against the Mamlūks and so made an alliance with the Crusaders and contacted Europe with plans for a

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new crusade. He sent his envoy Rabban Sauma to the Pope and the kings of France and England, but to no avail.

In 1287 Qalāwūn took Laodicea, the last city left from the principality of Antioch. He then besieged Tripoli with a huge army, took the city in April 1289 and in order to prevent the Crusaders, whose fleets were still powerful, from attempting to recover the land, had the ramparts completely pulled down. The defeat of Tripoli was a devastating loss for the Crusaders in Acre. King Henry implored Qalāwūn to extend the agreement already in force concerning the kingdom and Cyprus and his offer was accepted. Henry also sent messages to Europe demanding urgent aid. Italy responded to his call, the Venetians sending twenty ships and the king of Aragon five. The Italian Crusaders arrived in Acre in August 1290 and immediately began to attack the Muslims there who were engaged in trade. At the end of the month, the Crusaders launched a surprise attack and killed all the Muslims in the city. On hearing of the massacre, Sultan Qalāwūn and his army advanced on Cairo in November 1290, but six days later he fell ill. On his deathbed he extracted a vow from his son al-Ashraf Khalīl that he would continue the campaign.

The campaign had to be postponed until the spring, however, because the weather was unfavourable. In March 1291, when Sultan al-Ashraf was finally ready, he marched on Cairo. His army was joined by the armies of Damascus and Hama and he acquired reinforcements of siege machines and catapults from the regions under his rule. The Muslim armies laid siege to the city of Acre on 6 April. Putting aside their disagreements when faced with such danger, the barons of Acre, the Templars, the Hospitallers, the knights of the German Order, the Venetians and Pisans, the knights of Cyprus under the command of King Henry, and all those in the city who were capable of fighting, put up a defence. After fierce fighting which lasted a month, Acre was conquered on 18 May 1291. Most of the inhabitants were killed and the rest taken prisoner.

In July 1291 an army sent by al-Ashraf took the cities of Tyre and Beirut. The sultan also took Ḥaifa without a fight. Finally, two large fortresses belonging to the Templars, Tortosa and Athlit, were taken in August. The sultan's soldiers moved through the coastal regions for months, destroying everything that could be used in a Crusader attack. The fortresses were demolished, the orchards cut down and the water sources rendered unusable. Indeed, in their desire to erase all traces of the Crusaders whom they had been forced to endure for 200 years, the Islamic world destroyed the whole coastal region of Syria.

Chapter 4.1 (b)

THE CRUSADES IN THE PERIOD

AD 1291–1571

Aliyya el-Ganzoury

INTRODUCTION

In the shape of what came to be known as the Crusades, the Middle Ages witnessed a conflict between the followers of Christianity and those of Islam – not between Christianity and Islam – insofar as the Prophet Muḥammad was not sent to destroy the edifice put in place by Moses and Jesus, but rather to complete and crown it. The Qur’ān welcomes the Torah and the Gospel: ‘We sent down the Torah, wherein is guidance and light;’¹ ‘And We gave him the Gospel, wherein is guidance and light.’²

Held in 488/November 1095, the Council of Clermont was the opening salvo in the Crusader movement sparked by Pope Urban II (in office 481–93/1088–99).³ The participants drew the sign of the Cross on the backs of their shirts to indicate their purpose in going to war.⁴ In response to a call from the Pope, they embarked on their campaign to liberate Jerusalem and return to it the Kingdom of Christ,⁵ described in the Bible as a land ‘flowing

1 *Al-Mā’ida*, 4:44.

2 *Ibid.*, 4:46; Sa’id ‘Āshūr, ‘Opening Address to the Seminar “al-It̄ār at-tārīkhī li-l-ḥaraka aṣ-ṣalībiyya”’, Cairo, Manshūrāt ittiḥād al-mu’arrīkhīn al-‘arab, 1416/1996, pp. 18–19.

3 Raymond d’Agiles, *Tārīkh al-faranja ghuzāt Bayt al-Maqdis*, trans. Ḥusayn ‘Atīyya, Alexandria, Dār al-ma’rifa al-jāmi’iyya, 1989, p. 15; Michel Balard, *al-Ḥamlāt aṣ-ṣalībiyya wa-sh-sharq al-lātīnī min al-qarn al-ḥādī ‘ashar ila-l-qarn ar-rābi’ ‘ashar*, trans. Bashīr as-Sibā’ī, Cairo, Dār ‘ayn li-d-dirāsāt wa-l-buḥūth al-insāniyya wa-l-ijtimā’iyya, 2003, p. 48.

4 Muḥammad Manṣūr Ṣāliḥ, *Athar al-‘āmil ad-dīnī fī tawjīh al-ḥaraka aṣ-ṣalībiyya*, Benghazi, Manshūrāt jāmi‘at Qāryūnus, 1995, p. 24.

5 Balard, *al-Ḥamlāt*, p. 49.

with milk and honey'.⁶ Everyone cried out with one voice: 'God wills it. God wills it' (*Deus vult, Deus vult*).⁷

While the great majority of researchers and historians regard the fall of Acre to the Mamlūk sultan al-Ashraf Khalīl ibn Qalāwūn on 16 Jumāda II 690/Friday 18 May 1291⁸ as marking the end of the Crusader wars, the present chapter will demonstrate that the sources offer a different picture. History shows that religion was the principal factor influencing the first phase of the Crusades. It was worldly interests, however, that soon came to define the nature of late medieval relations between East and West, even though religion continued to serve as a cover for numerous crusading ventures during the period. Inhabitants of the Italian trading cities, for instance, changed their religious sympathies in ways that would benefit them financially.⁹ The most telling sign of this is the Venetian adage, 'Let us be Venetians first and Christians second' and the Genoese insistence that 'We are Genoese first and last.'¹⁰

In the eighth/fourteenth century, the goals of the Crusades changed. Pope Clement V (in office 705–14/1305–14) called for a crusade against the peasants of northern Italy who had rebelled under Fra' Dolcino against the nobility. The Crusades continued with the Children's Crusade and the Shepherds' Crusade in 799/1309, when 'groups of poor professionals and peasants gathered together in France, Germany and England, prompted by Pope Clement V's call for a crusade to liberate the Holy Land'. These groups, however, travelled no further than the French city of Avignon.¹¹ Elsewhere, crusades were undertaken in other locations to convert pagans to Christianity by force.¹² A modern source states that the Popes made themselves not only the heirs of St Peter but also the representatives of Christ on Earth, launching a vicious, merciless and unprecedented Crusader war against those who held temporal power in Europe. In this way, 'the Papacy

6 Ra'fat 'Abd-al-Ḥamīd, *al-Fikr al-bābawī aṣ-ṣalībī fī muwājahat as-salṭana az-zamaniyya* from the monk Robert's narration of the Council of Clermont, Cairo, Manshūrāt ittiḥād al-mu'arrikhīn al-'arab, 1416/1996, p. 17.

7 Balard, *al-Ḥamlāt*, p. 50; Sa'īd 'Āshūr, *al-Ḥaraka aṣ-ṣalībiyya*, Cairo, al-Maktaba al-anglo-miṣriyya, 1971, I, p. 133; 'Abd-al-Ḥamīd, *al-Fikr al-bābawī*, p. 17.

8 Mikhail Zaborov, *aṣ-Ṣalībiyyūn fī-sh-sharq*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1980, p. 326; W. B. Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East*, Beirut, Librairie du Liban, 1968, p. 354; Baybars ad-Dawādār, *Zubdat al-fikra fī tārikh al-hijra*, ed. Zubayda Muḥammad 'Aṭā, Cairo, Dār 'ayn li-d-dirāsāt wa-l-buḥūth al-insāniyya wa-l-ijtimā'iyya, 2001, IX, p. 295, note 1.

9 'At iyya, Aziz Suryal, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages*, London, Methuen, 1938, p. 114.

10 Nu'ayna', Suhayr Muḥammad, *al-Ḥurūb aṣ-ṣalībiyya al-muta'akhhira: ḥamlat Buṭrus al-Awwal Lūsīnyān 'ala-l-Iskandariyya, 767 hijrī/1365 milādī*, Cairo, Dār 'ayn li-d-dirāsāt wa-l-buḥūth al-insāniyya wa-l-ijtimā'iyya, 2002, p. 84.

11 Zaborov, *aṣ-Ṣalībiyyūn*, pp. 341–2.

12 Balard, *al-Ḥamlāt*, p. 347.

followed in the footsteps of Constantine, and left the path of the Fathers of the Church'.¹³

It would be somewhat inaccurate to accept that the above actions came to be defined as crusades by virtue of the Pope's blessing. As stated above, the Crusades should be seen as a war between the followers of Islam and Christianity. These actions are instead a clear sign that the Crusades had strayed from the original purpose they had had in the fifth/eleventh century, with the sack of Constantinople in 601–02/1204 providing the most obvious example.

In the thirteenth century AD, most notably after the fall of Acre, the Christian West was therefore unable to give concrete embodiment to its pain, its feelings or its battling spirit by dispatching a great crusade to the East as it had done in the late eleventh century.


Main ventures of the new advocates of the Crusades

At that time, the Christian West limited itself to discussing the ventures of a small number of advocates who maintained that the East must once again be subdued. The military and economic strength of the Mamlūks was the main cause of unease in the papacy and focused the attention of those in the Latin West who advocated a crusade designed to deliver an economic blow to the Mamlūk state in order to hasten its military destruction. We shall refer here to a few of those advocates, including, *inter alia*, Peter Dubois, a French lawyer and adviser to King Philip IV (r. 684–714/1285–1314), who set out his plans in his pamphlet 'On the Recovery of the Holy Land' (707/1307); Raymond Lull, who laid out plans for a crusade in his book *Liber de fine* and who in his later essay, 'Dialogue between the Christian Raymond and the Muslim 'Umar', called for Muslims to embrace Christianity peacefully; and the Venetian Marino Sanudo di Torsello, who wrote 'Secrets of the Faithful of the Crusades' (709/1309).¹⁴ Another figure who had a hand in calling for such plans was the Armenian Prince Hethum of Corycus, a scholar and historian, who argued in 707/1307 that a crusade should be launched by land and by sea, using Cyprus and Armenia as bases for military operations aimed at

13 'Abd-al-Ḥamīd, Ra'fat, *Qaḍāyā min tārikh al-ḥurūb aṣ-ṣalībiyya*, Cairo, Dār 'ayn li-d-dirāsāt wa-l-buḥūth al-insāniyya w-al-ijtimā'iyya, 1998, p. 65.

14 Steven Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, III: *The Kingdom of Acre and the Later Crusades*, London, Penguin Books, 1951–4, pp. 431–2; Zaborov, *aṣ-Ṣalībiyyūn*, pp. 342–3; 'Ashūr, *al-Ḥaraka aṣ-ṣalībiyya*, II, pp. 1192–4.

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the return of the Holy Land, in an alliance with the Mongols and with the support of the Armenians.¹⁵

The papal envoy William Adam (b. 1275) stated that ‘there was no way to destroy Mamlūk power in Egypt other than divine providence, which might intervene to allow the Christian West to wrest the Holy Sepulchre from the hands of the Muslims’. Adam argued that it was essential to consider a number of preliminary measures before embarking on any military operations. These included: dealing harshly with any parties that assisted Egypt and failed to implement the naval embargo; ensuring that the West gained control of Constantinople; preventing the Qipchāq Mongols or Crimean Tatars from forming an alliance with Egypt against the Mongols of Persia, who in turn were seeking an alliance with the European and papal states to strike at the Mamlūk state; preparing one European fleet to gain control of Mediterranean sea ports and another to close the strait of Hormuz and Bāb al-Mandab so as to prevent trade between the ports of the Mediterranean and those of the Syrian region; and lastly, redirecting all trade through the strait of Hormuz towards the Persian Gulf, which was under the control of the Mongols of Persia, and thence to the Euphrates and the ports of Armenia, by which was meant Ayās. Adam also believed that the Mamlūk state should be deprived of the revenues accruing to it from European Christian pilgrimages to the Holy Land by ‘completely preventing pilgrimages to Jerusalem’.¹⁶

All these ventures, however, were destined to remain nothing more than words on paper. The feudal rulers of the European West lacked the means to fight the young Mamlūk state, preferring instead to allow pirates to raid the coasts of Egypt and the Syrian region, much to the irritation of traders in the northern Italian cities who suffered losses as a result.¹⁷ Indeed, medieval Western Christians saw piracy as a legitimate activity and a form of revenge against the Muslims, as well as a type of trade that made substantial profits for those engaged in it. By involving itself in trade relations between the two warring camps, the papacy indirectly helped to increase the spread of piracy in the Mediterranean basin, and may even have conferred legitimacy on it by giving its blessing to anyone who engaged in piracy against Muslims.¹⁸

15 ‘Umrān, Maḥmūd Sa‘īd, *al-Maghūl wa-l-ūrubbīyyūn wa-ṣ-ṣalībīyyūn wa-qaḍīyyat al-Quds*, Alexandria, Dār al-ma‘rifa al-jāmi‘īyya, 2003, p. 378; Nu‘ayna, *al-Ḥurūb aṣ-ṣalībīyya*, p. 93.

16 ‘Umrān, *al-Maghūl*, pp. 378–85.

17 Zaborov, *aṣ-Ṣalībīyyūn*, p. 343; ‘Umrān, *al-Maghūl*, p. 377.

18 Najlā Muḥammad ‘Abd-an-Nabī, ‘al-Qarṣana al-lātīniyya fī sharq ḥawḍ al-baḥr al-mutawassiṭ ‘alā ‘aṣr as-salāṭīn al-mamālīk’, *Majallat al-mu‘arrikh al-‘arabī*, IX, Vol. 1, March 2001, Cairo, Manshūrāt ittiḥād al-mu‘arrikhīn al-‘arab, pp. 56–7.

The front lines of the Crusades (690–979/1291–1571)

Taking as a starting point the Russian historian Mikhail Zaborov's statement that 'any act of aggression undertaken by knights with the blessing of the Holy See thereby took the form of a crusade',¹⁹ there are three principal fronts on which crusades were waged in the period 690–979/1291–1571: first, the Mamlūk state in Egypt and the Syrian region; second, the Ottomans, who took Constantinople in AD 1453 and conquered much of eastern and central Europe;²⁰ and, third, heretics and rebels in western Europe.²¹ The present discussion will focus on the first two fronts, which will shed light on the conflict between followers of the two monotheistic faiths, Islam and Christianity. This conflict has been termed the 'mutual wars'²² or 'Counter-Crusades', that is, wars that were waged to confront the Crusaders.²³

CRUSADER ATTACKS ON THE MAMLŪK STATE (AD 1291–1571)

The Mamlūk state enjoyed considerable prestige and was seen as the greatest power in the Mediterranean in the eighth/fourteenth century, as well as during most of the following century.²⁴ Nevertheless, although the Mamlūks had in 690/1291 succeeded in definitively expelling the Crusaders from the Syrian region, the latter still retained control of three sizeable regions in the Near East: the state of Lesser Armenia in Cilicea, that of Lusignan in Cyprus, and that of the Hospitallers in Rhodes.²⁵ It has been said that after the Crusaders left their last base in Acre, most of the battles between Muslims and Christians 'moved from dry land to the sea'.²⁶

19 Zaborov, *aṣ-Ṣalībiyyūn*, p. 341.

20 'Aṭīyya, Aziz Suryal, *al-'Alāqāt bayn ash-sharq wa-l-gharb: tijāriyya, thaqāfiyya, ṣalībiyya*, Arabic trans. by Philippe Ṣābir Sayf, rev. by Aḥmad Khākī, Cairo, Dār ath-thaqāfa al-masīhiyya, 1972, p. 118.

21 Zaborov, *aṣ-Ṣalībiyyūn*, p. 341.

22 'Āshūr, Sa'īd, 'Qubruṣ wa-l-ḥurūb aṣ-ṣalībiyya', *Silsilat tārīkh al-miṣriyyīn*, No. 210, Cairo, al-Hay'a al-miṣriyya al-'amma li-l-kitāb, 2002, p. hā'.

23 'Aṭīyya, *al-'Alāqāt*, p. 117.

24 Robert Irwin, 'Islam and the Crusades, 1096–1699', in Jonathan Riley-Smith (ed.), *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades*, Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 246.

25 'Āshūr, *al-Ḥaraka aṣ-ṣalībiyya*, II, p. 1232.

26 Aḥmad Ramaḍān, *Tārīkh fann al-qitāl al-baḥrī fi-l-baḥr al-mutawassiṭ, 35 hijrī–655 milādī/978 hijrī–1571 milādī: naḥwa waḥy ḥaḍārī mu'āṣir*, Cairo, Maṭba'at hay'at al-āthār al-miṣriyya, n.d., p. 33.

The Mamlūks and Lesser Armenia

Lesser Armenia was located in the area once known as Cilicea, ‘the region in the south-east of Asia Minor, between the Taurus mountains and the sea. The Arabs termed the region *ad-Darb*, the pathway between Tarsus and Anatolia.’²⁷ The Muslims had many names for the king of Lesser Armenia, including Ibn Lāwun, Lāwun being a corruption of Leon or Leo, the first king of Lesser Armenia. Every subsequent monarch was consequently known as Ibn Lāwun (son of Lāwun). Another name was ‘the owner of Sīs’ or ‘the ruler of Sīs’, Sīs being the capital. Arab sources also referred to the king of Lesser Armenia as ‘at-Takfūr’.²⁸

The kings of Lesser Armenia looked to the Mongols for help against the Muslims, particularly during the devastating Mongol attack on Iraq and the Syrian region. An example is the following event narrated by Ibn Taghrī Birdī: ‘In 658/1260 a group of traders left the Iranian region, destined for Egypt. When they reached Sīs, the ruler prevented their passage and wrote to the Tatar ruler Abghā, who instructed him to arrest them and send them to him.’ When the sultan al-Malik az-Zāhir learnt of this, he wrote to his governor in Aleppo ordering him to write and tell the ruler in Sīs that ‘if the traders were subjected to a single dirham’s worth of damages, he would take back several times that amount in compensation’. The governor of Aleppo did as he was ordered and the traders were indeed released. He also ‘paid Abghā ibn Hülagü a vast sum to ensure that he did not go against az-Zāhir’s command’.²⁹

This is probably what prompted the historian Shihāb-ad-Dīn ibn al-‘Umarī to refer to the rulers of Lesser Armenia as ‘the worst enemy of Islam’, as reported by Sa‘īd ‘Āshūr. This was indeed the foremost reason for the animosity of the Mamlūk state towards the kingdom of Lesser Armenia.³⁰ There are many instances of the Mamlūks’ irritation with the kingdom. For example, in 661/1262 the sultan of Egypt sent a letter to the ruler of Lesser Armenia demanding his allegiance and ‘the Armenian ruler gave no answer, out of fear of the Mongols’. The Mamlūk sultan sent an army to Armenia

27 ‘Āshūr, Sa‘īd, *Salṭanat al-Mamālīk wa-mamlakāt Armīniyya as-Ṣughrā*, Cairo, Maṭba‘at jāmi‘at ‘Ayn Shams, 1968, pp. 133–4.

28 Ibid., p. 147. ‘Āshūr adds that the Byzantine emperor was referred to as al-Ashkarī and the ruler of Abyssinia as al-Ḥaṭṭī or an-Najāshī (Negus).

29 Ibn Taghrī Birdī, Jamāl-ad-Dīn, *an-Nujūm az-zāhira fī mulūk Miṣr wa-l-Qāhira*, Cairo, al-Mu‘assasa al-miṣriyya al-‘amma li-t-ta’lif wa-t-tarjama wa-n-nashr, n.d., VII, pp. 181–2. The Malik az-Zāhir referred to here is Rukn-ad-Dīn Abū-l-Futūḥ Baybars ibn ‘Abdallāh al-Bunduqdārī aṣ-Ṣāliḥī al-Ayyūbī at-Turkī, or Baybars ad-Dawādār, Sultan of the lands of Egypt and Syria. See ad-Dawādār, *Zubdat al-fikra*, IX, p. 83, note 10.

30 ‘Āshūr, *Salṭanat al-Mamālīk*, pp. 153–4.

which was attacked by the Egyptians, who ‘plundered the great church of Sīs, causing immense destruction in Sīs and Ayās’.³¹

In 691/1292 the Mamlūk forces, under the leadership of Sultan al-Ashraf Khalīl ibn Qalāwūn (r. 689–93/1290–93), proceeded ‘to the Byzantine citadel in the month of Jumāda II, set up trebuchets and laid siege to it. It was conquered forcibly by the sword after twenty-five days.’³² A large number of the townsfolk were killed and the Muslims amassed a great deal of plunder, after which the sultan returned to Damascus.³³

The most significant factor in all of this was economic. The Mamlūk state had built its power and might on the idea of maintaining a monopoly over the greater part of trade between East and West. The Mongols, however, had consolidated their presence in Fārs and the trade route between Tabrīz and Lesser Armenia saw a revival, particularly in the port of Ayās, where taxes on transit goods were lowered; leading traders from Genoa, Venice, Marseille, Pisa and other cities rushed to Ayās in order to buy what they needed. Furthermore, after the fall of Acre and the expulsion of the last Crusaders from the Near East in the late thirteenth century AD, the Pope called for an economic embargo on Egypt and issued papal bulls preventing European traders from travelling to Egyptian and Syrian ports.³⁴ These plans were never implemented, although some papal decisions did condemn cooperation with the Mamlūks and warn that anyone who cooperated with the Muslims could be excluded from the mercy of the Church.³⁵

Given that an economic blockade was the most powerful weapon with which to destroy Egypt and Syria during that phase of the Crusades, it was essential to seek an alternative trade route to that of the Mediterranean so that the Mamlūk state could also be encircled from the south. This entailed two things: first, the search for a route other than the Red Sea to transport Far Eastern trade to Europe without passing through the lands of the Mamlūk sultan; and secondly, an alliance with a nearby non-Islamic power south of the Red Sea in order to help the European Crusaders cut off trade to the Mamlūks by that route.³⁶

Abyssinia appeared to fit the bill: it had a firm grasp on trade routes between the Syrian hinterland and Egypt on the one hand and the Red

31 Gregory Bar Hebraeus of Malatya, *Tārīkh mukhtaṣar ad-duwal*, Beirut, Catholic Press, 1890, p. 285.

32 Al-Yāfi‘ī, ‘Abdallāh ibn As‘ad, *Mir‘āt al-jinān wa-‘ibrat al-yaqzān fī ma‘rifat mā yu‘tabar min ḥawādith az-zamān*, annotated by Khalīl Maṣṣūr, Beirut, Manshūrāt Muḥammad ‘Alī Bayḍūn, Dār al-kutub al-‘ilmiyya, 1417/1997, IV, p. 164.

33 Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya wa-n-nihāya*, ed. Aḥmad ‘Abd-al-Wahhāb Futayḥ, Cairo, Dār al-ḥadīth, 1418/1998, XIII, p. 363.

34 ‘Āshūr, *Salṭanat al-Mamālīk*, pp. 154–5.

35 ‘Umrān, *al-Maghūl*, p. 11.

36 ‘Āshūr, *al-Ḥaraka aṣ-ṣalībiyya*, II, pp. 1207–8.

Sea region on the other, including trade from South Asia which transited in Abyssinian ports.³⁷ Indeed, Abyssinia was a large Christian state on the southern border of the Islamic world and it would have been difficult for it to remain isolated from the Crusader movement. Thus, contacts were established between the European Christian powers (led by the Pope) on the one hand and the Christian rulers of Abyssinia on the other, with the aim of developing a joint plan to exact revenge on the Muslims and surround their territories from the north and the south. It is related that in 716/1316 Pope John XXII (in office 716–35/1316–34) sent a diplomatic delegation of Dominicans to Abyssinia. However, its members were captured by the Mamlūks in Egypt, and the same fate befell another delegation sent by France to Abyssinia in 738–39/1338.³⁸

Al-Maqrīzī mentions that on 1 Sha‘bān 727/1327 the Pope sent a further diplomatic delegation with a gift for the Mamlūk sultan and that ‘they brought with them a letter with an injunction regarding the Christians, saying that whatever was done to them in Egypt and Syria would be done to Muslims in the Christians’ territories. They were given an answer and sent back.’ This took place after a disturbance in Alexandria on 5 Rajab of the same year.³⁹ The rulers of Lesser Armenia helped the papacy to enforce an economic blockade by opening their ports, in particular Ayās, to Western ships.⁴⁰

Under such difficult conditions, the Mamlūks did not neglect to address the problem of the Mongols, who were aiding and abetting Lesser Armenia. The Mongols had raided the Syrian region ‘with Khuṭlū Shāh, the deputy of the Mongol Īlkhān Ghāzān. They had 4,000 men, whereas the Muslims had 1,500 horsemen.’⁴¹ This was in Jumāda II 702/January 1303, during the reign of Sultan an-Nāṣir Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn (r. 698–708/1298–1308).⁴² The two camps faced each other in a battle at Marj aṣ-Ṣafar, near Damascus, in which the Mamlūks inflicted a bitter defeat on the Mongols whose horses were exhausted and ‘whose souls became weak, so that they threw down their weapons and gave themselves up to be slaughtered’. When news of this reached Ghāzān, ‘he fell into a deep depression and blood flowed from his nostrils until he was near death’. He died a few years later.⁴³ It was said that the bodies of the dead covered the battlefield and that every one of

37 Sa‘īd ‘Āshūr, ‘Ba‘d al-aḍwā’ al-jadīda ‘ala-l-‘alāqāt bayna Miṣr wa-l-Ḥabasha fi-l-‘uṣūr al-wustā’, *Majallat al-jam‘iyya al-miṣriyya li-d-dirāsāt at-tārīkhīyya*, 14, 1965.

38 Ibid., pp. 27, 29–30, quoting Kammerer.

39 Al-Maqrīzī, *Taqīyy-ad-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī, as-Sulūk li-ma‘rifat duwal al-mulūk*, II, Part 1, ed. Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Ziyāda, Cairo, 1360/1941, pp. 284, 286–7.

40 ‘Umrān, *al-Maghūl*, p. 11.

41 Al-Yāfi‘ī, *Mir‘āt al-jinān*, IV, p. 176.

42 Al-Maqrīzī, *as-Sulūk*, I, Part 3, p. 1027 (App. 16).

43 Ibid., pp. 930–7.

the Mujāhidīn was found facing Mecca, with index finger indicating the profession of faith and face beaming, while the bodies of the Mongols were found lying face down.⁴⁴ The following year, 703/1303, witnessed an event that was painful for Lesser Armenia but joyous for the Mamlūks. The ruler, or ‘owner of Sīs’, prepared ships to sail to Cyprus containing goods worth almost 100,000 dinars. The wind brought them to the city of Damietta, so they were seized in their entirety by the Mamlūks.⁴⁵

The Mongols of Fārs soon converted to Islam, with the result that Lesser Armenia lost valuable support. Its rulers therefore turned to the papacy for assistance, as happened between Leo V of Lesser Armenia (r. 720–42/1320–41) and Pope John XXII. The European West, however, was preoccupied with internal conflicts, thus providing the Mamlūks with a golden opportunity to break part of the economic blockade on them and defeat Lesser Armenia. In 720/1320 the Mamlūks launched a great campaign against Sīs, ‘laying waste to land and crops and leading away large quantities of livestock’.⁴⁶ It is reported, however, that large numbers of Mamlūk soldiers drowned: ‘The army raided the land of Sīs, but many of them drowned in the river Khān.’⁴⁷

In 722/1332, as recorded by Abu-l-Fidā’,⁴⁸ the Mamlūks once again attacked Sīs and took it by the sword. Ibn Kathīr explains that ‘the conquest of Ayās and its removal from the hands of the Armenians took place in AH 722. The Aṭlasī tower was taken and the Muslims brought back considerable plunder.’⁴⁹ For his part, Al-Maqrīzī states that the Muslims took Sīs in AH 722 ‘by force after a siege, killed its people and devastated it’, amassing plunder and taking many Armenian prisoners before departing.⁵⁰

The Mamlūks launched frequent attacks on Lesser Armenia, as in the month of Shawwāl 737/1336 when the Mamlūk armies descended on the port of Ayās and laid siege to it for three days, destroying the tower of Ayās so that it fell into the sea. They returned home in Dhu-l-Ḥijja 737/1337 after delegating someone to run the city on their behalf.⁵¹ Ibn Kathīr states that the Mamlūk army ‘took control of seven citadels in the land of Sīs and fared very well’.⁵² In 744/1343 the ‘impact of the Mamlūk armies on Sīs was

44 Al-‘Aynī, Badr-ad-Dīn, *‘Iqd al-jumān fī tārikh ahl az-zamān: ‘aṣr salāṭīn al-mamālīk*, ed. and annotated by Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn, Cairo, al-Hay’a al-miṣriyya al-‘amma li-l-kitāb, 1412/1992, p. 243.

45 Al-Maqrīzī, *as-Sulūk*, I, Part 3, p. 942.

46 Abu-l-Fidā’, *al-Mukhtaṣar fī akhbār al-bashar*, introduction by Ḥusayn Mu’nis, ed. Muḥammad Zaynuhum ‘Azab and Yaḥyā Sayyid Ḥasan, Cairo, Dār al-ma‘ārif, 1999, IV, p. 104.

47 Al-Yāfi‘ī, *Mir’āt al-jinān*, IV, p. 195.

48 Abu-l-Fidā’, *al-Mukhtaṣar*, IV, p. 107.

49 Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, XIV, pp. 111–12.

50 Al-Maqrīzī, *as-Sulūk*, II, Part 1, p. 237.

51 Abu-l-Fidā’, *al-Mukhtaṣar*, IV, p. 139.

52 Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, XIV, p. 194.

so severe that its people submitted to paying the *kharāj* [tax levied on land].⁵³ It is also related that in 749/1349–50 ‘there was a severe plague in Sīs and 180 of the people of Takfūr died in a single day. Sīs and the region were emptied ...’⁵⁴

In 776/1376 Sultan al-Malik al-Ashraf Sha‘bān ibn Ḥusayn (r. 764–78/1363–76) decided to invade Lesser Armenia and force it to submit once and for all. Although the region resisted the Mamlūk siege for three whole months, it ultimately fell and was occupied. ‘Sīs and its dependencies were conquered by the governor of Aleppo, a happy event which took place on 20 Dhu-l-Qa‘ada AH 776. The good news was proclaimed for three days and the Armenian state collapsed.’⁵⁵ This was ‘but one of the concluding chapters in the story of the Crusades in the Near East’.⁵⁶ After the collapse of Lesser Armenia in AD 1375, and the death of its last Christian king, it ‘was joined in permanent union with the crown of Cyprus, but the union existed in name only – the country itself was controlled by the Egyptians until AD 1516 when it became a part of the Ottoman Empire’.⁵⁷

The Mamlūks and Cyprus

Cyprus constituted the second pocket of Crusader presence after the fall of Acre and was the foremost refuge of Latin Christians in the East as well as their strongest and most important base after AD 1291.⁵⁸ King Henry II of Lusignan of Cyprus (r. 684–724/1285–1324) was among those who presented a plan to Pope Clement V in 707/1307 with the aim of bringing Europe back into the Crusades. As part of that plan, he called for the Mamlūk state to be weakened economically by means of a two- or three-year naval blockade on Egypt and the Syrian region. As the Egyptian coast was ‘no more than five or six days from Cyprus’, it would be easy to overrun the Syrian coast once Mamlūk forces had been weakened by Mongol attacks. Henry insisted that the fleet charged with enforcing the embargo should be completely independent from the Italian merchant republics as he was sceptical about their commitment to crusading.⁵⁹

Most of Henry’s projects proved to be rumours that ultimately bore no fruit. Al-Maqrīzī states that in 708/1308 ‘news came that the ruler of

53 Al-Maqrīzī, *as-Sulūk*, II, p. 160; ‘Āshūr, *Salṭanat al-Mamālīk*, p. 180.

54 Al-Maqrīzī, *as-Sulūk*, II, p. 774; ‘Āshūr, *Salṭanat al-Mamālīk*, p. 181.

55 Ibn Duqmāq, *al-Jawhar ath-thamīn fī siyar al-mulūk wa-s-salāṭīn*, ed. Kamāl-ad-Dīn ‘Izz ad-Dīn ‘Alī, Beirut, ‘Ālam al-kutub, 1405/1985, II, p. 237.

56 ‘Āshūr, *al-Ḥaraka aṣ-ṣalībiyya*, II, p. 1222.

57 Mayer, Hans Eberhard, *The Crusades*, trans. from the original German by John Gillingham, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 237.

58 ‘Āshūr, ‘Qubruṣ’, pp. 52–3, and his *al-Ḥaraka aṣ-ṣalībiyya*, II, p. 1223.

59 ‘Aṭīyya, *Crusade*, pp. 59–60.

Cyprus had agreed with a group of Frankish kings to build sixteen naval units with which to attack Damietta [Damyāt]. The Mamlūk sultan an-Nāṣir Muḥammad gathered the *amīrs* and consulted with them. It was agreed that ‘a barrier should be built from Cairo to Damietta lest the Franks sail up the Nile ... and that another should be built on the road to Alexandria’. Other similar preparations were made,⁶⁰ giving the impression in Cairo that the invasion was imminent. The plans, however, came to nothing.

Henry died soon afterwards, to be succeeded by Hugh IV (r. 725/6–761/1324–59), who formed a military alliance with Venice, the papacy and the Knights Hospitaller. A number of campaigns against the Turks and Mamlūks did indeed take place, but ‘most of Hugh IV’s campaigns were seen by many as little more than raids that were more akin to piracy’.⁶¹ This was a characteristic shared by most naval warfare in the period insofar as Latinate piracy against Mamlūk interests in the eastern Mediterranean was a military tactic that the papacy had indirectly legitimized by requesting the Knights Templar to monitor Western merchant ships bound for Muslim destinations or the Nile. In so doing, the Pope had provided an incentive for Latin adventurers to engage in piracy against Muslims in the name of the Cross and of Holy War, but also for their own personal benefit.⁶²

When Hugh IV died, he was succeeded by his son Peter I of Lusignan (r. 761–71/1359–69). Peter’s exceptional personality and religious fervour made him a model of medieval chivalry. From the start of his reign, his ambition was to be the hero who defended Christianity against Islam; he determined to focus his efforts on the Crusades and on war against the Muslims. He was ‘[y]oung, virile, chivalrous, pious and full of enthusiasm for the cause’, so that the year of his succession to the throne can be seen as the beginning of a new era in the history of the Crusades.⁶³ Indeed, the young king showed considerable skill in battle, a skill honed by political experience.⁶⁴

Peter planned to embark on a huge crusade in which he would deal a powerful blow to the Muslims. In need of substantial preparations, many men and large sums of money, he set out on a journey to western Europe in order to persuade its kings and princes to support him – his journey lasted approximately three years,⁶⁵ from 764/1362 to 767/1365.⁶⁶ Peter’s journey is

60 Al-Maqrīzī, *as-Sulūk*, II, Part 1, pp. 48–9.

61 ‘Āshūr, ‘Qubruṣ’, p. 55.

62 ‘Abd-an-Nabī, *al-Qarāṣina*, p. 65.

63 ‘Aṭīyya, *Crusade*, p. 319; see also ‘Āshūr, ‘Qubruṣ’, p. 56.

64 Delaville le Roulx, Joseph, *La France en Orient au XIV^{ème} siècle: Expéditions du Maréchal Boucicaud*, Paris, Libraire des Écoles Françaises d’Athènes et de Rome du Collège de France et de l’École Normale Supérieure, 1886, p. 118.

65 De Machaut, Guillaume, *La prise d’Alexandrie ou chronique du roi Pierre 1er Lusignan*, ed. M. de Mas Latrie, Geneva, 1877, pp. 21–47.

66 See also ‘Āshūr, *al-Ḥaraka aṣ-ṣalībiyya*, II, p. 1224.

seen as a landmark in the history of Cyprus and the late Crusades. Never before had a crowned head of Cyprus visited the Latin West.⁶⁷ One therefore wonders about the reasons behind this journey, which Peter was determined to make. Was the aim to bolster King Hugh IV of Lusignan, given the latter's insistent requests for protection from threats? Or was it to make Peter the leader of Christendom in its conflict with Islam?⁶⁸

Peter put his brother John in charge of Cypriot internal affairs⁶⁹ and set sail on 24 October 1362 (AH 764). He stopped in Rhodes, where he met Roger, Grand Master of the Hospitallers, the third group of Crusader remnants, who left Acre for Cyprus and thence for Rhodes, as we shall see. Peter then travelled to Venice and on to Genoa. After arriving in Avignon in March 1363, he met Pope Urban V (in office 764–72/1362–70) and the king of France, John II (r. 772–64/1362–70). On 14 April 1363 (AH 764), in front of the two kings, the Pope blessed a new crusade. Peter then travelled to Flanders and Brabant and to several German cities and principalities.⁷⁰

The question that arises is whether the aim of the crusade was really to reclaim the Holy Land. The policy adopted in AD 1363 by the Pope and King John is far from unambiguous. The decisions taken by Urban V suggest a certain lack of clarity or an ambivalence, showing that the underlying aim of the campaign was somewhat nebulous. It was not clear whether the attack was to be directed against the Mamlūk sultanate or against the neighbouring regions in the Aegean Sea or the Balkans which were under pressure from the (Muslim) Turks.⁷¹

After a second meeting with the Pope, Peter I left for England, where King Edward III gave him a warm welcome and showered him with gifts. On the return journey, Peter heard of the death of his friend, King John II, and travelled to France to attend the coronation of the new monarch, Charles V. He then headed for central Europe⁷² before returning to Venice and requesting his deputy in Cyprus to wait for him in Rhodes with troops, ships and provisions.⁷³ The deputy did as he was asked. Peter arrived in Rhodes in August 1365 (AH 766)⁷⁴ accompanied by 300 ships.⁷⁵ The armies gathered by Peter for the campaign thus came together: there were volunteers from the

67 P. W. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades 1191–1374*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 164; Nu'ayna', *al-Hurūb aṣ-ṣalībiyya*, p. 112.

68 Edbury, *Kingdom*, p. 164.

69 *Ibid.*

70 De Machaut, *La prise d'Alexandrie*, pp. 27–9.

71 Edbury, *Kingdom*, p. 165.

72 De Machaut, *La prise d'Alexandrie*, pp. 30, 40–2.

73 L. Makhairas, *Recital Concerning the Sweet Land of Cyprus*, ed. R. M. Dawkins, Oxford, 1932, p. 145.

74 *Ibid.*

75 Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, p. 124.

West, sailors from Cyprus and foreigners who had previously been based in the East.⁷⁶ Some 160 ships⁷⁷ gathered in Rhodes, in addition to 10,000 men and 1,400 mounts.⁷⁸

It is time now to ask once again why Peter I of Lusignan's campaign of 767/1365 was directed at Alexandria. One reason for Peter's attack on Alexandria at that particular time is that it was:

an act of revenge for what had happened to the Eastern Christians who were expelled from government service in 755/1354–55 under Sultan Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn ibn Nāṣir ibn Muḥammad ibn Qalāwūn and forced to wear undignified clothing in order to distinguish themselves from the Muslims. Christians were treated badly by the common people. Moreover, the sultan refused to grant Peter permission to receive his crown at Tyre, as was customary for Cypriot kings. Looting had taken place in Rashīd and in Abu Qīr near Alexandria, contributing to the lack of defences along the Egyptian coast and leading the common people to kill a number of Venetians living in Alexandria.⁷⁹

The fleet set sail from Rhodes on 4 October 1365.⁸⁰ Peter took all necessary precautions and kept the target of the attack strictly secret. He even went so far as to write to his brother John in Cyprus asking him to 'prevent any ship from leaving the island for Syria so as to keep the attack secret'.⁸¹ In order to keep European traders in the dark – given that they had interests in the region and could move to prevent the campaign or to warn the Mamlūks⁸² – the soldiers were not told where they were headed until after the ships had left Rhodes and reached the open sea.⁸³

Notwithstanding these measures, news of the Cypriot preparations to attack Alexandria long preceded the arrival of the fleet.⁸⁴ The Mamlūks showed little interest, however. In addition to the Mamlūk disdain for the king of Cyprus, the governor of Alexandria made light of the news, commenting that the 'Cypriots are too few and too pathetic to try and come to Alexandria.'⁸⁵

76 Edbury, *Kingdom*, p. 165.

77 Makhairas, *Recital*, p. 151.

78 Housley, Norman, *The Later Crusades, 1274–1580, From Lyons to Alcazar*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 40.

79 'Āshūr, 'Qubruṣ', pp. 58–9, quoting an-Nuwayrī as-Sikandarī's *al-Ilmām bi-l-i'lām*; Nu'ayna', *al-Ḥurūb aṣ-ṣalṭibiyya*, pp. 110–11, also quoting an-Nuwayrī.

80 Edbury, *Kingdom*, p. 166.

81 Makhairas, *Recital*, p. 151; 'Āshūr, 'Qubruṣ', p. 60.

82 Edbury, *Kingdom*, p. 166.

83 De Machaut, *La prise d'Alexandrie*, p. 64; Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, p. 129.

84 'Āshūr, 'Qubruṣ', p. 60, quoting an-Nuwayrī.

85 'Āshūr, 'Qubruṣ', p. 61; Nu'ayna', *al-Ḥurūb aṣ-ṣalṭibiyya*, p. 137, quoting an-Nuwayrī.

Indeed, when the Crusaders' ships appeared on the horizon, the Alexandrians thought they were Venetian ships coming to trade as usual.⁸⁶

The Crusaders successfully stormed Alexandria and gained control of it on 22 Muḥarram 767/Friday 10 October 1365.⁸⁷ They 'took the city during the [Muslim] prayer time'⁸⁸ and intensified their attack on Alexandria, 'which did not have enough soldiers and was unable to organize them to defend the city'. Peter and his men succeeded in clearing the way into the city after 'setting fire to one of its gates. They then carried out massacres against the Muslims, as well as looting and plunder.'⁸⁹ Indeed, they 'obliterated everything in the city, sentient or otherwise'.⁹⁰ Ibn Kathīr gives us a detailed picture of what happened next:

They arrived there on Wednesday 22 Muḥarram to find no governor, army, coastguard or protector and therefore entered the city early on the Friday, having burnt down many of the large city gates. They wrought destruction on the people, killing men, taking property and capturing women and children ... This they did on Friday, Saturday, Sunday, Monday and Tuesday. On the morning of the Wednesday, the Egyptian Shālīsh [relief army] arrived and expelled the Franks, may God curse them, from the country.⁹¹

Peter I of Lusignan destroyed Alexandria after he had 'sacked it and plundered all of its commodities and valuables'.⁹² An-Nuwayrī is therefore correct in stating that he 'entered it as a thief and left it as a thief'.⁹³ For his part, Ibn Kathīr states that the Crusaders left the city of Alexandria after they had 'imprisoned a multitude of some 4,000 people', whom they took onto their ships along with the loot. Heart-rending wails, crying, lamentations and supplications to God were to be heard, along with appeals to Him and to the Muslims, which brought tears to the eyes of bystanders and deafened their ears.⁹⁴

At this juncture, there is a significant point worth making: it has been suggested by a modern source that Peter I of Lusignan's campaign was based on the idea that the Crusaders under Peter would attack Egypt from the north, while the king of Abyssinia would advance from the south, leaving Egypt –

86 'Āshūr, 'Qubruṣ', p. 62; Nu'ayna', *al-Ḥurūb aṣ-ṣalībiyya*, p. 156, quoting an-Nuwayrī.

87 Nu'ayna', *al-Ḥurūb aṣ-ṣalībiyya*, p. 143, quoting an-Nuwayrī.

88 Ibn Duqmāq, *al-Jawhar*, II, p. 222.

89 Edbury, *Kingdom*, p. 166.

90 'Āshūr, 'Qubruṣ', p. 66; *al-Ḥaraka aṣ-ṣalībiyya*, II, p. 1226.

91 Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, XIV, p. 336.

92 Ramaḍān, *Fann al-qitāl*, p. 36, quoting an-Nuwayrī.

93 'Āshūr, *al-Ḥurūb aṣ-ṣalībiyya*, II, p. 1227.

94 Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāya*, XIV, p. 336. It has been argued that the campaign was the reason for the writing of the book *al-Ilmām bi-l-i'īām fī mā jarat bihi al-aḥkām wa-l-umūr al-maqḍiyya fī wāqi'at al-Iskandariyya* by the Egyptian author Muḥammad ibn Qāsim an-Nuwayrī. See Ḥusayn Mu'nīs, *Aṭlas tārikh al-islām*, Cairo, az-Zahrā' li-l-i'īām al-'arabī, 1407/1987, p. 272.

the centre of Islamic resistance – sandwiched between the two. The king of Abyssinia did indeed march with an army consisting of ‘3 million warriors’ towards Egypt’s southern borders, but once news reached him that Peter had withdrawn from Alexandria after laying waste to it, he turned back. By this stage, he had lost large numbers of men because of the hazardous nature of the journey and the difficulty of the military campaign upon which he had embarked.⁹⁵

Although the Mamlūk state flourished in the first half of the eighth/fourteenth century, becoming the most prominent state in the region, its power had been curtailed and weakened on several accounts. Fate played a large part in these events:

In 748/1347, a plague swept through the region. The population, and hence the number of births, decreased. The wealth of the Mamlūk state therefore similarly waned as a result of the setback to agriculture and trade, all of which affected the economic situation of the Mamlūks. Moreover, the campaign of Peter I had shaken Mamlūk prestige.⁹⁶

There is also a view that ‘the capture of Alexandria was the West’s strongest blow to the Mamlūk sultanate’.⁹⁷

The impact of this event on the Muslims generally, and on the Egyptians in particular, cannot be ignored. We need look no further than the many contemporary elegies lamenting the fate of Alexandria.⁹⁸ In Europe, things were of course seen in a different light, as Delaville le Roulx explains in his *La France en Orient au XIV^e siècle*:

The victory of the Crusader campaign in Alexandria was a boost for Europe and had a powerful effect on morale, giving rise to ardent enthusiasm and determination. These feelings did not go beyond rhetoric and pride, however, and no ruler or religious leader was able to take things any further.⁹⁹

The question that arises is whether the campaign achieved its intended aims. Le Roulx provides the following assessment:

There is no answer. There is nothing to justify the sacrifices made by the kingdom of Cyprus and this is true for several reasons the first of which is the extent to which efforts were united. Instead of a continuous united

95 ‘Āshūr, ‘Ba’ḍ al-aḍwā’ al-jadīda’, p. 31, and his *al-Ḥaraka aṣ-ṣalībiyya*, II, pp. 1209–10.

96 Irwin, ‘Islam and the Crusades’, p. 248.

97 Housley, *The Later Crusades*, p. 41.

98 ‘Āshūr, ‘Qubruṣ’, p. 69.

99 Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, p. 140.

initiative, for instance, we find a series of disjointed attempts and despite the results, which were in the main positive and encouraging, there was nothing to link and connect them to one another. A second reason is the difficulty of gathering an army from several countries ... in addition to the disparate elements of which military units were composed.¹⁰⁰

Although the considerable damage inflicted on Alexandria by the Crusaders deeply scarred the Mamlūks, it being ‘one of the largest Crusader raids to hit the cities of the Delta since the fifth/eleventh century’, the city nevertheless ‘soon recovered its standing as a significant Mediterranean port’.¹⁰¹

Peter I’s victory in Alexandria was perhaps the reason for a fresh campaign in September 1367 (AH 768) against the coast of the Near East. Tripoli, the first city to be targeted by the campaign, was pillaged. Tartus, Laodicea and Baniyas were subjected to the same fate. Peter then met with the king of Armenia across from Ayās in 769/1367, but the latter did not join the campaign. The king of Cyprus therefore decided to return home in October 1367 (AH 769), which marked the end of the expedition; Peter’s men were tired of war and were no longer able to conclude the campaign. By waiting for the spring, assistance could once again be sought from the West.¹⁰²

We are told that Peter I attempted to prepare a new campaign against the Near Eastern coast which was ruled by the Mamlūks, and began another journey through Europe in October 1367 (AH 769). The Pope refused to grant him any more funds,¹⁰³ however, and frankly told him that ‘he should expect no more financial support from the revenues of papal lands or from taxes levied by the Church. He advised him to desist from his policies and to put an end to the conflict.’ Peter then attempted to establish friendly relations with the Mamlūks, but the sultan declined the offer.¹⁰⁴

Peter I was murdered soon afterwards, in 771/1369, to be succeeded by his son Peter II (r. 771–84/1369–82) who had not yet come of age. His uncle acted as regent, during which time he encouraged pirate attacks on the Egyptian and Syrian coasts.¹⁰⁵ In December 1370 a peace settlement was agreed between the Mamlūk sultanate on the one hand and Cyprus, Rhodes, Genoa and Venice on the other.¹⁰⁶ The Cypriots nevertheless continued to wreak havoc at sea, waylaying ships from Damietta and Alexandria, with

100 Ibid.

101 Irwin, ‘Islam and the Crusades’, p. 248.

102 Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, pp. 138–9.

103 Ibid., p. 140.

104 Edbury, *Kingdom*, p. 169.

105 Ibid., p. 170; ‘Āshūr, ‘Qubruş’, pp. 81–2.

106 Edbury, *Kingdom*, p. 170.

the encouragement of Janus Lusignan, king of Cyprus (r. 801–63/1398–1432). Attempts by Sultan Barsbāy to reach an agreement ensuring the safety of Muslim trade remained fruitless.¹⁰⁷

The Mamlūks decided to take revenge and to strike at their enemies in order to regain their standing. In the same year as the sack of Alexandria, the Mamlūks began to construct a powerful fleet at the shipyard in Būlāq.¹⁰⁸ Interest in this fleet peaked during the reign of the Mamlūk sultan al-Ashraf Barsbāy (r. 842–25/1422–38), who ordered the construction of a vast military fleet for the Mediterranean.¹⁰⁹

Coinciding with the increased attacks and threats from Cypriot pirates on the Near Eastern coast,¹¹⁰ the reign of Sultan al-Ashraf Barsbāy witnessed the harshest revenge to which Cyprus would be subjected. The sultan sent three naval campaigns to attack the island. The first took place in 827/1424. The second, which was larger and better prepared, took place – with some success – the following year. The third, in 829/1426, was the principal campaign that decisively put an end to the Cypriot state. The Cypriot forces were defeated at Khirokitia and their king Janus was imprisoned along with 3,000 other captives. Thereafter Cyprus became a possession of Sultan al-Ashraf Barsbāy¹¹¹ and was dependent on the Mamlūk sultanate. From that time onwards, the kings of Cyprus swore never to shelter pirates or allow them to enter any of the island's ports.¹¹²

The Mamlūks and Rhodes

Rhodes was the third refuge for a significant number of Crusader remnants after the fall of Acre to the Muslims in AD 1291. In this case, the remnants were the Knights Hospitaller¹¹³ to whom Henry III of Lusignan, the king of Cyprus, had given shelter in the city of Limassol on the southern Cypriot coast where they remained for some sixteen years.¹¹⁴ Rhodes was then a part of the Byzantine empire under Andronicus II (r. 681–729/1282–1328). In April 1308 (AH 707) the Knights Hospitaller attempted through diplomatic means to gain control of the island of Rhodes, which was under the emperor's influence.

107 Makharais, *Recital*, p. 523.

108 'Aṭiyya, *al-'Alāqāt*, p. 126.

109 Irwin, 'Islam and the Crusades', p. 248.

110 Edbury, *Kingdom*, p. 168.

111 Housley, *The Later Crusades*, p. 196; P. W. Edbury, 'The Latin East, 1291–1669', in *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades*, ed. John Riley-Smith, Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 225.

112 Irwin, 'Islam and the Crusades', p. 249.

113 For more information on the Knights Hospitaller, see Nabīla Ibrāhīm Maqāmī, *Firaq ar-ruhban al-fursān fī bilād ash-Shām fī-l-qarnayn ath-thānī 'ashar wa-th-thālith 'ashar*, Cairo, Maṭba'at jāmi'at al-Qāhira wa-l-kitāb al-jāmi'ī, 1994.

114 'Aṭiyya, *Crusade*, pp. 286–7.

In return, they would ‘support the Emperor’s army with 300 fighters against the Muslims, if the Emperor would help to make the inhabitants of the cities in Rhodes welcoming.’ Their request was turned down, however.¹¹⁵ Based in Asia Minor and Cyprus, the Knights Hospitaller ultimately succeeded in invading Rhodes, which became one of the most important and productive fortified cities in the East, as well as a main base for crusader campaigns in the late Middle Ages.¹¹⁶

The Knights Hospitaller based in Rhodes participated in attacks against the Muslims generally and against the Mamlūk state in particular. In 762–63/1361 the Knights of Rhodes helped to form a fleet gathered by Peter I, king of Cyprus, which comprised nineteen battleships and was funded by the Pope and by Genoa for crusading purposes.¹¹⁷ The Knights Hospitaller likewise played an important role in the Alexandria campaign of AD 1365; faced with the task of slaughtering the Muslims in the city, the attackers needed to ‘seek further help, which the Knights Hospitaller provided, giving assistance to the army with reinforcements’ under the command of the king of Cyprus. Further efforts resulted in control being asserted on the battlefield.¹¹⁸

As one modern source puts it, Rhodes was the third logical target of the Mamlūks in their counter-attack against the Crusaders.¹¹⁹ The immediate cause of the Mamlūk raid on Rhodes was the victory of Sultan Barsbāy, in the wake of which Sultan Jaqmaq (r. 842–57/1438–53) turned on Rhodes. Jaqmaq seized on the fact that the Ottoman sultan Mūrād II (r. 824–55/1421–51) had called for the island to be overrun and he hastened to respond. In fact, the real reason for the sultan’s call was to keep the Knights Hospitaller occupied with the defence of their own island, thereby preventing them from entering the Christian alliance which was set on resisting the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans. Moreover, Sultan Jaqmaq had found that the fleet used by Barsbāy to invade Cyprus was still in good condition.¹²⁰ Three attacks were therefore launched against the Knights Hospitaller in AD 1440, 1442 and 1444.¹²¹

Sultan Jaqmaq’s first naval campaign against Rhodes, in 844/1440, consisted of fifteen *ghurābs* built in the Būlāq shipyards. It sailed for Cyprus, where supplies were provided by John II, and then headed for the port of Alaya on the southern coast of Asia Minor, where a number of soldiers joined the fleet. The campaign ultimately failed, however, after news of its

115 Ibid., p. 287.

116 Ibid., pp. 289–90.

117 Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, p. 119.

118 Ibid.

119 ‘Aṭiyya, *al-‘Alāqāt*, p. 128.

120 Ramaḍān, *Tārīkh fann al-qitāl*, p. 38.

121 Housley, *The Later Crusades*, p. 43.

arrival was leaked by the Franciscan monks of Mount Zion monastery and Bethlehem.¹²²

The defeat of the sultan's armies in his first attack on Rhodes gave him a grudge against the Knights Hospitaller. He therefore decided to launch a second campaign in order to take revenge and in AD 1442 he began preparing for this fresh attempt.¹²³ On setting out, the campaign was preceded for a short time by a scouting mission composed of 'over 80 *ghurābs*, square-riggers and rowing boats carrying over 1,800 fighters'.¹²⁴ The funds for the campaign, however, were spent on attacking Christian lands on the western shores of Asia Minor.¹²⁵ This campaign also failed; winter came, the season for warfare ended and the fleet returned to Egypt.¹²⁶

The third campaign set sail early in the summer of 848/1444. Its objective was to attack the fortifications on Rhodes. It was composed of over 1,000 Mamlūks and some 1,600 volunteer fighters, all equipped with siege machinery. The focus of the attack was on land warfare rather than on naval warfare. After the forces that had stood up to the Mamlūks were destroyed, a fleet of ships known as *qarqūrs* left Rhodes and took on the Mamlūk fleet near Gaza. A fierce battle ensued in which 300 soldiers were killed and 500 injured, and the Mamlūks were forced to retreat. Finally, a truce was agreed between the Mamlūk sultanate and the Knights Hospitaller in which the latter agreed not to attack Muslim vessels.¹²⁷

The question arises as to why all the campaigns directed against the Knights Hospitaller in Rhodes by the Mamlūks ended in failure. One view is that the sultan was faced with a number of situations that led to the failure of his campaigns and to indecisive outcomes. For instance:

the Knights [Hospitaller] showed a bravery greater than that of the Cypriot forces. Their military organization was unshakeable, and the rigorous observance of discipline in the ranks of the Order was combined with a spirit of unity ... Moreover, they had developed a closely knit system of international espionage, a kind of intelligence service of a unique character in medieval times, whereby their agents in hostile countries forewarned the grand master of any military movement against the island.¹²⁸

122 'Aṭiyya, *al-'Alāqāt*, p. 129; Ramaḍān, *Tārīkh fann al-qitāl*, p. 38, quoting Muṣṭafā Ziyāda. The *ghurāb* ('crow') was a type of ship.

123 'Aṭiyya, *al-'Alāqāt*, p. 38.

124 Ramaḍān, *Tārīkh fann al-qitāl*, p. 38.

125 Irwin, 'Islam and the Crusades', p. 249.

126 Ramaḍān, *Tārīkh fann al-qitāl*, p. 38.

127 Irwin, 'Islam and the Crusades', p. 249. See also 'Aṭiyya, *al-'Alāqāt*, p. 131; Ramaḍān, *Tārīkh fann al-qitāl*, pp. 38–9. The latter focuses on a discussion of the different types of ship, including the *qarqūr*.

128 'Aṭiyya, *al-'Alāqāt*, p. 129.

Moreover, the Latin pirates were emboldened on account of the distance between Rhodes and the shores of the Mamlūk state.¹²⁹

CRUSADES AGAINST THE OTTOMAN STATE UP TO AD 1571

This section discusses the Crusades directed against the Ottomans. Most of these campaigns took place in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries AD in the wake of the Ottoman invasion of the Balkan peninsula and the threat they posed to eastern and southern Europe.¹³⁰ Due to limitations of space, we will focus on just a few of these campaigns.

The campaign of Robert, king of Naples, against Constantinople

We have already touched on the crusading venture of the papal envoy William Adam. The strangest aspect of that venture was the idea of preventing pilgrimages to Jerusalem, given that the fees paid by pilgrims constituted a substantial income for the Mamlūk treasury.¹³¹ Adam's ideas did in fact achieve a wide hearing in Europe. Some, such as King Philip V of France (r. 716–22/1316–22), were opposed to them, taking the view that the preparation of such campaigns was merely an opportunity for the Pope to collect funds and use them for other ends. On the other hand, it seems that the papacy showed an interest in Adam's ideas; Pope John XXI prepared a campaign directed against Constantinople and delegated the task to Robert, king of Naples (r. 707–44/1309–43). The campaign was unsuccessful, however, and never reached Constantinople.¹³²

The battle of Kosovo (791/1389)

Before discussing the battle of Kosovo, we should look back to the roots of the conflict between the Ottomans and the Hungarians. The Ottomans had rapidly succeeded in reaching north-western Anatolia during the reign of their sultan Orkhān Ghāzi ibn 'Osmān (r. 724–63/1324–62). In 740/1340 a group of Turks owing their allegiance to the Ottomans invaded the plains of Adrianople (now Edirne). The Ottomans then took Gallipoli in 755/1354 or 756/1355. During the reign of Mūrād I (763–91/1362–89), Macedonia and Thrace were also overrun.¹³³

129 'Abd-an-Nabī, *al-Qarāṣina*, p. 61.

130 Zaborov, *aṣ-Ṣalībiyyūn*, p. 343.

131 'Umrān, *al-Maghūl*, p. 385.

132 *Ibid.*, p. 392.

133 Irwin, 'Islam and the Crusades', p. 251.

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A significant factor in the conflict between Christianity and Islam emerged, growing noticeably in the first half of the fourteenth century – the Turkish fleets known as ‘sea *ghāzīs*’, one of whose main tasks was to patrol the northern shores that were seen as an arena for confrontation between Christianity and Islam: ‘The Christian West began increasingly to talk of Turkish superiority owing to fear of the Turkish advance, which was based on their military superiority, and the factor of religious creed sanctioning, and indeed advocating, *jihād*.’¹³⁴

The presence of Mūrād I and his troops in Europe, together with their advance towards the Danube, created something of a Christian build-up in the Balkans. The armies amassed in that area, however, were defeated at the battle of Kosovo on 15 January 1389 (AH 791). Despite the death of Mūrād I in the battle, his son Bāyezīd I (r. 791–805/1389–1402) assumed the leadership with great dignity and proficiency,¹³⁵ with the Ottomans gaining one of their most important victories.¹³⁶

The Crusade against the Ottomans and the battle of Nicopolis (798/1396)

The true reason for this campaign was Bāyezīd’s attack on the Hungarians in AD 1394, to which Pope Boniface IX (in office 791–807/1389–1404) responded by preparing for a crusade against the Ottomans. From 795/1393 to 797/1395 the entire territory of Bulgaria was integrated into the Ottoman empire.¹³⁷ In other words, Ottoman influence had reached Serbia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Adrianople, Hungary and Poland.¹³⁸ A Crusader army was put together from the forces of the Christian kingdoms such as France, Burgundy, Hungary, Italy, Germany, Poland and Byzantium.¹³⁹

The French-Burgundian army under King Sigismund moved towards Hungary, the Pope blessing the knights and giving them an indulgence. Under the leadership of King Sigismund, the forces of the allied Crusaders met in the city of Buda. Sultan Bāyezīd officially declared war on them in February 1396 (AH 798). He also announced that he would enter Hungary in May, but the Crusader army had no idea of Bāyezīd’s plans and the Hungarian spies brought back no reports of his presence in Europe. Sigismund decided to

134 Halil İnalcık, ‘The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades 1329–1451’, in Harry W. Hazard and Norman P. Zacour (eds), *The Impact of the Crusades on Europe*, Vol. 6 of Kenneth M. Setton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89, pp. 225–7.

