

THE
DIFFERENT
ASPECTS
OF ISLAMIC
CULTURE

VOLUME SIX

*Islam
in the world
today*

Editors:
Abdulrahim Ali
Iba Der Thiam
Yusof A. Talib



PART I
RETROSPECTIVE OF THE EVOLUTION OF
ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

UNESCO Publishing

THE DIFFERENT
ASPECTS OF ISLAMIC
CULTURE

6

THE DIFFERENT
ASPECTS
OF ISLAMIC
CULTURE

VOLUME SIX

—
ISLAM IN THE
WORLD TODAY

—
PART I
RETROSPECTIVE OF THE EVOLUTION OF
ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

Editors: Abdulrahim Ali, Iba Der Thiam and Yusof A. Talib

U N E S C O P u b l i s h i n g

Published in 2016 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 7, place de Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP, France

© UNESCO 2016

ISBN 978-92-3-100132-1



This publication is available in Open Access under the Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 IGO (CC-BY-SA 3.0 IGO) license (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/igo/>). By using the content of this publication, the users accept to be bound by the terms of use of the UNESCO Open Access Repository (<http://www.unesco.org/open-access/terms-use-ccbysa-en>).

The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNESCO concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

The ideas and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors; they are not necessarily those of UNESCO and do not commit the Organization.

Note: dates separated by a slash (e.g. 212/827) are given first according to the Muslim lunar calendar (AH), and then according to the Christian/common era calendar (CE/AD).

The preparation and publication of this volume have been funded by the World Islamic Call Society (WICS).

Cover photo: Stucco (8th to 9th century) Ibn Tulun Mosque, Cairo (Egypt)

Cover design: UNESCO

Layout and printing: Dergham sarl, Beirut – Lebanon

Printed in Beirut – Lebanon

P R E F A C E

The UNESCO Constitution states that ‘ignorance of each other’s ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples through which their differences have all too often broken into war.’

Since its creation 70 years ago, UNESCO’s message has been that of highlighting the value of diversity, to build understanding and dialogue, while fighting discrimination and upholding human rights.

UNESCO’s Histories project is a flagship to take forward this ambition. *The different aspects of the Islamic culture* makes a seminal contribution to exploring the richness of Islamic civilization, and its immense contribution to the history of humanity. In 1976, the General Conference of UNESCO launched this vital work, which has since been carried out with equal passion and determination.

The scope of these volumes is broad. They document the theological foundations of Islam, the status of the individual and society in the Islamic world, the expansion of Islam and the way in which the rights of converted peoples were preserved, the fundamental contribution of Islam to education, science and technology, as well as the cultural achievements of Islamic civilization, through literature, philosophy, art and architecture.


These volumes show how, over centuries, Islam has been a driving force in the rapprochement of cultures, and provided a framework within which diverse cultures could flourish and interact. At a time when violent extremists seek to distort the message of religion, it is critical that we share the depth of wisdom of Islam as a religion of peace, moderation and tolerance.

In the Middle Ages, the influence of Islamic civilization was felt throughout the world. From the China Sea to the Atlantic coast of Africa, people who embraced Islam adopted a set of cultural and spiritual references while preserving their own identity. Muslim thinkers and scientists, drawing on

the rich heritage of Greece, developed their own worldviews and influenced the emergence of the European Renaissance. Muslim philosophers, geographers, physicists, mathematicians, botanists and doctors made influential contributions to the adventure of science. Averroës taught at the University of Padua in Italy, and knowledge travelled with no heed across borders. Islamic culture developed a conception of the individual and the universe, a philosophy of life and art that has profoundly shaped our common history and our societies as they stand today.

This creative diversity, anchored within universal spiritual and cultural references and values, offered fertile ground for the dynamic development of scientific knowledge, artistic refinement and intellectual exchange that marked all great Islamic civilizations.

I wish to thank the eminent scholars from all over the world who have contributed to this Collection and guaranteed its high scientific standards. It is my hope that this Collection, which is now completed with the publication of volume VI, will encourage a more informed understanding of Islam, its culture, values and civilization, and promote further intercultural dialogue and the rapprochement of cultures. I am also determined that the in-depth knowledge presented in these volumes reach a wide audience, so that that young generations take pride and draw lessons from this heritage, in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.



Irina Bokova
Director-General of UNESCO

CONTENTS

List of maps and figures 13

Introduction

Abdelwahab A. Boubdiba 19

I – From the fall of Granada to the abolition of the caliphate (1492–1924)

CHAPTER 1.1

The expulsion of the Muslims from Andalusia and its consequences

Idris El-Hareir 27

CHAPTER 1.2

The impact of the great discoveries on the Islamic world

Iba Der Thiam 37

CHAPTER 1.3

Islamic revival in the Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal Empires

Yusuf A. Talib 45

CHAPTER 1.4

The Golden Age of Islam in the Sahel: the example of Songhay
humanism

Djibril Tamsir Niane 53

- CHAPTER 1.5
Islam in the Greater Maghreb
Idris El-Hareir 63
- CHAPTER 1.6 (a)
Colonial penetration and counter resistance movements in the Muslim
countries of Asia from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century
Yusuf A. Talib 85
- CHAPTER 1.6 (b)
Colonial penetration and resistance movements in Africa's Muslim
countries
Iba Der Thiam 91
- CHAPTER 1.6 (c)
Colonial penetration and resistance movements in the Arab
countries (the Arab East)
Idris El-Hareir 97
- CHAPTER 1.7
A forgotten page in the saga of the Suez Canal: from the Statue of
Liberty to the Statue of Lesseps: the story of a dual diversion
Ahmed Yousuf 121
- CHAPTER 1.8
Colonial imperialism: the partition of Africa at the 1885 Berlin
Conference and its consequences for African Muslims
Thierno Bah 133
- CHAPTER 1.9
The impact of the First World War on the Muslim world
Iba Der Thiam 139
- CHAPTER 1.10
Towards the creation of the State of Israel
Khairia Kasmieh 151
- CHAPTER 1.11
The Russian Revolution of October 1917 and its consequences for
the Muslim world
Iba Der Thiam 161

CHAPTER 1.12

Peace treaties and their consequences for the Muslim world

Omar Ibrahim El-Affas 171

II – Pan-Islamism and its role in the revival and affirmation of
the Muslim world (from 1924 to 1963)

CHAPTER 2.1

The abolition of the caliphate: causes and consequences

Basheer M. Nafi 183

CHAPTER 2.2

Resurgence of the struggle against foreign occupation in the
Muslim world

Iba Der Thiam 193

CHAPTER 2.3

The consequences of the Second World War on the Muslim world

Iba Der Thiam 213

CHAPTER 2.4

Creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and its impact on the
Muslim world

Khairia Kasmieh 227

CHAPTER 2.5

The emergence of Arab nationalism

Ali Muhammad Shembesh 239

CHAPTER 2.6

Nationalism and independence in South Asia

Fredj Maatoug 257

CHAPTER 2.7

The Bandung Conference

Ali Muhammad Shembesh 277

CHAPTER 2.8

Pan-Islamism and the struggle for independence in Africa

Iba Der Thiam 285

- CHAPTER 2.9
The creation of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference
Mustafa Cissé 295
- CHAPTER 2.10
Creation of the Organisation of African Unity
Ali Muhammad Shembesh 303
- III – The years of confrontation within the Muslim world
(1964–2003)
- CHAPTER 3.1
Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict 1964–2006
Khairia Kasmieh 317
- CHAPTER 3.2
The Kashmir question
Tabir Amin 349
- CHAPTER 3.3
The Iranian Revolution and the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty
Fredj Maatoug 369
- CHAPTER 3.4
The war in Afghanistan and its consequences
Omar Ibrahim El-^cAffas 391
- CHAPTER 3.5
The collapse of the Soviet Union
Fredj Maatoug 403
- CHAPTER 3.6
The war in Chechnya
Fredj Maatoug 419
- CHAPTER 3.7
The Gulf War: from the Iraq-Iran War (1980–8) to the 1991 Kuwait
War
Fredj Maatoug 433

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 3.8	
The events of 11 September 2001 and their consequences for Islam and the Muslim world	
<i>Fredj Maatoug</i>	457
CHAPTER 3.9	
Issue of terrorism and resistance	
<i>Fredj Maatoug</i>	471
CHAPTER 3.10	
The 2003 Iraq War	
<i>Fredj Maatoug</i>	487
General bibliography	501
Members of the International Scientific Committee and the Secretariat	519
Biographical notes on the authors	521
General index	529

LIST OF MAPS AND FIGURES

- I-2.1 Sankore Mosque, one of several historic madrasas in Timbuktu, Mali 41
- I-2.2 Mud brick mosque in Timbuktu, Mali, Africa 43
- I-3.1 Children file across the courtyard of Dargah Mosque, built by the Moghul emperor Akbar in his short-lived capital of Fatehpur Sikri 46
- I-3.2 Illuminated Ottoman Qurʾān from the seventeenth century 48
- I-3.3 Fatehpur Sikri, the city built by the Moghul emperor Akbar between 1571 and 1573 50
- I-3.4 A dark-green jade pot, 14 cm high, that once furnished the Safavid palace at Tabriz, and probably passed into Ottoman hands in the sixteenth century. Before that, the dragon-headed handle suggests that it may have belonged to a Timurid ruler 51
- I-4.1 The great mosque of Djenné, Mali, with a view of the weekly market in its grounds 55
- I-4.2 Songhai scholarship; Islamic scholarly texts at the Ahmed Baba Institute of Higher Learning and Islamic Research in Timbuktu, Mali 59
- I-4.3 The tomb of Askiya Muhammad in Gao, Mali (built 1495) 61
- I-5.1 The Alhambra in Granada; view of the Court of Lions 69
- I-5.2 The Alhambra in Granada 72
- I-5.3 The Hassan II Mosque in Casablanca, Morocco 76
- I-6(a).1 A traditional Indonesian market selling vegetables and spices 86
- I-6(a).2 Clock tower built by the Dutch in 1926 in Bukittinggi, Sumatra, Indonesia 88
- I-6(a).3 An official visit by the French minister Marius Moutet to Pondicherry in January 1946 90

- I-6(b).1 The trade links between Europe and Africa in the sixteenth-eighteenth centuries 92
- I-6(b).2 The Cazemajou Fort in Zinder, Niger, photographed in 1930, named after the French captain of the same name who was killed there in 1898 93
- I-6(b).3 Timzak pass in Mauritania; a stopping place fitted out by French troops 94
- I-6(b).4 The railway from Kayes (Mali) to Niger in 1894 95
- I-6(c).1 Harry St. John (later, ‘Abd Allāh) Philby, an early Western explorer of Arabia and agent of the British Government who met the Saudi Arabian King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz in 1917, and ultimately settled in Jeddah, becoming one of the king’s confidants 104
- I-6(c).2 Postage stamp from the Kingdom of Egypt, established in 1922 following recognition of Egyptian independence by the British 109
- I-7.1 Ships passing on the Suez Canal in April 1957 122
- I-7.2 An aerial view of the al-Ballah by-pass, a stretch of the Suez Canal, in 1957 125
- I-7.3 Clearing the Suez Canal; the UN salvage fleet lifts and removes the damaged eastern section of the al-Ferdan bridge 128
- I-8.1 A Touareg chieftain in Mali, photographed c.1895, an important part of the resistance to colonialism 134
- I-8.2 General inspection of the French camp at Thiès, Senegal c.1889 137
- I-9.1 A poster encouraging Algerians to sign up to the Compagnie Algérienne during the First World War 141
- I-10.1 Jerusalem, the Dome of Notre Dame Church and the Dome of the Rock 154
- I-10.2 Egyptian prisoners of war being returned to Egypt from Israel in 1957 157
- I-12.1 The gold hilt of a seventeenth century Ottoman broad-sword attributed erroneously to the Caliph ‘Uthman Osman 1, who founded the Ottoman dynasty in 1281 172
- II-1.1 The head of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, on a gold coin issued in 1960 185
- II-2.1 The spread of Islam in Africa by 1500 195
- II-2.2 Africa in 1900 200
- II-2.3 El Hadj Ibrahima Seck, Imam of Conakry, photographed in Dakar, Senegal, c.1930 on his return from pilgrimage to Mecca. Religious leaders were often also focal points for the resistance movement 206
- II-3.1 A poster criticizing Winston Churchill over the battles of Dakar (Senegal) and Mers-al-Kébir (Algeria), in 1940 220

- II-3.2 A recruitment poster for the French colonial forces c.1945 223
- II-4.1 Palestinian refugees constructing shelters in Jalazone camp, Palestine, in December 1949 228
- II-4.2 The partition of Palestine as proposed by the majority of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947 229
- II-4.3 A destroyed and deserted Palestinian village, 1948 232
- II-4.4 The opening day of the UN Security Council's debate on the question of Palestine, 24 February 1948 235
- II-4.5 Citizens in Gaza receiving supplies from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in May 1957 236
- II-5.1 The Arab League 245
- II-5.2 The Arab League in its early years: A.R. Azzam, Secretary-General of the Arab League, records a broadcast on U.N. Radio in 1950, to be used by radio stations across the Arab States 251
- II-5.3 Gamal Abdel Nasser in May 1963 252
- II-6.1 The Jāmi' Masjid in Delhi, India's largest mosque 260
- II-6.2 The main entrance of the Selangor State mosque, Malaysia 271
- II-7.1 A commemoration of the Golden Jubilee of the Bandung Conference of 1955, held on 24 April 2005, Bandung, Indonesia 277
- II-8.1 Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, founder of the pan-Islam movement and resistance to the British mandate 289
- II-9.1 The headquarters of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 295
- II-9.2 An OIC conference in 1972, held in Jeddah 296
- II-9.3 Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC), addresses a press conference 297
- II-10.1 An OAU press conference held in November 1972 at United Nations Headquarters 304
- II-10.2 A poster advertising the first All-Africa Games, in Brazzaville, July 1965 306
- III-1.1 Yasser Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, speaking before the UN General Assembly in 1974 321
- III-1.2 The General Assembly adopted a resolution granting Palestine the status of non-member observer state in the United Nations on 29th November 2012. This photo shows the Palestinian Delegation to the UN following the vote, with Maḥmūd Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority (front centre) 326
- III-1.3 Joint conference between Israeli and Jordanian commanders in Jerusalem in May 1950, in order to try and establish communications between Arab and Jewish Jerusalem 335
- III-1.4 Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, 'Amr Moussa, addresses a meeting of the Committee on Palestine of the Foreign Ministers of the Group of Arab States in January 2009 338

- III-2.1 Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), leading poet, intellectual, and politician from British India, and a crucial figure in the Pakistan movement 353
- III-2.2 The innovative Faysal Mosque in Islamabad, Pakistan, completed in 1986 359
- III-2.3 Interior view of the Faysal Mosque, in Islamabad, Pakistan. The biggest mosque in Pakistan, it has room for some 10,000 worshippers 365
- III-3.1 Demonstrators gather in front of the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, 8 March 1980 383
- III-4.1 Bamiyan valley, Afghanistan, showing one of the niches that housed giant standing Buddhas until their destruction in 2001 392
- III-4.2 Afghani refugee children playing at the Sosmaqala Internally Displaced Persons Camp in northern Afghanistan, in August 2009 396
- III-4.3 Daily life in Afghanistan: a vegetable stall in a traditional Afghan market 399
- III-4.4 The Mazar-i-Sharif, or Blue Mosque, in Afghanistan 401
- III-5.1 The breakup of Soviet Russia 405
- III-5.2 Worshippers in Uzbekistan 410
- III-5.3 Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, addressing the United Nations General Assembly in December 1988 414
- III-6.1 Bakery run by internally displaced persons from Chechnya in January 1997, many of whom fled from the fighting to the neighbouring autonomous republics of North Ossetia, Dagestan and Ingushetia 426
- III-7.1 The United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), deployed to supervise the Iran-Iraq ceasefire and withdrawal of troops in 1988 440
- III-7.2 The aftermath of the Gulf War for the Iraqi population in 1991; women waiting for humanitarian aid in Karbala, Iraq 444
- III-7.3 United Nations inspectors working to dispose of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons capacity in June 1991 454
- III-8.1 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visits the 9/11 memorial in New York City, in 2011, to offer his respects to those who were killed in the attacks on September 11, 2001 464
- III-9.1 Refugee Palestinian children in June 1967, making the difficult crossing into Jordan over the King Hussein Bridge (formerly the Allenby Bridge), which had been badly damaged during the fighting between Israel and Jordan 475

- III-9.2 Repairs begin after a double suicide attack by the al-Qaeda-affiliated extremist group al-Shabaab killed 18 people and injured dozens more at a restaurant in Mogadishu, Somalia in September 2013 479
- III-9.3 A suicide attack devastating the UN Headquarters in Baghdad and killing at least 22 people, including the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello. Some 100 people were wounded in the blast, which was caused by a bomb concealed in a truck parked outside the headquarters, in August 2003 483
- III-10.1 Al-Kadhimiya Mosque, Baghdad, Iraq 490
- III-10.2 A man selling textiles in a souk in Suleimaniyah, Iraq, in 1997 493
- III-10.3 United Nations observation post in northern Iraq, June 1998 494
- III-10.4 Members of the Fijian colour guard and the guard unit of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) on mission in Baghdad, Iraq, in February 2009 498

INTRODUCTION

Abdelwahab Bouhdiba

This is the last volume of UNESCO's major work on *The different aspects of Islamic culture*. It aims to show that Islam does not belong only to the past, and that its surprising and astonishing vitality is indeed part of today's world. The five previous volumes of the collection covered what is known as 'classical' Islam. By this is meant that the accomplishments of centuries have passed into history and that, as tangible achievements from the past, they now belong to the world's heritage. But people do not inherit only the past. What might be even more important for them is to inherit the future, as a project to be implemented, a work to be produced, a world to contribute to and a history that must be constructed, moment by moment. Classical Greece and classical Rome are discussed readily, it is true, but as civilizations that reached their limits. Greece and Rome in those forms were only really in existence for a few centuries, and if we are still able to gain some sense of them, it is from their remains and from the memory of humanity. It is clear too that the Umayyad, 'Abbāsid, Songhay and Mughal civilizations also reached their limits, with their greatneses and weaknesses. These limits, like those that enclosed the civilization of Athens, encompass the limitlessness of a culture that is ever present. It is a paradox, but true, to say that classicism is the infinite embedded in the finite: the works of art and of the mind that constitute it are fixed for all time through the centuries, to rouse ever-renewed admiration. Classicism proclaims the 'closure' of a civilization's works and confers upon them the 'investiture' of eternity. We continue to turn to them out of nostalgia or for pleasure. The present opens up to them unprecedented prospects for the future. The volumes in this collection dedicated to literature, art and science in Islam from this perspective require no comment. This is the enigmatic eternity of civilizations.

Islam does not aim to be reduced to this, though, but to surpass itself. Like many other cultures, it considers that its continually renewed mission still

sets before it tasks to be accomplished. It sees itself adamantly as a way of life and as a project for the future. It is a future that is indeed backward-looking for some, but for many, its opening to the contemporary world cannot take place without a return to its roots and an espousal of the present, for better and for worse. A civilization's past, in Islam more than elsewhere, implies fidelity and commitment. The past is never worth anything per se, nor indeed is the future. It is people who give it value, or who devalue it. Only the synthesis of the two is creative. After all, the most committed attachment to the past is still part of the present! Today – in this volume – classicism, grounds for pride, is somewhat out of place: only inventiveness is required. The present volume is dedicated to this Islam in action, the Islam that tackles the explosive asperities of the present, with the heavy burden of the self, the strange ambiguity of the other, which has been actively making its way towards modernity for a couple of hundred years. After the many decades of its *nahḍa* (renaissance), it aims now, more than ever before, to put an end to its persistent status as a 'sleeping beauty', and dare to regain the historical initiative. Do Muslims have the means to do so, though? They certainly do not lack the determination. It will also require a great deal of work and a great deal of intelligence. Hence the economy of this volume: covering recent history, explaining its experiences and identifying its lessons on the one hand and, on the other, making an up-to-date assessment of the cultural, economic and strategic advantages Muslims can draw on to make a daring entrance into the third millennium.

The first part sets out the recent history of the peoples of Islam. It is a history made, as always, of success and failure, violence, rupture, continuity, energy spent wisely or wasted in the ensuing chaos and the zigzags of a momentous cycle of rise and fall, of colonization and decolonization, de-structuring and restructuring, change and resistance to change. It is, ultimately, a highly fruitful socio-historical dialectic. These cycles of effervescence and progress have nevertheless been conducive to the emergence of criminal, blind and in the long run ineffective violence: those who have now taken the path of terrorism are mistaken in their objectives and means. Far from ensuring that Islam is integrated in the universal human family, this path makes it an outcast among nations. By default and by excess, within and without, violence can only miss its objectives. It is not a solution. It is always a problem. It is considered above all as a desperate admission of failure, not as a sign of hope or positive engagement.

In order to understand Islam today, we need to reconstitute its recent history and imagine possible developments. Centrifugal and centripetal forces are at work upon it, with a blend of endogenous and exogenous influences. Pan-Islamism was devised – yesterday and today still and under varying titles and justifications – as a bastion that is a source of identity and an agent of the fusion of the many of 'us'. It is the unfulfilled but recurrent dream of Muslims. It may take many forms: aesthetic and peaceful, or activist and violent. The

unicity of God in fact has as its corollary the community of the faithful. That they are divided is a major theological scandal. However, from the community of faith to political union, there's many a slip twixt the cup and the lip. That community soon worn down by the emergence of nations and the differing outcomes of attempts at nation-building.

The last century – which was ideologically a continuation of the preceding century, barely renewing it – saw the merciless confrontation of the dialectic of the painful and often aborted birth of nations. Then, after the Baku Congress, nationalism and communism clashed in a terrible yet sterile way in the Middle East, Indonesia and Central Asia. Twin brothers and feuding brothers! All these movements seemed – with hindsight and its strange mockery – to emanate from the same effort: ensuring self-possession and recovering from the inside and the outside. This is no doubt the same insatiable quest for the self. Identity is a mirage, conceived and established as modernity against a background of nostalgia for an often mythical and embellished past or future. Tradition and revolution remain the two strings in the bow of Islam. We become very quickly disillusioned, and reality appears in its immense gravity, as modernity has a price and all-out change can only be painful. Balandier has long shown this. And the history of Islam, long before Balandier, has long shown it. Living life to the full today has a double cost. The social cost of progress and the cost of social progress – equally difficult to pay – must both be fully assumed, and at the same time. Reluctance, however, or even refusal, makes progress difficult if not explosive.

Obviously, whether we like it or not, Islam must meet the challenges of the day. No matter what anybody says, the problems that societies face are always new. The pitfalls of the mirage of the classic era make efforts inadequate. Being attached to anachronisms is being stuck in time. Hence the need for a dual analysis: of the actual problems of structure and conditions, and of the material and human assets required to face them, and especially not to forget that every day there are new situations and new decisions to be made. However important the economic and, above all, moral and cultural values of Islam, they are not safe havens, much less 'open sesame'. We cannot stand up for them without understanding their deeper meaning, nor can we simply denounce them as pernicious mystification. The second part of this volume is devoted to these perpetually new problems and their appropriate or inappropriate answers.

'New' problems abound, and this volume could not address them all. Some of them must be dealt with on account of their urgency, impact and challenges. The first and foremost is a fact that conditions all the others: Islam, which now has more than a billion and a half followers, has become globalized, not only because it has been hit by the full force of triumphant globalization throughout the world but also because, thanks to information

and communication technologies, it is now present in every corner of the planet. This forces it to become dialectic, to live with others, interact with them or confront them. It is necessary to learn to live in a minority and away from home. The minority status that it is 'granted' in Europe, North America and elsewhere is not always generous. Restrictions on social, cultural and above all political rights that are applied to discourage believers (exclusion, misperception and intolerance) frequently fall short of the universal norms of international law and of *jus cogens*. Minorities, immigrants, sometimes clandestine, these believers are often outcast, even when they manage to fit in and, as demonstrated by Max Weber, carve out a prominent place for themselves in the host country. The information on Muslim minorities gathered together here – for the first time, we believe – is valuable and needs to be analysed once again in order to clear new horizons for Islam on the five continents.

Whether expatriates or not, Muslims of all classes and categories aspire to wellbeing as never before. They seek consumption not poverty, jobs not unemployment, freedom not oppression, justice not exclusion. The scope is immense: food, healthcare, education, housing, information, leisure, places of worship and religious practise. The demand is as great as the resources are scarce in nature and quantity. Underdevelopment and the squaring of the circle: the situation has been discussed and analysed a thousand times over.

At present, access to education at all levels, from preschool to postgraduate, is perhaps above all the largest Muslim conundrum. The data presented here are invaluable. They bring together information from ongoing publications by UNESCO, ISESCO, ALECSO and states, exposing the shortcomings without always obtaining the hoped-for success. The policies aim at quality, certainly, but also quantity. Mass education, mass culture and mass entertainment, but elitism remains the obligatory step for all societies. Education must teach the masses, train professionals and develop the finest skills. All these choices and priorities are constantly challenged by inflows at the bottom and demands from the top. The policies thus focus on quality as well as quantity. Birth limitation or demographic transition? For a long time, Islam, in some countries at least, officially opposed the former. Is the 'natural' development of things bringing *de facto* answers that make this earlier reluctance pointless?

Equally invaluable is the information provided here on finance, economy and natural resources. Political will, and therefore the management of human affairs, is naturally crucial. The record figures reported on paper do not always reflect reality, owing to difficulties of capital absorption and implementation of the most justified and informed decisions. Vitality, wealth, experience and creativity are seldom lacking. Culture, however, with its constants and

its variables, remains the major conditioning factor. Material and cultural potential is nothing without experience and implementation. Legacy – heritage and moral values – is merely a potential to be developed, used and brought to fruition through work and wise choices.

This volume shows that Islam is naturally turned towards the future. That is its destiny. The information provided, by force of circumstance, is sure to change. In what way, it cannot be known. In any case, it constitutes a good basis for discussion, raises many questions and provides no more than tentative answers. With this attempted inventory of the material and moral potential, of the peoples of Islam, the direction of their trajectories can only be provisional and needs to be further defined. The management of these achievements and future challenges requires considerable discernment and willingness on the part of both scientists and decision-makers. Dialogue with oneself and with others can help to bring this heritage to fruition. Islam today is by necessity an Islam of cooperation. Its universalizing global nature is both an opportunity and a vocation.

* * *

As volume VI, *Islam in the world today* is being publishing, and the work on *The different aspects of Islamic culture* being completed, the Editors and the members of the Scientific Committee would like to express their gratitude and pay tribute to those who played a vital role in developing the detailed plan of this volume and taking part in its preparation but who are no longer with us to see the outcome of their work.

The first of these is the late Dr. Ali Kettani (Morocco), a brilliant scholar who devoted his time and energy to the international intellectual cooperation, as well as significantly contributing to the promotion of inter-OIC cooperation, especially in the fields of science and technology. He undertook a pioneering role in making known the Muslim minorities throughout the world. Dr. Ali Kettani was Editor of Volume VI; he was actively involved in the preparatory stages, taking part in the elaboration of the first detailed plan of the volume and the meetings preceding the elaboration of the volume. As this volume is being sent to the printers, we pay our full tribute to the late Dr. Ali Kettani for furthering intercultural dialogue and combating stereotypes and prejudice against Islam.

The late Professor Ahmed Yusuf al-Hassan (Syria), Editor of Volume IV, *Science and Technology in Islam (Parts I & II)* and member of the International Scientific Committee for the preparation and publication of *The different aspects of Islamic culture* participated in the preparatory stages and read and commented on many contributions.

The late Professor Ismail Ibrahim Nawwab (Saudi Arabia), Editor of Volume I, the *Foundations of Islam* and member of the above mentioned

International Scientific Committee, actively participated in the preparatory experts' meetings, the development of the detailed plan of the volume, the selection of authors, and read many contributions and made comments thereon.

Dr. Abdallah Bibtana (Libya) co-authored with Dr. Abdelwahid Yusuf (Sudan), Section Five on 'Education, higher education and scientific research' in the OIC Member States. Dr. Bibtana passed away while the manuscript was being finalized.

To all, the Editors and the Scientific Committee pay tribute and pray that their souls may rest in eternal peace and bliss.

* * *

The Editors and the Scientific Committee wish to record their wholehearted thanks and their deep gratitude to the World Islamic Call Society (WICS) and its Secretary General, Dr. Mohamed Ahmed Sherif, for their unfailing support and their intellectual and financial contribution which enabled the completion of this six-volume work.

Finally, the Editors and the Committee members wish to express their deep gratitude to UNESCO and its Secretariat. They have all along been immensely cooperative and patient with the Editors of the volume. Special thanks are due to Professor Idris El-Hareir, President of the International Scientific Committee, for the preparation and publication of *The different aspects of Islamic culture* and to Mr. Mohamad Salih Ziadah of the UNESCO Secretariat, for their dedication to this project, for the support they always provided to the Editors and the contributors, and their countless efforts for the finalization of the present volume and the completion of the work. Little could have been achieved without their dedication and cooperation. The Editors and the members of the Committee also wish to thank Mr. Ali Moussa Iye and Khadija Toure of the Secretariat, for their invaluable help and their cooperation in the preparation and publication of this volume.

The Editors hope that despite the missing chapters in the present volume (chapters on *ijtihad* or independent thinking, youth, inter-OIC trade, science education and scientific research, etc.), *Islam in the world today* will constitute a positive contribution to more informed knowledge and a better understanding of Islam in our modern world and to peaceful dialogue within the world of Islam as well as between Muslims and people of other cultures and spiritual backgrounds.

- I -

FROM THE FALL OF
GRANADA
TO THE ABOLITION
OF THE CALIPHATE
(1 4 9 2 - 1 9 2 4)

Chapter 1.1

THE EXPULSION OF THE MUSLIMS FROM ANDALUSIA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Idris El-Hareir

A number of internal and external factors led to the weakening of the Kingdom of Granada, the last Islamic stronghold in Andalusia, which ended with the city being besieged by King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella with an army of 50,000 equipped with cannons and siege machines. The chain of castles and fortresses protecting the city of Granada had already been taken, forcing Abū ‘Abdullah Muḥammad, the last of the Nasrid kings, to surrender and seek terms with the Spanish. The resulting treaty, which was highly unfavourable to the Muslims, consisted of two parts, one public and the other secret. The public treaty, containing 47 articles, addressed the manner of Granada’s surrender to the Spanish and affirmed the rights and duties of both parties.

The secret treaty, which remained concealed many years, contained 16 articles, including the privileges granted to the young Abū ‘Abdullah, King of Granada, and the members of his family.¹

The two treaties, signed on 25 November 1491, provided for the surrender of the castles, fortresses and the city of Granada. They stipulated freedom of worship for Muslims, forbade Christians from entering mosques, prohibited forced conversion to Christianity and retained the Islamic legal system for Muslims. On the Spanish side, the treaties were signed by the two above-mentioned monarchs and an assemblage of princes.

The two monarchs gave an assurance that their son, the prince, and the nobles of the kingdom would uphold the agreement for all time and swore on

1. Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Maqqarī al-Ṭilimsānī, *Nafḥ al-ṭib min ghuṣn al-andalus al-raṭīb* [The Breath of Perfume from the Branch of Green Andalusia], ed. Iḥsān ‘Abbās, IV, Beirut, 1968, pp. 525–6; also Anon, *Nabdhāt al-‘aṣr min akhbār banī naṣr* [Brief History of the Nasirids], ed. Alfred al-Bustānī, Larache, 1940, p. 41; also Muḥammad ‘Abdu Ḥattāmala, *Maṣīr al-muslimīn al-andalusīyyīn ba‘d suqūṭ Gharnaṭa 1492* [The fate of Muslim Andalusians after the fall of Granada 1492] (study published in a reference work on the history of the Arab nation), p. 6.

their faith and royal honour to maintain it. They commanded that the treaty in its entirety was to be indefinitely upheld.²

The Spanish, however, did not fulfil their promises under the treaty and many of Andalusia's Muslims were forced to leave Granada within two months of its signature. They left on ships provided free of charge by the Castilians to rid themselves of as many Muslims as possible. Although the treaty allowed Muslims freedom of worship, the Spaniards quickly repudiated their undertakings by creating pretexts and provocations until, eventually, they raised the slogan of 'convert or be expelled'.³

The term 'Moriscos'

The term 'Moriscos' has been applied to all Muslims remaining in Andalusia after the fall of Granada in 1492, who were variously called 'Moriscos', 'Mudejars', 'crypto-Arabs' or '*conversos*' (converts)⁴. The word *moro* ('Moor'), comes from the Latin *maurus*, used by Spanish historians to mean 'Muslims who do not profess the Catholic faith'. It is also used to refer to the population of present-day Morocco and Mauritania. The word can, additionally, be applied to all Muslims. Among the Spanish masses, *moro* implies a certain contempt and derision.⁵ Arab and Muslim historians use the term to mean the Muslims who chose to remain in Andalusia or left under compulsion for the Islamic lands in the Mediterranean basin, such as Morocco, Egypt, Syria and Turkey.

Consistent with the lack of respect in which the treaty concluded with the young Abū 'Abdullah was held, a number of harsh measures were taken against the Muslim population of Granada. These included the forcible expulsion of Muslims who had decided to remain in their Andalusian homeland to other Spanish cities, in order to prevent communities of Muslims forming. Reports indicate that coastal areas of Spain were cleared of Moriscos to prevent them colluding with Muslims in the Maghreb countries to attack Spain.⁶

Other oppressive measures taken included compelling Muslims to live in special areas, known as *morerias*, and to sell their property. They were also subject to extortionate taxation.⁷

2. Ḥattāmala, *al-Tanṣīr al-qasrī li-muslimī al-Andalus fī 'abd al-malikayn al-kathūlikīyyayn 1474–1516* [Forced Christianization under the Catholic Monarchs], 1st ed., Amman, 1980, pp. 19–21; also Muḥammad 'Abdullah 'Annān, *Nihāyat al-andalus wa-tarīkh al-'arab al-mutanaṣṣarīn* [The End of al-Andalus and the History of the Arab *conversos*], Cairo, 1966, pp. 241–6.

3. Ḥattāmala, *al-Tanṣīr* ..., *op. cit.*, pp. 21–5.

4. 'Abdulḥakīm Salāma, *al-Mūrīskīyyūn* [The Moriscos] (article).

5. Ḥattāmala, *Maṣīr* ..., *op. cit.*, p. 6.

6. On the expulsion of the Moriscos from Andalusia, see Ḥattāmala, *Maṣīr* ..., *op. cit.*, pp. 5–18, also K. Garrad, *The Original Memorial of Don Francisco Nunez*, Atlanta II, No. 4, Oct. 1954.

7. A. Rachel, *L'Espagne musulmane au temps des nasrides 1232–1492* [Muslim Spain under the Nasrids 1232–1492], Paris, Boccard, 1973, p. 45.

A contemporary historian said of these events: ‘When the Christian king saw that people had forsworn safe passage and blandishments and renounced resettlement, he began breaking the conditions that had been stipulated initially and continued to do so one by one until he had broken them all. The sanctity of Islam was violated and he brought shame and disgrace upon the Muslims. The Christians lorded it over them, imposing onerous duties and fines. The call to prayer from the minarets was stopped. The Muslims were ordered to leave the city of Granada for outlying areas and villages. In shame and humiliation they went. He subsequently called upon them to convert and, in 1498, forced them to do so.’ The author adds, ‘How many tearful eyes, how many broken hearts and how many impoverished wretches were unable to emigrate. They watch their sons and daughters worshipping the cross, bowing down to idols, eating pork, drinking wine and committing abominations but are incapable of stopping them. Those who did that shall suffer the most grievous of punishments.’⁸

In implementation of these harsh measures, the Spanish set up courts of inquisition to pursue rigorously and forcefully pursue the process of converting the Muslims of Andalusia to Christianity. The establishment of the courts of inquisition in Spain dates back to 1478, when the Catholic Monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella, sent to the Pope, requesting permission. The Pope gave his consent and issued a bull authorizing them to proceed with their scheme in 1482. The first court was established in Seville and the courts commenced their activity in Castile against Jews, expelling thousands. In February of the same year, another papal bull was issued, setting up courts in Cordoba, Jaén, Segovia, Toledo and Valladolid.⁹ When the decree to carry out the forced baptism of Moriscos was issued in 1502, the courts of inquisition vigorously pursued Spanish Muslims. King Ferdinand advised Charles V to choose capable inquisitors loyal to the Catholic faith in order to tighten the noose around the Mohammedan sect.¹⁰

The royal instructions were carried out by Cardinal Jiménez de Cisneros, Archbishop of Toledo and Primate of Spain, and Archbishop Hernando de Talavera, in collaboration with the governor of Toledo. They followed a policy of intimidation, threat, and carrot and stick. When this produced negligible results, they put forward a series of measures between 1499 and 1609, which the anonymous author of *Nabdhāt al-ʿaṣr* summarizes as follows:

8. Anon, *Nabdhāt ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 643–5.

9. M. Razzūq, *al-Andalusīyyūn wa-hijratabum ila-l-maghrīb khilāl al-qarnayn 16 wa 17* [The Andalusian Migration to Morocco in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries], Casablanca, 1998.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 62; see also H. CH. Lea, *A History of the Inquisition of Spain*, I, New York, Macmillan, 1907.

Seven edicts were promulgated, stipulating forced conversion, prohibiting Islam in Spain and prosecuting all Moriscos who refused to convert, forbidding the carrying of arms and sale of property without prior royal permission, forbidding Moriscos from entering Granada's city limits, forbidding the wearing of Islamic clothes, the veil and the hijab, obliging Moriscos to wear a blue sign on their caps, requiring houses to be open on Fridays and feast days and forbidding the use of Arabic books.¹¹

One of the measures employed to erase the identity of the Muslims of Andalusia involved Cardinal Cisneros gathering together a large number of Qur'āns and other books, including works of literature and science, into enormous piles in the Plaza Bibarrambla and ordering that they be burned. Estimates of the number of books burned range from 80,000 to 1,005,000.¹²

Such measures against the Muslims of Andalusia resulted in a number of rebellions, including the Albayzín revolt in 1499. The factors behind the rebellion which broke out against the Spanish administration in 1499 were the extortionate taxes imposed on the Muslims of Andalusia by the Spaniards, the seizure of Muslim land and property, the attempt to convert Muslims and the use of torture when they refused. However, a spark was lit when Cisneros's aides assaulted a young woman on the Plaza Abad in the Albayzín quarter. The Muslims rose up in revolt, taking police agents captive. The throng of rebels advanced on the cardinal's house in the Casba, near the Alhambra palace.

The rebels formed a council of 40 of their leaders to govern Andalusia. The Spanish responded by sending a large force to subdue the demonstrators but the latter closed off all the streets and courageously confronted this force. When the Spanish realized what was happening, the Archbishop of Granada sought to mediate between the two parties and a compromise solution was reached, respecting the rights of the Muslims.¹³

The first (1501) and second (1568) Alpujarras rebellions

Following the Albayzín revolt, the Spanish authorities took the decision to allow Christian clergy to engage in missionary activity for the Catholic Church within the city of Granada. In addition, they adopted a policy of marginalization and violence against the Muslims of Andalusia. However, the Albayzín revolt encouraged the Muslims of the Alpujarras region south of Granada to rise up. Alpujarras is a mountainous and rocky region, which provided the rebels

11. Anon, *Nabdhāt ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–5; also 'Annān, *Nibāyat al-andalus ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 309–83.

12. W. Prescott, *History of Ferdinand and Isabella the Catholic*, New York, A. L. Burt, 1838, pp. 451–3; see also, Laylā al-Šabbāgh, *Thawrat muslimī Gharnāta*, *al-Asāla Journal*, Algeria, No. 27, Sept.–Oct. 1975, p. 119; Razzūq, *al-Andalusīyyūn ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

13. Razzūq, *al-Andalusīyyūn ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

with protection. This rebellion was the largest Morisco uprising against the Spanish persecution of the Andalusia's Muslims. The Spanish responded with extreme violence and the rebellion was put down in 1502.¹⁴

Following the rebellion, the mosque of Granada was turned into a cathedral and the mosque of Albayzín became a church and school, renamed the Church of the Saviour. In Granada and its environs, 50,000 Muslims were forcibly converted and all the mosques were turned into churches.

During the reign of King Charles V (1519–56), a number of decrees were issued regulating Spain's internal affairs. These included the appointment of Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht as Regent of the Kingdom of Castile and León, angering the nobles and lords of Spain, and the final split between Catholicism and Protestantism, whereby only Catholics were allowed to live in Spain. These decrees led to confrontation between king and nobles, and societies and gangs were formed to fight against King Charles.¹⁵

King Charles' attitude toward the Muslims varied; sometimes he employed violence and force, while at other times he used cunning and skill. In 1526, he reached an agreement with the Andalusian Muslims under which they were allowed to practise their religion in exchange for payment of 80,000 ducats. Furthermore, King Charles cancelled all oppressive decrees for a time. In this way, he skilfully solved his state's internal and external problems.

In 1524, Charles V obtained an edict from Pope Clement VII allowing him to renounce the oath he had sworn to the Muslims in 1519 to safeguard their lives, liberty, religion and property.¹⁶ Henceforth, Charles V began implementing harsh measures against the Moriscos, forcing those with means to do so to emigrate. As a result, a rebellion broke out in 1525 in the Kingdom of Aragon that the forces of the king were only able to put down with substantial help from German forces.¹⁷

To avoid further trouble and unrest, the Muslims of Andalusia and the Spanish authorities came to an agreement in 1528, mediated by the cardinal of Toledo and with the consent of King Charles V, under which the Muslims were to be allowed to practise their religion for ten years. However, the king soon broke this agreement when, at the end of that year, a conspiracy between the Muslims of Andalusia and those of the Maghreb was uncovered.¹⁸

In dealing with the Moriscos of Andalusia, King Philip II (1556–98) followed the same policy as his father. At the same time, however, he concluded a treaty – the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis – with Spain's two

14. *Ibid.* p. 65; Ḥattāmāla, *al-Tanẓīr ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 78–81.

15. Razzūq, *al-Andalusīyyūn ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 78–9.

16. *Ibid.* p. 81.

17. Asʿad Ḥawmad, *Miḥnat al-ʿArab fi-l-andalus* [The Arab Ordeal in Andalusia], Beirut, 1980, pp. 168–9.

18. Razzūq, *al-Andalusīyyūn ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

principal rivals, France and England, on 3 April 1559. This enabled him to focus on confronting Ottoman expansion in the western Mediterranean and Ottoman support for the Moriscos.¹⁹ This shows that the Morisco question had taken on an international dimension and become a significant factor in relations between the Ottoman Empire and European states, particularly Spain.

King Philip II took a number of measures to sever collaboration between the Ottomans and the Moriscos. He issued several decrees, including one in 1560 prohibiting Moriscos from purchasing black slaves, designed to prevent the number of Moriscos from increasing. On 14 May, 1563, he issued a decree prohibiting Moriscos from carrying and purchasing arms without a licence. In compliance with instructions from the Pope, King Philip issued orders forbidding Moriscos from using Arabic and wearing Arab clothes. He forbade Morisco women from wearing the veil and compelled Moriscos to leave the doors of their houses open on feast days so that the goings-on inside could be seen.²⁰

These harsh and oppressive measures led in 1568 to the outbreak of what has become known as the great rebellion of Alpujarras. The Muslims of Andalusia appear to have taken advantage of the revolt in the Netherlands, which had forced Spain to transfer large numbers of troops there to put down an uprising against Spanish rule. Another factor was the military and material assistance provided by the Ottomans in the Maghreb, such as that provided by ‘Alī Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Algiers. The leader of the great rebellion of Alpujarras – an Arab named Faraj ibn Faraj²¹ – was soon assassinated by the Spanish but, on 29 December 1568, the uprising was joined by supporters from Granada. A scion of the Umayyad dynasty in Cordoba, Muḥammad ibn Umayya (Aben Humaya), was chosen as king, and allegiance was sworn to him at a large religious gathering. The rebellion, which achieved a number of important victories against the Spanish, continued from 1570 to 1576.²² Mobilizing more forces, the Spanish were able to kill Ibn Umayya, who was succeeded by Moulay ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Abbū (Aben Aboo).²³

The great rebellion of Alpujarras resulted once more in the expulsion of the Moriscos from Granada to Castile, under a decree issued on 28 October

19. ‘Abd al-Jalīl Al-Tamīmī, *al-Khālfiyya al-dīniyya lil-širā‘ al-isbāni al-‘uthmāni ‘ala-l-imārāt al-maḡhribiyya fi-l-qarn al-sādis ‘asr* [The Religious Background to the Spanish-Ottoman Dispute over the Maghrebi Emirates in the Sixteenth Century], *Journal of Maghrebi History*, No. 3, Tunis, 1975, pp. 13–14.

20. Razzūq, *al-Andalusīyyūn ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 89–91.

21. Ḥattāmala, *al-Tanšīr ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 33–7; al-Šabbāgh, *Thawrat muslimī Gharnāta ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 147; ‘Annān, *Nihāyat al-andalus*, pp. 361–78.

22. Sic – Translator.

23. ‘Abdullah Ḥammādī, *al-Mūriskīyyūn wa-maḥākīm al-taftīsh fi-l-andalus 1492–1616* [The Moriscos and the Courts of Inquisition in Andalusia], Tunis, 1989, p. 73.

1570. Estimates of the number expelled range from 80,000 to 160,000. Conditions were extremely bad and many died en route.²⁴

Despite the expulsion of 80,000 Moriscos from Granada, some 63,000 remained in Aragon, representing 21 per cent of the region's total population. The other group which left relocated to Valencia.²⁵

When the Spanish Council of State met in Lisbon in 1582, the idea was put forward of expelling the Muslims from Andalusia once and for all. The state had proven unable to control them and all the arbitrary measures taken against them appeared to have been to no avail. They could neither be integrated into Spanish society nor compelled to abandon their Islamic faith. Accordingly, it was decided to conduct an accurate census of their numbers; it was just a question of waiting for a suitable time to carry out the decision. Historical sources affirm that there were approximately 321,000 Moriscos in Spain.²⁶

Morisco opposition to the Spanish continued. They received support from the Ottoman Empire and from Protestant communities resentful of the Spanish monarchs for expelling them from the country as a part of the policy to make Spain Catholic. In the years 1578–80, Ottomans and Protestants were active in helping Spanish Muslims but, following the defeat of the Ottoman fleet by the Spanish fleet at the Battle of Lepanto (1571), the Ottomans were unable to provide the material and military support against the Spanish which the Moriscos has requested.²⁷

Despite the close observation under which they were kept and the harsh measures taken against them, the Moriscos continued to practise their religion in secret and maintain their faith and Islamic lifestyle. They developed ways and means of concealment from the spies of the Inquisition, and *fatwas* were issued by several Maghrebi scholars permitting them to conceal their religion from the eyes of the Inquisition. Nevertheless, it was evident to the Spaniards that coexistence with the Moriscos was impossible, particularly once they had been seen to collaborate with the Ottomans, Moroccans, Algerians and Protestants opposed to the Catholic Church. In my view, however, the main reason was the higher rate of population increase among Moriscos than Spaniards. According to 1565–72 statistics, the number of Spaniards increased by 44.7 per cent, while the number of Moriscos increased by 69.7 per cent.²⁸ Accordingly, King Philip III (1598–

24. B. Vincent, *L'Expulsion des Morisques du royaume de Grenade et leur répartition en Castille 1570–1571* [The Expulsion of the Moriscos from the Kingdom of Granada and their Distribution in Castile 1570–1], in M.C.V., Tome VI, 1970, pp. 209–47.

25. Razzūq, *al-Andalusīyyūn ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 98; Hammādī, *al-mūriskīyyūn ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 99; Ḥattāmāla, *Maṣīr ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 100–1.

28. *Ibid.*, P. Chaunu, 'Minorités et conjonctures, l'expulsion des Morisques en 1609' [Minorities and Contexts, the Expulsion of the Moriscos in 1609], *Revue Historique*, 1961, CCXXV, No. 1, pp. 91–8.

1621) issued a decree in 1609 expelling the Moriscos from Spain, giving them 30 days to leave.²⁹

The Moriscos expelled in 1609 fled to all the Maghreb countries, as well as to Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. Some left by sea for Morocco, others went to France, while others departed for Venice. According to the testimony of French courts, tragedy and exploitation at the hands of ships' captains were commonplace, particularly among those who travelled via Marseille and Venice. The Spanish looted the property of deportees as they crossed Spanish territory, or at sea.³⁰ During this period, 100,000 of 140,000 people in a single convoy were killed.

Consequences of the expulsion of the Muslims from Spain

The expulsion of the Muslims from Spain had negative and positive consequences for Spain, Europe, the countries of the Mediterranean and the entire Muslim world.

The negative consequences for Spain included major demographic disruption and the emptying of many population centres of their inhabitants. This had a deleterious impact on agriculture, with many farms remaining deserted for long periods of time and irrigation canals, dams and wells falling into disrepair as a result. But the damage to industry and commerce was greater. The Moriscos were skilled in these areas and their departure caused several industries, such as silk, arms and paper manufacturing, to disappear.³¹

On the other hand, despite the adverse economic impact caused by reduction of the workforce, the removal of the Moriscos from Spain brought about the ethnic and religious unity of Spain, which was the goal of the Spanish monarchy and the Catholic Church – the primary concern of the latter being to unify the Catholic faith.

An estimated 40,000 to 60,000 Moriscos expelled from Spain settled in present-day Morocco – in Tangier, Ceuta, Melilla, Tétouan, Ksar el-Kebir, Larache and at the mouth of the River Bou Regreg – where they were welcomed by Sultan Zīdān.³² Some 47,000 settled in Algeria, largely in Algiers and Oran. The largest number of Morisco emigrants – estimated at between 50,000 and 80,000 – went to Tunisia,³³ where they were warmly received by the Ottoman governor, who exempted them from taxation for three years, supplied them with seeds and protected them from attack; they were settled in

29. Razzūq, *al-Andalusīyyūn ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 117–19, 120–1.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 129.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 127–8.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 129–30.

33. Muḥammad Ibn Abī Dīnār, *al-Muʿnis fi akbbār ifrīqiya wa-tūnis* [A Short History of North Africa and Tunisia], Tunis, 1967, pp. 204–366.

Tunis and other towns.³⁴ One group of Moriscos settled in Libya, particularly Tripoli, Misrata and Darna, while others went to Egypt and Syria. A large number went to the lands of the Ottoman Empire, where they were settled by Sultan Aḥmad I in the Galata quarter of Istanbul, Sis (Cilicia), Azīz, Tarsus, Kars and Alexandria.³⁵

Several sources state that some Moriscos were exiled to the Americas, particularly the present-day southern United States and South America, where several graves and tombs provide evidence of Arab names.

Emigration to Africa took place through trade across the Sahara with the sub-Saharan countries, as well as the campaign of Judar Pasha, a soldier of Andalusian origin whose army formed part of the Saʿdī forces of Sultan Aḥmad al-Mansūr al-Dhahabī, which included Muḥammad ibn Zarqūn, Aḥmad al-Harūs al-Andalūsī and Qāsīm Wardawī al-Andalūsī. His army included 1,000 Andalusian arquebusiers.³⁶

The brothers Khayr al-Dīn and Oruç Barbarossa played an important role, transporting a total of 70,000 Moriscos to the Maghreb countries.³⁷ Muslim ships would arrive at the Spanish coastal cities and take on board, free of charge, Muslims wishing to depart for the shores of the Maghreb.

Muslim piracy, particularly on the part of Moriscos, led to Spain occupying several Maghrebi coastal cities, including Tripoli (1510), Oran (1508), Algiers (1509), Bējaia (1510), Tunis (1534) and Skhira (1508).

The reaction to this across the Islamic West was to declare, with Ottoman support, ‘maritime jihad’ (as it is called in Islamic historical sources) against Europe, particularly Spain. Essentially, these wars involved Muslim warriors targeting European trading and naval vessels, resulting in large numbers of prisoners being taken by both sides and the destruction of many ships and entire fleets.

The most significant consequence of the expulsion of the Muslims from Andalusia was the emergence of the modern concept of imperialism, particularly with regard to the Muslim world. It was Portugal and Spain who initiated the imperialist venture. The Portuguese occupied the Arabian Gulf region as far as Bahrain, where they built a large fort, and threatened to raze Mecca and Medina. As for Spain, Charles V launched an expedition against Algiers in 1541 with a vast fleet of 156 ships, carrying 24,000 soldiers and 12,330 sailors. But battered by a violent storm in the Mediterranean, most of

34. Nāṣir al-Dīn Saʿīdūn, *al-Jāliyya al-andalusīyya fi-l-jaẓāʾir* [The Andalusian Community in Algeria], Cahiers, No. 4, 1981, pp. 111–24; see also Salāma, *al-Muriskīyyūn ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

35. al-Tamīmī, *Dirāsāt ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 24; al-Tamīmī, *al-Dawla al-ʿuthmaniyya ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

36. ʿAnnān, *Nihāyat al-andalus ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 383.

37. Saʿīdūn, *al-Jāliyya al-andalusīyya ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

the ships were wrecked and the army scattered and destroyed. Charles V had captured Tunis in 1535.

The conflict between Islam and Christian Europe resulted in the establishment of Ottoman control over the Maghreb from Egypt to Algeria. Indeed, the conflict between Ottomans and Europeans continued into the modern era, with the French occupation of Algeria (1830), Tunisia (1881) and Morocco (1912), the Italian occupation of Libya (1912) and the British occupation of Egypt (1881). The Ottoman Empire collapsed in 1918, following defeat in the First World War and the Arab lands were divided among Britain, France and Italy under the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. The Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917 handed Palestine to the Jews and the resulting tragedy for the Palestinian people continues today.

Chapter 1.2

THE IMPACT OF THE GREAT
DISCOVERIES ON THE
ISLAMIC WORLD

Iba Der Thiam

The Mediterranean has played a particularly important role in the history of humanity. This region of crossroads and of cultural, ethnic, religious and racial intermingling nurtured the ancient Egyptian, Chaldean, Assyrian, Hebrew, Cretan, Phoenician, Greek, Roman, Arab, Berber and African civilizations that blossomed and offered humanity one of the earliest expressions of the human genius on which classical humanism was founded.

It was also the starting point for great conquests by Alexander, the Romans, Julius Caesar and Hannibal and for the greatest intellectual changes under the influence of poets such as Virgil, Lucretius, Terence and Cicero, leading to changes in the religious and moral order and in the political and institutional spheres.

It was the cradle of Jewish civilization and of Christianity before the barbarian invasions.

Furthermore, it was marked by the advent of Islam which, from the seventh century, spread across the Byzantine Empire through Syria and Egypt to Persia, India and Chinese Turkestan to the east, while to the west, the Muslim cavalry took control of North Africa, before wresting Spain from the Visigoths after the battle of Jerez.

A new era of cross-fertilization then began, led by significant historical figures such as Hārūn al-Rashīd, who built a new civilization characterized by subtlety and refinement, and by economic, artistic, technological and scientific innovations that would have a lasting effect on the entire Mediterranean basin for nearly 10 centuries, during which the University of Cordoba enjoyed dazzling, unrivalled success in early mediaeval Europe.

The Mediterranean was naturally a sea of conflicts.

During the Crusades from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, Christianity and Islam clashed in the expeditions organized purportedly to free Turkish-occupied Jerusalem and the tomb of Christ, between 1096 and 1270.

This movement was sparked by the arrival of the Turkish Seljuqs, who, after conquering the Arab Kingdom of Baghdad, exerted their influence over a large part of Asia Minor, thus posing a real threat to Byzantium and its capital, Constantinople.

These military undertakings had significant political, social and economic consequences.

The resultant contact among civilizations and the intermingling of populations gave rise to important cultural transfers, as the highly sophisticated eastern Turkish and Arab Muslim civilization exerted a defining influence over the largely backward and uncouth Christian conquerors from the West.

This influence primarily came to bear on lifestyle and was evident in furnishings and clothing, most notably with the discovery of velvets, silks and finely crafted weapons made by talented craftsmen.

The use of carpets and the discovery of mirrors, sanitation and baths contributed to the development of a civilization of luxury and refinement and a certain predilection for a completely new art of living.

Those influences fundamentally transformed the Crusaders' habits and customs, thus enriching the Christian civilization of the West.

The Mediterranean was therefore a place of intermingling, exchange and contact among civilizations, which gave Europe access to the routes leading to the East, owing to the tales of Marco Polo and the Silk Road, for example, before opening up to the sophistication of eastern civilizations, which were, at the time, significantly more advanced than those of the Christian West.

The Mediterranean was such a source of economic strength that southern, central and western Europe surpassed the Hanseatic League, whose markets and guilds had given rise to substantial trade flows and had brought profit to a new category of merchants who formed the basis of an emerging bourgeoisie.

The fairs in Champagne, Troyes and Beaucaire, for example, were international trade centres, where tradesmen from Italy, Flanders and the Rhône sold products from the North (furs), the East (cloths and fabrics), Morocco and Spain (skins, leather and crafts), and spices and sometimes even precious metals from Africa.

The merchants were organized into associations known as guilds, which were governed by special conventions and held monopolies over transport, taxation, and so on.

These commercial activities were the key to the fortune of cities such as Venice, Genoa, La Rochelle, Rouen and Bordeaux, Bruges and Antwerp.

The Hanseatic League, established in 1283, had spread to encompass 90 towns, including some of the period's wealthiest cities, such as Cologne, Bremen, Lübeck and Hamburg.

Commercial transactions were facilitated by the existence of an international commodity exchange.

Yet, for all its power, the Hanseatic League did not supplant the Mediterranean, which remained the most active trade hub in the Middle Ages.

Maritime commerce was particularly well developed between centres such as Byzantium, Alexandria, Cyprus and Beirut, which fostered links with merchants from Italy, Spain and south-west France, ensuring that luxury products such as silks, cotton fabrics, sugar, perfumes, spices, weapons and woollen cloth from Flanders were traded to meet people's needs.

The city of Genoa then began to dominate the whole economic area of Byzantium and all coastal towns on the Black Sea, while Venice exerted a strong influence over the Adriatic Sea.

This prosperous trade was served by an imposing fleet, powerful workers' and sailors' guilds and impressive weaponry.

In the thirteenth century, Western civilization underwent a series of major changes driven by what is known as the Age of Discovery and the inventions to which it gave rise.

At that time, gunpowder and the compass – inventions which had been brought over from China by the Arabs – began to be used throughout Europe, altering the conditions of both navigation and war.

Paper and printing, whose origins can also be traced to China, were likewise brought into the Western world by the Arabs. Consequently, around 1450, Johannes Gutenberg designed a system that allowed him to print his first Bible in 1455. That revolutionary invention boosted the diffusion of science and knowledge, laying the foundations for free universal access to knowledge. Those developments had an inestimable effect on the minds of his contemporaries. The translation of the Bible into vernacular German accelerated a change in-mind set and led to the Reformation.

The Turkish conquests, including the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, dealt a decisive blow to Venice and Genoa's lucrative commerce with the East and it was thus necessary to find a new spice route that did not pass through the Mediterranean.

From 1476, Henry the Navigator, Prince of Portugal, began to turn the changes and progress that had been made in geography, cartography and the art and techniques of navigation to good account by organizing a series of expeditions along the west coast of Africa, in the hope of finding a new sea route to India by sailing to the south of the continent. In addition to that dream, he had political concerns.

Portugal, locked in conflict with Muslim Morocco, believed, as many did at the time, in the existence of one Prester John, a powerful Christian prince said to rule over a vast empire in Africa. Portugal was relying on winning his support in order to attack the Moroccans from the rear.

The Portuguese thus discovered Cape Verde in 1445, the mouth of the river Congo in 1482 and the Cape of Good Hope in 1487.

Vasco da Gama followed the same route and, assisted by an Arab navigator, reached India in 1498, the dream of many pioneers thus realizing.

The Spanish, for their part, developed a plan to reach that land of a thousand riches by sailing westwards, rather than along the African coast. Under the patronage of Isabella I, Queen of Castile, Christopher Columbus left Spain with three caravels on 3 August 1492 and landed on 12 October in the Lucayan Archipelago. Believing that he had reached the Indies, he later found out that he had actually discovered America, a new continent previously unknown to western and mediterranean Europe. The discovery thus begun was continued by Magellan. He sailed along the coast of South America, before he died in 1521. Delcano, his main companion, continued the expedition, which had already crossed the Pacific to the Philippines. He had set sail in 1519 and returned to Spain in 1522 by the Cape of Good Hope and, in doing so, completed the first voyage round the world. This was a giant step for humanity.

The consequence of these great discoveries was the rise of an immense Spanish empire in the Americas under the leadership of Hernán Cortés and Pizarro, among others to the detriment of the Aztecs, the Incas and other indigenous peoples.

As a corollary to the development of the new colonies and the tapping of their abundant agricultural and mining resources, the long-standing international trade routes were entirely diverted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic Ocean.

The cultivation of sugar cane and the establishment of a large-scale colonial system led to the use of slave labour and the launching of the slave trade, under which the indigenous peoples were replaced through the triangular trade by black slaves transported from Africa to places throughout the Americas to work on plantations and in mines operated by white European noblemen and aristocrats, driven by an insatiable thirst for wealth and power.

This change was initiated by Bartolomé de las Casas, a stubborn and determined Christian priest.

Gold and silver mines and the proceeds from the sale of coffee, tobacco, sugar and other tropical products brought great fortune to the countries involved in the villainous 'ebony' trade, which lasted for more than three centuries.

This resulted in large-scale economic shifts, as vast quantities of gold, silver and other riches were accumulated, giving rise to capitalism and its corollary – mechanization and the industrial revolution.

This trade was also the stimulus for the utterly abhorrent European colonization of the African kingdoms and states that provided slave labour.

The political map of the Western world was profoundly altered as a result. The Atlantic supplanted the Mediterranean and became the centre of



I-2.1 Sankore Mosque, one of several historic madrasas in Timbuktu, Mali.
© UNESCO/Lazare Eloundou

gravity. The cities of the Mediterranean basin declined and their relations with the eastern Islamic world suffered the consequences. Trade routes were thus diverted to the Atlantic Ocean. A new geostrategic and geopolitical situation emerged, with different stakes. Bordeaux, Nantes, La Rochelle, Liverpool, Manchester, Seville, Palos and Moguer eclipsed the previous maritime trade centres around the Mediterranean.

The Muslim peoples in Africa, where Islamic civilizations such as the kingdom of Takrur, the empires of Ghana, Mali and Gao, and the Muslim kingdoms of Senegambia and Gabu had previously flourished, declined sharply.

A culture of violence, pillage, war and distrust gradually took root at the heart of each society.

In the empire of Gao, for example, where Songhay humanism had particularly thrived owing to the Muslim universities of Timbuktu and where the entire population could read and write Arabic and where, according to the writings of Leo Africanus, the book trade was the most lucrative economic activity, desolation struck. The old universities of Sankore, Sidi Yahia and Djinguereber in turn fell into decline.

The Arabic-speaking intellectual elite, so impressively embodied by the emblematic figure of Ahmed Baba, a leading light of his time, the Bakhayokho brothers, Mohamed El-Aqib and so many other scholars of Islamic sciences (exegesis, translation, law and *hadith*) and history (brilliantly represented by Mahmoud Kati and ‘Abderrahman Sadi), began to collapse as a result of the violence engendered by political unrest, the weakness of the royal power and the alarming degeneration of morals, all consequences of the disruption caused by Atlantic trade and its harmful effects.

In Senegambia, the universities of Pire, Coky, Thilogne, Fouta Djallon, Mbakhol, Longor and Ndam also waned.

Fear, despair, insecurity and the absence of rule of law drove the people to fear for their future.

The caravan routes from the countries of the Sahel to the Mediterranean shores, supplying gold, salt and other trades, were gradually diverted towards the coastal trade hubs.

The coastal areas in the western part of Africa grew in importance over the hinterland and they opened up intra-African trade to new relations with the Americas.

In Spain, owing to the recovery built on the wealth drawn from the Spanish colonies in the Americas, the Catholic monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella became powerful enough to launch the great reconquest, which entailed driving the Muslims from Spain, even though they had been living there for eight centuries in a tolerance and peaceful coexistence unknown outside Africa.

In 1492, all Muslims and Jews were ordered to convert to Catholicism or leave Spain.

The pure-blood laws were introduced and enforced by the cruel Inquisition.

The Catholic monarchs thus dealt a decisive blow to the Mediterranean humanism that had enabled the artistic, scientific, literary and intellectual Renaissance to flourish during the preceding centuries.

The spirit of the Crusades, which had wreaked so much damage in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, resurfaced.

The Muslim states of North Africa, the northern and southern Mediterranean basin and the Middle East, whose history had been closely connected for centuries to that of the Christian West, were deeply shaken.

A new economic situation emerged all the more pervasively and forcefully as the initial stages of globalization had begun in 1500 and a world economy was developing, as noted by Wallenstein.

In black Africa, the arrival of the white people on the east and west coasts, the development of the slave trade and the ensuing wars laid the foundations for foreign domination, among other consequences.

Trading posts and the occupation of surrounding areas gave way to armed conquest of all of the pre-colonial Muslim kingdoms.

Islam, which had been the religion of refuge for African resistance fighters faced with foreign dominion, was banished from the fields of language, culture, society, economics and politics. It was repressed and marginalized,



I-2.2 Mud brick mosque in Timbuktu, Mali, Africa
© Michele Alfieri/Shutterstock

by means of the radical secularization of all institutions in countries under European influence.

The African people, meanwhile, were subjected to brainwashing and religious, cultural and mental indoctrination designed to convert them to Christianity, the religion of the colonizer, using insidious techniques of infiltration, seduction and reinstatement.

This whole operation was spurred on vigorously by the development of capitalism, the economic weapon that became its arm of attack. Capital investments, made in the name of modernization, led to excessively heavy debts, which the Western world later used as a pretext for conquering the Islamic world. Napoleon invaded Egypt, Algeria was conquered in 1830 and the Suez Canal was opened in 1869.

French, German and British capital flowed into Egypt and led to its colonization. The British advanced from this bridgehead to conquer Sudan. Africa was partitioned at the 1884–85 Berlin Conference. The French were in Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, the Germans in Morocco, the British and Italians in Libya, and Black Africa was shared between the French, the British, the Spanish, the Portuguese and the Dutch. The whole of Islamic Africa came under imperialist rule. The industrial revolution actually gave rise to imperialism, a tragic consequence of which was the First World War, which broke out as a result of imperialist rivalries. Under the peace treaties subsequently adopted, the Islamic territories of North Africa, central and western Africa, eastern and southern Africa, the Middle East, Asia Minor, India and even the Far East were carved up and placed under foreign control.

Another factor that exacerbated the shift in focus from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic Ocean was the maritime transport revolution, which began with the discovery of the steam engine, the propeller and armour plating. This enabled the West to found colonial empires, as the sources and bases of its new power, which it wielded in exerting its authority, its religious and cultural influence and in bringing its economic, political and moral weight to bear over the rest of the world.

It took many long years of struggle, armed resistance and inestimable sacrifice to restore to the conquered Islamic countries their right to independence, dignity, justice and freedom.

Chapter 1.3

ISLAMIC REVIVAL IN THE
OTTOMAN, SAFAVID AND
MUGHAL EMPIRES

Yusuf A. Talib

In the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries Turco-Mongol forces occupied a vast area in central and western Asia, and India. They established respectively the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal Empires. The Islamic world consisted of large territories in Africa and Southeast Asia where Islam spread mainly via commerce and mystical movements.¹

These two vast regions maintained close links by their adherence to Islamic traditions and the annual pilgrimage to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, by increasing numbers of pilgrims, facilitated in no small measure by the enforcement of widespread security and the great improvement in transportation routes over land and sea.

The Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal Empires were indeed an unsurpassed victory of Turkish military and political influence. The Ottoman and Mughal ruling elite adopted the Hanafi code of Islamic law. The Safavids, on the other hand, followed a different path with their adherence to a militant Shīʿa Sufi order and its imposition over a large part of the Iranian plateau. This inevitably led to prolonged military struggles with the Ottomans and posed a virtual threat to the Ottoman Anatolian frontier.²

On the other hand, religious differences did not interfere with the otherwise friendly Safavid-Mughal relations. In part the Mughal emperors were profoundly cognizant of the help rendered to them by the Safavids in the restoration of Mughal power in the middle of the sixteenth century.

1. I. M. Lewis, *Islam in Tropical Africa*, London, Hutchinson University Library for Africa, 1980; G.R. Tibbets, 'Early Muslim Traders in Southeast Asian', *JMBRAS*, 1982, XXX, No. 177, pp. 1–45.
2. A. Allouche, *The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict 906–960/1500–1573*, Berlin, 1983.



I-3.1 Children file across the courtyard of Darga Mosque, built by the Moghul emperor Akbar in his short-lived capital of Fatehpur Sikri

© S. M Amin/AramcoWorld

It is equally important to note that the Mughal emperors, with the exception of Emperor Aurangzeb (1658–1707) did not link religious adherence to loyalty to the ruling dynasty. This was largely based on their employing of Iranian Shiʿa Muslims as well as Hindus as they ruled over largely non-Muslim subjects.

Irrespective of their political or theological orientation, the rulers of these three empires encouraged and sponsored widespread commercial activities. Consequently, they provided an infrastructure of bazaars, caravan serails, and the establishment of law and order throughout these vast domains. Towards the end of the sixteenth century the Ottoman, Safavid, and Mughal Empires emerged as a vast commercial zone.³

The Ottoman Empire

At the beginning of the fourteenth century, the expansion of the Ottomans from the confines of Anatolia, marked their historical emergence and commenced their extraordinary epic. They were then only an obscure Turcoman emirate along the frontiers of the Islamic and Byzantine worlds.⁴

In 1453 Sultan Mehmet II conquered Constantinople, sealing once and for all the destiny of Byzantium. In the course of the sixteenth century, Sultans Selim I (1512–20) and Suleiman the Magnificent (1520–66) gave the Ottomans control over parts of Europe, Asia, and Africa. The empire reached the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf from Bosnia to Algeria, and the eastern Mediterranean Sea became virtually an Ottoman lake. By 1566 the Ottomans had established a powerful empire.⁵

The rapid expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century and its accomplishments in diverse fields would not have been possible without its solid internal institutions: a centralized power, and effective administration to cater to the needs of the state, a powerful army with the most advanced equipment of its day.⁶

Its establishment and expansion was largely brought about by the endeavours of three great Sultans: Murad, Mehmet II the Conqueror, and Suleiman the Magnificent.

3. H. Inalcik, and D. Quataert, *An economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1500–1914*, Cambridge University Press, 1994.

4. H. Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire – the Classical Age 1300–1600*, London, 1973.

5. T. Bittar, *Soliman – L'empire magnifique*, Paris, Gallimard, 1994.

6. H. Inalcik, 'The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Firearms in the Middle East', in V. I. Parry, and M. E. Yapp (eds.), *War Technology and Society in the Middle East*, London, Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 195–215.



I-3.2 Illuminated Ottoman Qur'ān from the seventeenth century
© Dick Doughty/AramcoWorld

The Safavids

The Safavid State derived its name from Shaykh Safi al-Dīn Ishāq, who established the Safavid religious order in the small town of Ardabīl in north-western Iran. Shaykh Safi al-Dīn Ishāq died in 1334.

The Safavid order was founded in the rugged uplands of Anatolia and western Iran at a time when there was no effective central power in this culturally diverse region to impose the Sunni *madhhab* in the central Arab lands.

The teachings of the Safavid shaykhs of Ardabīl initially differ much from those of Sunni Islam. A key figure in the transformation in Safavid beliefs was Shaykh Samayd who came to head the Safavid religious order in 1447. However, towards the fifteenth century it became increasingly rooted in Shī'a beliefs.

Later in the century they sought support for their religious claims among the Turkish tribes of Azerbaijan and western Anatolia, presenting a threat to the eastern Anatolian frontiers.

It was during this period that the Safavids became militarized to defend their interests against the predominantly nomadic Sunni regimes. By 1500, the Safavids had evolved into a cohesive and formidable military force. In 1501, Shah Ismail (1501–14) founded the Safavid dynasty with the capture of Tabriz which became the capital of the new state.

They appealed to their followers with dual Sufi and Shīʿa doctrines functioning simultaneously as Sufi shaykhs, often in authoritarian control over their disciples' religious life and as descendants of the seventh Imam, nearly sacred figures who could present themselves from a Shīʿa point of view and finally establishing themselves as the only legitimate leaders of the Islamic community.

During the reign of Shah Abbas (1587–1628) that an important trend emerged which contributed to the fall of Safavid rule in 1722.⁷ Shah Abbas no longer exercised control upon the Shīʿa ʿulama of Iran. Henceforth they began openly to press for what they termed the unquestioned Shīʿa religious rulings that only the descendants of Imam ʿAlī, the Prophet Muḥammad's son-in-law, were the legitimate interpreters of the holy texts of the Qurʾān and empowered to lead the Islamic community.

Consequently by 1722 they succeeded in exercising effective control over all religious matters of the dynasty and claimed that henceforth as a group they were indeed the embodiment of the Nāʾib Imam and his worldly representation.

The Mughals

Zahir al-Dīn Muḥammad Babur (1483–1530) established the Timurid Mughal Empire of India after his victory over the Lodies at Panipat in 1526. However, it is important to note that neither Babur nor his son and successor Humāyūn (1508–56) were able to lay down the foundations of Mughal dominion over the historic heart of previous Indian empires in the Ganges-Jumna basin.

However, Babur did not succeed in pacifying most of the strategic wealthy Ganges valley before his death in 1530. Humāyūn was overpowered by Afghan forces in 1540 and found refuge in Iran. It was only in 1556 that he succeeded in regaining his throne, just before his death in 1557.

The transformation of the hardly established Mughal State into the Mughal Empire was brought about by Akbar who reigned from 1556–1605. He was able to achieve this by launching a series of military operations in northern and north-western India during the thirty years of his reign.⁸

7. Allouche, *The Origins ...*, *op. cit.*; L. Lockhart, *The Fall of the Safavid Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Iran*, 1958.

8. J. F. Richards, *The Mughal Empire*, Cambridge, 1992.



I-3.3 Fatehpur Sikri, the city built by the Moghul emperor Akbar between 1571 and 1573

© G. Degeorge

He was successful in the co-opting of the still self-governing communities in the Mughal prevailing order and the minutely worked out survey of the land revenue system originated by his Afghan predecessors. This laid the economic foundation for royal revenue as well as the military fiefs that constituted the main sources of Mughal power.

After he succeeded in stabilising the Mughal State Akbar resorted to an ostentatious religious tolerance and the adoption of pragmatic politics in an empire in which a large majority of the population was non-Muslim and predominantly Hindu. Consequently in 1582 Akbar took the unprecedented step of establishing a national ideology which consisted of religious syncretism and termed it 'Din-Ilahi' (Divine Faith).⁹

However, during the reign of Emperor Aurangzeb (1658–1707) the Mughal Empire was radically transformed. It was no longer a secular empire but reconverted into an Islamic theocratic state. Aurangzeb, succeeded in a series of military campaigns, spread over a period of twenty-six years, succeeded in

9. A. Erably, *The Mughal World*, London, 2007, pp. xix–xx.

conquering the Indian sub-continent, thereby creating the largest empire that India has ever known.

However, Aurangzeb's death in 1707 paved the way for the decline and fall of the Mughal Empire. This has now been attributed to his moral severity and the imposition of ascetic Islam.



I-3.4 A dark-green jade pot, 14 cm high, that once furnished the Safavid palace at Tabriz, and probably passed into Ottoman hands in the sixteenth century. Before that, the dragon-headed handle suggests that it may have belonged to a Timurid ruler.

© Ergun Gagatay/AramcoWorld

Chapter 1.4

THE GOLDEN AGE OF ISLAM IN THE SAHEL: THE EXAMPLE OF SONGHAY HUMANISM

Djibril Tamsir Niane

Along the southern fringe of the Sahara (the largest desert in the world) lies the Sahel, a sparsely vegetated transitional area between the desert and the savanna. In Arabic 'sahel' means 'shore', as if the Sahara were a sea of sand and rock, crossed by caravans of camels in the guise of ships, and the cities of the Sahel the ports where the camels offload their cargo. This open area runs from the mouth of the Senegal River on the Atlantic to the far reaches of Lake Chad without any major geographical obstacles. Despite being a semi-arid zone, the Sahel is wonderfully irrigated by the excellent Niger and Senegal river systems. Thus the Sahel is concomitantly home to agricultural communities (Wolof, Serer, Soninke, Malinke, Songhay and Hausa), pastoral communities (Berbers and Fulani) and fishing communities (Thioubalo, Sorko and Bozo). There were three great empires in succession in the Sahel, originally called Bilād al-Sudan by Berber Arab travellers and geographers, between the fourth and sixteenth centuries – the Ghana Empire, the Mali Empire and the Songhay Empire.

Islam in the Sahel

Islam made inroads into the Sahel in the second century of the Hegira. In 734, an Omayyad expedition crossed the Sahara into the 'State of Ghana',¹ from which it brought back an abundance of gold; the area then became known as the 'land of gold', the Muslims' genuine el Dorado. The military expedition

1. Abū Abdallah al-Fazari, *Kitāb al Zīj*, in al-Mas'ūdī, *Murij al-dhabab*, French transl. Barbier de Meynard and Pavet de Courteille, *Les prairies d'or*, 1861, IV, p. 39 (Chap. LXII); Kamal, III, p. 510. This is the first reference to 'Ghana' as a state south of the Sahara, in J. M. Cuoq, *Recueil des sources arabes concernant l'Afrique occidentale du VIIIe au XVIe siècle*, Paris, Éditions du CNRS, 1975, p. 42.

was short-lived, but it paved the way for trade. It is noteworthy that Islam spread peacefully in Bilād al-Sudan, through the influence of merchants and holy men, not by force of arms.

Subsequent travellers and geographers underlined the splendour of Ghana's sovereigns, who held sway over several Bilād al-Sudan kingdoms, including those of Mali and Songhay.

In the tenth century, the traveller and geographer Ibn Hawqal described the king of Ghana as 'the richest sovereign on earth, for he possesses great wealth and reserves of gold that have been extracted since early times to the advantage of former kings and his own.'² News of the 'land of gold' actually triggered a rush by Muslim merchants, particularly as the very open-minded and tolerant animist princes and kings employed Muslims as advisers. The Andalusian geographer al-Bakrī wrote that the sovereign had a mosque built near his palace for Muslims visiting the royal city on business – a tolerant environment that contributed to the rapid spread of Islam among the various peoples.

The consequences of the discovery of the Sahel were considerable, for the Muslim world therefore extended well beyond the Sahara, encompassing a multitude of black peoples. With its abundance of gold, the Sahel, the new dominion won over to Islam, was literally an inexhaustible source of the precious metal that was then in desperately short supply in both the Muslim and the Christian West. The Sahel thus held pride of place in the concert of Muslim nations and kingdoms. Sahelian cities – Audaghost, Kumbi, Niani, Timbuktu and Gao – thrived as staging posts on the caravan routes that linked them to international trade.

From the ninth to the thirteenth centuries, Sijilmasa, a caravan city in southern Morocco and bridgehead to the cities in the Sahel, was a meeting place for merchants not only from the Maghreb and Spain but also from the Mashriq, in particular Basra, Kufa and Baghdad. Merchants of the latter city, who had settled in large numbers in Sijilmasa, specialized in the gold trade with two major Sahelian cities – Kumbi and Audaghost. The traveller Ibn Hawqal wrote that 'they won considerable profits, great advantages and ample wealth' and that 'very few traders in Islamic countries are as well established'.² As an example of the wealth of the Bilād al-Sudan merchants and the scale of their transactions, Ibn Hawqal reported an unprecedented incident: in the city of Audaghost, the second largest city in the Ghana Empire, he saw a merchant with a bill for 42,000 dinars made out to a merchant in Sijilmasa. He noted in amazement, 'I have never seen or heard the like of this in the East. I have told the story in Iraq, in Fars and in Khorasan, and everyone has found it incredible.'² Sijilmasa reached the height of its glory in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Al-Mas'ūdī, the author

2. Abu-l-Qāsim Muḥammad Ibn Ḥawqal, *Configuration de la terre (Kitāb Sūrat al-ard)*, in J. M. Cuoq, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–2.



I-4.1 The great mosque of Djenné, Mali, with a view of the weekly market in its grounds

© Brynn Bruijn/AramcoWorld

of *Meadows of gold and mines of gems*, wrote, ‘All of the gold used by merchants is struck at Sijilmasa, particularly dinars’.³ Other mints were opened up later, in Almoravid times, mainly in Aghmat, Tlemcen and Marrakesh.

The cities in the Sahel were very charming; travellers from the East were particularly impressed by Audaghost, for they thought that ‘of all the cities in the world, it resembles Mecca the most’.

Trans-Saharan trade boomed under the emperors of Mali, and Islam reached far south into the savannah to Sudan. However, when the trade routes shifted towards Egypt, Sijilmasa declined in importance and Kumbi was overshadowed by Niani, the capital of Mali.

The emperors of Mali effectively controlled imports and exports by means of a tax system that filled the public coffers, and the Songhay cities of Timbuktu and Gao gained greatly by the revival of trade in Mali. Converted to Islam in the eleventh century, the emperors of Mali were devout Muslims and several went on pilgrimage to Mecca. The most famous was Mansa Musa, whose 1324 pilgrimage was widely discussed in the Maghreb and Egypt until

3. Abu-l-Ḥasan ‘Alī al-Mas‘ūdī, *Murūj al-dhahab*, French trans. C. B. de Meynard and J. P. de Courteille, *Les prairies d’or*, Paris 1861, in J. M. Cuoq, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–61.

the very end of the century. Mansa Musa lived in grand style, with a retinue of some 10,000 people; he and his retinue completely flooded the Egyptian capital with so much gold that the value of the dinar plummeted. The lavish pilgrim gave alms generously in the holy cities and brought back to Mali several men of learning, *sharīfs* and an architect, Iṣḥāq al-Tuedjīn, who built him in Timbuktu a palace (*madugu*) and the great mosque (*djinguereber*). He built another mosque in Gao and is credited with the Goundam and Diré mosques. He also built a mosque and an audience chamber for the sovereign in Niani. The emperor's architect settled in Timbuktu, where he died in 1346.

That pilgrimage had far-reaching consequences, both in the Muslim world and the Christian west. The myth or legend of Bilād al-Sudan extraordinarily rich in gold was one that came true; Christians learnt of the pilgrimage from Muslim accounts, and Europeans became genuinely interested in the region. Thus, Angelino Dulcert's famous map revealed to Christians in 1339 the existence of a gold-rich 'Rex Melli' and, in 1375, the Majorcans, who had gleaned this knowledge from the Arabs, produced a very accurate map of Africa showing Mansa Musa on a throne holding a nugget of gold. From the fourteenth century onwards many attempts were made by Europeans to fathom the secret of the trans-Saharan routes leading to 'Rex Melli'. The best-known European exploration was the journey in 1447 by Malfante, a Genoan, as far as Tuat, but he could not go any farther. Europe's 'gold lust' grew stronger; 'Sudanese gold' fever inflamed minds, but the 'Muslim curtain' remained impassable. Minting resumed in Europe in the fourteenth century, however, when Bilād al-Sudan gold was supplied by the Muslims.

After the emperors of Mali, the sovereigns of Songhay, fully aware of the stakes and wishing to maximize profits from the trans-Saharan trade, tightened control over imports and exports. The Egyptians, for their part, very effectively prohibited all Christian inroads south of Cairo.

Under the Songhay emperors, Islam in the Bilād al-Sudan spread beyond city confines to the countryside owing to the influence of black Wangara, Soninke and Songhay merchants. The Songhay emperors were not only devout Muslims but also, for the most part, fine men of letters. Askiya Muhammad made the pilgrimage to Mecca accompanied by many learned men and Qur'ānic scholars. Upon his return, after being dubbed Caliph of Takrur (West Africa) by Moulay El-Abbas, the Ḥassanid *sharīf*, imam of Mecca, Askiya Muhammad began to spread Islam through *jihād*. Anxious to rule in accordance with Qur'ānic precepts, he consulted celebrated figures such as al-Suyūṭī, the Arab writer, and al-Maghili, the famous Tlemcen legal scholar. Being an enlightened sovereign, he encouraged the advancement of learning by granting stipends to Islamic scholars.

As a result, the Sahel became an integral part of the Muslim world during the reign of the Songhay emperors. Sovereigns of the Sahel and sovereigns of the Maghreb and Egypt exchanged letters and gifts.

One sign of such integration was the frequency of missions and journeys from Bilād al-Sudan to the cities of the Maghreb and Egypt. Cairo was home to many merchants and scholars from Bilād al-Sudan. In the late fourteenth century, the great historian Ibn Khaldūn obtained first-hand information about the sovereigns of Mali from that country's embassy in Cairo. The very existence of many principalities and cities in the Maghreb was closely linked to improved relations with the Sahel. Thus Muslims could trade and travel in a vast area from the shores of the Mediterranean across the Sahara to the Niger Bend. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Cairo became a hub for pilgrims from cities throughout the Sahel; many sovereigns, including Mansa Musa and Askiya Muhammad, bought houses in holy cities to accommodate pilgrims from Bilād al-Sudan.

It is noteworthy that geographical knowledge in the Muslim world was much greater than the information provided by Ptolemy in ancient times, which was still being used in its original form in the Christian West.

The age of the Askiyas: Songhay humanism

It is not easy to pinpoint the apogee of a civilization. Did the Bilād al-Sudan civilization and Islam in the Sahel reach their zenith in the tenth and eleventh centuries when the Ghana Empire, the 'land of gold', drew merchants not only from the Maghreb but also from Khorasan, Baghdad and Basra and when bills and other letters of credit were circulating between Audaghost and Sijilmasa, or in the fourteenth century when the Mali emperor Mansa Musa and his numerous suite of pilgrims flooded Cairo and the holy cities with gold, or in the age of the Songhay emperors, when Askiya Muhammad returned from Mecca with his retinue of learned men and Islamic scholars, crowned with the title of Caliph of West Africa?

Those periods were all high points, but the age of the Askiyas was particularly outstanding owing to the brilliance of its intellectual works and the humanism that blossomed along the Niger Bend. The Songhay Empire provided the background for a dazzling black Muslim civilization, to which the Songhay, Soninke, Mandingo, Berbers and Fulani all contributed. At the time Gao, Timbuktu and Jenne were cosmopolitan cities in which all ethnic groups of the Sahel mingled. There were many Arabs and Berbers as well. Islam was a powerful unifying force in the Sahel both spiritually and culturally; in those cities where trade brought together people of different ethnic origins, their shared faith created a convivial atmosphere conducive to fruitful commingling.

Art

The art of the Sahel, commonly known as ‘Sudanese art’, is merely the outcome of techniques and practises that blossomed and peaked under the Ghana and Mali empires. Mansa Musa, both a patron and a builder, owing to the work of his architect Ishāq al-Tuedjin, set his stamp on Sudanese architecture: adobe edifices reinforced by projecting wooden stakes. The monuments in Jenne, Timbuktu and Gao are particularly typical of this style.

This architecture reached its peak in the sixteenth century in the age of the Askiyas, who were great builders. Most of the buildings that are the pride of present-day Timbuktu and Gao date from the age of the Askiyas; the Sahel’s semi-arid climate has preserved these adobe monuments well. The craftsmen and masons of Jenne, the master builders of those imposing monuments, formed a powerful guild in the service of the sovereigns. The great mosque of Timbuktu (Djinguereber mosque) built by Mansa Musa was completely restored by Askiya Dawud, son of Askiya Muhammad, and the famous *qādi* al-Aqib; with its timber spikes and the flattened cone of its minaret, it dominates the entire city. The same *qādi* built the Sankore mosque, and its simple and austere lines won travellers’ admiration. It is now the seat of the University of Timbuktu.

In Gao the pyramidal tomb of Askiya Muhammad genuinely epitomised the Sudanese style, with its majestic bulk exuding grace and nobility. The monument that really symbolized elegance, however, was the mosque of Jenne, dating from the fourteenth century. Many residences of Islamic scholars and other men of letters in Timbuktu such as the house of Bagayogo and that of Abu-l-Barakāt, date back to that period. Civil architecture is well preserved in the Sahel on account of the dry climate.

Songhay humanism was religious in essence; ‘rather than being a revival’, wrote the historian Sekene Mody Cissoko, ‘it represented a flowering of African civilization, the outcome of a long history dating back to the Ghana Empire.’⁴ Under the Askiyas the cities of Gao, Jenne and especially Timbuktu became both centres of intellectual life and seats of academic learning, drawing students from cities throughout the Sahel.

Study of the Qurʾān formed the basis of education, since Arabic was the language of scholars and men of letters. Elementary education, provided by holy men throughout the city, was based on recitation and translation of the Qurʾān. There were no fewer than 120 schools in the city of Timbuktu alone. Secondary education concentrated on interpretation of the Qurʾān, while law (*fiqh*), theology (*tanḥīd*), traditions (*ḥadīth*) and astronomy were taught at the university. Geography and history were held in high esteem in the Sahel,

4. S. M. Cissoko, ‘L’humanisme sur les bords du Niger au XVI^e siècle’, *Présence Africaine*, 49, 1964, pp. 81–8.

while logic and rhetoric were also highly regarded in Timbuktu. Medicine and arithmetic, were taught, as well.

The Songhay emperors were highly aware of their role as educators and thus provided financial assistance for teachers and scholars, sparing them all material wants. Judges and other legal officials, too, were granted stipends. Teachers received gifts in kind from their students (grain, garments and livestock). The most outstanding of the teachers who made the University of Sankore famous was the holy man Sīdī Yaḥya (1373–1462), who was an exemplary master, humble in his duties and dedicated to his calling. He was placid by nature, with an intellect equalled only by his infallible memory. ‘His difficult duties as a judge did nothing to quench his devotion to teaching. He had begun as a teacher and continued to teach once he became a *qāḍī*. How pleasant it was to listen to his lessons! How clear were his explanations! What an unerring guide he was and how easy was his method! Sīdī Yaḥya gave fresh impetus to science in the country of the black peoples and educated a host of young people who later won distinction as men of letters.’⁵



I–4.2 Songhai scholarship; Islamic scholarly texts at the Ahmed Baba Institute of Higher Learning and Islamic Research in Timbuktu, Mali

© UN Photo/Mark Garten

5. A. Saadi, *Tarikh el-Sondan*, Paris, Maisonneuve, 1964, pp. 68–9.

Philosophy, law and letters

The sixteenth century was renowned for its scintillating intellectual activity, but the age of the Askiyas was above all that of the jurists, many of whom were famous, for Mohammed Touré, Salih Diawara, Mohammed Bagayogo, al-Aqib and Ahmed Baba all enjoyed the protection and liberality of the sovereigns. Several of them held the office of *qādi* in Jenne, Timbuktu or Gao, and all were theologians of great scholarship who devoted themselves to religious disciplines. However, few were drawn to the positive sciences; the heyday of Arab science admittedly lay in the past, in the fourteenth century. Although their works cannot all be mentioned, a few words will be said about two of the most celebrated scholars of the age of the Askiyas – Mohammed Bagayogo and Ahmed Baba.

Mohammed Bagayogo was a great jurist, a thinker and an outstanding teacher; the Timbuktu historian ‘Abderrahman Sadi wrote of Mohammed Bagayogo that with his ‘fine, scrupulous and lively wit and shrewd, discerning mind, always ready with a reply and with the quick understanding of a brilliant intellect, he was a man of few words.’ This peerless teacher had a large library that was open to anyone in search of knowledge. He was also a theologian and grammarian, and his lectures at Sankore were well-attended.

The great sixteenth-century scholar Sidi Ahmed Baba (1556–1627) was a pupil of Mohammed Bagayogo. Born in Arawan into a family of scholars, he was ‘the jewel of his age’ and ‘his vast intellect and his infallible memory made him a mine of knowledge’.⁶ He was a historian, a theologian and a jurist. When taken to Marrakesh as a prisoner, as were many scholars from Timbuktu after the Sultan of Morocco had captured the city, he impressed the scholars there. The Sultan freed him and gave him permission to teach.

The Arab men of learning called him the ‘standard of standards’. He had one of the largest libraries in the city, thought to contain more than 1,700 works. He wrote a substantial amount, but only extracts from two of his works have survived – *Nayl al-ibtihāj*, a bibliographical encyclopaedia of Islamic scholars and other learned men, and *Mi‘raj al-ṣu‘ūd*, devoted to the history of the peoples of Bilād al-Sudan.

History flourished in the age of the Askiyas: a family of historians – Maḥmud Kati (1468–1554) and his grandson – produced *Tārīkh al-fattash*, a work dedicated to the history of the Askiyas, which contains valuable information about the Sahelian kingdoms.

‘Abderrahman Sadi was the great historian of the Sahel: his *Tārīkh al-Sudān* covers the entire history of the Songhay Empire, and his critical judgment is outstanding.

6. *Ibid.*



I-4.3 The tomb of Askiya Muhammad in Gao, Mali (built 1495)

© UNESCO/Nomination File

Timbuktu, the great Songhay metropolis, had 100,000 inhabitants in the late sixteenth century; its influence extended throughout the Sahel, drawing thousands of students, doctors, jurists and teachers of renown. The city had attained a high degree of sophistication. To quote the historian Kati, who described it shortly before it was captured by Spanish mercenary converts in 1591, "Timbuktu had reached the pinnacle of beauty and splendour; religion flourished within its confines, and the *Sunna* inspired every aspect of not only religious but also worldly affairs, although these two fields are apparently incompatible by definition. At the time Timbuktu was unrivalled among the cities of Bilād al-Sudan from Mali to the outer fringes of the Maghreb for the soundness of its institutions, its political freedoms, the purity of its morals, the safety of people and property, its clemency and compassion towards the poor and strangers, its courtesy to students and men of science and the assistance provided to the latter."⁷

Timbuktu was also a city of saints, whose tombs were visited by large numbers of people wanting to make a wish. It was the city of the *San*, the scholars who lived around the Sankore mosque (Sankore being the scholars' quarter). Under the Askiyas, the city was placed under the authority of the

7. M. Kati, *Tarikh el-fettach*, Paris, Maisonneuve, 1964, pp. 312–13.

qāḍī, who acted as mayor. He was responsible for managing taxation in the city and for providing all public services.

The *qāḍīs* of Timbuktu, who were respected by the Askiyas, governed the city very fairly; the inhabitants were peaceful people who dreaded violence: ‘You could come across a hundred of them, and none would have a lance, a sabre, a knife or anything but a staff’ (Mahmud Kati).

The capture of Timbuktu by Moroccan troops was a disaster, but the deportation of the Islamic scholars to Morocco in 1593 was, to quote the historian Kati, ‘the greatest injury ever done to Islam’.

Without those illustrious figures, the city became a shell with no soul. It was a step backwards for civilization, and Timbuktu took a long time to recover.

Chapter 1.5

ISLAM IN THE GREATER
MAGHREB

Idris El-Hareir

In volume 3 *The Spread of Islam throughout the World*, Chapter 3 ‘Islam in the Maghrib’, we discussed the political situation in Greater Maghreb saying that it was divided into three political units: the Ḥafṣids in Tunisia, the Zayyānids in Algeria (Middle Maghreb) and the Banū Marīn in the Far Maghreb (*al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā*). These powers occasionally competed and fought against each other. They were connected with the contemporary European powers in alliances against their fellow Muslims. However, in the Far Maghreb rule passed into the hands of the Sa‘dids who were able to unite it and withstand the attacks of the Portuguese and the Spanish, and indeed to achieve notable victories over them such as at the Battle of Wādī al-Makhāzin in 986/1578.¹

Meanwhile, on the European coast we find the Spanish kingdoms uniting after the marriage of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella of Spain and also the emergence of the kingdom of Portugal. As we have already seen, in 898/1492 these political and military developments led to the expulsion of the Muslims from al-Andalūs. This momentous event had disastrous consequences for both Europeans and Muslims, especially in the Greater Maghreb.

Part of the policy of beleaguering the Muslims in al-Andalūs was to occupy towns concentrated along the Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts of the Maghreb so as to prevent supplies reaching the Muslims of al-Andalūs. After the Muslim expulsion, on the command of the Spanish Queen Isabella, these towns were used to facilitate penetration into the Maghreb and also into East Africa in order to convert it to Christianity.² This was in addition to

1. Idrīs El-Hareir, ‘Islam in the Maghrib’, *Different aspects of Islamic Culture*, III, UNESCO, 2010.
2. Jalāl Yahyā, *al-Maghrib al-Kabir: al-‘usūr al-ḥadītha wa-bujūm al-isti‘mār* [Greater Maghreb: The Modern Period and Attacks of Colonialism], Beirut Dār al-Nahḍa al-‘Arabiyya, III, p. 113; See also Aḥmad Tawfiq al-Madanī, *Ḥarb al-thalāthmi‘at sana bayna al-Jazā‘ir wa-Iṣbaniyā* [The Three Hundred Years’ war between Algiers and Spain], Algeria, al-Sharika al-Waṭaniyya li-l-Nashr, 1976, p. 80.

seizing the lucrative gold trade routes out of Africa, and generally damaging the economic interests of the Muslims who controlled the most important of these routes to the Far East, the source of trade in spices, tea, silk and so on. Thus, under the leadership of Prince Henry the Navigator, the Portuguese attempted to sail around Africa until they eventually reached the Cape of Good Hope and from there East Africa and then India.

It is clear that the reasons for this struggle were from the very beginning religious. They subsequently changed, however, into economic and political goals which formed the focal point of the struggle which continued up to the end of the Second World War. In more recent times, the struggle is manifested in international economic monopolies established by Western Europe and the United States of America.

In 803/1400, taking advantage of a war between the Marīnids and the Zayyānids over Tīlimsan (*Tilimsān*), the Spanish advanced and were able to occupy Tétouan (*Ṭatwān*) destroying it and killing half of its population and taking the remainder as captives to Spain. Following this, the Portuguese occupied al-Marsa al-Kabir (*al-Marsā al-Kabīr*) and remained there from 818–22/1415–19. They were then driven out but managed to seize it again and occupied it from 876–82/1471–7 when they were finally ousted.

In 818/1415, under the command of Prince Henry the Navigator, the Portuguese occupied Ceuta (*Ṣibta*). Somewhat later in 841/1437, they tried to seize Tangier (*Ṭanjā*) but suffered a crushing defeat in which Prince Ferdinand was taken captive and remained a hostage in Fez (*Fās*). An agreement was reached that the Portuguese would withdraw from Ceuta in exchange for the release of their prince, but King João I (John I) refused to surrender the town and so Ferdinand died in captivity.³

After a short respite the Portuguese resumed their penetration and advanced into the Far Maghreb where they occupied Kesr es-Seghir (*al-Qaṣr al-Ṣaghir*) in 863/1458, Asila (*Aṣīlā*) in 876/1471, Masat (*Masāt*) in 894/1488, Agadir (*Aghādīr*) in 911/1501, Safi (*Aṣfī*) in 914/1508, Azemmour (*Aẓmūr*) in 919/1513, El Jadida (*al-Jadīda*) in 920/1514, and Aguz (*Aghūz*) in 925/1519, while in 876/1417 they succeeded in taking Tangier, and in 921/1515 in plundering Marrakesh (*Marrākīsh*).⁴

After the Spanish had managed to expel the Muslims from al-Andalus following the fall of Granada, the last stronghold of Islam, in 898/1492, Spain began to compete with Portugal over the division of the territories of the Greater Maghreb. It appears that a disagreement occurred between the two parties which required mediation. It was because of this that the territories to

3. *A General History of Africa*, pp. 112–13; See also Aḥmad Tawfīq al-Madanī, *Ḥarb al-thalāthmiʿat ...*, *op. cit.*, 1976, p. 102.

4. *A General History of Africa*, UNESCO, 1990, p. 113.

the east of Ceuta were allotted to Spain while those to the west were given to the Portuguese.⁵

In implementation of the agreement, on 28 Rabīʿ I 911/29 August 1505 a Spanish force of 5,000 soldiers led by Don Ramòn de Cordoba set out from the port of Malāga and arrived in al-Marsā al-Kabīr on 11 Rabīʿ II 911/11 September 1505. After a bitter fight with those defending the town the Spaniards were able to occupy it and they changed its mosque into a church.⁶

In their campaign against al-Marsā al-Kabīr, the Spanish destroyed the garrison there leaving only 400 of its soldiers alive. When they left the town to seize Marghin (Marghīn), however, which lies three-days journey from al-Marsā al-Kabīr, they met with fierce resistance resulting in a terrible defeat in which most of their troops were killed.⁷

The Spanish continued their policy of occupying most of the Maghrebi coastal towns and on 26 Muḥarram 915/16 May 1509 Cardinal Ximénes, the Bishop of Toledo and chief minister of King Ferdinand, organized a large military expedition in command of which he appointed the Spanish general Pedro Navarro. The expedition launched a surprise attack on Oran (Wahrān) which nevertheless refused to surrender to the invaders. The Spanish prevailed, however, since they had already bought the services of agents within the town with whom they had reached a secret agreement before the arrival of the expeditionary force. History preserves the names of some of these traitors and they include Citorra, a Jewish immigrant from al-Andalūs, and two commanders from Oran, one called ʿĪsā al-ʿUraynī and the other Ibn Qānis. They opened one of the gates of the town allowing the Spanish suddenly to enter, to take the defenders by surprise and throw their plans into confusion. The Spanish forces inflicted terrible carnage on the town killing more than 4,000 Muslims and taking a further 8,000 captive. They also seized booty worth 48 million Algerian dinars. The Spanish rewarded Citorra, who had helped them occupy Oran, by allowing him to collect and retain the taxes paid by the inhabitants. This privilege was inherited by his sons from 915–80/1509–72.⁸

The Spanish continued their advance on the towns of the Middle Maghreb by attacking Hajar Badis (*Hajar Badis*), Bijaya (*Bijaya*) and Annaba (*ʿAnnāba*) and by fuelling the dispute between members of the Ḥafṣid and Zayyānid families.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Al-Madanī, *Ḥarb al-thalāthmiʿat ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 103–9.

Following the victories achieved by the Spanish fleet against the towns of Oran, Bijaya, Annaba and other places on the Maghreb coast, they turned their eyes to Tripoli-of-the-west (*Tārābulus al-Gharb*). At the head of a naval force of 8,000 men Pedro Navarro sailed to the island of Favignana to meet up with the rest of the fleet who were gathering there prior to continuing their journey to Tripoli-of-the-west which they intended to attack with the help of Sicily and Naples.⁹

The Spanish-Italian fleet set sail for Malta, stopping at the island of Gozo where it was joined by some Maltese who, due to their intimate knowledge of Tripoli, were to act as guides. The man charged with this task was Giuliano Abela. The fleet consisted of 60 ships, a number of various kinds of boats and five Maltese armed vessels. On 13 Rabī^c II/20 July 1510 the armada left Malta. It eventually comprised 120 naval units carrying 15,000 Spanish soldiers, 3,000 Italian soldiers and some adventurers.¹⁰

The fleet reached the waters off Tripoli on 18 Rabī^c II 916/25 July 1510. This coincided with the Feast of Saint James for the Spanish and the Portuguese and so lent the expedition the air of a Crusade. It managed to occupy the city and committed dreadful acts against the inhabitants, killing 2,000 Arabs and taking 400 captive who were sold at public auction. The Europeans received news of the fall of Tripoli into the hands of Spain with great delight and mutual congratulation. Indeed, the papal representative in Bologna, Francisco Alidosi, called on Christians to organize large rallies to give expression to their joy. Congratulations were also exchanged between the Duke of Venice and the King of Spain and his two representatives in Sicily. A commemorative medal was issued to celebrate the occasion.¹¹

The success of Count Pedro Navarro in Tripoli encouraged him to launch an attack on the island of Gozo on 23 Jumādā I 916/28 August 1510, but he experienced a crushing defeat in which he lost 4,000 troops. So he left for the island of Kerkennah where he met with another defeat. He departed from Tripoli after leaving a garrison there and arrived in Cambrai with his army reduced to 4,000 men and his fleet reduced to only 23 vessels. As a result of these repeated defeats the Spanish removed Navarro from his post.

Centres of popular resistance were established on the outskirts of Tripoli. The most famous of these was in the region of Tajura (*Tājura*[?]) which

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 110–16; Yahyā, *al-Maghrib al Kabir ...*, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 15.

10. E. Rossi, *Libiyā mundhu-l-fatḥ al-ʿarabi ḥattā sanat 1911* [Libya from the Arab Conquest to 1911], Beirut, Dār al-Thaqāfā, 1974, pp. 140–2. See also Idrīs El-Hareir, ‘Al-kiyānāt al-siyāsiyya fī Libiyā 447–933/1055–1517’ [Political Entities in Libya 447–933/1055–1517] in *al-Kitāb al-marjīʿ fī tārikḥ al-umma al-ʿarabiyya*, Tunisia, ALECSO, 2009, pp. 28–30.

11. El-Hareir (2009), pp. 140–1; Rossi, *Libiyā mundhu-l-fatḥ ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

imposed an impenetrable blockade on the Spanish in Tripoli preventing them from venturing beyond the city walls. Tripoli remained under Spanish control until 937/1530 when it surrendered to the Knights of Saint John who continued to rule it until they were expelled by the Ottomans in 958/1551.¹²

While the Spanish and Portuguese were extending their authority over most of the main Atlantic and Mediterranean coastal towns in the Greater Maghreb, they gave their military expeditions the character of a religious crusade since most of them were blessed by popes of the Catholic Church. The reaction from the Islamic side was the appearance of the naval jihad movement which Europeans called sea piracy, which it was not, however, being a movement of resistance to the invading forces and revenge on the Spanish who expelled the Muslims of al-Andalus estimated to number some one million people.

As a result of these wars the people of the Maghreb asked the Ottoman State for assistance against the European invasion of their country. Thus, we see a delegation from Tripoli travelling to Istanbul looking for help in liberating their city from the rule of the Knights of Saint John and their Spanish allies. Sultan Suleiman al-Qānūnī dispatched a naval force led by Murād Agha which set up camp in Tajura where Murād established his command headquarters. From there he launched attacks against the Knights of Saint John in Tripoli. When he was unable to retake the city, the Ottoman sultan sent a fleet under the command of Sinan Pasha who was helped by the pirate Darghut. In 958/1551, after besieging Tripoli, and with the support of the Tripolitans and those inside the country, the Ottomans were able to oust the Knights of Saint John and their allies from the city. Tripoli then became one of the most important bases for the Ottoman fleet in the Greater Maghreb.

In 959/1552, the Knights of Malta attempted to recover Tripoli from the Ottomans and sent a fleet of sixteen ships carrying 1,800 men under the command of Leone Strozzi. Although they landed in Zuwara (*Zuwāra*) and occupied it, Murād Pasha was able to defeat them.¹³

In view of the importance of Tripoli, the Spanish made another attempt to retake it. In 968/1560 they prepared an expedition of 30 infantry brigades under the command of General Don Alvaro de Sande, 35 Italian divisions under the command of Andrea Gonzaga, alongside 14 German divisions and two divisions of French infantry. This was in addition to a fleet consisting of 18 large ships, 14 small ships and 50 galleys. The man in overall command of these forces was Andrea Doria. The Pope also made a contribution of

12. El-Hareir (2009), p. 29.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 29–30.

four ships while the Knights of Malta provided a further five. The expedition landed at Ballu (*Bāllū*) near Zuwara to the west of Tripoli.¹⁴

In response, Darghut mobilized a force of 2,000 Turkish infantrymen, 100 cavalymen and 10,000 of the inhabitants. He was able to prevent the expedition from landing in Zuwara and it retreated to Djerba (Jarba) arriving there at the same time as did the Ottoman naval assistance in the form of 60 ships each carrying 60 Janissaries. The Ottomans achieved a great victory over the European force, destroying most of it and capturing Don Alvaro de Sande and the other commanders.¹⁵

Ottoman rule over Tripoli and Barqa (Libya) continued from 958–1329/1551–1911. During this time it passed through three stages known as the First Ottoman Period (958–1123/1551–1711), the Rule of the Karamanlids (1123–1251/1711–1835) and the Second Ottoman Period (1251–1330/1835–1911).

One of the consequences of Spanish pressure on the Hafṣids in Africa (present-day Tunisia) was that the inhabitants asked for Ottoman assistance against the Spaniards. In response, the Ottomans commissioned a group of formidable sailors such as the brothers ‘Arūj Pasha and Khayr al-Dīn, and Barbarossa, that is, Red Beard. In 922/1516 ‘Arūj Pasha came up against a Spanish expeditionary force which was making its way to seize Algiers (*madīnat al-Jazā’ir*). He defeated the Spanish and as a result managed to expel the invaders from the town of Jijal (*Jijal*) in 919/1513. He also successfully repelled an assault on the port of Algiers in 922/1516 and liberated Tunis in 923/1517.

Taking advantage of a dispute among the leaders, ‘Arūj attempted to invade the State of the Zayyānids in Tilimsan. However, in 924/1518 the Spanish managed to surround him, took him captive and killed him. ‘Arūj was succeeded by his brother Khayr al-Dīn. Sultan Selim I provided Khayr al-Dīn with 2,000 Janissaries, gave him permission to conscript 2,000 more men from Anatolia and conferred on him the title Emir of Emirs (*amīr al-umara’* or *beylerbey*).¹⁶

Khayr al-Dīn endeavoured to equip his fleet with fast-moving naval units and he eventually possessed a formidable force which frightened the Spanish, especially when it captured some Middle Eastern ports. In response, in 942/1535 the Spanish king Charles V prepared a powerful force of 30,000 men under his own command and with this he took Tunis. One third of the inhabitants, that is, 70,000 people, were killed, one third were taken prisoner and the final third managed to make their escape.¹⁷

14. C. Bergna, *Ṭarābulus bayna 1510–1850* [Tripoli between 1510 and 1850], Tripoli Dār al-Farjānī, 1969, pp. 49–69.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 69–72.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 80–3.

17. Al-Madanī, *op. cit.*, pp. 162–7, 189–93.



I-5.1 The Alhambra in Granada; view of the Court of Lions
© G. Degeorge

Nonetheless, Khayr al-Dīn launched a surprise attack on the Balearic islands, destroyed the Spanish fleet and captured 6,000 Spaniards. Following this, Muḥammad Ḥasan Āghā, Khayr al-Dīn's deputy, attacked Gibraltar with a fleet of 15 ships, seized it and returned carrying booty and prisoners. King Charles V resumed his raids on the coast of the Greater Maghreb and on 27 Jumādā II 948/18 October 1541 he led a large military expedition composed of 24,000 men who were a mixture of different European nationalities. He described the campaign as a crusade because the Pope had blessed it. However, the Algerians inflicted a crushing defeat on the expedition killing 12,000 troops and destroying 200 ships, including 30 warships, and 200 cannons. The defeat was facilitated by the weather conditions, such as rain and storms.¹⁸

Khayr al-Dīn fortified the port of Algiers, turning it into a citadel and a naval base of operations against the invaders. He became commander of the Ottoman fleets, the sultan conferring on him the title Pasha in appreciation of his services in the Greater Maghreb. After a long struggle with the Spanish and their allies the Ḥafṣids and the Zayyānids, Khayr al-Dīn was eventually able to annex most of the Maghreb to the Ottoman State. In the summer of 1188/1774 Tunis was added to the Ottoman domains.

When Khayr al-Dīn died in 953/1546 he was succeeded by his son Ḥasan Pasha, who followed the policy of his father in fighting the Spanish and their allies. He liberated Tīlīmsan and after this the sultan appointed him admiral of the Ottoman fleet. In 976/1568 Ḥasan was succeeded as governor of Algiers by ʿAlī 'the Infidel' (al-ʿilī).

Ottoman rule in Algiers passed through four periods.

1. The period of the *beylerbeys* (emir of emirs) (924–96/1518–83)
2. The period of the pashas (996–1070/1587–1659)
3. The period of the aghas (1070–80/1659–71)
4. The period of the *deys* (1082–1246/1671–1830).¹⁹

The policy of the European countries led by Spain and France was always to oppose the uniting of the Greater Maghreb with the Ottoman State so as to prevent the Mediterranean from becoming an Islamic Ottoman 'lake' which threatened their trade and security interests.

In 977/1569, under the command of ʿAlī 'the Infidel' the Ottomans took advantage of Spanish preoccupation with the Muslim revolt in Granada and events in Holland, and sought the assistance of the Ḥafṣid minister, Abu-l-Ṭayyib al-Khaḍḍār, to launch an attack on Tunis and expel the Spanish from it.

18. *Ibid.*

19. ʿAlī Sultān, *Tārīkh al-ʿArab al-ḥadīth* [The Modern History of the Arabs], Tripoli, al-Maktaba al-ʿIlmiyya, n.d.; A. Raymond, 'North Africa in the Pre-colonial Period' in P. M. Holt. et al. (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Islam*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, II, pp. 248–9; Ismaʿīl Abu-l-Nasr, *The history of the Maghrib*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 157–66.

Europe was shaken by this event and forgot its differences which the Pope had been striving to bring to an end. Thus, he convinced Venice, France and other European powers of the need to put aside their differences in order to overturn Ottoman power in the Mediterranean. Accordingly, a large naval force was formed which defeated the Ottoman navy at the Battle of Lepanto in 979/1571.

In 981/1573 Spain exploited the victory by organizing a naval expedition against Tunis under the command of Don Juan. The Spanish had agreed with Sultan Ḥasan the Ḥafṣid, who had taken refuge in Spain, to divide rule between them, but this led to disagreements among the Ḥafṣid amīrs. As a result of these disagreements the Spanish were able to seize Tunis.

In 982/1574, once ‘Alī ‘the Infidel’ had rebuilt the Ottoman fleet, he led a strong expeditionary force against the Spanish in Tunis. Reinforcements from Tripoli-of-the-west, Algiers and military units under the command of Sinan Pasha also took part in the campaign and they were able finally to drive out the Spanish. From that time, Tunis became an Ottoman *vilayet* (province) and the Ḥafṣid sultan was exiled to Istanbul.

Ottoman rule in Tunis is divided into four periods.

1. The period of the pashas (982–99/1574–90)
2. The government of the *deys* (1000–41/1591–1630)
3. The government of the beys (the Murādids) (1041–1117/1631–1705)
4. The government of the beys (the Ḥusaynids) (1117–1377/1705–1957).

During the last period, in 1298/1881, France occupied Tunisia and it remained a French protectorate until it gained its independence in 1375/1955. In 1377/1957 the regime of the hereditary bey was overthrown, the rule of the Ḥusaynids in Tunisia came to a close and the country was declared a republic.²⁰

When the Lower Maghreb (*al-Maghrib al-Adnā*) and Greater Maghreb (Libya, Tunisia and Algeria) became part of the Ottoman State they adopted both the laws of the Ottomans and their foreign policy towards the European countries which was mostly tense. Most European countries paid duties to the Ottomans so as to safeguard their merchant shipping in the Mediterranean. In 1246/1830 relations became strained between France and Algeria over debts that France owed to Algeria. As a result of Algeria’s demand for payment, a sharp exchange of words took place between the *Dey* and the French Consul which culminated in the Consul being hit in the face with the *Dey*’s fan and his being ejected from the meeting. France saw this as an insult, so the French king declared that a military expedition should be made ready to avenge the injury to his country, that it was a Christian campaign against the country of the Muslim Berbers and that it was on behalf of the whole Christian world.²¹

20. Sultān, *Tārīkh al-‘Arab* ..., *op. cit.*, p. 511, See also Yahyā, *al-Maghrib al-Kabīr* ..., *op. cit.*, III, p. 108.

21. Aḥmad ‘Izzat ‘Abd al-Karīm, *Dirāsāt fī tarīkh al-Maghrib al-ḥadīth* [Studies on the Modern History of the Maghreb], Beirut, Dār al-Nahḍa, 1970, pp. 405–12.

France dispatched a large armada consisting of 103 ships carrying 37,000 soldiers and 27,000 sailors. This was in addition to 675 merchant vessels, hired to transport equipment, supplies and so on. The armada stopped in Sidi Fredj (*Sayyidi Furaj*) 25 kilometres west of Algiers. Although the *Dey* Husayn put up stiff resistance and fought against occupation, he was quickly forced to accept French terms of surrender and left Algeria for Naples. The whole of Europe was delighted at France's invasion of Algeria, that is, apart from Britain. The Ottoman sultan protested but could do nothing; nor could Tripoli, Tunis and the Maghreb, which similarly gave in to French intimidation.²²

When General de Bourmont, the commander of the French forces, attempted to push into the country he was met with strong opposition from the Algerians such that the French discussed whether to withdraw from Algeria or to remain only on the coast. Under the command of Ahmad Bey, the governor of Biskra, the garrison in Constantine (*Qasantina*) resisted French occupation until 1253/1837. The French could do no more than seize Bijaya and Annaba.



I-5.2 The Alhambra in Granada

© UNESCO/F. Bandarin

22. A. Julien, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine 1827-1871*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1964, pp. 28-40.

Despite French aggression and their attempt to create divisions between the Algerians they did not achieve any great success in their advance into the country and several times they were forced to change their commanders.

Onto the scene came Amīr ‘Abd al-Qādir, the son of Sharif Muḥyī al-Dīn who was the shaykh of the Qādiriyya sufi order, and whose father had sent him to the Algerians as his representative to lead them in their resistance to the French. Amīr ‘Abd al-Qādir made his headquarters in Mascara (Mu‘askar) and organized his emirate as well as could be. He was victorious over the French in a number of places and forced them to negotiate with him and in 1250/1834 to conclude a peace treaty.

When the French broke the treaty and General Trezel attacked the Amīr’s forces the Algerians inflicted a crushing defeat on him. More than 354 men were killed in the battle and more than 400 were wounded. This forced the French to make the Peace Treaty of Tafna (*Tāfna*) on 14 Ṣafar 1253/20 May 1837.²³

In 1253/1837 the French prepared a large military campaign against Constantine under the command of General Damrémont who used heavy cannon and modern mines against the walls of the city. There was also fierce house-to-house fighting. The French army lost its commander, its chief of staff and 2,000 men.²⁴ Meanwhile, Aḥmad Bey was forced to take refuge in the Aurus mountains. He gave himself up in 1265/1848 and died in prison in Algiers in 1267/1850.

Amīr ‘Abd al-Qādir expanded his emirate in the Middle Maghreb and brought under his authority the tribes of Dawā’ir, Zamāla and Shalaf. His influence increased after France recognised him and during 1251/1835 he extended his control over such as the vilayet of Titri (*Titri*) and over Biskra oasis in the south.

Part of ‘Abd al-Qādir’s policy was to prevent the French from winning over the tribes so that he could instil in them the spirit of jihad against the invaders. As a result of the heavy defeats inflicted on the French by the Algerians, on 14 Ṣafar 1253/20 May 1837 France was forced to conclude another peace treaty with ‘Abd al-Qādir known as the Treaty of Tafna, mentioned above. The most important clause in the Treaty is that in which France recognized the authority of the Amīr over the territories under his control in Tafna, Tilimsan and Titri and France’s sovereignty over Algiers, Oran and the territories between them.²⁵

23. Shawqī al-Jamal, *al-Maghrib al-‘arabi al-kabir fi-l-‘asr al-ḥadith* [Greater Arab Maghreb in the Modern Age], Cairo, Maktabat al-Anglo al-Miṣriyya, 1971, III.

24. Abu-l-Nasr, *The History ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 224–44; Julien, *Histoire de l’Algérie ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 31–6.

25. Yahyā, *al-Maghrib al-Kabir ...*, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 162–8. See also Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jazā’irī, *Tuḥfat al-ṣā’ir fi ma’athir al-Amīr ‘Abd al-Qādir wa-akḥbār al-Jazā’ir* [The Visitor’s Gift on the Exploits of the Amīr ‘Abd al-Qādir and the History of Algeria], Alexandria, 1903, I, pp. 93–100, 110–17, 150–75; II, pp. 220–30.

Once he had put an end to the resistance movement General Valée felt strong enough to provoke ‘Abd al-Qādir. The Amīr attempted to unite the nationalist forces and contacted the French Government, requesting that it make Valée change his policies so as to discontinue his threats and his violation of the Treaty of Tafna. When the General’s actions did not cease, the Amīr’s forces attacked Mitidja (*Mitīja*) Plain and advanced to the outskirts of the capital Algiers. General Valée asked for reinforcements and when these arrived in 1256/1840 he was able to seize Sharshal (*Sharsbāl*), Almeria (*al-Mariyyā*) and Milyana (*Milyāna*).

In 1257/1841 France appointed General Bugeaud as commander of the French army in Algeria and as governor-general, a post he remained in until 1264/1847. Bugeaud followed the scorched-earth policy which entailed reprisals, massacres and the destruction of crops. The French Government put under his control one third of its military forces, that is, 108,000 soldiers, and gave him 500 million francs. The man responsible for this was Marshal Soult, Prime Minister of France. It is said that General Bugeaud ordered his troops to take no prisoners and to leave no one alive who might inform the newspapers. In 1257/1841 the French were able to seize Mascara, the old capital of the Amīr ‘Abd al-Qādir. In 1258/1842 they destroyed Mascara, Tilimsan and Mostaganem (*Mustaghānam*) thus forcing the Amīr to retreat into the desert. In 1259/1843 the French ambushed the Amīr with a large force led by Duke Aumale. In the Battle of Sidi Yahia (*Sayyidi Yahyā*) many of his men were taken prisoner and one of his most important aides, the leader Mubārak, was killed. This was a devastating blow to the Algerian resistance.²⁶

Despite this French victory, Amīr ‘Abd al-Qādir continued to fight against them and defeated them on a number of occasions. In 1261/1845 he was joined by another leader called Abū Ma‘azza from Wadi Shalif (*Wādī al-Shalīf*). The Algerians alarmed the French by their victory at the Battle of Jāmi‘ al-Ghazawāt when they captured 600 French troops, including the commander of the campaign.

Under French pressure, ‘Abd al-Qādir eventually took refuge in Morocco. But the French shelled Tangier and threatened to advance on Fez if they did not expel the Amīr from their territories. He was therefore forced to return to Algeria and to surrender to the French who took him to France where he remained in captivity until he was released in 1301/1883. After Algeria gained independence in 1586/1966 ‘Abd al-Qādir’s corpse was returned to Algeria.

Amīr ‘Abd al-Qādir was not the only leader who resisted the French invasion. Indeed there were many other rebels of whom we might mention Muḥammad b. ‘Abdullāh, known as Abū Ma‘azza and referred to above, whom ‘Abd al-Qādir had nominated as his successor and who led a large revolt in the

26. Sultān, *Tārīkh al-‘Arab* ..., *op. cit.*, pp. 498–500; Yahyā, *al-Maghrib al-Kabīr* ..., *op. cit.*, III, pp. 187–201.

al-Zahra (*al-Zabra*) mountains which extend from Algiers to Oran. Algerian history also records for us a list of other leaders of the resistance such as Abū Zayyān, a member of a sufi order and a follower of ‘Abd al-Qādir, Bū Baghla and Muḥammad b. ‘Abdullāh, who came from Tripoli and led the resistance in al-Aghwat (*al-Aghmāt*) and Ouargla (*Warqla*). During the period 1851–7, leadership of the resistance was taken over by Lallā Fāṭima who succeeded Bū Baghla and who engaged in brinkmanship with the invaders. There was also Sulaymān b. Ḥamza who led the revolt of the Aulad Sidi ash-Shaykh (*Awlad Sayyidi ash-Shaykh*) in 1281/1864.

The Algerians took advantage of the defeat of the French by Prussia in 1288/1871 and started a revolt led by Muḥammad al-Muqrānī with the help of Shaykh al-Ḥaddād the leader of the Raḥmāniyya sufi order. When al-Muqrānī was killed his brother Abū Mazrāq took over command. The revolt of al-Muqrānī and the Raḥmāniyya sufi order cost 60,000 lives over a period of six months and 20,000 French dead in 340 battles.²⁷

During the First World War the French conscripted a large number of Algerians to fight in their forces. This was also the case during the Second World War. After the end of the last war, in 1374/1954, the Algerians rose up against the French in a revolution that lasted until Algeria gained its independence in 1381/1962.

As for Libya (Tripoli, Barqa and Fezzan [*Fūzzān*]), which became subject to the Ottoman State and was ruled from 1123–1251/1711–1835 by the Karamanli family of Turkish origin, it entered into a fight with the European powers, led by Spain and then France and Britain, in their naval conflict in the Mediterranean. Although the war was justified on religious grounds, the main reason for it can be summed up as economic, that is, in order to control Mediterranean trade.

Between 1123–1258/1711–45 Aḥmad Karamanli was able to build a fleet and a naval force which imposed his authority on the Mediterranean. This forced the Italian States and most of the European countries which had interests in the sea to pay dues to protect their merchant ships and to conclude treaties with Aḥmad Karamanli to safeguard their economic activities.

27. Bergna, *Tarābulus ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 205–7; C. Féraud, *al-Ḥawliyyāt al-libiyya* [Annals of Libya], transl. By M. al-Wāfi, Tripoli, Maktabat al-Farjānī, 1973, pp. 229–34, 256–75; Aḥmad Nāʾib al-Anṣārī, *al-Manhal al-ṣadbb fi tarikh Tarābulus al-Gharb* [The Sweet Spring in the History of Tripoli in-the-West], Tripoli, Maktabat al-Farjānī, 1973, pp. 245–53; Maḥmūd Nāji, *Tarikh Tarābulus al-Gharb* [The History of Tripoli in-the-West], Cairo, al-Jāmiʿa al-ʿarabiyya, 1970, pp. 155–61; Muṣṭafā Khawja, *Tarikh Fūzzān* [The History of Fezzan], Tripoli, Markaz Jihād al-Libiyyin, 1979, pp. 70–80; R. Micacchi, *Tarābulus al-gharb taḥta ḥukm usrat al-Qaramanli* [Tripoli under the Rule of the Karamanli Family], transl. By Ṭ. Nāji, Jāmiʿat al-Duwal al-ʿArabiyya, Maḥad al-Dirāsāt al-ʿArabiyya al-Islāmiyya, 1961, pp. 50–89; A. Cachia, *Libya kbilāl al-ibtāl al-uthmani al-thāni 1835–1911* [Libya during the Second Ottoman Occupation 1835–1911], Tripoli, Dār al-Farjānī, 1975, pp. 28–50; Maḥmūd ʿAlī ʿĀmir, *Tarikh al-Maghrib al-ʿarabi (Libiya)* [The History of the Arab Maghreb (Libya)], Damascus, Jāmiʿat Dimashq, 1987, pp. 80–108, 122–6.

However, the Congress of Vienna in 1231/1815 and the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1234/1819 declared unlawful what was called ‘corsairing’ by which duties and taxes were exacted from ships operating in the Mediterranean so as to protect them. In this way the Karamanli family and others from the provinces of the Greater Maghreb lost a main source of income for their treasuries and this, in turn, had repercussions for their development and growth programmes.

The Karamanlis waged a war with the United States of America over these taxes. At first, in 1214/1799, according to a treaty concluded with Tripoli, America agreed to pay an annual sum of 250,000 francs in return for the freedom of its ships to operate in the Mediterranean. When America defaulted on payment, however, or simply refused to pay, Yūsuf al-Karamanli (ruled 1210–48/1795–1832) expelled the American consul from Tripoli. During the period 1216–20/1801–5, a war broke out between Tripoli and America known as the Four-Year War, which ended with a reconciliation between the two parties mediated by the Portuguese consul and Ḥusayn Pasha, the governor of Algeria.²⁸



I–5.3 The Hassan II Mosque in Casablanca, Morocco

© G. Degeorge

28. Idrīs El-Hareir, *al-istīqān al-Istīmārī al-īṭālī fī Lībiyā* [The Italian colonial settlement in Libya], Tripoli, Markaz Jihād al-Lībiyyin, 1984. See also W. C. Askew, *Europe and Italy's Acquisition of Libya 1911–1912*, Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press, 1942.

The loss of income from taxing maritime activity in the Mediterranean was a serious blow to the Karamanli family and it began to borrow from Europeans. This resulted in European interference in the domestic policy of Libya and the Ottoman sultan was forced to terminate the rule of the Karamanlis and to appoint governors by decree from Istanbul. This period is known as the Second Ottoman Period (1251–1330/1835–1911). It witnessed an increase in European interference in Libya, especially from the Italians who began to make preparations to invade the country.

When Italy became unified in 1287/1870 it began to look outside its borders like the other European powers such as Britain, France and Spain. At first it turned its attention to Tunisia because there was a large colony of Italians there and because of its geographical proximity. However, France forestalled it by making Tunisia its protectorate in 1299/1881. Since nothing remained in North Africa apart from Libya (Tripoli and Barqa) Italy concentrated on occupying other regions belonging to the Ottoman State. To pave the way for their invasion it came up with schemes such as opening branches of the Bank of Rome in Tripoli and Benghazi, and building factories producing oil and soap and schools teaching the Italian language. It also sent its agents to these areas to create a favourable climate, along with experts in military affairs, health, agriculture, water and soil.²⁹

Britain took advantage of the killing of an Italian monk in Derna (*Darna*) to issue a warning to the Ottoman sultan accusing the caliphate of being unable to protect its foreign citizens. It also sent its fleets to strike coastal towns such as Tripoli, Benghazi, Derna, Zawara (*Zawāra*), Tabruk (*Ṭabruq*) and Misrata (*Miṣrāṭa*). The Italians, including their military experts, estimated that their campaign, led by General Caneva and blessed by the Catholic Church, would take no longer than two weeks and that after this the Libyan territories would fall into their hands, the Libyan people would join them in defiance of the Turkish Ottomans and the whole affair would be little more than a pleasure cruise. But their mistaken assumptions dragged them into a devastating war which lasted for more than 20 consecutive years and saw 250,000 Italians and 833,000 Libyans killed in addition to huge economic losses.³⁰

In Shawwāl 1329/October 1911, after fierce battles with the Ottoman forces assisted by groups of Italian volunteers, the Italians were able to

29. Idrīs El-Hareir, 'Mawāqif Khālida li-ʿUmar al-Mukhtār', [The Unforgettable Stances of ʿUmar al-Mukhtār], in: *ʿUmar al-Mukhtār*, Tripoli, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Jihād, 1981.