135 Irwin, ‘Islam and the Crusades’, p. 251.

136 Housely, *The Later Crusades*, p. 71.

137 İnalcık, ‘Ottoman Turks 1329–1451’, pp. 250–1.

138 Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, Book III, Ch. 1, p. 220.

139 *Ibid.*, Book III, Ch. 1, p. 221.

wait for the Turks in Hungary. The primary aim of the campaign was to expel the Turks from Europe.¹⁴⁰

The Crusader army reached the walls of the city of Vidin and slaughtered the few Turks who attempted to defend it. The Crusaders left a group of 300 men in Vidin, which thereby became the first fortified city to be seized in the Crusaders' advance. The army proceeded along the Danube, meeting no stiff resistance until it arrived at Rachowa, a city protected by a double series of walls overlooked by towers and guarded by a garrison prepared to defend it fiercely. Bridges passed over the walls, which the Turks attempted to break down, and the Crusader army was forced to retreat because of their low numbers and the strength of the fortifications. Marshal Boucicaut addressed the troops and fired up their enthusiasm, then entered Rachowa. Sigismund left the Turks inside the city to slaughter them there: 'The Crusaders took control of the city, overran it and sacked it, carrying out massacres without distinction as to gender or age.'¹⁴¹

Sigismund left a military regiment of 200 men in Rachowa and the army continued its march until, on 12 September, it reached Greater Nicopolis on the southern banks of the Danube. This city was of strategic importance owing to its position overlooking the Aluta valley, for which reason it was the key to Macedonia for the Turks. The sultan had fortified it and protected it with a large, well-trained force.¹⁴² The Crusader army lacked the weaponry to breach the fortifications, so the soldiers made strong rope ladders to climb the walls. The Christian forces remained outside the walls of Nicopolis for fifteen days in a bid to enter the city – some small bands managed to do so in order to scout out the terrain.¹⁴³

The Turkish army made its base in Philippopolis, where the Ottoman armies arriving from Asia and Europe were grouped, together with the forces brought from Constantinople by Bāyezīd I. There were two routes from Philippopolis to Nicopolis. It has been stated that the Christians were convinced that the Turks would not dare to attack them. It has even been said that some soldiers were punished with beatings and abuse and had their ears cut off for bringing news of the imminent arrival of the Turkish army.

When the Crusader alliance heard on 24 September 1396 (AH 798) that the Turks were approaching and would soon arrive, they executed all the Turkish prisoners they had been holding in the hope of exchanging them for a large ransom. Despite this atrocity, le Roulx defends the inhuman actions of the Crusaders:

140 Ibid., Book III, pp. 247–51.

141 Ibid., Book III, pp. 252–4.

142 Ibid., Book III, pp. 224, 255–6. Ḥusayn Mu'nīs is mistaken when he states that the battle of Nicopolis took place in Asia Minor in AD 1396. See his *Aṭlas tārikh al-islām*, p. 271.

143 Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, Book III, pp. 256–8.

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Men who carried the Cross to free the Church in Jerusalem from the infidels (i.e. the Muslims) could have carried out such a deed only because they were seized by passion and by insane impulses on hearing that the enemy was approaching; they rid themselves of their captives so that the latter would not be a burden on them in battle.¹⁴⁴

The battle of Nicopolis (798/1396) and its outcome

The battlefield stretched to the south-west of Nicopolis, across a valley delimited to the north by the Balkan chain. The Ottoman Turks descended from the Balkans towards Nicopolis, concentrating on three lines. The French troops advanced towards a small group of Turkish cavalymen who fled before them, seeking help from another line of cavalry. This was the tactic usually followed by the Turks in battle. The Crusaders were met by a hail of arrows and within minutes many men and horses had been killed. The Crusaders' leaders realized that they must advance at all costs. The Crusader army therefore confronted the Turkish front lines, but before long they found themselves in the midst of their enemies. Several of the leaders were faced with no option but to flee the field of battle, while Bāyezīd was in the valley with 40,000 of his best men. The fighting resumed, causing havoc in the ranks of the Crusaders who were unable to reorganize or use their arrows. Many of their leaders fled the battlefield along with their armies. At this point, some 5,000 warriors reached Bāyezīd as reinforcements. Ultimately, on 25 September 1396 (AH 798), the Crusaders lost the battle.¹⁴⁵

Various sources and authorities trace the cause of the defeat at Nicopolis to the retreat of Hungarian forces from the field.¹⁴⁶ In the words of le Roulx: 'it was a comprehensive tragedy'. The Turks gained control of the entire route to the Danube, taking prisoner everyone they came across. All the others sought to flee across the river, but death awaited them: they attempted to reach their fleets or even any small boat that would carry them away from the battlefield, but 'once the boats became overcrowded, those already aboard would slash the hands of anyone who attempted to climb up and join them. Those left behind consequently drowned amid the confusion.'¹⁴⁷

Hence, as stated by Zabarov: 'in the vicinity of Nicopolis, the Ottomans were able to defeat a Western army consisting of several different countries acting together, foremost among them the Hungarian forces of King

144 Ibid., Book III, Ch. 3, pp. 259–61.

145 Ibid., Book III, Ch. 5, pp. 272–7; Inalčik, 'Ottoman Turks 1329–1451', p. 252.

146 Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, Book III, Ch. 5, p. 277; Housley, *The Later Crusades*, pp. 77–8.

147 Delaville le Roulx, *La France en Orient*, Book III, Ch. 3, p. 281.

Sigismund.¹⁴⁸ For his part, Norman Housley describes it as ‘one of the most crushing crusading defeats’.¹⁴⁹ Bāyezīd, the architect of the Ottoman victory, was crowned with the title ‘the hero of Islam, the victorious *ghāzī*’.

If the West suffered no great setback as a result of the damage inflicted by Bāyezīd’s victory at Nicopolis, the situation was not much different for the Christians of the East: ‘Constantinople continued to wait for someone who could liberate them from the Turks, who would leave from there and subsequently return, having annexed more territory and achieved more triumphs.’ Only the leader of the Knights Hospitaller could initiate such a move, ‘but he left the scene after being promised a high position and miraculously escaping the Nicopolis disaster’.¹⁵⁰

It was clear to everyone that Bāyezīd would be able to take Constantinople if he concentrated all his means and resources on the task. When matters became desperate, in 800–01/1397–98, Emperor Manuel II Palaeologus (r. 793–828/1391–1425) wrote to the West asking for help. In 803/1400 he likewise called upon Pope Boniface IX to initiate a crusade. To that end, King Charles VI of France sent Marshal Boucicaut with a force of 120,000 men to aid in the defence of Constantinople. Most of the force turned back, however, along with Boucicaut himself.¹⁵¹

Manuel then undertook a personal journey to the West. Having visited Venice in May 1400 (AH 802) and Paris on 3 June of the same year, he crossed the Channel and spent Christmas at the English court before returning to Paris in February the following year. Two years after his departure, he returned to Constantinople. Notwithstanding the delegations also sent to the West, the Byzantine capital was to be saved from the Turkish onslaught not from Europe but from another direction altogether. On 28 July 1402 (AH 804) a decisive battle took place near Ankara in which Bāyezīd was defeated and imprisoned by the Mongol military leader Tamerlane. A few months later, the sultan died.¹⁵² Tamerlane was thus able to extend his reach into Ottoman territory. The Ottoman empire was growing weaker, particularly when Bāyezīd’s sons Süleimān, ‘Īsā, Meḥmed and Mūsā quarrelled over who should succeed their father. The period of internal strife came to an end with the victory of Meḥmed I (r. 816–24/1413–21).¹⁵³

At this point, an important question arises: why did Bāyezīd I not attack and take Constantinople after his victory at Nicopolis? The answer, in short, is that he had neither the heavy artillery with which to fire at the walls

148 Zaborov, *aṣ-Ṣalībiyyūn*, pp. 343–4.

149 Housley, *The Later Crusades*, p. 77.

150 Delaville le Roux, *La France en Orient*, Book VI, p. 346.

151 Housley, *The Later Crusades*, p. 80.

152 *Ibid.*, pp. 80–1.

153 Irwin, ‘Islam and the Crusades’, pp. 252–3; Housley, *The Later Crusades*, pp. 81–2.

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of such a strongly fortified city, nor a fleet strong enough to surround it completely from the sea.¹⁵⁴

The Varna Crusade (AD 1444)

The Ottoman empire recovered something of its standing during the reigns of Meḥmed I and his son Mürād II (r. 824–55/1421–51). On ascending the throne, however, Mürād immediately attempted to lay siege to Constantinople and overrun it, only to be forced into lifting his siege because the aforementioned two elements – heavy artillery and naval strength – were lacking.¹⁵⁵

The death of the Hungarian king Sigismund in December 1437 (AH 841) encouraged Sultan Mürād II to lead his army into Transylvania the following year. In 844/1440 the sultan made several unsuccessful attempts to take Belgrade, which brought the Ottomans face to face with the strongest and most important Christian state in the Balkans, the kingdom of Hungary.¹⁵⁶ It was at this point that the personality of the Hungarian leader John Hunyadi came to the fore. Hunyadi inflicted crushing losses on the Turks in the course of conflicts in the years 845/1441 and 846/1442. These conflicts in turn sparked many disturbances and wars in the Balkans, leading to the Ottomans' speedy retreat from the region. The echo of Hunyadi's victory was felt in Europe, where it gave encouragement to the crusading spirit.¹⁵⁷

Hungary agreed to prepare a crusade against the Ottomans, which Poland also joined. The Byzantine delegate, John Torcello (or Torzello), visited Buda, Rome and other European capitals to implement the stages of the Crusader campaign. Pope Eugene IV (in office 834–51/1431–47) showed great enthusiasm.¹⁵⁸ In February 1442 (AH 845), he named Cardinal Julian Cesarini as papal representative in a delegation that travelled to Hungary, and in January 1443 (AH 846) he called on all Christian leaders to embark on a crusade against the Ottomans.¹⁵⁹

A 25,000-man army was formed which included Hunyadi's Transylvanian followers, Moldovan mercenaries, volunteers from Italy, France and Germany, and a battalion consisting of 8,000 Serbs and 5,000 Poles. The Crusaders took Nish and Sofia, then marched to Edirne, successfully reaching Belgrade in January 1444 (AH 847). This was not because of the weakness of the Turks but rather because of a lack of reinforcements and the bitterly cold weather.¹⁶⁰

154 'Aṭiyya, *al-'Alāqāt*, p. 136.

155 Irwin, 'Islam and the Crusades', p. 253.

156 Housley, *The Later Crusades*, p. 83.

157 Irwin, 'Islam and the Crusades', p. 253; Inalçik, 'Ottoman Turks 1329–1451', p. 267.

158 Inalçik, 'Ottoman Turks 1329–1451', pp. 268–9.

159 *Ibid.*, p. 269.

160 Housley, *The Later Crusades*, p. 86; Inalçik, 'Ottoman Turks 1329–1451', p. 270.

Venice agreed to join the campaign, albeit somewhat warily given its position towards and relations with the Ottomans, who had always avoided direct conflict with the doge. Venice agreed to construct a fleet of ten naval units to take part in the campaign once sufficient funds became available.¹⁶¹

What has been termed ‘the longest military campaign’ came to a head in 847–48/1444 and the Ottomans were forced out of the Balkans. On 12 June 1444 (AH 848) the Edirne pact was concluded between the Ottoman and Hungarian sides to the effect that neither would cross the Danube to raid the other. Nevertheless, on 19 April, the king vowed in the presence of the Pope’s representative Cesarini to end the war in the summer, a decision that met strong opposition in Hungary. The representatives of the Pope and the doge supported the war, Venice having planned to gain control of Gallipoli, Thessalonica, Albania and the Black Sea ports. On 15 August 1444, even as discussions between the parties were coming to an end, the Hungarian king Ladislas took the irreversible decision to continue the war against the Ottomans. Cardinal Cesarini had:

convinced the King that no harm would result from violating a pact made with infidels (i.e. the Ottomans), since this would be easier for him to bear than excommunication from the Church, which might happen if he were to rescind his oath to continue the war against the Ottomans.¹⁶²

Peasants of Bulgarian origin joined the attacking army. The force of between 4,000 and 7,000 tough warriors met with the Crusaders near the city of Nicopolis. The army decided to conquer Adrianople, which was then the Ottoman capital. On 9 November 1444 (AH 747) the Crusaders laid siege to the city of Varna on the Black Sea and overran it, making it easy to join with the Christian fleet. A decisive battle took place in Varna and the Hungarians were defeated, the dead including Ladislas himself whose fate marked the failure of the campaign. The Ottomans thus consolidated their presence in the Balkans more strongly than ever before. Nonetheless, Hunyadi ended his conflict with the Ottomans only after the battle of Varna.¹⁶³ In Robert Irwin’s words, the battle ‘proved to be the last attempt at a crusade that was able to stall the Ottomans’ advance across the Balkans’.¹⁶⁴

In February 1446 (AH 849) Venice reached a peace agreement with the Turks, leaving the defence of the Balkans to local Christian rulers. Before long, in 851–52/1448, Hunyadi began to plan another campaign against the Turks, which Pope Nicolas V (in office 851–59/1447–55) blessed as a crusade.

161 Inalčik, ‘Ottoman Turks 1329–1451’, p. 269.

162 *Ibid.*, pp. 271–3.

163 *Ibid.*, p. 274.

164 Irwin, ‘Islam and the Crusades’, p. 254.

The army marched southwards towards Serbia in order to attack Mürād's fortress in Kosovo. After a rapid battle lasting only two days – 18 and 19 October 1448 (AH 852) – Hunyadi was defeated on the same territory where the Serbs had suffered a crushing defeat some fifty-six years previously. Ottoman control of lands south of the Danube was thus consolidated.

*The Ottoman conquest of Constantinople (19 Jumāda I 857/1453)*¹⁶⁵

In AD 1451 Sultan Meḥmed II (r. 855–86/1451–81), who succeeded Mürād II, made preparations to lay siege to Constantinople. Artillery was to play an important part in the siege.¹⁶⁶ The Ottomans had used trebuchets before, specifically from 782/1380, but starting in 823/1420 they were frequently used on the battlefield, particularly during the siege of fortresses or cities. The Ottomans also managed to acquire rifles by taking the weapons of Crusaders captured in their wars against them. Other rifles additionally came into Ottoman hands from European converts to Islam who had joined the ranks of the Ottoman army.¹⁶⁷

As part of Meḥmed II's preparations, he signed a peace agreement with Emperor Constantine XI Palaeologus (r. 853–57/1449–53) in which he promised not to attack Constantinople. Agreements to the same effect were reached with the ambassadors of Bulgaria and Serbia.¹⁶⁸ Peace was also made with the Hungarian leader Hunyadi and a truce renewed with Venice, Genoa, the White Knights in Rhodes and the Albanian leader Skanderbeg.¹⁶⁹ During the period March–August 1453, the sultan completed work on the castle of Rumeli Ḥiṣār on the western shore of the Bosphorus, which was nicknamed 'the neck-cutter' on account of its setting opposite Anaḍolu Ḥiṣār, the Ottoman castle on the eastern shore. Meḥmed the Conqueror was thus able to impose his grip on the Bosphorus and to impose a tax on any ship heading to or from the Black Sea. The castle of Rumeli Ḥiṣār made a significant contribution to the naval siege on Constantinople.¹⁷⁰

The land troops set off on 23 March 1453 (AH 857) from the city of Adrianople under the leadership of Meḥmed the Conqueror himself. The fleet put out to sea from the port of Gallipoli in late March and early April, making

165 Eduard Zambaur, *Mu'jam al-ansāb wa-l-usrāt al-ḥākima fi-t-tārīkh al-islāmī*, ed. Zakī Muḥammad Ḥasan Bey and Ḥasan Aḥmad Maḥmūd, Cairo, Maṭba'at jāmi'at Fu'ād al-Awwal, 1951, p. 239.

166 Irwin, 'Islam and the Crusades', p. 253; see also 'Aṭiyya, *al-'Alāqāt*, p. 137.

167 Irwin, 'Islam and the Crusades', p. 254.

168 Nicolo' Barbaro, *al-Fath al-islāmī li-l-Qusṭanṭīniyya: yawmiyyāt al-ḥiṣār al-'uthmānī, 1453 milādī*, analysis, translation and commentary by Ḥātim 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān aṭ-Taḥṭāwī, Cairo, Dār 'ayn li-d-dirāsāt wa-l-buḥūth al-insāniyya wa-l-ijtimā'iyya, 2002, pp. 32–3.

169 'Aṭiyya, *al-'Alāqāt*, pp. 137–8.

170 Barbaro, *al-Fath*, p. 33.

for the territorial waters of Constantinople. Alongside Ottoman artillery, their ships played a crucial role in breaching the city walls, the Ottomans having reached a new level of sophistication in terms of the size and type of artillery used, the dimensions of the projectiles and the scale of damage inflicted.¹⁷¹

We shall not discuss the conquest of Constantinople in detail; what interests us here is the Crusader movement against the Ottomans at the time. Suffice it to say that history, in the words of Irwin: ‘has recorded that battle so that Mehmed the Conqueror was not only a Muslim hero, but one regarded by history as having a status analogous to that of Alexander the Great or of Caesar’.¹⁷²

The conquest of Constantinople did indeed mark a new stage in the history of the Crusades in Europe. Until Mehmed II’s death in 886/1481, the Popes did all in their power to convince the West that the organization of a crusade under the auspices and leadership of the papacy was a pressing duty for Europe.

*The Crusades from the conquest of Constantinople
to the battle of Lepanto (979/1571)*

Pope Nicholas V called upon all European governments to prepare for a new crusade. When the Ottoman court heard of this, it made a pact with Venice on 18 April 1454 (AH 858) with the objectives of keeping Venice neutral if a campaign were to be launched and making sure that the necessary fleets were unavailable. The rulers of Genoa agreed to pay an annual tax on their property in both the Black Sea and the Aegean. The Knights Hospitaller of Rhodes, however, refused to pay any such tax to the Ottomans, thereby acceding to the Pope’s wishes which had been forcefully expressed. Mehmed II then declared war on the islands of Rhodes and Chios.¹⁷³

A crusade was then launched under the leadership of the Pope. The fleet, which was finally able to put to sea only in mid-June 1456 (AH 860), comprised 16 galleys with 5,000 soldiers and 300 cannon. The objective of the campaign was to drive the Ottomans away from the Hungarian front, to liberate the islands of Lesbos and Chios from subservience to the Ottomans and to ensure the participation of these two islands in liberating the islands of the northern Aegean which had been overrun by Ottoman armies. Fearing for its commercial interests, however, Chios refused to break with the Ottoman sultan and even agreed to an increase in the annual tax.¹⁷⁴

171 Irwin, ‘Islam and the Crusades’, p. 254.

172 Ibid.

173 Halil Inalçik, ‘The Ottoman Turks and the Crusades 1455–1552’, in Harry W. Hazard and Norman P. Zacour (eds), *The Impact of the Crusades on Europe*, Vol. 7 of Kenneth M. Sutton (ed.), *A History of the Crusades*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–89, p. 317.

174 Ibid., p. 319.

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Pius II (in office 862–68/1458–64) proved as passionate as Calixtus III. He called for a great crusade in which all Christian countries would take part in order to ‘liberate Europe from the curse of Turkish rule’, a statement that has led Inalčik to comment that ‘the liberation of Constantinople was the Pope’s highest priority on his accession to the papacy’.¹⁷⁵

The Pope convinced Hungary – the Ottomans’ prime adversary in Europe – to use all the means at its disposal to facilitate the planned campaign. The conflict between the Ottoman empire and Hungary was inescapable because both laid claim to Serbia and it was in fact from Hungary and Germany that the Crusaders came. It was widely believed that Hungary would be unable to withstand Sultan Mehmed II’s powerful army. Indeed, the Italians were terrified at the sultan’s announcement that he would turn on Italy after dealing with the Hungarians. Hunyadi, however, succeeded in obtaining fresh reinforcements with which he was able to break the blockade on the Danube. This victory was music to the ears of Christian Europe. The Pope’s letter to the Christians stated that what he aspired to at that point was ‘not only to regain Constantinople, but also to free Europe, Asia and the holy sites in Jerusalem’.

Ottoman territory was attacked in the summer of 1472 (AH 877) and the invading army reached Akshehir in central Anatolia, but was crushed on 14 August. During the summer, an 87-ship fleet provided by Venice, Naples, Rhodes, Cyprus and the papacy patrolled the Ottoman shores of the Mediterranean. In the spring of 1473 (AH 877), this fleet succeeded in taking the fortresses of Corycus and Seleucia. The sultan took every possible measure to block the Christian attack. On 11 August 1473 (AH 873) the decisive battle of Bashkent took place, showing how difficult it was to approach and invade Ottoman territory.

The Pope spared no effort in preparing a great crusade against the Ottomans, one that would involve the participation ‘of all Italians and perhaps all Christians in the Christian world, if possible’.¹⁷⁶ At the same time, Bāyezīd II (r. 886–918/1481–1512) adopted a less hostile policy towards the West, hoping to retain the throne against his brother Jem. After his defeat, the latter travelled to Rhodes and from there to France and then Rome, at which point ‘Istanbul considered Jem’s move to live under papal protection until his death in 900/1495 as the beginning of a crusade’.¹⁷⁷

Frontier conflicts took place in 887/1482 and 888/1483 during the course of which the king of Hungary imposed his control over northern Bosnia. He also began to take over Herzegovina, which he declared to be an independent

175 Ibid., p. 322.

176 Ibid., p. 333.

177 Irwin, ‘Islam and the Crusades’, p. 255; Inalčik, ‘Ottoman Turks 1455–1552’, p. 338.

kingdom under the rule of his illegitimate son. During that time, the king was awaiting help from Italy and Germany to complete his vast preparations for a war against the Ottomans.¹⁷⁸ Bāyezīd II believed that he would be able to avert that campaign through diplomacy by sending one delegate to Hungary and another to Rome to meet with the Pope in February 1500 (AH 905). The kings of Europe then understood that only by joining forces, avoiding conflict and ensuring peace within Europe could they stand up to the Ottomans.¹⁷⁹

It is stated that in July 1501 (AH 907) the Crusader fleet dropped anchor near Smyrna and perpetrated horrific atrocities against the inhabitants. It is probable that the fleet formed by the Christian countries of Europe showed its superiority and its domination of the seas, attacking the Ottomans in their own territory.

In 918/1512 Bāyezīd II was succeeded by his son Selīm I, although ‘Selīm did not attach much importance to Europe and his reign is not regarded as one of great significance for the history of the Crusades’.¹⁸⁰

Under Süleimān I, known variously as the Magnificent, the Great and the Lawgiver (r. 926–74/1520–66), the Ottoman empire came to match the Christian empire of Charles V.¹⁸¹ The Ottomans became wealthier as a result of the conquest of Belgrade in 928/1521 and of Rhodes in 929/1522, then by their victory over the Hungarians at the battle of Mohacs and the subsequent fall of the kingdom of Hungary.¹⁸² The attacks on Belgrade and Rhodes were the last page in the history of Muslim victories, or what is known as the Counter-Crusade, and following this the conflict between the Ottomans and the Christian world entered a new phase.¹⁸³ In 935/1529 Süleimān reached the gates of Vienna to which he briefly laid siege before retreating to the Hungarian capital. This marked the greatest extent of Ottoman expansion into central Europe.¹⁸⁴

From then on, fortune did not always favour the Turks. In 973/1565 they failed to take the island of Malta, which came as a blow to Ottoman morale.¹⁸⁵ In 978/1570 the Ottoman takeover of Venice’s share of Cyprus led to the formation of a Christian fleet to be directed against them. The Crusaders were victorious in the battle of Lepanto waged in the Gulf of Corinth on 7 October 1571 (AH 979)¹⁸⁶ and for which full-scale preparations were made. Norman Housley notes that 208 Christian ships took part against some

178 Inalçik, ‘Ottoman Turks 1455–1552’, p. 335.

179 Ibid., p. 350.

180 Ibid., pp. 352–3.

181 Irwin, ‘Islam and the Crusades’, p. 255.

182 Ibid., p. 256.

183 Inalçik, ‘Ottoman Turks 1455–1552’, p. 353.

184 ‘Aṭiyya, , *al-‘Alāqāt*, p. 141.

185 Irwin, ‘Islam and the Crusades’, p. 256; see also ‘Aṭiyya, *al-‘Alāqāt*, p. 143.

186 Ibid.

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275 Turkish ships.¹⁸⁷ Another modern source, which focuses on the history of naval warfare, specifies the different types of Ottoman and Crusader vessels that took part and provides a detailed account of the battle.¹⁸⁸

The Christian fleet thus proved victorious and the Ottoman navy never regained its power. The battle of Lepanto was important not only because it loosened the Ottoman empire's grip and weakened its influence in the Mediterranean but also because it marked the end of fleets composed of light rowing vessels.¹⁸⁹ Although many Turkish sailors and archers met their deaths, their numbers were sufficiently large to withstand the loss, and the Ottomans were wealthy enough to be unaffected by the defeat. They began to build a new fleet.¹⁹⁰ Lepanto was 'a Christian naval victory on an unprecedented scale', and was marked by church commemorations in the form of paintings, commemorative medals and popular literature between late October and early December 1571.¹⁹¹

187 Housley, *The Later Crusades*, p. 141.

188 Ramaḍān, *Fann al-qitāl*, p. 45.

189 *Ibid.*, p. 48.

190 Irwin, 'Islam and the Crusades', p. 256.

191 Housley, *The Later Crusades*, p. 142.

Chapter 4.2

ISLAM IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

Yusof Ahmad Talib

The history of Islam in South-East Asia is a complex one. Its spread to this region, the farthest corner of the Muslim world, was largely brought about through the peaceful and gradual acceptance by growing numbers of its inhabitants to join the *Dār al-Islām* ('Abode of Islam'). This process spanned several centuries and started late when compared to that which took place in the heartlands of Islam in western Asia and North Africa. The view that 'Islam was only a thin, easily flaking glaze on the massive body of indigenous civilization'¹ is not tenable. Islam has had and continues to have a profound impact on the socio-cultural, political and economic life of South-East Asia. Indeed, it is today the most populous region of the Islamic world.

South-East Asia is strategically located and it constituted a veritable crossroads between western Asia, the Indian subcontinent and China well before the advent of Islam.² It has been observed by Prof. A. H. Johns that:

it is a region with a particular physical shape and a distinctive network of ecologies. However, areas capable of sustaining large populations are limited. There is severe internal fragmentation but a wide range of focal points,

1 J. C. Van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society: Essays in Asian Social and Economic History*, The Hague, van Hoeve, 1955, pp. 73–4.

2 G. F. Hourani, *Arab Seafaring in the Indian Ocean in Ancient and Medieval Times*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1951; S. A. Huzzayin, *Arabia and the Far East: their Commercial and Cultural Relations in Graeco-Roman and Irano-Arabian Times*, Cairo, Société Royale de Géographie d'Égypte, 1942; G. R. Tibbetts, 'Pre-Islamic Arabia and Southeast Asia', *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, XXIX, 1956, pp. 182–208; R. R. di Meglio, 'Il commercio arabo con la Cina (della Gahilliya al X secolo)', *Annali Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli*, XIV, 1964, pp. 523–52.

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which can serve as harbours – as places for the exchange and trans-shipment of goods between China and South West Asia.³

It was at such focal points that the first Islamic trading settlements were established. These settlements were, however, unstable and rarely endured for more than a century regardless of the range of their imperium. Once they had lost their authority, internal or external, they disappeared. Similarly, their heritage – cultural, architectural and economic – was also lost. Any new port city that replaced them represented a fresh beginning. Nowhere did a continuing tradition develop. There is hardly a locality with a history, a heritage, a tradition that could identify and stand for the region, a counterpart to other major centres in the Islamic world. Rather, their place was taken by a mosaic of starts, stops and fragmented development.⁴ Consequently, the sheer diversity and extent of the region make it impossible to formulate any single theory of Islamization.

The genesis of Islam in South-East Asia

Any attempt to throw light on when Islam first established a foothold and spread in the region is hampered by a dearth of documentary evidence. There are few recorded accounts of military conquests, political upheavals or the forceful imposition of foreign power structures and patterns of social behaviour. We only have fragments of epigraphic evidence,⁵ as well as local historiography in the form of annals and genealogies which are often blurred by legends and have more of an edifying than a historical character. This is supplemented by the classical geographic documents in Arabic⁶ as well as the accounts of early travellers⁷ and Chinese historical sources.⁸ Consequently, there are no simple answers to the questions of ‘when’, ‘why’, from which geographic area of the world and in what form Islam initially began to exercise a profound influence on the societies of South-East Asia.

3 A. H. Johns, ‘Islam in the Malay World. Desultory Remarks with Some Reference to Qur’ānic Exegesis’, *International Conference on Islam in South, Southeast and East Asia*, Jerusalem, Hebrew University, 1977.

4 Ibid.

5 L. C. Damais, ‘L’épigraphie musulmane dans le Sud-est Asiatique’, *Bulletin de l’École Française d’Extrême Orient*, 54, 1968, pp. 567–604.

6 G. R. Tibbetts, *A Study of the Arabic Texts containing Material on Southeast Asia*, Leiden/London, Royal Asiatic Society, 1979.

7 H. Yule, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*, London, John Murray, 1929; C. Defremery and B. R. Sanguinetti, *Voyages d’Ibn Battuta*, Paris, 1969.

8 S. M. Imamuddin, ‘Arab Mariners and Islam in China (under the Tang Dynasty AD 618–906)’, *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, XXXII, 1989; Haji Jusuf Chang, ‘The Ming Empire: Patron of Islam in China and Southeast–West Asia’, *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, LXI, Part 2, 1988, pp. 1–44.

THE ARRIVAL OF ISLAM IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA VIA TRADE ROUTES

It has been succinctly observed that in spite of the meagre and fragmentary sources at the disposal of scholars, it is nonetheless possible to see the extent of commercial relations between western Asia and the Far East during the first six centuries of Islamic history.⁹ According to G. R. Tibbetts, it is apparent that most of the commerce was in the hands of Muslim traders from the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the South Arabian coastal areas. Indian traders sailed to South-East Asia and also to China, but the Indians rarely if ever acted as middlemen between China and the countries of western Asia. The Arabs or Persians exercised control of commerce in their own seas and it was the Muslims from the Arabo-Persian homeland whom the Chinese sources reveal as holding the most important place among foreign traders in the Chinese ports. The Chinese called them 'Ta-Shih', a term generally applied to Arabs.¹⁰

Tibbetts is of the view that at the end of the ninth century AD a large area of South-East Asia was known to the Arab traders and a substantial number of products were taken back to the Middle East.¹¹ As a result of the different economic conditions in the two areas, however, this trade seems to have been on a completely different footing from that with China. In China, the Arab traders came across an elaborate organization controlled by the government. In South-East Asia, on the other hand, trade must have been conducted with the indigenous population on the shore or with petty rulers in the riverside villages. Kalah, a port at the southern end of the Malay peninsula, seems to have been a more organized district; while as far as we can tell from existing Arabic sources, the capital of the maharaja of Zabaj, the Saliendra of Sri Vijaya, although known to the Arabs, does not appear to have been a centre of commerce for them. Hence trade with South-East Asia was neglected for the more lucrative trade with China and it was only later that trade with the Malay archipelago developed.¹²

Abū Zayd (an editor at *Akhbār aṣ-Ṣīn*) reports the massacre of foreign merchants in Canton in AD 878 when the rebel Huang Chao besieged and sacked the city. This literally stopped all direct trade between China and western Asia and ruined many of the wealthy trading families in Oman

9 P. Wheatley, 'Geographical Notes on Some Commodities involved in Sung Maritime Trade', *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, XXXII, No. 186, 1961; F. Hirth and W. W. Rockhill (trans.), *Chua Ju-Kua*, St Petersburg, 1970.

10 G. R. Tibbetts, 'Early Muslim Traders in Southeast Asia', *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, XXX, No. 177, 1952, pp. 1-45.

11 *Ibid.*, p. 17.

12 *Ibid.*, p. 18.

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and Siraf. After this, Kalah became the central port for Chinese trade as well as that of the Malay archipelago.¹³

EARLY EVIDENCE OF ISLAMIC SETTLEMENTS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

The first reference to Islam in the Malay archipelago appears to have been made by the Venetian traveller Marco Polo in AD 1292 on his way home from China.¹⁴ He visited the 'Island of Java the less', which has been identified as Sumatra, and found that it was divided into eight kingdoms and that its people were all idolaters. However, when giving an account of one of these kingdoms, that of Ferlac (present-day Perlak), he made the contradictory statement that it was much frequented by Saracen merchants and that they had converted the indigenous inhabitants to the 'law of Mahommed'. He was essentially referring to the urban dwellers, for he described the inhabitants in the outlying areas as mere savages, cannibals by inclination and adherents of animism.¹⁵ In his description of other principalities in Sumatra, Marco Polo alludes to Sāmarrā, which has subsequently been identified as Samudra, and relates that its inhabitants were 'wild idolaters who had a king born great and rich'.¹⁶ This early, cursory and rather tentative attempt to depict the cultural and spiritual dimension of Sumatra prior to the establishment of Islam has encouraged a number of scholars to hold the view that Sumatra's arrival into the Islamic fold had only just begun.

A Malay royal chronicle, the *Hikayat Raja Pasai*,¹⁷ begins with the supernatural descent of the ancestors of the princes of Pasai, an account that is known from many a Malay tale, but remarkably enough their forefathers already bear the Muslim names Ahmad and Mohammad. This ancestral couple had two sons the elder of whom, Mērah Silu, founded the city of Samudra, having attained fame and wealth in a miraculous manner.¹⁸ Pasai was founded from Samudra. The story relates that:

in the days of the Apostle of God (may God bless him and give him peace), the Apostle of God said to his companions: 'In the latter days there shall be a city below the wind called Samudra, go thither with all speed and bring the

13 Al-Mas'ūdī, *Les prairies d'or*, trans. C. Barbier de Meynard and Pavet de Courteille, Paris, 1861, I, p. 308.

14 Yule, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo*.

15 *Ibid.*, p. 254.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 292, and note on p. 294.

17 A. H. Hill, 'Hikayat Raja-Raja Pasai', *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, XXXIII, Part 2, No. 190, 1960.

18 *Ibid.*, pp. 46-7.

people of that city into the faith of Islam, for in that city shall be born many saints of God. There shall be moreover a Fakir of a city named Ma'abri [on the Coromandel coast in India]. Him take with you.' Sometime after this saying of the Prophet (may God bless him and give him peace) the people of Mecca came to hear of the name of Samudra, and the ruler of Mecca sent a ship there with regalia on board and ordered that the ship should call at Ma'abri on the way. The master of the ship was one Shaikh Ismail.¹⁹

Shaikh Ismail took ashore the regalia he had brought with him on the ship and he installed Mērah Silu as raja with the title of Sultan Mālik aṣ-Ṣāliḥ. The sultan had two sons – Sultan Mālik al-Manṣūr and Sultan Mālik adh-Dhāhir. Before reaching Samudra, Shaikh Ismail made visits to a number of other places, these being Fansur, Lambri, Haru and Perlak. He then returned to Perlak.²⁰

An earlier historical source, the *History of the Yuan Dynasty*, records that in 1282 a Chinese envoy stationed in Quilon met a high-ranking official from the kingdom of Su-mu-ta (Samudra) and stressed to him the importance of initiating the diplomatic step of sending an emissary to the Chinese imperial court. Shortly afterwards, two envoys were sent to China and their names were given as Hasan and Sulaiman, indicating that they were Muslims. Based on this evidence, there is every likelihood that Pasai was an established state prior to Marco Polo's brief sojourn there in 1292.²¹

In 1345 the great Moroccan traveller Ibn Baṭṭūṭa²² visited northern Sumatra while on his passage to China and was warmly received by its ruler, Sultan Mālik adh-Dhāhir, with all the pomp befitting a Muslim court. In Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's rather detailed account, he mentions that the sultan and his subjects were adherents of the Shāfi'ī school of law.²³ The Islamization process accelerated during the first half of the fourteenth century and several adjacent areas came under the banner of Islam.

Melaka is situated along the strait of Melacca, which was part of the trade route between India and the West and China to the east. After its foundation in 1403 by a Hindu prince from Palembang (in Sumatra) named Parameswara, it soon developed from a mere fishing village to become a great trading centre. Initially to protect itself from Siamese attacks, it accepted the status of a tributary state of imperial China. In 1409 it was visited by the Ming official Admiral Zeng Ho, who was a Muslim. In 1411 Parameswara

19 C. C. Brown, 'Sejarah Melayu (The Malay Annals)', *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, XXV, Parts 2 and 3, 1952.


20 *Ibid.*, pp. 42–3.

21 E. H. Parker, 'The Island of Sumatra', *Asiatic Quarterly Review*, IX, 3rd Series, 1900, p. 131.

22 Defremery, *Voyages d'Ibn Battuta*, pp. 228–45.

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 230–1.

THE SPREAD OF ISLAM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD



4.5 The spread of Islam in South-East Asia (© R.R. Jambtan)

visited China as a token of respect. Parameswara became a Muslim and married a Muslim princess from neighbouring Pasai (northern Sumatra).

Muslim traders from India, Arabia and the Malay archipelago came to trade in Melaka and it developed into a powerful kingdom. However, Islam became the official religion only in the middle of the fifteenth century during the reign of Sultan Muzzāfar Shah (1446–56). During the reign of Sultan Mansur Shah (1456–77), Melaka became an empire and came to include the entire Malay peninsula and large parts of Sumatra.²⁴ Henceforth Melaka played a central role in the spread of Islam to other parts of South-East Asia. Important commercial links led to the establishment of Islam as the dominant faith of the northern Javanese coastal states. The states in the interior, notably Majapahit and Pasuruan to the east and Pajajaran to the west, remained staunchly Hindu, but gradually lost their political and economic domination. Islam also spread to the outer islands of Borneo, Celebes and

24 See W. S. Morgan, *The Story of Malaya*, Singapore, Malay Publishing House, 1952, pp. 21–31.

the Moluccas.²⁵ The fate of Melaka was sealed when it fell to the Portuguese forces under the command of Alfonso d'Albuquerque in 1511, almost two decades after the fall of Granada in Spain. This marked a crucial phase in the spread and establishment of Islam in the region, that of European colonial expansion.²⁶

The spread of Islam to the Philippines

Any historical reconstruction of the introduction of Islam to the Philippines is similarly hampered by a dearth of documents. The few at our disposal are in the form of genealogies, or *tarsilas*,²⁷ written in the Arabic script and largely commenting on the history of one of the sultanates, Mindanao, which preceded Christianity. They do, however, provide some information on the establishment of the Islamic faith in the southern parts of Mindanao and Sulu. We are indebted to Dr Najeeb M. Saleeby for having traced them and published them with translations and notes.²⁸

One of the *tarsilas* relates that in time gone by a celebrated sultan, Iskandar Dhu'l-Qarnayn, lived in Jūhūr (the present-day state of Johore at the southern tip of the Malay peninsula). He welcomed to his court a descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad, a certain Sharīf 'Alī Zayn al-Ābidīn who was an emigrant from the Ḥaḍramawt in southern Yemen and who was given in marriage to the sultan's daughter.²⁹ The union was blessed with three sons, the youngest of whom was named Sharif Kabungsuwan. He introduced Islam to Mindanao and became its first and greatest sultan. His two other brothers are not mentioned in the *tarsila*, but are referred to in other local traditions. Their names are given variously as Ahmad and al-Awi and Mohammed and Ahmad. The eldest founded the sultanate of Brunei and the second the sultanate of Sulu.³⁰

25 Y. A. Talib, 'Jawi Script, its Significance and Contribution to the Malay World', in *Three Fold Wisdom (Islam, the Arab World and Africa)*, Papers in Honour of Ivan Hrbek, Prague, 1993, p. 230, note 2.


26 Morgan, *The Story of Malaya*, p. 31.

27 This is derived from the Arabic *silsila* (genealogy).

28 N. M. Saleeby, *Studies in Moro History, Law, and Religion*, Manila, Saleeby Bureau of Public Printing, 1905.

29 *Ibid.*, pp. 52–4. See also A. Cabaton, 'Les Moros de Soulou et de Mindanao', *Monde Musulman*, IV, No. 1, 1908, pp. 21–74, on the role of the Alawi Sayyids of the Ḥaḍramawt in the spread of Islam in the Indian Ocean and the Malay world. See also Y. A. Talib, 'Études sur la diaspora des peuples arabes dans l'Océan Indien', *Diogenes*, Paris, 1980, pp. 39–54; Y. A. Talib, 'Les Hadramis et le Monde malais', *Archipel*, XII, Paris, 1974, pp. 41–68; 'Alawī al-Ḥaddād, *Ugūd al-Mās*, II, Singapore, 1950.

30 Saleeby, *Studies*, p. 53.



4.6 From left to right: Gravestone of Fatimah at Le'ran, East Java and gravestone from the south of Champa (© Journal Asiatique)

Kabungsuwan's departure from Jūhūr, or his arrival in Mindanao, occurred about the end of the fifteenth or beginning of the sixteenth century.³¹ *Tarsila* No. 2 states that many people accompanied Sharif Kabungsuwan on his departure from Jūhūr. *En route* they were dispersed by a storm and ultimately found their way to different ports. The places to which they went are reported to be Balimbang, Banjar, Kuran, Tampasak, Brunei, Sandakan, Sulu, Malabay, Tubuk and Mindanao. This statement clearly indicates a veritable immigration from the southern part of the Malay peninsula as far east as Mindanao.

Kabungsuwan was incontestably the greatest Muslim to arrive in the south of the Philippines. The traditions of Mindanao and its written records state that he was preceded by two pioneers, the first of whom was Sharif Awliya. The second arrival was that of Sharif Maraja, who is reported to have had a brother called Sharif Hassan who accompanied him as far as Basilan, but stopped there and founded the sultanate of Sulu. A new dynasty which stood for Islam, for progress and for civilization arose on the ruins of barbarism and heathenism. Islam brought in its wake art and communication with the outside world.³²

31 Ibid., p. 54.

32 Ibid., p. 52.

For four centuries different agents of civilizations have been at work in the Philippines. The Hispano-Christian influence started in the north and worked its way south, continuously progressing and constantly growing in power. The other, Islamic, trend began in the south and extended north but soon reached its limit.³³

Islam in Champa (Indo-China)

Islam spread to Champa much earlier than it did to other parts of the Malay archipelago. This is confirmed by the discovery of two monuments in the south of the country, a land once peopled by the Chams. These are an ancient people of the Malayo-Polynesian race who had very close linguistic and ethnographic links with the Malays of the archipelago and enjoyed long-established cultural and historical ties with them.³⁴ One of these monuments was found in the Phan-rang region and is a gravestone bearing an Arabic inscription in the Kufic script and dated 1039. The other is a very mutilated piece of stele inscribed with legal edicts. These edicts were first deciphered by the eminent French scholar Paul Ravaisse, who dated the stele to between 1025 and 1035.³⁵ According to an authoritative source, Phang-rang was referred to in ancient times as Panduranga³⁶ and was an important city. The *Annals of Annum* state that it was the capital of the Chams in 1477. It is now referred to as Phan-Ri and is situated on the east coast of southern Viet Nam.

Ravaisse is of the opinion that during the eleventh century there existed an urban population in Phan-rang regarding whom we possess little information. They were racially quite distinct from the indigenous population and also differed in their beliefs and customs. Their ancestors must have arrived there a century earlier and married local women. They were merchants and artisans, living in a well-organized society. They invested with authority a prominent member of the community who was referred to as the *shaykh as-sūq* ('lord of the marketplace'); his assistant was called a *nagīb*.³⁷

It is interesting to note that these settlers arrived in Phan-rang rather late when compared to those in southern China. Moreover, they did not

33 Ibid.

34 See the works of Antoine Cabaton, 'Les Moros'; 'Notes sur l'Islam dans l'Indochine française', *Monde Musulman*, 1906, pp. 27-47; 'Les Chams musulmans de l'Indochine française', *Monde Musulman*, II, 1907, pp. 129-80; 'Chams', in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Edinburgh, 1932, III, pp. 340-50.

35 P. Ravaisse, 'L'inscription coufique de Leran à Java', *Tijdschrift Bataviaasch Genootschap*, LXV, 1922, pp. 668-703.

36 M. G. Maspero, *Le Royaume de Champa*, Paris/Brussels, Vanoest, 1928.

37 Ravaisse, 'L'inscription'.

enjoy the same solidarity, the same potential for expansion, when compared with Muslim establishments in China which were numerous and prosperous and actively engaged in the propagation of Islam. However, ships from Basra, Siraf and Oman regularly called at the Islamic outposts on coastal Indo-China on their way to the *Bilād aṣ-Ṣīn* ('China').³⁸

The role of the Malay language in the Islamization process

As with other areas in the present inquiry, any attempt to study the adoption of the Jawi script (Malay written in a modified Arabic script) in the Malay archipelago in the wake of its Islamization is rendered problematic due to a scarcity of documentary material. We have only fragments of epigraphic evidence at our disposal.³⁹

Despite the fact that Java was Islamized much later than Sumatra, it is on the northern coast of Java that one finds one of the oldest known texts in the Arabic script in South-East Asia, that is, the inscription of Leran.⁴⁰ It is dated 7 Rajab 475/2 December 1082 and is on the tombstone of a young girl referred to as 'daughter of Maimun'. There is a possibility that the inscribed stone is an imported item and thus provides an isolated testimony of the use of the Arabic script in the Malay world. The next example of Arabic script dates from more than two centuries later: it is found on the 'Maesan' (tombstone) of Sultan Mālik aṣ-Ṣāliḥ of Pasai dated 696/1297 and is situated on the north-eastern coast of Sumatra.

A number of other tombstones have been found near the site of ancient Pasai close to Lho' Seumawe. All but one are inscribed in an ornamental script with numerous Qur'ānic citations and they were probably imported from Cambay in present-day Gujarat in India.⁴¹

It was the startling discovery of a stele in the Malaysian state of Trengganu some nine decades ago that gave us the first example of the use of the Arabic script in writing Malay. Compared with the script of the Pasai tombstones, that of Trengganu is plain, clean and functional. This is perhaps due to the fact that the Trengganu inscriptions contain laws and regulations,

38 Ibid., pp. 287–8. See also P. Y. Mauquin, 'L'introduction de l'Islam au Campa', *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient*, LXVI, 1979, pp. 255–87.

39 Damais, 'L'épigraphie musulmane', pp. 567–604.

40 J. P. Moquette, 'De oudste Moehammedaansche Inscriptie op Java n. m. de Grafsteen te Leran', in *Handelingen Van Erste Congres Voor de Taal – Land – en Volkerkunde van Java, Weltwreden*, 1921, pp. 391–9. See Plate II.

41 J. P. Moquette, 'De eerste Vorsten van Samoedra-Pasé', *Rapporten Van den Oudh Dienst in Nederlandsch Indie*, 1913, pp. 1–12. See Plate III.

were meant to be read, and thus had to be written in a script understandable at least to the elite.⁴²

Any study of the history of the spread of Islam to various parts of the globe would necessarily deal with the impact it had on the literatures and languages of newly converted peoples. This can be observed on two levels. First, Islam caused most of the previous literatures to disappear, in particular theological writings. Second, an enrichment process took place, with additions to the existing literature or the introduction of new literary genres such as *ḥikāyāt* (tales), *shi'r* (poetry) and so on, which replaced those that fell into oblivion.

It is important to note that the influence of Islam on the literatures of the Malay world is predominantly an influence of religion. Its main features are translations, reworkings and adaptations from Arabic and Persian works to educate and edify: textbooks of Arabic grammar, commentaries, translations of Qur'ānic *tajwīd* (the art of reciting the sacred text), religious biographies, philosophical treatises and tracts dealing with theological matters, law and mysticism – in short, with any aspect of Islamic spiritual and temporal life.⁴³

Henceforth, Malay was no longer confined to its dominant role as an international language of commerce: with the adoption and adaptation of the Arabic script, its vocabulary was enriched with a great number of Arabic and Persian words and phrases. Even its syntax was subject to the influence of Arabic.⁴⁴ It emerged as the language through which Islam spread its message throughout the Malay-speaking areas, attaining its apogee in the religious and cultural spheres during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when it remained unchallenged by any other regional language. Of equal significance is that the use of the Jawi' script inevitably paved the way for a kind of linguistic unity of the varied peoples of the Malay archipelago. To embrace Islam became synonymous with becoming Malay.⁴⁵

42 H. S. Paterson, 'An Early Malay Inscription from Trengganu', *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, II, Part 3, 1924, pp. 252–8. See Plate IV.

43 R. O. Winstedt, *A History of Classical Malay Literature*, rev., ed. and introduced by Y. A. Talib, Kuala Lumpur, Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1991.

44 P. Voorhoeve, 'Perzische invloed op het Maleis', *Bijdragen tot de Taal*, CXIII, 1952, p. 92.

45 A. Bausani, 'Note sui vocabuli persiani in Malese-Indonesiano', *Annali Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli*, XIV, 1964, p. 32. The influence of Arabic on local languages in the process of Islamization is not only confined to the Malay world, but is also seen in South India and the East African littoral as far south as Madagascar. On the origins and development of Arab-Tamil (*lisān al-arwī*), see Shu'ayb Alim Takya, *Arabic, Arwi and Persian in Serendib and Tamil Nadu*, Madras, 1996, pp. 54–126. In the state of Kerala (India) it is referred to as 'Arab-Malayali'. On the role of Kiswahili in East Africa, see J. S. Trimmingham, *Islam in East Africa*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964. In Madagascar, it is termed 'Sorabe'. On this, see Jacques Dez, 'De l'influence arabe à Madagascar à l'aide de faits linguistiques', in *Arabes et Islamistes à Madagascar et dans l'Océan Indien*, Tananarive, Imprimerie Nationale, 1967, pp. 1–14.

The acceleration of the Islamization process

In the sixteenth century, the increasing appeal of Islam must be studied within the framework of developments that were taking place in the Islamic world at large. The links initially established by Muslim settlements in the Malay archipelago with the Islamic heartlands were considerably reinforced during this period. There was also a strengthening of commercial, diplomatic and cultural exchanges with two of the important Islamic powers of the period: the Ottoman caliphate and the Mughal empire on the Indian subcontinent.

It is equally pertinent to note that despite the conquest of the sultanate of Melaka by the Portuguese in 1511 and the arrival of the Spaniards in the Philippines, Islam continued to spread to other parts of the Malay world. These European invasions were not just oriented towards proselytization but also towards the destruction of Muslim commercial dominance in the region. Indeed, protracted conflicts between Christians and Muslims in Europe and western Asia had prompted constant appeals for crusades and *jihād* ('holy war'), which were gradually disseminated by itinerant scholars and merchants to South-East Asia. This was also a period that witnessed the rise and consolidation of Islamic sultanates, the most important being that of Atjeh (present-day Aceh) in northern Sumatra.

The expansion of international shipping resulted in increasing numbers of South-East Asian Muslims being able to perform the annual pilgrimage and thus to visit the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. They could sojourn there for long periods of study and thus come under the influence of, and develop close student-master relationships with, prominent scholars hailing from all four corners of the Islamic world.

It is equally important to note the central role played by Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, in the spread of Islam in the region. Sufi scholars travelled along trade routes where members of their mystical orders (*ṭarīqas*) often resided in the trading centres. The most important Sufi orders in South-East Asia were the Qādiriyya, the Shattāriyya and the Naqshbandiyya.⁴⁶

This period also saw an increasing number of migrants coming principally from the South Arabian ports of ash-Shiḥr and al-Mukalla, settling throughout the Malay archipelago and thereby constituting a crucial factor in the Islamization process. The prominent members of this South Arabian migration were the Bā 'Alawī Sayyids, who never severed their ties with their ancestral land and who established close links with their established mystical brotherhoods, the 'Alawiyya *ṭarīqa* in the Islamic heartlands as well as the land bordering the Indian Ocean. The Bā 'Alawīs

46 D. A. Rinkes, *Abdoerraoef van Singkel Bigdrage tot de kennis van de mystiek op Sumatra en Java*, Heerenveen, 1909.

were held in great esteem on account of their Arab race and their lineage, being direct descendants of the Prophet. Their intermarriage with the princely and aristocratic families in the region afforded them influential roles and they occupied high positions as religious dignitaries and political advisors.

The closing years of the eighteenth century and the entire nineteenth century witnessed the expansion of Arab settlements in the sultanate of Atjeh, the port city of Palembang in Sumatra, and the sultanates of Kedah in the northern part of the Malay peninsula, the Riau archipelago, the island of Penang, Batavia (present-day Jakarta) and the principalities in the north-eastern parts of the island of Java. The sultanates of Siak in South Sumatra, that of Pontianak, Kubu, Mempawa, Matan in West Kalimantan (Borneo) as well as that of Perlis in the north of the Malay peninsula bordering Thailand were founded by Hadramī Sayyids.⁴⁷

The rapid dissemination of the Islamic faith and its triumphant advance in the region was largely due to its toleration of pre-Islamic beliefs and customary laws (*‘adāt*) as long as these did not contradict or oppose the teachings of Islam or the *sharī‘a*. This inevitably led to increasing numbers of Muslims acknowledging that the doctrine of Islam formed part and parcel of their cultural traditions and was not a foreign import.

The sultanate of Atjeh

In the early years of the sixteenth century and during the reign of the sultanate of Atjeh’s founder and first sovereign, Sultan ‘Alī Mughayat Shah (d. 937/1530), the coastal regions of south-east Sumatra were conquered. These conquests were further extended to include the Batak regions of central Sumatra by Mughayat Shah’s son and successor, Sultan ‘Alā-ad-Dīn Riāyat Shah al-Kahār (d. 976/1568).

In 1575 and 1582 several learned scholars, or *‘ulamā’*, from Mecca stayed in Atjeh in order to establish centres for the study of Islamic metaphysics, or *taṣṣawuf*. Studies which had already started earlier now developed further, resulting in the production of an increasing number of important religious tracts and treatises and the emergence of scholars, one of the most illustrious of whom was Ḥamza Fansuri, a member of the Qādiriyya mystical order.⁴⁸ In turn, this led to a renewal of the process of Islamization on the islands of Java and Sumatra.

Atjeh reached its apogee as a military and commercial power in the first half of the seventeenth century and it was the first Islamic sultanate in

47 Al-Ḥaddād, *Ugūd al-Mās*; Talib, ‘Les Hadramis’.

48 J. Doorenbos, ‘De Geschriften van Hamzah Pansuri’, PhD thesis, Leiden, 1933.

the region to appear in the full light of history. During the reign of Iskandar Muda (1606–36), widely known as Maḥkota ‘Alām (‘Crown of the World’), Atjeh conquered the Malay state of Perak and raided the kingdom of Johore. It subsequently went on to extend its authority over the rest of the Malay archipelago with the exception of Java and the islands in the eastern regions.

Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, commercial, diplomatic and cultural exchanges took place between Atjeh and Istanbul. For the sultans of Atjeh, the Ottoman sovereign always represented the indispensable foreign ally against the Christian invaders the Portuguese and, at a later period, the Dutch. The first diplomatic mission sent by Atjeh to Istanbul was dispatched by Sultan ‘Alā-ad-Dīn Riāyat Shah al-Kahār in 1562.⁴⁹ The Atjehnese were also in close contact with the Mughal court and imitated its ritual and administration.

It was, however, during the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda that a sultanate arose whose ruler was the leader of an Islamic community. Islamic teachers had a role at court and were responsible for the reception of foreign visitors, these being religious scholars from South Asia and the Islamic heartlands who brought learned treatises for commentaries and instructions. The Atjehnese themselves made the pilgrimage to Mecca and studied at the religious centres of Islam in the Ḥijāz and Yemen. There was a continuous flow of correspondence on religious matters between Atjeh and Arabia.

It is during this period that we come to know of the leading ‘*ulamā*’ by name and can identify those who played influential roles in court life and whose works and polemics can be studied. One of these religious scholars was Shams-ad-Dīn as-Sumatrānī (d. 1630) whose patron was Sultan Iskandar and who was proclaimed as the *shaykh al-Islām* (principal theologian) of Atjeh. As-Sumatrānī was one of the first exponents of the Islamic mystical tradition and two of his works have now been published.⁵⁰

The debates and polemics on *wujūdiyya* mysticism that started in the fifteenth century continued to dominate the spiritual climate of Atjeh, the spiritual nerve centre of the Malay archipelago until after the arrival of Nūr-ad-Dīn ar-Rāmīrī,⁵¹ a Ḥaḍramī migrant from Gujarat, India, during the reign of Sultan Iskandar II. Ar-Rāmīrī challenged the pantheistic heterodoxy of his predecessors and had their works burnt and their followers persecuted. His influence through his various polemical writings has been compared to that of Iranian Imam al-Ghazālī on Islamic philosophy.

49 Denys Lombard, *Le Sultanat d’Atjeh au temps d’Iskandar Muda 1607–1636*, Paris, École Française d’Extrême Orient, 1967.

50 C. A. O. Van Niewenhuize, *Shamsu’l-din van Pasai*, Leiden, 1945.

51 M. N. al-‘Attās, ‘Rānīnī and the Wujūdiyya of 17th Century’, *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, III, 1966.

Ar-Rāmīrī remained in Atjeh until 1644 and was the chief *qāḍī* (judge) under Sultan Iskandar.

The most significant event after this period was the translation of the Qur’ān and al-Bayḍāwī’s celebrated exegesis *Anwār at-tanzīl* into the Malay language by ‘Abd-ar-Rā’uf as-Sinkilī (1620–93), a member of the Shattāriyya mystical order who became famous during the reign of Sultana Saffiyat-ad-Dīn Shah (1641–75).⁵²

During the eighteenth century, the South Sumatran city of Palembang became a centre of Islamic learning and witnessed the establishment of an important circle of scholars. The presence of an emergent South Arabian colony in the sultanate of Palembang may have encouraged contacts with Yemen and western Arabia.

The most celebrated religious scholar during this period of Islamic expansion was ‘Abd-aṣ-Ṣamad ibn ‘Abdallāh al-Palimbanī.⁵³ He left his native city of Palembang to pursue his studies in Medina in western Arabia and Zabīd⁵⁴ in Yemen, where he spent a great part of his scholarly life. However, he continued to maintain close links with his place of origin as well as other areas in the Malay archipelago. He was a prime mover in the dissemination of the Samaniyya mystical order in South-East Asia and wrote a number of works in Malay as well as Arabic on *‘ulūm ad-dīn* (lit. sciences of the religion), *awrād* (regular voluntary invocations) and *jihād*.⁵⁵ His work in these areas contributed in no small measure to the development of Islamic studies in the Malay world. This was especially the case regarding his Malay translation of al-Ghazālī’s *Lubab ihyā’ ‘ulūm ad-dīn*, begun in Mecca in 1193/1779 and completed in the hill resort of aṭ-Ṭā’if in 1203/1788.⁵⁶



4.7 Headstone of Sultan Mālik aṣ-Ṣāliḥ’s grave (Courtesy of the author)

52 Rinkes, *Abdoerraef*.

53 M. R. Feener, ‘Yemeni Sources for the History of Islam in Indonesia: ‘Abd al-Samad Palimbani in the *Nafas al-Yamani*’, in *La transmission du savoir dans le monde musulman périphérique*, Paris, CNRS-EAESS, 1999.

54 ‘Abd-ar-Raḥmān al-Ḥaḍramī, *Zabīd*, Damascus, Institut Français d’Études Arabes, 2000.

55 C. Brockelman, *Geschichte Der Arabischen Litteratur*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1938.

56 Feener, ‘Yemeni Sources’, p. 136, note 42.

The rise of powerful Islamic states in Java and other parts of the eastern Malay archipelago

Some time between 1486 and 1515 the centre of Hindu-Buddhist power in Java shifted towards the east of the island at Kederi, but it was already in an advanced state of decline, rent apart by internal conflicts and threatened by the rise of Islamic coastal states. Its collapse occurred c. 1527 and was brought about by a coalition of a number of Islamic states under the leadership of Demak. This was an event of the utmost importance in the spread and consolidation of Islamic power on the island.

The ruler of the state of Demak assumed the title of sultan in 1524 and was intent on exerting his Islamic leadership over adjacent areas. Banten in West Java now emerged as an important Islamic centre and began incursions into the pepper-producing areas of Lampung in Sumatra. Its sultan, Hassanuddin (r. c. 1552–70), exerted his authority over the area. By the 1540s, the armed forces of the sultanate of Demak were prepared to make incursions into the eastern parts of Java that remained un-Islamized. Although Demak subsequently began to decline, this did not mark a slowing down of Islamic missionary efforts. Its place was taken by Gresik, which played a major role in supporting Islamic missionary efforts in Lampong, Makassar, Kutai and Malukku.⁵⁷ A further important stage was reached when the kingdoms of Goa-Tallo (Makassar) on the island of Sulawesi in eastern Indonesia embraced Islam.

It should be stressed, however, that as in other parts of the archipelago, the spread of Islam was a gradual and protracted affair and did not occur as related in the local chronicles, which state that the rulers converted through sudden revelations. Of these conversions, it was that of Luwu, the oldest and most prestigious kingdom in Sulawesi, in 1605 which was the most decisive.

Makassar's patronage of Islam provided a new base for missionary activities in Sulawesi and eastern Indonesia. It invited the surrounding kingdoms to accept the Islamic faith and when they refused Makassar launched a series of military campaigns against them. These proved to be successful, and by 1611 all of south-west Sulawesi, including Makassar's rival, Bone, had embraced the faith. During the 1640s all the neighbouring regions accepted Makassar's overlordship and with it the religion of Islam.


57 C. A. Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines: Past, Present and Future Prospects*, Manila, Convislam, 1971.

THE PHILIPPINES

When the Spaniards arrived in the Philippines in 1521 they regarded local Muslims in the same light as their old adversary ‘the Moro’, and for them it was a veritable extension of their crusade in South-East Asia. In 1565 they launched a series of ‘Moro wars’ against the Muslims of Sulu and Mindanao, which culminated in the invasion of the sultanate of Brunei in 1578 and 1581 and led to them successfully halting the spread of Islam towards the east of Mindanao. This policy was in accordance with the Spanish aim of Hispanicizing and Christianizing the local populations. Apart from religious and political objectives, Spain was equally determined to expel the Moro’s hold on local and regional trade. These objectives were actively pursued throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In 1637 Lamitan, the capital of Sultan Qudarat of Mindanao, fell to the Spanish forces and Jolo was occupied the following year. However, eight years after the fall of Lamitan, the Spaniards withdrew their forces and signed a treaty with Qudarat recognizing his sphere of influence over Zamboanga in the gulf of Davao and towards the east up to the territory of the Maranao. War broke out again in 1656 with a *jihad* conducted by Sultan Qadarat and the sultans of Sulu, Ternate and Macassar. In 1643 the Spaniards retired once more, only to return in 1718 to begin another series of ‘Moro wars’. In 1860 the Spanish authorities established ‘the Mindanao Government’ and eighteen years later the sultan of Sulu recognized Spanish sovereignty.⁵⁸

Finally, it is important to note that the spread of Islam via trade routes, the preponderant role played by Sufism and the use of the lingua francas of the region in the Islamization process were not only confined to South-East Asia. A similar state of affairs can be observed along the coastal regions of western and eastern India (Gujarat, Kerala and Tamil Nadu), along the East African littoral (Somalia, Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania) and the islands of the Indian Ocean (northern Madagascar, the Comoros and the Maldives).



4.8 The Trengganu Stone (Courtesy of the author)

58 Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines*.

Chapter 4.3 (a)

ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA UP TO THE MONGOL INVASION

Richard Frye

By Central Asia is meant Transoxiana, or the area that the Arabs call *Mā warā' an-nahr*, 'What is beyond the river', the river being the Amu Darya, the ancient Oxus (Jayhūn in the Arabic sources), and the frontier of the former Sāsānid empire in the north-east. The Muslim forces which pursued the last Sāsānian ruler, Yazdgird, to the Merv oasis where he was killed found a desert some 200 km wide which separated them from the river and a new world.

The history of Central Asia before the advent of Islam is different to that of the Iranian plateau. In the seventh century AD Central Asia had a mercantile culture and was ruled by many small city-states with trade connections to the north and to the east. The local aristocracy was composed of great landowners and rich merchants, whereas in Sāsānid domains the landed aristocracy vied with religious leaders for power and influence. Merchants were not held in high esteem in Persia and Transoxiana, and this had an effect on the spread of Islam. This is because the Prophet Muḥammad and his wife Khadīja had both been merchants in the Ḥijāz, and the Prophet's followers found communities in Central Asia which were favourably disposed to trade and traders, as was the case in pre-Islamic Arabia. Furthermore, the society in Persia was sedentary and pastoralists were not found in great numbers or of any influence; whereas in Central Asia a different situation prevailed. Here, pastoralists constantly surrounded and infiltrated the oases of the Zarafshan, Kashka and Surkhan river valleys.

Like the bedouin of Arabia, the nomads of Transoxiana lived in symbiosis with the settled folk, usually in a close trading relationship. But the settled folk were also frequently disturbed by raids of nomads seeking plunder or trying to impose their rule. Similarly, the tribal structure of the

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Arab *muqātila*, or warriors, who raided Central Asia from Merv (modern Mary) was similar to that which existed among the nomads of Central Asia who proved to be the most formidable opponents of the Muslim armies. How much of this correspondence was understood by the invaders, and whether it influenced their conduct, is unknown. But it is plausible to assume that some of them were aware of the situation in Central Asia as distinct from Persia.

Transoxiana was by no means as unified or centralized as the Sāsānid empire and the invading Muslims had therefore to deal with numerous individual principalities rather than a single state. During the seventh century AD, in the deserts and steppes of present-day Turkmenistan were tribes and leaders who may have paid lip service to Sāsānid governors but nonetheless acted as they saw fit and in defence of their own interests.

There were a number of city-states ruled by local dynasties in the oasis of Bukhāra in the Zarafshan valley, but at the time of the Muslim conquest Bukhāra had probably already dropped its name of Numijkath (after the indigenous name for the river) and had assumed the title of the oasis of which it now was the most important city. It had managed to gain that position over rivals, such as Paikand and Vardāna, due to its strategic position where the river divided into many streams and canals, these being vitally important for agriculture as well as for trade.

To the north of Bukhāra was the oasis of Khwārazm. Although not as large as the oasis of Bukhāra, it was nevertheless sufficiently large to permit rule to be frequently divided between the northern and southern parts. Trade with nomads was especially important here since Khwārazm, south of the Aral Sea, was often the base for caravans heading across the deserts to where furs, amber, beeswax and even wood could be obtained from the settled peoples living along the Volga and other rivers in what is today the Russian Federation. The Khwārazmians spoke an Iranian language close to the Sogdian of Bukhāra, and their culture and society were also very similar.

To the east, across the Kyzyl Kum desert, was the fertile oasis of Chāch, called Shāsh by the Arabs and known as Tashkent today. It had been settled by Sogdian speakers from the south, and was considered a Sogdian land with a number of small principalities, but with a smaller population than the southern oases. The 'Mountains of Heaven' (Tien Shan) farther to the east were inhabited by pastoralists who had already become mixed with Turkic tribes from the north. The areas of present-day Kazakhstan and the Ili valley had become the domain of Turkic peoples who had long since absorbed the Iranian speakers and other peoples of the steppes and mountain valleys.

The heartland of Central Asia was Sogdiana, with ancient Samarkand as the principal city. Sogdians had expanded into the Ferghana valley to the east, and Sogdian merchants had established trading colonies in Kashgar

and other oases of eastern Central Asia. Many small principalities flourished on the 'Silk Road' to China, two of the largest being Ustrushana in Ura-Tube (present-day Istaravshan) and Khojent of northern Tajikistan, and the town of Ferghana in the rich valley to the east. Another Sogdian principality was at Panjikant on the Zarafshan river to the east of Samarkand, notable for the wall paintings in the homes of rich merchants excavated in recent years. The other important Sogdian principalities were Kesh (modern-day Shahrīsabz) and Nakhshab or Nasaf (modern Karshi) on the Kashka Darya to the south of Samarkand. The Hissan mountain range marked the boundary between Sogdiana and Bactria to the south.

Bactria, with its principal city of Balkh, was the most populous of the regions of Central Asia, but at the time of the Arab conquests it too was divided into many principalities. Northern Bactria had already experienced Sogdian colonization but the city-states of Termez, Chagāniyān (present-day upper Surkhan Darya), Buttam (Dushanbe area) and Khuttāl had started to abandon their native tongues in favour of Persian, since the Sāsānians had occupied much of the fertile lands of Bactria in the past. In the mountains of Badakhshān and the Hindu Kush, however, the Bactrian language was still written in the modified Greek characters that the Kushans had introduced centuries previously, and dialects of it were still spoken. Buddhism was the chief religion in Bactria, and the land was filled with stupas, *viharas* and other Buddhist institutions.

In Sogdiana and Khwārazm there was no dominant religion, for missionaries had converted many to Nestorian Christianity, and to Manichaeism, while local forms of Zoroastrianism were the prominent indigenous faiths. There was no state religion with a hierarchy, as in the Zoroastrianism of Sāsānid Persia, and the general laxity and tolerance of other religions made conversion to Islam easier in Central Asia than in other lands. In addition to Jewish merchants and Buddhist adepts, though few in number, there were many who held local, popular beliefs, including shamanism which was popular among the nomads. Thus the religious situation in Sogdiana, and indeed in all of Central Asia, was radically different from that of the Sāsānid empire.

In the mountainous 'refuge' areas of the Pamirs and Hindu Kush, then as now, were remnants of indigenous peoples who maintained their own languages and customs, which were different from those of the lowland folk. The Indian and Iranian worlds met here, but slowly the dominance of the former was giving way to the spread of the latter, such that today we find Iranian-speaking Pashtuns and Baluch settled in the lowlands of the subcontinent of India. The spread of Islam into the mountains of present-day Afghanistan and the Indus river valley is not part of the history of Central Asia and will not be considered, except to remark that at times the

Muslim armies sent to Sind were coordinated with conquests in Central Asia, especially under the later Umayyads. Let us turn to the conquests in Central Asia.

The first raids across the Oxus river were initiated by the governor of Khurāsān, ‘Ubaydallāh ibn Ziyād, in 54/673 from Merv which had been occupied in 36/656. The civil war in the heart of the Umayyad caliphate brought an end to raids, and it was not until the time of ‘Abd-al-Malik that the conquest of Central Asia was begun in earnest under the energetic viceroy of Iraq and the East, al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf, beginning in 78/697.

Several generations had passed since the Arabs expanded from Arabia and many Muslims in the armies sent to Central Asia and Sind by al-Ḥajjāj were sons of mixed marriages, or Persians and other ethnic groups with the status of *mawālī* (clients) of Arab tribes. Furthermore, a great number of Arabs had learnt Persian, and this language served as the means of communication between the Muslims and the peoples of Central Asia. Many new converts had enlisted in the armies such that new resources were needed for their payment, as well as for the bureaucracy of the Umayyad caliphate. So the conquest of Central Asia was motivated mainly by the need for booty and additional subjects to tax. On the other hand, in the armies pious Muslims and missionary-minded persons were found who wanted to spread the faith, consequently conversions were made. Similarly, some settled Arabs began to cooperate with local merchants in trade, and this was especially fostered by one early governor of Khurāsān, al-Muhallab ibn Abī Ṣufra. Unfortunately for the Umayyads, al-Muhallab died in 82/702 and was succeeded by his son Yazīd, who was not as competent as his father but was replaced by an even more ineffectual half-brother. Finally, al-Ḥajjāj was able to appoint a tough general, Qutayba ibn Muslim, in 86/705.

Qutayba successfully practised a new two-pronged policy. He secured the participation of the local population in dividing and conquering the petty rulers, and he persuaded the Muslims to settle permanently in the conquered towns by promising them booty. To secure the support of the local people, he paid them to become Muslims and join his forces. The policy was most successful in Sogdiana, but everywhere recruits joined the victorious forces of the Arab general. Several local rulers called on the Turks to help them against the Muslims and Qutayba had much severe fighting before victory. Warfare was harsh, with frequent executions of prisoners, and as a result of the conquests the slave markets of the caliphate were filled with prisoners sent from Central Asia. Many of the local inhabitants accepted Islam to avoid such penalties, and Qutayba used both the carrot and the stick, especially the latter.

The death of Qutayba’s patron al-Ḥajjāj, followed soon afterwards by that of the caliph al-Walīd in 96/715, brought an end to the conquests, for



4.9 Dome of the Shīr dor Madrasa, Samarkand (© UNESCO)

Qutayba revolted against his enemy the new caliph Sulaymān, brother of al-Walīd. Sulaymān changed the caliphate from a community of Arab Muslims, based on bedouin or tribal mores, to a Syrian Arab kingdom, for the support of the dynasty now were the troops from Syria. Although the numbers of *mawālī* slowly grew, their allegiance to their Arab tribal patrons declined in favour of a general adherence to the tenets of Islam.

For a short time, from 99/717 to 101/720, the caliph ‘Umar II ibn ‘Abd-l-‘Azīz pursued a policy of conversion by peaceful means rather than war, as well as stressing the equality of non-Arab Muslims with Arabs. This policy had some success, but after the death of ‘Umar a return to the harsh policies of the past resulted in revolts against Umayyad rule.

Since the trade routes to the East had to be defended with garrisons and settlements of Arabs, the population of Central Asia at last became reconciled to their conquerors and mixed with them, far more so than in Persia where the division between Arab Muslim and Zoroastrian Persian was deep, even though a *modus vivendi* had been established between the two communities. To become a Muslim meant to sever all connections with family and community and become an Arab, learn the Arabic language and Arab customs. It was in Central Asia, however, that the equation Muslim equals Arab was broken, but that was after the fall of the Umayyads.

There was much fighting in Central Asia until the ‘Abbāsīd revolution and the Turks, allied to local rulers, were frequently victorious in battle.

However, the conciliatory policies of the later governors of Khurāsān, especially the last of these, Naṣr ibn Sayyār, swung the balance in favour of the Muslims. The Umayyads were brought down not by local people or new converts, but by Arab tribal conflicts all over the caliphate, and Central Asia was not immune to the revolts.

The leader of the ‘Abbāsīd forces in the East, Abū Muslim, was the architect of victory over the Umayyads, but his very success aroused the envy of the new ‘Abbāsīd caliph as-Saffāh, who had him assassinated. Some of Abū Muslim’s followers revolted, however, declaring him a saint. Central Asia became the breeding ground for more revolts against the new caliphate in Baghdad. The new movements were religious in nature, as though the coming of Islam had engendered an awakening of such sentiments in many people previously less concerned with religion. Mixtures of Zoroastrian and Islamic beliefs seem to have been popular, with a common thread of belief in a messiah. One such revolt, that of Ishāq the Turk in Transoxiana, proclaimed Abū Muslim a hidden Imam. Another similar movement was the revolt of Ostādsīs in the area of Harāt. Elsewhere, Yūsuf al-Barm in Bukhāra claimed to be reviving a Zoroastrian sect called Khurramdīn (‘the happy religion’). His preaching was mixed with Islamic features, such that some authors writing in Arabic claimed that its adherents really belonged to an Islamic sect located in rural districts. Metempsychosis was preached by another religious leader called al-Muqanna’ in Kesh, who proclaimed himself to be the reincarnation of Abū Muslim.

These revolts were religious and social more than political, for the followers mainly came from the lower classes, and they were usually new Muslims or even followers of other faiths. The revolts were not intended to overthrow the government but rather to change its policies towards the people. Revolts against ‘Abbāsīd rule, such as those of the Khārijīs and Shī‘ites, on the other hand, were led by Arabs, and questions of orthodoxy and heresy were political in nature. During the first two centuries of Islam, there was confusion about the nature of the faith and of orthodoxy, while later the intellectual freedom of the court at Baghdad, and the disputes over questions of philosophy and religion by the Mu‘tazila and others, only widened the vistas of Muslim thinkers. Only in the fourth century AH, when al-Ash‘arī laid the basis of the Sunnī profession of faith, did orthodoxy have any meaning.

Central Asia was by no means completely secure for Muslims under the ‘Abbāsīds. For example, in the time of al-Ma‘mūn (d. 218/833) Ṭalḥa ibn Ṭāhir, the governor of Khurāsān, accompanied a caliphal army sent against Ustrushana when the ruler, Afshīn, stopped sending tribute to Baghdad. The local ruler was defeated and he accepted Islam, agreeing to resume his tribute. This incident reveals the nature of the Muslim conquests in Central


Asia. A few cities were held by the caliph's officers and troops, but some areas were left alone as long as taxes or tribute were paid. Expeditions continued to be sent against the infidel Turks, usually by the governors of Khurāsān who for a long period were members of the Ṭāhirid family.

The initial wave of conversions had slackened, but individuals still acted as missionaries, especially sectarians such as the Shī'ites and Khārijīs. A new impetus came under the Sāmānid dynasty, when competition from the Fāṭimid caliphate of Egypt in the form of Ismā'īlī missionaries engendered a reaction from Sunnī religious leaders. In Persia during the tenth century AD many villages were converted to Islam, while in Central Asia we find a great expansion in the number of *ribāṭs* (caravanserais, usually fortified) where *ghāzīs* (soldiers for the propagation of Islam) gathered for local expeditions or for those into the steppes. Many zealous Muslims went to Sāmānid domains from the eastern Islamic world to fight, especially against the infidel Turks, to obtain slaves and convert them. In doing so, they also expanded the domain of Islam.

The tenth century AD was not only the time of the expansion of Islam to Kashgar and Khotan, and north of Shash into the steppes with the conversion of Turkic tribes, but it was also the period of the flowering of Islamic learning in Central Asia. The Sāmānid capital Bukhāra became a counterpart to Baghdad, and in some Arabic sources was called the 'dome of Islam in the East'.

It is noteworthy that in the early centuries of Islam one hears of many savants named after their homelands – Khwārazmīs, Bukhārīs, Samarkandīs and Nishapūrīs – but few Shīrāzīs, Isfahānīs or other western Iranians. One reason for the difference was the more open society in Central Asia, more conducive to an amalgam of religious, scientific and philosophical thought than the area of the former Sāsānid empire, which maintained a separation of religious communities. This was a heritage from pre-Islamic times when each minority religion was governed by its own leaders as in a ghetto, and it continued after Islam became the ruling religion, when the Zoroastrians maintained a separate existence from the rulers. At the end of the tenth century AD, the geographer al-Muqaddasī wrote that in the East, scholars ('*ulamā'*') were esteemed, while in Shīrāz and other cities of Persia it was the scribes who received the honours.

Schools of Islamic law also arose in Khurāsān and Central Asia. One famous scholar was Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl al-Bukhārī, the Shāfi'ite author of the canonical *Ḥadīth* collection of sayings of the Prophet. Others were at-Tirmidhī, and Ibn Ḥanbal, founder of the Ḥanbalite school of law, who was an Arab born in Merv but who moved to the West. There were many others. The names of scholars and poets who flourished under the Sāmānids would make a very long list. In short, Central Asia was where Islam was



4.10 Entrance of a mosque, Bukhāra (© UNESCO)

transformed from a religion bound to Arab – and still even to bedouin – mores into a fully fledged world religion with many and varied features of cosmology, philosophy, ethics and mysticism.

Ismā‘īl, the founder of the Sāmānid state, expanded his domains by subduing Talas in 280/893. Ten years later another expedition to the north secured the frontiers of his state in that direction against the raids of the Turks, and also enabled Muslim missionaries to penetrate even farther into the steppes. It was at the Sāmānid court that the Persian language, written in the Arabic alphabet, became a vehicle first of poetry and then of an Islamic literature, parallel to Arabic in the eastern Islamic world. Also in the Sāmānid state, the division of literate people into scribes (*kuttāb*, the bureaucracy), the literary class (*udabā’*) and religious leaders (*‘ulamā’*) was fully developed, and the latter were by no means the more influential.

In the end, the army, controlled by Turks who had been slaves, took over and Turks became rulers. Their leaders fought among themselves for power and the Sāmānid rulers lost their influence. In 999 the Karakhanid Turks from the East entered Bukhāra and the Sāmānid state fell. The people of Bukhāra did not rally to their former rulers since their religious leaders reminded them that the Karakhanids were Muslims, and Turks were already in charge of the Sāmānid state.

In the two centuries between the Sāmānids and the Mongol invasion, the economic, social and political role of religious leaders in the towns of

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Central Asia grew as central authority declined. There were fewer struggles between followers of the various religious schools of law (Ḥanafīs, Ḥanbalīs, Shāfi'īs and Mālikīs) there than in Persia, while the Ismā'īlīs and Karrāmīs lost any importance. In Chinese Turkistan (Xinjiang today), however, a struggle between the Muslim Karakhanids, based in Kashgar and Khotan, and the Buddhist Uighurs of Kucha and Turfan, engendered the lore of an opponent of the Muslims, similar to those on the frontiers of Islam in Anatolia (Diogenes Akritas), and in Spain (the story of El Cid). Just as an Islamic Persian literature was born under the Sāmānids, so under the Karakhanids a Turkic Islamic literature came into existence. Islam did not spread among the Uighurs, however, until the time of the Mongols, and the following history of the expansion of Islam in Central Asia is connected with the rise of Islam in China and in Russia.

Chapter 4.3 (b)

ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA

Devin DeWeese

The study of Islam in Central Asia has lagged well behind scholarship on Islam in other major regions of the Muslim world, not only because of the effects of Soviet ideology on intellectual endeavours in Central Asia itself during the twentieth century, but also because of academic trends in the West that relegated the region to the politically charged world of Soviet studies. The effects of this scholarly neglect are, ironically, more serious for the later historical periods. Before the Mongol conquest, Central Asia was such an integral part of the larger Islamic world, and contributed so much to the central lines of its social, political and intellectual history, that it could hardly be ignored in basic surveys of Islamic civilization. With the Mongol, Timurid and especially Uzbek periods, however, the profile of Central Asia in Islamic studies diminishes progressively, at least until the age of the Muslim reformers in the Russian empire. The immense body of Muslim religious literature (mostly in Persian) produced in Central Asia from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century AD, for instance, remains largely unexplored, basic trends in Islamic thought and practice during this period in Central Asia remain poorly understood, and the distinctive adaptations of Islam in the folk environment, especially among traditionally nomadic peoples such as the Qazaqs, Qırghız and Türkmens, remain unfortunately academically divorced from Islamic studies because of the ironic combination of reformist Muslim, Soviet and nationalist discourse that labels them non-Islamic or at best ‘survivals’ of pre-Islamic religion.

Nevertheless, a study of the historical experience of Islam in Central Asia will offer important insights and comparative material for the broader field of Islamic studies. Conversely, the domination of the study of Central Asia by an antiquarian ‘Silk Road studies’ on the one hand, and by Sovietology or ‘nationality studies’ on the other – focused, in effect, before and after the Islamic period – continue to have negative effects on a scholarly understanding of the region’s historical heritage and contemporary

development that can only be undone by approaching Central Asia as the setting for a distinctive regional synthesis of Islamic civilization.

The course of Islamization

The spread of Islam in Central Asia began in the late seventh century AD with the arrival of Arab armies in the region. The Arab conquest of the city-states of Khurāsān and Transoxiana (*Mā warā' an-nahr*) was a protracted affair, marked nearly as often by defeats and withdrawals as by victories and advances, that lasted into the early 'Abbāsīd era. Indeed, not until the early ninth century can 'Abbāsīd control be considered firmly established. The period of the conquest naturally involved the extension of Muslim rule, but also brought a number of measures that furthered the process of conversion to Islam among the inhabitants, such as the settling of Arab garrisons among the local population (serving as an avenue for the earliest mode of conversion, that is, the establishment of client relationships with particular Arab tribes); the construction of mosques in conquered cities; troop levies from the conquered regions that served to invest the local population in the political and military fortunes of the Islamic state; and direct inducements to adopt Islam (in the form of specific financial advantages, but also more diffusely in the form of the personal and social benefits of full participation in Muslim society). The success of such inducements is suggested by the measures taken by some Umayyad governors in Khurāsān and Transoxiana who, faced with declining revenues as new converts were freed from the obligation of the *jizya* (poll tax on non-Muslims), sought to stiffen the requirements for conversion and rescind the tax remission.

The resentment such measures provoked, and a growing discontent with the second-class status of new converts *vis-à-vis* the Arabs, helped make Central Asia a fertile ground for 'Abbāsīd propagandists. It also made the region a crucial focus of the early debates about the very nature of conversion, and of the conditions for acceptance into the *umma*, or Muslim community. The inclusive approach towards membership in the *umma* that would prevail throughout the history of Islam in Central Asia had already emerged in the eighth century; the movement known as the Murji'a, which gained wide support in Khurāsān and Transoxiana, advocated the view that an affirmation of faith and of affiliation with the Muslim community was the decisive factor in a person's status as a Muslim, not ritual proficiency or even proper moral behaviour. This principle allowed people who were willing to declare their alignment with the Muslim community to be recognized as members of the *umma* in good standing, entitled to the prerogatives of Muslim status, even if they were still ignorant of the details of doctrine and practice

and unfamiliar with the Qur'ān. This soon became a central part of Ḥanafī juridical thought which shaped Muslim life in Central Asia from the ninth to the twentieth century and in this way had a major impact on the process of Islamization in Central Asia. Its impact was felt among the rural and urban populations of the sedentary regions, but was of special significance along the frontiers with the steppe peoples. There, the process of Islamization appears often to have begun with the establishment of social bonds between Muslim townspeople and nearby Turkic nomadic communities, bonds that to some extent echoed the client (*mawlā*) status that defined conversion in earlier times. The nomads thereby gained a formal affiliation with the *umma* (community) as well as peaceful relations and, most likely, commercial ties with the settled population, leaving details of belief and practice subordinate to affirmed (and sustained) affiliation with the Muslim community.

The process of Islamization in Central Asia remains difficult to trace, however, in part because of the remarkable religious complexity in the region before, and even after, the Arab conquest. In addition to the brand of Zoroastrianism that was predominant among the sedentary population, there were sizeable Nestorian Christian, Manichaean and Jewish communities, and Buddhism was also strongly represented in some regions (above all, in the Tarim basin). The Turkic nomads of the steppes maintained their own ancestral religious traditions, but there were already Buddhist, Manichaean and Christian converts among them by the time of the Arab conquest. The impact of these traditions on the development of Islam in Central Asia is difficult to gauge; scholars have tended to focus on ritual, iconographic or doctrinal elements they believe passed from one or another of these earlier traditions into the cultural synthesis of Islamic Central Asia, but the reinterpretation of such elements in an Islamic framework is at least as remarkable and instructive as their mere preservation.

Such creative adaptations, with Islamic meaning infused into older religious forms, appear to be far more common in the religious amalgam of Central Asia than cases of genuine syncretism. The most likely examples of truly syncretic movements in the region are the repeated uprisings against both the Umayyads and the 'Abbāsids that culminated in the revolt of al-Muqanna' (775–83). The doctrines and political programmes of these groups, as described by Muslim heresiographers, appear to have combined elements of Zoroastrian and Manichaean cosmologies with messianic expectations akin to those that emerged around the family of 'Alī, linked in this case with the figure of the martyred 'Abbāsīd propagandist and military leader Abū Muslim. While sometimes portrayed as merely aberrant Islamic groups, and sometimes as simple popular uprisings against foreign rulers and ideologies, these movements seem to have had more in common with the phenomenon of revitalization movements, desperately looking forward

to an almost magical rollback of a new social and political order, while incorporating many features of the doctrine and practice underlying that order in its messianic hopes. At the same time, the syncretic character of these movements in itself suggests the extent to which Islamic religious ideas and symbols (as well as the charismatic personality of Abū Muslim) had struck deep roots among the local population in Central Asia, since it is unlikely that hostile heresiographers would have falsely imputed Muslim elements to these groups.

While it is clear that the firm establishment of Islamic rule in Central Asia by the first half of the ninth century created the institutional structures that strongly encouraged conversion to Islam, it is equally clear that non-Muslim communities continued to survive and prosper. Manichaean communities in Samarkand are still mentioned in the tenth century, and Christian groups in the same city were evidently of sufficient prominence during the thirteenth century to seek the support of Mongol officials in blocking conversions to Islam (the story of their efforts, however, as told by the historian Jūzjānī, ends with the Christian community destroyed through the intervention of another Mongol prince sympathetic to the Muslims). Epigraphic remains attest to the survival of Turkic Christian communities settled in the region of Yeti-su as late as the 1330s, while Buddhism was not supplanted by Islam in parts of the north-eastern Tarim basin until the fifteenth century.

Among the Turkic nomads of the steppes, the process of conversion must have differed from that in sedentary regions, if only because the range of economic, political and social pressures favouring Islamization differed from those pertaining among the settled peoples. Indeed, we must be wary of generalizations about the nomads as well. Conversion happened, for instance, among impoverished frontier groups compelled to seek assistance from their Muslim neighbours, among stronger nomads who entered southern Central Asia as conquerors, and among more distant communities in the steppe who had not yet felt significant political or military pressure from Muslim states, and the process must have had somewhat different parameters in each case. It seems likely that the social and economic realities of nomadic communities, where kinship and ancestry provided the idiom of social relations and where survival depended on communal resources and decisions, worked against the phenomenon of the individual convert who broke with family and community in order to improve his lot in life (whether spiritually or materially) – unless, of course, that individual was a slave separated unwillingly from his social support system – and lend credence to the reports of the wholesale adoption of Islam, on a communal basis, by substantial numbers of nomads. This was a transformation that can hardly have had immediate consequences in terms of doctrinal conviction,

but whose importance, in terms of social, political and cultural alignment, should not be underestimated.

During the tenth century, reports of such communal and dynastic conversions become quite regular, marking the beginning of the large-scale involvement of Turkic peoples in Islamic civilization. This period coincided with the cultural flowering and military power of the Sāmānid dynasty in Transoxiana and Khurāsān, and the three major Muslim dynasties that emerged in this era from the nomadic Turkic milieu were all shaped to some extent by interaction with the Sāmānid state. The institution of military slaves was an important mechanism for the entry of Turkic peoples into Islamic civilization, and produced the Central Asian dynasty of the Ghaznavids which emerged among Turkic slaves who rose in service to the Sāmānids.

The dynasty known as the Qarākhānids, which would put an end to the Sāmānid state in 999 and whose members would rule locally in some parts of Central Asia down to the early thirteenth century, reflected a pre-Islamic royal tradition already well-entrenched in the Tarim basin when one of its members adopted Islam in the middle of the tenth century (a similar royal tradition, on a smaller scale, appears to have produced the very first Turkic Muslim dynasty, with the conversion of the rulers of Isfījāb, late in the ninth century, under Sāmānid tutelage). The adoption of Islam by the Qarākhānids, and their subsequent conquest of Transoxiana, was particularly important for the beginnings of Islamic religious literature in Turkic, as Qarākhānid patronage yielded the *Qutadghu Bilig*, a 'Mirror for Princes' that also explores issues of the social responsibilities of the religious and intellectual elite, completed around 1070 by the courtier Yūsuf of Balāsāghūn for a Qarākhānid ruler of Kāshghar. Finally, the Seljūqs, who came to dominate much of Iran and the Middle East and began the Turkification of Anatolia, originated as tribal chieftains among the Oghuz Turkic tribes nomadizing along the lower Syr Darya. Their adoption of Islam facilitated their political break with a former overlord as well as their ties with Muslim townspeople of the Syr Darya valley, and paved the way for their involvement in the military and political turmoil of the late tenth and early eleventh centuries.

Unfortunately, we know as little about the actual circumstances of these conversions as we do about the Muslims who may have facilitated them. The image of the Sufi saint going into the steppe to convert the nomads is largely a product of the post-Mongol era, when the social roles of Sufis had changed considerably. Earlier narratives identify a wide range of Muslim travellers (merchants, scholars, physicians) as responsible for specific communal conversions, but we have virtually no evidence of any organized missionary endeavours in the steppe, and the motivations for conversion can be reconstructed, likewise, only conjecturally. What is clear is that periods of the spread of Islam into the northern steppe regions alternated with periods

in which still un-Islamized nomads pushed into the sedentary regions of Transoxiana and Khurāsān. The non-Seljūq Turkmen (the Ghuzz) who raided throughout Khurāsān in the twelfth century, the Qipchaqs along the lower and middle Syr Darya in the same era, and the enormous numbers of Turkic nomads brought southwards by the Mongol conquests marked new waves of nomads to be Islamized and acculturated, and subsequent influxes guaranteed that the Islamization of Central Asia was virtually an unending process.

It is often supposed that conversion in the Mongol era was a religious or political decision made by the elite, usually a forceful khan, and then imposed on a religiously hostile or indifferent tribal population. However, the precarious position of many Chinggisid contenders for power during the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and the centrality of the tribal population in supplying the military support needed to tip the balance of power to one among many potential candidates, suggest that the khans who gained fame as their realms' Islamizers – Ghāzān in Ilkhanid Iran, Özbek Khān in the Jöchid realm (the 'Golden Horde'), Tughluq Timur in the Chaghatayid state – may in fact have followed their subjects into the new religion, finding it expedient to respond to the adoption of Islam by substantial groups among the nomadic population with a declaration of support for the Islamizing party. That some would-be khans misjudged the extent of the following that conversion might bring to their side is evident from initial, unsuccessful attempts at Islamization in each of the three western Mongol successor states, but the eventual success of the adoption of Islam may itself signal the growing proportions, among the nomadic population, of a constituency inclined to support a Muslim khan.


By the Timurid and Uzbek periods, both the holders of power in sedentary Central Asia and the nomads of the steppes to the north were Muslims. The style of religious practice (and knowledge) characteristic of the two regions naturally differed, as did the specifics of the mutual accommodation between Islamic and inner Asian cultures that occurred in the two regions. However, the occasional faintness, in the steppe, of the signs of what is wrongly assumed to be normative Muslim religiosity (signs in fact proper to sedentary and especially urban environments) should not lead us to accept at face value the politically charged labelling of the enemies of the Timurids, or of the Uzbeks, as non-Muslims. The process of Islamization continued beyond the frontiers of Central Asia, however, even under Russian rule, and the spread of Islam in south-western Siberia, from the seventeenth to the early twentieth century, and in the Volga-Ural region in the nineteenth century, may be regarded as the continuation, under new political circumstances, of the process whereby Islam spread among the peoples of the steppe.

Religious life in Islamic Central Asia

Despite the uneven pace of Islamization in Central Asia, the region became a major centre of Islamic scholarship, literature and art quite early on. Already during the ninth century, under the Ṭāhirids, Central Asia's contribution to the very foundations of Islamic religious thought was sealed with the careers of the traditionists Muḥammad ibn Ismā'īl al-Bukhārī (d. 870), who lived much of his life near Samarkand, and Muslim ibn Ḥajjāj of Nīshāpūr (d. 875); the two books of *ḥadīths* compiled by these scholars, one from Transoxiana and one from Khurāsān, came to be regarded throughout the Muslim world as the most authoritative collections. Of the four additional collections that round out the accepted Sunnī canon of six esteemed *Ḥadīth* books, two were compiled by scholars with Central Asian ties, from the same era: Abū 'Īsā Muḥammad at-Tirmidhī (d. 892) and Abū 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān an-Nasā'ī (d. 915).

Central Asia was especially important, in the pre-Mongol era, as a centre of juridical and theological scholarship; the development of the Ḥanafī school of jurisprudence, in particular, was overwhelmingly the work of Central Asian jurists. The Shāfi'ī school was strong in Khurāsān down to the twelfth century, and there were smaller Shāfi'ī centres in other parts of Central Asia; Tashkent produced the noted tenth-century Shāfi'ī jurist Abū Bakr Qaffāl ash-Shāshī, and parts of Khwārazm were known as predominantly Shāfi'ī until after the Mongol conquest. The supremacy of the Ḥanafī school in Transoxiana, however, was established quite early. Tradition credited the activity of Imam Abū Ḥafṣ al-Bukhārī (d. c. 877) with consolidating the Ḥanafī domination of Bukhāra, and from the tenth century down to the fourteenth, Central Asia produced an unparalleled number of Ḥanafī jurists whose influence spread ultimately throughout the Indian subcontinent in the East and the Ottoman realms in the West.

The Sāmānid era produced such renowned Ḥanafī scholars as Abū-l-Layth as-Samarkandī (d. c. 983), whose extensive writings became popular throughout the Islamic world, and Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad al-Mātūrīdī (d. c. 944) of Samarkand, whose theological principles, resting on Ḥanafī juridical and exegetical foundations, defined the central themes of religious thought in the eastern Islamic world for centuries. Mātūrīdī theology stressed free will and the centrality of the affirmation of faith over works in defining the Muslim and ensuring salvation; it countered the rationalist thought of the Mu'tazila (which was also linked with Ḥanafī jurisprudence outside Transoxiana, and remained popular in Khwārazm into the fourteenth century, well after it withered elsewhere in the Islamic world), but also rivalled the Ash'arī theological synthesis that emerged further west. Combined with Ḥanafī jurisprudence, moreover, Mātūrīdī theology gained the support of the new Muslim Turkic dynasties of the Qarākhānids, and



4.11 Isma'īl Samanid Mausoleum, Bukhāra (© G. Degeorge)

especially the Seljūqs. It was indeed through Seljūq patronage that Mātūrīdī theology became influential throughout the Middle East beginning in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

Before the dynastic patronage of the Qarākhānids and Seljūqs, however, the dominance of Mātūrīdī and Ḥanafī thought was far from assured in Central Asia. The Sunnī synthesis that became normative in Central Asia thus owed much to the ascendancy of these Turkic dynasties. Ismā'īlī missionaries were active in Khurāsān and Transoxiana in the first half of the tenth century and found supporters in the Sāmānid military and in the dynasty itself. A violent backlash effectively eradicated the Ismā'īlī movement, but the spectre of heresy and the political threat it was understood to entail prompted renewed efforts to define an orthodox position, including Sāmānid sponsorship of the Mātūrīdī work known as *as-Sawād al-a'zam*, the title alluding to the 'great mass' of believers whose views it purported to represent, in refutation of sectarian errors. The work was produced in the middle of the tenth century in two versions, Arabic and Persian, by Abu-l-Qāsim Samarkandī (d. 953).

Sectarian movements continued, however, to seek a popular following as well as court patronage for their particular interpretation of Islam's doctrinal or ritual core. Maḥmūd of Ghazna, for instance, for a time lent his support to the leader of the radical pietist sect of the Karrāmiyya, which in the ninth and tenth centuries had played an important, and self-consciously

proselytizing, role in spreading Islam in rural Transoxiana and Khurāsān. Seljūq patronage of the Māturīdī/Ḥanafī synthesis served at first only to intensify tensions with the rival Ash‘arī/Shāfi‘ī school, and bitter factional struggles broke out in the towns of Khurāsān and eastern Iran during the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the great classics of Ḥanafī law produced in Transoxiana date mostly from the era of the Seljūqs and Khwārazmshāhs. The definitive works include the *Uṣūl* of Fakhr-al-Islām ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Pazdawī (d. 1089), the *Mabsūṭ* and *Uṣūl al-fiqh* of Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad as-Sarakhsī (d. c. 1096), known as ‘Shams al-A‘imma,’ and the *Hidāya* of Burhān-ad-Dīn ‘Alī al-Marghīnānī (d. 1197). The latter work, itself a shortened commentary on one of its author’s own works, became especially famous throughout the Muslim world and prompted numerous summaries and commentaries some of the earliest of which were produced in the fourteenth century by natives of the Syr Darya basin and Khwārazm, respectively Ḥusām-ad-Dīn Sighnāqī and Jalāl-ad-Dīn Kurlānī.

Other prominent Ḥanafī jurists of Central Asia during this period who left important literary works include Aḥmad ibn Manṣūr al-Isbījābī (d. 1087), al-Pazdawī’s pupil and al-Marghīnānī’s teacher, Najm-ad-Dīn Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar al-Nasafī (d. 1142), Fakhr-ad-Dīn al-Ḥasan ibn Manṣūr al-Uzjandī, known as ‘Qāzīkhān’ (d. 1196) and Shams-al-A‘imma Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd-as-Sattār al-Kardarī (d. 1244). The roles of Ḥanafī jurists were not limited to the scholarly pursuits reflected in these works; they also extended to juridical and civil administration, and the emergence of hereditary dynasties of juridical families, who amassed considerable wealth and political power, was common in this era in Transoxiana and Khurāsān. The best-known case is the lineage known as the Āl-i Burhān, whose members served in the post of *ṣadr* (eminence; prominent religious leader) in Bukhāra and were acknowledged as the chief political authorities in that city even under the non-Muslim Qarākhītāys.

The era that produced these Ḥanafī jurists also produced important religious scholars of rival schools. The Mu‘tazilī environment of Khwārazm shaped the grammarian and exegete az-Zamakhsharī (d. 1144) whose *Kashshāf* remains one of the most important commentaries on the Qur’ān, and the Khwārazmian scholar Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf Sakkākī (d. 1229) whose *Miftāḥ al-‘ulūm* was a compendium of the sciences of language. The ardent opponent of Mu‘tazilī thought, the theologian Fakhr-ad-Dīn Rāzī (d. 1210), likewise spent considerable time in Khwārazm, Transoxiana and Khurāsān in the age of the Khwārazmshāhs.

Central Asia’s religious culture in the pre-Mongol period was also shaped, finally, by the emergence of Sufi communities. Sufism’s history in Central Asia down to the Mongol conquest unfortunately remains poorly

studied. Already in the late eighth and ninth centuries, Khurāsān and Transoxiana produced prominent saints whose lives were celebrated in later hagiographies, such as Ibrāhīm ibn Adham of Balkh (d. 777), Fuḍayl ibn ‘Iyāḍ of Khurāsān (d. 803), Shaqīq of Balkh (d. 810), Bishr al-Ḥāfi of Merv (d. 841) and Abū Bakr al-Warrāq of Balkh (d. 893). The various labels applied to these and other early figures, however, suggest distinct traditions of ascetics and pietist preachers, as well as the emergence of local ‘wisdom’ traditions represented by such early tenth-century figures as al-Ḥakīm as-Samarkandī and al-Ḥakīm at-Tirmidhī whose *Khatam al-awliyā’* was one of the earliest discussions of the nature of sainthood in Islam. Khurāsān produced an influential tradition known as the Malāmātiyya whose adherents cultivated a disdain for social approval and the ostentatious piety they saw represented in such groups as the Karrāmiyya.

The earliest figure clearly referred to as a Sufi in Central Asia was Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-Wāsiṭī, known as Ibn al-Farghānī (d. 932), whose move from his native Iraq to his ancestral homeland introduced Sufi currents that remained distinct from, and often hostile to, the local Karrāmī and Malāmātī traditions. There is still a distinct Iraqi emphasis in the important manual of Sufism produced in Sāmānid Bukhāra by Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Ishāq al-Kalābādhī (d. c. 990), *at-Ta’arruf li-madhhab ahl at-taṣawwuf*. By the end of the tenth century, however, elements drawn from multiple local and imported mystical and pietist traditions were being fused together under the label of *taṣawwuf* (Sufism), and although separate currents such as the Malāmātiyya persisted, by that time Sufism becomes a suitable umbrella term covering a wide diversity of mystical and devotional activity.

The eleventh and twelfth centuries brought major new patterns of Sufi activity and organization, with the career of Abū Sa‘īd ibn Abi-l-Khayr (d. 1049) of Mayhana (in present-day Turkmenistan), a pioneer in mystical poetry who cultivated a high public profile in Nīshāpūr under the Ghaznavids, and with the hereditary Sufi tradition of Aḥmad-i Jām (d. 1141) whose natural descendants retained control of his shrine complex, and represented his spiritual legacy as well, down to the seventeenth century. By the time of the Mongol conquest, in part under the disciplinary and organizational influence of Abu-n-Najīb Suhrawardī (d. 1168) and his nephew Shihāb-ad-Dīn ‘Umar Suhrawardī (d. 1234), both active in Baghdad, the transformation of Sufi communities into hierarchical organizations with large public followings was well underway. The impact of the Suhrawardīs was already being felt in Central Asia and elsewhere in the eastern Islamic world during the thirteenth century.

The Mongol conquest was unquestionably a setback for the institutional foundations of Islamic religious culture, but its effects were neither unprecedented nor permanent. Some cities of Transoxiana and Khurāsān were

indeed devastated, and never again returned to their former prominence, but others were rebuilt and seem to have prospered. The Mongols did little to interfere with religious practice or scholarship based in the cities, and the drain of intellectual talent from Central Asia to other parts of the Islamic world was not as extensive as is often assumed. Institutionally, the loss of state patronage was not total and did not last long. During the thirteenth century, the actual administration of much of Islamic Central Asia was in the hands first of Maḥmūd Yalavāch, a Muslim of Central Asia who had entered the service of Chinggis Khān well before the clash with the Khwārazmshāh, and later of Maḥmūd's son Mas'ūd whose patronage included the endowment of a *madrasa* (Islamic college) in Bukhāra. Such patronage was not limited to Muslims in Mongol service: in the 1250s even the Mongol queen Sorghoqtani, who was the wife of Chinggis Khān's fourth son Toluy and was reputed to have had Christian sympathies, gave a large sum to endow a *madrasa* in Bukhāra and stipulated that the noted Sufi and Ḥanafī jurist Sayf-ad-Dīn Bākhazī should be its first director. In juridical thought, finally, there is little clear evidence of major disruptions in the training of scholars or the transmission of knowledge; chains of *Ḥadīth* transmission and certificates for the study of juridical books reveal little evidence of any substantial discontinuity during the thirteenth century.

The conversion of the Mongol elites to Islam, moreover, brought an expansion of royal patronage of Muslim scholarship, literature, art and architecture. For example, a series of important Turkic religious works, as well as Arabic and Persian books, were produced in the fourteenth century and were dedicated to khans and tribal chieftains of the Jöchid and Chaghatayid realms. Timur installed religious scholars, as well as artisans and poets, from many of the regions he conquered in his capital Samarkand. Timurid patronage in the fifteenth century marked another peak in the cultural profile of Islamic Central Asia. Patronage of religious scholarship and literature continued after the Uzbek conquest of Central Asia as well, but already at the beginning of the sixteenth century patronage of the religious sciences in particular assumed a heightened political importance as a result of the conflict between the Uzbeks and the newly emerged Shī'ite state of Safavid Iran. The mutual anathemas issued by the '*ulamā*' of Transoxiana and those of Iran justified the raids and extended campaigns that brought constant turmoil to Khurāsān during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with each side declaring the other to be the equivalent of infidels. They helped define a religious frontier that could not halt commercial or intellectual exchanges, but in many respects sundered the development of religious culture in Sunnī Central Asia from its long-standing ties to Iran.

One of the most significant religious developments in the post-Mongol era in Central Asia was the emergence of Sufi communities, organized

according to the principle of the *silsila* ('chain' of spiritual transmission), as important factors in political, economic and social history. The Mongol and Timurid periods witnessed the crystallization of several Sufi traditions, defined according to *silsilas* traced back to the Prophet Muḥammad through prominent saintly eponyms, that would dominate religious life in Central Asia down to the nineteenth century. The most important of these were the Kubraviyya, named after Najm-ad-Dīn Kubrā of Khwārazm, a Sufi shaykh who left important mystical writings and died in 1221 during the Mongol attack on his native Khwārazm; the Yasaviyya, named after Khwāja Aḥmad Yasavī from a town in the middle Syr Darya valley who is usually said to have died in 1166 but most likely lived into the early thirteenth century; and the Naqshbandiyya, named after Bahā'-ad-Dīn Naqshband of Bukhāra (d. 1389) but rooted in the earlier Khwājagānī tradition that emerged in the thirteenth century among the followers of Khwāja 'Abd-al-Khāliq Ghijduvānī.

Representatives of these and other traditions engaged in intense competition with one another beginning in the thirteenth century, seeking to attract popular followings as well as court patronage. The rapid growth of these communities undoubtedly reflects the opportunities presented by the process of Islamization that was underway in the Mongol era among the elites and the ordinary nomads alike. In this competitive environment, some Sufi groups experimented with diverse means of asserting their special authority or efficacy as purveyors of both mystical discipline and social cohesion. The latter factor was undoubtedly of importance in the process of Islamization among nomadic communities that were undergoing the profound dislocations of the Mongol era (i.e. tribal reorganization and adaptation to the enclosed nomadism of Transoxiana and Khurāsān).

By the latter part of the fifteenth century, the principle of the *silsila* was emerging as the definitive source of legitimation, and the Naqshbandiyya was emerging as the dominant Sufi tradition of Central Asia. The success of the Naqshbandiyya was closely linked with the career of Khwāja 'Ubaydallāh Aḥrār, born in Tashkent but most influential in Timurid Samarkand, who came to exemplify the Naqshbandī ideals of political engagement and economic independence. In the early Uzbek period, the decentralized political structure of Transoxiana created new opportunities for intense competition among leaders of the Naqshbandī, Yasavī and Kubravī orders, but by the second half of the sixteenth century Naqshbandī dominance was assured and it continued throughout the seventeenth century.

In the early eighteenth century, the introduction into Central Asia of the Mujaddidī branch of the Naqshbandiyya, which had taken shape in India as the Naqshbandiyya spread in that region, marked an important new phase in Central Asian religious life, reflecting the profound political and economic changes of the eighteenth century. The Mujaddidī shaykhs appear to have



4.12 Rajestan, Samarkand (© UNESCO)

been seen as an alternative source of legitimation for Chinggisid khans who sought to counter the restrictions on their power represented by entrenched urban elites and the tribal aristocracy – groups that had developed close ties with equally well-entrenched local Sufi communities. A number of Mujaddidī shaykhs were closely allied with khans who sought to solidify their power, first in the late Ashtarkhānid period, without much success, and later under the Manghīt dynasty in Bukhāra and the Ming dynasty of Qoqand, by promoting efforts at religious ‘reform’. These efforts entailed the condemnation, as un-Islamic innovations, of many long-established religious practices that had diffused into the larger society from traditional Sufi circles.

Neither these efforts, however, nor the later reformist programmes of the so-called *jadīdists* in the period of Russian rule, did much to alter the pattern of popular religious practice in Central Asia that had emerged in the preceding centuries. That pattern included, above all, the centrality of religious practice associated with pilgrimage (*ziyāra*) to saints’ shrines (*mazārs*); the permeation of kinship structures and communal life, in both sedentary and nomadic environments, by elements of Sufi practice and



4.13 Madrasa and Kalta Minār, Khiva, Uzbekistan (© UNESCO)

thought; the prominence of hereditary religious and social prestige in families linked to eminent local jurists and, especially, Sufi saints of the past; the incorporation of shrines and sacred lineages into the religious practice, social structure and epic traditions of the nomads; and the infusion of labour with religious meaning through religiously defined occupational organizations in both urban and rural environments. Only the social and religious upheavals launched by the Soviet regime in Central Asia during the late 1920s began to disrupt

this pattern; the closure of all *madrasas* devastated the transmission of Ḥanafī juridical training, and of religious scholarship in general, while Central Asia's legacy of Sufism was likewise seriously weakened.

The full impact of Soviet antireligious measures during much of the twentieth century will take decades to assess, but it seems clear that in addition to undermining religiosity, especially among the elites, the Soviet era may have seriously weakened the confidence of Central Asians in their own knowledge of Islam and its role in their ancestors' lives, leaving them more susceptible than they might otherwise be to modern interpretations of Islam that have no real roots in Central Asia's Muslim heritage.

Chapter 4.4

ISLAM IN THE BALKANS

Enes Karić

Studying the history of Islam in the Balkans

This chapter focuses on Islam in the Balkans rather than its historical development. Nevertheless, some introductory remarks are necessary on how to treat the history of Islam in the region. When speaking about the history of Islam in the Balkans, and of the expansion of Islam across the Balkan countries, one should beware of extremes and exaggerations. The history of Islam on the peninsula, or in parts of it, extends for over seven centuries and thus not only covers a huge geographical area, but also an immense temporal space.

Many historians (whose background is mainly Christian) tend to reduce the phenomenon of the expansion of Islam in the Balkans solely to wars, and emphasize the battles and military conflicts between the Ottoman empire (from the end of the thirteenth century AD onwards) and medieval statelets in the Balkans, conflicts which were, at times, also their mutual conflicts. But this approach is misguided. On the other hand, those historians (whose background is mainly Muslim) who tend to minimize or neglect the battles and conflicts between the Ottoman empire and the Balkan Christian statelets are also in the wrong in their answers to the question: 'What was decisive for the expansion of Islam in the Balkans – the military presence of the Ottoman empire or the theological attractiveness of Islam alongside economic and cultural prosperity?'

The contention in this chapter is that Islam in the Balkans is an extremely complex phenomenon and needs to be viewed within the context of religious, cultural, political, economic and military factors. All these elements must be kept in mind and their interrelationships understood if a historian wishes



4.14 Prizren Mosque, Kosovo
(© J.C. Chabrier)

to be objective and to avoid writing history in the mode of myth or mere 'prophecy in hindsight' and in the light of his or her own current political and ideological needs and views.

Why is it necessary to stress this need to be objective when dealing with the theme of Islam in the Balkans? It is because the political and nationalist ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the Balkans are responsible for the misrepresentation of the epoch of the Ottoman empire in the Balkans as an era of slavery, of the 'Turkish yoke', of darkness, of the new Middle Ages and so on. Thus, when dealing with Islam in the Balkans it is necessary to consult British, French and German historians in addition to Serbian,

Croatian, Bosnian and Turkish ones. Only in this way can a more complete and balanced picture emerge. This balanced picture is required in order to avoid the reduction of the multiple courses of history of the Ottoman empire to something they had never been. It is required so as to be able to avoid myths and legends and to attain an objective history.

In order to separate myth from history when dealing with Islam in the Balkans, it is necessary to cite several examples, such as the battle of Marica in 1371 and the battle of Kosovo in 1389. It is the representation of the latter, developed among the Serbs in the era of Serbian national romanticism towards the end of the eighteenth and in the course of the nineteenth century, that clearly illustrates the distortion of historical facts. Thus, in nineteenth-century Serbian historiography, the battle of Kosovo is described as a clash between Islam and Christianity. In works by serious historians, however, this battle is only given a passing mention alongside other battles that the Ottoman army routinely won during its forays into the Balkans. For example, in his *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* the German historian Joseph von Hammer describes the battle as merely one among many and informs the reader that legends and myths are being interwoven

with reality and truth. He remarks that one should not trust everything that the folk poetry relating to the battle has to say.¹

Halil Inalčik, another historian, mentions the battle of Kosovo only twice in his famous work *The Ottoman Empire* and one has the impression that he likewise considers it to be little more than one of numerous relatively insignificant battles waged, and won, by the Ottoman empire in its conquest of the Balkans.²

Yet another scholar, Noel Malcolm, has highlighted the false nature of the claim that the battle of Kosovo represented a clash between Islam and Christianity.³ On a number of occasions, he states that it is a complete misrepresentation to interpret the battle as a conflict between Islam and Christianity, or as a conflict between the Islamic East and the Christian West, simply because there were many units composed of Christians fighting side by side with the Ottomans. Furthermore, in 1389 when the battle took place, the political and geostrategic divisions into today's East and West were unknown. Thus, there was no clash between a Christian 'West' and an Islamic 'East' at the battle of Kosovo.

Together with many other historians, Malcolm asserts that in the medieval Balkans, as elsewhere in Europe, it was quite common to employ foreign military units as mercenaries and their religion was often considered to be irrelevant. Thus, during the Middle Ages the Balkan rulers used Germans, Hungarians, Catalonians and others as mercenaries. Similarly, the Christian rulers used to hire Muslim warriors to fight on their side. Even before the battle of Kosovo, the Serbian tsars, such as Tsar Milutin and Tsar Dušan, used to hire Turkish units as mercenaries. In his *Kosovo: A Short History*, Malcolm remarks: 'Milutin also had a large force of Turkic Cumans, and Tsar Dušan employed Turks in his army.'⁴

History is full of examples of the use of foreign mercenaries. The battle of Kosovo was therefore not a confrontation between Muslims, on the one hand, and Christians – and Christians alone – on the other. Historical sources testify that there were Christians who fought on the Turkish side. Thus, we read further in Malcolm's book:

1 Joseph von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches (Historija Osmanskog carstva)*, translated into Bosnian by Nerkez Smailagić, Zagreb, self-published, 1979.

2 Halil Inalčik, *The Ottoman Empire*, London, Phoenix, 1997, p. 15.

3 Noel Malcolm has written two exceptionally valuable books on the history of the Balkans: *Bosnia: A Short History* (London, Macmillan, 1994) and *Kosovo: A Short History* (London, Macmillan, 1998). These books should be consulted if we want to study the history of the Balkans outside the context of national romanticism and falsified history that occurred as the consequence of 'national awakening'.

4 Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History*, p. 60.

THE SPREAD OF ISLAM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

An early Italian chronicle, written perhaps seventeen years later, emphasized the presence of 'Greek and Christian' soldiers in the Turkish army, and concluded: 'The reason for Murat's victory lies in the 5,000 Christian crossbowmen he had in his pay, among the Greeks and the Genoese soldiers, and many other soldiers on horseback.'⁵

The generations of Serbs immediately after 1389 knew that the battle of Kosovo was one battle among many others waged throughout human history. Unlike them, however, the eighteenth-, nineteenth- and twentieth-century Serbs, inspired and motivated by so-called nationalist ideologies, turned the event into a myth and sang about it in their folk songs, describing it as their triumph over the Turks and Islam. That is why present-day Serbian historians, and many other Christian historians in the Balkans, find it difficult to separate the myth of Kosovo from the reality. But there are historians outside the Balkans who are more reliable, including the above-mentioned Noel Malcolm. He often emphasizes in his works that, as a historian, he is neither against the Serbs nor against their history, but rather against the Serbian myth. In his *Kosovo: A Short History*, he clearly states: 'My intentions in writing this book about Kosovo were not anti-Serb, but anti-myth!'⁶

Nonetheless, in the treatment of Ottoman history in the Balkans, it is the myth that has prevailed among most of the Serbian intelligentsia. Ever since the so-called First Serbian Uprising in 1804, Serbian historians and ideologues, such as Jovan Cvijić, Stevan Moljević and Ilija Garašanin, have claimed that the Balkans have always been an area of ethnic conflicts, and that for centuries all the peoples there were anti-Serb. In their attempt to read the entire history of the Balkans through the prism of ethnic clashes, Serbian ideologues in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries kept pronouncing Albanians, Bosniacs, Macedonians, Croats and sometimes even the Orthodox Christian Montenegrins (who in most cases were their allies) as enemies of the Serbs. Descriptions of the Balkans as a 'slaughterhouse' and a 'gunpowder keg' were something that the Serbs needed in the nineteenth

5 Ibid., p. 63.

6 Noel Malcolm and other Western experts on the Balkans, such as Francina Friedman (*The Bosnian Muslims*, Oxford, Westview Press, 1996), H. T. Norris (*Islam in the Balkans*, London, Hurst & Co., 1993) and Mark Pinson (*The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1994), have exposed and explained the Serbian myth of Kosovo and about the Serbs being the 'liberators of the Balkans'.

and twentieth centuries, when they were building their nation-state,⁷ and when they wanted to present themselves to the world as the unifying factor in the Balkans. In order to produce the myth of Kosovo, Serbian nationalist ideology had to ‘produce their own enemies’ in the Balkans; indeed, at times all the peoples of the Balkans were proclaimed as Serbian enemies.⁸

In all fairness, it should be mentioned that there are a few Serbian scholars who have unmasked those works of Serbian historiography that relied heavily upon myth. A number of Serbian philosophers and literary theoreticians have criticized the attitude of Serbian nationalist ideology and politics towards the myth of Kosovo and its pragmatic exploitation for political purposes. Thus, in his *Vidovdan i časni krst*⁹ [St Vitus Day and the Honourable Cross], Miodrag Popović clearly explains that the true Serbian history in the Ottoman empire has nothing to do with the myths referred to in Serbian heroic folk poems. Popović also asserts, quite objectively, that Serbia and the Serbs were for centuries an integral part of the Ottoman state and its legal system. The myth of the so-called ‘slavery under the Turks’ and the ‘Turkish yoke’ were produced later in order to mobilize Serbs to build their independent nation-state. This is why the myth is so full of anti-Turkish and anti-Islamic sentiment.

Likewise, Mirko Mirković, a professor at Belgrade University, published an interesting work entitled *Pravni položaj i karakter Srpske crkve pod turskom*

7 It is not true that there have always been enmities in the Balkans. In the thousand years of Balkan history, we can find long periods of neighbourly relations and political cooperation among its peoples. Alliances were made and unmade according to the needs and political interests of the day. In the above, it has been seen that historians assert that even in the battle of Kosovo, Serb and Albanian soldiers fought as allies against their Ottoman rulers. Moreover, in this battle, the Ottomans had mercenary units comprising Serb and Albanian soldiers. Therefore, the historical truth testifies that many Serbs and Albanians were fighting under the command of the Serbian Tsar Lazar, while, on the other hand, many Serbs and Albanians fought under the command of the Ottoman Sultan Murat I. Thus, even the battle of Kosovo cannot be seen in black and white. Serbian history, just like any other history, is one thing, whereas Serbian myth, just like any other myth, is another.

8 While for the Ottomans the battle of Kosovo was one among many battles, for Serbian historians who accepted Serbian mythology, this battle is the key battle, the battle of all battles. Serbian politicians and their nation have shared the same view since the nineteenth century. In Serbian historiography, from the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, the battle of Kosovo has been turned into a myth. The Serbian Orthodox Church supported this myth and participated in its creation. However, one should understand that Serbian national politics did not create this myth out of some pious motives and reasons. It was created for entirely pragmatic and political reasons, with the aim of developing and realizing the Serbian nationalist programme in the Balkans. In the era that saw the weakening of the Ottoman empire and the establishment of an independent Serbian state, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the myth of Kosovo was primarily used to mobilize the Serbian popular masses to overthrow the Ottoman empire.

9 Miodrag Popović, *Vidovdan i časni krst*, Belgrade, 1976.

vlašću (1459–1766),¹⁰ in which, while dealing with the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church under Turkish rule, he asserts that this Church was, in fact, the greatest feudal landowner in the Ottoman era. Mirković also claims that during the Ottoman empire the Serbian Orthodox Church was privileged and that it enjoyed all the benefits that arose from *sharī‘a* law and the Ottoman *millet* system.¹¹ The Serbian Church was the representative of all Christian Orthodox believers; it regulated their private and family matters (*al-aḥwāl ash-shakhṣiyya*) and adjudicated in their private disputes and, as the ecclesiastic hierarchy, it was highly positioned in Ottoman society. Elsewhere, Mirković mentions several examples which show the Ottoman empire itself using state treasury funds to build Orthodox monasteries and churches all over Serbia. In short, both Popović and Mirković claim that history and myth are two different things.