30. For more information on this period see El-Hareir, *Ibid.*; Idrīs El-Hareir, 'al-Mufāwāḍāt bayna ʿUmar al-Mukhtār wa-l-Itāliyyīn' [The Negotiations between ʿUmar al-Mukhtār and the Italians], *Majallat al-Thaqāfa al-ʿArabīyya*, 8 September, 1988A. El-Hareir, 'Siyāsāt farrīq wa-tasud wa-atharuhā ʿalā ḥarakat al-muqāwama al-libīyya 1911–1932' [The Policy of Divide and Rule and its Effect on the Libyan Resistance Movement], *Majallat al-Thaqāfa al-ʿArabīyya*, 1988B.

seize Tripoli in which a number of brutal encounters had taken place such as that of al-Ḥānī and ash-Shaṭṭ street. In Benghazi there were the battles of Julyāna, al-Birka Palace, as-Salāwī and Hawwārī al-Zarda. In al-Khumus occurred the well known battle of al-Marqab, while in Derna there was the battle of al-Qarqaf and Yawm al-Jum‘a, and in Tobruk there were the battles of al-Nāzūra and al-Mudawwar.

When the Italians became aware of the strength and ferocity of the resistance to their forces they thought it was due to the Turkish governors and their forces. Thus, they wished to make divisions between the Libyans and the Turks and so decided to invade the Dardanelles Strait and other Turkish territories. This created an international problem which forced Turkey to hold talks with Italy. In 7 Dhu-l-Qi‘da 1330/18 October 1912 they concluded the Treaty of Lausanne as a result of which Turkey withdrew its troops from Libya.

But the resistance did not cease, rather it continued in all parts of Libya. Among incidents involving the resistance, we can mention ash-Shab, Ashkada, al-Qāhira and the Battle of Qardabiya (*al-Qardābiyya*) on 13 Jumādā II 1334/28 April 1915 in which the Italians suffered a crushing defeat losing 12,000 men including both soldiers and officers. Following this was the Battle of Brega (*Braīqa*) and Bilāl on 25 Shawwāl 1341/10 June 1923. As a result, Turkey was compelled to withdraw all her troops from Libya, to blockade itself in Derna, Tripoli and Benghazi, and to negotiate with the Libyans. They granted the Libyans an emirate in Barqa on the strength of the Treaty of al-Rajma on 11 Ṣafar 1339/25 October 1920, and established a republic in Tripoli under the Treaty of Sawānī b. Yādim.

When the Fascists under Mussolini rose to power in Italy in 1341/1922 they abolished the treaties with the Libyans and waged a devastating scorched-earth war, conducted impromptu courts and congregated most of the inhabitants of the rural areas of the eastern region into four concentration camps, that is, al-‘Aqaila, al-Braīga, Sulūq and al-Maqrūn. The Italian Fascists used the worst kinds of torture, starvation, coercion and humiliation against the Libyan people. It is estimated that out of a total population of half a million people, 150,000 were killed. The Libyan people were the first to suffer concentration camps by which the Italians extended their authority over the west and south of Libya. During 1341–50/1922–31 the resistance was concentrated in the eastern region, that is, in Jabal al-Akhḍar under the leadership of ‘Umar al-Mukhtār who was involved in 100 battles against the Italians. In the final 21 months of the resistance al-Mukhtār was the commander in 50 major battles and 230 skirmishes with the enemy forces. When ‘Umar was killed on 3 Jumādā I 1350/16 September 1931 his deputy Yūsuf Abū Raḥīl took over. He, in turn, was killed in a fierce Battle on 24 December 1931. After this, from 1351–60/1932–40, the resistance movement ceased its activities.

With the onset of the Second World War the Libyan immigrants in Egypt formed what was known as the Libyan-Arab Force which comprised 10,000 soldiers and 300 officers most of whom had been with ʿUmar al-Mukhtār. They emigrated to Egypt and fought in the ranks of the Allies and, according to the testimony of the British, achieved magnificent victories against the Italians and Germans occupying Libya. In 1363/1943 they were finally able to drive the Italians and Germans out of Libyan territories.

From 1360–71/1943–51 Libya was ruled by the British military administration and then gained its independence on the basis of a United Nations resolution on 25 Rabīʿ I 1371/24 December 1951.³¹

In Morocco the Saʿdid state had begun to collapse as a result of conflict and disputes among its amīrs, the fact that some of them had cooperated with the Spanish and Portuguese while others had not, and their inability to repulse the aggressors and expel them from the Moroccan territory they had occupied. Thus, the Moroccans had recourse to one of the ʿAlawid sharīfs to lead them, deliver them from the chaos and drive out the invaders. This ʿAlawid family lived in Tafilalt (*Tāfilālt*) (formerly Sijilmasa) and its most senior member was Mawla (*Mawlā*) ʿAlī al-Sharīf who had nine sons, the oldest of whom was the sharīf around whom the people rallied. But after a while he stepped down in favour of his son Muḥammad who in 1050/1640 was appointed King of Morocco. In 1075/1664, however, a dispute arose between him and his brother Rashīd who rose to power after killing his brother Muḥammad. Mawla Rashīd managed to thwart the opposition and to unite Morocco under ʿAlawid family rule. Under Rashīd Morocco enjoyed a period of stability, security and prosperity. On his death he was succeeded by his brother Mawla Ismāʿīl who was acknowledged King of Morocco on 18 Dhu-l-Ḥijja 1082/16 April 1672.³²

At the beginning of his rule Mawla Ismāʿīl was faced with the rebellion of his cousin Aḥmad b. Miḥraz but he managed to quash this and focused his attention on recovering the Moroccan towns under European occupation. For this purpose he conscripted a powerful army of Africans loyal to him which became known as the ‘slaves of al-Bukhārī’. With this army Mawla Ismāʿīl was able to restore stability in Morocco and to liberate its cities from European occupation. He equipped a large force and laid siege to the city of al-Mahdiyya (*al-Maʿmūr*), which the Spanish had seized in 1023/1614, and which fell into his hands in 1095/1681. In 1095/1684 Ismāʿīl recovered the city of Tangier, in 1101/1689 he liberated al-ʿArāʾish and in 1102/1691 he did the same to Asila (*Aṣīla*).³³

31. Al-Salāwī al-Nāṣirī, *al-Istiḡṣāʾ li-akḥbār al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā* [A Close Study of the History of Far Maghreb], Casablanca, n. p., pp. 3–15; *General History of Africa*, V, pp. 256–60.

32. *General History of Africa*, IV, pp. 256–77; Yahyā, *Al-Maghrib al-Kabir* ..., *op. cit.*, III, pp. 64–72.

33. *Ibid.*, III, pp. 71–7.

These victories enhanced the international reputation of Morocco, the country flourished and peace and prosperity prevailed. However, Mawla Ismāʿīl made a mistake when he divided the state administration among his many sons, who began to vie for rule among themselves while their father was still alive. This forced Ismāʿīl to gather them together and to exile them to the oasis of Darʿā, that is, all apart from his heir apparent Aḥmad adh-Dhahabī. When Ismāʿīl died in 1139/1727, after 57 years of rule, he was succeeded as King of Morocco by his son ʿAbdullāh who was assisted by the Bukhārī army. During the period 1140–71/1727–57, however, the army began to depose their rulers and appoint whomever they pleased. Finally, in 1171/1757, Mawla Muḥammad b. ʿAbdullāh (reigned 1171–1205/1775–90) became King of Morocco.³⁴

The amīr Muḥammad b. ʿAbdullāh had been his father ʿAbdullāh's representative in Marrakesh. When he received the oath of allegiance he established security, put an end to the disorder, built up the fleet, fortified the border towns, constructed fortresses and strongholds and repaired the ports. In 1178/1764 the Moroccan fleet achieved a victory over the French and captured a number of their naval units. In 1182/1768 King Muḥammad b. ʿAbdullāh liberated the port of al-Jadīda (*Maṣaḡhān*) and compelled the Portuguese garrison there to surrender. In AD 1770 he laid siege to Ceuta and Malila (*Mahila*) but did not succeed in liberating them. Muḥammad also formed new relations with the countries of the Greater Maghreb.

When Muḥammad b. ʿAbdullāh died in 1205/1790 he was succeeded by his son Yazīd whose rule did not last long since the people and the army rebelled against him and he was deposed. In his stead they appointed his son Mawla Sulaymān (reigned 1207–38/1792–1822) whose period of rule was one of peace since he followed a moderate conciliatory policy towards the European rulers and the countries of the Greater Maghreb.

When Sulaymān died he was succeeded by his brother ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (reigned 1238–79/1822–59). Mawla ʿAbd al-Raḥmān attempted to put an end to the rebellions which broke out from time to time. He also tried to improve the Moroccan fleet. During his reign, in 1248/1830, the French occupied Algeria and the Europeans had designs on the Arab-Islamic countries. The Moroccan fleet was able to defeat the fleet of Naples which attacked al-ʿArāʾish. The British fleet bombarded Tangier, while al-ʿArāʾish, Asila and Tétouan were subjected to shelling from the Austrian fleet.³⁵

Mawla ʿAbd al-Raḥmān adopted a flexible and conciliatory policy towards the European powers when he became aware of the weakness of Moroccan military power. This was especially after France occupied Algeria in 1248/1830

34. *Ibid.*, III, pp. 246–385.

35. A. Julian, *Histoire de l'Algérie ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 603–7.

and the attacks on the borders between Algeria and Morocco which ceased in 1260/1844 after a treaty was made between the two parties.

Colonial rivalry between France and Britain had a momentous impact on developments in Morocco. Britain feared for its maritime trade routes with its colonies in the Far East and was concerned that France would seize the Strait of Gibraltar which controlled the shipping lanes across the Mediterranean particularly after the building of the Suez Canal. Thus, there was fierce competition between the two countries. The British diplomat Raymond Hill played a prominent role in the relations between Morocco and Britain and in imposing foreign concessions and economic intervention in Morocco.³⁶

During the period of Mawla Muḥammad b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān (reigned 1276–90/1837–59) Morocco was subjected to intense European pressure mainly from Spain which defeated the Moroccan army and occupied Tétouan in 1277/1859. Britain intervened between the two parties and in 1278/1861 imposed a peace treaty called the Treaty of Tétouan according to the terms of which Spain evacuated Tétouan in exchange for 20 million riyals which Morocco borrowed from Britain at a high rate of interest. In 1282/1865 France also concluded a treaty with Morocco which granted more economic control to French merchants. As a result of these developments Britain became the protector of Morocco against Spanish and French influence.

When Mawla Muḥammad died he was succeeded by his son Ḥasan (reigned 1290–1302/1873–94). However, France continued to cause problems for Morocco regarding the border with Algeria. Due to this international rivalry it was agreed to convene a conference in Madrid in 1298/1880 which was attended by the main European countries and the United States. The conference established foreign concessions such as exemption from customs duties and taxes, the right of foreign ownership and consular courts. During the conference Germany emerged as rival to France, Britain and Spain over Morocco.³⁷

Mawla Ḥasan b. Muḥammad attempted to strengthen the army by purchasing four naval units, sending military missions for training in Europe and using foreign instructors for his troops so that they would become versed in modern military science. He also organized the administration and extended his authority over all Moroccan territories. But international colonial rivalry

36. Zāhiyya Qaddūra, *Tārikh al-‘Arab al-ḥadīth* [The Modern History of the Arabs], Beirut, Dār al-Naḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1975, pp. 533–45.

37. Yahyā, *Al-Maghrib al-Kabir ...*, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 503–12; ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Ibn Salāma, *al-Maghrib qabla al-istiqlāl* [Morocco before Independence], Casablanca, Dār al-Thaqafā, 1980, pp. 30–50; R. Landou, *Aḥḥam al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā* [The Crisis of the Far Maghreb], Cairo, Maktabat al-Anglo al-Miṣriyya, 1961, pp. 85–90, 100–5, 190–5.

for control of Morocco was at its fiercest particularly after France extended its authority over Tunisia in 1299/1881.

When Mawla Ḥasan died he was succeeded by his son ʿAbd-al-ʿAzīz (reigned 1312–26/1898–1908). He was still a youth of thirteen so his father’s friend Abū Aḥmad b. Mūsa managed the administration of the country until 1318/1900 when ʿAbd-al-ʿAzīz took over. He found himself caught up in a feud between the conservatives and the reformers and at first was compelled to side with the reformers. Under French pressure he abolished the Islamic alms tax (*ḡakāt*) and instead imposed a single tax. At this, the conservatives rebelled against him and accused him of unbelief. This led to uprisings against him in some regions of Morocco. France exploited these disturbances and concluded a number of agreements and treaties with Germany, Spain and Britain concerning Morocco. Perhaps the most important of these was the Franco-Spanish agreement which called for the partition of Morocco such that Spain would occupy the Moroccan Mediterranean coast. But German intervention led to the convening of a new conference known as the Algeciras (*al-Jazīra*) Conference in 1324/1906 which resulted in an agreement between Germany, France and Spain but without any concern shown for the interests of the Moroccans and their independence.³⁸

The resolutions of the Algeciras Conference were rejected by the Moroccans. The freedom fighter al-Raysūlī began to extend the activities of his movement in the north of Morocco, while in the south ʿAlam al-Dīn Māʾ-al-ʿAynayn led a rebellion which included Mauritania. The objective of this latter insurrection was to prevent French interference in Mauritania and Marrakesh. It resulted, in 1325/1907, in the killing of the French physician Mauchamp whom the rebels had suspected of being a French spy, while in Casablanca (*al-Dār al-Bayḍāʾ*) it led to the death of eight foreigners most of whom were French. The French response was to occupy Oujda and to shell Casablanca. A further consequence of the disturbances was the deposing of Mawla ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz and the appointment of his brother Mawla ʿAbd al-Ḥafīz (reigned 1326–31/1908–12).

Events in Morocco developed quickly and led to the Agadir (*Aghādīr*) Crisis in 1330/1911 when Germany dispatched a battleship to the port of Agadir to put pressure on France. The upshot was an agreement between the two countries which gave a free hand to France to occupy Morocco in exchange for which France ceded to Germany some territories in the Congo. As for Britain, France consented to its occupying Egypt in return for France occupying Morocco, and also agreed that Italy should occupy Tripoli and Barqa in Libya in return for its not opposing France’s occupation

38. Yahyā, *Al-Maghrib al-Kabir* ..., *op. cit.*, III, pp. 670–80.

of Morocco. Similarly, Spain obtained the Moroccan Rif (*Rif*) region in the south.³⁹

Spain and France divided Morocco into four zones: Ceuta, Malila and Afti which were all administered centrally from Madrid, that is, they were Spanish territories, while the Rif was made semi-independent under the Moroccan caliph but subject to Spanish supervision; and Tangier which was put under international mandate. The rest of Morocco was ruled by the Moroccan caliph under French protection.

The Moroccans responded violently against Mawla ʿAbd al-Ḥafīz because of the protectorate which in reality made Morocco a French colony. The rebellion broke out in Fez with the rebels focusing their attention on the French sympathisers and killing 70 Moroccans including those who had accepted medals and French military ranks along with their French commander. They besieged Fez and forced France to bring the well-known General Lyautey appointing him as Resident-General in Morocco. Eventually, Mawla ʿAbd al-Ḥafīz was forced to step down in favour of his brother Yūsuf.

As for southern Morocco in the region of Sous (*Sūs*), Hibbatullāh b. Māʾ al-ʿAynayn also led a rebellion which was joined by many of the leaders from Fez. He was able to enter Marrakesh and to seize control of Agadir. At this, people in the south gave him their oath of allegiance as Sultan of the resistance. Lyautey, however, sought the help of Mawla Yūsuf to put an end to Hibatullāh and he made it known that the latter was trying to take over all Morocco. This caused the people some anxiety and Lyautey sent a large army to Marrakesh which managed to capture it.⁴⁰

Elsewhere, in the Rif mountains the freedom fighter Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Khaṭṭābī waged a fierce war against the Spanish and in 1340/1921 he destroyed a large Spanish force at the famous Battle of Anwāl in which the Spanish losses were 15,000 dead, 700 taken prisoner and the seizure of 20,000 rifles, 400 machine guns and 150 field guns.⁴¹

During the period of Mawla Mohammed b. Yousef, resistance to French colonization increased and it was demanded that the French protectorate be revoked and that Morocco be granted its independence. To meet these developments the French deposed Muḥammad b. Yūsuf on the pretext that he was unfit to rule, exiled him to Madagascar and replaced him as Sultan of Morocco with his cousin Muḥammad b. ʿArafa. But the Moroccans rebelled again and demanded the return of the legitimate Sultan. They formed the Independence Party (*Ḥizb al-istiqlāl*) and began to meet the attacks of the

39. Sulṭān, *Tārīkh al-ʿArab* ..., *op. cit.*, pp. 632–6.

40. *General History of Africa*, VII, p. 121.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 150–2.

colonizers. This forced France to bring back Sultan Mohammed b. Yousef and reinstate him as King of Morocco with the title Mohammed V. Morocco gained its independence in 1377/1957, the Protectorate Treaty was revoked and the regions of Morocco, including Tangier, were united.

Chapter 1.6(a)

COLONIAL PENETRATION
AND COUNTER RESISTANCE
MOVEMENTS IN THE MUSLIM
COUNTRIES OF ASIA FROM THE
SIXTEENTH TO THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY

Yusof A. Talib

Modern colonialism begins towards the end of the fifteenth century of the Christian era following the discoveries of maritime routes around the southern littoral of the African continent in 1488 and then across the Atlantic Ocean to America in 1492.

Maritime power shifted from the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans. The emerging nations – Portugal, Spain, Holland and England – through their respective discoveries, conquests and settlements expanded and colonized around the globe, resulting in the spread of their cultures and institutions.

Portugal was a forerunner in overseas expansion because of its limited access to the coveted Mediterranean trade with the Orient. It also hoped to spread Christianity and further extend an anti-Muslim crusade. However, the greatest motivating factor was the search for wealth¹.

In 1488 Bartolomeu Dias succeeded in rounding the Cape of Good Hope and beheld the Indian Ocean. In 1498, Vasco da Gama reached India and on his return to Portugal brought a cargo of spice.

Henceforth, voyages to India from Portugal became annually more frequent. However, matters changed dramatically in 1505 when Manuel I's Government transformed its policy of trading exclusively for one that included conquest. Portugal, being a small country, was not in a position to establish a

1. R. Meilink, M.A.P., *Asian trade and the European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and 1630*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, pp. 116–36.



I-6(a).1 A traditional Indonesian market selling vegetables and spices

© Brynn Bruijn/AramcoWorld

huge land-based empire and consequently resorted to capturing well-situated ports, thus enabling it to establish security for the Portuguese traders.

This new policy was mainly the work of two viceroys, Francisco d'Almeida from 1505 to 1509 and Alfonso d'Albuquerque from 1509 to 1515.

Francisco d'Almeida succeeded in capturing a number of East African and Indian strategic ports as well as in subduing a Muslim naval coalition off Diu (present day: Gujarat, India).

Albuquerque's principal objective was to obtain a monopoly of the European spice trade by sealing all entrances and exits to the Indian Ocean, thereby establishing a virtual control of this maritime route². In 1510, he succeeded in capturing Goa in western India, which henceforth emerged as the principal base of the Portuguese in the East. His greatest triumph was the conquest of the Islamic Sultanate of Malacca in the Malay Archipelago in 1511³. He also captured Hormuz in the Persian Gulf.

2. C. R. Boxer, 'The Portuguese in the East, 1500-1800', in *Portugal and Brazil - an introduction*, ed. H. V. Livermore, Oxford, 1953, pp. 185-247.

3. W. S. Morgan, 'The Story of Malaya', *MPH*, 1952, ch. 4, pp. 32-8.

However, Albuquerque failed in his attempt to capture Aden, which commanded the entrance to the Red Sea, which was under the protection of the Ottoman Empire.

Consequently, the commerce in Oriental spices passing through Alexandria and Venice flourished as before the aborted invasion.

The Portuguese presence in the Indian Ocean provoked a vigorous reaction from the eastern Muslim societies under the leadership of the Ottoman Sultan. In the thirty years that followed, the Ottoman imperial forces fought increasingly successful military campaigns to chase the Portuguese forces out of the Red Sea and away from the areas of the Arabian Peninsula. This lasted throughout most of the sixteenth Century.⁴

The Spaniards, when they came to the Philippines in 1521, regarded local Muslims as their arch enemy – the Moro – and for them it was a veritable extension of their crusade in southeast Asia.

Thus, in 1565, they launched a series of ‘*Moro Wars*’ against the Muslims of Sulu, Mindanao and ended with the invasion of the Sultanate of Brunei between 1578–81.

War was begun again in 1651 with a jihad led by the Sultans of Sulu, Ternate and Macassar.

In 1643, the Spaniards withdrew, only to return in 1718 and begin a series of ‘*Moro Wars*’.⁵

England’s defeat of Phillip II’s Armada in 1588 helped in no small measure to lessen Spanish sea power.

However, it was the Dutch who early in the next century broke Spanish power and became the world’s foremost naval and commercial nation.

The Dutch East India Company – V.O.C. – was founded in 1602 and established its first centre of activities in Banten (Java, Indonesia) in 1607.

Ian Pieterzoon Coen occupied Jacartara on the same island, renaming it Batavia in 1619, which became the new headquarters.

The Company’s main objectives were the ejection of its European commercial rivals – Portuguese, Spanish and British as well as the establishment of a monopoly of local trade previously handled by local traders.

Dutch domination of the other islands in the Malay Archipelago had begun well before Ian Pieterzoon Coen’s role as Governor of Batavia. However, he accelerated the process of the Netherlands’ colonial expansion.

A group of traders in London in 1600 established the East India Company.

4. R. B. Sergeant, *The Portuguese of the South Arabian Coast*, Oxford, 1963.

5. A. Ceaser Majul, *Muslims in the Philippines: Past, Present and Future Prospects*, Manila, 1971.



I-6(a).2 Clock tower built by the Dutch in 1926 in Bukittinggi,
Sumatra, Indonesia

© Brynn Bruijn/AramcoWorld

Yet it was not in a position to compete with its competitor, the Dutch East India company, in the lucrative spice trade in the Malay Archipelago.⁶

Consequently, it transferred its commercial colonial interest to the Indian sub-continent.

The British acquired Masuliputam in 1611. This was followed by the occupation of Madras in South India in 1639. Bombay was acquired by Charles II in the form of a dowry from his wife, the Portuguese Princess Catherine of Braganza in 1661.

It is to be noted that the decline of the Mughal Empire early in the eighteenth century paved the way for the British East India Company's rise.

The ascendancy of Western Europe between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries was significantly different from the colonial and mercantile expansions of previous centuries.

Along with the advent of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain and the continuing spread of industrialization in European countries there was a shift in the strategy of trade with the colonial world.

Henceforth, instead of being primarily purchasers of colonial products, the industrialized nations became new vendors and the search for new markets was begun.

In the long run this shift in trading patterns entailed, this meant it was necessary changes in colonial policy and practise as well as in the nature of colonial acquisition.

This resolution adapt the colonized areas to the newly acquired priorities of the industrialized nations.

These adaptations ensured major disruptions of existing social systems over wide areas of the globe.

The imposition of the culture and language of the dominant power along with the enormous technical superiority and colonial experience caused important psychological shifts of minority rule by foreigners: racism and arrogance on the part of the colonizers.

This prompted a counterreaction, especially in the Muslim areas of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and India in the form of holy wars or jihads.⁷

6. Meilink, *Asian Trade ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 173–206

7. P. B. R. Carey, 'Babad Dipanagara – An Account of the Outbreak of the Java War (1825–1830)', *MBRAS*, No. 9, Kuala Lumpur, 1981; S. F. Dale, 'The Mappilla Outbreak Ideology and Social Conflict in Nineteenth Century Kerala', *JAS*, XXXV, No. 1, November 1975, pp. 85–97; and *Islamic Society on the South Asian Frontier – the Mappilas of Malibar, 1498–1922*, Oxford, 1980; A. Reid, 'Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia', *JAS*, No. 2, 1967, pp. 267–83; and *The Contest for North Sumatra. Atjeh, the Netherlands and Britain 1858–1898*, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, 1969.

The spiritual power of Islam endowed the Muslim world with great unity and strength. It made every Muslim merchant not only a follower of Islam but also a propagator of the doctrine and the defender of the faith.

In the Indian Ocean and the Malay – Indonesian Archipelago it was Islam which offered continued opposition to the colonizers.

It was the Ottoman Empire that played a central role in the defence of the Islamic faith.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 – the era of steam – ship navigation, made it essential for the Muslims in Asia to have direct contacts with the Islamic heartland.

Indonesian pilgrims constituted from this point the highest number of pilgrims performing the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.



I-6(a).3 An official visit by the French minister Marius Moutetto
Pondicherry in January 1946

© ANOM France, Aix-en-Provence

COLONIAL PENETRATION AND
RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS IN
AFRICA'S MUSLIM COUNTRIES

Iba Der Thiam

It's commonly known that, Islam appeared very early in black Africa, having been established in Abyssinia by 617, five years before the Hegira and the founding of the city-state of Medina. Contact with the African continent continued throughout the life of the Prophet Muhammad, so that well before the establishment of colonial rule Islam was already well documented in the northern part of the continent, from the *Mashriq* to the *Maghrib*.

From here, promoted by traders and varying in intensity depending on the era, culture and trade flowed across the Sahara (which was never an insuperable obstacle) between Berber and Arab peoples to the north and black peoples to the south. In West Africa, Islam spread to the Sahara, Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia and both Guineas, covering roughly the areas previously settled by the Moors, Soninke, Mandingo and Bambara: the Ghana, Mali and Songhay empires, or the kingdoms of the Nigerian Sudan. Its influence also extended to Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire.

It covered the Hausa and Zarma peoples of Niger and Nigeria, the peoples inhabiting the Kanem-Borno Empire, the Kingdom of Baguirmi, the Wadai Empire, Kordofan, Darfur, the Mandara Kingdom and the Yoruba cities, not to mention the Segu Empire and Kingdom of Kaarta. In areas such as Futa Toro, Futa Jalon, northern Nigeria and Massina, dominated by the Fulani ethnic group, Islam was very prevalent.

The phenomenon is also noted in northern Cameroon and in the coastal sultanates of East Africa, visited for centuries by Arab travellers and traders through the ports of Sofala, Malindi, Dar-es-Salaam, among others.

This was the situation that existed on the ground when the colonial system was introduced. While local, essentially traditional, dynasties were conquered to varying extents after being weakened by the slave trade, the people in areas dominated by Islam tended to unite behind the standard of religion



I-6(b).1 The trade links between Europe and Africa in the sixteenth–eighteenth centuries

© UNESCO/UNESCO History of Africa

in order to prevent the colonial system from taking root in their country and from promoting its hostile religion.

There followed a long period of resistance, with struggles headed, almost without exception, by jihadist Muslim leaders, such as al-Hadj Umar Tall and his successors, Maba Diakhou Bâ, Alboury Ndiaye, Lat Dior Ngoné Latyr Diop, Fodé Kaba Doumbouya, Sounkary Camara, Abdoulaye Ndiaye, Alpha Yaya, Samory Touré and the Mahdi in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

In the same way as Queen Nzinga, Shaka, Menelik II of Ethiopia, Abd al-Qader in Algeria, Mohammed V of Morocco and Bourguiba in Tunisia, they embodied a spirit of independence and resistance and their deeds are still celebrated today in many African homes.

Their stance towards the colonial system earned them unrelenting enmity, lasting misfortune and unprecedented repression. Some examples of the colonizers' methods are given below in regard to Senegal alone.

Between January 1855 and December 1856, Faidherbe engaged in some 248 operations of military conquest in Senegal. They were usually violent and resulted in hundreds of villages set ablaze, thousands of prisoners taken, hundreds of thousands of heads of cattle, horses and donkeys seized as spoils of war, religious leaders burnt alive, civilian buildings bombarded, hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced people, young people press-ganged into the colonial army, raids on fields, harvests and property, thousands of women forced into sexual slavery, local chieftaincies decimated, Qur'anic teachers and spiritual leaders persecuted, hundreds of obstacles placed in the way of teaching Arabic, of importing printed copies of the Qur'an and of circulating books dealing with Islam, restrictive measures against the opening of Qur'anic schools and against the Qur'anic teacher's position and freedom to determine the nature of the material taught, and a never-ending onslaught on Islamic cultural identity.



I-6(b).2 The Cazemajou Fort in Zinder, Niger, photographed in 1930, named after the French captain of the same name who was killed there in 1898.

© ANOM France, Aix-en-Provence



I-6(b).3 Timzak pass in Mauritania; a stopping place fitted out by French troops
© ANOM France, Aix-en-Provence

Arabic and Muslim values were under attack. Judaeo-Christian law was imposed. The building of mosques was regulated by standards that were well-nigh impossible to meet. Pilgrimage to Mecca was controlled, supervised and subject to sundry conditions all designed to discourage potential pilgrims.

As Oumar Bâ wrote, the ‘colonizer’s principal enemy was not the warlike and unruly *ceddo* but the holy man who defended moral, religious and ethnic values and who had to be removed before a new order could be established. Thus whenever one was captured, he was executed and burnt in front of his students. Few were the holy men fortunate enough to be deported to Grand Bassam, Gabon or Madagascar after being arrested.’

Already in 1854, Faïdherbe, writing to the Ministry for the Colonies, gave reasons for his relentless repression in advance, in terms that prove that anti-Muslim fundamentalism has long been ingrained.

The new enemies that we had to fight were the most formidable of all. Wars of religion are ruthless, and fanaticism inspires a courage that never flinches, since for those driven by it, death itself is considered a blessing.

In his book on Faïdherbe, André Demaison puts at 20,000 the number of deaths caused by the colonial war against Al-Haj ‘Umar. We shall never really know how many millions of human lives were sacrificed by France, Britain,

Portugal and Germany during colonization in order to impose these countries' authority on their African colonies.

The onslaught was not only physical, it was also psychological, moral and axiological. Its consequences can never be properly assessed. Socio-cultural traumas have left scars that are hard to remove, even after decades. It takes centuries to heal such wounds.

The African peoples cannot forget that savage repression, that contempt for their culture and the official straitjacket into which they were relentlessly and ostentatiously forced with unheard-of violence. The official, political and cultural ways of life introduced by the colonial system were all designed to weaken Islam, considered public enemy number one. No history could ever produce an accurate account of this inordinate case of cultural genocide and indescribable intolerance.

Yet, for all these skilfully devised strategies, Islam resisted in every quarter, despite the establishment of legal and administrative standards modelled on Western secularism founded on a culture and history that bear no relation whatsoever to the culture and history of the colonized countries. Governors, local commanders, police officers and intelligence agents were all conditioned to harry Islam mercilessly. When those methods all failed, the screw was



I-6(b).4 The railway from Kayes (Mali) to Niger in 1894
© ANOM France, Aix-en-Provence

advisedly loosened in order to deceive opponents into believing that there had been a change of strategy, the better to destroy them. It was Governor-General William Merlaud-Ponty who invented this theory in France's colonial empire in the early part of the second decade of the twentieth century.

A similarly inspired method was introduced by L.H.U. Lyautey in Morocco and tested by Lawrence of Arabia in Saudi Arabia after René Caillié in Sudan in the very first decades of the nineteenth century. As a result, Muslims have always experienced coexistence with the colonial system as a long saga of frustration, humiliation, hypocrisy, furtive hostility and a constant determination to misrepresent, subordinate and destroy the place of Islamic faith in society while at the same time furthering rival religions. More than forty years after the start of African independence, the baleful effects of that onslaught are more apparent than ever.

COLONIAL PENETRATION AND
RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS
IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES
(THE ARAB EAST)

Idris El-Hareir

The penetration of colonialism into Arab-Islamic lands is not something new; indeed it began with the first Crusade against the Arab East (Sham, Palestine and Egypt) in 490/1096, and at the time of the Mongols in 656/1258. These attacks continued, with a few periods of peace, until they were resumed by the French in Napoleon's campaign against Egypt in 1214/1798.

The real reasons behind this penetration were strategic since the Arab homeland is the meeting point of the most important continents of the world – Africa, Europe and Asia – and thus controls the lines of communication of both the ancient and the modern worlds. The reasons were also economic since the Arab homeland controls the trade routes and sources of raw materials. Another cause of Western colonial penetration was the imbalance in military and political power between the Islamic world in general and Christian Europe, whose countries formed a unity composed of different nationalities while the Islamic world was divided into political units competing and fighting with each other. This latter was also the situation during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when there were wars between the Safavids in Iran, the Ottomans and the Mamluks.

The Industrial Revolution in Europe had an important role to play in the fight over the Arab-Islamic homeland with the development of communications and the increase in the number of factories which needed raw materials, workers and foreign markets in which to sell their manufactured goods.

In order to conceal the true nature of this penetration it was presented in a religious and humanitarian guise: it was to spread civilization, to combat piracy, to liberate slaves and other such feeble excuses. It is the same situation today with the war against so-called terrorism, spreading democracy, protecting human rights and so on.

Portugal was the first European nation to acquire colonies due to its geographical position and the maritime experience it had gained in al-Andalus. Thus, Prince Henry the Navigator (797–871/1394–1460) organized voyages of discovery along the West African coast and in 850/1446 arrived at the mouth of the Senegal River. From there, in 896/1486, Bartholomew Diaz continued sailing towards the south until he arrived at what became known as the Cape of Good Hope. Following this, in 903/1497, Vasco da Gama undertook his voyage to India. He reached East Africa and there, because Arab mariners understood the nature of the seasonal winds, sought the help of the Arab sailor Aḥmad b. Mājid who led him to India in 904/1498.¹

The Portuguese managed to extend their authority over the Strait of Hormuz. They occupied Bahrain and built a fortress there. They also put an end to the trade of the Mamluks. It got to the point where they were even able to threaten Mecca. Thus, they launched an attack on Jeddah but a violent storm destroyed the greater part of their ships. One of the plans of the Portuguese leader Lopez Suarez was, in 914/1513, to attack Mecca and Medina and to excavate the Prophet's tomb.²

Due to their control over the trade routes with the Far East, the Portuguese put an end to the main source of income of the Mamluk State and so weakened its military and economic power. The Mamluk sultan tried to break the Portuguese blockade but the Portuguese destroyed the Mamluk fleet at the Battle of Diu in 914/1508.

When the Ottomans extended their rule over the Arab region they assumed responsibility for defending it against the Portuguese, who had seized the Arab trade routes with the Far East and had deprived the Arabs of their most important sources of income which in turn undermined their military and economic power. Thus, after taking control of Egypt in 923/1517, the first step taken by the Ottomans to protect it was to drive out the Portuguese. Then in 945/1538 they occupied Aden and in this way dominated the entrances to the Red Sea. As for the Arab Gulf, in 958/1551 Berk Bey blockaded Hormuz, then in 961/1553 took possession of Qatif (*al-Qaṭif*) and Muscat (*Musqat*). Similarly, in 989/1581 ʿAlī Bey attacked Portuguese positions and inflicted heavy losses on them.³

Due to its strategic position and its command of the trade with the Far East and India, the Gulf became a focus of rivalry and struggle between the Portuguese, the British, the Dutch and the Persians. This struggle came to an end with the gradual entry of the British into the Gulf and their control over it.

1. Jalāl Yahyā, *al-Istīṣār wa-l-istighlāl wa-l-takballuḥ* [Colonialism, Exploitation and Under development], Cairo, al-Dār al-Qawmiyya, 1965, pp. 167–77.
2. Muḥammad Anīs, *al-Dawla al-ʿuthmāniyya wa-l-Sharq al-ʿarabi* [The Ottoman State and the Arab East], Cairo, Maktabat al-Anglo al-Miṣriyya, 1981, pp. 124–5.
3. Ṣalāḥ Al-ʿAqqād, *al-Qiyādāt al-siyāsīyya fi-l-khalij al-ʿarabi* [Political leaders in the Arabian Gulf], Cairo, Maktabat al-Anglo al-Miṣriyya, 1974 pp. 21–43.

In 1034/1624 Nāṣir b. Murshid al-Yaʿrūbī was acknowledged Imam in Oman. After managing to unite the country he then directed his attention to expelling the Portuguese from the Gulf and liberating Sur (*Ṣūr*), Julfar (*Julfār*) and Sahar (*Ṣaḥār*). He also besieged Muscat and forced the Portuguese to pay tribute to him. On his death in 1060/1650 he was succeeded by his nephew Sulṭān b. Sayf who continued the fight against the Portuguese and pursued them in India, East Africa and the Arabian Sea, finally ousting them from Muscat in 1065/1654. During the period of Sayf b. Sulṭān (reigned 1104–23/1692–1711) he was able to liberate East Africa from the Portuguese and to take control of Mombasa after a blockade which lasted 33 months. In this way he established Arab-Omani rule in Zanzibar and built a fleet of 28 ships equipped with cannons. He made Rustāq (*Rustāq*) his capital.⁴

During the reign of the Bū Saʿīdids, who still govern Oman to this day, and specifically during the period of al-Sulṭan Ibn Saʿīd, colonial rivalry between France and Britain intensified, especially after the French Revolution. This rivalry resulted in them extending their control over the most important locations in the world and also led to a war which began in 1208/1793. The French attempted to ensconce themselves in the Sultanate of Muscat from where they could fight the British who had been for a long time in the Gulf. From their base on the island of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, the French began to launch attacks against Omani ships and to send expeditions to the region. After the French occupation of Egypt in 1213/1798 the British, fearing for their lines of communication with India and to thwart French plans to reach the Far East and to damage British interests there, were forced to conclude an agreement with al-Sulṭan Ibn Saʿīd in 1213/1798 which formalized friendly relations between Oman and Britain, rejected the establishment of a French presence in Muscat, and permitted the British to create centres and factories in Bandar Abbās (*Bandar ʿAbbās*), which belonged to Oman at that time, and to maintain a military force to protect their interests. In 1214/1799 the British occupied the island of Barim (*Barim*) at the entrance to the Red Sea which controlled access to Bab al-Mandeb (*Bāb al-Mandab*) and they concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Trade with the sultan of Lahej (*Laḥaj*). In this way the British were able to close the Gulf to the French, to occupy the island of Mauritius in 1225/1810 and put an end to the French presence in the region.⁵

When Saʿīd b. Sulṭān (reigned 1221–73/1806–56) assumed power in Oman, he tried to annex Bahrain and, in 1223/1808, Muscat. He made another

4. ʿAlī Sulṭān, *Tārīkh al-ʿArab al-ḥadīth* [The Modern History of the Arabs], Tripoli, al-Maktaba al-ʿIlmiyya al-ʿĀlamiyya, n.d., pp. 218–19.

5. Al-ʿAqqād, *al-Qiyādat al-siyāsiyya ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 221–2.

attempt in 1232/1816 but the British prevented him, fearing for their interests in the Arabian Gulf. As usual, the British played games between the leaders in the Gulf, Yemen, Oman and Muscat, at one time supporting one against the other, so as to protect their interests. Indeed, this was recommended by the British expert in affairs of the Arab countries and Jordan in 1242/1826.⁶ On this basis the British refused the request of Sultan Saʿīd to place his country under British protection since they wished to avoid involvement in the problems of the Arabian Peninsula, the Ottoman State and France. When the Sultan wished to establish relations with the British in 1251/1835, his representative was not allowed to meet the British king and the Sultan was only permitted to produce a draft trade agreement in 1255/1839 in which Britain obtained concessions and its consul acted as governor of the country. In 1255/1839 and again in 1258/1842, the British also rejected Sultan Saʿīd's renewed request to annex Bahrain on the pretext that its inhabitants would not accept the rule of the Bū Saʿīdids. In 1260/1844 France established trade relations with Oman on terms similar to the agreement made with the British.⁷

When the Saudi Wahhabi movement appeared in the waters of the Gulf they seized al-Ahsa (*al-Iḥsāʾ*) and attempted to extend their authority over the neighbouring United Arab Emirates. This caused the British to fear for their interests in the Gulf and they applied themselves to opposing Wahhābi expansion. They thus strengthened their relations with the Imam of Muscat and the Shaykh of Bahrain and in 1224/1809 dispatched a naval force which destroyed the Wahhabi centres in Ras al-Khaima (*Raʾs al-Khayma*). When the forces of Muḥammad ʿAlī, the khedive of Egypt, arrived in the Arabian Peninsula and occupied the Hijaz (*al-Hijāz*) and Najd, the policy of the British was actively to confront this new threat by strengthening their relations, in 1236/1820, with the Imam of Muscat and the Shaykh of Bahrain. They also created a powerful front of Arab amīrs in the Gulf to oppose Muḥammad ʿAlī. The series of treaties concluded in 1236/1820 were like a chain which shackled these Arab leaders under British control. It was the British naval force in the Gulf which was responsible for imposing these treaties, since from time to time the British fleet would appear in the Gulf to intimidate the leaders and force them to submit to British policy.

When the Ottomans occupied al-Iḥsāʾ in 1288/1871 they used Islamic propaganda to encourage the amīrs and shaykhs to join their ranks and to support the German plan to extend the Berlin-Baghdad-Basra-Kuwait railway line. They also tried to draw the Amīr of Kuwait on to their side. However,

6. Sultān, *Tārīkh al-ʿArab* ..., *op. cit.*, pp. 123–4.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 225.

the Turks found that these shaykhs and amīrs were subject to strong British influence which they were unable to break.⁸

In 1310/1892 Britain concluded a treaty with the Sultan of Muscat in which it took it upon itself and its allies not to relinquish or sell any of the territories of Muscat or Oman except to the British Government itself. Indeed, Britain concluded the same treaty with the shaykhs of Bahrain and Qatar and with other Arab shaykhs in the Arabian Gulf. As for Kuwait, it was the last Arab emirate in the Gulf to come under British authority. This occurred in 1317/1899 when Shaykh Mubarak Āl al-Sabbāh concluded a treaty with Britain to enable him to resist Turkish and German pressure, and Britain sent its naval forces to protect the Shaykh when the Turks attempted to dispatch a garrison of its troops to the country. In this way British colonialism gradually penetrated and eventually came to dominate the whole of the Persian Gulf.⁹

In Yemen in 1255/1839 the British occupied the port of Aden which controlled entry into the Red Sea, and they used it as a base to stop the advance of Muḥammad ‘Alī into the sea. The withdrawal of Muḥammad ‘Alī’s forces opened the way for Britain to extend its influence over all the Arab amīrs, and to place them all under its authority, especially after the discovery of oil in the Gulf.

Britain’s designs for Iraq had initially been concerned with trade, but these changed to ambitions of a political, colonial and military nature which eventually led to the occupation of the country in 1333/1924 after the First World War. These ambitions began when the English East India Company established a trade centre in Basra in 1053/1643. In 1272/1855 Britain appointed a consul and a commercial representative in Baghdad and a vice-consul in Mosul. These representatives and consuls entered into trade relations with the pashas of the Ottoman State which controlled Iraq and with shaykhs from the Iraqi tribes.¹⁰

During the nineteenth century, British interest in Iraq increased and they sent some scientific missions there to study the antiquities and other areas of interests, as well as, a technical mission, under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Francis R. Chesney, to study the possibility of navigating the Tigris. They set up the Maritime Company for Navigation and established postal routes and telegraph lines. By the end of the nineteenth century Britain had become the most influential foreign country in Iraq. With the discovery of oil in Mosul and Kirkuk, Iraq increased in importance and as soon as the First World War was declared Britain stationed its forces in Basra, occupied it and

8. Aḥmad ‘Izzat ‘Abdu-l-Karīm et al., *Tārīkh al-‘Arab al-ḥadīth wa-l-mu‘āṣir* [The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arabs], Beirut, Mu‘assasat Nāṣir al-Thaqāfiyya, 1982, pp. 82–4.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 88–9. See also Sultān, *Tārīkh al-‘Arab ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

advanced northwards until it had completed the occupation of the whole of the country.

The Germans also attempted to enter the Arab countries by suggesting projects and offering technical assistance. Thus, they proposed to the Ottoman State a project to build a railway line beginning in Konya and passing through Aleppo (*Ḥalab*), Mosul (*Mawṣil*), Basra (*Basra*) and ending in Kuwait. Britain strenuously opposed this plan for fear of German competition in this vital region.¹¹

As for France, it focused its ambitions on Syria and Lebanon. These were old ambitions for it had been the most significant participant in the Crusades. In 943/1536 Sultan Sulaymān al-Qānūnī awarded France the first foreign concessions in the Ottoman State in accordance with a treaty he concluded with the French king, Francis I. On the strength of this, the French acquired the right to protect the minority Catholic groups and particularly the Maronites. Due to this agreement and concessions the educational missionary foundations established by such as the Jesuits and the Franciscans spread throughout Lebanon and Syria. Furthermore, when Napoleon invaded Egypt he was also interested in seizing Sham, so he besieged Acre (*ʿAkkā*) but failed to take it. Similarly, when Muḥammad ʿAlī, the khedive of Egypt, seized Sham, France and Britain were afraid for their interests there. This prompted France to provide material and military assistance to the Maronites, while the British supplied the Druze with weapons. This led to a military confrontation between the two groups in 1277/1860 to which a large number of bystanders fell victim. The confrontation also resulted in the European nations agreeing to send a French peacekeeping force to Mount Lebanon (*Jabal Lubnān*) in 1278/1861.¹² In the ten years prior to the First World War France constructed ports and established land and postal routes and laid railway and telegraph lines in addition to disseminating French culture. In this way, France acquired its own interests in the region and compelled the Great Powers to acknowledge them and accept its mandate over Syria and Lebanon, as we will see.

One of the most noteworthy consequences of Napoleon's campaign against Egypt in 1213/1798 was that it made the British aware of the importance of Egypt and the danger resulting from Egypt being ruled by a country hostile to England, especially to its trade routes with the Far East and India, the most important of its colonies. Thus, the British strove to exert their control over Egypt. This became clear from the time of the evacuation of the French forces from Egypt in 1216/1801. Therefore, Britain in 1222/1807 dispatched a military expedition under the command of Alexander Mackenzie Fraser.

11. Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣrī, *al-Bilād al-ʿarabiyya wa-l-dawla al-ʿuthmāniyya* [The Arab countries, and the Ottoman State], Cairo, Jāmiʿat al-Duwal al-ʿArabiyya, 1957, pp. 89–91.

12. ʿAbdu-l-Karīm, *Tārikh al-ʿArab ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 89–91.

Although this failed and its forces were obliged to withdraw, Britain nevertheless continued its policy of removing any foreign influence in Egypt. It had paved the way for exerting authority over Egypt through its economic monopolies and material exploitation which embroiled the country in debt. These debts caused a financial crisis and a state of instability in Egypt which facilitated the British occupation of the country in 1300/1882.¹³

During this period Egypt suffered under extravagant rulers especially in the time of the Khedive Saʿīd Ismāʿīl (ruled 1271–97/1854–79). Indeed, the rulers of Egypt spent vast sums on excessive splendour and luxury, incurring debt which in turn led to an inability to balance the budget and to European creditors having control of Egypt's economic resources and was a pretext for British and French colonialist interference in the country's affairs. When Khedive Saʿīd (ruled 1270–80/1854–63) granted the concession to the Suez Canal and borrowed from European banks, this was an indication of the financial disasters and political events which were to overtake Egypt during his time. He died in 1280/1863 leaving Egypt in debt amounting to ten million guineas, that is, more than the total annual budget of the country at that time.

During the period of Ismāʿīl (1279–96/1863–79) Egypt's debt reached alarming proportions to the point where it became 93 million guineas at a time when the annual budget was ten million guineas. The famous party to celebrate the opening of the Suez canal to international shipping contributed to the increasingly dangerous financial crisis since Ismāʿīl spent excessively on it. In 1291/1875 the financial situation seemed to reach its nadir and this forced Ismāʿīl to sell Egypt's shares in the Canal to Britain for the trifling sum of four million guineas. This resulted in serious political consequences in that Britain came to have the last word in affairs concerning the Canal.

When the economic situation in Egypt became yet worse, Britain and France placed the Canal under a financial bilateral supervisory board, set up a fund known as the Debt Fund and formed a committee to investigate the crisis, which pointed to the high personal expenses of the Khedive and the corruption of foreign contractors, inspectors and financiers.

One of the measures taken to control Egypt was the creation of what was called the European Mixed Cabinet, which resulted in foreigners rushing to Egypt and seizing the country's economic assets as well as the dismissal of a large number of Egyptian officials and their replacement with foreigners. In turn, this incited the anger of the people towards the government of the Armenian Nubar Pasha who had a leaning towards the Europeans. This anger aroused the spirit of rebellion against foreign interference in Egypt. Some

13. Jalāl Yahyā, *al-ʿĀlam al-ʿarabi al-ḥadīth* [The Modern Arab World], Cairo, Dār al-Maʿārif, 1979, pp. 71–6.



I-6(c).1 Harry St. John (later, ‘Abd Allāh) Philby, an early Western explorer of Arabia and agent of the British Government who met the Saudi Arabian King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz in 1917, and ultimately settled in Jeddah, becoming one of the king’s confidants.

© Saudi Aramco Archives/AramcoWorld

Egyptian military units joined forces with the irate population and in Şafar 1296/February 1879 around 600 officers came together, left their barracks and marched on the Ministry of Finance followed by a number of students from the military academy and about 2,000 soldiers. They were also joined by many individuals from the Egyptian population and some members of parliament. When the rebels surrounded the ministry Ismāʿīl himself was forced to intervene and he agreed to their demands, thus dismissing Nubar Pasha from his position as head of the ministry.

When Germany threatened to interfere in Egyptian affairs, Britain and France were obliged to put pressure on Sultan ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd to remove Khedive Ismāʿīl and replace him with his son ʿTawfīq.¹⁴

Khedive ʿTawfīq adhered to a policy of loyalty to Britain and France and therefore resisted the Egyptian people's demands for reform. This angered the Egyptian army under the command of Colonel Aḥmad ʿUrābī who came out with his regiment and those of his colleagues which were composed of cavalry, infantry and artillery, along with several thousand Egyptian people. They took up positions in front of al-ʿĀbidīn Palace demanding the dismissal of the cabinet of Riyāḍ Pasha, the convening of a Council of Representatives and an increase in the size of the Egyptian army.

Khedive ʿTawfīq was forced to accede to the demands of the army under ʿUrābī and to form a new government under the leadership of Sharīf Pasha who produced a nationalist programme consistent with the demands of the Egyptian people. Of course, this programme did not please Britain which sought to have it rejected and put pressure on ʿTawfīq not to accept it. Sharīf Pasha was therefore compelled to resign. Khedive Maḥmūd charged Sāmī al-Bārūdī, an associate of Aḥmad ʿUrābī, with the task of formatting a nationalist government in which Aḥmad ʿUrābī was made minister of war. But this also did not please the British who were conspiring with the French. France dispatched some naval units from its fleet to Alexandria, then on 9 Ramaḍān 1299/25 July 1882 sent a memorandum in which it demanded the resignation of the cabinet of al-Bārūdī who was left with no choice but to comply.

In order to harass Aḥmad ʿUrābī, the British obtained Khedive ʿTawfīq's agreement to create disturbances in Alexandria. This civil unrest led to a massacre on 24 Rajab 1299/11 June 1882 the victims of which included a number of foreigners and Egyptians. The aim, of course, was to create a pretext to interfere with and occupy Egypt. Thus, on 24 Shaʿbān 1299/10 July 1882 the British fleet bombarded Egyptian military positions in Alexandria, and British forces advanced on Cairo and entered it unopposed on 6 Dhu-l-

14. Amīn Saʿīd, *Tārīkh Miṣr al-siyāsī min al-ḥamla al-faransiyya ʿilā inḥiyār al-malakīyya 1852–1959* [The History of Egypt from the French Campaign to the Collapse of the Monarchy, 1852–1959], Cairo, no pub, pp. 93–4; See also Yahyā, *al-ʿālam al-ʿarabī ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 288–97.

Qifda/19 September 1882. ʿUrābī and his associates were sentenced to death but this was reduced to exile in Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka). Likewise exiled were many Egyptian nationalists among whom was Shaykh Muḥammad ʿAbduh.¹⁵

In the Sudan, which was a part of Egypt, the Mahdiyya movement was involved in a violent rebellion against the British presence. The leader was Muḥammad b. ʿAbdullāh, from the island of Labab near Dongola, who in 1299/1881 called himself the Awaited Mahdi and established himself on Aba island on the White Nile. The reasons for the rebellion were the corrupt administration in the Sudan and the harsh manner in which the people were treated. The governors of the Sudan whom the Khedive had appointed were Circassians, British and Europeans. Because of the Egyptian Government's control over the ivory trade, which brought in vast profits for Sudanese merchants, groups of people began to join the Mahdi's movement and to support it.

On 16 Ramaḍān 1298/12 August 1881, the Mahdi attacked and defeated a military force which the Governor-General had sent to deliver him to Tawfiq. He also defeated another force. When the rebellion had spread throughout the Sudan it was decided to remove the country from Egyptian administration. This was a plan devised by the British to separate the Sudan from Egypt and subsequently take possession of it. Britain assigned the task of doing this to General Gordon who was governor of the Equatorial province and later *bakimdar* of the Sudan during the reign of Khedive Ismāʿīl. On his way to the Sudan, Gordon openly declared that his task was to send the Egyptian army back to Egypt and to leave the Sudan to its people, and when he arrived in Khartoum he issued a proclamation in which he announced that the Sudan was totally detached from Egypt. He tried to approach the Mahdi who, however, refused to cooperate with him and instead advanced on Khartoum, seized it and on 3 Rabīʿ II 1302/20 January 1885 killed Gordon.

When the Mahdi died in 1303/1885 his position was taken by ʿAbdullāh at-Taʿāyishī who, in 1307/1889, attacked ʿAbd-ar-Raḥmān an-Nujūmī and his large Egyptian force at Tushkī to the south of Wadi Halfa. The Mahdists were defeated however, their leader was killed and many of them were taken prisoner.¹⁶

15. Sultān, *Tārīkh al-ʿArab ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 172–3; Yahyā, *al-ʿĀlam al-ʿArabī ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 299–328; Aḥmad Amīn, *Zuʿamāʾ al-islāh fi-l-ʿaṣr al-ḥadīth* [Leaders of Reformation in the Modern Period], Cairo, Maktabat al-Nahḍa, 1948, pp. 66–70.

16. Fūʾād Shukrī, *al-Ḥukm al-miṣri fi-l-Sūdān* [Egyptian Rule in the Sudan], Cairo, no pub., 1947, pp. 290–311; Makkī Shubaika, *Muqāwamat al-Sūdān al-ḥadīth li-l-ghaḥḥ wa-l-tasalluṭ* [The Resistance of Modern Sudan to Invasion and Control], Cairo, al-Jāmiʿa al-ʿArabiyya, 1972, pp. 80–120.

Following the Egyptian withdrawal from the Sudan, Italy took possession of Muṣawwa^c after the Egyptian garrison had left it in 1303/1885. The Italians also occupied Eritrea and Somalia and reached agreement with the British to occupy Kasala. Britain had already seized Zīligh and Barbar in 1309/1884, so as to complete its plan to control both sides of the strategically important Bab al-Mandeb. Britain also took possession of a large part of the Equatorial province and annexed it to Uganda in 1317/1889.

As for France, in 1302/1884 it took possession of Tajura and Djibouti and proceeded to advance from western Sudan. On 21 Ṣafar 1316/10 July 1898 the French officer Jean-Baptiste Marchand, at the head of a force of 200 soldiers, seized Fashoda (*Fashūda*) on the White Nile and raised the French flag. The result was a political crisis between Britain and France which also led to war. In view of these developments Britain decided to regain control of the Sudan in the name of Egypt, so it prepared an Egyptian force under the command of British officers led by Lord Kitchener. The Egyptian army occupied Dongola and Barbar and in Dhu-l-Qi^cda 1315/April 1898 defeated the Anṣār and the Mahdists at ^cAtbara and then again at Omdurman. Following this, the Egyptian troops entered Khartoum and Kitchener advanced across the White Nile heading for Fashoda. He arrived there on 3 Jumādā I 1316/18 September 1898 and demanded that the French lower their flag and raise that of Egypt. This was a ruse to convince the French that the rightful rulers were the Egyptians.

On 26 Sha^cbān 1315/19 January 1898 the British Government imposed on the Egyptian Government an agreement on the Sudan which stated that the administration of the country would be shared between Britain and Egypt and that the Khedive would appoint the Governor-General of the Sudan with the consent of Britain. During this war the Egyptians lost 80,000 soldiers while Britain lost only 1,400. Similarly, the Egyptian forces which reclaimed the Sudan consisted of 35,000 soldiers while there were only 2,000 soldiers from Britain. Moreover, Egypt paid most of the financial cost of the campaign while Britain paid only one third. This is not to mention the cost of internal reconstruction in the Sudan which is estimated to have cost millions and was also financed by Egypt.¹⁷

Britain set in place a special system of government for Southern Sudan which was based on establishing military posts throughout the region, strengthening relations between the people, officials and tribes, and relying on local leaders. Britain also opened the South to Christian missionary activity and attempted to stop Arab-Islamic influence in the region by preventing the spread of the Arabic language and Islam and promoting Christian missionary work.

17. Shubaika, *Muqāwamat al-Sūdān ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 64–5.

The Egyptians and the Sudanese resisted British occupation by various means and there arose among them a number of political leaders and religious scholars, including Muṣṭafa Kāmil and Muḥammad Farīd, who opposed the British presence in the Nile valley. These leaders met with different forms of intimidation from the British such as imprisonment, exile and the confiscation of property.¹⁸

At the outbreak of the First World War in 1333/1914 the Arabs were divided between those who were clients of Turkey and who therefore joined the Germans, the Austro-Hungarians and the Bulgarians, and those who remained on the side of the British and the French. For example, the Libyans, under the leadership of al-Sayyid Aḥmad Sharīf, decided to stand by the Ottoman caliphate and were helped in this by the Sultan of Darfur, ʿAlī Dīnār, and some Egyptian leaders such as ʿAzīz al-Miṣrī and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAzzām who rebelled against British rule. This led to the organizing of a military expeditionary force which set out from eastern Libya, occupied the Egyptian oases and penetrated deep behind the western Egyptian borders. However, the British met the expedition with a mechanized force of tanks and planes which it could not withstand and it was forced to return to Libya. In 1335/1916 the British were able to kill ʿAlī Dīnār who rebelled in western Sudan in collusion with the Libyans under the command of Aḥmad Sharīf.¹⁹

Since Egypt and the Sudan geostrategically crucial for Britain during the First World War, Britain dissolved Egyptian ties with Turkey, put an end to Turkish rule over the country and on 1 Ṣafar 1333/18 December 1914 declared its protection over it. Britain also deposed Khedive ʿAbbās II and appointed in his place the Amīr Ḥusayn Kāmil giving him the title Sultan of Egypt. This step incited resentment among the Egyptians and Sudanese but the circumstances of war and the imposition of martial law prevented them from expressing their feelings. A number of their leaders were put in prison while others were sent into exile.

At the end of the First World War the leaders Saʿd Zaghlūl, Muḥammad Maḥmūd and Aḥmad al-Bāsil attempted to make their way to London to ask for independence, an action which was a prelude to the rebellion of 1338/1919. Their demand was rejected and the British ordered that the three leaders be exiled to Malta, but under popular pressure in Egypt they were set free and

18. Labīb Rizq Yūnān, *al-Sūdān fī ʿabd al-ḥukm al-thunāʾi al-anwal 1899–1924* [Sudan in the Period of the First Bilateral Rule 1899–1924], Cairo, Maʿhad al-Buḥūth al-ʿArabiyya, 1976, pp. 170–80.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 129, 189–90; Idrīs El-Hareir, 'Jihād al-Lībiyyīn dīd al-Īṭāliyyīn wa-l-Ingliz wa-l-Faransiyyīn' [The Jihad of the Libyans against the Italians, the British and the French], *Majallat al-Buḥūth al-Tārikhiyya*, Tripoli, 2010; Yahyā, *al-ʿĀlam al-ʿarabi ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 454–7.



I-6(c).2 Postage stamp from the Kingdom of Egypt, established in 1922 following recognition of Egyptian independence by the British

© Benjamin Freudenthal/AramcoWorld

permitted to travel to the peace conference in Paris. When they arrived there, however, they were prevented from attending.²⁰

Under pressure from the Egyptian public Britain was compelled to set up a commission under Lord Milner, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, but the Egyptians boycotted it and met it with demonstrations since they knew that it was merely an example of British prevarication. With the failure of Milner's task Britain was obliged to receive in London an Egyptian delegation led by Saʿd Zaghlūl, and after long negotiations a draft treaty was arrived at. This was rejected in Egypt, however, because it retained its status as a British protectorate.

In 1340/1921, Britain held talks with the Egyptian Government headed by ʿAdlī Bey, who travelled to London. But he also failed to arrive at a satisfactory solution and so resigned from his post as Prime Minister. At the insistence of the Egyptian people the British Government was eventually forced to consent to independence and on 2 Rajab 1340/28 February 1922 made an official declaration dissolving the British protectorate in Egypt, granting the country independence, and releasing political prisoners and allowing those in exile to return to the country. In 1342/1923 a constitution was drafted which

20. ʿAbdu-l-Karīm, *Tārīkh al-ʿArab ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 180–3.

was then annulled and replaced with another in 1349/1930. Following this, in 1355/1936, the British and the Egyptians reached an agreement to define the relationship between the two countries. This provided for the establishment of an 'eternal alliance' between Egypt and Britain to be effective for a period of 20 years but which in fact remained in force until it was abolished by the Egyptian revolution in 1372/1952. Britain was eventually forced to leave Egypt on 22 Šafār 1374/19 October 1954.

On 28 Jumādā I 1372/12 February 1953 representatives of the Egyptian revolution signed an agreement with Britain which granted Sudan independence and unified its territories, north and south.²¹

The First World War had negative consequences for all the Arabs since they were put in a critical political and religious situation, especially when the Ottoman State announced its entry into the war on the side of Germany and its allies against France and Britain and their allies. From a religious perspective it was a matter of sacred law that they obey the Ottoman caliph of the Muslims who proclaimed a jihad against Britain and France and their allies. This proclamation had tremendous reverberations in Islamic countries particularly after the widespread propaganda which resulted from the idea of an Islamic league which the Ottoman sultan ʿAbd-al-Ḥamīd (reigned 1293–1327/1876–1909) had adopted. The only people who responded to the call of the Ottoman sultan, however, were the Yemenis, the Sudanese and the Libyans who fought alongside the Ottoman State as previously mentioned.

As for the rest of the Arab leaders, they either seized the opportunity offered by the war and made independent the lands under their control or rebelled against the Ottoman State and joined the British and French and their allies. One of the latter was the Sharīf Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī, the Amīr of Mecca, who entered into secret talks with the British known as the Ḥusayn-McMahon Correspondence, which culminated in the declaration of the revolt against the Ottoman Turks in 1338/1918.²²

The Young Covenant Society and the Arab League had made contact with Ḥusayn and had all agreed that the Arabs would not cooperate with the British against Turkey unless Britain recognized the independence of the Arab countries in Asia, from the Taurus mountains in the North to the Indian Ocean in the South. Ḥusayn sent the first of his letters to Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt and the Sudan, in Ramaḍān 1333/July 1915, via his son Amīr Fayṣal who acted as his father's foreign minister. After a dispute over some regions in Syria such as Mersin, Adana and Iskenderun (al-Iskandarūna) Britain eventually acceded to Ḥusayn's demands in view of their need for the Arabs. Sharīf Ḥusayn issued a statement in which he

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 183–8.

22. Yahyā, *al-ʿAlam al-ʿarabi ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 459–61.

explained his position, asked all Muslims to follow him, described the Arab revolt against the Turks as a religious and a national duty, and said that the war was an opportunity for the Arabs to achieve independence. He also accused the rulers of Turkey of renouncing Islam. Ḥusayn's plea resulted in the suspension of the Ottoman sultan's call to jihad in Arab countries especially since Ḥusayn belonged to the house of the noble descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad.²³

In fact, under the rule of the Young Turkish Party Turkey had pursued a policy of Turkification which did considerable harm to the various nationalities subsumed within the Ottoman State, in addition to the numerous ill-effects it had on the Ottoman administration.

The Arab forces of Ḥusayn were able to gain control of most of the Turkish positions in the Hijaz, to cut Turkish lines of communication between the north and south of the Arabian Peninsula and to block the entrances to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. However, they came to a halt in the face of Turkish-German expansion into the south. At this point, Ḥusayn proclaimed himself to be King of the Arabs. The Arab and British forces advanced and captured Aqaba (ʿ*Aqaba*), then proceeded north to Palestine and forced the Turkish-German army to retreat further north. Then on 27 Ṣafar 1336/11 December 1917 Ḥusayn's forces along with his British allies under the command of General Allenby entered Jerusalem.

However, the British, who had promised independence to the Arabs of the Arab East in return for their valuable support in the war effort, began to hold secret talks with France with the aim of dividing up the Arab territories in Asia. In 1335/1916, the British representative Mark Sykes and his French counterpart François Georges-Picot met and agreed to break up Turkish possessions in Arab Asia. They then travelled to Russia to acquaint the Tsar with their plan and to complete the deal with Russia which had its own ambitions. The territories were then apportioned between the three parties. France obtained Syria and Lebanon, Britain took Palestine, Jordan, Iraq and the Arabian Gulf, while Russia was given Constantinople, the lands around the Bosphorus and a large part of Anatolia adjoining the Russian borders.²⁴

When the Bolshevik revolution began in Russia in 1336/1917, the colonial plans of France and Britain came to light and the Russians handed over the text of the Sykes-Picot agreement to the Turks. They, in turn, informed Ḥusayn who asked the British whether it was true. The British assured him that it was only a Turkish ruse and Ḥusayn believed them and continued in his alliance with them.

At the same time in which the British and the French were agreeing to divide up their areas of influence in the Arab lands in the East, we find

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 438–41, 464–505.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 509–15.

Britain, under pressure from international Zionism, also holding secret talks with the Jews with the aim of their gaining a homeland. Thus, on 18 Muḥarram 1336/2 November 1917 was issued what is known as the Balfour Declaration or the Balfour promise, Balfour being the British Foreign Secretary at the time. It stated: 'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people'. Whatever the political and military circumstances which caused Britain to make this declaration, it gave what it did not own to those who had no right to it. It also betrayed those who stood alongside Britain at a time of adversity and made them forsake and rebel against their caliph.²⁵

On 7 Şafar 1337/11 November 1918 England and her allies signed an armistice with Turkey, and the Arab countries were occupied by the British and French armies. Syria and Palestine were partitioned into three regions. The first was known as the Eastern Zone (A) which included Palestine and was under British mandate. The second was called the Eastern Zone (B) which comprised inner Syria and had an Arab administration under the leadership of Fayṣal b. al-Ḥusayn. The third region was called the Western Zone and included Lebanon and the Syrian coast from Tyre (*Şūr*) up to the borders with Qalqīliya (*Qalqīliyya*). This was under French mandate.

As for Iraq, this fell under British mandate while the Arabian Peninsula was divided among its Arab amīrs under British control. Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī was given the Hijaz, the House of ʿĀl Saʿūd were given Najd with their capital in Riyāḍ (*Riyāḍ*), Ibn al-Rashīd was made amīr of the territory of Shammar between Najd and Iraq and al-Adarisa (*al-Adārīsa*) in al-ʿAsīr in the south, Imam Yaḥyā declared his rule over Yemen, and there were amīr' of the Gulf, Muscat, Lahej and Hadhramaut, each one in his own emirate but also under the ultimate control of the British.²⁶

In Şafar 1337/December 1918 Amīr Fayṣal b. al-Ḥusayn travelled to London to ask the British to keep its broken promises to his father to grant the Arabs independence and unite them. He carried with him authorization from his father to act as his representative in the peace conference in Paris, but while in London he discovered that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was true and that Georges Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister, and Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, were involved in negotiations and discussing how to implement the Agreement. Fayṣal also learnt that the French were unhappy about his appointment as head of the Arab administration of inner Syria, and he was subjected to a vicious press attack from the Zionist parties.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 518–20.

26. ʿAbdu-l-Karīm, *Tārīkh al-ʿArab ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 188–93.

Nonetheless, Amīr Fayṣal continued to hope that the Peace Conference which was convened in Paris in 1338/1919 would realize Arab aims. However, even though at the beginning of February the Arab delegation led by Fayṣal took a seat in the Conference and managed to raise the Arab problem, and even though the delegation argued that the Arab peoples living in Asia should be granted independence in accordance with the principles announced by the American President Wilson, still Lloyd George and Clemenceau refused the proposal. President Wilson, however, insisted on setting up a commission, known as the King-Crane Commission, which travelled to the Arab region and confirmed the validity of Arab nationalist aspirations.

The stance of the Paris Peace Conference regarding Arab independence and freedom was ambiguous and this created an atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty. Thus, when Amīr Fayṣal returned home he invited a number of Arab leaders to form a national council and quickly held elections, both in the region under his administration, and also in those regions under the control of the British and the French. The council, known as the General Syrian Congress, met in Damascus and made a number of resolutions, the most important of which were:

1. to declare the independence of Greater Syria (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordan) as a sovereign state, and the appointment of Amīr Fayṣal as its king;
2. to reject the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour promise;
3. to reject the mandate proposed by Britain and France; and
4. to refuse any assistance of whatever form from France.²⁷

On 28 Rajab 1338/16 April 1920 a conference was convened in San Remo attended by Britain, France and Italy during which Iraq and Syria were placed under mandatory rule and Sham was divided into three parts: Palestine, Lebanon and Syria. Iraq was not partitioned. Syria and Lebanon were put under French mandate and Palestine and Iraq were put under British mandate with the instruction that Britain should abide by the Balfour promise. Immediately, the commander of the French forces, General Henri Gouraud, sent a warning to King Fayṣal b. al-Ḥusayn demanding that he accept the French mandate over Syria and demobilize his army. When this order was ignored, on 8 Dhu-l-Qiʿda 1338/23 July 1920 the Syrian army engaged the French forces in an unequal battle known as the Battle of Maysalun. Although the Syrians put up fierce resistance, their leader, Yūsuf al-ʿAzma, was killed and Fayṣal was forced to depart for Europe.²⁸

As for Britain, it consolidated its presence in Iraq and exercised total control. It was the same situation in Palestine. Moreover, Britain began to

27. Yahyā, *al-ʿĀlam al-ʿarabi ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 538.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 538–43.

implement Balfour's promise to the Jews and renounced the promises of independence and freedom it had made to the Egyptians and the Sudanese.

During its mandate over Syria, France strove to break the unity of its territories and, after annexing Beirut and some Syrian regions such as Tripoli on the Biqā' coast to Mount Lebanon it established what is known as the State of Greater Lebanon. In 1340/1921 France also made the 'Alawite region in Latakia (*al-Lādhiqiyya*) a separate state. Similarly, it established a state in Jabal al-Druze and divided the remainder of the country into the State of Damascus and the State of Aleppo. This took place according to the well known colonial policy of 'divide and rule'. As a result of the opposition of the Syrian and Lebanese people to these plans, however, the French subsequently changed their minds and settled instead on the formation of the two republics of Syria and Lebanon. They surrendered the district of Iskenderun to the Turks on the pretext that the majority of the population there was Turkish. In fact, this was untrue but truth was forfeit so that Turkey would enter into an alliance with France in the event of war, the signs of the Second World War already being on the horizon.

Faced with this occupation, rebellions broke out everywhere. Perhaps the most famous of these was that which occurred in Jabal al-Druze in 1344/1925 under the leadership of Sulṭān al-Aṭrash. The fighting spread to Damascus and the French committed terrible crimes against the Syrian people. In order to contain the disturbances France was forced to change its policy and to permit the formation of a national government in Damascus. In 1355/1936 a treaty was concluded between Syria and France which contained harsh stipulations. Despite this it was still rejected by the French parliament. But with the commencement of the Second World War, the defeat of France and the inclusion of the French troops in Syria and Lebanon within the Vichy Government which made peace with the Germans, Syria and Lebanon were turned into a field of battle between the Allies on the one hand and the Axis forces on the other. The French who referred to themselves as the Free French were therefore forced to promise that they would grant independence to the Syrians and the Lebanese after the end of the war.²⁹

Thus, on 7 Ramaḍān 1360/27 September 1941 General Catroux announced the independence of the Syrian Republic then, on 8 Dhu-l-Qi'da 1360/26 November 1941 he announced the independence of the Lebanese Republic. When the Syrians and the Lebanese insisted that the French troops should completely evacuate their territories, however, in 1365/1945 the French forces bombarded them with cannon fire and killed hundreds of innocent

29. 'Abdu-l-Karīm, *Tārikh al-'arab ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 161–3.

people. They were finally granted independence in 1366/1946 and the French departed.

As for Iraq, at the end of the Second World War in 1365/1945 the Iraqis demanded an amendment to the Agreement of 1349/1930 which prevented their country gaining independence. After lengthy talks, agreement was reached on a new treaty which was signed by Ṣāliḥ Jabar and Bevin on 4 Rabīʿ I 1367/15 January 1948. However, this was not accepted by the majority of Iraqis and in 1375/1955 it was replaced by another as part of the Baghdad Pact, an alliance whose aim was to protect the Middle East. This situation continued until the revolution of 27 Dhu-l-Ḥijja 1377/14 June 1958 which abolished the monarchy and announced Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact.³⁰

Elsewhere, Transjordan was placed under British mandate according to a resolution reached at a meeting of the Allies in San Remo in 1339/1925. Amīr ʿAbdullāh b. Sharīf Ḥusayn was chosen as King of Jordan but with restrictions lasting 25 years imposed by the 1366/1946 Treaty with the British, signed by both parties. King ʿAbdullāh remained on the throne until he was assassinated in 1371/1951. He was succeeded by his son Ṭalāl, followed by King Ḥusayn b. Ṭalāl and then the present king, ʿAbdullāh II.

On the Arabian Peninsula, Amīr ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Saʿūd managed to remain neutral during the First World War. In the summer of 1340/1921 he led his forces in an attack on the region of Shammar which was ruled by the House of Āl Rashīd. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz arrived at Ḥāʾil, the capital of the region, and laid siege to it. This forced the surrender of its amīr, Muḥammad b. Ṭalāl al-Rashīd, and the region was annexed to the emirate of the Saudis. When the war came to an end, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz launched an attack on the Hijaz and snatched it from al-Sharīf al-Ḥusayn on 18 Rabīʿ I 1343/16 October 1926. Amīr ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz was then given the oath of allegiance as King of the Hijaz and Sultan of Najd and its dependencies. In 1349/1930 he was able to annex al-ʿAsīr with the agreement of its Amīr Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Idrīsī. Following this, on 22 Jumādā I 1351/22 September 1932, he declared Najd, the Hijaz and al-ʿAsīr to be a single Arab Saudi kingdom.

Turning now to Yemen, this was under the rule of the Imām Yaḥyā b. Ḥamīd al-Dīn who had fought alongside the Ottomans when the Italian forces had invaded Tripoli and Barqa in Libya in 1329/1911. Yemen met with British aggression when its cities were bombed from the air, so Imām Yaḥyā dispatched his forces with those of Turkey to attack the British in Aden and the other protectorates in the south of Yemen.

At the close of the First World War the Turks withdrew from Yemen. In 1353/1934 Yemen and Britain signed an agreement in which Britain

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 225–6.

acknowledged the status of the country as a kingdom. However, the country was isolated at the hands of the family of Ḥamīd al-Dīn which continued to rule until it was ousted in the revolution of 27 Rabīʿ II 1382/26 September 1962.³¹

The most extensive and serious example of European colonial penetration in the Arab East was the occupation of Palestine at the end of the First World War. It was placed under British mandate and the Jews were given a promise by the British that they could establish a homeland for themselves and a state in Palestine. This promise, which the British had to keep, became a document of statehood and constitutes the basis of the Palestinian problem up to the present time. The British began to implement its promise to the Jews when it chose a British Jew to head the civil administration in Palestine and appointed him as High Commissioner.

Under cover of the British mandate in Palestine, the Jews worked assiduously and by employing a number of subterfuges and stratagems, such as encouraging Jewish immigration to Palestine and purchasing land by various means, they became the majority. In this way the Judaization of Palestine was achieved with the full knowledge of the British and with their open and covert encouragement. The result of these developments was a riot which began on 16 Rajab 1338/4 April 1920 and in which the Arabs demanded the annulment of the Balfour promise, the removal of the British mandate over Palestine and the declaration of the independence of the country. Although Britain exercised authoritarian rule it permitted the Jews to establish the Jewish Agency which was engaged in a number of activities in the service of the Jews, such as education, spreading propaganda in Europe and America and providing finance and organization. Thus, the Jewish Agency was similar to a state within a state. As for the Arabs, they were preoccupied with the mandate and the French and British protectorate.³²

When the Arabs became aware of the Jews pouring into Palestine, and fighting broke out between them and the Jews at the Burāq Wall (Wailing Wall) in 1346/1929, Britain issued a paper in 1349/1930 called the White Paper which forbade any further Jewish immigration to Arab regions. But the Jews were unhappy with this and proceeded to put pressure on the British who in 1350/1931 issued another paper, called the Black Paper by the Arabs, which permitted the Jews to resume their influx into Palestine.

In the period 1355–8/1936–9 occurred the Arab revolt in Palestine. It began with general strikes which spread to the whole of Arab Palestine. This was followed by the Palestinian political parties coming together to form a united front known as the Arab Higher Committee. The strikes developed

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 188–94, 226–7.

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 168–9.

into an open armed revolt which was joined by Arab volunteers from the various Arab countries and fighting broke out between the British army and the Palestinians. The Arab kings and leaders were forced to mediate so as to put an end to the strike and to create an atmosphere in which a just settlement could be reached which would protect Palestine and preserve its Arab character.

In 1356/1937 the British Government set up an investigating committee which arrived at a political solution to the Palestinian problem based on the division of the country into three regions:

1. a Jewish state in the territories in which the Jews were in the majority extending from the coast at the borders of Lebanon to the south of Jaffa;
2. an Arab state in the remaining areas extending to Transjordan;
3. the area of the British permanent mandate comprising the Holy Sites and the region of Jerusalem.

The Jews welcomed this proposal while the Arabs totally rejected it.³³

Britain presented a plan to the United Nations which it considered to be the best way out of its predicament. The Arabs turned down the plan, however, and held a conference in Bloudan (*Blūdān*), Syria, which resulted in a resolution to reject the British proposal requiring the partition of the country, to withdraw the Balfour promise, to stop Jewish immigration and to forbid Arabs from selling their land to the Jews.

Revolt once again erupted in Palestine. Britain held the Arab Higher Committee responsible for this and sent its leaders into exile in the Seychelles. The revolt continued until 1358/1939 and transformed Palestine into a battlefield. When signs of the Second World War appeared, Britain resorted to its usual prevarication and appeasement and in 1357/1938 issued what was also called the White Paper. In this, it announced that it would abandon its plan of partition and called for the convening of a conference in London to be attended by Arab and Jewish leaders in Palestine and in which the Arab countries would be represented. This conference, known as the Round Table Conference, opened its proceedings on 18 Dhu-l-Ḥijja 1357/7 February 1939. The Arab delegates refused to sit at the same table with the Jewish representatives and Britain was obliged to meet each delegation separately. It was a failure. However, Britain issued a final White Paper in which it stated that Palestine was not mentioned in the correspondence between al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī and Sir Henry McMahon the British Commissioner in Egypt in 1335/1916. Britain also pointed out that Balfour's promise to the Jews did not entail the creation of a Jewish state. Moreover, it proposed that a single Palestinian state be established comprising both Arabs and Jews, that

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 171–2.

is, neither Arab nor Jewish in character, and that this state, represented by six Arabs and two Jews, should be linked to Britain by a treaty of alliance. After three years the people of Palestine were to elect a legislative council membership of which was in proportion to the number of Arabs and Jews in the population. The White Paper also stated that during the following five years the immigration of Jews to Palestine was to be restricted to 75,000 persons and that after this it was to stop completely. On the basis of this Paper, in 1359/1940 a resolution was issued which divided the territories of Palestine into three regions:

1. a region in which it was permitted to sell Arab lands to the Jews without any qualification;
2. a region in which special permission was needed to conclude a sale;
3. a region in which the sale of Arab land was totally forbidden.³⁴

The Jews rejected the proposal. The Arabs did likewise since it did not satisfy their main demands which were to annul the Balfour promise, to create an independent Palestinian Government and to put an end to the British mandate. However, the White Paper of 1358/1939 did contain some positive contributions towards a solution to the Palestinian issue.

With the outbreak of the Second World War everything came to a standstill. But during the war the Zionist movement began to put pressure on Britain and America and exerted considerable influence on the decision-makers within the Senate, the House of Representatives and the White House. President Truman was one of the strongest supporters of the Zionist movement in Palestine and he resolved to open the door to further Jewish immigration into the country. Thus, in 1365/1945 Britain permitted the entry of 100,000 Jewish immigrants all at once, with a further 15,000 immigrants in each succeeding month. This was quite apart from illegal and clandestine immigration.

In 1366/1946 Britain decided to form an Anglo-American committee to solve the Palestinian problem. The Jews had made use of the war to obtain weapons and to be trained in their use. A wave of terrorist attacks was directed at the Palestinians to force them to abandon their lands. Nevertheless, the Anglo-American committee recommended that 100,000 Jewish victims of the Nazis be allowed to enter the country and decided that it was the right of every Jew who wished to immigrate to Palestine to do so. The committee also considered that Britain should continue its mandate over Palestine until such time as the United Nations could take over.

The Arabs rejected these recommendations. At a time when the Arabs were divided among themselves, in the period 1945–6 the Jews committed terrorist acts against the Palestinians such as destroying railway lines and

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 173–4.

bridges, laying mines, the attempted assassination of the British High Commissioner and the successful assassination of the British Minister of State in Cairo.

The British made an attempt to convene a conference in London in 1366–7/1946–7 but failed. They also failed to arrive at a solution to the Palestinian problem. The British Government openly acknowledged this failure and referred the issue to the United Nations. The United Nations devoted a few sessions to discussing the Palestinian question in 1367/1947 and formed a special subcommittee composed of 21 neutral states which was to prepare a proposal. The subcommittee recommended that Palestine be divided into three parts: an Arab state, a Jewish state and an international zone comprising Jerusalem and the Holy Sites. The two states were to be granted independence after an interim period of two years during which they would be under the authority of the United Nations. After much argument and pressure from the Americans the resolution was taken to go ahead with the partition. The British delegate rejected this, however, and stated that Britain would relinquish its mandate over Palestine on 11 Rajab 1367/19 May 1948.

The Jews exploited this resolution and with the agreement of the British and American administrations declared their independence and the establishment of the State of Israel. President Truman was the first to recognize it 16 minutes after it was announced. Following this, in 1367/1948, a war broke out between the Jews and the Arabs. Three days after the commencement of hostilities the United Nations Commissioner submitted a proposal to the Security Council to stop the fighting in Palestine, and on 11 Rajab 1367/19 May 1948 the Security Council accepted this.

One consequence of the war was the forced migration of Palestinians from their lands and the ensuing problem of some 757,000 refugees. Despite the United Nations issuing a resolution in 1365/1948 calling for the return of the refugees to their lands, this has still to be implemented and the situation remains as it was. Indeed, the number of refugees and their suffering has increased. In 1387/1967 Israel was able to occupy yet more Palestinian territory and this only served to deepen the anguish of the Palestinian people.

Chapter 1.7

A FORGOTTEN PAGE IN THE SAGA
OF THE SUEZ CANAL:
FROM THE STATUE OF LIBERTY
TO THE STATUE OF LESSEPS: THE
STORY OF A DUAL DIVERSION

Ahmed Yousuf

‘You alone remember all of the financial
sacrifices that I have made and the travails that I have
undergone; unlike you, nobody in America has
ever sought to heal my old wounds.’

Bartholdi to his friend Richard Butler, 1886

‘To work! Workers by our France dispatched,
Break this new ground for the world unmatched!
Your mighty fathers to this place attained;
Be steadfast, like them, and bold of spirit,
Battling, like them, beneath the Pyramids,
Whose four-thousand-year gaze on you is trained!’

Henri de Bornier (poem given an award by the French Academy in 1862)

On 28 October 1886, a cold wind swept through New York’s Fifth Avenue, as tens of thousands of enthusiastic Americans thronged to watch the spectacular unveiling of the Statue of Liberty. The dignitaries around Frédéric Auguste Bartholdi, the celebrated French sculptor, comprised one guest, Ferdinand de Lesseps, who, seventeen years earlier, had been similarly feted on the banks of the Suez Canal.

As de Lesseps rose to the rostrum to deliver his speech, a sudden gust of wind blew the French flag away from the statue’s face. Bartholdi felt a twinge: there was no love lost between the two men, although Bartholdi had been received many times in Egypt by de Lesseps while the Suez Canal was being built.



I-7.1 Ships passing on the Suez Canal in April 1957
© UN Photo/JG/pcd

However, the French citizens attending the ceremony in New York felt great sadness, for the Khedive, heavily indebted, had been obliged to sell all of Egypt's shares in the Suez Canal to Britain, and Egypt, politically weakened, had been unable a few years later to oppose occupation by the British in 1882.

Bartholdi and de Lesseps knew perfectly well that the Statue of Liberty had initially been intended for the northern entrance to the canal. They also knew that, as soon as construction had begun in 1859, a series of strange incidents, described as a 'curse', had occurred along the canal.

De Lesseps had been obliged to counter powerful interests in order to complete the task in hand: the British, the Ottomans, many Egyptians and a good proportion of the French population had initially been opposed to the project.

An iron will and legendary perseverance had been required to complete the work, and the canal was finally opened in 1869. Unfortunately, de Lesseps' most influential protectors, Napoleon III and Eugénie, abdicated one year later after the heavy defeat at Sedan.

Khedive Ismail ruled for ten more years after the canal was opened, but they were the darkest years in the history of modern Egypt owing to heavy debts and such interference that Egypt was obliged by the Powers to have French and British ministers as members of its government and, worse yet, those grim ten years ended with occupation by the British.

De Lesseps's sad end after the Panama Canal scandal is well known. Had the curse of Suez struck again? There was something in the history of the canal that nobody wished to see; the French continued to consider de Lesseps a man of vision well after his death, and the Egyptians continued to convert the canal into a narrow symbol of patriotism and unthinking nationalism.

The Statue of Liberty would not be the only statue diverted from its original purpose; that of de Lesseps, too, like its American sister, was fated to be erected in a different place.

Before recounting the story of the two statues, a historical review will show how de Lesseps won the concession for the canal.

Through the ages, travellers through the 150 kilometres or so of desert between the two seas had been seriously inconvenienced by sandstorms and Bedouin raids.

It is known that in the age of the Pharaohs, Sesostris I was the first to build a waterway linking the Nile to the Red Sea. Subsequent efforts by Queen Hatshepsut and Pharaoh Seti I came to naught owing to neglect and the sand that buried the canal. Egypt's invaders, from Darius the Great to the Emperor Trajan to Caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd, who all cherished the proud ambition of connecting the two seas, also gave thought to the matter.

The project also tempted Bonaparte and, after lengthy study, J.M. le Père, his famous engineer, was instructed to survey the isthmus. He established that the Red Sea was ten metres higher than the Mediterranean and recommended that an indirect canal be dug between the Nile and the Red Sea, which he estimated would take four years to build. His erroneous calculation was disproved only in 1847.

'It is a grand undertaking', said Bonaparte upon receiving the report, 'and if I cannot accomplish it now, the Turkish Government will doubtless rob me of its glory one day'.

Everything changed when one Prosper Enfantin, the spiritual head of the Saint-Simonian community, set off for Alexandria to urge construction of the canal. The Saint-Simonians firmly believed that the canal would be conducive to world peace and would help to bring East and West together.

They were received in Egypt by Muḥammad 'Alī, who officially rejected the canal-building project.

‘The Suez Canal affair’, he said, ‘could lead to the type of complications that I more than anybody have always sought to avoid. I believe that it is a plot against me. I declare that I shall never agree to such a venture and, what is more, I shall do my utmost to prevent it from being carried out.

‘I am so determined in this matter that if this very day the European great powers were to demand that I either accept this humiliation or abdicate, I should not hesitate one moment to take the latter course. Austria is trying to bring about my downfall. She cannot achieve anything by herself, but her Consul-General never misses an opportunity to threaten me with intervention by the High Porte. It is through the High Porte that she will endeavour to work against my interests whenever the occasion arises.’

The Pasha gave the Saint-Simonians full liberty, however, to build a dam on the Nile.

He received them later on together with Ferdinand de Lesseps, the young French diplomat mentioned above, who was to play a key role in Egypt’s history.

Born in Versailles on 19 November 1805 and son of Mathieu de Lesseps, Commissioner-General for Trade in Egypt, Ferdinand de Lesseps became French Consul in Alexandria in 1833. Owing to the close friendship between Mathieu and Muḥammad ‘Alī, Ferdinand became an intimate friend of the ruling family after his father’s death.

Ferdinand de Lesseps himself wrote at length about the less public side of his relations with Muḥammad ‘Alī.

Muḥammad ‘Alī was stern, and seeing his beloved son put on flesh in momentous proportions drove him to despair. His sole wish was to prevent his dear child from becoming obese and thus he sent him up ships’ masts for two hours daily and compelled him to skip and row and walk round the ramparts. When Said came to visit me, he would throw himself exhausted upon the divan. Unfortunately for his figure, his favourite dish was macaroni, and I had it brought to him in secret by my servants to enable him to endure the fasting to which he was subjected. It must be understood that the Arabs of the desert consider fullness of figure to be a feminine characteristic and they overfeed their wives and deprive them of movement in order to keep them plump. I pitied Said from the bottom of my heart, but I did my best to cooperate by endeavouring, for instance, to teach him fencing, which he loathed because the sessions made him perspire copiously. He far preferred our outings on horseback. Much later in life, I had occasion to wonder by what miracle a king had incurred a debt of honour to me through a few dishes of macaroni and some horse riding in my company. Who can say what influence those dishes of pasta actually had on my destiny? But our mutual attraction also had deeper reasons, including the contrast between my education and his: did he not come from an illiterate Albanian family and had he not grown up in an adoptive country that was only just emerging from feudalism?

Realizing that the Pasha would not agree to build the canal because of European designs on Egypt, de Lesseps decided to postpone his project.



I-7.2 An aerial view of the al-Ballah by-pass, a stretch of the Suez Canal, in 1957
© UN Photo/JG

‘Austria and France may perhaps want the canal’, said Muhammad ‘Alī, ‘but Britain? And Russia?’

The accession to power of his former pupil, the prince, filled de Lesseps with hope and ambition.

During a journey in the Egyptian desert the two men exchanged old memories, and de Lesseps waited for a suitable moment to speak of his historic project to the sovereign.

He was [de Lesseps wrote] in an excellent mood, cheerful and high-spirited. He took my hand and, holding it for a moment in his, led me over to the divan, where he seated me beside him. We were alone. Beyond the awning of the tent we could see the sun setting in all its splendour – that same sun that had moved me so much when it had risen. At that moment, although I was about to ask the question on which my future depended, I felt calm and confident. My thoughts and studies on the canal between the two seas were clear in my mind, and the implementation of my plan seemed so easy that I had no doubt that I could convey my belief to the prince. I explained my plan without entering into detail: I could have recited my memorandum by heart, but I confined myself to the salient points. Said listened attentively. I asked him to tell me whether he had any doubts. In fact, he raised several apposite objections, to which I gave a reply calculated to give him satisfaction. In conclusion he said, ‘I am persuaded; I accept your plan. For the remainder of the journey, we shall discuss how to put it into practise’. He gathered his retinue to tell them the news. His men took their places on mats opposite

us and he gave them an account of the conversation that we had just had. Better qualified to judge a feat of horsemanship than a vast enterprise whose consequences were hard for them to gauge, the ad hoc advisers intimated that their master's friend, whom they had just seen venture his head above the parapet, was bound to offer excellent advice. From time to time, they raised their hands to their foreheads to indicate agreement to the measures being announced by the viceroy. The table for dinner having been laid, we all dipped our spoons into the same tureen of excellent soup betokening our unity of opinion. This is a faithful account of the most important negotiation that I have ever conducted or ever shall conduct.

The agreement between Said and de Lesseps was announced in the presence of all of the diplomatic representatives in Cairo.

Britain, scenting yet another French adventure in Egypt, raised serious objections to the canal and campaigned fiercely against the project and Said himself.

Thus Lord Clarendon, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, began to be threatening towards Said.

The disfavour [de Lesseps wrote] with which Her Majesty's Government views the project is not the consequence of the project's having been submitted to his Highness by a French subject. If Her Majesty's Government perceived the slightest possibility of advantage to the Pasha in this project, it would recommend its adoption whether it was proposed by a British subject or a French one. Whatever tends to smooth relations between British possessions in Europe and Asia can but be gratifying to Her Majesty's Government. It is only because it is persuaded that no benefit can come of the execution of this project that it has instructed you to hold aloof and convey frankly to the Pasha our reasons for acting thus.

To support Egypt, Napoleon III conferred the *Grand Cordon* of the Legion of Honour on Said on 22 December.

Although France did not champion the project openly in order not to embarrass its ally, the project was implemented owing to France's moral support and prompt purchases by the French of shares in the Suez Canal Company.

However, the French were then so uncertain and indecisive about the project, that the British could not only repeat the 1801 scenario – when the British had helped the Turks to drive Bonaparte out of Egypt – but also occupy the country some years after the opening of the canal in 1869.

Egypt's new sovereign, Khedive Ismail, held a canal-opening ceremony that was worthy of the *Thousand and One Nights* and was attended by the Emperor of Austria, the Empress Eugénie and sundry princes of Europe to music from Verdi's *Aïda*, Egypt was then on its honeymoon with France, but, as all honeymoons do, it presaged an inevitable end to passion and the beginning of trouble between the two countries.

The first noteworthy point about these lavish celebrations was that Bartholdi's name was neither on the Khedive's nor on de Lesseps's guest list, although he had met the Khedive on several occasions – probably against de Lesseps' wishes – to discuss the statue to be erected at the southern entrance to the Suez Canal.

Now comes the story of Bartholdi and the Statue of Liberty.

The famous statue was a gift from France to the United States of America, but very few people knew that it was commissioned by Khedive Ismail Pasha in 1869 for the southern entrance to the Canal.

Who was Bartholdi? What was his connection with Egypt?

Frédéric Auguste Bartholdi was born in Colmar (Alsace) in August 1834. His father died a year later, leaving behind a strong-willed wife and two sons – one mentally ill and the other in poor health but showing the early talents of an artist. After the father's death, the family moved to Paris to live with a paternal uncle, one Jean-Baptiste Bartholdi, future French Ambassador to the United States of America, who played a key role in the statue's transfer to the United States of America. The years passed, and young Bartholdi became a pupil at the Lycée Louis-le-Grand. It was then that he began visiting the studios of Antoine Etex, one of the greatest French painters and sculptors of the time. His mother's influence should not be overlooked, for she instilled in him steadfastness of purpose, discipline and, above all, the habit of writing a letter to her daily. Those letters, currently held by the Bartholdi Museum in Colmar, provide important information on the origins and history of the Statue of Liberty and on Bartholdi's stay in Egypt. His artistic work was given a mixed reception in France. Among his statues, *The Good Samaritan* was rejected by the Paris Salon in 1853, *The Seven Swabians* were rejected two years later by the same Salon and *General Rapp* nearly met with the same fate at the Paris Universal Exhibition of 1855. At the request of the Exhibition's managers, the young sculptor was obliged to erect his statue in the Exhibition gardens because of its size: it caused a sensation, for the floral garden setting and the statue's isolation from the overcrowded exhibition halls unexpectedly conferred great prestige on Bartholdi's work.

As a result of this huge success, the sculptor was sought after by artists, writers, Napoleonic philosophers and republican thinkers, such as the Saint-Simonians. Contact with the latter and with nostalgia for epic imperial times drew Bartholdi into the orbit of Egypt and its civilization. In December 1855, one month after his success at the Universal Exhibition, Bartholdi arrived in Egypt in search of new inspiration and a prosperous future, following in the footsteps of Soliman Pasha, Lambert Bey and even Champollion.

Armed with a paint box and camera, he was one of the first photographers in Egypt. He travelled the length and breadth of the country, immortalizing scenes of grassroots life in Cairo with his brush and photographing the Colossi of Memnon for the first time. The gigantic size of Egypt's statues made such

an impression on the young sculptor that they gave him the idea of creating a work modelled on antique statuary whose grandeur conferred permanence.

What about Ferdinand de Lesseps? Bartholdi drew enthusiasm and ready inspiration from his stay in Egypt, as evidenced by his statue *Champollion* (1875) that today adorns the courtyard of the Collège de France, *The Berbers' Lyre* (1867) and *Souvenir of Egypt* (1867), a wonderful painting that reportedly sparked his friendship with Khedive Ismail. He also took some important photographs and produced some watercolours that clearly conveyed their source of inspiration. However, Bartholdi, who dreamt of creating the eighth wonder of the world, was not content with his painting and sculpture. Producing a statue that would do justice to Egypt was for him both an ambition and a challenge, and to fulfil this pharaonic dream he needed a pharaoh on the one hand, and, on the other, an intermediary to open the door to the pharaoh's palace. He found the latter in Ferdinand de Lesseps, whom he met on three occasions: twice in Egypt and then in the United States of America, at the official opening of the Statue of Liberty. During the first meeting, Bartholdi told the diplomat about his intention to produce a colossal work to the glory of Egypt, but Ferdinand de Lesseps expostulated and, as Bartholdi wrote, (constantly doused Bartholdi's enthusiasm with cold water).



I-7.3 Clearing the Suez Canal; the UN salvage fleet lifts and removes the damaged eastern section of the al-Ferdan bridge

© UN Photo/JG

Ferdinand de Lesseps, who had just won permission to establish and manage the Suez Canal Company, really did not want his arrangements to be disrupted by another project. Nevertheless, it was through de Lesseps that Bartholdi, on his second visit to Egypt, had an audience with Khedive Ismail Pasha.

The idea of creating a statue symbolizing liberty was floated for the first time in 1865 by Laboulaye, a philosopher, staunch republican and Bartholdi's friend and spiritual father. His idea gave substance to Bartholdi's Egyptian dream, but both men knew that the project would never be implemented without a sovereign's support.

Two years later, Providence smiled on them. Khedive Ismail was impressed by *Souvenir of Egypt*, the painting that Bartholdi had produced for the Universal Exhibition. Enlightened and modern, the Egyptian sovereign was the darling of the French capital; in particular, he had been welcomed by the Anti-Slavery Society, whose president just happened to be Laboulaye. Bartholdi seized the opportunity and suggested to the viceroy that a colossal statue should stand at the northern entrance to the canal.

The project, as outlined to the Khedive, consisted of a statue roughly 28 metres high representing a woman draped in a tunic and coiffed with the headdress worn by Egyptian peasant women, thus symbolizing Egypt bringing light to Asia. The Khedive must have been enthusiastic, for the sculptor set to work to submit his project, supported by a model, to the Khedive. He arrived in Egypt, which he already knew from his first visit in 1855, in March 1869. On 6 April he presented his project and model to Ismail. The Khedive expressed a preference for the torch to be borne on the head in the manner of *fellah* women.

The changes requested by the Khedive are indicative of at least a partial agreement with the sculptor, since it is hard to imagine Bartholdi making life-size models in some instances, preparing plans and travelling, without some financial commitment from this very generous sovereign. Yet there is no evidence of any such commitment; nor is there any evidence that the Khedive did not, in a moment of euphoria, request the sculptor to make him a gigantic mausoleum – and the Bartholdi Museum holds a very fine drawing of a mausoleum designed by the artist in 1869. The sumptuous canal-opening ceremony in 1869, Egypt's ruin and the viceroy's deposition by the British, prevented Bartholdi's project from being pursued further.

Laboulaye then suggested that Bartholdi travel to the United States of America, where the former was recognized as a philosopher and admirer of American institutions. Bartholdi, arriving in the United States of America on 21 June 1871, was dazzled by the scene that met his eyes on entering New York harbour. He was introduced to the society of American artists, intellectuals and businessmen. Laboulaye's idea of erecting a grand statue symbolizing liberty and progress resurfaced. The projected Suez statue was again changed to become the New York statue.

Some newspapers intimated at the time that Bartholdi had resold the project; he refuted those insinuations, claiming that he had made only a small sketch for the Suez Canal statue, but extant models do indeed show that it was a huge project.

The Suez statue thus eventually became the Statue of Liberty. At the time, many French citizens wanted Egypt's name to be carved on the pedestal at the very least, particularly on account of the Egypt-inspired changes that Bartholdi had made to the statue, including both the pyramid base and the pedestal evoking the Lighthouse of Alexandria.

Egypt's countless friends in France would no doubt have liked to do Egypt justice by offering for the 1998 celebrations of the bicentenary of Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition a new statue of enlightenment that Egypt would have erected to the west of Alexandria on the very spot where Bonaparte and his men of learning had disembarked.

The Egyptian statue, which came to symbolize the United States of America, the New World and the American dream has been struck by the curse of Suez for it now symbolizes the hegemony and tyranny of the United States of America in which racial discrimination, abject poverty and high crime rates prevail.

In Youssef Chahine's famous film *Alexandria ... Why?* the hero manages to board a ship for the United States of America. The film's final scene is fraught with significance: when the ship arrives off New York, the Statue of Liberty winks strangely at the Egyptian.

While the destiny of the Statue of Liberty was diverted away from Egypt, the other statue, that of Ferdinand de Lesseps, suffered a similar fate inside Egypt.

Commissioned by Prince Auguste d'Arenberg from the sculptor Emmanuel Fremier, the statue of the father of the Suez Canal was unveiled on 17 November 1899, exactly thirty years after the official opening of the canal itself.

Fifty-seven years later, the curse of Suez struck the statue that purportedly symbolized the great Franco-Egyptian honeymoon. After the Suez War and the Franco-British bombing of Port Said, it became the symbol of the painful rift between Egypt and France and betokened a bygone age. It was dismantled and abandoned for more than forty years before being partly repaired owing to the commendable efforts by the *Association du Souvenir de Ferdinand de Lesseps et du Canal de Suez*. Together with the Suez parent company, the association genuinely promotes reconciliation and economic cooperation between the two countries.

It is now known that Nasser mentioned Lesseps' name three times during his Suez Canal nationalization speech as the signal for his men immediately to occupy the headquarters of the Suez Company. This was on 26 July 1956.

The battle to have the statue reinstalled at Port Said then promised to be hard and long. Many good intentions and promises on the Egyptian side have come to naught. The association's leaders in Paris know that the road to hell is paved with good intentions, but they nonetheless believe that only the Egyptians can give the statue a new lease of life.

There is still hope that Egypt, which recently erected statues of Khedive Ismail and Nubar Pasha, two other figures associated with the Suez saga, in two important places in Alexandria, will one day decide to give the man of Suez a second chance.

Today, there is one vital bond between past and present through the two Guys of Suez, namely the singer Guy Marchand, hero of *The Man of Suez*, a magnificent 1970s serial, and Guy Béart, son of Ismailia and writer of a fine song about Suez.

If and when the statue of de Lesseps is reinstalled, the story of the two Guys of Suez will certainly be told.

Chapter 1.8

COLONIAL IMPERIALISM:
THE PARTITION OF AFRICA AT
THE 1885 BERLIN CONFERENCE
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR
AFRICAN MUSLIMS

Thierno Bab

BACKGROUND

Europe's advance into Africa, slow throughout the nineteenth century, suddenly quickened between 1880 and the first decade of the twentieth century. The 1885 Berlin Conference was a turning point, a seminal event vested with both real and symbolic historiographical importance. The European occupation and partition of Africa ushered in a period of considerable importance and instated relations of inequality, domination and exploitation between peoples and continents – the hallmarks of colonial imperialism.

That turning point was underpinned by economic reasons, as first Britain and then the other Western European countries underwent structural change owing to the industrial revolution. The acquisition of colonies was therefore seen as a means of obtaining raw materials and access to foreign markets. Geostrategic calculations and considerations of national grandeur also came into play: the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and its occupation by the British together constituted one factor that sparked competition in Africa, in the same way as Germany's victory over France in 1871 triggered a wave of chauvinism throughout Europe, which found an outlet in possession of an overseas empire.

The Berlin Conference was convened by Bismarck, who had long refused to take an interest in the colonial question. Owing thanks to political unity and rapid industrial growth, Germany had become a great power that wished to take advantage of the international context in order to strengthen its authority in Europe and gain ground in Africa.



I-8.1 A Touareg chieftain in Mali, photographed c.1895, an important part of the resistance to colonialism

© ANOM France, Aix-en-Provence

While the Congress of Vienna (1814–15) had symbolized determination to rebuild Europe, the 1885 Berlin Conference laid the foundations for the diplomatic manoeuvring that formed the backdrop to the conquest and partition of Africa in the following fifteen years. Apart from Switzerland, all European countries were represented, as were the United States of America and Turkey. Belgium, a newcomer to the table, was conspicuous because its King, Leopold II, was acting in his capacity as president of the International Congo Society, a non-governmental body established to further his personal ambitions at a time when the Belgian people did not share their sovereign's expansionist dreams.

The general act and effective occupation

It is significant that on the very first occasion when Africa was the subject of an international conference, Morocco, Liberia and Ethiopia, all sovereign countries, were not invited; yet for the African peoples – the objects rather than subjects of history – the Conference's decisions were to be extremely serious.

Opened by Bismarck on 15 March 1884, the Conference proceedings were exceptionally long, ending only on 26 February 1885. It was marked by bitter behind-the-scenes negotiations and lobbying by King Leopold II, a master diplomat and man of great ambition, whose aim was to establish a trade monopoly in the Congo basin for his own benefit.

The Berlin Conference discussed, and then adopted in its General Act, a set of provisions based on a specific agenda that had been amended. The salient points were as follows:

1. freedom of trade in the Congo basin, thus ending rivalry among the French, Portuguese and Belgians for control of this strategic area, which was the rationale for the holding of the Berlin Conference;
2. freedom of navigation on the Congo, the Niger and their tributaries, which were given international status;
3. formalities for future occupation of the African coast, namely the principle of notifying other powers and the requirement of effective occupation of the hinterland before staking any claim to a colony or protectorate.

While the specific aim of the Berlin Conference agenda was not the immediate partition of Africa, partition was clearly at the back of all minds for, as soon as the conference rose, there was a scramble for Central and West Africa in the form of rivalries, conflicts and understandings among France, Britain, Germany and Belgium, in an irreversible 'steeple chase', with each nation trying to gain as much ground as possible.

The principle of effective occupation laid down at the Berlin Conference drove European states to define spheres of influence, but this decidedly failed

to produce clear-cut borders; spheres of influence were usually based on historical rights that conferred a sort of option on the hinterland. One of the consequences was a proliferation of expeditions and the signing of treaties with the sovereigns of coveted territories. Thus France held a dominant position in West Africa, Britain predominated in eastern and southern Africa, while King Leopold II of Belgium secured the vast territory of the Congo. The Portuguese were well established in southern Africa.

Africa was partitioned in the 1890s and the early twentieth century; the main factors that drove the European powers first to define and then to demarcate their territories were the frequency of commercial rivalry and the concern to avoid armed conflict with each other. Partition was shaped to a large extent by Britain's determination to defend its most valuable interests, whether strategic positions protecting sea routes to the Indies or the lucrative trade of regions such as Nigeria.

During that period many treaties partitioning the continent were signed specifying the rights of the various European powers either under the framework agreements of the General Act of the Berlin Conference or under bilateral agreements. When the First World War broke out, the entire African continent, with the exception of Ethiopia and Liberia, had been partitioned, at least on paper. On the ground, however, huge regions – such as Darfur, and Ovamboland in northern Namibia – remained outside Europe's control.

The partitioning of Africa was completed after the end of the First World War; that political map, the result of colonization, was confirmed by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) shortly after African countries acceded to independence.

Consequences for Muslim societies

Throughout the Sahel and Sudan, Islam was perceived in the nineteenth century as a dynamic force spurring leaders of an exceptional calibre to conquer vast territories and build states with institutional frameworks based on the Arab Muslim model. This held true for Usman dan Fodio, founder of the Fulani's Sokoto Empire, covering the present-day territory of northern Nigeria, northern Cameroon and south-western Chad. In the name of a faith revived by preaching and the Tijani doctrine, al-Hadj Umar Tall unified a large part of the western Sudan (present-day Senegal, Mali and Guinea) and founded the Tukulor Empire. It was also under the standard of Islam that Samory Touré established a well-organized kingdom extending into the south as far as the forest area in today's Côte d'Ivoire.

Faced with the European powers' determination to hold dominion over vast swathes of the hinterland, the various states put up stiff resistance under the banner of Islam in order to preserve their sovereignty and identity, particularly

during the period between 1880–1900. Depending on the circumstances, their resistance took a variety of forms such as direct confrontation, strategic withdrawal and refusal to cooperate with ‘infidels’. Thus Almami Samory Touré combated French imperialism in West Africa and defended the independence of his empire with varying success for nearly twenty years.

Shortly after the Berlin Conference, al-Hadj Umar’s son and heir Ahmadu assumed the role of champion of anti-colonialism and determinedly combated French troops in order to protect the Segu Empire in what is now Mali.

Further to the east, in the Sultanate of Sokoto, Zubayr fiercely opposed colonial rule from 1890 to 1903. He regularly issued orders warning against any form of collaboration with the European powers and rejected the protectorate treaty offered by Britain.

As the nineteenth century drew to a close, colonial armies clashed with another fierce adversary, Rabah, a hero of anti-British resistance in the Upper Nile. After withdrawing to the west, he built a strong kingdom on the ruins of the Bornu Empire around Lake Chad.

After military resistance failed, Muslim elites adopted a variety of attitudes and strategies towards the colonial order. Shortly after the conquest of Sokoto by the British in March 1903, Sultan Attahiru espoused the principle of *hijira*,



I–8.2 General inspection of the French camp at Thiès, Senegal c.1889

© ANOM France, Aix-en-Provence

consisting of refusal to live in the *dār-al-ḥarb*, and he emigrated to lands of freedom; he went to Mecca, followed by large numbers of people. The sultan of the Tukolor Empire, Ahmadu, took a similar decision after he was defeated by French troops.

A general *hijra* was obviously impossible and relations between Muslim communities and the colonial authority were therefore governed by various compromise and accommodation strategies. Out of realism or because they had no choice, the established religious elites, often of the Sunni faith, adopted a conciliatory attitude in order either to preserve their communities or to receive favours under the new order, which was regarded as fulfilment of divine will.

Britain adopted in its colonial territories a system of indirect rule that was marked by pragmatism and flexibility that allowed Muslim communities to preserve many areas of independence. Political emirate-based systems were generally retained and the colonial authority avoided any pro-Christianity proselytism in northern Nigeria.

The French colonial system in Africa was more direct and assimilationist and the Muslim hegemonies did not survive conquest as a result. The authorities were suspicious of the Muslim elites, who were placed under surveillance and deported. This was the case for Ahmadu Bamba, founder of the Mouridiyya brotherhood in Senegal, who was exiled to Gabon in 1895 and then to Mauritania in 1902. In 1910 France changed its policy towards Muslims and sought to win over religious leaders; those willing to swear allegiance were granted various privileges.

Overall, colonization nevertheless seems to have opened up new opportunities for Islam, owing to the building of roads and railways, urbanization and growth in trade. Arab scholars, holy men and Muslim merchants (*dyula*) became more mobile and proselytised in new cities as far as the edge of the forest. Under the influence of Ibrahim Niass from Kaolack in Senegal, the Tijaniyya order played a special role in this new phase of Islamic expansion in West Africa.

The end of the nineteenth century was therefore a historical turning point; the balance of power, which distinctly favoured the European conquerors who had sophisticated weapons, led to the defeat of the Muslim hegemonies. A new chapter had opened, as the cards were to be dealt afresh and a new order and new values were to be imposed. Muslim societies, defeated militarily, were to transfer their determination to resist and their will for self-preservation into the cultural sphere.

Occasionally the desire to preserve areas of independence and exploit changing cultural dynamics led to the rejection of the Western school system, which was regarded as an instrument of alienation. This is evident in *Ambiguous Adventure*, Cheikh Hamidou Kane's remarkable book.

Chapter 1.9

THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST
WORLD WAR ON THE
MUSLIM WORLD

Iba Der Thiam

The 1914–18 war broke out primarily because the main belligerents' imperialist interests clashed.

It all began in 1905 when frequent, repeated diplomatic upheavals, influencing the population and attitudes, alerted European countries to the likelihood of a major, large-scale world conflict unless decisive measures were taken to halt the alarming deterioration of international relations.

The assassination in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, by a student from Bosnia and Herzegovina was the ideal pretext to launch hostilities.

The Austro-Hungarian Government's decision to declare war on Serbia, which it had always wished to remove from the Balkans, led Russia, protector of the Slav countries, to join the fray. Whereupon, Wilhelm II of Germany gave the Tsar an ultimatum requesting him not to meddle in affairs thousands of kilometres from his own borders.

He took a similar attitude towards France and was even so arrogant as to demand, as a pledge of neutrality, that France agree to place the strongholds of Verdun and Toul under his authority.

The countries concerned by these exactions decided to stand firm against them, and so Germany declared war on Russia on 1 August and on France two days later.

As early as 4 August the German army invaded Belgium and Great Britain joined the war immediately, considering that the new German hegemony was likely seriously to disrupt existing balances – failure to react would have had alarming consequences for its own security. Accordingly, on 4 August 1914, Great Britain declared war on Germany, thus widening the battlefield.

Against all expectations, far from being a lightning war, the conflict dragged on for four long years, drawing in dozens of countries and

mobilizing millions of men and women, with a wide range of consequences worldwide. Naturally, the Muslim countries were not spared. It could even be said that in the final reckoning they were among the main victims.

However, the sacrifices made willingly or under constraint were far from being in vain for, on the contrary, they developed and stimulated a vital understanding of the colonial system and the ravages that it had wrought, and of the need to combat it more actively in order to eradicate it.

Indeed, although there had always been constant resistance to colonial oppression and domination, albeit, frankly, in forms and methods that varied according to the country, time and those involved, decolonization really began in practical terms after the end of the First World War, especially in the Muslim world. It continued relentlessly until the colonized countries had achieved international sovereignty.

When the war broke out, the economy throughout the Muslim world was still agricultural, rudimentary and traditional, the exception being Egypt where industrialization had begun, owing to European capital inputs after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.

Even Turkey, where the splendour of the Ottoman Empire was fading, and India, the jewel in the British crown, with a large Muslim population, were not unscathed.

The economy was fragile, as it was largely agricultural, and infrastructure was minimal. Education and health care systems were only in their infancy. The people lacked virtually everything. Inequality and discrimination were the norm. The towns and cities established or developed by the colonial system encapsulated all of the contradictions of the colonial microcosm.

Upscale neighbourhoods, inhabited virtually by whites only, were separated from the outlying neighbourhoods, generally known as the *medina* or the *Kasba*, which had narrow, insalubrious, badly-lit alleyways and the most basic sanitary conditions. Epidemics, shortages, famine were rife and there was mass rural exodus.

There were not enough resources for agriculture, fishing, crafts, trade and employment.

Poverty was widespread. The bureaucracy was sprawling, burdensome, invasive and repressive. Bureaucrats were to varying degrees distant, racist, aggressive, imbued with a marked superiority complex and involved in endemic corruption.

In a federation such as French West Africa, conditions in 1914 generally left much to be desired.

Although rainfall was satisfactory for cash crops such as groundnuts and the harvests had been good, the prices paid to producers by the major trading houses in Bordeaux and Marseille were abnormally low, locking the peasants into near-total destitution.

THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR
ON THE MUSLIM WORLD



I-9.1 A poster encouraging Algerians to sign up to the Compagnie Algérienne during the First World War
© ANOM France, Aix-en-Provence

Trade in gum arabic, gold and salt did not alleviate the underlying situation. Taxes and requisitions were a strain on most household budgets. Political reports even noted that the lack of subsistence had caused ‘shortage and even famine’ in some areas. To complete the picture, livestock was affected by epizootic diseases, while plague and smallpox were the bane of the Federation’s capital.

Even so, one month after France joined the war, enlistment began with a sense of urgency made all the more pressing by Mangin’s idea mooted since 1910, that the ‘black army’ could provide France with almost inexhaustible contingents.

In practical terms for instance, one colony, as small as Senegal, pressed 270 recruits into the service of the ‘motherland’ and they were soon joined by 930 more out of an overall quota of 1,500 initially, set by the colonial authorities not taking into account 550 volunteers, mostly *laptots* assigned to the navy.

In the theatre of operations, all forecasts of a quickly won war of movement were belied by events.

Fully in accordance with the hopes placed in the black army, for instance, Parliament decided to vote in special funds to recruit African infantrymen.

In this context, the proposed Diagne law of 19 October 1915 was adopted unhesitatingly and was promulgated in the *Official Journal* on 21 October, requiring all nationals of the self-governing *communes* to enlist for military service, which had heretofore been forbidden.

That meant that whereas an infantryman cost the army only FF15 in allowance per year, FF12 in pension per year and FF1,000 in subsistence, it was required from then on to pay FF35, FF1,200 and FF3,500 respectively, which was two and half times as much as the overall cost of a colonial infantry soldier.

According to Marc Michel, as a result of this measure, a total of 7,225 Africans from the four *communes* in question enlisted as volunteers, in addition to 20,591 nationals of protectorate countries, thus totalling 27,906 recruits out of a population estimated at 1,201,925 in the 1914 census.

Accordingly, in the self-governing *communes* in Senegal alone, the number of soldiers enlisted accounted for one third of the total population, while the ratio in France at the time was 1 in 10.

The French colonial empire made a great contribution to the war effort, in demographic terms, in payment of what was then known as ‘blood tax’ to the motherland.

French West Africa was readily compared with India and Indochina by French officialdom, which thus failed to consider that French West Africa had an area of only 4 million square kilometres and a population of 12

million, while the population of India was 300 million and Indochina's was 35 million.

On 1 August 1914, there were 32,000 Federation soldiers on the front, joined by 36,000 more in the following year. When sufficient financial resources were released under the budget decree adopted on 28 September 1915, the army launched an additional drive to recruit 50,000 men, and enlisted 68,000.

Accordingly, at the end of 1915, the French West African contingent taking part in the world war was 110,000 to 120,000 strong.

A comparison of this figure with the 20,000 Indochinese infantrymen from a country that was three times as populous, or the aggregate of 10,000 recruited in the same period from Madagascar, French Equatorial Africa (AEF), New Caledonia, Tahiti, French Somaliland, Réunion and French India, or indeed the 15,000 provided by the group of colonies of Martinique, Guadeloupe and Guiana gives a true measure of the actual sacrifice made by the people of Africa. In late 1915, 70 per cent of the 170,000 recruits from the French Empire were from West Africa alone.¹

An equally significant effort had been made by the infantrymen from Algerian and other North African countries placed under the authority of France. Those calculations naturally excluded *laptot* personnel – drivers, mechanics and so on.

Some of them were active in France. Some were assigned to defend French West Africa (11th, 16th and 17th Colonial Infantry Divisions), while others were sent to Morocco. Contingents also fought in Cameroon with British troops.

In metropolitan France, colonial soldiers fought on all battlefields regarded as the most decisive to the outcome of the war.

This holds true for the battles of Picardy, Artois, Yser and the Marshes of Saint-Gond.

It was also true of the Champagne front in 1914, Verdun, the Somme and Argonne in 1916, the battles of the Chemin des Dames, Craonne-Heurtebise and the Second Battle of Verdun in 1917 and the battles of Aisne, Champagne, Picardy and Saint-Mihiel, in 1918.

The involvement of colonial troops, mainly African, in the First World War had a powerful impact in theatres of operation outside metropolitan France, for instance in the fighting around Vardar and Struma.

As early as 1915, African soldiers had been sent to the East, as part of a special expeditionary force, which had distinguished itself particularly finely at Kumkale, in support of the famous Gallipoli landings.

In 1916, their participation in operations increased sharply in what was known as the Army of the Orient, after the establishment of the 'Mixed

1. I. D. Thiam, *Senegal in the War*, 1992.

Brigade', of which the 20th and 30th battalions of Senegalese infantrymen were key members.

The numerous graves of African soldiers who fell on the field of honour in Salonika bear witness to their involvement.

This demographic levy quite naturally had great economic, social and political consequences.

Army recruitment deprived the Administration of many of its officials.

Primary-school teachers, clerks, nurses and shop workers were particularly affected.

Peasants, livestock farmers and rice-growers left their fields, rice paddies and herds to go the front.

The economy was dislocated and the running of the Administration was hit hard.

The departures caused countless human tragedies – families deprived of their only means of support, left to their own devices, households broken, children abandoned, population exodus to neighbouring colonies where there was either no or very little recruitment.

This was the case in the British and Portuguese colonies in black Africa.

The war effort was even greater in economic terms and had incalculable consequences in the colonies.

The demographic levy had been so heavy in many colonies that protest riots broke out. This was the case in Upper Senegal-Niger, for instance, where there was violent unrest that had to be quelled in nearly all cases with implacable ferocity in 13 'circles' (districts) – Bougini, Koutiala, Bobo Dioulasso, Oulata, Nara, Balédougou, Dori, Hombori, Timbuktu, Dédougou, San, Bandiagara and Ouagadougou.

Twenty-one occupying companies, as opposed to 15 in the pre-war period, had been mobilized to impose the *Pax Francia*.²

The Zender district, too, fell victim to unrest, which was only quelled by a battalion dispatched from France.

In Dahomey, there were attempted uprisings among people in the Pobé, Bougou, Middle Niger, Aracora and Djougou districts and in Porto-Novo, Allado, So-Awo, Zagnanado, Abomey, Sové and Mona.³

In Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, there were reports that more than 50,000 Africans had crossed the border to seek refuge in Sierra Leone or the Gold Coast. Moreover, in Senegal, similar outflows had been recorded to Portuguese Guinea and the Gambia. Although there was no rebellion as such in the Gambia, there had been significant incidents in the Thiès, Matam, Baol, Podor and Casamance districts.

2. I. D. Thiam, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

3. *Ibid.*

The recruitment crisis reached such a point that the West Africa Section of the French Colonial Union (the French colonial business leaders' association) in an emergency meeting to address the threats to its interests posed by what it held to be excessive recruitment, expressed general consternation as follows: 'measures to be taken immediately: suspend the call-up of traders and shop-workers', followed by 'recruitment: stop it'.

The appeal was signed by Maurel et Prom, Chavanel, Vézia, CFAO, SCOA, Buhan et Teisseire, Barthès, Lesieur, Clastres et Plantey, Devès et Chaumet and Delmas.

The First World War did not have physical, material consequences only in the Muslim world.

It heralded in a new mentality, a change in attitude indicative of a new understanding of colonialism and its ravages, a far-reaching change in the image that the colonized had forged of the colonizer.

Peoples' subconscious was marked by seeing one European country trying to conquer another with an excess of logistical and human resources, mendacious propaganda, the occupation of territories acquired by force and the imposition of their sway over millions of men and women and the introduction of an administration with new symbols and new values; the strongest forced people into poverty through economic tributes levied on the subjugated countries and established master and slave relations of sorts, all of which combined into images evocative of the fate that they themselves had experienced precisely at the hands of a country that was now the victim of another more powerful country.

The inevitable comparison and the argument that France developed for its colonies to legitimize 'the call of the motherland' and the ensuing sacrifices led to an awakening and reawakening of awareness that had in part been numbed for many years.

Whatever the approach to the issue, the impression that subjugated peoples and victims of all sorts of abuse were being invited to go and free the colonial oppressor from the same evils, vexations, humiliations, looting and frustrations that it had meted out to its own colonial subjects was unavoidable.

The resulting awakening was terrible and incalculable.

Furthermore, owing to the high number of blacks participating in the First World War, colonization became universally recognized and was universally recorded.

It is easy to understand why Professor Henri Grimal, in his book on decolonization, gave 1919, the end of the First World War, as the date on which decolonization began.

The shared ordeal in the trenches, in the face of shelling, asphyxiating gas, air strikes and the infernal violence of tanks had enabled them to judge white men, to see them close up, underestimate them sometimes, even feel

superior to them, and to wonder how those men, such preys to passion, could claim to be superior, invincible and dominant.

Contact with the people of France at the time when the Sacred Union was beginning to crumble under the effects of revolutionary trade unionism, the consequences of the 1917 October Revolution and the rise of pacifism destroyed many stereotypes and thrust to the fore a sad reality that in many ways contradicted everything that had previously been learnt in colonial schools, the administration, the army and the trading posts of the Bordeaux and Marseille merchants, for instance.

Africans' contact with French society and black soldiers' relations with French women shattered another myth.

Nothing would be the same as before.

There were other, equally important, consequences, though. The war had fundamentally changed the existing economic deal. The Muslim countries' contribution to the war effort had been so great in economic terms that, in a manner unprecedented before the major upheaval of the First World War, metropolitan France became aware of the influence of the colonies on its own fate, as it was ultimately a centre of little importance unless it had the prestige that it drew from its imperial influence and the prosperity that it gained from colonial economic resources. From the beginning of the war, France had drawn on the Muslim world in its colonies for all kinds of resources. Thus, the Lyndiane industrial refrigerated abattoir, established in 1914 in Kaolack (Senegal) by Chanaud et Compagnie, a French food company, had been mobilized to feed the troops on the front. Cattle, bought on the hoof, were processed into canned meat to feed the soldiers. In 1914, the factory processed 1,800 heads of cattle. A year later that figure had risen to 27,000. In 1917, 54,000 animals were processed, that is, twice the number in 1915.

Packed into 300 gramme, 500 gramme or one kilogramme tin cans to feed the soldiers, the Lyndiane factory's output helped to feed a large proportion of the troops on the front and in Togo and Cameroon, where occupying units operated until the ship transporting tons of tin cans was sunk by a German submarine in 1917.

Madagascar, too, played the same meat-supplying role, as did the other colonies.

The meat and all by-products were used, including the intestines, horns, various waste products, fat and skins, which were all processed and exported to metropolitan France to meet national defence requirements.

From 1916, for instance, hides in colonies such as Guinea and Upper Senegal-Niger were requisitioned on a large scale.

On 21 March 1917, the French Academy of Agriculture requested the Government to consider generally mobilizing all colonial products that might be required for the national defence.

The General Council of the Seine went one step further in requesting the Administration to requisition the 16 million heads of cattle registered in Senegal, Sudan and Madagascar and grains such as millet, sorghum and maize from West Africa, not to mention gum, palm nuts, copra, maize, manioc, cotton, rubber, paddy rice various kinds of fruit, rice and groundnut oil. This far from exhaustive list does not include the collections, subscriptions and donations that were also part of the war effort.

Local assemblies throughout the empire were invited to take part in the effort. In 1915, FF 9,113,524 were collected. The Lebanese-Syrians who could not join the colonial army were generally required to make a contribution. In addition, there were subscriptions to bonds, obligations and loans for the national defence. Under that head alone, more than FF10 million were raised in 1915 in addition to cash donations and, to a lesser extent, donations in kind (clothes, the most varied effects, cigarettes, and so on). Groundnuts, coffee, cocoa, shea butter and palm oil were extensively requisitioned.

The mobilization of resources took on such proportions that the French Government established a department to manage the use of colonial products for the national defence, as stocks in strong demand had been depleted, owing to the protracted duration of the war.

In addition to gunpowder for example, the army requested the government to procure a consignment of alcohol.

The Ministry of War considered procuring maize from French West Africa, and manioc and rice from Indochina.

The Director-General for Gunpowder obtained between 1915 and 1917 190,000 tons of cargo rice and rice brokens, 65,000 tons of manioc, 60,000 tons of white rice for the Quartermaster Corps, 10,000 tons of paddy rice, 12,000 tons of maize and 500,000 hides from French West Africa and Madagascar.⁴

This massive exploitation caused a deep-seated economic and social crisis in most of the colonies.

The sacrifice was not in vain, though, as it showed all too clearly the utility of the colonies.

Arguably, it showed that colonies were indispensable to the future of metropolitan France. The notions of the 'civilizing mission', the 'white man's burden' and the 'myth of birthright' melted away like snow under a torrid sun.

The idea that colonization was no longer a unilateral act but a contract of solidarity then began to take root in people's minds.

After all, in 1915, Gaston Doumer, Minister of Colonies, admitted in an article dated 20 March and published in the Journal that 'since the outbreak of

4. I. D. Thiam, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

hostilities, the colonies have made a real contribution to the Metropolis and I cannot commend highly enough the dedication shown to the motherland by their inhabitants and their governors.’

In the article, the Minister praised the colonies’ contribution to the war effort and noted what he himself described as ‘the admirable effort of French West Africa’.

During that period, the people in the colonies, victim to the recruitment, requisitioning and various demands, were mired in poverty and insecurity – outer signs of a deep-seated economic and social crisis that found expression most visibly in the first union-organized strikes by workers at the company Le Sénégal on 10 December 1917, followed by a two-day strike by workers at Boukereau et Leblanc enterprises in the first two months of the following year.