Urban Islam in the Balkans: the development of cities, communications, the rise of *madrasas* and the flourishing of education

One could compare Ottoman rule in the Balkans – from the beginning of the fourteenth until the end of the seventeenth century – to the expansion of the European Union to the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans today. Just as the EU is the ‘promised land’ for many of those who have joined it, or are on the waiting list to do so, during the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries many parts of the world perceived the Ottoman empire in the same or a similar way. It was an empire in expansion, with an advanced and efficient economy and good roads. Apart from this, in the regions over which it ruled, the empire extended the *Pax Otomannica-u*, or Ottoman Peace, that is, the *millet* system that guaranteed freedom of faith and culture and of creating one’s own religious and cultural institutions.

The Balkans were incorporated into the Ottoman empire in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The most significant achievements of civilization introduced to the Balkans by the Ottomans were the development of old cities and the construction of new towns and roads. Indeed, many Balkan towns prospered under the Ottomans: in Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and

10 Mirko Mirković, *Pravni položaj Srpske crkve pod turskom vlašću (1459–1766)* [The Legal Position and Nature of the Serbian Church under Turkish Rule, 1459–1766], Belgrade, 1965.

11 On the Ottoman *millet* system, see Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, *A Culture of Peaceful Coexistence*, Istanbul, The Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA), 2004.

Croatia. These urban centres were established around mosques, churches and synagogues.¹² Meanwhile, the banks of raging Balkan rivers were joined by extraordinarily beautiful bridges, among which the most magnificent is Mehmed Pasha Sokolović bridge in Višegrad.

The growth of trade, the development of crafts, the expansion of caravan routes, as well as the development of agriculture and cattle breeding – all these characterized the first centuries of Ottoman rule in the Balkans. The Ottoman empire was an inclusive empire and it embraced many peoples. When the Catholic *Reconquista* occupied Granada in 1492, most of the Sephardic (Spanish) Jews emigrated to the Ottoman empire and many of them found a new homeland in the Balkans.¹³

In terms of culture and civilization, through most of its history Islam in the Balkans was an urban phenomenon. It was a mature Islam, an Islam whose teachings and interpretations originated from the great cities of Asia Minor, the Middle East and the Mediterranean and, naturally, from the great cities of the Balkans itself. It was thanks to the Ottoman empire that the Balkans became part of a global exchange of both commodities and ideas. And it was thanks to the imperial matrices of Ottoman schools that the Muslims of the Balkans lived in the *Dār al-Islām* ('House of Islam').

Madrasas (Islamic colleges), *tekkes* (dervish convents) and *hanikas* were for centuries an integral part of the imperial educational system in the Balkans. *Madrasas* were usually built by the great government and administrative dignitaries of the empire. Sometimes they were built by military dignitaries. The Ishak Bey *madrasa* in Skopje (1469), the Gazi Husrev Bey *madrasa* in Sarajevo (1537) and the Karadžoz Bey *madrasa* in Mostar (1569), to give but a few examples, all acted as famous centres of Sunnī learning and as schools that disseminated the teachings of the Ḥanafī *madhhab* (school of Islamic law).

The era that saw the establishment of these *madrasas* across the Balkans coincided with the intense expansion of Islam in the region. Students of these *madrasas* were local people, mainly of Albanian and Slavic origin. As an illustration of the type of *madrasa* that developed throughout the Balkans, we can briefly describe Sarajevo's famous Gazi Husrev Bey *madrasa*, which has seen unbroken activity for five centuries. This *madrasa*, which is intimately linked with Bosnia, the Bosnian Muslims and their culture, was founded in 1537. Bearing in mind that medieval Bosnia came under Ottoman rule in 1463, the relatively early foundation of this famous high school points to a

12 For excellent information on Islamic architecture in the western part of the Balkans, see Amir Pašić, *Islamic Architecture in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Istanbul, IRCICA, 1994. See particularly the Foreword by Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu.

13 On the status of Jews in the Balkans during the Ottoman empire, see Stephen Schwartz, *Sarajevo Rose, A Balkan Jewish Notebook*, London, Saqi, 2005.

very important fact: that the diffusion of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 1463 and 1537 was already well underway, since there were already local students in the *madrasa*, the sons and grandsons of the Bosnians who had embraced Islam.

In his *Spomenica Gazi Husrevbegove četiristogodišnjice* [Commemoration of Gazi Husrev Bey's Quatercentenary], the noted Bosnian historian Hamdija Kreševljaković says of Gazi Husrev Bey (1480–1541), the founder of the school, that he was the 'most important governor and at the same time the greatest benefactor Bosnia ever had. On his father's side he was our compatriot, and on his mother's a scion of the ruling Ottoman family, while his home was Serez.'¹⁴ His father was Ferhat Bey, son of Abdulgafur, and his mother was Seljuka, a princess (*sultāna*), the daughter of Bayazid II.

Upon taking up the post of governor of Bosnia for the first time (1521–25), again during his second tenure as governor (1526–34), and in particular during his third term (which lasted from 1536 until, probably, his death in 1541), Gazi Husrev Bey established many endowments in the city of Sarajevo. Among these, as well as his *madrasa*, was a large and famous mosque (1530), known for centuries in Sarajevo and throughout Bosnia as the *Begova džamija*, or Bey's Mosque; a *khanaqa* and *maktab* (1531); and the *kutubkhana* (library) that he endowed in 1537. The basic institution founded by Gazi Husrev Bey was his *waqf* (pl. *awqāf*). This religious endowment has financed almost all his institutions, and in particular the *madrasa*, for centuries.

Following the provisions of the *waqfnama* (deed of endowment), the Gazi Husrev Bey *madrasa* has always had a *mudarris* (head teacher) and also a chief assistant, called the *mu'id*. In his *waqfnama*, Gazi Husrev Bey refers explicitly to the *mudarris*:

Let one man be employed from among the servants of God who is educated, qualified, without fault, experienced, who with his lectures and writings lifts the veils of truth, who has gathered to himself the distinctions and foundations of knowledge, who encompasses both speculative and traditional knowledge ...

As in other Ottoman *madrasas*, for centuries an important role was played not only by the *mudarris* as the mainstay of instruction, but also by noted (or, rather, revered) textbooks. In Bosnia, these textbooks were popularly known by the names of their authors, for example Zamakhshari, Barghivi, Halebi, Bukhari, or by an abbreviated title, for example by a single word, as was the case with a textbook known as *Multeqa*.

14 See Schwartz, *Sarajevo Rose*, p. 17.

The *madrassa* was in every respect an Islamic high school; as an integral part of the Ottoman education system, it had an identical or similar curriculum to that of *madrassas* in Istanbul, Jedrene, Bursa, and so on. The Ottoman *madrassas* were in large part the successors to the Nizāmiyya *madrassa* and education system developed by the Seljūq Turks. *Madrassas* of the Nizāmiyya type directly anticipated the *madrassas* of the Ottoman empire. It is generally assumed by historians with an Islamic education that with the emergence of the Nizāmiyya *madrassa*, the word *madrassa* itself became synonymous – at least as regards the western regions of the Islamic world – with an institution of higher Islamic education. With the founding of the Gazi Husrev Bey *madrassa*, Sarajevo joined the ranks of cities that possessed such a high school and in this way Sarajevo and Bosnia participated in an education system of universal significance.

Historians with an Islamic education, such as George Makdisi, A. L. Tibawi, Aḥmad Shalaby, Michael M. J. Fischer, Dale F. Eickelman and others, claim that until the emergence and ascendancy of the Seljūqs in the early eleventh century, most *madrassas* were not directly financed by the state, but rather by *waqfs*. These authors claim that the system of *awqāf* was developed and established in such a way as to transcend regional, political, national, linguistic and even, frequently, state boundaries. The institution of the *waqf* was thus developed as a transnational, transregional institution; indeed, it would be more appropriate to say that the *waqf* was an institution of the Muslim *umma*. The greater part of the *waqfs*' income was spent on the maintenance of *madrassas*. If a ruler or other state dignitary wanted to support a *madrassa*, he would usually do so not by direct donation but through a *waqf*.

As regards the structure of the Ottoman education system, it is interesting to recall – within the context of the number seven and the seven humanities that were taught during this period in the West – that the Ottoman *madrassa* education system was developed in the sixteenth century, both theoretically and programmatically, again with seven fields of learning, by Ahmed Ṭāshköprizāde (1495–1561), a zealous follower of Iranian Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (from which one may see the direct link between the Nizāmiyya *madrassa* and the Ottoman *madrassa*, including that of Gazi Husrev Bey). Ṭāshköprizāde took as his starting point the existing curricula of Istanbul *madrassas*. He systematized this as falling into seven basic categories: calligraphic (types of letters, styles of writing); oral (Arabic language and phonetics, lexicography, etymology, grammar, syntax, rhetoric, prosody); rational (logic, dialectic); spiritual (within which, *sensu strictu*, belong the theoretical rational sciences such as general theology, the natural sciences, mathematics); practical-rational (ethics, political sciences); theoretical religious studies (Qur'ān, *Hadīth*, *tafsīr*, *'aḳā'id*); and practical religious studies (ethics, *akhlāq*, *iḥtisāb* and so on).

The famous precursors of the Gazi Husrev Bey *madrasa* known as the Sahn-i-Seman *madrasas* (which is probably the later title for the Madaris-i Semaniya, or ‘Eight *madrasas*’), built around the Mosque of Sultan Mehmed el Fatih during the period 1463–70, also included, depending on their profile, the same seven sciences in their curriculum. The standard Madaris-i Semaniya also had additional separate *madrasas* dedicated to various specializations as well as its lower *madrasa* (in some form of the Ottoman variant of the Arabic *maktab* or *kuttāb*).

Madrasas built at this time or later in Jedrene (Darul-hadis), Bursa, Plovdiv, Skopje (Ishak Bey *madrasa*), Sarajevo and so on were, understandably, at the very summit of the Ottoman education system, but not at the level of the Madaris-i Semaniya in Istanbul that had long enjoyed all the privileges of the highest elite *madrasas* of incomparable rank in the Ottoman empire.

The Gazi Husrev Bey *madrasa*, popularly known as the Kuršumljia because it was roofed with lead,¹⁵ recalls the Istanbul Sahn-i Seman in the style of its construction, although it is smaller in size. Nonetheless, the *madrasa* remains to this day, as it was in the past, one of Bosnia and Sarajevo’s architectural gems. Its twelve domed rooms for students and its domed lecture hall (*darshana*), all facing inwards to the central courtyard dominated by its fountain, radiate security and peace and recall the tranquil soul that permeates the fountainheads of learning.

According to the available information, education in the Gazi Husrev Bey *madrasa* began after completion of the *maktab* (elementary school), where students obtained basic instruction in subjects such as writing, reading and the rituals and principles of the faith.¹⁶ There were numerous *maktabs* in Sarajevo during the Ottoman period, almost every *džamija* (Friday mosque) having one. For centuries the Gazi Husrev Bey *madrasa* had its own *maktab* housed in the courtyard of the mosque.

Instruction in the *madrasa* was not organized according to grade but rather according to the so-called *halaqa* system (Bosniacs translated the Arabic word *halaqa* into the Bosnian word *kolo*),¹⁷ in which students sat around whomever had mastered a particular subject and used the textbooks from which that subject was taught. A younger student could overtake an older one if he was more successful in mastering the contents of a textbook. The subjects taught at the Gazi Husrev Bey *madrasa* were unchanging, and

15 In Turkish, *kurşum*. The name Kuršumljia is not found either in the *waqfnama* or in the *tarik* of this *madrasa*; in the *waqfnama* this endowment is called the *madrasa*.

16 See, for example, the study by Omer Nakičević, *Gazi Husrevbegova medresa u vrijeme Osmanske Turske* [The Gazi Husrev Bey *madrasa* during the Ottoman Turkish Period], which appeared in the publication *450 godina Gazi Husrevbegove medrese u Sarajevu* [450 Years of the Gazi Husrev Bey *madrasa* in Sarajevo], Sarajevo, 1988.

17 A circle, hence a group of students gathered around a teacher. *Kolo* also means a circle or round.



4.15 Sarena Mosque, Tetovo, Macedonia (© J.C. Chabrier)

the elements of those subjects as a whole were called by the name of the textbook from which they were taught. Regarding these subjects, a celebrated passage from the Gazi Husrev Bey *waqfnama* states:

The *mudarris* shall teach *tafsīr* [Qur'ānic exegesis], *Ḥadīth* [Islamic traditions], *aḥkām* [*sharī'a* law], *uṣūl* [the methodology of *sharī'a* law], *ma'ānī* [semantics and poetics], *bayān* [rhetoric], *kalām* [theology] and other subjects as required according to custom and place.

The *mudarris* of the Gazi Husrev Bey *madrassa* was required to teach these subjects himself or, if his *mu'īd* was not competent to teach a particular subject, to delegate them to other teachers. The *mudarris* was also required to form a judgement about which additional topics, referred to by the *waqfnama* as 'other subjects as required according to custom and place', should be taught. He also had the task of going through the prescribed textbooks with the students, but was not held to a strict timetable for this in the way that is now usual. If his students (his *ḥalaqa* or *kolo*) were quick to master the contents of a textbook, this implied that the *mudarris* was effective in his instruction. It is particularly important to highlight the fact that Gazi Husrev Bey also prescribed in his *waqfnama* that the *mudarris* should:

issue *fatwās* [formal legal judgements] to the people on such issues of *sharī'a* law as he shall be asked about. And that he should issue *fatwās* on the most fundamental issues and opinions, taking these from books of *fatwās* relating to all activities ...

The intention here was to indicate the important position of the *mudarris*, giving him, in practice, the position of a senior judge in *sharī'a* law.

The textbooks used in the Gazi Husrev Bey *madrassa* were the customary authoritative works of the Ottoman imperial education system. These included as-Sakkākī's *Miftāḥ al-'ulūm* which was used for rhetoric, al-'Ījī's *al-Mawāqif fī 'ilm al-kalām* for theology, al-Marghīnānī's *Hidāya* for *sharī'a*, and works and commentaries by such authors as az-Zamakhsharī, an-Nasafī, al-Bayḍāwī, al-Barghawī, al-Bukhārī and al-Ḥalabī. The Gazi Husrev Bey library, with its manuscripts of which a significant proportion are in the nature of textbooks (glosses, excerpts, compilations, commentaries and so on), is the clearest evidence of what was taught in this principal Bosnian and Balkan *madrassa* and what educated people were reading in Bosnia from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. Inevitably, with the coming of Austro-Hungarian imperial rule over Bosnia in 1878, the Gazi Husrev Bey *madrassa* curriculum gradually underwent reform and adapted to the demands of the new social and political circumstances in Bosnia.

As a rule, education in the Gazi Husrev Bey *madrassa* lasted between twelve and sixteen years. The most successful students studied for at least twelve years, and those who were less able would study for sixteen. Whatever the case, it was the *mudarris* who determined who graduated and when. On graduation, he would issue a diploma known as an *ijazet* (or *ijazetnama*) whose holder could then become an *imām*, a *khaṭīb*, a *mu'allim*, a *mudarris* in a *madrassa*, a religious teacher, a *muftī* and theoretically even a *shaykh al-islām*.

While the Gazi Husrev Bey *madrassa* has undergone many stages of modernization, it remains the most famous and important traditional higher Islamic school in the western Balkans. It bears witness to the fact that Islam is a living faith in the region that is being testified to, interpreted and lived not only as a religion, but also as a culture and a civilization.

In addition to the *madrassas* – of which there are at least twenty in the Balkans – the Sufi orders and their *tekkes* were also significant features of Islamic culture and civilization in the region. The Mawlawī, the Qādirī, the Naqshbandī, the Halvatī, the Bektashī and occasionally other Sufi orders played an important role in the region, not only in terms of their esoteric interpretations of the Qur'ān and their Islamic textual legacy, but also in the sphere of social and cultural movements among the Muslims of the region. Thus, Sufism has contributed greatly to the cultural, civilizational and social contextualization of Islam in this region. It functioned as an important

instrument that purified and filtered those numerous diverse forms of syncretism – ‘Islamizing’ them, so to speak. The entire Balkan region is still deeply influenced by Sufism, the *tekkes* still live their quiet lives and Sufi works are being translated into Bosnian, Albanian, Macedonian, Serbian and Croatian.¹⁸

Islam as a living culture and civilization in the Balkans today

Arabic and Islamic influences began to reach the Balkans well before the Turks and the start of Ottoman imperial rule in the fourteenth century. Museums throughout the Balkans contain items from the period of the first contacts of the Balkan peoples with the Arabs of Sicily, Southern Italy and al-Andalus. We thus find utensils with exactly the same names in Bosnian as in Arabic: for example, the Arabic *ibrīq*, which in the Balkans is called *ibrik*. The same situation exists in Serbian and Croatian.

The Dubrovnik archives contain a large collection of Arabic manuscripts which clearly show what kind of goods were traded between Arab merchants and those of the Balkans over many centuries. But Arab traders not only brought with them Arab customs, books, items, ideas and principles. The Slavs themselves, who served in the armies first of the Arabs of al-Andalus and then with those of Sicily and Southern Italy, also spread the influence of Arab culture throughout the Balkans.

Trading contacts mainly took place through the sea ports, and it was by these routes that cultural influences also spread. However, from the fourteenth century onwards the Arabic language, terminology, expressions, literature and books – in a word, all the important facets of Arab, Turkish and Islamic culture – began to spread rapidly throughout the Balkans. This is mainly because, at that time, the Balkans became part of a new cultural and civilizational context and experienced profound transformations. Many peoples embraced Islam as their faith and their worldview; and with the spread of Islam came the spread of Islamic principles and notions, Arabic, Turkish and Persian words and cultural influences. Together with this transformation of people’s spiritual life came profound changes in their material conditions.

Traded merchandise, military equipment, books, household goods, clothing, types of food, cosmetics, medicines and so on, all reached the Balkans not only from Turkey but also from the Arab East, which is to say, from the Islamic East, and all these goods were known by their Arabic, Turkish and

18 The third volume of Rumi’s *Masnawi* in Bosnian was published in Sarajevo in 2005.

Persian names. To this day Muslims in the Balkans use thousands of Arabic, Turkish and Persian words in Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian and other languages of the Balkan region – these words relate to science, religion, literature, trade, housing, clothing, cosmetics, medicine, cookery and so on.

Thousands of Arabic, Turkish and Persian words and expressions

When speaking of the Arabic and Islamic cultural influence on the Balkans, one must begin with Arabic words. Through their contacts with the Arab East over the centuries, the Balkan peoples adopted thousands of Arabic words and phrases which have entered and become permanent elements of their languages. As an illustration, you are invited to look inside a traditional Muslim house in the Balkans, where the host wants to offer you *ikram*, that is, to welcome you as his guest.

The room where guests sit with the host, with its rich decorations, is known as the *divan*. Muslims in the Balkans have also turned this Arabic word (*dīwān*) into a verb, *divaniti*, which in Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian means ‘to enjoy pleasant conversation’, sitting in the *divan* or some other attractively furnished place. In an old Bosnian house you will usually be served *kahva* and *šerbet*, sherbet. Muslims in the Balkans also use the Arabic word *kahva* (*qahwa*), meaning coffee, while they use the Arabic word *šarba*, in the form *šerbet* or *šerbe*, to denote a sweetened, non-alcoholic drink.

You will see that your host pours the coffee from a *džezva*, which in Bosnian too means *jazwa*, the narrow-necked utensil (usually copper) in which coffee is made. After being served with coffee, you could ask for *duhan*: any Bosniac, Serb or Croat will understand what you mean by this Arabic word for tobacco (*dukhān*) and offer you a cigarette. The host might offer you tobacco from his pocket, which in Bosnian is *džep* (from the Arabic *jayb*). It is the same word in Serbian and Croatian – there is no other local word that is an effective substitute for the word *džep*.

It is very likely that your host will offer you *halva*, which in Bosnia, and throughout the Balkans, is a sweetmeat made of wheat dough and oil. The word *halva* comes from the Arabic *ḥalāwa* or *ḥalawyyāt*, which also indicates a kind of sweet made of dough and oil. The host will probably bring you the *halva* in a dish known in Bosnia as a *sahan*, which is an Arabic word (*ṣaḥn*).

If you look around the rooms of your Bosniac host, you will notice many *sedžadas*. The Muslims in Bosnia also use the word *sajjāda* for a prayer mat, and the word has become completely naturalized here.

Taking a stroll around Sarajevo, the capital city of Bosnia and Herzegovina, you will even find streets with Arabic names. For example,



4.16 Mostar Bridge, Bosnia and Herzegovina (© UNESCO)

Mudželiti mali and *Mudželiti veliki* are two streets in the centre of Sarajevo which have taken their names from the bookbinders; and in Bosnia a bookbinder is often called a *mudželid*, from the Arabic *mujallid*. Sarajevo is full of shops, or *dućans*, from the Arabic *dukkān*. The city is also full of small streets which are called *sokaci* in Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian – derived from *zuqāq*, a word heard every day in Arabic. The word *džada* is frequently used in Bosnian and Serbian; it would be hard to find anyone in Bosnia, Serbia or Montenegro who did not know that the Arabic word *jadda* means road.

In addition, toponyms of Arabic origin are common throughout the Balkans. For example, travelling west from Sarajevo, you soon come upon an attractive town called Ilidža which acquired its name from its curative mineral springs. People recognized that the water had healing properties (*iladž*, in Arabic *‘ilāj*) and named the place accordingly. Indeed, sources of mineral or curative waters in Bosnia are often called *ilidža*.

As you travel around Bosnia and Serbia, and indeed in other Balkan countries, you will find numerous military fortresses known as *kule* (sing. *kula*). Here, too, one may recognize the Arabic word *qal‘a*.¹⁹ The Arabic *waqf*

19 Alkalaj, a well-known Jewish surname in Bosnia and Herzegovina, derives from the Arabic word *qal‘a* (fortress).

(*vakuf* in Bosnian) has also become incorporated into the names of many towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina – for example, Gornji Vakuf (Upper Waqf), Donji Vakuf (Lower Waqf), Kulen Vakuf, and so on. Balkan towns with a Muslim population had a *musala* (Arabic *muṣallā*), or place where people prayed *bajram namaz* (i.e. the prayers of *‘Īd al-Fiṭr*) together in a large congregational mosque, or *džemat* (Ar. *jamā‘a*). In Bosnian, *musala* literally means a place of prostration, the place where *namaz* or *ṣalāh* is prayed. There is a street in Sarajevo named Musala, where the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is now located.

It would take a very long time to list all the Arabic words that Bosniacs use every day in the Bosnian language, and which are also found in Serbian and Croatian. Words such as *duhan*, *džep*, *kahva*, *kana* (henna; Ar. *ḥinna*), *kula*, *sedef* (mother of pearl; Ar. *ṣadaf*), *šifra* (cipher; Ar. *ṣifr*) and *tarifa* (tariff; Ar. *ta‘rīfa*) have no adequate, let alone accurate, substitute in Bosnian, Serbian or Croatian. (And speaking of *kna* or *kana*, it is of interest to note that on the occasion of traditional weddings among the Muslim population in the Balkans, the tradition survives of using henna to colour the hair, hands and feet of the bride. In many places in the Balkans, this is regarded as an ‘Islamic’ custom.)

To this day Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs continue to use in their everyday speech Arabic words such as *belaj* (trouble, accident; Ar. *balā*), *dever* (distribution of a deceased’s small-change to the poor; Ar. *dawr*), *dželat* (executioner; Ar. *jallād*), *hajvan* (cattle; Ar. *ḥayawān*), *insan* (human being, man; Ar. *insān*), *mušterija* (customer, purchaser: Ar. *muštarī*), *inad* (defiance; Ar. *‘inād*), *fajda* (benefit, gain; Ar. *fā‘ida*) and so on. While not identical to the Arabic, the Arabic roots are clear in all these words.²⁰

In the Balkan region some valuable papers and fine dictionaries have been written on Arabic, Turkish and Persian words in the Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian languages.²¹ One of the best known is the dictionary by Prof. Abdulah Škaljić,²² who studies the use and number of Arabic, Turkish and Persian words in Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian. It can be said with full justification that there are thousands of Arabic words in these languages. This alone speaks volumes for the major cultural influence of the Arabic language in the Balkans. According to Škaljić, Arabic words and terminology are to be found in Bosnian in several fields:

20 If there is a road accident, for example, one might say: *Imali smo belaj* (We’ve had an accident). In Bosnia if someone behaves improperly, they might be told: *Ponašaj se kao insan, a nemoj biti hajvan* (Behave like a human being, not like an animal). It is common for shopkeepers and market traders to say: *Danas smo imali mnogo mušterija* (We’ve had a lot of customers today), meaning that they sold large numbers of goods.

21 For example, the outstanding analysis by Teufik Muftić, ‘Prilog semantičkom izučavanju arabizama u srpskohrvatskom jeziku’, *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju*, XVIII–XIX, 1968–9.

22 Abdulah Škaljić, *Turcizmi u srpskohrvatskom-hrvatskosrpskom jeziku* [Turcisms in Serbo-Croatian/Croato-Serbian], Sarajevo, 1973.

1. Words relating to religious life and the religious customs of Muslims: Allāh, Islām, *tespih* (rosary; Ar. *tasbīh*), *tedžvid* (the art of reciting the Qu'rān according to the correct principles of pronunciation; Ar. *tajwīd*), *ramazan* (Ramaḍān), *zekat* (obligatory alms; Ar. *zakāh*), *hadž* (the pilgrimage to Mecca; Ar. *ḥajj*), *šehadet* (witnessing; Ar. *shahāda*), and so on.
2. Personal names: Muhamed, Ahmed, Salih, Hatidža (Khadīja), Fatima, Alija ('Alī) etc. To this day Bosniacs are still almost always given Arabic (i.e. Muslim) names and not pre-Islamic names. A glance at Sarajevo's telephone directory suffices to show that the most common name for Muslim men is Muhamed, followed by Alija, Omer, Hasan, Husejn, and so on. Among women the most common name is Fatima, followed by Hatidža, Aiša, and so on.
3. Law, administration and the affairs of state: *hak* (right, just, true; Ar. *ḥaqq*), *kadija* (judge; Ar. *qāḍī*), *haps* (prison; Ar. *ḥabs*), *sultan*, *mutesarif* (regional governor; Ar. *mutaṣarrif*), etc.
4. The army and military expressions: *asker* (soldier; Ar. 'askar), *kula*, *hendek* (defensive trench; Ar. *khandaq*), *mušir* (marshal; Ar. *mushīr*), etc.
5. Weapons and other war *matériel*: for example, *sablja dimiskija* (a Damascene sword; from Ar. *Dimashq*).
6. Architecture, buildings and building materials: *bina* (building; Ar. *binā'*), *kube* (dome, cupola; Ar. *qubba*).
7. Trade and money: *mušterija*, *dinar*, *dirhem*.
8. Crafts, artisans and the tools of their trades: *sat* (clock or watch) and *sahačija* (watchmaker; from Ar. *sā'a*), *sarač* (leatherworker; Ar. *sarrāj*), *ćevapčija* (kebab maker, from Ar. *kabāb*), *abadžija* (tailor, from Ar. 'abā'), *makaze* (scissors; Ar. *miqaṣṣ*), etc.
9. Vessels, household goods and related items: *sahan* (copper dish or plate; Ar. *ṣaḥn*), *ibrik*, *maštrafa* (drinking glass; Ar. *mishraba*), *hasura*, *dolap* (shelved wall cupboard; Ar. *dūlāb*), etc.
10. Clothing, shoes, jewellery and make-up: *džuba* (black mantle worn by Islamic religious officials; Ar. *jubba*), *nanule* (wooden clog; Ar. *na'layn*), *kna*, *surma* (kohl), etc.
11. Food, drink and spices: *tufahija* (apples cooked in syrup and filled with walnut stuffing; Ar. *tuffāhiyya*, from *tuffāḥ*, apple), *halva*, *pasulj* (beans; Ar. *bisilla*, peas), *šerbe*, *rakija* (plum or other fruit brandy; Ar. 'araq), *kadayf* (sweetmeat of fine vermicelli-like threads in syrup; Ar. *qaṭā'if*), etc.
12. Names of birds and animals: *bulbul* (nightingale), *hudhud* (hoopoe), *akreb* (scorpion; Ar. 'aqrab), *žirafa* (giraffe), etc.

According to Abdulah Škaljić, Teufik Muftić and others who have conducted research in this field, Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian also have many

words of Arabic origin that relate to the following fields: geographical and topographical terms, streets, agriculture, forestry and stock-raising, hunting, medicine and hygiene, astronomy, music and games, civic titles, social class, occupations and professions, the names of parts of the human and animal body, colours, scents, metals, minerals and chemical elements, fabrics, embroidery and thread, types of leather, means of transport, family relationships, nature and natural phenomena, time and the calendar, abstract and other nouns, and so on.

People in the Balkans who are well versed in astronomy know that the words *el-ferkad* (the two bright stars of Ursa Minor; Ar. *al-farqad*), *el-džedj* (the North Star; Ar. *al-jady*), *el-akreb* (Scorpio) are words of Arabic origin used to name stars or constellations.²³ Indeed, in Europe the skies are in large part read through the medium of the Arabic words used in astronomy.

The distribution of the Arabic alphabet in the Balkans

After this general reference to the large number of Arabic words and terms in Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian (observations which hold good in large part for Macedonian, Bulgarian and certain other Balkan languages as well), it is interesting to note that for the most part all these terms arrived as a result of the spread of literacy by means of the Arabic language and alphabet.

Over the past five or six centuries, Bosniacs have written thousands of treatises and books in Arabic of which hundreds still survive in good condition. Indeed, for centuries members of the Bosnian '*ulamā*' and religious people in general, as well as poets, mystics and members of the administration, only used Arabic, Turkish or Persian when speaking or writing about Islam. The libraries – in particular, the Gazi Husrev Bey library in Sarajevo – are full of valuable manuscripts written in these languages, many of them by Bosniacs. This rich cultural heritage is evidence that Bosnia and the Balkans were, and still are, part of the literary and scientific patterns of the Islamic East during its mature period.

Prof. Hazim Šabanović has published a major encyclopedic work on the Bosniacs who wrote treatises of philosophy, theology, mysticism and so on in Arabic, Persian and Turkish, or whose poetry was sung in these languages.²⁴ These works, of which the majority are in Arabic, deal mainly

23 In European languages, these three terms are usually written as *pherkad*, *algedi* and *acrab*.

24 Hazim Šabanović, *Književnost Muslimana BiH na orijentalnim jezicima*, Sarajevo, 1973.

with *tafsīr*, *Ḥadīth*, theology, grammar, syntax, semantics, poetry, prose, history, *taṣawwuf*, and so on.

Thus, the Muslims in Bosnia, and in the Balkans, have long been familiar with the Arabic alphabet and language, and there are still specialists operating in all fields of Arabic and Islamic studies who either speak or write in Arabic. This is, of course, nothing new; Arabic calligraphy is very dear to the Bosniacs and hundreds of thousands of Muslim houses in the Balkans have at least one *levha* (*lawḥ*) with fine arabesques adorning the white walls.

What is perhaps not so well known is that the Muslims in Bosnia and in the Balkans also used the Arabic alphabet in writing their own languages. This dates from the early twentieth century. The Bosnian religious leader Mehmed Džemaludin Čaušević (1870–1938), one of the greatest scholars during the Austro-Hungarian period in Bosnia and Herzegovina, commissioned one of his friends, a printer by the name of Agof effendi Zeronian, to cast Arabic letters, and to make special letters for those which exist in Bosnian but not in Arabic, such as P, Ž, C, Č, Ć, Lj and so on. This script is known in Bosnia as *arebica*, and was used in printing a large number of religious books, such as primers of the Islamic faith, *akaid* (Ar. *‘aqā’id*). In this way, Čaušević intended to overcome the crisis that had arisen in Muslim society in the Balkans with the coming of Austro-Hungarian rule and of the Latin script to which the Austro-Hungarians accorded preferential treatment. Thus, Čaušević hoped to preserve the Arabic script and to have it used for written works in Bosnian.

The Arabic alphabet spread very rapidly in Bosnia and the wider Balkans thanks above all to the Qur’ān, since for centuries children learnt the Arabic alphabet in the *maktabs* of the Balkans so as to be able to read and recite it. Although the translation of the Qur’ān is in itself a major subject requiring a separate discussion, it is perhaps relevant here to mention something about its translation into Bosnian and Serbian. The first, and so far the only, translation of the Qur’ān into Serbian was made by a Serbian priest by the name of Mićo Ljubibratić Hercegovac. It was published in Belgrade in 1895 (without the original Arabic text). The first translation of the Qur’ān into Bosnian was undertaken by Mehmed Džemaludin Čaušević and hafiz Muhamed Pandža, and published in Sarajevo in 1937 along with the original text. That same year, but in Mostar, a translation of the Qur’ān by Ali Riza Karabeg was published without the Arabic text. Subsequently, in 1975, yet another translation into Bosnian was published (by the Oriental Institute), this time by Besim Korkut. Another two translations into Bosnian have since appeared, one by Mustafa Mlivo in 1995 and one by the present author in

the same year.²⁵ The most recent translation of the Qur'ān into Bosnian is by Esad Duraković and was published in Sarajevo in 2004.

The influence of Arabic and Islamic literature

From the very beginning of the close cultural encounter, Arabic had its own ardent protagonists in Bosnia and the wider Balkans, and for centuries Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs have been mastering the language and compiling Arabic dictionaries and grammars. If we confine ourselves only to more recent times and to brief, dictionary-style references, it can be seen that many scholars included among their works Arabic grammars of great merit. Among these, special mention should be made of the following professors: Teufik Muftić, Alija Kadić, Alija Bulić, Šaćir Sikirić, Mehmed Handžić, Muhamed Pašić, Besim Korkut, Rade Božović and Omer Nakićević. The name of Prof. Teufik Muftić stands out among Bosnian Arabists for his numerous contributions to the study of Arabic, and in particular because of his comprehensive textbook of Arabic grammar and his monumental Arabic-Bosnian dictionary.²⁶

Since the first encounters of the Balkans with the Arabic and Islamic cultural universe, Arabic and Islamic poetry has occupied an important place in the world poetry studied within the region. As far as pre-Islamic Arabic literature is concerned, the Seven *Mu'allaqāt*²⁷ are particularly popular in Bosnia, and extracts have often been published.²⁸ The epic poem on 'Antara ibn Shaddād is also well known in Bosnia, and has several times been the subject of comment within the context of broader literary treatises. Arabic poetry from the Umayyad and 'Abbāsīd periods has also been translated into Bosnian and Serbian.

As regards Islamic poetry in Arabic, the influence of Ka'b ibn Zuhayr's *Qasida-i burda* has been particularly marked; it is often recited in Arabic in Bosnia and has frequently been translated into Bosnian in part or in whole. Hifzija Suljkić has translated early Islamic *qaṣīdas*, as has Dr Jusuf Ramić, who has also written a long treatise on the *qaṣīda* as a genre.²⁹ The Muslims in Bosnia are also very familiar with the *qaṣīdas* of Ḥassān ibn Thābit, Ibn al-Mu'tazz and many other Arab poets. These *qaṣīdas* are often recited, usually

25 The first edition of Besim Korkut's translation of the Qur'ān included the original Arabic text, as does the present writer's 1995 translation.

26 The first edition was published in Sarajevo in 1973 under the title *Arapsko-srpskohrvatski rječnik* [Arabic-Serbocroatian Dictionary].

27 The oldest complete collection of pre-Islamic Arabic poems of the type known as *qaṣīda*, usually with a rigid tripartite structure.

28 The most recent translation, by Esad Duraković, was published in Sarajevo in 2003.

29 Jusuf Ramić, *Obzorja arapsko-islamske književnosti*, Sarajevo, 1999.

in part only, during the two *bajrams* (‘*Īd al-Fiṭr* and ‘*Īd al-Aḏḩā*) and on other formal occasions.

It was under the influence of the Arabic *qaṣīda* and *ilāhiyya* that there emerged in the Balkans a home-grown form of *qaṣīda* and *ilāhiyya* composed in Bosnian, Albanian and some other languages. The topics of the local *qaṣīdas* include the faith, the Prophet Muḩammad, the value of piety, the meaning of life and death and the transience of this world. The *qaṣīdas* and *ilāhiyyas* of many sheikhs are well known in Bosnia, for example those of Sheikh Sirri. At the present time, Džemaludin Latić stands out as the finest author of these genres in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The form of the Bosnian and Albanian *qaṣīda* and *ilāhiyya* is the Arabic couplet, or *bayt*; thus the influence of Arabic poetry could not be clearer. As well as these, Arabic poetry influenced Bosnian poetry in the form of the quatrain, or *rubā‘ī*. It should be noted here that in Bosnia, as in the wider Balkans, Arabic poetry of an edifying nature (*adab*) is popular. Thus, for centuries, the famous work by al-Mawardī, *Adab ad-dunyā wa-d-dīn*, was studied in the elite Gazi Husrev Bey *madrasa* in Sarajevo.

More than a century ago, Mehmed-beg Kapetanović Ljubušak compiled a major two-volume work of verses, sayings and proverbs entitled *Istočno blago* [Treasures of the Orient].³⁰ This includes hundreds of edifying Arabic verses in the original. It can be concluded that Ljubušak wrote his work with the assistance of Arabic books such as *Kutub al-amthāl*, *Kutub ash-shi‘r* and other similar volumes.

Many modern Arab poets have been translated into Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian, among them ‘Abd al-Wahāb al-Bayātī, Nāzik al-Malā’ika, Shawqī Ḍayf and Tawfīq al-ḩakīm. As regards the classical Arab poets, several Bosnian Arabists have translated Abu-l-‘Alā’ al-Ma‘arrī. Thus, Sulejman Grozdanić has translated the *Risālat al-ghufrān* into Bosnian, and Daniel Bučan has translated part of *Luzūm mā lā yalzam*.

ḩikāya is another classic form of Arabic and Islamic literature that has had a marked influence on literature in Bosnia and the wider Balkans. Bosnian and Balkan literature includes hundreds or even thousands of *ḩikāyas* of Arabic origin, or that have been acquired by means of multiple metamorphoses from the literary heights of the Arabic language. The following *ḩikāyas* are particularly well known: *ḩikaya o Ibrāhīm pejgamberu* [The *ḩikāya* of Abraham the Prophet], *ḩikaya o Ismail pejgamberu* [The *ḩikāya* of Ismā‘īl the Prophet] and *ḩikaya o Ejjub pejgamberu* [The *ḩikāya* of Ayyūb (Job) the Prophet]. There is also a *ḩikāya* of *Smrt hazreti Fatime* [The Death of Hazrat Fāṭima]. All these *ḩikāyas* have been composed by Bosniacs based on their knowledge of Arabic and Islamic works of history, literature and

30 Mehmed-beg Kapetanović Ljubušak, *Istočno blago*, I and II, Sarajevo, 1988.

so on. Of course, there are also many other *ḥikāyas* acquired via Arabic literary prose works and dealing with the themes of good and evil, death, the transience of this world and so on. These have penetrated deeply into Bosnian culture and literature.

Ḥikāyas are particularly favoured in traditional Muslim circles, and Bosnian men of letters, among them Alija Isaković, Rešad Kadić and Nedžad Ibrišimović, and many others, have used the *ḥikāya* form in their numerous books. It should be pointed out here that the difference between philosophical and religious *ḥikāyas* is perfectly well understood in the Balkans. Men of letters in the Balkans generally make use of the philosophical *ḥikāya*, while the ‘*ulamā*’ use religious *ḥikāyas* such as those quoted by Iranian al-Ghazālī or as-Samarkandī in his *Tanbīh al-ghāfilīn*.

Several novels have recently been written in Bosnian under the influence of story-telling, that is, the recounting of *ḥikāyas*. For centuries, there have been oral story-tellers in the Balkans whose role is identical with that of the *quṣṣaṣ* or *musāmirūn* in Arabic and Islamic culture. Indeed, the activities of the Balkan story-tellers emerged and developed in large part under the influence of the latter, both having the same role and telling the same or similar stories. The story-tellers are often illiterate but know thousands of verses and tales. For example, Avdo Međedović, a Muslim from the Sandžak (which now belongs partly to Serbia and partly to Montenegro), knew tens of thousands of verses by heart, but he was illiterate. His book *Ženidba Smailagić Mehe* [The Wedding of Smailagić Meho] has recently been published.

It is believed in academic circles that the Arabic *ḥikāya* became part of Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian literature through the medium of the *Thousand and One Nights*, and of *Kalīla wa Dimna* by Ibn al-Muqaffa‘. *Kalīla wa Dimna* was translated into Bosnian by Besim Korkut more than forty years ago and is a favourite text for reading in schools. As for the *Thousand and One Nights*, educated people in the Balkans were already reading this many years ago, and there are now several translations of the work both in Serbian and in Bosnian. The finest translation is that of Esad Duraković, a professor of Arabic language and literature at the Faculty of Philosophy (Humanities).³¹ The *Thousand and One Nights* has had a great influence on Balkan writers. For example, Dževad Karahasan, who recently obtained the prestigious European Herder Prize for his novel *Šahrijarov prsten* [Shahrayar’s Ring], uses motifs from the *Thousand and One Nights*, but in the shape of the skilful and intelligent introduction of a civilized and cultured dialogue between West and East. Karahasan followed this up with his novel *Istočni diwan* [Oriental Dīwān] whose central figure is Ibn al-Muqaffa‘.

31 Published in Sarajevo in 1999 by NIPP Ljiljan.

Another favourite of writers and philosophers in the Balkans is Ibn Ḥazm and his *Tawq al-Ḥamāma* [The Ring of the Dove]. This was translated ten years ago by Teufik Muftić. The Arab literary hero Juha is also well known in the Balkans, albeit under the name Nasruddin Hojja, for the Arab figure of Juha arrived via the Turkish figure of Nasruddin Hojja while taking on additional local traits. Many stories of an educational and humorous nature are told about this character, and some ten years ago the writer Alija Isaković published a collection of these stories.

Through Arabic and Islamic poetry, the *ilāhiyya*, the *qaṣīda* and the *ḥikāya*, dozens of Arabic proverbs have entered Bosnian and Serbian in a literal translation. For example, the proverb ‘time is money’ is a direct translation of the Arabic *al-mawāqīt lā tushtarā bi-l-yawāqīt*. It would not be difficult to write a whole book on the influence of Arabic, Turkish and Persian proverbs on literature in Bosnia and in the Balkans as a whole.

HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY

Arabic works of history and philosophy are well known in the Balkans, but none can compare with the popularity of the *Muqaddima* of Ibn Khaldūn. Teufik Muftić’s recent translation of the work into Bosnian is currently in press, while Daniel Bučan has already translated parts into Croatian in Zagreb, and Hasan Sušić likewise into Bosnian in Sarajevo. Many historians have adopted Ibn Khaldūn’s methodology in interpreting the history of the world. Thus, after studying Ibn Khaldūn, Dr Hilmo Neimarlija began to study the German philosopher Oswald Spengler and has published numerous studies on the subject in Bosnian.

Elsewhere, Ibn Hishām’s *Sīra* has recently been translated by Mustafa Prljača and was published in Sarajevo, while Usāma ibn Munqidh’s *Kitāb al-‘ibra* (on the Crusades and Ṣalāḥ-ad-Dīn al-Ayyūbī) was translated and published in Belgrade several years ago.

Mention should also be made of the classical authors of philosophy who are most sought-after in the Balkans – al-Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd, Ibn Sīnā and Farābī. In Zagreb, Daniel Bučan recently produced fine translations of al-Ghazālī’s *Tahāfut al-falāsifa* and Ibn Rushd’s *Tahāfut at-tahāfut*, both of which were published in handsome editions. Bučan has also translated Farābī’s *Kitāb al-ḥurūf* and Ibn Sīnā’s *Kitāb at-tanbīhāt wa-l-ishārāt*. Many other philosophical works written in Arabic have been translated.

Arabic Sufi works, by authors such as Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, Junayd, Bistāmī and Ibn ‘Arabī, have been translated in part or in whole into Bosnian. For example, Dr Rešid Hafizović has translated Ibn ‘Arabī’s *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* and this was very well received by the public. Sufi poetry is also very highly

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regarded in educated Muslim circles in the Balkans and the works of Ibn al-Fāriḍ and many other Sufi poets are greatly respected.

CONTEMPORARY ARABIC AND ISLAMIC LITERATURE

The poetry of Emir Shaqīb Arslān was popular in Bosnia, especially between the two world wars. Many of his poems were published, together with his treatises on the Arabic and Islamic world, during the first half of the twentieth century. Much has been done in modern times to translate contemporary Arabic literature in the Balkans. Thus, Ṭāhā Ḥusayn is very popular in Bosnia, and his autobiography *al-Ayyām* has been translated into Bosnian by Nijaz Dizdarević with the title *Dani* (meaning 'The Days', as the Arabic original). The second edition of this translation appeared in 2000, indicating the book's popularity in Bosnia and throughout the Balkans. Similarly, Nagīb Maḥfūz was much translated into Serbian as soon as he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1988. Mention might also be made of Khalīl Jibrān many of whose books have been translated and published in Zagreb. Esad Duraković also recently edited many of Jibrān's works in Sarajevo. The most popular of his works in the Balkans is *an-Nabī*. The finest and most productive scholar of Arabic literature, Esad Duraković, has written (in Arabic) a fine study on Arabic literature in the diaspora (*mahjar*).

Recently, many Bosniacs have written valuable doctoral dissertations on Arabic literature. Among these, Dr Ahmed Smajlović defended his dissertation, entitled *Falsafat al-istishrāq wa 'aṣruḥā fi-l-adab al-'arabī al-mu'āṣir*, in Cairo in 1974, while Dr Jusuf Ramić defended his dissertation, entitled *Uṣrat al-Muwaylihī wa 'aṣruḥā fi-l-adab al-'arabī al-ḥadīth*, in the same city the following year.

Finally, Bosniac poets are so greatly influenced by Arabic and Islamic poetry that with many of them one can recognize at every step the distant genes of Arabic poetry in particular, and Islamic poetry in general. Thus, for example, Hadžem Hajdarević writes of many things in his seven books of poetry, but his central theme is water. Why water? Because water is both the inner and the external world. Water is both visible and invisible. It is a great symbol, the sign of Allāh, the Almighty Creator. The Balkans owe an immense debt to Arabic and Islamic cultural influences, which have proved immeasurably enriching.

Chapter 4.5

ISLAM IN THE FAR EAST

Hee-Soo Lee

Ancient relations between the Muslim world and East Asia

Civilizations always feed on the work of previous civilizations, appropriating and digesting all that fits their needs and dispensing with all that does not. As a general rule in contact between cultures, material objects are taken over by the guest culture earlier than non-material characteristics. Tools, architecture and clothing, for example, are adopted by the recipient culture before religious ideas and social organizations. Under the stress of the assimilatory factors, Muslims in East Asia were responsive mainly to the host culture, but were insistent on preserving the essential Islamic value system.

Cultural contacts between the Islamic world and the East Asian countries (China proper, Korea and Japan) are believed to have been initiated as early as the first century AH/middle of the seventh century AD and have continued until recent times without showing any signs of conflict or antagonism. Not surprisingly, throughout the ages the Muslim community in East Asia has been characterized by an attempt to retain its identity as a religious minority while adopting many of the outward forms of the surrounding local culture and ways of life. Only when the tension between two divergent factors has become too great has the community broken out into rebellion, particularly against the Chinese regime of the Ch'ing dynasty (1644–1912).

SINO-MUSLIM RELATIONS

The first spread of Islam to East Asia is considered to be an outcome of the ancient China–Arabia commercial relations through sea routes from

the seventh century AD. Commercial trade between East Asia and Arabia probably precedes the period when records were first kept. Long before the advent of Islam, China and Arabia were trading by sea following established itineraries and by such overland routes as the Silk Road. According to Arabic sources like the *Kitāb at-tanbīh wa-l-ishrāf* by the Arab historian al-Mas'ūdī, Chinese ships often sailed in the fifth and sixth centuries to the port of Siraf on the Euphrates and to other ports in the Persian Gulf. One old Islamic record states that Arab-Chinese commercial relations date back to the year 14/636. When the Arab general 'Utba ibn Gazwān conquered Basra, he sent the following report to the caliph 'Umar in the month of Ramaḍān or Shab'ān AD 636:

Thanks to Allāh, we conquered Basra whence so many junks were coming from Oman, Bahrain, Morocco, India and China. Know and thank Allāh. He gave us their gold, silver, women and children. *In shā'a Allāh*, I will write to you with more details later.¹

Another important Arabic source concerning these times is the *Murūj adh-dhahab* (also by al-Mas'ūdī) in which the author describes how Chinese traders sailed loaded with commercial goods to eastern Arabia, Basra and several Omani ports.² An earlier Arab author, Ibn al-Kalbī, also mentions the commercial activities of the Chinese markets of Oman: 'In Daba, one of the two great ports of Arabia, there is a crowded trade market. Merchants from Sind, India and China, and Eastern and Western peoples constantly gathered there.'³ Ships from these areas also sailed directly to China. We are told by Chinese sources, however, that up to the fifth century AD, few Chinese from Cambodia, Annam or Tongking had reached Arabia, while merchants from those parts came frequently to Indo-China.⁴

It seems evident that during ancient and medieval times, the sea trade between Egypt and the Arabs on the one side, and India and East Asia on the other, remained almost exclusively in the hands of the enterprising Arabs and Persians of the South Arabian coast. In the very early days, they established stations at all the principal ports-of-call along the coast to the south of the Indus and thence ultimately to Canton, the most important

1 Abū Ḥanīfa ad-Dīnawrī, *al-Akhbār aṭ-ṭiwāl*, ed. Vladimir Guirgass, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1888, p. 123.

2 Abu-l-Ḥasan al-Mas'ūdī, *Murūj adh-dhahab wa-ma'ādin al-jawhar*, trans. C. Barbier de Meynard and P. de Courtielle, Paris, 1863.

3 Aḥmad b. Abī Ya'qūb al-Ya'qūbī, *Tārīkh al-Ya'qūbī*, ed. M. Th. Houstma, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1883, pp. 313–15.

4 F. Hirth and W. W. Rockhill (trans.), *Chau Ju-Kua: His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the 12th and 13th Centuries entitled Chu-fan-chi*, St Petersburg, Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1911, p. 6.

southern Chinese port. Thus, the origins of China's import and export trade with foreign countries can be attributed to the efforts of the Muslims. Merchants, missionaries, travellers from various countries by sea and by land, came pouring in, and of the foreign countries possessing precious goods none could surpass the Muslim lands.

There are many contradictory opinions, based on official historical records or traditional legends, concerning the period when Islam was first introduced into China. Although such a well-known Chinese historian as Liu Chih Chin Chi-t'ung offers AD 628 as the date of the Muslims' first entry into China on the basis of legends persisting up to the present time, most historians point to the year 651 as marking the advent of Islam in China. This is according to an official Chinese record which reads:

In the second year of Yung Hui (AD 651), the king of Tashi (Arabia) Amir al-Mumin sent an envoy for the first time to the Chinese court bearing tribute. He announced that the House of Tashi had already reigned for thirty-four years and had had three kings.⁵

While this was the first formal contact between the two empires, some legends of Chinese Muslims have it that Muslims came to China before 651. Among the many traditional narratives the best-known legend, and the one that has the widest currency so far as Chinese Muslims are concerned, is the coming to China of Sa'd ibn Abī Waqqās, the maternal uncle of the Prophet Muḥammad. According to this legend, Sa'd arrived in China in around 632 accompanied by the Chinese ambassador, who had been dispatched to Arabia, and three other companions. He is said to have been the first emissary from Islam to reach China and to be buried in Canton. Against this, however, more formal historical records indicate that in fact Sa'd did not go to China; nor is there any record of his having been known by other names. Thus, he never visited China and was not the apostle identified in the legends.⁶

There is no reliable evidence that lends credence to the above legends. On the other hand, the mere absence of evidence should not be adduced as absolute proof to the contrary. It is of course possible that there was intercourse between the two countries during Muḥammad's lifetime. A famous adage of that time attributed to Muḥammad is: 'Seek for knowledge even unto China.' This would appear to indicate that it is within the bounds

5 *Chiu Tang Shu (CTS: Old Tang Annal)*, Tashi Chuan (ch. on Arabia), year 651.

6 Sa'd ibn Abī Waqqās was the seventh person to embrace Islam and he accompanied Muḥammad in all his battles. He died at Akiq, 16 km from Medina, c. AD 678 and was buried at the Prophet's Mosque in Medina. See K. V. Zetterstéen, 'Sa'd ibn Abī Waqqās', *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edn, ed. B. Lewis et al., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954-, X, pp. 18-20.

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of possibility that the name of the country was known to the Prophet, commercial relations between Arabia and China having been established many years previously.⁷

Two factors were extremely influential in the spread of Islam to East Asia – commercial relations via the maritime routes, and political and diplomatic relations along the silk routes. Loading their ships at Sirāf in the Persian Gulf, the Muslim merchants set sail for China via Muscat (in Oman), following the monsoon. Crossing the open sea of the Indian Ocean, they reached South India. Starting again and striking the south coast of Ceylon, the vessels proceeded to the gulf of Siam through the Malacca strait. Only after a long journey of three months did the hardy Muslim navigators arrive at the famous port of Canton in southern China. From the Muslim navigation manuals that have come down to us, it is clear that these navigators were quite at home in the eastern seas of China.⁸

From the T'ang (618–907) to the Sung period (960–1127), Arab and Persian merchants came to China in increasing numbers. Bazaars established in the 'Abbāsīd capital Baghdad specialized in the sale of such Chinese products as silk fabric, porcelain, tea and natural silk. Similarly, in the western and eastern markets of the Chinese capital Ch'ang-an, the streets were filled with foreign peoples mostly from the Muslim world. There were foreign shops which dealt in precious stones, ivory, rhinoceros horn, spices, glass, pearls and other products from Arabia and Persia.⁹

It was the silk routes which were the main channel for political and diplomatic relations between China and the Muslim world. According to Chinese historical sources, during the 147 years between 651 and 798, the Arab states called 'Tashi' sent emissaries on more than 37 occasions.

Elsewhere, however, two important events contributed greatly to the early political and cultural relations between the two worlds. One was the battle of Talas river in 751 and the other was the An Lu-shan rebellion of 755–59. As to the former, one century after the official introduction of Islam to China, the armies of China and the 'Abbāsīds met on the banks of the river Talas near Samarkand. After the Arabs had fought for five full days against the Chinese, the Chinese general Kao Hsien-chi, of Korean origin, suffered a crushing defeat. Only a few thousand soldiers survived. This battle, the only unfortunate incident between China and Arabia in their joint histories, has a significant place in world history. Due to the victory of the Muslim

7 Thomas W. Arnold, *The Preaching of Islam: A History of the Propagation of the Muslim Faith*, Lahore, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1961, p. 297.

8 Marshall Broomhall, *Islam in China: A Neglected Problem*, London, Morgan & Scott, 1910, pp. 7–8.

9 *Chiu Tang Shu*, Vol. 198, ch. on Hsi-yu; Ma Qi-ching, 'A Brief Account of the Early Spread of Islam in China', *Journal of the Chinese Academy of Social Science*, Beijing, 1983, IV, p. 99.

Arabs, most of the Central Asian lands – which had been a stronghold of Buddhism from its earliest times – became rapidly Islamized and Chinese power was not to reappear in the region for another six centuries. Similarly, with the Muslim victory, the advance of Islam was accelerated among Central Asian Turks and this enabled them to exert more political influence on the ‘Abbāsids. The Arab armies were soon joined by their compatriots, who had been doing business in the capital of China. Thus, according to the census of 760, there were more than 4,000 Arab families in Ch’ang-an at that time.¹⁰

Even though the battle of Talas river had a negative effect on the promotion of political relations between China and Arabia, it should be noted that friendly relations still existed between the two countries when the official Arab envoy to the Chinese court arrived in 752. It is known that Arab envoys came to the Chinese court at least eight times between 752 and 756. The Chinese regime benefited greatly from this normalization of political relations with the Arabs when it faced a serious challenge in the shape of the dangerous rebellion of An Lu-shan, a Chinese general.

Unhappy with the Chinese emperor, An Lu-shan rose in rebellion in 756. When he succeeded in seizing the Chinese capitals of Ch’ang-an and Lo-yang, he promptly proclaimed himself emperor of a new dynasty called Yen. Under the critical situation of chaos and unrest, the T’ang emperor appealed to the Arabs for help. (It is of interest to note that only five years earlier, in 751, the Arabs had been fighting the Chinese.) The ‘Abbāsīd caliphate immediately responded to the appeal and sent a contingent consisting probably of some 4,000 Persians and Iraqis. With the assistance of the Arab troops, the Chinese emperor was able to recover his country and restore some sort of order. Chinese history clearly indicates that in 757 Arab troops, with the cooperation of the Uighur armies, assisted the Chinese in recapturing the two capitals from the rebels.¹¹

With the end of the rebellion, many Arab soldiers were allowed to settle in Ch’ang-an and Lo-yang as a reward for their services and bravery. Only a small number returned to their homes further west. The ones who stayed married Chinese women and thus became the nucleus of the naturalized Chinese Muslims of today. The settlement of this large body of Arabs in China may be seen as probably the largest and most definitive event recorded concerning the advent of Islam in China, and it represents the second large influx of Muslims to China along the Silk Road. Through the efforts of the settlers, Islam was spread further to the western part of the country.

10 Ma Ibrāhīm, *Muslims in China*, Kuala Lumpur, n.d., p. 21.

11 Charles Hucker, *The Chinese Imperial Past*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975, p. 144.

The politico-economic relations between China and the Muslim world accelerated during the period of the Sung dynasty (960–1127) during which time the Arab tribute envoys came to China forty-nine times. In 966 the first Sung emperor, T'ai-tsu (r. 960–76), dispatched a goodwill mission to establish contact with various Muslim countries. This mission, composed of more than 100 officials, was entrusted with numerous imperial messages. The most important message was the one delivered to the 'Abbāsīd caliph al-Mu'ṭī (r. 946–74) concerning the reopening of Sino-Arab sea trade. In response, an 'Abbāsīd tributary delegation, bearing valuable gifts and Arabian products, arrived at the Chinese court in 968. Between the years 971 to 976, four more 'Abbāsīd embassies visited the Chinese emperor and this resulted in the formerly discontinued Sino-Arab relations being resumed.¹²

The Sung government turned international trade into a monopoly. But in fact the import, export and shipping enterprises were owned and operated by Chinese and Muslim merchants. When the Sung dynasty took measures to protect foreign traders and established a definite trading policy, the influx of foreign traders to China increased. More came during the Sung period than in the T'ang period and they were concentrated mainly in Canton and Zaitun (Ch'un-chou) ports. Most of the traders were Muslims.

Although overland trade with East Asia during this period was predominantly in the hands of the Persians and Central Asian Turks, the Arabs played a leading role in maritime commerce. If we examine the commercial and maritime standing of the Arabs in the Persian Gulf, we find that from very early times the Arabs held an important position both in trade and in navigation. With their superb navigational skills, they sailed mainly from their countries of origin to Africa, India, Burma, Champa and places in South-East Asia where they collected commodities that were much sought after by the Chinese. Although these traders sometimes sailed to Korea and Japan, their final destination was always China, especially the two south-eastern international ports of Canton and Zaitun, then the busiest trade centres in the world.

During the Sung period, Zaitun's position became yet more important. Foreign merchants and goods 'congregated here like swarming bees', and all who left and came to China used Zaitun for embarking and landing. The Chinese scholar Chao Ju-kua's *Chu-Fan-Chi* records that the ships from Arabia could carry several thousand persons and were provided with wine and eating places.¹³ On visiting Zaitun, the great fourteenth-century Moroccan traveller Ibn Baṭṭūṭa described it as:

12 Yusuf Chang, 'Chinese Muslim Mobility in Sung-Ciao-Chin Period', *Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Jeddah, 1964, VI, p. 155.

13 Qi-ching, 'A Brief Account', p. 99; Hirth, *Chau Ju-Kua*, pp. 17–18.

the world's greatest port, with over a hundred big ships in its harbour, smaller crafts being simply countless. Chinese porcelain is produced only in Zaitun and Canton and is sold in India and other places, even as far as our country Morocco.¹⁴

The prosperous economic exchanges between China and Arabia at that time, and the common bond of trade between the two countries, caused large numbers of Arab and Persian Muslim traders to emigrate to China.