In early 1918, an attempted general strike was reported in Dakar.

On 20 February 1918, the masons in Rufisque went on strike to obtain substantial wage increases, as their purchasing power had plummeted.

One of the economic consequences of the war was recognition of the crucial role of groundnuts in the European economy, as groundnut oil was supplied for use in oleomargarine in the production of Dutch cheese, sardine canning, soap and, by extension, wool and silk bleaching, and the production of candles and glycerine.

Furthermore, out of sheer necessity, the practise of groundnut shelling was introduced during the Great War.

The policy that France adopted in its colonies naturally did not differ much from the economic policy implemented by Germany in its colonies.

There, too, the people were ruthlessly exploited. For that reason, among others, the German colonies were of prime importance.

It is widely known that during the War, the Allied armies occupied all parts of Africa, namely Tanganyika, South-West Africa, Cameroon and Togo, that were colonies of the German Government.

In the Pacific Ocean, too, there were some archipelagos under German control.

They, too, were occupied by the Allies.

After the Allied victory over Germany and Turkey, the Muslim colonial countries’ fate was sealed in peace treaties and agreements, for which their opinion was sufficiently taken into account.

Consequently, the League of Nations was established. President Wilson paid great attention to colonial issues in the Fourteen Points that he set out in February 1918 and even laid down the principle of self-determination.

This gave the Young Tunisians’ Party the opportunity to send a document to him stating their views on post-war Tunisia. Admittedly, many territories inhabited by varying numbers of Muslims were placed mandate.

Class A mandates

Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan and Mesopotamia. The first two were assigned to France and the others to Great Britain.

Class B mandates

Cameroon, North-West Cameroon, Ruanda-Urundi, Togoland, Eastern Togoland, and Tanganyika were divided among France, Belgium and Great Britain.

Class C mandates

South-West Africa, North Pacific territories, the Equator (Caroline Islands, Mariana Islands and Marshall Islands), South Pacific territories and Equator (Nauru, New Guinea, Eastern New Guinea, Western Samoa).

The First World War thus quickened the decolonization process in the Near East.

This involved, essentially, the Sykes-Picot Agreement and its consequences for Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey.

The First World War also had an impact on Egypt, which secured the lifting of the British protectorate as early as 1922.

Subsequently, as Germany had been deemed unworthy of having colonies, so too was its ally, Turkey, which was stripped of its pre-1914 empire.

Iraq gained independence in 1930. Egypt followed suit in 1935. Syria and Lebanon were granted independence under the agreement of 9 September 1936.

It was, ultimately, after the Second World War that Great Britain acquired key strategic positions not only to control the routes leading to the Indies but also, and above all, to place the main sources of oil in the Middle East under its authority.

The upheavals caused by the War affected mentalities deeply, as noted above. A nascent protest movement challenged colonial injustice and oppression, and although colonial administrators, educated in English schools, in French colonial schools and in the Leyden Institute in the Netherlands, made every effort to convince the people that the colonizer stood for progress, well-being, peace, order and civilization, their opinions fell on deaf ears. War had changed attitudes. Nothing would ever be the same as before.

The spirit of independence, formed more often than not during the War, bolstered by the various forms of resistance that had been mounted continuously from the fifteenth to the twentieth century, marched inexorably on towards international sovereignty.

Chapter 1.10

TOWARDS THE CREATION
OF THE STATE OF
ISRAEL

Khairia Kasmieh

INTRODUCTION

It is essential that the Palestine issue be clearly understood, free from distortion and misunderstanding. The conflict which erupted in the late nineteenth century cannot be explained by religious hostility between the Arabs, be they Muslims or Christians, and Judaism, for the Jews had lived in peace and harmony with the Arabs throughout centuries in Palestine¹. It should be remembered at the outset that Palestine has a religious and spiritual significance for the Muslims and Christians of the world not less than its significance for Judaism.

The Zionist movement

THE BEGINNING

At the end of the nineteenth century the Jewish community in Palestine constituted less than 7 per cent (35,000) of the total population. It was a mixture of a few Europeans and Arabic-speaking Jews, many dependent on alms (*Haluka*) collected by Jews living abroad.² The remaining 93 per cent (584,000)

1. A. Hourani, 'Palestine and Israel', in W. Laqueur (ed.), *The Israeli-Arab Reader*, Great Britain, Pelican Books, 1971 (Revised edition), p. 325–32.
 2. A. M. Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917–1939*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1979, p. 27. (The Modern Middle East series, No. 11, Columbia University, New York).
- The Sephardi (Oriental) Jews were unsympathetic to Ashkenazi (European) Jews. see: N. J. Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I*, Berkely, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 1980 (1st paperback printing), p. 3.

were Palestinian Arabs (88 per cent Muslim, 10 per cent Christian). They were all Arabs in language, culture and collective historical memory.³

The character of the Jewish community in Palestine changed markedly towards 1881, as part of an international movement (Alliance Israelite Universelle⁴ for example) to alleviate the conditions of the Jews in the Diaspora. There were a number of attempts to create Jewish agricultural colonies, but philanthropy, not nationalism was the basis.⁵

As a political movement, modern Zionism was an outcome of the failure of liberalism and equality which had been heralded by the French Revolution on the one hand, and colonial ideas in nineteenth century Europe on the other.

For in spite of Jewish ascendancy in European finances and politics, the (*Haskala*) the Enlightenment or Jewish assimilation movement had failed. The reaction to this failure took the form of a call for a national Jewish entity.⁶

This did not find popular acceptance until after the Russian pogrom following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881. The Russian authority made the Jews the scapegoat which sparked Jewish separatism and Gentile anti-Semitism. The year 1882 witnessed the establishment in Russia of *Choveve Zion* (Lovers of Zion) societies for promoting the idea of settlement in Palestine and the revival of the Hebrew language. The first seed of political Zionism had been planted.⁷ Opposition to this nascent political Zionism was apparent, both from within and without Jewish circles. Internally, a Jewish writer (Achad Ha'am) opposed political Zionism, advocating a cultural one.⁸ Externally, the new type of Jewish immigrants from eastern Europe, inspired by the Zionist idea, aroused the suspicion of Ottoman authorities. They issued regulations in the 1880s which restricted the entry of foreign Jews into Palestine to a three months pilgrimage.⁹ The Ottoman restrictions tended to thwart any serious colonization by European

3. W. Khalidi, *Palestine Reborn*, London and New York, I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd, 1992, p. 2.

4. In 1870, the Alliance Israelite Universelle, on the initiative of a group of Russian Jews, founded an agricultural school near Jaffa (Mikveh Israel) 2500 dunums (about 600 acres) granted to the society by Ottoman Government.
N. Barbour, *Nisi Dominus, A Survey of the Palestine Controversy*, Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969 (Reprinted edition), p. 33.

5. Abdu-l-Wahhab Kayyali, *Palestine, A Modern History*, London, Third World Centre for Research and Publishing, (n. d.) p. 14.

6. A. R. Taylor, *Prelude to Israel. (An Analysis of Zionist Diplomacy 1897-1947)*, Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970 (second impression), p. 1.

7. Mandel, *The Arabs ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

8. Taylor, *Prelude to Israel ...*, *op. cit.*, p. XIII.

9. Mandel, *The Arabs ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-8.

Despite legal restrictions the Jewish community in Palestine (totaled 35,000) in 1880 rose to 50,000 by 1900; Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

Jews. So the birth of organized political Zionism awaited the advent of a directive leader.¹⁰

HERZL'S CONSOLIDATION OF THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT

The founder of organized Political Zionism was Theodor Herzl, a Hungarian Jew, educated in Vienna. As the Paris correspondent for a Vienna newspaper, *Neue Frere*, and a witness of the implications of anti-Semitism in the Dreyfus case,¹¹ Herzl was led to believe that the only answer to the Jewish question was the creation of a Jewish state. Herzl's concern, in the pamphlet he composed entitled *Der Juden Staat*, was a solution to the problem of anti-Semitism, not the fulfillment of the prophecies of traditional Judaism. Thus the basic character of political Zionism was in its early stages, and always remained secular.¹² Herzl succeeded in convening the first Zionist Congress at Basle in August 1897. The Congress terminated in an official programme: and outlined the aim of Zionism 'to create for the Jewish people a (home) in Palestine secured by public law'. The steps to be taken in completion of this aim were:

1. The formation of an organization to bind world Jewry by means of an institution.
2. The promotion of large scale Jewish colonization of Palestine.
3. The acquisition of international consent to the attainment of the aim of Zionism.¹³

Having failed to obtain legalization of Jewish colonization of Palestine from Kaiser Wilhelm II (1898) and the Sultan (1901),¹⁴ Herzl concentrated his attention on Britain. In 1902, he entered into negotiations with the British Government to obtain a grant for autonomous Jewish settlement. Projects for the purpose of Jewish colonization in Sinai and Uganda¹⁵ failed. The seventh Zionist Congress, 1905 (following the death of Herzl), passed a resolution declaring that Zionism was concerned solely with Palestine¹⁶.

10. Taylor, *Prelude to Israel ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

11. Barbour, *Nisi Dominus ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

12. Khalidi, *Palestine Reborn ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

13. Laqueur, *The Israeli-Arab Reader*, *op. cit.*, pp. 28–9 (Document 4, the Basle Declaration).

14. Mandel, *The Arabs ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 9–13.

15. Barbour, *Nisi Dominos ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

The first proposed Jewish colonization of the neighborhood of al-Arish, in Egyptian territory, the second proposed a territory in British East Africa as an autonomous Jewish province.

16. Mandel, *ibid.*, p. 16.



I-10.1 Jerusalem, the Dome of Notre Dame Church and the Dome of the Rock

© G. Degeorge

The Arab attitude towards Zionism up to the First World War

The genesis of the Palestine problem historically dates back to the Basle programme of 1897. Palestinians have been on the strategic defensive ever since. From the Palestinian perspective, the historical record shows that it is the Zionist movement which challenged the demographic, cultural, social and political status quo with all the consequences that prevailed in Palestine at the turn of the century.¹⁷ The hostile attitude towards Arab sprang from the attempt to implant a new society there. The aim of the newcomers was not to be absorbed into it but to create a new Jewish society, which by the nature of the Zionist idea, was to be a complete and exclusive one.¹⁸

Until 1908 Arab leaders relied primarily on petitions to Istanbul and the influence of members of the Muslim elite in the Capital as the means to curb Zionism. The Ottoman regime, on its part, continued to be alarmed by the apparent aims of the Zionist movement.¹⁹ After the Young Turks' coup

17. Khalidi, *Palestine Reborn*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

18. Hourani, 'Palestine and Israel', *op. cit.*, p. 325.

19. Mandel, *The Arabs ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

d'état in 1908,²⁰ the Arab press registered protests and objections to Zionism, and delegations to the Imperial Parliament registered grievances that centered on the issue of Jewish immigration and land purchase. Tension increased, popular animosity flared²¹. Fear of Zionism accelerated the growth of an Arab political movement, which in the view of Zionist leaders could hinder the realization of their aims.²²

The First World War and its repercussions on Palestine

Between the summer of 1914 and the autumn of 1917, the international scene was concerned with the War. Although the politically active Palestinians were not unmindful of the dangers posed by Zionism, the repressive policies pursued by the Ottoman authorities alienated many people in Palestine, as in other parts of Syria (Bilād al-Shām). They became part of a national movement against the Ottoman Empire in spite of some reservations.²³

Before the Sherif of Mecca declared the 'Arab Revolt' in 1916, he reached an understanding with Britain. In the correspondence with the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, Britain pledged to recognize and support Arab independence with certain specified frontiers in the Syrian Provinces, in return for Sherif Hussein's declaration of war on Turkey. Whatever the British's real intentions at that time, the Arabs were under the impression that Palestine was included in the proposed independent state.²⁴

Simultaneously with the Hussein-McMahon correspondence the British were secretly negotiating with their French allies for their respective territories. Their negotiations culminated in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 16 May 1916²⁵

20. The Young Turks (Committee of Union and Progress led the coup d'état against Sultan 'Abd al-Hamīd).

G. Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1980, 4th ed., p. 44.

21. Lesch, *Arab Politics ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 27, 30–1.

Despite opposition the immigrants by 1914, numbered over 75,000 out of 650,000.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

23. G. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening (The Story of the Arab National Movement)*, Beirut, Librairie du Liban, 1969 (Reprint), pp. 101–18.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 164–75.

The British Government pledged to support 'the independence of the Arabs' in the large area bounded, in the north by the 37th parallel, in the east by the Iranian border down to the (Persian) Gulf, in the south by Aden. As to the western boundary McMahon admitted the Red Sea boundary excluded the coastal belt of Syria.

25. *Ibid.*, pp. 244–8.

This agreement formed an integral part of the general settlement reached between Russia, France and Great Britain to adjust their own claims to Asiatic portions of the Ottoman Empire. British and French claims were as follows: France was to obtain the northern

according to which Palestine was to have an international administration, the form of which was to be decided upon after consultation with Russia and with other Allies and the representative of the Sherif Mecca.

But before the end of the War a group of Zionist leaders who had moved to England in search of sympathetic backing,²⁶ succeeded in securing from the British Government a declaration embodied in a letter dated 2 November 1917 addressed by Lord Balfour, Britain's Foreign Minister to Lord Rothschild, the leading Jewish personality in Britain it stated 'H. M. Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people ... nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.'²⁷

The Balfour Declaration had no legal value, for the British Government had no power in Palestine. It was made in complete disregard of the rights and wishes of the inhabitants of the country. The number of Jews who then lived in Palestine did not exceed 56,000 (8 per cent of the population), while 'non Jews, Muslim and Christians numbered about 644,000 (92 per cent). As regards land ownership, the Jews in 1918 owned only 2 per cent of the total area of Palestine.²⁸ The sole explanation of the declaration is British interest: the British Government viewed Palestine as an essential part of its strategic holdings, linking Europe with Asia and Africa.²⁹

Palestine under the Mandate, 1920–48

The end of the First World War marked a new era for the Arab East, including Palestine. According to The San Remo settlement of April 1920,³⁰ lip service was given to the concept of self-determination under League of Nations supervision of the mandatory system used to govern several Arab territories.³¹

coastal strip of Syria, Great Britain was to obtain southern Mesopotamia, and the ports of Haifa and Acre. The zone between the French and British territories was to form a confederation of Arab States or one state. This zone was to be divided into a French and British sphere of influence. Palestine was to be internationalized.

26. The leading figure was Chaim Weizman, a Russian Jew and a Lecturer in Chemistry at Manchester University.

Barbour, *Nisi Dominus* ..., *op. cit.*, p. 56.

27. Laqueur, *The Israeli-Arab Reader*, *op. cit.*, p. 36 (Document 7 the Balfour Declaration).

28. S. Hadawi, *The Arab Israeli Conflict. (Cause and Effect)*, Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969, pp. 11–12.

29. Lesch, *Arab Politics* ..., *op. cit.*, p. 233.

30. Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* ..., *op. cit.*, pp. 305–6.

The whole of the Arab Rectangle lying between the Mediterranean and the Persian frontier was to be placed under mandatory rule, so as to suit the ambitions of each power i.e. France and Britain.

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 155.



I-10.2 Egyptian prisoners of war being returned to Egypt from
Israel in 1957

© UN Photo/JG

The whole Mandate structure of war was little more than a framework, for the division of colonial spoils between the victorious Western allies.³²

Palestine, which was until the end of the war an integral part of Greater Syria, was placed under British Mandate (brought into full operation in 1923). The preamble of the Mandate incorporated the Balfour Declaration, while the bulk of its 28 articles were devoted to its implementation.³³

The British occupation (Mandate) marked the realization of the Arabs' greatest fear: the triumph of the Zionist movement expressed through the Balfour Declaration.³⁴ As the Jewish population grew seizing the greater part of the land, the Arabs were convinced that the Jews would take power because the new Jewish society was an expanding society open to all who wished to

32. Khalidi, *Palestine Reborn*, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

33. Laqueur, *The Israeli-Arab Reader*, *op. cit.*, pp. 54–61 (Document 11 the British Mandate).

34. Lesch, *Arab Politics ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

come in,³⁵ while the Arabs wanted to preserve the Arab character of Palestine and so wanted little or no immigration.

As regards land ownership, over 30 years the Jews purchased (from non Palestinian absentee land lords) and leased additional land from the government.³⁶ Land was symbolic to the Arab community, their gradual loss of control over this land pointedly reminded them of their diminishing control over 'Filastin'.³⁷

These developments alarmed the Arabs, their opposition increased and took the form of protests, demonstrations, civil disturbance and riots. It was not due to anti-Semitism, but because in a Jewish state they would have no choice except between being a powerless minority or leaving their country.³⁸ This attitude was understood by the Arab and Muslim States, because the problem facing Palestine was a part of a broad challenge to the Islamic and Arab world. The major problem, however, was that the rulers, whose aid the Palestinians sought, lacked adequate leverage against Britain.³⁹

It was under British protection and by the force of British arms that during the Mandate the demographic, economic, military and organizational infrastructure of the future Jewish state was laid at the expense of the indigenous Palestinian population.⁴⁰

The climax: the partition plan and aftermath

It had taken Britain 30 years to find out that her obligations incorporated in Balfour Declaration were unworkable and irreconcilable.⁴¹ Having failed to enforce a solution in Palestine, subjected to pressure by the US Government to increase Jewish immigration and harassed by the campaign of violence led by the Zionist who were determined to create their state counting on widespread sympathy⁴², the Mandatory government referred in the summer

35. Hourani, 'Palestine and Israel'.

Within a quarter of a century the number of the Jews in Palestine increased from 56,000 (one tenth of the population) in 1946.

Hadawi, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict ...*, *op. cit.*, (Monograph Series No. 4) p. 11.

36. The total holdings of the Jews increased from 650,000 dunums (one dunum equals 1/4 acre) in 1920 to (1.4) million dunums on the date of the termination of the Mandate (less than 6 per cent of the total land area) Lesch, *Arab Politics ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

38. Hourani, 'Palestine and Israel', *op. cit.*, p. 326.

39. Lesch, *Arab Politics ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

40. Khalidi, *Palestine Reborn*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

41. Hourani, 'Palestine and Israel', *op. cit.*, p. 327.

42. W. B. Quandt, 'Political and Military Dimensions of Contemporary Palestinian Nationalism', In: W. B. Quandt, F. Jabber, and A. M. Lesch (ed.), *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, London, University of California Press, 1973, p. 45.

of 1947 the question of the future government of Palestine to the United Nations.⁴³

The General Assembly adopted on 29 November 1947, a resolution⁴⁴ of the partition of Palestine. The weight of the USA was put in balance in favor of the plan.⁴⁵ The proposed plan was incompatible with international law and justice. In effect the plan meant that the Jews who owned about 6 per cent of the land were given almost two third of the country, i.e. a territory which was almost ten times the area owned by them.

Shortly after the partition plan was adopted, the British Government announced its intention of withdrawing its troops and administration from the country on May 15th. The British Government undertook to maintain law and order to the last days of its Mandate and threatened the Arab States if they came to their brethren's aid. These circumstance made fighting inevitable.⁴⁶ Both parties were differently and unevenly prepared.

The Jewish territorial objective aimed at the seizure of as much of the land of Palestine as the Jews could lay hand upon, and thereby confront the world with a *fait accompli* before British withdrawal. In order to achieve this objective, coordinated and well planned attacks were launched by secret Zionist para-military organizations in various parts of Palestine against the unarmed Arab inhabitants.⁴⁷ The most outstanding incident which shocked the world and accelerated the panic flight of the Arab inhabitants, was the massacre of Deir Yassin on 9 April 1948.⁴⁸

On 14 May 1948, before the end of the Mandate, before the State of Israel was proclaimed and before the Arab armies entered Palestine, over 300,000 Muslim and Christian inhabitants had either fled in terror or had been expelled by the advancing Zionist forces.⁴⁹ So the exclusive, alien society which had grown among the Arabs seized power in the greater part of Palestine, with encouragement and help from some Western states.⁵⁰

43. H. Cattán, *The Palestine Problem in a Nutshell*, Beirut, Palestine Research Center, 1971. p. 15 (Palestine Essays, No. 26).

44. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

The Resolution was adopted by a vote of 33 to 13 with 10 abstentions.

45. Hadawi, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

The Resolution divided Palestine into 6 principal parts: 3 of which (56 per cent of the total area were reserved for the Jewish state (498,000 Jews and 417,000 Arabs). The other 3 with the enclave of Jaffa (43 per cent for an Arab state (725,000 Arabs, 10,000 Jews), Jerusalem and environs (0.65 per cent) was to be an international zone.

46. Hourani, 'Palestine and Israel', *op. cit.*, p. 327.

47. Cattán, *The Palestine Problem ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

48. *Ibid.*, 250 men, women and children were killed.

49. Hadawi, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

50. Hourani, 'Palestine and Israel', *op. cit.*, p. 327.

It is commonly thought that the establishment of the State of Israel was a natural and spontaneous event inspired by the traditional longing of the Jews to reconstitute their national life in Palestine and precipitated by recurrent episodes of anti-Semitism. In fact the foundation of Israel was the result of careful planning and organized activity on behalf of a secular national ideal.⁵¹

51. Taylor, *ibid.*, p. XII.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF
OCTOBER 1917
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE
MUSLIM WORLD

Iba Der Thiam

The Great October Revolution of 1917 had a far-reaching impact worldwide, the nature and forms of which varied with the region concerned and the issues in contention at the time when that cardinal event was unfolding.

Since 1914 the entire world had been immersed in the Great War. The years 1915 and 1916 had been marked by significant successes for the Central Powers which had crushed the Russian armies and were then joined by the armies of Bulgaria.

However, during 1916, German forces failed at Verdun, admirably defended by Generals Pétain and Joffre, thus enabling an Anglo-French offensive to be mounted on the Somme, on the initiative of General Foch. At sea, the British navy remained the master of the waves. Although the Germans had pulverized the Russian attacks, 1916 could, broadly, be considered as encouraging for the allied camp.

During 1917, the Germans suffered a series of reverses which substantially weakened them: German submarine warfare was contained and the United States decided to come to the aid of France and Britain on the initiative of President Wilson, whereas Greece was forced under pressure to withdraw from its alliance with the Central Powers.

The Entente also faced difficulties connected with the instability of the situation in Russia, which led to the Bolsheviks taking power and the movement towards the rapid conclusion of a separate peace in order to end a series of defeats, even at the cost of the country's territorial integrity.

The signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk brought about the collapse of Romania.

At the same time, French troops were showing signs of fatigue while, on the Italian front, the ruler of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Charles,

‘who reigned as Charles I as Emperor of Austria and Charles IV as King of Hungary’ imposed a humiliating defeat on Italy.

The enormous requirements in terms of material, economic and human resources eventually undermined the morale of the protagonists. It was for that reason that both sides, including military circles, strongly felt the need to conclude a peace. Wilhelm II abdicated and went into exile in Holland. The Armistice was signed on 11 November 1918. The consequences of the war affected much of the Muslim world since Turkey, the epicentre of the Ottoman Empire, had been a belligerent. They were felt not only in the European territories but also in all parts of the Mediterranean basin which came under the sway of the Sublime Porte.

The 1917 October Revolution introduced a new dimension into this setting. The coming to power of the Bolsheviks in Russia resulted in the introduction of communism under the shrewd and energetic leadership of Vladimir Lenin. Proceeding with great skill, Lenin undertook the systematic conquest of power, with the support of the peasants and workers and exploiting the people’s great longing for peace and their attachment to equality between the different nationalities of Russia. He thus immediately gained considerable popular support. This event, marked by the establishment of a popular workers’ and peasants’ regime, naturally had a very far-reaching impact worldwide.

The Muslim world was not neglected since, by establishing the Third International, Lenin gave the Russian Revolution the mission of spreading throughout the world.

Drawing the consequences from the defeat of the Central Powers and the exhausted and weakened state of the Allies, he believed that the time had come to overthrow the capitalist States in order to replace them with revolutionary governments.

That was the role assigned to the Comintern. Although initially targeted at Germany, Hungary and Europe as a whole, the action programme also concerned North Africa, that is to say the Mediterranean basin, as well as France, Britain and Italy, not to mention the peoples of Africa and Asia still under foreign domination among which there were many workers whom the Comintern called upon to unite in the battle against capitalism and imperialism.

This intention is clearly present in the strategy set out by Lenin at the time of the peace conference and the treaties to which it gave rise.

The Great War enabled the Muslim populations of the colonies under French rule, by paying the blood price, to acquire a different view of themselves: transplanted to the theatres of war, they saw France defeated, the invasion of some of its provinces and the supremacy of German arms during the first years of the conflict.

Many among them thus discovered a different image of the white man, completely at odds with that of inherent superiority which was spread by

colonial hagiography. Some were also present at the birth of revolutionary syndicalism [v] and witnessed the disintegration of the *union sacrée*, the rise of pacifism and the influence on people's minds of the news from Moscow.

Jean Suret-Canale referred to the attitude of the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* stationed in Romania, who refused to march against the Soviets.

The brotherhood of arms formed between the soldiers of Africa and of Europe undoubtedly revealed another aspect of the colonial system, fighting for the liberation of France, its independence and its dignity against foreign oppression and an unjust occupation of its territory. These colonial soldiers could not fail to compare their own situation as colonized people, accorded inferior legal status under the laws of the *Indigénat*, for example, in the countries of North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, East Africa and French Somaliland [v], with that of French people in the areas under German control.

When the October Revolution broke out and its shock waves spread throughout the world, the Muslim populations of the countries involved in the war realized that they had been presented with an ideal opportunity to demand greater justice and equality.

It was not by chance that the uprisings recorded during 1917 in 13 *Cercles* of Upper Senegal and Niger protesting against the recruitment of soldiers took place in areas mainly inhabited by populations in which many adhered to Islam.

These were violent expressions of unrest that can be attributed to the levies in aid of the war effort, although it cannot be excluded that there were other contributory factors.

These uprisings occurred at Bougouni, Koutiala, Bobo Dioulasso, Oualata, Nara, Bénédougou, Dori, Hombori, Timbuktu, Dédougou, San, Bandiagara and Ouagadougou.

Similar movements also occurred in the *Cercle* of Zinder in Niger and in Dahomey, in the *Cercle* of Pobé, Bongou, Moyen-Niger, Atakora, Doudjou, Porto Novo, Alada, So-Awa, Zagna Nado, Abomé, Savé and Nono. Disturbances of the same sort were recorded in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire.

There was also a substantial exodus of inhabitants to foreign colonies such as Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Portuguese Guinea and the Gold Coast in order to escape from the war. These were territories where Muslims were fairly well represented.

When the war ended, the soldiers who returned from the front came back to their countries inspired by new ideas.

In 1913 a structure had been established in Geneva for the defence of colonized peoples, the '*Bureau International de la Ligue de défense des indigènes*' (Bureau for the Defence of Indigenous People).

It was organized by prominent public figures including the internationalist propagandist Edmond Privat who was *persona non grata* in France.

Among other activists were Louis Ferrière, married to an Austrian woman and the son of a German woman, Professor Herrou, who was portrayed as an anti-French American and Ms Rusifoka, President of the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities.

It may therefore be said that the anti-colonial cause was already on the agenda of progressive circles and that it already had networks of support which, however small, were nonetheless involved in the defence of oppressed peoples.

The formation in France of a Communist Committee of Colonial Studies (*Comité communiste d'études coloniales*) known as the *Union inter-continentale* fitted into the strategy defined by the Comintern.

At its second congress, one of the resolutions stated that: 'It is essential to deprive the bourgeoisie of the possibility of combating the proletariat with the help of its indigenous troops and of using the colonies during a revolutionary period as a refuge of the counter-revolution.'

The *Union inter-coloniale* was affiliated to Stéfany's *Ligue française*, to the group of Indo-Chinese patriots and to the group of Nguyễn Ai Quoc.

When it disappeared, the Brussels Congress against colonial oppression and imperialism held in February 1927, whose illustrious patrons included Vernochet, inspector of elementary education, the American bishop William Montgomery, Henri Barbusse, the German Le Debour and Ku Menguy, Rector of the University of Peking, and whose honorary presidents were the scientist Albert Einstein, Madame Sun Yat-sen, wife of the famous Chinese nationalist, and Jawaharlal Nehru, founded the League against Imperialism and for National Independence. Other participants were the Tunisian Chadli b. Moustapha, J.T. Gumede from South Africa, Thiémokho Garan Kouyaté from the French Sudan and Lamine Senghor from Senegal, for West Africa.

Thus, it can be said that efforts were made to establish links between the pan-African movement, the world communist movement, the pan-Islamist movement and the Arab and South African patriots as well as those from Indochina and the West Indies, and it was owing to those efforts that the '*Assises des peuples coloniaux*' were held.

In France, the first black trade unions were founded.

In Egypt, nationalist unrest was evident from 1919.

In the following year the Algerian Communist Party and the Destour Party [the Destour Party founded in 1920 was not communist] were founded, in Algeria and Tunisia respectively, and in 1923 and 1924 the Wafd Party won the elections in Egypt while, in Tunisia, the first trade-union federation was established.

All of these movements should be seen in the context of a broad pattern, in line with the Turkish precedent of Mustafa Kemal and the appearance of the Young Turk movement which, from its source, spread out to reach

the banks of the river Senegal through the movements of Young Tunisians, Young Algerians and Young Senegalese, the latter playing a decisive part in the election to the French National Assembly of the first black deputy from sub-Saharan Africa in 1914.

There is no doubt that the 1917 October Revolution played an important part in the publication by Lamine Senghor of '*Violation d'un pays*', which conducts a systematic critique of the colonial system and its mechanisms, and in the birth of the nationalist movement in the Arab countries, thus continuing the work of revival which some individuals had pursued since the nineteenth century when the Western world undertook to impose its territorial, diplomatic, commercial, financial, cultural and strategic domination on the populations of the Mediterranean basin, Mesopotamia and the Middle East as well as on the Muslim peoples of East Africa, the Indian Ocean and Asia.

By the time that the Armistice was signed, all of the nations which had taken part in the war, with the exception of the United States, had been bled dry. Their economy was in ruins, the coffers empty, *matériel* worn-out and supplies exhausted. Poverty affected broad layers of their populations. The disadvantaged social classes were determined to fight to improve their living conditions rather than resigning themselves to their fate, taking their inspiration from the Soviet example.

An aggravating factor in the Muslim countries was that such concerns were echoed more loudly since the governments' only response to such challenges was often the use of force.

Ensuing from the above, a new awareness and large-scale social demands surfaced even before the Armistice was signed.

In Senegal, strikes broke out in 1917. There was even an attempt at a general strike planned in 1918.

In Gambia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria, as well as in South Africa, there were disturbances in the social field.

The African continent, for example, had been the theatre of military operations in Togo, Cameroon, Tanganyika and South-East Africa. The signing of the peace treaties had consequences which affected the status and welfare of the populations.

These mandated territories were offered prospects which held the attention of the populations concerned and those in adjacent territories.

When President Wilson, a professor of jurisprudence, a disciple of the philanthropists and humanitarians of the late eighteenth century, deeply attached to democracy and peace, formulated the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination, the colonized populations were infused with fresh hope.

When, well before that, the October Revolution made public the appeal to workers, soldiers and peasants from the Second Congress of Soviets, of 25 October 1917, which states that ‘the power of the Soviets will guarantee to all the nations of Russia effective rights of self-determination’, the colonial peoples of Asia discovered there the ideas which Lenin had expressed in 1916 when he drew attention to the conflict between the capitalists and the proletariat, on the one hand, and between colonial and imperialist circles and colonized peoples, on the other.

In his doctrinal work, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Lenin expanded on this idea, thus supplementing Marxism in an area which Karl Marx had not been required to address since his literary work had been entirely produced at a period when Western mercantilism had not yet been transformed into a conquering imperialism.

Furthermore, if the First and Second Internationals [not designated as communist] had neglected colonial issues, out of racial prejudice, the Third International affirmed, as pointed out earlier, that ‘the European Communist parties should assist the populations of the colonial countries dominated by imperialism to recover their freedom.’

The French philosopher Louis Althusser, writing on the Leninist theory of the weakest link of imperialism, showed in an interesting book how the war had detonated and uncovered a vast wave of demands against the capitalist systems, weakened by the damaging effects of the conflict, and how the Third International had drawn lessons from that situation.

In 1920 the International instructed an Italian steamer to establish contact with the communists of South America.

The Second Congress of the Communist International had concluded that the proletarian masses of the countries subjugated by capitalists all over the world had the same interests as the European movements and that attention should therefore be given as a matter of priority to the oppression of the global working class.

Lenin, drawing conclusions from this analysis, presented to the Conference of the Supreme Council of Soviets, held on 10 September, 1920, his thesis on the necessity of striking the Entente in its colonies.

In this regard, he instructed Litvinov to study the means of applying this policy to Indochina and Algeria and charged him to report on the matter to the next conference at Baku.

Thus, as 1921 drew to a close, the Bolshevik regime was fully absorbed with preparations for a Muslim revolt which it hoped to see in the following spring in countries and regions such as India, Persia, South Asia and North Africa.

A programme had been drawn up to organize economic disruption and the French Communist Party had been charged with taking this task in hand.

Between 1919 and 1939, many events of great significance occurred in the colonial world since the war had indeed changed everything but also because the peace treaties signed between 1919 and 1921 had fundamentally transformed the situation.

The founding of the League of Nations bolstered that hope, the more so since Iraq became independent in 1930, followed by Egypt in 1935 and Syria and Lebanon in 1943.

The Treaty of Saint Germain, by dismantling Austria-Hungary, created new states in which there were Muslim minorities.

So did the Treaty of Neuilly (27 November 1917), with its consequences for Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia.

The Treaty of Sèvres, signed on 11 August 1920, detached from Turkey all of the Arab countries under its control and placed them under British and French mandates.

Such was the fury of Constantinople that a revolutionary government in Ankara raised the flag of revolt and rejected the conditions imposed by the victors. As a result of this revolt, Mustafa Kemal deposed Sultan Mehmet VI, confronted the Greek armies encouraged by the British, and defeated them in August 1922.

Italy and France, which disapproved of the role played by Great Britain in the confrontation between Turks and Greeks, entered into contact with Mustafa Kemal, enabling him to march on Constantinople, to compel the British to recognize his authority and to sign with him the Armistice of Mudanya on 10 October 1922.

The Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923 abrogated the Treaty of Sèvres of 11 August 1920. It attributed to Turkey an area of 23,000 km² in Europe. The military clauses restricting the size of its army were eliminated.

Turkey was authorized to maintain a garrison at Constantinople and was even given the presidency of the Straits Commission which was assigned responsibility for policing the Straits.

From its Soviet homeland, the communist ideology spread throughout the Ottoman Empire where the first parties claiming allegiance appeared in Tabriz in Persia (Azerbaijan) and in Greece (Salonika).

The first movements which appeared failed to achieve much success.

The same was true at Gilan and in Transcaucasia, as well as in the Arab countries and the rest of the Muslim world.

The effects were seldom lasting.

In Egypt, for example, the Egyptian Socialist Party was founded in 1921, in Alexandria and Cairo, reaching its high point in 1924. However, it consisted mainly of foreigners, mostly Christian, belonging to the Lebanese Armenian and Greek, hence Orthodox, groups.

In Palestine, the Palestinian Communist Party, although it had been founded in 1919, stagnated until 1928, and had great difficulty in becoming established among the Muslim masses.

In Lebanon and Syria, the leadership of the Communist Party experienced many upheavals which it, overcame by focusing its action on the combat for national liberation.

In Iraq, the communist movement, brought to the country by Christians, only consisted of members of the minority communities, so that when the Second World War broke out, the consequences of the 1917 October Revolution were only really felt in Syria and Lebanon.

The atheistic character of the ideology, the attachment of the populations to their traditional values and their mistrust of the colonial occupation authorities partly explained its poor performance and its disappointments, to say nothing of the undoubtedly discouraging effect of the positions occupied by the minority communities in its leadership structures.

Another aggravating factor was represented by the pan-African movement mentioned earlier.

Since the holding of the Pan-African Conference in London in 1900, Henry Sylvester Williams, W. E. B. Dubois, Booker Washington and Marcus Garvey, together with many other activist movements, had not ceased their struggle to convince the black world of the need to take its destiny in hand.

In this connection, three pan-African Congresses were held successively, in London from 27 to 30 August 1921, in Brussels on 31 August, 1 and 2 September 1921, and in Paris on 4 and 5 September 1921.

The colonial system was pilloried.

There were Garveyite movements from Senegal to the Congo and in many other colonies, British as well as French. According to the archives, a national liberation movement for Senegal and the French Sudan was founded in 1934. That is why, when Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, the event provoked a genuine revolt in people's consciences.

It may be said, therefore, that the 1917 October Revolution represented, in Muslim countries, a powerful factor of awareness about colonialism.

It served as a model for all the struggling peoples of the Muslim world and even acted as a catalyst for the emergence of Pan-Islamism, whose junction with Garveyism and the Sikh movements would create the conditions for the appearance of powerful anticolonial movements in the countries of the Mediterranean; in Dutch colonies, Malaya, in Indonesia through the Sarekat Islam, founded in 1912, the establishment of the Indonesian Communist Party in 1920 and the Indonesian National Party of Sukarno; and the Moroccan nationalism embodied by the Istiqlal party and Sultan Mohamed b. Yusuf. In Tunisia, with Munsif Bey, and in Algeria, nationalism developed rapidly in North Africa. Messali Hadj founded the *Étoile nord-africaine*.

In Senegal, the Senegal Action Committee, which channelled locally the struggle of the Garveyite movements, included some genuine Muslims.

That movement had cells in such towns as Louga, Kédougou, Mékhé, Rufisque, Mbour, Thiès, Tivaoune, Saint-Louis, Khombole, Bambey, Diourbel and Dakar, as well as in the Belgian Congo, French Sudan, Guinea, Dahomey, and also in the British colonies of Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ghana and Nigeria.

Naturally, when the Moscow Stalin School was established in 1930 to prepare for revolution in the colonies, nationals from Muslim countries were recruited.

All of these factors certainly influenced the foundation, by Habib Bourguiba, of the Tunisian Neo-Destour Party in 1934 and that of the Algerian People's Party in 1936, following the establishment of the Algerian Communist Party in 1920.

The action of the Moroccan nationalist Allal al-Fassi whom the French Government exiled to Gabon for almost 10 years may also be seen as part of this sequence.

The repression also affected Tunisia, where the leader of the Neo Destour was arrested in 1939. However, the movement still continued since Ferhat Abbas founded at the very same time the Algerian Popular Union.

In the countries of Russian Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Crimea, Siberia and the Volga-Urals region as well as in the Muslim countries of South-East Asia such as India, Malaya, the Indonesian archipelago, the north of Sumatra, Malacca, Brunei, Aceh, Minangkabau, the kingdom of Samudera and the north-west of Borneo, in particular the archipelago of Sulu, Mindanao, Java, the archipelago of the Moluccas and Indonesia, a country islamicized at the dawn of Islam, the situation was not fundamentally different from those we have discussed in the Arab and African countries.

There too, the 1917 October Revolution found fertile ground prepared by Western colonization.

By reason of its anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist stance, the October Revolution, which had broken out in Russia, represented hope to the populations of all those regions.

That was why, when the Soviet Union decided to export communism beyond its borders by establishing the Comintern, the populations of Arab countries were among the potential targets.

The task could, in any event, be facilitated by the presence of a strong Arab nationalist movement which was all the easier to exploit since the new occupation, legalized by the League of Nations lauded the repellent face of colonization.

In all of the Arab countries, for example, the Mandate authorities imposed their language, encouraged the coming of Christian missionaries,

introduced their own institutions, their laws, customs and ways, their lifestyle and culture, favouring the recruitment of non-Muslim minorities and engaging in economic and financial penetration in order to secure advantages in political terms and to remain as long as possible, relying on the complicity of the local elites.

While this strategy varied from one country to another, it essentially remained the same.

This combination of factors provided fertile ground for the effect which the 1917 October Revolution could have on populations resisting foreign domination.

In any event, as indicated above, the strategy of the world communist movement, aimed at striking Western countries in their colonies in line with the theory of the weakest link, had all the more chance of succeeding since colonial domination, with its *corvées*, the code of the *Indigénat*, racism, racial discrimination, requisitions, forced labour, the control of centres of decision-making and of power by the colonizers and the imposition of their language, mobilized in resistance intellectuals, trade unions, traditional chiefs, religious authorities, workers and the increasingly aware school pupils and students.

In this regard, the 1917 October Revolution aroused great expectations as a beacon of hope and liberation which people admired and wished to copy in their own country.

The world communist movement thus could thus call on a quiescent body of supporters who could be mobilized at any time in the battles between communism and the Western world.

After the participation by colonial troops in the defeat of militarism, fascism and Nazism in the Second World War, that is to say with the emergence of the free world, followed by the Yalta agreement and the start of the Cold War, this process developed in all of the Asian, Arab, African and European countries.

With the same causes producing the same effects, the nationalist movement naturally developed around the struggle against injustice, discrimination, exclusion and cultural prejudice.

It was not by chance that the Bandung Conference was held, in April 1955, in a country of South-East Asia.

In conclusion, the Great October Revolution of 1917 in Russia had countless consequences in the Muslim world. It helped to stimulate an awareness of the nature of colonialism and the need to resist it, and it broadened the front of the fight against imperialism to include social classes that had initially been more or less excluded from the struggle.

In that respect, it played a double role, revealing and precipitating historical processes that were already under way.

PEACE TREATIES AND THEIR
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE
MUSLIM WORLD

Omar Ibrahim El-ʿAffas

The Ottoman Empire was one of the greatest empires witnessed by human history in terms of both time and geographic extent. In time, the Empire existed for some six centuries, from 1299 until 1922. In extent, it included vast areas of Europe, Asia and Africa. In Europe, it embraced the Balkan Peninsula up to the river Danube in the North, Transylvania to the north of the Danube, Moldavia, Walachia, most of Hungary, the territory of Podolia in Poland and all the northern coast of the Black Sea. In Asia, the authority of the Ottoman State extended to Asia Minor, Armenia, most of the Caucasus, the Tigris and Euphrates valleys up to the Arabian Gulf in the south, all the countries of Sham (Greater Syria), Palestine and large areas of the Arab Peninsula. In Africa, the Ottomans controlled the Arab lands up to Algeria. This is in addition to their possessions in the Mediterranean, that is, Crete, Cyprus and all the islands of the Aegean.¹

With this length of time and geographical extent the Ottomans inevitably ruled over many different nationalities, races and religions. These included Tartars, Arabs, Turkomen, Berbers and Mamluks all of whom adhered to Islam. Moreover, the Empire played an important role in spreading Islam to many Greeks, Hungarians, Slavs, Romanians, Armenians and Georgians. The areas under Ottoman control were also home to many races who followed religions other than Islam.

1. For more information, see R. Mantran, *Tārīkh al-dawla al-ʿuthmāniyya* [The History of the Ottoman State], Cairo, Dār al-Fīkr li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 1993; Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Muṣṭafa, *Fī uṣūl al-tārīkh al-ʿuthmānī* [On the Origins of Ottoman History], Cairo, Dār al-Sharq, 1982; Muḥammad Anīs, *al-Dawla al-ʿuthmāniyya wa-l-Sharq al-ʿarabi 1514–1914* [The Ottoman State and the Arab East 1514–1914], Cairo, Maktabat al-Anglo al-Miṣriyya, n.d.; Muḥammad Farīd Bāi al-Muḥāmī, *Tārīkh al-dawla al-ʿuthmāniyya* [The History of the Ottoman State], Beirut, Dār al-Jil, 1977.



I-12.1 The gold hilt of a seventeenth century Ottoman broad-sword attributed erroneously to the Caliph ‘Uthman Osman 1, who founded the Ottoman dynasty in 1281

© Ergun Cagatay/AramcoWorld

Anyone studying the Ottoman Empire is faced with a confused and unclear picture whose outlines are still subject to disagreement. This confusion results from the different methodological approaches adopted in writing its history. Some people consider that European, Jewish and secular historians have not hesitated to attack the Ottomans and have defamed, denigrated and cast doubts over their service to Islam. This dubious methodology has been followed by the majority of Arab historians each with their own national and secular loyalties, and inclinations. Such is also the case with Turkish historians who have been affected by the secularism of Mustafa Kemal (*Muṣṭafā Kamāl*), and for whom it was natural to denounce the Ottoman period, and who found the writings of the Christians and the Jews a rich source of support for the secular transformation of Turkey after the First World War.²

2. ‘Alī Muḥammad al-Ṣallābī, *al-dawla al-‘uthmāniyya: ‘awāmil al-nuḥūd wa-l-suqūṭ* [The Ottoman State: Factors in the Rise and Fall], Beirut, Dār al-Ma‘rifa, 2006, p. 15.

The historical sources reveal three facts which must be taken into consideration. The first, as already said, is that the Ottoman Empire lasted for six centuries, and this can only be done by a regime which achieved a reasonable degree of stability and productivity as compared with what was usual for the time. The second fact is that at a certain time most of the empires that history has witnessed reached a high point while at other times they declined and faced many problems. This is due to a number of factors which eventually led to extinction. The third fact is that, due to a variety of religious, intellectual and political reasons, European writing on the history of the Ottoman Empire was not done objectively. A hatred for Islam and Muslims was passed down from generation to generation, so it was only natural that the West would occasionally launch campaigns of vilification, scorn and suspicion against the principles of Islam and the history of those who follow it. The Ottoman State received a large share of these vicious assaults,³ and this is perhaps not surprising given the tremendous Ottoman expansion into European lands. It is interesting to note that some Arab thinkers took the same view as the Europeans. This is because the European powers which opposed the Islamic caliphate encouraged nationalist thought in the Arab world, not in the interests of the Arabs but rather to create a conducive environment in which to exercise control over Arab territories after separating them from the influential Muslim powers such as Turkey. It is perhaps somewhat strange that most of the works which attempt to instil this antithetical point of view were written by non-Muslim Arabs such as Jūrjī Zaydān, Adīb Ishāq, Salīm Naqqāsh, Faraj Anṭwān, Shiblī Shumayl, Salāma Mūsā, Hinrī Kūriyāl, Khalīl Shafārtz, al-Bustānī and al-Yāzījī.⁴ Turkish thinkers were no better than their Arab counterparts. In the period of Turkish national propaganda many of those with nationalist sympathies were biased against the Ottoman caliphate, whether this was merely in conformity with the political and intellectual tendencies which prevailed in their country and which viewed the period of the Empire as full of all kinds of weakness and decay, or because the Turks were influenced by the dishonourable stance taken against the authority of the caliphate and which assumed a formal aspect after Sultan ʿAbd-al-Ḥamīd was deposed in 1909. This was when the caliphate entered the First World War, suffered numerous defeats and so lost many of its territories and was forced to surrender itself to the articles of the Treaty of Sèvres in 1918.⁵

Whatever the case, the Ottoman Empire reached the peak of its glory and power in the sixteenth century. Many books indicate that it was

3. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

distinguished by its military character since the expansion that it achieved made it live as if in a state of perpetual war. Perhaps this is the main reason that the military class was afforded such great prestige, even up to the present day. Moreover, to promote further expansion the Ottoman sultans used to grant lands to their troops, who would then help incorporate these lands into the Empire.

As for the economy of the Ottoman Empire, this was as usual for the time, that is, it was based on handicrafts and agriculture. The Empire also engaged in certain types of trade and industry. Interestingly to note here that it was the Jews who were in control of trade since the Muslims had no wish to engage in such activities rejecting the idea of having dealings with those not belonging to their faith. The Ottoman Empire suffered European exploitation of the raw materials in its territories to feed Europe's industries, especially in the last two centuries of its existence.

From the end of the sixteenth century up to the nineteenth, the Ottoman State passed through a period of sharp decline. After the second siege of Vienna it began gradually to lose its territories one after another. There is a complex of both internal and external factors behind the disintegration and eventual disappearance of the Empire which can perhaps be summarized as follows.

Internal factors

These concern both the central authorities of the Ottoman Empire and the regions of which it was composed. The main factors are:

1. The tremendous expansion achieved by the Ottoman Empire made it impossible to control the various rulers and their desire for independence. This inevitably led to cracks and divisions in the general structure of the Empire and the deterioration of its bureaucratic apparatus;
2. The Empire had sultans who were weak and unable to cope with their various problems especially in terms of finance and the military;
3. The increase in administrative corruption, whether in the central government or in the vilayets (provinces). This was due to the financial burdens it had to bear because of the continuous wars. Another result was the oppressive taxes on economic activity and service industries in the vilayets;
4. The decline of the military structure of the state, manned by the Janissaries who constituted a special social class;
5. The internal wars waged by the Ottoman Empire to quash rebellions in the vilayets, which broke out for reasons to do with national, racial and religious conflict. As is known, the Empire comprised some 20 different races and 15 religious denominations.

External factors

There are numerous intellectual and military external factors which contributed to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Throughout its long period of existence the Empire experienced problems and disturbances in its Asian and European territories. These factors can be summarized in the following points:

1. The attempts of the Shah of Iran, Ismā'īl the Safavid (*Safawi*), to spread Shi'ism in some parts of the Empire;
2. The appearance of nationalist aspirations in most regions and their support by the Great Powers;
3. European protection of the religious minorities;
4. The system of foreign concessions which burdened the Ottoman State with large debts and led to the interference of foreign states, especially France, in the affairs of the Empire. This had serious consequences in the social sphere with the spread of European education and when Ottoman Christians received preferential treatment while the Ottoman elites were alienated. In terms of the economy and trade, the basic structure of the Ottoman economy was damaged, its currency fell in value and its various commercial activities and industries deteriorated in the face of the European economic invasion of the domestic market;
5. The interference of European consuls in Ottoman affairs.

These factors and others led to the decline of the Ottoman Empire then to its disappearance. The opposing powers at the time, that is, Britain, France, Russia and other European countries, strove to demolish the pillars of the state. Indeed, all these countries adopted a clear stance against Turkey originating from Christian hostility towards a Muslim empire.⁶ But even though the European countries were all equally hostile to Turkey based on racial and religious prejudice, on the political level their attitude alternated between confrontation and friendship. In fact, what determined the stance of each European country was its own particular interests and its view of how the Empire's possessions should be divided.

In 1918, at the end of the First World War, Turkey signed the Peace Treaty in Port Mudros thus accepting the demobilization of its army, the right of the Allies to control its railway and their occupation of Baku, Batum, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.⁷

6. Muḥammad 'Abd al-Karīm al-Wāfi, *al-Ṭariq ilā Lāzān: al-Khafīya al-diplumāsīyya wa-l-askarīyya li-l-ghaẓw al-italī li-Lībīyya* [The Road to Lausanne: The Diplomatic and Military Secrets behind Italy's Invasion of Libya], Benghazi, Manshūrāt Jāmi'at al-Qāriyūnis, 1988, p. 24.

7. Riyāḍ al-Ṣamad, *al-ʿAlāqāt al-dawliyya fi-l-qarn al-ʿisbrīn: taṭawwur al-aḥdāth li-fatrat mā bayna al-ḥarbayn* [International Relations in the Twentieth Century. The Development of Events between the two World Wars] n.p., al-Mu'assasa al-Jāmi'iyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīf, 1986, p. 110.

The desire to carve up the Islamic Empire had actually begun many decades before the First World War. This is witnessed in the agreements concluded between Turkey and the European countries the most important of which are dealt with in what follows.

The Treaty of Berlin (1878)

The Treaty of Berlin was a final agreement proceeding out of the Congress of Berlin which took place from 13th June to 13th July 1878 and, which ratified the Treaty of San Francisco signed in March of the same year. The Congress was attended by the United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the Ottoman Empire under Sultan ‘Abd-al-Hamīd.

The Treaty recognized the total independence of the vilayets of Romania, Serbia and Montenegro and granted Bulgaria self-determination although it remained under Ottoman suzerainty and was divided into the vilayet of Bulgaria and the independent region of Eastern Rumelia. The Treaty did not realize Russian plans for the independence of Greater Bulgaria. The Ottoman territories of Bosnia, Herzegovina and the former Sanjak of Novi Pazar were put under Austro-Hungarian occupation although officially they remained part of the Ottoman Empire.

One after another the newly-independent vilayets declared themselves kingdoms, Romania in 1881, Serbia in 1882 and Montenegro in 1910. In 1908 Bulgaria demanded its independence after uniting with Eastern Rumelia in 1885. Austria-Hungary annexed these latter to Hungary in 1908, something which caused a serious crisis in Europe.

The Treaty of Berlin also granted special legal status to some of the religious groups, and thus became a model for the rules protecting religious minorities subsequently elaborated by the League of Nations.

The Treaty also vaguely called for a comprehensive solution to the problems between Greece and the Ottoman Empire, which occurred after protracted negotiations in 1881 with the transfer of Thessaly to Greece.⁸

The Treaty of Sèvres (1920)

The Treaty of Sèvres was a peace treaty. It was concluded by the Allies of the First World War in Sèvres, France, on 10th August 1920, and clearly articulated the intentions of the Christian West regarding the non-Arab Turkish territories. Its contents can be summarized as follows:⁹

8. *Wikipedia*, ‘Treaty of Berlin’ at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Berlin_%281878%29.

9. Al-Şamad, *al-‘Alāqāt al-dawlīyya ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 113–14.

1. All of Thrace was irrevocably ceded to Greece with the exception of Izmir whose fate was to be decided by its National Assembly after a period of five years of Greek rule. Greece was also given the Dodecanese Islands apart from Rhodes and Kastelorizo which were given to Italy.
2. In addition to Rhodes and Kastelorizo, Italy was also awarded the northern part of Antalya, one of the richest coal mining regions in Anatolia.
3. The eastern part of Anatolia was made into the independent State of Armenia. This was after the USA stubbornly rejected the idea of establishing a mandate over the region.
4. Kurdistan was granted self-determination, and what remained of Anatolia was placed under Turkish sovereignty after France and Britain had been given zones of influence there.
5. The Turkish fleet was to be broken up and the number of Turkish troops limited to 50,000 men.
6. The status of the Turkish Straits, the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus which occupied an important place in European policy not only before the First World War but also subsequently was settled. The Treaty determined that the Straits were to be a demilitarized zone overseen by an international committee.

The Treaty was rejected by the Turkish national movement under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who had been fighting successfully for Turkish independence and who managed to force the Allies to return to the negotiating table. This resulted in the delegates ratifying and signing the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 which replaced the Treaty of Sèvres.

The Treaty of Ankara (1921)

The Treaty of Ankara was a bilateral peace agreement concluded between France and the Turkish revolutionaries (the Grand National Assembly of Turkey). The Treaty declared a final end to the Cilicia war in exchange for economic concessions from Turkey and the Turkish Government's recognition of authority by France placing Syria under mandate.

The Treaty of Lausanne (1923)

The Treaty of Lausanne, which was ratified on 24th July 1923, was a peace treaty concluded on the one hand by the Turkish national movement, and on the other by the Allied nations of the First World War (the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece and Romania) and the Serb-Croatian-Slovene State. The Treaty undertook to regulate the Anatolian part of the Ottoman Empire by revoking the Treaty of Sèvres. This was under

pressure from the Turkish national movement led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as previously mentioned.

Like the other treaties made with the Ottoman Empire, the Treaty of Lausanne revealed European aspirations to carve up the Empire and to put its possessions under their control in the service of their own colonial interests and aims.

There is a difference between the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 and the Treaty of Lausanne of 18th October 1912 which brought to an end the Turkish presence in Tripoli-of-the-West (*Ṭarābulus al-Gharb*) and Barqa and confirmed the Italian occupation of Libya.¹⁰

The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne was composed of 141 articles whose main sections addressed the following points:

1. Agreement on the Turkish Straits;
2. Trade (the abolition of concessions);
3. The transfer of people between Greece and Turkey;
4. Agreements;
5. Binding letters.

The issues that formed the subject of the protracted negotiations preceding the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne exposed a radical shift in the British and Russian positions regarding the Turkish Straits. Throughout the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries Russian policy was directed towards opening the Straits and allowing the free movement of shipping there. But this changed at the conference of Lausanne when Russia began to call for the closing of the Straits and a return to the Convention of 1841. As for Britain whose policy throughout the nineteenth century was aimed at closing the Straits and adhering to the Convention of 1841, at Lausanne it began to call for the free movement of shipping there.¹¹ The British opinion prevailed, supported by France and Italy. Thus, the delegates resolved to declare that shipping had free movement in the Straits. But this was then blocked by the Russians, supported by Turkey, who said that it was Turkey's right to close the Straits to its enemies as long as it was officially at war with them, and it could also forbid any state from sending a naval force into the Black Sea larger than the naval force of any adjacent state. The British delegate, however, although in principle accepting that there should be a balance of power on the Black Sea, insisted that the principle should not be observed in the event of a war whose operations were in the Black Sea.

The Treaty also contained provisions for the protection of minorities of Greek descent living in Turkey and minorities of Turkish descent living

10. Al-Wāfi, *al-Ṭariq ilā Lūḏān ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

11. Al-Ṣamad, *al-ʿAlāqāt al-damliyya ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

in Greece,¹² and these minorities subsequently moved to the countries to which they racially belonged. The exception was that those Greeks who lived in Istanbul, Imbros and Tenedos should remain. The same exception also applied to the Muslims who lived in Thrace. Article 14 of the Treaty allowed for a special administrative system in Imbros and Tenedos but this was rejected by the Turkish Government on 17th April 1926.

In addition to all of this, the Turkish Government agreed to surrender Cyprus to the British Empire, while the fate of Mosul (*Mausil*) in Iraq was postponed for further discussion within the halls of the League of Nations. The Treaty also defined the borders of European states such as Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey. Similarly, it was decided that Turkey should relinquish Iraq and Syria (as stipulated in the Treaty of Ankara) and that the borders of these two Arab countries were drawn.

The Treaty noted that all signatories recognized the independence of Turkey and confirmed its right to control the territories granted it by the Treaty, these including Constantinople, (*Istanbül*), all of eastern Thrace and the two islands of Imbros and Tenedos important due to their proximity to the entry to the Dardanelles.

Finally, these agreements and other peace treaties concluded between the Ottoman Empire and the European powers at that time had a number of important consequences for subsequent international relations. Perhaps the most significant of these was the disappearance of the Islamic Ottoman Empire and the partition of the Arab region with most of its parts, alongside the non-Arab Islamic territories, falling under the colonial rule of the West as represented by Britain, France, Italy and Spain. Consideration should also be given to another important consequence of these treaties, that is, the resistance movement and the struggle of the Arab regions to rid themselves of European colonialism when the Arabs and the non-Arab Muslims became aware of the betrayal and lack of credibility of the Western European countries. Without doubt, this was an important factor behind the creation of a significant psychological barrier between the Islamic states and the West which militated against the possibility of forming relations governed by trust.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

— II —

PAN - ISLAMISM
AND ITS ROLE IN
THE REVIVAL AND
AFFIRMATION OF
THE MUSLIM WORLD
(FROM 1924 TO 1963)

Chapter 2.1

THE ABOLITION OF THE
CALIPHATE: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES

Basheer M. Nafi

On 1 March 1924, Mustafa Kemal (d. 1938), president of the newly established Turkish Republic, opened a new session of the Grand National Assembly (the Turkish Parliament). In his speech, he emphasized several points, among which was the need to ‘cleanse and elevate the Islamic faith, by rescuing it from the position of a political instrument, to which it has been accustomed for centuries.’ What Kemal really meant by this was to be clarified next day at a meeting of the ruling People’s Party. Proposals submitted to the meeting by the president were discussed and agreed upon, and on 3 March were presented to the Grand National Assembly. In light of Kemal’s dominant position in the country and the overwhelming majority that his supporters enjoyed in the Assembly, the proposed motions were approved. These historical legislations provided for the abolition of the Caliphate, deposition of the Caliph, and the banishment of all members of the Ottoman house from the Turkish territories.¹ The next day, ‘Abd al-Majīd (d. 1944), the last of the Ottoman Caliphs, was accompanied to board an Orient Express train for a permanent exile in Paris.

Measured by any standard, the abolition of the Caliphate was a gigantic step; yet, it is difficult not to see this step as an inevitable sequel to the abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate and the declaration of Turkey as a republic just over a year earlier. In the fall of 1922, as the Turkish resistance forces led by Mustafa Kemal emerged triumphant in Anatolia, the allied powers accepted Kemal’s demands to replace the humiliating Sèvres peace treaty. Since the

1. C. A. Nallino, ‘La fine del così detto califato ottomano’, *Oriente Moderno*, 4, 1924, pp. 137–53; B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, Oxford University Press, 1961, pp. 258–9; N. Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Montreal, McGill University Press, 1964, pp. 457–60; Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Raḥīm Muṣṭafā, *Fi usul al-tārīkh al-‘uthmānī*, Cairo, Dār al-Shurūq, 1986, pp. 313–14.

Sultan's government was still functioning in Istanbul, the allies invited both the Ankara National Assembly and Istanbul's government to attend negotiations at Lausanne. In order to prevent a dual representation of the Turkish people, Kemal called on the National Assembly on 1 November to abolish the Sultanate and vest power in the sovereignty of the Turkish people.² Although many members of the Assembly were uneasy about such a move, the motion was finally agreed upon. In a forceful speech to the Assembly, Kemal explained that Sultanate and sovereignty were not about traditions or scholarship, and power now rested with the Ankara forces of liberation, not the Sultan and Sublime Porte. But conscious of religious sensibilities in the Assembly, as well as among the people at large, Kemal opted to retain the Caliphate in the Ottoman house. When the last Sultan Caliph Mehmed V Vahideddin (d. 1926) departed the country aboard a British vessel, the National Assembly elected 'Abd al-Majid II to succeed as a Caliph only. A year later, On 29 October 1923, the National Assembly resolved that 'the form of government of the Turkish State is a republic'.³

Throughout the war of independence, from 1919 onwards, Mehmed V showed himself to be a feeble, ineffective Sultan. While nationalist forces in Anatolia rallied behind the leadership of Kemal and fought to safeguard the integrity and independence of what remained of the empire, the Sultan opted to stay in the comfort of Istanbul, complacent to the British occupation. It is true that his representatives in the peace negotiations were unhappy with the terms of the Sèvres treaty, yet, his government was still to endorse it, against the wishes of the nationalists. Hence, when the question of representation at Lausanne arose, Kemal realized it was necessary to assert the sole legitimacy of Ankara and put an end to the division of authority. But if the reasons behind the elimination of the Sultanate were clear enough, the causes of the subsequent abolition of the Caliphate were always debatable,⁴ especially in light of the historically rooted religious symbolism of the Caliphate.

The most common explanation is related to an Indian-Muslim letter, sent to the Turkish prime minister. Pan-Islamic sentiments had been on the rise among Indian Muslims since the late nineteenth century. In late 1919, as the First World War ended with the destructive defeat of the Ottoman Empire, Indian pan-Islamic leaders, fearing for the fate of the Caliphate, organized a Khilafat (Caliphate) Conference, where an All-India Khilafat Committee

2. S. J. Shaw and E. K. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. II, *Reform, Revolution, and Republic*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 365; A. Palmer, *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire*, London, John Murray, 1992, pp. 258–9.

3. Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 368; Lewis, *The Emergence ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 254–6; Berkes, *The Development ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 450–6.

4. For an overview of the debate, see H. Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought*, London, Macmillan, 1982, pp. 52–68.



II-1.1 The head of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, on a gold coin issued in 1960

© Michael Di Biase/AramcoWorld

was set up.⁵ The Khilafat was a religio-political mass movement, joined not only by Sunni Muslim leaders and activists, but also by Shīʿi, Ismāʿīli and Ahmadi figures, who were not necessarily loyal to the Caliphate. What united them perhaps was the wish to seize the opportunity to organize Muslims in India and affirm their identity. On 24 November 1923, three of Istanbul daily papers published the text of a letter to İsmet Paşa (Inönü, d. 1973), the prime minister, signed by two Indian Muslim leaders, the Agha Khan (an Ismāʿīli; 1877–1957) and Amīr ʿAlī (a Shīʿite; 1849–1928). Written apparently on behalf of the Khilafat movement, the letter indicated that the separation of the Caliphate from the Sultanate had increased its significance for the Muslims in general, and urged the Turkish Government to place the caliphate ‘on a basis which would command the confidence and esteem of the Muslim nations, and thus impart to the Turkish State unique strength and dignity.’⁶ Although it is not clear how the letter was leaked to the Istanbul papers, Turkish official circles believed that it was the writers of the letter who made the leak, in

5. On the Khilafat movement, see J. M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, pp. 203–15.

6. Lewis, *The Emergence ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 258; Enayat, *Modern Islamic ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

an attempt to pressure the republican government. As the government used the sectarian background of the two signatories to discredit the letter in the eyes of the Turkish people, the great majority of whom were Sunni Muslims, Mustafa Kemal launched a stinging attack on the Caliph. During the first two months of 1924, which Kemal spent in Izmir presiding over large scale military maneuvers, preparations were planned for abolishing the Caliphate, suppression of the ministries of *Shari'ah* and *Awqaf* (religious endowments), and the unification of public education.

There is no doubt that the Indian-Muslim letter episode played an important role in setting off Kemal's move to abolish the Caliphate. Yet, the motivations and forces that effected this turning point in modern Islamic political history were more complex:

First, was the making of Mustafa Kemal and his vision of the republican state. Kemal was the product of the late Ottoman modernization period, particularly of the *harbiyya* (military) college, the Ottoman institution most deeply and comprehensively influenced by the process of modernization. His vision of the world was largely modern, shaped by modern European thought of state and society. He saw both the Sultanate and Caliphate as anachronistic, a link with the Islamic past, which he held accountable to the country's weakness and decline. This vision, like many other aspects of the emerging republic, was not entirely new, but was mainly rooted in, and a continuation of, the late nineteenth century Ottoman State and intellectual trend.⁷

Second, was the Ottoman defeat in the war, which left Kemal and other leaders of the nationalist movement struggling to protect remains of the empire, largely dominated by Turkish-speaking inhabitants. The Turkishness of the emerging state in Anatolia and Rumelia was re-asserted by the mass population exchange with Greece at the end of the war of liberation. Kemal had every intention of cultivating Turkish nationalist sentiments, envisioning the future of the country that he was to rule as a modern nation-state. He, therefore, instructed his close aide and later president of the republic, Ismet Pasha, who led the Turkish delegation to Lausanne, to assure the Allies' delegates that the Ankara government favoured the creation of a Turkish national state, free from outside interference and disinclined to embark on foreign adventure.⁸

Third, this vision of a modern, territorial, national state was not only meant for placating the European allies, all of whom now occupying former Arab-speaking Ottoman provinces, but was also a strategic position on behalf of the nationalist leadership, reached through a careful understanding

7. R. H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774–1923*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1990, pp. 243–64.

8. Palmer, *The Decline and Fall ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

of the limitations imposed on history by the balance of power in the modern world. From the late nineteenth century onward, three main views dominated Ottoman political thought: pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism, and Turkish nationalism.⁹ The realities of the post-First World War, where the Turkish heartland was surrounded by the Soviet Union, and British and French colonial forces, made the pursuit of pan-Islamic and pan-Turkish policies virtually impossible. What remained was Turkish nationalism, and the safeguarding of the new borders.

Finally, once the Sultanate was abolished and the republic was declared, the Caliphate institution became an anomaly. The Caliph position in a national state was never clearly defined; and despite that the period of history during which all Muslims lived under one Caliphate was short indeed, Muslims could never really comprehend the existence of a Pope-like-Caliph. Furthermore, with its inherent extraterritorial dimensions, the Caliphate institution was in total contradiction with the state conception that was being implemented in the Turkish republic.¹⁰

What is interesting is that the document published by the National Assembly to explain its decision to abolish the Caliphate relied mainly on the Shari‘a, quoting *hadiths* and religious sources to justify its perspective of justice, expediency, common sense, and good religion.¹¹ This, however, would only intensify Islamic reactions engendered by the Turkish step. One aspect of the Muslim reactions to the abolition decision was the outbreak of a passionate intellectual debate about the nature, attributes and meaning of the Caliphate, and the second was political, reflecting the scramble of aspiring Muslim rulers to obtain the prestigious Caliphate seat. Naturally, Muslim reaction to the demise of Caliphate was in its most intense phase during the 1920s, waning gradually in the following decades. Yet, Muslim invocation of the Caliphate would persist, somehow intermittently, down to the present times.

In early March 1924, King Husayn (Sharīf Husayn d. 1931) of the Hijaz, was a guest of his son Amir ‘Abdallah (d. 1951) in Transjordan. Husayn was an aspirant to the Caliphate seat for years; his declaration of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman authorities in 1916 and his involvement with the British during the war years were based on his understanding that Britain would later support a united Arab state with him as Caliph. Hence, once the end of the Ottoman Caliphate was declared, ‘Abdallah seized the opportunity

9. S. Mardin, ‘Patriotism and Nationalism in Turkey’, in R. Michener (ed.), *Nationality, Patriotism and Nationalism in Liberal Democratic Societies*, St. Paul, Minnesota, Paragon House, 1993, pp. 191–222.

10. Remarks made by Kemal (quoted in Nallino, ‘La fine del così detto califato ottomano’, *op. cit.*, pp. 141–2) just before the abolition of the Caliphate illustrate that he became aware of these contradictions.

11. Enayat, *Modern Islamic ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

to encourage his father to claim the Caliphate.¹² During the next few days, pro-Hashemite elements sent telegraphs of support to Husayn from various parts of Greater Syria, while in the Hijaz dignitaries were summoned to the government building in Jeddah, where the King's deputy announced that his Majesty King Husayn had accepted the Caliphate. In Iraq, recognition was delayed until mid-March at the orders of the circumspect King Faysal (d. 1931), Husayn's other son. But strong objections to Husayn's claim were voiced both in Egypt and among Indian Muslims. At any rate, Husayn's chances were doomed from the very beginning. The failure of the Arab Revolt to achieve Arab freedom and unity, and Muslims' view of him as too close and too dependent on the British tarnished his reputation. In addition, it was becoming increasingly clear that his rule in the Hijaz was no longer secure, threatened by the expansion of the Saudis of Najd.¹³ To bolster his precarious claim, Husayn, upon his return to the Hijaz, scrambled to establish a 31-member Caliphate advisory council, and called for a Caliphate congress. The Hajj Congress, the first of a series of pan-Islamic congresses, was held in July 1924.¹⁴ But lacking a strong world wide Muslim backing and due to rifts caused by differences, the congress ended with a declaration that avoided even a mention of the Caliphate. A year later, unable to check the Saudi advance into the Hijaz, Husayn abdicated and went into exile. His bid for the Caliphate never recovered.

Egyptian objections to Husayn's endeavor were most uncompromising, both in Egyptian official circles and among *'ulamā* of the prestigious mosque/university of al-Azhar, seat of Islamic learning for centuries. While King Fuad (d. 1936) of Egypt saw himself more entitled to claim the Caliphate, leading *'ulamā*, many of whom were associated with Fuad's bid, believed that only al-Azhar could settle the Caliphate question. Yet, aware that they could not impose their will on the world Muslim community, the Azharis decided to organize a pan-Islamic congress to decide on the future of the Caliphate, and a preparatory committee was set up in October 1924. Originally, the congress was scheduled to meet in March 1925, but opposition to the idea within and outside Egypt proved to be more serious than had earlier been anticipated, resulting in further delays. As Egypt was still engulfed by the debate about constitution, parliament and limits of the King's powers, many in the Egyptian cultural and political circles, including enlightened members of the royal family, leading political parties, and Sufi Shaykhs, viewed the congress

12. B. M. Nafi, *Arabism, Islamism and the Palestine Question, 1908–1941*, Reading, Ithaca Press, 1998, p. 97.

13. On Husayn's precarious situation in 1924–5, see Talib Muḥammad Wahim, *Mamlakat al-Hijāz, 1916–1925*, Baṣra, Baṣra University, 1982, pp. 343–404.

14. Nafi, *Arabism, Islamism ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 98; M. Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 80–5.

project with suspicion.¹⁵ If the congress was designed to secure the Caliphate for King Fuad, it would only result in consolidating his already authoritarian control of Egyptian affairs.

It was in the midst of this contentious debate that the Azhari judge of *Shari'a* court, Shaykh 'Ali 'Abd al-Raziq (d. 1964), published his controversial book *al-Islām wa-uṣūl al-ḥukm* (Islam and the Fundamentals of Governance).¹⁶ 'Abd al-Raziq argued that the Caliphate was not a religious institution, and that neither Islamic historical precedents nor the *Shari'a* precluded Muslims from developing different forms of government. To a large extent, *al-Islām wa-uṣūl al-ḥukm* was influenced by the document of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on the abolition of the Caliphate, as well as similar orientalist tracts, published after the abolition. For long, 'Abd al-Raziq's book has been considered as the first shot in the 1920s liberal-conservative conflict over the soul of Egypt. The truth might have been less dramatic. 'Abd al-Raziq belonged to a well-entrenched landed family, with strong ties to the Liberal Constitutionalist Party. Like many other Egyptian political and Islamic figures, 'Abd al-Raziq was perhaps more concerned about the King's authority than the revival of the Caliphate, *per se*. But in the charged atmosphere enveloping Sunni Muslim opinion at the time, 'Abd al-Raziq's book aroused a heated argument in Egypt and other Muslim countries, and subsequently led to his exclusion from the *ʿulamā*'s ranks by an Azhari tribunal.¹⁷

One of the most significant contributions to the 1920s' Caliphate debate was Rashīd Riḍā's (d. 1935) *al-Khilāfa wa-l-imāma al-ʿuzmā*,¹⁸ regarded as the major counter-argument to the Turkish official view and that of 'Abd al-Raziq. In fact, Riḍā's work was published in 1922–3, on the eve of the Caliphate abolishment. The eruption of the controversy over *al-Islām wa-uṣūl al-ḥukm* lent additional significance to Riḍā's work, and he subsequently emerged as one of the powerful opponents of 'Abd al-Raziq. However, as a proponent of the modern Islamic reformist school, Riḍā's thesis does not entirely reflect the typical traditionalist position. While affirming the obligatory nature (*wujūb*) of the Caliphate, he highlighted its ideal as had been manifested in the Madina and outlaid by classical Muslim jurists, criticizing later Islamic political regimes.¹⁹ His was a largely modernist perspective, envisioning a system based

15. Nafi, *Arabism, Islamism ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 99–100; A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1925. Volume 1, The Islamic World Since the Peace Conference*, London, Oxford University Press, 1927, pp. 81–91; Muḥammad Muḥammad Ḥusayn, *al-Ittijābāt al-waṭaniyya fi-l-adab al-mu'āṣir*, Beirut, Dār al-Irshād, 1970, II, pp. 51–4.

16. 'Ali 'Abd al-Rāziq, *al-Islām wa-uṣūl al-ḥukm*, Cairo, Maṭba'at Miṣr, 1925.

17. A. Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, London, Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 183–92.

18. Rashīd Riḍā, *al-Khilāfa wa-l-imāma al-ʿuzmā*, Cairo, Maṭba'at al-Manār, AH 1341.

19. For a discussion of Riḍā's vision of the Caliphate, see Enayat, *Modern Islamic ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–83.

on the principle of *shūrā* (consultation), in which the *‘ulamā* play a pivotal role. He even asserted the legitimate right of the people to revolt against unjust rulers, surprisingly citing the overthrowing of the Ottoman Sultanate by the Turks as an example.

In the end, neither intellectual differences nor political opposition precluded the Cairo Caliphate Congress. But when the congress was finally assembled on 13 May 1926, after two years of preparations and hundreds of invitations, only 39 delegates were present, most of whom were Egyptians. Opposition to the congress project from governments of countries such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, or colonial administrations in occupied Muslim countries, contributed to this poor outcome. With such narrow representation of the Muslim world community, it was impossible for the congress to attempt electing a Caliph.²⁰ During the sessions, participants disagreed on the attributes of a Caliphate candidate, while others expressed the view that in light of the Muslim divisions it was doubtful if the revival of the Caliphate institution was ever attainable. The participants' agreement to meet again the following year in a more representative congress was only cosmetic, since no other such convention would be held, neither in Cairo nor anywhere else. If anything, the Cairo Caliphate Congress illustrated the erosion of the power of the *‘ulamā* class, and the influence that the evolving sense of nationhood began to exercise on the outlook of modern Muslims.

Two other major congresses were held during the same period. The first was the Congress of the Muslim World, which convened in Mecca between 7 June and 5 July 1926; and the second was the Jerusalem General Islamic Congress of December 1931.²¹ Although both congresses were pan-Islamic in composition, and both rekindled the debate about the Caliphate future, none was really meant to deal with the Caliphate issue. The first originated in ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Ibn Sa‘ūd's (d. 1953) declaration to the Muslim world in September 1925, just prior to his final triumph over the Hashemites of the Hijaz. Anticipating victory, Ibn Sa‘ūd looked for ways to alleviate possible Muslim concerns over the status of the Holy places and the Hajj by calling for a pan-Islamic conference to discuss their future. The second, on the other hand, was the idea of the Palestinian nationalist and Islamic leader, the mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin al-Husayni (d. 1974), and a few others of his Arab-Islamic associates. As the conflict between the Palestinian Arabs and the Zionist movement in mandated Palestine intensified, the congress was meant to assert the Arab-Islamic dimension of the conflict over Palestine.

20. Nafi, *Arabism, Islamism ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–1; J. M. Landau, *The Politics ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 237–8.

21. On both, see Nafi, *Arabism, Islamism ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 101–27; Landau, *The Politics ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 238–42.

The interwar period, however, would soon witness another attempt to revive the Caliphate, once again in Egypt. Contrary to his father, when the young King Faruq (r. 1936–52) was crowned, he was received by the Egyptians with great hope and enthusiasm. While his Arab and Islamic education made him more Arab and Egyptian than any of his ancestors, he was also surrounded by a group of officials with strong Arab and Islamic attitudes, including the wily Grand Shaykh of al-Azhar, Muḥammad Muṣṭafa al-Marāghī (d. 1945). Shaykh al-Marāghī, an earlier teacher of the King, believed that acquiring the Caliphate would strengthen the position of Egypt and secure her leading role in the region. For a while, as Faruq began to attend major Islamic occasions and build his image as a committed Muslim leader, al-Marāghī began to promote the King as the most deserving candidate for the Caliphate.²² Al-Marāghī's project, however, never materialized. Muslim world opinion was not in the mood for opening the Caliphate file anew; and soon, the outbreak of the Second World War would change the entire political climate in Egypt, the Muslim world, and the world at large.

Calls for Muslim solidarity and the reestablishment of the Caliphate would not feature very prominently in the programmes of the Islamic political forces, beginning with the Muslim Brothers (*al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*) in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world, or the *Jama'at-i Islami* of India and Pakistan. For both, the emphasis was rather on the question of identity and social re-Islamization than on the pan-Islamic ideal. Only the Islamic Liberation Party (*Ḥizb al-Tahrir*), founded in Jordan in 1953 by Taqiyy al-Dīn al-Nabhānī (1909–77), adopted a pan-Islamic program, placing the Caliphate at the centre of its vision of Islamic revival and regeneration.²³ But even after the rise of the Islamic revivalist groups in the late 1970s, *Ḥizb al-Tahrir* continued to be a marginal force on the Islamic political scene.

The only existing frameworks for pan-Islamic coordination and solidarity are the Muslim World League (MWL; *Rabīṭat al-ʿalam al-islāmī*), and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).²⁴ The MWL was established in Mecca (where its main office is based) in 1962. A non-governmental organization, the MWL is composed of *ʿulamā*, religious figures, and even political activists, and is almost exclusively financed by the Saudi Government. The OIC, on the other hand, is an organization of the Muslim states, established at a summit meeting in Rabat in 1969, triggered by the partial burning of al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem by an Australian fanatic. With

22. E. Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle-Eastern Studies*, London, Praeger Publishers, 1970, pp. 203–5.

23. An excellent study of the Islamic Liberation Party and its founder is S. Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for Islamic Caliphate*, London, Grey Seal, 1996.

24. On both, see Landau, *The Politics . . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 283–95.

a permanent secretariat in the Saudi city of Jeddah, the OIC holds summit meetings of the heads of Muslim states every three years. Generally speaking, great progress in transportation and communications have strengthened the Muslims' feeling of being an *umma*. The Caliphate vision, however, is still a mere dream, and a non-realistic ideal.

Chapter 2.2

RESURGENCE OF THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST FOREIGN OCCUPATION
IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

Iba Der Thiam

The struggle against foreign occupation in the Muslim world has a long history.

Contact between foreign countries and what would, by the Middle Ages, become the Muslim world dates back to antiquity.

Such relations originally arose from geographical proximity, mutual discovery and trade interests, but later on they became conflictual and antagonistic.

In 634, when Islam began to spread beyond its cradle towards Syria, Egypt and North Africa, the geographical area around the Mediterranean and western Asia was dominated by Christianity. It had been unified by the conversion of Emperor Constantine in 312 and continued to strengthen its influence until Arab-Islamic expansion into the subregion.

Between 530 and 552, Byzantium succeeded in extending its influence across the western Mediterranean, chiefly through the conquests of Emperor Justinian I (ruled 527–65) in the province of Africa, southern Italy and the Iberian Peninsula. This trend continued under the Eastern Roman Empire (641–1204), which was marked by the Hellenization of the empire. Under the descendants of Heraclius (641–711), the Arabs reached the gates of Constantinople.

In 650, the Umayyad dynasty established itself in Damascus, making it their capital city.

In 1071, the victory of the Turks over Byzantium at the battle of Manzikert heralded the dawn of Turkish rule over the eastern Mediterranean.

The Western, Christian counter-offensive began with the capture of Toledo from the Arabs in 1085, followed by Cordoba in 1232, and Seville in 1248.

In 1095, the date of the Council of Clermont, Pope Urban II initiated the first crusade with the aim of delivering the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem

from Muslim colonization and putting an end to the persecution of eastern Christians.

This version of events came from Peter the Hermit, a priest and smooth talker. However, it was littered with falsehoods, as demonstrated in the work of Professor Cahen published in the *Bulletin of the Faculty of Literature of Strasbourg* in 1950 as *Notes sur l'histoire des Croisades de l'Orient latin* (Notes on the History of the Crusades in the Latin East). Cahen's research showed that the Muslims never mistreated the Christians. Moreover, Professor Perroy's *Les Croisades et l'Orient latin* (The Crusades and the Latin Orient) (Paris, CDU) shows that what was said to be a letter from Alexius I Comnenus of Byzantium to Robert II, Count of Flanders, calling for the deliverance of the Holy Places, was in fact a propagandist forgery. It is likely that the letter was written some time later, probably during the Siege of Antioch in 1098.

Nevertheless, there were eight crusades against the 'infidel' between 1204 and 1270, during which the Muslim East suffered repeated attacks by fanatical warriors.

With the victory of Saladin at the Battle of Hattin in 1187, the Muslim world finally triumphed over the crusaders and Arab domination of the Middle East confirmed its supremacy. By 1292, all the Latin kingdoms and Crusader states established in the eastern Mediterranean had disappeared from the political scene, with the exception of Cyprus.

There were other types of crusade too, including the sacking of Alexandria by Jean sans Peur (John the Fearless), in 1395, the crusade of Ladislas III of Hungary in 1444, and the crusade of Philip the Good (Philip III, Duke of Burgundy), in 1454, as well as the founding of religious and military orders (the Teutonic Knights, the Knights Templar, and the Knights Hospitaller of Saint John of Jerusalem). In fact, this process lasted for over 700 years, until the eighteenth century, without any major changes to the previous configuration.

There were multiple consequences ranging from political (the emergence of the Latin states of the East) and cultural (the introduction of Western Christian culture in the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia and the settlement of Franciscan and Dominican missionaries across Asia, North Africa and the Mongol world), to commercial (the establishment of various patterns of trade).

To compound this, the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453 marked the end of the Eastern Roman Empire.

Despite these changes, the Muslim world was unable to develop in peace and stability. The Western Christian world undertook a string of conquests designed to undermine the authority of the Muslim world, reduce its sphere of influence on land and at sea, and force it relentlessly into retreat with assorted acts of aggression.

RESURGENCE OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST FOREIGN
OCCUPATION IN THE MUSLIM WORLD



II-2.1 The spread of Islam in Africa by 1500

© UNESCO/UNESCO History of Africa

Perhaps the most remarkable event during this new period of great discoveries was the capture of Granada in 1492 in the name of the *Reconquista* by the Catholic monarchs Isabella I of Castile and Ferdinand II of Aragon.

This led to the mass expulsion of Muslims from Spain – whose presence there dated back eight centuries – and Jews who refused to convert to

Christianity, and created an inquisitorial atmosphere marked by unprecedented violence and the implementation of *limpieza de sangre* (laws of purity of blood). In 1609, 300,000 Moors who refused to renounce their faith in the One God were also expelled from the Kingdom of Granada.

Fortunately, the capture of Rhodes by the Turks in 1552, led by Suleiman the Magnificent, marked the beginning of the complex and lengthy process of turning the Mediterranean into an Ottoman lake. The capture of Chios in 1566 was part of that process, and the victory of the Holy League over the Muslims at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571 was, in the final analysis, merely an interlude that failed to reverse completely the balance of power.

The period 1768 to 1774 saw the emergence of ‘the Eastern Question’ during the Russo-Ottoman wars, which were exploited by European Christian powers seeking to dismantle the Ottoman Empire and divide it up between them.

This arrogant and unacceptable project continued throughout the nineteenth century, and the Ottoman Empire suffered a series of setbacks that limited its power and capacity for intervention.

In 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte, wishing to wage war on Great Britain, arrived in Egypt and embarked on a conquest that, although destined to end in disaster, formed part of a wider strategy to deprive the British access to the Indies and the Far East. Napoleon showed absolutely no regard for the consequences this would have for Egyptian Muslims.

Moreover, throughout the nineteenth century, the Mediterranean basin was the base for British, French, German, Italian and Austro-Hungarian forays into countries such as Morocco and Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Sudan and the countries of Mesopotamia and Arabia. Some Western powers also had a presence in the coastal sultanates of East Africa, sub-Saharan Muslim countries (Senegal, Gambia, the two Guineas, Sierra Leone, Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and so on), and Muslim territories in Asia such as Java, Indonesia, Malaysia, Muslim India, and so on.

During the same period, Tsarist Russia was pursuing the Russification of all the Muslim countries of the Caucasus, Central Asia and Transcaucasia.

When Greece rose up against Ottoman domination between 1821 and 1829, Great Britain, Russia and France rushed to its aid, resulting in the destruction of the Turkish-Egyptian fleet at the Battle of Navarino in 1827 and the proclamation of Greek independence in 1830.

In that same year, the French occupation of Algeria marked the beginning of the French colonial era in the Maghreb.

Although the French and the British fought on the side of the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War (1854–6), it was not out of sympathy or shared conviction, but because their vital interests were under threat in the Mediterranean.

This was amply demonstrated in 1860, when the French intervened in Lebanon to protect the Christians, whom they considered to be the victims of Ottoman domination. Russia, for its part, went to war against the Ottoman Empire from 1876 to 1878 in order to support pan-Slavism. The rest is history: the Armistice of Adrianople, the Congress of Berlin, the recovery by Turkey of Macedonia and Thrace, and the independence of Romania and Bulgaria.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was annexed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Cyprus was occupied by the British.

Although the Ottoman Empire had been a great Mediterranean power since the sixteenth century, it went into slow decline when confronted with nationalist movements supported by the European states. Following in the footsteps of Greece, Cyprus gained its independence in 1878, followed by Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania and Montenegro.

Bosnia-Herzegovina came under the control of the Habsburgs.

The division of the territories previously governed by the Ottoman Empire set in motion the process of Balkanization that led to the demise of European Turkey, the birth of Albania, and the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, which were contributory factors in the outbreak of the First World War.

It must not be forgotten that, since 1905, France and Germany (under Kaiser Wilhelm II) had been engaged in conflict with each other in Morocco (Tangier).

One year later, the Algeiras Conference recognized the rights of Spain and France in Morocco.

In 1911, the Agadir Crisis highlighted the imperialist rivalries between Germany and France for control of the southern shores of the Mediterranean and contributed to accelerating the march towards the Great War.

The first two years of the First World War were dominated by the naval and terrestrial Gallipoli Campaign led by Winston Churchill on behalf of the Allies. The objective was to ensure free passage through the Straits, launch an attack on Istanbul, and secure Serbia.

Fortunately for the Ottoman Empire, the expedition failed to achieve its objectives.

In 1916, in the midst of a world war, Great Britain, Russia and France signed the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, which stated that the entire Ottoman Middle East should be divided between the three powers at the end of the conflict, to the detriment of the Muslims who lived there.

The Ottoman Empire, which had supported Germany throughout the First World War, collapsed in 1918.

The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres effectively dismantled the Ottoman Empire by giving Great Britain and France mandates for Lebanon, Syria and Palestine

and sanctioning the establishment of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1913 and the *Compagnie française des pétroles* (French Petroleum Company) in 1927.

It had become clear that oil would become a decisive factor in international relations in the period between the two world wars and beyond.

The Balfour Declaration of 1917 went further, stipulating that the Jewish people should be given a national home in Palestine, the heart of the Muslim world.

However, the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) made it possible for Turkey to recover Smyrna and Thrace and establish its present borders.

In spite of these unintended effects, when the Second World War broke out, the Muslim world took an active part in it, demographically, economically and financially.

A tangible manifestation of this was Operation Torch, an Anglo-American landing in North Africa, launched on 8 November 1942.

Muslims in the subregion were concerned by the fighting that took place in the western Mediterranean during the campaigns of Tunisia, Sicily, Elba, Corsica, and the Provence landing in 1944.

As the colonial system gradually took root in sub-Saharan Africa, Islam spread to numerous African countries, particularly those in West Africa and the Senegambia.

From at least 617, Muslims persecuted in Mecca decided to be guided by the Prophet Muḥammad and go into exile in Abyssinia, long before the emergence of the city-state of Medina (*al-Madīna*), in order to find refuge and practise their faith.

They chose an African country ruled by a *negus* (king) who was considered to be 'a just king, who has never harmed anyone', and who was, incidentally, practising Monophysite Christianity.

Recent excavations in Niger and Mauritania have uncovered tombs where Muslims were buried in accordance with their religious rites.

Al-Bakrī wrote about the history of Ghana and its development between the seventh and twelfth centuries.

Raymond Mauny's geographical mapping of West Africa provides another glimpse of this empire, as does the work of Maurice Delafosse on Upper Senegal and Niger.

Its historical trajectory is well known, up to and including the conquest by the Almoravids in 1076 and the role of the Goddāla, Yaḥyā ibn Ibrāhīm, a convert to Islam.

From this period, pilgrimages and holy visits were made to Kairouan and Fez, and relations were established with ulama (Muslim legal scholars), as renowned as Abū 'Amrān and 'Abd Allāh ibn Yāsīn.

What happened next is well known: the retreat to a 'ribāṭ', the indoctrination of disciples known as al-Murābiṭūn, the holy war declared by

‘Abd Allāh ibn Yāsīn, the conquest of the Sanhaja region, the submission of the Goddāla and Lemtuna, the conquest of Awdāghust by Yaḥyā ibn Ibrāhīm’s successor, Yaḥyā ibn ‘Umar, in 1054 and the conquest of southern Morocco, while his cousin, Yūsuf ibn Tāshufīn continued the war in Morocco.

The history of Tekrur is better known, with the conversion, around the eleventh century, of its sovereign, Waar Diabe. Tekrur lay between Ghana and the Atlantic Ocean, the Adrar region of Mauritania and the Ferlo Desert. It was so famous that Arab scholars used the name ‘Tekrur’ to refer to all black African countries.

Equally well known is the history of Mali, which features Sundiata Keita and the Manden Charter of 1236, and in particular the great reign of Kanga Moussa (1312–37), whose pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324–5 was so celebrated that he was portrayed in the Catalan Atlas of King Charles V, which was published in 1375 to map black African countries.

It was Sundiata Keita who brought the poet Es-Saheli to Mali, where he built an imperial palace and the Djingueriber Mosque.

The writings of Ibn Battuta, who sojourned in Mali for three months, attest to the high degree of civilization that this society had known under Islam.

Volume IV of his travel diaries, which dates from 1352 (page 421), pays tribute to the fine qualities of the black population and its commitment to justice, and to the country’s security and the protection of property, including that of white foreigners. He said that nobody stole, and everyone could enjoy his or her possessions freely. The author described a devout people who practised canonical prayers – a practise that extended to children, who were soon chastised by their parents if they neglected it. Furthermore, he mentioned the scrupulous observance of Friday prayers and, in particular, the interest of the people in learning the Holy Qur’ān.

In the *dabiras* (the schools where the Qur’ān is taught), less motivated students were given special treatment.

We know, too, of the defeat of the Fula by Koli Tengella at Futa and the overthrow of the Denianke Dynasty in 1776.

The magnificence of the Songhai Empire was embodied in the pilgrimage to Mecca of Askia Muḥammad the Great, which lasted from 1496 to 1497.

Also of note are the Hausa Kingdoms and their influence before the thirteenth century, which are described in the Kano Chronicle of 1890.

The legacy of this epic period in history survives today in the brilliant cities of Timbuktu, Gao, Diéné and Oualata, which had relations with the universities of Fez, Tunis, Cairo and the Arab East.

Education was considered to be the most valuable asset of all. Leo Africanus wrote that, since everyone could read Arabic, the most lucrative trade was in books.



II-2.2 Africa in 1900

© Dergham

Each town boasted schools and universities.

The subjects taught were theology, law, dialectics, rhetoric, logic, history, grammar, poetry, mathematics, the natural sciences, medicine, chemistry and languages.

Scholars included the Kunta, Sidi Yahia, Sadi Diawara, Muḥammad Ture, Maḥmūd Katy the historian, Abderrahman Sadi, Muḥammad Sadi, Chérif Sequil, brothers Aḥmad and Maḥmūd Bakhayokho, al-Aqib, Kadi Omar, and above all Ahmed Baba, a philosopher, thinker, exegete, lawyer, poet and 'the light of his times', whose library ran to 1,700 volumes.

The strength of Islam was such that, when Askiya Daoud violated the rights of the people, he was admonished publically by the lawyer Muḥammad Bakhayokho.

According to the eye-witness accounts of Portuguese, Dutch, British and French chroniclers, the situation was more or less the same throughout the Senegambia, in Futa Toro, Oualo, the Kingdom of Cayor, the Jolof Empire, the Kingdom of Saloum, Bundu, Gabú, Casamance and The Gambia.

The University of Pire was founded by Khali Amar Fall in the sixteenth century. Its alumni included Matar Ndoumbé from Cayor, founder of the Coki School, as well as Thierno Süleiman Baal and Abdul Khader Khan.

Similar centres were found at Ndame, Nguick, Ndiagurèye, Mbakhol, Niomré, Tivaoune, Kaolack Niassene, Bamba Mody, Thilogne, Galoya, Kobilò, and so on.

It is therefore clear that Islam had a stronghold across Nigerian Sudan, and in the Senegambia, as the writings of exceptional scholars like Khālī Madiakhate Kala of Cayor testify.

In Nigeria, the entire Sokoto region came under Islamic control with the saga of Usman Dan Fodio, which dates from the early nineteenth century. The same was true of north Cameroon, Chad, Guinea and Sierra Leone.

Thus when Western countries wished to establish themselves in sub-Saharan West Africa, they had to do battle with religious leaders who were defending Islam.

This was the case in the Senegambia, for example, where epic African resistance efforts were led by El-Hadj Umar Tall, Maba Diakhou Bâ, Lat-Dior Ngoné Latyr Diop, Soukari Camara, Mamadou Lamine Dramé, Alboury Ndiaye Bourba and the leaders who were collectively known as the *Ligne Tidiane*.

The reason why matters turned out this way is that, during the conquest of Algeria in 1830, France was confronted with the wave of resistance that Emīr 'Abd al-Qādir had sought to re-introduce to Muslim black sub-Saharan countries, a policy aimed at demonstrating that Islam served as a cultural barrier preventing France from ruling hearts and minds with absolute power.

To overcome this obstacle, the colonial system attacked schools teaching the Qurʾān and formulated an indigenist policy designed to discredit Islam by targeting its religious leaders.

What follows is an illustration of the *modus operandi* of that disastrous undertaking.

To fully understand the issues and context, a historical detour is in order. Since French colonial policy against Islam was implemented in an extremely sophisticated and tenacious manner, a discussion focused on the policy's objectives and the reactions it provoked is the most appropriate way of revealing sufficiently its philosophy, mechanisms, means of action, devastating effects and forceful responses.

When Claude Chappe invented the telegraph in 1793, the challenge of long-distance communication was surmounted: in 1794, news of the French victory over Republican armies at Condé sur l'Escaut reached Paris almost instantaneously by this medium.

In the nineteenth century, significant advances were also made in the field of cartography (although its origins date back to Ptolemy and the sixth century). In 1809, Napoleon commissioned a new map that was ready for use in 1817. From that date until 1880, the new Ordinance Survey map was used, providing Western armies with a formidable resource that enabled them to understand the terrain they wished to conquer and move around it with ease.

With the discovery of quinine by Pelletier and Caventou, Europeans had at their disposal an instrument that permitted them to take the colonial project into the hinterland, where previously the fear of malaria had restricted their presence to the immediate surroundings of trading posts.

And when Morse invented wireless telephony, he provided Western armies with a tool that further improved long-distance communication (in 1831 and 1844).

In the military sphere, artillery underwent significant change in the nineteenth century. Mortar bombs replaced metal cannon shot and spherical bombs. *Tatas*, which had hitherto been an adequate means of defence and resistance for local chiefdoms, were now useless against bombardment by foreign troops.

Moreover, the nineteenth century also saw the emergence of a powerful steam navy. Although its origins date back to French cardinal Richelieu and Colbert, it was not until the Bourbon Restoration that it became properly organized. In 1830, France conquered Algeria with its naval forces. Then, following the discovery of the propeller and the use of steam and armour, Napoleon III launched France's first battleship in 1859. Between 1870 and 1914, then, it was the navy that procured for France a colonial empire that stretched from North Africa to Asia by way of the African subcontinent.

Technological advances in Europe – the invention of the telephone by Alexander Graham Bell in 1876, the manufacture of the machine gun (which could fire over 1,200 shots per minute and came after the rifle, the Mauser German repeating rifle, and the Lebel Model rifle and, finally, the invention of dynamite by Nobel changed the face of war and its methods, to European advantage.

Qualities such as courage, valour, temerity and the spirit of sacrifice, important though they were, would never again be sufficient to triumph over the enemy.

It was because of the technologies listed – to which we should add the railways, which were invented by Stephenson and made it possible to transport troops, equipment and supplies – that Lat-Dior Ngoné Latyr Diop of Cayor, Soukari Camara, Fodé Kaba Doumbouya, Samory Touré, Ndiouma Diatt, Alpha Yaya of Labé, Béhanzin and all other resistants were overwhelmed.

Subsequently, the Senegambia and Nigerian Sudan recognized that they needed to find new methods of resistance.

Now that the colonial system had wrested control of the land, political power and labour force, all that remained for it to do in order to exert total power over a protracted period was to conquer the souls of the people by winning their hearts, minds and consciences. The historian Georges Hardy has referred to this as ‘the moral conquest’. Islamic religious leaders understood that even the strongest adversary would never be victorious unless it could dominate the collective consciousness, so they focused their resistance efforts on setting up schools to teach the Qurʾān and building mosques. Welfare associations capable of self-defence (*dabirus*) were set up within Muslim communities, and pilgrimage ceremonies and remembrance events were organized at carefully chosen memorial sites so as to bring Muslims closer to their faith and support them in its practise.

In Senegal in 1853, Abbé Boilat had already declared that ‘the Futa region is already so fanatical that it would take the blood of a thousand martyrs and, most likely, interminable wars before a Catholic mission could be established there.’

The region’s resistance was rooted in its strong Islamic past.

Echoing Abbé Boilat’s remarks, Faidherbe said that same year that ‘the progress of Islam among the blacks is disastrous. It is imperative that we ensure that the marabouts rally to us and our ideas, as we did in Algeria. We shall crack down on those who prove recalcitrant, but to complement our strict requirements, we shall establish French schools for young Muslims.’

This policy was implemented by a decree dated 1 October 1857, reducing the number of marabouts running a Qurʾānic school, engaged in the legitimate practise of their cultural customs, from around 40 to 20. The measure did not produce the intended result, however, so the colonial administration

prohibited Qurʾānic schools from admitting more than 250 pupils and made evening classes in a French school compulsory for older pupils.

On 17 March 1817, a French school was established in Saint-Louis, Senegal. The *Ecole Mutuelle de Saint-Louis*, as it was called, admitted boys only.

The first school for girls would not open its doors until 1826, following a visit to Senegal by the French nun Anne-Marie Javouhey between 1822 and 1824.

The *signares* (young mixed-race women) converted to Christianity, and in 1825 three young men – Abbé Moussa, Abbé Boilat and Abbé Fridoil – were sent to France, where they remained until 1842. It was in that year the church of Saint-Louis was built, whereas the mosque was not built until 1846.

In 1838, at the initiative of the Sisters of Saint Joseph of Cluny, provision was made for girls to board at the school, a possibility that was made available to boys some time later. The idea was to isolate young adolescents from their family environment and culture in order to recruit them to the colonial cause. In 1841, the Brothers of Ploërmel established a permanent monastic order in Senegal. Six years later, they founded the *Ecole des Otages* (School for Hostages) and a secondary school. The former was subsequently closed before reopening in 1855. The secondary school was abolished in 1848, but was taken up again by the Brothers of Ploërmel in 1854, according to Papa Amadou Fall. It closed for good in 1895.

The Saint-Louis madrasa (religious college for the study of Islam) was not built until 1857.

In subsequent years, young Muslims seeking admission to the *Ecole du Père Libermann* (a topic beloved of the poet Léopold Sédar Senghor) had to substitute their first names with a Christian name. There was a dramatic rise in the numbers of children entering Christian religious education.

Lebanese, Syrians and Moroccans were not allowed to attend mosques or participate in Muslim religious festivals.

On 22 June 1857, a Governor's Decree forced the heads of Qurʾānic schools to send all pupils over the age of 12 to French schools. This resulted in the construction of several schools – Dagana in 1858, Podor in 1860, Bakel in 1861, and in Dakar, Sédhiou, Louga, Rufisque and Matam between 1857 and 1895 – as was consistent with the colonial plan for domination. However, these efforts proved futile, and colonial hostility towards Qurʾānic schools intensified in 1870.

In that same year, a new decree was issued stating that authorization must be obtained from the lieutenant-governor of French West Africa before opening any Qurʾānic schools. At the same time, importing of printed copies of the Qurʾān was prohibited, a rule that remained unchanged until 1885.

Within the Directorate of Internal Affairs, a political bureau was set up to control the entry into Senegal of books and magazines originating from the

Arab-speaking Islamic world, the objective being to cut Senegal off from the global pan-Islamic movement.

On 9 May 1896, the colonial authorities further hampered the opening of Qurʾānic schools by making it a requirement for registrants to sit an examination in Arabic and keep an enrolment register in French, a copy of which had to be sent to the Directorate of Internal Affairs each term for verification.

The result of these measures was that between 1857 and 1904 only 142 authorizations were granted, an average of three schools per year.

In 1903, Governor-General Guy Camille ordered that the authorizations for Qurʾānic schools would no longer be issued by the lieutenant-governor, but by the head of the Federation of French West Africa.

The latter, despite being a highly qualified professor of the French University, ordered on 12 June 1906 that Qurʾānic schools should teach French for two hours each week. As an incentive to the heads of Qurʾānic schools, a grant of 300 francs would be paid to those who complied with the directive.

Trading records show that, at that time, the cost of a granary was 500 francs, a bull 100 francs, a camel 200 francs, three sacs of millet 100 francs, 10 sheep 250 francs, a donkey 50 francs, an ordinary horse 200 francs, and four loincloths 120 francs.

After the reorganization of the Saint-Louis madrasa in 1896, the colonial administration established three more madrasas: in Boutilimit in 1904, and in Djenné and Timbuktu in 1905, with the aim of educating Muslims in the colonial way. However, this was almost entirely unsuccessful.

Students who wished to pursue their studies at a higher level could only do so in Algiers or at the Lycée Alaouite in Tunis – places that were a long way from home – in order to discourage prospective candidates.

The pilgrimage to Mecca was, of course, affected by this war against Islam, and draconian conditions were imposed on potential pilgrims in order to deter them.

Permission had to be obtained and a sum of money forfeited that was simply unaffordable for ordinary people; converts to Islam were totally excluded from the pilgrimage. In 1926, the pilgrimage was cancelled outright for Senegalese Muslims, allegedly because of the situation in the Hijaz. This was the icing on the cake.

When the pilgrimage was reinstated in 1927, only 46 permits were granted: eight for Saint-Louis, two for Rufisque, nine for Sine-Saloum, three for Podor, four for Thiès, 12 for Cayor, one for Dagana and four for Baol.

Similarly draconian conditions applied to the building of mosques. Here, too, authorization was required, and was only granted if a set of outrageous demands were met.



II-2.3 El Hadj Ibrahima Seck, Imam of Conakry, photographed in Dakar, Senegal, c.1930 on his return from pilgrimage to Mecca. Religious leaders were often also focal points for the resistance movement

© ANOM France, Aix-en-Provence

Public subscriptions and applications for funding were prohibited – constraints that did not apply to places of worship of other religions.

It is unsurprising, then, that following the construction of the mosque in rue Blanchot in 1884 and the Zawiya el-Hadji Malick Sy mosque in 1919, only four permits were issued in 1928. These were for the Keur Bassine mosques in Louga cercle, or district, the Koungheul mosque in Baol district, the Touba mosque in Baol district, and the Kaolack mosque in Sine-Saloum district.

Depressingly complex administrative procedures meant that the construction of mausoleums commemorating Islamic religious leaders was effectively prohibited.

It is therefore clear that Islam was subject to as much surveillance as communism or Garveyism, if not more.

The *Ecole des Langues Orientales* (School of Oriental Languages) was founded to nurture a new kind of Arabist; at the same time, secularism was being developed by Jules Ferry, Emile Combes and René Viviani, whose credo was to create a world ‘without God’.

The archetype proposed to the Muslim world as a model was that of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk wearing a three-piece suit, ripping up the Turkish headdress and stigmatizing traditional dress, the Turkish alphabet and Ottoman civilization.

Anyone of Muslim faith wishing to acquire French nationality would be forced to renounce his or her personal status as a Muslim. It was not until 1951 that Deputy Abass Guèye was successful in ensuring that certain Muslim festivals, such as al-Mawlid, which celebrates the birth of the Prophet Muḥammad were declared public holidays.

Evidently, the colonial doctrine drew inspiration from the approach advocated by Gladstone, who declared that ‘as long as they obey the Qurʾān, they will resist us. We must therefore turn them away from it.’

In this regard, Oumar Bâ wrote in the preface of a modest volume entitled *Histoire du Sénégal au jour le jour, 1855–1856* (An Everyday History of Senegal: 1855–1856): ‘As paradoxical as it may seem, the principal enemy of the colonial power was not the warlike and turbulent *ceddos* (warrior) but the marabouts who, as the defenders of moral, religious and ethical values, had to be eliminated in order to make way for the new order.

As soon as one of them was captured, he was executed and burned in front of his *talibés*.

Once arrested, it was rare for a marabout to be fortunate enough to be deported to Grand-Bassam, Gabon, Guyana or Madagascar.’

Such harsh treatment of the marabouts by the administration is hardly surprising. In 1854, Faidherbe wrote in a letter to the Ministry of the Navy and the Colonies that ‘the new enemies we have had to face have been the most formidable of all. Wars of religion are merciless and fanaticism inspires

a courage that retreats from nothing, because for those driven by it death itself is regarded as a blessing.’

The entry in his war diary for 25 February 1855 reads: ‘Faidherbe orders a series of military operations in Waalo’.

Following 10 days of combat against Waalo warriors, 25 villages were burned, including Nder, Temey, Ndombo, Ntiago and Keurmbay.

Serigne Nder was captured by a patrol and shot dead; the Waalo warriors retreated, leaving around 100 dead on the battlefield. One hundred and fifty of them were taken prisoner. The expeditionary force laid claim to significant spoils.

On 10 October 1855, at 7.30 a.m., a Great Marabout of the Army of el-Hadj Umar Tall was publicly shot and burned on the orders of the Commander of the Podor Corps.

The victim is related to Mustafa, Chief of Halwar.

And yet, despite this military repression, between 1 January 1855 and 30 December 1856 alone, the Islamic religious leaders of Senegal mounted some 248 belligerent or fatal attacks on the colonial system’s attempts to establish itself in a country where it had been present since 1659, where its nationals had married local women, and where it had conferred on the communes of Saint-Louis, Gorée, Rufisque and Dakar the status of a fully functional *commune de pleine exercice* (a civil territory in which French common law is applicable) and made their inhabitants French citizens.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the failure of the colonial system became even more apparent with the conversion to Islam of Bour Siné Mbacké II, who ruled over a fiercely anti-Islamic province, and of Bour Saloum Guédél Mbodji.

In 1902, el-Hadj Malick Sy established himself at Tivaouane, in the same locality as the Dakar-Saint-Louis railway where the *damel* (Wolof king) of Cayor, Samba Laobé Fall, had been lured into an ambush and murdered.

The invincible power of Islam was demonstrated by the situation of the rue Blanchot mosque in the heart of the capital, 100 metres from the Governmental Palace, and of the Zawiya el-Hadj Malick Sy, where Wazifa was practised morning and evening, on the corner of avenue Maginot and rue Thiers, just 150 metres from the Governor’s palace.

Graduates of the University of Ndiarndé, through the Tijānī Sufi order, formed a close network across Senegal. The Ndiéguène family in Thiès, Alpha Thiombane in Mont-Roland, el-Hadj Elimane Sakho in Rufisque, Thierno Seydou Nourou Tall in Dakar, Amary Ndack Seck in Thiénaba, el-Hadj Abdoulaye Cissé in Pire, Thierno Amadou Dème in Sokone, Thierno Alioune Dème in Ndiayecounda, el-Hadj Abdoulaye Cissé in Diamal, and Serigne

Makhfouss Aïdara in Banghère undertook extraordinary acts of proselytism of unparalleled pugnacity and courage. Kaolack was left to Abdoul el-Hamid Kane and el-Hadji Abdoulaye Niass.

At the end of the seven-year exile imposed on Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba Mbacké by the colonial administration, it was finally forced to repatriate him in 1902.

He was sent to live in Diourbel before being exiled again in 1903, this time to Mauritania. He returned in 1907 and was placed under house arrest in Thiéyène, in the Jolof kingdom, before being sent back to Diourbel in 1912, where he remained until his death.

However, he had succeeded in defying the colonial system by building a superb mosque in Diourbel and instigating plans for the Great Mosque in Touba.

Reflecting on the colonial administration's catalogue of failures, in 1912 the Governor-General, William Merlaud-Ponty, wrote:

In attempting to destroy Islam, a head-on attack is futile. It must be attacked indirectly. The time has come to renounce violence, except when it is strictly necessary in situations where we have recourse to stealth. In our action against Islam and Islamized groups, excessively harsh coercive measures leave no room for the unexpected. They must not be taken except when we are absolutely certain that the desired result has been achieved and are prepared for any eventuality.

Indeed such measures, regardless of their immediate effects, continue to strengthen the tendency of the masses to esteem those against whom such measures are taken as martyrs who have suffered for the holy cause.

The *ceddos* – who for other reasons have remained indifferent, or whose interests made them loyal – are beginning to feel doubtful and suspicious of us: a multitude of neophytes is emerging and we could quickly find ourselves in real and grave danger.

Therefore we must act with extreme caution. Our indigenous policy, as I have often repeated, must not be one of violent spasms. It must be one of gentleness and benevolent firmness, not brazen measures of coercion.

‘We cannot be too cautious when we find ourselves in the presence of large Islamic groups, whose activities we have been monitoring over a long period. We must never let our guard down where they are concerned.

Accordingly, we should not associate ourselves with the personal views of the *Commandants de Cercle* (district commanders), which are almost always too narrow in scope.

Our action must have a broader horizon. With regard to Islam, our action must proceed from the general policy of France, not only in French West Africa, but across North Africa.

Moreover, the direction in which we should develop our action in French West Africa will naturally be determined by the peculiar characteristics of Islam in the colonies of the General Government. Even as we engage in skilful surveillance of the Great Marabouts and attempt to diminish, slowly but surely,

the authority they enjoy, and even as we exploit them for our own purposes, it is our duty to remain in contact with Islamized groups and not cut ourselves off from them.

We must focus on isolating them from the propaganda of foreign Islam, by turning them away, as far as possible, from the incitements of Muslim internationalists, visionaries and sectarians.

It is therefore no exaggeration to say that, in spite of appearances, when the Ottoman Caliphate was officially abolished in 1924, the colonial system was confronted with the full force of resurgent Islam in the majority of Muslim countries under colonial rule.

When the First World War ended, the Allied powers, having destroyed the Ottoman Empire, took advantage of peace treaties to extend their influence and finish carving up the territories that had flown the flag of the Sublime Porte.

In the years immediately following the First World War, economies were exhausted and people were weary; they yearned for peace. Against this backdrop a new era dawned in Europe: the Roaring Twenties.

As the Western powers consolidated their positions and counted the cost of the conflict, they made concessions to the peoples of the Middle East, Asia and North Africa without renouncing any of their economic, political, cultural and social domination.

Fresh from their victory in armed conflict, they glorified their powerful weapons, equipment and technological supremacy in order to justify their position as the self-appointed leaders of world affairs.

The founding of the League of Nations created a forum in which the Western powers could engage in discussion and act on behalf of humanity as a whole. In doing so, their objective was to begin a process of institutional and axiological standardization that would render more palatable the domination they sought to achieve over the minds, behaviour, ideas, concepts, values and references of the colonies.

The United States of America had only entered the First World War in 1917, but it had acted as a creditor and donor to victorious Europe, and naturally it invited itself to the negotiating table and participated in discussions about peace treaties – indeed, it managed to impose its views in the Fourteen Points brought to the table by President Wilson.

The colonial peoples had a stake in the victory because they had served in the ranks of the allied troops, and they emerged from the war in a new frame of mind. Having been mobilized in the name of liberty, democracy, independence and justice – all of which they had been denied by colonialism – they became aware of the realities of their surroundings, while among the ranks of the elite there was an awakening of consciences and a desire for

change that were inspired by the 1917 October Revolution and the abolition of the Caliphate in Turkey in 1924.

In the trade unions, unrest broke out again in response to shortages, the rising cost of living, worn-out equipment and difficulties in restocking. A disenchanted youth pondered its fate.

Between 1924 and 1929, with the onset of the global financial crisis, global development was marked by a series of upheavals. When the crisis began, it led to the rise in Europe of fascism and Nazism and ushered in strict regimes that were detrimental to civil liberties.

In Muslim countries, the Renaissance movements, which had fallen relatively silent during the war, began to come to the fore once again. It was also during this period that the pan-Islamist movement, pan-black movements and the global communist movement launched propaganda campaigns against colonialism, denouncing its methods, influences, and devastating effects on colonized populations.

The fractured global economy of the Great Depression created a fragility to which no continent was immune. Capitalist regimes emerged weakened from the crisis.

In Muslim countries, the fight to preserve cultural identity gained renewed vigour. In the countries of Mesopotamia, the Middle East, Arabia and post-Ottoman Egypt, and in the newly independent states of the Arab world, an elite sought to define new ways forward inspired by the glory of the Islamic past. The reactions of the colonial authorities resulted in a powerful nationalist movement that grew with every passing day, won over broad swathes of public opinion and involved every social class in the fight for independence.

In 1939, the Second World War broke out. Yet again, Europe had no choice but to call on colonial troops. It was with their assistance that militarism, fascism and Nazism were defeated: colonial countries had helped to pioneer the free world.

Although in Africa the Brazzaville Conference marked the beginning of a process of renewal that, while excluding the possibility of independence, permitted some development of the colonized peoples, the global context meant that the process, once under way, was unstoppable. The African National Congress of South Africa was founded in 1912. In India, the road to independence was dominated by the rise of the Muslim party led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, head of the Muslim League, whose radical politics culminated in the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan as a separate state when independence was declared on 15 August 1947. India and Pakistan remained in the Commonwealth. Burma, Ceylon, Malaya and Singapore followed. Since 1945, the people of Vietnam had been fighting against colonial rule. In 1949, the communist revolution triumphed in China. In 1954, the Viet Cong triumphed at the Battle of Dien Ben Phu. Revolution

broke out in Algeria. France was forced to recognize the independence of Morocco and Tunisia, having already recognized that of Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Libya and Sudan.

During the 1950s, riots broke out in Dimbokro in Côte d'Ivoire. They had been foreshadowed by the events of 1947–8, when there had been a strike on the Dakar-Niger railway lasting five months and 10 days, and by events in Madagascar that had left 90,000 people dead.

In 1952, the revolution in Egypt led to the overthrowing of King Farouk I, bringing the nationalist Gamal Abdel Nasser to power. In Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco it was also the nationalists who triumphed.

In 1955, the Bandung Conference was held in Indonesia. The 29 countries represented collectively denounced colonialism and its misdeeds. The Dutch and the British had already been forced to grant independence to their colonies.

1956 saw the outbreak of the first Arab-Israeli war.

In 1957–8, France enacted the *loi-cadre* (a framework law giving self-governance to African territories). Ghana gained its independence and Guinea opted for international sovereignty. Algeria obtained its independence in 1962. Two years previously, most African states – following the example of Patrice Lumumba's Congo – had embarked on the road to independence.

In 1963, African countries, many of which were mostly Muslim, founded the Organisation of African Unity. The Palestine Liberation Organization and the Arab League were also founded, thereby consolidating the political will of their Member States and establishing unity and solidarity in opposing the creation of the State of Israel in 1948.

All the sacrifices made in the name of Islam by illustrious exiles such as Apha Yaya, Thierno Aliou, Cheikh Anta Mbacké, Cheikh Hamala, Bounafou Niamaga, Souwahibou Cissé, Mohamed Kounta, Birane Cissé, Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba, Samory Touré, Alal Al Fassi and Mohamed b. Youssef had not been in vain.

The path to independence and dignity was now open, and the religion preached by the Prophet Muḥammad had triumphed.

In a sign of the times, the Organization of the Islamic Conference was born, officially, in Rabat on 21 September 1969, in response to the attack on the al-Aqsa Mosque on 21 August of that same year.

Chapter 2.3

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
SECOND WORLD WAR ON THE
MUSLIM WORLD

Iba Der Thiam

On 1 September 1939, a new war was breaking out in Europe that was not dissimilar to the First World War of 1914–18, which had drawn almost every country in the world into fierce combat, and ignited by conflicts of interest, rivalries and antagonism between the imperialist powers.

The Second World War, which began with the invasion of Poland by Germany, would cost 40 million lives and obliterate 20,000 towns. The first atomic weapons were deployed and communities deliberately exterminated in a frenzy of fanatical nationalism, horrendous violence and senseless destruction that was worse than anything that had gone before.

As the war escalated, almost every European country, and the other continents, were dragged into the hostilities, in a global context that had been shaken by a series of crises since the signature of peace treaties in the aftermath of the First World War, including the Great Depression of 1929, the rise to power of Nazism in Germany, personified by Hitler, and of Mussolini's Fascism, the weakening of the League of Nations, and the militaristic and expansionist aspirations of countries like Japan.

On 6 and 9 August 1945, the first atomic bombs ever to be deployed were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with devastating and terrifying consequences, and it was Japan's capitulation that ended the Second World War.

This was a turning point in the history of humanity, because the advent of fascism, Nazism and militarism and their subsequent defeat, coupled with the rise of communism, locked humanity into a wide-ranging ideological struggle following the Allied victory. That struggle was the Cold War, which set the capitalist, liberal West and the international communist movement against each other. The diverse repercussions of the Cold War were felt in every corner of the globe.

The Muslim world was of course, not immune to these repercussions.

In every stage of the conflict, the Muslim world played a pivotal role in negotiations and strategies, because it was an abundant source of human resources and raw materials, not only in Asia, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and the Soviet Union's Caucasus, but also in the Near and Middle East and other areas where Muslim communities were scattered across a number of countries, such as the Mediterranean basin, Europe, and even some Latin American countries.

The involvement of the Muslim world in the conflict had a demographic impact, as its men and women were drafted into the war effort, particularly from still-dependent colonies.

Those countries were also theatres of military operations, with terrible consequences.

Moreover, the Muslim world participated in every aspect of the war effort, often to the detriment of its own populations.

In all sectors of activity, the Muslim world was hit hard by the economic consequences of involvement in the conflict, and by the social, political, diplomatic and territorial repercussions of the Second World War in all the colonies where several key figures exercised their colonial authority.

When the war broke out, some regions of the Muslim world were beginning to emerge from the tribulations they had already endured and overcome foreign oppression to make an impact on the world stage.

In the era of the motorcar, aviation and the transport revolution, reserves of oil and gas became strategically important to the point that none of the belligerents could afford to ignore them: ultimately, the availability of fuel could determine the outcome of the war.

The geography of the Muslim world and the ethnic composition of its populations meant it was of crucial importance in addressing the problem that had arisen in connection with the creation of the State of Israel in Palestinian territory in 1948.

The Muslim population of the Soviet Union had been attached to Islamism for centuries. Under Stalin's policy of Russification, they were constantly subjected to acts of ideological, cultural and religious aggression, fuelling a discontent and frustration that might erupt at any time.

The Muslim world in North Africa and the Middle East was home to Arab peoples who had inherited a strong historical tradition and a cultural and civilizational heritage that gave them a clear sense of identity that found expression in their language, alphabet, art, culture, lifestyle and material accomplishments, which had been drawn on extensively by the West to promote the Renaissance and enter the modern age.

In Asia, the Muslim world consisted of mainland and island countries with cultural heritages spanning several millennia. Their populations wished for nothing more than to live in peace and keep their traditions and values

alive, but there could be no escape from the impact of the expansionism of the West and its determination to replicate its institutions, law, language, culture and religion in all other societies.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the Muslim world consisted of a group of states that were the heirs to the prestigious empires of Nigerian Sudan, Benin and Bornu, the Fulani theocracies, which were admirably sophisticated in the arts, sciences and crafts, and which still jealously guarded the memory of all that the Congress of Berlin had chosen to overlook in its quest to legitimize European ambitions for expansion and conquest: Europe wanted to brush aside pre-existing cultures and civilizations and create a blank canvas onto which it could project its own image.

This Muslim universe, unified by religion, was a kaleidoscope of peoples of different skin colours, languages, cultures, aspirations and lifestyles.

However, the sense of belonging to one religion, the desire to live freely, and a determination to reject any form of domination or occupation conferred strength, cohesion and solidarity on the Muslim world. Moreover, it was unified by the ideal of a diversity of cultures forming a vast pan-Islamist movement, uniting hearts and minds in a solidarity that was founded on the common values that were symbolized and strengthened by the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.

In Europe, Germany turned the repercussions of the Great Depression to its advantage and took every opportunity to establish itself from 1933 as a military power at sea, in the air and on land and acquire the status of a great economic power. Meanwhile, France continued to flounder and was manifestly incapable of resisting its neighbour Germany when it wiped Poland off the map and endorsed the Soviet Union's occupation of Finland, leaving the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden and Denmark) in a strategically vulnerable position that would cost them dearly.

On 10 May 1940, Hitler ordered German troops to invade Holland and Belgium. Belgium capitulated and German victories at the Somme led to the fall of France. On 10 June, Fascist Italy declared war on France.

This crushing defeat provoked a mass exodus of civilians and troops, triggered by fear and disarray. Entire convoys clogged up the roads to uncertain destinations, causing indescribable chaos.

To make matters worse, the military and civil commands were indecisive and prone to procrastination, especially when they had to decide what France's next move should be when threatened with defeat.

The government left Paris for Tours and then Bordeaux, where the military command threw its full weight behind an armistice agreement. French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud became entangled in a web of contradictions, and he eventually threw in the towel and resigned.

President Lebrun, who followed Reynaud, subsequently appealed to the hero of Verdun, Maréchal Pétain, in the hope that he would be able to secure an armistice agreement that would be less humiliating for France.

Yet even before the armistice was signed (with Germany on 21 June and with Italy on 24 June), General de Gaulle, in London, issued a clarion call rejecting surrender in any form in which he declared, three times in a row, that France was not alone, that it had a vast Empire behind it, that it had allies such as Great Britain and the United States of America, that it had lost a battle but not the war, that the war was a worldwide war, and that it was necessary to organize the resistance effort against Germany and Italy.

This appeal did not immediately meet with the desired response.

While civilians and the military argued fiercely about the best way forward, a number of politicians were already leaving France for North Africa.

On the advice of Laval, Pétain agreed to move the government to Vichy. On 10 July, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies held a joint meeting at which Pétain was elected head of state.

The President of the Republic, Lebrun, simply faded from view.

The French Third Republic had now collapsed, thus making room for what has become known as the Vichy regime of Pétain and Laval.

From then on, the Muslim world was of key importance in the strategies of the protagonists.

In reality, de Gaulle's Appeal of 18 June, launched from London, had been intended more for Africa than the French Empire, which he had referred to in his speech, since Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guiana were too far away and their populations too small to swell troop numbers.

Furthermore, France and its American colonies were separated by what Pierre Chaunu has termed 'the thickness of the Atlantic', and there was always a risk of submarine attacks on troop convoys travelling by sea.

In contrast to the American colonies, France's Asian colonies were densely populated, but Asia was a long way from the military theatre of operations and, crucially, it was unpredictable.

That is why the Appeal of 18 June was intended mainly for the people of Africa, a continent separated from Europe only by the Strait of Gibraltar – a mere 14 kilometres – and the Italian and Balkan peninsulas.

This theory is confirmed by the fact that when de Gaulle was searching for a base for Free France, in a part of the empire that was under French sovereignty, that would be suitable for military staff and a launch pad for the liberation of occupied territories, he chose Dakar.

It was in Dakar that de Gaulle's Free French Forces attempted to land, with logistical assistance from the British, on 23 September 1940.

It is worth noting, incidentally, that the capital of the Federation of French West Africa occupied a privileged geographical position on the far western tip of Africa.

A gateway to the ocean, Dakar was home to all the institutions of French West Africa, which had been a federation of eight states since 1895.

The city played a pivotal economic and political role in the colony of Senegal, which had four *communes de plein exercice* (municipalities in which French common law was applicable) in 1872, 1880 and 1887, and 18 other *communes de moyen exercice* (a mixture of French and local governance) when the Second World War broke out in 1939.

Senegal, France's gateway to Africa, was a microcosm of diversity: although predominantly Muslim, it was also home to Christians and animists, as well as French, Lebanese, Syrian and Cape Verdean nationals, and it had a total population of over 1.6 million inhabitants. Its communities were a mixture of French citizens and French subjects. Its political status was unique in sub-Saharan Africa.

Senegal had been intensely political since 1840, with regular elections, a truculent association movement and a burgeoning press, as well as marches, petitions, debates, trade union struggles and a vibrant cultural scene that gave expression to the country's political verve.

Although agriculture, livestock breeding and fishing were the mainstays of Senegal's economy, an important contribution came from the import and export of goods of all kinds, which transited through the port of Dakar before being distributed to the hinterland by means of the Dakar-Niger Railway, which was built between 1907 and 1923.

Thus Dakar was a port of call and a distribution hub that provided access to the ocean for countries such as Sudan, Niger and Mauritania, of which Saint-Louis became the capital in 1920.

John Watson's work on Dakar during the Second World War discusses de Gaulle's aborted landing in Dakar in the following terms: 'It was clear that if the great port of Dakar would join with Free France and, with Dakar, the rest of French West Africa of which it was the capital, the key to most of the French Empire would fall into the hands of the Allies, General de Gaulle's position would be consolidated and the Allied war effort would be greatly facilitated.'

For the French Navy, Dakar was similar in function to Toulouse, Marseille, Rochefort, Lorient, Brest, Nantes or Cherbourg.

Dakar was a fulcrum for the French fleet in the Atlantic and a military harbour, supplying food, munitions and fuel.

Since the Great War, black troops destined for the theatre of operations of mainland France had sailed from Dakar. Furthermore, Dakar was the closest port to Latin America.

In 1939 the capital of French West Africa had an airport with two runways. The first was 1,300 metres by 70 and was used by aircraft flying the Dakar-Natal route or those providing a fast service to North America. At that

time, the runway was the longest in the world, a fact that gave it exceptional strategic importance.

The second runway was 1,000 metres by 50 and was used by aircraft connecting Dakar with Casablanca and Toulouse. Seen from any angle, the choice of Dakar as a base was a wise one.

De Gaulle's operation was unsuccessful owing to the pre-emptive measures taken by Pétain, who had surmised de Gaulle's intentions and supplied Governor-General Pierre Boisson with 'modern batteries and air squadrons, as well as a large naval base' to defeat de Gaulle's troops.

By deploying this equipment, Dakar managed to fend off de Gaulle's attempted landing, and the leader of the Free French could do little more than drop a few bombs and pamphlets in dense fog.

The plan to make the predominantly Muslim capital of French West Africa the epicentre of the resistance effort against Germany had failed, and it was only now that an alternative solution was sought.

This was facilitated by the decision of Félix Eboué, Governor of Chad (a Muslim country), to join Free France on 26 August 1940.

Immediately after this capital, not to say historic event, Major Leclerc was appointed governor of Cameroon for the Free French forces, which led to the Middle Congo and Ubangi-Shari rallying to the cause as well.

Subsequently, Brazzaville was chosen as the capital of Free France, and Africa became crucially important in the strategy to liberate mainland France.

Indeed, it was in Brazzaville that Ordinance No. 1 of 27 October 1940 was issued, establishing a Council for the Defence of the Empire mandated to 'ensure the internal and external security of the territories of the Empire, support the moral cohesion of the Empire's troops, and oversee the administration of war, negotiations with foreign powers, and the exercise of administrative and political power, legislation by ordinance, judicial powers and economic activity.'

Ordinance No. 2 was also issued in Brazzaville. It was signed by de Gaulle, and named the members of the Council for the Defence of the Empire as General Catroux, Vice-Admiral Muselier, General de Larminat, Governor Eboué, Governor Sautot, Physician-General Sicé, Professor Cassin, Reverend Father d'Argenlieu and Colonel Leclerc.

Later on, de Gaulle would write, understandably, that 'Brazzaville was, during those terrible years, the refuge of our honour and our independence, and will always be an example of the most meritorious French effort.'

It was moreover from Chad, an integral part of the Muslim world, that the future General Leclerc and the future General Koenig set forth with an armoured column that would enable them to cross the Sahara and return to North Africa – a region that was crucial to the outcome of the Second World War because it served as the launch pad for efforts to liberate part of Provence.

It is interesting to note that the Vichy government had failed to improve the living conditions for ordinary people in mainland France.

Faced with the ever-greater demands made by Germany, the Vichy authorities acquiesced to a form of collaboration that demolished what credibility they had left.

As the conflict went on, the enemy camp began to flounder in the aftermath of Germany's failed attempts between August and December 1940 to invade Great Britain and force it to surrender. Italy, too, suffered serious setbacks following Mussolini's decision to attack Greece.

Not only did the Greeks thwart the Italian offensive, but in Tabruk British, New Zealand and Australian troops joined forces to inflict devastating defeats on the Italians on 22 January 1941 and 8 February 1941.

Mussolini and his troops left over 200,000 prisoners and suffered enormous material losses.

These events were all the more significant because Hitler had intended to use Spain as a base for operations in Africa that would be detrimental to British interests. But Franco rejected the idea, and by late 1941 the war had escalated, and with the involvement of Japan and the United States everything changed.

In Asia, the area spanning Indochina, the Dutch East Indies, China and Tonkin was now in the eye of the storm.

The surprise attack on Pearl Harbour by the Japanese ended in the destruction of the American fleet and the successful occupation of Malaya, Singapore, Burma and the Philippines; Japan's influence now extended so far that it posed a threat to India and Australia. Meanwhile, Rommel had made inroads into Egypt, from Bir Hakeim to the gates of Alexandria, and Mussolini had left for Libya, where he intended to celebrate the victory of the Axis powers.

On the Russian front, German troops invaded the Caucasus.

In these conditions, the Allied intervention in North Africa in 1942 was particularly significant, especially in the light of the strong performances by the Axis powers at the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Stalingrad, as well as in the battle being fought on the Eastern Front.

Rommel had suffered a humiliating defeat, though, that cost him 500 tanks and 45,000 men during the recapture of Mersa Matruh and Benghazi on 6 and 20 November respectively. Cyrenaica fell to the British once more. Montgomery fortified Tabruk and unloaded 3,000 tonnes of equipment per day, transforming the military situation in that part of North Africa.

On 8 November 1942, the landing of Allied troops in Algeria and Morocco fundamentally redefined Africa's strategic position. The mission was an Anglo-American landing conducted amidst considerable confusion, most of which could be attributed to the personal tensions and rivalries that existed



II-3.1 A poster criticizing Winston Churchill over the battles of Dakar (Senegal) and Mers-al-Kébir (Algeria), in 1940

© ANOM France, Aix-en-Provence

between military chiefs and politicians and a general lack of coordination. Finally, however, a consensus was reached, and the Council for the Defence of the Empire, which comprised representatives of French West Africa and North Africa led by General Giraud, put on a show of unity.

It was in North Africa – the most staunchly Muslim region – that de Gaulle, Roosevelt and Churchill met for the first time. It was also in North Africa, in Fes, on 9 August 1943, that de Gaulle ventured out to meet the crowds for the first time, and in the Middle Atlas region he was greeted warmly by the Berber people, thus conferring on him a legitimacy that he needed now more than ever.

On 17 September 1943, the Provisional Consultative Assembly opened its offices in Algiers. It was formed of 40 representatives from resistance organizations based in mainland France, 12 representatives of the former extra-metropolitan resistance movement, 20 members of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, and 12 representatives of the General Council.

De Gaulle presided over its first meeting, which was held on 3 November 1943.

It was also in Algiers that the French Committee of National Liberation (*Comité Français de Libération Nationale*) was established, before being transformed into the Provisional Government of the French Republic by the Ordinance of 3 June 1944.

All the Muslim peoples of the subregion were alarmed by the fighting that took place in the western Mediterranean during the campaigns of Tunisia, Sicily, Elba, Corsica and at the time of the Provence landings in 1944.

It was from the Muslim countries of North Africa that the Provence landings were launched. They followed on from the Normandy landings, and they led to the liberation of Toulon and marked the real beginning of the recapture of France, with the arrival of 900,000 new soldiers, 170,000 vehicles, and four million tons of arms and goods, as well as the provision of 600 aircraft to the Allies in the Azores.

The Muslim countries of North Africa played host to high-ranking generals such as Montgomery, Rommel, de Larminat, Leclerc, Koenig, Dalton, Eisenhower, and Giraud, who were operating on African territory, as well as to politicians presiding over the fates of the United States, Great Britain and France, which already had residence in North Africa.

It is important to realize the full extent of the Muslim world's demographic contribution to the war effort throughout the conflict, both the Vichy period and the Resistance, in the form of military recruits.

All the colonies had to provide troops, as 'blood tax', and a recruitment process was held annually, regardless of adverse weather, epidemics or other limiting factors. If there was a labour shortage, fields, factories and construction sites operated at less than full capacity or were simply abandoned. The

administration, too, was short of staff. Some who were likely to be recruited sometimes sought refuge in bordering countries, families were separated, and there was a shortage of food and work.

In French West Africa alone, almost 200,000 Africans were conscripted and sent to France to engage in armed combat. To a lesser extent, the situation was the same in French Equatorial Africa, Madagascar, French Somaliland, North Africa and in the rest of the empire.

Recruitment was carried out in collaboration with canton and village chiefs and district commanders, who were at times only too keen to cooperate.

In economic terms, the colonies had provided an array of raw materials, mostly goods but also labour and services, in conditions in which dilapidated vehicles, worn-out equipment, inadequate tools and a shortage of spare parts were an everyday reality.

Thus the war slowed down the development of the colonies, and several plans for industrialization never came to fruition. Furthermore, the conflict impoverished local populations and caused shortages of fuel, flour, cloth, foodstuffs and other products, resulting in famine, starvation and even death.

This scarcity of goods inevitably led to the creation of a black market that wreaked havoc on the economy, trade, supplies and living conditions and plunged entire communities into insecurity and poverty.

The war effort also had an impact on taxation. Demonstrations were held to mobilize funds for the French Committee of National Liberation, the Red Cross undertook fundraising efforts, and parcels were sent to prisoners.

Agricultural products such as groundnuts, palm oil, rice, millet, maize, potatoes, shea, cassava, cowpea, rubber, coffee, cocoa, bananas and other fruit, cattle, oilcakes, and honey were in high demand.

Africa's contribution was acknowledged by de Gaulle in *Memoirs of Hope*, in which he wrote: 'the contribution of Africans to what has come to be known as the war effort is invaluable' – a statement that provides ample proof of the scale and quality of that contribution.

In spite of this, the Boisson Government's refusal to host de Gaulle in Senegal resulted in the bombing of Dakar in September 1940, which killed 417 people, including 105 Europeans.

A further consequence was the Thiaroye Massacre in December 1944, during which soldiers back from the front, claiming legitimate rights, were shot, killing between 34 and 200 Africans from 17 different countries at Camp Thiaroye.

The refusal to abandon resistance efforts was particularly strong because in most of the colonies there was a fervent patriotic desire to reject capitulation. In Senegal, for example, Alpha Bâ tried to preserve the patriotic flame and the public's desire for resistance by encouraging the establishment of resistance committees that denounced any form of submission to Germany and advocated the approach taken by de Gaulle.



II-3.2 A recruitment poster for the French colonial forces c.1945
© ANOM France, Aix-en-Provence

Ultimately, the contribution of the colonies was so important in the survival of Free France and in combat against the Axis powers that de Gaulle considered it a moral obligation to convene the Brazzaville Conference in January 1944 – which was attended by three of the governors-general of French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa and Madagascar, 17 governors of colonies in black Africa, nine members of the Consultative Assembly, and six observers sent by Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco – in order to reflect on the future of the colonies, in keeping with the wishes of the populations that had been subjected to French rule and had made so many sacrifices.

It was on that occasion that a programme of economic, political and social emancipation was drawn up, although at no point did it contemplate the possibility that the colonies might leave the French Empire, either in the present or the future.

Preparations were made for a new constitution that would redefine the colonies' relationship with France, and the preliminary draft was submitted to the Constitutional Consultative Committee, in which participated African parliamentarians such as Mamadou Dia from Senegal, Sékou Touré from Guinea, Modibo Keita from Sudan, Boubou Hama, Hamani Diori from Niger, and Léopold Sédar Senghor from Senegal.

The process led to a proposal to create a French Union, but the concept of independence was now firmly in everybody's sights.

In 1946, the African Democratic Rally was formed at an historic congress at Bamako, Mali, and the African Regroupment Party was formed subsequently. Libya had obtained its independence in 1941.

In spite of these moves towards independence, the colonies endured further massacres in Algeria, at Sétif in 1948, and at Guelma.

The awakening of Muslim nations, in an international climate dominated by the Cold War, had a strong impact on the countries of the subregion.

The Second World War had a number of other consequences, including America's intervention in Greece in 1946.

The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 led repeatedly to conflicts between the Jewish state and its Arab neighbours. It must be said, though, that there had already been a revolution in Egypt in 1952. Morocco and Tunisia put an end to the protectorate in 1956.

Led by Kwame Nkrumah, the former Gold Coast gained independence in 1957 and was renamed Ghana. The African Independence Party was born, and the African Regroupment Party established a system that would enable it to operate in the eight colonies of French West Africa and beyond.

In Madagascar, the repression of civil uprisings resulted in 90,000 deaths. In Cameroon, the Union of the Populations of Cameroon began the fight for national liberation, while in Algeria in November 1954 the National Liberation Front proclaimed an armed struggle for liberation from French occupation.

In British and Dutch Asian colonies and those of the Middle East, former colonizers, beaten into submission by the sheer force of political will, gradually began to relinquish their colonies in India, Burma and Ceylon. Malaya became the Federation of Malaya, which eventually included Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei.

Under the French Union that had been established at the end of the war, a framework law was presented to African countries in September 1958, and Guinea did not hesitate in opting for immediate independence, thus rejecting the idea of participating in the new ‘community’ envisaged in the text.

In Niger, the Sawaba party wanted to follow in Guinea’s footsteps, but under the leadership of Djibo Bakary it failed to secure the ‘no’ vote.

The new French Community was successful in initiating an autonomous transition phase that laid the foundations for international sovereignty and dampened other colonies’ eagerness for independence. The so-called Mali Federation linked Senegal and French Sudan, but as a political entity it was already obsolete in a world that was undergoing an accelerated transformation.

All these events were taking place in a context set by the Yalta agreements, according to which the Second World War victors divided the world into spheres of influence administered by the Western powers or the Soviet Bloc. The Soviet Union had installed communist regimes in all the European countries it had helped liberate from the Nazi yoke and those regimes were determined never to loosen their grip on power.

Once Germany had been cut in half and the Nuremberg Trials had ended, the Cold War began to dominate world affairs. In an attempt to halt the spread of communism, the United States launched the Marshall Plan in order to aid European recovery.

In addition to economic integration, the Plan made provision for political institutions (the Council of Europe in Strasbourg), scientific institutions (the European Research Council) and economic institutions (the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, and the European Coal and Steel Community), which laid the foundations for Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community) and the Common Market.

In the mid-1950s, there was a period of relative *détente*, in spite of the coming to power of the communists in China in 1949 and the Korean War.

Across the Muslim world, the war had awakened consciences, resulting in unequivocal demands for independence and an increasing desire for dignity.

This process was undeniably accelerated by the creation of the State of Israel.

The consequences of all these events included the 1956 Suez Crisis – in which Arab countries such as Egypt, Iraq and Jordan opposed the State of Israel and the nationalization by Nasser of the Suez Canal – and the Six-Day War of 1967.

All over Asia, Great Britain, driven back in countries that were not part of the Muslim world, established new links with its former colonies (India, and countries in the Middle East and Africa) in the form of the Commonwealth.

The end of the war in Indochina in 1954 and the Bandung Conference one year later clearly demonstrated to other Afro-Asian peoples that they should pursue the goal of decolonization.

From then on, Muslim peoples were no longer isolated, because the Communist International, in the form of Cominform (which had replaced the Comintern) sought to forge a new alliance with them against international imperialism.

It was in this context, following the wave of independences in the 1960s, that a group of 'non-aligned' countries formed a movement within the United Nations that would have a voice in the international community.

In conclusion, by the time Germany, Italy and Japan had been finally defeated, the configuration of the world map of 1939 had changed beyond recognition.

A new world, born of the Yalta agreements, was beginning to take shape against the backdrop of the Cold War and the bitter struggle between communism and capitalism, embodied by the Western countries.

The Muslim world was once again of key importance in determining how those processes would play out.

Participation in the war had given the Muslim peoples greater awareness of their situation, and they now aspired to greater justice, liberty, economic and social progress, and the recovery of their sovereignty.

The war had changed everything, and nothing would ever be the same as before. With the exception of the Palestinian people, the Muslim world took the opportunity to cast off the shackles of colonialism and the consequences of foreign domination, but its active role in defeating Japanese militarism, Hitler's Nazism and Italian fascism meant that it was also one of the pioneers whose sacrifices had helped to build what Churchill nobly called 'the free world'.

In a sign of the times, a fire at the al-Aqsa Mosque on 21 August 1969 gave the Muslim world the opportunity to establish the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, thereby offering peoples and communities across the world an organizational framework for discussion, cooperation, participation, joint action and campaigning that was underpinned by the values of Eternal Islam.

Chapter 2.4

CREATION OF THE STATE OF
ISRAEL IN 1948 AND ITS IMPACT
ON THE MUSLIM WORLD

Khairia Kasmieh

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations resolution of 29 November 1947 represented a major triumph for Zionist diplomacy and efforts over half a century. While falling far short of the full-blown Zionist aspiration for a state comprising the whole of Palestine and Jerusalem, it provided an invaluable charter of international legitimacy for the creation of an independent Jewish state. Although most of the political leaders of Zionism were disappointed with the idea of an independent Palestinian state and the exclusion of Jerusalem, they had grave doubts about the viability of the Jewish state within the United Nation borders. But still, the United Nations resolution represented a tremendous gain of international support for the establishment of a Jewish state, hence their decision to go along with it.¹

The first Arab-Israeli dispute 1948 and its results

The establishment of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948 was one of the most momentous events in the history of the twentieth century, but created the problem of Palestine.² Thus were sown the seeds of the Palestinian ‘Diaspora’ and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The State of Israel was born in the midst of a war with the Arabs of Palestine and the neighboring Arab states. This war which the Israelis call the ‘War of Independence’ and the Arabs call ‘al-Nakba’, or the disaster, had

1. A. Shlaim, *The Iron Wall (Israel and the Arab World)*, New York, London, W. W. Norton and Company, 2000. p. 25.
2. A. R. Taylor, *Prelude to Israel. (An Analysis of Zionist Diplomacy 1897– 1947)*, Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970, 2nd ed., p. 111




II-4.1 Palestinian refugees constructing shelters in Jalazone camp, Palestine, in December 1949

© UN Photo/AW

two phases. The first phase lasted from 29 November 1947, when the United Nations passed the Partition Resolution, until 14 May 1948, when the State of Israel was proclaimed. The second phase lasted from 15 May until the termination of hostilities on 7 January 1949. The first and unofficial phase of the war, between the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine ended in triumph for the Jews and tragedy for the Palestinians. The second and official phases, involving the regular armies of the neighboring Arab states, also ended in a Jewish victory and a comprehensive Arab defeat.³

3. Shlaim, *The Iron wall ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL IN 1948
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MUSLIM WORLD



II-4.2 The partition of Palestine as proposed by the majority of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947

© UN photo

The Arab countries that had agreed to military intervention following the termination of the British Mandate over Palestine and the collapse of Palestine resistance were Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan. The Arab countries' decision to intervene came as the only hope of stemming the tide of refugees and averting the complete loss of Palestine. But it was too late if it was meant to prevent the destruction of the Palestinian community. It also was too late to prevent the establishment of the Jewish state.

The Arab armies had no concerted aim and no serious will to face the Israelis who had proceeded with a total mobilization of their man power on modern lines. In fact Arab and Jewish forces were obviously unequal: Israel owed her victory, besides better equipment and superior organization, to assistance extended from abroad. The Arab armies proved to be inadequate instruments of determined action.⁴

No sooner was the Jewish state established than the Israelis began to violate the provisions of the very resolution which brought their state into existence. An Israel state, which had nothing in common with the Jewish state envisaged by the United Nations partition resolution, unjust and iniquitous as it was, had emerged and was determined to maintain itself by force of arms.⁵

As a result of the momentous events of 1938–49, the area which fell under Israeli control amounted to 20,820 square kilometres (80 per cent) out of 26,323 square kilometres representing the total area of Palestine.⁶

The Palestine war ended with four Armistice Agreements signed in 1949, under the auspices of the United Nations, between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria. The Armistice Agreements were intended to serve as steps on the road to peace. An identical preamble to all four Agreements was 'to facilitate the transition from the present truce to a permanent peace'. Yet not in a single case did the Armistice Agreements turn out to be the precursor to a formal peace settlement.⁷

Israel bears a larger share of the responsibility for the political deadlock that followed the formal ending of hostility. The State of Israel came into being as a result of an act of the United Nations and as such, the Israelis are obliged to the world organization, to respond and comply unreservedly with all its principles. This was rejected by Israel from the outset.

4. G. Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1980, pp. 407, 409.

5. H. Cattar, *The Palestine Problem in a Nutshell*, Beirut, Palestine Research Center, 1971, p. 21.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

7. W. Khalidi, *Palestine Reborn*, London and New York, I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd, 1992, pp. 74–6.

The Palestinian refugees' problem and its Complications

Palestinian society disintegrated under the impact of the Jewish military offensive that got under way in April, and the 'exodus' of the Palestinians was set in motion. But the first and the largest wave of refugees occurred before the official out break of hostilities on 15 May. By the end of 1948 the number of Palestinian refugees had swollen to around 900,000.⁸ The loss of a large part of the country to the Israelis led to the dispersal of the Palestinians who were forced to seek refuge and relief in the neighboring Arab countries, or those parts of Palestine-the West Bank and Gaza- that remained under Arab control.⁹ The Israelis consummated the tragedy of the refugees by seizing and taking over all their property, movable and immovable. The looting and plunder extended even to the holdings of those Palestinians who remained under Israeli occupation.¹⁰

The overwhelming majority of the refugees were peasants, deprived of the land and consequently their sources of livelihood; they were reduced to almost total dependency. Pinned in camps at the mercy of relief organizations, their daily life became consumed by the sheer struggle to survive in the face of overwhelming odds.¹¹

The United Nations, being largely responsible for this tragic situation, made efforts to redress the calamity which did actually occur. On December 1948, the General Assembly resolved, among other things, that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return. The tragedy of this resolution was threefold: its lateness, the absence of effective machinery for implementation and the absence of any admission of a responsibility.¹²

Israel refused, with limited exception, to allow the Arab refugees to return, and its attitude was accepted by the Western powers. Every year the United Nations passed a resolution calling for the return or compensation of the refugees, but no one tried seriously to carry it out.¹³

8. Shlaim, *The Iron Wall ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

9. Transjordan annexed (December 1, 1948) the east central part of Palestine, while the Gaza strip was put under Egyptian military administration. Lenczowski, *ibid.* p. 409.

10. Cattan, *The Palestine Problem ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

11. P. A. Smith, *Palestine and the Palestinians*, London and Sydney, Croom Helm, 1948, p. 145.

12. S. Hadawi, *The Arab Israeli Conflict (Cause and Effect)*, Beirut, the Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969, p. 23.

13. A. Hourani, 'Palestine and Israel', in W. Laqueur (ed.), *The Israeli Arab Reader*, Great Britain, Pelican Books, 1971, pp. 327-8.



II-4.3 A destroyed and deserted Palestinian village, 1948

© UN Photo/LM

Once confident that the United Nations did not possess the power or was willing to assert its authority, the Israelis simply ignored it and continue to resist so-called United Nations interference in Israeli internal affairs. Thus they were given ample opportunities to consolidate and strengthen their hand over Palestine.¹⁴

The United Nations' parallel effort to envisage settlement of the Palestine Question by means of a Conciliator (Mediator) was unable to secure any agreement.¹⁵ Following the Mediator's assassination,¹⁶ the General Assembly

14. Hadawi, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 23–4.

15. In May, 1948, the Security Council appointed Count Folke Bernadotte, President of the Swedish Red Cross, as UN mediator for Palestine.

Lenczowski, *The Middle East ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 408.

16. On September 16, Bernadotte recommended to the UN General Assembly a change in the proposed partition boundaries. The following day he was assassinated by Jewish terrorists. Dr. Ralph Bunch, an American, took over his duties, aided by the Conciliation Committee. *Ibid.*, p. 408.

entrusted his function to a Conciliation Committee, which in May 1949 secured the signature of the belligerent parties on what has since been called the 'Lausanne Protocol'. However, the Commission's conciliation efforts failed utterly due to Israel's refusal to permit the repatriation of the refugees and to give up any of the territories which it had seized, even though they fell outside the limits of the Partition Resolution.¹⁷

The Israelis made political use of the refugees by refusing to consider the refugees, problem except in the framework of a peace settlement with the surrounding Arab states. They linked together two matters which had no moral connection. For the return of the refugees was an obligation which they owed to the Palestinian Arabs themselves as inhabitants of the land they conquered. What Israel wanted was to have the land without its inhabitants, so as to settle its own immigrants.¹⁸

The assumption which underlay the attitude of Israel was that sooner or later the refugees would melt away, absorbed into the surrounding Arab peoples, and then the problem of Palestine would cease to exist. But this was a false assumption. It was not a mass of individuals who fled in 1948, it was the greater part of a society, a common land and language, and a common political life.¹⁹

More widespread still was a sense of human dignity, a feeling that in the eyes of Israel and its supporters, the Arabs were surplus human beings, to be removed and dumped elsewhere to redress a wrong not they, but Europe, had done to the Jews.²⁰

Allowing for natural increase, by early 1960s, there must have been rather more than two million Palestinian Arabs: almost 400,000 in the Gaza Strip, 300,000 in Israel, 1,300,000 in Jordan, 150,000 each in Lebanon and Syria. About two-thirds were still registered refugees, in the documents of UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency constituted 8 December 1949 to assist the Palestinian refugees).²¹ Many of the Palestinians in their 'dispersion' had become wholly or partly self-supporting. Those with wealth, influence, professional skills and educational qualifications managed to find themselves at a distinct advantage.²²

17. Cattani, *The Palestine Problem ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

18. Hourani, 'Palestine and Israel' ..., *op. cit.*, p. 327.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 328.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 329.

21. General Assembly (UN) Resolution No. 302 (4). G. J. Tomeh (ed.), *United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1917-1971*, Beirut and Abu Dhabi, Institute for Palestine Studies and Center for Research and Documentation, 1975, pp. 18-20.

22. Smith, *Palestine ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 115, 123, 146.

On the whole, the Palestinian Arabs remained a people who had lost every thing but were determined to continue to exist. After 1948 this was the heart of the Palestinian problem. The problem in the eyes of the Western powers, who assisted Israel politically, morally, financially and militarily, has ceased to be one of a people expelled and dispossessed. It became merely a case of how to ensure and preserve the safety and integrity of Israel.²³ The 'de facto' existence of Israel was not really in serious danger, but what remained to be assured was the existence of the Palestinian people.

The attitude of the Arabs towards Israel

In 1949, having achieved 'independence', the State of Israel became a status quo power. It accepted this status quo and worked to preserve it in the face of Arabs attempt to change it.²⁴ For the Arabs the situation created in Palestine in 1948 was provocative and explosive. It is not only what the Israelis have done since 1948 that has been a source of worry for the Arabs, it is what they plan to do in the future. As long as Israel remained open to all Jews who wished to immigrate, as long as it could maintain Western standards of technology and hope for wide support in Europe and the USA, there would be a danger of its expanding into the territory of the surrounding Arab states.²⁵

The Arabs perceived the Palestine Issue as an Arab one, the centre of inter-Arab politics. They shared with the Palestinians their attitude towards Israel because they belong to the same geographical and historical unit as Palestine, and where almost every family had a Palestinian connection.²⁶

Whatever their differences on other matters, the Arab states were united in animosity to Israel, and attracted the support, within limits, of most Islamic and other Afro-Asian states, in spite of Israeli efforts to enter into close relations with the newly emancipated African states and underdeveloped countries of Asia.²⁷

A peace settlement seemed far away, Israel did not cease protesting that she desired peace and that she was prepared to sign a treaty to replace the existing Armistice Agreements. The Arab States made any talk of peace conditional upon Israeli compliance with three resolutions of the United Nations, namely, those enjoining the internationalization of Jerusalem, the readmission of Arab refugees to their homes, and the rectification of boundaries so as to conform to the original Partition Resolution of November 1947. As long as Israel steadily rejected these conditions as a prerequisite to a peace treaty, and the

23. Hadawi, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict ...*, *op. cit.*

24. Shlaim, *The Iron Wall ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

25. Hourani, 'Palestine and Israel' ..., *op. cit.*, p. 330.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 329.

27. Lenczowski, *The Middle East ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 436.

CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL IN 1948
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MUSLIM WORLD



II-4.4 The opening day of the UN Security Council's debate on the question of Palestine, 24 February 1948

© UN Photo/KB

Arabs were adamant in insisting upon them, the likelihood of the two parties coming together was as remote as ever.²⁸

Israel's policy from the outset was to impose itself by force and fear and to cow the neighboring Arab states whenever it could claim that its interests were in danger. The acts of aggression committed by Israel after the signing of the Armistice Agreements were too numerous to list, they ranged from army patrol and crossing of Armistice demarcation lines to murder and destruction of villages. All these acts were in violation of the Armistice Agreements and were condemned by the International Organizations.²⁹

For years Arabs have appealed, protested and argued for justice and removal of Israel threats against Arab rights and security but in vain. UN records show that at no time have any of the Arab States been found guilty and

28. *Ibid.*, p. 423.

29. For details of the Armistice lines' incidents. Shlaim, *The Iron Wall ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 81–94.

condemned by any organ of the United Nations for attacks by their regular military forces against territory occupied by the Israelis.³⁰

One of the most prominent Israeli aggressions was the Israeli invasion of November 1956 of the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula according to Israel's program of expansion. This invasion assumed the proportions of a war in which France and Britain became involved. It was only as a result of a combined pressure by the United Nations, the USA and the Soviet Union, that Israel was forced in 1957 to withdraw with great reluctance from the territories which had it occupied.³¹



II-4.5 Citizens in Gaza receiving supplies from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) in May 1957

© UN Photo/JG

30. Cattan, *The Palestine Problem ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

31. For all implications of the War: Shlaim, *The Iron Wall ...*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 4. pp. 143–85.

The Arab-Israeli dispute remained relatively dormant for almost a decade following the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sinai in March 1957, and the stationing of United Nations troops on the Egyptian borders. Regional inter-Arab issues kept Arab capitals more than busy. By the end of 1963 the Palestine issue again came to the fore with the dispute over the diversion of the Jordan River waters.³²

The Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict

This dimension receded into the background with the formal Armistice Agreements ending the fighting between the Arab States and Israel.³³ In the absence towards a final solution between Arabs and Israel in the following years, activist Palestinians turned to the surrounding Arab states to promote their cause in the belief that Arab unity was the road to the liberation of Palestine. Unfortunately, the Arab States had relegated the liberation of Palestine to the bottom of their list of priorities.³⁴

While the Arab governments were bickering among themselves, and furthering their own interests, a new generation, geographically dispersed, of Palestinian activist intellectuals came to maturity in the late 1950s. They were suspicious of the Arab solution to the Palestine Problem.³⁵

These young activists, especially in Kuwait and the Gulf states, had come to the conclusion that the time factor decidedly was not on the Arab side.

They saw two particular developments as ominous indicators that Israel was on the way to becoming a permanent fact of life: the impending completion of the project for the utilization of the Jordan River waters in the Negev desert, and Israeli nuclear activities.³⁶

The settling of the Negev was seen as permitting the Israelis to absorb several million more immigrants, increasing Israel's wealth and power, and dispersing its population. The presence or potential threat of atomic weapons would provide a 'standing argument' for the defeatists. Both developments threatened to turn the existing status quo into permanent reality, and served as focal points to demonstrate the necessity for immediate actions and the dangers of further temporization.

32. F. Jabber, 'The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics', in: W. B. Quandt, F. Jabber, and A. M. Lesch (eds.), *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, p. 159. London, University of California Press, 1973.

33. Quandt, *ibid.*, p. 48.

34. Smith, *Palestine ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

35. Quandt, *ibid.*, p. 49.

36. As early as 1956 Israel received her first cyclotron from Cornell University and it was reported that by 1960 Israeli scientists were well on their way to producing nuclear fission. Lenczowski, *The Middle East ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 436.

Palestinian activists saw their role as one of activating tension along the borders and causing armed confrontations, in the expectation that this would embroil the Arab countries in an all-out decisive war of liberation.³⁷ Many of the activists among the Palestinians envisaged that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) would be only an entity for propaganda and without any revolutionary meaning.³⁸

37. Jabber, 'The Palestinian ...?', *op. cit.*, p. 159.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 162.

Chapter 2.5

THE EMERGENCE OF ARAB
NATIONALISM

Ali Muhammad Shembesh

In order to broach this topic, to clarify the nature of Arab nationalism, or at least provide a few simple definitions of the concept from among the many, we will mention a few definitions which, although not generally agreed upon, include the majority of the others.

Arab nationalism is when an Arab has a genuine inner awareness of his complete social existence, that he is an inseparable part of his nation (*umma*), that he has no interests other than those of his nation or that he has no use other than to serve his nation.¹ It has been remarked that:

Arab nationalism is that distinctive communal characteristic of a group of people which is given the name 'Arab' or the 'Arab nation', or more succinctly, it is a sense of the total historical, linguistic, cultural and social realities of life including shared customs, traditions, interests, aims, experiences and established truths. It is this that makes the Arab nation a discrete single social and historical unit based on the interaction of numerous national ties which it has in common. Every person who speaks Arabic and traces his origins to Arab history or is proud of that history and internalizes it belongs to Arab nationalism. Such a person belongs to Arab society and the Arab homeland which extends from the Atlantic in the west to the Arabian Gulf and the Iranian highlands in the east, from the Taurus mountains and the Mediterranean in the north to Yemen and the southern coast of Arabian the Peninsula on the Indian Ocean and the African Sahara in the south.²

1. Nadīm al-Biṭār, 'Al-Qawmiyya al-ʿarabiyya' [Arab Nationalism]. *Qirāʾat fi-l-fikr al-qawmī* [Readings on the Nationalist Idea], I, Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-ʿArabiyya, n.d., p. 187.
2. Al-Ḥakm Durūza, and Ḥamīd Jabūrī, *Qirāʾat fi-l-fikr al-qawmī* [Readings on the Nationalist Idea], I, p. 320.

Perhaps Arab nationalism can be defined as an ideological, emotional, cultural and political movement which aims at uniting all Arabs based on the fact that they all belong to a single nation which shares a history, a language, a civilization, interests and destiny. It is an ideological movement because it has philosophical and human content. It is an emotional movement because it is based on a popular reaction and concern for national heritage and a spiritual commitment to realizing its mission. It is a cultural movement because it believes in the positive nature of Arab civilization in the past and in the future, a civilization which relies on a language which has proved its ability to express human thought in all its forms and throughout all periods. Finally, it is a political movement because it aims at the total unity of all parts of the Arab homeland and with all its power defends the heritage, personality and borders of the Arab nation. It is clear that in this sense Arab nationalism is not a racial or sectarian movement. Quite simply and in short it is a national, protective and human movement. We might add that on the strength of this definition Arab nationalism only came into existence with the Arab popular resistance to French occupation in 1835.³

In the modern sense, nationalism is a product of the Arab Organization which it acquired from the West. Prior to Islam, Arabs were composed of tribes often in conflict while at other times cooperating together. Then Islam arrived to transform these tribes into a nation with a mission. But Muslims fought among each other, became weak, and allowed the West to damage their nation through the Crusades and colonialism. The whole Arab region was partitioned into French, British and Italian colonies. The decline of the Ottoman Empire, which controlled the entire Arab region, played a role in igniting the national spirit, when the Arabs saw the nationalist impulse which promoted the establishment of the nation state in Europe. It also motivated the Arabs in the Arab East to establish a national Arab state. But because the colonizers had many different affiliations, numerous nation states emerged rather than a single one.

In the view of its first proponents, Arabism was a framework within which to resist the attacks of the aggressors. According to them, Arabism was the past, the present and the future. It included the language, the religion, the history, the hopes and pains, and culture in general. The idea of Arab nationalism was at first merged with the concept of Islam as a force for opposing all kinds of colonialism and tyranny. This became evident in the resistance against colonialism in many Arab regions such as Egypt, Algeria and the countries of Sham (Greater Syria). The idea of nationalism appeared only recently with the intellectual movement and the cultural renaissance in Arab lands. This was especially the case in the Arab East where it occurred in the organizations established in Syria and Lebanon and

3. Abu-l-Qāsim Saʿdallāh, 'al-Jazā'ir wa-l-qawmiyya al-ʿarabiyya' [Algeria and arab nationalism], *ibid.*, pp. 587–8.

which contributed greatly to promoting the national movement in its beginnings. These organizations, which began to be founded in 1857, attracted members from a variety of groups.⁴ The Arab civil and military organizations were active in spreading Arab nationalism with the basic aim of pressurizing their Turkish leaders to grant some concessions. In this, they were striving for unity, not wishing to weaken it. At this time both the Christian and Muslim Arab leaders agreed to rise above their differences regarding Arab nationalism and to adopt a working nationalist programme for the Arab countries. This took shape in the proposals of the Arab Congress held in Paris on 23 July 1913 and which were forwarded to the Ottoman government.⁵

These organizations, both clandestine and open,⁶ attempted to oppose Turkish rule and foreign consignments by inducing the Arabs to revolt and regain their stolen sovereignty and dignity. They called on them to embrace national unity so as to rid themselves of Turkish tyranny and oppression, and to attend to the Arabic language, the basis of culture which is one of the basic elements of nationalism.⁷

The idea of Arab nationalism arose among the Arab Christian intellectuals before it did among the Arab Muslims. The idea spread slowly even among the Christians. This was because the Western colonial powers at that time attempted to divert the Christians away from the notion of Arabism by exploiting the divisions between them and thus inciting sectarian conflict and religious fanaticism.

After the appearance of Turanism (*Ṭurāniyya*), the official and unofficial policy of the Ottoman government – based on despotism, subjugation and torture – was to disregard the Arabs and their national aspirations. The result was that the Arab Christians became even more enthusiastic in their support for the idea of Arab nationalism and secession from the Turkish State which adopted the principles of discrimination and fanaticism in its dealings. This saw an increase in the number of secret and public organizations both within and outside the Arab regions, all demanding self-determination and independence from the Turkish State. These ideas appeared particularly during the last quarter of the nineteenth century and subsequently, and in 1916 they led to the nationalist revolution in Arab lands against the Turkish presence which

4. George Anthonius, *Yaqẓāt al-ʿArab* [The Arab Awakening], transl. By Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Asad and Ihsān ʿAbbas, Beirut, Dār al-ʿIlm li-l-Malāyīn, 1978, p. 118.

5. Majīd Kaddūrī, *al-Ittijābat al-siyāsiyya fi-l-ʿalam al-ʿarabi*, a transl. of *Political Trends in the Arab World*, Beirut, al-Dār al-Muttaḥida li-l-Nashr, 1985, pp. 32–3.

6. For more information on these organizations, see G. Lenczowski, *The Political Awakening in the Middle East*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1970, pp. 62–9.

7. For more information on this subject, see ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Dūrī, *al-Judhūr al-tāriḫiyya li-l-qawmiyya al-ʿarabiyya* [The Historical Roots of Arab Nationalism], Beirut, Dār al-ʿIlm li-l-Malāyīn, 1960, pp. 63–6.

was an expression of the Arab will. But the revolution did not achieve its main aims which were to create a single, all-inclusive nation state for all the Arab regions under Ottoman control. In his *al-Ittijāhāt al-siyāsīyya fi-l-‘ālam al-‘arabī* (Political Trends in the Arab World) Majīd Khaddūrī remarks that

Although it widened in scope, due to the hostile position of Europe Arab nationalism was transformed from a positive movement to a negative one. The First World War allowed the Arabs to claim independence and gave them a real chance to achieve this. But particularly in the Fertile Crescent, no sooner had they rid themselves of Ottoman authority than they succumbed to foreign mandate.⁸

This is supported by the words of another writer:

British support for the Arabs against Turkey in what is known as the Great Arab Revolt was not out of love of the Arabs in contrast to their later betrayal, but rather out of hatred of the Ottomans and to see their state destroyed by hands other than theirs. This was in accordance with the well known colonial principle ‘divide and rule’. The British also intended to restrict the Ottoman State within the national borders of Turania so that it would be easy to swallow the remaining parts and divide the Arab state between the Great Powers. After this it would swallow Turanian nationalism itself by means of westernization and secularism. So the Arabs supported Britain against the Ottomans and merely exchanged the tyranny of strangers for the tyranny of the strong.⁹

With the victory of the Allies in the First World War the hopes of the Arabs were dashed since the victorious countries denied the role of the Arabs in the war, broke their promises and did not give the Arabs their freedom and independence, indeed, they imposed a new kind of colonialism. Thus, in escaping from the talons of Turkish rule they fell under the oppression of Western colonialism, like someone jumping out of the frying pan into the fire. Under the various kinds of colonialism, whether protectorate, mandate, trusteeship or direct settlement, the Arab region was even more fragmented than before. Each Arab state was left to its own devices in confronting the great colonial powers which controlled the whole region on the pretext of bringing to an end the last convulsions of the ‘Sick Man’, the Ottoman Empire.

There was a noticeable increase in nationalist fervour in the period between the two world wars but this did not crystallize into any united form of action. This was due to fragmentation and the policies of those in power which meant that each individual country attempted to achieve its own independence and its own sovereignty. Nationalist sentiment became associated merely with support for the issue of independence through assistance provided by Arab

8. Kaddūrī, *al-Ittijāhāt al-siyāsīyya* ..., *op. cit.*, p. 35.

9. Muḥammad Aḥmad Khalfullāh et al., *al-Qawmiyya al-‘arabiyya wa-l-Islām* [Arab Nationalism and Islam], Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, n.d., p. 233.

organizations and institutions, especially those in independent countries, to some organizations and fronts in countries fighting for independence and sovereignty. A scholar of Middle Eastern affairs observes that both the Ottoman government and Western imperialists facilitated the rise of nationalism in most of the Middle East, stoked its fire and were responsible for the political activities which took place.¹⁰ Arab nationalism was based on human objectives, not race or faction, and perhaps the most important of these was total unity.¹¹

When we isolate the basic elements of Arab nationalist sentiment we find that two of them are cited in all opinions and schools of thought. These two elements are the concepts of Arabism and unity.¹² The concept of Arabism is fundamental to an understanding of Arab nationalism. It rejects the need to relive the events of the past which are of no benefit; the past is studied not to keep it alive but rather to cast light on the events of the present. Arabism is progressive and it stresses its heritage by rediscovering it not by invalidating it, that is, by bringing it back.¹³

The concept of Arabism is well known in the Arab homeland especially after a number of intellectuals in the last century, such as Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣrī, Miṣhīl ʿAflaq and many others, dealt with it in their writings. Regarding Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣrī and his role in bringing Arab nationalism into popular awareness, Walīd Fazīhā remarks:¹⁴

Today, all educated Arabs agree that Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣrī was the main thinker behind and proponent of the idea of Arab nationalism and Arab unity between the end of the First World War and the appearance of the notion of Baathist nationalism in the mid-1940s and the later Nasserism. Indeed, many view al-Ḥuṣrī as the one who first established the idea. Of course, this does not ignore the importance of many other thinkers such as Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī, Shakīb Arslān and, shortly before the Second World War, Dr Quṣṭanṭīn Zurāfiq, and their role in establishing the concept of nationalism among the Arabs. Nor does it underestimate the significant intellectual and political influence of some of the political movements and parties. The most important of these, in terms of developing national awareness in the region at this time, was the League

10. M. Halpren, *The Politics of Social change in the Middle East and North Africa*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 196.

11. On the main objectives of Arab nationalism, see M. Berger, *The Arab World Today*, New York, Doubleday and Company Inc., pp. 300–12.

12. H. Sharabi, *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World*, Princeton, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1966, p. 96.

13. L. Binder, *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East*, New York, John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1964, p. 169.

14. Walīd Fazīhā, 'al-Qawmiyya al-ʿarabiyya fī marḥalat mā baīna al-ḥarbayn al-ʿālamiyatāin' [Arab Nationalism in the Period between The Two World Wars], *al-Mustaqbal al-ʿarabi*, Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-ʿArabiyya, n.d.

of Nationalist Action. Nonetheless, it is certain that among all these Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣrī was the most comprehensive thinker and the most persistent proponent of the theoretical elements that he proposed. Until the very end of his life he continued to reiterate these. This was at a time when the majority of Eastern thinkers who preceded him at the beginning of the twentieth century associated the idea of Arabism with support for the Islamic Group, then for administrative and political decentralization, and then at the end of the First World War with the call for an Arab state to be established in the East. Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣrī was the most thorough of them since he provided answers to a number of theoretical questions such as what is nationalism? what are the bases of the Arab nation? what is the relationship between nationalism and the state? and how does Arab nationalism stand regarding calls for religion, internationalism and regionalism?

The present writer considers that the most important contribution al-Ḥuṣrī made in his writings is that in comparison with those Arab thinkers who preceded him he was at the forefront of those who laid down the theoretical foundations of Arab nationalism. While the others were focussing all their attention on the political union of the countries in the East, al-Ḥuṣrī was more aware of the theoretical dimensions behind this which he founded on culture and history and certain aspects of the Arab reality. One consequence of this was that the logic of his theorizing led him to include Egypt, the Sudan and the countries of the Arab Maghreb into the desired Arab entity.¹⁵ As we know, his views on these countries isolated him from a number of nationalist thinkers of the time.

Arabism means emphasizing the Arab identity of the individual such that there arises a belief that Arabism is more important than anything else, that is, that it is more important than the existence of the individual. In its Nasserist form, Arabism provided an argument against three interrelated situations. The first and most obvious of these was the division of the countries into small independent states, the second was the economic and social circumstances of some Arab countries in opposing the power of their political structure, while the third situation was the bipolarity in the balance of world power. In contrast to the other new leaders, President Abdul Nasser (ʿAbd-un-Nāṣir) proved that he was the only army officer who possessed leadership magnetism and this earned him the respect of both the military and civilians and enabled him to lead the revolutionary reform movement. But the countries in which the Arab revolution took place have still not decided up to today whether they will follow a revolutionary programme independent of their local leaders or whether they will follow an Arab national programme under a unified Arab leadership. Implicated in this is the issue of Arab unity.¹⁶

15. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

16. Kaddūrī, *al-Ittijāhāt al-siyāsiyya ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 158.



II-5.1 The Arab League
© UNESCO

Arab intellectuals began to take an interest in an Arab union whatever form this might take. The obvious trend was for the establishment of a league of Arab States which would constitute a crucial stage towards achieving total unity. In this way, there was an attempt to make the idea a reality assisted by a number of external factors including the support of Great Britain. Sulaymān al-Ghawīl remarks:

Although there were some positive aspects to the League of Arab States, it could not realize the aims of the people in the Arab nation, nor could it express their future nationalist aspirations and endeavours. This is because the establishment of the League of Arab States in 1945 was the direct result of an old policy which Eden and Churchill had promoted in the 1930s. Thus, the League was built on the rubble left behind by the Ottoman State. It was an impotent organization incapable of keeping pace with political developments and of resisting the international conspiracies devised by colonial circles.¹⁷

17. Sulaymān Šāliḥ Al-Ghawīl, *al-Dawla al-qawmiyya* [The National State], Benghazi, Jāmi'at Qārayūnis, 1990, pp. 241–2.

In fact, all the Arab States which signed the Charter of the League of Arab States had been created according to their own particular stipulations and circumstances which differed considerably from those of the others. This was due to the diverse policies of the colonizing countries which extended their rule and influence to all the Arab regions alike. For this reason events in each Arab state took their own particular course. The States differed from each other in terms of their administrative and judicial structures, in trends in education and training, and in their economic and financial organizations.¹⁸ Perhaps this only served to increase division and fragmentation among the Arab States under the aegis of the League of Arab States rather than rapprochement and unity.

With the appearance of the Alexandria Protocol in 1944 the League of Arab States became a platform for Arab cooperation, but as someone concerned with Arab affairs in the last century has said: 'The League of Arab States which was established in 1945 remained ineffectual in the disputes between the Hashemites in Iraq, Jordan and the other Arab regions of Egypt, Syria and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia'.¹⁹ We can say that even though today these disputes are different in nature, they are still in evidence. Although the League of Arab States was established with the aim of being a bridge to unity, it has been found to be more like a wrestling ring. The foundations for regional sovereignty and independence were laid down in the League's Charter. Perhaps the conflict between the independent Arab countries during the 1950s for the first time revealed the ideological content of the differences between them which had far-reaching international repercussions.²⁰

Despite the role played by Egypt in creating the League of Arab States and participating in its leadership since its establishment in 1945, it was only after 1954 that it began to implement any effective policies. This perhaps emerges from the political speech of President Abdul Nasser prior to 1955 in which he paid no attention to Arab issues or the Arab people.

Seven independent Arab states signed the League's Charter, these being the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Syrian Republic, the Kingdom of Iraq, the Arab Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Lebanon, the Kingdom of Egypt and the Mutawakkilid Kingdom of Yemen. These agreed to the drafting of the Charter, affirming the close relations and many ties linking the Arab States on the basis of respect and the autonomy and sovereignty of those states. In confirmation of this, they drew up Article 7 of the Charter which states 'The unanimous decisions of the Council shall be binding upon all Member-States of the League; majority decisions shall be binding only

18. Anon, *al-ʿAmāl al-qawmiyya li-Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥusri* [The Nationalist Works of Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥusri], Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-ʿArabiyya, 1990, part. 1, III, p. 67.

19. Halpren, *The Politics of Social Change ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 370.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 370.

upon those states which have accepted them'.²¹ It was therefore possible for any state to act contrary to what the majority had decided, and the bond which had led to the creation of the Charter was thereby weakened. The Charter confirmed the sovereignty of the Member-States in the League, but did not give the Council any higher authority or jurisdiction than they themselves possessed. When we consider the possibility of the Charter being amended we find that this could only be undertaken with the agreement of one third of the members, and this was not something easy to obtain.

When the League of Arab States was founded in 1945 many people believed that it was a practical and realistic step on the road to total Arab unity, but events which overtook the League over the years proved the opposite. Its inability to deal with many issues and crises led Arab States, in their differences with each other or with other countries, to resort to other organizations to resolve them. The League was also incapable of referring to the primary source of the Charter which consecrated national sovereignty and which articulated the will of the leaders and their desire to safeguard the regional entities for all time. According to the assessment of a professor, within the framework of something like a regional organization or institution the efforts of the Arab States are coordinated.²² This is despite the fact that the League came into existence before the United Nations. Contrary to what was desired of it, that is, that it function a stage on the way or a bridge to total unity, the League of Arab States became a pulpit for expressing personal opinions or a theatre in which differences were aired. Perhaps the best indication of its inability to achieve what was desired is Article 2 of the Charter which confirms the aims of strengthening cooperation and relations between its members and coordinating the policies of the Arab States in order to consolidate this cooperation so that their independence and sovereignty would be assured.

The notion of an inclusive national Arab State continued, but it did not crystallize into a comprehensive idea which included all the Arabs, nor did it appeal for national unity except after the revolution of 23 July 1952 under the leadership of Gamal Abdul Nasser. For the first time, this revolution witnessed a call for unity from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Gulf, and this was just the opposite of previous demands for a partial unity of certain regions in the Arab homeland. With the onset of the 23 July revolution in Egypt, and due to certain decisive circumstances in Egypt, the call for unity was raised and it spread to include all regions and peoples of the Arab world.

Many movements appeared in the Arab countries at the beginning of the 1950s led by individuals from the middle classes. The movements, which were

21. *The Charter of the League of Arab States*.

22. Muṣṭafā ʿAbdullāh abu-l-Qāsim Khashīm, *Mawsūʿat ʿilm al-ʿalāqāt al-dawliyya* [Encyclopaedia of International Relations], Sirte, al-Jamāhīriyya li-l-Nashr wa-l-Iʿlān, AH 1425, p. 299.

of a military character, managed to seize the reins of power from the traditional authorities. Despite the number of these movements, the resulting forms of revolutionary military rule and their progressive slogans, none of them had an effect on the Arab world as a whole apart from the movement of Gamal Abdul Nasser which arose in Egypt. This had a profound nationalist influence throughout the whole of the Arab region from the Gulf to the Atlantic.

There are perhaps many aspects of Egypt which Abdul Nasser harnessed for the benefit of the Egyptian revolution and its appeal for nationalism. He used slogans calling for freedom, unity and socialism for all Arab lands without exception. Under the leadership of the charismatic Abdul Nasser the idea of total Arab national unity spread and promoting this became his greatest concern. The nationalist republican movement, known as Nasserism, proved attractive for Arab leaders from Marrakech to Iraq. It was not organized on the lines of a political party but was rather held together by Nasser's leadership and the cohesion he provided.²³

Nasserism was a symbol for those who believed in the principles laid down by Nasser after he achieved power. These were the principles of Arab nationalism which were founded on total Arab unity. Nasserism embraced numerous groups, factions and parties from the different Arab societies, all believing that Arab nationalism could only succeed under Nasser's leadership. They therefore supported his policies and continued to have faith in his leadership.²⁴ Nasserism became the vehicle that carried the ideas of comprehensive nationalism, but its appearance in some Arab countries led to conflicts with the other interest groups or with the main political parties. The struggle was fierce and especially so in countries like Syria and Iraq. It was after Nasserism had adopted the principles of freedom and socialist unity that the revolutionary structures emerged.

In Nasser's revolutionary philosophy the Arab domain was the main focus. It was also the chief concern of Egypt with respect to international affairs, which had a great impact on the country. As Nasser understood it, Arabism occupied a central place due to its emphasis on the unity of the region in opposition to the unity of the colonial powers which opposed it.

Indeed, Abdul Nasser began to fight against colonialism and to discredit colonialist thought, which was to rid Egypt of Arabism and Arab nationalism. Especially after 1955, Nasser strove to play an important role in the Arab countries and was active in trying to gain the Arab people's support. Thus, he called for total unity which became a republican aspiration, and he did not hesitate to join Syria in a union which may be said to have been required by the current situation. Nasser did not abandon Syria in its time of hardship.

23. Sharabi, *Nationalism and Revolution ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

On 28 March 1955, Abdul Nasser for the first time announced the six principles of the revolution. These were:

1. To put an end to colonialism;
2. To end feudalism;
3. To break monopolies and the rule of capitalism;
4. To achieve social justice;
5. To form a strong national army;
6. To establish a truly democratic system of government.

Nasser's policies during this period were governed by two crucial developments. The first was his opposition to the Baghdad Pact which he saw as a new colonial means of thwarting any attempt to achieve total Arab unity. The second was the unexpected wide public support for nationalizing the Suez Canal, which Nasser duly announced and which led to an agreement with Britain that it should withdraw its troops from the Canal Zone. Although the agreement was much criticized it was also held to be a victory of Nasser and this endeared him to various different sectors of society and was excellent propaganda for him in the Arab world. The pillar of Nasser's policies was that there should be no pact and no alliance, now no in future.²⁵

As far as Nasser was concerned the unitary project was to recover the Arab nation and allow Arabs to regain their confidence in themselves, in their creative capacity and in their ability to achieve progress. Regaining confidence was a result of progress because colonialism had destroyed that confidence, and had deceived the Arabs into believing that backwardness was their natural state and that the gulf separating them from progress was something preordained, unbridgeable and inescapable.²⁶ Abdul Nasser was a soldier and a statesman. From his position as leader of a revolution and as a statesman he tried to develop Arab national ideology both on the theoretical and the practical levels. From 1956 until his death in 1970 Nasser used the concept of a nation (*umma*) in the sense implied in the phrase 'the Arab nation' (*al-umma al-ʿarabiyya*), and in talking about Egypt he used a variety of terms most notably 'the Egyptian people' (*al-shaʿb al-miṣri*).²⁷

The flexibility in Nasser's policies left the door open for him to do all he could to achieve union between the Arab countries. The realization of

25. For more information on these developments, see Binder, *The Ideological Revolution ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 198–229.

26. Ḥasan Saʿd, 'ʿAbd al-Nāṣir wa-l-waḥda al-ʿarabiyya' [ʿAbd al-Nāṣir and Arab Unity], *Qirāʾat fi-l-fikr al-qawmī*, II, Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-ʿArabiyya, 1983, pp. 330ff.

27. ʿAlī ʿAbbās Murād, and ʿĀmir Ḥasan Fayyāḍ, *al-Zāhira al-qawmiyya. Madkhal ila-l-fikr al-qawmī al-ʿarabī* [The Nationalist Phenomenon. Introduction to The Arab Nationalist Idea], Bēghāzī, Jāmiʿat Qarayūnis, 1998, p. 174.

a single Arab state was the supreme objective subsumed within the general aim of making the Arabs into a united nation, a single nation with a single nationalism. Indeed, in 1958 and in complete conformity with this objective, the United Arab Republic was formed. After the failure of the experiment of Egyptian-Syrian unity, Nasser stated that he still held firm to the idea of total Arab unity, but he relegated this to a third stage after attaining freedom and socialism. He also abandoned the idea of an amalgamation to achieve union, preferring instead a federation and the style of a gradual process.

The programme of Arab nationalism assumed a clear shape after the mid-1950s when Nasser had broken the Western arms monopoly and turned to another source – the Soviet Union. This followed the Western countries' refusal to finance the projected High Dam. The USA and Britain had laid down the condition that if they financed the project then Egypt must regularize its relations with Israel. President Abdul Nasser rejected this on principle. In addition, the Western countries wanted Nasser to support Western policy in the region.²⁸

With the nationalization of the Suez Canal another feature of the Arab revolutionary nationalist programme emerged. It was a bold and courageous decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company and Abdul Nasser took it in response to the disdain shown to him and all Arab people by the USA when it in an official statement drew attention to the weakness of the Egyptian economy so as to justify the impossibility of financing the High Dam. In a speech given on 26th July 1956 President Nasser announced his decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company and to make it an Egyptian corporation.²⁹ He thwarted the aims of the tripartite aggression in the Autumn of 1956.

In a speech which Nasser gave in Port Said on 23 February 1957 he said: 'Arab nationalism has emerged victorious. Port Said was the first experience of a struggle which Arab nationalism has entered, and all Arabs have shared in the battle of Port Said'. The victory was crowned with the defeat of the Eisenhower Doctrine and the beginning of the revolution in Iraq in 1958. Iraq had been the birthplace of the Baghdad Pact and the union between Egypt and Syria under the name of the United Arab Republic.

The experiment of unity between Egypt and Syria had failed for a number of reasons which we cannot go into here. Likewise, the Arabs were disappointed in the Iraqi revolution of 14 July 1958. After frequent setbacks in a number of Arab countries on both the domestic and international levels

28. Muḥammad al-Sayyid Salīm, *Ta'mim sharikat qanāt al-Swais*, [The Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company], Cairo, Dār al-Fajr li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīf, 2002, pp. 83–5.

29. Salīm, *Ta'mim sharikat ...*, *op. cit.*, Appendix 11: 'Khiṭāb al-Ra'īs Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir fi 26 Yūliyū 1956 ḥawla Ta'mim Sharikat Qanāt al-Swais' [The Speech of President Abdul Nasser on 26th July 1956 concerning the Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company], pp. 310–30.

Algeria gained its independence; and this seemed to herald a new dawn for Arab nationalism and its revolutionary programme. But the Algerians did not earn independence without cost, indeed they sacrificed much to attain it. With the arrival of the third decade of the twentieth-century religion, and specifically Islam was the only language which the great majority of Algerian people shared and the only political means for the collective expression of identity in opposing French occupation. The Muslim scholars (*ʿulamaʿ*) in Algeria urged people to embrace the nationalist idea and they attempted to prove the existence of an Algerian nation prior to the French occupation and that there was an Algerian national character with Islam and Arabism as its two basic components.³⁰

In the midst of the call for Arab nationalism and the pursuit of freedom and liberation occurred the Algerian war (the War of a Million Martyrs) against the French colonizer which afflicted Algerian lands for long decades. The Algerian people and freedom fighters (*mujāhidūn*) from every place waged



II-5.2 The Arab League in its early years: A.R. Azzam, Secretary-General of the Arab League, records a broadcast on U.N. Radio in 1950, to be used by radio stations across the Arab States

© UN Photo/AF

30. Walīd Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Nāṣir, ʿal-Taḥāṣul bayna al-Islām wa-l-ʿurūba wa-l-ishtirākīyya fi-l-Jazāʾir 1954–1992' [The Interaction between Islam, Arabism and Socialism in Algeria 1954–1992], *Majallat al-Siyāsa al-dawliyya*, No. 112, X, October, pp. 24–5.



II-5.3 Gamal Abdel Nasser in May 1963

© UN Photo/JH

a heroic war for the sake of freedom. The revolutionary programme in the remaining countries of the Arab homeland contributed greatly to igniting the flame of resistance against French colonialism. There was the support that Nasserism gave to the war, the popular support in the other Arab countries for the freedom fighters and the dedication and sacrifice for the Algerian revolution. Djamila Bouhired (*Jamila Buhirad*) became a symbol of heroism in every Arab country.

Since the French occupation of Algeria in 1830 there had been continuous jihad initially inspired by the religious spirit of the Algerians. France was only able to control the country by force of arms. It changed Algerian culture and tried to replace its language and all its Arab and Islamic characteristics. But the war of liberation on which the Algerians embarked with the help of all the

powers available in the Arab lands demonstrated that there need be no despair or impossibility as long as one is determined to defeat the enemy.

One of the most important political aims of the Algerian National Liberation Front was independence and this would be achieved by realizing two objectives. These were:

1. Regaining the sovereignty of the social and democratic Algerian State within the framework of the principles of Islam;
2. Respecting all fundamental human rights without discrimination as to religion or race.³¹

The Algerian Revolution in the war of liberation was a clear indication of the progress of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s. It arose due to a variety of political, social and economic factors arguably the most significant of which was the nationalist impulse. Especially after the Second World War, the Algerians yearned to secure their natural right to rule their country by themselves and to choose the kind of government they wanted. But despite its suffering during the War, France was unwilling to grant this right to the Algerians even though it recognized, for example, the independence of the people of Sino-India. We might point out here that many Algerians served in the French army fighting there.³²

Algeria emerged victorious in its war against the French colonizer and through its revolution and war of liberation managed to gain its independence. This was achieved by Algeria's belief in its cause and with the assistance of all its Arab brothers. There was great loss of life and much sacrifice but the victory was even greater and its effect could be seen in the life of the Algerians and indeed in the life of all Arabs.

The independence of Algeria led to a social revolution and thus the death of the million martyrs in the war of liberation was not in vain. Even though the Algerians experienced difficulties for many years, they never wanted to return to merely nominal independence. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Bazzāz notes that

This independence will confirm the freedom of the North Africa countries. The real issue which resulted from colonialism in Algeria was that the innocent blood which was spilt on the peaks of the Aures mountains, in the valleys of Oran, on the Algerian coasts and in the desert was not only for the freedom of the Algerians, but rather for the freedom of all Arabs of North Africa, indeed for the many peoples of Africa as a whole. They would not enjoy independence if not for the unflinching sacrifice of the free people of Algeria.

31. Anon, *al-Aẓma al-jaẓā'iriyya* [The Algerian Crisis], Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabiyya, 1990, p. 33.

32. Shawqī al-Jamal, *al-Maghrib al-'arabī al-kabīr mina al-fatḥ al-islāmī ila-l-waqt al-ḥādīr* [The Greater Arab Maghreb from the Islamic Conquest to the Present Time], Cairo, al-Maktab al-Miṣrī li-Tawzī' al-Matbū'āt, 2003, p. 397.

This is a fact that the Arabs of North Africa in particular and all free people in the world ought not to forget. Those who think that Algerian independence was achieved through the skill of negotiators or the diplomatic abilities of some world leaders are mistaken. In the whole history of man a people have never paid a higher price for their freedom than that paid by the free people of Algeria. A people have never shown a more genuine determination and a stronger will in the cause of freedom and dignity than the people of Algeria. This is a truth which should fill the heart of every Arab with pride and give them complete confidence in the ability of our nation to achieve what it wants when it wants.³³

After Algeria gained its independence following a bitter struggle it waited for help from the Arab countries in general and in particular from the League of Arab States, and it did indeed receive this from the Arab countries. This help consisted of all the organization, structural and educational assistance needed for Arabic to replace the French language which French colonialism had imposed on the Arab people of Algeria by force of arms, by the tyranny it exercised for almost 135 years, by the detestable occupation and the oppressive intellectual colonization. On 5 July 1962 Algeria gained its independence and the Algerian flag fluttered high.

Independence was nothing but one step after another in terms of culture. Colonialism had left a poor legacy and the emaciated elite were riddled with linguistic and cultural divisions along with many 'bilingual illiterates'. The state assumed responsibility for transforming the cultural edifice inherited from colonialism and for creating a new national culture and ideology (an Algerian press, radio, television and national cinema). The most profound change, however, took place in the educational system, and this put an end to all that was inherited from colonialism. The educational system was given three important tasks: to disseminate national revolutionary culture, to encourage Arabization, and to create the scientific, technological and administrative organizations which the state required.³⁴

Abdul Nasser continued his fight for total unity and was always the instigator and stimulus for this. He exploited the networks in more than one conference and fought against damaging events whenever he could, such as the dispute with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the war in Yemen and the many revolutions in the Arab States. Setbacks arrived one after the other the last being the war of June 1967, which was the straw that broke the camel's back. This was a terrible blow to Nasser, and indeed to the whole Arab world. The defeat in the war of 1967 was not expected and it had many

33. 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Bazzāz, 'Mustaqbal al-qawmiyya al-ʿarabiyya' [The Future of Arab Nationalism], *Qirāʾat fi-l-fikr al-qawmī al-ʿarabī*, I, p. 561.

34. 'Abd al-Qādir Jaffūl, *Tārīkh al-Jazāʾir al-ḥadīth* [The History of Modern Algeria], transl. by Fayṣal 'Abbās, Beirut, Dār al-Hadātha, 1982, p. 222.

repercussions on the both the domestic and the international levels. Then came the Libyan revolution of 1 September 1969 which was to the benefit of Arab nationalism in general and the Nasserist movement in particular since the revolutionaries led by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi announced that they were following the programme of Abdul Nasser. They joined forces with those who at that time were waiting to free themselves and to be liberated from the authority of foreign laws and a system of government which was unacceptable on all levels.

The initial stage of the revolution occurred at the beginning of September 1969 when it was declared that it would adhere to the concepts of Arab nationalism and total Arab unity. The leadership of the revolution acted according to a particular philosophy within the general framework of Arab nationalism and Arab unity, for example in the sphere of Third World social theory which views nationalism and the nationalist factor as the basis of cohesion in society. Following Abdul Nasser, the revolutionaries in Libya endeavoured to achieve Arab unity in whatever form, disregarding any discrepancy in political systems.

In short, as one researcher has remarked:

Arab nationalism was represented by a complex of meanings and principles which the Arabs knew about before civilized man defined the outlines of the nationalist attitude in the form of principles, precepts and theories.

Arab nationalism is seen in the principles of individual freedom, of tribal freedom, of communal and national freedom before Islam.

It is also seen in the unity of the clan, the tribe and the national community which came to light when opposing the Persians and the Abyssinians prior to Islam. It is seen in the freedom and unity experienced throughout the life of the nation state established by the Arabs and mentioned in history.

It is seen in taking consultation (*shura*) since the Arabs were bedouins, freely expressing their opinions, showing their courage in public displays, disputing over what is right, convincing and being convinced.

It is seen in the equality which was practised ever since the Arabs placed their trust in personal worth and took pride in their existence, acquired the sense that their worth lay in the life of the community with no account of social status, wealth or authority, and ever since the Arabs established parity in their extensive state between races and ethnic groups.

It is seen in fraternity and chivalry, support, love and compassion ever since the Arabs had been nomads whose actions issued from their innate natures and their inherited dispositions, and from the time they incorporated these qualities into their unwritten moral constitution during their long rule.

It is also seen in democracy, socialism and the cooperative society as the earlier Arabs understood these, drawing upon personal opinion, consultation and collaboration in doing good deeds, in coming together in kindness long before democracy, socialism and the cooperative society became systems, principles and laws.

It is seen in Arab spiritual values which were in all ages articulated in Arabic as a tool fit for its purpose or a slave subservient to it. The Arab prefers a free life full of difficulties rather than a comfortable and peaceful life under subjugation. He sleeps with an empty stomach but still gives generously. He does not sell himself for material things but rather leaves these to the devil.

It is seen in the deliverance of mankind from the misfortunes of oppression, coercion and poverty, in helping the weak and standing by their side against those who subjugate them. This has been the case ever since the Arabs became messengers of political and social justice, elevating human worth in the society of the Middle Ages.

It is seen in the Arab's belief in human rights, both those that he possesses and those that belong to others. The Arab is moderate in his behaviour and does not act unjustly. He does not shirk nor deviate from his obligations. He does not debase or demean.³⁵

We find that all the intellectual trends which prevailed in the Arab homeland, during any period and with whatever aim, were always based on the principles mentioned above. The Arabs acted according to them, defended them and fought for them in the name of Arab nationalism.

35. Ibrāhīm Jum'a, 'Aṣālat al-qawmiyya al-ʿarabiyya' [The Origins of Arab Nationalism], *Qirāʾāt fi-l-fikr al-ʿarabi*, *ibid.*, pp. 582–3.

Chapter 2.6

NATIONALISM AND
INDEPENDENCE IN SOUTH ASIA

Fredj Maatoug

INTRODUCTION

The 1940s were a time of national liberation for the countries of South Asia. Chronologically speaking, these countries were among the first nations to regain independence between 1945 and 1957. From 1956 to 1960, it was the turn of countries in North Africa, first of all Morocco and Tunisia, followed by Mauritania. Algeria was an exception, for reasons bound up with the kind of colonization that France had imposed on the country. However, Algeria, too, eventually achieved independence, in 1962. Meanwhile, Black Africa had followed the general trend, first between 1957 and 1958, and then in 1960. It was during the latter year that the wave which swept across the African continent, bringing independence to African nations, was at its most powerful, causing 1960 to be dubbed the ‘Year of Africa’.

Nationalism in Asia was exogenous, like African and Latin-American nationalism, and unlike European nationalism. ‘It originated within the framework of the “metropolitan country-colony” system, as a reaction to the unequal situation and unjust distribution of the wealth and power. For this reason, it was, for the most part, based on an anti-foreign attitude from the outset.’¹

However, apart from this common feature, we can discern peculiarities that were specific to each country. These peculiarities can be explained in terms of the ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious differences between these countries. They are also attributable, in part, to the fact that the countries in question did not have the same colonizer. India, which, before partition, included Pakistan and Bangladesh, was under British rule. Malaya,

1. N. A. Simonia ‘National Liberation Movements and the Collapse of Colonialism’ in *History of Humanity*, VII, UNESCO Publications, p. 56.

too, was a British colony. It was even occupied by the Japanese, for a short time, during the Second World War. As for Indonesia, it had been colonized by the Dutch. However, in spite of these differences, one common feature linked these countries together. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaya and Indonesia all shared the same religion: Islam.

All this raises a number of questions. Firstly, what role did Islam play in the national liberation movements of the countries of South Asia? In the case of India, for example, what was the specific role of Muslims in the national liberation movement, compared to that of Hindus? And what were the attitudes of the *Central Khilafat Committee*, *Jam'iyat al-'Ulama-ye Hind* (The Association of the Scholars of India) and the *Khilafat Movement*, given that India was a country where Islam was a minority religion compared to the Hindu religion? Or in the case of Indonesia, what was the impact of *Sarekat Islam* (Islamic Union) and *Muhammadiyah* on nationalist demands and the fight for independence? Or to take a last case, how was Malayan nationalism defined? Then the second major question concerns how we should explain the absence of specifically Muslim political movements. And thirdly, and finally, there is the question of how we should interpret the strength of the Communist Party in Malaya. Can it be explained by the presence of a large minority of Chinese?

The Indian sub-continent

Before we address the rise of nationalism in the Indian sub-continent, a brief historical reminder is in order. Prior to the seventh century C.E., India was made up of several small kingdoms that constantly clashed with one another. Between the eighth and twelfth centuries, there was a long succession of Muslim conquests. This gradual process of domination began with the Sindh province and eventually subjected the majority of Indian provinces to Muslim dynasties. Under the Mogul emperors, India underwent radical political reforms, especially in the reign of Akbar, the most famous of India's Muslim emperors (1542–1605). He left his mark on the country's administrative organization by pursuing a policy of decentralization from the end of the sixteenth century. This enlightened ruler introduced a decentralized system of administration, under which the provinces were governed by princes he appointed personally and which paid taxes. Akbar also established a genuine policy of religious tolerance with regard to Hindus. The result of this policy was a thriving culture, the finest expression of which was the emergence and establishment of the Urdu language, a successful amalgam of Arabic, Persian and Hindi. But it was in the field of art and architecture that the Mogul emperors left their most exquisite legacy. It was during this same period that the Mogul emperor Shah Jahan

built in Agra, as a mausoleum for his favourite wife, one of the world's most beautiful architectural gems, the Taj Mahal.

It is also important to highlight a crucial contemporary event, which, in the late 1940s, would radically change the face of India. This was the partitioning of the country in 1947. Just as it was set to gain its independence from British control, India was faced with the most appalling religious strife between Muslims and Hindus. Massacres on both sides left tens of thousands dead and led to mass migration in both directions, with millions of individuals being affected. On the eve of independence, partition was already a reality: two independent states were created, India for the Hindus, where a substantial Muslim minority continued to reside notwithstanding, and Pakistan for the Muslims. The latter state consisted of two distinct parts: Western Pakistan, comprising Sindh and the Punjab, in the north-west corner of the Indian sub-continent, and Eastern Pakistan in Bengal, to the north-east of the Republic of India, which separated the two parts by a distance of some 2,000 kilometres. However, the two parts of Pakistan did not only suffer from the geographical separation, but an overwhelming sense of injustice also poisoned relations between them. The Bengalis in the east were deeply affected by the ostracism to which they were subjected by their fellow citizens in the west. In 1970, intellectuals and students in Eastern Pakistan (now Bangladesh), demanded that the central government, concentrated in Western Pakistan, should respect the results of local elections. The fact that India actively supported these demands was seen by Islamabad as interference by New Delhi in its internal affairs. This involvement led to the Indo-Pakistani War, which broke out on 26 March 1971. It was as a result of this war, which Islamabad lost, that Eastern Pakistan seceded and created a new, independent country. From that point on, this new country became known as Bangladesh.

To get to grips with the question of the emergence of Indian nationalist demands, we have to return to the period between the second decade of the twentieth century and the early 1940s. 'When the first global conflict broke out in 1914, India was seen as a cornerstone of the British Empire. In 1942, however, the British were faced with what was clearly a popular uprising.'² This brief reminder, albeit a schematic one, gives us an idea of how quickly the political situation in India evolved and of the change in the relationship between indigenous Indians and their British colonizers.

2. C. Markovits (ed.), *Histoire de l'Inde moderne 1480–1950* [A History of Modern India 1480–1950], Fayard, 1994, Paris, p. 438.

THE DEFENCE OF THE CALIPHATE AND MUSLIM NATIONALISM

At the end of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire found itself on the losing side. Muslims the world over felt personally concerned by the fate of the High Porte, since the Sultan was also the ‘Commander of the Faithful’. The Indian Muslims were not to be outdone. They organized themselves into a large-scale movement for the defence of the Caliphate. But it was particularly after the signing of the Treaty of Sèvres in May 1920, sanctioning the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, that the movement became radicalized and ceased to cooperate with the British administration. In fact, the Friday *khutba*³ in India’s countless mosques ended up mobilizing Indian Muslims in the defence of the High Porte and the Ottoman Sultan, who was henceforth seen as a symbol of the last Islamic empire capable of defying the hegemony of the Western powers.

Furthermore, ‘at the instigation of two radical Muslim leaders, the Ali brothers, the Central Khilafat Committee decided, in June 1920 in Allahabad, on a programme of non-cooperation.’⁴ What the two brothers, Mohammad Ali and Shaukat Ali, realized was that religion and a common identity, in this



II–6.1 The Jāmi' Masjid in Delhi, India’s largest mosque

© Nik Wheeler/AramcoWorld

3. *Khutba* is an Arabic word that literally means ‘speech’. The Friday *khutba* is the sermon delivered by an imam at mosques during weekly prayer, in which all Muslims are obliged to participate with their fellow believers every Friday.
4. Markovits (ed.), *Histoire ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 442.

case an Islamic one, were a formidable catalyst for mobilizing Indian Muslims around specific political goals. Gandhi, for his part, saw Muslim discontent with British policy as an ideal opportunity for re-launching the nationalist struggle for independence. At this time, India's Muslim population accounted for a staggering quarter of the entire population of India. Gandhi, therefore, wanted the Congress Party to adopt this tactic. However, he ran into opposition from both its moderate and its extremist wing. Nevertheless, during a special session of the Party held in Calcutta, Motilal Nehru, initially against such a tactic, was won over to the ambitious programme, which was aimed at destabilizing, even paralyzing the administration and British trade in India. Among the key points in this programme, mention should be made, in particular, of 'the restoration of the Caliphate, the return of British honorary titles by Indians, the boycott of formal schools, rejection of the courts and abstention in the legislative councils.'⁵

The demise of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the Caliphate by Mustapha Kemal Atatürk in 1924 spelt the beginning of the end for the *Khilafat Movement* in India. Far from forging a real and lasting alliance between Hindus and Muslims, the movement had succeeded in propagating a political awareness among India's Muslim community. This new-found awareness also had the effect of awakening a sense of religious identity not only among Hindus but among Christians too. Each community immediately began to parade its own religious specificity. The Hindus glorified the fifth and sixth centuries, which they regarded as the golden age of Brahmanism. As for the Muslims, they made reference to the Qur'ān and *Sunna*, and the glory of the early days of Islam. And although some Muslims gathered around Zakir Husain at *Jamia Millia Islamia*, Muhammad Jinnah channelled all his energies into the Muslim League.

THE ROLE OF ASSOCIATIONS, THE ULAMA AND THE SUFIS

The Caliphate question was then the cause of the politicization of the traditionalists as well as of a number of mystical orders such as the Naqshbandiyya, Qadiriyya and Chishtiyya orders. A number of circles and organizations came into being as a result of local initiatives with religious, social or philanthropic aims. Traditionalists and reformists, Sufis and intellectuals made every effort to transcend their particular interests under the banner of pan-Islamism and to merge completely in their country's fight for independence from the British intruder. Deobandis and the Ahl-e Hadith, particularly the group around the Begum of Bhopal, already had established contacts with Ottoman rulers at the beginning of the twentieth century, the "Association of Helpers" (*Jam'iyyat*

5. *Ibid.*, p. 442.

al-Ansar) being founded in 1909 for this purpose by Mahmud al-Hasan (1850–1920), one of the earliest students of the seminar in Deoband.⁶

The founder of this association sent an activist called ‘Ubaidallah Sindhi to the Emir of Afghanistan with a decree to wage a *jihād* (a holy war) against the British. However, he was soon captured by them and spent three years in prison in Malta. He quickly took his revenge. He successfully carried out the task of extending the Deobandis’ and Sufis’ communication network to the Sindh region and to Afghanistan. This expansion was vitally important for the nationalist struggle, since it is possible that the Khilafat Movement would not have had such a faithful following or enjoyed the success it did without the active support of the Sufis and the ulama. Mention must also be made of the part played by another current, namely the Farangi Mahallis. This current began to attract attention from 1913 onwards, after the founding of the ‘Association of the servants of the Kaaba’ (*Anjuman-e Khuddam-e Ka’ba*) by ‘Abd al-Bari Farangi Mahalli and Muslim intellectuals like Mushir Husain Kidwa’i, to support the Caliph. ‘All these efforts finally found their institutional manifestation in the “association of the scholars of India” (*Jam’iyyat al-‘Ulama-ye Hind; JUH*) in 1919, initiated primarily by Deobandis and Farangi Mahallis, and joined by members of the Ahl-e Hadith.⁷ The demands formulated by the association were adherence to the principles of Islam, the strengthening of its relationship with the Muslim world, notably the Ottoman Empire, and the fostering of Muslim-Hindu friendship. The Indian National Congress, under the leadership of Gandhi, accepted them unequivocally, especially as the association embraced the idea of a united nationalist movement (*muttabida qaumiat*). This receptivity facilitated the publication of a *fatwā*⁸ (*muttafiqa fatwā*) on non-cooperation and civil disobedience, issued by ‘Abd al-Bari Farangi Mahalli in 1920.

It all began in 1919 with the establishment of the *All India Khilafat Committee* in Bombay. Shrewdly tapping into Sufi currents and the Congress Party’s infrastructure, the Committee managed to get close to the traditional groups which wielded influence in the community. It thus drew on all skills and capacities, including those of Urdu poets, journalists and public orators. As early as 1911, in Calcutta, Mohammad Ali had launched *Comrade*, an influential weekly newspaper published in English, and, in 1913, *Hamdard*, a weekly in Urdu. The traditionalist Abu-l-Kalam Azad followed his example, achieving prominence through his own famous and highly successful newspaper, *al-Hilal*, which first appeared in Calcutta in 1912 and which announced at the same time the creation of a Party of God (*Ḥizb Allah*). Feeling that India had become a war zone (*dār al-ḥarb*), he called on Muslims to resort to armed

6. J. Malik, *Islam in South Asia: A Short History*, Leiden, Boston Brill, 2008, p. 325.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 326.

8. *Fatwā* is an Arabic word meaning a religious decree that can only be issued by an experienced doctor of religion with an extensive knowledge of Islamic case law (*fiqh*).

resistance and to wage a holy war (*jihād*), or to emigrate (*hijra*) to Afghanistan, the land of Islam (*dār al-Islām*).

The non-cooperation and Caliphate movement, lasting from December 1920 to February 1922, was a success. It reached its climax on 17 November with the protests against a visit to India by the Prince of Wales and gave rise to violent incidents in Bombay. For the first time, the British administration found itself in a very difficult situation. Protests were well coordinated right across India. The movement spread to the south and brought in the Mappilas, a Muslim population that inhabited Malabar. This population had long been hostile to the British presence and, at the same time, to landowners, who were generally Hindu. The Mappila rebellion was sparked by a police raid on a mosque on 20 August 1921. The guerrilla war that followed set thousands of people against the police and the military for several months. Although the uprising 'was not recognized by the Congress as part of the non-cooperation movement, owing to the violence perpetrated by the rebels',⁹ it demonstrated just how explosive the situation had become. In addition, Gandhi's credo of non-violence, respected by a limited group made up of the Mahatma's disciples, did not apply to ordinary Indians, who were, of course, far more numerous. As far as the latter were concerned, resorting to violence against British oppression seemed the only solution possible.

THE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE MOVEMENT

A movement of civil disobedience, which started in 1930–1, had more effect than the non-cooperation movement of ten years earlier. The resignations of minor government officials in the villages of a number of regions brought the colonial administration to a standstill. Constant demonstrations on a large scale forced the administration to step up the number of arrests, which soon reached 90,000. The prisons were packed to bursting point. And although, to begin with, repression was restrained, it rapidly hardened. The international press was soon denouncing the 'brutal behaviour of the police against unarmed demonstrators'.¹⁰

In April 1930, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, a local Congress Party leader, was arrested in the North-West Frontier Province, a predominantly Muslim region. The arrest of this popular figure, who was known as the *Frontier Gandhi*, sparked matters off, triggering a popular uprising in Peshawar, the provincial capital, which then led to the imposition of martial law. The repression that followed claimed many victims, mainly among the Muslim population. But the casualties would have been heavier, had it not been for the spirit of

9. Markovits (ed.), *Histoire ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 444.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 448.

solidarity displayed by the Indian soldiers towards the insurrectionists, much to the disgust of the British authorities. Indeed, the colonial government was angered by the attitude of a squad of Hindu soldiers who refused to open fire on a crowd of Muslim insurgents. The policy of *divide and rule* that the colonial power was trying to apply had this time backfired in humiliating fashion.

It is obvious that by taking part in the Indian nationalist movement in 1930–1, the Muslim population had made a significant contribution to the success of non-cooperation. However, some have qualified this contribution by highlighting the cautious attitude towards the civil disobedience movement taken by this population generally, with the exception of the Pathans in the North-West Frontier Province. How are we to explain the cautiousness of the Indian Muslims at this particular point in time? In some quarters, it is explained in terms of there being no undisputed leader in their midst capable of taking bold decisions and of winning the approval of the community. It did appear that ‘the Muslim League had indeed virtually become inactive and no figure was emerging’.¹¹ But there were other reasons for this scepticism on the part of Indian Muslims. ‘The distinctly Hindu flavour of Gandhian discourse (he would conjure up pictures of a Ramraj, the ideal kingdom, according to Rama), added to the intransigence shown by the Congress Party members at the All-Parties Conference on the question of the autonomy of the provinces, was hardly likely to win over the Muslim elites in the cities.’¹² Besides, in the Punjab, where there was a clear preponderance of Muslims among the rural population, the Congress was primarily a party for Hindus living in the towns. As for Bengal, the Congress remained dominated by upper-caste Hindus. The latter were conservatives and defended the *zamindari* system, whereas the Muslim peasantry throughout the region of eastern Bengal were opposed to the *zamindars*, who were for the most part Hindus. But none of this prevented the main Muslim leaders, like Muhammad Jinnah, from taking part in what is known as the Round Table Conference in London, early in 1931. Gandhi and Britain were moving towards a compromise. In view of the acceptance by the colonial power of the principle of the responsibility of the executive, the Mahatma was ready to consider the establishment of the federal system demanded by the Muslim leaders and the princes.

Nevertheless, in the provincial elections of 1937, Congress had some of its worst results in Sindh, the Punjab and Bengal, which were predominantly Muslim. However, this outcome must be seen in perspective. The Muslim League itself had suffered a humiliating defeat in these same provinces. ‘Most of the seats reserved for Muslims went to the regional parties (the Unionist Party in the Punjab and the Krishak Praja Party in Bengal).’¹³ This failure

11. Markovits (ed.) *Histoire ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 450.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 454–5.

is partly explained by the fact that the members of Muslim associations (the *Jam'iyat*) were more versed in religion than in politics. Now, in the first instance, it was up to politics to provide a response to the population's expectations. 'Since the members of the *Jam'iyat* considered themselves religious guides rather than politicians, they continued to emphasize the correct observance of *shari'a* and concentrated on the religious and legal dimensions of community life rather than its immediate political aspects.'¹⁴

INDEPENDENCE AND THE PARTITIONING OF INDIA

To begin with, the idea of a separate Muslim state was far from Muhammad Jinnah's mind. This was equally true of Muhammad Iqbal, the celebrated philosopher and poet, who had come to politics via philosophy. But witnessing the decline of Islam, especially with the demise of the Ottoman Empire and, in 1923–4, the inexorable eclipse of the Khilafat Movement in India, he came to the conclusion that an independent Islam was a necessity in southern Asia. However, there was no talk of a separate, independent Muslim state. After the drubbing suffered by the Muslim League in the 1937 elections, Jinnah redoubled his efforts to repair the damage such a result had inflicted. He made it his aim to forge a common Muslim identity with political aspirations opposed to aspirations found within Congress and firmly focusing on Muslim separatism. Jinnah strongly emphasized the fact that 'honourable settlements can only be achieved between equals, and unless the two parties learn to respect and fear each other, there is no solid ground for any settlement.'¹⁵ He publicly evoked the common identity and nationalist goals of Muslims when he was led to develop his 'two-nation theory'. The man who would henceforth be looked upon as the 'great leader' (*Qa'id-e A'zam*) did not demand a separate territorial entity for all Indian Muslims until March 1940. Until then, he had advocated a unitary approach.

The 1945–6 elections brought good news for the Muslim League. The results of the ballot showed that the League had made some headway. It had become stronger. But this progress brought no concrete advantages. The colonial power, still reeling from the cataclysm of the Second World War, which had just ended, was at a loss about how to proceed. And even the offer of a Muslim state within the framework of an Indian federation, which had been made at some point during the war, was withdrawn by the 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan. Furthermore, Congress, under the influence of J. L. Nehru, ignored the Cabinet Plan recommendation after the transfer of power. The League then withdrew from the Plan. It was still agreed by everyone, however, that Jinnah was against partition and for a united India within a federal

14. Malik, *Islam in South Asia ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 326–7.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 339.

framework. On the other hand, and in accordance with public opinion at the time, Congress was pushing for partition. Jinnah was, then, initially in favour of a united India, like most Muslim leaders. However, in 1943, he came out 'against a federation, just in contrast to Husain Ahmad Madani (1879–1957), Principal of Dar al-'Ulum Deoband, and Chief spokesman of JUH, who in April 1946 was in favour of one centre and one constituent Assembly, with Hindus and Muslims sharing parity both in the government and in the central legislature.'¹⁶ But Gandhi was against parity. So a division of executive and legislative powers according to population size was proposed.

When Viceroy Mountbatten tried to implement the plan, Jinnah opposed it. He called for a day of action (Direct Action Day) on 16 August 1946, which resulted in a bloodbath in Calcutta between Hindus and Muslims. Instead of maintaining Indian unity, the plan proposed partition by detaching the provinces of the Punjab, Bengal and Bihar from the rest of the country. In August 1947, East and West Pakistan were hastily separated from India. This painful episode was accompanied by a two-way migration of 15 million people and appalling massacres, the impact of which had still not been erased decades later. After more than half a century since the separation of India and Pakistan, this impact is still keenly felt and the wounds have not fully healed; in some cases, even, have remained open, as in Kashmir. The tension that prevails between the two entities, which were once a single country, makes South Asia one of the most volatile regions on the planet today.

Modern Indonesia and the road to independence

The penetration of the Indonesian archipelago by Islam dates from the late thirteenth century, thanks, in particular, to pirates and traders from Sindh and Gujarat. This penetration was aided by the crisis that engulfed 'the Majapahit Empire on the death of Hayam Wuruk: a difficult succession, partition and civil wars'.¹⁷ At the end of the thirteenth century, a Javanese nobleman settled in Malacca. He succeeded in transforming it into a trading metropolis and in levying, with their agreement, customs duties on traders who sailed from India to the eastern islands, using Malacca as their port of call. History also informs us that the prince who ascended the throne in 1414 was called Muhammad Iskandar Shah. Around this time, an apostle of Islam by the name of Malik Ibrahim, who died in 1419, was revered in Java. The apostle was a merchant who had made his fortune in the spice trade. He tried, without success, to convert the Emperor of Majapahit to Islam. What we find, then, is that Islam was introduced into the

16. *Ibid.*, p. 341.

17. J. Bruhat, *Histoire de l'Indonésie* [A History of Indonesia], Paris, PUF, (Que sais-je?), 1968, p. 21.

Indonesian archipelago peacefully. The spread of the religion of the Prophet Muḥammad followed the same course as the development of trade, through the activities of Arab, Persian and Indian merchants.

The speed with which the new religion permeated populations can be explained by its egalitarianism and simplicity, in particular. Indeed, 'Islam was perceived by Indonesians as an egalitarian, simple religion that adapted with great flexibility to local conditions. In places where animism subsisted, resistance was all the weaker because Islam allowed many ancient beliefs to survive. Where Hinduism had taken root – and this applied to most parts of Indonesia – it suffered from the decline of the kingdoms that had converted to Hinduism and from the sometimes bloody struggles that set them against one another.'¹⁸ The simplicity, flexibility and tolerance of Islam, which was able to accept and assimilate rituals of Indian origin explain why Indonesia did not experience wars and religious strife. Malacca was the great hub from which Islam radiated outwards. In just a few decades, the Javanese aristocracy and the coastal regions converted to the new religion, before it went on to conquer the whole of Indonesia.

THE BIRTH OF INDONESIAN NATIONALISM

It was at the beginning of the twentieth century that the Indonesian nationalist movement defined its objectives and acquired solidity. Although, at first, it confined itself to demands for autonomy, it soon formulated social and political demands, even going as far as demanding total independence, especially during and after the Second World War. Several factors had contributed to the forging of Indonesian nationalism. It was the country's elite and intelligentsia who set things moving. The fact of the matter was that the Indonesian elite, educated at Dutch and other Western universities, were bitterly disappointed, on returning to their country, not to be given posts that matched their qualifications. Their frustration knew no bounds when they saw the most coveted jobs go to the Dutch occupiers. The same dissatisfaction existed among the Indonesian bourgeoisie, owing to the flood of foreign capital into the country. To this must be added other external factors that would not fail to act as catalysts for Indonesian nationalism. These factors included Japan's victory in 1905, the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Mustapha Kemal Atatürk's triumph in Turkey and, finally, the Second World War, and the hope it engendered among colonial peoples, particularly after the defeat of Nazism and Fascism. Indeed, 'the Second World War was a crucial event for Asia generally ... Japanese imperialism had forced the imperialist powers of Europe onto the defensive for the first time; in spite of its ultimate defeat,

18. *Ibid.* p. 22.

it precipitated the decolonization of India, Indonesia, Indochina and the coming to power of the Communist regime in China.¹⁹ In this sense, we can regard the antagonism between the imperialist powers – in the event, Japan and the Netherlands – as having benefited the Indonesian nationalists, and as having done so in spite of and against the very intentions of these powers.

We can divide the history of the rise of Indonesian nationalism into several phases. The first phase corresponds to the period between 1908 and 1926–7. The second covers the years from 1927 to 1934. As for the third, it runs from 1934 to 1942. The fourth and final phase extends from 1945 to 1957. This last phase was the most eventful and the most crucial. In little more than a decade, from the proclamation of Indonesian independence to the demise of the system of parliamentary or constitutional democracy late in the 1950s, Indonesia went through perhaps the most turbulent years of the century.²⁰

Indonesian nationalism began, then, in 1908 with the founding of *Budi Utomo* on 20 May by students from Batavia (Jakarta). Then, in 1911, a more structured movement emerged. This was *Sarekat Islam*. It consisted of a group that ‘united Javanese traders in Batik and had as its goal the protection of Javanese trade and industry against European and Chinese competition.’²¹ Other movements immediately sprang up, with different preoccupations. Firstly, the *Muhammadiyah*, founded by Muslim reformists, then the *Indonesian Social-Democratic Union* in 1914, which came into being under the influence of Dutch Socialists. After the First World War, political life in Indonesia intensified. In 1919, *Sarekat Islam* fought a fierce battle to limit the size of sugar-cane fields, so as to benefit the paddy fields, which were vitally important to the Indonesians. A new political actor took the stage: the *Indonesian Communist Party* was created on 23 May 1920. It was not long before divergent currents began to show through in *Sarekat Islam*, and in 1921 the organization decided to break with the Communists and move closer to the Muhammadiyah. This rapprochement bore fruit, firstly in the form of Indonesia’s first Pan-Islamic Congress. In 1923, the Indonesian students in Holland founded the Indonesian Union (*Perhimpunan Indonesia*). It was within this Union that Indonesia’s future politicians would learn their trade. Towards the end of 1926 and the beginning of 1927, insurrection broke out in various parts of Indonesia: in Bantam and Jakarta, before spreading to Sumatra.

The most significant event during the next phase was the founding, in 1927, of the *Indonesian National Party* (PNI), which demanded complete independence for the country and the formation of a democratic government.

19. E. P. Meyer, *Une histoire de l’Inde, les Indiens face à leur passé* [A History of India, Indians Confronted with their Past], Paris, Albin Michel, 2007, p. 271.

20. C. Brown, *A Short History of Indonesia: the Unlikely Nation?* Crow’s Nest NSW 2065, Australia, Allen and Unwin, 2003, p. 156.

21. Bruhat, *Histoire ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

Having socialist leanings and working closely with *Sarekat Islam*, it quickly established itself as the largest nationalist party. The credit for creating it belonged to 'former members of Perhimpunan Indonesia, who had returned to their country. The presidency of the party was entrusted to a young man (he was born in 1901), called Dr Sukarno.'²² A victim of its own success, the PNI exposed itself to repression by the Dutch authorities. On 24 September 1929, eight party leaders were arrested. Sukarno was one of them, and he was sentenced to imprisonment. This organization subsequently experienced a crisis and divisions, made worse through repression by the colonial power. In April 1931, those who had remained most faithful to the initial programme of the PNI founded a new political organization, which they decided to call the *Partindo* (Partai Indonesia). They were joined by Sukarno when he was released from prison in 1932. However, Sukarno was again arrested in 1933, exiled on the island of Flores, then in Benculin, an exile from which he would not return until the Japanese invasion of 1942. Other figures rallied to the nationalist cause, such as Sutan Sjahrir and Dr Hatta, who together founded the Independent Group (*Golongan Merdeka*). They, in turn, became victims of Dutch repression. In 1934, they were arrested and sent into exile. During this period, there was a split in *Sarekat Islam*. A group led by Dr Sukiman and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, motivated mainly by religious considerations, gave the party a new name: *Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia*. In retaliation, 'Haji Agus Salim founded the Penjedar Barisan PSII (Movement to Make the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia Conscious).'²³

Two other parties enjoyed a brief existence. The first was formed under the leadership of Dr Raden Sutono: *Parindra*. It soon failed. It opted for self-government within the framework of Dutch sovereignty. The proposal was rejected by the Dutch Government and was soon consigned to oblivion, and *Parindra* with it. Another new party, the *Gerindo* (*Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia*, Indonesian People's Movement) was to meet with the same fate of instant failure. It made the mistake of seeing and placing the fight for national independence in the context of a vague international struggle against fascism. In contrast, the creation of a committee of coordination between eight nationalist organizations in 1939 met with more success. The committee, the GAPI (*Gabungan Politik Indonesia*, Federation of Indonesian Political Parties) put two demands at the top of its agenda: Indonesia's right to self-determination and the establishment of a democratic system within the framework of Indonesian national unity. Only then did it state its intention to join the fight against fascism.

22. *Ibid.* p. 87.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

The next phase was the convening of an Indonesian People's Congress by the GAPI in 1939. The Congress made some important decisions. It adopted 'Bahasa Indonesia as the national language, as well as the red and white flag, and the song Indonesia Raya as the national anthem.'²⁴ Following the German army's invasion of Dutch territory, the Dutch Government announced in August 1940, and was supported in this by a speech made by the Queen on 10 May 1941, 'that reforms could not be considered until the war was over'. The Indonesians were disappointed and decided to respond. In September 1941, an Indonesian People's Congress was held in Jakarta. It chose 'a permanent executive board, made up of members of GAPI (Federation of Indonesian Political Parties), the MIAI (Federation of Non-Political Muslim Organizations) and the PVNN (Federation of Trade Unions of Government Employees).'²⁵ But a new factor was about to muddy the waters. In addition to the German occupation of metropolitan Holland in 1942, and within the space of just three months, the Netherlands East Indies fell into Japanese hands.

THE CRUCIAL PERIOD, FROM REVOLUTION TO INDEPENDENCE:
1945–57

Japanese successes in the British territories in Borneo, the Malacca Peninsula and Sumatra did much to diminish white prestige in the eyes of Indonesians. Presenting themselves as Asian brothers, the Japanese were at first well received. The Indonesians had the impression that the Japanese would allow Indonesia to govern itself independently, an impression that was reinforced when they released Indonesia's nationalist leaders, Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta. Attempts were therefore made by the nationalist leaders to exploit the receptiveness of the Japanese. It has to be emphasized, however, that this receptiveness was only a front, a fact that Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin, 'who had not only refused to collaborate with the Japanese but had been imprisoned and nearly executed by them',²⁶ were well placed to appreciate. Nevertheless, an effort was made to extract from the Japanese three main concessions: recognition of independence, the creation of a nationalist mass movement, and an army to defend the homeland. At the same time, from 1944 onwards, the Axis powers were facing ever greater difficulties. The situation of the Japanese themselves was becoming impossible. On 29 April 1945, they agreed to 'the formation of an Investigating Committee to prepare the way for independence. On 11 August, Sukarno

24. *Ibid.*, p. 89.

25. *Ibid.*

26. M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1300*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and London, The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1993, p. 218.



II-6.2 The main entrance of the Selangor State mosque, Malaysia

© Nik Wheeler/AramcoWorld

and Hatta were granted what were virtually discretionary powers and, four days later, Japan surrendered.²⁷ Shortly afterwards, on 17 August, the independence of the Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed in Batavia, which, once more, became Jakarta. This republic would be ‘an independent, united, sovereign, just and prosperous Indonesian State.’²⁸ The next day, Sukarno was appointed President of the Republic and Hatta the Vice-President. From that moment, the situation was an ambiguous one. The republic was proclaimed, that was a fact. However, the Dutch Government had not renounced its rights to what it still regarded as ‘its’ colony. It even went as far as to announce reforms. But as soon as the Dutch tried to return to the country, their action sparked off a conflict. The nascent Indonesian Republic had neither a navy nor an air force, but did have an army of volunteers, which was thoroughly familiar with the terrain, adapted very quickly and was, above all, fired with patriotic zeal. Despite a first, then a second police operation, mounted by the Dutch in July 1947 and December 1948, respectively, despite aerial bombardments and the occupation of key locations by parachutists and despite, finally, the re-arrest of Sukarno and Hatta, the resistance invariably managed to organize itself and the guerrilla war continued. Then, a new tactic was tried. The Dutch played

27. *Ibid.*, p. 92

28. Bruhat, *Histoire ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

the separatist card, a 'Balkanization' strategy, by multiplying the number of autonomous states, but with inconclusive results. To hold on to its colony, the colonial power also tried federalism as a ploy. Indeed, 'federalism was a principle strongly supported by the Dutch and in particular by the Lieutenant Governor-General, van Mook. He argued that federalism would accord the best degree of protection for the non-Javanese of the archipelago.'²⁹ However, the federal constitution of 14 December 1949 was eventually torn up. On 15 August 1950, it was replaced by one that was strictly unitary: one state, one government and a single House of Representatives, elected by universal suffrage. Finally, the last act of total liberation for Indonesia was to terminate the Dutch-Indonesian Union. This union had been signed at the round table conference in December 1949 as a last-ditch attempt by the Dutch to keep a foothold on Indonesian soil. It was rescinded by Jakarta on 10 August 1954 and so became null and void. From this point onwards, the relationship between Indonesia and Holland was one of total equality.

Malaysia

Geographically speaking, Malaya forms a natural bridge between continental Asia and the Indonesian archipelago. Down the centuries, this geographical position has had a major influence on the country's destiny. Its history takes on a definite shape from the fifteenth century onwards, with the dramatic rise of Malacca as an important centre for trade. For a long time, its dealings were with the neighbouring islands, especially Sumatra, an island with which it more or less shared a culture and a language (Malay). Their destinies appeared intertwined until late in the eighteenth century, when a wedge was driven between them by colonization and the formation of a 'British Malaya', along the lines of, but in opposition to, the 'Netherlands East Indies'. From the beginning of the fifteenth century onwards, the history of Malaya was inseparable from that of Islam. At that time, Malacca, which had only recently been founded, was about to become a thriving and cosmopolitan crossroads on a grand scale. In 1419, the city's prince converted to Islam. From then on, the Sultanate grew wealthier and wealthier. It was at its most prosperous under Mansur Shah and Ala ud-Din Riayat Shah, who ruled from 1459 to 1477 and from 1477 to 1488, respectively.

The Federation of Malaysia came into being on 16 September 1963. It included Singapore and Malaya, but also encompassed all of the territories of the Malayan world that belonged to the British Empire, namely, the Malayan peninsula and the island of Singapore, and Sabah and Sarawak in the north of the island of Borneo. It therefore consisted of two very distinct geographical

29. Brown, *A Short History* ..., *op. cit.*, p. 165.

groupings: on the one hand, Western Malaysia, which brought together the eleven former states of the Federation of Malaya, created in 1948, and, on the other, Eastern Malaysia, consisting of the two northern provinces in Borneo. As a result of the racial violence between Malays and Chinese, the Federation would soon divest itself of the island of Singapore with its Chinese majority. On 9 August 1965, Singapore ceased to be a part of the Malaysian Federation and became an independent state. However, apart from colonization by Britain, the national history of modern Malaysia would be shaped to a considerable extent by the Japanese occupation during the Second World War.

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF MALAYA

France's surrender to Nazi Germany in the spring of 1940 prompted Japan to occupy the north, then the south of French Indochina between the summer of 1940 and 1941. To pre-empt the Japanese threat, Great Britain sent reinforcements to Malaya and Singapore. However, the dispatched forces were inferior, in terms of both quality and quantity, to those Japan was able to deploy in the Far East, an area it regarded as being within its sphere of influence. Consequently, Japan's victory was swift and decisive. The Japanese forces landed in Hong Kong, Siam and Malaya. 'The Repulse and the Prince of Wales, which left their base to attack the Japanese convoys, were sunk off the coast of Pahang on 9 December.'³⁰ The day before, 8 December 1941, in a spectacular operation, the Japanese air force had destroyed the American fleet in Pearl Harbour. The north of Borneo, which was under British sovereignty, was occupied in December 1941. In sharp contrast to these rapid defeats, the British forces in Malaya offered fierce resistance. They eventually yielded, nonetheless, and in late January 1942 withdrew to the island of Singapore. The Japanese invasion of the island took place during the night of 30 to 31 January. Despite the British reinforcements, who had arrived by sea and air, but most certainly too late, the Japanese forces had the upper hand. General Percival surrendered on 15 February 1942. At a single stroke, 80,000 men in the British armed forces had fallen into the hands of the Japanese. And to cap it all, the latter succeeded in occupying the whole of the Malay Archipelago.

The rout of the British forces had marked, significant psychological repercussions, since the myth of the white man's invulnerability was more present than ever in the minds of Malaysians. This psychological factor would play its part in catalysing nationalist movements in South Asia. From that point onwards, the masses felt able to take an increasingly important role in the political struggle for a free and independent future. The Malaysians suffered less

30. J. Dupuis, *Singapour et La Malaisie* [Singapore and Malaysia], Paris, PUF, Collection *Que sais-je?*, 1972, p. 53.

than the Chinese under the Japanese occupation. The Chinese, together with the British, were seen as the enemy by the Japanese. Even so, the Malaysians themselves were not seen in a good light. In the eyes of the Japanese occupiers, they were inferior and therefore not deserving of independence. After their victory, the Japanese turned their attention to how they might capitalize on their gain: 'Ultimately, the Japanese hoped to make Singapore a permanent colony and the Malay states a protectorate. But in the early years of the occupation, these long term aims were sacrificed for the more crucial question of how Malaya could best contribute economically to Japan's war effort.'³¹

THE DRAMATIC RISE OF MALAYAN NATIONALISM

During the Japanese occupation, the idea of national independence had become increasingly popular in Malaya. It was given a boost in 1948 by the Malayan Communist uprising. After Japan surrendered in 1945, Anglo-Indian troops entered the British territories of Malaya and northern Borneo unopposed. In 1946, the Colonial Office set up a *Malayan Union*, consisting of the nine states plus the two settlements of Penang and Malacca. The Sultans, seeing their power reduced, opposed the new system. The Malaysians, too, were against the system, because it conferred citizenship on Indian and Chinese immigrants and so encroached upon their own privileges. Consequently, the Malayan Union was soon abandoned. Under pressure from Malayan public opinion, a new constitution was drafted, resulting, in 1948, in the *Federation of Malaya*, which grouped together the nine states, ruled by their sultans, who were assisted by two councils, one executive, the other legislative, and the two Settlements. A British High Commissioner headed the federal government. He was assisted by an executive and a legislative council, in which the numerical preponderance of Malaysians was guaranteed. The Malaysians were also assured of another advantage: 'They were automatically recognized as citizens, whereas the Chinese and Indians had to fulfil certain conditions (either they had to be British Subjects in one of the Straits Settlements, or else have parents who had both been born on Federation soil).'³² However, the new arrangements did not satisfy the Malaysians, as they still kept Malaysians under British tutelage. Nor were they popular with all the Chinese, the Communists in particular, who, having gone underground to fight the Japanese occupier, agreed to be disarmed upon the return of the British forces. They had transformed themselves into a politically active movement (the *People's Democratic Movement*) and were ready to go underground again. All this showed that the Federation of Malaya was not really a viable proposition – at least not yet. To remedy

31. B. W. Andaya and L. Y. Andaya, *A History of Malaysia*, London and Basingstoke, The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1982, p. 248.

32. Dupuis, *Singapour ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

the situation, the British looked elsewhere for a solution: in April 1949, the British Parliament made a commitment, re-affirmed by the Prime Minister the following March, to grant Malaya independence.³³ However, it was not until 31 August 1957 that *Merdeka Day* (Independence Day) arrived. To satisfy the sultans, the Federation of Malaya retained the monarchic system of rulers in the nine states. The two settlements, Penang and Malacca, were no longer British colonial territories. On account of its large Chinese minority, Singapore kept its internal autonomy. Malay now became the country's sole official language, with English being used for a further period of ten years. Islam was declared the national religion. Gradually, independence became a reality. After negotiations between Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia, an agreement was reached on 11 June 1963 and the idea of Malaysia was born. The new state was proclaimed on 16 September 1963. The United Kingdom's sovereignty over Singapore, the North of Borneo (which in the meantime had become Sabah) and Sarawak ended in favour of Malaysia, which automatically became a member of the Commonwealth. Against a backcloth of economic rivalry between the Malayan and Chinese communities, the conflict between the two main political factions – the *Malayan Alliance*, the Malayan party that exercised power in Kuala Lumpur, and the *People's Action Party*, a predominantly Chinese party that governed in Singapore – had reached the point of no return. Accordingly, on 7 August 1965, following negotiations, Singapore ceased to be part of Malaysia, which was a considerable economic loss for the latter.

CONCLUSION

In India, Muslim nationalism emerged in the 1920s with the Central Khilafat Committee. The movement nursed a grievance against the British Empire, which it suspected of being involved in a large-scale Western plot that targeted the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate in Constantinople. The cause was then taken up by the ulama associations and by the Sufis, such as *Jam'iyat al-Ansar* and *Anjuman-e Khuddam-e Ka'aba*. Also, the role played by the great emblematic figure Iqbal in the crystallization of a common awareness among Indian Muslims was far from negligible. However, what we see, at the same time, is the deepening of divisions between Hindus and Muslims, as independence drew closer. In spite of the great stature of luminaries like Gandhi and Jinnah, there was no avoiding the painful separation of India and Pakistan. This took place in 1947. It was accompanied by a human tragedy: on both sides, droves of individuals were displaced, killed or wounded.

In Indonesia, Muslim nationalism would lead the fight against the Dutch occupation. Embracing *Sarekat Islam*, the brainchild of Javanese traders, and the *Muhammadiyah*, founded by Muslim reformists, it went through four phases

33. See Andaya and Andaya, *A History of Malaysia*, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

between 1908 and 1957. The fourth, between 1945 and 1957, was the most eventful and the most crucial. Faced with Dutch colonialism and the short-lived Japanese occupation during the Second World War, the nationalists Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta exploited the contradictions between the two colonial powers for the good of their country. The independence of Indonesia became a *fait accompli* when the Dutch-Indonesian Union was terminated by Jakarta on 10 August 1954.

Malaya, unlike neighbouring Indonesia, was occupied by Great Britain. But like its neighbour, it was subjected to Japanese occupation during the Second World War. What accounted for the specificity of Malaysia as a nation was its adoption of Islam as its national religion and of Malay as its official language, and the fact that the sultans remained in power. These were realities that neither the British nor the Japanese were able to change. Thus, when independence finally came on 31 August 1957, the Federation of Malaysia kept its monarchic system. However, after regaining its independence, it would sever its links with Singapore, which, from 7 August 1965, would no longer be a part of it.

Chapter 2.7

THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE

Ali Muhammad Shembesh

The Bandung Conference, regarded as historic in the context of international political relations in the twentieth century, was held in the Indonesian city of Bandung, from 13 to 24 April 1955, in order for the 29 African and Asian countries taking part to discuss their common goals.



II-7.1 A commemoration of the Golden Jubilee of the Bandung Conference of 1955, held on 24 April 2005, Bandung, Indonesia

© UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

The Bandung Conference was a distinctive event and a distinguished gathering that demonstrated the support and solidarity of the assembled countries. It was not the initial starting point, however, for it was immediately after the Second World War, as a result of the growing national liberation movement and the call for the right to self-determination, for independence and for the solidarity of anti-colonialist countries; and following the independence of various colonies in Asia and Africa, that Afro-Asian solidarity took shape as the basis for an anti-colonial movement of Asian and African countries.

In 1949, at the invitation of Indian Prime Minister Nehru, a conference was held in New Delhi in order to discuss the problem of Indonesia and the Dutch offensive launched against it. Nineteen countries, including Egypt and Ethiopia, participated in the conference, which sought to develop an Afro-Asian policy at the United Nations. The conference called on participating countries to consult through diplomatic channels, both within and outside the United Nations, and to work on establishing a body responsible for cooperating with and consulting among African and Asian countries in the United Nations setting.

The League of Arab States welcomed involvement in the Bandung Conference and called on Arab countries that were independent at that time to take part, on the understanding that Israel was not to be invited.

Participating in the Bandung Conference were six African and twenty-three Asian countries, all of them independent at the time of the conference. As already mentioned, this conference did not set the ball rolling towards Afro-Asian solidarity but marked the beginning of a distinctive phase in relations among African and Asian countries themselves and in their relations with the outside world.

The Bandung Conference saw the emergence of the neutral movement, advocated by Egypt, Syria, India and Indonesia, that rejected alignment with either of the Western or Eastern camps. This movement unfolded in response to the programmed approach towards alignment with the West, which attempted to win over the Conference. After the Conference, the role of these (African and Asian) countries also developed substantially, as did their responsibilities within the international community.

Bandung was the first time that African and Asian countries had met, without European intercession, to discuss among themselves problems of concern to them and to the world at large. As we know, the discussion of such problems had previously been limited to European countries or groups alone.

The conference achieved numerous outcomes that would otherwise have been unlikely, namely:

1. solidarity and cooperation among the Member States participating in the conference;

2. advancement of the struggle of the peoples of the developing country for independence and the elimination of colonialism;
3. emergence of the Afro-Asian group as a United Nations bloc representing over one half of the world's population from countries that had recently gained independence;
4. a shift in the nature of international relations between these Afro-Asian countries and countries in the Eastern and Western camps.

In the context of these developments, the group and its leaders, in particular Abdul Nasser, Nehru and Tito, endeavoured to establish an Afro-Asian policy at the United Nations.¹

The debate that took place at the Bandung Conference in April 1955 underscored the importance of catering intrinsically to the needs of peoples and not to those of governments or states. The first conference was therefore convened, from 6 December 1957 to 1 January 1958 in Cairo, with the aim of fostering solidarity among African and Asian peoples by mobilizing them to fight colonialism, advocate the Bandung principles, seek the promotion of global peace and create closer ties in all spheres among the peoples of both continents.²

The Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization was established at this conference and numerous conferences have since taken place, in addition to specific Afro-Asian conferences.³ The idea of solidarity between the peoples of the two continents of Africa and Asia and the peoples of the continent of Latin America also materialized and a resolution on the subject was adopted by the Organization's Solidarity Council. The first conference of this new group was held in Havana, Cuba, in 1966, and the second in Cairo.

In the light of the positive outcome from the Bandung Conference, African and Asian countries pursued consultations on convening a second conference along the lines of the Bandung Conference. At the same time, efforts were underway for the convening of a conference of non-aligned states, which took place in Cairo in October 1964. As to the Conference of Afro-Asian states, the global situation at that time prevented it from being held as planned.

Anyone exploring the positions and policies of progressive states, including Arab countries such as the United Arab Republic (as it was at that time), headed by Gamal Abdul Nasser, will note that these states speak on

1. See the study by Sāmī Maṣṣūr entitled 'Al-mu'tamar al-thulāthī li-duwal 'adam al-inḥiyāz' [Trilateral Conference of Non-Aligned States], *Majallat al-Siyāsa al-dawliyya*, Issue 6, 1966, pp. 34–47.
2. Alī al-Dīn Hilāl, 'al-Jamhūriyya al-'arabiyya al-muttaḥida wa-l-taḍāmun al-afrū āsiyawī' [The United Arab Republic and Afro-Asian solidarity], *Majallat al-Siyāsa al-dawliyya*, Issue 5, July 1966, p. 152.
3. *Ibid.*

behalf of the Afro-Asian group of countries, the non-aligned countries, Afro-Asian solidarity and the countries of Latin America, upholding and fighting for the following objectives to:⁴

1. work on combating colonialism in all its forms and manifestations;
2. affirm the right of nations to self-determination and the choice of socio-economic system;
3. promote solidarity among African and Asian peoples (and subsequently the peoples of Latin America) in the economic, social and cultural spheres;
4. condemn aggression and put an end to means of political and economic pressure;
5. eliminate foreign military bases and reject alliance- and bloc-based policies, or, in other words, adopt a policy of non-alignment and positive neutrality;
6. work for disarmament;
7. establish international economic relations on the basis of equity between rich and poor countries producing manufactured goods and raw materials and to have faith in the prosperity of peoples as the true basis for a prevailing atmosphere of global peace;
8. affirm the right of the people of Palestine to return to their country and to consider Israel as tantamount to a hostile threat to Arab States and as a tool of colonialism;
9. believe in the United Nations and peace, and to work for de facto peace across the world in the second half of the twentieth century.

At the Bandung Conference and subsequent meetings of political leaders, the policy of non-alignment and positive neutrality was spelt out, advocating the acceptance of all forms of unconditional aid and assistance (gifts, loans and grants) offered by any country in the Eastern or Western camps that was in a position to do so.

Successive events and developments across the world in general and in the Middle East in particular were indicative of the West's opposition to neutrality, even to the point of it using armed force. The policy of force was inadmissible, however, and Western countries were obliged to reconcile themselves to the new trends in the Middle East region and consequently accept the idea of positive neutrality and non-alignment.

The first and second Conferences of Non-Aligned States, held respectively in Belgrade in 1961 and Cairo in 1964, had an enormous impact in terms of establishing the politics of progressive and revolutionary countries of the developing country that aspired to a path other than dependence. They therefore pursued the policy of non-alignment and positive neutrality, which was built on promoting the establishment of a just and lasting global peace. Representing over one half of the world's independent states at that time,

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 152–3.

those countries adopted a series of resolutions, the substance of which can be outlined as follows:

1. concerted action for the liberation of countries still dependent and the right of resort to arms by colonized peoples to secure the full exercise of their right to self-determination and independence;
2. respect for the right of peoples to self-determination;
3. condemnation of racial discrimination and apartheid;
4. peaceful coexistence and the codification of its principles by the United Nations;
5. respect for the sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity;
6. settlement of disputes without threat or use of force in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
7. general and complete disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests;
8. opposition to taking part in military alliances, blocs and pacts and prohibition of foreign military bases;
9. belief that economic development is an obligation of the whole international community;
10. efforts for cultural, scientific and educational cooperation and consolidation of the international and regional institutions working for that purpose.

These and other resolutions were of significance in that period when the battle between the two blocs and with the rest of the world was at its height in what was known as the Cold War, under the principle of the right to self-determination, sovereignty, independence and an end to subjugation in all its forms and manifestations. The fundamental principles of the policy of African, Asian and other states that sought to follow the spirit of Bandung were therefore to:

1. desist from joining military alliances and organizations and from alignment with the parties to the Cold War;
2. interact and cooperate with both camps;
3. promote solutions to international problems and crises and stand alongside dependent and newly liberated peoples and the United Nations with respect to measures taken for the benefit of these peoples.⁵

The Bandung Conference, which was primarily held for the purpose of enabling a group of African and Asian countries to discuss issues of joint concern and to cooperate on the basis of their common interests and goals, thus came to assume various dimensions in the context of cooperation and solidarity among the peoples of the developing country in particular. This was

5. For further information on these principles, see ‘Ā’isha Rātib, ‘al-Jamhūriyya al-‘arabiyya al-muttaḥida wa siyāsāt ‘adam al-inḥiyāz’ (The United Arab Republic and the policy of non-alignment), *Majallat al-Siyāsa al-dawlīyya*, Issue 5, July 1977, pp. 156–7.

at a time of multiple crises and differing aspirations of the major countries and blocs that sought to extend their influence yet again by establishing alliances and installing military bases, which were of key importance during that period of the Cold War.

Following the Bandung Conference, African and Asian countries unquestionably grew ever more aware of the interest in the problems which at that time affected their future and influenced their destiny. This was perhaps most clearly evidenced by the continuing encounters and meetings between countries and leaders, first and foremost the meeting of Abdul Nasser, Tito and Nehru, which took place in Brioni, Yugoslavia, at the invitation of President Tito, on 18 July 1956. The main legacy of this meeting was that:

1. the foreign policy of independence, which then developed into non-alignment, was not restricted solely to countries that had rid themselves of Western colonialism but also included any country having left the communist bloc. It is a well known fact that not only was Yugoslavia a member of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) but its capital was also the site of the Cominform headquarters;
2. the non-alignment policy could be embraced by any state, irrespective of its political or economic system;
3. non-alignment is not a policy limited to the Afro-Asian world but one open to other countries, meaning that it is not a closed regional or continental policy but an open global policy;
4. in addition to the benefit of past experiences in terms of not belonging to any particular bloc and the priority of working with countries with similar policies, the Brioni meeting added a new factor. While it is true to say that it proceeded from the experience of the three countries, the non-aligned countries came to realize that expanding their efforts in different parts of the world was instrumental in achieving peace and security among nations;
5. given the rewards reaped from the cooperation among only three countries with similar policies, there is no doubt that the inclusion of a larger number of countries with similar policies, which is to say non-aligned countries, would have benefited the international community. It is this that prompted the call for non-aligned conferences.⁶

The second outcome of the Bandung Conference was the Accra Conference, held in 1958, in which eight independent African countries participated. It signalled the first African attempt to organize such an event from within the continent itself, rather than it being organized from elsewhere. The attempt was limited by the circumstances of these countries and the Conference resolutions were treated as general principles, which was the only means of reconciling conflicting points of view. For that reason, the role of the

6. Mansūr, 'Al-mu'tamar ..., *op. cit.*, p. 41.

Conference was limited to opposing racist colonization and advocating respect for the African personality.

All in all, the Conference coincided with a tense global situation, and the efforts of eminent leaders of authority in their countries and regions⁷ were aimed at solidarity against colonialism, both old and new. This initiative (the Bandung Conference) succeeded in establishing and strengthening the pillars of solidarity and cooperation among countries of the developing country in their quest to oppose colonialism and eliminate dependence of all kinds.

7. Such as 'Abd al-Nāṣir in the Arab region, Nkrumah in Africa, Nehru in Asia and Tito in Eastern Europe.

Chapter 2.8

PAN-ISLAMISM AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
IN AFRICA

Iba Der Thiam

Long before the Arab leaders of Pan-Islamism arrived on the scene, Muslim African chiefs had already, to some extent, paved the way. Without ever having written it down formally, they were living it, practising it, making it their credo in everyday life, in their relations with other communities and with other Muslim contemporaries.

A great movement to unify the Muslim world had already been attempted in the Nigerian Sudan, on the initiative of the leading Chiefs.

The aim of the Mande Charter dating from 1236 was, among other things, to unite the various tribes of the Mande people under the banner of Islam, by recognizing its credo and accepting its authority, within the meaning of Article 3 of that strategic document, which states that the '*Morikanda lolu* (Muslim scholars) are our masters and teachers in Islam. Everyone owes them respect and consideration.'

This is amply demonstrated by the great importance that the Charter gave to the religion's spiritual leaders. They were similarly given pride of place throughout the reign of Kankan Musa, at the height of the Mali Empire, from 1312 to 1390.

Kankan Musa has gone down in history, in unrivalled glory, especially because of his memorable pilgrimage to Mecca, from 1324 to 1325, accompanied by a large retinue of *ulemas*, jurisconsults, imams, crown princes, men and women, as well as griots, this retinue was estimated to have numbered between 8,000 and 14,000 people by the writer, Tarikh El Fettach, and even 60,000 by other sources. In addition to the religious act of pilgrimage, he sought to establish relations of unity and solidarity with the Islamic world.

Kankan Musa started out from Niani, crossed the desert through Ualata and Libya and travelled on to Cairo, carrying such a great fortune in gold that it affected the market value of this metal throughout the entire Mediterranean basin. He was warmly received everywhere.

He had established contacts with Sultan al-Malik al-Nāṣir, spending time in Mecca and Medina, and returned with two *shorfa* of the Quraysh tribe, including a poet named Abu Ishaq Ibrahim, better known as el-Saheli.

His sole concern afterwards was to strengthen Muslim unity and so he refused to enter into any disputes that might pit one faction against another.

For that reason too, he refused to be drawn into the disagreement that arose between the Almohad Prince el-Mamer and Sultan Durgla of the Maghreb.

In the same vein, his deeds throughout the Nigerian Sudan marvellously illustrated cooperation among Muslims and solidarity within Islam. For example, he is said to have built the magnificent mosques that are the pride of Timbuktu, Gao, Bako, Goundam, Dire and Ouanko to this day. He thus contributed to the near-uniform Arab-Islamic stamp on much of the Nigerian Sudan.

He also built in the capital of Mali a sumptuous imperial palace, and its characteristics, according to art historians, gave birth to the so-called Sudanese style of architecture that is so beautiful, so original and so typically Negro-African.

Kankan Musa's successors continued this openness towards the Muslim world, conducting a policy of active solidarity and close relations with the Muslim princes in the Maghreb, including Sultan Abdu Salam of Morocco, to whom he dispatched ambassadors bearing gifts in 1359.

During the Songhay Empire, the same policy was pursued under Askiya Mohammad, who also undertook a famous pilgrimage to the holy sites of Islam, between 1496 and 1497, leaving its indelible mark on history. He used the pilgrimage to establish bonds of friendship, unity and solidarity between the Sudano-Sahelian peoples of the Maghreb, Mashriq, Mecca, Medina and the Middle East.

The influence of Islam grew considerably in western Sudan during that period. Leo Africanus wrote that nearly all of the people could read because of the trade in books written in Arabic. It spread eastwards towards the Hausa and Kanem Borno kingdoms and westwards towards Senegambia.

In Senegambia, the site of the University of Pire is most noteworthy as the crucible that moulded some of the pre-eminent Islamic personalities mostly heavily involved in the resistance against foreign rule, in particular Thierno Suleyman Baal, Abbu Kader Kane, el-Hadji Malick Sy of Bundu, el-Hadj Umar Foutiyou Tall, Mamadu Lamine Drame, and such spiritual leaders as Ndiambour, Cayor, Baol and Sine.

They were all united by the same faith in Islam, a sincere desire for unity and solidarity, and unwavering commitment to the resistance against occupying forces, whether African or non-African.

At the very beginning of the nineteenth century, Usman dan Fodio, a Fulani chief and descendant of Musa Djok Kolo, left Futa Toro to travel to Haud.

He islamized northern Nigeria and the north of Cameroon. Through his endeavour Islam's territorial hold extended practically from the Atlantic to Central Africa and, in places, to the east coast of the continent.

The Western world's relations increased with Africa in the fifteenth century, after the first major discoveries.

Interest in the continent grew constantly for more than three centuries, as trading posts were established mainly on the coast for informal and limited trade or as the triangular slave trade, drawing on the hinterland, developed.

The discovery of quinine made it possible to withstand the ravages wrought by malaria, while technological developments such as the discovery of wireless telegraphy, Morse code, the invention of artillery, Ordnance Survey maps, the railway, naval steam power (which enabled France to conquer Algeria) followed by the invention of the machine gun and dynamite caused such a yawning technological gap that, despite their bravery, intrepid energy, heightened spirit of sacrifice and heroic courage, the African resistance movements succumbed, one after the other.

Africa was brought gradually under imperialist rule, at a time when Europe needed colonies in order to export its capital, its burgeoning industrial output and some of its people.

The 1884–5 Berlin Conference, at which the continent was partitioned into zones of French, British, German, Portuguese and Spanish influence, was the high point of that process.

New forms of resistance to the establishment of foreign rule through territorial, political, economic, social, and cultural colonization then sprang up. Some were local, tribal or village-based, while others were community-wide, national, subregional and sometimes even regional, depending on the importance of the leaders and the political stakes involved.

The resistance movements differed in nature. In predominantly Muslim countries, colonial rule challenged the Muslim way of life in many ways that threatened the peoples' cultural identity, intrinsic faith and cultural practises by attacking and negating their ideas, concepts, symbols and references through the introduction of administrative, legal, institutional and political mechanisms and cultural codes that ran counter to the Islamic world's values, which, if not negated, were eliminated purely and simply through brainwashing.

By refusing to submit to the distortion, falsification and negation instituted by the colonial system, the people and the elite alike repudiated colonial intrigues and arbitrariness, rejected domination and unhesitatingly raised the battle flag against the foreign invader.

Their attitude was founded on Islamic doctrine, a religion of freedom and dignity, which rejects all forms of servitude or submission to any authority other than God, especially when such authority is exercised by non-Muslims in a systematic endeavour to destroy Islam.

Pan-Islamism, as a ‘movement for the reform and modernization of Islam’, was started by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, a Persian, who introduced the notion of ‘Al-Jami‘a al Islamiyya’.

Amid social and political turmoil, he lived for some time in Afghanistan and Cairo, where he established strong links with al-Azhar University. He then embarked on an intense and sustained propaganda drive, targeting the colonized intellectual communities, to convince them of the need to shake off the yoke of foreign domination and free Islam from oppression in order to achieve freedom and renewal.

Persecuted by the British, he sought exile in India. Having spent time in Paris and London, he became known for his diatribes against British colonization; he strongly criticised Renan’s anti-Islamic theories and launched a journal to disseminate his ideas.

Expelled from Persia, al-Afghani found refuge in Constantinople, in undocumented circumstances.

This precursor of Muslim unity, in an effort to defend the religion independently and in dignity, trained a number of disciples, such as Shaykh Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), who later became Mufti of Egypt.

Several fellow Muslims had been won over by his active militancy, for he had convinced them of the two key conditions for the renaissance of Islam:

- total freedom from the alienation wrought by the colonial system;
- a return to the true teachings of the Holy Qur’ān and the *Sunna*, as taught by pious ancestors.

He thus provided generations of Muslim scholars with the necessary ideological and doctrinal weapons to raise the battle standard in the anti-colonial struggle.

The other thinkers in this school of thought included el-Hadji Umar Futiyyu Tall, Maba Diakhou Bâ, Mamadu Lamine Drame, Sunkari Camara, Alpha Molo, Fode Kaba Dumbuya, Abdoulaye Ndiaye, Samory Touré, Alpha Yaya Diallo, Ndiouma Diatte and Aly Yoro, who must indisputably be included in the lineage of ‘Abdal-Rahmān al-Kawākibī (1849–1902), Gaspirali Alias Ismail Gasprinski (1855–1914), Rachid Rida – born in 1865, and Ibn Bādis – born in 1899.

Their struggle, which occurred before that of some of the eminent persons mentioned above, was sometimes violent because it was a response to the colonial violence that was the hallmark of foreign rule and its preferred *modus operandi* – traumatizing the people by imposing its authority by force.



II-8.1 Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, founder of the pan-Islam movement and resistance to the British mandate
© National Library and Archives of the Islamic Republic of Iran

After the defeat of these resistance fighters, the movement was continued in other guises by the Senegalese Youth Movement, Tunisian Youth, Algerian Youth and similar movements in Turkey.

The action of the Universities of Cairo, al-Azhar, al-Zaytuna in Tunisia and the Qarawiyyin University in Fez, had definite effects, as did the influence during the following centuries of the schools of Sankore, Sidi Yahia and others in the Nigerian Sudan, led in the sixteenth century, in particular, by Ahmed Baba, Mohamed Bakhayokho, Omar Bakhayokho and qadi El-Aqib, all emblematic figures of Songhay humanism. The universities of Pire, Thilogne, Coki, Niomre, Ndam, Ndiarnde, Saint-Louis, Nguith, Ndiagourèye, Mbakhol, Diamal, Bamba Modu, Futa Jalon and Gabu were noted for their definite influence.

It is true that these peoples were not yet all under a single political authority. It is also true that they were not all yet motivated by a consensually shared ideal. Yet it could be said that it was already becoming a possibility.

There is no doubt that, since this period, every Muslim has a sense of belonging to a larger community.

That first experiment was very strongly reinforced by the advent of el-Hadji Umar Futiya Tall, who embodied the struggle against Muslim doubters and foreign rule.