The Sung dynasty was anxious to promote the import and export trade with Muslims. At various seaports it even installed an Office of Superintendency of Merchant Shipping to look after this promising trade. In 999 Inspectorates for Maritime Trade were established at Hang-chou and Ming-chou ports. The superintendents of merchant shipping were appointed especially to manage such shipping affairs as collecting custom duties on foreign and domestic goods, offering warehouses for storage and purchasing profitable foreign goods for resale.¹⁵

Many rich Arab merchants appeared in China at this time. At the end of the tenth century, an Arab sea captain, P'u Hsi-mi, arrived in Canton and presented many gifts to the Sung court including 50 ivory tusks and 1,800 bottles of frankincense. In the latter half of the eleventh century, an Arab merchant called Sin Abdallāh, who had lived in Canton for several decades, accumulated a huge fortune and offered his own money to assist in the rebuilding of Canton city. Towards the end of the Sung period, a well-known Arab descendant by the name of P'u Shou-keng looked after Arab merchants' affairs in China in his capacity as the superintendent of maritime trade. It was with the economic power of the Arab traders that new projects were completed. Thus, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, Zaitun city expanded and the use of granite became commonplace.¹⁶

MUSLIM RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND KOREA

It has yet to be determined when Muslims had their first direct contact with the Korean peninsula and Japan, though it is believed that Islamic and Turkish culture has had a significant influence on East Asian culture since ancient times. Documented references are few and far between, but are sufficient to indicate a substantial volume of commerce between Korea and the Arab world. Though sources from the medieval Eastern world record

14 Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *Rihlāt Ibn Baṭṭūṭa*, New York, Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 464.

15 Hirth, *Chau Ju-Kua*, p. 20.

16 Chang, 'Chinese Muslim Mobility', p. 162; Qi-ching, 'A Brief Account', p. 100.

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Arab Muslims travelling to and from the Korean peninsula in the early part of the eleventh century, Muslims apparently first attempted to make contact with the peninsula in the latter part of the Shilla period (57 BC–AD 935). One piece of evidence is the glass cups excavated from the ancient tombs of the Korean kingdom of Shilla. Most of these are either from Arabia or Persia. Assuming that the tombs were constructed towards the end of the fifth or at the beginning of the sixth centuries, it can be safely assumed that about that time Arabian or Persian merchandise had already found its way into Korea and Japan.

The chronicles of Korea and Japan contain detailed accounts of the musical instruments and trading products representing Muslim culture. The introduction of Arabic and Persian culture and its products into Korea and Japan before Islam was largely a result of indirect contact between those countries and East Asians through China. But direct contact between Arabs and Central Asians on the Korean peninsula and in Japan also occurred from time to time. Moreover, during recent archaeological digs carried out in Korea, several clay busts have been unearthed whose shape resembles Central Asian Muslims with their beards and moustaches. These resemble those that were found in the old royal tombs of Korea in the middle of the seventh century. But direct evidence of the Muslims' advance into and contact with the Korean peninsula was not found until the early eleventh century.¹⁷

In order to understand the development of Islam in East Asia, it is also important to consider indirect contacts between the two different worlds in China; Japan and Korea had very close relations with T'ang China at that time and there existed between them a wide range of political, economic and cultural relations. Moreover, it was only a few days' voyage from the western part of Korea and Japan to the southern and eastern parts of China where large Muslim communities were to be found. It is very likely that Japanese and Korean peoples came into contact with Muslims through a number of channels:

1. Business contacts in Chinese ports between Muslim merchants who dominated the southern sea trade (Arabia–India–Malaya–China) and Korean counterparts who controlled the eastern regional trade (China–Korea–Japan).
2. Political contacts in Ch'ang-an, the capital of T'ang China, between Muslim residents and Japanese-Korean diplomats or trade missions who regularly visited the Chinese court as part of tribute diplomacy or official trade.

17 Hee-Soo Lee, *The Advent of Islam in Korea: A Historical Survey*, Istanbul, The Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA), 1997, pp. 54–6.

3. Cultural contacts in China between Muslims and Japanese-Korean students who were sent to study Chinese culture on government scholarships.
4. Religious contacts between Muslims and Japanese-Korean Buddhist monks who frequently went to China and the western region (modern Turkistan). Some of their travel accounts tell us about contacts with Muslims and their religion.

Muslim merchants may have extended their own trade routes to the Korean peninsula or Japan. While trade was the primary reason for contact, it also seems that many elements of Islamic culture were introduced to Japan and the Korean peninsula. That this development took place is well supported by accounts about Korea (referred to as 'Shilla') found in twenty Islamic books of geography, history and travel written by seventeen Muslim scholars ranging from Ibn Khurdādhbih of the mid-ninth century AD to 'Abd-al-Faḍl of the early sixteenth century. Concerning Japan, however, there are as yet no reliable historical sources.

The oldest extant record, being not only the first information on Korea but also mentioning the settlement of Muslims on the Korean peninsula, is Ibn Khurdādhbih's *al-Masālik wa-l-mamālik* of AD 846. The book contains two passages about the Muslim advance to Korea and their settlement there, one of which is as follows:

Beyond China, across Qansu, there is a country with many mountains and abounding in gold called Shilla. Muslims who happened to go there were fascinated by the good environment and tended to settle there for good and did not think of leaving the place. There is no way of knowing what lies beyond there.¹⁸

In addition, there are more detailed and interesting accounts of Muslims living in Shilla in the writings of such scholars as Ibn Rustah, al-Mas'ūdī and al-Idrīsī.¹⁹ The early accounts tell us that Muslims began to venture to and settle down on the Korean peninsula from the ninth century AD or earlier.

Among the works written by early Muslims concerning the Korean peninsula and Japan, there are many passages whose credibility and authenticity are doubtful because of the fragmentary and indiscriminate quotation of earlier works. Nevertheless, some features of the geography

18 Abu-l-Qāsim ibn Khurdādhbih, *Kitāb al-masālik wa-l-mamālik*, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leiden, 1889, p. 180.

19 Abū 'Abdallāh al-Idrīsī, *Nuzhat al-mushtāq fi-khtirāq al-āfāq*, ed. R. Dozy and M. J. de Goeje, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1970.

and living conditions on the Korean peninsula do emerge, and there are trustworthy accounts of the appearance of Muslims on the Korean peninsula 150 years prior to the earliest Sino-Korean historical records. This information provides a new insight and perspective on this period.²⁰

Korean sources also provide very clear indications of Muslim contacts with the Korean court. The *Koryosa* [Official Chronicles of the Koryo Dynasty] make several references to Muslim advances into Korea and to their commercial activities: 'In September of 1024, the 15th year of King Hyun-chong's reign, ar-Rāzī and a hundred people from the country of Tashi [i.e. Arabia] came and presented their native products to the king.'²¹

The following year, another group of Muslims from Arab countries headed by Ḥasan and Raza visited Korea for the purpose of establishing trade contacts. The king ordered that all possible facilities be provided to make them comfortable in selected guest houses. But there is no clear evidence that they resided permanently in Korea or initiated the dissemination of Islam. Of course, they may well have followed their own religious rites, such as praying and fasting, and have pursued their own customary practices during their stay.

The early spread and cultural influence of Islam

The birth of Chinese Islam was a product of Sino-Arabian friendship. As the political and economic relations increased between Arabia and China, large numbers of Arab and Persian Muslim traders emigrated to China. In particular, the battle of Talas river gave added momentum to the rapid influx of Islamic culture, while at the same time benefiting the Arabs due to the introduction of paper-making by Chinese prisoners of war. A certain clerical officer, Tu Huan, who accompanied the ill-fated Chinese forces, wrote a travel account entitled *Ching Hsing Chi* in which he very accurately recorded the principles, teachings and fundamental beliefs of Islam. In fact, his book can be seen as the earliest work on Islam in China.²²

The Muslims spread Islam through marriage and by providing examples of the beauty of the faith, whose basic teachings did not differ much from Chinese customs. Islam was accepted readily without war and bloodshed and this resulted in its being introduced to China earlier than to many other countries with the exception of Arabia.

20 Lee, *The Advent of Islam*, pp. 40–53.

21 *Koryo-Sa (KS: Koryo History)*, Se-Ga, the 9th year of King Hyun-jong (1024).

22 Yung-ch'ang Yang, 'Detailed Research on the Early Islamic Spread in China', *ITC*, n.d., pp. 127–8.

The Muslims built beautiful mosques with Chinese-style architecture. Two of the earliest mosques built in China in the first half of the ninth century AD were the Kwang-Tai-Se Mosque of Canton and the Chi-Lin-Se Mosque of Zaitun. Besides serving as a place from which the faithful were called to prayer, the minaret of the Kwang-Tai-Se Mosque also had a weather vane on its roof which indicated the direction of the wind. The mosque's original name was Hui-Sheng-Se and it is reputed to be one of the first mosques to be built outside Medina. These old monuments are without doubt testimony to the early entry of Islam into China.²³

Some Arabs lived among the Chinese but most Muslims were confined to the Fan-Fang, a residence specifically set aside to cater for the increasing number of Muslims. In the Fan-Fang, men of virtue called *qadi* (judge) and *shaikh* were chosen and appointed by the Chinese government to administer the colonies in accordance with Islamic law and customs. Through marriage to Chinese women, they gradually settled there. According to the Arab writer Abū Zaid, in the middle of the ninth century AD there were more than 150,000 Muslims on the south-east coast of China. The information contained in the Chinese records shows that foreign sojourners enjoyed freedom in their commercial and religious life and also something that resembled their own integral state within another country. The Fan-Fang and the laws governing affairs there later developed into the 'right of extra-territoriality' of foreigners in modern China.²⁴

Most Arab Muslims living in China returned home during the winter season, but not a few Arabs and Persians became assimilated, thus creating the earliest group of Chinese Muslims. A combination of fine Chinese culture, excellent living conditions such as seasonable weather and fertile agriculture, the tolerant nature of the Chinese and profitable trade all attracted Arab Muslims to settle permanently in China. Some even became high-ranking officials.

It can safely be said that the amalgamation of Chinese and Islamic culture had enabled the Chinese Muslims to emerge as a distinct community, one that was intensely aware of the divine laws and human sentiments of life. China produced a large number of prominent Muslim personalities who observed Chinese customs and whose loyalty to China was no less profound than that of other Chinese.

However, from time to time Muslims faced severe hardships. The most serious incident was the Huang Ch'ao rebellion in AD 879 in which hundreds of thousands of Muslims were massacred. To escape from another similar massacre during this period, many Arab and Persian Muslims moved to

23 The Chinese Islamic Association, *Moslems in China*, Beijing, 1953.

24 Hirth, *Chau Ju-Kua*, p. 14; Qi-ching, 'A Brief Account', p. 100.

the Indo-China peninsula or the Malay ports, while other Muslims perhaps made their way to the Korean peninsula and Japan with its well-known and convenient sea routes only a few days' travel away from other ports. After those two major massacres, the Muslims were to experience no similar ill-fortune until the dawn of the Ch'ing dynasty, although in this latter period Muslim assimilation was accelerated in order to protect them from further disaster.

Islam was again revitalized in East Asia with the advent of the empire of the Mongols, who reopened the cultural route along the Silk Road.

Islam during the medieval period

The emergence of the Mongol empire in the early thirteenth century AD can be regarded as one of the most remarkable events in the history of the spread of Islam to East Asia. The Mongol conquest of the whole of Asia resulted in a vast immigration of Muslims, particularly Turks, into China and other East Asian countries. Muslims were suddenly appointed to high-ranking positions in the central government of the Mongols and played an influential role in the national economy. The nomadic Mongols found it extremely difficult to set up and run a civil administration; thus, in their efforts to ensure their absolute rule, the Mongol leaders obtained the service of the Muslims. When the Mongols established the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) on Chinese territory, a large number of Muslims were invited to make a contribution to every field of Yuan society.

In 1224 a certain 'Abd-ar-Raḥmān was appointed head of Imperial Finance and allowed to farm the taxes imposed upon China. Mongke Khan appointed the venerable Maḥmūd Yalavach as governor of north-western China and of the adjacent territories in Central Asia. Maḥmūd's son Mas'ūd Bey was given jurisdiction over Khwarazm and much of western Central Asia. The flourishing economic activities of such well-known Muslim officials as Aḥmad, Uygur Sang-ga and Abū Bakr P'u Shou-keng are described in detail in the Chinese chronicles. In 1259 'Umar Shams-ad-Dīn, commonly known as Sayyid Ajail and a native of Bukhārā, was entrusted by Kubilai Khan with the management of the Imperial Finance. Afterwards, he became the governor of Yunnan province, where he built mosques. The Yuan used the Central Asian Muslims as convenient buffers between the Mongol ruling elite and their Chinese subjects.²⁵

25 William E. Henthorn, *Korea: The Mongol Invasions*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1963, p. 25; Morris Rossabi, *Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988, pp. 277–8.



4.17 The Niujie Mosque, Beijing (© Aramco World Magazine)

Like the Muslims in China during the T'ang-Sung period, the Muslims in the Mongol empire often lived in self-contained, virtually self-governing communities separated from the Chinese sections of towns and cities. They enjoyed a privileged position as a second group of *Se-mu-jen*, which isolated them from the Chinese and other ethnic groups.

During the Yuan period, Muslims extended their activities even to Korea, which had been under the control of the Yuan since 1270. At that time, many Muslims from Central Asia settled permanently in Korea because of the good treatment they received and the sound economic advantages. They took up positions not only as officials of the Korean court, but also as private traders in almost every corner of the country. Their commercial activities were mainly those in which they had been engaged for generations.

In Korea, Muslims formed their own communities where they celebrated their own festivals, wore national dress and headgear and maintained their Islamic way of life. They also built a mosque called *Ye-Kung* (Ceremonial Hall).²⁶ The religious leaders in the Muslim communities, called *doro*, were chosen to perform acts of worship in accordance with Islamic law and customs. From time to time, these leaders had the exceptional honour of being invited to attend official court ceremonies where they practised their own religious rituals such as Qu'rān recitation and the Arabic *du'a* (supplication) in which they prayed for the king's long life and the prosperity of the country.

The Muslims' commercial activities and political status saw a steady improvement up to the early fifteenth century.²⁷ At that time, however, the continued existence of Islamic religious activities was faced with a serious

26 Yi Neung-hua, *History of Chosun Buddhism*, II, p. 605.

27 *Chosun Wangjo Silrok* [Chronicles of the Chosun Dynasty], King Sejong Document, p. 36.

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threat in the form of the newly established Chosun dynasty in Korea. At this point, Muslim settlers in Korea, who had secured quite a high social and economic position, gradually began to shed their native attire and the customs and rituals to which they had adhered for about 150 years.

During the period of the Ming dynasty in China (1368–1644), although Muslims were scattered they tended to form strong communities. Owing to the isolationist policy of the Chinese government, however, they were cut off from communication with other Muslims living abroad. Thus, they tended gradually to become merged into the mass of the indigenous population through marriage to Chinese women and the adoption of Chinese manners. Many mosques were built in the pagoda shape of Chinese temples and without minarets. The Muslims became outwardly indistinguishable from the Chinese, a trend which continued up to the Ch'ing dynasty.

Admiral Cheng Ho was the most remarkable Muslim in the Ming period, making eight great voyages to the Indian Ocean and East Africa between 1405 and 1431. It was also during this time that friendly relations were cultivated with the Muslim states of Central Asia.

THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAMIC CULTURE

Under the banner of the Pax Mongolica, a strong cultural exchange between East and West was accelerated. During the Middle Ages all East Asian countries without exception benefited from some aspects of Islamic culture. In spite of the unhelpful environment for Muslim advancement under the assimilation policy of the Chinese Ming dynasty, Muslims made great cultural and scientific advances in such fields as astronomy, calendar science, medicine, and musical and scientific instruments, which were used extensively within East Asian society.

According to official Chinese and Korean chronicles, the lunar calendar system – which was widely used throughout East Asia – was in fact based on the theory of Islamic astronomy and calendar method. Thus, the Chinese and Korean calendar employed genuine lunar years as did that of the Islamic calendar. Similarly, and again based on Islamic astronomical sciences, a system of calculation was developed that could be adjusted to the sun travelling through the twelve zodiacal constellations.²⁸

Besides the development of calendar science, East Asian society of the Middle Ages was also characterized by important advances in astronomy and meteorology and many instruments for use in these fields were devised. The

28 K. Tazaka, 'An Aspect of Islamic Culture introduced into China', in *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko*, XVI, Tokyo, 1957, pp. 77–149.

relatively advanced Islamic science might have contributed to the invention of Chinese and Korean scientific instruments such as the celestial globe, the water clock, the sundial, the astronomic clock and the rainfall gauge.

Similarly, during this period some aspects of Muslim art, medicine and literature were also introduced into East Asia. Muslim medical influences contributed to the development of Chinese and Korean medicine, with some medicinal herbs from the Islamic world being imported into East Asia and some medicinal formulae which were originally taught by Muslims being introduced. In return, around this time, the process of metal movable-type printing was probably introduced into the Islamic world through Muslims in Korea or China.²⁹

The situation of Islam up to the early twentieth century and relations with the Ottoman empire

Very few records dating from the sixteenth to the late nineteenth century mention the activities of Muslims in Japan and Korea. In China, however, it is known that the Muslim population steadily increased due to its stable circumstances. The followers of Islam appear to have been entirely content with the religious liberty they enjoyed and up to the establishment of the Ch'ing dynasty by the Manchus in 1644 there is no record of any Muslim uprising. But difficulties occurred soon after the rise of the new ruling power. Insurrection in the province of Kansu in 1648 was the first occasion on which any Muslim rose in arms against the government. Nevertheless, it was not until the nineteenth century that a revolt had disastrous consequences or seriously disrupted the amicable relations between Muslims and the Chinese Manchu government.

With the decline of the Manchu regime, Muslim revolts took place in almost every Muslim area, and especially in provinces where Muslims constituted a large proportion of the population. The prime reason was that Muslims were loyal to the Ming dynasty and refused to be ruled by the Manchus. Their motto was 'crush the Manchus and restore the Ming'. Another reason was the aspiration for independence and the creation of a Muslim state in Turkistan, where the great majority of the inhabitants were Muslims. The rebellions were cruelly suppressed and during the 200-year period of the Ch'ing regime about 12 million Muslims were massacred. But the Muslims refused to give up their own separate identity and the aspiration for their own state.

29 Lee, *The Advent of Islam*, pp. 125–8.

THE SPREAD OF ISLAM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

From the late nineteenth century, the European powers exerted every effort to divide up and share out the possessions of 'the sick man of Europe', the Sublime Porte. Thus, they initiated a wide range of anti-Islamic propaganda in which they criticized the religion as an obstacle to the modernization and development of the country. In order to counteract the growing threat of the European 'super-bloc', the Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid II attempted to mobilize the Islamic potential of his empire. Within the framework of this policy, the sultan was supported by the philosophy of pan-Islamism, a movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which attempted to revive the unifying strength of Islam so as to resist Western encroachments. Under the policy of pan-Islamism, the sultan personally selected judges, teachers and other religious scholars and dispatched them as agents to North Africa, the Balkans, India, Turkistan, Java, China, Japan and Korea. With the arrival of these religious missions, Islamic activities in the East Asian region were reinvigorated.

PAN-ISLAMIC ACTIVITIES IN CHINA

Sultan Abdul Hamid II sent official and private emissaries to China who furnished him with information concerning the circumstances of the Muslim population there. Through continuous communications with Chinese Muslim leaders, or by exploiting the successful activities of his pan-Islamic agents, the sultan attempted to tie Chinese Muslims to the cause of the Sunnī doctrine of Islam. Muḥammad Ali in 1902 and Sulayman Shukru Bey in 1905 were two of his emissaries. Moreover, the sultan invited Chinese Muslim leaders such as Abdul Rahman Wang Kuan and discussed with them ways of bringing Chinese Muslims under the banner of the Islamic caliphate. He also sent teachers with Islamic books and in 1901 dispatched Enver Pasha to China during the Boxer uprising. Meanwhile, Mustafa Shukru and Haji Tahir, who were in charge of religious affairs in the mission, distributed leaflets containing the messages of Sultan Abdul Hamid II to the Chinese Muslims. The leaflets had been prepared in Chinese to strengthen the solidarity between Muslims in China and the Sublime Porte. As a result of these efforts, in 1908 the Peking Hamidiye College, which signified the authority and power of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, was opened in Peking (Beijing).³⁰ More interestingly, in the Friday sermons (*khuṭbas*) delivered in the Peking Mosque, the name of the caliph Abdul Hamid II was praised. This was at a time when very few Muslims in China knew the name, or even the existence, of the caliph. During the Friday sermon, whenever the imams

30 Taha Toros, 'Geçmişte Türk-Çin İlişkileri', *Milliyet Gazetesi*, Istanbul, 1972, pp. 5-7.



4.18 Entrance of the Niujie Mosque, Beijing (© Aramco World Magazine)

reminded the Chinese Muslims of the position and importance of the caliphate, they rededicated themselves to the head of Islam.

In general, the Chinese Muslims possessed a firm Islamic faith as well as being basically good and hardworking citizens. Despite their somewhat limited opportunities, they placed great emphasis on an Islamic education for their children and latterly began to open many Muslim schools in the country, including *madrasas* (religious schools) in the mosques. The *madrasas* made a great contribution to the raising of Muslim children in the spirit of Islam.

OTTOMAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS AND ISLAM IN JAPAN

Official Ottoman-Japanese relations began in 1868 with the Meiji Restoration in Japan. This marked the turning-point from medieval feudalism and isolation to modernization. With the open policy of the new Japan, several Japanese emissaries arrived in Istanbul. The first mission arrived in 1871, in 1878 the Japanese battleship *Seiki* came to Istanbul and in 1887 the Japanese royal prince Komatsu visited the sultan. It was only at this time, and with the translation of a biography of the Prophet Muḥammad into Japanese, that Islam came to be known and to gain ground among the Japanese.

The most important event for Ottoman-Japanese relations during this period was the arrival in Japan in 1890 of the frigate *Ertugrul*, under the command of Osman Bey as envoy to Japan. During the year-long journey from Istanbul to Japan, the mission was warmly welcomed by local Muslims in South-East Asia. But on the return trip, the *Ertugrul* was caught in a typhoon and was shipwrecked with the loss of 595 crew members, including the captain Osman Bey. This tragic accident was a good opportunity to promote cultural and social relations between Japan and an Islamic country, and provided the momentum for a better understanding about Islam by the Japanese people.

Ottoman archival documents state that two Japanese men (called Yamada and Noda) who visited Istanbul at this time became Muslims, the first Japanese Muslims in history. Yamada became known as Abdul Khalil, while Noda was given the name Abdul Hakim. Yamada returned home after two years' service. He subsequently made frequent visits to Turkey and contributed a great deal to the promotion of cooperation between Japan and Turkey. Noda also performed his duties with great success and as a result Abdul Hamid II decorated him with an order, that of the third rank.

The Russo-Japanese war and Japan's victory in 1905 also served to bring Turkey and Japan closer together since they were both facing the same Russian threat. The Ottomans paid special attention to the progress of the war and most of the newspapers had detailed news coverage of it. The memoirs of Abdul Hamid II reveal how the Ottoman government provided moral support for the Japanese:

The Japanese victory over Russia will satisfy us. Their victory can be regarded as ours as well. Since the Russo-Japanese war began I have started to pray for the victory of Japan, that it would break the arrogance of Russia. I became a spiritual commander of the Japanese fleet.³¹

Japan's unexpected victory over Russia had a great impact on the sultan and the Turkish people. It created a feeling of great confidence that the Ottomans would also defeat Russia. At the same time, it led to a closeness between the Turkish and Japanese people. Muslim leaders and scholars from Turkey and the wider Islamic world who regarded the war as a victory of the Eastern people over one of the great powers in a full-scale war turned their attention to Japan and studied Japanese history and its advances. Some pan-Islamists who had expected to gain advantages from the Japanese sought to cooperate with them and to look for a way to invite them to enter Islam. One consequence of this was the establishment in Japan of an organization

31 A. Fethi Okyar, *Üç Devirde Bir Adam*, ed. Cemal Kutay, Istanbul, Tercüman Yayinlari, 1980.

called the Japanese Society for the Investigation of Religious Truths. In April 1906 the society, composed of leading Japanese scholars and other prominent citizens, decided to hold a congress of inquiry into religious belief. According to some extant archive documents, the main objectives of the congress were to examine the genuine principles of Islam and to measure its potential, and to study possible ways of cooperating with the Ottomans.³²

Islamic activities in Japan and Korea in the early twentieth century were initiated by an outstanding Muslim leader from Central Asia named Abdul Rashid Ibrāhīm (1857–1944). As an idealistic pan-Islamist and a dedicated adversary of Russia and socialism, Ibrāhīm came to Japan in 1908. He was a religious agent of the Ottoman sultan and his mission was probably to pave the way for further practical cooperation between Turkey and Japan as well as to disseminate Islamic doctrine among the Japanese. After seven months of successful and extraordinary Islamic activities in Japan, Ibrāhīm arrived in Korea on 18 June 1909. During his ten-day visit to Korea, he gained valuable information on the education system, national morality, daily life, Christian missionary works, Japanese influence and the natural environment of Korea in general. He also thoroughly researched the possibility of propagating Islam through contacts at various levels within Korean society. He wrote a remarkable book entitled *Alem-i Islam* in which he records some of his very interesting ideas on Islam in East Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.³³

One positive result of this activity was that in 1909 Islam made its first religious impact on Japanese territory through the conversion of Mitsutaro Yamaoka, who then went on to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca. At the same time, another Japanese, Bumpachiro Ariga, travelled to India on business and while there embraced Islam under the guidance of Indian Muslims.

Turkic Muslim communities in East Asia

The first emigration of Russian Turks – mostly Tatars from Russian Central Asia – to East Asia began at the end of the nineteenth century. In 1896, after the Sino-Japanese war (1894–95), Russia, which had assumed the role of China's protector against Japan, concluded an alliance with China. The conditions of the alliance included the establishment of a Russian-owned Chinese Eastern railway from west to east across northern Manchuria and linking Siberia with Vladivostok. The project would be administered by Russian personnel

32 Foreign Office, Public Record Office, London, 37/1148, No. 9549.

33 Abdarreshid İbrahim, *Alem-i Islam ve Japonya'da Intisar-i Islamiyet*, Istanbul, Ahmed Saqi Beg Printing House, 1912–13.

and the Russian police force, who would have the privilege of extraterritorial rights.

With the start of construction work, many labourers and technicians were brought from Central Asia to Manchuria. This meant that numerous Russian Turks, together with Russian administrators, came to Harbin, the central city of Manchuria and headquarters of the railway project, and to Haydar and other small cities. Most of the Turks came from the Penza and Tombof regions of Russian Central Asia, either as labourers or to run small-scale businesses. Once they had settled and arranged their business affairs, they called their family members to join them. Thus, as time passed, quite large Muslim Turkic communities appeared in various parts of Manchuria. In order to cater for the increasing number of Turks, they needed to organize a cooperative system to receive the immigrants, while at the same time resolving their national, cultural and religious differences. They built mosques, opened schools, established a Muslim cemetery and started various national and cultural activities.

The second and main influx of Muslim Turks into East Asia in the twentieth century began with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Soviet Russia. Escaping from the Bolshevik regime, around 600 Russian Muslim Turks, mostly Kazan Tatars, settled permanently in Manchuria, Korea and Japan. In the 1920s, with the help of the Japanese Government, they were dispersed in groups of some 200 persons in Manchuria, Japan and Korea. They lived in their respective countries and preserved their own culture and religion in their communities which were called *Mahall-i Islamiye*. They established cultural centres and schools so as to preserve their religious and Turkic identity.

Throughout history, Turks had generally respected other religions, believing that religious faith was a private matter. Thus, the Turks in Korea and Japan did not attempt to indoctrinate other peoples with Islam. Indeed, only a few of those who worked with the Turkic immigrants seemed to be interested in the religion.

The Turkic Muslims in Korea enjoyed the profitable regional trade between Manchuria, Korea and Japan and rose to high social positions under the protection of the Japanese. After Korean independence in 1945 and the Korean war of 1950–53, however, they were forced to emigrate to Turkey and elsewhere. Nonetheless, it is thanks to these Muslim Turks that elements of Islamic and Turkic culture, for example, the publication and distribution of the Qur'ān, were introduced into Korean society. The Koreans who embraced Islam under the guidance of Muslim Turks are regarded as the earliest Korean Muslim group.

In Japan, too, Muslim Turks formed their own communities and participated in various Islamic activities. Through their contacts with these



4.19 Xian Mosque, China (© Aramco World Magazine)

Muslims, some of the local Japanese began to convert to Islam. Among those who converted during this period were Sadik Imaizumi, Mustafa Komura and Ahmad Ariga. However, the most important development undertaken by the Turks was their building of mosques. In 1935, as a result of the joint efforts of the Indian, Chinese and South-East Asian Muslims living in Japan, the first mosque was opened in Kobe. Similarly, in 1938 the Tokyo Mosque was opened following the practical efforts of the Turkic community headed by Kurban Ali and with the help of the Japanese Government. The establishment of these two mosques gave additional momentum to the rapid growth of Islam in Japan.

Modern Muslim communities and the present situation in East Asia

After the downfall of the Ch'ing, the first Republic of China was established in 1912. All the Hui and the other non-Chinese Muslim minorities in Sinkiang were recognized as one of the five races who formed the republic. At that time, the Muslims regained their freedom and started a movement of

national revival which has been continued by the Hui minority in mainland China and Taiwan up to the present.

Although no reliable census has ever been taken, the Muslim population in China is estimated to be between 70 and 100 million. This includes the Turkic ethnolinguistic group of Muslims of Sinkiang and Chinese Hui Muslims. Hui Muslims constitute the majority group, especially in the north-western and south-western provinces. They also have a strong presence in virtually all the major cities of China and represent a sizeable minority in many other places. In public, they use their Chinese names and speak Chinese; but with other Muslims, they use their Arabic names and speak a Chinese mixed with many Arabic and Persian words. Thus, in their daily life Muslims have adopted a double standard of behaviour. They build and decorate the outside of their homes according to the Chinese style; but inside, they decorate them with Qur'ānic calligraphy and arabesques. There is an interdependence between the Chinese and the Muslims: the Muslims depend on the Chinese market for certain basic commodities, while the Chinese depend on Muslim traders and artisans for others. Chinese Islam has thus adopted a very clever survival strategy involving harmony and coexistence with Confucian culture. But the vital power of Islam preserves its values and its potential and these never allowed it to collapse even during periods of violent rebellion against the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty.

With the powerful open-door policy of the current Chinese Government, the Muslim community in China will become ever more conscious of its Islamic identity. Chinese Muslims enjoy their religious freedom, study the Qur'ān, educate their children in Islamic institutes, publish Islamic literature and so on. As a kind of integral Muslim organization, the Chinese Islamic Association, established in 1952, coordinates these Islamic propagation activities in China. By facilitating more frequent contacts with the outside world through such channels as pilgrimage, Muslims in China actively contribute to the world Muslim community.

At the present time, there are only some 50,000 Chinese Muslims in Taiwan, but they are nonetheless free to conduct their daily life as they wish. They keep close contacts with the Muslim world through the Islamic Association in Taipei. Friendly relations with Muslim countries have enabled both the Chinese government and some Muslim businesspeople to develop profitable trade with Arab states. Every year, the Islamic Association sends a delegation to Mecca to perform the pilgrimage and sends Muslim youths to the Middle East and South-East Muslim countries for their Islamic studies. Even though they form a small minority of the population, Muslims in Taiwan enjoy their daily life as Muslims.

Japan started its military involvement with China in around 1935. It was therefore for military purposes that the Japanese tried to establish close

relations with the Muslim population in China and South-East Asia. During the period 1935–43, many research institutes and centres for Islamic studies were opened and these published over 100 books and journals on Islam. However, these institutes neither had close contacts with Muslims in Japan nor aimed to propagate Islam. Thus, with Japan's defeat in 1945 in the Second World War, the progress of Islam in Japan was halted.

Following the war, in 1952 over 100 Japanese Muslims formed an organization which was the origin of today's Japan Muslim Association. This was to become a turning-point for Islamic *da'wa* (religious activities) in a real sense. Furthermore, with the establishment of diplomatic relations with Muslim countries, many Muslims flowed into Japan, as diplomats, scholars, businesspeople and students. Prof. Abdul Karim Saitoh was one of the Japanese diplomats who was converted to Islam in 1957 through the Islamic activities of foreign Muslims in Japan. At the same time, many Japanese travelled to the Muslim world to learn Arabic or Islam and returned having become Muslims. The most important result of these Islamic studies was the publication of a Japanese version of the Qur'ān by Haji Omar Mita in 1972.

Unlike Korea, Japan had many Muslim organizations. The Japanese Muslim Association was the main centre of Islamic activities for mostly Japanese Muslims. But another institution, the Japanese Islamic Centre, established in 1966, is mainly administered by foreign Muslims. This has been very effective in propagating Islam in Japan through publications, lectures, conferences and other social activities. Dr Salih Sāmarrāi, an agriculture expert from Saudi Arabia, is one of those in charge of the Islamic Centre. In order to coordinate the work of the many different Islamic organizations in Japan, the Council of the Islamic Organizations in Japan was formed in 1976 by respected Muslim leaders in the country.

The seed of the modern Muslim community in Korea was sown in 1955 by a group of Turkish military personnel stationed in South Korea who responded to the call of the United Nations to defend South Korea from the attacks of combined communist troops. During the Korean war (1950–53), Turkish soldiers, besides undertaking to defend peace and freedom, also propagated their religion. In this way, the first Korean Muslims opened a new era for Islam in Korea.

In the field of Islamic activities, the contribution made by Abdulgafur Karaismailoglu and Zubeyir Koch, imams of the Turkish brigade, was particularly remarkable. These two Turkish imams initially started teaching Islam only to those Koreans who visited the Turkish army camp, but they later reached out to the Korean public through lectures. Indeed, from September 1955 they initiated a wide range of Islamic activities in Korea. In addition to giving regular lectures on Islam, they even built temporary mosques for daily prayers. Omar Jin-kyu Kim and Muḥammad Doo-young Yoon were the

first generation of Korean Muslims to convert to Islam under the guidance of the Turkish imams. The year 1955 witnessed the conversion by thirty-nine Koreans simultaneously, an occasion which marked a turning-point in the progress of Islam in Korea.

In 1967 the newly converted Koreans formed the Korean Islamic Society. This subsequently grew into the Korean Muslim Federation, which is a unique legal body for the propagation of Islam in Korea. In the 1970s, and particularly with the advent of the oil crisis, Korea suddenly started paying attention to other Islamic countries. Islam in Korea saw a new era for rapid development with the opening of the Seoul central mosque and Islamic centre in 1976. The second and third mosques were built in Pusan and Kwangju provinces in 1979 and 1980 respectively. At present, there are some 35,000 Muslims in the Republic of Korea, and five mosques have opened in major cities. There are no reliable records as to the number of Muslims in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Conclusion and future prospects

Throughout 1,400 years of Islamic history, Islam has been a culture of tolerance, particularly in East Asia. The peaceful and gradual process of Islamization has been a valuable opportunity for East Asians, who are cosmopolitan, open-minded, tolerant and amenable to cultural diversity. In East Asia, full freedom of religion is guaranteed by the constitution. Indeed, people in East Asia benefit from being favourably disposed to Muslims and their activities since, from the viewpoint of national interests, they need to build friendly relations with Muslim countries, including the oil-rich Islamic world.

Perhaps the greatest obstacle facing Muslims in the region is the widespread misinformation regarding Islam that is systemically fabricated by the Western mass media. Islam is a thoroughly misunderstood religion in East Asia, particularly in Japan and Korea. Islam and its culture, especially the issues of polygamy, the status of the Prophet, militarism and Islamic fundamentalism, are seriously distorted in many reference works and even official textbooks.

In spite of the difficulties, the future of Islam in East Asia seems to be very bright. Some of the main reasons are as follows: the Islamic and Confucian tolerance shown towards other civilizations; the notion of Muslim brotherhood; economic and political concerns in the Muslim world, with its more than 1.5 billion population; and growing interest in the value system of Islam as an alternative to capitalism or socialism. Many aspects of the East Asian Confucian value system are in agreement with Islamic principles.

Another positive factor is the great importance given to education in East Asia, with more than 95 per cent of the population in Japan and the Republic of Korea being literate. Moreover, as a homogeneous people, East Asians still insist on adhering to their traditions and culture. Finally, East Asia and the Islamic world have enjoyed friendly relations since the first century AH.

Islam is a religion of tolerance, and Islamic civilization has a positive attitude towards others and respects their rights and freedoms. In addition, Islam has throughout history played a central mediating role by introducing East Asians to the highest scientific and academic achievements of the Muslim world. At the same time, East Asian technology and philosophy have penetrated the Muslim world via the Silk Road. Thus, Islamic–East Asian interactions have mostly been peaceful, and for centuries, the two worlds interacted with each other positively and in a spirit of cooperation due to their common cultural values and trade interests. Surely, this will continue to lead to mutual benefit and contribute to world peace.

– V –

NEW HORIZONS FOR
THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

Chapter 5.1

ISLAM IN EASTERN AND SOUTH-EAST EUROPE

Smail Balic

Early history

Several scholars have studied the Muslim presence in the Danube region and the Balkans or in South-East Europe during the early Middle Ages. Some have done so within the framework of research into their own national history, others while studying the effects of the *Völkerwanderung*, and still others in their studies of Byzantine and early Arabic chronicles, travel books and folkloric texts.¹ If I deal with this subject here, it is for a concrete reason. Of late, the thesis is being promoted that Islam has at all times been an alien religious and cultural world to the peoples of South-East Europe, that its establishment in the region was only possible as a result of centuries of Ottoman foreign domination, and that it was achieved through the use of force. This thesis serves to justify repressive measures and atrocities against Muslims, and forms the ideological basis of the Serbian, Bulgarian and Greek authorities and some scholars for the policy they have been pursuing over the last few decades.

The Hungarian, Romanian and Balkan Slav encounter with Islam dates from the period of gradual Christianization. As early as the eighth century AD, groups or individuals belonging to these peoples were professing Islam. Muslim Turkish troops served under Hungarian kings. Arab pirates

1 Among many others, some of the most distinguished scholars in this field are Josef Marquart, Istvan Kniezsa, Ladislaus Makkai, János Karácsony, Akdes Nimet Kurat, Konstantin Jirecek, Géza Fehér, Gyula Moravcsik, Zeki Validi Toğan, Petur Mutafčiev, Veselin Beševliev, Paul Wittek, Ivan Hřebek, Tayyib Okiç, Julius Germanus, Györgffy György, Halil Inalçik and Kemal Karpat.

repeatedly struck at the Adriatic shores of what is today Croatia, establishing in the wake of these raids particularly close relations with the *ṣaqāliba*, the Slavs. These can be traced far back in Moorish-Spanish history. In Dalmatia, the *Moreška*, the traditional sword dance and drama, is a reminder of their influence. Chronicles from the late twelfth century record princes with Arab names among the inhabitants of the Narenta valley in Herzegovina: Melekdok (Arabic *malik*, 'king', and Latin/Italian *doge*, 'duke'), Zoloyn (corrupted from the Arabic *dhū l-'ayn*, 'the one-eyed') and Damald (probably a corrupted form of *ṣamad*, 'prince'). As further evidence of these early contacts, shortly before the Second World War, in the village of Potoci near Mostar, Herzegovina, an Arabic silver coin dating from the time of the caliph Marwān II (r. 744–50) was found.² Unfortunately, no systematic examination of the site has so far been carried out.

At the end of the late *Völkerwanderung* of the Turkish tribes in the tenth to the twelfth century AD, quietly and unrelated to any missionary policy, Muslim communities formed in the Danube region. Their originators were Eurasian nomadic horsemen of Turkish extraction: Pechenegs, Kumans, Chwalisians (Kalises), Oghuzes or Uzes, Khabars and ancient Bulgars. These were joined by individual Arab merchants and scholars, travellers and adventurers. The various fortunes of peoples and individuals came together in this Islamic-Christian coexistence. The settlements were established in Hungary, Walachia and Moldavia, Serbia, Dobfudja, Smyrna (present-day Izmir) and parts of Bosnia.

In his famous dictionary *Muʿjam al-buldān*, Yaqūt al-Ḥamawī (1179–1229) describes an encounter in Aleppo, Syria, with Muslim students from Hungary. From these young students of Islamic theology, he gleaned some interesting details of the life of Hungarian Muslims of that time. Thus, he learnt that a short time beforehand, the Hungarian king had forbidden Muslims to surround their settlements with walls, evidently because he feared their increasing strength.

The Muslims in Hungary were not part of the indigenous people. However, they settled in the Pannonia plain at the same time as the Magyars. Although the majority of the Muslims were soldiers, the Muslim element played a different role in the social life of the state at various times. King Ladislaus' law of 1092 mentions them as merchants. The Golden Bull of 1222 provided that no Muslim or Jew was to serve at court. Up to that time, individual Muslims had acted as minters and money-changers for the court, and there had been periods when the production and sale of salt, and the customs system, was in Muslim hands.

2 M. Hadžijahić and N. Šukrić, *Islam I Muslimani u Bosni I Hercegovini* [Islam and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina], Sarajevo, Starješinstvo Islamske Zajednice, 1977, p. 21.

From the tenth century to the middle of the thirteenth century AD, the Muslims in Hungary formed compact communities which played a considerable role in the state. In Smyrna alone there existed some thirty Muslim villages between 1080 and 1250. There is also evidence of Muslim settlers in Mačva, northern Serbia, and in the eastern areas of Bosnia. Ismaelites (see the next paragraph) repeatedly took part in warlike enterprises around Belgrade. Geographical names such as Kozara, Kozarac, Kalesije (in the district of Zvornik), Kalesiči (in the district of Srebrenica) and Kulize (in the district of Priboj) are reminders of the former life and work of the Chazars (Kazars) and Chwalisians.

The Arab theologian and writer of travel books, Abū Ḥāmid al-Gharnāṭī (1080–1169), who, in about 1150, occupied a high position within the Muslim community in Hungary, divides the followers of Islam in the Hungarian kingdom into two groups – the Maghrebians (Occidentals) and the Khwārazmians. According to research conducted by the Czech orientalist Ivan Hřebek, the former were mostly called Ismaelites (*ismaelitae*, *izmaeliták*), while the latter were called *Bezzermanae* (*böszörmény*) or *Saracens*. Ethnically, the majority of the Maghrebians were Pechenegs. Already under the ‘Abbāsid caliphate, the term ‘Maghrebian’ designated Turkish mercenaries. Hřebek suspects this to be in keeping with a popular tradition which somehow links the origins of the Pechenegs with the West.

It is remarkable that in the Kumanovo region of Serbia, the Muslims were called ‘Latin’ (*latini*) right up until recent times. The name ‘Kumanovo’ harks back to the nearest relations of the Pechenegs, the Kumans. Another name commonly used in the north Serbian region for the followers of Islam – *Kozari* – is reminiscent of the Khazars, the great tribe to which the Chwalisians belonged.

In 1233 an edict of King Andrew of Hungary (r. 1205–35) decreed that all subjects who professed the Islamic faith were to be barred from the civil service. Furthermore, they were ordered to wear special clothes or a badge to make them easily distinguishable. The repression reached its peak under Charles Robert of Anjou (r. 1301–45), when Muslims were forced either to leave Hungary or to be baptized. Despite all these measures, Islam managed to survive in the lands of St Stephen’s Crown right up until the fourteenth century, Thomas Arnold dating its demise to 1341. According to the Croatian scholar A. Bazala, however, there were still Ismaelites living in the Croatian ethnic region after this time.

From time to time the south-eastern wing of the Balkan peninsula, that is, Bulgaria and Macedonia, was washed by waves of Islamic and Israelite

propaganda.³ Thus, in the ninth century AD, the Jews had a strong spiritual centre in Saloniki (today's Thessaloniki); while during the same period, in the Vardar valley above Saloniki, the Byzantine emperor Theophilus (r. 829–42) settled a large unit of Turkish soldiers who went down in history under the name of Vardariots.⁴ These foreign legionnaires were originally Muslims, but were later absorbed into Christianity. Names of some Bulgarian princes mentioned in documents of the period have an Islamic ring, for example, Umar, Kurt, Ehac, Kardam, Omurtag, Malamir (*al-amīr?*) and Murtagon.

Pope Nicholas I (in office 858–67) advised the Bulgarians of his time not to keep the books they had been given by the Saracens in their houses any longer but to commit them to the flames. The document containing this advice has been preserved in the Vatican archives under the title, 'Responsa Nicolae I Papae ad consulta Bulgarorum'.

The Arabs occupied Athens for a short period, from 896 to 902.⁵

Comparatively recent research has revealed that the 'unknown religious phenomenon' which, in the tenth century AD, introduced biblical names to the Romanian Carpathian region and the Macedonian part of the Bulgarian empire destroyed by Basil II (r. 867–86) was in fact Islam.⁶ In no way could it have been the anti-scriptural Manichaeism.⁷ That the Pechenegs, and some of the Kumans who took over from the Pechenegs in Transylvania, were followers of the Islamic faith is also explicitly confirmed by the medieval author Nikon.⁸

In the ninth century, the Turkish ancestors of the Slav Bulgarians extended their rule to a part of Hungary, to Syrmia, to the region between Maroch and the Danube, and to Transylvania. The ruling Bulgarian elite there probably retained their Turkish character longer than their ethnic brethren in Bulgaria.⁹

Elsewhere, several contemporary Arab authors report the presence of Islam among the Volga-Bulgarians. Indeed, there were times when the Muslims held important strongholds there. Al-Mas'ūdī (d. 956), for example, mentions a battle near the town of Idil in about 944 in which Christian and Muslim soldiers fought side by side against pagan Russians.

3 F. Rački, *Bogumili I patareni* [The Bogumils and the Patarens], Belgrade, Srpska Akad., 1931, pp. 350–1.

4 R. Janin, 'Les Turcs Vardariots', *Écho d'Orient*, XXIX, 1930, pp. 437–49.

5 K. M. Setton, 'On the Raids of the Moslems in the Aegean in the Ninth and Tenth Centuries and their Alleged Occupation of Athens', *American Journal of Archeology*, LVIII, 1954, pp. 311–19.

6 A. Randa, *Der Balkan – Schlüsselraum der Weltgeschichte. Von Thrake bis Byzanz*. Graz/Salzburg/Vienna, Pustet, 1949, p. 290.

7 Ibid.

8 H. V. Kutschera, *Die Chasaren. Historische Studie*, Vienna, A. Holzhausen, 1909, p. 112.

9 I. Kniezsa, *Ungarns Völkerschaften im XI. Jahrhundert*, Budapest, Osteuropäische Bibliothek, 1938, p. 105.

The Danube-Bulgars were said to have entered their prayer houses – the exact description of which has unfortunately not been handed down to us – beltless but with their heads covered in Muslim fashion. Their king, Krum (r. 805–15), probably influenced by the Islamic prohibition on alcohol, had all the vines in his state destroyed.¹⁰ In the army of the Danubian prince Glad von Widdin, Kuman troops, some of whom were followers of Islam, fought against the Hungarians together with Bulgarian and Walachian troops.¹¹

News of Muslims in Dobrudja is found in the writings of the Arab author Abu-l-Fidā' (d. 1331). In 1262 the Byzantine emperor Michael VIII (1261–82) settled Anatolian Turks in Dobrudja when, with 'Izzaddīn Kaykāwus, they sought asylum in Byzantium. However, most of these settlers returned to Anatolia in 1307.¹²

The rule *Cuius regio, eius religio* ('Whose rule, his religion'), elevated to the constitutional principle with the peace of Augsburg of 1555, seems to have come into full effect in the Balkans; each change in the political conditions brought about a change in the people's religion. Hungary seems to have resisted this rule for an unwarrantedly long time, however, since Muslim ethnic communities managed to survive there up until the end of the thirteenth century.

The Bulgarians were Christianized only after the heavy defeat inflicted upon them by the Byzantine emperor Michael III (r. 842–67) in 863 when, under the terms of the peace treaty, the Bulgarian ruler Boris I Michael Bulgarski (r. 853–88) had to agree to be baptized together with his people. Resistance against such baptism cost the lives of fifty-two boyars (magnates) and numerous ordinary people.

As to religious propaganda and missionary activities, by both Christians and Muslims, this was carried on by outsiders. There were, for example, the two 'Slav apostles' of Greek origin, Cyril and Methodius, and the two Arab scholars Muḥammad and Ḥāmid al-Gharnāṭī who preached Islam in Hungary in the twelfth century.

Around the middle of the ninth century, Islamized Pechenegs, a warlike people partly in the service of the Hungarian kings and generally called 'Ismaelites' and 'Agarenes', made their appearance in the Balkans. The raids and pillages perpetrated by these Pechenegs in 1048–49 are mentioned with some bitterness in the early Serbian and Bulgarian chronicles.

10 L. Thaller, *Od yrača I čarobnjaka do modernog liječnika* [From Soothsayer and Magician to the Modern Physician], no pub. details, 1938, in the introduction.

11 O. Blau, 'Über Volkstum und Sprache der Kumanen', *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, XXIX, 1875, p. 566.

12 M. Šamić, *Istorijski izvori Travničke hronike Ive Andrića I njihova umjetnička transpozicija* [Historical Sources of the 'Chronicle of Travnik' by Ivo Andrić and their Artistic Transposition], Sarajevo, 'Veselin Masleša', 1962, p. 44.

The Balkans first came face to face with the Arab-Islamic world when the Arab army commander Maslama ibn ‘Abd-al-Malik (d. 738), one of the most impressive Muslim generals, invaded the territories of the Byzantine empire in Thrace in 717–18. This invasion brought the Arabs up to the gates of Edirne and Saloniki. They also besieged Istanbul and founded a mosque, the Arap Camii of today.

Arnold sees the early presence of Muslims in the medieval Danube region as one of the causes of Islam’s rapid expansion in the Balkans in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Conditions of decay call into play the conqueror

Constantinople’s Latin rule (1204–61), introduced after the Fourth Crusade, provoked anger and social tensions throughout South-East Europe. In the succession states ruled by Latin feudal lords, in particular, the plight of the peasants was deplorable. Tribute payments in kind and forced labour oppressed the people and the many wars and devastations left the country partly depopulated. In addition, the incursions by the Hungarian monarch reached as far as Vidin, Bulgaria, and were accompanied by his continued endeavours to Catholicize Bulgaria. A current saying in the Balkans was: ‘Better the sultan’s turban than the Pope’s tiara.’ In the meantime, the Ottomans had carried out their mass settlement of Turks there. This new element brought Islam to the region. Many converted to the new religion, as memories of the former religion, Islam, were awakened, for example, in the case of the ‘Vardar Turks’ (Vardariots). Although Albanians and Pomaks allegedly first converted to Islam in the seventeenth century, they had nevertheless attained high honours and influence before then. Thus, in the late sixteenth century, the poet Üweys Weysī (1561–1628) could intone his lament:

*Adjebdir, ‘izz u dewlet te djemī ‘an Arnawūd Bošnaq, Čeker dewrimde
dhilletler, Shāhā, āl-i Resūlullāh.*

(Strange, that in glory and fortune, there be but Arnauts and Bosniaks,
whereas the descendants of the Prophet, O God, in my times have to endure
all kinds of ignominies.)

The mention of ‘descendants of the Prophet’ refers not only to the Arabs, but also to the Turks.

Multireligious life in the hundred years of the Pax Ottomana

With the conversion of some of the population to Islam, the partition of Bosnia into three parts along religious lines was assured. The two main Churches, set on expansion and correspondingly aggressive, were kept quiet and a long period of peace ensued (the Pax Ottomana). The French traveller Louis Gédoyen, travelling in the Balkans in 1623–24, observed that in the city of Belgrade – with its numerous Bosnian inhabitants at the time – many followers of the Greek Orthodox Church lived peacefully side by side with Calvinists and members of other ‘sects’ from nearby Hungary and Germany. Their ministers had full freedom to engage in their fruitless discussions.

At that time, the Bosnian vizier Warwarī ‘Alī Pasha (d. 1647) wrote the much-quoted verses on the rule of Sultan Ibrāhīm I (r. 1640–48):

Adjeb emn u amān oldu demined;

Qoyun qurdiyle gezdi devletinde.

(Admirable security and many acts of clemency abounded during his reign; the sheep and the wolf jaunted happily together in the demesne.)

The Bosniaks, Albanians and other peoples who had embraced Islam had not, thereby, lost their national identity. They were given full scope to act. The Bosnians, in particular, had the opportunity to be recompensed for the suffering they had endured as ‘heretics’ and their position within the confines of the main Churches was considerably strengthened. In these circumstances, one cannot speak of any subjugation of the Bosnians by the Turks. Bosniaks had a say in the affairs of state and their viziers and grand viziers had a significant voice in matters of government. Among them were more than 300 authors, active in various genres and of differing degrees of importance, but who all made contributions to the development of culture.¹³ Literary works were written in Arabic, Turkish, Persian and Bosnian. In all this, the driving force in state politics was not Islam but rather the glory and honour of the ruling Ottoman family. The Muslims were not greatly concerned with the life and doings of the non-Muslim religious communities, who were granted full autonomy. Thus, society was freely multicultural and multireligious. Lessing’s parable of the ring – the archetype of which is found in Qur’ān 5:49 – was a reality in that society long before it appeared in writing.

13 For the Bosnian part of the Balkans, see Smail Balic, *Das unbekannte Bosnien/Europas Brücke zur islamischen Welt*, Cologne/Weimar/Vienna, 1992, and his ‘The Cultural Achievements of Bosnian Muslims’, *Islamic Studies* (Islamabad), XXXVI, No. 2/3, 1997, pp. 137–75.

Up to the rule of Sultan Bāyezid II (d. 1512), the Ottoman empire practised a very liberal and tolerant religious policy. There were no forced conversions. On the contrary, the occasional group endeavours to convert people to Islam were stopped by the sultans for economic reasons.

State interests as the Ottomans' main motivation

The Ottoman expansion to Western Europe was not essentially due to religious motives; it was due, rather, to the ancient Mongolian aspiration to suzerainty held by the Ottoman dynasty. Religious arguments only emerged later. The Viennese Turcologist Herbert Jansky remarked that: 'Although Islam was the state religion, although non-Muslims were regarded as second-class citizens, they were not oppressed.' When filtering out the essential law in Ottoman history, Jansky also quite rightly states:

The true idea behind the creation and rise of the Ottoman empire was the belief in the calling of the Ottoman dynasty to rule the world; the source, however, from which this belief and the pertinent traditions stemmed was essentially non-Islamic.¹⁴

In this sense, the Ottoman empire did not apply a uniform legal system and non-Muslim peoples were allowed to retain their ancient laws. Many other elements remained unchanged, such as indigenous princes and kings, the social structure and religion. In some of the areas of state, the empire was modelled on Byzantine lines, in particular on the important position occupied by the Orthodox Church. Under the Ottomans, the ecumenical patriarch of Fannar virtually played the role of grand vizier and made decisions regarding the religious affairs of all the Christians.

Needless to say, with all its vicissitudes, history contains examples to the contrary. There was no shortage of aberrations and abuse of morals. However, Muslims and Christians had found a *modus vivendi* and everywhere Christian places of worship and synagogues stood – and still stand – side by side with mosques. Between 1523 and 1527 the Ottomans settled Serbs in the Croat region around Zrmanja and Cetina in Dalmatia, and Serb Orthodox churches in Biljani, Ostrovica, Karin, Biovčino Selo, Mokro Selo and some other locations date back to that period. Some monasteries were also founded. The assertion that when the Turks had conquered a country they

14 H. Jansky, 'Das Osmanische Reich in Sudosteuropa von 1453 bis 1648', in *Handbuch der europäischen Geschichte*, Vol. 3, Stuttgart, Theodor Schieder, 1971, p. 1171.

would destroy its churches is mere prejudice.¹⁵ After occupying an enemy town or village, and once they had overcome the resistance, they would, first of all, requisition a church to serve as a mosque, but they left the other churches in the hands of the church administration. Things were different, of course, if the town or village had been abandoned.

It is thanks to the Albanian Sheikh *ül-islām Sembillī ‘Alī Efendi* (d. 1525), and to his steadfast faith, that the Balkan Christians were spared expulsion from their country or liquidation as the Moors had suffered on the Iberian peninsula. Some vengeful characters had indeed urged Sultan Selim I (r. 1512–20) to take such steps. But before making such a momentous decision, the sultan took counsel from the supreme religious representative, Sembillī ‘Alī Efendi, as to the admissibility of such a scheme. The reply came in the form of a *fetwā*, a binding religious ruling, which said: ‘*Olmaz!*’ (‘Unlawful’). The grounds on which the ruling was based were that the Christians, being under the protection of the state, were entitled to remain unscathed. They were not to be held responsible for the deeds of their co-religionists anywhere else in the world. The Qur’ān states: ‘No soul shall be made responsible to bear another’s duty.’¹⁶

The famous Turkish historian Halil Inalçik has pointed to a facet of Ottoman morality that resulted in an enduring solidarity with non-Muslim citizens. This was the obligation to practise *istimāla (istimālet)*, that is, ‘compassion’, to share one’s neighbours’ joys and sufferings irrespective of their faith.

The beginnings of a permanent Islamic presence in the Balkans

It was in South-East Europe that Islam achieved its most lasting influence, and many towns and villages there still possess a distinctively Islamic character. Indeed, two states in the region have Muslim majorities: Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Contrary to the previously held opinion that Islam was imposed on the indigenous population – especially the Slavs and Greeks – by the Ottoman Turks, who first set foot on European soil in 1354, research in the first half of the twentieth century and subsequently has established that Islamization was on the whole voluntary. Islam was not a product of ‘Turkish imperialism’. In fact, for economic reasons the Ottoman empire at times even discouraged mass conversions.

15 B. Nilević, *Srpska pravoslavna crkva. u Bosni i Hercegovini do obnove Pečke patrijaršije 1557 godine* [The Serbian Orthodox Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina up to the Renewal of the Patriarchate of Peć in 1557], Sarajevo, 1990, quoting from *Politika* (Belgrade), 19 May 1992.

16 *Fāṭir*, 35:18.

At the time of writing, nearly 15 million Muslims live in the Balkans: 6 million are citizens of European Turkey, while the remainder live in the former Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece. The largest non-Turkish Islamic population consists of Albanians (Arnawuds), and the second largest consists of Bosniaks or Bosnians in the national sense. According to their nationality, 8 million Muslims are Turks, with approximately 1 million in Bulgaria, 250,000 in Greece, 70,000 in Romania and the rest in The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Kosovo. Muslim Slavs number approximately 2,700,000: this figure includes 2,290,320 Bosniaks, 290,000 Pomaks in Bulgaria and Greece and nearly 70,000 Macedonians. Elsewhere, there are about 4,810,000 Albanians who belong to Islam or to the Islamic sect of the Bektashiyye. Of these, 1,810,000 live in Kosovo and FYROM. The final groups of Muslims are the Sinti and the Roma who, at a rough estimation, number a few tens of thousands.

A critical situation

In the former Yugoslavia, the Islamic tradition is being eroded from outside and within. For some years Islam has been exposed to a flood of suspicions and disavowals and has been accused of antidemocratic, anti-Western and dogmatic acts. The attacks are directed against all forms of Islamic religious life. Thus, in the Kosovo area and in FYROM, the traditional walls built around Muslim courtyards are being forcibly demolished by the local authorities, an action strongly reminiscent of the restrictive measures taken against indigenous Muslims in medieval Hungary. Nationalistic forces are taking every opportunity to repress Islamic culture. The famous phrase coined by the Austrian author Franz Grillparzer, namely, 'From humanity via nationality to bestiality,' is once again proving true.

Like the Serbian policy, the Croatian policy is also increasingly dominated by restorative expectations. Narrow nationalistic attitudes and corresponding behaviour patterns have once before been evident in the relationship with Bosnia. The Muslims will have to abandon their resistance in view of the persistent pressure by their two neighbours: their lot would be the same as that suffered at the time by their pre-Islamic forefathers, the Bosnian Patarenes. They will be in part wiped out, in part absorbed by the Christian religion.

The Bosnians are increasingly embittered by the behaviour of the Croats, especially their government. Many long for a new Tito to appear on the political scene, to bring an end to their nightmare – a pious wish devoid of any chance of realization. Only the international community, particularly the United States of America and Europe, could bring about a real peace in the

region, similar to that achieved through territorial occupation by the Austro-Hungarian army acting on the decision of the Congress of Berlin in 1878.

In Bulgaria, the restrictions against Muslims started in 1982, when the authorities forced the Muslim population to change their personal names to Bulgarian and especially Christian ones. Anti-Bulgarian demonstrations took place. The reaction of the Communist regime was barbaric and there was increased resistance. In May 1989 the inhuman pressure led to mass expulsions to Turkey.

Bosnia: a special case

Bosnia was fertile ground for Islam in the fifteenth century. There were mass conversions in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, mainly among the Patarenes or Bogumils or their Catholic descendants, actually Crypto-Bogumils, who had remained in the country after the many years of oppression.

There were strong mystical elements in the Islam practised at that time by the Ottoman army. It was also endowed with numerous syncretistic elements and was generous and far-sighted and thus quite tolerant for those times. Similarly, the 'Bosnian Church', as the indigenous Patarenism or Bogumilism understood itself, was organized on lines similar to those of the Islamic mystical orders. It did not recognize the clergy of the papal primateship; it understood Christ as a spiritual person; and the followers performed their prayers five times a day and observed certain forms of abstinence not essentially different from the selective diet prescribed by Islam. As a result, the Bosnian Bogumils saw themselves as spiritual relations of the Ottomans when they made their appearance. Furthermore, the main thrust of Ottoman expansion was directed against Hungary, the former oppressor which had conducted veritable crusades against the Patarene Bosnians and their state. Both political and national considerations were therefore at play. Thus, a large part of the indigenous population, led by the aristocracy, adopted Islam.