In spreading its influence over Kaarta, Futa Jalon, the former Kingdom of Gabu, other countries in Senegambia, Futa Toro and the lands of Segu and Macina, he extended the reach of Islam from the borders of Guidimakha to Timbuktu, from west to east, and from Diarra in the north to Dinguiraye in the south, putting into practise ideas that were upheld by the pan-Islamist movement after his death in 1864.

His clashes with the French for control of Senegal and the Medina post were similar to the battles being waged by other Muslims in the Maghreb and in the Middle East, against all forms of domination.

The adoption by his successor, Ahmadu Seku Tall, of the title of Amir al-Mumineen, like the sultans of Istanbul and Fez, is indicative of the spiritual and political affinity that prevailed among the various Islamic centres at the time.

Furthermore, as Yves Saint Martin has written, 'it was at the instigation of a Moroccan sharif that in 1870, he dubbed himself Commander of the Believers.'

Maba Diakhou Bâ, el-Hadji Umar's lieutenant, in an effort to drive French Christians out, had previously called unhesitatingly on Muslims from the south, east and north of Senegambia and on the King of Morocco, to mobilize their troops in a coordinated pincer offensive in the name of Islam, to cast the foreign colonizers who had settled in Senegambia into the sea.

When Burba Wolof thought that he had to leave his capital of Yang Yang to join Ahmadu in battle in regions such as the north of present-day Mali, south-west Niger, the north of present-day Benin and the west of present-day Nigeria, he was acting in a manner that was both pan-Africanist and pan-Islamist.

Merchants, being both itinerant and literate, played a crucial role in spreading pan-Islamism, even if it was not the subject of evidence-based theory.

It is well known, for example, that during the time of Idris Alaoma, Borno had established close relations with the Ottoman Empire and with the Kingdom of Morocco.

The Hausa kingdoms, according to the Kano Chronicle, played an equally important role by spreading Islam in many areas known together as Bilad Al-Sudan.

When the colonial movement to conquer new territory was stepped up, the Islamic world was one of its main victims.

The British, French, German, Austrian and Russian lust for land sparked conflicts known collectively as the Eastern Question.

To gain control over the route to the Indies, to control straits or to occupy the African continent, Europe began a series of wars and found Islam in its path at every turn.

Turkey and Egypt were the main victims. The same held true for Asia, where Britain's insatiable hunger, in its efforts to conquer India, brought it into conflict with the Dutch, who controlled the Indonesian archipelago, and with France, whose presence in Indochina was a major obstacle to the British.

Afghanistan and Persia did not escape this struggle for influence.

In Africa, the colonial powers were present in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria and Morocco.

They were also to be found in Somalia, East Africa, Senegal, the Nigerian Sudan, Central Africa, and even South Africa.

In Europe, the Turkish Empire, established on both sides of the Mediterranean, was a major obstacle.

Naturally, the European imperialist drive for further conquests had opened the Arabs' and Muslims' eyes and bolstered the emergence of strong forms of nationalism.

This was the case in Egypt, where Bonaparte landed in 1798.

When the Suez Canal was built in 1869, westerners coveted the country so much that the Islamic authorities in the countries concerned were obliged to introduce reforms, remove corrupt rulers who were in league with the foreigners and encourage nationalist movements.

Colonel Turabi, with his rallying cry of 'Egypt for Egyptians', is a splendid example of Egypt's will to resist. He also gave the Arab world and the entire *umma* (community) a new cause, for which no sacrifice was too great.

Bonaparte's presence in Egypt was followed by France's conquest of Algeria in 1830. In 1881, Tunisia became a protectorate. In 1882, Egypt was occupied by the British. At the same time, Italy imposed its authority over Libya, while other countries such as Spain, France and Germany set their sights on Morocco.

One aggravating factor was the League of Nations mandates established after the First World War, which placed Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Yemen, Muscat, Oman and the Gulf Emirates under European rule.

In the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Chechens and Tartars were deported with the same aim in view.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement was signed in 1916.

When the Balfour Declaration dated 2 November 1917 was proclaimed and supported by the United States of America, France and Italy, affirming the intention to make Palestine a future national home for the Jewish people, the awakening of the Arab world and its desire for unity were felt more keenly.

In 1924, the Caliphate was abolished. The *umma* – or Islamic community – found further reasons to stand up to its oppressors.

From that point on, the imperialist colonizing West became the enemy of the Muslim world, although the leaders of that movement must be distinguished from the Western peoples, who often knew nothing of those sombre designs.

The Abdelkrim revolution was fought in the name of the Muslim resistance against the colonizers.

Mohamed Abdel Asam urged a jihad against the British, around 1900, with the same aim in view.

The All-India Muslim League was founded in India in 1906.

Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the Sultan of Atjeh, too, had raised the flag of revolution.

A similar movement had sprung up in Russia.

The concept of pan-Islamism was very clearly formulated at the turn of the twentieth century.

It was a rallying cry for the nascent resistance movements in Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Asia, in British, Dutch and French colonies, in the Near East, Africa and the Americas.

The al-Nahḍa (awakening) spread throughout the world, including Western Europe and even to Australia, Canada, the United States of America and all of Latin America.

Many newspapers were established.

In the Americas alone, 205 out of 268 publications were run by immigrants of Arab origin.

Cairo's al-Azhar University played an important role in this movement, as did the Egyptian press, such as al-Manar magazine. The same was true of the Syrian/Lebanese publications, *al-Muqtataf* (The Harvest) and *al-Hilal* (The Crescent).

Intellectuals played a decisive role in this movement.

They were at the battlefront everywhere – from Pakistan, the Americas and the Soviet Caucasus to the Cape of Good Hope.

The battle was such that Egypt recovered its independence as early as 1922, though this was neither real nor effective until 1936. Syria and Lebanon did the same.

In 1926, Reza Pahlavi acceded to the throne in Iran.

In 1932, Iraq took the lead in gaining its independence. In 1947, Pakistan was separated from India.

In the previous year, Malaysia, Burma, Ceylon and Singapore gained independence from foreign rule.

In 1956, Tunisia and Morocco gained their independence, too, while Algeria declared its national war of independence in 1954.

A wind of nationalism blew throughout black Africa, despite efforts to counter it legally.

Whether in Muslim Iran or Muslim India, the prevailing wind of change therefore affected relations with Europe, with science, technology and progress and attitudes to internal challenges.

That was particularly true in India, where Hindu nationalism – powerful and all-pervasive – built Islamic community awareness that culminated, as noted above, in the establishment of Pakistan.

Some thinkers have since drawn a distinction between Arabism and reformism.

Anti-Zionist sentiment grew at the same time.

The above-noted mobilization triggered by pan-Islamism thus led to the defeat of imperialism, the independence for Muslim peoples, the struggle against communism and the building of a new identity in the quest for freedom from the effects of colonial domination and construction of a common destiny for men and women sharing the same faith in a single God, who has not been created and never begotten.

There has always been continuous contact between the centres of Islam and the worldwide Islamic movement owing to the movement of books and pilgrimages to Mecca, despite the many barriers raised by the colonial system.

Young African students travelled to Arab countries to visit the major religious centres, and returned steeped in pan-Islamic ideologies.

They launched the Muslim Cultural Renaissance in French West Africa in the early 1950s, after the Second World War, which comprised eminent persons such as Saliou Mbacke, Abdu Wahab Doucoure, Boubacar Sy, Iyane Thiam and Alioune Diouf.

There were similar initiatives in each of the French West African colonies, especially where Islam has a significant presence.

Students trained in universities in Arab countries took similar initiatives in British and Portuguese colonies.

At the same time, Cire Ly and Amadu Mustapha Wade launched the Muslim Students' Association in Europe.

There were similar organizations in the various federated colonies, such as those in French West Africa.

The Muslim Cultural Renaissance was one of the first Muslim cultural organizations to condemn the colonial system and to fight to promote the use of Arabic, by adopting resolutions at various meetings held throughout the

1950s and public meetings in towns, which had a genuine impact on youth, in particular.

Its action was feared all the more because it had linked together such prestigious French West African spiritual leaders as Shaykh Al Islam Ibrahima Niasse, Shaykh Mohamed Mbacke, el-Hadji Abdul Aziz Sy and el-Hadji Seydou Nourou Tall, who wielded considerable influence in sub-Saharan Africa.

All eyes were on the nationalist movements springing up under Messali Hadj in Algeria, Bourguiba in Tunisia, Alal el Fassi in Morocco, Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt and al-Mukhtar in Libya.

Those Pan-Islamist movements were linked to the African Youth Council, the General Union of Workers of Black Africa (UGTAN), the National Youth Council of Senegal and similar groups in Togo, Cameroon and French West Africa.

This process was much facilitated because there were Muslims in most anti-colonial student associations, such as Balla Dembele, Demba Konate, Shaykh Tidiane Coulibaly, in Sudan, Boubacar Sylla, Nabi Laye Camara, in Guinea, not to mention Niger, Dahomey, the Upper Volta and others on whom they could conceivably rely, because of their anti-colonial commitment.

These African pan-Islamists and their conscious or unconscious allies were also linked to the World Communist Movement, which had included them in its anti-colonial strategy since the 1920s at least.

Their primary form of action entailed the establishment of Qurʾānic schools and the dissemination and teaching of Arabic, despite the barriers raised by the colonial system.

Their role in the liberation of the continent was so decisive that colonialism, pan-Africanism, pan-Islamism and revolutionary movements are all filed together in most colonial archives.

Chapter 2.9

THE CREATION OF THE
ORGANISATION OF THE ISLAMIC
CONFERENCE

Mustafa Cissé

The precursor to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was established at the end of the first Summit of Islamic States, held in Rabat (Morocco) on 22 and 25 September 1969, following the fire at al-Aqsa Mosque.

The summit brought together twenty-four countries in addition to the representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Muslim community of India, who participated as observers.



II-9.1 The headquarters of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
© Permanent Delegation of Saudi Arabia to UNESCO



II-9.2 An OIC conference in 1972, held in Jeddah

© Permanent Delegation of Saudi Arabia to UNESCO

For the Islamic *umma* the meeting was timely.

As the saying goes, every cloud has a silver lining.

The profanation of the third sanctuary of Islam was a grave event that effectively hastened the establishment of the OIC. In other words, the period preceding the setting up of that body had been marked by untoward events and difficult obstacles to unity in the Muslim world.

Before the first Islamic summit in Rabat, the various confessions, particularly the Sunnis, the Shī'as and others, had been riven by politico-religious divisions, notably in the Middle East, the cradle of the revealed religions. The rulers of the Arab States were also broadly divided by political antagonism.

Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's pan-Arabism, which had spread far and wide since the revolution of the free officers of 23 July 1952, was viewed in some circles as a means of attempting to relegate Islam to a minor role.

The Arab masses had demonstrated their support for pan-Arabism, regarding it as a genuine policy of liberation and emancipation.

Thus, Nasser's speeches were listened to closely and disseminated widely throughout the Arab Muslim world, more so than the Holy *Qu'rān* or any other work of Islamic science.

Furthermore, Egypt's military intervention in Yemen after Imam Badr had been ousted by his army had set Cairo and Riyadh at loggerheads. The



II-9.3 Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC), addresses a press conference

© UN Photo/Sarah Fretwell

two countries waged a war of words over the airwaves. The Cold War also played a ‘divide and rule’ role in the Arab Muslim world.

Islamic mass organizations such as the Muslim World League, the Higher Council of Islamic Affairs and the Islamic Congress which had its seat successively in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, had not made sufficient efforts to achieve genuine unity among Muslim communities, especially as each of those organizations had a particular outlook.

It was in those circumstances that the late King Faisal b. Abdulaziz Āl Saud, the sovereign of Saudi Arabia, had done his utmost to reunite all segments of the Islamic *umma*. He had begun by conducting a long tour in Africa and Asia. It was in Pakistan in 1966 that he made his historic appeal to all the Muslim countries, proposing the establishment of an organization for consultation and coordination on issues of common interest.

After Pakistan, King Faisal travelled to a number of African countries, in particular Mali, Guinea, Morocco and Tunisia, in order to make his appeal more widely known. Owing to the diplomatic calendar, it was only in 1972 that he made an official visit to Senegal, where he was received triumphantly by President Senghor and the Senegalese people. After that visit, described as historic, sustainable and ever growing cooperation was initiated between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Republic of Senegal.

While governments in some Muslim countries and prominent intellectuals strongly supported King Faisal's initiative, officials in other countries not only condemned Faisal's appeal but also uttered accusations going so far as to maintain that it was an attempt to resuscitate the Baghdad Pact on the Middle East Treaty Organization, signed on 24 February 1955 by Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and the United Kingdom. The pact was renamed the 'Central Treaty Organization' (CENTO) after Iraq withdrew on 21 August 1959.

Thus, in his endeavours to achieve Muslim unity, King Faisal encountered enormous obstacles and palpable, at times skillfully organized, hostility. Furthermore, the communist countries, led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, took a very dim view of an Islamic force capable of self-organization for the purpose of mobilizing human, scientific and economic resources.

Nevertheless, owing to the wisdom and determination for which he was known, the Saudi monarch courageously stayed the course and his idea eventually gained ground, reaching the remotest corners of the Islamic *umma*.

The fire at the al-Aqsa Mosque on 21 August 1969, rumoured to have been started by a mentally ill Jew who has never been charged, was paradoxically the event that led to the holding of the first Islamic summit in Rabat (Morocco) on 22 and 25 September 1969. It was the first summit that brought together the Kings, Heads of State and Government of the Arab Muslim States.

The meeting was convened on the initiative of King Faisal and Hassan II. The Saudi King's dream of reuniting Muslims thus began to come true.

At the close of the Rabat meeting, the declaration of 25 September 1969 was adopted. It contained the following clauses:

1. Discuss the results of the common action which participating countries have taken at the international level on the subject of the resolutions stated in the Communiqué of the Rabat Islamic Summit Conference;
2. Discuss the subject of establishing a permanent Secretariat, charged inter-alia with the responsibility of making contacts with governments represented at the Conference, and to coordinate their action.

Those clauses are contained in the three-page Rabat summit communiqué. That document, albeit no more than a declaration of principle, nonetheless constituted the first stone in the construction of the OIC. Yet the obstacles in the path of unity were still far from being fully and finally overcome.

At the ministerial meeting in Jeddah in March 1970, two Arab States of communist allegiance fiercely opposed the establishment of a permanent Secretariat in accordance with the communiqué of the summit, arguing that the text merely provided for discussing 'the subject of establishing a permanent

Secretariat' and that the document, therefore, was in no way legally binding. That stance gave rise to lively discussions on the subject, which was ultimately referred to the next ministerial meeting scheduled for December of the same year in Pakistan. Nevertheless, before parting, the ministers of foreign affairs took the following decisions:

1. the appointment of a Secretary by the next ministerial conference for a two-year period, to be chosen by Malaysia;
2. the expenses incurred for the administration and activities of the Secretariat to be borne by the Member States;
3. Jeddah to be the headquarters of the Secretariat pending the liberation of Jerusalem.

Thus, difficulties were still being encountered in the process of establishing the OIC.

It was at the end of the Karachi meeting, held on 26 and 28 December 1970, that Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra al-Haj, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, was elected Secretary General, to take charge of implementing the decisions of the first summit in Rabat, and establishing the newly created organization, the Islamic Conference.

There was still no major document governing the organization. It was therefore necessary to draft a statute or charter setting out the objectives, membership requirements and programme of the Islamic Conference, bearer of the hopes of all Islamic communities.

After the Karachi conference, a meeting of ambassadors was held in Jeddah in the presence of the new Secretary General Tunku Abdul Rahman in March 1971.

The opening session of that meeting, which was required to draw up the preliminary draft charter of the Islamic Conference, was chaired by the late King Fahd b. Abdulaziz, then Interior Minister of Saudi Arabia. In his address, King Fahd set out clearly the mission that had been entrusted to the ambassadors, stating that His Majesty King Faisal, the Saudi Government and the entire Islamic *umma* placed great hopes in the meeting convened to draft a balanced document entitled Draft Charter of the Islamic Conference.

After the opening session King Fahd invited the doyen of the diplomatic corps, His Excellency Musa Rouweissi, Ambassador of Tunisia, to discharge the office of Chairman of the Conference. As Ambassador of Senegal, I was designated Rapporteur.

We thus drew up the preliminary draft OIC charter.

The first problem encountered was to propose a name for the new organization that would be approved unanimously.

The Karachi Conference of December 1970 had requested the newly elected Secretary General to take the following measures:

‘circulate ... a draft memorandum setting forth these objectives and the rules of procedure for the Conference, inviting the comments of the participating states and ascertaining their respective wishes to take part in a meeting to study the document;

‘make arrangements for holding the foresaid meeting at Jeddah, within four months of circulation of the Memorandum; and

‘submit the recommendations of their meeting to the next Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers for their consideration.’

The Karachi Conference had also decided, on the proposal of Pakistan and Egypt, to consider the idea of establishing an Islamic bank.

Egypt was accordingly charged with responsibility for making a comprehensive study of the project in the light of its own proposal and in the light of the discussions that took place.

The Karachi Conference had thus made a start to setting up the organization that is now the OIC.

In accordance with the Karachi declaration, the conference of ambassadors in Jeddah was assigned important responsibilities involving the preparation of a draft charter setting the objectives, the form of administration of the new organization and its terms of membership.

The first point on which agreement was required was the organization’s title. Saudi Arabia proposed ‘League of Islamic States’.

Several states that had secular constitutions could not adopt such a proposal. They comprised Lebanon and Senegal, to name but two.

There were lengthy discussions on that point. Some countries would not even agree to ‘The Conference of Islamic Countries’. A consensus was reached at last on ‘Islamic Conference’, in the knowledge that it was a rather vague title that did not reflect the Muslim countries’ wish to come together in order to work for their development in genuinely active solidarity.

The preliminary draft charter thus adopted defined in general terms the election and term of office of the Secretary General, which was limited to two years and was not renewable.

Tunku Abdul Rahman served for only one term, handing over to Hassan Touhami, one of the free officers who had carried out the 1952 revolution in Egypt.

I myself submitted Mr Touhami’s nomination at the third ministerial meeting in Benghazi (Libya) in March 1973.

He was a warm, extremely dynamic man, very eager to help the Islamic Conference to make progress.

On taking office, he immediately launched into somewhat exuberant activities which made some people fear that the organization would become too political.

The new Secretary General was someone with a practical background who soon managed to publicize the Islamic Conference in all continents. Yet

he had always intimated that our organization's name was rather uninspiring and, at the fourth ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) in July 1974, he secured the adoption, not without difficulty, of the title 'Organization of the Islamic Conference'. It was, however, the appointment of Doctor Amadou Karim, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Senegal, which revolutionized the administration of the OIC.

During his term of office, the following OIC subsidiary organs were established:

- the Dhaka (Bangladesh) Centre for Technology;
- the Istanbul (Turkey) Centre for Islamic Art and Culture; and
- the Rabat (Morocco) Centre for Culture, Science and Education.

These three centres have performed their missions successfully in that, since their establishment, they have constantly developed and have achieved satisfying results.

Other organs have been established and are discharging their functions properly.

The OIC's mission to the United Nations plays an important consultation and coordination role.

The annual ministerial meeting, held during the General Assembly as a side event, is an opportunity for Member States to meet every year, coordinate their positions and provide the OIC with fresh impetus to accomplish its mission to best effect.

CONCLUSION

The Organization of the Islamic Conference is now thirty-seven years old.

It must evolve to consolidate and preserve its achievements, without losing sight of fresh prospects as they appear in order to carry out its mission more effectively.

In view of the changes that have occurred internationally in recent years, and globalization which leaves no one indifferent, the Organization, which embodies the hopes of the Islamic *umma*, must be in the forefront of economic and social development, while playing an active part in the maintenance of international peace and security and the defence of human rights, in accordance with the sacred principles of Islam.

The Kings, Heads of State and Government certainly believed this when they adopted, at the tenth summit in Malaysia in November 2003, a decision on the establishment of the OIC Commission of Eminent Persons to reflect on the Organization's progress.

The OIC now has nearly forty years of experience behind it, a period of major achievements under a wide-ranging multidimensional action plan whose implementation nonetheless remains clearly inadequate.

Yet it is satisfying to note that the OIC's subsidiary organs, specialized and affiliated institutions and specialized committees have functioned most effectively, as a result of the enlightened guidance provided by the Kings, Heads of State and Government and under the dynamic direction of the General Secretariat. That has made it possible to increase the international prestige of the Organization and to enhance the status of the Islamic *umma* whose civilizing mission must never be lost from view, in keeping with the counsels of Almighty Allāh.

‘You are the best nation produced [as an example] for mankind. You enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong and believe in Allāh’ (III.110).

It is therefore more than ever necessary, in my view, as proposed in the resolution of the tenth summit, to promote policies and programmes designed to encourage enlightened moderation in accordance with the recommendations and precepts of Islam on tolerance, emancipation and the exaltation of all humanity.

Chapter 2.10

CREATION OF THE
ORGANISATION OF
AFRICAN UNITY

Ali Muhammad Shembesh

The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established on 25 May 1963 and was a regional governmental organization for the African continent. The idea of African unity did not appear out of a vacuum or come about overnight; it went through several phases, the first of which was during the period between the beginning of the twentieth century and the end of the Second World War. This phase occurred mainly outside of Africa with the beginnings of racial awareness among a small elite of black African descendants, who were then joined by African students studying in Europe and America. Some members of this group later became leaders who called for African unity, such as Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta.

Despite the fact that the pan-African movement originated in the New World in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as part of the liberation struggle of blacks against whites and against exploitation, and despite the fact that pan-Africanism and African liberation initially constituted a separatist religious conflict between Africans and Americans which later spread throughout Africa, Pan-Africanism as a national liberation movement dates back to the Italian Fascist invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and is mainly a result of the inclusive African Conference held in Manchester in October 1945. For the first time in the history of the pan-African movement, African delegates made up the majority of seats in that conference and discussions were focused on the liberation of Africa from colonial rule.¹ This conference was resolute and directed its strongly-worded demands towards the colonial powers of the time. These demands included:²

1. UNESCO, *General History of Africa*, California, Heineman, 1993, VIII, p. 808.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 809.



II-10.1 An OAU press conference held in November 1972 at United Nations Headquarters

© UN Photo/Yutaka Nagata

1. Full liberation and independence for Africans and other ethnicities from domination by European powers claiming sovereignty and mandate over them;
2. the immediate abolition of all racist and other discriminatory laws;
3. freedom of speech and of the press, and the right to assembly and association;
4. the abolition of forced labour and equal pay for equal work;
5. the right of every man and woman above 21 to vote and to stand in elections;
6. the provision of medical services, social welfare and education for all citizens.


The second phase was marked by the transfer of the concept of African unity after the Second World War to the African continent itself and it took the form of anti-colonial liberation movements. This was an important reason for the uniting of those black African nations that were still under detested colonial rule and for combining efforts to rid Africa of the injustice inflicted on it for many years. The shift of thought in the second phase was a result of the ideas of the first group of elite African intellectuals and leaders who lived outside of Africa.

The third phase, which is said to have started in 1958, is the most crucial in the African unity movement; this was when the idea began to take shape and approach the stage of implementation. This idea became fact with the independence of several African countries from colonialism. Once this was accomplished, they sought to intensify their efforts and to work together towards unity. The previous racial awareness was no longer of great importance for African Unity; it would be transformed into a feeling of belonging to Africa as a distinct continent, without discrimination between the North and South as contrived by colonialism, and the concern of African nations as a whole would be the suffering long inflicted upon them by European colonial rule.

In the history of pan-Africanism as a national liberation movement the period from 1950 to 1965 can be called the era of Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah was able through his words, actions and abilities to mobilize the leaders of the African liberation and independence movements in the cause of pan-Africanism. In the speech he made on the eve of Ghanaian independence, he stated that the independence of Ghana was meaningless without the liberation of the African continent as a whole. Nkrumah also organized a number of pan-African conferences once Ghana had gained independence. It could be argued that he laid the foundations for the creation of the OAU by prioritizing political independence, assisting liberation movements, and forming a united front within the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement.³

In fact, no differences appeared among African nations on the international level from April 1958, the date of the first and most important meeting of the Conference of Independent African states held in Accra (and attended by representatives from all eight independent African countries at the time: the United Arab Republic, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Liberia, Ethiopia and Ghana), that is, not until October 1960 when the second conference was held in Addis Ababa. These countries were cooperating in the international arena, something that was made clear by the Permanent Secretariat composed of permanent representatives, (established by the United Nations in accordance with the previously-mentioned Accra Conference), whose function was to coordinate their policies, collaboration and consultations aimed at resolving African issues. The United Arab Republic played an important role in coordinating the efforts of African states on the international level and in their rise as a front. But by the end of 1960 this had come to an end, due to the quick succession of states gaining independence on the African continent and the radically different views on important African issues that arose during that year. These issues were discussed at the Conference of Addis Ababa and centred on the problems of Algeria, the Congo and Mauritania and the establishment of an independent African trade union.

3. *Ibid.*, VIII, pp. 810–11.



II-10.2 A poster advertising the first All-Africa Games, in Brazzaville, July 1965

© ANOM France, Aix-en-Provence

It was inevitable that differences would arise between the African nations due to their conflicting ideas on reform. Thus, the United Arab Republic joined forces with Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the interim government of Algeria (and later with the independent Algeria) in the Casablanca Conference convened in January 1961, which came to be known as the Casablanca Group. The remaining countries, however, came together in the Monrovia Group, made up of 20 countries all of which were French-speaking with the exception of Mali and Guinea. It was this group that later became the Organization of African Nations which emerged from the Brazzaville Conference held in December 1960. In contrast to the revolutionary Casablanca Group, the Monrovia Group, which included the Brazzaville Group, represented the conservative side of Africa.⁴

Tensions between the two Groups soon eased with the resolution of key problems affecting their nations, such as the independence of Algeria, the membership of Mauritania in the United Nations and the easing of the crisis in the Congo. Thus, all the independent African states met in May 1963 at the Addis Ababa Conference and formed the OAU as the first organization in Africa whose goal was to establish the unity of the continent.⁵

Although the OAU seems initially to have largely succeeded in bridging the divide between the African nations and bringing them together as a continent, with the passage of time it became apparent that the differences that had arisen between the Casablanca and Monrovia Groups had not been resolved. The United Arab Republic and the revolutionary states still continued to represent the Organization's revolutionary left-wing with regard to the various African problems, while the Monrovia countries, especially Nigeria and the Ivory Coast, continued to represent the right-wing. Moreover, the progressive position of the United Arab Republic towards the problem of the white minority government being attacked in Rhodesia and the country cutting its ties to Britain, was still evident. The United Arab Republic also participated in helping liberation movements in areas that remained under colonial rule and contributed to funding them. Perhaps another sign of the different positions of the United Arab Republic and the revolutionary states compared to those of the conservative states was the last coup in Ghana. Thus, when a delegation representing the government of the coup appeared at the session of the Conference of African states in Addis Ababa, the delegation of the United Arab Republic pulled out, as those of the other revolutionary states.

However, the differences that existed within the OAU should not have been a cause for concern. It took Europe years to form a common European market

4. For more information on this point, see *Ibid.*, pp. 789–91.

5. *Majallat al-Siyāsa al-dawliyya*, No. 5, July 1966, p. 150.

and this had no more than six permanent members. What can be said, however, is that the revolutionary states led by the United Arab Republic succeeded in guiding the remaining countries towards the idea of unity, and that the United Arab Republic was able to prove that it was indeed an African country.⁶

The OAU used to hold an annual meeting in one of the African capitals attended by Heads of State and government of member countries. It became commonplace for the Secretary-General of the United Nations to attend the opening session and address the delegates. Following this, representatives of what could be considered the four blocs within the African continent took it in turns to speak. There was a representative for the Arab-African countries, one for the French-speaking countries, one for the English-speaking countries, and finally a representative for the Portuguese-speaking countries.

The OAU was a governmental organization which included in its membership only independent sovereign states. African international relations were based on a set of principles that the countries pledged to respect when they signed the OAU Charter.⁷

In his book, *Munazzamat al-Wahda al-ifriqiyya* (The Organisation of African Unity), Dr Boutros Ghali explains and summarizes the principles governing relations between African countries. He says: ‘The Charter of Addis Ababa is made up of four basic principles regulating relations between African countries:⁸

1. Equality in sovereignty of all Member States;
2. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of Member States and a complete denunciation of all types of destructive activity;
3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state;
4. The peaceful settlement of disputes’.

The *General History of Africa*, published by UNESCO, remarks that these principles, among others, were developed as a system of political ethics for pan-Africanism. It states:⁹

The Charter of African Unity includes another aspect of the pan-African movement, that is, Pan-Africanism as a system of political ethics. It therefore set forth the following principles:

1. The absolute equality of all Member States;
2. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of states;

6. *Ibid.*, p. 151.

7. Muṣṭafā ‘Abdullāh Abu-l-Qāsim Khashīm, *Mawsū‘at ‘ilm al-‘alāqāt al-dawliyya* [Encyclopaedia of International Relations], Sirte, Dār al-Jumāhīriyya li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzī‘, AH 1425, p. 360.

8. For more details, see Buṭrus Ghālī, *Munazzamat al-wahda al-ifriqiyya* [The Organisation of African Unity], Cairo, Maktabat al-Anglo al-Miṣriyya, 1964, pp. 83–91.

9. *General History of Africa*, VIII, p. 813.

3. Respect for the sovereignty of all states, their territorial integrity and right to independent existence;
4. The peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration;
5. The total condemnation of political assassinations and subversive activities by any neighbouring or other country;
6. Full commitment to the liberation of those African territories which have not achieved full independence;
7. Affirmation of the policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

The ethics of pan-Africanism gave Member States a set of principles which exemplified their dream of African unity and solidarity. Thus, pan-Africanism, considered the beginning of ‘the hearts and minds movement’, succeeded in shaping the feelings, strengths and aspirations of the African peoples, embodying them in the Charter of African Unity.

The OAU was founded on 25 May 1963, under a Charter signed by thirty-two African countries in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. This was in the wake of the first African summit since the independence of African nations. Some of the most significant parts of the Charter are ‘non-interference in the domestic affairs of nations, and respect for the sovereignty of OAU Member States and the inviolability of their borders’. These became two of the most important principles underlying the organization.

In the Preamble to the Charter, Heads of State and Government outlined the considerations on which they had based their work. These were the right of self-determination; the principles of freedom, justice and equality; the common desire for unity and mutual help; the maintenance of national independence and national sovereignty; and adherence to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article I of the Charter provides for the establishment of the African Union, Article II states its objectives and Article III outlines the principles necessary to achieve these.¹⁰

When the OAU was founded, and before the outbreak of any fundamental differences between its founding members, it intended to act as a forum for joint initiatives aimed at developing the continent and supporting African solidarity. Its most important objectives included coordinating and developing cooperation between African countries through establishing and supporting common institutions, creating a strong base for constructive cooperation between them, working for the welfare of their nations by devoting efforts and allocating resources, focussing on the internal and external security of Member States through bilateral conflict resolution by peaceful means, avoiding the use of arms to resolve conflicts, and removing every trace of modern imperialism.

10. For more information, see the *Charter of the African Unity Organization*.

All these objectives, principles and values were aspirations of the OAU when it was founded. The Organization was the dream of those leaders who fought for its establishment and who imagined that it would be the platform and channel through which all problems would be solved and all hopes fulfilled. After more than four decades, however, we find that the situation in Africa is no different in terms of internal and external conflicts. Furthermore, although the OAU was replaced by the African Union this contributed little to realizing that for which the founding members had yearned.

In the second OAU conference held in Cairo in 1964, a particular stance was taken towards the Congolese Prime Minister, Moïse Tshombe, his aides and his policies that favoured old and new forms of colonialism. This stance was linked to the position of the OAU on colonialism and its removal from the African continent, and fighting pockets of white colonialism based on racism, oppression and depriving the African majority of their legitimate right to a dignified independent life on their own lands.

The issue of the Congo was the first case that conflicted with the ambitions of the OAU and was a clear example of domestic and inter-African conflicts on the continent. If that can be considered the first case, then the last has yet to be resolved. Perhaps one of the most important internal problems is that of South Sudan and the crisis in Darfur which has had repercussions for inter-African relations to this day, not to mention other recent issues.

The OAU endeavoured to be a platform for the coordination of general policies among African nations in all decisive matters, but recurring conflicts and new disputes between Member States have significantly influenced the development of relations and policy coordination between them aimed at serving the common interests of all African nations.¹¹ Disputes remain between the Member States as if the main characteristic of the OAU had been to cause 'disunity'. Support for this view is seen in what happened to the Organization and its members within the first decade of its founding.¹²

The challenge faced by the OAU at that time and the African Union today is a product of global changes and their impact on all countries and blocs, as this required the Organization and its Member States to further cooperate and to coordinate in all areas, which was what is stressed in its Charter.

Despite the attempts at cooperation between African countries in various areas within the framework of the OAU Charter and the agreements of its assembly, these numerous countries and diverse groups have nonetheless encountered significant problems, including:

11. Riḍa Khalifa, 'Mu'tamar al-qimma al-ifriqiyya fi Akra' [The African summit in Accra], *Majallat al-Siyasa al-dawliyya*, No. 3, 1965, pp. 157–65.
12. See Abū Shādi, 'Kharītat al-wahda al-ifriqiyya fi 'aqdih al-awwal' [The Map of the African Unity Organization in its First Decade], *Majallat al-Siyasa al-dawliyya*, n. 33, pp. 129–32.

1. A lack of political commitment and support by Member States;
2. A lack of funding and the creation of an unnecessarily large administrative staff;
3. Member States did not implement decisions such as reducing customs duties and the free movement of capital and labour;
4. Non-adherence to the main objective of the OAU which was economic development, but instead focusing on political matters such as using these assemblies as political cover to resolve conflicts by military intervention in some regions.¹³

Upon its founding, the OAU had set itself great goals and aspirations such as liberating the continent from colonialism once and for all, eliminating administrative and economic backwardness, consolidating African solidarity and support and developing the multi-national continent. However, its members digressed from these goals and continued to engage in new disputes within the African ranks, which often turned into armed conflicts. Despite the difficulties it encountered in the pursuit of unification, due to divisions between the Member States, between the progressive and moderate (or even unprogressive) parties, and the conflicting interests that guided the policies of these countries, the OAU was unable to undertake the task of effective governance in a number of internal African conflicts. Leaders of African countries may have differed with the OAU, they may have attacked it and boycotted its work for a period of time, but they always eventually went to the capital hosting the next annual meeting of the Organization to take their seats alongside the rest of their colleagues. Even if the OAU was unable to identify a common course of action to which all African countries could subscribe, it still symbolized the dream of African unity as well as being a platform where all African leaders were eager to make their voices heard.

The OAU faced a big challenge in attempting to transcend all disputes and conflicts and to build a new Africa without relying on help from outside Africa. It was in a position to promote Africa had the majority of African leaders resolved to abide by its basic principles. But a conflict of personal interests between them, along with the individual paths they chose to follow for over 40 years, did not enable them to achieve success and make the Organization a tool for unity instead of one for division.

The OAU did not manage to create a strong union between Member States despite some African leaders demanding this from the beginning. For example, the President of Ghana at the time, Kwame Nkrumah, called for the immediate unity of Africa, basing this on several arguments:

13. Aḥmad Ḥajjāj, ‘al-‘Awlāma wa-l-waḥda al-ifrīqiyya’ [Globalization and African Unity], *Majallat al-Ṣiyāsa al-dawlīyya*, No. 145, 2003, p. 44.

1. The immediate unity of Africa is the only way to fight neo-colonialism: 'If we falter at this stage', he said, 'and allow enough time for neo-colonialism to reinforce its position on this continent, what would be the fate of our people who put their confidence in us?'
2. The union of all of Africa is the only way to resolve border disputes between neighbouring African countries. African unity will make the current border problems redundant and obsolete;
3. Africa will not be able to turn the principle of non-aligned association into a real ideological bond unless it defends this principle while in a position of strength, and this strength will not exist except in unity;
4. The African people want unity. As Nkrumah remarked: 'In their great strides towards unity, they understand that freedom is meaningless unless it is achieved'.

Nkrumah was not content with just insisting on the urgent need for immediate unity, but also presented a detailed plan for achieving it. This included the future capital of the union being somewhere in Central Africa (either in Bangui in the Republic of Central Africa, or in Leopoldville in the Congo), a framework for the Constitution of the African Unity Government, an African currency, an African central bank, a common foreign policy and a united diplomatic mission. To conclude, he said: 'If we take these steps, we will be moving forward on the path to a united government in Africa'.

This line of thought, which had already been taken by Ghana at the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, had no effect, except as seen in the speech given by Milton Obote, the Prime Minister of Uganda.¹⁴ In this he asked that the revolutionary African leaders, led by the leader of the Libyan revolution, affirm the idea of the union and, among other things, called for the establishment of an African Union with a constitution, a council, a central bank, a common foreign policy and peacekeeping forces.

With the establishment of the OAU, the hopes and aspirations of the founding fathers for a politically independent Africa were realized. These were first and foremost a demand for decolonization. The first resolution that was adopted by the OAU at its inaugural meeting in May 1963, and which was unanimously approved, was that 'all independent African states have a duty to support the non-independent African nations in their struggle for freedom and independence'.¹⁵ In the address, agreement was reached on the urgent necessity to coordinate and intensify efforts to accelerate the empowerment of all regions of Africa still under foreign control in order to achieve unqualified national independence. If this goal had been achieved, then the demands of loyal African leaders for greater solidarity and stronger

14. Ghālī, *Munazzamat* ..., *op. cit.*, pp. 72–3.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 810.

alignment in the face of all conspiracies would not have been renewed:¹⁶ that is, demands for the formation of a new united continent or a United States of Africa.

Given changing international circumstances and the insistence of leaders striving for the unity of Africa, and unlike what happened to Nkrumah's proposal in the early sixties in the Addis Ababa Conference when he faced opposition from the majority of leaders, the initiatives of General Muammar Gaddafi found a response from African leaders, though it required considerable effort to reconcile their divergent views.

16. This was championed by President Nkrumah who was one of the earliest and staunchest of those calling for the establishment of a united African country in the form of a united government or a United States of Africa. See *General History of Africa*, p. 791.

– III –

THE YEARS OF
CONFRONTATION
WITHIN THE MUSLIM
WORLD (1964 – 2003)

Chapter 3.1

PALESTINE AND ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT 1964–2006

Khairia Kasmieh

INTRODUCTION

Over the years the Palestine problem has generated concentric circles of expanding conflict. From the early 1880s to 1948 the conflict was preponderantly between the Jewish community of Palestine and the indigenous Arab Palestinians. From 1948 to 1967 the conflict was preponderantly between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries. In the period since 1967 the struggle has grown to new dimensions despite all aspects of the peace process since 1979.

A cursory look at the developments since 1979 would reveal the adverse – and often bizarre – effects of the persistence of this conflict on regional stability, Western interests and super power relations.

The establishment of the PLO, 1964
'Palestine Liberation Organization'

Israel's plan to divert the Jordan River headwaters offered a good reason for reconciliation among Arab States. The first Arab summit conference was held in Cairo (in response to President Nasser's invitation) in January 1964. The conference took two major decisions: to establish a unified command under Egyptian supervision to coordinate Arab military preparations for eventual war with Israel, and to implement a counter-diversion for the Jordan River headwaters to prevent Israeli use.¹

1. Y. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949–1993*, Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington D.C., Oxford, Carleton Press, p. 45.

The heads of Arab states satisfied themselves by vaguely instructing Ahmed al-Shuqayri to continue his consultations with the Member States and Palestinian people with the aim of setting up a sound foundation for organizing the Palestine people and enabling them to play their role in liberating their homeland and determining their destiny.²

(Al-Shuqayri was a minister in the 'All Palestine Government' in 1948 and later acted as representative of Syria then Saudi Arabia to the UN until 1963. At Nasser's request al-Shuqayri was selected to represent Palestine in the League of Arab States.)

The weak resolution adopted by the Arab summit conference allowed al-Shuqayri to take further steps, in the complexity of the pan-Arab environment. A few weeks after the summit conference, he presented Nasser with a blueprint for a Palestinian organization with a national charter, internal statutes and guidelines for political, military and financial activity. Al-Shuqayri had obviously over-stepped his mandate. In an address to the Palestinians on Cairo radio in mid February 1964, he explained: 'We are a people without an entity, without a leadership ... and so we must assemble in all-embracing organization ... the conference of the kings and presidents has opened the way to the entity of the Palestinian people.'³

Al-Shuqayri claimed that the proposed entity would not exercise any territorial sovereignty over the West Bank (in Jordan) nor over the Gaza Strip and al-Himmeh (on the Syrian border). This revealed both the continuing duality of Palestinian national identity and the inevitable tension between embryonic Palestinian state building and Arab interests.

Al-Shuqayri convened an assembly of 422 Palestinians in Jerusalem to decide on the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization, approve its national charter and other founding documents and statutes and to reconstitute itself as the Palestine National Council (PNC).

This parliamentary body was to be the highest authority in the PLO, empowered to legislate, approve budgets, and set overall policy for implementation by the elected Executive Committee on an annual basis. Each member of the Executive Committee was responsible for a different 'ministerial' portfolio. Al-Shuqayri was elected its first chairman.

The PLO is a predominantly civilian organization, its backbone is the professional unions, there are separate unions for students, women, workers and teachers, etc. The unions are represented in the Palestinian National Council which has a membership of 600. The mainstream 'guerrilla' groups in

2. *Ibid.*, p. 91.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

the PNC constitute only 13.4 per cent of this body. The largest organization in the PLO is Fatah, led by Arafat.⁴

The PLO Charter considered Zionism and Israel illegal and the UN partition resolution (1947) null and void. The Charter in the new circumstances aimed at the total liberation of Palestine.⁵ The Jerusalem Assembly also resolved to impose compulsory military training on all Palestinians able to bear arms, and to form regular battalions equipped with modern weapons.

Al-Shuqayri had established a national institution that was to obtain formal Arab recognition during the second Summit Conference in September 1964. He had created a *fait accompli*. It was believed that the PLO had finally provided the Palestinians with the responsible, mature, state-like framework that they had lacked throughout their modern history. When the PLO was founded in 1964, the existence of the Palestinian people as a coherent entity appeared to be in a terminal state. The Palestinian people truly appeared in the mid-1960s to be in serious danger of disappearing from the political sphere, just as their country had disappeared from the map. At this stage the only exception to this slow disappearing act could be found at the United Nations where the 'Question of Palestine' kept appearing on the annual agenda of the General Assembly.⁶ The PLO was, for a decade, the largely uncontested face of the Palestinian national movement and provided the central focus for Palestinian politics.⁷

Al-Shuqayri's achievement was sharply criticized in some quarters, especially among younger Palestinian activists, notably in the ANM (Arab National Movement) and Fatah. They accused the PLO of being subservient to the Arab States which would prevent it from waging war against Israel. Indeed, the very creation of the PLO reflected the Palestinian shift in orientation from a pan-Arab to a more particularistic self-image. The mood represented by this shift was more militantly represented by the concurrent rise in the mid 1960s of the Palestinian 'guerrilla' movement led by Arafat, which soon captured the leadership of the PLO.⁸

The 'guerrilla' movement amended the PLO Charter to include armed struggle as the only means of total liberation. The 'guerrilla' movement argued that Palestine was not on the agenda of the international community or that of any of the Arab countries, and that there was no other alternative to auto-emancipation for placing it on the agenda. It argued that the Palestinians had to take matters into their own hands and through 'guerrilla' operations, force the

4. W. Khalidi, *Palestine Reborn*, London, New York, Tauris and Co Ltd., 1992, p. 8.

5. *Ibid.*

6. R. Khalidi, *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood*, Boston, Beacon Press 2006, p.164.

7. *Ibid.*

8. W. Khalidi, *Palestine Reborn*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

Arab countries into a military confrontation with Israel.⁹ Palestinian ‘guerrilla’ operations in the years 1965–7 had little military impact on Israel, but were catalytic in creating the atmosphere that led to the 1967 war. The ‘guerrilla’ strategy drew its inspiration from the success of the Algerian revolution as well as from the war in Vietnam. But its strategy was intrinsically flawed. It did not recognize the extent of the irrelevance of both analogies.¹⁰

The 1967 War and its aftermath

The twenty-year hiatus after the first phase of Zionist colonization culminated in the June 1967 war. During this period, no progress was made in addressing Palestinian grievances because of international indifference, Arab disarray, the cold war, Israel’s refusal to accept any responsibility for the fate of the Palestinians and the Arab countries’ inability to face the new realities.¹¹

The underlying reason for the June war of 1967 was Israel’s obsession with its security, which in practical terms could be translated into the concept of preventive war. The immediate cause, however, was a result of long-range-term trends. President Nasser decided to remove from the Egyptian-Israeli border the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) that had been stationed there since the conclusion of the 1956 war. There is no hard evidence to indicate that Nasser ever had a serious intention of waging war on Israel. By the same token, there always existed in Israel a school of thought that viewed the existing Israeli boundaries as insecure. This school was in favor of an enlarged territory for Israel so as to secure strategic safety. For this school, therefore, Nasser’s ordering the UNEF out supplied a welcome opportunity for waging a ‘preventive war’.¹²

In the space of six days between 5–10 June the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces) shattered the armed forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan and occupied large tracts of their territories. During the June war, Israel succeeded in conquering Sinai and the Golan, thus deepening the inter-state conflict with the Arab countries. But it also succeeded in conquering the rest of the Palestinian territory not incorporated into Israel in 1948: East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, thus taking over 100 per cent of Palestine.¹³

On 28 June 1967, the Israeli Government decreed the ‘administrative unification’ of Jerusalem, thereby annexing the old city and other Arab parts of Jerusalem, declaring that Israeli sovereignty over the unified city was

9. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

12. G. Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1980, 4th ed., pp. 448–9.

13. W. Khalidi, *Palestine Reborn*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.



III–1.1 Yasser Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, speaking before the UN General Assembly in 1974

© UN Photo/DB

not negotiable. In the case of a peace settlement Israel would agree to an arrangement whereby the Christian and Muslim holy places would enjoy local administrative autonomy and be accessible to members of both denominations from the Arab world and beyond.¹⁴

There is perhaps no other city in the world that has drawn as much attention as the *city of Jerusalem*, especially among the adherents of the three monotheistic religions. The city's religious predominance has generated its historical political importance, as well as its symbolic impact.¹⁵ It is considered the third holiest city in Islam. It derives its religious prominence from being the first Qibla. But despite its religious significance Jerusalem was never the capital of Islam.¹⁶ The passage of time and certain events served to enhance Jerusalem's position in Muslim tradition and history.

The Israelis' occupation of Jerusalem is viewed by Palestinians and Muslims as equal in magnitude to the Crusades. By occupying Palestine, the modern 'Crusaders' have earned the enmity of all Arabs, by seizing Jerusalem, that of all Muslims.

Palestinians and Arab Islamists clearly began to focus on Jerusalem after the occupation of the eastern part of the city in 1967. Repeated Muslim pronouncements on the city which stress its Arab and Islamic character came as a reaction to Israeli measures to Judaize the city and distort or wipe out its Arab and Islamic identity. They fear Jewish designs on East Jerusalem and the holy places in it. Although Jerusalem is an integral part of Palestine, its loss deprives the various Palestinian political groups, secularists and Muslims alike, of their unique position as custodians of the holy city, and their struggle to regain Jerusalem places them at centre stage.

Israeli measures in the city have acted as catalyst, inflaming Muslim sentiment. Al-Aqsa Mosque was the object of repeated attempts of sabotage. Israeli excavation activities in the city are perceived by Palestinians and Arab Islamists as part of Israeli designs on the city.¹⁷

Certainly there will be no end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict without a lasting solution for Jerusalem, a solution which must allow Palestinians and Israelis to share the city equitably and must allow people of all faiths to have free and unimpeded access to Jerusalem.¹⁸

The only way to achieve universal recognition and acceptance of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, is for Israel to recognize Jerusalem as the

14. Lenczowski, *The Middle East ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 449–50.

15. Z. Abu-Amr, 'The Significance of Jerusalem. A Muslim Perspective', *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture*, II, No. 2, 1995, p. 23.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

18. R. Khalidi, *The Iron Cage ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

capital of Palestine and recognize Palestinian sovereignty over occupied Arab East Jerusalem.¹⁹

As for the other parts of the occupied territories, beside Jerusalem, Israel launched the second major phase of colonization following the June war. This second phase was a repeat performance of the process that had caused the Palestinian problem except that in this phase, unlike the first, Israel was in total control and the Palestinians were hostages to all the administrative, legal and military measures that Israel saw fit to take.²⁰ Expanding its control over large Arab territories, Israel found under its sovereign power about 1.5 million Arabs. About 400,000 of them constituted the Arab minority in Israel proper and the rest were inhabitants of the Occupied Territories.²¹

The Israeli attitude towards the Palestinians could be described as negative. It tended to reject the notion of a distinct Palestinian nationality, who could and should be assimilated in the surrounding Arab countries. The most pronounced statement in this respect was that made by Golda Meir in June 1969, 'The Palestinians do not exist'.²²

In fact, the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, accelerated the development of a Palestinian movement free from the control of the Arab governments. Most important was the fact that Israel had seized more territory in the 1967 war. Nearly half of the Palestinians now lived under Israeli control.²³

The immediate lesson of the defeat was that the State of Israel could not be destroyed by conventional war. Consequently, the Palestinians determined on taking the lead in managing their own affairs. Several Palestinian groups in the mid-1960s carried out commando raids against Israel. Armed struggle was not part of the PLO programme. Instead a conventionally trained and equipped army was assembled in Egypt, Syria and Iraq.²⁴

Israel's victory over the Arabs in 1967 served as a catalyst in the process of awakening Palestinian nationalism and intensifying guerilla warfare. This brought Israel military actions against the bases of 'fedayeen' and the localities in Jordan and Lebanon that harbored them.²⁵

The Israeli security organization Mossad was effective in tracking down Arab commandos both at home and abroad.²⁶ Overwhelming Israeli power

19. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

21. Lenczowski, *The Middle East ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 452

22. *Ibid.*, p. 452.

23. W. Quandt, F. Jabber, and A. M. Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, University of Los Angeles, London, California Press, Berkeley, 1974, 2nd printing, pp. 50–1.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

25. Lenczowski, *The Middle East ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 453.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 461.

compared with the limited capabilities of the Palestinians was the major impediment to full success. Palestinian dependence on outside sources, primarily the Arab governments, for arm and funds, was a further constraint on effective military or political action. In brief, within the fragmented and dispersed Palestinian community the 'fedayeen' were able to organize a large part of the politically conscious population.²⁷

The United Nations played a significant role in the 1967 crisis, in spite of the removal of UNEF (United Nations Emergency Force) from Egypt on the eve of the war. It continued to arrange for cease-fires, sent a new team of observers, passed various resolutions and mediated for peace. The following acts of the United Nations deserve mention.²⁸

- a) The General Assembly voted to censure Israel for its virtual annexation of East Jerusalem.
- b) Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories, the right of every state in the area to exist in peace, secure boundaries, freedom of navigation in international waters and a solution for the Arab refugees (but not for the Palestine issue).
- c) Prominent Swedish statesman Jarring was appointed UN representative with the task of searching for a peaceful settlement.
- d) Occasional resolutions censured Israel for its massive reprisal raids directed at Jordanian or Lebanese localities or Palestinian refugee camps in those countries.
- e) General Assembly resolutions censured Israel for the violation of human rights in the occupied territories.
- f) The General Assembly censured Israel for its policy of establishing Jewish settlements in the occupied territories.

On the whole, the United Nations, particularly the General Assembly, in its attitude, was in marked contrast to its earlier history.

In the 1960s UN membership was about four times larger than in the 1940s and it was clearly weighted in favor of the developing countries, many of which were freshly emancipated from foreign colonial rule. The sympathies of these countries were on the side of the Arabs and they tended to share the Arab view of Israel as an aggressive expansionist state. In an era in which the issues of racial inequality and liberation from imperialism constituted major themes of international and domestic politics, this attitude of the UN General Assembly was not surprising. In Israel, it provoked negative responses expressed in scorn mixed with cynicism toward the UN as a whole.

27. Quandt, etc., *The Politics ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

28. G. Tomeh (ed.), *United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1975.

While Egypt, Jordan and eventually Syria accepted UN resolution 242, Israel was suspicious of its main provisions. By 31 July 1970, it had accepted the resolution with major reservations: withdrawal of its forces should by no means signify evacuation of all the occupied territories, that the matter of final boundaries should be left to direct negotiation between the parties, and that there should be an agreement providing for a comprehensive peace.²⁹ One result of the failure of the UN mediating mission was that the weight of mediation passed over to the United States. This was because of the growing conviction of Arab leadership that only the United States possessed enough influence to induce Israel to accept a peace settlement according to the terms of UN resolution 242. After June 1967 the United States became the main supplier of arms and military equipment to Israel, as well as of generous economic assistance. The fact is that the military school of thought, which insists on strategic territorial safeguards, dominated Israel's political thought and behaviour.³⁰ The lack of progress in the search for peace found its reflection by 1969–70 in what became known as the war of attrition on the Suez Canal front, with exchanges of artillery fire across the Canal, military aircraft duels and occasional Israeli raids into the Egyptian interior. By August 1970 a ceasefire was agreed under the auspices of Rogers, the American Secretary of State.³¹

On 28 September 1970, after chairing an emergency summit conference to deal with the confrontation between PLO 'guerilla' forces and the government of Jordan, Nasser died of cardiac arrest. His acceptance of the ceasefire with Israel before his death confirmed the centrality of the Arab-Israeli peace process in regional politics, while his death marked the end of the period of domestic instability that followed the June war in Egypt, Syria and Jordan.³²

The 1973 War and its repercussions

Six years of intensive negotiations following the 1967 war had left the Arab States with two convictions: First, that the Israelis were not going to give up their conquests in the war since their new 'frontiers' were much more defensible than the old. Second, that the United States was either unwilling or unable to put enough pressure on Israel to withdraw.³³

29. Lenczowski, *The Middle East ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 451.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 452.

31. Sayigh, *The Palestinian ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

32. *Ibid.*

33. C. Issawi, 'Checking on the Consequences of Oil Squeeze by Arab States', *International Perspectives*, March/April, Ottawa, Canada, 1974, Department of External Affairs, p. 11.



III–1.2 The General Assembly adopted a resolution granting Palestine the status of non-member observer state in the United Nations on 29th November 2012. This photo shows the Palestinian Delegation to the UN following the vote, with Mahmoud Abbas, President of the Palestinian Authority (front centre)

© UN Photo/Rick Bajornas

In October 1973 Egyptian and Syrian forces launched simultaneous attacks along the length of the Suez Canal and on the Golan Heights.³⁴ The October War shattered the two major assumptions underlying American policy: that a strong Israel would deter the Arabs from going to war and that the *status quo* in the Middle East could be maintained in Israel's favor.³⁵ The IDF (Israel Defense Forces) gave way at first, but mounted a counter-attack on both fronts over the next 16 days. Massive supply efforts from the US and USSR provided for the immediate for needs of the combatants.³⁶ The fourth Arab-Israeli war served as a watershed in the history of Middle East conflict. For both sides, the result of the war changed nothing in the basic dispute. The principal Arab combatants, Egypt and Syria, ostensibly began the war to regain lands lost in June 1967. Yet when the ceasefire took hold,

34. Sayigh, *The Palestinian ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

35. A. Shlaim, *The Iron Wall. Israel and the Arab World*, New York, London, WW. Norton and Company, 2000, p. 19.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 319.

Israeli forces had forged even deeper into Egyptian and Syrian territories. While it can be said that Israel won a military victory, it was a pyrrhic victory in other respects. Israeli casualties were the worst since the 1948 war.³⁷ The initial successes of the Arab forces shattered Israel's image of invincibility and shed doubt on the effectiveness of the occupied territories as buffer zones in defence of Israel's borders.

Although the Arabs failed in their military objectives, they made considerable diplomatic advances and achieved greater solidarity among Arab countries than ever before. Israel emerged from the war diplomatically isolated except for the United States, the Netherlands, South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal, on all of whom the Arab oil States placed embargoes.

The employment of Arab oil as a political lever in the Arab-Israeli conflict has been a recurring theme in Arab political thought since the early 1940s. Already in 1947 Arab spokesmen had warned that US support of the creation of the State of Israel might jeopardize the burgeoning American oil industry in the Middle East.³⁸ There had been two major efforts by the Arabs to use their oil as a political lever prior to the 1973 war, both of which failed to produce significant political results, though they did cause temporary disruption in world oil trade.³⁹ As for the non-Arab oil exporters, although they had joined with the Arab producers in 1960 to form OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) they did not take any concurrent action.⁴⁰

By 1973 Saudi Arabia's greatly enhanced oil power was accompanied by a rise in its influence in Arab councils, and it may be added that the Israeli victory in 1967 must have aroused in King Faisal both anger and anxiety, hence his repeated warnings that if necessary, he would use oil as a means of pressure on the US and its allies to induce them to change their pro-Israeli policies.⁴¹ There was no indication as to when Saudi Arabia would actively began carrying out its threat of curtailing production.⁴²

Since the outbreak of the 1973 war, the oil producers had taken two measures: on the one hand the price of oil had been sharply increased. (In this the non-Arab producers were at one with the Arabs). The other measure, a purely Arab one, had a political aim:⁴³ the Arabs decided to make a

37. J. Paust, and A. Blaustein, *The Arab Oil Weapon*, New York, Oceana Publications Inc., 1977, p. 2.

38. Issawi, 'Checking on the Consequence', *op. cit.*, p. 4.

39. F. Itayim, 'Arab Oil. The Political Dimension', *Journal for Palestine Studies*, III, No. 2. 1974, p. 85.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 86–7.

43. Issawi, 'Checking on the Consequence', *op. cit.*, p. 10.

two-pronged thrust. On the one hand, the military attack by Egypt and Syria would demonstrate that the Arabs were both willing to fight and capable of inflicting serious losses on Israel, and this would restore fluidity to a situation that seemed frozen. Simultaneously, the oil weapon would be used: a boycott of shipments to the US and the Netherlands, together with curtailment of deliveries to Western Europe and Japan, the whole operation being rendered more effective by a 10 per cent cut in production.⁴⁴

In so doing the Arabs seem to have had two objectives: first to persuade the US Government, and perhaps more important, the American public, that support of Israel was not costless: It was hoped that enough discomfort would be created to put pressure on Washington to play a more active role in negotiating a Middle East peace, and to modify its pro-Israeli stance. Secondly, by bringing home to the Europeans and Japanese their great dependence on Arab oil, this would persuade them to dissociate themselves from US Middle East policy, and use their influence with the US Government in a way favourable to Arab interests.⁴⁵ However, no firm decision was taken at that time for the imposition of a total oil embargo on any country.⁴⁶

The embargo on exports to the US and Holland was maintained. In addition, certain 'friendly' countries were granted preference.⁴⁷ The embargo on the US was followed by all Arab States to include all indirect shipments as well as direct deliveries to the American markets. The 'most favoured' list was expanded to include India and all African states which had broken diplomatic relations with Israel.⁴⁸

The motivation underlying the use of Arab oil as a political weapon was a direct one. It stemmed from the growing Arab desperation at the failure of the world community to ensure implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967. Thus, while Arab oil continued to contribute to the prosperity of the non-Arab world, it seemed incapable of restoring the political rights of several million Arabs.⁴⁹

The Arab oil States were able to inflict serious oil shortages on the industrial nations of the non-communist world due to their ability to present a united front to a disorganized group of oil-consuming nations. That united front derived its power and coherence from two organizations: the Organization of Petroleum Countries (OPEC) which includes the world's principal oil exporting countries and its sister group, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

46. Paust, etc., *The Arab Oil Weapon, op. cit.*, p. 5.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

48. *Ibid.*

49. Itayim, *Arab Oil ..., op. cit.*, p. 95.

The embargo, coupled with the production cuts, caused serious shortages in the oil supplies of the US, Western Europe and Japan. As a result most of the nations of Western Europe and Japan altered their Middle East policies, which was the purpose of the Arab oil States' action. As for the impact of the embargo on the US: in the long run it would be imperative that the US become less dependent on foreign sources of energy especially such politically unstable sources as the Middle East, in the short run it would be, within reason, possible to convince the Arab producer states to lift the embargo.⁵⁰

In January and February 1974, rumors of an impending end of the Arab embargo of the US proliferated. The intensive shuttle diplomacy of the US Secretary of State Kissinger finally bore fruit in mid-March. The embargo against the US was lifted by most Arab States on 18 March 1974 but continued against Holland. In addition, Iraq and Libya continued their embargo against the US. The curtailment of US petroleum supplies had lasted exactly five months.⁵¹

The Arabs were in a position to exert great economic pressure. But this enormous economic power was in no way backed by political or military power.⁵² The October war showed solidarity among Arab countries at its peak. President Sadat of Egypt and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia emerged from the war as co-leaders of the Arab world. Sadat's leadership was based on his political ability to forge an unprecedented state of unity among traditionally factional Arab countries. King Faisal's ascendancy resulted from his leadership in the oil embargo, his economic support for the Arab combatants and his insistence on the return of the old city of Jerusalem to Arab control.⁵³

On the opposite side, the principal parties involved in the Middle East conflict now were willing to make several efforts to resolve the territorial disputes and to attempt to find a solution to the Palestinian issue.⁵⁴ While the war was still in progress, Kissinger began to develop a new policy toward the Middle East, a policy which for the first time had not just an Israeli component, but also an Arab component. This policy committed the United States to an active role in mediation between Arabs and Israelis, a step-by-step diplomatic process.⁵⁵ This approach was to dismantle the combined diplomatic, economic and strategic pressures mobilized by the Arab coalition, while initiating bilateral negotiations. He therefore worked in the following period to neutralize European, Japanese and developing country support for the Arab position,

50. Paust, etc., *The Arab Oil Weapon*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

52. Issawi, 'Checking on the Consequence', *op. cit.*, p. 12.

53. Paust, etc., *The Arab Oil Weapon*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

55. Shlaim, *The Iron Wall ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

deny the USSR (and UN) a role, lift the oil embargo, encourage Arab ‘moderates’ versus ‘radicals’ and reassure Israel of US support.⁵⁶

The rift between presidents Sadat and Assad, started during the war, had deepened with the conclusion of bilateral agreements to disengage Egyptian and Israeli forces in January 1974, which Syria saw as a blow to its own bargaining position. It preserved a campaign of military attrition on its front until the end of May when it accepted a similar disengagement of forces. Under the terms of the agreement Syria endorsed UN Security Council Resolution 338 as the basis for a lasting peace, and in so doing accepted UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967 which had been cited in the preamble.⁵⁷ The Israeli Government extracted far-reaching American commitments as the price for showing some flexibility toward Egypt, in Sinai, according to agreement 54 of 1975.⁵⁸

The consolidation of US-Egyptian ties alienated the USSR and Syria, the former realizing in late 1974 that the US intended to deny it a more effective role in the peace process.⁵⁹ Syria backed by Saudi Arabia and other Arab States, played a key role in ensuring Arab recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians during a summit conference in Rabat at the end of October.⁶⁰ However, the PLO had itself been guilty of a striking lack of interest in the Occupied Territories. The October war had ended the period of relative quiescence brought about since 1967 by the Israeli ‘open bridges’ policy. Israel had gained a great deal thanks to the apparently liberal policy, especially with regard to facilitating transport and travel.⁶¹ Again no practical or programmatic decisions were taken. Only in January 1973 did the PLO finally address the occupied territories as a distinct and primary arena. It now resolved to stem the exodus of Arab inhabitants, resist the Israeli settlements and Judaization programmes, mobilize and organize the masses systematically, support farmers, develop local economic and cultural institutions, preserve the national identity of the Arab citizens, reabsorb labourers working in Israel’s economy, and to combat collaborators, as well as to reinforce ties of national unity and struggle between the masses in the Occupied Territories and outside. The significance of these references became apparent after the October 1973 war, as the increase in armed attacks and civilian protests propelled the Occupied Territories to the centre of PLO thinking.⁶²

56. Sayigh, *The Palestinian Armed ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 314.

58. Shlaim, *The Iron Wall ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

59. Sayigh, *The Palestinian Armed ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

60. Paust, etc., *The Arab Oil Weapon*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

62. Sayigh, *The Palestinian Armed ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

Camp David Accords and following

Following the conclusion of the disengagement agreements between Israel on the one hand and Egypt and Syria on the other, the American role in the search for a permanent peace settlement was semi-dormant. It seemed that step-by-step diplomacy had exhausted its possibilities and that either a more decisive move should be made to resolve the lingering conflict, or the situation would again deteriorate to the point of war.⁶³

With the new American administration of President Carter, January 1977 the US Government began to take new initiatives in search for peace. In fact it gave the resolution of the Middle East problem top priority among foreign policy concerns. Carter received in succession King Hussein, President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin. His next move was to travel to Geneva to meet President Assad. Later Crown Prince Fahd visited Washington. His visit coincided with the victory of 'Likud' in the Israeli elections and the emergence of Begin as a future prime minister. In terms of intensity of presidential contacts with Middle East leaders, this activity had no precedent.⁶⁴ Carter was the first American president to deal with the Israeli right wing government which claimed sovereignty over the whole 'land of Israel'.⁶⁵

The US administration reiterated its support of UN Resolution 242 in clearer terms than the previous administration. The President spelled out his view on the nature of the proposed settlement as follows: (a) Withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories to the pre-June 1967 boundaries with only minor alterations. (b) Establishment of secure or defensive borders. (c) Establishment of a full-fledged peace which would include diplomatic recognition, exchange of ambassadors, trade, tourism, and cultural relations.⁶⁶

Begin's visit to Carter in July 1977 brought no further progress; the stalemate was broken unexpectedly by President Sadat's peace initiative. On 19 November Sadat flew to Jerusalem and in an address to the Knesset offered recognition of Israel, and full peace and security guarantees, in return for total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. On 25 December, Begin met Sadat in Ismailia and submitted to him an Israeli peace plan. Begin's proposals offered Egypt a separate peace treaty while asserting continued Israeli control over the Palestinian territories. Begin's proposals fell short of Sadat's expectations and a new stalemate developed.⁶⁷

To break it President Carter resorted to an initiative of his own by hosting a conference at Camp David between 5–17 September 1978. The

63. Lenczowski, *The Middle East ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 463.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 463.

65. Shlaim, *The Iron Wall ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

66. Lenczowski, *The Middle East ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 464.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 465.

conference brought together Begin and Sadat, accompanied by their advisors. Carter played an active role, as a full partner in all the discussions. The Camp David meeting ended in the announcement of the frameworks of multilateral treaties, which contained the principles that were to be embodied in the final treaties.⁶⁸ The main principles of the first framework were as follows: (a) A peace treaty between Israel and Egypt to be concluded within 3 months, the treaty to be implemented within 2–3 years after its signing. (b) Egypt to regain sovereignty over Sinai up to the pre-1967 border. (c) Freedom of navigation for Israel. (d) A highway to be constructed between Sinai and Jordan. (e) Limitation of Egyptian forces within the area lying 50 kilometres east of the Suez Canal. (f) Absence of Egyptian forces in the remaining part of Sinai. (g) Limitation of Israeli military forces in the area within 3 kilometres east of the international border. (h) UN forces to be stationed in specific areas. (i) Peace between Israel and Egypt to embody full diplomatic recognition, economic and cultural relations, and termination of economic boycott and barriers to the free movement of goods and people.

The main principles of the second framework of peace focusing on the West Bank and the Gaza Strips were as follows: (a) UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 to form the basis of the peace settlement. (b) Peace treaty to be negotiated by Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people. (c) Full autonomy for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to be granted. (d) Egypt, Israel and Jordan to agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in those areas. (e) A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces to take place and a redeployment of the remaining forces into specific security locations. (f) Once the self-governing authority was established, a transitional period of 5 years to begin, by the end of this period, the final status of the West Bank and Gaza to be determined, it being understood that the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements be recognized.⁶⁹

When, upon the conclusion of the conference (17 September 1978), President Carter announced its result to the joint session of Congress in the presence of Begin and Sadat, the general mood was one of euphoria. One might wonder whether this enthusiasm was fully warranted. In the first place the two framework agreements bore a similarity to the Begin peace plan of 1977, thus creating a doubt whether the Camp David deal represented a genuine compromise or rather a capitulation to the Israeli point of view. The agreements signified a reversal of Carter's programme announced in the spring of 1977 providing for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied lands (with minor territorial adjustments) and a homeland for the

68. *Ibid.*, p. 466.

69. *Ibid.*, pp. 466–7.

Palestinians, with the connotation of political self-determination rather than mere administrative autonomy under Israeli military control. In fact, except for Sinai, Israel was not committed to withdraw its forces but merely to redeploy them.⁷⁰

In addition, the Camp David agreement failed to mention the fate of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, the future of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories and did not stipulate a linkage between the Egyptian - Israel and the West Bank and Gaza treaties.

The agreements provoked a strong negative reaction in the Arab world at large, and the threat of isolation began to have its impact on Egyptian diplomacy.⁷¹ To counter the peace initiative some Arab countries (Syria, Algeria, Libya, and South Yemen with the PLO) founded a confrontation front. Iraq hosted a Summit Conference marshalling the Arab States (except Oman and Sudan) to impose collective sanctions on Egypt. The newly-formed Arab solidarity was not to last long.

In Israel, except for the critical attitude of fundamentalist, religious and expansionist groups, the response to the Camp David agreement was positive, an Israeli diplomatic success. Two major points of difference immediately arose between Begin and Carter. One was the issue of Jewish settlements in the occupied lands. While Carter maintained that according to an unwritten understanding at Camp David, Israel was to refrain from creating new settlements or enlarging the existing settlements during the five-year transition period, within a few weeks, Begin announced that Israel was about to 'thicken' the existing settlements. The other point was that of linkage which loomed large in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. Carter maintained that the purpose of Camp David was to achieve a comprehensive settlement, not a separate peace treaty with Egypt. Begin resisted the inclusion of a linkage pledge into the text of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty.⁷² There was no doubt that by the end of 1978 the search for peace was entering a decisive phase.

Much of the credit for the Camp David Accords and for the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty (26 March 1979) goes to Carter. But whereas Carter and Sadat saw the Camp David Accords (and the Peace Treaty) as the first step in a process that should lead to a comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbors, Begin saw peace with Egypt as end of the road.⁷³ Carter, for his part, was convinced that Israel must return to the 1967 borders because the Arab confrontation states were ready for peace, because the Palestinians deserved a homeland, and because a 'Greater Israel' would generate perpetual instability in the Middle East. In short, he believed that Israel could not have

70. *Ibid.*, p. 467.

71. *Ibid.*

72. *Ibid.*, p. 468.

73. Shlaim, *The Iron Wall ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

both territory and peace. Carter's inability to induce the Begin Government to honour its commitment to seek a solution to the Palestinian problem discredited the Camp David Accords in the eyes of many Arabs, isolated Egypt, and undermined America's credibility as a peacemaker.

Despite its criticism from some Arab sources, this treaty 'stands as a proof that diplomacy can bring lasting peace between ancient adversaries.'⁷⁴

The peace process at a standstill (1979–87)

By 1979 the Arab-Israeli peace process was at a complete standstill despite continuation of talks between Egypt and Israel over Palestinian 'autonomy' in the West Bank and Gaza. The election of President Reagan in November 1980 signaled a return to the pro-Israeli stance of the globalist school of US foreign policy, as opposed to the evenhanded 'regionalist' approach of the Carter administration. Little too was left of the Arab pillar of the PLO's diplomatic strategy with the Iraqi-Syrian feud, Iran-Iraq war, decline of oil revenues, and ostracism of Egypt. The PLO was beset by the proxy conflict waged in Lebanon by proxies of Iraq, Syria and Iran and by the Israeli campaign of attrition that had persisted since 1978.⁷⁵

In spring 1981 Israel raised the stakes by the destroying of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June. On 31 December Israel extended Israeli law to the Golan Heights, annexing them.⁷⁶

The Israeli Government sought to subdue Palestinian nationalism in the Occupied Territories, and to this end resolved to destroy the source of its leadership, the PLO State in exile in Lebanon. The Israeli hope of dealing a deathblow to Palestinian nationalists by the military destruction of the PLO led to the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.⁷⁷ Ten days in June 1982 created a bitter new reality for the world to ponder. The Israeli troops occupied the southern part of Lebanon, and for the first time laid siege to and occupied an Arab capital, Beirut.⁷⁸ The US continued to extend massive political and material support for the invasion.

Throughout the 1970s Israeli officials clung to the fiction of 'retaliation' in justifying their attack on Lebanon.⁷⁹ During the month before the invasion, the Reagan administration was aware of the Israeli momentum toward

74. J. Carter, *Palestine: Peace not Apartheid*, New York–London–Toronto–Sydney, Simon and Schuster, 2006, p. 205.

75. Sayigh, *The Palestinian Armed ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

76. *Ibid.*

77. W. Khalidi, *Palestine Reborn*, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

79. S. Rayan, 'Israel's Invasion of Lebanon: Background to the Crisis', *Journal for Palestine Studies*, XI, No. 4, XII, No. 1. Summer/fall 1982. Issues 44/45, p. 27.



III–1.3 Joint conference between Israeli and Jordanian commanders in Jerusalem in May 1950, in order to try and establish communications between Arab and Jewish Jerusalem

© UN Photo

attack.⁸⁰ Sharon's (the Israeli Minister of Defense) before the invasion laid emphasis on the impending Israeli attack as a legitimate act of self-defence.⁸¹ To obtain American support for his plan of creating a 'new political order' in Lebanon, Sharon emphasized that the proposed Israeli move would have the effect of weakening the pro-Soviet forces in the Middle East.⁸²

80. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

81. Shlaim, *The Iron Wall ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

Unlike previous Arab-Israeli wars, the strategic impact of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon did not extend beyond the principal protagonists. Yet its effect was immense on the PLO which lost the territorial base of its 'state in exile', its headquarters and the bulk of its military infrastructure. The loss of the territorial base removed a main pillar of the PLO leadership's diplomatic strategy.⁸³

Despite Arab disarray and the tumultuous fortune of the PLO, the Palestinian stance was more propitious for a viable settlement than ever before. The resolution of September 1982 of the Arab Fez Summit, remains a collectively articulated Arab peace plan enunciated at the level of the heads of state. The Fez Summit was conciliatory toward a peaceful settlement on the basis of coexistence with Israel within the 1967 frontiers. There is nothing like it on the Israeli side at such a comprehensive level.⁸⁴

The lessons concerning America's role and impact on the Middle East are too important to be forgotten. In the first place, the Lebanon war showed Israel to be a source of regional turmoil and violence not a strategic asset for America but a serious liability. Second, for all its concern to promote order and stability in this volatile area, by its own actions the US contributed to the destruction of the Lebanese State and to the collapse of the precarious regional order. The third and most significant lesson of the war in Lebanon is that America's uncritical support of Israeli security seriously damaged America's broader interests.⁸⁵

One sticking point has been the American refusal to recognize or hold talks with the PLO until it is clearly recorded that it has accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338, is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel and has renounced terrorism. Repeated American declarations in favor of direct Jordanian-Israeli negotiations lack substance when no serious American pressure is brought to bear on Israel to halt the policy of creeping annexation of the Occupied Territories and to give minimal assurance on the final status of those territories.⁸⁶

According to the American administration, especially the proponents of the 'Israel first' doctrine, the Arab world is so weak, so divided and so volatile as to preclude the possibility of a durable peace. In these circumstances the best available option of the US is to maintain Israel's superiority over its adversaries through regular infusion of money and arms so as to enable it not only to deal with threats to its own security but also to fend off challengers to US interests from radical, Islamic and Soviet backed forces.⁸⁷

83. Rayan, 'Israel's Invasion of Lebanon', *op. cit.*, p. 37.

84. W. Khalidi, *Palestine Reborn*, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

85. Shlaim, *The Iron Wall ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

86. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

87. *Ibid.*

Following the Lebanese crisis, the PLO was completely adrift, its presence almost entirely overlooked at the Amman Summit Conference (November 1987). The Arab States were riven politically and drained economically.⁸⁸

The first Intifada relaunches the Palestinian struggle 1987

After 23 years of colonization since 1967: (a) East Jerusalem has been formally annexed to Israel with expanded municipal boundaries at the expense of the West Bank. 140,000 Israelis (now) live in East Jerusalem. (b) 150 Israeli settlements have been established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with a total population of 100,000 Jews. (c) 35 per cent of the lands of the West Bank and 42 per cent of those of the Gaza Strip have been taken from Palestinian ownership. (d) Palestinian building is barred on 68 per cent of the West Bank. (e) All the water resources of the Occupied Territories are under Israeli control, the bulk being diverted to the needs of Israel or of Israeli settlers in the Occupied Territories. Looming over all this is the dark shadow of a million Soviet Jews expected in the next 2–3 years to the pressure on the finite water and land resources of Israel and the Occupied Territories.⁸⁹

It is this that partly explain the causes of the Palestinian uprising (Intifada), The uprising that began in December 1987 in the territories Israel has occupied for over twenty years, ranks as the fourth major attempt by the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine to stem the Zionist colonization of the country. (First came the rebellion of 1936–9 against Britain's policy, then the resistance to 1947 UN General Assembly Resolution to the Partition Plan, third from 1964–5 onward, the uprising among the Palestinian Diaspora against the *status quo*). In 1987, in contrast to the three earlier instances, the Palestinians on the West Bank and in Gaza were face-to-face with their dispossessors, with no third party or geographic distance intervening. While the Israelis wield all state powers, the chief weapons of the Palestinians are the stones of the countryside. If the areas of Israel proper and those in the Occupied Territories already colonized, requisitioned or annexed are subtracted from the total area of Mandatory Palestine, the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories stand in 1987 on no more than 15 per cent of the soil of the country.⁹⁰

Why did the uprising begin in early December 1987, more that 20 years after the West Bank and Gaza Strip were occupied? The answer may be found in several factors: the first immediate trigger was the incident of 26th November in which a young Palestinian 'guerrilla' entered Israel and succeeded in killing six Israeli soldiers. The second trigger was the 8th December accident in Gaza

88. Sayigh, *The Palestinian Armed ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 547–8.

89. W. Khalidi, *Palestine Reborn*, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

90. *Ibid.*, pp. 121–2.



III-1.4 Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, ‘Amr Moussa, addresses a meeting of the Committee on Palestine of the Foreign Ministers of the Group of Arab States in January 2009

© UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

in which Palestinian workers were killed when their van was hit by an Israeli truck. The longer-term factors include the humiliation suffered by Palestinians as a result of Israel’s ‘Iron fist’ policy, as well as their frustration with Arab governments for their failure to give priority to the Palestine question.⁹¹

In addition it is worth mentioning how costly the twenty years of occupation have been to the Palestinians: Land confiscation, legal system, and the absence of political freedom, taxation, collective punishment, travel restrictions, difficulty of family reunions.⁹²

Palestinians under the age of twenty-one, who comprise more than 50 per cent of the population, have learned not to fear their occupiers and to withstand the hardships of imprisonment.⁹³ Since the late 1970s Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have recognized that they can no longer rely solely on the diplomatic initiatives of the Arab governments or on the PLO to secure Palestinian political rights and an end to the occupation. By the fall of 1987,

91. G. Pressberg, ‘The Uprising: Causes and Consequences’, *Journal for Palestine Studies*, XVII, No. 3, Spring 1988, p. 39.

92. *Ibid.*, pp. 39–40.

93. *Ibid.*, pp. 40–1.

Palestinians had determined that the US and Israel would continue to block an international peace conference and thus the Arab countries seemed to place higher priority in the Iran-Iraq war than on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The combination of the long term and immediate catalyst finally led to the spontaneous combustion of demonstrations in December 1987. And it soon became apparent that the anger with the occupation was deep enough to draw virtually all segments of Palestinian society into some form of participation in or support for this uprising.⁹⁴

There is evidence of an extensive organizational infrastructure emerging at a grass root level. The activist leadership seems to be typically diffuse, anonymous, and decentralized with heavy representation from the younger urban/rural and refugee camp generation. A new psychology seems to have gripped the bulk of the population, partly induced by the anniversary falling in 1980–7 (the forty-fourth anniversary of the establishment of Israel), and the twentieth anniversary of the occupation, and partly by the ultra-hawkish stance of Prime Minister Shamir, the perceived indifference of Washington and the loss of momentum in the peace process.⁹⁵

Within this psychology, a new element can be singled out: factional and ideological differences among Palestinians are being overcome. These differences had hitherto impaired the effectiveness of resistance but now seem to have been subsumed under a national consensus of cohesion.⁹⁶ A barrier of fear has been broken. This is the result of a sense of immunity acquired over two decades against the worst the occupation could do.

Finally, there is a growing awareness of the need for self-reliance. For too long the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have seen themselves as minor actors in the shaping of their own destiny. That the occupation has succeeded in activating the moral outrage of the population is self-evident.⁹⁷

During the early days of the uprising, no demands were made, leaving some observers to conclude that the uprising was an expression of the hopelessness of living. But it was proved to be an organized group action, not widespread violence. In addition, Palestinians presented their demands on 14 January 1988 at a press conference in East Jerusalem. The demands were made in the name of ‘all Palestinian institutions and personalities’. The 14 demands covered a full range of economic, land, human rights, political and labor rights issues. The fourteen demands reveal a relationship between the PLO and the ‘Territories’ whereby Palestinians under occupation decide upon local tactics and initiate strategic plans in coordination with the PLO.⁹⁸

94. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

95. W. Khalidi, *Palestine Reborn*, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

96. *Ibid.*, pp. 132–3.

97. *Ibid.*, p. 133.

98. Pressberg, ‘The Uprising: Causes and Consequences’, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

The extent of the influence of Islamic organization in the uprising remains a matter of some speculation. Mosques were used to encourage Palestinians to resist occupation. Islamic organizations participated with secular -nationalist organizations in the United National Command of the uprising and in local uprising committees. Palestinian nationalist organizations welcomed Islamic organizations' role.⁹⁹

The Israeli Government and public were surprised by the initial strikes and demonstrations. After the use of live ammunition, tear gas, speedy trials, detention and deportation failed to quell the demonstrations, the Ministry of Defense announced that it would resort to beating, but the beating policy backfired. It not only failed to bring an end to the uprising but also provoked the wrath of the international community as well as many Israelis because of its widespread severing. As the settlers became more vulnerable they began to take their security into their own hands and pressed right wing Israeli politicians to demand tougher actions.¹⁰⁰ The settlers' status had changed dramatically with the uprising: no Israeli could travel in the area without a Palestinian guide and some prior assurance of safe passage, and 180,000 Israeli troops were deployed to protect settlers and preserve the peace.¹⁰¹⁾

The Palestinians' uprising succeeded in bringing their struggle to the world's attention; they have challenged one of the world's strongest armies, the IDF, for the control of the streets, they have also forged an unprecedented degree of unity at the grass roots level. On the international level the UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution placing the Palestinian question back on the political agenda.¹⁰²

A setback for the Intifada came from Iraq. Its war with Iran had left this oil rich country in a state of material and economic losses and debts. Iraq prepared the stage for a major escalation at its southern borders. The Iraqi army occupied Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Contrary to Iraqi expectation, the international community reacted forcefully to the occupation. A United States-led coalition expelled the Iraqi army. The League of Arab States had been unable to achieve a diplomatic solution, and was now paralyzed by the bitter divisions among its members.¹⁰³

The Gulf war had negative and positive implications with regard to the resolution of the Palestinian problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The negatives include the rift between the Arab 'Coalition' partners and both the PLO and Jordan, the deepening reciprocal hatred between Israelis and Palestinians, and the increased aversion to the PLO. Above all, Israel had

99. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

100. *Ibid.*, pp. 47–8.

101. Carter, *Palestine: Peace ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

102. Pressberg, 'The Uprising: Causes and Consequences', *op. cit.*, p. 50.

103. Sayigh, *The Palestinian Armed ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

now attained, in the wake of war, a military dominance without firing a single Israeli bullet.¹⁰⁴

The positive implications of the Gulf war included the *rapprochement* between Syria and both Egypt and the US, the increased international awareness of the volatility of the Middle East and of the interconnectedness of its conflicts, the focusing of attention on the need for compliance with UN Resolutions, and the personal commitment of the President of the US to a just and comprehensive settlement. More problematic were the erosion of Moscow's regional influence, and the invigoration of the UN and the concept of collective action.¹⁰⁵

A week after the war, Baker (the US Secretary of State) launched a new peace initiative, under US-Soviet sponsorship that envisaged two negotiating tracks: one consisted of separate bilateral talks between Israel, on the one hand, and Syria, Lebanon, and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation; on the other hand, multilateral talks involving other Arab and non-Arab Middle East states and extra-regional parties, to deal with matters of general concern. The PLO was to be denied a direct role in talks which were intended to lead to a five-year period of Palestinian autonomy in the Occupied Territories, following which further negotiations would decide the final status of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Jerusalem. Shorn of options, the PLO accepted these terms, but worked over the next two years to obstruct substantial progress by the delegates of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza that it had chosen.¹⁰⁶

Reactivating the peace Process- Oslo Accords

Until September 1993 the Palestinians were absent from the official Israeli historical narrative.¹⁰⁷ During this period of relative standstill, and under Rabin's (Israeli Prime Minister) leadership and without America's involvement, Norway's Foreign Minister, Holst, and Professor Larsen, helped to orchestrate highly secret peace talks between the Government of Israel and the PLO. Israeli foreign Minister Peres and Deputy Foreign Minister Beilen had more than a dozen sessions, mostly in Oslo, with PLO leader Arafat's team headed by Abbas (Abū Māzen) and Qurei (Abu 'Alā') during the early months of 1993. Both Peres and Arafat kept president Carter informed about these efforts.¹⁰⁸

104. W. Khalidi, *Palestine Reborn*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

106. Sayigh, *The Palestinian Armed ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 549.

107. A. Jamal, 'The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership', *Journal for Palestine Studies*, No. I, Autumn 2000, Issue 117, p. 36.

108. Carter, *Palestine: Peace ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

Israelis were flying to the US to inform the Clinton administration about these sessions. Above all, they emphasized the provision in the agreement that called for the formation of a Palestinian National Authority with the election of a president and members of a National Assembly.¹⁰⁹ In sum the Oslo Accords provided for a phased withdrawal of the Israeli military from the West Bank and Gaza, the establishment of a Palestinian governing authority, with officials to be elected, and a five-year interim period during which the more difficult and specific issues would be negotiated. Although Rabin, Peres and Arafat all received the Nobel Peace Prize for their historic achievement, there was strong opposition from radical elements on both sides.¹¹⁰

What was meant by the exchange of letters between Rabin's and Arafat's mutual recognition between the two peoples? While Arafat recognized on behalf of the Palestinians the right of Israel to exist in peace and security, the recognition accorded to the Palestinians did not include the recognition of their rights. Rabin merely recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people without any mention of their rights.¹¹¹

Although Israel recognized the PLO as sole representative of the Palestinians in the peace negotiations and promised five years of further progress, Arafat had failed to obtain further specific concessions concerning a timetable for Israel's withdrawal from the Occupied Territories. In effect, what he got from the Oslo Agreements was the assurance of organizing a form of Palestinian government and staying in power so that he could administer Palestinian affairs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Israelis wanted and achieved much more.¹¹²

Israel's plan was that Arafat and the PLO would assume responsibility for local administration, free to receive and distribute (or perhaps retain a portion of) the international financial support that would be available to the Palestinians.¹¹³ A careful examination reveals that the Oslo process brought the Palestinians no closer to their goals of liberation, independence and statehood.¹¹⁴

Following Oslo, Rabin emphasized that Jewish settlements would be placed under exclusive Israeli jurisdiction; the Palestinian Autonomy Council would have no authority over them. The forces of the Israeli army would be redeployed in the locations determined only by Israel. In the agreement the Israelis did not consent to use the formula 'withdrawal of Israeli army forces' except when it applied to the Gaza Strip. In application to all other places the

109. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

110. *Ibid.*

111. Jamal, *The Palestinians ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

112. Carter, *Palestine: Peace ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

113. *Ibid.*, p. 136.

114. R. Khalidi, *The Iron Cage*, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

only term used is ‘redeployment’, the Palestinians coping with the problem of enforcing order by their own methods.¹¹⁵

Rabin soon concluded a peace accord with Jordan and announced his willingness to negotiate with the Syrians, and he and Arafat concluded an agreement in May 1994 that applied to the Gaza Strip and to Jericho and its environs.¹¹⁶ It addressed the four issues of security arrangement, civil affairs, legal matters, and economic relations, and it pledged withdrawal of Israeli military forces from a number of Palestinian communities, including Gaza and Jericho, and a transfer of some civil authority from the Israeli Civil Administration to a Palestinian authority.¹¹⁷ There was also a commitment for elections to form a governmental structure for the Palestinians. The hope for further steps was severely damaged with the assassination of Rabin in November by an Israeli rightwing religious fanatic, who declared that his goal was to interrupt the peace process.¹¹⁸

After the founding of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the aegis of the PLO leadership that returned to Palestine from Tunis in the mid 1990s, it appeared to many that the PLO had crossed a threshold toward the final goal of statehood notwithstanding a few critical Palestinian voices.¹¹⁹

The Oslo Agreements were a foretaste of what was to come in every Palestinian-Israeli negotiation over the following few years. During the 1990s, one unsatisfactory and unbalanced partial accord governing minor matters succeeded another. All the while, the truly weighty matters, the so-called ‘final status issues’ (Palestinian sovereignty and statehood, the status of Jerusalem, the refugee issue, Israeli settlements, and water) were kept off the table by the negotiating framework imposed by the US at the insistence of Israel at the beginning of the process. The supposed logic of this procedure, that partial interim accord would build confidence between the two parties, was proven false. The result of the entire Oslo process was a steep decline in mutual confidence. In fact, the real logic of the partial interim approach was that it was intended by its Israeli and American architects to relieve Israel of having any hard decisions on ending the occupation and settlement of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. Instead, Israeli occupiers and settlers were massively reinforced during the period of negotiations.¹²⁰ In the case of the Palestinians, the recovery of land was closely linked to the aspiration for political independence and statehood. The Oslo Agreements

115. Carter, *Palestine: Peace ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 136–7.

116. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

117. *Ibid.*

118. *Ibid.*, p. 138.

119. R. Khalidi, *The Iron Cage*, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

120. *Ibid.*, pp. 161–2.

carried the kernel of an understanding that Israel would have no peace unless it recognized the Palestinian right to national self-determination.¹²¹

The 'Declaration of Principles' signed in 1993 had the potential to bring about a comprehensive settlement of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, provided it was honestly and fairly implemented and in a manner that took into account the legitimate interests of the two sides. By the time of Israel's fiftieth birthday, five years after the signing of the 'Declaration of Principles', this potential had still not been realized.¹²² The Palestinians had made their choice. They offered Israel peace in return for a minimal restitution of what had been taken away by force. Israel had to choose. It could have land or it could have peace, it could not have both.¹²³

The second Intifada 2000 and after

The second uprising is a description of the clashes that engulfed the Occupied Territories in late September 2000. As in the first uprising, a dramatic event in the context of a diplomatic stalemate sparked a reaction on the ground that was ripe for explosion. In 2000 it was Sharon's visit to the Haram al-Sharif on 28 September and the deaths of demonstrators at the site. However, in both cases one should look beyond the sparks to the deeper factors. The most crucial difference between the first and the second uprisings lies in the changed political and diplomatic context in which they took place and in the consequences they produced. The first broke out at a time when there was no contact between the Palestinian national movement and Israel. The PLO had dispersed in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the Israeli military was in full control of the daily lives of Palestinians throughout the Occupied Territories. The first uprising enhanced the position of the internal political forces. It took the form of unarmed civil insurrection and succeeded in bringing home to the Israelis the notion that Palestine could not be governed by colonial rule.¹²⁴

At the time of the new uprising, a virtual Palestinian state apparatus ruled over a population that after seven years of the Oslo peace process was penned up in disconnected fragments of occupied territory encircled by ever-expanding settlements. The Palestinian entity was headed by the relocated and expanded PLO bureaucracy, a substantial and armed security apparatus and an elected parliament. Yet none of these new players were capable of acting.¹²⁵

121. Shlaim, *The Iron Wall ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 602.

122. *Ibid.*, p. 603.

123. *Ibid.*

124. S. Tamari, and R. Hammami, 'The Second Uprising: End or New Beginning?' *Journal for Palestine Studies*, XXX, No. 2, Winter 2001, p. 6.

125. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

In the negotiations to implement the Oslo agreements (The Sharm el-Sheikh agreement, Camp David Summit) the Israeli side insisted on moving directly to final status talks, ignoring the original understanding that withdrawal from the vast majority of the occupied territories would be completed during the transitional period as a prerequisite to final status. Now withdrawal became linked to major Palestinian concessions on final status issues. This shift represented the inevitable outcome of the massive power imbalance between the two sides that has defined the logic of Oslo all along.¹²⁶ The breakdown of negotiations was the product of the clash between two contending logics: the Israeli expectation of Palestinian concessions on final status issues in return for a greater land area, versus the Palestinian leadership's inability to concede much on final status after having conceded so much during the transitional period.¹²⁷

As with the first Intifada the continuous dependence of the Palestinian economy on Israel is a major vulnerability that has been used by Israel to suppress long term resistance. A major difference of the second Intifada in addition to the old vulnerabilities (reliance on Israeli water and electricity network, dependence on Israeli labor market) there are new ones that emerged as part of the Oslo process: the presence of a public sector employing 150,000 persons who rely on the PA for salaries, and 63 per cent of the PA's revenue derive from taxes that are to be paid by Israel under the shared custom regime that was part of the Oslo process. Other interests that have emerged since Oslo: such as the influential economic class that has emerged through strong ties to the political leadership.¹²⁸

The Israeli side is vulnerable for its integration in the new global economy: the impact is felt in tourism, the agricultural sector and the construction sector. The Palestinians suffer far greater physical and human losses, but their secret weapon lies in the range of survival strategies that households have developed over the past fifteen years.¹²⁹

One major difference between the two uprisings is the absence of wider civil rebellion, the population at large has been left with virtually no active role. Popular committees as well as mass organizations began to collapse at the end of the first Intifada under the weight of Israeli methods. Their recovery was preempted by the Gulf War and by Oslo. The only structure remaining to organize civil resistance is (professionalized) non-government organizations (NGOs) and what is left of the political factions. Their structural limitation made them incapable of organizing at the mass level.¹³⁰

126. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

127. *Ibid.*

128. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

129. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

130. *Ibid.*

While the religious character of the first Intifada was relatively muted, religion has played a major mobilizing and symbolic role in the second uprising. Nevertheless, with al-Aqsa as the main trigger for the uprising, religious fervour has been a salient dimension that at times has engulfed the entire conflict.¹³¹

There are two contrasting trends within Palestinian politics in response to the events: the first calls for utilizing the political gains of the uprising to raise the ceiling of negotiations in which the Palestinians would be able to extract better conditions. The second trend calls for the continuation of the uprising, exemplified by the more militant wing of Fatah and the opposition parties (Islamic ones: Jihad and Hamas).

The Intifada's role has become a means to keep up the pressure on a number of fronts: on the one hand the continuation of clashes demonstrates the untenability of the status quo. In addition, the Israeli military response helps demonstrate instead the need for an international peacekeeping force to protect the population. Limited armed actions against settlements send a message to the settlers that they cannot remain in Palestinian territory peacefully. What began as an uprising for al-Aqsa has increasingly become a battle against the settlements.¹³²

Meanwhile, inside the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip a weak fractured PA was certainly not thriving. The PA had been humiliated by the armed might of Israel (from late 2000 until the end of 2004), as the areas Israel had evacuated in the mid 1990s were reoccupied. The core of both the PLO and the PA, the Fatah movement, has been driven by conflicts between its old and new guards and between returnees from exile and local West Bankers and Gazans. It is also plagued by rivalries between the warlords who emerged from the competing security services created by Arafat. The result is that Fatah, the political movement that has dominated Palestinian politics for nearly four decades, has for the past few years often seemed to be paralyzed. The PA itself, thoroughly dominated by Fatah, was accused of corruption and nepotism. Beyond these damaging criticisms the effective monopolization of power in the PA by Fatah never brought unity and discipline to the Palestinian political scene. This was true even before the January 2006 election for the PLC (Palestinian Legislative Council).¹³³

The Palestinian election gave Hamas, Fatah's main rival, a sweeping victory in one of the most democratic exercises ever to take place in the Arab world. Hamas controlled the Parliament (PLC) and a Cabinet headed by the Prime Minister. Israel and the US reacted by announcing a policy of isolating

131. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

132. *Ibid.*

133. R. Khalidi, *The Iron Cage ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

and destabilizing the new government. Gaza is effectively isolated and every effort is made to block humanitarian funds to Palestinians.¹³⁴

Hamas is the acronym of the ‘movement of Islamic resistance’. In place of the Arab nationalism proposed by Movement of Arab Nationalism (MAN) as the way toward liberation, and the Palestinian nationalism proposed by Fatah, Hamas proposed in its first communiqué on 14 December 1987 ‘Islam as the solution’. Resistance is Hamas’s other key component. Liberation has been the watch word of both MAN and Fatah, both shaped by the 1948 expulsion and dispersed refugees’ condition. Hamas was shaped by the occupation, the context and driving force behind its emergence. As a result Hamas from the outset has been dominated by the concept of resistance instead of the concept of liberation.¹³⁵

With the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis having ground to a halt, and with the waning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Hamas presents itself as a major player in the Palestine national movement.

In fact religious undertones have always been present in the Palestine issue. But the Palestinian opposition to Zionism was primarily motivated by its political objects.¹³⁶

CONCLUSION

It is apparent to most observers not only that the Palestinians are a people with clear national rights, but that for all their material weaknesses, and their lack of a state, they are nevertheless a significant factor in the Middle East.

One can debate precisely who deserved the credit for putting the Palestinians back on the political map and bringing them from the brink of oblivion. However, some would say that the revival in the salience of the Palestinians was mainly the result of persistence and perseverance of the Palestinian people, their steadfastness and their stubborn refusal to cease to exist in the face of the extraordinary pressures on them to disappear. It would therefore seem that just as Israel is a reality which Palestinians must accept, Palestinian nationhood is a reality which Israel must accept. As Israel is here to stay, Palestinians are here to stay.

It will be a tragedy – for the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the world, if peace is rejected and a system of oppression, apartheid and sustained violence is permitted to prevail.

134. Carter, *Palestine: Peace ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

135. H. Baumgarten, ‘The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism 1984–2005’, *Journal for Palestine Studies*, XXXIV, No. 4, Summer 2005, p. 210.

136. W. Khalidi, *Palestine Reborn*, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

Chapter 3.2

THE KASHMIR QUESTION

Tabir Amin

INTRODUCTION

The Kashmir question has been one of the oldest unresolved disputes on the UN agenda. It has led to three wars between India and Pakistan, first in 1947–8 when the two countries were born, second in 1965 when the two fought a full-fledged war for seventeen days and third in 1999 when a limited war in the Kargil region of Kashmir broke out. As India and Pakistan had conducted nuclear tests in 1998, the world became deeply alarmed over the outbreak of the Kargil war and feared that Kashmir could become a flashpoint for a potential nuclear showdown between the two countries. The international community in general and the US in particular exercised intense diplomatic pressure to restrain both countries from going to all-out war against each other.¹ However, in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the US, the war in Afghanistan and the global war against terrorism, there has been a contextual change in India-Pakistan relations as well. Since 2004, both countries have initiated a peace process aimed at finding a lasting solution to the Kashmir problem as well as to other bilateral disputes. It is premature to say whether they will be able to find a solution which will be acceptable not only to India and Pakistan but also to the people of Kashmir. Nevertheless it remains the case that the two countries have been closer to finding a solution in the recent history.

1. B. Reidel, *American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House*, Policy Paper Series, Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, 2002.

Basic facts

Kashmir is situated in the extreme north-west corner of the South Asian sub-continent. It has a strategic location between Central Asia and South Asia, sharing borders with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and China. The territory has an area of 86,023 square miles, divided by a Line of Control (LOC) agreed upon in 1972 that leaves an area of 32,358 square miles in the north and west to Pakistan and the remainder, amounting to 53,665 square miles, under Indian control.² At the time of partition, the State of Jammu and Kashmir comprised five distinct regions: the Vale of Kashmir, Jammu, Laddakh, Baltistan, Poonch and Gilgit. The Vale of Kashmir, known for its beauty and fertility, is 84 miles long and between five and twenty miles wide. Like an emerald, pitched among pearls, it is the heart of Kashmir and remains under Indian control.

The Kashmiri people are an admixture of different races: Aryan, Mongol, Turkish and Afghan.³ According to the 1941 census, its total population was 4,021,616; of these, 77 per cent were Muslims, 20 per cent were Hindus, and 3 per cent were Sikhs and other minorities. According to the 1981 Indian census, the total population of Indian-controlled Kashmir was 5,987,389; it consisted of 64.2 per cent Muslim, 32.25 per cent Hindus, 2.23 per cent Sikhs and the remainder Buddhists, Christians, and Jains. The population of the Pakistani part of Kashmir, according to the 1981 Pakistani census, was 1,983,465; 99.8 per cent of the population was Muslim, while the rest consisted of Ahmadis, Christians and Hindus.⁴

Historical background

The early history of Kashmir was dominated by clashes between Buddhism and Brahmanism as rulers belonging to one or the other religion persecuted their adversaries. Islam entered Kashmir in the fourteenth century.⁵ Rinchan, a Buddhist ruler of Kashmir, embraced Islam in 1320 at the hands of Sayyid Bilal Shah (also known as Bulbul Shah), a widely traveled Musavi Sayyid from Turkistan.⁶ Islam consolidated its hold during Shah Mirs' reign (1339–44). The spread of Islam among the masses, however, was primarily due to 'a long continued missionary movement inaugurated by and carried out mainly by faqirs or friars or dervishes and Ulama or theologians.'⁷ A large number of

2. For the basic facts see, 'The Jammu and Kashmir', *Encyclopedia Britannica*, X, 1979 edition.

3. See 'Kashmir', *Encyclopedia of Islam*, IV, (1978 edition) pp. 706–11.

4. *1981 Census Report of Azad Kashmir*, Islamabad, Government of Pakistan, 1984.

5. Sufi G.M.D., *Kashir*, Two Volumes, Lahore, 1949.

6. R. K. Permu, *A History of Muslim Rule in Kashmir 1320–1819*, New Delhi, 1969.

7. Sufi, *Kashir*, *op. cit.*, p. 340.

Muslim ulama came from Central Asia to Kashmir to preach Islam. Sayyid Bilal Shah, Sayyed Jalaluddin of Bukhara, Sayyed Tajuddin and his brother Sayyed Husayn Simani, Sayyid Ali Hamadani and his son Mir Muhammad Hamadani and Shaykh Nuruddin are some of the well known ulama who played a significant role in spreading Islam. By the end of the fifteenth century, a majority of the inhabitants of Kashmir had embraced Islam. The Muslim rule in Kashmir lasted for five centuries from 1320 to 1819, including the periods of independent sultans (1320–1586), the Mughals (1586–1753) and the Pathans (1753–1819).

In 1819, Kashmir was conquered by Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of Punjab, who ruled it until 1846. In the wake of the first Anglo-Sikh war, the British sold Kashmir to Gulab Singh for 7,500,000 rupees under the Treaty of Amritsar, signed on 15 March, 1846.⁸ He founded the Dogra dynasty which ruled Kashmir until 1947. Gulab Singh was succeeded by the three rulers of the Dogra Dynasty, Ranbir Singh (1858), Partap Singh (1885), and Hari Singh (1925) who was the last ruler of the dynasty until the partition of the sub-continent. The Dogra rule, like the earlier Sikh rule, was extremely harsh and repressive for the Muslim community. Heavy taxation, discriminatory laws, forced work without wages (beggar), lack of representation in services and lack of educational facilities were the chief characteristics of the Dogra rule.⁹ The revenue collection was so harsh that besides taking 50 per cent share of the produce, the state officials also collected taxes on windows, hearths, marriages, live stocks, and chimneys of the Muslim houses.¹⁰ The slaughtering of the cow was forbidden by law and punishable by death, the mosques were under the control of state and the murder of a Muslim was considered an offense of lesser degree as compared to the murder of a non-Muslim.¹¹

Initially, two traditional Islamic institutions, Mir Waiz, a hereditary institution attached to The Jamia Mosque of Srinagar, and Shah-i-Hamadan of Khanqah-i-Muallah, played a useful role in highlighting the socio-economic grievances of the Muslims.¹² However, it was with the rise of the educated middle class that a political consciousness began to emerge among the Muslims of Kashmir. In 1922, an organization called Young Men's Muslim Association was formed in Jammu by Choudhary Ghulam Abbas and a Reading Room party was established by Shaykh Mohammad Abdullah in 1930 to mobilize the

8. P. N. Bazaz, *The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir*, Islamabad, 1976.

9. M. Y. Saraf, *Kashmiri's Fight for Freedom*, Two Volumes, Lahore, 1977.

10. A. H. Suhrawardy, *Tragedy in Kashmir*, Lahore, 1983.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

Muslims. The two men, Choudhary Ghulam Abbas and Shaykh Mohammad Abdullah played a very critical role in later developments.¹³

The Kashmiri mass movement was triggered in 1931 when a state functionary forbade the Imam to deliver Khutba (Sermon) before the Friday prayer. A fiery speech was delivered by one Abdul Qadeer against the Maharaja's un-islamic injunctions. On 13 July 1931, twenty-two Kashmiris were martyred when the police opened fire on the mob protesting against the arrest of Abdul Qadeer. On 14 October 1932, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference was formed under the leadership of Shaykh Abdullah. This organization became a principal vehicle for mobilizing the Muslim masses against the Maharaja's oppressive rule.

Soon the politics in Kashmir came under the influence of politics in British India where the All India National Congress advocated the 'one nation theory', i.e. that India despite its communal divisions was one nation, while the Muslim League believed in the 'two nation' theory that there existed two major nations in the sub-continent, i.e. the Hindus and Muslims, which differed from each other in all respects. A split occurred among the Kashmiri Muslims as well when Shaykh Abdullah grew closer to the secular-nationalist view of the Indian National Congress and renamed the Muslim Conference the National Conference.¹⁴ Choudhary Ghulam Abbas, fearing that the organization would act as an extension of the Indian National Congress, revived the Muslim Conference in October 1941 which became closely identified with the Muslim nationalist view of the Muslim League. The Muslim Conference, with the largest elected representation in the State Legislative Assembly, passed the resolution in favour of Kashmir's accession to Pakistan, in July 1947.¹⁵

On the eve of the partition of the Indian sub-continent, there were three main political forces in Kashmir: the National Conference, the Muslim Conference, and the Dogra dynasty. The National Conference, led by Shaykh Abdullah, wanted to join India; the Muslim Conference, led by Choudhary Ghulam Abbas, was in favour of joining Pakistan and the Dogra Maharaja Hari Singh apparently wanted to remain independent because he knew that accession to India or Pakistan would actually mean the loss of his throne and the substitution of his autocracy by some form of democratic government. At the time of the partition, the Maharaja had put all the significant leaders of the National Conference and the Muslim Conference behind bars.

13. *Ibid.*

14. See C. G. Abbas, *Kashmakash* [urdu], Lahore, 1950.

15. *Ibid.*



III-2.1 Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), leading poet, intellectual, and politician from British India, and a crucial figure in the Pakistan movement

© Permanent Delegation of Pakistan to UNESCO

Origins of the dispute

The British had maintained a paramountcy relationship with 584 princely states of India, regulating their foreign affairs and defence matters.¹⁶ On the eve of the transfer of power, the British advised these princely states to either accede to India or Pakistan, keeping in view the wishes of their masses. Three princely states did not make their choice on 15 August 1947—Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir. The Muslim ruler of Junagadh, despite the predominant majority of Hindu population, decided to accede to Pakistan in 1947. With the opposition among the populace to this move, the Indian army entered the state and conducted a plebiscite which favoured its union with India. Similarly, in Hyderabad, a Muslim ruler wanted to remain independent but the majority Hindu population did not approve of his plan. On 13 September 1948, the Indian army entered into Hyderabad and secured its accession to India.

The case of Kashmir was just the opposite of the above two cases where the Hindu ruler, failing to remain independent, eventually decided to join India against the wishes of the predominant majority of the Muslim population to join Pakistan. India accepted the accession while rejecting the two earlier ones. The Maharaja of Kashmir Hari Singh wanted to buy more time. He preferably wanted to remain independent of both India and Pakistan, but given the choice between India and Pakistan, he wanted to throw his lot with Hindu India rather than with Muslim Pakistan. However, he decided to proceed cautiously as he was apprehensive of the possibility of revolt by his Muslim majority against his rule. He offered a standstill agreement to both India and Pakistan to maintain communications and supplies. Pakistan entered into the agreement while India did not. The Maharaja began to follow a calculated policy. On the one hand, he began a planned genocide of the Kashmiri Muslims in connivance with other Hindu Maharajas, and on the other, he undertook several steps to facilitate accession to India.

The scale of the killing of the Muslims can be seen from the fact that 200,000 Muslims were massacred by the Maharaja's forces in Jammu alone, converting the Jammu from a Muslim majority province to a Muslim minority province.¹⁷ The Maharaja's contact with the top Indian leadership increased, a road linking India to Kashmir began to be hastily built, the Prime Minister of Kashmir Pandit Kak who had signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan, was replaced by Mehr Chand, who openly sided with India, and Shaykh Abdullah whose policy was decidedly anti-Pakistan was suddenly released from jail, while

16. The following historical account is based on these books: A. Lamb, *The Kashmir Problem*, N.Y, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966; S. Gupta, 'Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations', Bombay, Asian Publishing House, 1967; M. Brecher, *The Struggle for Kashmir*, Toronto, The Reyon Press, 1953.

17. A. Lamb, *Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1946–1990*, Hertfordshire, Roxford, 1991, p. 108.

Choudhary Ghulam Abbas and other Muslim Conference leaders continued to languish in jail.

All these events convinced the Pakistani leadership of the Maharaja's long term plan to accede to India. In that communally charged situation, hundreds of Pathan tribesmen from the NorthWest Frontier Province of Pakistan entered Kashmir to help their Muslim coreligionists who were being slaughtered by the Maharaja's forces. The Maharaja fled from Srinagar and was apparently persuaded by the Indian authorities to accede to India on October 22, 1948. However, on hearing the news of the tribesmen's entry into Kashmir, India dispatched its troops to Kashmir even before the formalities of accession had been completed.¹⁸ India accepted the accession provisionally and conditionally subject to a referendum, to be held under international auspices to ascertain the wishes of the people.¹⁹ On 1 January, 1948, India under articles 34 and 35 of Chapter Six of the UN charter (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), complained to the UN of Pakistan's aggression on a territory which had acceded to India legally.

Recently disclosed documents of the history of the partition reveal British complicity with the top Indian, leadership to wrest Kashmir from Pakistan. Alastair Lamb, based on the study of recently declassified documents, has convincingly proved that Mountbatten, in league with Nehru, was instrumental in pressurizing Redcliff to award the Muslim-majority district of Gurdaspur in East Punjab to India which could provide India with the only possible access to Kashmir.²⁰ The British perception was that strategically located Kashmir was vulnerable to a possible encroachment by Russia or China and could better be protected by larger and more stable India than by unstable and smaller Pakistan.

Alastair Lamb has also challenged the Indian claim that the instrument of accession was ever signed by the Maharaja Hari Singh. His view is that the chronological order of the event strongly suggests that Indian troops intervened in Kashmir prior to the signing of the instrument of accession.²¹ In fact, he believes that the signed instrument of accession did not exist at all because of the Maharaja's reluctance to sign it; therefore, the Indian Government never produced the original document of accession either in official documents or at any international forum.²² There appears to be considerable weight in his arguments as they are substantiated by documentary evidence.

18. *Ibid.*

19. P. L. Lakhanpal (ed.), (*Kashmir, op. cit.*) *Essential Documents and Notes on the Kashmir Dispute*, Delhi, International Books, 1965, p. 57.

20. Lamb, *op. cit.*, p. 107; Also see A. Lamb, *Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947*, Hertingfordbury, Roxford Books, 1994.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*

From this background, we can identify the basic Kashmiri, Indian, and Pakistani positions on the dispute, the stakes of each party in it and the basic issue in the conflict. The people of Kashmir, who are the primary party to this conflict, have been the worst sufferers of this stalemate between India and Pakistan. They have not only been denied their right of self-determination promised to them by India and in several UN resolutions but also their basic human rights which are being violated every day by the Indian security forces.

India's position was determined by composite factors: strategic factors, politico-economic considerations and the personality factor. Indian leadership believed that the possession of Kashmir was vital to India's security because Kashmir's northern frontiers were adjacent to Afghanistan, Russia and China; therefore, defence of India demanded that Kashmir should be part of India.²³ Among the political factors, they thought that since Kashmir was the only Muslim-majority state in India, it was necessary for India to retain it to demonstrate India's secular credentials. There was also a personal factor of Jawaharlal Nehru, who himself was a Kashmiri Brahmin and who never hid his personal interest in keeping control of Kashmir.²⁴

Pakistan claimed that Kashmir was vital for its security because the two main strategic roads and the railway system of West Pakistan ran parallel, and occupation of Kashmir by India could be a direct threat to Pakistan's security.²⁵ Economically, Pakistan claimed that it was vitally linked to Kashmir because the headwaters of three major rivers which formed the backbone of Pakistan's agricultural system were located in Kashmir. Above all, Pakistan believed that it was in accordance with the logic of the two-nation theory which formed the basis of the partition that Kashmir, being the Muslim majority area, should have joined Pakistan. Pakistani leadership regarded Kashmir as 'unfinished business of the partition'.²⁶

Efforts to resolve the conflict

India raised the Kashmir question in the UN under Article 35 of its Charter in the form of a complaint against Pakistan. The Indian spokesman concentrated his attention on the tribal invasion of Kashmir and accused Pakistan of complicity in it, thus committing aggression against India insofar as Kashmir had acceded to India on 26 October 1947. The Indian argument was based on the validity of the Maharaja's accession to India. The Indian representative also repeated Jawaharlal Nehru's offer of a plebiscite under UN auspices.²⁷

23. Lakhanpal, *Essential Documents ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

24. Brecher, *The Struggle for Kashmir*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

25. *Ibid.*

26. J. Korbelt, *Danger in Kashmir*, N.Y, Princeton University, 1966, p. 132.

27. Lakhanpal, *Essential Documents ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 96–131.

The Pakistani representative presented his case in a broader context. He considered Kashmir as part of a wider Indian project to strangle Pakistan and undo partition. Challenging the legal validity of the Maharaja's accession to India, he presented the situation in Kashmir as essentially one of a popular revolt against the oppressive regime of the Maharaja. He also compared Junagadh's accession to Pakistan which India set aside, and Kashmir's accession to India which was accepted. In both cases, it was pointed out that the ruler was of a different religion than his subjects.²⁸

The Security Council's resolutions of 21 April 1948, 13 August 1948, and 5 January 1949 were of cardinal importance. They outlined the Security Council's stand on the Kashmir conflict, recommended the method of its solution and became the principal term of reference for various UN representatives. Instead of taking a judicial view of the complaints and counter-complaints of the parties, the Security Council adopted a political solution and tried to reconcile two extreme positions. It proposed a package deal, comprising three sections; withdrawal of forces, interim government in Kashmir and plebiscite. On the withdrawal of forces, Pakistan was asked to withdraw all the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals from Kashmir and India was permitted to retain a minimum force to the government in Kashmir during the plebiscite. On the matter of plebiscite, the UN favoured international control.²⁹ Both parties rejected the resolution for different reasons.

We shall delineate the main areas of disagreement between Indian and Pakistani proposals which continually figured in the UN debates and were never resolved.

(a) To India, the issue of accession was between itself and the people of Kashmir, and to Pakistan, the issue of accession was open and on which Pakistan and India had equal standing. (b) Pakistan would entrust the UN with the authority and responsibility as well as the function of holding, organizing and supervising the plebiscite while India would have the plebiscite under the advice and observation of the UN. (c) To India, the primary need was stopping the fighting and restoring normal conditions; and to Pakistan, this would be achieved as part of the preparations for the plebiscite. (d) To Pakistan, the withdrawal of forces must be complete, and simultaneous; to India, the bulk of its troops should remain there. (e) India would like to have Shaykh Abdullah's administration during the plebiscite; Pakistan would prefer a UN administration.

All the UN mediation efforts, the UN Commission for India and Pakistan, Canadian General A.G.L Mcnaughton's Mission, Owen Dixon's proposals, Gunnar Jarring's efforts and Frank Graham's efforts failed. The

28. *Ibid.*

29. *Ibid.*

UN efforts to mediate generally ended with the conclusion that the only possible solution must be direct bilateral negotiations. India and Pakistan conducted such negotiations in 1953, 1955, 1960, and 1962–3, but the hostile perceptions, deep mistrust of each other and power imbalances between the parties marred the negotiations. Some proposals aimed at dividing Kashmir were also discussed but differences over the Valley of Kashmir continued to persist and the negotiations ended in a failure.

Institutionalization of the conflict

Gradually, the scope of the conflict started widening. The institutionalization of the conflict can be discussed at three levels: the domestic level, the bilateral level, and the international level.

As the socio-political structures of the two states were in the making, the processes of hostile perceptions, the mistrust, and ill will harbored by the decision makers towards each other were perpetuated among the masses through the media. In the case of India, it appears that Nehru's personal attachment to Kashmir was a crucial factor in the gradual inculcation of a strong public opinion in India.³⁰ Popular images played a large role in the case of Pakistan. Deriving inspiration from their core values, the masses strongly felt that the Kashmiri and Pakistani elite had used popular religious slogans such as *Jihad* to consolidate their own power position. Gradually, the structure of public opinion became an important factor in the domestic political systems of the two states which no political leader could ignore.

At the bilateral level, new incompatibilities arose between the two countries, such as an intense propaganda war, problems of the equitable distribution of financial assets, evacuees' property disputes, water disputes, economic war and minorities' problems. As mutual suspicions and fears grew, occasional troop movements and border skirmishes became the norm between the two countries.

The Kashmir conflict was drawn into the vortex of the Cold war. When Pakistan entered into the Mutual Defense Agreement with the United States in 1954 and subsequently joined the US sponsored alliances of CENTO and SEATO in 1955. India leaned towards the former Soviet Union for diplomatic and political support on the Kashmir question. The Soviet Union twice used its veto in the UN Security Council in favour of India. Both parties started acquiring arms from their allies, thus preparing themselves for an eventual military showdown.

30. See Korbels excellent account on the differences between Pakistani and Indian perceptions on this point. Korbels, *Danger in Kashmir, op. cit.*, p. 140.



III-2.2 The innovative Faysal Mosque in Islamabad, Pakistan,
completed in 1986

© S. M. Amin/AramcoWorld

A war broke out between India and Pakistan in 1965 when Pakistan tried to infiltrate 5,000 guerillas into the Indian-held Kashmir. India responded by attacking West Pakistan on 6 September, 1965.³¹ The war lasted for seventeen days but ended in a stalemate. Both sides failed to achieve their objectives. Pakistan could not make any headway in Kashmir and India could not capture any major city in Pakistan. Failure of either side to win any decisive victory, international pressure, the depletion of military resources, and the UN efforts led to a ceasefire between India and on Pakistan on 23 September, 1965. The Soviet Union mediated between the two countries but failed to resolve the fundamental differences over Kashmir. The Tashkent Conference (1966) hosted by the Soviet leadership ended in a limited success as India and Pakistan only agreed to settle the peripheral issues arising out of the war.³²

India and Pakistan went to war over the Bangladesh issue in 1971. The Simla Accord signed between India and Pakistan on 2 July 1972 recognized that the Jammu and Kashmir issue remained an unsettled issue 'without prejudice to the recognized position of either side' and the representatives of both India and Pakistan would meet to discuss 'the final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir'.

The Kashmir issue remained dormant until the 1980s.³³

Rise of the mass movement

However, the Kashmir issue came back to life in 1987 when a powerful mass movement emerged in Indian-controlled Kashmir in the wake of massively rigged state elections in India, which a coalition of the Islamic parties Muslim United Front (MUF) were supposed to win. The Indian State's political, economic and cultural policies in Kashmir were primarily responsible for generating the immediate causes of the crisis.

Politically, despite Indian promises at the highest level to the Kashmiri people and the UN, the Indian Government never allowed them to exercise their right of self-determination. The view of the Indian Government has been that the Kashmiri people have expressed through the successive state assembly elections their desire to remain with India. However, the UN, in response to Pakistan's complaint, made it clear that the state elections under Indian control cannot be considered a substitute for a plebiscite held under UN auspices.³⁴ After 1953, India went back on its promise of holding a

31. T. Amin, *Tashkent Declaration: Third Party's Role in the Resolution of the Conflict*, Islamabad, Institute of Strategic Studies, 1980.

32. *Ibid.*

33. G. S. Bhargava, *The Success of Surrender? The Simla Summit*, New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1972.

34. A. G. Noorani, *The Kashmir Question*, Bombay, 1964.

plebiscite under UN auspices and declared Kashmir to be an integral part of India. It must be pointed out that India followed a dual policy towards the unsettled issue of accession of Kashmir. Officially, it maintained that Jammu and Kashmir had become an integral part of India since 1954, while it continued to discuss the dispute with Pakistan both officially and unofficially on various occasions whenever it felt under pressure. This dual policy had a deep impact on the populace of Kashmir which never developed a loyalty to India and always felt that the issue had yet remained unsettled. The issue of self-determination has never died down in Kashmir.³⁵

Successive Indian Governments have denied the Kashmiri people any genuine political participation, by installing puppet regimes through manipulating the state election results. Balraj Puri, a noted Indian scholar, observed: 'It is now universally recognized that the elections in the state [Kashmir] were usually manipulated though the degree and technique of manipulation varied from election to election.'³⁶ Another Indian scholar, N. Y. Dole, wrote in 1990:

All elections since 1951 to 1989, with the sole exception of elections, in 1977 were rigged. Elections in 1987 when the National Conference and Congress joined hands was the last straw. People are kept away from sharing political power, an indispensable condition of democratic functioning ... they feel all these governments were imposed on them by Delhi to suit Delhi's convenience.³⁷

On the one hand, the Indian Government has been installing unrepresentative governments through rigged state elections while on the other; its developmental policies have given rise to a large constituency of the educated middle class. This educated middle class experiences political deprivation, job discrimination and cultural alienation. Kashmir represented a classic case of an increasing lag between political participation and a faster rate of social mobilization, a dilemma which created an explosive situation in the 1987 state elections. The massive rigging of elections by the Indian authorities proved to be the last straw on the camel's back.³⁸

In the cultural sphere, growing emphasis on secularism generated a backlash, contributing to the popularity of Islamic parties, especially the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba, its allied student body. Islam remained the most powerful stimulus despite the secular outlook of successive governments. Islamic parties like the Jamaat-i-Islami, the People's League, the Muslim Conference, and the Islamic Study Circle became a real alternative to the secular parties.³⁹ Their popularity began to rise and their alliance under the

35. Jagmohan, *My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir*, New Delhi, 1991.

36. B. Puri, *Kashmir Towards Insurgency*, New Delhi, Orient Longman, 1993, p. 45.

37. N. Y. Dole, 'Kashmir: A Deep-rooted Alienation', *Economic and Political Weekly*, May, 5, 1990.

38. 'Kashmir: Wages of Manipulation', *India Today*, August, 31, 1991.

39. F. Rehmani, *Azadi Ki Talash* [urdu], Srinagar, 1988.

name of Muslim United Front (MUF) emerged as a mass-based front, forcing the ruling party to rig the elections. Furthermore, the transnational effects of events in Iran and Afghanistan at the regional level had a tremendous impact on the domestic politics of Kashmir. The Islamic revolution of Iran (1979) and the myth that Ayatollah Khomeini's ancestors originally belonged to Kashmir had a deep impact at the popular level. The successful resistance of Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet Union also inspired the Kashmiri youths. The liberation movements in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union at the global level compounded the effect, inspiring the Kashmiri people to launch a mass resistance movement against Indian rule in Kashmir.

There are many organizations which are involved in the current resistance against Indian rule in Kashmir. The two most prominent organizations are the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and the Hizbul Mujahideen. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which was established in 1965 under the leadership of Maqbool Butt, is the oldest organization which has been struggling for the independence of Kashmir on the basis of secular nationalism.⁴⁰ They took the lead in spearheading the current phase of Kashmiri resistance in 1987 in the wake of massively rigged state elections in Kashmir. In the Indian part of Kashmir, the resistance is led by Yasin Malik and Shabbir Shah while in the Pakistani part of Kashmir it is being led by Amanullah Khan, who has been steadfastly advocating for the independence of Kashmir as it existed in 1947.

The Hizbul Mujahideen, founded in 1989 and then headed by Ghulam Mohammad Saffi, and currently being led by Sayyed Salahuddin, is committed to Jihad and seeks accession to Pakistan. Hizbul Mujahideen is actually an armed wing of the Jammāt-i-Islami of Kashmir and is more powerful than the JKLF and enjoys wide spread grassroots support.

A coalition of thirty Kashmiri political organizations, All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) is also an important player which represents the political face of the Kashmiri resistance. It is divided into two factions. The moderate faction is led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, and supports a negotiated solution of the Kashmir problem involving India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir while the hardline faction is led by Sayyed Ali Gilani, who favours the resolution of Kashmir dispute on the basis of the right of self-determination in accordance with the UN resolutions on Kashmir.

There are other non-Kashmiri militant organizations active in Kashmir with pan-Islamist goals.⁴¹ Their objective is to attack all Indian targets, not

40. A. Khan, *Jubd-i-Musalsal* [urdu], Rawalpindi, 1992.

41. R. Zeb, 'Pakistan and Jihadi Groups in the Kashmir Conflict' in *Kashmir, New Voices, New Approaches* by Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Bushra Asif and Cyrus Samii (ed.), London, Lynne Rienner, 2006.

necessarily confined to Kashmir, but also inside India.⁴² They also reportedly collaborate with other Indian terrorist groups and organizations as well. Many of these organizations have recruited veterans of the Afghan war, who had become available after the end of the Afghan war in the wake of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Harkat-ul Mujahideen, established in 1998, Lashkar-e-Taiba, established in 1993, Jaesh-i-Mohammad, established in 2000, are some such organizations. Most of these organizations are supported and financed by Pakistan.

The Indian Government alleges that the Kashmiri struggle has been instigated and supported by Pakistan, while Pakistan maintains that the Kashmiri struggle is entirely indigenous in character and that Pakistan supports the movement only morally. In fact, when the current phase of the Kashmiri movement started in 1987, it was primarily indigenous in character and was triggered in reaction to the Indian state's political, economic and cultural policies; however, with the passage of time, Pakistan became deeply involved in supporting a plethora of militant organizations inside the Indian-administered Kashmir. Almost all of the militant organizations are dependent on Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) for the supplies of weapon, training, finances and other necessary logistical support.⁴³

The Indian Government has responded with massive repression of the Kashmiri people, employing nearly half a million security forces. According to official Indian sources, only 40,000 people have been killed since 1987, but independent sources estimate that the number of casualties has exceeded more than 100,000 in the past two decades.⁴⁴ Furthermore, the Indian security forces have engaged in widespread molestation of women, burning down the houses of the suspected militants and brutally torturing the able-bodied Kashmiri youths leading to thousands of deaths in custody. These harrowing atrocities have been documented in detail by Indian human rights groups as well as such international groups as Amnesty, Asia Watch, and Physicians for Human Rights.⁴⁵

The current India-Pakistan peace process

The Kashmir issue has figured prominently in the current India-Pakistan peace process which began in 2004.⁴⁶ After years of neglect, India and Pakistan have been holding sustained dialogue on all bilateral issues including Kashmir,

42. D. S. Chandran, 'India and Armed Non-state Actors in the Kashmir Conflict' in *ibid*.

43. H. A. Rizvi, 'Islamabad's New Approach to Kashmir' in *ibid*.

44. I. Kaur, 'Warring over Peace in Kashmir' in *ibid*.

45. *Kashmir Bleeds*, New Delhi, 1990; *Kashmir Imprisoned: An Indian Human Rights Report reproduced in the Nation*, Lahore, August, 19, 1990.

46. E. Mahmud, 'Pak-India Peace Process: An Appraisal', *Policy Perspective*, IV, No. 2, July–Dec. 2007.

raising hopes that both countries would be able to find a consensus on the thorniest issue of Kashmir. The most significant aspect of the negotiations on Kashmir has been that both India and Pakistan have changed their traditional positions. Pakistan no longer insists on a plebiscite in accordance with the UN resolutions on Kashmir and has practically stopped its support of the militant organizations inside Indian-held Kashmir. India no longer continues to insist that since Kashmir had become an integral part of the Indian Union, therefore, it was not a negotiable issue. India has also shown its willingness to discuss the Kashmir issue as a part of a composite dialogue between the two countries.⁴⁷ However, it has yet to be seen how the initiative taken by these two countries is received by the people of Kashmir as well as how the representatives of the Kashmiri people are consulted and what mechanism is evolved to ensure the will of the Kashmiri people.

A number of factors are responsible for this dramatic transformation in the attitudes of the two countries: the nuclear factor in South Asia, the impact of global changes in the post-9/11 era and substantive US involvement in South Asia.