Hamid Algar, an expert in Islamic mysticism, is correct when he says that 'despite being permanently intermingled with Christian populations, the Muslims of Bosnia showed little inclination' towards syncretism. But the beginning of Islam in this area – as in other parts of the Balkans – seems to have been quite syncretic. This is evident first of all in the phenomenon of Bosnian Poturs, a term referring to the 'suspect Muslims' or 'half-Turks'.¹⁷

The Bosnian entity as a national identification is deeply rooted first and foremost in the Bosnian Muslims. Their ancestors in the independent

17 H. Algar, 'The Hamzeviye: A Deviant Movement in Bosnian Sufism', *Islamic Studies* (Islamabad), XXXVI, No. 2/3, 1997, p. 243.

kingdom of Bosnia (1377–1463), who at that time were mostly Patarenes or Bogumils, in the Ottoman empire (1463–1878) and in the Austro-Hungarian empire (1878–1918) felt they belonged to this entity. In many ways, the four decades of Austro-Hungarian presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a time of stronger differentiation for the country. The Bosnian Catholics, as a national group, decided to ally themselves with the Croatian entity, while the Orthodox or Pravoslavs opted for the Serbian entity. From the very outset, each of these two nationalisms claimed the Muslims for itself. At the same time, whether surreptitiously or openly, efforts were directed towards eliminating the Bosnian entity from the political vocabulary and popular consciousness.

Thus, the Serbian slogan of political propaganda to the effect that the Bosnian Muslims, by adopting Islam, had betrayed the nation (which in their case was not Serbian anyway) is nonsensical. The majority of the state supporting the Bosnian people has been Muslim by faith since the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and since 1971 they have been ‘Muslims in the national sense’, this being a self-identification brought about by circumstances.

The results of a census carried out in 1991 in the territory of the former Yugoslavia put the total number of ‘Muslims in the national sense’ at 2,299,328. Ninety-five per cent of them stated that Bosnian was their language, this being the actual term used for the idiom spoken in Bosnia during Ottoman rule and at the time of the Austro-Hungarian administration.

At the end of February 1992, a plebiscite was held in the then still Yugoslav part-republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which, just as had been the case in the two western part-republics, the overwhelming majority of the population voted for independence. Shortly afterwards, the sovereignty of the dichotomous country, proclaimed in the meantime, was recognized by the international community of nations. The ensuing political reshaping that was preceded by an increasing Serbian antagonism against other Yugoslav nations led to violent resistance by the country’s Serb population, the Belgrade Government, the army and the mass media. Weeks before, the nature of the Serbian reaction had announced itself through acts of provocation, arson and murder. Then, following international recognition, it took the form of genocide. The systematic way in which this genocide was carried out clearly revealed a plan, prepared long beforehand, to exterminate those people whom the Serb-dominated Communist power structures had officially designated in 1971 as ‘Muslims in the national sense’. In the meantime, this designation turned into a death trap for the original Bosniaks or, somewhat more elegantly albeit not entirely accurately, the ‘Bosnians’.

Serbian Orthodox fundamentalism, largely identical in its Stalinist way of dealing with people, took its toll in Bosnia with utter disregard for

any human feelings. One cannot speak of a civil war in the classic sense. The behaviour of the aggressor witnessed such blatantly criminal features (destruction of cultural goods, torture of prisoners, shooting of children, systematic rape of women and young girls as a means of total humiliation of the opponent, castration of young boys, looting of humanitarian aid, and many more such acts) that the violence was disqualified from possessing the attributes of a civil war. These are acts that clearly distinguish the aggressive and rapacious perpetrators from their victims. The unparalleled dehumanization in the heart of Europe in the closing years of the twentieth century would have warranted a unanimous police action, not a warlike intervention. Nothing of the sort took place, however. On the contrary, the decision-makers of the world community, by upholding the arms embargo on the crisis region, denied the victims the right to defend themselves. As a Muslim doctor in England remarked: 'If they can destroy Bosnians, who are white, European, and Muslims in name alone, who are completely integrated, what hope is there?'

In this analysis it is very important to make a distinction between Western and Eastern Christianity. Western Christianity – insofar as it exists as 'Christianity' – is a result of the Enlightenment; it is open-minded, normally tolerant and far from fanatical. Eastern Orthodox Christianity, on the other hand, is predominantly underdeveloped and sometimes fanatic, as in the Serbian case.

The situation in Bosnia cannot be divorced from that of the Sandjak of Novi Pazar, where there also is a Bosniak majority. According to the 1991 census, the Sandjak numbered 253,000 and constituted 57 per cent of the population. Many were registered as 'Muslims in the national sense' on the registration forms. Thus, if the Serbs lay claim to the regions in Bosnia in which they are in the majority, the same right should be accorded the Sandjak Bosnians; that is, the criterion applied in Croatia for the benefit of the Serbs should also apply in Serbia for the benefit of other ethnic groups living in a similar situation. The culture of the Sandjak Muslims is an integral part of Bosnian culture.

Bosnia was a touchstone of the world's conscience. What we witnessed was an aggression against an originally virtually unarmed peace-loving population. Not only did the Tchetnik gangs (Serbian brigands) and the former Yugoslav federal army join forces against Bosnians; the darkest forces of Balkan history, nurtured by myths and ahistorical views and supported by a clergy steeped in what would seem a medieval theological way of thinking, were harnessed to mobilize an unbridled nationalism. The Dinaric peasant, with his anti-civilization instincts, was unrestrictedly at work.

On 28 September 1993 an all-Bosniak Assembly, among whose participants were prominent intellectuals, peoples' deputies, representatives

of religious communities and leading military figures, radically rejected the designation of 'Muslims in the national sense' inherited from the Communist era. Instead, they made a resolution to return to the original ethnic name. The next day, this resolution was adopted and ratified by Parliament. Thus, the Bosnian people regained their historic name Bosniaks or Bosnians. It is this name alone which describes their true identity. Because of the Orthodox and Catholic Bosnians who broke away to adopt a Serbian or Croatian identity, the Bosniaks or Bosnians at present are mainly represented by the Muslim population. It is this element alone which is interested in preserving sovereign Bosnia within its historic confines.

In their political vocabulary, the Serbians and Croats still use the term 'Muslims' for the Bosnians in the national sense. In this way they demonstrate the quasi non-existence of the Bosnian nation, that is, Bosniaks. Once again, the wise words of Albert Camus are applicable to this region: '*Mal nommer les choses, c'est ajouter au malheur du monde.*'

Regional Islamic reformism

Since the Austro-Hungarian occupation of 1878, Bosnian Islam has been through a phase of theological review, restructuring and spiritualization within the meaning of the Enlightenment. Osman Nuri Hadžić (d. 1938), *cadi* of Mostar, later ministerial counsellor in Belgrade and religious scholar and man of letters, fought against backwardness and oriental recidivism in the minds of Bosnian Muslims. The two important guiding principles of his Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth* exegesis were: 'Back to the credible text' and, as in Muḥammad 'Abduh's teachings: 'No correct understanding of the Qur'ān and the *Ḥadīth* without a scientifically verified conception of the world and humankind.' He demanded that in theological instruction the findings of scientific research be given maximum consideration. He denied that biblical wonders and stories of the prophets in the holy texts possessed any dogmatically binding nature. Hadžić's book *Muḥammad and the Qur'ān*, written in the Bosnian language and in which he expounds his reformist theology, was a God-given gift to the community during the repressive Communist era (1945–90). Every progressive Bosnian Muslim was able to identify with Hadžić's understanding of Islam.¹⁸

In his writings, Hadžić must have drawn upon Turkish literature. His attitude to the problem of women in Islam, for example, reveals the direct influence of the Turkish writer and philosopher Ahmet Ağaoğlu (d. 1939), who

18 This is also reflected in the present author's book, *Ruf vom Minarett*, 3rd edn, Hamburg, 1984.



5.1 Ionia Mosque, Greece (© J.C. Chabrier)

contributed greatly to establishing the ideological basis of Turkish laicism. Just like Aġaoġlu, HadŹiċ held that the veil or headscarf worn by women was not an Islamic but rather an oriental custom. He provided his two daughters with an excellent education, and the elder one, Bahrija, subsequently became the prima ballerina of the Belgrade Opera.

The result of the restructuring of religious life after the occupation, the ‘Islamic religious community’, by its very name, already signalled the emergence of a new spirit: only Islam as religion, ideally accompanied by its culture, was to be fully recognized as a social reality. The laical way of thinking that underlies this term is all too obvious. People at the time would have been disturbed by the change of name to ‘Islamic community’ (omitting the word ‘religious’) after the collapse of the Communist power structures.

A great Islamic scholar, working among the Muslim Bosnians, developed a latitudinarian Islamic theology adapted to laicism. His name was Husein Djozo (d. 1982), a graduate of al-Azhar University in Cairo, who for many decades was counsellor to the head of the religious community, the *ra’īs al-*

'*ulamā*'. Like all citizens of Muslim faith who have long been settled in South-East Europe, Džozo also belonged to the relatively liberal Ḥanafī school of the interpretation of Islam. According to him, Muḥammad's example showed the way. Thus, practice-orientated theology will never be alienated from life although the specific form it takes will vary according to the requirements of the times and the region. Only cult and credo are excluded from these changes.¹⁹

The laicism of modern Turkey rubbed off on Bosnia and the influence of the '*ulamā*', or spiritual leaders, declined. Under the reformist *ra'īs al-'ulamā*' Fehim Spaho (in office 1938–42), the offices of the *muftī*, those most important socio-political factors of conventional Islam, were abolished. This went beyond even the Kemalist model of laicism. Indeed it was mainly the secular intelligentsia who championed the laicization of public life. In a special study, Maximilian Braun described the literary aspect of these endeavours which, in their outward appearance, in many ways amounted to Europeanization.²⁰ In this connection, the great Bosnian regional poet and cultural historian Safvetbeg Bašagić (d. 1934) deserves special mention. Bašagić resolutely combated prejudice and aberrations, hypocrisy and cruelty, intolerance and religious and nationalistic fanaticism.

Post-Communist Albania

Under Communism, Islamic pious endowments were confiscated throughout the entire Balkan region. At that time, all religious communities were forced to live with a minimum of financial means. Albania was short even of this minimum. And even though political change after 1990 certainly brought an improvement, this was not enough. Religious education in Albanian state schools is voluntary and in some regions only 10 per cent of pupils take advantage of it.

Nowadays, Christian sects are proliferating in Albania. It is exactly the same situation in Bosnia and Bulgaria, but there all efforts of these sects are doomed to failure. Nevertheless, about 500 former Muslims in Tuzla, eastern Bosnia, have converted to become Jehova's Witnesses. The proselytizing seems to come from some members of the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR).

The numerical strength of the Muslim population in the three remaining Balkan states is as follows: Albania 1,750,000, Greece around 140,000, and

19 H. Džozo, *Islam u vremenu* [Islam in Time], Sarajevo, Udruženje ilmijje, 1976, p. 28.

20 M. Braun, *Die Anfänge der Europäisierung in der Literatur der muslimischen Slaven in Bosnien und Herzegowina*, Leipzig, Markert & Petters, 1934.

Romania around 35,000. The level of Islamic religious culture in Albania and Romania is minimal.

Bulgaria: an Islamic revival

Bulgarians are less nationalistic than the Serbs. Between 1984 and 1990 the country was deeply affected by a dangerous ethno-religious crisis when the Muslim inhabitants were forced to change their names and were subject to expulsion. Following this, human rights in Bulgaria were restored. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms, a Muslim political organization, participates actively in political life.

At the time of writing, the Bulgarian Muslim community is composed of approx. 802,200 Turks, 176,700 Pomaks (Muslims of Bulgarian origin), 123,200 Roma and Sinti, and 8,290 others. Ninety-three per cent are Sunnīs belonging to the Ḥanafī school and 7.7 per cent are Shī‘ites or, more correctly, ‘Alawites.²¹

For decades in Bulgaria, circumcision, the observance of religious praxis and rites, animal sacrifice on the occasion of the festival of *‘Īd al-Adḥā* and speaking in Turkish were outlawed. This ultimately led to a massive expulsion of the Muslim population, and in 1989, 310,000 citizens left the country for Turkey. An Islamic revival is, however, now under way. Many mosques and religious institutions have been renewed or raised. In the very neglected living space of the Pomaks, an Islamic foundation *Irşād* (‘Guide’) is very active. But in this milieu some Christian mission-houses are also effective.

Islamic educational institutions

The highest Islamic educational institutions in South-East Europe are the Faculty for Islamic Sciences in Sarajevo and the Islamic College in Sofia. At the time of writing, a similar college is planned for Skopje (Üsküp, FYROM). Basic religious instruction for ordinary believers is given during weekend courses or at specially designated schools called *mektebs* (equivalent to the Arabic *katātīb*). Higher education in Islamic law (*sharī‘a*) is provided in *medresas* (Arabic: *madrassa*) for boys and girls. One famous example is the 500-year-old Gazi Husrev Bey *medresa* in Sarajevo, Bosnia. In Zenica, in central Bosnia, the Islamic Educational Academy prepares religious teachers for their vocation. A further four Bosnian *medresas* are found in Mostar, Tuzla, Bihać and

21 On the Islamic presence in Bulgaria in general, see Ali Eminov, ‘Islam and Muslims in Bulgaria – a Brief History’, *Islamic Studies* (Islamabad), XXXVI, No. 2/3, 1997, pp. 209–41.



5.2 Plovdiv Mosque, Bulgaria (© J.C. Chabrier)

Travnik. Elsewhere, a *medresa* which uses the Bosnian language as the medium of instruction is found in Novi Pazar in the Sandjak district. In Prishtina in Kosovo, the famous ‘Alāuddīn *medresa* provides Albanian students with an Islamic education. Teaching in the well-known ‘Isābeg *medresa* in Skopje is in Macedonian and Albanian. The most famous Islamic school in Bulgaria is the *mektebī* Nuwwāb, which focuses on Islamic judgeship. Meanwhile, Greece has preserved a relatively strong Islamic educational system. Thus, at Gümülcine (Comotini) there is a higher-grade *medresa* as well as an Islamic grammar school. A second *medresa* is

located at Şahin (Xanthe). Finally, the *medresa* in Mecidiyye in Romania has been reopened following the defeat of the Communist regime there. Apart from the schools mentioned above, Bulgaria has a further three *medresas*.

The beautiful Mosque of Şiṣman Ibrāhīm Paşa in Počitelj, with its attached old *medresa* and clock tower – an outstanding ensemble – was damaged by nationalistic Croats. The same fate befell the famous old bridge of Mostar. Like the picturesque old towns in Herzegovina, many other Muslim cities and settlements in Bosnia were completely destroyed by Serbian brigands and the Yugoslav army during the years of Bosnian genocide. Indeed, approximately half of all the mosques, that is 1,500, no longer exist.

What of the future?

One factor that threatens the continuance of religious faith and practice and obscures the eschatological dimensions is expressed in the cliché that Islam is both religion and state. The phrase *dīn wa-dawla* is, however, attested

neither in the Qur'ān nor in reliable Tradition. On the contrary, it is a slogan coined by certain sections of the Third World in their search for identity, freedom and social justice. For more than a century, the Islam of the ancient Muslim communities in Europe has been expressed exclusively in doctrine concerning faith, ritual obligations and morality. When Islam is understood and taught in this way it cannot be presented as, for example, an alien and aggressive religion. Politics leads to extreme behaviour and, as we know, sometimes to terrorism and the killing of innocent human beings. The Qur'ān gives us an unequivocal warning:

If anyone kills a person – unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land – it would be as if he kills the whole people: and if anyone saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people.²²

Islam offers its adherents many ways of coping with life in a secular society. Mention may be made, for example, of the absence of sacraments, of a priesthood and of baptism, the civil nature of marriage and tolerance of a sort of mixed marriage, the natural approach to sexuality, the rejection of the idea of excommunication, the positive attitude to knowledge and scientific research and the long-standing readiness for dialogue with the other monotheistic religions.

Obviously, Muslims living in South-East Europe will not be able to isolate themselves from the democratic and emancipatory processes, however much they might wish to do so. Their individual and collective welfare largely depends on the extent to which they can adapt to modern conditions, contribute to the solution of the problems that beset modern society throughout the world and feel solidarity with fellow citizens holding different views of life, and how far they can broaden their religious consciousness by opening up to the great spiritual achievements of the Enlightenment. Islamic religious life will have to adopt new priorities. Only by seeing this as the necessary response to the challenge of modern reality can Islam in Europe hope to secure a lasting existence for itself.

22 *Al-Mā'ida*, 5:32.

APPENDIX III: ISLAMIC PUBLICATIONS IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE

At the time of writing, the following titles are published in South-East Europe:

1. ALBANIA: *Dritta Islame* [The Light of Islam], published monthly, Tirana; and *Shkelqimi Islam* [The Splendour of Islam], monthly (?), Tirana – both in Albanian.
2. BOSNIA: *Dnevni Avaz* [The Daily Voice], daily; *Preporod* [The Rebirth], weekly; *Lijiljan* [The Lily], weekly; *Glasnik Rijasetau Islamske Zajednice* [The Herald of the Presidium of the Islamic Community], bimonthly; *Muallim* [The Teacher], weekly; *Zemzem* [Zamzam], published occasionally; *Kabes* [The Firebrand], monthly; and *Hikmet* [Wisdom], monthly. All these are in Bosnian and are published in Sarajevo apart from the last two: *Kabes* is published in Mostar, while *Hikmet* is published in Tuzla.
3. CROATIA: *Behār* [The Blossom], bimonthly, Zagreb; and *Takvîm* [The Almanac], annual, Zagreb. Both publications are in Bosnian.
4. BULGARIA: *Güven* [Confidence], weekly (?), Sofia; *Hak ve Özgürlük* [Right and Freedom], Sofia – both in Turkish and Bulgarian; and *Müslümanlar* [The Muslims], monthly, the official organ of the community in Sofia.
5. GREECE: *Gerçek* [The Truth], weekly, Comotini, in Turkish; *Yol* [The Way], weekly, Comotini, in Turkish; *Bati Trakya'nin Sesi* [The Voice of Western Thrace], an exile-journal, bimonthly, published in Istanbul.
6. THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA: *El-Hilāl* [The Crescent], biweekly, Skopje, in both Turkish and Macedonian; *Hū* [He, i.e. Gott in mystical terminology], monthly, Prizren, in both Turkish and Albanian; and *Nūr* [The Light], Skopje, in Turkish.
7. MONTENEGRO: *Elif* [Alpha], bimonthly, Podgorica, published in both Bosnian and Albanian.
8. ROMANIA: *Emel* [Hope], monthly, an exile magazine. Until 1990 it was published in Ankara in Turkish.
9. SERBIA: *Nūr* [The Light], quarterly, in Serbian, and the organ of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Belgrade; *Sandžak* [Sandjak of Novi Pazar], monthly, Novi Pazar, in Bosnian; and *Educate Islame* [Islamic Education], monthly, Prishtina, Kosovo, in Albanian.

Chapter 5.2

ISLAM IN NORTH, CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA¹

Muhammad Akbar

INTRODUCTION

The present chapter is a brief survey of the presence and spread of Islam in the Americas. It is not intended to be an analytical study of Muslims in such a large part of the world, nor does it include all facets of the Muslim presence and the spread of Islam in any particular country. The United States of America is given more space than other countries and regions of the Americas because there are more Muslims in the United States, according to the most reliable estimates, than in all of the rest of the Americas. Furthermore, reliable sources on Muslim Americans – whose pre-1975 history is somewhat unique – are by far the most numerous and available.

North America

THE MUSLIM PRESENCE

The earliest Muslims in North America were sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Moriscos (Muslims under Christian rule) and Mudéjares (Muslim converts to Christianity), mainly from Andalusia (southern Spain), who arrived in Mexico with the Spanish explorers and settlers. Apparently many

1 This chapter is dedicated to the memory of M. Ali Kettani, a pioneer in the study of Muslim communities internationally and a major source for this chapter.

Moriscos and Mudéjares not only secretly maintained some Muslim practices for generations; according to some reports, they initiated the conversion of some Amerindians to Islam. Due to forced conversions to Christianity and executions during the Inquisition, Islam is generally thought to have disappeared in Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking America, though the Andalusian cultural influence is still obvious in Mexico and parts of the south-western United States to the present day.

There were also 'early Muslim visitors' in North America. Algerian, Egyptian and Sudanese soldiers fought on both sides of the French-Mexican war. It is highly probable that some of the 2,000 or more soldiers remained after the French withdrawal from Mexico in May 1867. Other 'visitors' include the early sixteenth-century explorer in Florida, Estevanico (also called Estephan, from Azammūr, Morocco); the eighteenth-century (?) Egyptian hunter Norsereddin (probably Nasruddin) in upstate New York; the nineteenth-century 'Arabian' or Turkish cameleer Hajj Ali (also called Hi Jolly) in the south-western United States; seven nineteenth-century Algerians in North Carolina and later in New York City who were ostensibly escapees (or released former soldiers) from French military service in French Guiana (South America); Yemeni sailors in nineteenth-century New York State and California; and participants in the 1876 Philadelphia Centennial Exposition, the 1893 Columbian Exposition in Chicago and the 1904 St Louis Fair in St Louis, Missouri. Thus far, most of these (like other Muslims) remain little-known names in North American Muslim history.

The Muslim presence in Canada may have begun with the arrival, from an unnamed place, of a Scottish couple, James and Agnes Love. Their son (also called James) was born in 1854, thus being the first Muslim to be born in Canada. An American couple, John and Martha Simon, of English and French descent respectively, are mentioned in the 1871 census as 'Mohammedans'. These two families apparently constituted the thirteen 'Mohammedans' in Ontario, Canada, in that year. However, a runaway slave, Aaron, 'an Arab' (his ethnicity is not to be taken literally), apparently escaped from the southern United States to Canada in the early nineteenth century.

Although the Atlantic slave trade was an important source of Muslims in North America, scholars have identified more enslaved Muslims in the United States than in the other countries of the continent. Allan Austin estimates that 'there may have been about forty thousand African Muslims in the colonial and pre-Civil War territory making up the United States before 1860'. Enslaved Muslims in the Americas deserve more international exposure.

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Among the Muslims who were enslaved in the United States were the Fula/Fulani *ḥāfiẓ* (i.e. a memorizer of the Qur'ān) – Job Ben Solomon (Ayyūb ibn Sulaymān Diallo) of modern Senegal, who was enslaved in Maryland; the aristocratic and learned Fulbe, Abdul Rahaman ('Abd-ar-Raḥmān) Ibrāhīma of Guinea, in Mississippi, whom Austin describes as 'the most famous African in America' in 1828;² the scholarly Omar ('Umar) Ibn Sa'id of Fouta Toro, Senegal, in South and North Carolina, who apparently feigned conversion to Christianity and reverted to Islam upon his return to West Africa; and Salih Bilali of Massina, Mali, 'a strict Mahometan', in Georgia.³

The cultural legacies of enslaved Muslims were not entirely lost. Indeed, a group known as Free Moors:

trace their independence back to 1790 and a petition to the South Carolina legislature which recognized them as subjects of the Emperor of Morocco. They did not want to be considered 'Negroes', and they seem to have been treated as honorary whites, even to the point of their being allowed to fight for the Confederacy.⁴

Relatively free Muslim emigrants from south-west Asia, South Asia and Eastern Europe arrived in North America during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Initially they came mainly from Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Russia. They sought to improve their economic, social and political conditions. The number of emigrants from these and many other Muslim societies increased enormously in the second half of the twentieth century. The latter émigrés were much more educated and better trained than their earlier co-religionists. They migrated in separate waves, depending on travel restrictions in their own countries and in the North American countries. By the 1990s, the settlers (i.e. descendants of early immigrants) and recent immigrants represented almost every major and many minor Muslim people in Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe. They now form the largest group of Muslim North Americans. Muslims are represented in many areas of North American life, especially in the United States.

2 Allan D. Austin, *African Muslims in Antebellum America: A Sourcebook*, New York/London, Garland, 1984, III; Allan D. Austin, *African Muslims in Antebellum America: Transatlantic Stories and Spiritual Struggles*, New York/London, Routledge, 1997, p. 66; Terry Alford, *Prince among Slaves*, New York/London, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977; James Register, *Jallon: Arabic Prince of Old Natchez, 1788–1828*, Shreveport, La., Mid-South Press, 1968.

3 Austin, *Sourcebook*, V.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 64, note 73. The Confederacy refers to the eleven slave-holding southern states which seceded from the United States in 1860–1.

THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

All North American countries witnessed an enormous increase in the spread of Islam in the second half of the twentieth century. This was a consequence of political, social and economic changes in the emigrants' countries and in North America, the resurgence of Islam in the Muslim world, a huge increase in the number of Islamic institutions in North America, increased dissemination of Islamic literature and increased information about Islam and Muslim peoples in the North American mass media and in educational institutions. A significant element in the phenomenal numerical increase of Muslim North Americans was the emergence of early twentieth-century Islamic organizations.

The United States is unique among North American countries in that American converts established almost all of the earliest national Islamic organizations. Conversion to Islam was often based on a desire for personal and communal improvement and/or a desire to reclaim a perceived lost heritage. These desires or quests made a 'pseudo-Islam' attractive to prospective converts. Moreover, many propagators of such 'Islamic' formulations and some of their followers were well aware that their doctrines were not in complete accord with the Qur'ān and the *sunna* (the authoritative collections of the Prophet Muḥammad's sayings, deeds and rulings).

European ('white') Americans were the first documented American-born converts to Islam. Their interest in Islam was the result of a combination of factors: the European colonization of Muslims in Asia and Africa, the questioning attitude engendered by the European Enlightenment, a growing interest in oriental or Eastern religions, Christian missionary activities among Muslims and the generally negative Muslim response to these activities and to colonialism.

The most well-known early American convert to Islam was Alexander Russell Webb (d. 1916), a descendant of English Protestant immigrants to the United States. Webb, a journalist, businessman and later US consul to the Philippines (1887–92), and a widely read student of religion and philosophy, came to Islam by way of theosophy. He certainly had some knowledge of Sufism as well. His spiritual quest led to a written correspondence with Indian scholars about Islam, his resignation from the United States diplomatic service and a two-month tour of India as the guest of men interested in propagating Islam in the United States. In Bombay (now Mumbai), Webb made his famous announcement about his conversion to Islam:

I adopted this religion because I found, after protracted study, that it was the best and only system adapted to the spiritual needs of humanity ... It teaches universal benevolence, and requires purity of mind, purity of action, purity of

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speech and perfect physical cleanliness. It, beyond doubt, is the simplest and most elevating form of religion known to man.⁵

Having adopted the personal name ‘Mohammed’, and with financial support mainly from India, Webb founded the Moslem Brotherhood organization, which was also known as the American Islamic Propaganda, in New York City in 1893. The purpose of his organization was to teach the intelligent masses who and what the Prophet Muḥammad was and what he really taught, and to overturn the fabric of falsehood and error that prejudiced and ignorant writers have been constructing and supporting for centuries against Islam:

The first step in this great work will be the establishment of a weekly journal devoted to the elucidation of Islamic doctrines and laws, and the discussion of matters bearing thereon, as well as to record news items of interest to Mussulmans in all parts of the world ... [and] encouraging direct intercourse between the Mohammedan world and the more intelligent masses of our country ... The natural result of this will be to stimulate an interest in the study of Arabic and Persian literature ... a free lecture-room and library will be opened to the public ... A book publishing house will also be established which will print and circulate Islamic books and pamphlets.⁶

Webb accomplished much of what he set out in the above statement, and despite his limited appeal to the elites, he pioneered the establishment of a Muslim organizational infrastructure. His views on Christianity and his method of appealing to non-Muslims were repeated by subsequent Muslim American leaders. Webb eventually expanded his organization to include about seven national branches, called ‘Circles’, for the study of the Qur’ān. He published a journal, *Moslem World*, and introductory booklets on Islam. Webb lectured widely, primarily to European-American audiences. He was the official representative of Islam at the founding meeting of the 1893 World Parliament of Religions in Chicago (apparently with the acquiescence of Jamal ad-Din Afghani (Assad-Abadi), other Muslim thinkers and the Ottoman sultan Abdul-Hamīd III). Excerpts from some of his speeches appeared in the mass media. He was critical of what he saw as Christianity’s lack of spiritual and moral values, and the lack of appreciation of Islam and Muslim culture. He condemned Christian missionaries and opposed British colonialism.

5 Mohammed A. R. Webb, *Islam: A Lecture Delivered at the Framji Cowasji Institute, Bombay, India, Thursday Evening 10th November 1892*, Bombay, The Bombay Gazette Steam Printing Works, 1892, I, p. 7.

6 Mohammed A. R. Webb, *Islam in America*, New York, The Oriental Publishing Co., 1893, pp. 67–8.

Webb does not seem to have institutionalized basic Islamic practices at the Moslem Brotherhood. He died a Muslim whose theosophical background continued to influence his thought. Due to financial mismanagement and internal quarrels, the Moslem Brotherhood became defunct some years before Webb's death, although a memorial was held for him in New York City as late as 1945.⁷

Numerically, Islam had its greatest appeal among African Americans. The enslavement of Muslim Africans was to stimulate conversion or 'reversion' to Islam. A number of factors compounded the post-slavery misfortunes of African Americans and intensified their search for religious and ideological solutions: ethnocentrism ('racialism') and segregation, large-scale migration from the southern to the northern states in search of better economic opportunities, the Great Depression of 1929, the two world wars, rampant unemployment, the Korean war (1950–53), the Civil Rights movement and the social upheavals of the 1960s of which the Black Power movement was a significant part.

Many African Americans were disposed to accept an interpretation of Christianity to which they could relate spiritually and socially. The struggle for social justice, equality and a noble identity had produced 'the Black Church' and variant forms of Christian worship. In 1898 the nationally influential Bishop Henry McNeal Turner (d. 1915) of the African Methodist Episcopal Church declared: 'God is a Negro.' He argued that since other people had imagined that they resembled God, 'why not the Negro believe that he resembles God as much so as other people?'⁸ While this statement is abhorrent to Muslims – indeed, it is an expression of *shirk*, an inappropriate association of creatures with their Creator – it nevertheless reinforces the frequent relationship between the quest for meaning and dignity on the one hand, and 'truth' on the other. A similar statement was made later by leaders of the Moorish Science Temple of America and the Nation of Islam (see below), which together attracted hundreds of thousands of African Americans.

Claiming a spiritual relationship with Buddha, Confucius, Zoroaster, Jesus and Muḥammad, Noble Drew Ali (d. 1929 or 1930) founded in 1913 the national organization widely known as the Moorish Science Temple, in Newark, New Jersey. Drew Ali taught that Islam was the natural religion of African Americans, that they were 'Asiatics' being descendants of the Canaanites and Moabites, that they were 'Moors' and their true nationality was 'Moorish American', and that they were a 'lost [and] found' people (i.e.

7 See the present author's forthcoming biography of Webb and critical editions of his writings.

8 Edwin S. Redkey (ed.), *Respect Black: The Writings and Speeches of Henry McNeal Turner*, New York, Arno Press/The New York Times, 1971, pp. 176–7.



5.3 Colorado Muslim Society, Denver (© Zakat Foundation of America)

lost from their people but now found). He claimed to be their prophet, and in 1927 produced *The Holy Koran of the Moorish Science Temple of America*, which he compiled from various sources, including the Bible and, albeit minimally, the Qur’ān. The organization owned several business enterprises.

Drew Ali was not learned, Islamically or otherwise. However, he had ample opportunity to know much more than basic Islam. Nonetheless, he taught his followers to believe in the Unity of Allah (*tawhīd*) and the prophethood of Muḥammad, and to ‘pray’ towards the East three times a day, but without the bodily movements of *ṣalāt*. ‘Meat, alcohol, and smoking were forbidden (along with shaving, cosmetics, and hair straighteners).’⁹ Drew Ali emphasized the moral principles of ‘Love, Truth, Peace, Freedom, and Justice’ and obedience to American law. He also discouraged his followers from fraternizing with recent immigrant Muslims. The Moorish Science Temple splintered into a number of subgroups some of which still command the devotion of many African Americans and others. Some former adherents have joined Sunnī organizations.

An external attempt to establish a national Muslim organization was made by the well-known Indian Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam, after the division of the Ahmadiyya into two groups, the Qadiyanis and the

9 Peter Lamborn Wilson, *Sacred Drift: Essays on the Margins of Islam*, San Francisco, City Lights Books, 1993, p. 33.

Lahoris. A ‘missionary’ of the latter, Mufti Muhammad Sadiq, arrived in the United States in 1921 to convert Americans to their understanding of Islam. However, African Americans have been the most receptive Americans to their teachings. African-American (and other) converts were appointed as heads of and teachers in their multiethnic branches. They encouraged members to study Arabic and Islam at their national branches and later in India and the United Kingdom. They have many branches in the United States and have introduced thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of Americans to Islam. Their headquarters, the Fazl Mosque in Washington, D.C., was opened in 1950. Their major organ is the *Muslim Sunrise*. The Ahmadis have missed few opportunities to address American audiences.

Pseudo-Islamic ethnic exclusiveness passed from the Moorish Americans to the Nation of Islam (NOI) in 1931. The founder of the NOI was Wallace Fard Muhammad (who is also known by other names), an immigrant allegedly from Mecca. While I have yet to identify his exact origin, I still maintain that he was culturally a Turko-Iranian.¹⁰ He was influenced by Shī‘ī and (other) esoteric thought, and had some knowledge of Sunnī and Shī‘ī historical and hagiographical literature, contemporary popular science and important events in Muslim lands and the West. However, there is no evidence that he was an Islamic scholar or that he had a firm grip on Christian, Jewish, Buddhist and Hindu scriptures. From being a street-peddler in Detroit, Michigan, Fard became the leader of an organization which was to become a major vehicle for the spread of Islam in the United States and parts of Central America.

The NOI’s principal appeal was its anthropomorphic and nationalistic doctrines, including a ‘black’ god; African Americans are the ‘Lost-Found’ descendants of the ‘original black’ people; their redemption is imminent; their ‘white’ oppressors are the real ‘devil’ (*shayṭān*), who made them Christians, and who will be destroyed by Allah. Fard taught his followers to pray towards the East, in a standing position with outstretched arms and palms upward, reciting in English translation, Qur’ān 1 (*al-Fātiḥa*) verses 1–7 and Qur’ān 112 (*al-Ikhlāṣ*) verses 1–4. Other verses, for instance Qur’ān 6 (*al-An‘ām*) verse 79, were occasionally recited. Fard’s religio-moral system emphasized truthfulness, ‘racial’ segregation, hard work, self-discipline, economic advancement through self-help and obedience to US law. Although Fard considered the Qur’ān a sacred scripture, he did not make it a basic text for his followers. Whether he claimed to be a prophet, a personification of Allah or the Mahdi is a controversial point in the early history of the

10 Akbar Muhammad, ‘Muslims in the United States: An Overview of Organizations, Doctrines, and Problems’, in Yvonne Y. Haddad et al., *The Islamic Impact*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1984, p. 201.

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5.4 Islamic Center of Washington (© Zakat Foundation of America)

NOI. Fard disappeared rather mysteriously in 1934. His most important successor, Elijah Muhammad (d. 1975), claimed that Fard was all of the above, and that he, Elijah Muhammad, was the ‘Messenger of Allah’ to African Americans.¹¹

During Elijah Muhammad’s leadership, the NOI gradually became an economic ‘empire’. The organization acquired farms, various kinds of retail and manufacturing establishments, tens of ‘Temples’ (later called ‘Mosques’) in the United States and some Caribbean countries, and schools. The curriculum of the Chicago school, called ‘the University of Islam’, included Arabic instruction from the 1940s onwards. During the early 1950s, the curriculum also included memorization and chanting (*tajwīd*) of the Qur’ān and some Sunnī doctrines which were taught somewhat clandestinely by a Palestinian immigrant, Jamil Shakir Diab. Elijah Muhammad disseminated his message via African-American newspapers, radio broadcasts, the organization’s newspaper *Muhammad Speaks* and national annual meetings.

11 The basic sources on the doctrine of the NOI are Elijah Muhammad’s *Message to the Blackman in America* (Chicago, Muhammad Mosque of Islam, No. 2, 1965) and his *From God in Person, Master Fard Muhammad: How to Eat to Live* (Chicago, Muhammad Mosque of Islam, No. 2, 1967).

NEW HORIZONS FOR THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

These achievements encouraged the conversion of tens of thousands of African Americans, some African Caribbeans and African-American members of other Muslim organizations. In addition, the NOI gained innumerable non-Muslim African-American (and other) sympathizers. Elijah Muhammad's forthright condemnation of European and American oppression of 'black, brown, yellow and red peoples' gained him much acclaim in the United States and abroad. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the NOI reached the height of its fame, Elijah Muhammad was widely known as 'the premier Muslim American leader.'

Much of the NOI's appeal in the late 1950s and early 1960s was due to Malcolm X. An avid reader and an intrepid and talented orator, the urbane Malcolm was well acquainted with 'the culture of the streets'. Converted to the NOI's doctrines in 1956 while in prison for burglary, Malcolm reinforced the NOI's practice of 'fishing', that is, direct invitation to people on the streets to hear Elijah Muhammad's message in the temples and mosques. He ably debated with professors, and gained the admiration of many intellectuals and ordinary people. Indeed, Malcolm's preaching across the United States greatly increased the NOI's membership.

Despite Malcolm's basic understanding of Islam, he, like Elijah Muhammad, continued to espouse the NOI's aberrant form of Islam until his suspension in early December 1963, allegedly because of his inflammatory remark about President John F. Kennedy's assassination.¹² In March 1964 Malcolm announced the formation of the Muslim Mosque Inc.:

This will give us a religious base, and the spiritual force necessary to rid our people of the vices that destroy the moral fiber of our community.

Muslim Mosque Inc. ... will be the working base for an action program designed to eliminate the political oppression, the economic exploitation, and the social degradation suffered daily by twenty-two million Afro-Americans.¹³

The Muslim Mosque was primarily to be the 'base' for Malcolm's social and political activism, and secondarily a religious institution. The venture was short-lived as it suffered from lack of funds and good administration, in addition to internal dissension. Some of its members later joined other Muslim organizations.

The death of Elijah Muhammad in February 1975 marked a significant turning-point in the spread of Islam among African Americans. The change was marked by the beginning of a large-scale African-American

12 *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*, with the assistance of Alex Haley, New York, Grove Press Inc., 1964, p. 305.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 321.

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‘conversion’ *inside* the NOI from aberrant Islam to Sunnī Islam, and without an overwhelming numerical diminution in the largest successor to the NOI, the World Community of Islam in the West (WCIW). The exception is the NOI led by the well-known Minister Louis Farrakhan (see below).

Elijah Muhammad’s son, Imam Warith Deen Mohammed (he changed the spelling of his surname), quickly became internationally famous for his sweeping doctrinal, organizational and economic reforms. Although Imam Mohammed’s formal Islamic and Arabic learning essentially ended with his completion of high (secondary) school in the NOI’s University of Islam,¹⁴ he is widely read in religious studies.

In a 1975 article, he characterized the place of the WCIW in the NOI’s evolution as the Second Resurrection: ‘Because I am the first in this Resurrection (the Second Resurrection), you will have to depend upon me for some time for this understanding of the Light [God].’¹⁵ Imam Mohammed quickly established himself as the interpreter of the legacies of Fard and Elijah Muhammad, as well as what he deemed to be symbolic passages in the Bible, the Qur’ān and the *sunna*. Along with some initial public derision of Fard’s and his father’s doctrines, Imam Mohammed introduced the Qur’ān, the *sunna* and the biography of the Prophet Muḥammad to an extent unparalleled in many other national organizations before 1975.

Imam Mohammed opened the WCIW (now called the American Society of Muslims, ASM) to all who wished to join it, irrespective of ethnicity. He is dedicated to the improvement of American morals, and encourages his followers to participate in all Islamically correct aspects of American life, including the military. ASM operates scores of mosques, schools, publishing facilities, the weekly newspaper *Muslim Journal*, and retail and manufacturing businesses. ASM sponsors regional and local events many of which are used for *da‘wa* (the call to Islam and its practice). Imam Mohammed and other ASM imams present weekly radio and television broadcasts and are frequently invited to lecture to a variety of audiences. The media have contributed to their positive image. These activities have led to countless conversions to Islam, almost all by African Americans.

The other most significant successor to the Nation of Islam is the organization of the same name led by Minister Louis Farrakhan, who withdrew from the WCIW in 1977 in order to revive the NOI. To Farrakhan, the derision of the former NOI leaders was distasteful, and the economic

14 The University of Islam, several of which were attached to the NOI’s temples, was a primary and secondary school, not a university. All the schools are now named after Imam Mohammed’s mother, ‘Sister Clara Muhammad’, in recognition of her leadership assistance to the NOI during her husband’s incarceration, 1942–6.

15 *Muhammad Speaks* (weekly newspaper, Chicago), ‘The Second Resurrection, Part 1, “The Light Behind the Veil”’, 11 April 1975, p. 12.

programmes of the former NOI were more conducive to African-American advancement. Farrakhan calls himself 'the Representative of the Honorable Elijah Muhammad'. Nonetheless, he recently declared publicly his belief in the basic tenets of Islam and performed the *hajj*. His national and international appeal is largely based on his oratorical talent, his emphasis on moral rectitude and self-help, his identification with underprivileged African Americans and his strident criticism of American and other Western nations' ill treatment of 'Third World' peoples. His weekly newspaper, *The Final Call*, is distributed internationally. Farrakhan has preached to hundreds of thousands of African Americans, although he seems to have many fewer followers.

Unlike Imam Mohammed, Minister Farrakhan has a negative image in the American and international press. He is portrayed in the media as not a true Muslim and as a racist and anti-Semitic – that is, anti-Jewish – despite his denials and clarifications and his cordial relations with a few Jewish leaders. Additionally, Farrakhan receives little recognition from most Muslim Americans, despite his sponsorship of an international Muslim conference in July 1997, at which he was given a white turban by the mufti of Cyprus and hailed by others as an imam. At a large public meeting in February 2000, he declared his belief in the globally accepted Islamic tenets.

A Sunnī organization which deserves a mention for its commitment to the spread of Islam nationally and internationally is the Islamic Party in North America (IPNA). Led by the Dominica-born Imam Yusuf Muzaffaruddin Hamid (d. 1991), the IPNA was officially established in early 1972 and was most active during that decade. The IPNA had many educated and professional members. Influenced by Abūl-'Ala Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb, it produced a bimonthly journal called *Al-Islam, The Islamic Movement Journal* and other publications. IPNA operated a primary and secondary school, and sponsored social and political awakening activities.

IPNA was one of the most active and significant movements of conversion to Islam in North America, the Caribbean and to some extent in South America, especially in Guyana. It engaged in full-time *da'wa* on the streets of Washington D.C. and its Trinidad and other Caribbean branches were similarly active. Although its membership was predominantly African-American and Caribbean, it attracted some Spanish-speaking Americans (mainly Puerto Ricans). A noteworthy former member of IPNA is Yahya Figuero, the leader of the national organization known as Alianza Islámica, which is dedicated to spreading Islam among grassroots Hispanics. Internal divisiveness, poor administrative decisions and personal injudiciousness were important causes of IPNA's decline. Some former members founded other Sunnī organizations, while others became Shī'īs (e.g. in St Croix, US Virgin Islands).

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Numerous African-American local and regional personalities and mosques have contributed immeasurably to the spread of Islam in the United States. Among the most notable Sunnī organizations is the Mosque of Islamic Brotherhood in Harlem, New York City, founded in 1967 by a group the most prominent among whom was Sheikh Ahmed Taufiq (d. 1988), a former associate of Malcolm X. The *da'wa* efforts of the Brotherhood were not limited to New York's African Americans, but reached Spanish-speaking Americans and prisoners as well. Another noteworthy national and international organization is the Islamic Mission of America, founded in New York City by the Trinidad- or Grenada-born Sheikh Daoud Ahmed Faisal (d. 1980) of New York City. A fervent Sunnī, he was instrumental in the conversion to Islam of thousands of African Americans. Lastly, Imam Siraj Wahhaj of Masjid at-Taqwa, a former member of the NOI, is one of the most popular Islamic proselytizers in the United States.

Prominent entertainers, sportsmen and incarcerated Muslims have also contributed to the spread of Islam among those of similar professions, their fans and fellow inmates. The famous trumpet player Dizzy Gillespie (d. 1992) informs us that many of his co-professionals converted to Islam in the 1940s. Although Gillespie himself does not seem to have converted to Islam, he acknowledged the prophethood of Muḥammad.¹⁶ Due to their professional and non-professional activities, the well-known former basketball player Abdul-Kareem Jabbar and the former heavyweight boxing champion Muhammad Ali have directly and indirectly influenced others to become Muslims, especially youths. In many prisons, inmates have achieved much recognition for Islamic practices. There are prayer places (*muṣallas*) in prisons, Islamic dietary requirements and preferences (daily, during Ramaḍān and 'īds) are frequently implemented, and Muslims sometimes have access to imams inside prisons ('chaplains') and in nearby communities. These concessions and Muslim inmate behaviour have gained more converts to Islam than many mosques in the larger society.

The spread of Islam in North America has certainly not been limited to the efforts of Webb and African Americans. Since the 1950s, in particular, some immigrants and their descendants have greatly increased the availability of Islamic knowledge and publications in numerous cities and towns. Significantly, they have reinforced the corrective efforts of others aimed at turning pseudo-Muslims into Muslims.

Islamic centres have been a feature of Muslim communities in the United States and North America for decades; in many cases, they serve as places of introduction to Islam. The Islamic Cultural Centers of New York (the first

16 Dizzy Gillespie with Al Fraser, *To BE, or not ... to BOP: Memoirs*, New York, Doubleday & Co., 1979, pp. 291–3.

opened in 1954) and Washington D.C. (1955), for example, have introduced many American intellectuals, students and ordinary Americans to Islam. Indeed, from the 1950s Islamic centres have appeared in several north-eastern, mid-western and western cities. At present, New York and other major cities have relatively new multifunctional mosques and Islamic centres.

The spread of Islam in American and Canadian institutions of higher learning from the 1960s onwards is largely attributable to the arrival of foreign Muslim intellectuals and students many of whom were influenced by current Islamic ideologies and the Islamic resurgence. A group of these students initiated one of the most important organizations in North American Islamic history, that is, the Muslim Student Association of the United States and Canada (MSA), founded in 1963 at the University of Illinois in Urbana. It has branches in high schools and almost all institutions of higher learning in the two countries. MSA's aims are described in one of its pamphlets as:

Helping in the development of [an] Islamic personality and attitudes; disseminating Islamic knowledge and understanding; carrying on religious, cultural, social, charitable, and educational activities among Muslims in North America and nourishing their friendly relations with non-Muslims; presenting Islam to non-Muslims as a complete way of life and a viable alternative to all other doctrines.¹⁷

The MSA's presence among people who would contribute to future scholarly and professional classes of Americans, and its dedication to *da'wa*, encouraged the conversion to Islam of a section of society that had barely been touched by previous Muslim organizations.

The MSA was the nucleus from which emerged in 1981 the present well-known national association, the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), with its headquarters in Plainfield, Indiana. ISNA has been led by naturalized intellectuals and professionals. Nevertheless, various MSA branches continue to spread Islam on campuses, while ISNA is an umbrella organization to which mosques, centres, institutes, professional associations and specialized Islamic organizations are affiliated. ISNA's major publication is *Islamic Horizons*.

The Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), founded in 1971 and with its headquarters in Jamaica, New York, is a similar organization and also has affiliates in the United States and Canada. *Da'wa* is an important programmatic aim of ICNA while its major publication is *The Message*.

European ('white') American and Native American Muslims are far less studied and numerous than African Americans. European-American

17 'Know the MSA', n.p., n.d.

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5.5 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb Mosque, Los Angeles
(© Zakat Foundation of America)

converts, before and after Webb, were not as conspicuous as the others, perhaps intentionally so. They have shown an interest in Sufi thought for more than a century. More recently, others – including those of Christian, Jewish and agnostic backgrounds – have been inspired to convert to Islam by reading books on various aspects of the religion and translations of the Qur'ān, contact with ordinary Muslims in the United States and abroad, and through their university studies. Like Webb, many of them were dissatisfied with earlier religious doctrines and practice and sought a simpler form of religion. Several European-American Muslims – for example, Hamza Yusuf Hanson, Ingrid Mattson, Jeffrey Lang and Yahiya Emerick – are influential in disseminating Islam and showing its relevance to contemporary times. Male and female converts perform a much-needed service to their ethno-religious group: they help new converts adjust to their new Muslim environment and to smooth over differences with their families and friends. An analytical study of European-American conversion to Islam is long overdue.

Similar to Spanish-speaking converts, a small number of Native Americans have turned to Islam because of its similarity to their cultural traditions, many of which are forgotten or have been diluted with Christian beliefs and practices. Indeed, some of them aver an early adherence to Islam through contact with Moriscos, Mudéjares or slaves in the southern and south-western United States.

Islamic institutions seem to have begun in Canada with the opening in 1938 of the first mosque, Al-Rashid, in Edmonton, Alberta, by some

Lebanese. As in the United States, most mosques and centres in Canada have been opened from the 1950s to the present. While the organizations have not been totally exclusive, they have exhibited ethnic characteristics. There is, for example, the Croatian Islamic Center, Etobicoke, Ontario, the predominantly Caribbean and West Indian Ontario Association in Toronto, Ontario, the mainly Arabic-speaking Fatima Mosque in Montreal, Quebec, and the South Asian-dominated Quebec Islamic Centre.

Prominent among provincial and national organizations in Canada are the Council of Muslim Communities of Canada (CMCC, founded in 1972), the Organization of North American Shia Ithna-Ashari Communities and ISNA. These associations are affiliated with other Canadian and American associations and mosques of similar doctrinal and organizational goals.

Canadian statistics for 1991 suggest that the spread of Islam was mainly the result of emigration and reproduction by immigrants and converts. According to Dawood Hamdani, intermarriage has been the main source of converts to Islam.¹⁸ While increasing numbers of interfaith marriages – typically (but not exclusively) between males of Muslim descent and non-Muslim women – have promoted conversions to Islam, such marriages have also contributed to the non-transmission of Islamic traditions. The low occurrence of inter-Muslim marriage, if Yvonne Haddad's findings are still correct, also impedes the continuance of Islamic customs. Individual conversions, that is, outside marriage, seem to occur among students and intellectuals, including various 'reverts'.¹⁹ Furthermore, the anthropologist Harold Barclay has suggested that the Muslim lack of Islamic knowledge hinders the continuation of Islamic traditions.²⁰ Although limited in scope, the above suggests that efforts to spread Islam in Canada have not been as vigorous as in the United States.

With respect to Mexico, the early immigrants were Islamically inactive for decades. As Muslim women were relatively few, extensive intermarriage occurred between Muslim men and Mexican (including Amerindian) women. Until 1970, according to Ali Kettani, 'Islam looked as if it were extinct in Mexico. Many Mexicans had Muslim last names, but they did not have the slightest idea what Islam was.' With increased emigration from and

18 Dawood Hassan Hamdani, 'Muslims in the Canadian Mosaic', *Journal [of the] Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs*, V, No. 1, 1983/84, p. 8; 'Islam in Canada', in Amadou Mahtar M'Bow and Ali Kettani (eds), *Islam and Muslims in the American Continent*, Beirut, Center of Historical, Economical and Social Studies, 2001, pp. 64, 65, 71.

19 Yvonne Y. Haddad, 'Muslims in Canada: A Preliminary Study', in Howard Coward and Leslie Kawamura (eds), *Religion and Ethnicity*, Waterloo, Wildrid Laurier University Press, 1977, p. 74; Hamdani, 'Muslims in the Canadian Mosaic', p. 14; Amadou (ed.), *Islam and Muslims*, pp. 72, 73–4, 89–90, 97.

20 Harold Barclay, 'The Muslim Experience in Canada', in Coward (ed.), *Religion and Ethnicity*, p. 110.

enhanced Islamic activity in Muslim countries, adherence to Islamic practices and the establishment of Muslim organizations increased significantly from the 1970s onwards.²¹

The stimulus for the 'resurgence' is attributable to several factors. Over the last three decades, some immigrants have brought a renewed interest in Islam and the descendants of early immigrants showed a distinct awareness of their Muslim origins. Recent émigrés and travel to Muslim countries have proved a significant stimulus to early immigrants. Other Mexicans encountered Islam in the United States, Spain and the United Kingdom, converted to Islam and returned to Mexico to preach it zealously. Islam has attracted a good number of learned and professional Mexicans some of whom founded Islamic organizations which appeal to their ethnic group. Islam is spreading among less prosperous Amerindians and Mexicans of European descent in south-eastern Mexico through the efforts of their compatriots and Spanish-speaking proselytizers from the United States.

The Islamic Cultural Center of Mexico (Centro Cultural Islámico de México), opened in 1995 in Mexico City, is probably the most national and grassroots organization in the country. The director of the centre is the committed and apparently indefatigable Omar Weston, who was born in Britain, brought up in Mexico and converted to Islam in the United States. Although small, the centre has one of the strongest and most widespread *da'wa* programmes in North America known to the present author.

Central America and the Caribbean islands

THE MUSLIM PRESENCE

Compared with North America, little research has been done on Islam in Central America. Contrary to the assertions of several scholars, a pre-Columbian Muslim presence in the Caribbean is as yet unproven. Whereas the 'evidence' is indeed impressive, a good deal of it remains hypothetical, and some of it is certainly dubious, to say the least. The earliest Muslims in Central America and the Caribbean may well have been Moriscos and/or Mudéjares, but credible sources suggest that they were mostly enslaved Africans. In Grenada, for example, they were involved in a slave rebellion at a place now known as Palmiste; in Jamaica, there was Abū-Bakr as-Siddiq (known as

21 Ali Kettani, 'Islam in Central America', in Amadou (ed.), *Islam and Muslims*, pp. 471–2, 475.



5.6 The Mosque Foundation, Bridgeview, Illinois
(© Zakat Foundation of America)

Edward Dolan) and Muhammad Kaba (Robert Pearl); in Haiti, there was the celebrated François Makandal and others who rebelled in the 1750s.²²

With respect to Trinidadian slaves, of particular interest is Jonas (Yunus) Mohammed Bath (d. 1838), the ‘Mohammedan “priest” and “magistrate” (mufti?)’ from Gambia who was a Trinidadian slave. He purchased his freedom and founded a society dedicated to buying the freedom of other enslaved Muslims. Another member of the society was Mohammedu Sisei (Felix Ditt), formerly a schoolteacher in Gambia, who was ‘well acquainted with the Koran, certain texts of which he always carried about him’. After his release in 1825 from fourteen years of military service in the British third West India regiment, he lived in Trinidad for twenty years.²³ Mohammedu Sisei, Jonas Mohammed Bath and others probably initiated more conversions to Islam of other freed men and slaves than we know. The West India regiment

22 Ali Kettani, ‘Islam in the Caribbean’, in Amadou (ed.), *Islam and Muslims*, pp. 232, 238, 275, 282; Carolyn E. Fick, *The Making of Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below*, Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1990, see ‘Makandal’ in index.

23 Capt. Washington, ‘Some Account of Mohammedu-Sisei, a Mandingo, of Nyáni-Marú on the Gambia’, *The Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London*, XIII, 1838, pp. 449–51; Carl Campbell, ‘Jonas Mohammed Bath and the Free Mandigos in Trinidad; The Question of Their Repatriation to Africa 1831–38’, *Journal of African Studies*, II, No. 4, Winter 1975/76, pp. 467–93.

was a vehicle for conversions to Islam. A few African Americans from the southern United States served in it and were converted to Islam by 'Mandingo priests'; they were freed and given land in eastern Trinidad. Other Muslim converts to Christianity later 'relapsed into Mohammedanism'.²⁴ A recent Trinidadian Muslim leader, Mansoor Ibrāhīm, states that Muslims in the West India regiment 'joined ... Bath's group in 1826. Others still, clustered in Manzanilla and Turure on Trinidad's eastern coast and converted the inhabitants of the area to Islam. By 1840, Quare became a predominantly Muslim settlement.'²⁵

Despite the dearth of credible information, it is inconceivable that the Islamic heritage of Muslim Africans was totally destroyed before the arrival of Muslim East Indians in Trinidad, as is claimed by some modern writers. It is interesting that Trinidadian Hindus referred to their Muslim Indian countrymen as 'Mandingos [which] manifests that both Indian and African Muslims existed under one and the same Islam'. It may further indicate that African Muslims were still there at the time of the Indian arrival. In 1946 an Indian possessed an Arabic Qur'ān 'given to his father as a gift from a Mandingo Muslim'.²⁶

Many Muslim Caribbeans are of Indian ancestry. Indian indentures arrived in British, Dutch and French ships in Jamaica, Martinique, Barbados, Grenada, Guadalupe, British Guyana, French Guiana and St Vincent in the nineteenth century. In some areas, indentures are the earliest documented Muslims, for example in Panama at the turn of the twentieth century. Trinidadians of Indian ancestry are the largest and most economically and politically successful of all Muslim Caribbeans. The official census of 1921 recorded 17,691 Muslims in Trinidad. East Indians were recently estimated to outnumber Muslims of African ancestry at a ratio of twenty to one.²⁷ As was the case elsewhere, the early Muslims lost many of their Islamic traditions.

Most Muslim post-slavery immigrants were Arabic-speakers originally from Greater Syria (which included the present territories of Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine) who arrived in the region around the turn of the twentieth century. As was the case elsewhere and for similar reasons, most of the earliest immigrants to this region lost much of their Islamic culture. Muslims

24 Edward Bean Underhill, *The West Indies: Their Social and Religious Condition*, Westport, Negro Universities Press, 1970, reprint of 1862 edn, p. 46; Carlton Robert Ottley, *Slavery Days in Trinidad: A Social History of the Island from 1797-1838*, Trinidad, published by the author, 1974, p. 66.

25 Mansoor Ibrāhīm, 'Islam in Trinidad and Tobago', in Amadou (ed.), *Islam and Muslims*, pp. 298, 299-300.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 298.

27 Gilbert Earle, 'Mohammedans in Trinidad', *The Moslem World*, XIV, No. 1, Jan. 1924, p. 40; Ibrāhīm, 'Islam in Trinidad', p. 306; Larry Luxner, 'Muslims in the Caribbean', *ARAMCO World*, XXXVIII, No. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1987, p. 6.

from other countries arrived during the last four decades of the twentieth century.

THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

Islamic institutions emerged rather slowly in Central America, with few exceptions, for example, Panama. The first Islamic organization, the Islamic Mission or Panama Muslim Mission, was founded in Panama City in 1930 by Indians. An organized Muslim presence with supporting Islamic institutions did not begin in Belize until the arrival of NOI members in Belize City in 1962; the IPNA and others arrived in the early 1980s. Mosques, centres, Islamic instruction and a Muslim cemetery (Panama) appeared in the 1970s (Panama and Belize) and especially in the 1980s (Panama, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Nicaragua) and the 1990s (Honduras and El Salvador).

Conversion to Islam has also been a slow process in Central America. Credit for initiating this process is due to the above-mentioned organizations and later to international Muslim bodies, regional associations and *da'wa* activities of mosques (the word *da'wa* is, most unusually, included in the name of a mosque founded in Guatemala City in the 1980s, the Mezquita de Al-Daawa Islámica de Guatemala). Apparently some Honduran converts, or perhaps better 'reverts', were originally from predominantly Muslim south-west Asian countries and had studied Islam in Saudi Arabia. After visiting Islamic centres in the United States, a Salvadorean chemist from a 'wealthy Christian Arab family' converted in 1983 and officially established the Centro Islámico Árabe Salvadoreño in 1991 in San Salvador. Persons of African origin and 'Black Caribs' appear to be more receptive to Islam than those of Spanish descent. For example, an African Nicaraguan converted in the United States (1978), returned to Nicaragua in the 1980s and 'established a growing Islamic community made up of reverts in the town of San Miguelito (Department of Río San Juan)'.²⁸

In the Caribbean, Muslim Indians relatively quickly established Islamic institutions to preserve their Muslim and Indian identities. The East Indian Association was founded as early as 1893. During the next century, they became a semi-autonomous entity. From purchasing the freedom of their indentured compatriots, they have established an impressive infrastructure of mosques (numbering approximately 100), organizations, accredited primary and secondary schools (for Muslims and non-Muslims), bookstores, publishing facilities, commercial enterprises, a national youth camp, at least one cemetery (initially granted by the British colonial administration),

28 Kettani, 'Islam in Central America', pp. 481, 486, 491, 492, 494, 496.

clinics, and homes for children and the aged. Among the most notable East Indian organizations are the Anjuman Sunnat-ul-Jamaat (founded in 1933), which is the largest in Trinidad, and the Islamic Missionaries Guild of South America and the Caribbean (IMG, 1960). As early as 1938, Muslim East Indian women organized commercial and welfare associations to help their female co-religionists.

An impressive Muslim female convert of St Vincent must be mentioned. Halima John, with her husband (and two children), converted to Islam in Toronto in 1970. After her return home, she was instrumental in the conversion of her mother, father, four brothers, a sister and apparently some of her friends. Despite some help from the IMG, 'she faced great resistance and even police harassment and had to return to Canada in 1974'. She studied Islam at the Guyana Trust and returned to St Vincent in 1990. The next year she co-founded the Islamic Association of St Vincent and the Grenadines, taught Muslim children and in 1995 became vice-president of the association (one of her Muslim brothers was president).²⁹ Halima John is one of the little-known Muslim women who deserve a well-researched and published biography.

African Trinidadians appear to have been much less successful economically and in building Islamic organizations and institutions. Nonetheless, they have opened mosques and schools and have been active in spreading Islam.

South America

THE MUSLIM PRESENCE

The fall of the last Muslim stronghold in southern Spain, Granada in 1492, caused the transportation of Moriscos and Mudéjares to various South American countries. Interestingly, in his *The Masters and Slaves* (1986), the historian and sociologist Gilberto Freyre informs us that the Portuguese colonizers of Brazil, among whom were nobles, were themselves of 'Mozarab', 'Moorish', 'Berber' and 'African' descent. Most of the first Muslims in the Spanish-speaking countries and Portuguese-speaking Brazil were sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Moriscos, Mudéjares and Berbers ('Moors') who accompanied the Spanish and Portuguese explorers and settlers. Were there identifiable women of Muslim heritage among the Andalusian colonists? If Muslim or formerly Muslim women accompanied Spanish explorers (such as Beatriz La Morisca and Isabel Rodríguez 'La Conquistadora'), there must

29 Kettani, 'Islam in the Caribbean', p. 284.

have been a good number of women who concealed their Islamic heritage in the colonies, as they did during the Inquisition in Spain.³⁰

Despite intermarriage, cohabitation, name changes and brutal executions, individuals and communities continued Islamic practices in several areas of the Americas for years. Otherwise, there would have been little justification for officials to issue 'licences' or exit permits to those suspected of being normal Christians, and to arrest and/or expel those who were observed practising or preaching Islam (for example, in Colombia, Venezuela, Hispaniola, Peru and Mexico). Moreover, the texts of anti-Muslim edicts strongly suggest that they converted some Amerindians to Islam.³¹ There is a remarkable account of a sixteenth-century Turkish captain called Amir Çighala (Giorgio Zapata), who secretly adhered to Islamic prescriptions for fifteen years in Potosí (Peru, now in Bolivia) and then returned to Istanbul.³²

Enslaved Muslim West Africans, a number of whom were literate in Arabic, seem to have been numerous in Brazil in the sixteenth century, after which time their numbers increased, as did their desire for freedom. They participated in the Palmares revolt of the seventeenth century, as they did in the Dutch colony of Guiana in the eighteenth century. The most widely studied Muslim revolt occurred in 1835 in Bahia, Brazil, where Muslims attempted to establish a state. The continuance of Islamic institutions and practices – imams, mosques, hand-copied Qur'ānic texts, Arabic and religious instruction and Islamic artefacts – facilitated *da'wa* in the slave quarters of plantations and sometimes in slave settlements (*mocambos, quilombos*).

With respect to the earliest Muslim presence in South America, Suriname is an exception. The first Muslims there were nineteenth- to early twentieth-century Indian and Javanese (Indonesian) indentures. Moreover, Suriname has the highest percentage (estimated at between 25 per cent and 35 per cent) of Muslims in the Americas. At about the same time, however, Indian and Javanese indentures also arrived in Guyana.

Thousands of Muslims from Greater Syria, especially Lebanese and Syrians, and probably from other Ottoman-dominated lands, began migrating to South America in the mid-nineteenth century. Their numbers increased enormously from the mid-twentieth century with the arrival of other Arabic

30 Paul Lunde, 'Muslims and Muslim Technology in the New World', *ARAMCO World*, XLIII, No. 3, May–June 1992, p. 39; Ronald E. Surtz, 'Morisco Women, Written Texts, and the Valencia Inquisition', *Sixteenth Century Journal*, XXXII, No. 2, 2001, pp. 42–3; Mary Elizabeth Perry, 'Contested Identities: The Morisca Visionary, Beatriz de Robles', in Mary E. Giles (ed.), *Women in the Inquisition: Spain and the New World*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, pp. 171–88.

31 Rafael Guevara Bazan, 'Muslim Immigration to Spanish America', *The Muslim World*, LVI, 1996, pp. 182, 186.

32 Lunde, 'Muslims', pp. 39–40.

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speakers from south-west Asia and Indians from South Asia. The majority of the immigrants and settlers now trace their existence to the period of the Second World War and afterwards.

Like the Andalusians and West Africans, most of the earliest Muslims did not continue to practise Islam, due partly to colonial laws (for example, in Argentina and Brazil) that prohibited and discouraged Muslim practices, even the bearing of Muslim names (in Argentina).

THE SPREAD OF ISLAM

The establishment of mosques and Islamic organizations in South America followed the same ethnic pattern as in the other regions of the Americas. One of the first East Indian mosques was opened in Leonova, Guyana, in 1910. Arabic-speaking émigrés generally established the earliest Muslim organizations in the 1920s. For example, in Brazil, they founded the Sociedade Beneficente Muçulmana de São Paulo in São Paulo City ('the Islamic capital of Brazil'; however, the São Paulo Mosque, which still exists, was not officially dedicated until 1950); in Buenos Aires ('the capital of Islam in Hispanic America'), Argentina, the Unión Islámica; in Santiago, Chile, the Sociedad Unión Musulmana de Chile; and in Guyana, The Islamic Association of British Guyana, a national organization. Similar local and national organizations appeared later and were often accompanied by the establishment of schools and Arabic publications. The number of ethnic societies, clubs and institutions (including schools and cemeteries) increased greatly from the 1970s onwards. Funds, imams and teachers from various external Muslim sources gave a significant boost to the proliferation of such organizations. Today, there are Islamic centres and mosques in practically every major South American city.

The stimulus for conversion and reversion to Islam by Spanish- and Portuguese-speakers, irrespective of ethnic origin, has come from several directions. Post-1950s immigrants have significantly increased Islamic fervour among earlier generations, encouraged the latest opening of mosques and centres, and increased the availability of Islamic literature and imported objects, including foods. As elsewhere, these changes are attractive not only to the older generations but also to descendants of Africans and Europeans, especially when ethnic identification is internationally condoned, rebellion against the old ways is risky but fashionable, and alternatives are clearly apparent.

Identification with the Andalusian and the African heritage, and news about and encounters with foreign Muslims in South America, and travel to the United States, Europe and Africa have all led to conversions and the establishment of ethnic mosques and associations. The creation of African

and Islamic Studies in higher education reinforces the general appeal of Islam. Muslim students at South American universities and sympathetic professors (for example, the Brazilian Sid Teixeira, who contributed to the present writer's research in 1979) have had a similar effect.

Foreign Muslims have helped *da'wa* efforts in all of the Americas. Diplomatic missions early encouraged and hosted religious activities, facilitated the establishment of mosques and centres and funded scholarships at universities in Muslim countries. Mosques and organizations have received financial support from international Islamic organizations and Muslim governments.

Conclusion

The ways by which Islam spread in the Americas were not monolithic, nor was the presence of Muslims – even free Muslims – always contemporaneous with the active dissemination of Islam. As was the case in early Islamic history, Islam in the Americas often began from 'below' (Moriscos, slaves, indentures and poor immigrants), and only later among those who sought a new identity or who wished to regain one, whether real or imagined. Apparently the quest inevitably led to religious distortions and ethnic formations which, although with historical precedents, were not in accord with the hallowed Islamic teachings.

Yet 'pseudo-Islamic' teachings and ethnic associations have proved to be the foundations for purer forms of Islamic beliefs and organizations in the Americas, as M. Ali Kettani and others have recognized. Recent immigrants, settlers, dedicated converts, 'reverts' and generous overseas Muslims must be given the credit for much of the transformation still occurring in the Americas, and for the continuous spread of Islam.

Chapter 5.3

ISLAM IN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE NEIGHBOURING ISLANDS

Taj al-Din al-Hilaly

INTRODUCTION

The straits and seas to the north of Australia have been very busy routes for many centuries. Travellers in the region have included some of the outstanding figures of Islamic history, but just how close they came to Australia is unclear. Certainly, they left no mark upon the place. As for the known history of Muslim contact, this is dominated by two main factors: European colonization and racial discrimination.

It was the spread of European settlement and administration which ousted the Muslim Macassans from trade and cultural contacts with northern Australia. Although there were desultory attempts to utilize that contact for the benefit of the British empire, they came to nothing. The memory of the Macassans remained among the tribal peoples of the north but almost completely vanished from the consciousness of mainstream European Australia. The few Muslims present in the penal settlements of the east coast also failed to make an impact on colonial society and went largely unnoticed by two hundred years of Australian historical writing.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the growing demand from the east coast of the continent for new lands and new mining areas led to the introduction of the camel and its appendage, the Muslim Afghan cameleer. These despised men had a greater impact than previous Muslims but their vital importance in every exploratory expedition into central Australia from the Burke and Wills debacle until the 1939 crossing of the Simpson desert

is still only dimly perceived by most modern Australians. Their role in the construction of the 1872 Overland Telegraph Line, in carrying supplies into the interior, in keeping remote stations and settlements alive in the most severe drought, and in providing water to desert mining towns for many years, was written out of the history books. Their role lasted for about fifty years. As the railways moved inland and as the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act and accompanying restrictive legislation killed off their businesses and their contacts with their home countries, their mosques and their faith faded from the scene.

The arrival of Islam in areas off the north coast of Australia

Just to the north of Australia, around South-East Asia and through the straits between the islands of the Indonesian archipelago, there was a great deal of coming and going by people from all world civilizations. Representatives of the Confucian, Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic and, latterly, Western Christian civilizations visited, struck root and occasionally evolved into something else. Some left or were cast out.

The precise date of Islam's arrival in insular South-East Asia cannot be readily established. Some historians maintain that by the beginning of the ninth century Arab merchants and sailors, along with other Muslims, had begun to dominate the Nanhai or South-East Asian trade.¹ There was already a colony of foreign Muslims on the west coast of Sumatra by 674 and other Muslim settlements began to appear after 878.² Islam steadily spread, societies became Islamized, and according to even hostile commentators Islam was an element in the life of the islands by the end of the twelfth century.³

There are indications that Arab explorations off northern Australia did take place. The map of the Sea of Java drawn in 820 by Muḥammad ibn Mūsā al-Khwārizmī shows Cape Yorke peninsula, a V-shaped gulf of Carpentaria and a curved Arnhem Land.⁴ A later map, that of Abū Ishāq al-Fārsī al-Iṣṭakhrī done in 934, also includes an outline of the north coast of Australia.⁵

Other celebrated travellers also left their accounts. The Chinese Muslims Admiral Zheng He and his lieutenant Ma Huan (Muḥammad

1 Cesar Adib Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines*, Quezon City, University of the Philippines Press, 1999, p. 41.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 44.

3 Peter Gordon Gowing, *Muslim Filipinos – Heritage and Horizon*, Quezon City, New Day Publishers, 1979, p. 15.

4 Eric B. Whitehouse, *Australia in Old Maps 820–1770*, Queensland, Boolarong Press, 1995, p. 65.

5 Whitehouse, *Australia*, pp. 16, 66.

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Hasan), in the service of Yung Lo, the third Ming emperor, became famous as navigators and explorers between 1405 and 1433. The chronicler Fei Xin accompanied many of these voyages and it is from his records that we know that 'the treasure fleet reached Timor, which is just 400 miles [644 km] north of Darwin'.⁶ The discovery of an image of the god Shou Lao in Darwin in 1879, wedged in the roots of a banyan tree over 1 m underground, points to a very early Chinese contact with Australia,⁷ but it is not known whether it was at the hands of Zheng He or some other Ming sailor.

The palace revolution which brought an end to the Chinese voyages of exploration opened the way for other seekers of new worlds off the north coast of Australia. Islam steadily spread throughout the Indonesian archipelago, extending across the whole of Java by the eleventh century, into the Moluccas in the early sixteenth century and into Macassar via the royal courts of Gowa and Tallo' in the first decade of the seventeenth century.

In later years, the aggressive Portuguese presence hindered the process of Islamization in the Moluccas and Timor. Despite this, Islam retained its dominance throughout the archipelago. It was indeed Muslim Macassans and Buginese who established links with Australia.

THE FLEET OF PRAHUS

There were annual voyages of prahus from Macassar in southern Sulawesi to the coasts of Marege, the area of coastline east of Darwin to the coasts of the gulf of Carpentaria and to Kai Djawa, the coastline from Darwin westwards. Pobassoo, the Macassan master of a fleet of six prahus, was encountered by Flinders in 1803 in the Malay Roads at the north-eastern tip of Arnhem Land. He informed the English visitor that he had made six or seven voyages in the preceding twenty years and that he had been one of the first to come.⁸


So significant was Macassan trade that for many years the British tried schemes to make the north coast into a second Singapore. They understood that the Muslims offered a bridge to trade with the region. While the Dutch tried to wrest control of Singapore to the east of the Indonesian archipelago, the British believed that they could, through trading with the Macassans and Buginese, economically infiltrate the Dutch-controlled areas of the west.

The Macassan trade continued but it was viewed with jaundiced eyes by the new masters of the north coast. Searcy, sent to impose customs duties upon the prahus, revealed the thinking of the time:

6 Louise Levathes, *When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994, p. 197.

7 P. M. Worsley, 'Early Asian Contacts with Australia', *Past and Present*, 7, April 1955, pp. 1-11.

8 Alfred Searcy, *In Australian Tropics*, London, George Robertson & Co., 1909, p. 15.



5.7 The Imam Ali Mosque in Lakemba, near Sydney (Courtesy of the author)

So long as this portion of the coast was waste there was no reason why the Malays should not gather the annual harvest and turn it to their own profitable account. But now that there was some chance of Europeans following suit, and with the idea of local trading on the coast, it was decided that the time had come for the Malays to be placed on an equal footing with the local people, and to pay something towards the revenue of the country ...⁹

Oppressive imposition of the customs dues by men such as Searcy, growing racism in Australia after the introduction of the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act and jealousy over Macassan success combined to crush this link with Australia's neighbours. By 1907, the trepang trade with Macassar had ceased.

THE IMPACT OF MACASSAR

Contact brought changes to language. The languages of the tribes along the north coast can be as distinct as English and Greek. Although the children of Marege grew up in communities which had a variety of languages and were all multilingual,¹⁰ contact with tribes from different areas could be difficult. Since the Macassans were in contact with widely dispersed tribes, their language became a lingua franca all along the coast. Searcy's vessel was manned by Malays, who were valued by the English colonists as they had

9 Searcy, *In Australian Tropics*, p. 13.

10 Searcy, *In Australian Tropics*, p. vi.

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the ability to communicate with the prahu masters and the local inhabitants. There are several vocabulary lists demonstrating the widespread use of Macassan terms,¹¹ but the influence was deeper than just items of vocabulary. Thus, Mary Lucille Jones notes that a number of verbs in Gupabuyngu, the best-known language of north-east Arnhem Land, are used in irregular fashion, and all are derived from Macassarese.¹²

Another consequence of the relationship with Macassar was noticed by several British explorers. For example, Stokes, who visited the northern coastline on several occasions between 1837 and 1843, reports observations by Captain Grey in 1838 and a Mr Osborne in 1840 that they had noticed individuals of a different physical appearance from their peers in groups of Aborigines they encountered in the north.¹³ While Grey considered that they were probably the descendants of shipwrecked Dutch sailors, Stokes was more of a mind that they were Malays either captured from the trepangers or voluntarily associating with the locals. There was quite close contact between them: 'As we know that the Australian not infrequently abandons his country and his mode of life, to visit the Indian archipelago with them [the trepangers].'¹⁴ There were several documented cases of Macassan Muslims living among the Aborigines. For instance, Timbo, a Macassan left at Port Essington in 1839 to act as interpreter with the Aborigines, walked into the interior with the local tribespeople and was gone for several months. Similarly, Da' Atea from Macassar deserted a prahu in 1829 and walked across the northern part of the Cobourg peninsula.¹⁵ In the 1880s Searcy also remarked upon the results of association with the Macassans: 'Naturally some of the aborigines showed unmistakable signs of having Malay blood, in the way of a lighter skin and sharper and more refined features. In some of the women it was very marked.'¹⁶

The introduction of new commodities into tribal communities, such as metal knives, axes and spearheads, increased the efficiency of hunting and gathering. The Macassan dug-out canoe, which replaced the more fragile indigenous bark canoe, also permitted expanded trading and contact with

11 Michael Cooke, *Makassar and Northeast Arnhem Land: Missing Links and Living Bridges*, Batchelor College Report, 22 June–4 July 1986, Batchelor College, Australia, Northern Territory, October 1987, pp. 7–8, 53–8.

12 Mary Lucille Jones, 'Muslim Impact on Early Australian Life', in Mary Lucille Jones (ed.), *An Australian Pilgrimage: Muslims in Australia from the Seventeenth Century to the Present*, Melbourne, Victoria Press, 1993, p. 36.

13 C. C. McKnight, *The Voyage to Marege*, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1976, p. 95, quoting from Alexander Dalrymple, *A Plan for Extending the Commerce of this Kingdom and the East-India Company*, London, 1769, p. 89.

14 John Lort Stokes, *Discoveries in Australia in the Years 1837–43*, I and II, London, T. & W. Bone, New Bond St., 1846, p. 73.

15 Stokes, *Discoveries*, p. 211.

16 McKnight, *The Voyage to Marege*, p. 86.

other tribes. Inter-tribal trade appears to have expanded as a result of the introduction of such commodities.¹⁷ The pearls, pearl-shell and turtle-shell prized by the annual visitors also meant that there was some specific production for the market. Aborigines occasionally worked for payment in the process of trepanging, an unusual development in a hunter-gatherer economy.

Despite these innovations, there was little impact upon the dynamics of tribal society. Aboriginal culture was not disrupted by contact with the Muslims, something which cannot be said about the later cultural contact experiences of these now oppressed people. There were cultural and religious consequences from the contact with the Macassans, but these were not destructive either. Arnhem Land Aborigines later spoke of the period of contact with Macassar as a Golden Age.

Christian civilization to the east

When the Europeans had penetrated the seas north of Australia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Muslims were seen as the major enemy of Christian civilization. By 1788, when the British penal colonies were established on the east coast of Australia in Port Jackson and on Norfolk Island, the power of the Muslims was on the wane. The Mughals, the Muslim rulers of India, had been reduced to impotence and the Muslim sultanates of the East Indies, apart from the fiercely independent Aceh, were under Dutch East India Company control.

The older Christian imperialists had also lost their power. The militantly anti-Muslim and anti-Protestant Christian Portuguese empire had declined to a couple of outposts in Timor and in India. The Dutch, along with the spice trade to Europe, were also rapidly waning in significance. Now, rivalry between the new powers of Christian Britain and France had become the main arena of action.

No longer independently powerful, the Dutch still held key ports and controlled key waterways on the sea route from Europe to India, China and north-west America. The outcome of an internal power struggle in Holland in the 1780s between factions backed by the French on the one hand and the British on the other was of vital importance. If the French-backed faction won, all the Dutch bases would come under effective French control. The Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius in the middle of the ocean on the route to India and China, Dutch ports in South India and Ceylon and the waterways between the islands of the East Indies could become closed to

17 Searcy, *In Australian Tropics*, p. 58.

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British shipping: 'The plan to settle at Botany Bay (or any better harbour in that region) was thus in part an insurance against a French takeover of the Netherlands and of its trading bases.'¹⁸ Ships could sail in the winds which blow from the west, in the latitude of the forties, and sail south of Australia instead of sailing northwards along the west coast towards the East Indies. Ships could sail up the east coast of Australia, obtain supplies and repairs in Sydney, and then sail on to their trading destination.

Convicts were not sent to Port Jackson or Norfolk Island for reform or punishment, but rather as a form of cheap labour. 'The policy of sending convicts to New South Wales stands recorded upon the rolls of Parliament – it was and it is to improve the colony and make it more useful to the British nation,' stated Mr Justice Forbes in 1827.¹⁹

British shipping companies were already making good use of the vast supply of labour that British imperial expansion had delivered to them. Muslim sailors were apparently frequently employed and in January 1796 Norfolk Island acquired several of them at one time. They were classed as Lascars (Indians and Ceylonese) by the Norfolk Island *Victualling Book*, the record of all those receiving government food assistance. They were abandoned there due to a misfortune related to the shoddy quality of colonial ship-building at that time and the racist attitudes of their officers.

In September 1795 the colonial-built ship the *Endeavour* left Port Jackson with a companion ship, the *Fancy*, intending to touch at New Zealand and Norfolk Island before sailing to India. The *Endeavour*, with its Muslim sailors and with convicts destined to expand the labour supply on Norfolk Island, began leaking and it was feared it might break up. It ran aground at Dusky Bay in New Zealand. The sailors found a partly assembled ship on the beach, built by the carpenter of the *Britannia* while at Dusky Bay in 1793. The crew finished the ship, named it the *Providence*, and with the *Fancy* sailed on to Norfolk Island. Some forty of the convicts from the *Endeavour* were returned to Norfolk Island and completed their sentences.²⁰ The excess sailors were dumped with them.

Little was recorded of these exotic arrivals but it is apparent that they were not provided with a passage home. Some fifteen years later, according to the *Victualling Book*, John Hassan, a sailor from the *Endeavour*, was on the island working as a labourer. He was relocated to Port Dalrymple in Tasmania with the remaining settlers in 1813 when this settlement was

18 Worsley, 'Early Asian Contacts', p. 4.

19 K. M. Dallas, *Trading Posts or Penal Colonies: The Commercial Significance of Cook's New Holland Route to the Pacific*, Devonport, Tasmania, C. L. Richmond & Sons, 1969, p. 53.

20 Dallas, *Trading Posts*, p. 93.

closed.²¹ Another Muslim from the *Endeavour* was Sua (or Saib) Sultan. He had an 11½ acre (4.66-ha) plot of land on the island. He and his unnamed wife were transferred from Norfolk Island on the *Lady Nelson* as third-class passengers on 9 November 1809. He was given the name of Jacob on the 1818 stores list for Hobart Town and by then he had a much larger plot of land. He was given a 27-acre (10.94-ha) grant in his new location on the Derwent river near the village of New Norfolk.²²

Mahomet Cassan is also listed as coming free on the *Endeavour* in 1795.²³ An alternative spelling of his name is given on this list as 'Cassom'. Another name which crops up on the stores lists is that of number 615, Mahomet Cassem. Probably the same as 'Cassan' and 'Cassom', he appears on the 'General Muster of Free Men, Women and Children off and on Stores in His Majesty's Settlement of Hobart Town 2 October 1818', as 'came free' from Norfolk Island and off the stores.

These names subsequently disappear from the records; they left no Muslim families, no institutions and no mosques. Perhaps they changed their names, like Saib Sultan, assimilated into the Christian community or returned home after earning sufficient funds for their passage. It is certain that they would have suffered from considerable religious intolerance. As Muslims and a subject people, despised for their race, they would have lived on the fringes of society. Even Christians suffered persecution at that time if they were from the wrong sect. The British Test and Corporation Acts were not repealed until 1828. These acts, passed under King Charles II,²⁴ required that any person who wished to hold a position under the Crown or even in a town corporation had to take communion in the Church of England.

The men who 'came free' might have been despised, but they were not subjected to the horrors of the penal system that the convicts experienced. The system of transportation of convicts was cruel enough, separating them from all they knew for years, perhaps for ever. It was, however, relatively humane compared to the system that followed the Bigge Report of 1823. The administration of New South Wales was accused of excessive leniency, contributing to the failure of transportation as a deterrent to crime, whereas

21 Reg Wright, *The Forgotten Generation of Norfolk Island and Van Diemen's Land*, Sydney, Library of Australian History, 1986, p. 27.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 28.


23 Peter C. Sims, *The Norfolk Settlers of Norfolk Island and Van Diemen's Land*, Quoiba Tasmania, P. Sims, 1987, p. 29.

24 Irene Schaffer (ed.), *Land Musters, Stock Returns and Lists. Van Diemen's Land 1803–1822*, Hobart, St David's Park Publishing, 1991, p. 177.

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Bigge ‘wanted to tighten up the transportation system and make punishment more of a deterrent’.²⁵

Zimran Wriam, an Indian Muslim convict who arrived in Atlantic on the Third Fleet in 1791,²⁶ missed this most oppressive time. Born in Hyderabad, Zimran was sent to Norfolk Island and in 1813 was removed to Port Dalrymple in Van Diemen’s Land as a third-class passenger on the *Lady Nelson* with John Hassan. He was given a 40-acre (16.2-ha) land grant to permit him to be economically independent.²⁷ Unfortunately, he did not live long to enjoy it as two ‘currency lads’ (locally born men) beat him to death.²⁸



5.8 An Afghan camel driver in Australia
(Courtesy of the author)

Other Muslim convicts who arrived in this relatively humane period included a convict from Oman, Nowardin, who said he was born in Muscat. A sailor on a ship visiting London, he had been convicted of a minor offence and in 1815 was sentenced to seven years’ transportation. He arrived in Sydney on the *Fanny* on 18 January 1816. Another Muslim, one John Johannes of Bengal, in London on 6 December 1815, was also sentenced to transportation for seven years. He arrived in Sydney on the *Almorah* on 3 August 1817.²⁹ A relatively minor offence committed in the Port of London could have disastrous consequences.

In total, there were at least eight convicts who arrived in Australia after 1813 who may have been Arab or part-Arab. Five came from Oman, one from Bussarah (Basra, Iraq), one from Mauritius and one from South Africa. All of these people were Muslims.³⁰ Unfortunately, many of them arrived in the

25 John Richard Green, *A Short History of the English People*, London, Macmillan, 1884, p. 627.

26 A. G. L. Shaw, *Convicts and Colonies*, London, Faber & Faber, 1966, p. 88.

27 James Hugh Donohoe, *The Forgotten Australians*, Sydney, J. H. Donohoe, 1991, p. 91.

28 Sims, *The Norfolk Settlers*, p. 34.

29 Donohoe, *Forgotten Australians*, p. 91.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 86.

1830s when the inhuman convict regime recommended by Commissioner Bigge was being implemented.

The Report of the Select Committee on Transportation 1837–38 heard evidence of terrible crimes against humanity being perpetrated in the Australian penal colonies. Sir Frances Forbes, chief justice of Australia, stated in a letter to Mr Amos on the subject of transportation that:

The experience furnished by these penal settlements has proved that transportation is capable of being carried to an extent of suffering such as to render death desirable, and to induce many prisoners to seek it under its most appalling aspects.³¹

Men murdered their comrades in order to be executed so that they could escape the horrors of living any longer in the places of secondary punishment.

Siedy Abdallāh, like Nowardin, came from Muscat, Oman. Doubtless looking for employment, he had migrated to Mauritius and worked as a footman or a groom. He was one of several people sentenced to ten years' transportation in February 1837 for the crime of mutiny. Under the conditions of that time, this meant disobedience towards an employer or a refusal to work. He arrived in Sydney on 26 May 1838, but subsequently disappeared. On 26 April another footman and groom, also convicted of mutiny in Mauritius, arrived in Sydney to serve a life sentence. He was Hassan Sheikh of Bombay and he arrived on the *Moffat* via Hobart.³² Siedy Maccors Mahomed, originally from Basra, was another of those sentenced for mutiny in Mauritius and he arrived at the same time as Siedy Abdallāh. He completed his ten years and was granted a Certificate of Freedom in 1847.³³ Mauritius must have offered a hazardous work environment for in 1834, Bargatta Lascar, also known as Sheikh Burkhit, was sentenced in that place to fourteen years' transportation. Born in Calcutta in 1798, he arrived in Sydney in July 1834 and was later assigned to work for a Mr J. Philips on his property near Port Macquarie.³⁴

Cape Town, a key supply port on the British route to the East, and now included within the British empire, also sent its convicts to New South Wales. Two men described as 'of the Malay faith' arrived in Sydney on the *Eden* on 11 January 1837. Ajoup, a groom, had been sentenced to fourteen years' transportation in Cape Town and another named Matthys was sentenced to

31 Ibid., p. 40.

32 C. M. H. Clark, *Select Documents in Australian History 1788–1850*, Melbourne, Angus & Robertson, 1958, p. 142.

33 Donohoe, *Forgotten Australians*, p. 45.

34 Ibid., p. 46.

seven years'. Both men were born in 1815.³⁵ They appear but briefly in records and like those who 'came free' to Norfolk Island disappear without trace.

The conquest of the interior

As pastoralism expanded in the Australian colonies and it became apparent that convict labour could never fulfil the needs of the growing economy, free labour had to be obtained. From 1840 to 1880 European settlement spread from the south-eastern lands across the continent. This was the period of exploration of the interior of the country, of the extermination of large numbers of indigenous people, of massive immigration schemes and of a booming wool industry.

The 1850s Gold Rush added another strand to economic development, that of minerals and their exploration. It also caused a huge increase in population in the colonies. The population of Victoria, for example, increased from 97,489 in 1851 to 539,764 by 1861.³⁶ This led to a demand for farms and the development of agriculture. This in turn required the opening up of new lands in the interior of the continent.

Early explorations of the south-eastern part of the continent, the last of which was that of Major Mitchell through southern New South Wales and the Western District of Victoria in 1836, opened up vast tracts of land for the squatters and their sheep. The terrain and the climate allowed a reliance upon horses. However, when the drier western and central parts of the continent had to be explored, horses were found to be of limited value. Camels from India were first suggested as suitable in 1837.³⁷ A few years later, at the suggestion of Governor Gawler of South Australia, the colonial commissioner in London purchased six camels in Tenerife but only one survived the trip, landing in Adelaide in October 1840.³⁸ The camels could carry:

from seven to eight hundred pounds [318 to 363 kg] weight ... they last out several generations of mules ... the price paid for them does not exceed one half of that paid for mules ... and it is proved that these 'ships of the deserts' of Arabia are equally adaptable to our climate.³⁹

35 Donohoe, *Forgotten Australians*, p. 47.

36 *Ibid.*, p. 82.

37 Clark, *Select Documents*, p. 664.

38 Christine Stevens, *Tin Mosques and Ghantowns; A History of Afghan Camel Drivers in Australia*, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 13.

39 Stevens, *Tin Mosques*, p. 13.

Melbourne, rich with the gold of the 1850s and certain of its leading role in the future of Australia, was eager to spread its influence into the far reaches of the continent. In 1858 the Victorian Exploration Committee requested George Landells, who regularly accompanied exported Australian horses to India, to buy camels and recruit camel drivers on his next visit. He bought twenty-four beasts and hired three drivers: the Hindu Samla and two Muslims, Esan Khan and Dost Mahomet. They arrived in 1860 and were housed at Parliament House, where both beasts and men were kept in stables. The men were hardly regarded at all. It is interesting to note that Manning Clark, in his *History of Australia*, reports upon the whole Burke and Wills Expedition and the debacle it became without mention of the Afghan cameleers at all.⁴⁰ The expedition set out with great fanfare in August. Dost Mahomet and Esan Khan:

killed their own expedition stock cattle in the *ḥalāl* manner prescribed by the Qur'ān. Though severely ill with dysentery, they diligently performed the five daily Muslim prayers and held to their faith in Allah during the months of waiting at Menindie.⁴¹

Dost Mahomet was bitten by a camel at this camp and his arm was smashed, thus becoming effectively disabled for life at the age of 23. Despite his appeals to the Victoria Government, he was awarded only two hundred pounds compensation and was never to see his home again. He also requested that he be paid as promised. He had been told that he would have the same pay as the other members of the exploration team, that is, ten pounds a month. This was not honoured. He and Esan Khan were paid only three pounds a month, increased to four pounds five shillings a month after Landells had resigned from the party.⁴² Afghans were not white and not Christian. Dost Mahomet died soon after this refusal and is buried at Menindie.

Although the various exploration parties that went into the interior depended upon the camels and their Muslim drivers, their contribution received scant recognition. The white leaders of the expeditions received the credit from their peers and their exploits were recorded by white historians. It was Kamran who, with Gosse in July 1873, was the first recorded non-indigenous person to see the great rock, Uluru, named for the then governor

40 *The Argus*, Melbourne, 24 Jan. 1846, p. 2.

41 C. M. H. Clark, *A History of Australia*, Carlton, Victorian, Melbourne University Press, 1962, IV, ch. 8, pp. 146–63.

42 Christine Stevens, 'Afghan Camel Drivers: Founders of Islam in Australia', in Mary Lucille Jones (ed.), *An Australian Pilgrimage: Muslims in Australia from the Seventeenth Century to the Present*, Melbourne, Victoria Press, 1993, p. 52.

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of South Australia, Sir Henry Ayers.⁴³ Gosse at least had the grace to name a 'Kamran's Well' between Uluru and Lake Amadeus for his leading Afghan cameleer, and 'Allanah Hill' 28 miles (45 km) south-east of Uluru for the other Muslim on the team.

Saleh, who led the Giles Expedition of 1875–76 across the Nullabor plain and then to Perth and back via Geraldton to South Australia, was given the honour of having 'Saleh's Fish Pond' named after him near Mount Gould on the way back east from Geraldton. Nevertheless, Saleh's treatment indicates the type of intolerant and superior attitude these Muslims had to endure:

Saleh faithfully performed his lone daily prayers, regularly teased by the others. Sometimes he would ask Giles the direction of east and the leader would playfully point the other way. On these occasions Saleh was more likely to have been facing closer to Mecca for, from Australia, the Holy City was not eastwards but north-westwards.⁴⁴

These expeditions were not just brave manly exploits; they had economic motives. Giles was being supported by the major importer of camels, Thomas Elder, and on this expedition had agreed to survey country near Fowlers Bay for a prospective English squatter, a friend of Elder's.⁴⁵ The expedition that Saleh accompanied some years later in 1886, surveying the Queensland–Northern Territory border, took prospecting parties with it, hoping to find new mineral wealth.⁴⁶

The willingness of the Afghans to search for mineral deposits for days in terrible conditions, and the offer from the major camel owner Faiz Mahomet to send his camels and men to the search, impressed contemporary opinion. Larry Wells, the leader of the expedition, named a landmark in the sandy desert 'Bejah Hill' and gave Bejah Dervish his compass.⁴⁷ Years later Nora Bejah, his daughter-in-law, still had that compass. She also recalled that Bejah had been given the name 'the Faithful'.⁴⁸

Abdul or 'Jack' Dervish, the son of Bejah, was most instrumental in getting the Madigan Expedition across the Simpson desert in 1939. This was the last major exploration into the interior. Afghan Muslims had been on all of them since 1860. The second Afghan on this expedition, 'Nurie', Nur Mohamed Moosha, was the son of Moosha Balooch who had accompanied the Horn Expedition over forty years earlier. However, things had changed:

43 Stevens, *Tin Mosques*, p. 33.

44 *Ibid.*, p. 39.

45 *Ibid.*, p. 42.

46 *Ibid.*, p. 40.

47 *Ibid.*, p. 44.

48 *Ibid.*, p. 52–3.

‘By the 1930s the second generation of cameleers ate the same meat as the Europeans. The Muslim faith had diluted and *ḥalāl* meat was no longer a requirement to the younger men.’⁴⁹

THE CAMEL COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

It was the Afghans and their camels who gave access to the vast interior of the continent. They proved themselves during the construction of the Overland Telegraph Line in 1870–72. They were used in both the survey and construction work, carrying loads of materials into otherwise impenetrable country.

By 1898 there were 300 members of the Muslim community in Coolgardie and 80 on average attended Friday prayer. There was not one Muslim woman among them, no marriages were performed and no burials, reflecting a relatively young, celibate and transient population.⁵⁰ There appear to have been two mosques in Coolgardie, if that is what is meant by ‘church buildings’, with five other buildings used for public worship. The one ‘Minister’ and three ‘Lay Readers’ might be taken for the imam and other less-educated prayer leaders. Fremantle had two buildings used for public worship but no main mosque and one lonely ‘Lay Reader’ or prayer leader. Perth had three buildings used for public worship but no mosque at that stage. It claimed one imam and three prayer leaders.

The working conditions of some of the Afghan camel drivers, even by the standards of the time, were appalling. *The Bulletin*, which had a less than favourable attitude to non-European labour, was moved in 1899 to support an appeal for ‘Afghans enslaved by the Bourke (NSW) Camel Carrying Co.’ The company was owned by a group of Europeans, mainly pastoralists, who hired their labour in India and Afghanistan. Abdul Wade, an Afghan, was appointed manager in 1895.⁵¹ The men, who had been employed on an agreement that they had not understood, were jailed for refusing to work when ordered to do so by the company. They were to be paid twenty-four pounds a year. Three-quarters of their wages, held until they completed their six-year contract, were to be forfeited if they missed even a day of work. The magistrate told them they could appeal against the sentence at a higher court, but as they were without funds that was not possible without public

49 Basil Fuller, *The Ghan: The Story of the Alice Springs Railway*, South Australia, Rigby, 1975, p. 19.

50 Stevens, *Tin Mosques*, p. 56.

51 ‘Application for Statistical Information Relating to Churches of the Mohammedan Denomination in Western Australia for the Year 1898’, *National Archives of Australia*, series No. PP95/1, item No. 1899/114.

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support. The poor response to the appeal was, complained this most racist of journals, ‘perhaps because of the circumstance that the oppressed men happen to be coloured foreigners instead of white Australians’.⁵² At least it contributed ten pounds towards the one hundred and fifty pounds needed for the appeal.

RACISM REARS ITS HEAD

Camel teams competed with the bullock drivers and horse teamsters. The cameleers were Afghan, the bullockies were European. Clear cases of assault against Afghans, even murder, were dismissed by racist courts.⁵³ In western Queensland in the 1890s, there was a major campaign of racist vilification against the cameleers. Local newspapers declared Afghans to be ‘more detestable than the Chinese’ and attacked them for refusing to drink alcohol and for opening their own stores and butcher shops.⁵⁴

In 1892 ‘Unionist’ of Bourke NSW wrote in a letter to *The Bulletin*: ‘the introduction of camels and Afghans is worse than the introduction of Chinese to the masses’.⁵⁵ Attacking the ‘hopeless conservatism’ of this position regarding the camel, which *The Bulletin* steadfastly maintained was the saviour of the outback, the editor had an alternative suggestion:

There is no earthly reason why the Afghan and the camel should go together; the Australian has at least as much intelligence as that imported Asiatic, and he knows enough to make use of that ‘ship of the desert’ without hiring any cheap Mohammedan to help him. But, apparently, he never dreams of making the attempt, and because the Afghan is another cheap labour curse in a land where such curses are already much too plentiful, therefore he wants to abolish him and the animal altogether. The idea of abolishing the man and not the animal has not yet, so far as we are aware, been proposed by anybody.

This was, ultimately, what occurred.

The link between the Afghan and the camel had direct political repercussions. At the November 1893 conference of the Labor Electoral League of New South Wales, the platform which called for ‘Prohibition by law of the use of camels as beasts of burden, as being inimical to the health and well-being of the residents where such beasts are used’ was confirmed. As *The Bulletin* remarked in its commentary: ‘The only real reason for its [the camel’s]

52 Stevens, *Tin Mosques*, p. 101.

53 *The Bulletin*, 4 March 1899.

54 Stevens, *Tin Mosques*, pp. 140, 180.

55 *Ibid.*, p. 141.

abolition is that it is run by Asiatics,' but this did not indicate sympathy for or solidarity with the Afghans: 'Apart from its obnoxious Asiatic driver, there is just the same reason for abolishing the camel that there is for tearing up the railroads.'⁵⁶

In an article on 'The Camel Odious' in 1894, *The Bulletin* included a comment by a Major Leonard, the author of a book on the camel, that the Afghan is 'the dirtiest brute on record'.⁵⁷ The very next edition of the magazine had a response from someone who strongly objected to this, pointing to the bravery of the Afghans throughout history and the defeats they had inflicted upon numerous invaders, including the British. The letter, under the heading 'The Odious Afghan', alluded to the number of whites who manage to survive without a bath from New Year to Christmas and to the many 'women who have only bathed on their wedding day'. It also mentioned the hospitality of the Afghans in Bourke and pointed to the large number of whites who were happy to take the bounty offered. However, even this sympathetic correspondent could not support the notion of Afghan Australians:

I don't like the Afghan; he cannot mix with us; in some things he is a bit too good for us; and I think he is better out of the country; but he is more honest and manly than many of those who jeer at him.⁵⁸

The life of Mahomet Allum, Adelaide's much-loved Afghan herbalist, spanned the history of the Afghan Muslims in Australia.⁵⁹ He had sold horses to the British army in the Second Afghan War and came to the goldfields of Western Australia as a cameleer.⁶⁰ He witnessed the opening of the Coolgardie water pipeline in 1903,⁶¹ and worked in the Broken Hill mines where he laboured for hours underground in icy cold water.⁶² He bore witness to the teachings of Islam on racial difference in racist Australia. In one of his letters to the press, reprinted by Brunato, he challenges the editor:

If any Britisher can prove to me that he is white and I am black, I will unreservedly give him five hundred pounds. In God's earth we are all His creatures. He brought in the sun and the moon and the stars to function twenty-four hours a day for all of us, and as an indication that He expects us,

56 *The Bulletin*, 9 July 1892.

57 *Ibid.*, 17 Feb. 1894.

58 *Ibid.*, 14 July 1894.

59 *Ibid.*, 21 July 1894.

60 Stevens, *Tin Mosques*, pp. 198–9.

61 *Ibid.*, p. 13.

62 *Ibid.*, p. 91.

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every hour of the day, to do His work. Why then this invidious distinction, even in the cemetery, between peoples of different races?⁶³

Allum's reputation for charity – he donated six thousand pounds over four years – was explained as 'a practical demonstration of the Islamic doctrine that all men are brothers and should be treated as such'.⁶⁴ He was not without influence on the non-Muslims around him. Miss Halima Schwerdt of Adelaide, in her contribution 'I am proud to be Muslim', in the publication 'Charms of Islam' produced by the very British Muslim community of the Working Mosque, indicated her debt to him. She wrote:

Here in Australia where it is rare to come in general contact with anyone of the Muslim faith, I consider myself extremely lucky when I met Mahomet Allum Herbalist, 'Wonder Man' and healer as he has been named by the people in Australia whom he has cured.⁶⁵

The report 'Undesirable Immigrants', written a few years later, noted that the thirteen Indians destined for Melbourne and the seventy-seven destined for Sydney from a ship which had just arrived in port, were 'a fine looking lot of men' of whom 'the majority speak English fluently'.⁶⁶ However, they were associated with 'the Asiatic evil in Melbourne'. In a comparison of the relative filthiness of Mahometans and Hindus, the anonymous author wrote:

Everyone will be gratified to know that the Mahometans, at any rate once a year, indulge in a thorough wash and put on absolutely clean garments. This takes place at the feast of Ramazan, either in February or March.⁶⁷

The report went on to urge action by the city authorities, since the generally appalling habits of both the Hindus and Mahometans threatened the city with the black death or bubonic plague.

63 Madeline Brunato, *Hanji Mahomet Allum: Afghan Camel-driver, Herbalist and Healer*, Leabrook SA, Investigator Press, 1972, p. 27.

64 *Ibid.*, p. 40.

65 *Smiths Weekly*, 12 Aug. 1933.

66 The Working Muslim Mission and Literary Trust, *Charms of Islam. A Collection of Writings of Some Eminent Scholars*, Woking, The Mosque, 1935, p. 42.

67 *The Leader*, 18 June 1898.

MUSLIMS AND THE POLICY OF RACIAL EXCLUSION FROM 1901

The Immigration Restriction Act was passed in 1901 as soon as the new Commonwealth Parliament was established. It provided that all 'coloured people' trying to enter Australia would be required to submit to a medical examination and to a dictation test. This test could be in any European language. In practice, this meant any language of which that individual was ignorant.⁶⁸ Resident 'coloureds' were also required to apply for a special certificate to enter another state. The free crossing of inland borders, a necessity for the Afghan cameleers' inland trade, was thus abolished at a stroke. This discrimination was intensified by the 1902 Roads Act requiring that a licence had to be obtained to run a camel-carrying business and a registration fee had to be paid for each camel.⁶⁹

Despite some concessions in individual cases and the admission of religious teachers for limited periods, the Immigration Restriction Act had the desired effect. Between 1901 and 1921 the number of Afghans fell from 393 to 147. The experience of Moaz Khan from Punjab illustrates the decline in the Muslim camel industry. Arriving as a camel driver at the start of the century, he was a camel proprietor working in Bourke, Wilcannia and Broken Hill before 1913; then, after a visit to his wife and family in India between 1918 and 1921, he returned to employment as a labourer, doing station work. He eventually retired, via a period at the Adelaide Mosque, to India and his wife in 1947.⁷⁰ In effect, the policies of 1901 and 1903, based as they were upon false notions of the relationship between race and standard of living, wiped out the Australian Muslim community for nearly seventy years.

Islam in New Zealand

Located in the South Pacific Ocean, south-east of Australia, New Zealand has a population of over 4 million, 1 per cent of whom are Muslim.⁷¹ As far as early Muslim settlements are concerned, 1874 census data listed seventeen Muslims who were all males of Chinese origin.⁷² These were Cantonese-speaking Chinese who arrived in 1868 and worked in the Otago goldfields of

68 Trevor R. Reese, *Australia in the Twentieth Century*, Melbourne, F. W. Cheshire, 1964, p. 38.

69 Stevens, *Tin Mosques*, p. 148.

70 'Immigration Act – Application for Document of Identity Moaz Khan – Afghan Camel Driver', *National Archives of Australia*, series No. D1976/1, item No. SB1947/149.

71 'Islam & Muslims in New Zealand', at www.islamawareness.net/Oceania/NewZealand.

72 Qamer Rahman, 'Muslim Women in New Zealand; Problems and Prospects', at www.ifew.com/papers/muswomnz.html.

New Zealand.⁷³ When the mining industry declined they returned to China without leaving any Islamic legacy.⁷⁴

According to Ayyub Bhikoo, the first Indian Muslim (called Ismail Bhikoo) arrived in New Zealand in 1907. Later, in the 1930s, Ismail Bhikoo's five sons also arrived. In 1952 the first *eid salah* was performed in Suleman Bhikoo's house. In the 1950s the New Zealand Muslim Association in Auckland was formed by Suleman Bhikoo along with fifteen other Muslims, including Ghulam Muhiddeen, Dosi Mia Ali Moses, Ismail Moses, Abdul Rahim Sukumia, Yusuf Ismail Bhikoo and Adulsamad Bhikoo. In the same year the Islamic Centre in Hargrave Street was purchased.

In addition to Muslims from Fiji, during the 1950s and 1960s important contributions were made to the spread of Islam by people from Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo. Today, the Muslim community continues to grow.

Islam in Fiji

Fiji is a South Pacific island nation consisting of over 350 islands and islets of which only 105 or so are inhabited by humans. It is situated approximately 2,730 km north-east of Sydney, Australia, and about 1,770 km north of Auckland, New Zealand.⁷⁵ There are two major islands in Fiji, known as Viti Levu and Vanua Levu, on which the majority of the population live. According to the 1996 census, Fiji's total population was 775,077. The majority (52 per cent) are indigenous Fijians, who are a mixture of Melanesian and Polynesian and who follow the Christian faith (37 per cent Methodist and 9 per cent Roman Catholic).⁷⁶ Approximately 38 per cent of the population are Hindus and 8 per cent are Muslims, both of these being faiths of the Fijian Indian population.

Most authorities agree that people came into the Pacific from South-East Asia via Indonesia. Here the Melanesians and the Polynesians mixed to create a highly developed society long before the arrival of the Europeans. Between 1879 and 1916 large numbers of Indians, mainly from northern India – though some also travelled from South India, mainly from Madras, which then was governed by the British – came as indentured labourers to work on the sugar

73 James Ng, 'An Overview of New Zealand Chinese Writing', Wordstruck Conference, 2003, at www.stevenyoung.co.nz/chinesevoice/history/nzchinesewritingmay03.htm.

74 The Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand, 'Muslim Community in New Zealand', at www.fianz.co.nz/index.htm?wrapper.php?id=pressreleases/declaration_content_, 12 April 2003.

75 'Atlapedia Online', at <http://www.atlapedia.com/online/countries/fiji.htm>.

76 Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics, Dec. 2000, Suva, Fiji.

plantations. Of these, 7,000 were Muslims.⁷⁷ The indenture system was basically a labour contract modifying the labourers' employment and living conditions. This system committed the labourers to a five-year contract where they were required to work eight hours a day for five and a half days a week in the plantation fields. They were paid a shilling for an eight-hour shift.⁷⁸

The reasons why the Indians left their ancestral lands were poverty, poor economic conditions and the general insecurity in India. The main factor was, however, the depiction of a paradisiacal Fiji as a land of opportunity and prosperity. They were led to believe that they could make enough money in a short period of time and return home, where they could become successful citizens of India. Yet the reality was different as only a few lived long enough to acquire better material conditions. Indeed, many others found they had substituted one form of poverty for another, and many more found only death and disease.⁷⁹

At first, beneath the cruelty and harshness of the indentured labour system, Islam was strictly a hidden and private practice; it had no public structure at all.⁸⁰ In the early stage of the indenture period, Islamic practices such as praying, fasting and celebrating 'Īd were very much part of the personal ceremonials of Muslims within the boundaries of the domestic sphere, since plantation life did not encourage them to maintain and practise their faith. Nonetheless, Muslims clung to it.⁸¹

During the period of indenture, Muslims adopted a number of aspects of Hinduism in their everyday lives. Muslims and Hindus ate together, married into each other's faiths, celebrated religious festivals together and were tolerant of each other's faiths and religious traditions.⁸² Jan Ali's article 'Islam and Muslims in Fiji' mentions that Hindus and Muslims attended each other's weddings and funeral ceremonies.

After finishing their indenture contract the Indian labourers, both Muslims and Hindus, demanded their political rights and equal status in the Fijian social structure and usually moved onto the land as farmers. They were reluctant to engage in business and other occupations and only a very few of them entered into activities such as leather-making, selling jewellery, running laundries and hairdressing.⁸³

77 Lance Brennan, John McDonald and Ralph Shlomowitz, *The Origins of South Indian Muslim Indentured Migration to Fiji*, Adelaide, Flinders University Press, 1992, pp. 1–11.

78 Jan Ali, 'Islam and Muslims in Fiji', *Journal of Muslim Affairs*, XXIV, No. 1, April 2004, p. 142.

79 *Ibid.*, p. 143.

80 *Ibid.*, p. 141.

81 Ahmed Ali, *Plantation to Politics: Studies on Fiji Indians*, Suva, University of the South Pacific and the Fiji Times and Herald Limited, 1980, p. 108.

82 Ali, 'Islam and Muslims', p. 148.

83 Ken Gillion, *Fiji's Indian Migrants: A History to the End of Indenture in 1920*, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 137.

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Before the twentieth century there was a lack of mosques and experienced leaders, and even though self-styled 'Muslim teachers' existed, they lacked meaningful authority. The only exception to this was Mullah Mirza Khan, who made his way from India to Fiji in 1898 to promote educational and religious work.⁸⁴ In 1900 he initially took charge of building a mosque at Navua, and soon afterwards another small mosque and school were built at Nausori on land leased from the Colonial Sugar Refining Company.⁸⁵ Mullah Mirza Khan devoted himself to the Muslim community, worked hard throughout Fiji and became a significant Muslim leader.

The number of Muslims in Fiji steadily increased, firstly by means of indenture, then by birth and migration. Research has shown that the spread of Islam in Fiji was not due to missionary preaching but was a result of the broader processes of geographical and social mobility produced by the international labour market and social and economic growth through personal initiatives by individuals in pursuit of a better existence. Islam progressively came to play an established role in society and was led by better-organized and more resourceful Muslims. In turn, these developments demonstrated a growing sense of identity within the Muslim community, and Hindus and Muslims became more structured and aware of their religious differences, bringing real religious tolerance.

In the early 1900s, Muslim schools and mosques were built and a wide range of Islamic educational opportunities developed to meet the needs of the Muslim population. Thus, Muslims have contributed to Fiji's environment and have played a part in its social and cultural diversity. Today, several religious groups constitute the Muslim community in Fiji, the differences between them being both ideological and in their practices. Thus, while the majority are Sunnīs – the first Muslims to arrive in Fiji – there are also Ahmadis, Miladis, Ahl-i-Hadithis and Tablighis.

84 Ali, 'Islam and Muslims', p. 149.

85 Gillion, *Fiji's Indian Migrants*, p. 149.

– VI –

ISLAM ON THE THRESHOLD
OF THE MODERN
WORLD

Chapter 6.1

COLONIALISM AND ISLAM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Iba Der Thiam

Islam is one and indivisible. It is faith,
life and action

From the beginning of Islam to the present day, the founding principles of Islamic doctrine have not been eroded by the passing of time. Against all expectations they have remained unchanged. A religion of supreme monotheism, teaching virtue, rectitude, integrity, honesty, truth and sincerity, but also tolerance, harmony, equality, justice, moderation, love of one's neighbour and peace, Islam has achieved a perfect blend, integrating, confirming and renewing all the divine messages which have reached human beings since the dawn of time and which were so outstandingly incarnated by the prophet Abraham, in order to give meaning to life and a purpose to the world.

Despite the assertions that colonial ideology long tried to impose as established truths, there is no 'Black Islam' any more than there is an 'Arab Islam', an 'Asian Islam', a 'European Islam' or an 'American Islam'. There is only one Islam, indivisible in its essence, its language, its message, its form of worship, its doctrine and its laws. Conceived in such a way as to adapt to all periods of time, all cultures, ethnic groups or nations and to provide relevant responses to the challenges of the past, the present and the future, it gives 'eternal guidance', coherent and intelligible to all, which reveals in all places and at all times the ultimate and absolute purpose of Muslim action in everyday life. In no way does this absolve Islam of its responsibility to

develop new concepts and ideas and to make fresh discoveries at each period of time in constantly changing conditions, but without ever deviating from the path set by God through the Holy Qur'ān and the *sunna* – 'the means to achieve these ends'. Despite the theories put forward by some of the so-called modernists in the social sciences, there are not several Islams but only one.

Indeed, it is this one and indivisible nature of Islam, among other factors, which explains the strong and lasting attraction that the religion has always exerted and continues to exert on people's minds. Fifteen centuries after it first appeared in Arabia, it has spread phenomenally throughout the five continents and, with more than one billion, six hundred million followers, it has become the world's leading religion.

It is of course true that all peoples have their own customs, traditions and practices, values and folklore, which represent their specific culture and identity. But while acknowledging this fact, Islam does not automatically align itself with such specificities. Its message was never intended to be confined to its community of origin but rather to serve the whole of humanity in its infinite diversity, transcending ethnic and tribal considerations, cultural differences and philosophical and moral distinctions. Islam is defined and experienced in terms of absolute, universal values. It brings to all people an awareness of the perfect continuity and unswerving oneness of the divine teaching which humanity has absorbed from its earliest beginnings on earth. The universal and immutable gift that each of God's earthly creatures receives, whether individually or in the community, is: faith in God's supreme majesty, in His transcendence which excludes all forms of idolatry, in the Holy Scriptures and in the prophets whom He sent, in the angels, in paradise, in hell, in the Resurrection and in the Day of Judgement.

These are the obligations of the believer. They imply personal commitment, a compact with God made in full awareness and blending harmoniously with a sense of belonging to the community of all those who share Islamic beliefs, the *umma*. This sense of community is an act of responsibility reflecting true fellow feeling and is fundamentally different from the individualism practised by certain societies.

The Islamic world as it should be understood is a human entity, global and universal; it has no geographical, state, institutional, ethnic, cultural, political or economic boundaries. It is composed of all the men and women who believe that God exists, that He is One, that He created the world, that Muḥammad is His Prophet and Jesus is His messenger, and that the Qur'ān is the word of Allah. The Islamic world is composed of all the men and women who believe in all the prophets sent before Muḥammad and in the Holy Scriptures which God had entrusted to them, scriptures which have been partly distorted, unlike the Qur'ān.

It is Roger Garaudy who wrote that to proclaim *Allāhu akbar* (God is Great) is to relativize all power, all possessions and all knowledge.¹ It means asserting the absolute supremacy of the Almighty over all other temporal or supposedly spiritual authority; rejecting allegiance to any law, power or faith other than that of Allah; consecrating in action the primacy of spiritual power over temporal power; having recourse to categories and patterns of analysis and the perception of reality which ignore and disrupt the conceptual and ideological structures painstakingly built up by the colonial system.

It is also to deny that there is any validity in the theory of 'the civilizing mission', the 'white man's burden' or the 'duty and birthright' which supposedly entitled civilized nations to seek to raise so-called primitive peoples to their level. It means dismantling the whole system which underpins, justifies and inspires colonialism and its zealots.

Conflict with the colonial system

Between the foreign conquerors from Europe and the Muslim populations of sub-Saharan Africa, therefore, there arose a major contradiction which assumed the form of an insurmountable conflict. The system that France established in French West Africa operated according to a precise mechanism based on a number of assumptions, like a real ideological system. The main idea behind this approach was that the occupying power was stronger. Its strength was certainly not based on numbers, since the colonizers were only a handful of people, but was instead material, intellectual, scientific, technological, conceptual, human and moral. This form of strength seemed to be reflected in its sense of power, authority and discipline, its sophisticated weaponry, spirit of organization and method and in its efforts to harness nature and to dominate and develop the zones in which the colonies were established.

The colonizers considered themselves superior in strength to the colonized peoples and thus believed themselves to be more intelligent, more efficient and endowed with greater initiative. This feeling of superiority, at first racial, then became cultural and religious and finally intellectual and moral. Because the colonizers regarded themselves as superior, they felt it their duty to guide, enlighten and command all those whom they regarded as inferior and obviously could not imagine that they might meet with the slightest resistance.

Similarly, they thought that, as superior beings, they should be waited on hand and foot, and they obliged the subjugated people to cater to their needs,

1 Roger Garaudy, *Pour un Islam du XXe siècle*, Paris, Éditions Tougui, 1985, p. 12.

transport them in hammocks, obey their every whim, accept exploitation and domination, heed their counsel, show recognition and gratitude, acknowledge their self-attributed privileges and the leading role which, in their own eyes, they alone were fit to fulfil in conducting the affairs of the country. People had to sing their praises, constantly expressing allegiance, submission and fidelity, and pay tribute to the colonizers and their country. Any who departed from these rules were regarded as ungrateful rebels who must be subdued.

In the name of these principles, colonialism imposed upon the colonized peoples its own language, religion, law, values, way of life and institutions, all of which were regarded as superior. Systems were then established to counteract any attempt to call this supremacy into question.

Conflict inevitably arose in the colonies in which Islam endeavoured to organize the life of the populations. As soon as they were established in sub-Saharan Africa, the colonizers put in place a series of measures aimed at erasing Islam and its values entirely from the minds of the people, or at least at achieving a substantial and lasting weakening of its influence on their hearts, minds, social practices and culture, or at turning the dominated populations into bad Muslims by prohibiting any religious education and withholding any real knowledge of Islam on the philosophical, moral, cultural and linguistic levels.

In order to achieve this, a general policy was devised on the basis of the experience gained in other countries in the Islamic world and where colonial power was already established. Thus, in the French colonies, for example, no state schools provided Islamic religious instruction other than in their own *madrasas*, which were set up for their own specific purposes. Working hours were set in such a way as to prevent the Muslim believers from fulfilling their religious obligations on Friday, for example.

The Arabic-speaking Moroccan, Tunisian, Lebanese and Syrian communities which had settled in the African colonies did not have the right to attend the mosques or to take part in traditional public events such as the celebrations to mark the end of the sacred month of Ramaḍān or Abraham's sacrifice. Religious festivals as important as the anniversary of the birth of the Prophet Muḥammad, or the tenth day of the month of Muḥarram, were not celebrated with all the solemnity due to their symbolic and liturgical significance, for lack of tolerant legislation which would have taken such realities into account. They were neither feast days nor holidays nor paid days. Permission to be absent for personal reasons was difficult to obtain, so as to discourage any postulants.

'Muslim affairs' were always supervised by foreign officers, such as Captain André in French West Africa in 1923. Indeed, military officers disguised as interpreters were specially trained in religious espionage. They infiltrated



6.1 Manuscripts from the Qur’ān, twelfth century
 (© Khalili Family Trust/Nour Foundation)

marabout circles at all levels – at the personal and family level and within the brotherhoods – reporting daily on the slightest actions or movements. Links between the religious leaders and Medina, Mecca, al-Azhar, North Africa, the Senoussi of the Fezzan, the Middle East (Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Jordan) and Mesopotamia were monitored, supervised, discouraged and sometimes repressed. Mail was intercepted, opened, read and photographed by staff trained in Arabic: as, for example, Ayoub Mansour in 1923–25, Mokhtar Ould Khaṭṭāri in 1924–27 and Touradou Camara in 1928.

In order to devise a strategy to contain Islam, weaken its authority and diminish its influence in the colonies, officers were sent on missions to study other Muslim societies under British, Portuguese or German domination, in the hope of discovering more effective means of neutralizing or stifling the Islamic influence. This was the case of the Mangin mission to Nigeria in 1952, which visited the Yoruba, the Fulani and the Hausa country in the north and the Muslims of north Dahomey.

The pilgrimage to Mecca was strictly controlled, regulated and subjected to conditions which had only one purpose, namely to discourage any possible applicants. Not only was authorization required from the administration, but a deposit had to be paid for reasons which no one really understood. Any public official or employee in the private sector had to request leave of absence



6.2 Collection of cotton tax, Bandiagara, West Africa - Sudan, 1907-1908 (© UNESCO)

from his superiors, which was obviously no mean task on account of the length of time needed for the pilgrimage. Some people were obliged to hand in their notice and bear the consequences.

No apostate was allowed to go to Mecca. This category of people was systematically prohibited from accomplishing one of

the essential Five Pillars of Islam. There were also occasions when, without warning, the colonial government simply forbade the whole Muslim community under its jurisdiction from making the pilgrimage to the holy places of Islam. This occurred in 1926 after the unrest in the Middle East and the suppression of the caliphate by Ataturk.