Although both India and Pakistan had conducted nuclear tests in 1998, they continued to engage with each other in the traditional balance of power politics, oblivious of the change which had taken place in the wake of the emergence of the nuclear factor in South Asia. Pakistan initiated the Kargil crisis in 1999 by occupying Indian positions in the Indian-held Kashmir across the Line of Control, mistakenly believing that it will not only be able to secure advantage over India but also to internationalize the Kashmir issue in the nuclear context. However, the move backfired as India retaliated vigorously and the international community reacted adversely against Pakistan. Fearing that this limited war could spill over into a full-scale war including the possibility of a nuclear exchange, Pakistan sought US help to end the crisis and the US exercised its diplomatic pressure to persuade both India and Pakistan to agree to the cessation of hostilities.⁴⁸ Similarly India, reacting against a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001, blamed Pakistan for sponsoring the Kashmiri militants for the attack and mobilized its troops along Pakistan's border, warning Pakistan of a limited war across the Line of Control in Azad Kashmir, under Pakistani control. Pakistan also counter-mobilized its troops, creating a real fear of another full-scale war in Kashmir. However, it appears that the nuclear factor has acted as a deterrent for both India and Pakistan, in terms of forcing them not to go for an all-out war.

47. A. G. Noorani, 'India and Pakistan: A Step Closer to Consensus', *Frontline*, December, 2-16, 2006.

48. Reidel, *American Diplomacy...*, *op. cit.*



III-2.3 Interior view of the Faysal Mosque, in Islamabad, Pakistan. The biggest mosque in Pakistan, it has room for some 10,000 worshippers

© S. M Amin/AramcoWorld

Global changes in the wake of the 9/11 events, the US and Western countries' invasion of Afghanistan and the 'war on terror' brought a contextual change in the international politics of South Asia. As both India and Pakistan became allies in the war against terrorism, Pakistan no longer found it tenable to support the militant Kashmiri organizations as many of them were seen by the US as 'terrorist' organizations. Pakistan had to abandon completely its traditional policy on Kashmir, under US pressure. India was also persuaded by the US to engage with Pakistan on the contentious issue of Kashmir. The clout exercised by the US among the decision-making elites of India and Pakistan has been the most significant factor leading to a change in the attitude of the two countries.

As US involvement increased in South Asia, both Pakistan and India began to respond to behind-the-scenes influence exercised by the US for settling the bilateral issues between the two countries. The rising cost of the Kashmir conflict also made India and Pakistan realize the futility of the continuing conflict. The Indian leadership saw their potential global role hampered by the continuing Kashmir imbroglio and the Pakistani leadership found that there was little support for their Kashmir policy at the international level.

Pakistan's President General Pervez Musharraf, in a series of interviews to the media, declared, in 2006 that Pakistan was willing to give up its old demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir and was prepared to forget all the UN resolutions if his following four-point proposal were accepted by India: (a) Kashmir would have the same borders but people will be allowed to move freely back and forth in the region; (b) the region would have self-governance and/or autonomy but not independence; (c) troops would be withdrawn from the region in a phased manner; (d) a joint supervision mechanism would be set up with India, Pakistan and Kashmir represented.⁴⁹ The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reciprocated by saying that 'There is a need to evolve a common understanding on autonomy and self-rule for the State of Jammu and Kashmir and I am confident that working together with all groups, both within and outside the mainstream, we can arrive at arrangements within the vast flexibilities provided by the Constitution, arrangements which provide real empowerment and comprehensive security to all the people of Jammu and Kashmir.' Manmohan Singh also made the following four points on 24 March 2006: (a) a step by step approach, (b) dialogue by both India and Pakistan 'with the people in their area of control; (c) 'I have often said that borders cannot be redrawn but we can work towards making them irrelevant-towards making them just lines on the map. People on both sides of the LOC should be able to move more freely and trade with one another; (d) 'the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir can with the active encouragement of the governments of India and Pakistan work out cooperative consultative mechanisms so as to maximize the gains of cooperation.'⁵⁰

There is little doubt that both parties have shown remarkable flexibility in their traditionally stated positions on Kashmir and there has emerged a broad agreement at the leadership level; however, it has yet to be seen how they settle the details of this formula, how the Kashmiri people react to these proposals and whether a variety of resistance groups accept these proposals or not. Both countries have completed four rounds of composite dialogue covering all of their bilateral issues. There have been some agreements, such as the start of a bus-service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad and truck services between the two parts of Kashmir but it appears that there have been significant divergences in the positions of the two parties as well. India would like to progress slow, gradually increasing step-by-step confidence building measures between the two countries, whereas Pakistan's interest is to push for the entire package simultaneously. The biggest difficulty is

49. *The Nation*, Lahore, December, 6, 2006.

50. Noorani, '*India and Pakistan*', *op. cit.*

how to make operational the concept of joint management on the ground.⁵¹ Given the history of conflict between the two countries and the abiding fears regarding each one's sovereignty and independence, both are extremely cautious of the mechanism of joint control. Therefore, the dialogue process is slow and there has not been any final agreement between the two sides, but the leadership of the two countries is cautiously optimistic that a breakthrough on the solution of the Kashmir dispute has been achieved.

The biggest hurdle would be the attitudes of the resistance groups who have been engaged in war with the Indian Government for the past two decades. As noted above, these resistance groups are deeply divided among themselves on their goals, strategies and objectives, some of them want complete independence while others want the merger of Kashmir with Pakistan and some have Pan-Islamist goals. Prospective agreement between India and Pakistan falls short of the expectations of practically all of these groups. There have already been sharp denunciations of the agreement by the majority of the groups. It will be a big challenge for both countries to how they achieve the consensus among these diverse groups who have been engaged in armed struggle for so long. Finally, it is likely to be very difficult to win the support of the Kashmiri people who have been fed on the slogans of *Azadi* (independence) for so long. It may appear logical to them to maintain status quo in Kashmir with minor changes.

CONCLUSION

The Kashmir issue has been the thorniest issue between India and Pakistan emerged from the process of partitioning of the sub-continent when the two countries became independent in 1947. It has been the cause of three wars between the two countries and generated great bitterness in bilateral relations besides, bringing great misery to the millions of Kashmiri people. The dispute was not merely over the territory of Kashmir, which was the bone of contention between the two countries but that leadership in the two countries also saw their ideals being compromised. The Indian leadership had envisioned India as 'one nation' despite the diversity of religions and races, while the Pakistani leadership saw the existence of 'two nations' in the sub-continent which had their right to self-determination. It was the conflict between the 'one-nation' versus the 'two-nation' theories which was the principal obstacle in resolving the conflict in the beginning. All the early efforts to resolve the conflict failed because of the tenacity of the views held by the leadership in the two countries.

51. *Ibid.*

Gradually, the conflict was institutionalized. Public opinion in the two countries was mobilized, new incompatibilities arose between them and the issue was drawn into the vortex of international politics, making the resolution more difficult. The conflict escalated into full-fledged wars, but these wars also could not resolve the issue.

Emergence of the mass-resistance movement in Kashmir in the wake of the 1987 state elections proved to be a catalyst which brought the virtually dormant issue of Kashmir back to life. The movement started in reaction to Indian political, economic and cultural policies and frustrated Kashmiri youths began to look towards Pakistan for help. Other transnational factors, such as the successful Islamic resistance against the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran, also had their impact. A plethora of resistance organizations emerged with active assistance from Pakistan. These organizations are divided in their goals, some want independence, others want a merger with Pakistan and still others have Pan-Islamist goals.

A contextual change occurred in 1998 when India and Pakistan became overt nuclear states and the logic of nuclear deterrence began to dawn upon the leadership in the two countries. The futility of military adventures in Kashmir had increasingly become obvious to both sides. Global and regional changes in the wake of the 9/11 events and war on terrorism forced the two countries to review their policies towards Kashmir. Pakistan's policy of supporting militancy had become obsolete and even counterproductive, Indian policy of ignoring the Kashmir issue was no longer tenable and the US pressure on the two countries who had become allies in the war against terrorism, could not be ignored. Pakistan took the initiative in leaving its traditional stand, declaring that it would no longer insist on the plebiscite in accordance with the UN resolutions. It presented a four-point formula consisting of a soft border across LOC, demilitarization of Kashmir, self-rule and joint management of Kashmir by India, Pakistan and Kashmiri representatives. India reciprocated by agreeing to the formula in principal but leaving the details of self-rule and joint management to be worked out during the negotiations between the two sides. However, it is as premature to say if the Kashmiri people will approve this arrangement or not, because the achievement of a lasting solution will eventually depend on the consensus between India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people.

Chapter 3.3

THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND THE FALL OF THE PAHLAVI DYNASTY

Fredj Maatoug

INTRODUCTION

Can the end of Pahlavi Iran be summed up as the story of a struggle between two men – a king, the Shah, and a Shi'a religious dignitary, Ayatollah Khomeini? According to Fereydoun Hoveyda, that goes without saying. In a book in which he analyzes the 1979 Islamic Revolution through the prism of Iranian mythology, he states that: 'Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution was in a way the outcome of a long struggle between two men: Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.'¹ However, in reality, matters were far more complicated than that. Reducing Iran's 1979 revolution to a confrontation between two men overlooks the importance of the popular movement initially led by secular liberal intellectuals. This movement was soon joined by thousands of young Muslim militants, both liberals and Marxist revolutionaries, spurred by nationalist and Third-Worldist ideals. Furthermore, the legacy of the democratic currents that had shaken the country nearly a century earlier, or that of Mosaddegh's more recent reform attempts must not also be forgotten. With the help of the CIA, Mosaddegh was ousted by a *coup d'état* in the 1950s.

How can we explain the speed with which such a strong and structured regime as the Shah of Iran was brought down? This specific aspect of the 1979 Iranian Revolution cannot be objectively understood without mentioning the Imamate, a notion that is specific to Shi'a Islam, the majority faith in Iran. Indeed, 'the belief in the occultation and eventual return of the twelfth Imam is of paramount importance in order to understand the rapidity and almost

1. F. Hoveyda, *The Shah and the Ayatollah: Iranian Mythology and Islamic Revolution*, Westport, Connecticut, London, 2003, p. 1.

peaceful fall of the Shah and Khomeini's access to political power.² Thus, a tradition of civil strife and religious specificities came together to precipitate the end of the Pahlavis and the birth of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The beginning of the end of the Shah's reign

Was the 1979 Iranian Revolution inevitable? When we observe the evolution of the situation within Iran in the 1970s with this question in mind, we realize how strong, stable and far from being on the verge of a revolution the country was. Yet, looking more closely, we see that the 1970s was the decade in which the Shah of Iran's regime grew in power and then collapsed. Although in the first half of that decade it achieved some success economically and internationally, events at the end of the 1970s precipitated its downfall.

After several years of high economic growth and reinforcement of its military capabilities, Iran was in a strong international position.³ The British withdrawal from the east of Suez led, at the end of 1971, to the independence of three new Arab states in the Gulf region – Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates – achieving independence. At the same time, the Sultanate of Oman gained greater independence, obtaining the right to conduct its own diplomacy. With the departure of the British after one and a half centuries, a void was felt in the region, a void that Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's Iran stepped in to fill. The international context in no way hindered the Shah's imperialist ambitions in the Gulf region. On the contrary, the 1969 Nixon Doctrine encouraged regional powers to play a greater role in the security of their immediate environments. Of course, Washington saw no harm in this role being taken on by a friendly state such as the Iran of the Pahlavis, and it was with this objective that the regime took advantage of its new status to receive substantial shipments of arms. Thus, 'that choice by Washington facilitated realization of the Shah's ambitions in the Gulf region ... Indeed, in 1972, on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the foundation of the navy, the Shah declared that Iran's security perimeter (*harim-é amnié*) was no longer limited to the Strait of Hormuz but extended to the Indian Ocean.⁴ That established the Shah as the 'policeman of the Gulf'.

INTERNAL FACTORS

Iran is an oil-producing country which experienced unbridled economic expansion in the 1970s. Although the whole country benefited from that rapid growth, paradoxically it accentuated social and geographical disparities.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

3. M.-R. Djalili, and T. Kellner, *Histoire de l'Iran contemporain* [History of Contemporary Iran], Paris, La Découverte, 2010, p. 71.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

Consequently, the government of Jamshid Amouzegar, who was appointed prime minister in 1977, set out to improve his control over the effects of that expansion. However, viewed from outside, Iran was perceived as a country with a historic opportunity to undergo development and become an advanced nation, while preserving its identity. But to what extent did that view reflect the reality?

To answer this question, we start by noting that, for a country like Iran, being led by an imperial regime that employed despotic methods and was firmly supported by the all-powerful United States embassy in Tehran, cast a dark shadow over the country. Although anti-establishment sentiment simmered among the populace, 'most opponents only aspired to a softening of the imperial regime and stronger assertion of national independence.'⁵ Nonetheless, a marginal sector of the population, inspired by revolutionary Marxism, adopted a more hard-line position. Thus, 'the People's Fedaian and the People's Mujahedin carried out terrorist acts against American interests in Iran ... Meanwhile, militant revolutionary Islamists such as the Fadā'iyān-e Islam were even less successful at undermining the stability of the state as the vast majority of intellectuals, the middle class and especially the clergy rejected them.'⁶ Was this state of affairs destined to remain unchanged? Subsequent developments in Iran show that the answer is 'no'.

In March 1977, a seemingly insignificant action marked the beginning of the 'Tehran Spring'. The writer Ali-Asghar Haj Seyed Javadi sent an audacious letter to the Shah, after which, contrary to the Iranian political rules in force at that time, he was not investigated by SAVAK. This unexpected, small and still-fragile tolerance on the part of Iran's political police emboldened the country's intellectuals to speak out. In October 1977, the Iranian Writers' Association managed to hold a series of successful poetry evenings at the Goethe Institute in Tehran. Led by literary figureheads, particularly the poet Ahmad Shamlou, unexpectedly, these evenings immediately became immensely popular. At their height, they attracted as many as 15,000 people. The popularity of these poetry evenings triggered the government's security reflex and, afraid of their influence, it banned them. Had the government forgotten that Iran was the land of Ferdowsi and Omar Khayyām? Perhaps fear made it forget. In any event, the adage 'fear is a bad counsellor' proved to be true. The ban on those celebrated events did not prove to be a solution. On the contrary, it further complicated the already troubled relationship between the Shah and his people.

In addition to the intellectuals, many other organizations emerged or re-emerged in Iranian public life. 'Within a few months, numerous organizations dared to commence or resume public activities, such as the Committee for the

5. J. P. Digard, B. Hourcade, and Y. Richard, *L'Iran au XXème siècle: entre nationalisme, Islam et mondialisation* [Iran in the Twentieth Century: between Nationalism, Islam and Globalization], Fayard, 2007, p. 155.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 154–5.

Defence of Political Prisoners and the Federation of Lawyers.⁷ At the same time, in this context, prominent civil society figures began to speak out and enter the political landscape. ‘All the political opponents, who had long been forced into silence, including the various branches of the National Front with Karim Sanjabi, Shapour Bakhtiar and Dariush Forouhar, Mehdi Bazargan’s Freedom Movement of Iran and liberal religious leaders such as Ayatollah Taleghani, took turns to ask (always courteously) the Shah for greater political freedom.’⁸

Secular opposition to the Shah was initially led by Mehdi Bazargan and his *Freedom Movement of Iran*. Bazargan was close to Mosaddegh’s National Front and enjoyed considerable support both within Iran and abroad, particularly in the West.

The discreet role played by a number of Muslim intellectuals should be highlighted. Their charismatic leader was Ali Shariati, who had recently died in exile in London after three years of imprisonment in Iran. This philosopher had been more radical than the group surrounding Bazargan. He had advocated attaining social justice and democracy through a modern interpretation of Islam. He was the man behind the renewal of Shī‘a Islamic thinking. The fact that as many pictures of Shariati as of Ayatollah Khomeini were displayed during the first demonstrations of the Islamic Revolution shows just how popular the French-educated professor was. And, despite the overwhelming presence of Imam Khomeini as the central figure in post-revolution Iran, Ali Shariati was ‘paradoxically, the one who was considered to have inspired the Islamic Revolution, the one the majority called for, the intellectual whose name was most often mentioned during the first phase of the revolution.’⁹

EXTERNAL FACTORS

Another factor – external this time – encouraged those figures to step definitively into that gap: the recent arrival of Jimmy Carter to the White House. At first, his attitude towards the Shah was positive, even friendly. Indeed, during a state visit to Iran, he described the country as ‘an island of stability in a turbulent corner of the world’.¹⁰ The Democrat President presented himself to the world as a staunch defender of human rights. So as not to contradict himself, he had no choice but to apply his new policy in favour of human rights to Iran as well. Therefore, in order to be aligned with the new policy of its powerful American ally, the imperial regime had

7. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 155–6.

9. F. Nahavandi, *Aux sources de la révolution iranienne: étude socio-politique* [The Sources of the Iranian Revolution: Socio-political Study], Paris, L’Harmattan, 1988. p. 164.

10. E. L. Daniel, *The History of Iran*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, London, 2001, p. 166.

to show signs of greater openness in its domestic policies. 'President Jimmy Carter's declarations about the universality of human rights contributed to awakening anti-establishment sentiment, which was taken up outside Iran by branches of the Confederation of Iranian Students in other countries.'¹¹ In the months leading up to the fall of the Shah, those student groups were very active, particularly in the French capital, Paris. Indeed, it was perhaps not by chance that Imam Khomeini chose to take refuge in France after being forced by the Iraqi government to leave Najaf on 6 October 1978. From his French residence in Neauphle-le-Château, in the Paris region, the religious leader was to make his triumphant return to Tehran a few months later.

Despite his efforts not to go against American President Jimmy Carter's policy of respect for human rights, the Shah would commit crimes against his own people. The inexorable rise of the civil liberties movement throughout the country frightened Mohammad Reza. He gave the SAVAK special services, which needed no encouragement, complete freedom to act. Consequently, large numbers of Iranians of all ideological persuasions were attacked or imprisoned. They included intellectuals and liberal religious leaders, such as Ayatollah Taleghani. This explosive situation led directly to the incidents at Rey and Qom. In turn, those incidents strengthened the popularity of the Tehran Spring, which began to take on a more marked political dimension and, in response to the increase in police repression, gain momentum.

FROM OPPOSITION TO REVOLT

On 7 January 1978, a slanderous article about Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was published in the daily newspaper *Ettela'at* by persons close to the Shah's secret police, SAVAK. This proved to be an unwise move, as the article caused outrage among Shi'a clerics. The protests by theology students in Qom that followed publication of the article and lasted for two days were violently suppressed, resulting in the deaths of numerous demonstrators. This heavy-handed response simply served to fuel the anger of the clergy, which joined the opposition movement. From that moment on, ever-larger popular protests took place and the imperial regime responded with increasingly brutal repression. This marked the start of a spiral of protests and repression that would eventually lead to the fall of the Shah. The mourning ceremonies for the victims of Qom, held in Tabriz on 18 and 19 February 1978, forty days after their deaths in line with Shi'a tradition, turned into a vast popular insurrection. This uprising was the first in which the representatives of the Shi'a clergy joined forces with the champions of liberal political demands. The rioters vented their anger by sacking and setting fire to the Rastakhiz Party headquarters, the Palace of Youth, cinemas, luxury boutiques and

11. Digard, etc, *L'Iran au XXème siècle ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

Armenian stores selling alcohol. The message was two-fold as symbols of both the imperial regime and 'corrupt' non-Islamic society were targeted. Unable to handle the situation on its own, the Iranian police called in the army for the first time. The army suppressed the riots with violence, resulting in the deaths of around 100 protesters. The repercussions of this uprising were felt throughout the country, especially in Tehran, Iran's largest city. A series of demonstrations took place across the country. 'On 29 March 1978, demonstrations for the mourning of the fortieth day of the martyrs of Tabriz took place in most towns, notably in Yazd where the repression was particularly heavy-handed. In May, the army killed more protesters in Qom, then in July in Mashhad and in August in Isfahan, where martial law was declared ...'¹²

Following the Tabriz rebellion, the imperial regime faced united opposition from the combined forces of the Islamists, liberals and Marxists. The coalition between these groups was, in a way, a marriage of convenience, prompted by the need to be more effective in challenging the repressive apparatus of the Shah's regime. The last two currents, the liberals and Marxists, felt that they would not be able to lead such a massive popular movement as effectively as the Shī'a clerics could. The Shī'a clerics' religious culture was based on 'the powerful mythology of Hasan and Hussein and other Imam martyrs, its popular traditions of meetings, processions, the mosques and hoseyniye, and lastly , its clergy ... which was independent of the state and structured in a hierarchy that gave it the necessary means.'¹³ On 19 August, the anniversary of the *coup* that had put an end to Mosaddeq's government, a fire broke out at the Cinema Rex in a poor district of Abadan. The death toll was extremely high: 'almost 400 people burned to death because the doors had been locked'.¹⁴ This fire signalled the adoption of a new tactic by the Iranian Government, which consisted of intentionally causing unrest and turmoil so as to justify taking control of the situation and thus secure the support of the Iranian middle class. However, the demonstrations continued. The largest took place on 4 September, the day of Eid al-Fitr, in Tehran. It was attended by several hundred thousand protesters who marched through the city to the University of Tehran, offering gladioli to the vastly outnumbered soldiers as they passed. In turn, the *baẓāari* merchants switched allegiances, causing the balance to tip slightly more in favour of the Shī'a clerics. A significant number of important *baẓāaris* used to provide considerable financial backing to Imam Khomeini. With an extensive network of militants abroad and capitalizing on the charisma of their leader, Khomeini's supporters established themselves as the main opposition movement to the Shah's regime. Imam Khomeini, a charismatic religious dignitary, who spoke simply and had radical ideas,

12. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 158–9.

14. Daniel, *The History of Iran*, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

succeeded in rallying influential and effective figures, such as Abolhassan Banisadr and Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, to his cause. By the autumn of 1978, 'most other opposition groups had allied themselves to Khomeini and his programme. Karim Sanjabi and Mehdi Bazargan flew to Paris, met with Khomeini, and declared their support for him in the name of the National Front and the Freedom Movement.¹⁵ Before long, Neauphle-le-Château had become something of an Iranian capital in exile.

The fall of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi

Sensing a change in the wind but keen to regain control, the Shah made a last-ditch attempt to show that he was listening to the people's demands. On 27 August, he appointed Jafar Sharif-Emami, 'a Freemason from a religious family'¹⁶ as prime minister. Sharif-Emami introduced a return to the Islamic calendar and banned casinos, but it was too little, and probably too late. Apart from the fact that this move was viewed by the popular masses as a sign of the weakness of the regime, which had been forced to make concessions, the rejection of the new prime minister by the Iranian people was resounding. Sharif-Emami was viewed as a key member of the corrupt imperial regime so despised by the people. From that moment onwards, opposition to the regime intensified. Demonstrating peacefully in the streets of Tehran on 7 September, the crowds demanded for the first time the departure of the Shah and the return of Khomeini. The regime's response was immediate.

THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW

Following the demonstration of 7 September, the Shah replaced the carrot with the stick. 'Martial law [was] declared that very evening in 11 cities, including Tehran, which was placed under the command of General Oveisi.¹⁷ This change of approach did not calm the population; on the contrary, it served to fan the flames of unrest, especially after the killings in Zhaleh Square in the south of the capital. During a local march on Friday 8 September, around a thousand people had gathered in the streets. Instead of fraternizing with the marchers, the army, which had taken up position in the area, shot at the crowd, resulting in numerous deaths. Some placed the number of people killed that day in the hundreds, leading it to be christened 'Black Friday'. This massacre extinguished any hope of reconciliation between the Shah and the opposition. Spontaneous gatherings immediately took place in working-class neighbourhoods around tanks and armoured vehicles parked at the

15. M. Axworthy, *A History of Iran: Empire of the Mind*, 2008, Basic Books, p. 257.

16. Djalili, etc., *Histoire de l'Iran contemporain*, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

17. Digard, etc., *L'Iran au XXème siècle ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

intersections of main roads. The soldiers opened fire again to disperse the peaceful crowds, some members of which then tried to retaliate. Yet another bloodbath ensued. Some have observed that 'it was the bloodiest incident thus far, showed that an armed insurrection was a definite possibility, and made Sharif Emami's promises of change sound even more hollow.'¹⁸ And like the sign of a curse, on both the regime and the Iranian people, on the evening of Black Friday, an earthquake hit the traditional town of Tabas in the middle of the Iranian desert, destroying the town and leaving 2,700 dead.

Given this evolution of the situation in Iran in 1978, today, three-and-a-half decades later, the following question can be asked: would the Shah have dared to intensify the policy of repression without the support of Washington? We consider it unlikely. Many observers and specialists believe that the imposition of martial law and the Iranian army's adoption of a tougher approach in 1978 reflected a shift in priorities in Washington. The desire to prevent Iran from falling into the hands of a coalition with Communist links or playing into the hands of the Soviet Union outweighed the Democrat President Jimmy Carter's commitment to scruples and respect for human rights. It should be borne in mind that these events were unfolding in the context of the Cold War. And, at the time, the Cold War would have been precisely the prism through which American strategists would have analyzed the Iranian situation. After the Black Friday massacre, it was clear that a return to the situation that had prevailed prior to that date was impossible. The regaining of control of Iran by the regime in place was deemed by its powerful American ally to be more consistent with the interests of the West in general and the United States of America in particular.

THE REGIME COLLAPSES

The policy of repression chosen by the Shah, which some have described as reckless, ended up turning undecided members of the population against him. From that point, the revolutionary movement gained momentum, uniting the whole Iranian people. Joining the middle class and the clergy, which had led the protests, poor recent migrants to the city who had settled in the southern districts of Tehran also began to flock to the demonstrations,¹⁹ although not for the same reasons. In reality, 'like the peasants, the urban proletariat was overwhelmed by problems of subsistence and had serious reservations about the return to the helm of a clergy that had always been linked to the bourgeoisie, be it the bazaaris or property owners.'²⁰ The issues that prompted the proletariat from the working class neighbourhoods to join the protests

18. Daniel, *The History of Iran*, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

19. Digard, etc., *L'Iran au XXème siècle ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

20. *Ibid.*

were mainly linked to housing. The inhabitants of those neighbourhoods had been ostracized by the municipal authorities, which had neglected the city's peripheral districts. They were the victims of a town planning policy imposed by corrupt developers close to the imperial regime.

In the summer of 1978, developments picked up speed. After a surprising silence of several weeks, the Shah returned to centre stage in an attempt to regain the upper hand. However, events were to spiral out of control and catch him off guard. At the start of October, Khomeini was expelled from Iraq. Keen to remain geographically close to Iran, he expressed a wish to move to Kuwait, but that country denied his request under pressure from Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Finally, he left Iraq for France, where he lived in Neauphle-le-Château. Many Iranians opposed to the Shah flocked to this village in the department of Yvelines; they were ordinary people, mostly Muslims, who went to see, ask questions and listen to this man who was becoming a living legend. His visitors also included politicians and envoys from various governments. Some, anticipating an imminent change, were preparing to get into position. During his four months in Neauphle-le-Château, tens of thousands of people went to visit the Shi'a leader Ayatollah Khomeini, who gave 132 press, radio and television interviews during that period. Indeed, the media gave him an unexpected platform. The Shah had completely miscalculated the situation; with hindsight, he would no doubt have let Khomeini settle in Kuwait, far from the Western media. However, in a move designed to keep him far from Iran, he actually brought him closer to Iranians, thanks to the media available to him.

Subsequently, 'on 4 and 5 November, Tehran was rocked by violent riots'.²¹ The rioters ransacked the city centre. Had they been deliberately manipulated by the secret police? Some believe that to be the case. It has been stated that the 'insurgents, probably manipulated by SAVAK, ransacked the centre of Tehran. Hotels, restaurants, banks and bars were set on fire, giving the Shah a pretext to appoint a military government headed by General Azhari, who imposed a curfew.'²² The Shah then proceeded to give, 'on 6 November, a historic speech in which he declared that he "had understood the discourse of the revolution" voiced by the population. However, that speech [had] the opposite effect of weakening him even further.'²³ A widespread campaign of civil disobedience ensued. General strikes across the country paralyzed economic life throughout Iran and, at the same time, brought new impetus and a new dimension to the opposition movement. The oil sector was not spared. When the protests reached the National Oil Company, the state became destabilized. 'On 10 October, Abadan Refinery went on strike and,

21. Djalili etc., *Histoire de l'Iran contemporain*, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

22. Digard etc., *L'Iran au XXème siècle ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

23. Djalili etc., *Histoire de l'Iran contemporain*, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

on 26 December, oil exports were suspended.²⁴ To add to the litany of bad news, the bazaars were shut down, newspapers disappeared from the shelves, and radio and television broadcasts were suspended. The paralysis of the oil industry dealt a fatal blow to the Shah's regime.

Iranians continued to follow news about their country via the programmes broadcast in Persian by the BBC and Voice of America. Meanwhile, analyses of the evolution of the situation, the political line to follow and instructions were recorded by Khomeini on cassettes that he sent to Iran from France. Despite the increased presence of tanks and armed soldiers on the streets, and the banning of gatherings of any sort, the population continued to demonstrate. It drew its strength to resist from the Shi'a tradition of struggle and devised various tricks to defy the Shah's army. On certain evenings, specified in advance by Imam Khomeini, the inhabitants of all the towns and villages went onto the roof terraces of their houses to shout '*Allāhu Akbar*' (Allah is greater) and '*Marg bar Shāh*' (Down with the Shah). 'There was a stark contrast between the peaceful "religious" crowd, perched on the rooftops in the freezing temperatures, which revealed a determination whose ultimate outcome was clear, and the military force busy enforcing the curfew to keep the streets empty.'²⁵ The life of the imperial regime was hanging by a thread. The foreign chancelleries were no longer under any illusions. Their analysis was confirmed on 10 and 11 December 1978, which corresponded to *Tāsu'ā* and *'Asburā*, the ninth and tenth days of the month of Muharram in the Islamic Hejira calendar, when Shi'a Muslims commemorate the death of the Imam martyr Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet, who was killed at Karbala, Iraq, in 680.²⁶ To prevent the protest planned to coincide with that occasion, General Oveisi was all set to take tough action to suppress the demonstration. However, pressure from the United States and advice from figures close to the Shah persuaded him to hold back. The risk of a bloodbath was high. The general reluctantly agreed to withdraw his tanks from the centre and south of the capital. The army forces were redeployed to the north of the city with the aim of protecting the middle-class neighbourhoods and the

24. Digard, etc., *L'Iran au XXème siècle ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 162.

26. 'Āshūrā, 10 *Muharram* of year 61 of the Hegira calendar, corresponds to 10 October 680. On that date, Hussein ibn Ali ibn Abi Talib, grandson of the Prophet and son of Ali and Fatima, daughter of the Prophet, was killed by the Umayyad army at Karbala in Iraq. Travelling to join his followers in Kufa, Hussein was escorted by a small group of 72 people, including the members of his own family. He was intercepted at Karbala by the Umayyad army, whose leader demanded that he pledge allegiance to the caliph Yazid b. Muawiya. His refusal led to a one-sided battle. All of Hussein's male companions were killed; only his wives and youngest son, Ali Zayn al-Abedin, were spared. Hussein's body was buried on the site of the battle. His head was cut off and sent to Caliph Yazid in Damascus. Hence the mourning, sorrow and tears among the Shi'a Muslim community during the commemoration of 'Āshūrā each year.

imperial palace from a possible surge of the mob in their direction. However, the demonstration on the day of *Tāsū‘a*, which was attended by more than one million people, was a calm and enthusiastic event. The following day, which corresponded to *‘Ashūrā*, an even more imposing and impressive demonstration filled the streets of Tehran. The whole world concluded that the imperial regime had become a shadow of its former self and that its end was just days away.

CHECKMATE: THE KING IS DEAD

Seeking a way out, the Shah approached Karim Sanjabi, among others, and offered him the position of prime minister, but Sanjabi was already liaising with Khomeini. So the Shah turned to Shapour Bakhtiar, whom he considered capable of restoring calm in the country. Thus ‘on 4 January 1979, Shapour Bakhtiar [was] appointed prime minister. He remained in office for 37 days.’²⁷ On the day following the appointment of the new prime minister, the leaders of the major Western powers met in Guadeloupe, on the initiative of French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. The presidents and heads of government present at this mini-summit agreed to abandon the Shah to his fate.

In an attempt to calm the national mood, Shapour Bakhtiar asked the Shah to leave Iran temporarily, for an unspecified period. On 16 January 1979, the Iranian sovereign went into exile with his wife and their entire family. They set off for Cairo, where President Sadat was waiting for them. But the Egyptian capital was merely to be a stopover; a few weeks later, the imperial family flew to Morocco, before continuing on to the Americas. There were hardly any countries willing to give refuge to the deposed emperor. Few governments wanted to risk offending the Iranian people at that time of revolution by taking in their dictator. The ground was giving way beneath the feet of the Shah and his family. His wandering took him to the Bahamas, Panama and Mexico, and then to a military base in Texas. His presence on United States soil served as the pretext for Iranian students to take hostages at the American embassy in Tehran, an incident that triggered a serious crisis between the two countries. Islamic Iran called for Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was now sick and a pariah, to be returned to the country to be tried. He returned to Egypt, and that was where his life ended, shortly after a final surgical operation. The Iranian people could hardly believe it, but they rejoiced at the turn of events and the acceleration of history. For them, ‘the departure of the Shah was a singular moment in their history. Ecstatic expressions of jubilation were mixed with a keen sense of anxiety. Few believed that the “omnipotent” Shah, backed by the United States, could be so easily dismissed and removed from power.’²⁸

27. Djalili etc., *Histoire de l’Iran contemporain*, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

28. A. M. Ansari, *Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and After*, UK, Pearson Education Limited, 2003, p. 211.

THE FINAL ATTEMPTS OF THE BAKHTIAR GOVERNMENT

During the Shah's wanderings and until his death, Shapour Bakhtiar's government attempted to restore the situation as best it could. Bakhtiar took two symbolic decisions: ordering that all political prisoners be released and that SAVAK, the Shah's secret police which was loathed by the vast majority of Iranians, be dismantled. He continued to nurture the hope of winning over Khomeini's supporters and thus being able to remain at the head of the government. However, it proved impossible to reach a compromise in the negotiations during this period with the Ayatollah. On the contrary, it became increasingly apparent that the Bakhtiar government was doomed. From his exile in France, Khomeini continued to fire up his followers by promising that he would soon be among them in Iran. Taking advantage of the closure of Tehran Airport for several days due to protests blocking all civil aviation activities, Khomeini's followers continued to work all-out to prepare for the return of their leader. On 1 February 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini arrived in Tehran. He was greeted triumphantly by hundreds of thousands of Iranians and went to the great cemetery of martyrs, *Behesht-e Zabra*, to pay homage to the martyrs of the revolution and present his vision for an Islamic Iran. Some have placed the number of people who went to welcome him at three million. Describing that moment, Michael Axworthy writes: 'Whether one approves of Khomeini or not, it is indisputable that when he arrived in Tehran on 1 February 1979, he was the focal point of the hopes of a whole nation ... It may be that the euphoric crowds welcoming him numbered as many as three million.'²⁹

Viewing Shapour Bakhtiar's government as illegitimate, Khomeini said that he wanted to set up a new provisional government, in accordance with the wishes of the Iranian people and the Islamic Revolution. Mehdi Bazargan was appointed prime minister. In addition to forming the government, he was responsible for organizing the transition and preparing free elections. Consequently, Iranians and the international community found themselves with two governments in Iran. This state of affairs was unacceptable for Bakhtiar, who was under pressure from pro-Khomeini demonstrations. His own supporters responded by demonstrating in Amjadieh Stadium in Tehran. The tension between the two camps was palpable. There were even predictions of a civil war between the two sides. To avoid such a fratricidal conflict, Khomeini set about rallying the army to his cause. However, although some non-commissioned officers, particularly the cadets of the air force, had already joined the revolution, the great generals of the army were keen to avoid further bloodshed at all costs. They waited in a state of uncertainty. Tensions within the army reached such a level that the fragile balance was broken and, on 9 February 1979, an armed conflict broke out between the Imperial Guard and the cadets at Doshan Tappeh garrison.

29. Axworthy, *A History of Iran ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 259–60.

After Shapour Bakhtiar met with a number of army leaders, fighting erupted once again during the night of 10 February. Bakhtiar did not leave his quarters, remaining under the orders of General Gharabaghi. The following morning, 11 February, the Iranian army announced that it would remain neutral in the conflict. That neutrality had actually been guaranteed for at least a month prior to the announcement. Indeed, ‘discussions between the American General Huyser, on a mission to Iran since 5 January 1979, and the revolutionary leaders, among them Ayatollah Beheshti, Yadollah Sahabi, Hashem Sabbaghian and Mehdi Bazargan, had made it possible to obtain guarantees of the neutrality and integrity of the Iranian armed forces.’³⁰

On the evening of 11 February, Ayatollah Khomeini was in control of Iran with Mehdi Bazargan as the head of government. The Imam entrusted Ayatollah Mousavi Ardebili with announcing the victory of the Iranian Revolution on the radio. Shapour Bakhtiar was deposed and forced to flee the country. Meanwhile, the revolutionary forces took control of the radio and television stations. This marked the end of Iran’s empire and the birth of the Islamic Republic.

The triumph of the Islamic revolution in Iran

THE END OF THE PAHLAVIS

On the subject of the fall of the Shah and the foundation of the Islamic Republic in Iran, the Encyclopaedia Universalis contains the following paragraph, written by Pascal Buresi:

1979 marked the end of the regime instituted in 1941 by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who in 1967 had taken the title of Shahanshah (King of Kings), like the Persian princes of antiquity. The authoritarian regime led by him was supported by the United States. A formidable political police force (SAVAK) brutally crushed all opposition.³¹

If we wanted to sum up the situation on the eve of the Shah’s deposition, we would do so in terms very similar to those quoted above. Describing the start of the Islamic Republic, he went on to state:

In 1978, strikes paralyzed the country; popular pressure forced the Shah out of power and into exile on 16 January 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini then returned from Neauphle-le-Château, in the Paris suburbs, where he had been living in exile. Given a triumphant welcome in Tehran, he established a nationalist, anti-

30. Digard, etc., *L’Iran au XXème siècle ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

31. Pascal B., *Révolution islamique iranienne (1979)* [Iranian Islamic Revolution (1979)], <http://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/revolution-islamique-iranienne>.

capitalist, anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist Islamic republic, whose legislation took inspiration from sharia (Islamic law).³²

The adjectives used by Pascal Buresi to describe the Islamic Republic are those used in the slogans of the leaders of Iran's Islamic revolution.

There has been much speculation as to whether or not the 1979 Iranian Revolution could have been avoided, with various hypotheses being put forward. Could the revolution have been prevented if the Shah had been firmer or more conciliatory with the opposition? Or if the Shah had spent less on high-technology weapons and more on equipment to control the mob? Or if the generals of the Iranian army had acted with greater unity? Or if Washington had been more consistent in its support for the Shah? Or if the White House had ignored the diplomats' self-criticisms and paid heed to the serious warnings given by sceptical academics ...? Such speculation is of little interest today, except perhaps for the intellectual luxury of ensuring a methodological approach. However, for this same methodological need, we may make the following observations. The Iranian Revolution cannot be attributed to the political or economic upheavals that immediately preceded it. It was not solely the result of a specific political error on the part of the Shah during the last months of his reign, or of a decision or change in United States policy towards the Shah under the Carter administration. Like all events in the history of humanity, the causes mentioned were merely the catalyst or spark that triggered the eruption of the volcano. In reality, Iran's Islamic revolution was the outcome of a long process that had its roots deep in Iranian society and its evolution, as well as in the complexity of the country's history, culture, social life and clergy. Some trace its origins back to the early 1960s and '*the White Revolution*', a series of reforms announced on 26 January 1963. This revolution promoted by the Shah consisted of six main measures: agrarian reform and the distribution of farmland; nationalization of forests and pastureland; civil and legal equality for Iranian women; reform of the electoral code; privatization of state enterprises with the aim of financing the reforms, and the formation of a literacy corps, responsible for increasing literacy in the countryside, complemented by a health corps, a sort of compulsory civilian service for young doctors in the provinces.³³ The Shah wanted to transform Iranian society. This transformation did occur, but not in the manner he expected. The White Revolution broke the traditional structures, but without replacing them with a mobilizing framework. 'The lack of popular support forced them to impose their reforms from the ministries in Tehran, without caring about the medium- and long term consequences, without imagining for a second what would happen 15 years later ...'³⁴ The lack of a democratic

32. *Ibid.*, <http://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/revolution-islamique-iranienne>.

33. R. Parham and M. Taubman, *Histoire secrète de la révolution iranienne* [Secret History of the Iranian Revolution], Paris, Denoël, 2009, p. 201.

34. Digard, etc., *L'Iran au XXème siècle ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 125.



III–3.1 Demonstrators gather in front of the United States Embassy
in Tehran, Iran, 8 March 1980

© UN Photo/John Isaac

framework, and the absence of a parliament between 1961 and 1963, gave these reforms a univocal and propagandist character more than anything else. For that and other reasons, Mehdi Bazargan's Freedom Movement of Iran opposed them. For yet other reasons, the Iranian clerics were also violently opposed to 'the Shah's White Revolution'. And on the day in January 1963 when the reform programme was approved by a referendum, demonstrations organized by the clerics were forcibly suppressed. Ultimately, instead of reforming and developing Iranian society, the White Revolution broke it apart.

Many consider that the Shah himself was responsible for the collapse of his regime. He was no saint. He was certainly not a democrat, either. He committed numerous authoritarian excesses and political errors that ultimately cost the last of Pahlavi monarchs his throne. Nonetheless, 'unlike the Qajars, the Pahlavis left the regime that succeeded them a relatively prosperous country, with a strong state capable of managing a vast territory and an economic, industrial and university infrastructure unlike any the country had ever known before ...'³⁵ Externally and 'internationally, Iran was, for the first time in its contemporary history, a regional power.'³⁶ At the moment the Shah

35. Djilili etc., *Histoire de l'Iran contemporain*, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

36. *Ibid.*

fell, Iran could be described as a strong country in economic, administrative and military terms.

However, Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, did not see it that way. On the contrary, he constantly demonized the Pahlavis, father and son alike, in his speeches. He considered them the cause of all Iran's ills. 'From his point of view, they were corrupt, enemies of Islam, and had abandoned Iran to the greed of foreign powers.'³⁷ Consequently, it should come as no surprise that, in several areas, the policies of the new regime of the Islamic Republic went against and completely broke with those previously implemented by the Shah.

MEHDI BAZARGAN'S GOVERNMENT

The replacement of the deposed government of Shapour Bakhtiar by the provisional government headed by Mehdi Bazargan went relatively smoothly. However, the process of restoring law and order proved more difficult. The new prime minister, Bazargan, was the former leader of a small modernist party inspired by Islam. He was an engineer and had studied in France. He was honest and thorough. He was not a revolutionary, but rather a moderate reformist. Those qualities enabled him quickly and skilfully to counterbalance Bakhtiar, who was his friend. Once in office, Bazargan took stock of the situation. He found a country that, although rich and solid, had descended into a state of anarchy. 'Iran's economic production was blocked, there were thousands of arms in the hands of the population, the army which had obeyed a single sovereign had no leader ...'³⁸ Politically, too, the situation was far from ideal. Parties of various leanings, ranging from secular liberals to Islamists, via Marxists, had widely differing views about the type of power to put in place. Neither the constitution nor any economic and social plans were discussed or shared by them. And to crown it all, Mehdi Bazargan, the prime minister, actually had very little power. He soon realized that he had no influence over the crucial political matters of the country. In reality, his position as head of government was a façade, as his main task was merely to deal with routine business. Thus, some observers described the team around him as a 'knife with no blade'. Meanwhile, actual power was in the hands of Ayatollah Khomeini and his immediate entourage in the Council of the Revolution, which was composed of around Thirty people, some of whose names were confidential. However, everything led back to Ayatollah Khomeini who had the real authority to control the country. The provisional government did not even have the trust of the influential political forces, to the extent that it was forced to go to Qom to receive instructions from the man who henceforth would

37. *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

be known as the Imam. The provisional government was essentially made up of members of the National Front, such as Karim Sanjabi, militants returned from exile, such as Abolhassan Banisadr, and religious figures unknown to the general public, such as Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Ali Khamenei.

Lacking any real power, Mehdi Bazargan's government was confined to secondary roles. It gave speeches about Third-Worldism and anti-imperialism, and set about resolving questions such as how to eliminate the 'corrupt bourgeoisie', how to confiscate and nationalize wealth and the means of production, and how to express solidarity with revolutionary and national liberation movements around the world. However, the new Iranian Government did play an active role in defining a new international policy. Making a clean break with the positions adopted by the Shah in relation to foreign policy, Iran withdrew from its role as 'policeman of the Gulf' and ended its traditional alliances with the West. It broke off relations with Israel and recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the 'sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people'.

The architect of Iran's new foreign policy after the revolution was Karim Sanjabi. The terms 'independence' and 'non-alignment' were the key words that were constantly heard. The four pillars on which Sanjabi based this new policy were: history, geography, the spiritual and humanist ideals of Islam and, finally, the principle of complete reciprocity in relations with others. He maintained that 'for 50 years we have been violently subjected to the influence of foreign imperialism, mainly from tsarist Russia and Great Britain and, for the past 25 years, the United States. That is why we want to eradicate the remnants of imperialism from our country, whether from North, South, East or West.'³⁹ With regard to the conflict between Israel and Palestine, he expressed a cautious position in principle. Alluding to both anti-Semitism and Zionism, he stated that: 'We do not have any anti-Semitic feelings and I acknowledge that the Jews of Iran who have been in the country since the prophet Daniel have been here longer than some other Iranians. However, we are hostile to Zionism, which has violated the human rights of Palestinians, attacked Arab countries and committed a blatant crime against international law.'⁴⁰ Finally, on the subject of the Gulf, Karim Sanjabi expressed an interesting position, because not only did it break with the policy of the Shah, but it became largely aligned with the position of Iraq. In substance, he said as follows: 'The neighbouring countries, while preserving their independence, should work together to ensure the security of this waterway in the interest of all. They should also prevent any hegemony and resist foreign influences.'⁴¹

39. P. Balta, *Iran-Irak, une guerre de 5000 ans* [Iran-Iraq, a 5,000-year war], Paris, Anthropos, 1988, pp. 31–2.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

THE ADVENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

On 1 April 1979, following a hastily-held referendum, Iran became an 'Islamic Republic'. The ordinary Iranian did not know what the exact shape and meaning of such a republic would be. The country had to wait for the election of an 'assembly of experts', whose role was to draft a constitution, before it could see what the Islamic Republic would be like and understand the nature of the nascent regime. The referendum reflected strong consensus, with Iranians voting almost unanimously (98 per cent) against the imperial regime. However, the election of the 73 members of the assembly of religious experts (a form of constituent assembly) on 3 August was boycotted by nearly all the political movements other than the Islamic Republican Party. This confirmed the split between the new Shi'a clerical power and the majority of the non-Persian provinces. A constitutional referendum held on 3 December gave Imam Khomeini unlimited powers and no clearly defined responsibilities. As paradoxical as that may seem, the fact that he did not have conventional official responsibilities made Khomeini the most powerful man in Iran and throughout the Shi'a world, under the *wilāyat al-faqih* (guardianship of the jurist). This notion, which does not exist in Sunni Islam, was contested by many Shi'a dignitaries.

The strong hold of the Islamic Republican Party, which took the stage immediately after the revolution, was soon felt. This new party was 'chaired by Ali Khamenei and left little room for the various Islamist currents such as the Hojjatieh, led by Ahmad Tavakoli and Habibollah Asgaroladi, which nonetheless maintained considerable influence among traditionalist bazaaris, or the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization, headed by Behzad Nabavi.⁴² The arrest of the sons of Ayatollah Taleghani further aggravated an already charged atmosphere. Taleghani had been the uncontested leader of the fight against the Shah within Iran. In a gesture of protest, he withdrew from the political scene for several weeks. The situation deteriorated considerably when, on 1 May, the Islamist group *Furqan* assassinated Ayatollah Motahhari, one of Iran's greatest thinkers. Indeed, 'already some key members of the revolutionary establishment had become victims of assassination, including Ayatollah Motahhari, while the country was convulsed by demonstrations which were regularly descending into (often well-orchestrated) street brawls.⁴³

Thus, Iran entered a dangerous process of polarization in which hard-line Islamists fought to hold sway and impose their interpretation of Islam on everyone. Their hold over political life in the new Islamic Republic was so strong that it sparked open opposition between them on one side and the other political movements that had participated in the revolution on the other.

42. Digard, etc., *L'Iran au XXème siècle ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

43. Ansari, *Modern Iran ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

Those movements 'whether liberals (the National Front and its many offshoot organizations) or the far left (People's Mujahedin, People's Fedaiian, small Trotskyist and Maoist groups, Communists)⁴⁴ were less and less tolerated by Imam Khomeini hardliners. This polarization revealed a lack of efficiency on the part of the provisional government. But the provisional government had no choice, as it did not have the means to govern properly. Several Islamic groups simply had no intention of obeying Mehdi Bazargan's cabinet. This rebelliousness of the Islamist groups increased the frustration of those who objected to what they perceived as excessive legalism on the part of Bazargan in relation to the clergy. They did not consider that such an attitude would not help restore order and guarantee security. Among them, 'many feared (and some no doubt hoped) that the country would, once the euphoria had settled, descend into fratricidal civil war.'⁴⁵

The most dramatic fate of all was that reserved for supporters of the Shah by the new leaders of Iran. They were tried by secret, anonymous Revolutionary Courts. The chief prosecutor of the revolution was the greatly feared Sadegh Khalkhali, who would become famous for the sham trials which sent large numbers of suspects to their deaths. He showed no mercy for the generals like Rabi'i and Rahimi, who were among the first to be executed, even though they had worked hard to achieve the neutrality of the army when the outcome of the revolution was still in the balance. Moreover, they had obtained an assurance of safe conduct. Each day, the front page of Iran's newspapers published photos of the victims. The aim was to show that the government was prepared to go all the way, except that, in truth, the government had no say in those trials. Furthermore, Bazargan was not even informed of the executions of the political and military leaders of the former regime, whose sentences were delivered and enforced by the Islamic Courts. The trials continued for months, affecting around a thousand people. However, after finishing with the people sentenced to death for their relations with the Shah's regime, two years later attention turned to the liberals and members of the far left. Some 10,000 people fell victim to this last crackdown.

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

Revolutionary Iran did not hide its grievances against the United States of America, which Khomeini dubbed 'the Great Satan' due to its long term support of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's regime. The favourite cry of protesters '*Marg bar Amrika*' (Down with America), was a founding slogan for the Islamic Republic, as the chant '*Marg bar Shah*' (Down with the Shah) had been at the start of the revolution. As a result of the agitation, or even tensions

44. Digard, etc., *L'Iran au XXème siècle ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

45. Ansari, *Modern Iran ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 224–5.

between the different political movements, on 4 November 1979, Khomeinist militants stormed the American embassy in Tehran. This move placed the Islamic Republic not only in confrontation with the world's leading power, but also in violation of international law. The Iranian Islamist militants saw their attack on the United States embassy as a way of completing their fight against the imperial regime. In their view, the embassy had been the headquarters of a backup government and a '*spy den*' during the final months of the former regime. Through this action, they also demanded the Shah's extradition, in order for him to be tried in Iran, while at the same time asserting Iran's new policy of independence: 'neither East nor West'.

Considering their revolution to be of historic importance, Iran's Islamic revolutionaries were keen to export what they saw as a revolutionary ideology that was valid for all Muslims of the world. From that moment, their neighbours Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates felt targeted. The message of Iran's revolution was deemed to be universal. It called for an end to corruption and for social justice in the Middle East and the rest of the world. Iran's leaders, headed by Khomeini, did not hesitate to openly urge the Shi'a minorities in those countries to revolt against Sunni 'hegemony'. But it was Iraq, where the Ayatollah had spent fourteen years in exile, that would be the main target of the most violent attacks by Iran's Islamist leaders and by Khomeini in person. Iraq, a direct neighbour of Iran, with the two sharing hundreds of kilometres of borders, was of particular interest to the Imam for two main reasons: firstly, because Shi'a Muslims made up more than half of Iraq's population, and secondly, because Karbala and Najaf, the holiest sites of Shi'a Islam where lay 'Ali and Hussein, the two imams most revered by the Shi'a, were lay entombed on Iraqi soil. As the days passed, the attacks by Iran's highest dignitaries against the modernist, secularizing and Arab-nationalist Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party's regime in Baghdad intensified. At the same time, the repeated calls to Iraqi Shi'a to rise up against their regime continued. However, the Rubicon was crossed on 1 April 1980. That day, a grenade attack was carried out at al-Mustansiriya University, in the heart of Baghdad. Thousands of students were there to attend an international economics symposium which was due to be inaugurated by Iraq's deputy prime minister, Tariq Aziz. Aziz, a secular Baathist of Christian faith, was slightly wounded. In the face of this escalation in violence, Saddam Hussein swore to punish those responsible for the attack. Incensed by the repeated provocations of the mullahs and misled by the Iranian opposition, which claimed that the Islamist regime, undermined by internal disagreements, was on the point of collapse, Iraq took the plunge and invaded Iran on 22 September 1980. That was the start of the Iran-Iraq War, a deadly conflict that would continue until 1988. After eight years, the two countries found themselves back where they had started, but having lost hundreds of thousands of men and women, and spent hundreds of billions of dollars.

CONCLUSION

Towards the end of the 1970s, cracks began to appear in Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's authoritarian regime. Having taken the throne in 1941, in 1953, with the help of the CIA, he staged a *coup* against the democratically elected prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, who had nationalized the Iranian oil industry. In the memories of Iranians, his power will always be associated with SAVAK, the formidable political police that, for years, suppressed all opposition to the regime. It will also be associated with corruption as he entrusted oil extraction to Western companies that paid him royalties.

The White Revolution, which he applied in the early 1960s, had far-reaching repercussions. It wrought changes unprecedented in the country's history. Those changes weakened the traditional foundations of the monarchy, which had always been supported by large landowners, the clergy, which was responsible for managing mortmain lands (*waqf*), and the tribal leaders. The emergence of middle and business classes with growing political and economic demands, and an opposition with Shi'a religious and popular roots, threatened – seriously this time – the very foundations of the regime. Successive strikes, religious activism and the propaganda generated by the charismatic Khomeini from his exile abroad ultimately forced the Shah to relinquish power and leave the country, in what he considered a temporary move. Shortly afterwards, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to the country he had left fourteen years earlier. Receiving a triumphant welcome, he established a nationalist and anti-imperialist Islamic Republic, inspired by Islamic law.

Once the euphoria of the first days had subsided, the regime took a tougher line that insisted on a very strict interpretation of Islam, and on expelling all those who had participated in the revolution alongside Khomeini's followers: the liberals, Marxists and even moderate Islamists. Driven by Imam Khomeini's wish to export the revolution, Iran adopted an aggressive policy in relation to its neighbours. The regime of the Islamic Republic increased provocations towards the Gulf countries, particularly Iraq. When pro-Iranian attacks began to target dignitaries of its regime in the heart of Baghdad, the Iraqi Government lost patience. Denouncing the 1975 Algiers Agreement which, among other things, regulated the river border of Shatt al-Arab between the two countries, it invaded Iran, igniting a war that would continue for eight years. The Iran-Iraq War, in which hundreds of thousands died, was one of the most deadly conflicts since the wars of national liberation.

Chapter 3.4

THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Omar Ibrahim El-Affas

It is difficult to understand important international events without the correct knowledge of the general circumstances surrounding those events. Hence, one cannot know the dimensions of the 2001 war in Afghanistan led by the United States under the pretext of the so-called ‘Global War on Terror’, without understanding the national, regional and international conditions associated with that war.

Thus, Afghanistan’s situation cannot be understood without knowledge of the history of this Islamic state and its geopolitical positioning. As pointed out by one expert: ‘the historical perspective may help in understanding the conditions that Afghanistan faces today.’ Firstly, this can be illustrated by referring to Afghanistan’s past, which effectively shapes its reality and helps in understanding the present and future of this country. Despite the fact that Afghan society was relatively unaffected by colonialism, in that they have never been under foreign colonial rule unlike the majority of Islamic countries, this society did not live in a vacuum. In fact, the country experienced a series of conflicts centred on various important issues, such as the status of power in society, empowerment of the weak, the source of political legitimacy and state-building projects.¹

Secondly, in this context one cannot ignore the geopolitical impact when trying to understand the general situation in Afghanistan. In fact, this state does not live in a regional vacuum, for it shares borders with ancient nations that have made distinct contributions to human history such as Iran, India and Pakistan. These countries house multiple and diverse ethnicities, religions, languages and cultures’ which is sufficient to make the region fertile ground for extremist disputes and clashes.

1. C. Cramer and J. Goodhand, *Try Again, Fail Again. Fail Better? War, the State, and the ‘Post-Conflict Challenge in Afghanistan’*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002, p. 219.



III-4.1 Bamiyan valley, Afghanistan, showing one of the niches that housed giant standing Buddhas until their destruction in 2001

© UNESCO

The origins of the Afghan State go back to the tribal coalition that was established by the Durrani rulers between 1747 and 1798, and war-mongering and invasions were two features associated with the formation of the state in its ancient and early forms.² These characteristics associated with the rise of the Afghan State are attributable to many factors, perhaps most notably to the nation's harsh terrain. Similarly, some have remarked that Afghanistan was home to a large number of warlords and rivals who have contributed to the outbreak of war in Afghanistan at different stages of its ancient, medieval, and perhaps contemporary history too.³

Also, by historically tracing Afghanistan's relationship with its neighbours, it is evident that this state has a special status in the region. From time to time, Afghanistan's neighbours attempt to use hostile policies against it to generate power and legitimacy, which they need. For

2. *Ibid.*, p. 892.

3. A. Ozerdem, 'Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from a Cross-Cultural Perspective', *Third World Quarterly*, XXIII, No. 5, 2002, p. 961.

instance, in recent years, Pakistan has established authority and legitimacy to mobilize its military capabilities due to the threat of war posed by its neighbours – an attempt to solve its domestic problems by causing external ones. In this way, Pakistan works repeatedly to destabilize the domestic situation in Afghanistan. The Islamic Republic of Iran is no less interested in Afghanistan than Pakistan, for it is another influential regional country often motivated by its own interests and party to the violence that we witness in Afghanistan.⁴

In the international arena, Afghanistan has faced all kinds of foreign greed and intervention for different reasons: to use its territories as a key passageway between the British and Russian Empires, which is what happened when it was founded in the last quarter of the nineteenth century; or as a conflict zone between the United States of America and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. In another experiment, this Islamic state witnessed Marxist rule as a result of a coup in 1978 that created much national unrest. The most significant and serious example of this unrest, in terms of the domestic situation and Afghanistan's relationship with neighbouring Pakistan and Iran, was the migration of thousands of educated non-Marxist refugees and others belonging to religious groups, to those neighbouring countries. These events, which were due to external causes, led to political and jihadist structures playing an important role in Afghanistan over a long period of time. These contributed to the Cold War and aroused the keen interest of the US and the West in general towards Afghanistan, whose fate seems always to place it in the realms of violence.⁵

The international environment that contributes to the violence in Afghanistan changes according to the changing nature of global power. During the Russian and British Empires, Afghanistan was a demarcation line ready to erupt at any moment. During the Cold War, the policies of the United States and the former Soviet Union led to instability and armed conflict between the Afghans themselves.

These regional and international interventions caused a very complex domestic backdrop, for war and armed conflict in Afghanistan started to arise not only to resist foreign invaders, but due to internal disputes based on different values and visions for the future, which can be easily observed. In this regard, we can refer to the conflict that broke out between the conservatives and the reformists, which was supported by the call to resist all types of foreign intervention, and by Afghan sensitivities towards imported values and ideologies.

4. C. Johnson, and J. Leslie, 'Afghans have their Memories: A Reflection on the Recent Experience of Assistance in Afghanistan', *Third World Quarterly*, XXIII, No. 5, 2002, p. 186.

5. Ozerdem, 'Disarmament ...', *op. cit.*, p. 963.

All of the above shows the sensitivity of Afghanistan's position and its role as a focal point of national, regional and international events. This is behind the lengthy and continued instability, stifling development and growth and can be seen in the wars in which Afghanistan has been involved since 1979. These are:⁶

1. The call for jihad which arose during the Cold War from 1979 to 1988. There was a state of unity between the numerous factions of the mujahideen who fought against Soviet military forces. Both the religious and national aspects played a vital role in this confrontation, especially if we take into account the atheist ideology upon which the Soviet ideology was founded. Soviet troops were a common enemy for all Afghan jihadist factions, and the religious element was sufficient in uniting them despite their ideological, ethnic and tribal differences.

It is important to note here that the United States Government played a leading role in supporting the mujahideen on all levels, whether with weapons, intelligence or logistics. Indeed, Afghanistan has been the site of indirect confrontations between major powers.

It is also worth mentioning that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 led to a mass migration, probably reaching six million people who migrated to both Pakistan and Iran, which meant that the maintenance of irrigation systems and flood protection infrastructures was neglected. This is no simple matter for the people who depend mainly on agriculture and grazing, especially if we consider the magnitude of devastation and loss of life resulting from direct military operations by Soviet forces.

2. The outbreak of armed conflicts between factions of the Afghan mujahideen and Afghan Government forces in Kabul from 1989 to 1992, backed by the Soviets.⁷
3. The fighting that broke out between parties in the mujahideen government (1992–6) led to a deterioration of conditions in south and west Kabul, and to a rapid decline.
4. The regional war between the Taliban and NATO forces from 1996 to 2001. This war greatly affected the economy of Kabul due to the location of the Taliban and NATO front line in the Shomali Valley region to the north of the capital, which weakened its position as a centre of trade. The city of Mazari Sharif also suffered due to the closure of the Uzbek border after Taliban forces occupied the city in 1998. This had the effect of the closure of the trade route between Asia Minor and

6. S. Barakat, and G. Wardell, *Capitalizing on Capacities of Afghan Women: Women's Role in Afghanistan's Reconstruction and Development*, Geneva, International Labor Organization, 2001.

7. P. Marsden, 'Afghanistan: the Reconstruction Process', *International Affairs*, No. 29, 2003, p. 92.

Pakistan through the city of Mazari Sharif. Moreover, the war resulted in a collapse in the infrastructure of important sectors such as transport and telecommunications.

5. The war waged by the United States under the pretext of the so-called ‘Global War on Terror’ against the Afghan mujahideen, whom the West classified as terrorists. The strange thing is that the United States was a key supporter of the mujahideen movement during the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the rule of the Marxist People’s Democratic Party. When the Party was threatened due to the incompatibility of its ideology with the domestic environment, it invoked the help of the Soviet Government which sent 80,000 troops to Afghanistan in December 1979. The Western powers saw the presence of the Red Army on Afghan territory as an escalation of the Cold War. In their desire to respond to the Soviet move, the Western nations pledged billions of United States dollars to support the mujahideen and to prepare suitable conditions for the resistance to continue. They also did everything they could to strengthen the military capability of the mujahideen who were carrying out their operations in Afghan and Pakistani territories. This resistance movement, whose main supporters were the Western countries, most notably the US, were later the same mujahideen against whom the United States waged a fierce war in 2001 after their presence was no longer compatible with its interests.⁸

So it seems that the modern history of the Islamic State of Afghanistan is no different from its past. War and national, regional and international conflicts have always contributed to the lack of internal stability and affected the development of the state.

The most important event that illustrates the suffering of this developing country, however, is the aggressive attack by the United States in 2001 under the pretext of the so-called ‘Global War on Terror’.

In order to understand the full dimensions of the Afghan situation it is worth examining the Soviet-Afghan and American-Afghan wars in some detail, including the consequences of the latter war.

The Soviet-Afghan War (1979)

The former Soviet Union, at the invitation of its ally the Afghan Government, invaded Afghan territory in 1979. The invasion can be analyzed by looking at two important matters. The first of these is the American-Soviet (Russian) relationship that oscillated between indirect conflict (the Cold War), and

8. L. Jazayery, ‘The Migration-Development Nexus: Afghanistan Case Study’, *International Migration*, XL, 2002, p. 202.



III-4.2 Afghani refugee children playing at the Sosmaqala Internally Displaced Persons Camp in Afghanistan in northern Afghanistan, in August 2009

© UN Photo/Eric Kanalstein

détente and rapprochement. The second issue is related to the importance of the geopolitical position of Afghanistan for the Soviets. The Soviet point of view is characterized by a fear that was two-fold: the Soviets feared any interference from Afghanistan's regional neighbours on the one hand, and on the other, they feared attempts by the United States to intervene in the affairs of the region as a whole.

History tells us that the former Soviet Union could not ignore the course of events in Afghanistan. This position did not change with the developments that occurred in the political and geographical make-up of the former Soviet Union. Today Russia looks at what is happening in Afghanistan with the same level of fear and interest. The matter is related, in fact, to the needs of Russian national security. It is hard to imagine the former Soviet Union or modern Russia not responding to what is happening in Afghanistan and meeting any threats that may come from the southern border.⁹

With regard to the United States and Soviet threats, it is useful to note what was said by Brzezinski on American-Soviet rivalry in the region.

9. M. Gareev, 'Consequences of The Afghan War: Lessons for Russia', in R. Z. Sagdeev et al (eds.), *Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution, and Change*, the Center for Political and Strategic Studies Press, 1995, p. 2.

After the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War and the decline of its regional and global influence and prestige, the United States prepared for its first opportunity to gain a political presence in a region extending from the independent republics of the former Soviet bloc in Euro-Asia to China, and tried to extend its domination over the territories parallel to southern Euro-Asia and in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf territories.¹⁰

Thus, we can understand the Soviet point of view which resulted in 80,000 Soviet soldiers being sent to invade Afghanistan in 1979, during which time the Soviets appointed their ally Babarak Carmel as Vice-President and General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party and General Commander of the Afghan Armed Forces. At this time, Carmel tried to implement Soviet plans in Afghanistan which stipulated that the Afghan Government must liaise with the progressive forces (the left) and seek to improve standards of living for people through modernization and undertaking social, political and economic activities in a manner consistent with Marxist ideology. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was met with fierce resistance from mujahideen factions, who were joined by hundreds of volunteers coming to Afghanistan from Arab and Islamic countries. This resistance demonstrated an important Islamic phenomenon, that is, the willingness of Muslims to come together and form a united front when facing a common enemy who attacks the Islamic faith. Everyone believed that the Soviet presence with its Marxist ideology would implement policies and principles that do not conform to Islamic teachings. And as already mentioned, this jihadist movement benefited greatly from American and Western aid, sparking the most vicious conflict in the history of the Cold War.¹¹

Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan after the inauguration of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989, and in the same year Najibullah, Head of the Afghan Secret Police, was inaugurated as President of Afghanistan. Despite all expectations that he would not remain in power without the presence of Soviet troops, he continued in his post of president of Afghanistan until 1992: that is, for three years after the departure of Soviet forces. His government's attempt to face the mujahideen and stay in power, and the brutality of the confrontation that ensued, led to the mass migration of refugees out of Afghanistan.

In April 1992, mujahideen forces marched to the capital Kabul and toppled the Najibullah government. But the inability of the Afghan factions to agree on the formation of a new government led to a resumption of fighting at the end of 1992, this time among the mujahideen themselves. Thus a terrible civil war raged from 1992 to 1996, as previously mentioned. This war

10. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

11. Jazayeri, 'The Migration ...', *op. cit.*, p. 232.

claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people and resulted in thousands of refugees migrating to neighbouring countries.¹²

These events show that the resistance against the Soviets was unable to unite, as was similarly the case during the Soviet presence and its allied Afghan Government's rule. Disagreements on the future vision of the state, tribal differences and the struggle for power all played their part in the widening circle of armed confrontation between former mujahideen comrades.

The US-Afghan War (2001)

Before 11 September 2001, the Taliban were more or less in control of the domestic situation in Afghanistan, after increased national and international visibility and recognition in 1994. As is widely known, most members of the Taliban are Pashtuns from Kandahar, and those affiliated to the movement would at some point have studied in Pakistani religious *madrasas* in the region of Madras. Under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Taliban called for the unity of Afghanistan which they thought should be realized within the framework of Islamic *Shari'ah* law. The Taliban were received with open arms in most areas under their control due to the ties between them and the local population, in addition to the fact that the Afghans desperately needed security. In late 1996, the Taliban managed to seize the capital, Kabul, and by the end of 1998 had gained control of many Afghan regions and cities.

Some reports suggest that the Taliban became a terrible power due to some of the heinous things they did in the areas under their control, and this may be partly what motivated the mujahideen leaders to organize an effective resistance movement against them. This led to the establishment of the Northern Front under the leadership of Ahmed Shah Massoud, who was assassinated in 2001. Until the Taliban fell from power, Afghanistan was a country ruled by two governments: the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan under the leadership of the Taliban, and the Islamic State of Afghanistan led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE all recognized the Taliban government, while Afghanistan continued to be officially represented at the United Nations by the Rabbani government.

After the events of 11 September the United States declared war on what it called terrorism in Afghanistan.¹³ As a result, former allies became terrorists that had to be wiped out completely, and a democratic government needed to be established that operated according to Western political concepts instead of the existing religious government institution.

12. Johnson and Leslie, 'Afghans have their Memories ...', *op. cit.*, p. 682.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 233.



III-4.3 Daily life in Afghanistan: a vegetable stall in a traditional Afghan market
© Harold Sequeira/AramcoWorld

One can explain the United States position toward the Afghan case from different perspectives. They could have been reacting to the events of 11 September which was the first direct attack on United States territory since the Second World War. According to this point of view, the United States acted on the concept of pre-emptive or preventive strikes against areas it considers a threat to its national security. Another interpretation of US actions, based on economic factors, relates to its attempt to dominate strategically important areas so as to secure control of different global oil sources and thus keep up with the requirements of international competition today. It was therefore imperative that the United States secured its presence in a critical region such as Afghanistan for strategic, economic and trade reasons, if it was to achieve its ambition of world domination and obstruct its current competitors, China, Japan and the European Union. A third explanation is that the United States actions in Afghanistan stem from the desire of Western capitalism, led by the United States, to fight the Islamic religion and Islamic countries that are, in the view of the West, the final threat to Western interests after the collapse of socialist regimes and the decline of communism.

Regardless of the accuracy of these explanations, the international coalition led by the United States against a developing Muslim country has

had serious implications for the future relationship between the nations of the world. This was because in the eyes of millions of people the war appeared to be one between Muslims and Christians. In addition, the stage has been reached today where American interests are threatened all over the world. The pre-emptive security measures may be justified given the nature of the violence resorted to by some groups and organizations with different beliefs and ideological orientations, for the violence that is practised today on an international level is of a complex and mysterious nature in terms of locating it in space and time. It would seem that the use of violence is advancing alongside advances in technology, communications and arms. This may be natural, but what is not is interfering in the beliefs of other faiths and cultures and their idea of how to live. Based on this, the Western viewpoint of the Muslim world seems to be leading international relations in a frightening direction and promoting a lack of understanding and stability.

The events that took place in Afghanistan at the beginning of the new millennium clearly show the contradictions within the policy of the United States, its malicious allegations and obvious misleading of American and world opinion. Western actions become clearer when one remembers that it was the United States which trained factions in Afghanistan long before the arrival of Soviet forces. History also shows us that there are well-developed relations that link the United States to the Taliban, despite the media's denial of this. To illustrate this relationship on the official level, Elie Krakowski, an official in the American Department of Defense in charge of the Afghan dossier in the eighties, said that Afghanistan remains an important location for the United States to this day because it is the crossroads between what Halford MacKinder called the world's Heartland and the Indian sub-continent. It owes its importance to its location at the confluence of major routes. A boundary between land power and sea power, it is the meeting point between opposing forces larger than itself. Alexander the Great used it as a path to conquest. So did the Moghuls. An object of competition between the British and Russian Empires in the nineteenth century, Afghanistan became a source of controversy between the American and Soviet superpowers in the twentieth. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has become an important potential opening to the sea for the landlocked new states of Central Asia.¹⁴

14. N. M. Ahmed, 'Afghanistan, the Taliban and the United States. The Role of Human Rights in Western Foreign Policy', *Media Monitors Network* ..., 2001, pp. 27–8.



III-4.4 The Mazar-i-Sharif, or Blue Mosque, in Afghanistan
© Harold Sequeira/AramcoWorld

Results of the war in Afghanistan

The results of the war led by the United States and its allies in 2001, which included the toppling of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, can be briefly summarized as follows:

1. The war led to the creation of a long term resistance and to the creation of a broad front line of confrontations between American and Afghan fighters who have a deeply entrenched concept of jihad against foreign invaders from an Islamic perspective.
2. It led to heightened instability in Afghanistan which has afflicted the country for many decades. This lack of stability naturally resulted in a lack of security and an increase in the number of migrants.
3. Another result was a delay in social and economic development despite an increase in aid that the United Nations and United States are sending as part of a special strategy to strike within Afghanistan and work towards separating the people from the resistance movement. But everyone seems to prefer the truth, which is that rockets do not grow into crops and do not help to create the democracy and equal social development of which the West speaks.
4. It led to the Afghan people being sympathetic towards the resistance movement due to their understanding of Western policies and their belief

that democracy and development are not important to the West, and that in fact the West's main concern is with oil and gas and Afghanistan's strategic location in the competition between major powers.

5. The war has led to a deeper and more complicated state of hostility between the West in general, and the United States in particular, and between most Islamic nations and organizations. It seems to be a confrontation between two incompatible parties and the outcome remains unknown.
6. Finally, the war resulted in toppling the Taliban from power and this has created an environment suitable for the Islamic Republic of Iran to prepare for a confrontation with the United States. As is widely known, relations between the governments of the Taliban and Iran were full of enmity and hostility. This means that the toppling of the Taliban from power and the control of Afghanistan has worked in the favour of Iran, which is also an enemy of the United States.

Chapter 3.5

THE COLLAPSE OF THE
SOVIET UNION

Fredj Maatoug

INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991 marked the end of an era in the history of humanity. It had been preceded by the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. Those two events, occurring within a short time of each other, marked the end of the bipolar world dominated by the Cold War. The USSR, from its establishment in 1922 to its collapse in 1991, lasted for seven decades. All agree that 9 December 1991, the date of the official dissolution of the Soviet Union, heralded the end of communism as a political system and the end of the twentieth century. The Soviet Union, the other superpower that had dominated international politics together with and, more frequently, in opposition to the United States of America, ‘ceased to exist in an instant, as if by magic’.

The break-up of the USSR had been predicted since the 1970s. The best-known work to warn of its collapse, at least in the French language, was undoubtedly H  l  ne Carr  re d’Encausse’s *L’empire   clat  * (Decline of an Empire). Most people who had predicted the Soviet Union’s demise imagined that it would be a painful and violent process. Latterly, they had in mind the terrible crises that had occurred in the 1990s when Yugoslavia – a tiny country in comparison with the Soviet Union – broke up. Most observers feared a repetition of the exacerbated national antagonisms and unrest seen in Yugoslavia, which, given the size of the Soviet Union, would have triggered incommensurate violence. Nothing of the sort happened, however, for the transition from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was a smooth one. Was that due to the dominant position of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, which wanted an orderly transition? Was it due to the joint political will of the three Slavic presidents – Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, Stanislav Shushkevich of

the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, and Leonid Kravchuk of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic? Before considering these questions, the root causes of the collapse of the USSR, the key stages of the transition and the consequences of liquidating the Soviet legacy and forming the CIS must be addressed.


Causes of the collapse of the USSR

The USSR was founded in 1922 and collapsed in 1991. It was a federal state with an exceptionally vast surface area of 22 million square kilometres, and thus occupied one sixth of the inhabitable land on Earth. It stretched from West to East across 11 time zones, over a length of almost 10,000 kilometres. It was situated between the Gulf of Gdansk on the Baltic Sea in Eastern Europe to the West and the Chukotka Peninsula on the Bering Strait to the East. From North to South it covered nearly 5,000 kilometres from Cape Chelyuskin, along the Arctic Circle, to the village of Kushka in southern Turkmenistan in Central Asia. Such was the immensity of that state.

Administratively, the USSR was formed of 15 federal Soviet socialist republics.¹ Constitutionally, they had the right 'freely to secede from the USSR' and 'to enter into direct relations with foreign states'. It also comprised autonomous republics and regions. The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic was by far the most important politically, economically, geographically and demographically. Then, as now, it comprised 21 autonomous republics and one autonomous region inhabited by a variety of nations with a multitude of languages and faiths. When the USSR imploded, the Russian Federation inherited its legacy. It became *de jure* a permanent member of the United Nations and the depositary of the right of ownership of the Soviet arsenal of nuclear and strategic weapons. The international community simply endorsed this state of affairs.

What caused the collapse of the USSR? Sovietologists have listed many factors that together contributed to the implosion of that political construct. Some causes were remote, while others were direct and more closely linked to the moment when the edifice fell like a house of cards. What were the determining factors of its collapse? To answer this, the event must be set in its historical context.

1. The USSR officially came into being on signature of a treaty in December 1922. The treaty entailed the establishment of a federation of four republics, namely the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), the Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) of Belarus, the SSR of Ukraine and the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, which was divided into the SSRs of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1936.



III–5.1 The breakup of Soviet Russia

© UNESCO/UNESCO History of Humanity

INDIRECT CAUSES

Observers and specialists in the study of the Soviet Union have put forward the following factors to explain its collapse. Firstly, the economy had declined in the 1970s and 1980s and the over-centralized Soviet authorities had not responded adequately to the challenges and economic problems facing the country. Secondly, the arms race during the Cold War had been depletive and costly. The race became an aggravating factor in the 1980s owing to the ‘star wars’ programme pursued by the United States of America, which had become more belligerent and hawkish than ever under the Reagan administration. Then there was the difficult war in Afghanistan that had been fought for most of the 1980s. It had ended in humiliating failure marked by exceptionally heavy human and material losses. Oil prices on the world market then plummeted in the 1980s, forcing the Soviet Union to draw on its gold and currency reserves until they were depleted. A further, unprecedented factor was the emergence of civil society and nationalist movements in the Baltic, Caucasian and Central Asian republics, which were not under the influence or authority of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Other reasons that are sometimes mentioned include the failure to complete de-Stalinization, which dates back to the 1960s, to the late Khrushchev and early Brezhnev eras.

DIRECT CAUSES

As to the less remote causes, the importance of the boomerang effect of Gorbachev's reforms should not be underestimated. In April 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Secretary-General of the Communist Party and, subsequently, the first and last president of the USSR, began to implement unprecedented reforms in the Soviet Union, initiating a radical overhaul of the Soviet political system under the banners of 'restructuring' and 'transparency', or *perestroika* and *glasnost* respectively in Russian.

Yet another likely direct cause of the implosion of the Soviet Union was undoubtedly the referendum held in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on 1 December 1991. In that referendum the people voted for the independence of Ukraine, simultaneously putting an end to the USSR, which had been a shadow of its former self after the aborted coup in August 1991.

The other, more obvious direct cause was the meeting some days later of the three presidents of the Slavic republics: Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia. On 8 December 1991, Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk and Stanislav Shushkevich met at Belovezhskaya Pushcha near the Byelorussian capital of Minsk to consider the serious implications. They issued a joint statement that 'the USSR, as a subject of international law and as a geopolitical reality ... , ceases to exist.'² They were obliged to draw consequences, and did so immediately. They decided to 'found a new entity, the Commonwealth of Independent States, open to all federal republics of the USSR and other states wishing to be Members.'³ The aim was to preserve the key structure of the USSR but to place it on a new foundation. The task proved to be more difficult than expected.

THE SOVIET POLITICAL CONTEXT IN 1990

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union, a world superpower second only to the United States of America, to find a state on the brink of bankruptcy. At that time, he was firmly committed to reforming the system in order to combat economic stagnation and the vestiges of Stalinism. That, however, was easier said than done. His stated

2. Observatory of Post-Soviet States, *De l'U.R.S.S. à la C.E.I. 12 Etats en quête d'identité*, Paris, Ellipses, 1997, p. 16.

3. *Ibid.*

goals were not achieved and, instead, the shortage of consumer goods and social inequalities worsened. The climate of social tension thus created threatened to destabilize the country. The Soviet peoples gave free rein to their discontent.

The serious accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in April 1986 made the already dire political situation even worse. It exposed the technical and communications weaknesses of the USSR. Owing to the strong emotion that the disaster aroused in European and international public opinion, the Kremlin finally realized that its old methods of communication, shrouded in state secrecy, were things of the past. Therefore 'Gorbachev and his advisers were quick to see the advantages of being transparent in their strategy to win over Western elites and civil societies.²⁴ The accident therefore gave a fillip to the Soviet regime's incipient democratization policy, known as *glasnost* (transparency). Paradoxically, however, that policy triggered inter-ethnic conflicts and an upsurge of nationalism. What had gone wrong? The introduction of a pluralist public arena had been designed to consolidate the supreme power that still claimed Soviet legitimacy in the pure tradition of Bolshevism. 'The irony of history, [was] that the same imperatives that had been used to establish the Soviet Party State, strengthen its grip on society and form a new commonwealth [were] ultimately used against the system to destroy it.'²⁵

In 1989, moreover, the Soviet Union had held free elections on its territory for the first time in its history and political parties other than the Communist Party had subsequently emerged in 1990, but instead of improving and defusing the general climate in the country, the democratization of political life had the opposite effect. Peoples belonging to the various nationalities that constituted the Soviet Union, who had for so long been constrained by the logic of a single discourse and a single party, voiced their desire for sovereignty. The Russians were the first to take the initiative. From 1990 onwards, and above all in 1991, two authorities held power in the Kremlin. On the one hand, Boris Yeltsin was emerging as a growing force who epitomised the freedom of Russian state forces from the stewardship of the Communist Party, while on the other, the organs of an archaic and conservative Soviet power remained in place. The hesitant and clumsy coup of August 1991 ended in failure and precipitated the collapse of the USSR. Twenty years on, that episode in the USSR's history has still not been fully explained. Some believe that details about the coup have not been fully disclosed and consider that 'there are grey areas in the history of *perestroika*. Major events, beginning with the coup of August 1991, have

4. J.-R. Raviot, and T. Ter Minassian, *De l'URSS à la Russie, La civilisation soviétique, genèse, histoires et métamorphoses de 1917 à nos jours*, Paris, Ellipses, 2006, p. 113.

5. *Ibid.*

not yet been adequately explained by reliable sources.⁶ The coup was but one of many factors in the collapse of the Soviet Union. Other factors, all indicative of the USSR's impending implosion, came into play.

The collapse of the USSR and the dismantling of the Soviet system

THE RISE OF NATIONALISM

In 1990, Nikita Khrushchev's certainty in the early 1960s that the *USSR* 'had reached the point at which its nationalities had merged to produce a uniform whole, the "Soviet people"⁷ rang hollow. Interestingly, however, Mikhail Gorbachev, the initiator of *glasnost*, practically shared that belief, which was not surprising for he, too, had been marked by his Marxist-Leninist ideological education in relation to the nationalities issue, at least. He associated the rise of nationalist sentiment with historical phenomena at the dawn of capitalism and therefore considered it to be anachronistic and contrary to the flow of history. He also believed that 'the whole world, and not only Europe, must unite politically'.⁸ Yet it is undeniable that the Soviet nationalities policy, formulated and implemented by the Stalinist regime in order to control the periphery from the centre, contained the seeds of its own destruction. Accordingly, the national elites trained in the Soviet mould in the 1960s spearheaded their republics' claims for autonomy and independence in the 1980s. Therefore 'national movements were formed during *perestroika* owing to it was the rational core of the Soviet nationalities system – the policy of indigenization of the elites. National claims were formulated or relayed by intellectual elites within official institutions (writers' unions and academies of science) who sometimes held prominent positions.⁹ The Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudayev is an enlightening example. He was a pure product of the Soviet system and the first Chechen to rise to the rank of general in the Red Army. He joined the Communist Party in 1968, served in the Soviet Army for over twenty years and had the good fortune and prestige of being honoured by the Soviet authorities.

To protect the national interest, national movements employed a variety of arguments, some of them environmental. There was therefore interplay between protection of the natural heritage and the need to defend the national historical heritage. Taboos were broken and people dared to discuss previously

6. *Ibid.*, p. 111.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

8. Cited by A. Yakovlev, *Le vertige des illusions: réflexions et analyses sur la tragédie soviétique*, Paris, J. C. Lattès, 1993, p. 87, in Raviot and Ter Minassian, *De l'URSS à la Russie ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

9. Raviot and Ter Minassian, *De l'URSS à la Russie ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

forbidden subjects, such as the protection of national languages, and to criticize the Russification policy. After Chernobyl, the leader of the Ukrainian environmental movement Zeleny Svit spoke out against Moscow's subjugation of Ukraine in unprecedented and inflammatory terms. 'The Soviet Union has always used heavy-handed methods – destruction, annihilation, genocide – against Ukraine, against our culture, against our traditions and against our interests [...]. The decision to build the maximum number of nuclear power and hydroelectric plants in Ukraine was a deliberate one designed to subjugate our country and bring it to its knees before Muscovite power.'¹⁰ The tone of this speech clearly demonstrated that the time for the 'merging of nationalities' described by Krushchev in the 1960s had passed.

The national movements were institutionalized and were transformed into political parties after the elections of Peoples' Deputies at the Soviet Congress of 1989. Political pluralism had in the meantime been established. The communist parties of the Baltic states had become social democratic parties. Elsewhere, in the Caucasus, Volga and Central Asia, they had been transformed into national parties or had simply disappeared from the political landscape altogether.

THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE USSR

In the winter of 1989 to 1990, the recently elected new supreme soviets of the republics voted for 'declarations of sovereignty', as had the Baltic republics. The next step up was independence, and it was on everyone's mind. The violent anti-Russian demonstrations held in Tbilisi, Georgia, on 8 April 1989 did nothing to calm the mood, especially as they had been quelled harshly by Interior Ministry forces. The losses were high, with a death toll of twenty. Those victims were in the thoughts of Lithuanian protesters in Vilnius in January 1991. In the ensuing clash with special Interior Ministry forces, they too suffered heavy loss of life, with thirteen dead. Gorbachev was definitively discredited in the eyes of the national intelligentsias in the republics for having backed action by the Special Forces. His *perestroika* policy did not save him. Loss of respect for Gorbachev only quickened the pace of abolition of the USSR. Even the referendum held on 17 March 1991, on the initiative of the architect of *glasnost*, could not put matters back on an even keel. Although seventy per cent of the population voted in favour of 'maintaining a union in the form of a new federation of equal Soviet republics', it was too late: the die was cast. The favourable result could not halt the demise of the USSR, which occurred several months later.

10. Y. Scherbak, *Literaturna Ukraina*, 15 March 1989, in J.-R. Raviot and T. T. Minassian, *De l'URSS à la Russie ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 123.



III-5.2 Worshippers in Uzbekistan

© Brynn Bruijn/AramcoWorld

The date of 21 December 1991 is a memorable date because it marks the end of an era. On that day, Mikhail Gorbachev dissolved the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the USSR collapsed as if by magic. At the same time, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMAE), established in 1949, and the Warsaw Pact, the military organization founded in 1955 and comprising the socialist Eastern European states bordering the USSR, disappeared almost instantly. The Russian Federation took control of three-quarters of the former Soviet territory, more than half of the population of the former superpower and nearly two thirds of its industry. It claimed – and was granted – the status of principal successor to the defunct Soviet Union. As a result, it inherited the Soviet Union’s seat in international organizations, including a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. In return, the Russian Federation agreed to bear the financial liabilities of the former superpower. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was founded officially on the same day. That economic and political union made its debut on the international stage in order to maintain special relations among the countries that had seceded from the defunct USSR.

The CIS was originally a Slavic initiative. At the time of its establishment, it comprised the three Slavic republics that had supported the beginnings of the USSR in 1922, before being extended to other members some days later. On 21 December 1991, eight former Soviet republics joined the three founding

states in Alma-Ata, thus making the CIS a Eurasian community. Two years later, in 1993, Georgia became a member. The three Baltic republics did not join the new organization, which had reconfigured the former Soviet area. They had already set their sights westwards towards the European Union (EU). The CIS was self-evidently dominated from the outset by the Russian Federation, which was by far the richest and most powerful country in the group.

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SUCCESSOR TO THE USSR

With a vast territory of 17,075,400 square kilometres, the Russian Federation is still by far the largest state in the world. Yet Russians could have felt somewhat cramped with the collapse of the USSR, for they had become accustomed to travelling across the immense Soviet territory of 22,402,200 square kilometres. Viewing the new situation, Jean Radvanyi asked an unusual question: ‘Will the Russians ache for territory?’ In answering the question, he attempted to explain the spatial upheavals caused by the break-up of the Soviet Union, stating that ‘one of the unexpected effects is the brutal change in the Russians’ living space, which will have numerous material and symbolic consequences.’¹¹ Such consequences include, for example, the obligation of Russian citizens who had previously travelled freely within the 22.5 million square kilometres of Soviet territory to pass the border controls of the new sovereign states that achieved independence in 1991. The stringency of such controls may vary and in the three Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and Georgia they are required to have a visa. Twenty-five million Russians still live in ‘over the border’ (in other former Soviet republics), which gives an idea of the scale of the challenge, both administratively and psychologically. Moscow wished its nationals to remain in the republics, which it intended to keep within its sphere of influence by any means necessary.

According to Marlène Laruelle, ‘one of the great challenges for the future of the Russian Federation lies in the balance between Russians and their eponymous nationality on the one hand, and on the other, minorities who are Russian citizens (*rossiskiy*) but are not ethnically Russian (*russskiy*).’¹² Far from viewing the 180 ‘nationalities’ identified in the 2002 census as burdensome, the Russian Federation appears to take pride in them. Official texts are silent on ‘ethnic’ Russians. Emphasis is laid, instead, on civic identity. It would appear to be true that ‘the Russian Federation is a federal

11. J. Radvanyi, ‘Les Russes et leur espace, une relation complexe’, in M. Ferro and M.-H. Mandrillon (ed.), *Russie peuples et civilisations*, Paris, La Découverte, 2005, p. 15.

12. M. Laruelle, ‘Les Russes et les «autres», introduction à la diversité nationale’, in M. Ferro and M.-H. Mandrillon (ed.), *Russie, peuples et civilisations*, Paris, La Découverte, 2005, p. 33.

state of 89 subjects, including 21 republics, and it recognizes the rights of national minorities, whether they have their own territory or not.¹³

This analysis must, however, be qualified. Following the collapse of the Soviet regime in 1991, there was a mass exodus of Germans from the Volga to Germany, and another equally large exodus of Jews to Israel. The Russian Federation's national diversity has since focused on 'Oriental' peoples, the majority of whom are Muslim. This view is reinforced by the presence on the Russian Federation's territory of some three million Ukrainians and more than 800,000 Belarusians who are not regarded as foreigners, simply because both belonged to the East Slavic group, as do the Russians.

Of the 'Oriental' peoples, by far the largest group is the so-called 'Turkish Muslims'. The largest subgroup is that of the Tatars, who numbered 5.5 million in 2002.

Understandably, even its weakened state, 'Russia will remain the key structural component of this huge state, but its influence is already less hegemonic. Community operations that respect national identities would be a determining factor of democratic stabilization of the entire federation.'¹⁴

The consequences of the collapse of the USSR

THE ADVENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

In the treaty signed at Alma-Ata on 21 December 1991, the signatory states agreed on two fundamental principles – the intangibility of borders, and the territorial integrity of CIS Member States. The stated aims were the sum total of a number of domestic and foreign policy objectives, some of which have proven unfeasible. The signatories agreed 'to coordinate their foreign policy, develop a common economic community, establish uniform control of nuclear and strategic weapons and cooperate in the fields of transport, telecommunications, environmental protection and crime control.'¹⁵ Lastly, they also opted to guarantee free movement within the CIS and to open their borders.

The difficulty of the task and the effort required to set up the CIS soon became apparent, however. Three groups of CIS countries had adopted national policies that deviated significantly from the CIS common policy. Azerbaijan, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Ukraine decided to mount a vigorous defense of the freedom that they had won in 1991. Their main goal was to 'ensure their independence and assume the competences incumbent

13. *Ibid.*

14. Observatory of post-Soviet States, *De l'URSS à la CEI ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

on any Nation state worthy of the name.¹⁶ The second group of countries consisted of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Belarus, which were in favour of greater integration. They were prepared to ‘sacrifice a not insignificant degree of autonomy. ... As orphans of the Soviet Union, they [were] in favour of close integration, or even a return to a degree of centralization. Safeguarding their sovereignty and assets was a secondary concern in this context.’¹⁷ The third group comprised Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan, countries ‘too weak to be fully independent.’ Moreover, as states these countries were ‘vulnerable to pressure exerted on them, whether economically, politically or militarily, and their sovereignty was de facto under the influence of Moscow.’¹⁸ After tasting the delights of freedom, they were aware that their independence was limited. They felt the full effects of being dependent on the Russian Federation and were doomed to remain under the influence of Moscow or the CIS. The CIS was a far cry from the uniform structure that it aspired to be and such divisiveness could only be detrimental to its performance.

The Russian Federation took charge partly for that reason. Very quickly, it established itself as the successor to the USSR. The international community, caught off guard by the collapse of the USSR, sought reassurance about the future and safety of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. It suited the United States of America and the entire Western world that Boris Yeltsin’s Russian Federation was in control of the arsenal, as this allayed their great fear of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists.


DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCES

The main consequence of the collapse of the USSR was the near-automatic renaissance of Russia. Yeltsin, who emerged as the new ‘tsar’ of Russia, had guided the Russian Federation toward that historic moment. His popularity in the West at the end of the Soviet regime was equalled only by his popularity among Russians. However, despite being the successor to the USSR, the Russian Federation could not assert itself as a superpower. It faced enormous domestic problems. In addition to pressing economic issues, the Russian Federation was obliged to devise a new democratic political system and, above all, to deal with a burning issue – the war in Chechnya. Those domestic difficulties, so complex as to be almost insurmountable, took the Russian Federation away from the international political scene. The United States of America were only too willing to step into this breach and impose a unipolar world view on international relations.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

18. *Ibid.*



III-5.3 Mikhail Gorbachev, President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, addressing the United Nations General Assembly in December 1988

© UN Photo/Saw Lwin

In addition to its domestic worries, Moscow faced economic, political and strategic problems in the former Soviet republics. It soon became clear that the CIS was not a panacea for the complications of sixty-nine years of coexistence under the Soviet regime. As soon as the agreements on the establishment of the CIS had been signed in Minsk, Ukraine issued a decree instituting a national army and called on soldiers stationed on its territory to swear allegiance to the Ukrainian authorities or to go and 'serve elsewhere'. It seized the Black Sea Fleet, which comprised 300 warships, some of them nuclear. Five republics followed Kiev's lead and announced the establishment of a national army. The Red Army had ceased to exist.

Mini-wars were already raging within and between the CIS founding republics. A merciless war was being fought in the southern Caucasus between the Azeris and Armenians over the disputed *Nagorno-Karabakh* region. In Moldova, Russian-speaking minorities were torn apart by war. At the border between the Russian Federation and Georgia, there were exchanges of gunfire between Georgians and Ossetian nationals. Even within the Russian Federation, the situation was far from rosy. The Chechens, who had openly defied the federal government of Moscow, claimed independence and called on all Muslims in the northern Caucasus to support their national cause.

CONSEQUENCES ABROAD

As the Soviet Union no longer featured as a superpower in 1991, many observers and ideologists viewed the United States of America as the only superpower for the foreseeable future. They firmly believed that the Soviet socialist system had been swept away because liberalism and market economics were better. They considered this to be and an unshakeable truth vindicated conclusively by history. Furthermore, the United States of America was convinced that it had the right and moral authority to control and conduct world affairs as it saw fit. The question arises as to whether it fell victim to its own naivety by considering itself to be the only superpower capable of controlling and protecting the world without external assistance,¹⁹ as noted by the British historian, Eric Hobsbawm. Apparently it did, but its illusion was to be shattered because, historically, that has never proven to be the case. Washington painfully realized in due course that the world was so diverse and complex that it could not be controlled by a single power, albeit the richest and most powerful of all time militarily and technologically. The United States of America thus understood that it had to become accustomed to living in a multifarious world – that much has become clear since its disastrous experiment in Iraq in 2003. It has returned

19. C. Martinez, *Via Alternativa*, Le Clarin, Suplemento Zona, (translated from Spanish), 2 December 2001.

to thinking that the United Nations has the centrality and primacy required to manage and organize international life.

The consequences of the USSR's collapse were felt first abroad in European countries. Some of the earliest effects were felt shortly before the effective dissolution of the Soviet Union: it should not be forgotten that one of the major events preceding the end of communism was the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which had already begun to transform Eastern Europe. When the Wall fell, one of the most symbolic vestiges of the Cold War disappeared. What happened next? From that time on, states reunified. In 1990, the two Germanies, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), which had been separated since the Second World War, were reunified. Others separated peacefully. In Czechoslovakia, Czechs and Slovaks parted amicably in 1993. Others separated amid scenes of bloodshed, violence and the horrors of genocides and ethnic cleansing. Yugoslavia, where Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and other Slovenes and Kosovans had lived harmoniously under the communist regime, erupted into a bloody conflict that lasted from 1991 to 1995. That bitter war, marked by atrocious war crimes, resulted in the country being divided into several states; the new borders are still not universally accepted. Subsequently, in its bid for independence, Kosovo seceded from Serbia in 1999, with the aid and military protection of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces.

The collapse of the USSR forced the Russian Federation, the successor to Soviet power, to recognize the independence of peoples and of former satellite states. As noted above, fifteen states rose from the ashes of the former USSR. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania subsequently joined NATO and the European Union, as have most of the Eastern European countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Others, such as Ukraine, are still waiting their turn. Suffice it to consider Ukraine's Slavic culture and, more importantly, its location within the Russian Federation's immediate sphere of influence to understand why Moscow takes umbrage at such a possibility.

CONCLUSION

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was a watershed moment in contemporary international relations. By ushering out the Cold War and the bipolar world that had dominated politics since the Second World War, it opened up to an ever changing world. Twenty years on, the effects of that event on human destiny are still being measured and evaluated. Was it a bad or good thing? Has it put an end to socialist ideology once and for all? Does it signify that the failure of 'real socialism' has set the seal on the ultimate victory

of capitalism? Some observers, convinced of the benefits of the market economy, answer the last two questions in the affirmative. They might be less certain, however, if they were to scrutinize changes in the prices of staples in the former Soviet Union. The price of bread, which was half a rouble in 1989, cost 4 roubles, or eight times more, ten years later in 1999. A journey on the Moscow metro, which cost 0.2 roubles in 1989, cost 2 roubles, or ten times more, in 1999. Health insurance and university education were free under the Soviet regime; by contrast, an appointment with a doctor in the Russian Federation in 1999 cost 300 roubles as an absolute minimum, and university education cost roughly the same as in North America and almost exactly the same as in Canada. Naturally, human life and the quest for happiness cannot be quantified or judged solely by the material conditions of life, but when one can no longer afford to eat and feed the children when they are hungry or care for them or give them a good education, human despair is boundless.

Apart from the material question, from a philosophical standpoint the collapse of the Soviet Union and the discrediting of the Marxist-Leninist ideology do not necessarily spell the end of 'Soviet values and civilization'. The legacy of Soviet society subsists, both tangibly in industry and technology, and as a state of mind. Despite the apparent luxuries of the consumer society (luxuries that, incidentally, are not affordable by everyone), for those who experienced the Soviet regime, the post-Soviet period has meant the loss of social gains of the communist era in areas such as healthcare, pensions and education. This accounts for their instinctive suspicion of the Western model. The sentiment expressed by the Germans of the former GDR is significant here, for despite their access to a society of plenty after reunification, they still feel that they are 'East Germans', and the result of the general elections in September 2005 confirmed that slightly paradoxical situation. It would be wrong to think, however, that the Soviet Union and the Western world were diametrically opposed and completely cut off from each other. In fact, they are the opposing forces of modernity. This makes Soviet civilization one of the pillars of modernity.

A witness of the interaction between the Soviet and Western worlds, the former dissident Aleksandr Zinoviev describes the Russian communist experience as 'an original way of westernizing the country' and links between the collapse of the Soviet Union directly to recent changes in the West. It is not far-fetched to think that, in the post-Cold War period, the times we live not only in a post-communist, but also in a post-liberal era.

Chapter 3.6

THE WAR IN CHECHNYA

Fredj Maatoug

INTRODUCTION

In the Caucasus, where Chechnya is located, indigenous Islam has for centuries cohabited with Orthodox Christianity, of which the Church of ‘Holy Russia’ sees itself as the standard-bearer. Islam is thus an internal reality in Russian political life. This prompted the French Academician H el ene Carr ere d’Encausse to say that the Russian Federation is not merely Eurasia, unless the latter is to be enlarged to incorporate a particular dimension, that of Islam. For the Russian Federation is also a Muslim country.¹ This was the geopolitical reality before, during and after the Soviet era – and to this day. It is thus increasingly present in Russians’ everyday lives, albeit sometimes dramatically so. For

while the Russian Federation lost its properly Muslim states owing to the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), it retains major Islamic entities within its borders. Almost twenty million Muslims now live within the Federation and the dynamic of their birth rate, in contrast with the Russians’ demographic weakness, guarantees that they will have a growing part to play in future years.²

Thus, and in the light of this geopolitical reality, the war in Chechnya appears a more complex matter than first sight suggests. While Moscow considers it an internal matter, the Chechens view it as a war of national independence. The international community, for its part, remains to varying extents undecided and timid. The big players in international politics, especially the United States of America and the European Union, cannot reach a common position on the Chechen drama. The all-out war against Islamic terrorism waged since September 2001 by Washington and its closest ally, the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent by Paris and a few other European

1. H. C. d’Encausse, *La Russie entre deux mondes* [The Russian Federation between two worlds], Paris, Fayard, 2010, p. 219.

2. *Ibid.* pp. 219–20.

capitals, merely complicates the position. A few questions therefore arise. The first may be put as follows: in Chechnya, is Moscow conducting 'its own' war against terrorism? Other questions also arise. Has it in reality embarked upon an imperialist war, as stressed by part of public opinion and constantly and loudly proclaimed by Chechen fighters and independence-seekers? Is the War in Chechnya an internal Russian affair or is it an unequal war of national independence waged by a small people, oppressed for centuries, against its Big Russian Neighbour? These questions encapsulate the range of views that divides the international community to this day. Should we intervene, exert pressure on the Russian Federation and even impose sanctions against it to make it loosen its hold on Chechnya? Should we rather assist it in a war that some, following in Russia's wake, unhesitatingly view as a war on terror? Or should we, finally, look away and leave the Russians to settle their internal problem as they see fit? It must be recognized that whether we adopt one or the other of these positions depends largely how we answer the questions. This answer, far from uniting the international community, divides it sharply.

The Chechens and Chechnya: history and geography

GEOGRAPHY

International awareness of the existence of the Chechen people was low. Only after 1991 did the public at large become aware of it. So who are the Chechens? Where do they come from? What are their ethnic and linguistic origins? The Chechen people are among the oldest in the Caucasus. Its language, Chechen, 'is a Caucasian language of the Nakh branch, which also includes the Ingush language.'³

Their territory today is surrounded by Daghestan to the east, the Stavropol region of Russia to the north and Georgia to the south. The Chechens have always lived in the Caucasus. Their territory has shrivelled steadily down the ages, having been reduced since antiquity by the advance of the Alans, the ancestors of the Ossetians. Contemporary Chechens have not forgotten this very ancient historical fact. Despite the Ingush buffer, their relations with the Ossetians are far from easy.

More recently, and particularly from the sixteenth century, the Chechens found themselves hemmed in among three imperial powers: the Ottomans, the Persians and the Russians. Their feudal leaders were obliged to switch alliances and to rely in turn on one or the other of those empires. How did the Chechens reach the current situation in which their country is an autonomous region within the Russian Federation? Arguably, by a simple accident of history. To

3. M. Ferro and M.-H. Mandrillon (eds.), *Russie, peuples et civilisations* [The Russian Federation, Peoples and Civilizations], Paris, La Découverte, 2005, p. 43.

clarify matters, we must go back to the Middle Ages. In all probability, 'the Russians being at that time still the least dangerous, the Caucasian chiefs opened the first Chechen Embassy in Moscow in 1589, on the initiative of Prince Shih-Murza Okutsky whose influence was felt across most of the Chechen territory.'⁴ The Tsars intervened in the region under the pretext of protecting their subjects, and only in the following century did borders between the peaks of the Caucasus and the Terek basin become stable, giving rise to the geographical and ethnic map that exists today. The other salient historical fact that should be stressed is the conversion of the Ingush to Islam. Other tribes followed suit and joined the religion of the Prophet, at the same time as, moreover, most of the other North Caucasian peoples. Once Islamized, the Chechens established Sufi brotherhoods which were to be maintained to the present day. Linguistically, the Chechens belong to the Caucasian language family as do the peoples of Daghestan. As to writing, lastly, as a consequence of the Chechens' conversion to Islam 'the language was thenceforth written in the Arabic script'.⁵

CHECHEN HISTORY AND RESISTANCE

The Chechens may have thought it wise to join forces with the Russians against the other empires at one point in their history, but the alliance was not to prove happy for them. As soon as they had modernized their administration and their army, the tsars launched an active colonial policy in their ancestral drive to the south. Peter the Great in the eighteenth century was the first Russian Tsar to practise that colonial policy. As soon as they had conquered Ossetia the Russians sought to maintain the momentum and do the same to neighbouring Chechnya, but things proved more difficult than expected. They met with ferocious popular resistance from the Chechens, led in 1795 by an intractable warrior Sheikh. Imam Mansur was indeed a war leader and religious leader of mythical status. Today in the collective imagination of the Chechen people he is an outstanding historical figure. Faced with the steamroller of the Russian army, what did the Chechens do? 'To protect themselves along their military line, they founded Grozny (*the fearsome*) along the Terek-Kuban road. Never really defeated at the time, the Chechen warriors, renowned for their courage, fell prey to their inability to unite and marshal their forces.'⁶ The history became a series of wars in which the Chechen people's resistance to Russian forces became a protracted guerrilla war. Faced with this ferocious resistance, St Petersburg's troops were humiliatingly defeated in the nineteenth century by the Chechens, Circassians and other peoples of Daghestan, but the

4. P. Karam, and T. Mourges, *Les guerres du Caucase: des Tsars à la Tibétobénie* [Wars in the Caucasus: from the Tsars to Chechnya], Paris, Perrin, 1995, p. 159.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Karam, Mourgues, *Les guerres du Caucase ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

balance of power was so unequal that the Russians ultimately won the day. 'After Imam Shamil surrendered in 1859 ... the Chechens kept up their fight for almost five years more. In 1877–9 the war resumed with its succession of deportations, particularly to the Ottoman Empire.'⁷ It should be noted that Imam Shamil, a legendary figure in the Chechen resistance, led the revolt against Moscow's forces for a quarter-century. He coordinated 'from Chechnya the military operations of numerous North Caucasian peoples, including Chechnya and Dagestan, until his surrender in 1859. His courage and his tactical acumen terrorised the Russian garrisons, which had to operate in a mountainous terrain in which they were ill at ease.'⁸ In defeat Shamil was not executed as Russian tradition required rebels to be. His prestige and international reputation forced the Tsar to treat him as a distinguished personality. He died while on pilgrimage in Mecca, one of the five pillars of Islam. Although Imam Shamil had fought from Chechnya he was not of Chechen, but rather of Avar nationality. In the Caucasus it is claimed that if he had been Chechen, the Russians would never have won the war, but that is part of metahistory rather than of history proper. It must therefore be ascribed to the legends that surround the history of Chechen resistance.

The events that led to war in Chechnya

THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET EMPIRE (THE USSR)

Every specialist in international affairs was confident that the end of the Soviet Union as a political structure would both rekindle all desires for independence among the former nations of the USSR, and trigger the outbreak of war in the Caucasus. The events that were to enmesh and lead inexorably to the war in Chechnya began one year before the USSR's official demise. The date of note is that of 20 September 1990: the proclamation of the sovereignty of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) of Chechen-Ingushetia by the republic's political authorities. Observers rarely mention this date in the chronology of the Chechen crisis: they consider the proclamation quite banal. 'Far from being an event of significance, it seemed at the time to be very trivial, since a large number of the republics of the USSR did the same, following the proclamation by Boris Yeltsin, Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, of Russia's sovereignty and his appeal to other republics to do the same.'⁹ No-one therefore regarded the proclamation of sovereignty made in Grozny by Dokhu Zavgayev, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet

7. Ferro et Mandrillon, (eds.), *Russie, peuples et civilisations ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

8. Karam, Mourgues, *Les guerres du Caucase ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

9. V. Avioutskii, 'L'engrenage de la guerre en Tchétchénie' [The events that led to War in Chechnya], *Hérodote*, No. 81, p. 42.

of the Republic of Chechen-Ingushetia, as anything out of the ordinary. He was doing no more than Yeltsin had in Russia or others in the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Central Asian Republics. It must be said that at the time political unrest was spreading visibly in most of the capitals of the federal or autonomous Soviet republics. The following month, in November 1990, something happened that would have obvious repercussions for the intricacies of the situation in the Caucasus. Dzhokhar Dudayev,¹⁰ an air force general of Chechen origin, who had commanded the strategic bomber base in Estonia since 1987, was chosen as president of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People. His military distinctions and his radical statements, combined with his merit in being the first Chechen to have reached the rank of Red Army general, made him the man of the hour. His profile was considered ideal for someone presiding over the destinies of this independence party.

A RUSSO-CHECHEN WAR OR A CIVIL WAR?

War between the Chechen people and the 'federal centre' or Russia broke out twice – from 1994 to 1995 and from 1999 to 2000. Boris Yeltsin did not lack pretexts for ordering the Russian Army to launch a surprise attack against the little Republic of Chechen-Ingushetia. That was the start of the war in Chechnya.

In March 1991 the Supreme Soviet of the ASSR of Chechen-Ingushetia decided not to take part in the referendum on maintaining the Union. The All-National Congress of the Chechen People even took a further step towards independence: it proclaimed 'that its principal objective was to achieve an independent Chechnya.'¹¹ The attempted coup in Moscow on 19 August 1991 pushed the USSR closer to the abyss. At the same time, it destabilized the local *nomenklatura*. Accused of complicity with the conspirators, the President of the Chechen Parliament was pushed towards the exit, and resigned. The All-National Congress of the Chechen People seized power immediately: its leader, Dzhokhar Dudayev, was elected President of the Republic on 27 October 1991. As such, on 1 November 1991 he proclaimed the independence of Chechnya, but Russia intervened. On 2 November, 'Moscow decreed this election and declaration of independence 'illegal'. In the Kremlin's eyes, Chechnya had become a zone of 'non-law'. Dzhokhar Dudayev sought to create unity among the peoples of the Caucasus. But their response to Chechen independence was not what had been hoped.'¹² On 7 November Boris Yeltsin proclaimed a state

10. Dzhokhar Dudayev was the first Chechen to reach the rank of general. He was a pure product of the Soviet system. He joined the Communist Party in 1968 and, after serving in the Soviet Army for more than twenty years, he had the twofold prestige of being Chechen and of having been honoured by the Soviet authorities.

11. Avioutskii, 'L'engrenage de la guerre' ..., *op. cit.*, p. 42.

12. Ferro et Mandrillon (eds.), *Russie, peuples et civilisations, op. cit.*, p. 45.

of emergency throughout the Republic of Chechen-Ingushetia. However, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, chaired by Ruslan Khasbulatov, himself of Chechen origin, refused to endorse that proclamation. A thousand Russian Interior Ministry troops dispatched to Grozny were captured by the Chechen National Guard under Dudayev's command. In addition to Russian hostility, the Ingush showed reservations. Through a referendum held on 30 November, they refused to leave the Russian Federation. On 1 December they decided to establish their own Republic of Ingushetia.

The Chechens had not reached the end of their troubles. Divisions appeared within the Republic of Ichkeria (Chechnya). In summer 1992, Dudayev's supporters in Government split over the distribution of profits from oil sales. On 13 September, Khasbulatov stated in Moscow that the Dudayev regime must be brought to an end. On 2 November, Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in Ingushetia and North Ossetia.¹³

The First War in Chechnya

The first conflict in Chechnya pitted the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation against the Chechen separatists. The war lasted from 1994, when Russia launched a military offensive, to 1996, the year of the Khasav-Yurt peace accord. This agreement was signed by Aslan Maskhadov, chief of the Chechen separatist army, and General Aleksandr Lebed, chief of the Russian Armed Forces. The Khasav-Yurt agreement made no provision for the independence of Chechnya, but Russian President Boris Yeltsin authorized the holding of presidential elections. Aslan Maskhadov won the elections with 54 per cent of the votes, but failed to control the war chiefs. The latter called for the establishment of an Islamic Caucasus uniting all of the republics bordering on Chechnya. Attacks were launched against neighbouring regions and in Russia, as well as against Russian civilians living within Chechnya. Radicals such as Shamil Basayev committed atrocities deep inside the Russian Federation. The Russians described those actions as acts of terrorism. After 11 September 2001, this description conferred a new dimension on the war in Chechnya – Russia too, like the United States of America, apparently had its war with Islamic terrorism.

The war was violent and destructive. The Russian Army took the capital, Grozny, after massive bombardments. Some observers suggest that 400,000 people fled the fighting, so murderous was it. Some suggest that 80,000 to 100,000 were killed, including 5,000 Russian soldiers and several thousand Chechen civilians. It is known that in such situations, figures may represent the continuation of warfare by other means. After Chechen fighters retook

13. Avioutskii, 'L'engrenage de la guerre' ..., *op. cit.*, p. 45.

Grozny on 6 August 1996, the Russian Federation was induced to negotiate a ceasefire in recompense for the retreat of its forces.

In the autumn of 1994, civil war intensified between Dudayev's forces and those of the opposition, who were divided among several clans. The leaders, Khasbulatov, Labazanov, Mamodayev and Avturkhanov, who were indirectly supported by Moscow, were too divided to gain the upper hand. Faced with persistent fighting and growing losses, Yeltsin sent all factions an ultimatum to stop the fighting, and after the Duma sent a delegation to Grozny where it met Russian soldiers captured by Dudayev's forces, Russian troops went into action. On 10 December they entered Chechen territory and on 31 December they launched a final assault against the capital, Grozny.

To understand the opposition and hostility between these men, we must go back a little. On 2 January 1994, taking a further step towards greater personal power, Dudayev established a 'Constitutional College of the Supreme Court, made up of five judges who must be nominated by [himself] personally.'¹⁴ In March, Khasbulatov made a triumphant return to Chechnya. This was after Yeltsin had removed him as President of the Russian Parliament. On 30 May, Dudayev escaped an assassination attempt and, on 5 June, he stripped Khasbulatov and several other opposition figures of their right to reside in the country. This compelled Mamodayev to head a government of opposition from Moscow.

The situation changed when Dudayev's presidential palace was captured on 19 January 1995, leading to fresh fighting in Grozny. After the Russians captured the major cities of Argun and Gudermes, on 24 and 30 March respectively, Dudayev launched a people's war from the mountains against the Russian occupier. The hostage-taking in the hospital in Budennovsk, in the Stavropol region of Russia, by Shamil Basayev's Chechen commando, marked a further escalation of violence in the Caucasus crisis. Negotiations to end this operation were conducted personally by Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin himself. A military agreement had thus become possible. It was signed on 30 July by the Russian Army on one side and the Chechen resistance on the other. Its chief provisions were a partial retreat of Russian forces, the phased disarmament of the Chechen fighters and the handover of Shamil Basayev to the Russian Army. The application of the agreement was suspended after the 6 October 1995 attack on General Romanov, who had headed the Russian delegation to the signing of the agreement, and who was seriously wounded. With difficulty, progress was made towards the controversial elections. They were boycotted by the resistance and by Khasbulatov, who withdrew his candidacy a week before the ballot. Nonetheless, the elections were held on 17 December, and the victor was the pro-Russian candidate, Zavgayev, with 95 per cent of the votes.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 46.



III-6.1 Bakery run by internally displaced persons from Chechnya in January 1997, many of whom fled from the fighting to the neighbouring autonomous republics of North Ossetia, Daghestan and Ingushetia

© UN Photo/T. Bolstad

The year 1996 brought its share of hostage-takings – in Kizlyar in Dagestan, involving a Chechen commando headed by Dudayev's nephew, or the seizing of the ferryboat *Avrazija* in the Black Sea by a team made up of North Caucasians and diaspora Turks in solidarity with the besieged Chechen commando. The outstanding events of the year were doubtless the death of General Dudayev in an airraid on 22 April, and his replacement by Vice-President Yandarbiyev. The other major event was the Chechen-Russian agreement negotiated in Moscow, in May, by Boris Yeltsin and a Chechen delegation headed by the new President Yandarbiyev. The agreement contained, in particular, 'a timetable for the phased withdrawal of the Russian Army from the country, [and for] elections in Chechnya on the country's future.'¹⁵

The Second War in Chechnya

The second war in Chechnya pitted the same Russian Federal Army against the Chechen independence fighters. It took place from 1 October 1999 to 1 February 2000, when the Russian forces entered Grozny. The military operations that the Chechens describe as resistance and the Russians see as acts of terrorism did not reach a conclusive end. The fire may well still smoulder on beneath the ashes. To understand how the parties resumed the war after signing an armistice and a political agreement, more than one reason must be examined. First, there was the wave of atrocities in the Russian Federation in 1999, then there were summary executions of several hostages, including Westerners, and lastly the massive incursions of Chechen forces into Dagestan with a view to provoking an Islamist coup d'état there. All this led straight to the second war in Chechnya in the autumn of 1999. Grozny was quickly seized in January 2000 by the Russian Federal forces commanded by Vladimir Putin, then Prime Minister of Russia.

The background to the second war in the Caucasus must be sought somewhat earlier in time. The interwar period in Chechnya lasted from 1996 to 1999. Specialists describe it as a period of struggle between two rival parties in Chechnya – the Islamists and the secularists. It was a time of intense political debate on the role of Islam in society. The Islamists were represented by Basayev, Yandarbiyev and others, and the secularists were led by Maskhadov. The Gudermes crisis of 1998 gave rise to violent clashes and the country was on the brink of civil war. Maskhadov's loyalist forces crushed the Islamists. The latter then decided to expel the foreign Wahhabis who had come in a jihadist wave to support their Chechen Islamist brothers. Despite his clear victory, Maskhadov lost ground politically and in 1999 he adopted a decree introducing the Islamic sharia. Moscow was monitoring the situation closely.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

It joined in this inter-Chechen religious competition, not hesitating to support Mufti Kadyrov when the latter called on North Caucasian neighbours for assistance in combating Salafism. Similarly, at the Congress of Muslims held in Grozny, Moscow used its influence to ensure that all neighbouring regions of Russia were represented.

Nonetheless, when Russian Federal forces invaded Chechen territory in late 1999, the question again arose in the same terms as in 1994: should holy war, or jihad, be declared to resist the invaders? Logically, that would have been the role of Mufti Kadyrov, the very man who proclaimed holy war against those very Russians in 1995. 'This time, however, he abstained from any proclamation, preferring to collaborate with the Russian forces.'¹⁶ Why did he side with the Russians this time? Out of conviction? Out of antipathy for Maskhadov? Whatever the reason, the rift between the two men became definitive when Mufti Kadyrov appeared in public at Putin's side.

Chechen-Russian relations: ancestral hostility

CONTEMPORARY CHECHEN RESISTANCE TO RUSSIA

In modern times the rebirth of the Chechen people began with the establishment in 1918 of the Mountain Republic, a confederation of the Caucasian peoples, which was established after the Russian Empire collapsed in 1917. Although they had welcomed, even enthusiastically, the Bolshevik Revolution, the Chechens were soon disillusioned. Lenin's comrades very quickly adopted a policy similar to Tsarist Russia's imperial policy. In the name of the revolutionary struggle against backwardness and reaction, Chechens were exposed to the worst form of destruction, that of their culture.

Attempts were made first to de-Islamize Chechen culture (with the closing and destruction of mosques) and then to assimilate it: Moscow replaced the Arabic script with the Latin alphabet in 1926, then finally imposed Cyrillic although it was unsuitable for rendering the Chechen glottal sounds. The intention was to isolate the Chechens both from their fellow Muslims abroad and from their own past.¹⁷

In 1922 Chechnya broke away from the Caucasian confederation to form an autonomous region. In 1934 this became the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Region and in 1936 an Autonomous Republic.

The salient aspects of the Chechens' long journey were acts of courage and an enormous and inexhaustible capacity for resistance. Their qualities of courage were acknowledged by friends and foes alike. 'Their god is freedom;

16. B. Balci, and R. Motika (eds.), *Religion et politique dans le Caucase post-soviétique* [Religion and Politics in the post-Soviet Caucasus], Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 2007, p. 220.

17. Karam, Mourgues, *Les guerres du Caucase ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

their law is war',¹⁸ the Russian poet Lermontov wrote of them in the nineteenth century. A Russian officer applied the following image to them: 'it is as hard to subdue the Chechens as it is to flatten the Caucasus mountain range'.¹⁹ Their indomitability, due largely to their clan structure and their Sufi brotherhoods, earned the Chechens ferocious repression and religious persecution from their large northern neighbour. Did the establishment of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Chechen-Ingushetia signal an end to their troubles? Not really. More recently, at the end of the Second World War, the Chechens were punished collectively. Accused of Nazi collaboration, they were classed among the 'punished peoples'. In 1944 Stalin punished them by deporting them to Central Asia. However, closer examination has shown that the Chechens had scarcely responded to the Germans' pressing entreaties. Moreover, they 'had been mobilized en masse by the Red Army and had distinguished themselves for their courage'.²⁰ Two years later, in 1946, the Republic of Chechen-Ingushetia was dissolved by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. This decree explains after the fact the tragic and inhuman decision to deport the Chechens, the Ingush and the Crimean Tatars.²¹ The Chechen-Ingush ASSR was to be revived only 11 years later, after the death of Stalin and the inception of destalinization in the Soviet Union. On 9 January 1957, in the Khrushchev period, a decree re-established the republic and ended the ban on the Chechen people living on its own land. The Chechens will forever resent the Russians as the butchers of their people.

THE PHOENIX: THE CHECHENS' ETERNAL RESURRECTION

Those Chechens who had survived the 1944 deportation returned in 1957. Deprived of its leaders owing to the purges and the long years of exile, Chechnya had been invaded by Russians. Often holding the most skilled positions, they had become the country's real masters. Meanwhile, the

18. A. Le Huerou, A. Merlin, A. Regamey, and S. Serrano, *Tchéchénie: une affaire intérieure? Russes et tchéchènes dans l'état de la guerre* [Chechnya, an Internal Affair? Russians and Chechens in the Grip of War], Autrement, Collection CERI, 2005, p. 43.

19. *Ibid.*

20. Ferro and Mandrillon, (eds.), *Russie, peuples et civilisations ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

21. The decree stated in part: 'In the period of the Great Fatherland War, when the peoples of the USSR were heroically defending the honour and independence of their fatherland by struggling against the German fascist invaders, many Chechens and many Crimean Tatars, at the instigation of German agents, joined German-organized volunteer units and, arms in hand, fought alongside German troops against units of the Red Army ... Meanwhile, the great majority of the population of the ASSRs of Chechen-Ingushetia and of Crimea did nothing to oppose the actions of those traitors to their homeland. That is why the Chechens, the Ingush and the Crimean Tatars have been re-settled in other regions of the USSR, where they have received lands ...' In Karam, *Les guerres du Caucase ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

indigenous people found themselves second-class citizens on their own land. Owing to the economic situation of chronic under-employment and that feeling of national frustration, many young Chechens emigrated.²² Some found alternative solutions within the economic and social fabric of the Soviet Union, far from their native Chechnya. Compared with the prospect of poverty, unemployment and corruption awaiting them in their homeland, exodus was seen as a lesser evil.

To grasp the complexity of the situation in the Caucasus, it is noteworthy that the territory of the ASSR of Chechen-Ingushetia, when reconstituted, was twenty per cent larger than before its dissolution. The enlargement was in the lowlands and to the Cossacks' detriment. The decision may at first sight appear to be a sign of the centre's goodwill towards the Chechens and beneficial to them. Is it really? Far from sure: it thinly veiled an obvious political calculation. As Viatcheslav Avioutskii says, 'contrary to a widespread view, Russians, whether officers of the Tsar or of the Bolsheviks, have tried to bring them down from their mountains the better to control and integrate them [the Chechens].'²³ The following figures are enlightening because they show the ostracism that Moscow practised particularly against the Chechen population. In the two years following 1957, the year of return from deportation, '232,000 Chechens and Ingush returned to repopulate the Republic. Russians already amounted to 28 per cent of the population, as compared with 59 per cent of Chechens and 13 per cent of Ingush.'²⁴ What complicated the situation and envenomed Chechens' resentment was the iniquitous distribution of power. Rather than applying the equitable rule dictated by respect for majority rights as compared with a minority, the Moscow authorities applied quite the reverse. 'The First Secretary of the Chechen Communist Party must be Russian, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet must be Ingush, while the Chechens could accede only to the post of Prime Minister, the least important of the three.'²⁵

These events must be recalled to understand the War in Chechnya today. This quick historical overview highlights the complexity of relations between the Russians and the Chechen people. We may regret that this ancestral antagonism, which continues to pit these peoples against each other, is mismatched. We may, further, suggest that war between them is not inevitable for ever. But it is not pointless to dissect the chain of events so as to understand the machine that pitched everyone, almost unknowingly, headlong into war.

22. In this chapter it must be stressed that many students left for Arab States or Turkey. Rather than leaving for Syria or Turkey, several chose to go to Tunisia where Sufism was still strong.

23. Avioutskii, 'L'engrenage de la guerre' ..., *op. cit.*, pp. 35–69.

24. Karam, Mourgues, *Les guerres du Caucase* ..., *op. cit.*, p. 165.

25. *Ibid.*

THE CHECHENS SACRIFICED: CONSENSUS OR INTERNATIONAL HYPOCRISY

Moscow used the Kadyrov card for a specific purpose. It wished to show the international community that the war in Chechnya pitted Russians no longer against Chechen separatists demanding their autonomy on a basis of nation and religion, but against terrorists. The latter happened to be Islamic extremists, precisely the people against whom the West in general and the United States of America in particular were pitted. According to Moscow, the terrorists had but one purpose – ‘to prevent Russia from re-establishing constitutional order in Chechnya.’²⁶ Consequently, in Moscow’s eyes they had but one right – to surrender. However, the Kadyrov card very quickly became valueless: by changing to the Russian side, he was discredited among the Chechen people. The Russian authorities therefore attempted to put forward another equally pro-Russian mufti in the person of Shamayev. Once appointed, the new mufti did not beat about the bush. He confirmed Moscow’s position by stating that the Chechens had only themselves to blame for the war and it was all their fault.

The Russians used another argument in their communications policy targeting international public opinion – the role and presence of foreign fighters in Chechnya. Those fighters, said to be Islamists, of course, and potentially terrorists, apparently threatened the Russian Federation’s national integrity and security. Russian propaganda deliberately exaggerated the number of those ‘foreign terrorists’. In truth, however, there were scarcely more than the few scores of mujahidin fighting under the Emir Khattab’s command. Nonetheless, the West took Moscow’s statements at face value. The European Union confined itself to a ‘few ritual reminders of the alarming plight of civilians and the need for a political solution.’²⁷ After genuine criticism at the start of the war, the trend towards appeasement was confirmed after 11 September 2001. Even the international organizations seem to forget their obligation to defend human rights when it comes to Chechnya. As an example that speaks volumes of the international community’s abandonment of the Chechen people, the United Nations Human Rights Commission discontinued efforts to adopt a resolution on Chechnya for the third time in March 2004.

26. Balci and Motika (eds.), *Religion et politique ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

27. Le Huerou, Merlin, Regamey, Serrano, *Tchéchénie: une affaire intérieure? ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

CONCLUSION

While some regard the war in Chechnya as a 'cultural conflict to be ascribed to the intrinsically violent nature of the Russian state',²⁸ others see it as a war nourished by self-evident economic and geopolitical interests in a region both rich and strategic. A third view is that the conflict was triggered because the 'United States of America, drawn by the oil and strategic position of the Caucasus, sought to consolidate its presence on Russia's southern flank.'²⁹ What is certain is that the conflict raised the question of the Chechen national identity and, concomitantly that of Russia's geopolitical identity. That Westerners, Europeans and Americans wished to capitalize on the collapse of the USSR to gnaw away at the southern borders of what remains the region's most powerful state, the Russian Federation, should not be excluded either.

The post-Soviet period was for Chechens one of building independence and above all an identity. That task could not be accomplished without war and a break with Russia. It was also a period 'for adapting Chechen Islam to new circumstances, in and through war, founded on an indigenous substratum.'³⁰ Chechen Islam remains above all a key factor of Chechen resistance to the Russian Federation in its political, military and cultural guises and has been attached since the nineteenth century, through its historic specificity, to religious brotherhoods. It has made changes such as moving away from *Naqshbandiyya* and towards *Qadiriyya*, considered the most suitable form of resistance and accepted by most Chechens. Use of the Arabic term *gazavat*, literally meaning *conquests*, refers to a glorious past but clearly shows that the Chechen people strive to link national history to religious fact.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*

Chapter 3.7

THE GULF WAR: FROM THE
IRAQ-IRAN WAR (1980–8)
TO THE 1991 KUWAIT WAR

Fredj Maatoug

FOREWORD

The 1950s, like the 1960s and the 1970s, were the lean years of secular nationalist revolutions in the Middle Eastern and Arab Maghreb countries. The prevailing ideology in those areas ranged from Arab nationalism, of both Nasserist and Baathist inspiration, to the socialist left sometimes tending towards Marxism. In 1979, however, an event occurred that changed everything, especially in the Middle East – the regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in Iran was overthrown by the Islamic revolution and replaced by a Shī'a Islamic regime under the authority of Ayatollah Khomeini, the revolution's supreme leader. 'Khomeinism was a convenient solution for everyone who was disenchanted with secular Arab nationalism and Soviet-style Marxism but nonetheless hostile to Western policies on the Middle East, defined by support ... for Israel.'¹ The Iranian Revolution therefore had deep and lasting consequences for the Muslim Middle East, in particular Iraq and Lebanon, and shortly afterwards, for countries further afield. Some interpreted the revolution's success as bringing Iran another step closer towards achieving its long-held dream of becoming the Gulf superpower.