The organization of the pilgrimage to Mecca was always entrusted to an administrative commission headed by non-Muslims – in 1952 to a Captain Cardaire for French West Africa and in 1953 to General Sankale. The same applied to the pilgrimage to the tomb of Shaykh Ahmed Tidjani in Fez, which was placed under the responsibility of a commissioner named Nakache, who was Jewish. It was only after vehement protests from the Arabic scholars returning to Africa from Arab countries on completion of their studies, supported by religious leaders such as Thierno Seydou Nourou Tall, El Ḥadji Ibrāhīma Niase, Shaykh Mbacke and El Hadji Abdoul Aziz Sy, that the Muslim Guinean commissioner Diallo Telli was appointed in 1956 for French West Africa. The French consul in Jeddah received express instructions to follow the pilgrims' every movement and to report in detail on all their contacts with the academic, financial and so-called pan-Islamic circles.

The pilgrimages which took place in colonial territory in Africa – to Bandiagara, Timbuktu, Djenné, Gao in French Sudan, Dinguiraye in Guinea, Nimjatt in Mauritania, Touba and Tivaouane in Senegal, Kano in Nigeria, or the Bamoum country in Cameroon – were also subjected to close surveillance. Reports were drawn up indicating approximately the number of followers present, the religious leaders and other notables and officials who had gone on the pilgrimage, the content of the message delivered by the caliph, the general attitude of the pilgrims, the views of the spiritual leaders on colonization, their degree of loyalty to France and its representatives and so on.

Files were kept on each religious leader, giving details of their family connections, their courses of study, their family or marriage problems, their

spiritual and moral strength, their weaknesses, their views on colonialism, their real influence in the country, and even a list of their property and that of their representatives throughout the whole Federation of French West Africa. From 1951 onwards, a vast survey of the marabout leaders was undertaken, following the study carried out by Paul Marty at the beginning of the century.

Similarly, the building of mosques was no easy matter. Since it was subject to administrative authorization, which was difficult to obtain, neither subventions nor fund-raising nor public subscriptions were possible. This was the case with the mosques at Diourbel and Touba in the 1920s. In 1928, to take another example, only four authorizations were issued for the whole colony of Senegal. They concerned the villages of Keur Bassine and Touba and the towns of Koungheul and Kaolack. The same applied to the mosques in Paris (1925) and Bamako, French Sudan (1935–39); to those of Cambérène (1938), Dagana, El Hadji Oumar Kane (1937–38), Fann (1937), Guinguinéo (1938), Kaolack (1937–38), Ségou (1938), and Yoff (1937); the *madrasas* of Atar (1937) and Dakar (1937); and the Marseille Mosque (1942). The allocation of grants for further Islamic or Arabic studies in the North African *madrasas* was henceforth prohibited. Decree No. 2541/AP of 20 August 1945 had re-established almost all the constraints imposed from 1857 to 1945. The building of mausoleums dedicated to saints or martyrs of Islam was also subject to prior authorization and thus heavily controlled.

Selected officers or officials set out to learn Arabic and assimilate Islamic culture, as, for example, Paul Marty who in 1917 published his two-volume doctrinal work entitled *Études sur l'Islam au Sénégal* [Studies on Islam in Senegal]. Others, like Houdas, translated the *Risāla* and the *Ḥadīth* of al-Bukhārī. Guiraud published a work of Muslim jurisprudence and procedure in 1926, followed by Lieut. Jean Montezer, who in October 1939 published *L'Afrique et l'Islam* [Africa and Islam] and in September 1940 *L'Islam en Afrique noire* [Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa]. The aim was to invent an official Islam which was cut off from pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism, in the same way as the official colonial-based *madrasas* had sought to create an Islamic law and to select Muslim judges (*qāḍīs*) and *tamsīrs* (local religious leaders) who were under the thumb of the colonial power, to officiate in Islamic courts.

The concept of Black Islam, which was the product of these official agencies, was spread little by little in order to influence the way of thinking of the African elite, despite the fact that it is generally recognized that the religion revealed to Muḥammad by Allah through the angel Gabriel is not confined to any race nor ethnic group nor territory, as we have already said.

Every three months, newsletters on all the Muslim countries of North Africa and the Near and Middle East were distributed throughout all levels

of the colonial administration. The Arabic press was supervised, monitored and censored, as was the case with the following publications: *as-Sa'āda* in 1920; *Mir'āt al-khayr*; *al-Waṭan*; *al-Bayān* (Beirut, starting in 1924); *Alif bā'* (Damascus, 1925); *al-Ahrām* and *al-Mukhattam* (Egypt, 1925); *al-'Udhra* (Tunis, 1925); *al-'Ahd al-jadīd* (Beirut, 1925); and also the play by Haïck entitled *Le héros du Liban* [The Hero of Lebanon], a historical drama in five acts.

Books in Arabic were also subject to relentless censure, a task entrusted to the Bureau of Muslim Affairs, later to become the Political Bureau. Packages were opened and works were read, assessed, checked and confiscated whenever the content was considered 'subversive'. It was, however, the Qur'ānic schools that were subjected to the most relentless colonial repression.

The campaign against the Qur'ānic schools

This campaign began with Governor Faidherbe, who had come from Algeria and had been the companion of Bugeaud. He was familiar with Islam and had taken the trouble to study Arabic and African languages such as Wolof. On taking up his duties in 1854, Faidherbe devised a plan to efface the influence of Islam on the first colonial society upon which French colonialism had decided to exert its cultural, political and economic domination, in order to make it a basis for the imperial expansion which was to begin in the last third of the nineteenth century.

On 22 June 1857 Faidherbe issued an order making it compulsory for all pupils of 12 years of age enrolled in a Qur'ānic school to attend a French school so as to assimilate the counter-culture. On 1 October of the same year, that is to say, three and a half months later, Faidherbe decided that the number of Toucouleurs marabouts receiving contributions from the faithful would be reduced from 40 to 23, thus depriving them of the financial means to promote the development of Islam. Not content with this, he went even further by forbidding any Fouta or Walo religious leader to have more than 250 enrolled pupils. Above that number, the older pupils all had to enrol in a French school.

Thirteen years later, in 1870, a new order imposed the need for authorization by the governor of the colony before a Qur'ānic school could be opened. It was hoped in this way, by increasing and complicating the procedures and constraints, to discourage the religious leaders and to stem the wave of Islam which was fast spreading throughout the population. It was not before 1885, therefore, that the first printed edition of the Qur'ān was introduced into the colony that had been selected as the bridgehead of French colonization in sub-Saharan Africa.

COLONIALISM AND ISLAM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

In 1872 Africans who could read and write Arabic were declared 'illiterate' after the promulgation of the decree of 10 August 1872 creating two fully fledged 'communes' at Saint-Louis and Gorée, which had town councils whose members were obliged to know how to 'speak, read and write French'. The text of the decree acknowledged clearly that the aim was to provide 'encouragement likely to facilitate the much sought-after assimilation of a population already under French domination and which we must endeavour to initiate gradually to civilization'.²

Twenty-one years later, in 1893, a further order stipulated that for a Qur'ānic school to operate without hindrance, the visit of colonial inspectors had to be accepted without demur. In 1895 three more requirements were introduced. The first obliged the headmasters of Qur'ānic schools to sit an examination in Arabic organized by the French. The second concerned the compulsory maintenance of a register, written in French, containing the family names, first names, date of birth and family relations of the pupils. The last stipulated that each term a copy of the register should be sent for verification, naturally at the expense of the Qur'ānic school concerned, to the Department of the Interior.

As none of those measures met with the expected success, despite their restrictive and discouraging nature, Guy Camille, the governor-general of French West Africa – following the conversion to Islam of Bour Sine M'backé II in 1891, followed by that of Bour Saloum Fara Guédel Mbodji – decided in 1903 that henceforth it would be the head of the Federation of French West Africa alone who would be responsible for delivering the authorizations to open Qur'ānic schools. Those wishing to open such a school were faced with a complex series of obstacles.

As this new measure proved as ineffective as the previous ones, Camille issued a new decree on 12 June 1906 in which he decided that:

1. Qur'ānic schools could no longer enrol the children aged between 6 and 12 years who were obliged to attend classes given in French between 8 am and 12 noon and between 3 and 6 pm.
2. The Qur'ānic schools were obliged to teach French for at least two hours per week.
3. A subsidy of 300 francs would be offered to any religious leader who agreed to apply these regulations.

A decree of 20 August 1945 confirmed that the special authorization established by Camille would henceforth be the sole responsibility of the Governor-General of French West Africa.

2 Article 4 of the Decree of 10 August 1872.

REASONS FOR THE HARASSMENT OF THE QUR'ĀNIC SCHOOLS

The reason for the harassment of the Qur'ānic schools was that for the colonizers, the religious education given to the colonized children created a major obstacle to the brainwashing and spiritual and cultural re-indoctrination that they wished to undertake. The Qur'ānic school has always formed a mould in which Islam has infused the thinking and behaviour of its followers with sufficient strength, significance and depth to protect them against the most insidious forms of spiritual, mental, intellectual and cultural alienation.

Far from confining itself merely to transmitting knowledge by training pupils to commit to memory the Holy Scriptures, which are an essential guide to cultural practice, the Qur'ānic school offers a complete education which trains the intellect, the spirit and the heart, shapes character, gives its followers a firm grounding in the fundamental values of Islam and society, encourages the highest virtues, awakens the senses, dictates language, behaviour, everyday habits, ways of eating and dressing and general conduct – in short, it teaches people how to live, how to appear and how to act towards God, towards the community and towards others. It particularly affects human aspirations and expectations and gives people protection against domination, suffering, poverty, the vanity of earthly and material pleasures, covetousness, honours, prestige and renown. It gives a meaning to life and a purpose to the world.

Far from representing dogmatic introspection or egoistically sectarian withdrawal, the Qur'ānic school operates on the complementary bases of deep consolidation, on the one hand, and an opening up to the world, on the other, by training a healthy mind in a healthy body, by means of an ability to analyse, understand, compare, classify and choose, thereby increasing the pupils' capacity to make their own responsible decisions based on wisdom, moderation, humility and lucidity, following clear guidelines and sound, reassuring and standardizing criteria.

It is therefore understandable that, although the colonial regulations considerably hindered the creation and development of the Qur'ānic schools and the growth and consolidation of Islam, the religious leaders decided to circumvent them, first by ignoring them completely and then by running the risk of heavy penalties, ranging from the closing down of the schools to imprisonment, not to mention fines and intimidation. They had all the more reason to do so in that between 1857 and 1904 in Senegal, for example, only 142 authorizations were given to open Qur'ānic schools, that is, an average of 3 a year in a country in which at least 70 per cent of the population was Muslim at the turn of the century.

Chapter 6.2

NATION STATES AND THE UNITY OF ISLAM

Iba Der Thiam

From its origins to the peak of colonization

Before Islam, Mecca was the centre of a rigidly organized tribal society divided into social classes, which included upper and middle classes mainly involved in trade, and constituted an aristocracy of wealth and power resting on the defence of the old order, the perpetuation of its pagan religion and the glorification of its blood lines and race and determined to oppose anything that might lead to any social or political upheaval. It was from there that Islam was introduced into Africa (Abyssinia) as early as AD 617 by Meccan exiles before it spread to Medina and, in successive phases, to almost the whole of the Arabian peninsula. After the death of the Prophet Muḥammad, the expansion of Islam took place in two phases: the first was the work of the Companions of the Prophet of Islam and the Umayyad caliphs; the second took place as a result of action by the Turks.

In Europe, North Africa, the Anatolian plateau, Central Asia, Iran, Asia Minor, Afghanistan, the east coast of Africa, the Sahara, the savannah and the African forests, the religion of Muḥammad was adopted in an astonishingly short period of time. One after the other, the Umayyads (661–750), ‘Abbāsids (750–1258), Seljūqs (1038–1194), Mongols (1206–1332), Ottomans (1324–1924) and Mughals (1526–1857) established empires that stretched from the Iberian peninsula in the west to the Indus in the east and from the Caucasus in the north to the African forests in the south.

The new religion exercised over the people who embraced it and the political regimes that shared its beliefs an authority that was manifest in every aspect of life. Indeed, Islam is not only a religion that gives spiritual guidance and an ethical code that determines every aspect of social and human behaviour; it is also a way of organizing everyday life and, as a law of divine origin, it provides a comprehensive, precise, detailed, coherent and logical structure that governs every aspect of a Muslim's existence. Thus, it makes every human being into a believer with a specific identity who is a member of a community governed by common laws. This community is a construction that transcends earlier racial, ethnic, tribal, geographical, political, economic, social and cultural groupings so as to form a pan-human family that crosses the frontiers of nation states within the eschatological context of a community of faith known as the *umma*.

It was against this background that the fall of Granada in 898/1492 to the Catholic monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella ended eight centuries of Muslim presence on the Iberian peninsula. This important event marks a major break in the history of Islam. After the successes of Muslim expansion in the first century AH, this was a turning-point that led to a period when, in relative terms, Muslims lost the initiative, in one part of Europe in particular, both historically and culturally. This was not yet the case everywhere, however, since by 1512 three Muslim empires – the Ottoman, Persian Safavid and Moghul empires – were simultaneously at the height of their power.

The Muslim world was temporarily excluded from the part of Western Europe where Islam had reached its highest point in terms of thought and artistic creation, in particular through the University of Córdoba, which from the tenth to the eleventh century AD, had become the most prestigious Islamic centre of its time. This was due to constant research, investigation and scientific and technical thought, drawing its sources and inspiration from the translation and assimilation of the world's greatest cultures (Greece, Rome, Persia, India, China and North Africa) of which it produced original and intelligent syntheses so as to extract from them a symphonious culture.

The Muslim world moved eastward to the Ottoman and Mughal civilizations and southwards to sub-Saharan Africa. Here its influence spread so as to achieve in the empires of the western Sudan drained by the river Niger (the Mali and Sonrai empires in particular), through the brilliant advances made by the universities of Timbuktu, Djenné and Gao, a splendour and magnificence that led to vigorous expansion, despite the disaster of Tondibi in the sixteenth century and the colonial onslaught in the nineteenth.

Until then, while the conquest of Granada and the Turkish defeat at the battle of Lepanto in 979/1571 were undoubtedly important events in the history of Islam, they did not in any way mark an irreversible decline. Evidence of this is provided by the fact that Isfahan was founded in 1621, that

the Taj Mahal – that incomparable symbol of Muslim art – was built in 1632, that, after capturing Constantinople, the Turks were at the gates of Vienna in 1683 and that in 1799 Ranjit Singh founded a Sikh state in India.

It is true that after Christopher Columbus arrived in the Americas, the centre of gravity of world geopolitics shifted from the Mediterranean basin, where the most brilliant civilizations of antiquity had emerged and prospered, to the Atlantic Ocean. This major shift had significant geopolitical, political, economic, social and cultural consequences. These included the Renaissance, involving the simultaneous rise of capitalism and colonialism in Europe in the fourteenth century. This was marked by the African slave trade, the settlement of the Americas, the industrial revolution in Europe and the growth of the science and technology on which its increasing supremacy was based, the general movement of ideas, the English, American and French revolutions, the colonial conquests, the carving up of Africa and the rise of the colonial empires.

For almost five centuries Europe was to exercise absolute supremacy over the rest of the world. One of the most important consequences of that supremacy was the emergence of the imperialist rivalries of the First World War of 1914–18, whose most obvious and devastating outcomes included the defeat of the Ottoman empire, the peace treaties (particularly those of Sèvres in 1920 and Lausanne in 1923) and the empire's dismemberment and strategic and geopolitical eclipse, the October Revolution in Russia in 1917, followed in 1920 by the Congress of the Peoples of the East, held in Baku, the abolition of the Muslim caliphate in 1924, and so on.

Many other events should also be seen as part of this trend, including the emergence of pan-Islamic resistance movements, the establishment of Sukarno's Nationalist Party in Indonesia in 1927, Sultan Muḥammad V's arrival on the scene in Morocco, the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, the Great Depression starting in 1929, the first signs of Muslim dissidence in India in 1930, the establishment of the Association of Ulemas in Algeria by Ben Badis in 1931, the foundation of the Istiqlal Party in Morocco by Allal al-Fasi in 1932, the split in the Tunisian Dustour Party provoked by Bourguiba in 1934, and the Algerian Messali Hadj's decision to revive the *Étoile Nord-Africaine* [North African Star] in 1935. The other consequences of this economic, political and social upheaval were the rise of Fascism and Nazism and the march of events leading up to the Second World War (1939–45), to mention only the most significant among them.

Each of the events just mentioned had direct consequences for the Muslim world and strongly influenced the individual and collective destinies of the peoples belonging to it, both in countries where they form the majority and those where they are minorities. It would, however, be wrong to see the situation of Muslim regimes as simply the result of external factors.

This would be to ignore the considerable sociological, cultural, political and economic inertia that has had a constant and sometimes negative impact on their development.

At a time when the world is undergoing an intense process of renewal and upheaval, many Muslim regimes have withdrawn into themselves, clinging to their ancestral traditions, not all of which are positive. This is the case even though Islam, when properly understood, can be seen to have a formidable capacity for adaptation and openness whose origin dates back to the time of the Prophet and the first caliphs. Unfortunately, this capacity very often tends to be ignored rather than exploited for the greater well-being of all Muslims.

Colonialism divides the *umma*

Colonialism, domination and the retreat of Islam in some parts of the world were accompanied almost everywhere by the division or even fragmentation of the *umma* into a multitude of separate entities with varying degrees of autonomy subject to political and legal systems and cultural influences that ranged from the French to the German systems, by way of those of Great Britain, Portugal, Holland and Spain. The Muslim populations, already subject to many forms of aggression, now suffered authoritarian violence on the physical, psychological and spiritual levels, which forced them to develop appropriate strategies of resistance in order to safeguard their identity.

In Palestine the overriding problem was to prevent the establishment and consolidation of a Jewish state against the wishes of the Arab-Muslim world. In Iraq, Asia Minor, Central and East Asia, North, West, Central and East Africa, the islands of the Indian Ocean and some Balkan and European countries, on the other hand, faced with repressive laws that completely ignored Islamic values and with instances of official and private intolerance that denied Muslims even the right to have their own places of worship, it was rather a matter of confronting such arbitrary power in order to challenge colonial ventures. Elsewhere, armed struggle in the form of anti-colonial resistance movements was necessary simply in order to drive out the colonizer. Such was the situation in Algeria, for example.

The domination of the Muslim world also imposed artificial borders, drawn simply to suit colonial empires and in response to criteria that took little note of the preoccupations of the populations concerned, with, it is true, the complicity of Turkey and the United States of America. The foundations for this were laid in the late nineteenth century at the Berlin Conference (1884–85) and later by the aforementioned peace treaties that followed the defeat of the Axis powers in 1918.

The new borders divided states, peoples, ethnic groups and religions and enclosed them in arbitrary and fragmented groupings in response to a desire to achieve political containment and drastically alter religious and cultural values. The Ewe, Mende, Wolof, Halpularéen, Hausa, Fan, Bantu, Manding, Senufo, Tuareg, Toubou and Berbers, for example, were dispersed and scattered in many different geopolitical areas that were divided up and arranged into such restricted administrative units that an organization such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was forced to declare borders to be inviolable in order not to plunge Africa into interminable border wars.

Muslim populations were similarly placed in numerous administrative, legal and institutional frameworks carefully designed to ensure that each had its own specific character, particularities, constraints or requirements, all of which factors gave rise to disorder, rivalries, mutual incomprehension and tensions. In some places where there had never been the least conflict between religion and the state, laws that were completely foreign to the local culture were imposed in the name of secularism. In others, missionaries backed by the colonial power conducted an aggressive campaign of proselytism in order to impose a particular religion. They monopolized the schools, controlled education and culture, shaped ways of life and behaviour and changed values.

All this naturally had many consequences for relations between government and the governed, the status of persons and property, the conditions under which Muslim worship could take place (prayers, religious festivals, dress codes, culinary habits, pilgrimage, mosque-building, the opening of Qur'ānic schools, the training of elites, relations with the outside world and so on) and for the relations of Islam with other religions. Conflict arose over every one of these issues, undermining the unity and cohesion of society and threatening its stability at a time when it most needed to close ranks to confront foreign domination.

As can be seen, Islam thus faced constant challenges: the challenge of fragmentation and extreme dispersal; the challenge to survive; the challenge of recognition; the challenge of the right to exist; the challenge of the right to self-expression; and the challenge to be able to demonstrate its philosophical, moral, social, cultural, axiological, political and economic identity. In the face of such challenges, the Muslim world devised various responses and confronted them with varying degrees of success.

Despite constant attacks, campaigns to distort, misrepresent and demonize Islam, ferocious repression and vicious assaults by the media, there are now 1.5 billion Muslims. It is the fastest-growing religion in the world and one that conquers new ground every day that God gives, precisely because of its great humanism.

Islam makes no distinction between the spiritual and temporal fields. Turning its back on the dichotomous conception of power incarnated by prince and prelate, it reconciles faith and politics, religion and the social system. There is something sublime about the important place that the concept of equality occupies in this world view that transcends all previous philosophies.

The French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) states that 'Men are born and remain free and equal in rights' (while France at the same time practised colonialism with its Code Noir, or Black Code, violent expeditions and the economic, social and cultural devastation it caused), but it failed to institute the means to put its stated principles into practice. Islam, on the other hand, breaks down, as a matter of principle, inequality in all its forms, denies the aristocracy of fortune, birth and social rank – in other words, the aristocracy of wealth, power and knowledge – and recognizes only that of piety based on purity of heart, good actions and refined habits, the spirit of peace and active brotherhood based on solidarity, sharing, generosity and selflessness in the service of the community.

When this vision of the world was expressed in a context of foreign domination, it was bound to come into open conflict with a colonial society based on the absolute paradigm of the superiority of the white man, the primacy of matter over spirit, reference to republican laws that were essentially secular, and mistrust of, not to say hostility towards, God, His commandments and His sacred values.

As a result of the colonial powers' imposition of patterns of behaviour that were not only foreign to peoples' own cultures but also totally different as regards their societal objectives, foreign domination came to be seen by the colonized peoples as a provocation and a challenge that had to be met at any cost. Seen in this light, the national resistance movements that emerged throughout the Islamic world are easier to understand.

Bonaparte's arrival in Egypt in 1798, the French conquest of Algeria in 1830, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the establishment of the French Protectorate in Tunisia in 1881, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, the establishment of Italian, Spanish and French authority in Libya and Morocco, the mandates that the League of Nations established over Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Yemen, Oman and the Persian Gulf Emirates after the First World War, as well as the deportation of the Chechens and the Crimean Tatars, the British and Soviet colonization of Iran, the arrest of Sukarno by the Dutch, the crisis between France and Lebanon, the Sétif massacres and the Jewish immigration to Palestine – all these were seen not only as intolerable acts of domination but also as serious violations that called into question the territorial integrity of the countries concerned. They were also considered to be direct threats whose aim was to cut off the people

of those countries from their cultural heritage and religious values in order to incorporate them by assimilation into the civilization of the dominant world. By signing the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which laid the foundation for a 'Jewish homeland' in Palestine, and by encouraging Mustafa Kamal to abolish the caliphate in 1924, the Western countries sowed the further seeds of inevitable conflict with the peoples of the Islamic *umma*.

As early as the nineteenth century, religious leaders in the African countries south of the Sahara had already raised the standard of revolt against foreign penetration. In West Africa these leaders included El Hadji Omar Futiya Tall, Maba Diakhou Ba, Samory Touré, Mamadou Lamine Dramé and Alfa Yaya, to name only a few. They were the forerunners of intellectual movements such as the Young Turks (1906), Young Tunisians, Young Algerians and Young Senegalese, which represented some of the thousand faces of a pan-Islamic consciousness. The patriotism these movements displayed in challenging the colonial system goes a long way to explain the current negative perception and deep-seated prejudices that the Western world has of Islam and its place in society.

One of the most important consequences of the First World War was and remains the weakening of the *umma* and its division into a multitude of states that the peace treaties placed under the sovereignty of the victorious countries. Iraq regained its nominal sovereignty in 1932. Egypt regained some control over its affairs in 1922 but its effective independence was not recognized until 1936. From 1936 onwards, Syria and Lebanon were moving towards freedom. Under British authority, a Jewish state was established in Palestine in 1948, to the detriment of the Arabs. India was the scene of rivalries between Muslims and Hindus before it achieved independence in 1947 after a long struggle by Mahatma Gandhi. On Muhammad Ali Jinnah's initiative, Pakistan broke away from the Indian Union in 1947 and became a separate Muslim state. In North Africa, France ruled Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, but its authority was increasingly disputed by the rise of various forms of nationalism, with Islamic nationalism playing a decisive role. Tunisia and Morocco gained independence in 1956.

Colonialism was increasingly being challenged by French socialists, British radicals, Marxist-Leninist parties and liberals in Europe, Asia, Africa and the Americas. The United Nations and the United States also supported the struggle by colonial peoples for independence. Nationalist movements also emerged in Africa, in the Muslim colonies of French West Africa and in Central and East Africa and the Indian Ocean. In Asia too, where the Dutch were the colonial power, nationalism was on the rise and Islam played an important role in the national liberation struggle in Indonesia. The same was true in Malaysia, Burma, Ceylon and Singapore from 1946 onwards.

As can be seen, the *umma* had become fragmented. Naturally, this division affected the overall geopolitics of the Muslim world. The spheres of influence that were carved out represented, in each case, an area within which, as we have seen, each colonial power established its own influence and its own institutions, essentially based on its own political and administrative experience. Administrative practices, ways of life, the law, values, education systems, political life, assemblies, governments, regions, municipalities and economic structures were almost all devised in accordance with the models employed in the ruling country. The language of the colonial power became, almost everywhere, the language of the colonized country. Islam was permanently excluded from the political, institutional and judicial fields. In the words of the British prime minister William Gladstone: 'As long as they obey the Qur'ān, they will resist us. We must therefore turn them away from it.'

Subject to different laws and practices, the various Muslim peoples were genuinely traumatized. Within the French sphere of influence, for example, colonization methods ranged from assimilation in Algeria and Senegal to the granting of autonomy by way of associate rule. The English-speaking countries were subject to indirect rule, while the Portuguese, Spanish, Italians and Germans each had their own system. Within a whole area such as French West Africa, there were French citizens who from 1830 onwards came under the Napoleonic Civil Code in what were later called the Four Communes of Saint-Louis and Gorée in 1872, Rufisque in 1880 and Dakar in 1887, while in the rest of French West Africa and in French Equatorial Africa the people were French subjects who were subject to the Indigenous Peoples Code as laid down in the Decree of 30 November 1887.

In most countries where there was a Muslim majority, the personal status of Muslims was completely ignored. Only in Senegal and North Africa were indigenous Muslim populations given a special status, although only after epic struggles. The policy employed towards Muslims in Senegal, which had been the bridgehead of colonization, was followed to a greater or lesser extent in the various, predominantly Muslim, French territories of sub-Saharan Africa.

All this had a considerable effect on the elites, who were attracted by the intellectual values of the colonizer and, in some cases, acted as intermediaries for the foreign authorities so as to defend their institutional, legal, ethical and axiological system. In turn, this resulted in a dualistic, sometimes antagonistic, society split into cultural and religious groups asserting interests that in many respects conflicted with each other. The cultural fracture produced an elite which was Westernized in its ideas, concepts, symbols, values and references, which virtually monopolized wealth, knowledge and power and which had considerable influence, even though it was numerically insignificant. On the other side, the mass



6.3 Courtyard of the Sankore Mosque, Timbuktu (© UNESCO)

of citizens clung to their Islamic values, which they were determined to defend at any price. These two standpoints, one looking to external systems of reference, the other to internal and endogenous determinants, weakened the whole society, making it a breeding-ground for numerous frustrations likely to give rise to the manifestations of extremism and incomprehension to which many Muslim societies are subject.

Events in Europe between 1919 and 1939, marked by the rise of authoritarian regimes and by Nazi and Fascist policies that led to the Second World War, waged in the name of democracy and freedom against intolerance, racism, exclusion and blind domination, gave the Muslim resistance movements additional elements with which to legitimize their struggle. In such circumstances, it is not surprising that the period roughly between 1945 and 1960 was marked by the emergence of anti-colonial nationalist movements in most of the Muslim countries of Africa and Asia that were still under imperialist domination.

Only the Muslim republics of Soviet Central Asia were generally exceptions to the rule, mainly because of the Soviet Union's anti-colonial position and the decisive role it played in terms of financial, material and political support for pan-Islamist movements and anti-colonial Muslim resistance throughout the world. The 1917 Russian Revolution took an interest



6.4 Al-Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem
(© G. Degeorge)

in Muslim peoples under colonial domination as early as 1919 by convening in Baku a congress of countries asserting their Islamic heritage. The leadership it acquired on this occasion was part of a global strategy to attack imperialism and colonialism in its colonies on the basis of the theory of 'the weakest link' put forward in the early 1920s by Lenin himself. A series of initiatives were taken, all of them along similar lines. They targeted groups such as religious leaders, intellectuals, trades union movements, workers, the political class, women and young people.

After the disappointing Brazzaville Conference in 1944 and the more militant and committed Manchester Conference in 1945, the

oppressed decided to make their voices heard. The war in Indochina was already at its height. The Dakar-Niger railwaymen's strike in 1947, the Malagasy revolt the same year with its 100,000 deaths, the events in Dimbokro and Ségala, the creation of the Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC), Indian independence and the birth of Pakistan, the Ashanti revolts and Mao Zedong's victory in China were all expressions of a profound aspiration for independence. Increasing nationalist demands in Sudan and elsewhere resulted in the emergence of a national liberation movement in Algeria, followed by demands for independence in Tunisia and Morocco. Similarly, after the establishment of the state of Israel, the Arab world had been involved in a process of nationalist awakening strikingly embodied by Gamal Abdel Nasser's rise to power in 1952. It was not by chance that Bandung was chosen as the venue for a historic conference in 1955 to which the former colonial powers invited all the peoples desirous of freedom to come and proclaim their desire to escape from colonial domination.

As a result of the situation described above, since 1960 the Muslim world has been characterized by a relatively high level of fragmentation, although

the *umma* lives on in the collective consciousness of the peoples of which it is composed. Thus, from the seventh to the twentieth century, and after a period of relative weakness, the position of Islam was not only consolidated but extended. Zeitouna University in Tunis and Kairouan University (the first in the world), founded in the ninth century, like al-Azhar University in Cairo, have played a decisive role in this movement. Islam is now represented by significant minorities in Mediterranean Europe and the Balkans, as well as in a number of people's democracies. It is present in the former Soviet societies of the Caucasus, as well as throughout Central Asia, the Asian archipelago and the Far East. It is present in Iraq, the Fertile Crescent, the whole of the Hijāz, Iran, the Anatolian plateau and all the Persian Gulf states. In Africa, it is to be found in Ethiopia, the old Nubian lands, the coastal sultanates of Somalia, Zanzibar, Sofala and Malindi, in the countries of the Indian Ocean, as well as in China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.

In sub-Saharan Africa, Islam is clearly in a majority in most countries of former French West Africa. This is also true of areas that came within the British sphere of influence (Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Gambia) and the former Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau. Indeed, Islam's early establishment in Africa has made it the dominant force there. There are also Muslim minorities in some countries of the West Indies, the Caribbean and Latin America. While in the American hemisphere, there is a strong presence in the United States of America and Canada.

Unity and diversity: future prospects and challenges

Nowadays, the Muslim world takes the form of a constellation of nation states whose situation varies in different regions and countries. Thus, while Islamic societies are structured mostly around family-based monarchies in the Persian Gulf states, most of the countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and North Africa are republics, sometimes alternating with mixed systems. Likewise, Islam's place in the choice of institutions, personnel and values varies from country to country. In most of the Arab countries, the absolutely essential point of reference is still, more than ever, faithfulness to the Qur'ān.

It should be added that since the formation of the Arab League, pan-Arabism has been growing steadily. The movement has been strengthened by attacks against the Muslim world, the occupation of the Golan Heights, South Lebanon and the Arab territories of Palestine, the establishment of Jewish settlements, the construction of a separation wall, acts of humiliation, targeted assassinations, the destruction of houses and buildings, the violent

repression of civilian populations and the restrictions imposed on the Palestinian Arabs' freedom of movement. The war in Afghanistan after the events of 11 September 2001, and more recently the war in Iraq, have implanted in the collective consciousness of the Arabs the painful feeling that the United Nations has turned its back on them, is ignoring their rights and is following a policy of double standards. This feeling is widely shared by the world pan-Islamic movement as expressed through the fifty-six countries of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

The question of Palestine and the way that Arab countries and Islam are treated affect relations between the Arab and Muslim countries and the Western world within an international environment marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the disappearance of the Soviet empire and the awakening of Islamic nationalism in the Muslim republics of the Caucasus. All this is taking place within a globalized world dominated by the role that geopolitical oil issues continue to play in international relations. It has resulted in divergences in relations between the capitalist and former Communist worlds. This is very clear when it comes to establishing cooperative relations or alliances.

Within the *umma*, the Islamic world is still trying to define fruitful relations between its members. Admittedly, the OIC has been operating since it was established after the fire at al-Aqṣā Mosque, but relations between its members do not yet seem to have gone beyond a formal framework, although the Islamic Development Bank is developing interesting projects in a number of Muslim countries. A comprehensive policy, that is to say, a broad and bold vision that can rise to the challenge of global geostrategic issues, has still not emerged with sufficient clarity.

The same is true of relations with non-Muslims when the identification of Islam with terrorism on the one hand and the right to resist on the other have resulted in muddled thinking at a time when the high priests of the clash of civilizations are expounding their theories and gaining great media attention. It is therefore urgent that Islam should take striking initiatives so as to present itself as the religion of peace, tolerance, openness, social harmony and respect for others, for life and for human rights, which, through its founding principles, it has never ceased to be.

Within states, although much has been achieved and there has been significant progress, profound and wide-ranging changes in people's lives following the transition from colonization to independence have yet to make themselves sufficiently felt everywhere. Relations between governments and the governed have in some cases remained too hierarchical. Pluralist democracy, the multi-party system, respect for human rights, in particular freedom of expression and association, freedom of the press, good governance, efforts to combat the misappropriation of funds and corruption,



6.5 Al-Azhar Mosque, Cairo (© G. Degeorge)

the status of women, young people, children and the family, the place of religion in society, cultural practices, education, the development of law, ethics and labour law – all these still present serious problems that need to be confronted if appropriate solutions are to be found before a hotchpotch of demands and accumulated frustrations are expressed in ways that might have serious consequences.

There are very few Muslim countries where democracy and the rule of law are established. Fewer still hold free, fair and transparent elections on a regular basis to renew the political leadership. Official institutions, such as a national assembly, senate, economic and social council and auditor-general's department, are often lacking, and where they do exist they generally do so only in name. Fortunately, there are welcome exceptions, but it has to be acknowledged that they are rare. The multi-party system, the right to critical and free expression, freedom of opinion and freedom of the press are in most cases limited. The activities of voluntary associations are stifled, controlled and in many cases even suppressed, so it is difficult for civil society to assert itself. The judicial system usually acts in response to the wishes of the government, while the rights of the defence are generally not respected.

As good governance is generally lacking, corruption and misappropriation of public funds have free rein and enrich family, clan or party oligarchies



6.6 Al-Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem
(© Permanent observer mission of Palestine to UNESCO)

that are entirely unaccountable. The right to work and the right to strike are still non-existent everywhere. Working conditions naturally reflect this situation. Women's right to participate in government and decision-making bodies as responsible citizens on an equal footing with men, to take part in national life, to set policy and work to see that it is implemented are still not recognized or applied. Such marginalization is counterproductive for development and largely responsible for Muslim countries lagging behind with respect to the human development index. This is the exact opposite of the place that the Prophet of Islam gave women during his lifetime.

Young people also find it difficult to assert their place in society, even when they are strongly attached to the sacred values of their religion. Various prohibitions that are not justified by any text prevent the healthy development of their potential.

The difficulty in achieving Islamic renewal may be partly a consequence of the problems the nation states encounter in finding their own place when the theories and the very notion of the 'nation' are evolving within the context of globalization. Similarly, the position of Arabic and other national languages in relation to the colonial languages, the influence of religion on economic life and the organization of political life and the life of institutions are also important challenges that need to be confronted.

As can be seen, the Islamic world is facing multiple challenges. Fortunately, there are some hopeful signs. A wind of political liberalism is beginning to blow in many Arab monarchies. Peace and democracy are gaining ground in North Africa, and the situation in Bosnia and Kosovo is improving.

Other encouraging signs are the successes that Arab countries have achieved in the areas of sport and satellite television channels and communication media, and in the fields of arts and literature. In the economic arena, the Persian Gulf states and the Muslim countries of Asia (especially Malaysia and Indonesia) have experienced sustained growth and undoubted prosperity. The same is true for many Muslim countries of Africa. All of this is clear from various encouraging indicators. Meanwhile, in the political sphere, several monarchies have set up parliaments and are trying to promote further progress.

Muslim women have held office as prime minister in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Muslim countries played a significant role in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio, 1992), the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo, 1994), the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen, 1999), the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995) and the World Conference against Racism (Durban, 2001). Similarly, the fact that the sovereign of Saudi Arabia has preferred the title of 'Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques' to that of 'King' certainly augurs well.

Nonetheless, a great deal still remains to be done in many states of the Muslim world in terms of education, justice, economic and social equality, solidarity and health. If an Islamic economic grouping could be formed alongside the European Union, Mercosur, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Asian countries represented by the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), there would surely be no challenge that it could not meet.

EPILOGUE

Idris El Hareir

Throughout history, from antiquity up to the present time, the Middle East has been a region of significance to both the ancient and modern worlds due to its strategic geographic location between the major continents of Africa, Asia and Europe. As a result of this importance, the 'Eastern Question' arose, with the region being constantly contended for by the great powers which have arisen at different times. Thus, the Greeks, Romans, Byzantines and modern European states, and empires such as Russia, Germany, Italy, Austro-Hungary, Great Britain and France, have fought against the Persians, the Phoenicians and the ancient Arab kingdoms. These conflicts have continued during the Islamic era.

Shortly before the emergence of Islam, the struggle between the Sāsānid Persians and the Byzantines was at its most intense, with each side achieving victories and suffering defeats before both were eventually defeated by Islam. The real cause of the conflict was control over ancient and modern trade routes, that is, it was economic. It is the same today, particularly after the appearance of oil and gas in the region at the beginning of the twentieth century which increased its importance. The region is now controlled by means of international trade and communications, whether by land, sea or air routes.

The emergence of Islam in the seventh century AD was a momentous occurrence and a turning-point in the course of world events. It altered religious concepts in this region of the world, turning them upside down. It eradicated idolatry, restored the concept of the worship of the one God, reformed the social and economic ideas that were then prevalent and eradicated much injustice and tyranny. It established political rule based on political and religious freedom, justice, equality and consultation and called for liberty and respect for human beings without regard to colour, origin or language. In consequence, many people responded to this call, both individually and collectively. Those who adhered to their religion were guaranteed safety and security in life, property and belief under the protection of Islam.

EPILOGUE

A number of factors assisted the rapid spread of Islam in the seventh and eighth centuries AD of which the most important are:

1. the destructive and bitter struggle between Persia and Byzantium, which weakened both empires;
2. the Arian and Donatist schisms within the Christian Church;
3. the conflict over the Byzantine imperial throne;
4. the unity of the Arab tribes and princedoms under the banner of Islam and the one faith, thereby forming a military power backed by the desire to seek martyrdom for the sake of the spread of Islam; and
5. the oppressive and tyrannical practices of the Persians and Byzantines against their own subjects and the imposition of heavy taxes, both of which led those subjects either to convert to Islam or to accept the just rule of the Muslims.

All these factors help to explain the rapid advance of the Islamic armies and their astonishing victories in their battles against Persia and Byzantium. Indeed, within some seventy years Muslim rule extended from India in the east to northern Spain and the Atlantic in the west. Muslims gained control over the major trade routes and sources of wealth, particularly the routes leading to the Far East, the source of the silk, tea, spice and perfume trade, and to the gold mines of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana and West Africa. They also held sway over the Mediterranean, which became an Arab-Islamic sea. Once trade with the Far East and Africa had fallen under Muslim control, Europe had to import essential commodities, such as tea and spices from the East, through Arab-Islamic ports.

By virtue of this lively trade, the Muslims amassed enormous wealth and with this they built great cities such as Basra, Kufa, al-Fuṣṭāṭ, Kairouan, Fez, Baghdad, Marrakesh, Córdoba and Granada. Because of the accumulation of riches and the environment of stability and security, learning increased and the number of scholars grew. Muslims translated the works of India, Greece and Rome, and added to them. In consequence, the sciences of mathematics, astronomy, medicine, chemistry, physics, music, geography, history and philosophy flourished and there arose many famous scholars, including Ibn Sīnā, ar-Rāzī, Ibn Ḥayyān, al-Khwārizmī, al-Bīrūnī, Ibn Maymūn, az-Zahrāwī, Ibn Bayṭār, Ibn Rushd, Fārābī and Ibn Khaldūn.

This scientific knowledge was transferred to Europe via Sicily, the Italian principalities which traded with the Muslims, and al-Andalus. Many Islamic works were translated into European languages, particularly Latin, in fields such as medicine, astronomy, music and mathematics. This aided the advancement of science in Europe, as did the educational missions

which studied in Islamic universities in Córdoba, Toledo, Seville, Sicily and elsewhere.

These favourable economic and political conditions helped the Islamic caliphate and, subsequently, the numerous Muslim states, to spread Islam in Africa and Asia as far as the Far East, China, Malaysia and Indonesia. This was further encouraged by means of trade, missionary activity and intermarriage, and by the ease of movement and security within the Islamic state.

This situation continued until the middle of the fourth/tenth century, when the Islamic world became divided into three caliphates: the ‘Abbāsid caliphate in Baghdad, the Fāṭimid caliphate in the Arab Maghrib (later to transfer to Egypt) and the Umayyad caliphate in al-Andalus. At this point, conspiracies and wars began between these three political entities and weakness entered the body of the Islamic state, encouraging the enemies of the *umma* to seize possession of it. The Franks, with the support of the Catholic Popes, were the first to challenge Islamic global economic dominance. Thus, the first major military confrontation occurred between the Christian West and the Muslim East in what became known as the Crusades. These continued for more than 200 years (490–691/1096–1291). The ostensible cause was religious but the intrinsic cause was economic as indicated, for example, by the pillage and looting of Muslim, Christian and Jewish property by those who took part in the First Crusade.

The Islamic world also faced the Mongol advance from the east – this devastated the Islamic East as far as Baghdad, which fell to the Mongols in 656/1258. The Mongols continued westward, with the cooperation of the Crusaders on several occasions, until their defeat at the battle of ‘Ayn Jālūt in 658/1260.

Despite these attacks against the Islamic world, Islam remained strong and cohesive. The Ottoman Turks soon took over the caliphate and thus the leadership of the Muslims. They exerted outstanding efforts to protect Islam and to disseminate it in Eastern and Central Europe, and were able to bring about the fall of the Byzantine empire in 857/1453. They were subsequently engaged in a long struggle with the European powers which continued until 1343/1924.

With the failure of the Crusader campaigns against the Islamic East, the West focused its attention on Islamic Spain and Sicily. With the support of the Pope, the French, Germans and Normans, the Spanish were able to expel the Muslims from al-Andalus in a long series of wars known as the *Reconquista* which finally ended in 898/1492. The historical sources indicate that 3 million Muslims were killed in Spain in the period between the fall of Granada in 898/1492 and the beginning of the seventeenth century, and that

some 1 million Muslims were expelled to the countries of the Arab Maghrib.¹ From these people was formed an army of warriors, or pirates as they are called in European sources, who began raiding Spain and attacking European merchant ships in revenge for what had befallen them in al-Andalus.

The Spanish, Portuguese, Normans and French were not content with expelling the Muslims from al-Andalus and Sicily; they also repeatedly raided the coasts of the Arab Maghrib, occupying the city of Tripoli in 916/1510, Marsa-l-Kabīr and Sabta (Ceuta) in 818/1415 and Melilla and Tangier in 876/1471. This protracted confrontation affected commercial relations between the East and Europe, drawing the Ottomans to the western coast of the Mediterranean and enabling them to expand their control over the countries of the Maghrib with the exception of the far west. The involvement of the Turks protected Islam and the Muslims in this part of the Mediterranean.

When the Europeans, under the leadership of the Portuguese and Spanish, saw the damage to their economic interests as a result of Muslim control of trade routes to the Far East, they sought an alternative route. By travelling around Africa, the Cape of Good Hope and thence to India and the Far East, they reached the source of the spice, perfume, sugar, tea and silk trade. The discovery of the sea route to the Far East, along with the New World of the Americas, had a deleterious effect on all activities in the Islamic countries and ultimately resulted in the stagnation of their economies, the drying up of their financial resources and their scientific and military decline. This led to their collapse at the hands of the European powers, which competed with one another to divide up the Islamic countries. Under Napoleon's leadership, France invaded Egypt in 1798, Algeria in 1830 and Tunisia in 1881. Italy invaded Libya in 1911. In 1912 Morocco fell under French occupation and, during the First World War, Syria, the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Yemen and Iran were occupied. Most Muslim countries in the Far East fell under British control, while Great Britain and France divided up the Islamic countries in Africa.

Despite the European colonial powers' hegemony over the Muslim countries of Africa and Asia and the Arab countries of the Middle East, and their attempts to suppress Islam and its glorious history, the religion remained strong. Attempts to convert the population to Christianity, and to Westernize them and encourage the adoption of a European lifestyle, were unsuccessful. Colonialism did, however, succeed in creating a fifth column which tried to serve colonialism, even after its demise, but this was thwarted by liberators and nationalists in the Arab and Islamic lands.

1 Philip K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, London, Macmillan, 1970, p. 556.

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During the two world wars, the colonialists were forced to conscript thousands of Muslims into their colonial armies, and the conscripts began to debate among themselves about control over the Third World, including the Islamic countries. Furthermore, the colonialists transported hundreds of thousands of Muslim labourers to their countries or colonies to help with construction projects for the colonial states. It was these labourers who spread Islam to regions such as Australia and countries in the Americas, Africa and Europe.

With the Axis powers defeated and millions of Europeans killed, Europe needed thousands of Muslim labourers to rebuild the war-damaged continent. Islam was also spread in Europe by means of these labourers. With the passage of time, the number of these émigrés has begun to increase due to a variety of reasons, including the higher birth rate, family reunification and the conversion to Islam of non-Muslims, particularly in Europe. There are currently estimated to be around 15 million Muslims in Europe. Elsewhere, 282 million Muslims live as a minority in non-Islamic Asian countries, there are 4 million in the Americas, approximately 3 million in Australia and about 70 million in non-Islamic Africa.² Several sources indicate that during recent years there have been approximately 200,000 converts to Islam in France.³

We see that Islam, which began with the Prophet Muḥammad and a few individuals has now, by the grace of God, become a religion of more than 1.5 billion people. Indeed, every fifth person in the world is Muslim, that is, 20 per cent of the world's population.⁴ Despite Western propaganda directed against Islam – what has become known as 'Islamophobia' – especially after the events of 11 September 2001, every day Islam continues to attract more converts in all parts of the world. Muslims are increasing in number and in strength. Islam is safeguarded whenever it faces difficulties in this world, by the grace of God and by virtue of the Glorious Qur'ān kept in the hearts of the Muslims, which says: 'We have, without doubt, sent down the Message; and We will assuredly guard it (from corruption).'⁵

2 Ra'd Jabbara, *Muslim Minorities*, Tehran, al-Huda Est., 2000, p. 42; see also Jorgen Nielsen, *Muslims in Western Europe*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1992.

3 Nielsen, *Muslims*, pp. 65–6.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 43.

5 *Al-Hijr*, 15:9.

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Address: Section of General and Regional Histories,
Division of Cultural Policies and Intercultural Dialogue,
Sector of Culture
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1, rue Miollis
75732 PARIS Cedex 15
(France)

The texts were revised by Ronald P. Buckley, Senior Lecturer in Arabic
Studies, the University of Manchester, U.K.

Iconography: Mehrdad Shabahang

Copy preparation: Jana Gough

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

ON THE AUTHORS

ABD AL-LATIF Bahjat Kamil (Iraq)

A professor of history and Islamic studies of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Baghdad; former head of the Department of History and former dean of the Faculty of Arts and the Faculty of Education at the University of Basra; former dean of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Baghdad; former director of Arab Encyclopaedia (ALECSO); and member of the Scientific Committee for drafting the reference book on *The History of the Arab Nation* (ALECSO). He has published over seventy papers and books in the field of Islamic studies.

AENEHVAND Sadegh (The Islamic Republic of Iran)

A professor of Islamic history since 1996, former head of the Department of History, former head of the Department of Social Studies and former dean of the Faculty of Humanities at the Tarbiat Modares University in Tehran; director of the Society for Iranian History; member of the board of directors of the Iranian Society for Women Studies; member of board of directors at the Association for Islamic History of Iran; managing director of the *International Journal of Humanities*; chief editor of the *Journal of Islamic Civilization* in Arabic; member of the editorial board of the *Modares Journal*. He has published numerous papers and articles as well as more than twenty books in various fields including the history of political Islam, science of history in Islamic civilization, history of women in early Islam and translation in eastern Islam.

AKBAR Muhammad (USA)

An associate professor of history and African studies at Binghamton University in New York, he is a specialist in African history and the study of Islam in Africa and the Americas. A PHD from Edinburgh University, he has also studied the theory of Arabic and Islamic law at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. He is the co-editor of *Racism, Sexism and*

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE AUTHORS

the World-System. His writings have also focused on slavery in Muslim Africa, Muslims in the United States and integration in Nigeria.

AL-ALIM Abd al-Salam Muhammad al-Sherif (Libya)

A professor of Islamic Law of the Faculty of Law at the University of Benghazi; professor of Law of the Faculty of Law at Al-Fatih University in Tripoli; and visiting professor at the Islamic Da`wa College in Tripoli.

AL-HILALY Taj al-Din (Australia)

A former mufti of Australia, New Zealand and the neighbouring islands; member of the International Council of the Islamic Da`wa; and president of the Council of Islamic Jurisprudence. He has published several books on Islamic civilization, jurisprudence, dialogue, youth and the Palestinian Question.

AL-MALLAH Hashim Yahya (Iraq)

A professor of Islamic history of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Mosul since 1977. He has published more than seventy papers and books in the various areas of history and Islamic civilization, such as *The Governmental System of the Prophet Muhammad: A Comparative Study in Constitutional Law* and widely known contributions to the *History of the Arabs before Islam, the Prophet and the rightly-guided Caliphs*, a reference book on the philosophy of history.

AL -ZELITNY Abdallah Salem (Libya)

An assistant professor of history and Islamic civilization and former head of the History Department, Faculty of Arts, at the University of Benghazi.

AMIN Abd al-Amir Hussain (Iraq)

A professor of history and PHD in history from Alexandria University in Egypt; the first Iraqi visiting lecturer at Martin Luther University in Germany; former and visiting professor at twenty-one universities in Iraq and abroad; former and first chair of the Iraqi Society of History; first secretary-general of the Union of the Arab Historians; first editor in chief of the *Journal of History* in Iraq; first editor in chief of the *Journal of Arab Historians*; first chair of the Multqā ar-ruwwād Forum; former head of the Division of Cultural Heritage at the Institute of Higher Studies; and former head of the Department of History at the Centre for Arabic Research and Studies of the Arab League. He has published fifteen books in the various fields of history.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE AUTHORS

AQIL Mohammad Nabih (Syrian Arab Republic)

A professor of Islamic history at the University of Damascus; former head of the Department of History (1969–1973) and dean of the Faculty of Letters at the University of Damascus (1973–1977); chief of the History Department and dean of the Faculty of Education at the University of the United Arab Emirates (1977–1979); and assistant secretary-general of the Union of Arab Universities (1985–1988). He is the author of a number of books and articles published in Arabic and English.

BALIC Smail (Bosnia and Herzegovina)

A librarian and curator for oriental languages and linguistics at the National Library of Austria; research fellow in Arabic and Islamic studies at the J.W. Goethe University in Frankfurt; and first director of the Institut der Bosniaken in Zurich. He published many scholarly works including *Kultura Bosniaka* (1973), *Ruf vom Minarett* (1984), *Das unbekannteste Bosnien* (1992), *Der Islam – europakonform?* (1994) and *Mostar – Wem gehört die leidgeprüfte bosnische Stadt?* (1993).

BOSWORTH Clifford Edmund (United Kingdom)

An emeritus professor of Arabic studies of the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Manchester, England; lecturer in Arabic at St. Andrews University (1956–1967); visiting associate professor at Toronto University (1965–1966); professor of Arabic studies (1967–1990) and later an emeritus professor and honorary fellow at the University of Manchester; visiting professor at Kuwait University (1975); visiting fellow of the Middle East Centre at Harvard University (1997); honorary professor at the University of Wales (1997); and visiting professor of the Institute of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Exeter (2004). He has published numerous books and articles, including *The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran 994–1040* (1963) and *The Islamic Dynasties: A Chronological and Genealogical Handbook* (revised ed. 1980). He is the editor of two volumes of *The History of Civilizations of Central Asia* (UNESCO) and of the new edition of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*.

DEMIRKENT İşin (Turkey)

An assistant professor and later professor of History of the Department of History, Faculty of Letters, at Istanbul University, she studied and conducted research at the J.W. Goethe University in Frankfurt. Founding member of the Turkish History Society (from 1983 until her death in 2006). She is author of a number of publications, including *Urfa Haçlı*

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE AUTHORS

Kontluđu Tarihi (1098–1118), Urfa Haçli Kontluđu Tarihi (1118–1146), Turkiye Selçuku Hükümdari Sultan I. Kiliç Arslan and Istanbul Albümü.

DEWEESE Devin (USA)

A professor of Islamic and Central Eurasian studies at Indiana University in Bloomington and former director of the Sinor Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies at Indiana University (1997–2007). He is the author of many works and articles in the fields of Islamic Central Asia, Sufism, Islamization and religions in Inner Asia. One his well-known works is *Islamization and Native Religion in the Golden Horde: Baba Tükles and Conversion to Islam in Historical and Epic Tradition* (1994).

EL-GANZOURY Aliyya (Egypt)

A professor of medieval history of the Girls' College at Ain Shams University in Egypt and member of the Union of the Arab Historians and the Egyptian Society of History. He is the author of several books and papers on the relations between Islamic States and Byzantium, medieval terrestrial ports of the Muslim world, women in the Byzantine Empire and the Crusades.

EL HAREIR Idris (Libya)

A professor of history of the Faculty of Arts at the University of Benghazi; visiting professor at the universities of Muhammad V in Rabat and Sidi Muhammad Ben Abdallah in Fez as well as in Howard University, the University of Utah, the University of Michigan and Ann Arber, in the United States, and the Islamic College of London. He is the president of the International Scientific Committee for the elaboration of *The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture*; former representative of the WICS to UNESCO; member of the International Scientific Committee for the elaboration of *The General History of Africa* (1978–1999); and vice-president of the Scientific Committee for the preparation and publication of the reference book on *The History of the Arab Nation* (ALECSO). He is a member of several associations and committees, including the Union of the Arab Historians, the Libyan Association of Historians and the Libyan Centre for History. He is the author of numerous publications in English and Arabic including contributions to *The General History of Africa* (UNESCO), *The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture* (UNESCO) and the reference book on *The History of the Arab Nation* (ALECSO).

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE AUTHORS

FRYE Richard (USA)

A professor of Iranian Studies at Aga Khan University in Karachi; former director of The Asia Institute at the Pahlavi University in Shiraz; visiting professor at Frankfurt University, Hamburg University and the University of Tajikistan; founder of the Centre for Middle East Studies (CMES), the Aga Khan Chair of Iranian Studies and the Indo-Pakistan Studies at Harvard University; and founder of the Hagop Kevorkian Chair of Iranian Studies at Columbia University. He is the editor and compiler of the encyclopaedic Persian dictionary *Dekhodia*. Some of his best-known works on Iranian and Central Asian history and culture are *The Heritage of Persia*, *The History of Ancient Iran*, *The Heritage of Central Asia*, *Greater Iran* and *Bukhara: The Medieval Achievement*.

KARIĆ Enes (Bosnia and Herzegovina)

A professor of Islamic history and civilization of the Faculty of Islamic Studies and associate professor in post-graduate studies of the faculties of Law, Philosophy and Political Sciences at Sarajevo University. He has written several titles, papers and articles in Arabic, English, Bosnian and German on religion, philosophy and hermeneutics, and translated numerous books including his Bosnian version of the Qur'ān.

LEE Hee-Soo (Republic of Korea)

A professor of history and Islamic culture at Hanyang University in Seoul; former lecturer at the Seoul National University; visiting professor at the University of Washington and assistant professor at Marmara University in Istanbul; former research fellow at the Islamic Education Centre in Jeddah, the CERES and Bourghiba School in Tunis, the Public Record Centre in London and the IRCICA Centre in Istanbul. He is the author of numerous books, including *Islam for Children*, *The Mediterranean Cultures*, *Islam in Korea*, *World History*, *Maritime Silk Roads*, *Endless Wars: Minority Conflicts in the Muslim World*. He translated many books into Korean and has published many articles in academic journals and encyclopaedias. A winner of the Best Professor Award (2000) and Best Teacher Award (2009) from the University of Hanyang and chairman of the Academic Council of International Institute of Central Asian Studies.

M'BAYE El Hadji Ravane (Senegal)

A professor of Islamic studies at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar since 1998; president of the Centre for Islamic Studies in Dakar; director-general of the Islamic Institute of Dakar; inspector-general at the Ministry of Education since 1983; visiting professor at Memphis

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE AUTHORS

University since 1998; member of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy; member and later president of the International Scientific Committee for the preparation and publication of a work on *The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture* and editor of volume III. He has published numerous articles and papers in national and international periodicals and encyclopaedias, including *the Encyclopédie de la Pléiade* (Paris) and *Revue Science et liberté*. He has translated a several books from Arabic into French and written many studies on Islamic studies.

NADWI Sayyid Rizwan Ali (Pakistan)

Chairman, Markaz–E–Fahm al–Qur’an; former professor of history and Islamic civilization at the University of Benghazi; former professor of history and Islamic studies at Imam Ibn Saud University in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; and former chair and professor of Arabic at Karachi University.

OÇAK Ahmet Yaçar (Turkey)

A professor of history at Hacettepe University in Ankara. His work on Seljuk and Ottoman social, cultural and religious history and his extensive publications include *La révolte des Babais ou la formation de l'hétérodoxie musulmane en Anatolie au XIII^{ème} siècle*; *Osmanli Imparatorlugu'nda Marginal Sufilik*; *Popular islamin Balkanlar'daki destani onkusu*; *Osmanli toplumunda zindiklarve mulhidler*; *Social and Intellectual Life (1071–1453) in The Cambridge History of Turkey*, volume 1; *From History to Theology: Ali in Islamic Beliefs*; and *Sufism and Sufis in the Ottoman Society*.

SHALABY Ahmad (Egypt)

A professor of history and Islamic civilization and former head of the Department of History, Dar al-'Ulum Faculty at Cairo University, and professor of history in Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia; former editor-in-chief of the *Majallat al-Zahraa'*, a periodical of the Arab League Institute of Islamic Studies; former member of the Higher Council of Islamic Affairs; and former member of the Higher Council for Culture. He has published a number of books and papers including a ten-volume *Encyclopaedia of Islamic History* in Arabic, as well as other titles in English and Indonesian.

TAHA Abd al Wahid Dhanun (Iraq)

A professor of history and Islamic civilization since 1988; dean of the College of Education at the University of Mosul; editor-in-chief of the *Journal of Education and Science* at Mosul University; former visiting

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE AUTHORS

professor at other Iraqi universities, at al-Yarmuk, Al al-Bayt and al-Zarqa universities in Jordan, and at Aden, Ta`iz and San`ā' universities in Yemen. He has published over 130 papers and articles in Iraqi, Arab, Spanish, French and Arab journals and encyclopaedias, as well as eighteen books, including *Iraq under al-Hajjāj b. Yusuf*, *The Origins of Historical Research*, *History of al-Andalus*, *Ibn `Idhārī al-Marrākushī*, *The Umayyads*, *Studies on the History and Civilization of the Maghrib*, *History and Civilization of the Mashriq* and *The Muslim Conquest and Settlement of North Africa and Spain*.

TALIB Yusof Ahmad (Singapore)

An associate professor and former head of the Department of Malay Studies at the National University of Singapore, and a specialist in Islam, the Malay world and the Middle East, including South-West Arabia. He is the author of many publications in the fields of history and Islamic civilization, Islam in South East Asia and the history of Africa, including the relations between Africa and the Indian Ocean. A former member of the International Scientific Committee for drafting *The General History of Africa* (UNESCO) and member of the editorial board therein for the Arabic version; editor of volume VI, *Islam in the World today*, of *The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture*.

THIAM Iba Der (Senegal)

A professor of history at Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar; member of the Executive Board of ISESCO; and first vice president of the National Assembly of Senegal. Former minister of education (1983–1988); former director of the École Normale Supérieure in Dakar; former director of the Université des Mutants set up by President Senghor; former member of the Executive Board of UNESCO; member of the International Scientific Commission for drafting a *History of Humanity* and co-editor of volumes VI and VII (UNESCO); editor of volume VI, *Islam in the World Today*, of *The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture* (UNESCO). He is the author of numerous articles and papers on various subjects of geography, history and politics as well as of several books on contemporary history, intercultural and interreligious dialogue and World War I and II.

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