The wave of Khomeinism changed the region's prevailing political ideology quickly and radically. The first signs of change came in the form of an official Iranian speech that was openly hostile to the Arab monarchies in the Gulf. That hostility peaked in relation to neighbouring Iraq, where Ayatollah Khomeini had spent fourteen years in exile in Najaf. Was it

1. G. Corm, *Le Proche-Orient éclaté 1956–2006* [The break-up of the Middle East 1956–2006], Gallimard, Collection Folio/histoire, 4th ed., 2005, p. 498.

because Iraq was a major centre for Shī'a Islam? Was it because it had thus acquired vital and strategic importance to the Ayatollah's Islamic revolution? That was quite likely, but one thing was certain: no sooner had Iran's Arab neighbours heaved a sigh of relief at the Shah's downfall and the end of his hegemonic policies, than Khomeinism assumed the Shah's mantle. The slogans had changed, tending more towards Pan-Islamic nationalism in tenor, but there was no change in Tehran's hegemonic designs on its Arab neighbours in the Gulf. The new Islamic regime soon launched into revolutionary diatribes that were far more dangerous and even more direct than the Shah's hegemonic policies. The new discourse inveighed against 'the hypocrisy of Saudi Arabian fundamentalism, the mainstay of American imperialism in the region'.² The new revolutionary discourse was more threatening to 'secular' Iraq than to the oil-producing Arab monarchies, for a number of reasons, two of which were most important. The first concerned the geopolitical position of Iraq as Karbala and Najaf, the two most important religious sites of Shī'a Islam, were within its borders. The second concerned Iraq's population, more than fifty per cent of whom were Shī'ite. Iraq's geopolitical position and its religious and ethnic composition were both catalysts for the forces of Shī'ite Islamism, boosted by the Islamic revolution in Iran. Other factors combined with these to plunge the two countries into eight long years of ruthless warfare.

I – THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR 1980–8

INTRODUCTION

How did Iraq and Iran come to declare war on each other? Why did the Iraqi Government take the momentous step, on 22 September 1980, of ordering its troops into battle? Was it the outcome of repeated Iranian provocation on its borders and even in Baghdad, the Iraqi capital? Were the recurrent calls by the Republic of the Mullahs on Iraq's Shī'ite minority to rise up against it the last straw? Did Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi President, yield to the temptation to put an end to the openly hostile neighbouring theocratic regime? Would he have made such a serious decision, had he not underestimated the solidity of the situation inside Iran? Many observers claimed that he had been 'misled by the Iranian opposition, which had informed him that the revolutionary regime, undermined by its internal contradictions, was running out of steam and was

2. *Ibid.*, p. 499.

on the brink of collapse.³ Were they right? Was there, in addition, a historical dimension to the dispute between Baghdad and Tehran? Did the past, like fate in a Greek tragedy, weigh heavily on the two protagonists? Were the two valiant peoples of Iraq and Iran not fated to clash from time to time, with each side invoking its ancestors? If each side had known that the war would be protracted, tragic and costly in both human and material terms, would it have yielded so readily to the will of Mars, the god of war? Whatever the answer to each of these questions, war incontrovertibly broke out. Incontrovertibly, too, that war was a mistake that had far-reaching consequences. Where is the evidence for this? The conflict opened a Pandora's box, triggering a whole series of dramatic and destructive wars that drew in all of the region's peoples, and the Iraqi people in particular.

The Causes of the war

ON THE IRAQI SIDE

It is clear that the decision to start the first Gulf War was taken in haste on the Iraqi side. Many factors account for such haste: above all, the power vested in one man and the lack of a democratic tradition in Iraq. Yet another situational factor was President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr's withdrawal from the Iraqi political scene, officially 'for health reasons'. President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr was considered by all who understood the internal power structures in Baghdad to be the last factor of stability in Iraq. He was practically the only person in the country who had the necessary authority to restrict Saddam Hussein's personal power. Virtually no-one else could influence the initiatives taken by his heir apparent that were considered by some to be untimely. Does that mean that President Saddam Hussein personally decided to go to war? The speed with which this conflict was dubbed 'Saddam's Qadisiya' confirms this theory as to who was responsible for starting the war. 'Qadisiya' was meant to give the war an Arab nationalist complexion, as against the implacable Persian foe. By invoking the memory of one of the earliest triumphant battles of the Islamic conquest, the name and the history behind it were meant to have a galvanizing effect. The Iraqi army soon became mired, however, and the euphoria of the first few days gave way to scepticism among much of the Iraqi population.⁴ Among the Arab States generally, there was muted hostility, and even recriminations, against Baghdad. Syria and Libya openly entered into an

3. J. Gueyras, 'L'Irak après sept ans de guerre', in *Iran-Irak: la diplomatie du conflit* [Iraq after seven years of war. In *Iran-Iraq: Diplomacy in the Conflict*], *Politique étrangère*, Second quarter, 1987, p. 317.

4. W. Raouf, *Irak-Iran, des vérités inavouées* [Iraq-Iran, Untold Truths], Paris, L'Harmattan, 1985, p. 31.

alliance with Tehran. The opportunity to be rid of his Baghdad rival was too good for President Assad of Syria to let slip. Owing to the deep animosity between the two wings of the Baath Party in power in the two sister countries, it is easy to understand why President Assad could not dream of a better opportunity to weaken, even of topple, his arch-rival in Baghdad. Libya's Colonel Gadhafi, rather a Nasserist, had never sought to conceal his distrust of political parties in general and of the Baath Party in particular.

ON THE IRANIAN SIDE

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to attribute responsibility to Baghdad alone. Over the border, Iran's resolve to 'export its revolution' had not been refuted. On the contrary, as the days passed, it became more clearly defined, and it is now questionable whether, in the light of Iran's revolutionary fervour, the war could have been avoided. Be that as it may, it is part of the normal scheme of things for a revolution to flaunt its messianism. At the same time, however, newly established regimes with revolutionary ambitions had often exported revolution as a tactic to camouflage dissent and difficulties at home. Did that mean that whenever there was a revolution, war broke out with a neighbouring country or countries? In reply to this question, history admittedly shows that wars have often, albeit not systematically, broken out in the wake or as the result of a revolution. Accordingly, Iraqi politicians' arguments claiming Iranian provocation may not be discounted entirely, although they must not be believed completely. Iraqi politicians claimed that such provocation, repeated ever more intensely and seriously, finally exhausted their patience and goaded them into action. This raises the question of the substantive content of Iran's provocation.

In reply, it must first be pointed out that Iraq had myriad grievances against Tehran, as evinced by this quotation: 'Post-1979 Iran switched from a "cold" war of psychology and ideology against its Iraqi neighbour to a "hot" war, when Iranian artillery "divertingly" shelled Iraqi border towns, such as Khanaquine and Mandali. Scores of other violations in Iraq's territorial waters, its air space and on its territory were recorded subsequently.' Iraq consistently argued throughout the eight years of conflict that the war broke out on 4 September 1980, which Baghdad regarded as the date that 'marked the true beginning of the war between the two countries',⁵ and it exploited to the full the shelling by Iranian artillery of Iraqi army positions, on Iraqi soil, at the towns of Khanaquine and Mandali. The invasion of Iranian territory by Iraq's armed forces on 22 September 1980 was therefore, according to the argument made by Baghdad merely a response to the attacks initiated by Iran's armed forces. Each side subsequently advanced a host of arguments in an attempt

5. A.-M. T. Zemzem, *La guerre Irak-Iran: Islam et nationalisme* [The Iraq-Iran War: Islam and Nationalism], Paris, Albatros, 1985, p. 18.

to prove that the other had opened hostilities. It was all a question of clearly demonstrating that the opposing side had unilaterally denounced the 1975 Algiers Accord.⁶ The Accord, the outcome of hard bargaining by the two countries, provided for strict observance of border security as a precondition of compliance with the spirit of the agreement as a whole. The declaration of principle made in Algiers was followed by a series of interrelated texts, protocols and meetings. The texts ratifying the Accord were exchanged on 22 June 1976 in the Iranian capital, Tehran, and were subsequently recorded at the United Nations. At the time, Iraq had no other option but to sign the agreement. The threats of the Shah of Iran and the bloody conflict in Kurdistan had left no room for manoeuvre. Referring to that episode later on, Saddam Hussein disclosed that his country had reached breaking point and that the army had run short of weapons and ammunition, so much so that the air force had three bombs left. Amid those circumstances, the Iraqi Government had agreed most reluctantly to sign an agreement that was clearly to its disadvantage. Did Iraq therefore unhesitatingly denounce the clauses of the Algiers Accord on 17 September 1980 because it had been flawed from the outset? This question could probably, with little risk of error, be answered in the affirmative. The skirmishes on both sides of the international borders, pitting its army against that of the Islamic Republic, had strengthened its desire to denounce the Accord.

THE TERRORIST ATTACK AT MUSTANSIRIYA UNIVERSITY

There had more recently been a spate of dramatic events that eventually sealed the deterioration of relations between the two regimes in power. Those events occurred a few months before the declaration of military hostilities.

6. The Algiers Accord of 6 March 1975 was signed by Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, and Saddam Hussein, Vice-President of the Republic of Iraq during the first OPEC summit conference in Algiers, after mediation by Houari Boumediène, President of Algeria and President-in-Office of the non-aligned countries. The Accord ended the war in Iraqi Kurdistan, in which Mullah Mustapha Barzani, actively supported by the Shah of Iran, had led a ruthless rebellion, said to have cost more than 60,000 Iraqi lives between 1974 and 1975. The Algiers Accord is in sum a 'Joint Iraqi-Iranian Declaration'. The two parties decided to:
 1. carry out a final delineation of their land boundaries in accordance with the Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and the Proceedings of the Border Delimitation Commission of 1914;
 2. demarcate their river boundaries according to the Thalweg line;
 3. restore security and mutual confidence along their joint borders ... put an end to all infiltrations of a subversive nature wherever they may come from;
 4. consider the aforesaid arrangements as inseparable elements of a comprehensive solution. Consequently, any infringement of one of its components shall naturally contradict the spirit of the Algiers Accord.

On 1 April 1980, there was a grenade attack at Moustansiriya University in the very heart of Baghdad. Thousands of students had gathered for an international economics conference that was to be opened officially by Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz. Two grenades were hurled at him as he entered the lecture theatre, but did not hit him directly. He was nevertheless injured and several students were killed. The perpetrator of the attack was named as Samir Gheilani Ali. According to the Iraqi authorities at the time, he was a member of al-Da'wa, the Shi'ite religious party, and, even more significantly, one of those Iranians who had always lived in Iraq but had never become Iraqi nationals. Iraq seized the opportunity to stress two key points.

The first was that members of the pro-Iranian and Shi'ite fundamentalist party were recruited from within the Iranian community, which had neither become integrated into nor felt any affection for Iraq, the country that had sheltered and protected them for decades, even generations. The second point, highlighted by the pro-government media, was ideological — they stressed that Tariq Aziz's religious background was Christian and that he had been targeted because he was a Christian 'who was, moreover, very popular well beyond his own community. He therefore symbolized everything that pro-Iranians detested: someone whose roots reached deep into Islamic soil but who remained outside Islam, someone whose very relaxed personal style was considered westernized',⁷ He was doubtless also targeted because he was prominent both within the Baath Party hierarchy and in the government. The worst was yet to come. A few days later, on 5 April, there was a second attack, this time on mourners at the funerals of the Mustansiriya victims.⁸ Enough was enough. The Iraqi Government was pilloried. It was obliged to respond in the face of Iraqi public opinion, which had been nurtured by Saddam himself to revere only a victorious leader. Accordingly, from the bedside of those injured in the attack, the Iraqi Head of State promised his people that the bloodshed at Mustansiriya would not have been spilt in vain. The promise was of the utmost significance.

THE TEMPERAMENTS OF THE POLITICAL LEADERS

Yet another factor drove the two regimes inexorably towards military confrontation — it stemmed from two men's personalities and temperaments and their ability to see eye to eye or otherwise. Thus, after a brief period of uncertainty in the far-from-peaceful relations between the two countries,

7. J.-M. Cadiot, *Quand l'Irak entra en guerre, la Qadisiyah de Saddam* [When Iraq Went to War, Saddam's Qadisiya], Paris, L'Harmattan, 1989, pp. 119–20.

8. The Baath regime's opponents suspected that the Iraqi state intelligence services were implicated in the attack.

mistrust prevailed. Relations of mistrust arguably constituted the most appropriate response, once the Islamic Republic had been declared, that is to say from 31 March 1979 onwards. With hindsight, it can be said that events might have taken a more satisfactory, or at least a normal, course, if the government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, a Muslim modernist, had remained longer at the helm, but he had quickly been sidelined by the increasingly hawkish and maximalist clerics. The two regimes were consequently poles apart on a slippery slope and diametrically opposed to each other. Saddam Hussein, a modernist and secularist, might have reached an understanding with Bazargan but could neither co-exist nor cooperate with Khomeini, a Shi'ite Muslim cleric and revolutionary. 'Two philosophies of history, two visions of humanity, two world views, in short, two rival combative ideologies irrevocably separated Islam's Savonarola and Comrade Saddam'.⁹ Apart from the structural differences between the two schools of thought, there was on the one hand one man's resentment, Ruhollah Khomeini's, and, on the other, another man's remorse, that of Saddam Hussein. The former was a vindictive religious leader, who had never forgiven his Iraqi host for forcing him to leave Najaf, where he was in exile, for Neauphle-le-Château in France. The latter could only curse the historical circumstances that had forced him to cede so cheaply 'Shatt al-Arab', a priceless Arab territory, under that harsh and unfair agreement, the 1975 Algiers Accord, signed with the Shah on terms unfavourable to Iraq. This background, together with the war of words and the border clashes, played a significant role in igniting the bloody war between the two neighbours.

The weight of history and the problem of proximity

The deeper causes of the Iraq-Iran War of 1980–8 inevitably included the weight of history. According to Paul Balta, between 'the two valiant and prestigious peoples of Mesopotamia and the high plateau of Iran', opposition had often triumphed over understanding and cooperation. 'They knew that for thousands of years ... history, geography and their sovereigns' ambitions had more often than not set them against each other; as allies, the two states shone with a brilliance that was the admiration and envy of their contemporaries, but such periods were too rare and too fleeting to serve as examples.'¹⁰ Geography, too, drove the two states towards discord.

9. P. Balta, *Iran-Irak, une guerre de 5000 ans* [Iran-Iraq, a 5,000-year war], Paris, Editions Anthropos, 1987, p. 110.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 81.



III-7.1 The United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), deployed to supervise the Iran-Iraq ceasefire and withdrawal of troops in 1988

© UN Photo/John Isaac

THE 'ARABIAN' OR THE 'PERSIAN' GULF?

Beside the weight of a long history, there were other bones of contention between Iraq and Iran. One of them had its origins in what could be called a war of adjectives. The terms 'Arabian' and 'Persian', used as qualifying adjectives for the Gulf, has been a source of tension between Iranians and Iraqis and, even more widely, between Arabs and Persians. In that connection, it should be noted first of all that the term 'Arabian Gulf'¹¹ had not been coined by the Baath regime, established in 1968. It already had currency at the time, even beyond the

11. It is noteworthy, in favour of the term 'Arabian Gulf', that Mercator had written '*sinus arabicus*' on a map dating from 1595. Subsequently, in 1763, The Danish orientalist Karsten Niebuhr travelled to Yemen, the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf, Iraq and Persia. He wrote an account of his travels, making the following observations:

'It is ridiculous that certain geographers should present a part of Arabian lands as belonging to the Kingdom of Persia. Persia's kings have never succeeded in taking control of the Gulf and have had to accept the situation of the coast remaining in Arab hands. The powers that have invaded the Gulf at various periods tried to destroy its Arabian character and replace it with an alien character, but never succeeded in their aims. The inhabitants of both shores of the Gulf have preserved their Arab customs and traditions ... Besides, the Gulf's inhabitants belong to Arab tribes: the Temim, Kaab, Bani Tarf, Ajman, Na'im, Bawakra...'

geopolitical confines of Iraq itself. As early as the 1950s, ‘Voice of the Arabs’, the powerful radio station in Nasser’s Egypt, had used only the adjective ‘Arabian’ to refer to the Gulf. Iran began to protest against that designation only when the Republic of Iraq was established in 1958 under the leadership of General Abdelkerim Kassem. Use of the term was not confined to those two states, for all of the then independent Arab states did the same. ‘These states maintain that the designation “Persian Gulf” was coined later than “Arabian Gulf”, which corresponds to a geographical and human reality: the majority of the people and territories on its shores have always been Arab.’¹² Arab historians and politicians also stress that ‘Arabian Gulf’ was commonly used by the geographer Strabo and by the Roman historian Pliny to refer to the present-day Gulf.

THE SITUATION OF SHATT AL-ARAB

Is this river the source or the continuation of the Gulf? It all depends on whether the traveller is moving southwards or northwards. It is ultimately a moot point. Whether source or continuation, Shatt al-Arab lies to the north of the Gulf. Shatt al-Arab literally means ‘Shore of the Arabs’. It is, in reality, a river, created by the confluence of the two great, blessed rivers in Mesopotamia – the Tigris and the Euphrates – which meet at Qarna, in Iraq, 204 kilometres to the north of the town of Fao on the Gulf. ‘A river that provided sustenance in Antiquity and boosted trade in the Islamic era, Shatt al-Arab ... has, in the twentieth century, become the world’s most important river for the transport of crude oil.’¹³ It flows for ninety kilometres along the border between Iraq and Iran before entering the sea. It varies in width from 400 metres at al-Aksar to 1,500 metres at its estuary and from six to ten metres in depth. It carries thirty-five million tons of silt each year and fertilizes the neighbouring palm groves. Shatt al-Arab deposits have been a divine ‘baraka’, a gift from heaven to Mesopotamia since Antiquity. Owing to the fertilizing silt of the Tigris and Euphrates, this eternal Mesopotamia had since time immemorial been the granary of this blessed region, but silting impedes use of the waterway by Iraqi ships. As Iraq has a narrow twenty-five kilometre coastline, it must dredge this inland waterway constantly to keep it navigable. It is, therefore, evident that the Shatt al-Arab waterway is strategically important for other reasons, too. Iran, which has the advantage of two coastlines, on the Caspian Sea to the north and on the Gulf and the Sea of Oman to the south, giving a total length of 2,440 kilometres, faced no such constraints. This situation in itself contained the risk of potential conflict that gave rise to two bloody wars.

12. Balta, *Iran-Irak, une guerre ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

‘AL-AḤWĀZ’, ‘ARABISTAN’ OR ‘KHUZESTAN’?

The third potential cause of dispute between the two neighbours was the Iranian province of Arabistan, which the Arabs used to call *al-Aḥwāz* and which the Iranians today call *Khuzestan*. This region, 420 kilometres long, 380 kilometres wide and covering an area of 185,000 square kilometres, is rich in water and oil and has always been regarded as inseparable from Shatt al-Arab and the Gulf. It is thus naturally and geographically continuous with Iraq and the Gulf states. On the other hand, it is separated from Iran’s other provinces by the Kurdistan mountains to the north and by the Bakhtiar mountains, an extension of the Zagros range to the east. The Arabs called this region *al-Aḥwāz*, a word in the plural that means ‘possession’, the singular being *ḥawz*, which is derived from the verb *ḥāza*, meaning ‘to acquire’ or ‘possess’ absolutely, without possession being contested by anyone, collectively or individually. Non-Arabs, such as Turks and Persians, used the term *Arabistan*, which means ‘land of the Arabs’, to refer to this province. The Safavids never questioned the Arab identity of the land or the people in that region, even when claiming sovereignty over the territory. The province’s name was changed in 1925, after Shaykh Khaz‘al, the Arab ruler of al-Aḥwāz, was deposed. On annexing the province, the Iranian sovereign gave it the Persian name of Khuzistan, which means ‘the land of fortresses’.

It is noteworthy that the famous Battle of Qadisiya, between Muslim Arabs and Mazdean Persians, was fought in this very region in 637. That battle will remain in the annals of Arab history as a memorable victory by the Arabs, message-bearers of the Islamic faith, over the Mazdean Persians. The Iranians, though Muslims themselves, have given that battle a different name, the ‘Battle of Khuz’, which means the ‘Battle of the Towers’ or ‘Battle of the Fortresses’. It is thus easy to understand why the Arabs adopted the self-explanatory term *Arabistan* to designate a province that is somewhat the equivalent of Alsace-Lorraine to the French. For while Iran’s sovereignty over the region, which it calls ‘Khuzestan’, is treaty based, Arabs point to the Arab identity of this same region, which they call both ‘*Arabistan*’ and ‘*al-Aḥwāz*’, invoking both its geography and its people. Iraq, imbued with Arabism, especially under the Baath regime, from 1968 to 2003, continually invoked the Arab identity of the region of *Arabistan*, usurped by the Safavid kings. Countless studies have sought to prove this thesis, both in Iraq and elsewhere.¹⁴

14. Louis Massignon described Arabistan in detail as the same kind of region as the plain of Mesopotamia. Furthermore, Sir Arnold Wilson wrote: ‘Arabistan is as different from Iran as Germany is from Spain, since Iran is a plateau hemmed in by mountain ranges on all sides, especially on the Arabistan side, while Arabistan forms a single geographical and economic entity with the lower part of Mesopotamia that contributed to the influence of the Sumerian and Chaldean civilizations.’

The end of the First Gulf War: its specificity and its consequences

WHAT WAS UNIQUE ABOUT THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR?

The Iraq-Iran War was unique firstly because it pitted two ‘developing countries’ against each other. Those two countries, which were, moreover, neighbours, were endowed with substantial modern resources. Secondly, the war was fought during the Cold War era against the backdrop of a bipolar world in which reconciliation was impossible. The third feature of the conflict follows from the second and assumes a special character in the context of contemporary international relations. The Iraq-Iran War was one of those rare conflicts in which neither of the two Cold War superpowers was involved, either directly or indirectly. Neither the United States of America, the leader of the Western world with its free-market economy, nor the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the other world superpower representing the socialist camp, had a direct stake in the war. Furthermore, a third medium-sized international power, France, became embroiled in the conflict because it had supplied weapons to one of the warring states – Iraq. This aspect of international contemporary life could not conceal another, equally important, aspect. The war was a genuine threat to the flow of a commodity that was the lifeblood of the world economy and industry – oil.

In addition to the points listed above, there was, perhaps, yet another that was regional in nature and concerned the Arab States in the Gulf directly albeit reluctantly. Those states chose to support Iraq, which liked to portray itself as the ‘guardian of the eastern gateway to the Arab world’. The Gulf monarchies were very careful, however, about the extent of their involvement and their support for Iraq. As they did not wish to give Iran any excuse for spreading the war to their own soil, their support was strictly financial and was provided all the more discretely and warily because the monarchies were not exactly enamoured of Baghdad’s Baathist regime. Quite the contrary, it gave them some cause for concern. Owing to their very nature, the monarchies feared the Baath Party and its socialist, Arab, unionist ideology like the plague. They were free-market economies and politically pro-Western. They were, in particular, aligned to the political positions of Washington, the bastion of world capitalism. For that reason, they were suspected by Arab public opinion, rightly or wrongly, of being in league with the United States of America, the staunch allies of the State of Israel, and stood accused, by that public opinion, of having long betrayed the Arab cause in Palestine. Instead of Arab nationalism, the monarchies cultivated inward-looking nationalism within the confines of their kingdom, emirate or sultanate. Their prime concern was to defend doggedly the wealth that had been built on oil revenues, which the ruling princes spent and dispensed as if it were their personal or family fortune.



III-7.2 The aftermath of the Gulf War for the Iraqi population in 1991;
women waiting for humanitarian aid in Karbala, Iraq

© UN Photo/John Isaac

It cannot be overemphasized that the two warring parties in the Iraq-Iran War were irremediably different. That difference was more than a mere ideological rift. The scales tilt towards Iran when the two are compared in terms of land area and population size, as Iran is generally larger than Iraq and its population is three to four times larger. There were therefore major differences in each state's military strategy. The ability to sustain a fairly long war and the capacity to absorb human losses varied, particularly in relation to the strategic depth of each country's territory and the size of its population. As those two factors were in Iran's favour, throughout the entire conflict it clung to the idea of winning a decisive victory by outright defeat. Iraq, on the other hand, with a smaller land area and a population a third the size of Iran's, had no hope of winning such a victory. Its strategy was, therefore, to prevent Iran from winning the war on the battlefield and to persuade it to agree to a cease-fire. The achievement of that goal was seen as a victory in itself by Iraq, but as a defeat by Khomeini.

Furthermore, the political systems in both countries were structurally completely different. For example, while the dominant ethnic base in Iran was essentially Indo-European, in Iraq it was Arab-Semitic. The unifying factor of Islam notwithstanding, that implied a difference of temperament and approach

to the most basic things. Lastly, although Iranian Islam was mostly Shi'ite, Iraq had a high proportion of Sunnis, who, though they were a minority, accounted for nearly forty per cent of the country's total population. The size of the Sunni population takes on a new significance when considered against the background of a Muslim Arab world that is almost exclusively ninety per cent Sunni.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF EIGHT YEARS OF WARFARE

In 1988, the Iraq-Iran war was still raging, and had been for eight years. Iraq, which had fewer strategic resources than its adversary, wanted at all costs to end the conflict. To achieve that goal, its air force stepped up its bombardment of Tehran and other Iranian cities, which experienced in that year the worst moments of the war. The huge civilian losses had become so intolerable to the Iranian Government that it ultimately agreed to a ceasefire. On 18 July 1988, Iran accepted Security Council resolution 598, adopted in the previous year, in July 1987, which called for an immediate cessation of hostilities between Iraq and Iran. Hachemi Rafsandjani, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, then announced: 'It is Imam Khomeini in person who has taken the decision to end the war in order to save human lives and to restore peace.'¹⁵ In private, Imam Khomeini said that it had been very difficult for him to agree to a cease-fire before accomplishing the goal that he had passionately vowed to achieve - which was to bring down the regime of Saddam Hussein, whom he had dubbed 'the little devil'. He even likened endorsement of the ceasefire, personally, to swallowing a deadly poison. The neighbouring states could at last breathe more easily. The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait welcomed Iran's decision. The United States of America regarded it as 'an important step towards the establishment of peace in the Gulf.'¹⁶

The Iraq-Iran war, declared rather rashly in September 1980, had caused enormous material and human losses to two developing countries. It had, in particular, compromised the political and economic future of Iraq, which, before the war, had made some radical choices for its industrial, scientific and economic development. Towards the end of the war, things were very different in the land of the Tigris and Euphrates:

Dependent on foreign powers, which provided him with the financial aid and the weapons needed to withstand the war of attrition being waged by Iran against his regime, the Iraqi President, who had dreamt of making his country the foremost power in the Gulf, severely reduced his international and regional

15. Abdel Jalil Zayd Marhoune, *Amn al-Khalij ba'd al-harb al-bārīda* [Security in the Gulf after the Cold War], Beyrouth, Dār al-Nahār, 1997, p. 217.

16. *Ibid.*

ambitions and introduced strict austerity measures in order to avert state bankruptcy.¹⁷

Iraq's debts after eight years at war had been estimated in reports on the economy at \$60 billion, with \$35 billion being owed to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, \$15 billion to the Soviet Union and \$6 billion to France. War-incurred material losses, excluding income lost from unsold oil, had been estimated at \$400 billion in another report. The two belligerents themselves had suffered the heaviest losses: \$180 billion by Iran and \$120 billion by Iraq. The figure for 1987 to 1988, the two bloodiest years of the entire conflict, was \$500 billion. The cost of reconstruction was put at \$50 billion for Iraq and \$120 billion for Iran. The losses in terms of personnel can only be described as a massacre: the two countries had together lost one million men, including the wounded.¹⁸

CONCLUSION

The consequences of the Iraq-Iran War were disastrous to the two protagonists, but were equally disastrous to the other Gulf states, and at several levels. During the war years, nationalist sentiment had intensified almost to the point of racism. Many Iraqis' experience of the war was one of resurgence of the age-old animosity between Arabs and Persians. Furthermore, the sectarianism that characterized the Shi'ites' and Sunnis' sense of religious identity reached a new pitch. It must be noted, however, to keep matters in perspective, that Iraqi Shi'ites firmly resisted the lure of religious sectarianism. During the eight years of war against Iran, in spite of overt advances by the Khomeini camp and the inflow propaganda from the Iranian mullahs relayed by Iraqi members of the al-Daoua Party, their patriotism as Iraqis stood the test. It outweighed their membership to the Shi'ite community. For how long? The temptation to ask the question is very strong.

Moreover, the United States of America emerged from the conflict as clear winners on the geopolitical front. Their military presence in the Gulf became permanent and official. The war had frightened the weakened Gulf monarchs, who had turned eagerly to their great American ally. The United States of America had, of course, readily signed security treaties and military agreements extending their presence in that sensitive region beyond the duration of the conflict.

Israel, the other non-Arab force in the region apart from Iran and Turkey, had seen immediately that it could gain an advantage from that deadly clash

17. *Politique étrangère*, 2/87, *Iran-Irak: la diplomatie du conflit* [Iran-Irak: Diplomacy in the conflict], Second quarter 1987, p. 290.

18. The figure varies, depending on the source. It fluctuates between one million and one and a half million victims.

between Baghdad and Tehran. Israel's leaders tried to answer the eternal question that the Jews of the Diaspora had pondered throughout their history. Wherever they happened to be, the question that had always preyed on their minds with every event was 'Is it good or bad for us?' Yet again, therefore, at the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran Gulf War, the State of Israel inevitably pondered the same question. Although Israel's leaders regarded both belligerents as hostile to them, 'their strategy, from the outset, was to side with Iran, which posed a more remote threat.'¹⁹ A statement on the matter by Israel's former ambassador to the United Nations, General Haïm Herzog, soon after the war broke out, spoke volumes. He said that 'Iraq's inability to win an outright military victory could only be viewed with relief in Israel. At the same time, Iran, like Israel, could not stand idly by while Iraq developed nuclear facilities.'²⁰ Besides, Israel took advantage of the confrontation between the two countries to bomb Iraq's Tammuz nuclear installations in a suburb of Baghdad in June 1981.

II— DESERT STORM OR THE KUWAIT LIBERATION WAR

INTRODUCTION

The Iraq-Iran War had many consequences not only for the Gulf states but also for the Middle East as a whole, some of which have already been mentioned above. In assessing the situation prevailing at the end of the war, a paradox becomes evident. Despite the huge human and economic cost, Iraq emerged from the war militarily mature and with a wealth of experience. It was therefore, from a military standpoint, a regional power to be reckoned with in future, as noted by international observers in Europe and the Americas; but that was cold comfort to Israeli strategists. That said, while Iraq had gained a level of military experience that began to give some neighbouring states cause for concern, it lacked the financial and economic resources to back its policies. Worse yet, it was even on the brink of bankruptcy. Now, as everyone knows and as the old adage says, money is the sinews of war.

As bad news never travels alone, it was not long before Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the sister states that had acted as Iraq's creditors during its war with Iran, requested Iraq to repay its debts. The Iraqi leaders took offence, astonished at the sister states' ingratitude and greed, and expressed clearly their annoyance at such a demand. How dare they demand

19. Balta, *Iran-Irak ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 218–19.

money from a sister state that had made such bloody sacrifices! How dare they speak of financial debts, when Iraq had lost hundreds of thousands of its children in defending, in the name of the Arab nation, the ‘eastern gateway to the Arab world’ against ‘the Persian foe’!

The moral issue raised by the Iraqi Government should not, however, mask the country’s desperate economic situation. Iraq’s coffers at the end of the war were empty. In 1988, Iraq was increasingly regarded as an emerging regional power, but this was true in military terms only, for it was financially and economically in dire straits. This prompted some observers to declare that Iraq ‘emerged from the war both powerful and bled dry.’ Iraq was in a dangerous situation. The land of the Tigris and Euphrates was seriously at risk of imploding economically and socially. Ironically, it was threatened by its greatest source of pride – its army, which then comprised ‘55 divisions, compared to 10 divisions in 1980, one million fully trained and combat-ready men, 500 aircraft and 5,500 tanks.’²¹ After eight years of sacrifices, Iraqi soldiers craved comfort and recognition but, owing to the economic situation, Iraq had virtually no prospects of surmounting its predicament. The Iraqi Government therefore decided, as a diversionary tactic, to press on regardless. It drew the nation’s attention to an external foe as a means of absorbing rising internal tensions. It thus pointed the finger at yesteryear’s allies – the Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwaiti – against whom a new battle was about to be waged. The grievances against them were related to their borders, the debt and oil. This was the backdrop to the tragic event of the night of 2 August 1990, when Iraq’s army invaded and annexed Kuwait.

The prelude to an invasion

At the end of the war with Iran, the Iraqi Government’s request for additional financial aid from the Gulf states was met with a refusal. Kuwait even demanded that Iraq repay the \$10 million loan that it had negotiated during the war. Incensed, the Iraqi leaders argued that they had spent eight years fighting to defend Arab identity and the Gulf states’ security. Relations worsened further when the thorny issue of oil quotas was broached. ‘On 9 August 1988, the very day after the ceasefire, Kuwait decided to increase its oil production in violation of the agreements signed with the other Members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).’²² Iraq regarded that action not only as provocation but also as betrayal. It therefore accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of exceeding their production quotas,

21. P. Salinger and E. Laurent, *Guerre du Golfe, le dossier secret* [the Gulf War, the secret dossier], France, Olivier Orban, 1991, p. 7.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

and blamed them for saturating the oil market, for the fall in oil prices and for Iraq's loss of several billions dollars per year. Were those accusations founded? Some observers had estimated that Iraq's oil revenue had fallen by thirty per cent. On 13 August 1990, *Newsweek* estimated the revenue that the Iraqi economy had lost of \$14 billion owing to the glut on the oil market. A number of Western observers therefore shared Iraq's diagnosis. According to some oil economists 'overproduction had been orchestrated deliberately from 1986 onwards by the United States of America, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in order to weaken Iraq, whose per annum oil income plummeted to seven billion dollars in 1988, the amount required to service the debt.'²³

Iraq's other grievance against Kuwait was the illegal pumping of oil from the contested Rumayla oil field. Iraq's anger against the Gulf states was expressed in public for the first time in a speech delivered by Saddam Hussein at Amman on 23 February 1990, at the Arab Cooperation Council Summit,²⁴ when, in the presence of King Hussein of Jordan, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Ali Abdallah Saleh, the President of Yemen, the Iraqi Head of State disclosed his private thoughts on future international developments and their potential effects on the region. It is most interesting to note, writing now in 2010, that in February 1990, he evoked Moscow's dwindling influence and its consequences. He warned his fellow summiteers that the Soviet decline would present the United States of America with a unique opportunity in 'the coming five years' and would give it unprecedented freedom of action in the Middle East. He then explained himself in greater detail:

The country that will exert the greatest influence on the region, the Gulf and its oil will consolidate its superpower status ... This shows that if the peoples of the Gulf – and, further afield, the entire Arab world – are not vigilant, this whole area will be governed to suit the United States of America. For example, oil prices would be set to benefit American interests, regardless of anyone else's interests.²⁵

Was this why Iraq took the initiative of attempting to form a united front with Egypt, the Yemen and Jordan? Was it for the same reason that Iraq, containing its anger, made a last-ditch effort to reach agreement with Kuwait? The answer is probably 'yes'. It is known for certain today that Iraq was aware of the United

23. R. Berthier, *L'Occident et la guerre contre les Arabes, réflexions sur la guerre du Golfe et le nouvel ordre mondial* [The West and the War against the Arabs, Reflections on the Gulf War and the New World Order], Paris, L'Harmattan, 1994, p. 64.

24. The Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) was a short-lived Arab organisation. Instrumental in its formation were Iraq and Yemen, which were excluded from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in February 1989. In addition to these two countries, the A.C.C. included two other members, Egypt and Jordan. Saudi Arabia saw the creation of this group as a ploy to encircle it.

25. Salinger et Laurent, *Guerre du Golfe ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

States of America's designs on the Gulf, a region overflowing with oil. Iraq's unimaginative and heavy-handed attempts to resolve the disputes met with failure. What did he need to achieve success? First of all, the necessary trust among the Arab States which lacked, above all, an appropriate and effective inter-state organization that transcended political differences and each state's individual interests.

At the Arab Summit in Baghdad on 28 May 1990, in a private meeting, Saddam Hussein again accused Kuwait mainly of exceeding its production quota. While Kuwait's OPEC-allocated quota was 1.5 million barrels per day until March 1991, Kuwait had produced 2.1 million barrels per day, which was far above that allocation, and so, the Iraqi President, rounding on the Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, told him angrily: 'you are waging nothing short of an economic war on my country.'²⁶ He demanded that the Emirate halt its overproduction and that it cancel Iraq's \$35 billion debt, and requested another \$10 billion in aid. One month later, at the end of June 1990, Saadoun Hamadi, the Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament, travelled to Kuwait for more talks on the debt issue. At first, the Emir apologized for being unable to do anything, but then changed tack, conceding that he would consider the matter, but on one condition, Iraq accept the borders as delimited between the two countries and recognize the independence and sovereignty of Kuwait. It is known that none of these attempts at reconciliation had a favourable outcome. Quite the contrary, for matters took a turn for the worse, and so the crisis deepened beyond the point of no return.

The Iraqi army invades Kuwait

On 16 July 1990, Iraq wrote to the League of Arab States, accusing Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of exceeding their oil production quotas. The letter further stated that Kuwait had also occupied Iraqi oilfields in the Rumayla border area. Iraq therefore demanded \$2.4 billion in compensation for the oil that had already been extracted from these fields. It accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of 'collusion in an imperialist-Zionist plot against the Arab nation'.

Kuwait responded to Iraq's accusations in a letter to the League of Arab States dated 19 July 1990, in which it in turn accused Iraq of violating Kuwaiti sovereignty and of drilling on land falling within its sovereignty, thus stealing Kuwaiti oil. It therefore requested that League of Arab States establish a commission to settle the border dispute between the two countries on the basis of the *convention* in force and documents held by each country, which the two parties were obliged to exchange. The crisis between Iraq and Kuwait was

26. Marhoune, *Amn al-Khalij* ..., *op. cit.*, p. 221.

at its height, when hope glimmered at the prospect of negotiations to be held in Jeddah on 1 August 1990, on the initiative of Saudi Arabia. Those last-ditch negotiations soon failed, however.

Thus, on 2 August 1990, the Iraqi armed forces invaded Kuwait. A series of measures and decisions were taken immediately in quick succession. Those measures had serious consequences because they ignited conflict in the region.

First, a communiqué was released by the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, announcing the dissolution of the Kuwaiti Government and the formation of 'the Provisional Government of Free Kuwait', and stating that Iraq would withdraw as soon as the situation became stable and at the request of 'the Provisional Government of Free Kuwait'. The Iraqi armed forces therefore closed Kuwait's air space and all land and sea entry and exit points. It took steps to prevent anyone from entering or leaving the Emirate.

Five days after the invasion, Iraq announced the establishment of the Republic of Kuwait. A next step taken was to establish Iraqi and Kuwaiti dinars as a single currency. On the following day, 8 August, the Revolutionary Command Council released a new communiqué, announcing that 'the Provisional Government of Free Kuwait had requested Iraq to make the two countries a single organic unit, under the presidency of the Iraqi President, [and that] the decision, once taken, would be irreversible.'²⁷

On 28 August, Iraq announced that Kuwait had become a province of Iraq, the nineteenth, and would be subject to the same administrative laws as all other Iraqi provinces. By presidential decree, the capital, Kuwait City, would thenceforth be known as '*al-Kadhima*', said to be the city's name under the Ottoman Empire. What were the reactions of the region and the rest of the world to the invasion of Kuwait?

Regional and international reactions to the invasion of Kuwait

What is to be learnt from the tragic episode of 2 August 1990 and from reactions that it sparked? The answer to this question requires a rare ability to sum up information, as the volume of statements, communiqués and position papers on the event was so great. When he asked: 'whether he was surprised by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait?' Michel Jobert, several times French Foreign minister of the Fifth Republic and a leading French authority on the Arab world, replied: 'It was obviously impossible to foresee exactly when the invasion would occur, but it is evident from their entire history and geography that Iraq had long considered that Kuwait was to be tolerated, but did not

27. *Ibid.*, p. 222.

really exist.' This short reply speaks volumes about relations between Iraq and its southern neighbour, the Emirate of Kuwait.

To return to the question of what was to be learnt from the events of 2 August 1990, it must first be stressed that the Arab States had reacted very quickly in an endeavour to find an internal solution to that thorny problem. It was no Utopia. The region's recent history had shown that the states could find solutions to the most desperate situations, as proven by the success of the Arab Good Offices Commission in ending the bitter fratricidal confrontations between Jordanians and Palestinians in September 1970. It became apparent very quickly, however, that this particular Arab solution was doomed to failure. The reason was twofold: firstly the United States of America's determination to torpedo any Arab initiative and, secondly, the puzzling position of Cairo, which did little to salvage the initiative.

THE FRUITLESS ATTEMPTS AT AN ARAB SOLUTION

Apart from the unsuccessful Saudi mediation on 1 August 1990, one day before the invasion, other Arab initiatives had been taken in an attempt to extinguish the flames that threatened to engulf the entire region. The boldest attempt was that of the King of Jordan, Hussein Ibn Talal. The Palestinians, too, through Yasser Arafat, had sought a solution. Why had the Palestinians and Jordanians been the first to attempt to mediate? The answer is that by virtue of the geographical situation of the former and the geopolitical situation of the latter, both were vulnerable and Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) had sensed, more than any of the Arab States, the dangers of a Middle East war directed against Iraq. Jordanians and Palestinians were convinced that Iraq's military clout was strategically in their favour. King Hussein therefore won very quickly Saddam Hussein's agreement in principle to an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Baghdad, nonetheless, laid down one condition, which was not, all things considered, an insurmountable obstacle. Iraq did not want to be condemned by the Arab States. Hosni Mubarak had agreed and had given his word to King Hussein to that effect. They had not, however, reckoned with interference by the United States of America, which succeeded in scuppering the initiative, thus nipping any Arab reconciliation in the bud. It exerted great pressure on Egypt to speak out strongly and clearly against the Iraqi invasion. Thus, the summit meeting of the League of Arab States, held in Cairo on 10 August 1990, was conducted briskly by the Egyptian President. Many heads of state, in particular the leaders of the Arab Maghreb states, were absent. A decision was taken, condemning by twelve votes Iraq's invasion Kuwait. At the request of Saudi Arabia and in view of the fear prevailing in both Riyadh and the United Arab Emirates, the communiqué also condemned

Iraqi threats against the Arab states in the Gulf and the mobilization of Iraqi forces along Saudi borders.²⁸ As a result of this condemnation, the Jordanian King's efforts came to naught.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA'S INTRANSIGENCE TOWARDS IRAQ

From the beginning of the invasion of Kuwait, the Government of the United States of America opposed all attempts by the Arab States to resolve the crisis. What was its motive in taking such a stance? If former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is to be believed, the

United States of America's options when Kuwait was invaded were threefold: passive endorsement of all United Nations decisions; support for the industrialized democracies – which were more dependent than the United States of America on oil supplies from the Gulf; and taking the lead in actively opposing Saddam Hussein. As it took the third option, the United States of America could either go for a sanctions policy or prepare for a military offensive.²⁹

Washington, as is known today, resorted both to sanctions and to a military offensive. The thing that mattered to the United States of America was ensuring that Iraq was not allowed to absorb Kuwait. Why? The reply as viewed by the United States of America's strategists and summed up here by Kissinger was that

If Iraq were allowed to take over Kuwait, that would lead to an increase in Iraq's oil revenues, which would enable it to accelerate its arms programme, and that would, sooner or later, ... lead to a real possibility of conflict among the other moderate Arab states and the radical states, and to the virtual certainty of an Arab-Israeli conflict, with a strong probability, this time, of nuclear weapons being deployed.³⁰

Who would use an atomic weapon if war broke out in the Middle East a few years thence? Kissinger was silent on that point, but it was common knowledge that Israel was the only state in the region that could do so, for the simple reason that it was the region's only nuclear power.

The Arab solution, albeit difficult, was not a Utopian. The aim of the United States of America in blocking it was certainly to avoid public debate on the real causes of the crisis. That would have meant discussing Iraqi claims relating to oil, borders and Palestine. Whether these were legitimate, of doubtful legitimacy or totally illegitimate is, in our view, secondary. It was the actual

28. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

29. A. Joxe, *L'Amérique mercenaire* [Mercenary America], Paris, Stock, 1992, p. 265.

30. Reply to a question raised by Senator Dan Coats, *ibid.*, p. 264.



III–7.3 United Nations inspectors working to dispose of Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear weapons capacity in June 1991

© UN Photo/P

principle of Arab States discussing and debating those claims that Washington rejected. There was also another important imperative of American policy, which could not be reconciled with the prospect of a peaceful Arab solution. According to Brent Scowcroft, the then National Security Adviser at the White House, Washington wanted to make sure that ‘no hostile regional power could highjack the majority of oil supplies’.³¹ Furthermore, the United States of America wished to have a permanent military base in the Gulf and to weaken by war a powerful Arab State driven by Arab nationalist ideology that would never be an ally and, moreover, engaged in fiercely anti-Israeli rhetoric. ‘Lastly, while the Soviet Union was in its death throes, the White House was poised to rewrite the rulebook for the new post-Cold War international order.’³²

The United Nations Security Council therefore adopted, in a very short time, several resolutions on Iraq, which were among the harshest in the United Nations’ history since the end of the Second World War. As the terrible

31. G. Bush, B. Scowcroft, *A World transformed*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1998, in A. Michel, and F. Voyer, *Irak, la faute* [Iraq, the Transgression], preface and introduction by Alain Gresh, Paris, Les éditions du CERF, 1999, p. 21.

32. *Ibid.*

weakness of the Soviet Union was no longer a secret, the United States of America, only too aware of the situation, acted as a superpower that had the field to itself. From then on, the Security Council was merely a sounding board to endorse the political will of Washington. Binding resolutions, some harsher than others, were adopted on Iraq. Suffice it to mention but two such resolutions. Resolution 661 of 6 August 1990 imposed mandatory sanctions, comprising a total arms embargo, a ban on all international flights, a trade ban, including financial transactions, and the freezing of Iraqi assets abroad. Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990 set the stage for the Kuwait liberation war waged by the United States of America at the head of an international coalition of some thirty states. It authorized United Nations Member States to use force if Iraq did not withdraw its troops from Kuwait by 15 January 1991.

The rest is history – a terrible, lopsided war, in which the United States of America gave an awesome demonstration of its power at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives. It was not a war but a massacre.

CONCLUSION

The Kuwait liberation war, codenamed '*Desert Storm*', was a statement by Washington to the world. The war marked the masterly establishment of a new and exclusively American world order and the advent of the new empire. Was it necessary for the empire to destroy so much? Practically nothing was spared. Bridges, roads, water mains, water purification systems, food and drug manufacturing plants, such as the baby-milk producing factory, were systematically bombed. Even some Iraqis who were most critical of Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait said that they were under the impression that 'the West could not bear seeing a third-world country lift itself out of poverty and use its wealth to benefit its people'. In view of the scale of the destruction, tens of millions of Arabs, such as the Chaldean Patriarch of Baghdad, constantly said that international law was guilty of applying double standards. Suffice it to compare the fate of Iraq after its criminal actions in Kuwait with that of Israel, which has never even applied the most innocuous United Nations resolution, after occupying Palestinian territory for decades.

However, the worst was that, even after the war had ended, punishment was still being meted out to a whole nation – the Iraqi people – under the continuing and unjust embargo. After the intensive bombing and a ground offensive by a coalition of 700,000 soldiers of various nationalities, Iraq lost the war and Kuwait regained its independence. One might be forgiven for thinking at the time that, as the allies had accomplished their task as defined by the United Nations, it was all over and the time had come for a fresh start. That was not the case. There were other plans. Security Council resolution 687, adopted on 3 April 1991, imposed new, draconian conditions

on Baghdad. Dubbed '*the mother of all resolutions*', it set out the ceasefire terms and established the United Nations Special Commission tasked with disarming Iraq. In particular, it specified eight preconditions for the lifting of sanctions against the country. Iraq was required to recognize Kuwait's borders, destroy its chemical and biological arsenal and its missiles under the permanent supervision of a United Nations commission, eliminate Iraqi nuclear capabilities under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, accept responsibility for the war damage and therefore the compensation fund administered by the United Nations. Resolutions 706 and 712, of 15 August 1991 and 19 September 1991 respectively, further eroded Iraq's sovereignty, effectively placing it under trusteeship. The latter two resolutions provided that Iraq was authorized to sell 1.6 billion barrels crude oil products every six months, the proceeds being collected and paid into an escrow account for allocation on the following basis: sixty-six per cent for imports; thirty per cent for the compensation fund; and four per cent for the United Nations inspections commission in addition to its other expenses. No goods, food or medicines were to be imported without the authorization of the United Nations sanctions committee, under the control, directly or indirectly, of the United States of America.

In other words, the war against Iraq was far from over. It merely continued in a different form, that of a total blockade and limited sovereignty. The ceasefire of 3 April 1991 was therefore merely a respite required by the United States of America while it planned its next move. It waited patiently until the time was right to announce to the international community the fate that it had in store for the land of Sumer. That time came on 11 September 2001.

Chapter 3.8

THE EVENTS OF
11 SEPTEMBER 2001 AND THEIR
CONSEQUENCES FOR ISLAM AND
THE MUSLIM WORLD

Fredj Maatoug

INTRODUCTION

The attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC were a watershed moment. For Americans it was, as Yves-Henri Nouailhat puts it, undoubtedly ‘the worst attack in their history’. According to some it was worse than the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in the Second World War. For much of the mass media in Western liberal democracies, the world witnessed a ground-breaking event on 11 September. The attacks heralded a new phase in post-Cold War international relations. The importance of such a shift is comparable to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. So much so that the date of the events – 11 September 2001, or 9/11 – became the symbol of a new phase in the history of the United States of America and its relationship with the outside world in general, and with the Muslim world in particular. Some observers, such as the historian and journalist Alexandre Adler, felt that they could see ‘the end of the old world’ in these painful moments. Others saw it as ‘an apocalypse’. Nevertheless, although it is an exaggeration to see the events of 11 September as the end of the world, it is no exaggeration to speak of the end of a world. ‘The symbolism of 11 September has imposed itself everywhere as the outbreak of war between civilization and barbarism, democracy and terrorism, Islam and the Judeo-Christian West.’¹

As we can see, many analysts came to see this event, geostrategically speaking, as ground-breaking. This is why the now famous expression: ‘pre-9/11’ or ‘post-9/11’ was used so frequently in subsequent months and

1. G. Corm, *Orient Occident, la fracture imaginaire*, Paris, La Découverte, p. 9.

years; a frequency that showed just how much American society and Western society in general had been affected by the 11 September attacks. But what was new about the acts perpetrated in Manhattan and Washington? It could hardly be the threat of terrorism, since it has always existed in every society and within every religion, whether monotheistic or otherwise. Indeed, as Régis Debray said, ‘indiscriminate terror, the rejection of the laws of war and the massacre of innocent civilians is something that has been practised by the fundamentalists of every country and every religion.’ What is it then? Is it the type of terrorism that is important here? Here again, the answer is no. What was new, however, was essentially that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) might be used by non-state groups. This fear was expressed by Western analysts and policymakers alike. Some observers have even given this phenomenon a new name: ‘the privatization of weapons of mass destruction’. And it should be noted, in this respect, that while it was soon announced that the perpetrators of these attacks were Muslims and that they all came from the Arab world, we are still waiting for an answer to a question that would appear crucial to our understanding of the situation. The question, moreover, has not even been asked. Worse still, we have refused to ask it. And anyone tempted to ask it has been subtly dissuaded from doing so. In fact, a strong suspicion of complicity with the terrorists has been allowed to hover over anyone who dares to ask why America was attacked. ‘The overall result is that any attempt to place the horrors of what occurred on September 11 in a context that includes US actions and rhetoric is either attacked or dismissed as somehow condoning the terrorist bombardment’² says Edward Said, one of the most original intellectuals of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

International context and regional context in the Middle East in 2001

Following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States emerged as the winner of the Cold War. This strategic shift has been seen and analyzed as a complete, definitive victory for liberal democracy and the market economy over its rival of sixty years: the planned socialist economy. Ten years later, in 2001, the United States of America was unquestionably the major world power economically, politically, militarily and culturally. In order to reflect the importance of American power at the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the following economic reality must be borne in mind: in 2000, there were 65,000 multinationals controlling 850,000 subsidiaries around the world; a considerable number, and a significant increase over the previous decade. The most important thing to stress here is that the weight of American firms within this group was *dominant* to a very considerable extent. In fact the picture

2. E. W. Saïd, *From Oslo to Iraq and the Road Map*, New York, Vintage Books, p. 115

was as follows: ‘more than one third of the 100 biggest multinationals are American. They control over twenty per cent of world investments.’³ The overwhelming American dominance of the world, both economically and politically, would result in the emergence of an imperial ideology. Indeed, in the 1980s, even before the implosion of the Soviet Union (USSR), theories emerged which attempted to prove that the American way of life was not just the only valid way, but also the best in the world.

THE ‘END OF HISTORY’ THEORY

The first theory of United States imperialism came from Francis Fukuyama. This former State Department official got the ball rolling with his book *The End of History and the Last Man*,⁴ which, thanks to the colossal American propaganda machine, received huge media coverage. The author’s central argument in the book is that ‘the “end” of history had arrived with the achievement of the global market economy, liberal political pluralism and possessive individualism. [Fukuyama particularly wanted to demonstrate] that the American system was the best and that no other was possible. Any objection to this system was an affront to the Truth of human history, which had at last been found in the United States of America.’⁵ Consequently, there was only one thing left for other nations to do: draw the logical conclusions and copy the American model. This meant signing up to the liberal economic system, accepting globalization by opening up domestic markets to multinationals in which US companies had the lion’s share and then implementing a policy of liberal democracy.

THE ‘CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS’ THEORY

The second contribution to the emergence of the ideology of a triumphant America came from Samuel Huntington. We can, to some extent, see Huntington not so much as a philosopher as the heir of Protestant preachers who had, over the centuries, provided American society with its civil religion. He was the ideologue and briefly the architect of the anti-Communist struggle under the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson in the 1960s. His book *The Clash of Civilizations* was essentially based on a short article published in 1993, but following the coverage that the article received, he fleshed it out and turned it into the book that he would eventually publish in 1996. In it, Huntington advances the hypothesis that the basic distinctions between individuals are not ideological, political or economic in nature, but cultural. Everyone undergoes

3. ‘*Alternatives économiques*’, No. 208, November 2002, in Sami Näir, *L’empire face à la diversité*, Paris, Hachette Littératures, 2003, p. 30.

4. F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and The Last Man*, New York, Free Press, 1992.

5. Näir, *L’Empire face à la diversité, op. cit.*, p. 144.

an identity crisis. And when people want to answer the central question of who they are, their response inevitably harks back to their ancestors, their religion, language, history, values and customs, and so on. People thus define themselves through their identification with cultural groups. He then goes on to classify humanity into seven or eight major cultures or areas of civilization.

Huntington lists these as the Western, Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and African civilizations. He sees Western civilization as being quite different from the others because, for him, the cultural superiority of the West is based on the primacy of 'individualism, liberalism, the constitutionality of human rights, equality, freedom, democracy, etc.'⁶ Furthermore, he assumes that this clash of civilizations can turn into a hot war, not least with Islam. But, we may ask, why specifically Islam? Because with Islam, according to Huntington, we are faced with a strong civilization that would 'not easily submit to the Western imperial ethos'.

THE NEOCONSERVATIVE CURRENT

The third ideological tendency of the American empire is represented by a current revolving around the entourage of George W. Bush. When he entered the White House, the advocates of this current occupied highly influential positions in the decision-making spheres of the American administration, not least the sphere of international politics. All the requirements for implementing an imperial policy were met, running the gamut from the 'neoconservative' team to the American Enterprise Institute - the think-tank of the ultraconservative right. Added to these are 'activists from various agencies and Christian sects, as well as unconditional supporters of the Israeli Likud, who see Jewish Democrats as their worst enemies.'⁷ Together, allied to the powerful business community, their thinly-veiled aim was now to transform the culturalist myth of the superiority of the American system into a political reality in the field of international relations. But, it might be argued, none of this is new. Surely Americans have always believed that they have a special message for all of humanity? Have they not mentioned, at every stage of their brief history, their 'manifest destiny'? It was this mindset that, following the attacks on the WTC, caused George W. Bush to ask feebly: why do they hate us so much? These currents received their historical confirmation with the implosion of the USSR. The events of 11 September 2001 gave them wings.

For the representatives of this current, the era of deterrence which had underpinned the doctrine of American national security during the Cold War

6. *Ibid.*, p. 145.

7. M. Lind, 'The weird men behind George W. Bush's war', *New Statesman*, April 2003, in Sami Naïr, *L'Empire face à la diversité*, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

was over. American strategists argued that, with the end of the Soviet Union, Washington had lost an opponent which was a partisan of the *status quo* and reluctant to risk confrontation. However this idea of ‘deterrence based only on the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations.’⁸ After the events in New York and Washington, the consequences were drawn at the highest level of the American state. ‘After September 11, the doctrine of containment just doesn’t hold any water’⁹ asserted George W. Bush at a press conference with Prime Minister Tony Blair on 31 January 2003, shortly before the invasion of Iraq.

The events of 11 September and Washington’s reaction

AN UNPRECEDENTED ATTACK OR THE END OF SANCTUARY

Never, or almost never, has a dramatic event been so widely publicized in the media as the sequence of two Boeing 767 planes hitting the WTC towers in New York. The twin towers were struck one after the other in the space of just a few minutes. On the morning of 11 September 2001, America woke up to a catastrophe. People could not believe their eyes. The world’s only superpower, sure of its right, its might and its invulnerability, believing – quite rightly, since it had done all it could to make sure – that its territory was protected, was attacked on its own soil. And how! The WTC, symbol of the economic power of the United States of America and of the religion of liberal economics in the country of George Washington, was in ruins. The shock and trauma were commensurate with the catastrophe. Who had dared to attack America? Who was angry with the United States of America? ‘Why do they hate us so much?’ asked Bush. Speaking of the attacks on the WTC, one observer of American foreign policy, particularly its relationship with war since Vietnam, said that ‘9/11 is one of those events that will never fade out of our history, for it was not only a cataclysmic disaster but a symbol, gargantuan and mysterious, of we know not what, an obsession that will return decades to come.’¹⁰

The perpetrator of these attacks was quickly identified. It was the ‘axis of evil’. Its name was al-Qaeda. Its address? The Afghanistan of the Taliban. Its leader was called bin Laden, who – ironically – had for a time been an ally of America. The drums of war and sabre-rattling could already be heard. America, wounded in her flesh and in her pride, was on the warpath.

8. B. R. Barber, *Fear’s Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy in the Age of Interdependence*, New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 2004.

9. *Ibid.*

10. N. Mailer, *Why are We at War?*, New York, Random House, 2003.

THE REACTION TO THE 11 SEPTEMBER ATTACKS IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND AROUND THE WORLD:
OR, THE WAR ON TERROR

Faced with these unprecedented events, the United States was initially stunned, but the national authorities were quick to recover and eventually react. The speed with which Washington had reacted was a message in itself: their enemies should expect the swiftest and most exemplary punishment. The war against al-Qaeda was presented as a just war, a war of good against evil. In this paradigm, the United States of America was portrayed as the party that was defending the values of democracy, freedom, progress and human rights: it was thus the force for good. On the other hand, they were faced with the forces of evil – of Islamic terrorists with all they represented in terms of fanatical, reactionary, obscurantist and hateful ideology. The Americans did not hesitate to demand revenge, which for them meant a desire, albeit unformulated, to go to war. Their history and their mythology seemed to demand this war. Some observers said that, as far as they were concerned, America was the only force for good capable of correcting evil.¹¹ Consequently, the whole world was told to choose sides. For Washington, neutrality was neither possible nor acceptable. It was, as George W. Bush would recite, a case of being either ‘with us or with the terrorists’. This position is not new. It is actually an eternal return to a traditional view that is typical of the United States of America: a Manichean view of the world. Already in the 1950s, at the height of the Cold War, President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State Foster Dulles had latched onto the ‘for us or against us’ policy.

On 12 September 2001, the day after the attacks,

the United Nations Security Council took less than half an hour to adopt unanimously resolution 1368, recognizing the United States of America’s right of individual or collective self-defence, which basically authorized them to respond with military action. The text calls on all states to cooperate to ‘bring to justice’ not only ‘the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks’ but also ‘those responsible for aiding, supporting or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts’.¹²

America’s aim was now to rethink its breached security, which could only be secured by neutralizing its designated enemy: the Islamists. And while George W. Bush took the precaution of distinguishing between Islam and Islamists, there were many American and Western ideologues who were quick to point out that the boundaries between the two were porous. Consequently, the change on a global scale that Washington wished to see would require a root-and-branch restructuring of the Arab Muslim world. Should this

11. *Ibid.*

12. Y.-H. Nouailhat and S. de la Foye, *Les Etats-Unis et l’islam*, Paris, Armand Colin, 2006, pp. 28–9.

restructuring fail, it was imperative, according to one neoconservative, ‘that the Arab Muslim world and the Muslim world in general be kept in check, contained, monitored and observed with a sharp and lucid eye.’¹³

Three days after the attacks, Secretary of State Colin Powell set the tone for the American ‘*crusade*’¹⁴ against terror. In a blunt threat to the Taliban, he sent them a simple, clear message: ‘You cannot separate your activities from the activities of the perpetrators.’¹⁵ A few days later, ‘on 20 September Bush declared to a full meeting of Congress: “we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom”’.¹⁶

IS THE UNITED STATES ISLAMOPHOBIC?

If we look at the history of the United States of America, we see that, until recently, unlike European countries, it had never been in direct confrontation with Islam and Muslims. This previously non-hostile relationship and the lack of any historical tradition of confrontation with Islam in the United States of America, is due to several factors.

Firstly, Muslims in the United States do not suffer from the degree of association between Islam and colonialism, immigration and social exclusion that is found on the Old Continent. In the United States, it tends to be African Americans and immigrants from Latin America who occupy this space. Muslims are members of the middle class, with correspondingly middle-class incomes. Furthermore, if we bear in mind that most Arab Americans are Christians, we can soon see why the connection between Arab and Muslim does not work in the same way as in Europe.

Secondly, the colonial past of the United States of America, besides being very brief compared to other Western powers, has never involved Muslim countries or territories. As Olivier Roy points out, ‘their physical contact with the South and Third World countries passes through a frontier that is not religious but linguistic (Spanish in Mexico).’¹⁷ He goes on to explain that ‘on the contrary, for Europe the colonial frontier is now that separating the North and South, passing mostly through Muslim

13. G. Millière, *Ce que veut Bush, la recomposition du monde*, 2003, Editions de la Martinière, p. 160.

14. This term was used by George W. Bush when he announced that the United States of America was embarking on a long war on terror. Was he aware of the historical significance of the word? Had he chosen it deliberately? Was it a slip of the tongue? In his defence, the United States of America – born in 1776 from a European migration that began in 1607 – never knew nor took part in the Crusades of the Middle Ages. Depending on whether it is used by an American or a European, the term ‘*crusade*’ can then mean different things.

15. R. Fisk, *The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East*, London, Harper Collins, 2006, p. 1043.

16. Nouailhat and de la Foye, *Les Etats-Unis et l’islam*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

17. O. Roy, *Les illusions du 11 septembre, le débat stratégique face au terrorisme*, Paris, Seuil, 2002, p. 62.



III–8.1 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visits the 9/11 memorial in New York City, in 2011, to offer his respects to those who were killed in the attacks on September 11, 2001

© UN Photo/Evan Schneider

countries: this frontier is implicit in the social opposition between immigrant Muslims and the rest of the population.¹⁸

Thirdly, the notion the concept of a shared religious space are different in the United States and in Europe. Despite the separation of religion and state in America, the expression of religious feeling is part of the political space. And if ‘secular Europe sees in Christianity a culture rather than a faith, the practising religious America refers to faith, to an omnipresent religiosity that can basically be expressed in different denominational registers, none of which is seen in itself as representative of national identity. There is greater tolerance than in Europe for open expressions of religiosity.¹⁹

Therefore, given the way this relationship with Islam had evolved spatially and over time, Washington had no trouble in siding with the Bosnian Muslims and Kosovars against the Serbs. Neither did it have any problem in supporting and vigorously championing Turkish accession to the European Union (EU).

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 63–4.

The impact of 11 September on Islam and the Muslim world

A breaking point, disbelief, bewilderment, horror: these are just some of the words used by the media and American officials after the attacks of 9/11. These feelings were caused by the event itself, as well as by the discovery of who the perpetrators were. '11 September marks a breaking point. Until then, Islam had in no way been perceived as the enemy of the United States of America'²⁰ according to Arab world specialist, Antoine Sfeir, while Nicole Bacharan, who specializes in the country's history, had this to say:

It was with utter shock and disbelief that Americans discovered, on 11 September 2001, the depth of this Islamist hatred. Nothing that had gone before – the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre, the subsequent attacks on American interests in Saudi Arabia, the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the USS Cole in Yemen – had alerted them to its extent. On 11 September everything changed; and the shock was immeasurable.²¹

This leads us to define the nature of relations between the United States and Islam in general, and between the United States and the Arab Muslim world in particular.

IS ISLAM THE ENEMY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA?

Our approach requires us to answer a fundamental question: is Islam the enemy of America? According to Olivier Roy,

It was inevitable that the 11 September attacks would lead, both in America and Europe, to a debate on Islam and its place in the West. This naturally gave rise to general considerations (what is the relationship between Islam and violence? What does the Qur'ān have to say on such and such a subject?) from a viewpoint largely inspired by a 'clash of civilizations', although – it must be said – this was not so much down to the specific ideas developed by Samuel Huntington ... as to the coverage they were given in the media.²²

Others took a more extreme stance towards the significance of the events of 11 September for Americans, or rather, how the events should be understood. Charles Krauthammer wrote in the *Washington Post* 'that since 11 September 2001, a majority of Americans had understood that Islam was not only waging a war against the presence of US troops in various places, but against the very existence of Western civilization.'²³ First of all, is this analysis correct?

20. N. Bacharan, and A. Sfeir, *Américains, Arabes: l'affrontement*, Paris, Seuil, 2006, p. 139.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 140.

22. Roy, *Les illusions du 11 septembre ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

23. C. Krauthammer, 'The Bush Doctrine', *Washington Post*, 5–12–2001.

And assuming it is, how do we explain this hatred? Is it structural or cyclical? Norman Mailer's response is relevant here: 'he thinks there is a big difference between doing wrong and being cruel. Cruel people constantly raise the bar without really realizing what they are doing. He says we are all pretty cruel.'²⁴ He goes on to put this into perspective and shows that hatred is also here among us. 'After all, there are plenty of right-wingers in America who keep saying: "Let's keep it simple and kill all the Muslims!" Do we think that Islam has a monopoly on terrorism,' he asks.²⁵

Nevertheless, the policymakers and advisers around George W. Bush wanted the unconditional surrender not just of Islamists but of Muslims too. From that moment on, all Muslims were required to reformulate Islam, a religion accused of being 'hostile to freedom' and prone to violence and excess. They were asked to come up with a new reading of the Qur'ān. With some American ideologues, this request seemed more of an order and a requirement. Some neoconservatives demanded nothing less than a rewriting of the Qur'ānic text. The re-write must purify it, they said, of 'the culture of hatred' and 'archaic ideas'. The Qur'ān should be 'compatible with modern times', according to the most uncompromising of these ideologues. Daniel Pipes, one of the strongest champions of the idea that Islam is incompatible with American values, made

A number of clearly anti-Muslim and anti-Arab proposals (selective control for visas and immigration, condemnation of the cultural expression of Islam in America).²⁶ In his numerous media appearances, Pipes establishes a link between terrorism and immigration, is sympathetic to the anti-immigrant vote in Europe (especially in the Austria of Jörg Haider) and draws a parallel between the increase in the Palestinian population and that of a Muslim community in the United States of America.²⁷

The Muslims of the world, especially those of the Middle East, should be 'able to see that those who think they can push others into the abyss are actually dragging themselves towards a bottomless pit, and taking other Muslims down with them.'²⁸ In the world of tomorrow that the United States wanted to see, peace in the Middle East was one of the strategic objectives. But how was it to be achieved? On the basis of United Nations resolutions since 1948? On the basis of justice and the free will of the peoples of the region? Not quite. It was,

24. Mailer, *Why are we at War?* *op. cit.*

25. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

26. Olivier Roy notes in this regard that: 'We see for example Daniel Pipes condemning a role-play used in an American school to teach children about Islam (e.g. by making girls wear a veil and giving boys Muslim names): Daniel Pipes, 'Become a Muslim warrior', *Jerusalem Post*, 2 July 2002.'

27. D. Pipes, 'Israel's Moment of Truth', Commentary, February 2000, in Roy, *Les illusions du 11 septembre ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

28. G. Millière, *Ce que veut Bush ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

on the contrary, based on a vision that only took account of the interests of Israel. Consequently, that peace ‘would be achieved by erasing everything that, politically and spiritually, had claimed the name of Palestine in recent years, and the patient reconstruction of something else.’²⁹ The extent to which the events of 11 September had been detrimental to the Palestinian people needs to be stressed. It was a godsend for the Israeli Government of Ariel Sharon as it faced the second Intifada, the al-Aqsa uprising, and for the pro-Israel lobby in the United States of America. The specific correlation made in the American and Israeli media between suicide bombings by desperate Palestinians and the jihad championed by al-Qaeda, finally persuaded American public opinion, which had confused the two. neoconservative Israeli and American television stations such as Fox News had shown on a loop a single, isolated image showing some Palestinians dancing after the twin towers of the WTC had collapsed. Accordingly, unconditional supporters of Israel in the United States of America wasted no time in stepping into the breach to make statements such as, ‘we are all Israelis now’.³⁰ And yet there was no structural link – however remote – between the Palestinian struggle and the events of 11 September. Olivier Roy rightly notes that ‘no Palestinian living in the Israeli-Palestinian territories is involved in al-Qaeda, no foreign terrorist has acted on Israeli-Palestinian territory, no Palestinian has committed any terrorist act outside of this space.’³¹

THE WAR AGAINST AL-QAEDA AND THE INVASION OF IRAQ

The ‘global terrorism’ on which George Bush had declared war after 11 September, was represented by al-Qaeda whose leader, Osama bin Laden, was sheltered by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Consequently, a ‘justice and punishment’ campaign was triggered against a country that was already ravaged by endless fratricidal wars and ten years of Soviet occupation. The declared objective was to bring to justice those responsible for the atrocities of 11 September. But what did that matter? When the armada of B-52s, F-18s, AWACS and Apache helicopters descended upon Afghanistan, the distinction between bin Laden and Mullah Omar, between al-Qaeda and the archaic and ultraconservative Taliban regime, was no longer made. And anyway, if we fail to catch bin Laden, we’ll destroy him. But wait: could the B-52s, flying at an altitude of 30,000 feet and dropping their bombs weighing a tonne distinguish between a man with a beard and a civilian, between a man and a woman or a child? Who cares!

However, while everyone, allies and adversaries alike, had-more-or-less accepted Washington’s reasoning for the assault on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, it was a different matter when it came to invading Iraq.

29. *Ibid.*

30. Saïd, *From Oslo to Iraq ...*, *op. cit.*, p.133.

31. Roy, *Les illusions du 11 septembre ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

There was nothing to implicate Saddam Hussein or the ruling Baath Party in Baghdad in the 11 September attacks. There was no hard evidence or serious analysis to suggest any relationship between the secular regime and the Islamist mujahidin of bin Laden. As for the story about weapons of mass destruction that Iraq supposedly possessed between 2001 and 2003, it appeared that Tony Blair, George Bush and his Secretary of State Colin Powell were the only ones who believed it. If they even did. Because we are now entitled to ask whether they really believed it or whether it was just a piece of propaganda, an alibi with the sole purpose of getting public opinion in their respective countries to endorse the decision to go to war.³² This was why there was unprecedented opposition to the Iraq war. International public opinion was mobilized as millions of people descended upon the major cities from London to New York, from Berlin to Boston, Paris to Los Angeles. In spite of this, the American administration, acting against the will of the United Nations and in defiance of international law and legitimacy, invaded Iraq – a sovereign nation. The decision was taken by the alliance of lobbies mentioned above: the neocons, religious fundamentalists allied with pro-Israelis and the military industrial complex, for strategic reasons that were different from those brandished in public.

In order to understand what was behind this vicious attack on Iraq, we need to allude to the ulterior motives that everyone was careful not to reveal before the invasion. ‘Regime change in Iraq [said one of the intellectuals close to the neocons] also targets Saudi Arabia and Iran and the objective is for both countries to change and cease to be dangers and opponents of the West. It also targets the Middle East. With Saddam gone and Iraq’s oil in the hands of those who are no longer enemies of the West, a definitive or almost definitive solution could be found to the Arab-Israeli conflict.’³³ It must be said that the invasion of Iraq had little to do with the consequences of the 11 September attacks. There is another specific and independent agenda at work here.

CONCLUSION

The crucial question that the policymakers of the Bush administration tried to avoid at all costs was this: why did the perpetrators of the 11 September attacks hate the United States so much? The answer to this question is of no great importance. Washington’s relations with the outside world depend

32. Some years after this episode, and after the whole world had discovered the enormity of the lies that led to the invasion of Iraq, Colin Powell, referring to his famous speech to the United Nations during which he showed what was supposed to be a deadly chemical similar to those produced by Iraq in its WMD factories, recanted. In a *mea culpa*, he said it was one of the most shameful things he had done and that he would remember it all his life.

33. G. Millière, *Ce que veut Bush ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

on it. And we could say the same for its relationship with the Arab Muslim world. It seemed clear at the time that a confrontation between America and Islam, or at least a certain kind of Islam, was inevitable. This was confirmed by what ensued: the war on terror. But, although some Arab and Muslim governments – under enormous pressure from Washington – signed up to the war on terror, most people saw the war, especially the invasion of Iraq, as an unjust ‘crusade’ against the Arab Muslim world. Many illustrious American and Western intellectuals such as Noam Chomsky, Régis Debray, Robert Fisk and Pascal Boniface share this opinion.

How did it come to this, when what we really needed to hear was a rational analysis of the situation rather than the drums of war. But as the Palestinian-American intellectual Edward Said put it, George Bush and his team wanted the drum-beating, not rational understanding. Yet, despite the pain amplified by the unbearable images shown on virtually every television channel in the world, despite the anger and fierce determination not to be intimidated and despite the desire for vengeance and not to eradicate terrorism for good, some wise people, resisting the temptation to jump to hasty conclusions, dared to identify the underlying causes of the problem. Their reading of the situation was able to shed light on a simple truth: the foundation of Muslim ‘anti-Americanism’ was in no way a ‘hatred of modernity’ or envy of the Americans for their technology; it was the result of the accumulation of several decades of injustice and humiliation. For most inhabitants of the Arab Muslim world, the United States of America was ‘synonymous with arrogant power, primarily known for its moralizing, munificent support both of Israel and of numerous repressive Arab regimes ...’

We also need to ask another question: is the clash between the United States and the Muslim world permanent? Is it irreversible? The answer is no. It cannot be otherwise. A modicum of common sense makes it clear that this is a misunderstanding conditioned by a well-defined context. It is by no means a definitive structural opposition. For, as we noted above, there is nothing in American culture nor in Muslim culture that designates the other as an implacable enemy. On the contrary, it is not long since Islam and America were united in a battle they were fighting together against what they had agreed was their enemy: Soviet colonialism in Afghanistan.

Chapter 3.9

ISSUES OF TERRORISM
AND RESISTANCE

Fredj Maatoug

INTRODUCTION

Resistance, as a human action, is synonymous with defence, protection and survival. As old as humanity itself, humans have put up resistance ever since they began to live in groups, tribes and societies. It is a response to the survival instinct that is not unique to humans, but features in all living beings.

First of all, what is resistance and how can it be defined as human action? According to the definition in the French dictionary *Le Petit Robert*, resistance is action designed to render ineffective (an action directed against the resister). Resistance to oppression is a human right. According to Mirabeau, '[w]hen authority becomes arbitrary and oppressive ... resistance is one's duty and cannot be called revolt.' Thus, when one revolts, the violence committed by the oppressed is more than a right to protect oneself and one's interests – it is a duty. On the other hand, the adverse party, who has an interest in preserving the status quo, will claim immediately that such acts of violence are terrorist acts. That was the case in France during the Second World War, when people resisted the presence of the German army – but not only in France. Elsewhere in Europe, the hard-line members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) were classed and fought as terrorists by the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland, the Ulster Government and the government in London. That was also the case in Vietnam, first against the French presence and then against the presence of the United States of America. The same occurred in Algeria, in the case of the National Liberation Front against the French occupation, and the same is occurring today in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, where the Palestinians are resisting the Israeli occupation in an unequal fight.

Turning now to the second half of the question, what is terrorism? According to the *Le Petit Robert* again, terrorism can be defined as 'systematic use of violence to achieve a political end (taking, keeping, exercising power,

etc.)’ It is also defined ‘as all acts of violence, attacks and civilian hostage-taking that a political organization commits in order to disrupt a country (its own or another).’ Moreover, some see terrorism as the weapon of the weak and the vanquished who are forced to resort to desperate solutions. Are they really solutions? To judge from the experience of the struggle of the Palestinian people to date, the answer must be in the negative. Furthermore, in the case of the attacks perpetrated by the al-Qaeda Islamists, are they not harmful to the very people whom they are supposed to defend? Do they not undermine, rather than champion, the image and justness of the cause of Muslim peoples? Moreover, are they not unjust and criminal towards their innocent civilian victims? That is on the one hand. On the other hand, the question can be framed differently. Is it not likely that arrogant interference and imperialism by the West in general and the United States of America in particular, and their double standards, are directly or indirectly linked to the causes of those attacks that primarily kill innocent civilian victims? The situation is all the more appalling because the victims in practically all cases have no connection with any of the decisions denounced, with good reason, or any of the policies impugned by the perpetrators of the attacks. Consequently, do those attacks not constitute a weapon – the weapon of the weak – to force a superpower such as the United States of America to change its policies? Are they not a lever to expose the world’s only superpower before its own public opinion so that it will halt its policy of interference and aggression in the Muslim world, its overly systematic support for Israel and Israel’s policy of colonization and aggression against the Palestinian people? Between terrorism and resistance, what is the true nature of those acts? Fathoming these questions is no easy task. The landmarks, reference points and legitimacies, which are complex on both sides, are so enmeshed that it is difficult to take sides. It is therefore essential to be extremely alert and irreproachably objective before expressing an opinion on this matter.

The West’s response to the attacks: indiscriminate terrorism

Acts of armed violence – whether by Basque, Corsican or Irish movements, small German, French or Italian ultra-left groups, or branches of the Palestine liberation movement – have always been denounced in the West as terrorist acts. In the 1970s and 1980s, Palestinian nationalist and Marxist militants hijacked several aeroplanes and took hostages in order to exchange them for Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli gaols. They were branded as terrorists because of those acts. One such memorable operation was the Munich massacre during the 1972 Olympic Games in Germany. That breath-taking operation drew extensive media coverage. The eyes of television viewers worldwide were fixed on events in Munich. It ended in a bloodbath after the German police, who had refused to negotiate with

the hostage-takers, decided to launch an attack to rescue the hostages. After the invasion of Lebanon by the State of Israel in 1982, the struggle against the Israeli military presence in that country took a new form, namely suicide operations by the Lebanese Hezbollah, involving lorries loaded with explosives, driven by kamikaze militants ready to die for their cause. In the case of Palestine, after the Second Intifada, which started in front of al-Aqsa Mosque, and Ariel Sharon's election in January 2001, the Palestinians increasingly resorted to suicide attacks by kamikazes, also known as '*human bombs*'. Suicide attacks have since been the weapon used by militants belonging to the Islamist movement Hamas, in particular, and, to a smaller extent, to the Islamic Jihad Movement. Fatah, which has a majority within the Palestine Liberation Organization and is supposed to be the most moderate of the Palestinian movements, also resorted to this weapon in reaction to the Oslo stalemate and Sharon's harsh treatment of the Palestinian people. Thus were born the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, linked to Yasser Arafat's Fatah.

It was only later, after the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s against the Soviet invasion, that al-Qaeda came on to the scene. That war was waged jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Afghan and Arab Muslim mujahidin, including bin Laden. After that episode, sporadic al-Qaeda attacks began against embassies of the United States of America in Africa, escalating to the infamous attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York City on 11 September 2001. Those attacks marked the divorce of the previous allies, namely the United States of America and the mujahidin. Then that divorce became a war to the death.

PROFILE AND PSYCHOLOGY OF THE KAMIKAZE

It has often been said in the West that suicidal, murderous acts are committed by weak people manipulated by wicked leaders. It has also been said for a long time that the Identikit profile of the terrorist is someone who comes from the poor fringes of society, with emphasis often being laid on terrorists' lack of access to schools or universities or advanced training, which makes them easy prey for religious indoctrination. The typical terrorist has also been portrayed as a lost and isolated person or someone who has suffered traumatic experiences during childhood. All this could be reassuring for the Westerner, both the informed observer and the man in the street, if it were true. Is it true? That is the question! One of the authors of '*Etudes sur la mort*' [Studies on Death] suggests that it is not true.

'Yet all of the explanations and the desperate interpretative endeavours collapse owing to the lack of proof' [he said]. 'There is no typical portrait of the 11 September killer or even those behind the near daily killings in Baghdad (Sageman, 2005). The Bali and Madrid explosions were not planned by

manipulated puppets or desperate fanatics. ... We are coming to acknowledge that most bomb carriers and aircraft hijackers are “normal” people.¹

In the particular case of the Palestinian kamikazes, this reality has been confirmed. ‘Not all human bombs are poor. Many of them are not refugees. What characterizes them is often the gap between the level of their studies and their professional occupations.’² Their motives and frustrations are indeed the result of their individual situation, but also and above all, a national situation. Thus, ‘the dependence of the Palestinian economy on Israel weakens them: they are refused jobs commensurate with their qualifications, which are instead reserved for Israelis or other nationalities not suspected of terrorism.’³

Bruno Etienne, a leading French specialist in Islam and the Muslim world, also turns to psychology as a first step to try to explain ‘how some move from fanaticism to terrorism’. To answer that question, he suggests that ‘the death wish results from pent-up energy released by the failure of the containment capacities of representations. The surfeit of excitations leads to a rupture: the actor, or agent, as Bourdieu would say, is emptied of his own desires. He is then the object of a movement of unbinding whose outlet is a war neurosis.’⁴

However, Etienne does not dwell too long on this aspect before returning to the sense of humiliation felt by Palestinians. He also describes the important role played by colonial humiliation,⁵ the occupation of the Arab territories in Palestine, the dictatorship, poverty and other ills in priming candidates for suicide operations, and stresses that these factors have a very real influence. Nonetheless, he does add a rather peculiar observation. ‘Militants who sacrifice themselves (*fidāʿiyyin* or *shuhada*, not kamikaze)’ he notes, ‘are cultured people and not merely the disadvantaged (*mustaḍʿafin*). We must therefore turn to ethnopsychiatry to explain their thanatocracy, their desire to die as martyrs to save the world by destroying it.’⁶

1. M.-F. Bacqué, ‘La Fabrique du terroriste’ [The Terrorist Factory], p. 62, in *Etudes sur la mort – Thanatologie*, *op. cit.*
2. F. Khosrokhavar, *Les nouveaux martyrs d’Allah* [Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs], France, Flammarion, 2002, p. 202.
3. *Ibid.*
4. B. Etienne, *Les amants de l’apocalypse: pour comprendre le 11 septembre* [The Lovers of the Apocalypse: Understanding the Events of 11 September], France, Editions de l’Aube, 2002, p. 49.
5. On the notion of the humiliation felt by Arab opinion and its role in the emergence of a destructive sense of frustration, Bruno Etienne wrote: ‘During fieldwork with the *Observatoire du Religieux team*, we detected two more subtle types of “humiliation” since Nasser’s death. The key lies in the loss of paternal authority, whether in the suburbs or in Algeria or Palestine (giving rise to the first Intifada), non-achievement of democracy by the ideal city of Islam the exacerbation of inequalities by “market democracy” and “westernization”. Such dual frustration produces a frenzied desire for fusion and unity which will emerge dramatically in individual and collective choices.’
6. B. Etienne, *Les amants de l’apocalypse ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 50.



III–9.1 Refugee Palestinian children in June 1967, making the difficult crossing into Jordan over the King Hussein Bridge (formerly the Allenby Bridge), which had been badly damaged during the fighting between Israel and Jordan

© UN Photo/BG

TERRORISM OR ‘DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE’

From the Western point of view, ‘the attacks in New York City and Washington on 11 September 2001 reflect, on a much larger scale, the same disregard for human life.’⁷ Much has been written in the West, both before and since 11 September, about terrorists’ hatred of democracy. That would explain their hatred of the democratic West. George W. Bush’s sanctimonious exclamation ‘Why do they hate us so much?’ after the attacks on the World Trade Centre

7. B. Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam*, France, Gallimard, 2003, p. 164.

has remained in our memories. With that short sentence, the President of the United States of America stressed the absurdity and horror of the terrorist act.

Moreover, the Western media claim that by being considered murderers in the West because they kill innocent people, terrorists thus achieve the best possible status on earth from a strictly Muslim standpoint. Indeed, by carrying out a suicide mission, the kamikaze commits an act considered by Islam to be an extremely grave sin, for which the perpetrator is eternally damned. Western writings are full of references to Qur'anic *sūras* and *ḥadīths* by the Prophet to that effect. Consequently, instead of *shahāda* (martyrdom), which would guarantee glory on earth and eternal paradise in the afterlife, the perpetrator of a suicide operation goes to hell, damned for eternity, which is the only possible 'reward' for committing such an act.

Moreover, to strip those movements of any legitimacy, some suggest that their primary concern is considerably different from that of the Palestinians or of the Iraqi people after the 2003 invasion by the United States of America. They reportedly have another agenda. Pascale Boniface, a considered and excellent expert of the Near and Middle East, expresses this idea as follows:

Osama bin Laden obviously did not attack the World Trade Centre in order to help to contribute to the establishment a Palestinian state. Those attacks are not directly linked to the resumption of the Intifada. ... The Americans, nonetheless, know perfectly well that as long as the violence continues in the Near East, anti-American sentiment will prevail among Muslim peoples.⁸

Another reason for condemning acts of violence against civilians was voiced by Albert Camus during the Algerian Revolution in the 1950s. In a letter to Messali Hadj's committee on 25 March 1955, he decried those acts as acts of terrorism. 'But, insofar as my opinion might interest our Arab comrades, I rely on you to let them know that I wholly disapprove of terrorism that harms civilians.'⁹ Albert Camus gives the reason for his disapproval based on his wish not to weaken the struggle of the French liberals in Algeria, who were campaigning for a fair solution between the Algerians and the Europeans settled in the country. 'The only outcome of those indiscriminate methods is, I have observed, an even stronger colonialist reaction and growing powerlessness of French liberals there, whose task becomes increasingly difficult,'¹⁰ he wrote in his letter. Today, more than half a century later, the same arguments are being raised. In the paradigm of the Palestinian people's struggle, reference

8. P. Boniface, *Chroniques Proche-orientales, 2001–2005* [Near-Eastern Chronicles, 2001–2005], Liège, IRIS-Dalloz 2005, p. 38.

9. M. Ferro (ed.), *Le livre noir du colonialisme, XV^e – XXI^e siècle: de l'extermination à la repentance* [The Black Book of Colonialism from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-first Century: from Extermination to Repentance], France, Hachette littératures, Editions Robert Laffont, 2003, p. 687.

10. *Ibid.*

is often made to the concern not to weaken, by acts of violence and suicide operations, the difficult struggle of the peace camp within Israeli society.

A TEMPERED WESTERN VIEW OF TERRORISM

Commenting on the flood of opinions, editorial content, comments and statements of all kinds that was triggered by the events of 11 September, the French philosopher Régis Debray wrote ironically: ‘The wise man shows us the moon, and we look at his finger. Pathetic, isn’t it? But at least it allows us not to take the end of a world for the end of the world.’¹¹ As to Rony Braumann, a true humanitarian, seeing the great solidarity displayed worldwide with the American people, he appositely remarked that ‘some humans are more human than others; some deaths are more moving than others.’¹² Was he wrong? Not really. For is it not true that the world did not mourn the million deaths in the Rwandan civil war or the 500,000 Iraqi children who died as a result of the embargo coldly and cynically decreed and applied by the United States of America and its Western allies, particularly the British and French? Many Western intellectuals saw the attacks of 11 September as an understandable backlash. It was perhaps a fair reversal of the situation, then, for the people of the United States of America – who had always filmed bombardments from their bombers, from the top down – to experience the events and film them from below. It was a traumatic experience for them to have to look up into the sky, with the camera on the ground. That position ‘until then, had been for the Vietnamese, Iraqis, Yugoslavs, Libyans, in short, for the thugs down on the ground, who were only getting what they deserved’,¹³ remarked Debray mischievously.

How is the kamikaze perceived by this category of intellectual? His profile does not correspond to an ‘ordinary’ terrorist. It is more controversial. ‘The kamikaze is not striving for money or celebrity. He is striving for Heaven. ... His reward is in the afterlife. In the meantime, he is the master. In the master-slave dialectic, the master can be very rich and heavily armed, but if he is not prepared to give his life, he will become the slave of his slave.’¹⁴ Later, outlining the profile of the kamikaze, Debray adds that: ‘Belief cannot be bought. You can give money to a man so that he kills others – then he is called a mercenary or a hitman. You can force a man to take up arms with a mobilization order – then he is called a soldier or a conscript. You cannot order a person in good health to commit suicide one fine morning. The kamikaze is a serial killer, with self-esteem.’¹⁵

11. R. Debray, *Chroniques de l’idiotie triomphante: Terrorisme, guerres, diplomatie 1990–2003* [Chronicles of Triumphant Idiocy: Terrorism, Wars, Diplomacy 1990–2003], France, Fayard, 2004, p. 99.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

13. R. Debray, *Chroniques de l’idiotie triomphante ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 103–4.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

A Muslim view of the attacks: resistance of the weak against the strong

Those responsible for terrorist acts object to the use of the adjective ‘terrorist’. They consider that their actions are part of the inalienable right of any oppressed people to resist and that they simply resist excessive forces of oppression that abuse their overwhelming superiority to oppress and attempt to subjugate the weak. Expressing a similar idea in a book on French resistance fighters and partisans, Charles Tillon wrote: ‘Here we want to bear witness alongside those who were betrayed and then handed over, alongside those who had no hatred other than the violent hatred necessary to wage war against the occupier.’¹⁶ Thus, faced with the yoke of occupation, the people under occupation have the right and even the duty to respond by all means, including with hatred, violence and weapons.

RESIST THE YOKE OF OPPRESSION BY ALL MEANS

In addition to being forced to resist by whatever available means, the adversary or enemy’s persistence in regularly and excessively exerting its superiority creates a feeling of powerlessness in the oppressed. That same feeling leads to another, stronger feeling, which can be even more devastating: despair. Once despair sets in, the oppressed feel morally entitled to resist by any means, including with the most spectacular violence. The ultimate aim is to make the enemy feel – even for a mere instant and to a very small extent – that it is not invincible or completely beyond reach and that it, too, can suffer losses. Those losses may seem disproportionate to the party who sustains them. That is the logic behind the eye-for-an-eye principle. Those acts of violence, more spectacular than effective, are intended to have the psychological effect of unsettling the enemy and undermining the morale of its troops. Other peoples must, at some time in their histories, have resorted to occasional acts of sabotage in an endeavour to harass and weaken the morale of enemies who were stronger in terms of weaponry. That was true of the French people under German occupation during the Second World War. ‘Thus’, said Charles Tillon, ‘the criticism of the enemy through violence began among the masses when the Germans moved into the occupied zone. The search for weapons and major acts of sabotage against the German army foreshadowed the uprising of the patriots.’¹⁷

What does it matter if those losses are only symbolic or only claimed innocent victims most of the time? Public opinion in the Muslim world considers in the main that it is, after all, terribly unjust that it is only the victims

16. C. Tillon, *Les F.T.P.: Témoignage pour servir l’histoire de la Résistance* [The Resistance Fighters and Partisans: Accounts to Contribute to the History of the Resistance], Paris, Julliard, 1962, p. 10.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 62.



III-9.2 Repairs begin after a double suicide attack by the al-Qaeda-affiliated extremist group al-Shabaab killed 18 people and injured dozens more at a restaurant in Mogadishu, Somalia in September 2013

© UN Photo/Stuart Price

of the weaker side – the Palestinians, Iraqis, Afghans – who are not always counted. Such injustice is in itself unbearable. It is painful to public opinion in the Arab Muslim world and stokes the fire of frustration. It is that frustration which is the mother of all violent acts against Western forces in general, and not actual Islamic or Muslim culture, (as the less objective observers have often claimed). Thus, the attacks in the United States of America itself, for example, are viewed as acts of resistance designed to restore a form of justice and equality ... but a sad form of equality because it is not equality of opportunities and life, but of suffering and misfortune. A measure of balance is sought, but it is not one of opportunities for well-being and the pursuit of happiness. Balance here is sought in the number of victims, a balance of deaths and likelihood of death.

HUMILIATION, THE MOTHER OF ALL RESENTMENT AND VIOLENCE

In the difficult relations between the West and the Arab-Muslim world, the feeling of humiliation among Muslims is often mentioned. Objectively, that feeling is understandable in the light of past and current events in Palestine, Iraq and elsewhere. Of course, that is not the end of the story, because

humiliation quickly turns into resentment towards the West and the United States of America. ‘That’s how we got to this point’, said Robert Fisk after the attacks on 11 September,

The entire contemporary history of the Middle East – the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Balfour Declaration, the lies of Lawrence of Arabia, the Great Arab Revolt, the foundation of the State of Israel, four Israeli-Arab armed conflicts and thirty-four years of brutal occupation of Arab lands by Israel – all erased in a matter of hours, when the self-proclaimed representatives of a crushed and humiliated population struck with the malice and cruelty of a damned people. Is it fair or moral to write all of this so soon, without proof, when the last act of barbarism of the same kind was actually committed by native Americans in Oklahoma City? Alas, I think it is.¹⁸

Thus, frustrations that have built up over decades, the terrible feeling of humiliation and the lack of hope of being able to equal the enemy in advanced technology and modern weaponry are, combined with the other elements, the essential ingredients that generated support for Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda and other jihadist movements.

THE ‘KAMIKAZE’ OR THE ULTIMATE SACRIFICE

In international bodies, it is very difficult for States to agree on a common definition of terrorism. We note, in passing, that although we struggle to acknowledge the existence of terrorism among our own people; it is easier to see it elsewhere. Indeed, ‘[t]his term, used with inflationary complacency and given multiple metaphorical meanings ... generates consensus on at least one point: it applies to others but rarely to oneself.’¹⁹ Can we say, then, as some do, that the use of this term ‘serves above all to discredit an enemy and give oneself an excuse to use any means to fight it?’ The reply is in the affirmative, especially when one sees how the enemy, is caught in a whirlwind of confusion that likens the enemy, and the enemy’s cultural region in its entirety, to absolute evil.

However, Muslims do not see this in the same light. Offering to die in a suicide operation is a unique act of bravery and heroism. It is immensely important to be considered a martyr in the afterlife. Thus, ‘[i]n bringing its determination to fight the injustice and policy of “double standards” to fruition, resistance, however small, expends human flesh, in the form of a living bomb, known as “kamikaze”.’²⁰ Consequently, what political leaders and

18. R. Fisk, *The Great War for Civilization: The Conquest of the Middle East (1979–2005)*, Paris, La Découverte, 2005, p. 746.

19. P. Hintermeyer, ‘Terrorisme, sacrifice et volonté de puissance’, *Mourir pour tuer: les kamikazes* [Die to Kill: Kamikazes], *Études sur la mort* 2006, No. 130, Editions L’Esprit du Temps, p. 29.

20. S. A. Koussay, *Le kamikaze ou le mobile de se donner la mort* [The Kamikaze or the Motive for Killing Oneself], *Études sur la mort*, L’esprit du temps, p. 71.

the media in the West call terrorism is regarded here as resistance, and the kamikaze – whether Palestinian, Lebanese or Iraqi – who gives his life, is performing an act of resistance and making a stand against the injustice and humiliation to which the forces of the United States of America and the West in general have subjected his people and nation. ‘People under the yoke of arms are motivated to take up arms’²¹ said Charles Tillon, a French resistance fighter who was active early in the Second World War.

In Western public opinion, terrorism sticks to Islam and Muslims like a shadow. It has become somewhat synonymous with Islam. The majority of Western intellectuals know, however, that this idea is not only false, but also unfair to more than one billion people worldwide. Bernard Lewis, who cannot be suspected of Islamophilia, shares this opinion and states that ‘most Muslims are not fundamentalists and most fundamentalists are not terrorists.’²² He does, however, put that excessive objectivity into perspective by immediately adding that, nevertheless, the majority of terrorists in the world today are Muslims. Is he right? Are people not simply focusing on terrorist acts committed on Islamic soil or by Muslims? Do the Western media report on terrorist acts and operations perpetrated in Ireland, the Basque Country or India with the same vigilance and rigour as they do whenever such acts and operations are linked to Islam and Muslims? Perhaps not. For that reason, Muslims repeatedly complain about being stigmatized and demonized by Western mass media. Are they wrong? Are they right? The second seems more likely and, unfortunately, there is no change there. Not even the soothing statements of George W. Bush just before commencing the war in Afghanistan in response to the attacks on 11 September.

After those sad events, the Sharon government in Israel seized the opportunity to settle the Palestinian question in its own way, which, it believed, would resolve matters once and for all. Very soon ‘its forces invaded Jenin and Jericho and repeatedly bombarded Gaza, Ramallah, Beit Sahour and Beit Jala, causing great civilian casualties and enormous material damage.’²³ Weapons supplied by the United States of America were used for the invasion and bombardments, under a slogan that was more popular than ever: the war on terror. Furthermore, linking Palestinian attacks to the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York City, supporters of Israel in the United States of America coined their own, very significant and topical slogan: ‘Now we are all Israelis’.²⁴ In the *global war on terror*, people readily linked the Palestinian Yasser Arafat to Osama bin Laden, the head of al-Qaeda.

Like other Western political leaders, George W. Bush had taken care to state that the war was not against Arabs or Muslims, but against terrorism, still

21. C. Tillon, *Les F.T.P. : Témoignage pour servir ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

22. B. Lewis, *The Crisis of Islam*, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

23. E. W. Saïd, *From Oslo to Iraq ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

24. *Ibid.*

there were some slips of the tongue. For example, the President of the United States of America spoke of a ‘crusade’ and the President of Italy’s Council of Ministers, Silvio Berlusconi, spoke of incompatibility between democracy and Islam as a civilization, to mention but the best known cases. Those slips were quickly brushed over, with the assurance that no position against Islam or the Islamic civilization should be inferred from them. How should the situation be interpreted, then?

The United States of America had urged the governments of Arab and Muslim States to join its anti-terrorist ‘crusade’. Pressure from Washington was so strong that those countries had no choice but to support the war on terror. Yet, the leaders of Muslim countries knew that by doing so, they were creating a contradiction between their people and public opinion in their country. Nonetheless, they did so readily, to avoid the wrath of Washington, which, for most of them, was often their main source of protection and support to remain in power against the will of their people.

Contradictory views of terrorism

The terrorist is often the ‘other’. As mentioned above, home-grown terrorism goes unacknowledged. Brave voices do speak out from time to time in the Israeli camp to express another view, different from the politically correct discourse often heard, which resembles propaganda more than an idea or genuine information.

OBJECTIVE ISRAELI VOICES

Amnon Kapeliuk, a free-thinking Israeli writer, has objectively shown that the Israelis consider the terrorist systematically to be ‘an armed nationalistic Palestinian, who attacks Israeli civilians, settlers and soldiers in the Occupied Territories. On the other hand, a Jewish terrorist? There’s no such thing.’²⁵ That attitude begs the questions about the terrible killings at the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron in 1994. During that massacre – fittingly so termed owing to the number of victims – a far-right Israeli settler, Baruch Goldstein, opened fire on a group of Palestinians as they prayed, killing forty and wounding around 100 people. Did that cold-blooded killing spree not constitute an act of terrorism? The Israeli authorities and media answered in the negative. Goldstein was treated as an isolated killer. However, he was a very active member of the well known, ultra-racist far-right movement *Kach*.

To give another example, when the State of Israel executed a historic national Palestinian leader – Abu Ali Mustafa, General Secretary of the Popular

25. A. Kapeliuk, ‘*Terrorisme : définitions contradictoires*’ [Terrorism: Contradictory Definitions] in *Terrorisme: questions*, Henry Lelièvre (ed.), Brussels, Editions Complexe, 2004, p. 149.



III–9.3 A suicide attack devastating the UN Headquarters in Baghdad and killing at least 22 people, including the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello. Some 100 people were wounded in the blast, which was caused by a bomb concealed in a truck parked outside the headquarters, in August 2003

© UN Photo/AP Photo

Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) – by firing rockets into his office, the Israelis considered that to be an act of war against terrorism. Yet, when the members of that Palestinian movement, the PFLP, killed a far-right Israeli minister in retaliation, its act was condemned as terrorism. The same applies to all acts before and after those events, under the labour governments or governments led by Likud, before Oslo and after Oslo. Tensions intensified dramatically with the advent of Sharon, reaching calamitous proportions after 11 September, when Sharon decided that his government would join the war on terror unleashed by George W. Bush, whatever the cost. In Sharon’s view, the war on terror entailed killing more Palestinians, expropriating more Palestinian land and destroying more Palestinian homes.

THE PALESTINIAN VICTIMS OF ISRAELI TERRORISM

Violence is employed against Palestinians by far-right Israeli groups and individuals, by armed settlers living in the Occupied Territories, and mainly by the army. When a Palestinian is killed by a settler, the Israeli Government

opens an inquiry, but the defendant is hardly ever convicted. Such impunity gives settlers a sense of freedom. In fact, the settlers are in favour of their government's laxity, as it gives them freedom in their deeds and actions. They engage ever more frequently in acts of violence against Palestinians in order to intimidate (terrorizing?) them or take possession of their lands. The Palestinians call that violence terrorism. Yet the Israeli authorities describe those crimes as disputes between neighbouring farmers.

During the Gaza War, the Israeli army had no qualms about dropping a one-tonne bomb on a densely populated residential district, in order to kill a leader of the Hamas movement. The result, as might be expected, was eighteen deaths and dozens of wounded, nearly all of them civilians. While Israel talks about the fight against terrorism, the Palestinians denounce state terrorism. Israel could not have been unaware of the consequences of bombing such a heavily populated urban area as Gaza. Israel's real intentions may therefore be questioned, for was it not seeking to punish an entire civilian population which it regarded as guilty of harbouring men as connected to resistance fighters whom the Israeli army wanted to kill as terrorists? If the answer is affirmative, which it is, then this is a scenario in which a state, Israel, terrorizes an unarmed population, the Palestinian people – a scenario of state-sponsored terrorism quite simply.

When questioned about the kamikazes and the harm that they do to their people by tarnishing their just cause through indiscriminate massacres and about the crime that they commit by killing innocent Israeli citizens, Palestinians reply that the scheming of the State of Israel drives them to defend themselves by any means, including that. In reply to that question, they paint a bleak picture of the reality of the occupation and the miserable living conditions that their people endure daily. They describe life in the Occupied Territories, so riven and separated by hundreds of checkpoints, that they have become a huge open-air prison. They also reply that 'the Israeli army crushes Palestinian society and asserts its leadership through killings, land confiscation, settlements, blockades of numerous towns, destruction of hundreds of homes ... arrests of thousands of young Palestinians, sometimes intentionally preventing access to essential services, which all constitutes, to the letter, a crime against humanity.'²⁶ The bans enforced by the Israeli army with an iron fist include blocking pregnant women travelling urgently to hospitals, resulting in their giving birth at checkpoints. This unbending approach (a crime in the eyes of the Palestinians) has caused and continues to cause hundreds of tragedies. Indeed, since the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000, more than twenty pregnant women have died on the street, in front of Israeli soldiers preoccupied with enforcing the order on roadblocks.

26. A. Kapeliuk, '*Terrorisme: définitions contradictoires?*, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

Amnon Kapeliuk, the writer, has spoken out against these scenarios, writing: 'Yes, they are real crimes against humanity.'²⁷

An even bleaker picture has been painted by the American-Palestinian intellectual Edward Said of the inhuman conditions imposed on the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation. He writes that

[T]he fantastically cruel confinement of 1.3 million people jammed like so many human sardines into the Gaza Strip, plus the nearly two million Palestinian residents of the West Bank, has no parallel in the annals of apartheid or colonialism. F-16 jets were never used to bomb South African homelands. They are used against Palestinian towns and villages. All entrances and exits to the territories are controlled by Israel (Gaza is completely surrounded by a barbed wire fence), which also controls the entire water supply.²⁸

This image is unbearable, without a doubt, but it is not the full picture. There are also the offensive comments and insults (Palestinians are stigmatized as 'thieves, snakes, cockroaches and grasshoppers') and the long queues at Israeli checkpoints 'that detain and humiliate the elderly, the sick, the student and the cleric for hours on end.'²⁹ Furthermore, '150,000 of their olive and citrus trees have been punitively uprooted; 2,000 of their houses demolished; acres of their land either destroyed or expropriated for military settlement purposes.'³⁰

CONCLUSION

In September 2001 in New York City, Jacques Chirac, exclaiming before the rubble of the Twin Towers, said, 'Seeing this could move a man to tears.'³¹ The French president was right. Except that it would be even more appropriate to ask who, on the other side of the picture, would want to shed tears for the sad, iniquitous and miserable plight of the Palestinians? Who has been moved to tears at the fate of the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi children who died as a result of the most comprehensive and severe embargo ever imposed on a country, which crippled theirs for thirteen long years? Who wants to cry for all the other damned on the planet, who exist unknown to others? Nobody, or hardly anybody, apart from the damned themselves. Would those people cease to exist simply by edging them out of the picture and out of view of the camera? Can it be said that people have no feelings if they see no images? If things work according to that scheme— and unless proven otherwise that does seem to be the case – it explains one of the fundamental causes of all

27. *Ibid.*, p. 152.

28. Saïd, *From Oslo to Iraq ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*

31. R. Debray, *Chroniques de l'idiotie triomphantes ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 102–3.

forms of hatred, extremism and terrorism. 'That's how we got to this point', Robert Fisk repeats. When the 'other' is excluded from humanity, that 'other' can be dehumanized a little more each day. That can be the disadvantage of the excluder ... and of the 'other', too. The 'other's' revolt and cry, to put an end to such dehumanization, can in extreme cases take the form of terrorism, viewed not as terrorism, but as resistance, by the other.

Is this a war of legitimacy or a conflict of concepts? It does not really matter. What does matter is that 'Islam' and 'the West' 'are simply inadequate as banners to follow blindly' as Edward Said has so aptly noted. We can say, as he has, that it will be detrimental to humanity if future generations are doomed to war and suffering. The rising generations can see that their histories are interdependent, that they can become liberated through mutual enlightenment and that by addressing the root causes of terror, namely injustice and poverty, terrorists might be isolated, deterred or thwarted more successfully.

Chapter 3.10
THE 2003 IRAQ WAR

Fredj Maatoug

INTRODUCTION

The invasion of Iraq by armed forces from the United States of America and the United Kingdom cannot be separated from the context of the events of 11 September 2001. This does not mean, however, that the idea of invading Iraq arose only after the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York City had been attacked. Much of the American political establishment had already been toying with the idea of establishing a presence in Mesopotamia. The neoconservatives and the oil, military industry and Israeli lobbies were never far from the corridors of power in the federal capital. They all wanted the war in Iraq, for a variety of reasons. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the war waged by Washington on Iraq was obviously not a closed chapter: at the end of the 'Desert Storm' military operations in April 1991, which had led to the liberation of Kuwait, the war was far from over. Observers could see that the governments of the United States of America and of the United Kingdom wanted to keep Iraq in a state of emergency on purpose. What was that purpose? Nobody had a clear idea at the time, but it became clearer after 11 September 2001. Riding on the anger and fear felt by public opinion shocked at the terrorist attacks, neoconservatives gravitating around President George W. Bush secured implementation of the policy that they had already chosen for Iraq. Public opinion both worldwide and increasingly in the United States of America was appalled by the continued embargo that had caused the deaths of nearly one-and-a-half million Iraqi civilians over fourteen years. Each day that passed made Washington's position increasingly untenable. It required all the strength of American propaganda and all the ingenuity of White House officials to continue to raise arguments to justify the unjustifiable. They continued, despite the monstrous damage inflicted on

the Iraqi people, to keep Iraq under supervision against the will of the entire international community. Some international figures such as Ramsay Clark, former Attorney General of the United States of America, unhesitatingly and sharply criticized that policy for being the vector of crimes against the Iraqi people. Denis Halliday, United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq between 1997 and 1998, resigned over the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq that he denounced as 'genocidal'.

The policy of sanctions against Iraq ended when the operation misleadingly named 'Iraqi Freedom' began. The invasion of Iraq by the United States of America and the United Kingdom placed the country under occupation, completed the destruction of its infrastructure that had begun in 1991, inflicted atrocious suffering on its people and structurally dismantled the Iraqi State.

Diplomacy, propaganda and sanctions: preparations for war

The invasion of a sovereign and independent country in the early twenty-first century, namely Iraq, was no easy task, either politically, legally or morally. Yet the United States of America and a few of its most faithful allies, in particular the United Kingdom under the government of Tony Blair, did indeed invade that country. Despite their unquenchable thirst for Mesopotamia's oil, the Americans, aware of the enormity of the act, had waited for a favourable context to initiate such an undertaking. The events of 11 September 2001 provided that context, but did not suffice of itself as a legal argument. Political, legal and moral rationale was required to legitimize such action. Two members of the Security Council, France and the Russian Federation, withstood the pressure from the United States of America and refused to endorse the planned invasion. Washington finally resolved to act unilaterally, outside the United Nations and international law, which was hazardous and regretful for the Americans and the international community but, above all, catastrophic for the Iraqi people.

THE CONTEXT OF 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Centre in New York City and on the Pentagon were an unprecedented shock for the American people. They had been accustomed to wars being fought on foreign soil and had positively internalized a comfortable feeling of living in total security in a sanctuary inviolable by enemies. That sense of security was shattered by the terrorist attacks. The shock to the vast majority of American people was therefore inevitably tremendous, bordering a trauma at the national level. The violence of the reaction of the United States of America and the outburst of

patriotism and outrage, of which only its people are capable, can be explained in the light of that shock.

The 'Empire of America' was quick to identify the culprits, find them and attack them. The first designated target was Afghanistan, where the Taliban regime was accused of providing a safe haven for members of al-Qaeda and its leader Osama bin Laden. A bombing campaign lasting a few weeks sufficed to bring down the Taliban in Afghanistan. The war on terror had just begun. Washington set up an allied government chaired by Hamid Karzai, and then turned to Iraq. George W. Bush instructed Donald Rumsfeld and Tommy Franks to draw up an operations plan to invade Iraq, which was given the code 1003V. It was a revised battle plan of the first Iraq war in 1991, codenamed 'Operation Desert Storm'. Why was Iraq chosen as the next target after Afghanistan? The Americans, backed by a formidable propaganda machine, brandished 'hard evidence' on alleged ties between Iraq and al-Qaeda. Were those accusations true? Nobody took the time to ask such questions, especially at that moment in history. It was a time for decisive mobilization and involvement in the war on terror. Any hesitation would be understood by the enemy as a sign of weakness. Hence the need to be firm, as Western media asserted unanimously. America had been attacked and wounded and was seeking revenge and the punishment of the Islamic terrorists responsible. Its assailants were evil forces who hated the values of freedom and democracy. There was no time to dwell on the fate that was in store for them. Yet on 18 September 2001, Richard Clarke sent a memorandum to the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, on the issue of the alleged relations between Baghdad and al-Qaeda. His report, entitled 'Survey on intelligence information on any Iraq involvement in the September 11 attacks', was very interesting. It showed that there was only a little anecdotal evidence linking Iraq to the terrorist organization and, above all, no concrete trace of Iraqi involvement in the planning or implementation of the attacks on 11 September 2001.

Were these the only accusations levelled against Iraq? No. Other grievances accrued to increase the charges against the country, which became the irreversible target of the United States of America that was at last poised for attack.

THE ARGUMENTS IN THE CASE AGAINST IRAQ

A media frenzy in the written press, daily and weekly newspapers, on radio and on television preceded the invasion of Iraq. The spotlight was on Saddam Hussein and his regime, as if there were no civilians in Iraq, and as if only a few hundred regime leaders lived in the land of the Tigris and the Euphrates. Describing this media block, Edward Saïd wrote:



III-10.1 Al-Kadhimiya Mosque, Baghdad, Iraq
© Michael Spencer/AramcoWorld

In the current American propaganda campaign for regime change in Iraq, the people of that country, the vast majority of whom have suffered from poverty, malnutrition and illness as a result of ten years of sanctions, have dropped out of sight. This is entirely in keeping with US Middle East policy, which is built on two mighty pillars: the security of Israel and plentiful supplies of inexpensive oil.¹

To prepare the American public and win the support of the international community, the governments of the United States of America and of the United Kingdom first used the compelling 'war on terror' argument. They stated with certainty that Iraq was supporting international terrorism, in particular al-Qaeda, with which it was logically jointly responsible for the terrorist attack on the United States Navy destroyer *USS Cole* in Yemeni waters, strikes on embassies of the United States of America in various African countries, in particular at Nairobi, and lastly, the attacks on 11 September 2001.

Secondly, Baghdad was accused of possessing weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles, which were of course prohibited by the United Nations under resolution 687 of 3 April 1991. It was concluded, therefore, that no further proof was required of the duplicity of the Iraqi regime, which refused to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and thus continued to hide prohibited weapons. Those assertions were in reality mere speculation. Nevertheless, the United States of America and its allies attempted to portray them as ascertained facts. Jean Salmon described that hawkish mind-set in the introduction to a report on the intervention in Iraq and international law: to persuade other states and public opinion to follow them in their endeavour, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Spain, in short, advanced several arguments, all of which raised serious doubts.²

The first doubt, regarding the facts stated by those countries, concerned the issue of weapons of mass destruction. The first point, stated as an established fact, was evidence that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. It was rumoured that Donald Rumsfeld knew this full well because it was he who had provided them, at least in part. Despite efforts by Hans Blix and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct a full international verification, the unverified unilateral charges prevailed.³

As to the Iraqi regime's links to al-Qaeda, as discussed earlier, nothing had been proven. Quite the opposite was probable, given Saddam Hussein's

1. E. W. Saïd, *From Oslo to Iraq and the Road Map*, Vintage Books, 2005.

2. K. Bannelier, T. Christakis, O. Corten, and P. Klein (eds.), *L'intervention en Irak et le droit international* [Intervention in Iraq and International Law], Paris, Centre of International Law, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Cahiers internationaux, No. 19, 2004, p. 3.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

well known hostility towards Osama bin Laden.⁴ Thus, it is easy to demonstrate the inadequacy of the legal arguments advanced by Washington and its allies to justify the war against Iraq.

The other point, which had been overused to win public opinion over the war, was information. To quote Roland Barthes, ‘the more information grows, the more knowledge retreats, and therefore the more decision is partial.’⁵ Media hype during that campaign was unprecedented. The main idea to be conveyed was that a war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was unavoidable, for the human good. Therefore, under the huge avalanche of articles and reports on imminent war against the dictatorship, Edward Saïd wrote that ‘with five-thousand-year-old history, Iraq is mainly now thought of either as a “threat” to its neighbours, which, in its currently weakened and besieged condition, is rank nonsense, or as a “threat” to the freedom and security of the United States of America, which is more nonsense.’⁶ Dozens of print journalists in the United States of America and media pundits on CNN, CBS, NBC and Fox-News had flooded the media to spread the word. Their simplistic message to the average American was ‘to spread American democracy and fight the good fight, no matter how many wars have to be fought all over the world.’⁷ The most enthusiastic war advocates were the second generation of neoconservatives, in particular Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice and others close to George W. Bush, who flung themselves into promoting the Iraq war.

THE FINAL STRETCH BEFORE THE WAR

On 8 November 2002, the Security Council adopted resolution 1441, submitted by the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, affording Iraq ‘a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations’ within seven days. The resolution was adopted unanimously. Even Syria, the only Arab Member State on the Security Council, voted for the resolution. A few months later, Washington, to drive the point home, requested that the Security Council authorize the use of force against Iraq. That task proved more difficult than previous ones. Some allies no longer agreed.

On 5 February 2003, the conference room at United Nations Headquarters was packed. Taking the floor, Colin Powell again stated his country’s position: Iraq posed a threat to the international community by producing and storing weapons of mass destruction. He showed photographs of lorries, stating that they were mobile biological research laboratories, and satellite photographs of chemical weapons plants. He also exhibited a small

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

6. Saïd, *From Oslo to Iraq ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 230.



III-10.2 A man selling textiles in a souk in Suleimaniyah, Iraq, in 1997
© UN Photo/Pernaca Sudhakaran

empty vial theatrically in front of world cameras. The Secretary of State of the United States of America said that Iraq possessed millions of such small vials full of toxic chemicals. According to Colin Powell, by hiding those illegal products from United Nations inspectors, the Iraqi Government had violated Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 687 adopted at the end of the 1991 Gulf War, which enshrined the terms of the ceasefire. From that moment, the world had been put on notice: the Bush Administration was inexorably going to war. From that moment, too, there was a deadlock in the Security Council between those advocating war, represented by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, and those wishing to continue negotiations, represented by France, Germany and the Russian Federation.

On 9 February, France and Germany jointly proposed an alternative to the military option. Under the Franco-German plan, European United Nations peacekeepers would be stationed in Iraq and the presence of United Nations inspectors would be strengthened. The Russian Federation joined those two states on the following day to adopt a joint statement in favour of continuing and strengthening United Nations inspections in Iraq. China in turn supported that proposal two days later. Baghdad immediately authorized the 'unconditional' overflight of its territory by U2 spy craft.



III-10.3 United Nations observation post in northern Iraq, June 1998

© UN Photo/Eric Falt

Washington had been reminded on the previous day, by two major decisions by France and the Russian Federation, not everyone considered unilateralism to be unavoidable. Igor Ivanov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, had said that Moscow would veto any resolution submitted by the United States of America and the United Kingdom calling for the authorization of the use of force. For his part, Jacques Chirac, President of France, had reaffirmed his determination to do his utmost to prevent a war against Iraq, including the use of France's veto at the United Nations. Opposition between the two sides had reached the point of no return. On 17 February, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Spain faced the facts. As there was no likelihood that their draft resolution would be adopted, those states decided not to submit a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq to the United Nations vote. Did that signal retreat by the Bush administration? No. That very evening, to universal surprise, George W. Bush gave Saddam Hussein forty-eight hours to leave Iraq. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan immediately announced the withdrawal from Iraq of United Nations weapons inspectors and the suspension of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme. On 20 March 2003, at the behest of George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, and Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, an intensive bombing campaign, began

targeting all of Iraq's official buildings; the invasion of Iraq was under way. Ironically, the operation was codenamed '*Iraqi Freedom*'.

The invasion and the dismantling of a sovereign state

Despite unanimous world opposition to the war, confirmed by two former Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Mr Kofi Annan and Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who described it as illegal, the Iraq war went ahead. The war axis constituted by the United States of America and the United Kingdom overrode international law. Thus, on the evening of 19 March 2003, at exactly 21.37 p.m., the United States of America unleashed war on Iraq by launching missiles on Baghdad. Iraq retaliated by firing sea-to-sea missiles against American targets in Kuwait. During the initial offensive, in addition to the United Kingdom, Washington also relied on its faithful ally Australia. Other countries that played significant logistical, political and armed-support roles were Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey and Ukraine. Some countries withdrew from Iraq as soon as a policy change or a major event permitted. This is true of Spain, which withdrew its troops in March 2004 after José María Aznar's right-wing government had been voted out in the parliamentary elections and the Socialist Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero had taken office. The same was true of the Philippines, which withdrew after a Filipino had been taken hostage and executed. The United States of America said that it had formed a coalition of 49 countries, including such diverse states as Albania, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Honduras and Ukraine. One important point must, however, be made – most of those states merely had token military presence, no more than a few dozen soldiers in some cases. Furthermore, many small states such as Azerbaijan, Costa Rica and Rwanda were under pressure from the United States of America or had simply been bribed with money.

THE AFTERMATH OF A PRECIPITOUS VICTORY

On 19 March 1917, when the British army occupied Iraq, the commander in chief, General F. S. Maude, said, in an address to the people of Mesopotamia, 'our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators. Your wealth has been stripped of you by unjust men. ... But you, people of Baghdad ... are not to understand that it is the wish of the British Government to impose upon you alien institutions.'⁸ Iraqis have

8. Abdel-Hussein Chaabane, 'al-Mashhad al-ʿIrāqī al-rahin: al-Ḥīṭal wa-tawabīʿhu fī ḍawʿ al-qanūn al-dawli' [The current Landscape of Iraq: the Occupation and its Consequences in the Light of International Law], *al-Mustaqbal al-ʿArabi*, 26th year, No. 297, November 2003, p. 30.

never forgotten this episode in their history. They still remember with pride what they now call ‘the 1920 revolution’. They know that they made great sacrifices to rid their country of the colonial presence of British soldiers, who had assured them that they had come as liberators.

On 10 April 2003, in a television programme for the Iraqi people on *Towards Freedom TV*, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said, addressing the channel the Iraqi people after the fall of Baghdad, ‘our forces are friends and liberators of the Iraqi people, not your conquerors.’⁹ History repeats itself. As in 1917, the invasion in 2003 was by no means the liberation of the Iraqi people. Subsequent events confirmed the view that colonialism always spawns the same horrors and atrocities.

After three weeks of unequal conflict between the American, British and other coalition forces and the Iraqi army, Baghdad fell. The Iraqis awoke on 9 April 2003 to discover that their country had been defeated, devastated and occupied. Optimistic statements, which were completely fanciful, made by war propagandists and Iraqi political opponents resident in the United States of America who had lost all contact with the reality of their country. They all thought that the Iraqis would see the American soldiers as liberators and welcome them with open arms. The mere idea was contemptuous of and unfair to the brave and patriotic Iraqi people, who had first-hand experience of two destructive invasions by the United States of America within twelve years. They had seen with their own eyes the heavy bombing and shelling by B-52, F-16 and F-117 stealth bombers and by cruise missiles on their towns and their buildings in Basra and Baghdad. They had witnessed the destruction of hospitals, factories, universities, roads and bridges and, for fourteen long years, had been deprived under harsh and inhumane sanctions of all of the necessities of life at the behest of the United States of America. Why would that same country now come to liberate them? Such a brazen remark was an insult to their intelligence, as it implied that they were malcontents waiting to be liberated by American soldiers, whom they would welcome with flowers – all tantamount to lying, ignorance or both. Contrary to the expectations of the war strategists in the United States of America, the Iraqi people’s attitude immediately after the fall of Baghdad astonished their enemies – the occupiers.

As an immediate consequence of Iraq’s military defeat, the state ceased to exist and there was a constitutional vacuum as a result. Overnight, the Iraqis found themselves without the police, army or legislation required to regulate daily life. That void was catastrophic in proportions, especially as the Iraqi people had always been accustomed to a very strong state presence, even too strong a presence in their general opinion. Moreover, the sovereignty lost by

9. *Ibid.*

Iraq would be exercised by the occupying forces, for which no provision had been made. The issue was settled by the Security Council a few weeks after the invasion. Without granting United Nations endorsement for the United States of America's invasion of Iraq, the Security Council took stock of the situation on the ground and, on 22 May 2003, adopted resolution 1483, recognizing the specific authorities, responsibilities and obligations incumbent on the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, under the applicable international law, as occupying powers under unified command.

Owing to non-existence of the state and the lack of security forces after the police and the Iraqi army had been dissolved by Paul Bremer, there was total anarchy, theft was rife and the people were faced with insecurity. Museums, monuments, libraries, universities, education authorities and other cultural and historic buildings were robbed, looted and vandalised. Unique manuscripts and books of great value were thus lost.¹⁰ It has been proven that United States military personnel were also guilty of theft of museum articles in particular. The international press published photographs showing American soldiers in the act, taking paintings off museum walls and stealing archaeological specimens. The looting of Iraq's heritage reached such proportions that it was reported to UNESCO, which was alarmed at such large-scale, openly conducted international theft.

IRAQI RESISTANCE: ADVANCED PREPARATION?

Two months after the invasion, the civil administrator of Iraq, Paul Bremer, arrogantly said: 'We dominate the scene and we will continue to impose our will on this country [Iraq].'¹¹ He promised to fight and kill any Iraqi who opposed the occupation. This was a far cry from the statements made before the poetically named 'Shock and Awe' military operation, which spoke of liberating the Iraqi people and establishing democracy. Indeed, one month later, on 24 July 2003, Paul Bremer, in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), said: 'We are going to fight them and impose our will on them; we will capture or, if necessary, kill them until we have imposed law and order on this country.'¹² Naturally, he meant the law and order of the occupier. It was paradoxical that this came from the very same person who had decided to dissolve Iraq's state apparatus, from the army to the police, and to leave the country to looters

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 60–9.

11. L. P. Bremer, US proconsul to Iraq, in a BBC-television interview on 29 June 2003, in Hiro, *Secrets and Lies Operation 'Iraqi Freedom' and after*, New York, Nation Books, 2003, p. 299.

12. M. Hassan and D. Pestieau, *L'Irak face à l'occupation* [Iraq: Eye to Eye with the Occupation], France, EPO, 2004, p. 69.



III-10.4 Members of the Fijian colour guard and the guard unit of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) on mission in Baghdad, Iraq, in February 2009

© UN Photo/Rick Bajornas

and indiscriminately released common criminals. It was as if there was a will to create and encourage disorder as grounds for a specific policy. Only the oil ministry, guarded from the outset by American tanks, survived unscathed. This was certainly no coincidence. The links between the oil lobby and neoconservatives in power in Washington are well known. Oil companies such as the Carlyle Group, Enron and Halliburton Energy Services – once led by Dick Cheney – were close to the upper echelons of power in Washington, both under George W. Bush and before.

On 1 May 2003, George W. Bush triumphantly announced that the Iraq war was finally over; but that was premature. Iraqi resistance had only just begun. Immediately after the fall of Baghdad, Iraqis retaliated through acts of resistance against the American occupiers. International observers unfailingly noted the distinctive and rapid onset of such acts. In other historical examples worldwide, the first blow of resistance was struck against the occupier after a few years and sometimes decades. In Iraq it was struck without delay, which means that the resistance structure, with all of the necessary human and technical resources, had been organized and readied before the military operation actually began. Was the Iraqi resistance already in place before the fall of the Baathist regime? There are many who think that it was. So, too, does Scott Ritter, former United Nations weapons inspector, who reported his findings to intelligence agencies in the United States of America in 1996. ‘What I saw in 1996 – and passed on to US intelligence agencies – were what might be called the blueprints of the post-war insurgency that the US now faces in Iraq.’¹³

Some Iraq analysts have even said that all arrangements had been made by Saddam Hussein himself, before the fall of Baghdad. Acts of resistance spread throughout the country and intensified over time, prompting Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Commander of Coalition Ground Forces in Iraq, to say: ‘The enemy has evolved. It is a little bit more lethal, little bit more complex, little bit more sophisticated and in some cases a little bit more tenacious.’¹⁴ He was not the only one to be worried about the rise of the Iraqi resistance, for, in November 2003, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) wrote a sobering report revealing that growing numbers of Iraqis were joining the guerrillas. The resistance had sufficient weaponry and ammunition and was increasingly well organized. It was active in the north, the south and the centre of the country.¹⁵

13. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 69–70.

GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbreviations:

JAS – *Journal of Asian Studies*

JMBRAS – *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*

MBRAS – *Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*

MLM – *Mare – Luso – Indicum – Geneva*

MPH – *Malayan Publishing House – Singapore*

‘ABD AL-KARĪM, Aḥmad ‘Izzat, 1970, *Dirāsāt fi tārikh al-Maghrib al-ḥadīth* [Studies on the Modern History of the Maghreb], Beirut, Dār al-Nahḍa.

‘ABD AL-KARĪM, Aḥmad ‘Izzat et al., 1982, *Tārikh al-‘Arab al-ḥadīth wa-l-mu‘āṣir* [The Modern and Contemporary History of the Arabs], Beirut, Mu’assasat Nāṣir al-Thaqāfiyya.

‘ABD-AL-Nāṣir, Walīd Maḥmūd, 2005, ‘al-Tafā‘ul bayna al-Islām wa-l-‘urūba wa-l-ishtirākiyya fi-l-Jazā’ir 1954–1992’ [The Interaction between Islam, Arabism and Socialism in Algeria 1954–1992], *Majallat al-Sīyāsa al-dawliyya*, No. 112, X, October 2005.

‘ABD AL-RĀZIQ, ‘Alī, 1925, *al-Islām wa-uṣūl al-ḥukm*, Cairo, Maṭba‘at Miṣr.

‘ABD AL-WAHHĀB, Ḥasan Ḥasanī, 1973, *Khulāṣat tārikh Tūnis* [A Summary of the History of Tunisia], Tunisia, no pub.

ABDELKRIM-DELANNE, C., 2001, *Guerre du Golfe, La sale guerre propre* [The dirty war that was clean], Paris, Le cherche midi auditeur, Collection ‘Documents’.

ABDULGHANI, J. M., 1984, *Iraq and Iran, the Years of Crisis*, Baltimore, Maryland, The Johns Hopkins University Press, USA.

ABRAHAMIAN, E., 2008, *A History of Modern Iran*, UK, Cambridge University Press.

ABŪ SHĀDĪ, 1973, ‘Kharīṭat al-waḥda al-Ifrīqiyya fi ‘aqdihi al-awwal’ [The Map of the African Unity Organization in its First Decade], *Majallat al-Sīyāsa al-dawliyya*, No. 33.

ABU-L-NASR, Ismā‘il, 1975, *The History of the Maghrib*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

AHMED, N. M., 2001, ‘Afghanistan, the Taliban and the United States. The Role of

- Human Rights in Western Foreign Policy', *Media Monitors Network* at <http://www.mediamonitors.net/mosaddeq2.html>.
- ALL, O., 1993, *Crisis in the Arabian Gulf, An Independent Iraqi View*, Westport, Connecticut, London, Praeger.
- ALLEN, R., 1974, *Imperialism and Nationalism in the Fertile Crescent*, London, Oxford University Press.
- ALLOUCHE, A., 1983, *The Origins and Development of the Ottoman Safavid Conflict 906–960/1500–1533*, Berlin.
- AMĪN, Aḥmad, 1948, *Zu'ama' al-iṣlāḥ fi-l-ʿaṣr al-ḥadīth* [Leaders of Reformation in the Modern Period], Cairo, Maktabat al-Nahḍa.
- ʿĀMIR, Maḥmūd ʿAlī, 1987, *Tārīkh al-Maghrib al-ʿarabī (Libiyya)* [The History of the Arab Maghreb (Libya)], Damascus, Jāmiʿat Dimashq.
- ANDAYA, B. W. and ANDAYA, L. Y., 1982, *A History of Malaysia*, London and Basingstoke, the Macmillan Press Ltd.
- ANDERSON, E. W., and RASHIDIAN, K. H., 1991, *Iraq and the Continuing Middle East Crisis*, London, Department of Geography University of Durham, Pinter Publishers.
- ANĪS, Muḥammad, 1981, *al-Dawla al-ʿuthmāniyya wa-l-Sharq al-ʿarabī 1514–1914* [The Ottoman State and the Arab East 1514–1914], Cairo, Maktabat al-Anglo al-Miṣriyya.
- ʿANNĀN, Muḥammad ʿAbdullah, 1966, *Nihāyat al-andalus wa tārīkh al-ʿarab al-mutanaṣṣarīn* [The End of al-Andalus and the History of the Arab *conversos*], Cairo.
- ANON, 1940, *Nabdhāt al-ʿaṣr min akhbār banī naṣr* [Brief History of the Nasirids], ed. Alfred al-Bustānī, Larache.
- . 1990, *al-ʿamal al-qanmiyya li-Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣrī* [The Nationalist Works of Sāṭiʿ al-Ḥuṣrī], Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-ʿArabiyya.
- . 1996, *al-Aẓma al-jazāʾiriyya* [The Algerian Crisis], Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-ʿArabiyya.
- ANSARI, A. M., 2003, *Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and After*, UK, Pearson Education Limited.
- AL-ANṢĀRĪ, Aḥmad Nāʾib, 1973, *al-Manbal al-ʿadbb fi tārīkh Ṭarābulus al-Gharb* [The Sweet Spring in the History of Tripoli-in-the-West], Tripoli, Maktabat al-Farjānī.
- ANTONIUS, G., 1969, *The Arab Awakening (The Story of Arab National Movement)*, Beirut, Librairie du Liban (Reprint).
- . 1978, *Yaqẓat al-ʿArab* [The Arab Awakening]. Translated by Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Asad and Iḥṣān ʿAbbās, Beirut, Dār al-ʿIlm li-l-Malāyyin.
- AL-ʿAQQĀD, Ṣalāḥ, 1969, *al-Maghrib al-ʿarabī* [Arab Morocco], Cairo, Maktabat al-Anglo al-Miṣriyya.
- . 1974, *al-Qiyādāt al-siyāsiyya fi-l-khalij al-ʿarabī* [Political Leaders in the Arabian Gulf], Cairo, Maktabat al-Anglo al-Miṣriyya.
- ARKELL, A. J. A., 1961, *A History of the Sudan from the Earliest Times to 1821*, London, Athlone Press.
- AL-ASAD, Nāṣir and ʿABBĀS, Iḥṣān (trans.), 1981, *Yaqẓat al-ʿArab* [The Arab Awakening]. A translation of George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, Beirut, Dār al-ʿIlm li-l-Malāyyin.
- ASIWAJU, A. I. (ed.), 1985, *Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884–1984*, no pub.

- ASKEW, W. C., 1942, *Europe and Italy's Acquisition of Libya 1911–1912*, Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press.
- ATABAKI, T., 2009, *Iran in the 20th Century: Historiography and Political Culture*, London, New York, I.B. Tauris.
- AXWORTHY, M., 2008, *A History of Iran: Empire of the Mind*, Basic Books.
- AZIZ, P., and DUCRET, A., 2002, *Les kamikazes d'Allah* [Allah's Kamikazes], France, Editions DIDRO.
- BACHARAN, N., and SFEIR, A., 2006, *Américains, Arabes: l'affrontement*, Paris, Seuil.
- AL-BĪṬĀR, Nadīm, 'Al-Qawmiyya al-ʿarabiyya' [Arab Nationalism]. *Qirāʾat fi-l-fikr al-qawmī* [Readings on the Nationalist Idea], I, Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-ʿArabiyya.
- BALCI, B., and MOTIKA, R. (eds.), 2007, *Religion et politique dans le Caucase post-soviétique* [Religion and Politics in the post-Soviet Caucasus], Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose.
- BALTA, P., 1987, *Iran-Irak, une guerre de 5000 ans* [Iran-Iraq, a 5,000-year war], Paris, éditions Anthropos.
- BALTA, P. (ed.), 1989, *Le conflit Irak-Iran 1979–1989* [The Iraq-Iran Conflict 1979–1989], Institut français de polémologie, Centre d'études de l'Orient contemporain, La Documentation française, No. 4889.
- BANNELIER, K., CHRISTAKIS, T., CORTEN, O. and KLEIN, P. (eds.), 2004, *L'intervention en Irak et le droit international* [Intervention in Iraq and International Law], Paris, Centre of International Law, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Cahiers internationaux, No. 19.
- BARAKAT, S., and WARDELL, G., 2001, *Capitalizing on Capacities of Afghan Women: Women's Role in Afghanistan's Reconstruction and Development*, Geneva, International Labor Organization.
- BARBER, B. R., 2003, *L'empire de la peur, terrorisme, guerre, démocratie*, Paris, Fayard.
- BARBOUR, N., 1969, *Nisi Dominus, A Survey of the Palestine Controversy*, Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies (Reprinted edition).
- BARILIER, E., 2004, *Nous autres civilisations... Amérique, Islam, Europe*, Geneva, Editions ZOE.
- BARRY, B., 1998, *La Sénégambie du XV^e au XIX^e siècle: Traite négrière, Islam, conquête coloniale*, L'Harmattan, Racines du Présent.
- BAUDRILLARD, Jean, 1991, *La guerre du Golfe n'a pas eu lieu* [The Gulf War did not Take Place], France, Editions Galilée.
- BAXTER, C., 1997, *Bangladesh: From a Nation to a State*, Westview Press.
- AL-BAZZĀZ, ʿAbd al-Rahmān, (1999), 'Mustaqbal al-qawmiyya al-ʿarabiyya' [The Future of Arab Nationalism], *Qirāʾat fi-l-fikr al-qawmī al-ʿarabī*, I, Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-ʿArabiyya.
- AL-BAZZĀZ, Saʿad, 1992–1993, *Harbun talidu okbrā, al-tarikh al-sirri li-ḥarb al-khalij* [War and the One after, the Secret History of the Gulf War], Amman, al-Ahliyya Publishers, Second edition.
- . 1995, *Ramādu-l-ḥurūb, asrāru ma baʿda ḥarb al-khalij* [Ashes of wars, post-Gulf War Secrets], Amman, al-Ahliyya Publishers.
- BEAULIEU, I., 2008, *L'Etat rentier: le cas de la Malaisie* [Rentier States: the Case of Malaysia], Canada, Presses de l'Université d'Ottawa.

- BERGER, M., 1970, *The Arab World Today*, New York, Doubleday and Company Inc.
- BERGNA, C., 1969, *Ṭarābulus bayna 1510–1850* [Tripoli between 1510 and 1850], translated by Muḥammad al-Tillīsī, Tripoli, Dār al-Farjānī.
- BERKES, N., 1964, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, Montreal, McGill University Press.
- BERTHIER, R., 1994, *L'Occident et la guerre contre les Arabes, réflexions sur la guerre du Golfe et le nouvel ordre mondial* [The West and the War against the Arabs, Reflections on the Gulf War and the New World Order], Paris, L'Harmattan.
- BESSON, S., *La conquête de l'Occident, le projet secret des islamistes* [The conquest of the West: the Islamists' Secret Project], France, Seuil.
- BIGO, D., BONELLI, L., and DELTOMBE, T. (Eds.), 2008, *Au nom du 11 septembre... Les démocraties à l'épreuve de l'antiterrorisme*, Paris, La Découverte.
- BINDER, L., 1964, *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East*, New York, John Wiley and Sons Inc.
- BITTAR, T., 1994, *Soliman – L'empire magnifique*, Paris, Gallimard.
- BLANC, F., 2001, *Ben Laden et l'Amérique* [Bin Laden and America], Paris, Bayard.
- BOISSEL, J., 1975, *L'Iran moderne* [Modern Iran], PUF, (Que sais-je ?).
- BONIFACE, P., 2003, *La France contre l'empire*, Robert Laffont.
- . 2005, *Chroniques Proche-orientales, 2001–2005* [Near-Eastern Chronicles, 2001–2005], Liège, IRIS-Dalloz.
- BONIFACE, P. (ed.), 2004, *Les défis du monde arabe*, Paris, IRIS-PUF.
- BOUCHON, G., 1973, 'Les Musulmans du Kerala à l'époque de la découverte portugaise', Genève, *MLM*, Tome II.
- BOUMAZA, B., 1984, *Ni Emir ni ayatollah, le monde arabe et musulman à l'épreuve du conflit Irak-Iran* [Neither Emir nor Ayatollah, the Muslim Arab World tested by the Iraq-Iran Conflict], Paris, Editions Cana.
- BOUZAR, D., 2007, *L'intégrisme, L'Islam et nous* [Fundamentalism, Islam and us], France, PLON.
- BOXER, C. R., 1953, 'The Portuguese in the East, 1500–1800', in *Portugal and Brazil – an Introduction*, ed. H.V. Livermore, Oxford.
- BROWN, C., 2003, *A Short History of Indonesia: The Unlikely Nation?*, Crow's Nest NSW 2065, Australia, Allen and Unwin.
- BROWN, K. (ed.), 2004, *L'Irak de la crise au chaos, chroniques d'une invasion* [Iraq from Crisis to Chaos: Chronicles of an Invasion], Paris, Ibis Press.
- BRUHAT, J., 1968, *Histoire de l'Indonésie* [A History of Indonesia], Paris, PUF, collection *Que sais-je?*.
- BRUNSCHWIG, H., 1960, *Mythes et réalités de l'impérialisme colonial français (1871–1914)*, Paris, A. Colin.
- . H., 1971, *Le partage de l'Afrique noire*, Paris, Flammarion.
- BURESI, P., *Révolution islamique iranienne (1979)* [Iranian Islamic Revolution (1979)], <http://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/revolution-islamique-iranienne/>
- BURGAT, F., 2005, *L'islamisme à l'heure d'al-Qaida* [Islamism in the Shadow of al-Qaeda], Paris, La Découverte.
- CACHIA, A. J., 1973, *Libya under the Second Ottoman Occupation 1835–1911*, Tripoli, no pub.

- CACHIA, A., 1975, *Libya khilāl al-ihtilāl al-ʿuthmānī al-thānī 1835–1911* [Libya during the Second Ottoman Occupation 1835–1911], Tripoli, Dār al-Farjānī.
- CADIOT, J.-M., 1989, *Quand l'Irak entra en guerre, la Qadissiyyah de Saddam* [When Iraq Went to War, Saddam's Qadisiya], Paris, L'Harmattan.
- CAREY, P. B. R., 1981, 'Babad Dipanagara – An Account of the Outbreak of the Java War (1825–1830)', Kuala Lumpur, *MBRAS*, No. 9.
- CARTER, J., 2006, *Palestine: Peace not Apartheid*, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Simon and Schuster.
- CATTAN, H., 1969, *Palestine, the Arabs and Israel, The Search for Justice*, n. p., Longman, Green and Co. Ltd.
- . 1971, *The Palestine Problem in a Nutshell*, Beirut, Palestine Research Center, (Palestine Essays, No. 26).
- CAZES, S., (Coordination), 2004, *Reporters sans frontières, La guerre en Irak, le livre noir* [Reporters without Borders, The Iraq War, the Black Book], Paris, Editions la Découverte.
- CHADLI, EL-M., and GARON, L. (ed.), 2003, *Et puis vint le 11 septembre, L'hypothèse du choc des civilisations remise en question*, Quebec, Les Presses de l'Université Laval.
- CHAUNU, P., 1961, 'Minorités et conjonctures, l'expulsion des Morisques en 1609' [Minorities and Contexts, the Expulsion of the Moriscos in 1609], *Revue Historique*, CCXXV, No 1.
- CHERBAK, Y., 2006, 'Literaturna Ukraina', 15 March 1989, in J.-R. RAVIOT, and T. TER MINASSIAN, *De L'URSS à la Russie, La civilisation soviétique*, Paris, Ellipes.
- CLARK, W. K., 2003, *L'Irak, le terrorisme et l'empire américain*, France, Seuil.
- . 2003, *Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire*, France, Seuil.
- CLUTTERBUCK, R., 1973, *Riot and Revolution in Singapore and Malaya 1945–1963*, London, Faber and Faber Limited.
- COHEN-TANUGI, L., 2005, *Le choc en retour, l'Occident dans l'après-guerre froide, 1992–2005*, Paris, Odile Jacob.
- CORDESMAN, A. H., 1987, *The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security 1984–1987*, London, Jane's Publishing Company Limited.
- CORM, G., 2002, *Orient Occident, la fracture imaginaire*, Paris, La Découverte.
- CRAMER, C., and GOODHAND, J., 2002, *Try Again, Fail Again. Fail Better? War, the State, and the 'Post-Conflict Challenge in Afghanistan'*, Oxford, Blackwell.
- DALE, S. F., 1975, 'The Mappilla Outbreak Ideology and Social Conflict in Nineteenth Century Kerala', *JAS*, XXXV, No. 1, November.
- . 1980, *Islamic Society on the South Asian Frontier – the Mappillas of Malibar, 1498–1922*, Oxford.
- DANIEL, E. L., 2001, *The History of Iran*, Westport, Connecticut, London, Greenwood Press,
- DANVERS, F., 1966, *The Portuguese in India*, London, F. Cass and Company.
- DAVISON, R. H., 1990, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774–1923*, Austin, University of Texas Press.
- DEBRAY, R., 2004, *Chroniques de l'idiotie triomphante: Terrorisme, guerres, diplomatie 1990–2003* [Chronicles of Triumphant Idiocy: Terrorism, Wars, Diplomacy 1990–2003], France, Fayard.

- DESCHAMPS, H. (ed.), 1971, *Histoire générale de l'Afrique noire, Tome II: De 1800 à nos jours*, Paris, PUF.
- DESPORTES, V., 2002, *L'Amérique en armes, anatomie d'une puissance militaire*, Paris, Economica.
- DIGARD, J.-P., HOURCADE, B. and RICHARD, Y., 2007, *L'Iran au XX^e siècle: entre nationalisme, Islam et mondialisation* [Iran in the Twentieth Century: between Nationalism, Islam and Globalization], Fayard, Paris, (new edition).
- DILIP, H., 2003, *Secrets and Lies, Operation 'Iraqi freedom' and after*, New York, Nation Books.
- DJALILI, M.-R. and KELLNER, T., 2010, *Histoire de l'Iran contemporain* [History of Contemporary Iran], Paris, La Découverte.
- DUPUIS, J., 1972, *Singapour et la Malaysia* [Singapore and Malaysia], Paris, PUF, collection *Que sais-je?*.
- AL-DÜRĪ, 'Abd al-Wahhāb, 1960, *al-Judbūr al-tārikhiyya li-l-qawmiyya al-ʿarabiyya* [The Historical Roots of Arab Nationalism], Beirut, Dār al-ʿIlm li-l-Mmalāyīn.
- DURŪZA, al-Ḥakm and JABŪRI, Hāmid, 1999, *Qirāʾat fi-l-fikr al-qawmi* [Readings on the Nationalist Idea], I, Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-ʿArabiyya.
- ENAYAT, Hamid, 1982, *Modern Islamic Political Thought*, London, Macmillan.
- D'ENCAUSSE, H. C., 2010, *La Russie entre deux mondes* [The Russian Federation between two worlds], Paris, Fayard.
- ERABLY, A., 2007, *The Mughal World*, London.
- ETIENNE, B., 2002, *Les amants de l'apocalypse: pour comprendre le 11 septembre* [The Lovers of the Apocalypse: Understanding the Events of 11 September], France, Editions de l'Aube.
- FĀRIS, Muḥammad Khair, 1987, *Tārikh al-Maghrib al-ḥadīth wa-l-muʿāṣir* [The History of Modern and Contemporary Morocco], Damascus, Jāmiʿat Dimashq.
- FAZĪHĀ, Walīd, n.d., 'al-Qawmiyya al-ʿarabiyya fi marḥalat mā bayna al-Ḥarbayn al-ʿalamiyataīn' [Arab Nationalism in the Period between the Two World Wars], *al-Mustaqbal al-ʿarabi*, Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-ʿArabiyya.
- FÉRAUD, C., 1973, *al-Ḥawliyyāt al-lībiyya* [Annals of Libya], Translated by M. al-Wāfi, Tripoli, Maktabat al-Farjānī.
- FERRO, M., 2003, *Le livre noir du colonialisme, XV^e–XXI^e siècle: de l'extermination à la repentance* [The Black Book of Colonialism from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-first Century: from Extermination to Repentance], France, Editions Robert Laffont, Hachette littératures.
- FERRO, M., and MANDRILLON, M.-H. (eds.), 2005, *Russie, peuples et civilisations* [The Russian Federation, Peoples and Civilizations], Paris, La Découverte.
- FILLION, A., 2003, *La chute de Bagdad, chronique d'une guerre controversée* [The Fall of Baghdad, Chronicle of a Controversial War], Paris, L'Harmattan.
- FINKEL, C., 2006, *Osman's Dream [The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1423]*, London John Murray.
- FISK, R., 2005, *The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East*, London, Harper Collins.
- FUKUYAMA, F., 1992, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York, Free Press.
- GARDNER, J. A., 1988, *The Iraq-Iran War, A Bibliography*, London, Mansell Publishing Limited.

- GAREEV, M., 1995, 'Consequences of the Afghan War: Lessons for Russia', in R. Z. SAGDEEV et al. (eds), *Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution, and Change*. No place, the Center for Political and Strategic Studies Press.
- GARRAD, K., 1954, *The Original Memorial of Don Francisco Nunez*, Atlanta.
- GASCOIGNE, B., 1971, *The Great Mughals*, London.
- GHĀLĪ, Buṭros, 1964, *Munaẓẓamat al-waḥda al-ifriqiyya* [The Organisation of African Unity], Cairo, Maktabat al-Anglo al-Miṣriyya.
- AL-GHAWĪL, Sulaymān Ṣāliḥ, 1990, *al-Dawla al-qanmiyya* [The National State], Benghazi, Jāmi'at Qarayūnis.
- GIFFORD, P. and LOUIS, W. R., 1967, *Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule*, New Haven, Yale.
- HADAWI, S., 1969, *The Arab Israeli Conflict. (Cause and Effect)*, Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies, (Monograph Series, No. 4).
- HAJJĀ, Aḥmad, 1965, 'al-ʿAwlama wa-l-waḥda al-ifriqiyya' [Globalization and African Unity], *Majallat al-Siyasa al-dawliyya*, No. 145.
- HALIM, 1992, *Ḥarbu-l-kebalij, kbuṭūṭun fī-r-ramli wa-l-ẓamān* [The Gulf War, the Writing in the Sand and in Time], Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Wiḥda al-ʿArabiyya, (Centre for Arab Unity Studies).
- HALPREN, M., 1963, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- ḤAMMADĪ, ʿAbdullah, 1989, *al-Muriskejyūn wa-maḥakim al-taftish fi-l-Andalus 1492–1616* [The Moriscos and the Courts of Inquisition in Andalusia], Tunis.
- EL-HAREIR, Idrīs, 1979, 'al-Mujāhid al-Faḍīl Bū ʿUmar' [The Freedom Fighter al-Faḍīl Bū ʿUmar], *Majallat al-Buḥūth al-tārikhiyya*.
- . 1980, 'al-Tamhīd al-siyāsī al-īṭālī li-l-ghazw al-īṭālī li-Lībiyā' [Italian Political Preparation for the Invasion of Libya], *Majallat al-Buḥūth al-tārikhiyya*, Tripoli, Markaz Jihād al-Lībiyyīn.
- . 1981, 'Mawāqif khālida li-ʿUmar al-Mukhtār' [The Unforgettable Stances of ʿUmar al-Mukhtār], in *ʿUmar al-Mukhtār*, Tripoli, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Jihād.
- . 1984, *al-Istīṭān al-istiʿmārī al-īṭālī fī Lībiyā* [The Italian Colonial Settlement in Libya], Tripoli, Markaz Jihād al-Lībiyyīn.
- . 1987, 'al-Taḥarrukāt al-siyāsīyya al-īṭālīyya wa-l-tamhīd li-iḥtilāl Lībiyā 1911' [Italian Political Movements and Preparations to Occupy Libya], *Majallat al-Buḥūth al-tārikhiyya*, No. 2.
- . 1988A, 'al-Mufāwaḍāt bayna ʿUmar al-Mukhtār wa-l-Īṭālīyyīn' [The Negotiations between ʿUmar al-Mukhtār and the Italians], *Majallat al-Thaqāfa al-ʿArabiyya*, 8 September.
- . 1988B, 'Siyāsāt farriq wa-tasud wa-atharuhā ʿalā ḥarakat al-muqāwama al-lībiyya 1911–1932' [The Policy of Divide and Rule and its Effect on the Libyan Resistance Movement], *Majallat al-Thaqāfa al-ʿArabiyya*.
- . 1989, 'al-Mujāhid Yūsuf Bū Raḥīl nāʿib wa-khalīfat ʿUmar al-Mukhtār' [The Freedom Fighter Yūsuf Bū Raḥīl, Deputy and Successor of ʿUmar al-Mukhtār], *Majallat al-Buḥūth al-tārikhiyya*, No. 1.
- . 1992, 'al-Mujāhid ʿAwaḍ al-ʿAbīdī' [The Freedom Fighter ʿAwaḍ al-ʿAbīdī], *Majallat al-Buḥūth al-tārikhiyya*, No. 1.
- . 2009, 'al-Kiyānāt al-siyāsīyya fī Lībiyā 447–933/1055–1517' [Political Entities

- in Libya 447–933/1055–1517] in *al-Kitāb al-marjī‘ fi tārīkh al-umma al-‘arabiyya*, Tunisia, ALECSO.
- . 2010, ‘Jihād al-Lībiyyīn dīdd al-Ītāliyyīn wa-l-Ingilīz wa-l-Faransiyyīn’ [The Jihad of the Libyans against the Italians, the British and the French], *Majallat al-Buḥūth al-Tārīkhīyya*, Tripoli.
- . 2011, ‘Islam in the Maghrib’, *Different Aspects of Islamic Culture*, III, UNESCO.
- HARGREAVES, J. D., 1963, *Prelude to the Partition of West Africa*, London, Macmillan, 1963.
- . 1974, *West Africa Partitioned, I: The Loaded Pause, 1885–1889*, London, Macmillan.
- HARNEY, D., 1998, *The Priest and the King: An Eyewitness Account of the Iranian Revolution*, London, New York, I.B. Tauris Publishers.
- HARPER, T. N., 1999, *The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya*, U. K., Cambridge University Press.
- HASSAN, M. and PESTIEAU, D., 2004, *L’Irak face à l’occupation* [Iraq: Eye to Eye with the Occupation], France, EPO.
- HASSIB, Khair-Eddine, 2004, *Moustaqbal al-‘Irāq, al-ihṭilāl – al-muqāwama – al-tahrīr wa-l-dimuqrāṭīyya* [The Future of Iraq, Colonization, Resistance, Liberation and Democracy], Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Wiḥda al-‘Arabiyya, (Centre for Arab Unity Studies).
- ḤATTĀMALA, Muḥammad ‘Abdu, 1980, *al-Taṣṣīr al-qasrī li-muslimī al-andalus fi ‘abd al-malīkayn al-kāthulīkiyyayn 1474–1516* [Forced Christianization under the Catholic Monarchs], 1st ed., Amman.
- . *Maṣīr al-muslimīn al-andalusīyyīn ba’d suqūṭ Gharnāta 1492* [The Fate of Muslim Andalusians after the Fall of Granada 1492] (study published in a reference work on the history of the Arab nation).
- HAWLEY, D., 1970, *The Trucial States*, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
- ḤAWMAD, As‘ad, 1980, *Miḥnat al-‘arab fi-l-Andalus* [The Arab Ordeal in Andalusia], Beirut.
- HOLT, P. M., and DALY, M. W., 1970, *The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881–1891*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- . 1979, *The History of the Sudan*, Colorado, Westview Press.
- HOURANI, A., 1962, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, London, Oxford University Press.
- . 1971, ‘Palestine and Israel’ in W. LAQUEUR (ed.), *The Israeli-Arab Reader*, Great Britain, Pelican Books (Revised edition).
- HOVEYDA, F., 2003, *The Shah and the Ayatollah: Iranian Mythology and Islamic Revolution*, London, Westport, Connecticut, no pub.
- LE HUEROU, A., MERLIN, A., REGAMEY, A., and SERRANO, S., 2005, *Tchéchénie: une affaire intérieure? Russes et tchéchènes dans l’étan de la guerre* [Chechnya, an Internal Affair? Russians and Chechens in the Grip of War], Autrement, Collection CERI.
- HUBAC, O., 2006, *Irak, une guerre mondiale 1980 à nos jours* [Iraq, a World War 1980 to the Present], Paris, Editions de La Martinière.
- ḤUSAYN, Muḥammad Muḥammad, 1970, *al-Itijāhāt al-waṭaniyya fi-l-adab al-mu‘āṣir*, Beirut, Dār al-Irshād, II.
- AL-ḤUṢRĪ, Sāṭi‘, 1957, *al-Bilād al-‘arabiyya wa-l-dawla al-‘uthmāniyya* [The Arab Countries and the Ottoman State], Cairo, Jāmi‘at al-Duwal al-‘Arabiyya.
- IBN ABĪ AL-ḌAYYĀF, Aḥmad, 1971, *Itḥāf abl al-ḡamān bi-akbbār mulūk Tunis wa-‘abd al-amān* [The Contemporaries’ Presentation of the History of Tunisia and the Peace Treaty], Tunis, al-Jāmi‘a al-Tūnisiyya.

- IBN ABĪ DĪNĀR, Muḥammad, 1967, *al-Muʿnis fī akhbār ifriqiya wa-tūnis* [A Short History of North Africa and Tunisia], Tunis.
- IBN SALĀMA, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, 1980, *al-Maghrib qabla al-istiqlāl* [Morocco before Independence], Casablanca, Dār al-Thaqāfa.
- IDWELL, R., 1983, *The Two Yemens*, Colorado, Longman.
- INALÇIK, H., 1970, 'The Heyday and Decline of the Ottoman Empire' in P. M. HOLT, A. K. S. LAMBTON and B. LEWIS (eds), *The Cambridge History of Islam*, I A, *The Central Islamic Lands from Pre-Islamic Times to the First World War*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- . 1973, *The Ottoman Empire – The Classical Age 1300–1600*, London.
- . 1975, 'The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Firearms in the Middle-East', in V. J. PARRY, and M. E. YAPP (eds.), *War Technology and Society in the Middle East*, London, Oxford University Press.
- INALÇIK, H., and QUATAERT, D., 1994, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire 1500–1914*, Cambridge University Press.
- ISMAEL, T. Y., 1982, *Irak and Iran, Roots of Conflict*, New York, Syracuse University Press.
- JAAFAR, D. J., and AL-NAĪMĪ, N., 2005, *al-Fitraf al-akhyr, baḥiqatu al-barnāmej al-namawi al-Iraqi* [The Ultimate Confession, the Reality of Iraq's Nuclear Programme], Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Wiḥda al-ʿArabiyya, (Centre for Arab Unity Studies).
- JABBER, F., 1973, 'The Palestinian Resistance and Inter-Arab Politics', in W. B. QUANDT, F. JABBER, and A. M. LESCH (eds.), *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, London, University of California Press.
- JACKSON, R., 1991, *The Malayan Emergency, The Commonwealth's Wars 1948–1966*, London and New York, Routledge.
- JACQUARD, R., 1998, *Fatwa contre l'occident* [Fatwa against the West], Paris, Albin Michel.
- . 2001, *Au nom d'Oussama Ben Laden...* [In the Name of Osama Bin Laden], Paris, Editions Jean Picollec.
- JAFFRELOT, C., 2000, *Le Pakistan* [Pakistan], Paris, Fayard.
- JAFĪLŪL, ʿAbd al-Qādir, 1982, *Tāriḫ al-Jazāʾir al-ḥadīth* [The History of Modern Algeria], translated by Fayṣal ʿAbbās, Beirut, Dār al-Ḥadātha.
- AL-JAMAL, Shawqī, 1971, *al-Maghrib al-ʿarabi al-kabir fi-l-ʿaṣr al-ḥadīth* [Greater Arab Maghreb in the Modern Age], Cairo, Maktabat al-Anglo al-Miṣriyya.
- . 2003, *al-Maghrib al-ʿarabi al-kabir mina al-fath al-islāmī ila-l-waqt al-ḥādīr* [The Greater Arab Maghreb from the Islamic Conquest to the Present Time], Cairo, al-Maktab al-Miṣrī li-Tawziʿ al-Maṭbūʿāt.
- AL-JAZĀʾIRĪ, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir, 1903, *Tuḥfat al-zāʾir fī maʾathir al-Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir wa-akhbār al-Jazāʾir* [The Visitor's Gift on the Exploits of the Amīr ʿAbd al-Qādir and the History of Algeria], Alexandria, no pub.
- JAZAYERY, L., 2002, 'The Migration-Development Nexus: Afghanistan Case Study', *International Migration*, XL.
- JOBERT, M., 1991, *Journal du Golfe, août 1990 – août 1991* [A Gulf Diary, August 1990 – August 1991], Paris, Albin Michel.
- JOHNSON, C., and LESLIE, J., 2002, 'Afghans have their Memories: A Reflection on the Recent Experience of Assistance in Afghanistan', *Third World Quarterly*, XXIII, No. 5.
- JOXE, A., 1992, *L'Amérique mercenaire* [Mercenary America], Paris, Stock.

- JULIEN, A., 1964, *Histoire de l'Algérie contemporaine 1827–1871*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France.
- JUMA^{‘A}, Ibrāhīm, 1999, ‘Aṣālat al-qawmiyya al-‘arabiyya’ [The Origins of Arab Nationalism], *Qirā’at fi-l-fikr al-qawmī*, I, Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Wahḍa al-‘Arabiyya.
- KADDŪRĪ, Majīd, 1985, *al-Ittijābat al-siyāsīyya fi-l-‘alam al-‘arabi*, a translation of *Political Trends in the Arab World*, Beirut, al-Dār al-Muttaḥida li-l-Nashr.
- KAMRANE, R., 2007, *Le vingtième siècle iranien: le jeu des quatre familles* [The Iranian Twentieth Century: a Story of Four Families], Paris, Editions Kimé.
- KARAM, P., and MOURGUES, T., 1995, *Les guerres du Caucase: des Tsars à la Tibétchénie* [Wars in the Caucasus: from the Tsars to Chechnya], Paris, Perrin.
- KAYYALI, Abd al-Wahhab, n.d., *Palestine. A Modern History*, London, Third World Centre for Research and Publishing.
- KEDOURIE, Elie, 1970, *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle-Eastern Studies*, London, Praeger Publishers.
- KEPEL, G., 2000, *Jihad, expansion et déclin de l’islamisme* [Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam], France, Gallimard.
- . 2005, *Du Jihad à la Fitna* [From Jihad to Fitna], Paris, Bayard–BNF.
- KHALAFULLĀH, Muḥammad Aḥmad et al., n.d., *al-Qawmiyya al-‘arabiyya wa-l-Islām* [Arab Nationalism and Islam], Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Wahḍa al-‘Arabiyya.
- KHALIDI, R., 2004, *L’empire aveuglé, Les Etats-Unis et le Moyen-Orient*, France, Actes Sud.
- . 2006, *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood*, Boston, Beacon Press.
- KHALIDI, W., 1992, *Palestine Reborn*, London and New York, I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd.
- KHALĪFA, Riḍā, 1965, ‘Mu’tamar al-qimma al-ifriqiyya fi Akra’ [The African Summit in Accra], *Majallat al-Siyāsa al-dawliyya*, No. 3.
- KHALLA, Kāmil Maḥmūd, 1982, *Filastīn wa-l-intidāb al-briṭānī 1922–1939* [Palestine and the British Mandate 1922–1939], Tripoli, Libya, al-Manshā’a al-‘Āmma li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi’ wa-l-I’lān.
- . *al-Taṭawwur al-siyāsī li-sharq al-Urdunn 1921–1948* [The Political Development in Eastern Jordan 1921–1948], Tripoli, Libya, n.d, no pub
- KHASHĪM, Muṣṭafā ‘Abdullāh Abu-l-Qāsim, AH 1425, *Mawsū‘at ‘ilm al-‘alāqāt al-dawliyya* [Encyclopaedia of International Relations], Sirte, al-Jamāhiriyya li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi’ wa-l-I’lān.
- KHAWJA, Muṣṭafā, 1971, *Tārīkh Fūzzān* [The History of Fezzan], Tripoli, Markaz Jihād al-Lībiyyīn.
- KHOSROKHAVAR, F., 2002, *Les nouveaux martyrs d’Allah* [Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs], France, Flammarion.
- KI-ZERBO, J., 1972, *Histoire de l’Afrique noire*, Paris, Hatier.
- KRAMER, M., 1986, *Islam Assembled*, New York, Columbia University Press.
- KULKE, H. and ROTHERMUND, D., 2004, *A History of India*, London and New York, Fourth Edition, Routledge.
- LABEVIÈRE, R., 2003, *Les coulisses de la terreur* [Behind the Scenes of Terror], Paris, Grasset.

- Laboratoire SEDET (Sociétés en Développement dans l'Espace et le Temps), 1984–1985, *Autour de la conférence de Berlin*, Cahier 'Afrique noire', No. 9.
- LAIDI, A., 2002, *Le Jihad en Europe: les filières du terrorisme islamiste* [The Jihad in Europe: Networks of Islamist Terrorism], Paris, Seuil.
- LANDAU, J. M., 1990, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- LANDAU, R., 1961, *Aḥmāt al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā* [The Crisis of the Far Maghreb], translated by Muḥammad Ismāʿīl, Cairo, Maktabat al-Anglo al-Miṣriyya.
- . 1963, *Tāriḫ al-Maghrib fi-l-qarn al-ʿishrīn* [The History of Morocco in the Twentieth Century], translated by Naqūlā Ziyāda, Beirut, Dār al-Thaqāfa.
- LANGER, W.L., 1951, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism (1880–1902)*, New York, 2nd ed., no pub.
- LARUELLE, M., 2005, 'Les Russes et les «autres», introduction à la diversité nationale', in M. FERRO and M.-H. MANDRILLON (ed.), *Russie, peuples et civilisations*, Paris, La Découverte.
- LAURENS, H., 2004, *L'Orient arabe à l'heure américaine, de la guerre du Golfe à la guerre d'Irak* [The Arab East under the Americans, from the Gulf War to the Iraq War], Paris, Armand Colin.
- LAURENT, E., 1991, *Tempête du désert, les secrets de la Maison Blanche* [Desert Storm, the White House Secrets], II, France, Olivier Orban.
- LEA, H. CH., 1907, *A History of the Inquisition of Spain*, I, New York, Macmillan.
- LELIÈVRE, H., (ed.), 2004, *Terrorisme : questions* [Terrorism: Questions], Brussels, Editions Complexe.
- LENCZOWSKI, G., 1970, *The Political Awakening in the Middle East*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall.
- . 1980, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 4th ed.
- LESCH, A. M., 1979, *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917–1939*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, (The Modern Middle East Series, No. 11, Columbia University, New York).
- LESCH, A. M. and TESSLER, M., 1989, *Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians. From Camp David to Intifada*, n. p., University of Indiana Press.
- LEWIS, B., 2003, *The Crisis of Islam*, France, Gallimard.
- . 1961, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, Oxford University Press.
- LEWIS, I. M., 1980, *Islam in Tropical Africa*, London, Hutchison University Library for Africa.
- LOCKHART, L., 1958, *The Fall of the Safavid Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Iran.*
- M'BOKOLO, E., 1992, *Afrique noire. Histoire et civilisations. Tome II: XIX^e-XX^e siècles*, Hatier-AUPELF.
- AL-MADANĪ, Aḥmad Tawfiq, 1976, *Ḥarb al-thalāthimi? at sana bayna al-Jazāʾir wa-Iṣbāniyā* [The Three Hundred Years' War between Algeria and Spain], Algeria, al-Sharika al-Waṭaniyya li-l-Nashr.
- MAILER, N., 2003, *Why are We at War?*, New York, Random House.
- MAJUL, A. C., 1971, *Muslims in the Philippines: Past, Present and Future Prospects*, Manila, no pub.
- MALIK, J., 2008, *Islam in South Asia: A Short History*, Leiden, Boston, Brill.

- MANDEL, N. J., 1980, *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I*, Berkely, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 1st paperback printing.
- MANTRAN, R., 1993, *Tārīkh al-dawla al-‘uthmāniyya* [The History of the Ottoman State], translated by Bashīr al-Subā‘ī, Cairo, Dār al-Fikr li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzī‘.
- MARDIN, S., 1993, ‘Patriotism and Nationalism in Turkey’, in R. MICHENER (ed.), *Nationality, Patriotism and Nationalism in Liberal Democratic Societies*, St. Paul, Minnesota, Paragon House.
- MARKAZ DIRĀSĀT AL-WIḤDA AL-‘ARABIYYA, *Ihtilāl al-‘Irāq* [The Occupation of Iraq and its Impact on Arab, Regional and International Spheres] (in Arabic), Beirut, August 2004.
- MARKOVITS, C. (ed.), 1994, *Histoire de l’Inde moderne 1480–1950* [A History of Modern India 1480–1950], n. p., Fayard.
- MARSDEN, P., 2003, ‘Afghanistan: The Reconstruction Process’, *International Affairs*, No. 29.
- MARTIN, V., 2003, *Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran*, London, New York, I. B. Tauris.
- MARTINEZ, C., 2001, *Via Alterna*, Le Clarin, Suplemento Zona, (translated from Spanish), 2 December 2001.
- MEILINK, R., M.A.P., 1962, *Asian Trade and the European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and 1630*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff.
- MEYER, E. P., 2007, *Une histoire de l’Inde, Les Indiens face à leur passé* [A History of India, Indians Confronted with their Past], Paris, Albin Michel.
- MICACCHI, Rodolfo, 1961, *Ṭarābulus al-Gharb taḥta ḥukm usrat al-Qaramanli* [Tripoli under the Rule of the Karamanli Family], translated by Ṭ. Nāji, Jāmi‘at al-Duwal al-‘Arabiyya, Ma‘had al-Dirāsāt al-‘Arabiyya al-Islāmiyya.
- MICHEL, A., and VOYER, F., 1999, *Irak, la faute* [Iraq, the Transgression], preface and introduction by Alain Gresh, Paris, Les éditions du CERF.
- MILLIÈRE, G., 2003, *Ce que veut Bush, la recomposition du monde*, Editions de la Martinière.
- MORGAN, W. S., 1952, ‘The Story of Malaya’, *MPH*, Chapter 4.
- AL-MUḤĀMĪ, Muḥammad Farīd Baī, 1977, *Tārīkh al-dawla al-‘uthmāniyya* [The History of the Ottoman State], Beirut, Dār al-Jil.
- MURĀD, ‘Alī ‘Abbās and FAYYĀD, ‘Āmir Ḥasan, 1998, *al-Zabira al-qawmiyya: Madkhal ila-l-fikr al-qawmi al-‘arabi* [The Nationalist Phenomenon. Introduction to the Arab Nationalist Idea], Benghazi, Jāmi‘at Qarayūnis.
- MUSTAFA, Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Raḥīm, 1986, *Fī usul al-tārīkh al-‘uthmāni*, Cairo, Dār al-Shurūq.
- NAFI, B. M., 1998, *Arabism, Islamism and the Palestine Question, 1908–1941*, Reading, Ithaca Press.
- NAHAVANDI, F., 1988, *Aux sources de la révolution iranienne: étude socio-politique* [The Sources of the Iranian Revolution: Socio-political Study], preface by Claude Javeau, Paris, L’Harmattan.
- NAÏR, S., 2003, *L’Empire face à la diversité*, Paris, Hachette Littératures.
- NAJĪ, Maḥmūd, 1970, *Tārīkh Ṭarābulus al-Gharb* [The History of Tripoli-in-the-West], Translated by ‘Abd al-Salām Adham and Muḥammad al-Uṣṭā, Cairo, al-Jāmi‘a al-‘Arabiyya.
- NALLINO, C. A., 1924, ‘La fine del così ditto califato ottomano’, *Oriente Moderno*, 4.

- AL-NĀSHIRĪ, al-Salāwī, 1956, *al-Istiḡṣā' li-akhbār al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā* [A Close Study of the History of the Far Maghreb], Casablanca, no pub.
- AL-NASRAWI, A., 2002, *Iraq's Burdens, Oil, Sanctions, and Underdevelopment*, Westport, Connecticut, London, Greenwood Press.
- NGUYEN, Eric, 2007, *De Yalta à Bagdad, les présidents américains et le monde*, France, Studyrama perspectives.
- NIVAT, A., 2008, *Bagdad zone rouge* [Baghdad Red Zone], Paris, Fayard.
- NOUAILHAT, Y.-H., and DE LA FOYE, S., 2006, *Les Etats-Unis et l'islam*, Paris, Armand Colin.
- NOUCHI, A., 'North Africa in the Period of Colonization' in P. M. HOLT et al. (eds), *The Cambridge History of Islam*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, II.
- OBSERVATOIRE DES ETATS POSTSOVIÉTIQUES, 1997, *De l'URSS à la C.E.I. 12 Etats en quête d'identité* [From the USSR to the CIS, 12 states searching for identity], Paris, Ellipses.
- OLIVIER, R. and ATMORE, A., 1970, *L'Afrique depuis 1800*, Paris, PUF.
- OZERDEM, A., 2002, 'Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from a Cross-Cultural Perspective', *Third World Quarterly*, XXIII, No. 5.
- PALMER, A., 1992, *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire*, London, John Murray.
- PALMIER, L., 1962, *Indonesia and the Dutch*, London, New York, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, London Institute of Race Relations.
- PARHAM, R. and TAUBMAN, M., 2009, *Histoire secrète de la révolution iranienne* [Secret History of the Iranian Revolution], Paris, Denoël.
- PAUST, J. and BLAUSTEIN, A., 1977, *The Arab Oil Weapon*, New York, Leyden, Oceana Publications Inc., Dobbs Ferry.
- PAX, S., 2004, *Bagdad blog, Journal d'un Irakien dans le chaos* [Baghdad Blog, Diary of an Iraqi in the Chaos], France, Hachette Littératures.
- PHILBY, H., 1972 *Saudi Arabia*, New York, Aron Press.
- PLOQUIN, J.-C., 2003, *Irak: le Moyen-Orient sous le choc* [Iraq: the Middle East in Shock], Paris, L'Harmattan.
- PONDI, J.-E. (ed.), 2003, *Une lecture africaine de la guerre en Irak* [An African Analysis of the War in Iraq], France, Maisonneuve & Larose/ Afredit.
- PONS, F., 2004, *Pièges à Bagdad, les secrets d'un conflit sans précédent* [Traps in Baghdad, the Secrets of an Unprecedented Conflict], France, Presses de la cité.
- PRESCOTT, W., 1838, *History of Ferdinand and Isabella the Catholic*, New York, A. L. Burt.
- PYLEE, M. V., 1967, *Constitutional History of India 1600–1950*, London, Asia Publishing House.
- QADDŪRA, Zāhiyya, 1975, *Tārikh al-ʿArab al-ḥadīth* [The Modern History of the Arabs], Beirut, Dār al-Nahḍa al-ʿArabiyya.
- QĀSIM, Jamāl Zakariyyā, 1966, *Imārāt al-khalīj al-ʿarabi* [The Emirates of the Arabian Gulf], Cairo, ʿAyn Shams, no pub.
- QUANDT, W. B., 1973, 'Political and Military Dimensions of Contemporary Palestinian Nationalism', in W. B. QUANDT, F. JABBER, and A. M. LESCH (eds.), *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, London, University of California Press.

- QUANDT, W., JABBER, F., and LESCH, A. M., 1974, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, Berkely, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 2nd printing.
- RACHEL, A., 1973, *L'Espagne musulmane au temps des nasrides 1232–1492* [Muslim Spain under the Nasrids 1232–1492], Paris, Boccard.
- RADVANYI, J., 2005, 'Les Russes et leur espace, une relation complexe', in M. FERRO and M.-H. MANDRILLON, (eds.), *Russie, peuples et civilisations*, Paris, La Découverte.
- RAOUF, W., 1985, *Irak-Iran, des vérités inavouées* [Iraq-Iran, Untold Truths], Paris, L'Harmattan.
- RASJIDI, H. M., 1977, *Documents pour servir à l'histoire de l'Islam à Java* [Documents to Serve as a History of Islam in Java], Paris, Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient.
- RAVIOT, J. R., and TER MINASSIAN, T., 2006, *De L'URSS à la Russie, la civilisation soviétique, genèse, histoires et métamorphoses de 1917 à nos jours*, Paris, Ellipses.
- RAYMOND, A., 1970, 'North Africa in the Pre-colonial Period' in P. M. HOLT et al. (eds), *The Cambridge History of Islam*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, II.
- RAZZUQ, M., 1998, *al-Andalusīyyūn wa-hijratahum ila-l-maghrib kabilā al-qarnayn 16 wa 17* [The Andalusian Migration to Morocco in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries], 3rd ed., Casablanca.
- REDISSI, H., 2004, *L'exception islamique* [The Islamic Exception], France, Seuil.
- REID, A., 1967, 'Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia', *JAS*, No. 2.
- . 1969, *The Contest for North Sumatra. Atjeh, the Netherlands and Britain 1858–1898*, Kuala Lumpur & Singapore.
- RICHARDS, J. F., 1992, *The Mughal Empire*, Cambridge.
- RICKLEFS, M. C., 1993, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1300*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and London, the Macmillan Press Ltd.
- RIDĀ, Rashīd, AH 1341, *al-Khilāfa wa-l-imāma al-ʿuzmā*, Cairo, Maṭbaʿat al-Manār.
- RITTER, S., 2004, *Les mensonges de George W. Bush* [The Lies of George W. Bush], Monaco, Le serpent à plumes/Éditions du Rocher.
- . 2005, *Iraq Confidential, The Untold Story of America's Intelligence Conspiracy*, London-New York, I.B. Tauris
- ROBINSON, D. and TRIAUD, J. L. (eds), 1997, *Le temps des Marabouts. Itinéraires et stratégies islamiques en Afrique occidentale française, 1880–1960*, Paris, Karthala.
- ROSSI, Ettore, 1974, *Libiyā mundhu-l-fatḥ al-ʿarabi ḥattā sanat 1911* [Libya from the Arab Conquest to 1911], translated by Khalifa Tillīsī, Beirut, Dār al-Thaqāfa.
- ROY, O., 2002, *Les illusions du 11 septembre, le débat stratégique face au terrorisme*, Paris, Seuil.
- AL-ṢABBĀGH, Laylā, 1975, *Thawrat muslimī Gharnāta*, al-Aṣāla Journal, Algeria, No. 27, Sept.-Oct.
- SAʿD, Ḥasan, 1993, "Abd al-Nāṣir wa-l-waḥda al-ʿarabiyya" [ʿAbdul-Nasser and Arab Unity], *Qirāʾat fi-l-fikr al-qawmī*, II, Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-ʿArabiyya.
- SAʿDULLĀH, Abu-l-Qāsim, n.d., 'al-Jazāʾir wa-l-qawmiyya al-ʿarabiyya' [Algeria and Arab Nationalism], *Qirāʾat fi-l-fikr al-qawmī*, I, Beirut, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-ʿArabiyya.
- SAʿID, Amīn, 1959, *Tārikḥ Miṣr al-siyāsī min al-ḥamla al-faransiyya ila inḥiyār al-malakiyya 1852–1959* [The History of Egypt from the French Campaign to the Collapse of the Monarchy 1852–1959], Cairo, no pub.

- SAʿIDŪN, Nāṣir al-Dīn, 1981, *al-Jāliya al-andalusīyya fi-l-jaẓāʾir* [The Andalusian Community in Algeria], *Cahiers*, No. 4.
- SAĪD, E. W, 2005, *D'Oslo à l'Irak* [From Oslo to Iraq and the Road Map], Paris, Fayard.
- . 2004, *From Oslo to Iraq and the Road Map*, New York, Pantheon.
- . 2005, *From Oslo to Iraq and the Road Map*, Vintage Books.
- SALĀMA, ʿAbdulḥakīm, *al-Muriskīyyūn* [The Moriscos] (article in a reference book on the history of the Arab nation).
- SALĪM, Muḥammad al-Sayyid, 2002, *Taʾmim sharikat qanāt al-Swaīs* [The Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company], Cairo, Dār al-Fajr li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ.
- SALINGER, P., and LAURENT, E., 1991, *Guerre du Golfe, le dossier secret* [The Gulf War, the secret dossier], France, Olivier Orban.
- AL-ṢALLĀBĪ, ʿAlī Muḥammad, 2006, *al-Dawla al-ʿuthmāniyya: ʿawāmil al-nuḥūd wa-l-suqūt* [The Ottoman State: Factors in its Rise and Fall], Beirut, Dār al-Maʿrifa.
- AL-ṢAMAD, Riyād, 1986, *al-ʿAlaqāt al-dawliyya fi-l-qarn al-ʿisbrin: taṭawwur al-aḥdāth li-fatrat mā bayna al-ḥarḃayn* [International Relations in the Twentieth Century: The Development of Events between the Two World Wars], No place, al-Muʿassasa al-Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ.
- AL-SARRĀJ, Muḥammad al-Andalusī, 1985, *al-Ḥulal al-sunduṣiyya fi-l-akḥbār al-tūnisīyya* [The Clothes of Brocade in Tunisian History], Tunis, Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī.
- EL-SAYEGH, S., 1993, *La crise du Golfe de l'interdiction à l'autorisation du recours à la force* [The Gulf Crisis: from the Prohibition of the Use of Force to its Authorization], Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence.
- SAYIGH, Y., 1997, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949–1993*, Washington D.C., Institute for Palestine Studies, Oxford Carleon Press.
- SCHILLER, A. Arthur, *The Formation of Federal Indonesia 1945–1949*, The Hague, 1955, Bandung, W. Van Hoeve Ltd.
- SERGEANT, R.B., 1963, *The Portuguese of the South Arabian Coast*, Oxford, no pub.
- SHARABI, H., 1966, *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World*, Princeton, D. Van Nostrand Company Inc.
- SHAW, S., 1976, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*.
- SHAW, S. J., and SHAW, E. K., 1976, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, II, *Reform, Revolution, and Republic*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- SHLAIM, A., 2000, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, New York, London, W. W. Norton and Company.
- SHUBAĪKA, Makkī, 1972, *Muqāwamat al-Sūdān al-ḥadīth li-l-ghaẓw wa-l-tasalluṭ* [The Resistance of Modern Sudan to Invasion and Control], Cairo, al-Jāmiʿa al-ʿArabiyya.
- SHUKRĪ, Fuʾād, 1947, *al-Ḥukm al-miṣrī fi-l-Sūdān* [Egyptian Rule in the Sudan], Cairo, no pub.
- SMITH, P. A., 1948, *Palestine and the Palestinians*, London and Sydney, Croom Helm.
- STERN, B., 1991, *Les aspects juridiques de la crise et de la guerre du Golfe* [The legal Aspects of the Crisis and the War in the Gulf], Centre de droit international, Nanterre, Paris, Editions Montchrestien – E. J. A..
- SULTĀN, ʿAlī, n.d., *Tārikḥ al-ʿarab al-ḥadīth* [The Modern History of the Arabs], Tripoli, al-Maktaba al-ʿIlmiyya.

- TAJI-FAROUKI, S., 1996, *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tabrir and the Search for Islamic Caliphate*, London, Grey Seal.
- AL-TAMĪMĪ, ‘Abd al-Jalīl, 1975, *al-Khalḥfiyya al-dīniyya lil-ṣīrā‘ al-isbānī al-‘uthmānī ‘ala-limārāt al-maghribiyya fi-l-qarn al-sādis ‘asbr* [The Religious Background to the Spanish-Ottoman Dispute over the Maghrebi Emirates in the Sixteenth Century], *Journal of Maghrebi History*, No. 3, Tunis.
- . 1993, *al-Dawla al-‘uthmāniyya wa-qadīyyat al-mūriskīyyin al-andalusīyyin*, Centre for Ottoman and Morisco Studies and Research, Zaghouan.
- . *al-Sīyāsa al-‘uthmāniyya tujāba tard al-mūriskīyyin wa-murūribim bi-faransa wa-l-bunduqīyya 1609–1610* [Ottoman Policy toward the Expulsion of the Moriscos and their Passage through France and Venice], II.
- TAMIMI, A., 2007, *Flamas, A History from Within*, Northampton, Massachusetts, Olive Branch Press.
- Tārīkh Ifriqiya al-‘amm* [A General History of Africa], UNESCO, 1990.
- TAYLOR, A. R., 1970, *Prelude to Israel. (An Analysis of Zionist Diplomacy 1897–1947)*, Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies, 2nd ed. (Reprint Series No. 5).
- TAYLOR, J. G., 2003, *Indonesia Peoples and Histories*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press.
- TEMPERLEY, Harold, 1936, *England and the Near East*, London, Longmans, Greens and Co. The League of Arab States. *The Charter of the League of Arab States*.
- TIBBETS, G. R., 1982, ‘Early Muslim Traders in Southeast Asia’, *JMBRAS*, XXX, No. 177.
- AL-TILIMSĀNĪ, Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Maqqarī, 1968, *Nafḥ al-tīb min ghuṣn al-andalus al-raṭīb* [The Breath of Perfume from the Branch of Green Andalusia], ed. Iḥsān ‘Abbās, IV, Beirut.
- TILLON, C., 1962, *Les F. T. P.: Témoignage pour servir l’histoire de la Résistance* [The Resistance Fighters and Partisans: Accounts to Contribute to the History of the Resistance], Paris, Julliard.
- TOMEH, G., (ed.), 1975, *United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies.
- TOMEH, G., J. (ed.), 1975, *United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab Israeli Conflict 1917–1971*, Beirut and Abu Dhabi, Institute for Palestine Studies and Center for Research and Documentation.
- TOUVAL, S., 1966, ‘Treaties, Borders and the Partition of Africa’, *Journal of African History*, VII, No. 2.
- TOYNBEE, A. J., 1927, *Survey of International Affairs, 1925*. I, *The Islamic World Since the Peace Conference*, London, Oxford University Press.
- UNESCO, 1993, *General History of Africa*, California, Heineman.
- VAN SCENDEL, W., 2009, *A History of Bangladesh*, U.K. Cambridge University Press.
- VINCENT, B., 1970, *L’Expulsion des Morisques du royaume de Grenade et leur répartition en Castille 1570–1571* [The Expulsion of the Moriscos from the Kingdom of Granada and their Distribution in Castile 1570–1571], in M. C. V., Tome VI.
- AL-WĀFĪ, Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Karīm, 1988, *al-Ṭariq ilā Luṣṣān: al-Khafāyā al-dibḥumāsīyya wa-l-‘askariyya li-l-ghazw al-īṭālī li-Libiyā* [The Road to Lausanne: The Diplomatic and Military Secrets behind Italy’s Invasion of Libya], Benghazi, Manshūrāt Jāmi‘at Qārayūnis.

- WAHIM, Ṭalib Muḥammad, 1982, *Mamlakat al-Hijāz, 1916–1925*, Baṣra, Basra University.
- YAHYĀ, Jalāl, 1958, *al-Thawra al-mahdiyya wa-uṣūl al-siyāsā al-briṭāniyya fi-l-Sūdān* [The Mahdist Revolt and the Sources of British Policy in the Sudan], Cairo, Maktabat al-Nahḍa.
- . 1965, *al-Istiṣmār wa-l-istiḡhlāl wa-l-takhalluf* [Colonialism, Exploitation and Under development], Cairo, al-Dār al-Qawmiyya.
- . 1979, *al-ʿAlam al-ʿarabi al-ḥadīth* [The Modern Arab World], Cairo, Dār al-Maʿārif.
- . 1981, *al-Maghrib al-Kabir: al-ʿuṣūr al-ḥadītha wa-hujūm al-istiṣmār* [Greater Maghrib: The Modern Period and Attacks of Colonialism], Beirut, Dār al-Nahḍa al-ʿArabiyya.
- YAKOVLEV, A., 1993, *Le Vertige des illusions, réflexions et analyses sur la tragédie soviétique*, Paris, J. C. Lattès.
- YŪNĀN, Labīb Rizq, 1976, *al-Sūdān fi ʿabd al-ḥukm al-thanaʿī al-amwal 1899–1924* [Sudan in the Period of the First Bilateral Rule 1899–1924], Cairo, Maʿhad al-Buḥūth al-ʿArabiyya.
- ZEMZEM, A.-M. T., 1985, *La guerre Irak-Iran: Islam et nationalisme* [The Iraq-Iran War: Islam and Nationalism], Paris, Albatros.
- ZINOVIEV, A., 1995, *L'occidentalisme. Essai sur le triomphe d'une idéologie*, Paris, Plon.

Articles in Periodicals

- ABU-AMR, Z., 1995, 'The Significance of Jerusalem. A Muslim Perspective', *Palestine-Israel Journal for Politics, Economics and Culture*, II, No. 2.
- BAUMGARTEN, H., 2005, 'The Three Faces/Phases of Palestinian Nationalism 1948–2005', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, XXXIV, No. 4, Summer, 2005.
- CAMILLE, M., 2001, 'Israel's Colonial Impasse', *Journal for Palestine Studies*, XXX, No. 4, Summer 2001.
- ISSAWI, C., 1974, 'Checking on the Consequences of Oil Squeeze by Arab States', *International Perspectives*, Ottawa, Canada, Department of External Affairs, March/April, 1974.
- ITAYIM, F., 1974, 'Arab Oil. The Political Dimension', *Journal for Palestine Studies*, III, No. 2, 1974.
- JAMAL, A., 2000, 'The Palestinians in the Israeli Peace Discourse: A Conditional Partnership', *Journal for Palestine Studies*, No. 1, Autumn, 2000.
- KHALIDI, R., 2001, 'The Centrality of Jerusalem to End of Conflict Agreement', *Journal for Palestine Studies*, XXX, No. 3, Spring 2001.
- KUTTAB, D., 1988, 'The Palestinian Uprising: The Second Phase. Self Sufficiency', *Journal for Palestine Studies*, XVII, No. 4, Summer 1988.
- PRESSBERG, G., 1988, 'The Uprising: Causes and Consequences', *Journal for Palestine Studies*, XVII, No. 3, Spring 1988.
- RAYAN, S., 1982, 'Israel's Invasion of Lebanon: Background to the Crisis', *Journal for Palestine Studies*, X, No. 4/XII, No. 1, Summer/Fall 1982.
- SHLAIM, A., 1988, 'The Impact of US Policy in the Middle East', *Journal for Palestine Studies*, XVII, No. 2, Winter 1988.
- SONTAG, D., 2001, 'Quest for Middle East Peace. How and Why it Failed', *Journal for Palestine Studies*, XXXI, No. 1, Autumn 2001.

TAMARI, S. and HAMMAMI, R., 2001, 'The Second Uprising: End or New Beginning?' *Journal for Palestine Studies*, XXX, No. 2, Winter 2001.

Internet Electronic Press

www.guerrefroide.net/pages/chute
www.oulala.net/Portail/spip.php?article726
www.rfi.fr/. / 20110830-pays-sortis-union-sovietique-espoir-desillusion.
www.cafepedagogique.org/urss/index.php
http://www.ac-orleans-tours.fr/hist-geo3/conferences/depuis_45/modele-sovietique.htm
www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/l-urss-en-chute-libre_591509.html
histoireontheway.blogspot

Reviews and journals

Le Monde diplomatique
Libération
Le Nouvel observateur
Majallat al-Siyāsa al-dawliyya, No. 5, July 1966.
Socialisme international

AVIOUTSKII V., 'L'engrenage de la guerre en Tchétchénie' [The events that led to War in Chechnya], *Hérodote*, No. 81.

HERODOTE, *Geographical and Geopolitical Review*, No. 81, *Géopolitique du Caucase* [Geopolitics of the Caucasus].

LACOSTE, Y., 'Réflexions sur les causes d'un incendie au versant nord du Caucase' [Reflections on the Causes of the Conflagration on the North Slopes of the Caucasus], *Hérodote*, No. 81.

TOUMARKINE, A., 'Les identités de la société tchétchène, l'extérieur et la guerre' [The Identities of Chechen Society, the Exterior and War], *Hérodote*, No. 81.

Revue:

Politique étrangère, 2/87, *Iran-Irak: la diplomatie du conflit* [Iran-Iraq, Diplomacy in the Conflict], Second quarter, 1987.

Journals and Collections

Les terrorismes contemporains [Contemporary terrorism], special edition published in *Stratégique*, Quarterly journal published by the Institut de stratégie comparée (ISC) and edited by Hervé Coutau-Begarie, 2–3/97.

Le spectre du terrorisme, 2001, Déclarations, interviews et témoignages sur Oussama Ben Laden [The Spectre of Terrorism, Statements, Interviews and Testimonies on Osama bin Laden], Paris, Editions Sfar.

Mourir pour tuer: les kamikazes [Die to kill: Kamikazes], series of articles published in *Etudes sur la mort*, 2006, No. 130, France, Editions l'Esprit du Temps, 2006.

Wikipedia, 'Treaty of Berlin' at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Berlin_%281878%29.

MEMBERS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC
COMMITTEE AND THE
SECRETARIAT

Members: Professor Idris El-Hareir (Chairman)
Professor Abdelwahab Bouhdiba
Professor Ahmad Y. al-Hassan
Professor Albert Zaki Iskander
Professor El Hadji Ravane M'Baye
Professor Ismail Ibrahim Nawwab
Professor Zafar Ishaq Ansari
Professor H.A. Mukti Ali
Professor Halil Inalcik
Professor Ahmad Saleh Taieb

Secretariat: Mohamed Salih Ziadah
Ali Moussa Iye
Khadija Toure

Address: History and Memory for Dialogue Section
Division of Social Transformation and Intercultural Dialogue
Social and Human Sciences Sector
UNESCO
7, Place Fontenoy, 75352 Paris 07 SP
France

Iconography: Teresa Witcombe
Proof-reading: Rania Halabi
Copy preparation: Sabine Abi Dergham, Gergès el-Masri

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

ON THE AUTHORS

AAVANI, Gholamreza (Iran)

Former President, Director of the Iranian Institute of Philosophy. President of the International Society for Islamic Philosophy. Chair of the Iranian Philosophical Association. Member of the Editorial Board of the Encyclopedia of Islamic Philosophy. Areas of scholarship include Western philosophy, Mysticism, philosophy of art, Islamic philosophy and comparative philosophy. He has published various articles and books on Western and Eastern philosophy including *A Study in the Thought and Works of Plato*, a partial translation of *Aristotle* (by Sir David Ross), *Aḥlam al Nubuwwah* and *Hikam and Spiritual Art*.

AFFAS, Omar Ibrahim (Libya)

Associate Professor of International Relations, at the Department of Political Science at the University of Garyounis (Benghazi). He has participated in several conferences including the conference of the British Association of Political Science (1982), the Global Conference: After Independence (1985), the conference on Arab Unity (1985), as well as seminars on democracy and human rights in Africa among many others. Among his published academic works are *Behind the Green Agricultural Revolution, Public Management and the Means of Applying It in Libya* (Arabic), *Empirical Study in Social Science*.

ALI MOHAMED, Abdulrahim (Sudan)

Secretary General of the Islamic Da‘wa Organization. Former Vice Chancellor of the International University of Africa, Khartoum. Former Director of the International Institute of Arabic Language, Khartoum. Lecturer of the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Edinburgh (1977–81). Assistant Lecturer of the Department of Arabic, University of Khartoum (1972–4). Member of the Fiqh Academy, the Arabic Language Academy and the Sudanese Society

for Dialogue between Religions, Khartoum. Participated in more than sixty international conferences and seminars all over the world. He has published various papers and books including *Qur'an on Civilization*, *The Literary Structure of the Qur'anic Verse*, *Democracy in Africa* and *Islamic Da'wa in the End of the Twentieth Century*.

AMIN, Tahir (Pakistan)

Professor at the Department of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, (Islamabad). Former holder of Iqbal Chair at the Centre for International Studies, University of Cambridge. Former visiting scholar at Harvard University. He has published various articles in renowned journals including *Oxford Encyclopedia of Islam* and the *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. Among his published books are *Mass Resistance in Kashmir: Origins, Evolution, Options*; and *Afghanistan Crisis: Implications and Options for Muslim World, Iran and Pakistan*. Recipient of Fulbright Award at Harvard University (1992), and the Gold Medal for the best book on Kashmir (1998).

ASHMAWI, Fawzia (Egypt)

Professor of Arabic Language and Islamic Studies at Geneva University. Member of the: European Islamic Conference, Forum for European Muslim Woman, Egyptian/Swiss Cultural Association, Islamic and Arabic Studies at Geneva Academy, *Association suisse et Culture islamique*, Egyptian Association of Switzerland. Her publications include *The Status of Muslim Women*, *Acts of the International Conference on Uprooted Muslim Women*, *Comparative Study of the History Textbooks of 7 Mediterranean Countries*, *Muslim Voices in Switzerland*, *Teaching for Tolerance in Muslim Majority Societies*, *Guidebook for History Textbooks*. She is a recipient of the Egyptian Prize for Literature and Arts for her publications and studies in the Islamic field.

BÂ, Cheikh (Senegal)

Professor Emeritus, holder of a third cycle Ph.D. and a *Doctorat d'état*, eminent scholar specialized in human geography, Cheikh Bâ has taught for many decades at the Department of Geography, University of Cheikh Anta Diop, Senegal. His study of the Peul ethnic group remains an outstanding reference. His fields of interest and scientific research include Mouridisme and development of Senegal and Africa.

BABIKR, Khalifa (Sudan)

Ph.D. in Islamic Law, el Azhar University, Egypt, Khalifa Babikr Azrag is a Senior Expert in the Islamic Fiqh Academy, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

Specialized in Islamic law, jurisprudence and Ijtihad (independent thinking), former Lecturer and Head of the Department of Shari'ah, University of Khartoum, he was Professor at the University of the United Arab Emirates. Head of the Department of Islamic Law, then Dean of the Faculty of Islamic and Arabic Studies in Dubai, then Professor at the University of Shariqah; former member of many national councils and committees in the fields of Islamic jurisprudence, fatwa, etc. He has published many books in the fields of Islamic jurisprudence, economy, culture, fiqh schools and history.

BAH, Thierno (Republic of Guinea)

Professor at the University of Yaoundé I. Research interests include the Fulani herders' nomadic traditions, castes, blacksmiths, slaves, the griots, the nobles. Member of several learned societies including the Association of African Historians, the International Commission of Military History, and the Seville Statement on Violence. Author and/or co-author of numerous books and articles including *Architecture and Traditional Military Poliorcétique of Western Sudan 17th to 19th Century*, *Black Africa: History and Civilization 19th–20th Century* and *The Military and Militarism in Africa*.

BOUHDIBA, Abdelwahab (Tunisia)

Former President of Bayt al Hikma (the Tunisian Academy of Science, Literature and Arts) in Carthage. Professor of Sociology at the University of Tunis. Member of the International Scientific Committee for the work on *The different aspects of Islamic culture*, Chief Editor of Volume II, *The Individual and Society in Islam* of *The different aspects of Islamic culture* and author of many chapters therein. Laureate of the UNESCO-Sharjah Prize for Arab Culture (2004). Author of numerous publications in the fields of Islamic culture, philosophy and literature, including *La sexualité en Islam*, *Criminalité et changements sociaux*, *L'imaginaire maghrebin* and *Raison d'être*.

BUBTANA, Abdalla (Libya)

Member of the Board of Trustees at the Arab Open University. Former Chief of the Higher Education Section at UNESCO. Former Director of UNESCO Doha. Representative of UNESCO to the Arab States of the Gulf. His areas of interest include higher education, education administration, development psychology, educational policy, planning, evaluation and monitoring. He has contributed to several publications during his tenure at UNESCO, including *Higher Education in the Arab Region: Issues and Prospects* and *Readings in Higher Education*. He is a member of the editorial board of the *Journal of Higher Education* (ALECSO, Tunis).

CISSE, El hadji Moustapha (Senegal)

Honorary Ambassador. Former diplomat. Specialist in Arabic Studies and the Arab world, especially the Palestinian question and the African Arab relations. Active member of many Islamic associations of Senegal and one of the leaders of the Federation of the Islamic Associations of Senegal. Member of the OIC Eminent Personalities' Commission. Secretary-General of the Preparatory Committee of the World Summit on dialogue between Islam and Christianity. Grand-Croix de l'Ordre national du Lion, Dakar.

FATEMI, Ali (USA)

President of the American Graduate School of Business and Economics. Professor of Economics and Finance at AGSBE and at the Baruch College of the City University of New York. Fields of Expertise include monetary theory and policy, international trade theory, international finance, capital markets, managerial economics. President of the European Center for Advanced International Studies, (Paris). Contributing Editor for Keyhan of London. His publications include *Reflections on Current Political and Economic Challenges*, *Economic Development in the Model Cities*, *The Political Economy of the Middle East: A Computerized Guide to the Literature*.

HAMID, Eltigani Abdulgadir (Sudan)

Associate Professor of Islamic Studies at Zayed University (Abu-Dhabi). Member of the Association of Muslim Social Sciences, the American Oriental Society and the American Political Science Association. Research interests include Muslim Communities, Politics and Reform. He has published several papers and Encyclopedia articles, as well as multiple books including *Poverty: An introduction to the Bases of Political Economy in Islam*, *The Qur'an and Political Philosophy* and *The Origins of Thought in the Meccan Qur'an*.

El HAREIR, Idris (Libya)

Professor of History at the Faculty of Arts, University of Benghazi, Libya. Visiting Professor at the Universities of Muhammad V in Rabat, Sidi Muhammad Ben Abdallah in Fez and Howard University, University of Utah, University of Michigan and Ann Arbor, USA. President of the International Scientific Committee for the work on *The different aspects of Islamic culture*, El Hareir is Editor of Volume III, *The Spread of Islam throughout the World*. Former Delegate of the World Islamic Call Society (WICS) to UNESCO, he was also member of the International Scientific Committee for the elaboration of *the General*

History of Africa (1978–1999) and Vice President of the Scientific Committee for the preparation and publication of a reference book on the history of the Arab nation. He is member of several associations and committees including the Union of the Arab Historians, the Libyan Association of Historians and the Libyan Centre for History. He is the author of many publications including contributions to *The General History of Africa*, *The different aspects of Islamic culture* and the *History of the Arab Nation*.

KABIR, Nahid Afrose (Bangladesh)

Research fellow at the School of Communications and Contemporary Arts at the Edith Cowan University in Perth. Former Visiting Fellow at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the Harvard University, USA. Research interests include Australian immigration, race relations and cultural history, media and society, youth and society, women in Islam, and Islam and politics. Author of *Muslims in Australia: Immigration, Race Relations and Cultural History* and *Young British Muslims: Identity, Culture, Politics and the Media* (in press).

KASMIEH, Khairia (Palestine)

Professor of Arab History at the University of Damascus. Former visiting Professor at King Saud University, Princeton University, University of Chicago, Notre Dame University and the Institute of Arab Research (ALECSO). Member of the Committee of the History of the Bilād al Shām, the Union of Arab Writers, the Arab Organization for Education, Science and Culture, the Scientific Committee for the Book Project and the Committee of the Writing of the History of the Arabs. Her publications include *Jews of the Arab Countries*, *al-Qaḍīyyah al-Falastīniyyah wa al-qāḍah al-Hashimiyyūn*, *Min baqīyyat al-suyūf*, and *Qaḍīyyat al-Quds*.

MAATOUG, Fredj (Tunisia)

Assistant Professor of Contemporary International Relations at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Tunis El-Manar University. His research interests include the history of the United States, the history of sub-Saharan Africa, Europe between the wars, and the history of contemporary international relations. Former Visiting Professor at the University of Massachusetts at Boston UMB to EU. Former Professor of Islamic civilization at the University Paris Diderot – Paris 7. Publications include *The United States and War Propaganda: from the Spanish-American War in Cuba (1898) to the Invasion of Iraq (2003)*.

ELMUFTI, Mohamed (Libya)

Medical Doctor, consultant in General Surgery, Benghazi, Libya. He is the author of several medical books including *Islamic Medicine, Modern Medicine, Clinical Procedures and History of Epidemics*. He is co-author of numerous research papers in the field of medicine.

NAFI, Basheer (Palestine)

Former Reader in Islamic History at the Muslim College and Adjunct Professor of Islamic Studies at Birkbeck College, University of London. Senior research fellow at al-Jazeera Centre for Studies. Research interests include the history of Arab nationalism and the Palestinian Question, modern Islam and Islamic intellectual history, including the history of Salafiyya. His publications include *Arabism, Islamism and the Palestine Question: 1908–1941, The Rise and Decline of the Arab-Islamic Reform Movement, Islamic Thought in the Twentieth Century, Iraq: Contexts of Unity and Disintegration, The Islamists*.

NIANE, Djibril Tamsir (Republic of Guinea)

Founder of the *Société Africaine d'Édition et de Communication* (SAEC). Former Director of the National Archives in Dakar. Former technical counselor to the Minister of Culture (1979–81 Dakar). Member of the Scientific Committee of the Léopold Sédar Soghor Foundation. Member of the Association of French-Language Writers (ADELF). Member of the Association of African Historians. Recipient of the *Chevalier de l'Ordre national du Lion* (Senegal) and the *Chevalier de la Légion d'Honneur* (2001), among many others. He has published multiple research, literary articles and books about history, geography and civic education in Africa.

NIASSE, Sidy Lamine (Senegal)

President and Director General of the Walfadjri Group, Radio Walf FM. Former Personal Adviser to his Excellency, Abdou Diouf the Ex-President of Senegal during which he served as Project Manager of the Arab-Islamic world. Founder and director of the Wal Fadji Journal. He has participated in numerous international conferences on Islamic thought. His published works include *Essai sur l'état islamique, Sharifu : la fin de la nuit, Un arabisant entre presse et pouvoir*.

RAHMA, Siddiq Talha (Sudan)

Ph.D. in Development Studies, University of Khartoum. Director of the Islamic Economic Centre at the Sudan International University. Lecturer, Ribat University, Khartoum. Former Director of the Training Centre,

Agricultural Bank of Sudan. Dr. Siddiq Talha Rahama has published a number of papers and books on Islamic economy, finance and banking.

SAYED, Fathi Sidahmed (Sudan)

Ph.D. in Agriculture, University of Khartoum. Lecturer and Associate Professor, then Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Agriculture, El Azhari University, Sudan. Senior staff member at the Arab Organization of Agricultural Development, and at the Ministry of Agriculture, Sudan. Specialist in the fields of agricultural development, Professor Fathi Sidahmed undertook extensive research and studies in agriculture, markets and marketing, global trade, credit and Arab states' agricultural integration, and has many publications in the fields of agricultural development, economy, food security and trade.

SHEMBESH, Ali (Libya)

Professor of Political Science and former Chairperson of the Political Science Department that he established at the Garyounis University in Libya. Served as a Political Attaché to the Libyan Embassy. Assisted in the establishment of the branch of the Academy of Graduate Studies in Benghazi and currently serves as its director. He has published several academic works.

TALIB, Yusof (Singapore)

Associate Professor and former Head of the Department of Malay Studies at the National University of Singapore. Specialist in Islam, the Malay world and the Middle East, including South-West Arabia. Author of numerous publications in the fields of History and Islamic Civilization, Islam in South East Asia, history of Africa, including the relations between Africa and the Indian Ocean. Former member of the International Scientific Committee for drafting the *General History of Africa*, UNESCO and member of the Editorial Board of the Arabic version.

THIAM, Iba Der (Senegal)

Agrégé de l'Université, and holder of a Ph. D. (*Docteur d'État*), University of Sorbonne, Paris. Former Minister of National and Higher Education. Deputy and former First Vice President of the National Assembly of Senegal. Professor of History at the Cheikh Anta Diop University (Dakar). Member of the Executive Board of ISESCO. Former member of the Executive Board of UNESCO. Member of the International Scientific Commission for drafting the UNESCO History of Humanity. He has published several books on issues of contemporary history,

intercultural and interreligious dialogue, including *Histoire du mouvement syndical africain, 1790–1902*, and *Histoire du Sénégal et de l'Afrique*. General coordinator of *General History of the Senegal* in 20 books.

YOUSIF, Abdelwahid (Sudan)

Current Advisor to the Minister of Education in the State of Bahrain. Former Director of Literacy and Non-Formal Education Programmes at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris. Former Senior Programme Specialist at the UNESCO Regional Office for Education in the Arab States (UNEDBAS). Former Programme Specialist responsible for planning and managing training and research programmes at the UNESCO Regional Training Centre (ADFEC) in Egypt. During his career at UNESCO, Dr. Yousif prepared several key education policy documents, position papers and project documents.

YOUSUF, Ahmed (France)

Former Professor of History and Comparative Literature at the Heliopolis University (Cairo). Correspondent at the Cairo National Radio in France. Journalist working for *Al Abram* newspaper (Cairo) and contributing to *Al Abram Weekly*. His publications include *Les sept secrets de la bibliothèque d'Alexandrie*, *Bonaparte et Mahomet*, *L'Orient de Jacques Chirac*. He is the recipient of the *Chevalier des Arts et des Lettres de la République française* (2005), as well as the *Prix Marseillaise de l'Assemblée nationale*.

ZEIN AL-ABIDIN, Al-Tayeb (Sudan)

Secretary General at SIRC. Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at IIUI. Former Director of the Department of Investment and Development at the University of Khartoum. Former Director of the Islamic African Centre. He has published more than twenty articles in academic journals in the fields of Middle Eastern politics, Sudanese politics, and Muslim political thought. He also writes weekly articles in three Arabic newspapers.

GENERAL INDEX

A

- A. Talib, Yusof, 45, 85
ʿAbbas (Abu Mazen), 49, 56, 169, 326, 341
ʿAbbas (Shah), 49
Abbas, Chaudhary Ghulam, 351f., 355
ʿAbbas, Ferhat, 169
ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd (Sultan), 105, 173, 176
ʿAbd al-Majīd, 183
ʿAbd al-Majīd II, 184
ʿAbd al-Qādir, 73–5
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, 80
ʿAbd al-Raziq, ʿAli (Shaykh), 189
Abdel Nasser, Gamal, 130, 212, 225, 244, 246–50, 252, 254f., 279, 282, 294, 296, 317f., 320, 325, 441
Abdul Qadeer, 352
Abdul Rahman Putra al-Haj, Tunku, 309f.
ʿAbdullāh II, 115
Abdullah, Mohammad (Shaikh), 351f.
Abela, Giuliano, 66
Abū ʿAbdullah Muḥammad, 27f.
Abu Ali Mustafa, 482
Abu al-Kalam Azad, 262
Abū ʿAmrān, 198
Abū Maʿazza, 74
Abyssinia, 91, 198
Accra, 2824, 305
Achad Ha'am, 152
Addis Ababa, 305, 307–9
Adler, Alexandre, 457
Adrian (Cardinal), 31
Adrianople, 197
Adriatic Sea, 39
El-ʿAffas, Omar Ibrahim, 171, 391
Afghan, 49f., 350, 362f., 391f., 394–401, 473
Afghan mujahideen, 362, 394f.
Al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din, 288f.
ʿAflaq, Mishīl, 243
Africa, 35, 38–42, 44f., 47, 56, 64, 68, 77, 91f., 97–9, 133–8, 143f., 148, 156, 162f., 165f., 168, 170, 173, 195, 197, 202, 213, 218–21, 224, 226, 228, 255, 259, 280f., 287, 289, 293f., 299, 305–10, 312–15, 475
Africanus, Leo, 42, 199, 286
Agadir (Aghādīr), 64, 82f., 197
Agra, 259
Aḥmad I (Sultan), 35
Al-Aḥmāz, 442
Akbar (Emperor), 46, 49f., 258, 378
Āl Saud, Faisal b. Abdulaziz (King), 297–9, 327, 329
ʿAlawid, 79
Albayzīn, 30f.
Aleppo, 102, 114
Alexander, 37
Alexander II (Tsar), 152

- Alexandria, 35, 39, 87, 105, 123f., 130f., 167, 194, 219, 246
- Algeria, 34, 36, 44, 47, 63, 71f., 74–6, 80f., 93, 164, 166, 169, 171, 196, 201–3, 212, 219f., 224, 240, 251–4, 257, 287, 291–4, 305, 307, 333, 471, 476
- Algerian Revolution, 476
- Algiers, 32, 34f., 68, 70–5, 205, 221, 437
- ‘Alī (Imam), 49, 388
- ‘Alī (Pasha), 32
- ‘Alī ‘the Infidel’, 70f.
- Alī, Mohammad, 260, 262
- ‘Alī, Muḥammad, 100–2, 123–5
- ‘Alī, Samir Gheilan, 438
- Alī, Shaukat, 260
- Alma-Ata, 411f.
- Alpujarras, 30, 32
- El-Aqib, Mohammed, 42, 58, 60, 201, 290
- Althusser, Louis, 166
- Amin, Tahir, 349
- Amman, 337, 449
- Anatolia, 47f., 68, 111, 177, 183f., 186
- Andalusia, 27–33, 35
- Ankara, 167, 177, 179, 184, 186
- Annan, Kofi, 496f.
- Al-Aqsa Mosque, 192, 212, 226, 295, 298, 322, 473
- Arab Kingdom of Baghdad, 38
- Arabian Gulf, 35, 100f., 111, 171, 239, 247, 441
- Arabistan, 442f.
- Arafat, Yasser, 319, 321, 341–3, 346, 452, 473, 481
- Aragon, 31, 33, 195
- Ardabil, 48
- Arab(s), 28, 35, 37, 40, 53, 56, 60, 79, 91, 98–101, 110–13, 115, 117f., 138, 154–6, 158f., 164, 169–73, 176, 186, 188, 191, 194, 199, 205, 212, 224, 227f., 230f., 233–5, 237, 239–50, 252–6, 267, 285, 292, 296, 317–20, 322–30, 333–6, 338, 340f., 347, 388, 397, 433–5, 439, 441–4, 446, 448–50, 452–4, 463, 466, 468f., 474, 476, 480, 482
- Arab countries, 100, 102, 110, 111, 112, 117, 165, 167, 169, 179, 225, 230f., 238, 241, 244, 246–50, 252, 254, 278f., 293, 317, 319f., 323, 327, 329, 333, 339, 385
- Arab East, 97, 111, 116, 156, 199, 240, 323
- Arab homeland, 97, 239f., 243, 247, 252, 256
- Arab-Islamic, 80, 97, 107, 179, 190, 193, 286
- Arab lands, 36, 48, 111, 118, 171, 240f., 248, 253, 480
- Arab League, 110, 212, 245, 251
- Arab Muslim(s), 38, 136, 179, 241, 296–8, 462f., 465, 469, 473, 479
- Arab region(s), 98, 113, 116, 179, 240–2, 246, 248, 523
- Arab revolt, 111, 116, 155, 187f., 242, 480
- Arab state(s), 117, 119, 159, 187, 227f., 233–5, 237, 240, 242, 244, 246f., 250f., 254, 280, 298, 317–9, 325, 328–30, 333, 337f., 370, 435, 441, 443, 450, 452–4
- Arab world, 158, 173, 191, 211, 242, 247–9, 254, 291f., 322, 328f., 333, 336, 346, 443, 445, 448f., 451, 458, 465
- Ardebili, Mousavi (Ayatollah), 381
- Argun, 425
- ‘Arūj (Pasha), 68
- Asad, 330f.
- Asia Minor, 38, 44, 171, 395
- Al-‘Asīr, 112, 115
- Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal (*Muṣṭafā Kamāl*), 165, 167, 172, 177f., 183–6, 207, 261, 267
- Atlantic Ocean, 40f., 44, 85, 199, 247
- Audaghost, 54f., 57
- Aurangzeb (Emperor), 47, 50, 51
- Axworthy, Michael, 380
- Azadi, 367

Azerbaijan, 48, 167, 412, 495
 Al-Azhar, 188, 191, 290, 292
 Azīz, 35
 Aziz, Tariq, 388, 438
 Al-ʿAzma, Yūsuf, 113

B

Bâ, Oumar, 94, 207
 Baath Party, 388, 436, 438, 444, 467
 Baathist, 243, 388, 433, 443, 499
 Bab al-Mandeb (*Bāb al-Mandab*), 99, 107
 Baba, Ahmed, 42, 60, 201, 290
 Babur, Zahir al-Dīn Muḥammad, 49
 Bacharan, Nicole, 465
 Badr (Imam), 296
 Bagayogo, Moḥammad (Askiya), 60
 Baghdad, 38, 54, 57, 100f., 388f., 435–8, 443, 447, 450, 453, 456, 467, 473, 483, 489–91, 493, 495f., 498f.
 Baghdad Pact, 115, 249f., 298
 Bah, Thierno, 133
 Bahrain, 35, 98–101, 370, 388
 Baker, 341
 Bakhayokho, 42
 Bakhayokho, Muḥammad, 201
 Bakhtiar, Shapour, 372, 379–81, 384
 Al-Bakr, Ahmed Hassan, 435
 Al-Bakrī, 54, 198
 Balfour, 36, 112–14, 116–18, 156–8, 198, 292, 480
 Balta, Paul, 440
 Baltic, 404f., 409, 411, 416, 423
 Bamba, Ahmadu, 138, 212
 Bandung, 277–9, 281
 Bandung Conference, 170, 212, 226, 277–83
 Bangladesh, 258f., 301, 360
 Banisadr, Abolhassan, 374, 385
 Banū Marīn, 63
 Barbarossa, Khayr al-Dīn, 35, 68
 Barbarossa, Oruç, 35

Barbusse, Henri, 164
 Barthes, Roland, 492
 Bartholdi, Frédéric Auguste, 121f., 127–30
 Bartholdi, Jean-Baptiste, 127
 Basayev, Shamil, 424f.
 Al-Bāsil, Aḥmad, 108
 Basle, 153f.
 Basra, 54, 57, 100–2, 496
 Battle of Maysalun, 113
 Battle of Qadisiya, 442
 Bazargan, Mehdi, 372, 375, 380f., 383–5, 387, 439
 Al-Bazzāz, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, 253
 Beaucaire, 38
 Begin, 331–4
 Beilen, 341
 Beirut, 39, 114, 334
 Béjaïa, 35
 Belgium, 135f., 139, 149, 215
 Ben Yousef, Mohammed (Sultan), 83f., 168
 Bengal, 259, 264, 266
 Bēghazi, 77f., 219, 300
 Berber, 37, 53, 91, 221
 Berlin Wall, 403, 416, 457
 Berlusconi, Silvio, 482
 Bey, Munsif, 169
 Bilād al-Sudan, 53f., 56f., 60f.
 Bishop of Toledo, 65
 Biskra, 72f.
 Bismarck, 133, 135
 Black Africa, 42, 44, 91, 144, 199, 224, 257, 293f., 523
 Black Friday, 375f.
 Black Sea, 39, 171, 178, 427
 Blair, Tony, 461, 468, 488, 494, 496
 Blix, Hans, 491
 Boilat, Abbé, 203f.
 Bolshevik, 111, 161f., 166, 267, 407, 430
 Bombay, 89, 262f.
 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 44, 97, 102, 123, 126f., 130, 196, 202, 291
 Boniface, Pascal, 469
 Bordeaux, 38, 41, 142, 146, 215

Borneo, 169, 225, 270, 272–5
 Bornu (Empire), 137, 215
 Bosnia, 47, 139, 176, 197
 Boubacar Sy, 293
 Bouhired, Djamila (*Jamila Būhirad*), 252
 Bourguiba, Habib, 169
 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 308, 495
 Brahmanism, 261, 350
 Braumann, Rony, 477
 Brazzaville, 211, 218, 224, 306f.
 Bremer, Paul, 497
 Brezhnev, 406
 Britain (Great Britain), 36, 72, 75, 77, 81, 82, 89, 94, 99–103, 105–13, 115–19, 122, 125f., 133, 135–9, 149, 153, 155f., 156, 158, 161f., 167, 175, 177–9, 187, 196f., 216, 219, 221, 226, 236, 242, 245, 249f., 264, 273, 276, 307, 385, 492, 494, 497
 British, 36, 44, 79, 81, 87, 89, 98–103, 105–13, 115–17, 119, 122f., 126, 129, 133, 137, 140, 143f., 155f., 158f., 167–9, 178f., 184, 187f., 196f., 201, 212, 216, 219, 225, 240, 242, 257–64, 270, 272, 275, 287f., 291–3, 351–5, 370, 370, 393, 400, 477, 495–7
 British Empire, 177, 179, 259, 272, 275, 393
 British Fleet, 80, 100, 105
 British Government, 101, 104, 107, 109, 117, 119, 153, 156, 159, 495
 British High Commissioner, 110, 119, 155, 274
 British mandate, 112f., 115f., 118, 157, 167, 230, 289
 British occupation, 36, 103, 108, 184
 British protectorate, 109, 116, 149
 Brioni, 282
 Brzezinski, 396
 Buddhism, 350
 Bugeaud (General), 74
 Bulgaria, 161, 167, 176, 179, 197, 416, 495
 Buresi, Pascal, 381f.

Bush, George W. (President), 460–3, 466–9, 475, 481, 483, 487, 489, 492, 494, 499
 Al-Bustānī, 173
 Butt, Maqbool, 362
 Byelorussia, 406, 423
 Byzantine Empire, 37
 Byzantium, 38f., 47, 193f.

C

Cahen (Professor), 194
 Cairo, 56f., 105, 119, 126f., 167, 190, 199, 279f., 285, 288, 292, 296, 310, 317f., 379, 452f.
 Calcutta, 261f., 266
 Cameroon, 91, 136, 143, 146, 148f., 165, 196, 201, 218, 224, 287, 294
 Camp David, 331–4, 345
 Camus, Albert, 476
 Cape of Good Hope, 40, 64, 85, 98, 293
 Cape Verde, 40
 Carmel, Babarak, 397
 Carter, Jimmy (President), 331–4, 341, 372f., 376, 382
 Casablanca, 76, 82, 218, 307
 Caspian Sea, 47, 442
 Castile, 29, 31f., 195
 Caucasus, 169, 171, 196, 219, 409, 415, 419–23, 425, 427, 429f., 432
 Central Africa, 287, 291, 312
 Ceuta (*Sibta*), 34, 64f., 80, 83
 Ceylon, 106, 211, 225, 293
 Chahine, Youssef, 130
 Champagne, 38, 143
 Chand, Mehr, 354
 Chappe, Claude, 202
 Charles V (King), 29, 31, 35f., 68, 70, 199
 Chechen(s), 291, 408, 415, 419–25, 427–32
 Cheney, Dick, 492, 499
 Chernobyl, 407, 409

China, 39, 211, 219, 225, 268, 350, 355f., 397, 399, 493
 Chinese Turkestan, 37
 Chirac, Jacques (President), 485, 494
 Chomsky, Noam, 469
 Churchill, Winston, 197, 220f., 226, 245
 Cissé, Mustafa, 295
 Cissoko, Sekene Mody, 58
 Citorra, 65
 Clarendon (Lord), 126
 Clark, Ramsay, 488
 Clarke, Richard, 489
 Clemenceau, Georges, 112f.
 Clement VII (Pope), 31
 Clinton (President), 341
 Coen, Ian Pieterzoon, 87
 Cold War, 170, 213, 224–6, 281f., 297, 376, 393–7, 403, 405, 416f., 443, 458, 460, 462
 Colmar, 127
 Cologne, 38
 Columbus, Christopher, 40
 Constantinople, 38f., 47, 111, 167, 179, 193f., 288
 Cordova, 29, 32, 193
 Cortés, Hernán, 40
 Côte d'Ivoire, 91, 136, 145, 163, 212
 Cyprus, 39, 171, 179, 194, 197
 Czechoslovakia, 416

D

d'Albuquerque, Alfonso, 86f.
 d'Almeida, Francisco, 86
 d'Encausse, Hélène Carrère, 403, 419
 da Gama, Vasco, 40, 85, 98
 Dakar, 148, 169, 204, 206, 208, 216f., 218, 220, 222
 Dardanelles Strait, 78
 Dardanelles, 78, 175, 177, 179
 Darghut, 67f.
 Dawud (Askia), 58
 de Cisneros, Jiménez, 29

de Cordoba, Ramòn (Don), 65
 De Gaulle (General), 216–18, 221f., 224
 de las Casas, Bartolomé, 40
 de Lesseps, Ferdinand, 121–31
 de Sande, Alvaro (Don), 67f.
 de Talavera, Hernando, 29
 Debray, Régis, 458, 469, 477
 Deir Yassin, 159
 Delhi, 259f., 278, 361
 Demaison, André, 94
 Derna, 77f.
 Desert Storm, 448, 455, 487, 489
 Adh-Dhahabī, Aḥmad, 80
 Dhaka, 301
 Diaz, Bartholomew, 98
 Dīnār, 'Alī, 108
 Diouf, Alioune, 293
 Diourbel, 169, 209
 Dogra dynasty, 351f.
 Doucoure, Abdu Wahab, 293
 Doumer, Gaston, 148
 Dudayev, Dzhokhar, 408, 423
 Dulcert, Angelino, 56
 Dulles, Foster, 462
 Dutch, 44, 87f., 98, 148, 168, 201, 212, 219, 225, 258, 267–72, 275f., 278, 291f.
 Dutch East India Company, 87, 89
 Dutch East Indies, 219
 Dutch Government, 296–71
 Dutch Socialists, 268
 Dutch-Indonesian Union, 272, 276

E

East, 38f., 42, 54f., 86, 111, 123, 137, 143, 194, 239, 244, 259, 266, 290, 320, 324, 332, 337, 343, 355, 370, 385, 388, 404, 412, 417, 420, 442
 East Africa, 63f., 91, 98f., 163, 165, 196, 291
 East India Company, 87, 89, 101
 Eastern Bengal, 264

Eastern Europe, 152, 362, 404, 416
 Eastern Malaysia, 273
 Eastern Pakistan, 259, 266
 Eastern Rumelia, 176
 Eboué, 218
 Egypt, 28, 34–7, 44, 55–7, 79, 82,
 97–100, 102f., 105–10, 117,
 121–4, 126–31, 140, 149, 155, 157,
 164f., 167, 188f., 191, 193, 196, 212,
 219, 224f., 230, 240, 244, 246–50,
 278, 288, 291–4, 296f., 300, 320,
 323–6, 328–34, 341, 379, 441,
 450, 453
 Eisenhower (President), 221, 462
 Emirates, 292, 449
 Ethiopia, 93, 135f., 168, 278, 303, 305
 Etienne, Bruno, 474
 Euphrates, 171, 441f., 446, 448, 489
 European States, 32, 35, 197
 European Union, 399, 411, 416, 419,
 431, 464

F

Faidherbe, 93f., 203, 207f.
 Fall, Khali Amar, 201
 Far East, 44, 64, 81, 98f., 102, 196, 273
 Far Maghreb (*al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā*), 63f.
 Farangi Mahalli, ‘Abd al-Bari, 262
 Farooq, Mirwaz Umar, 362
 Fars, 54
 Faruq (King), 191
 Al-Fassi, Allal, 169
 Fatah, 319, 346f., 473
 Fāṭima, Lallā, 75
 Fazīhā, Walīd, 243
 Ferdinand (King), 27, 29, 42, 63, 65,
 195
 Ferdinand, Franz (Archduke), 139
 Ferdowsi, 371
 Fertile Crescent, 242
 Fez, 64, 74, 83, 198f., 290, 336
 Fisk, Robert, 469, 480, 485
 France, 32, 34, 36, 39, 70–5, 77, 80–4,
 94, 96, 99f., 102f., 105, 107, 110f.,

113f., 121, 125–8, 130, 133, 135f.,
 138f., 142–6, 148f., 161–4, 167,
 175–9, 196f., 201f., 204, 209, 212,
 215–19, 221f., 224, 236, 252f., 257,
 273, 287, 291f., 373, 377f., 380, 384,
 439, 443, 446, 471, 488, 493f.
 Franks, Tommy, 489
 French Equatorial Africa, 143, 222,
 224
 French West Africa, 140, 142f., 147f.,
 204f., 209, 216–18, 221f., 224, 293f.
 Fuad (King), 188f.
 Fukuyama, Francis, 459
 Fulani, 53, 57, 91, 136, 215, 287

G

Gaddafi, Muammar, 255, 313
 Galata, 35
 Gallipoli, 144
 Gambia, 91, 145, 163, 165, 169, 196,
 201
 Gandhi, 261–4, 266, 275
 Ganges, 49
 Geneva, 164, 331
 Genoa, 38, 39
 Georges-Picot, François, 111
 Georgia, 409, 411, 413, 415, 420
 Germany, 81f., 95, 105, 110, 133, 135,
 139, 148f., 162, 176, 197, 213, 215f.,
 218f., 222, 225f., 291, 412, 472, 493
 Ghana (Empire), 53, 54, 57f.
 Ghana, 41, 53f., 58, 91, 169, 196, 198f.,
 212, 224, 305, 307, 311f.
 Al-Ghawīl, Sulaymān, 245
 Ghotbzadeh, Sadegh, 375
 Gibraltar, 70
 Gilani, Ali (Sayyed), 362
 Goddāla, 198f.
 Golan, 320
 Golan Heights, 326, 333f.
 Goldstein, Baruch, 482
 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 397, 406–10, 414
 Gouraud, Henri (General), 113
 Granada, 27–33, 64, 70, 195

Greater Maghreb, 63f., 67, 70f., 76, 80
 Grozny, 421f., 424f., 427f.
 Guinea, 91, 136, 144, 146, 163, 169,
 196, 201, 212, 224f., 294, 297, 307,
 523
 Gulf, 47, 86, 98–101, 112, 237, 248,
 370, 385, 389, 433f., 440–3, 446f.,
 450, 453, 455, 493
 Gutenberg, Johannes, 39

H

Ḥafṣids, 63, 68, 70
 Haj Seyed Javadi, Ali-Asghar, 371
 Halliday, Denis, 488
 Hamadi, Saadoun, 450
 Hamas, 346f., 473, 484
 Hamburg, 38
 Hannibal, 37
 Harkat-ul Mujahideen, 363
 El-Hareir, Idris, 27, 63, 76, 97, 108
 Hārūn al-Rashīd, 37
 Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar, 385
 Hassan II, 76, 298
 Hatta, Mohammad, 270f., 276
 Havana, 279
 Henry the Navigator, 39
 Herzegovina, 139, 176, 197
 Herzl, Theodor, 153
 Herzog, Haim, 447
 Hizbul Mujahideen, 362
 Hijaz (*Al-Jazīra*), 100, 111f., 115, 187f.,
 190, 205
 Al-Himmeh, 318
 Hindus, 47, 258, 261, 264, 266, 275,
 350, 352
 Hitler, 213, 215, 219, 226
 Hobsbawm, Eric, 415
 Holland, 70, 85, 162, 215, 268, 270,
 272, 328f.
 Holst, 341
 Hoveyda, Fereydoun, 369
 Humāyūn, 49
 Huntington, Samuel, 459f., 465
 Husain, Zakir, 261

Al-Husayni, Amin (Haj), 190
 Al-Ḥuṣrī, Sāṭi^c, 243f.
 Hussein (Imam), 374, 378, 388
 Hussein, Saddam, 388, 435f., 438f.,
 445, 449f., 452f., 455, 467, 489,
 491f., 494, 499
 Hyderabad, 354

I

Ibn ‘Abbū, ‘Abdullah (Aben Aboo)
 (Moulay), 32
 Ibn ‘Abd al-Rahmān, Muḥammad, 81
 Ibn ‘Abdulaziz, Fahd (King), 299
 Ibn ‘Abdullāh, Muḥammad, 74f., 80,
 106
 Ibn ‘Alī, Ḥusayn (Sharīf), 110, 155f.,
 187
 Ibn Battuta, 199
 Ibn Faraj, Faraj, 32
 Ibn Ḥasan, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, 82, 115
 Ibn Hawqal, 54
 Ibn al-Ḥusayn, Faiṣal, 112f.
 Ibn Ibrāhīm, Yaḥyā, 198f.
 Ibn Khaldūn, 57
 Ibn Laden, Osama, 461, 467f., 473,
 476, 480f., 491
 Ibn Mā’ al-‘Aynayn, Hibbatullāh, 83
 Ibn Mājid, Aḥmad, 98
 Ibn Sa‘īd (Al-Sultan), 99
 Ibn Sa‘ūd, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, 115, 190
 Ibn Sharīf Ḥusayn, ‘Abdullāh (Amīr),
 115
 Ibn Talal, Hussein, 452
 Ibn Umayya, Muḥammad (Aben
 Humaya), 32
 Ibn Yāsīn, ‘Abd Allāh, 198f.
 Al-Idrīsī, Muḥammad ‘Alī, 115
Al-Iḥṣā’, 100
 Imbros, 179
 India, 37, 39f., 44f., 49, 51, 64, 85f., 89,
 98f., 102, 140, 143, 166, 169, 184f.,
 191, 196, 211, 219, 225f., 258–63,
 265f., 268, 275, 278, 288, 291–3,

295, 328, 349f., 352, 354–8, 360–8,
391, 481
 Indian, 368
 Indies, 40, 136, 149, 196, 291
 Indochina, 143, 147, 164, 166, 219,
226, 268, 273, 291
 Indonesia, 87–9, 168f., 196, 212, 258,
266–72, 275–8, 292
 Intifada, 337, 340, 346f., 476, 484
 Iqbal, Muhammad, 265, 275, 353, 522
 Iranian Revolution (1979), 369f., 382
 Iraq, 54, 101, 111–13, 115, 149, 167f.,
179, 188, 225, 230, 246, 248, 250,
293, 298, 323, 329, 333f., 340,
377f., 385, 388f., 415, 433–56,
461, 467–9, 479, 483, 487–99
 Isabella I (Queen), 27, 29, 40, 42, 63,
195
 Ishāq, Safi al-Dīn (Shaykh), 48
 Iskenderun, 110, 114
 Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba, 361
 Islamic State of Afghanistan, 396, 398
 Islamist(s), 164, 211, 215, 290, 294,
322, 362, 367f., 371, 374, 384,
386–9, 427, 431, 462, 465–8, 472f.
 Ismāʿīl (Maula), 79, 80
 Ismail (Shah), 49
 Ismāʿīl the Safavid (*Safawi*), 175
 Ismāʿīl, Saʿīd (Khedive), 103
 Ismet (Pasha), 185f.
 Israel, 119, 151, 157, 160, 227f., 230f.,
233–7, 250, 278, 280, 317, 319f.,
322–8, 330–4, 336–9, 341–7,
385, 412, 433, 447, 454, 456, 466f.,
469, 472, 474f., 480f., 484f., 491
 Istanbul, 35, 67, 71, 77, 154, 179,
183–5, 197, 290, 301
 Ivanov, Igor, 494
 Izmir, 177, 186

J

Jabal al-Druze, 114
 Jaén, 29
 Jaffa, 117

Jahan (Shah), 259
 Jakarta, 268, 270–2, 276
 Jamaat-i-Islami, 361
 Jammu, 350–2, 354, 360–2, 366
 Janissaries, 68, 174
 Japan, 177, 213, 219, 226, 267f., 271,
273f., 328f., 399, 495
 Jarring, 324
 Jean sans Peur, 194
 Jeddah, 98, 104, 188, 192, 296,
298–300, 451
 Jericho, 343, 481
 Jerusalem, 37, 111, 117, 119, 154, 192,
194, 227, 234, 299, 318, 320, 322f.,
329, 331, 333, 335, 341, 343
 Jews, 29, 36, 42, 112, 114, 116–19,
151–3, 156–60, 172, 174, 195,
228, 233f., 337, 385, 412, 447
 Jihad (*Jihād*), 35, 56, 67, 73, 87, 110f.,
252, 262f., 292, 346, 358, 362, 394,
401, 428, 467
 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali, 211, 261,
264f., 266, 275
 João I (King), 64
 Jobert, Michel, 452
 Jordan, 100, 111, 191, 225, 233, 246,
292, 318, 320, 323, 325, 332, 340,
343, 449f., 452, 475
 Jordan River, 237, 317
 Judar (Pasha), 35
 Julius (Caesar), 37
 Junagadh, 354, 357

K

Kabul, 395, 397f.
 Kadyrov (Mufti), 428
 Kaiser Wilhelm II, 153, 197
 Kak, Pandit, 354
 Kala, Khali Madiakhate, 201
 Kamikaze, 473f., 476f., 480
 Kāmil, Muṣṭafa, 108
 Kane, Hamidou (Cheikh), 138
 Kaolack, 138, 146, 209

Kapeliuk, Amnon, 482, 484
 Karachi, 299f.
 Karamanli, 75–7
 Kargil, 349
 Karim, Amadou (Dr.), 301
 Karzai, Hamid, 489
 Kashmir, 266, 349–52, 354–8, 360–8
 Kasmieh, Khairia, 151, 227, 317
 Kassem, Abdelkerim, 441
 Katy, Mahmoud, 42, 60–2, 201
 Keita, Sundiata, 199
 Khaddūri, Majīd, 242
 Khalkhali, Sadeq, 387
 Khan, Abdul Ghaffar, 263
 Khanaquine, 437
 Khartoum, 106f.
 Khasbulatov, Ruslan, 424f.
 Khayyām, Omar, 371
 Khomeini, Ruhollah (Ayatollah), 362, 369f., 372–5, 377–81, 384, 386–9, 433, 439, 445, 447
 Khomeinism, 433f.
 Khorasan, 54, 57
 Khrushchev, 406, 429
 Khrushchev, Nikita, 408f.
 Khuzestan, 442
 Kissinger, Henry, 329, 453f.
 Kitchener (Lord), 107
 Knights of Malta, 67f.
 Knights of Saint John, 67
 Krakowski, Elie, 400
 Krauthammer, Charles, 465
 Kravchuk, Leonid, 404, 406
 Kremlin, 407, 423
 Ksar el-Kebir, 34
 Kufa, 54
 Kumbi, 54f.
 Kuwait, 100–2, 237, 340, 377, 388, 445f., 448–53, 455f., 487, 495

L

La Rochelle, 38, 41
 Laboulaye, 129
 Ladislav III, 194

Lake Chad, 53, 137
 Lamb, Alastair, 355
 Larache, 34
 Larsen, 341
 Laruelle, Marlène, 411
 Latakia (*al-Lādhiqiyya*), 114
 Latin America, 217, 279f., 292, 463
 Lausanne, 178, 184, 186
 Laval, 216
 Lawrence of Arabia, 96, 480
 Le Debour, 164
 League of Arab states, 245–7, 278, 318, 338, 340, 450, 452
 League of Nations, 149, 156, 167, 169, 176, 179, 210, 213, 292
 Lebanon, 102, 111–14, 117, 149, 167f., 197, 212, 230, 233, 240, 292f., 300, 323, 334–6, 341, 344, 433, 473
 Lebrun, 216
 Lenin, Vladimir, 162
 Leopold II (King), 135f.
 Lermontov, 429
 LESSEPS, Ferdinand de, 121–31
 Lewis, Bernard, 183, 481
 Liberia, 91, 135f., 163, 169, 305
 Libya, 35f., 44, 68, 71, 75, 77–9, 82, 108, 115, 178, 196, 212, 219, 224, 255, 285, 291f., 294, 300, 305, 329, 333, 436
 Likud, 331, 460, 483
 Lisbon, 33
 Liverpool, 41
 Lloyd George, 112f.
 London, 87, 108f., 112, 117, 119, 168, 216, 264, 288, 372, 468, 471
 Lower Maghreb (*al-Maghrib al-Adnā*), 71
 Lucayan Archipelago, 40
 Lyautey (General), 83

M

Maatoug, Fredj, 257, 369, 403, 419, 433, 457, 471, 487

- Macedonia, 197
 Madagascar, 83, 94, 143, 146f., 207,
 212, 222, 224
 Magellan, 40
 Al-Maghili, 56
 Maghreb, 28, 31f., 34–6, 54f., 57, 61,
 63, 65–7, 70, 72, 196, 244, 286,
 290, 433, 452
 Mahatma *see* Gandhi
 Mahdi, 92, 106
 Maḥmūd, Muḥammad, 108
 Mailer, Norman, 465
 Malacca, 86, 169, 266f., 272, 274f.
 Malay Archipelago, 86f., 89, 273
 Malay – Indonesian Archipelago, 90
 Malaya, 168f., 211, 219, 225, 258,
 272–6
 Malaysia, 89, 196, 271–3, 275f., 293,
 299, 301
 Malfante, 56
 Mali, 41, 43, 54–7, 59, 61, 91, 95, 134,
 136f., 196, 199, 224f., 286, 290, 297,
 307
 Mali Empire, 53, 285
 Malta, 66, 108, 262
 Mamodayev, 425
 Manchester, 41, 303
 Mandali, 437
 Mandingo, 57, 91
 Manhattan, 458
 Mansur (Imam), 421
 Al-Marāghī, Muḥammad Muṣṭafa, 191
 Marīnids, 64
 Marrakesh (*Marrākīsh*), 55, 60, 64, 80,
 82f., 248, 305, 307
 Al-Marsa al-Kabir (*al-Marsā al-Kabīr*),
 64
 Marseille, 34, 142, 146, 217
 Mascara (*Muʿaksar*), 73f.
 Mashriq, 54, 91, 286
 Maskhadov, Aslan, 424, 427f.
 Al-Masʿūdī, 54
 Maude, F. S. (General), 495
 Mauritania, 28, 82, 91, 94, 138, 198f.,
 209, 217, 257, 305, 307
 Mauritius, 99
 Mazari Sharif, 395
 Mazdean, 442
 Mbacke, Saliou, 293
 McMahan, Henry (Sir), 110, 117, 155
 Mecca, 35, 45, 55–7, 90, 94, 98, 138,
 190f., 198f., 205f., 215, 285f., 293,
 422
 Medina, 35, 45, 91, 98, 198, 286, 290
 Mediterranean, 32, 34f., 37–42, 44, 47,
 57, 63, 67, 70f., 75–7, 81f., 85, 123,
 168, 171, 193f., 196–8, 291
 Mediterranean basin, 28, 37, 41f., 162,
 165, 196, 214, 285
 Mehmet II, 47
 Meir, Golda, 323
 Melilla, 34
 Menguy, Ku, 164
 Mersa Matruh, 219
 Mersin, 110
 Mesopotamia, 149, 165, 196, 211,
 440–2, 487f., 495
 Messali Hadj, 169, 294, 476
 Michel, Marc, 142
 Middle East, 21, 42, 44, 115, 149, 165,
 194, 197, 210f., 214, 225f., 243,
 280, 286, 290, 296, 326–9, 331,
 333, 335f., 341, 347, 388, 433, 447,
 449, 452f., 458, 466, 468, 476, 480,
 491
 Middle Eastern, 68, 433
 Middle Maghreb, 63, 65, 73
 Milner (Lord), 109
 Minsk, 406, 415
 Mir (Shah), 350
 Mirabeau, 471
 Mohammad (Askia), 56–8, 61, 286
 Mongol, 45, 194, 350
 Montgomery, William, 164
 Moriscos, 28–35
 Moro, 28, 87
 Moroccan(s), 33, 39, 62, 79–83, 168f.,
 204, 290
 Morocco, 28, 34, 36, 38f., 44, 54, 62,
 74, 76, 79–84, 93, 96, 135, 143,

196f., 199, 212, 219, 224, 257, 286,
291–5, 297f., 301, 379
Morse, 202, 287
Mosaddegh, Mohammad, 369, 372.
389
Moscow, 163, 341, 409, 411, 413,
415–17, 419–25, 427f., 430f., 450,
494
Mosul, 101f., 179
Motahhari (Ayatollah), 386
Mountbatten, 266, 355
Moussa, Kanga, 199
Moustansiriya University, 438
Mubarak, Hosni, 449, 453
Mughal Empire, 49–51, 89
Muḥammad V *see* Ben Yousef,
Mohammed
mujahideen, 394f., 397f.
Al-Mukhtār, ‘Umar, 78f.
Munich, 472
Al-Muqrānī, Muḥammad, 75
Murād (Agha), 67
Murad (Sultan), 47
Musa, Kankan, 285f.
Musa, Mansa, 55–8
Muscat (*Musqat*), 98–101, 112, 292
Musharraf, Pervez (General), 366
Muslim World League (MWL) 191, 297
Mussolini, 78, 213, 219

N

Nafi, Bashir M., 183
Nairobi, 491
Najaf, 373, 388, 433f., 439
Najd, 100, 112, 115, 188
Najībullah, 397
Nantes, 41, 217
Napoleon III, 122, 126, 202
Napoleon *see* Bonaparte, Napoleon
Nasser *see* Abdel Nasser, Gamal
Navarro, Pedro, 65f.
Nazi, 118, 225, 429
Nazi Germany, 273

Nazism, 170, 211, 213, 226, 267
Ndiaye, Abdoulaye, 92, 288
Neauphle-le-Château, 373, 375, 377,
381, 439
Negev, 237
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 164, 261, 278f., 282,
355f., 358
Netherlands, 32, 87, 268, 327f., 495
Netherlands East Indies, 272
Niane, Djibril Tamsir, 53
Niani, 54–6, 285
Niass, Ibrahim, 138
Niger Bend, 57
Niger, 53, 91, 93, 95, 135, 163, 198,
217, 224f., 291, 294
Nixon (President), 370
Nkrumah, Kwame, 224, 303, 305,
311–13
North, 43, 82, 91, 110f., 149, 169, 171,
239, 272f., 290, 305, 350, 378, 385,
394, 404, 417, 420, 424, 426f., 441f.,
463, 499
North Africa, 37, 42, 44, 77, 162f., 166,
168, 193f., 198, 202, 209f., 214, 216,
218f., 221f., 253f., 257
North America, 22, 217, 417
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), 394, 416
Northern Ireland, 471, 492, 494, 497
Nouailhat, Yves-Henri, 457
Nubar (Pasha), 103, 105, 131

O

Obote, Milton, 312
Okutsky, Shih-Murza, 421
Omar, Mohammad (Mullah), 398
Oran, 34f., 65f., 73, 75, 253
Organisation of African Unity (OAU),
136, 212, 303, –5, 307–12
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
(OIC), 297, 385
Organization of Arab Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OAPEC), 328

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 327–8, 437, 448
 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 23f., 191f., 212, 295f., 298–301, 524
 Oslo, 341–3, 345, 473, 483
 Ossetians, 422
 Ottoman(s), 32–6, 45, 47f., 51, 67f., 70–2, 75, 77, 87, 97f., 100–2, 110f., 115, 122, 152, 154f., 171–6, 183f., 186f., 190, 196f., 207, 210f., 241–3, 245, 260f., 420
 Ottoman Anatolian Frontier, 45
 Ottoman Empire, 32–6, 47, 87, 90, 140, 155, 162, 167, 171–9, 184, 196f., 210, 240, 242, 260–2, 265, 275, 290, 422, 451, 480
 Oveisi (General), 377, 380

P

Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza (Shah), 369f., 373, 375, 377, 379, 381, 383, 387, 389, 433
 Pahlavi, Reza, 293
 Pakistan, 191, 211, 258f., 266, 275, 293, 297–300, 349f., 352–68, 391, 393–5, 398
 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 295, 317–19, 321, 452, 473
 Palestinian(s), 116–19, 152, 154, 158, 168, 190, 214, 227f., 230–4, 237f., 318–20, 322–4, 326, 331, 334, 336–47, 385, 456, 466f., 469, 472–6, 480–5
 Panama Canal, 123
 Panipat, 49
 Paris, 109, 112f., 127, 131, 153, 168, 183, 194, 202, 215, 241, 288, 373, 375, 381, 419, 468
 Pashtuns, 398
 Pearl Harbour, 219, 273, 457
 Penang, 274f.
 Pentagon, 457, 488

Peres, 341f.
 Persia, 37, 166f., 288, 291
 Persian, 258, 267, 288, 381, 436, 440, 442
 Persian Gulf, 47, 86, 101, 397, 441
 Pétain (Marshal), 161, 216, 218
 Peter the Great, 421
 Peter the Hermit, 194
 Philip III (King), 33
 Philip the Good, 33, 194
 Picardy, 143
 Pipes, Daniel, 466
 Pizarro, 40
 Plaza Bibarrambla, 30
 Poland, 171, 213, 215, 416, 495
 Polo, Marco, 38
 Pondicherry, Marius Moutetto, 90
 Port Said, 130f., 250
 Portugal, 35, 39, 63f., 85, 95, 98, 327, 495
 Portuguese, 35, 40, 44, 63–7, 76, 79f., 86f., 89, 98f., 135f., 144, 163, 201, 287, 294, 308
 Powell, Colin, 463, 468, 492f.
 Prester John, 39
 Privat, Edmond, 164
 Protestants, 33
 Ptolemy, 57, 202
 Punjab, 259, 264, 266, 351, 355
 Puri, Balraj, 361
 Putin, Vladimir, 427f.

Q

Al-Qānūnī, Suleiman *see* Suleiman I (Sultan)
 Qom, 373f., 384
 Qurei (Abū ‘Alā’), 341

R

Rabat, 191, 212, 295f., 298f., 301, 330
 Rabbani, Burhanuddin, 398
 Rabah, 137

Rabin, 331, 341–3
 Radvanyi, Jean, 411
 Rashīd (Maula), 79
 Reagan (President), 334, 405
 Red Sea, 87, 98f., 101, 111, 123
 Republic of Chechen-Ingushetia, 422–4, 429
 Republic of Ichkeria, 424
 Republic of Kuwait, 451
 Republic of Libya, 246
 Resistance, 85, 91, 97, 106, 221, 237, 421, 428, 471, 478, 497
 Reynaud, Paul, 215f.
 Rhône, 38
 Rice, Condoleezza, 489, 492
 Rida, Rashid, 189
 Rinchan, 350
 Ritter, Scott, 499
 River Bou Regreg, 34
 Rogers, 325
 Romans, 37
 Rommel, 219, 221
 Roosevelt (President), 221
 Rothschild (Lord), 156
 Rouen, 38
 Rouweïssi, Musa, 299
 Roy, Olivier, 463, 465, 467
 Ruanda-Urundi, 149
 Rumaylah, 449, 451
 Rumelia, 176, 186
 Rumsfeld, Donald, 489, 491f.
 Rusifoka, 164
 Russia, 111, 125, 139, 152, 156, 161f., 166, 169f., 175f., 178, 196f., 292, 355f., 385, 396, 405f., 412f., 420, 422–5, 427f., 431f.
 Russian Federation, 404, 410–13, 415–17, 419f., 424f., 427, 431f., 488, 493f.

S

Al-Sabah, Jaber Al-Ahmad (Sheikh), 450

Sadat (President), 329–33, 379
 Sadi, ^cAbderrahman, 42, 60
 Safavid, 45, 47–9, 51, 443
 Saffi, Ghulam Mohammad, 362
 Sahar (*Sahar*), 99
 Sahara, 35, 53f., 57, 91, 218, 239
 Sahel, 42, 53–5, 57f., 60f., 136
 Said, Edward, 458, 469, 485f., 489, 492
 Saint-Louis, 169, 204f., 208, 217, 290
 Saint-Simonians, 123f., 127
 Saleh, Ali Abdallah, 450
 Salmon, Jean, 491
 Salonika, 144, 167
 Samayd (Shaykh), 48
 San Remo, 113, 115, 156
 Sanchez, Ricardo, 499
 Sanjabi, Karim, 372, 375, 379, 384f.
 Sankore Mosque, 41, 58, 61
 Sarajevo, 139
 Saudi Arabia, 96, 190, 297, 299f., 318, 327, 329f., 388, 398, 445f., 448f., 451, 453, 465, 468
 Scowcroft, Brent, 454
 Segovia, 29
 Segu, 91, 137, 290
 Segu Empire, 91, 137
 Seku Tall, Ahmadu, 290
 Selim I (Sultan), 47, 68
 Seljuqs, 38
 Senegal, 91, 93, 136–8, 142–4, 146f., 164f., 168f., 196, 203–8, 217, 220, 222, 224f., 290f., 294, 297, 299–301
 Senegambia, 41f., 198, 201, 203, 286, 290
 Senghor (President), 297
 Seville, 29, 41, 193
 Sfeir, Antoine, 465
 Shah, Bilal (Sayyid), 350f.
 Sham, 97, 102, 113, 171, 240
 Shamayev (Mufti), 431
 Shamil (Imam), 422
 Shamir (Prime Minister), 339
 Shamloo, Ahmad, 371
 Shammar, 112, 115
 Shariati, Ali, 372

Sharīf (Pasha), 105
 Sharif-Emami, Jafar, 375
 Sharm el-Sheikh, 345
 Sharon, Ariel, 335, 344, 467, 481, 483
 Shatt al-Arab, 389, 439, 441f.
 Shembesh, Ali Muhammad, 239, 277, 303
 Sherif of Mecca *see* Ibn ‘Alī, Husayn (Sharīf)
 Shī‘a, 47, 48, 49, 296, 369, 372–4, 377f., 386, 388f., 433f.
 Al-Shuqayri, Ahmed, 318f.
 Shushkevich, Stanislav, 404, 406
 Sidi Yahia (*Sayyidi Yahya*), 42, 74, 201, 289
 Sīdī Yahya (holy man), 59
 Sijilmasa, 54f., 57, 79
 Sikh, 168, 350f.
 Silk Road, 38
 Sinai, 153, 236f., 320, 330, 332f.
 Sindh, 258f., 262, 264, 266
 Singapore, 211, 219, 225, 272–6, 293
 Singh, Gulab, 351
 Singh, Hari, 351f., 354f.
 Singh, Manmohan, 366
 Sis (Cilicia), 35
 Sixtus IV (pope), 29
 Skhira, 35
 Sokoto, 136f., 201
 Songhay Empire, 53, 57, 60, 286
 Soninke, 53, 56f., 91
 South-Africa, 164f., 211, 291, 327
 South-East Africa, 165
 South-East Asia, 169f.
 South-West Africa, 148f.
 Southern Africa, 44, 136
 Soviet Union, 169, 187, 214f., 225, 236, 250, 358, 360, 362, 376, 393f., 396, 400, 403, 405–11, 413, 415–17, 420, 422, 429f., 446, 455, 458f., 461
 Spain, 28–35, 37–40, 42, 54, 63–6, 70f., 75, 77, 81–3, 85, 179, 195, 197, 219, 292, 491, 494f.
 Spanish, 27–35, 40, 42, 44, 61, 63–8, 70f., 79, 81–3, 87, 287, 463

Srinagar, 351, 355, 366
 Stalin, 169, 214, 429
 Strait of Gibraltar, 81, 216
 Strait of Hormuz, 98, 370
 sub-Saharan Africa, 163, 165, 198, 201, 214f., 217, 294, 525
 Suez Canal, 44, 81, 90, 103, 121f., 124f., 127f., 130, 133, 140, 225, 249f., 291, 325f., 332
 Sukarno, 168, 269–71, 276
 Suleiman I the Magnificent *see* Suleiman I (Sultan)
 Suleiman the Magnificent *see* Suleiman I (Sultan)
 Suleiman I (Sultan), 47, 67, 102, 196
 Sumatra, 88, 169, 268, 270, 272
Sunna, 61, 261, 288
 Sunni, 48f., 138, 185f., 189, 386, 388, 445
 Al-Suyūtī, 56
 Svit, Zeleny, 409
 Switzerland, 135
 Sy, Malick (el-Hadji), 207f., 286
 Sykes, Mark, 111
 Sykes-Picot Agreement, 36, 111–13, 149, 155, 197, 291
 Syria, 28, 35, 37, 102, 110–14, 117, 149, 155, 167f., 177, 179, 193, 197, 212, 230, 233, 240, 246, 248, 250, 278, 292f., 318, 320, 323, 325f., 328, 330f., 333f., 341, 436, 492

T

Tabriz, 49, 51, 167, 373, 374
 Tabruk (*Tabruq*), 77f., 219
 Tafna (*Tafna*), 73
 Tajura (*Tajura*), 66f., 107
 Taleghani (Ayatollah), 372f., 386
 Taliban, 395, 398f., 402, 461, 463, 467, 489
 Tall, Umar (Al-Hadji), 92, 94, 136f.
 Tanganyika, 148f., 165

Tangier (*Tanja*), 34, 64, 74, 79, 80, 83f., 197
 Tarsus, 35
 Tartars, 171, 292
 Tawfiq (Khedive) 105f.
 Tbilisi, 409
 Tehran, 371, 373–7, 379–83, 388, 434–7, 445, 447
 Tehran Spring, 371, 373
 Tekrur, 199
 Tenedos, 179
 Terrorism, 336, 349, 365, 368, 398, 419f., 424, 427, 457f., 466f., 469, 471f., 474, 476, 480–6, 491
 Tétouan (*Tatmān*), 34, 64, 80f.
 Thiam, Iba Der, 37, 91, 139, 143f., 147, 161, 193, 213, 285
 Thiam, Iyane, 293
 Thrace, 177, 179, 197f.
 Tigris, 101, 171, 441, 446, 448, 489
 Tillon, Charles, 478, 481
 Timbuktu, 41–3, 54–62, 144, 163, 199, 205, 286, 290
 Tito, 281, 282
 Togoland, 149
 Toledo, 29, 31, 193
 Touhami, Hassan, 300
 Touré, Samory, 92, 136f., 203, 212, 288
 Transjordan, 113, 115, 117, 149, 187, 230
 Tripoli-of-the-west (*Tarābulus al-Gharb*), 35, 66–8, 71f., 75–8, 82, 114f., 178
 Troyes, 38
 Truman (President), 118f.
 Tshombe, Moise, 310
 Al-Tuedjin, Iṣḥāq, 56, 58
 Tukulor Empire, 136, 138
 Tunis, 35f., 68, 70–2, 199, 205, 343
 Tunisia, 34, 36, 44, 63, 71, 77, 82, 93, 149, 164f., 169, 196, 198, 212, 221, 224, 257, 290–4, 297, 299, 305
 Turabi (Colonel), 291
 Turkey, 28, 78, 108, 110–12, 114f., 135, 140, 148f., 155, 162, 167, 172f.,

175–9, 183, 185, 190, 197f., 242, 267, 290f., 298, 301, 447, 495

U

Uganda, 107, 153, 314
 Ukraine, 406, 409, 412, 415f., 423, 495
 UN Security Council, 119, 328, 330, 332, 340, 357f., 410, 445, 454f., 462, 488, 492f., 497
 United Arab Emirates, 100, 370, 388, 445, 447f., 450, 452
 United Nations (UN), 59, 79, 117–19, 122, 125, 128, 157, 159, 226–37, 247, 251f., 277–81, 297, 301, 304f., 307–9, 318f., 321, 324–6, 330–2, 335–8, 341, 349, 355–8, 360f., 364, 366, 368, 383, 396, 398f., 404, 414, 416, 426, 431, 437, 440, 444, 447, 453–6, 464, 466, 468, 475, 479, 483, 488, 491–5, 497–9
 United States of America (US), 35, 64, 76, 81, 127–30, 135, 159, 161, 165, 177, 210, 216, 219, 221, 225, 234, 236, 250, 292, 313, 325–31, 334, 336, 339–43, 346, 349, 358, 364f., 368, 371, 376, 378f., 381–3, 385, 387f., 391, 393–403, 405f., 413, 415, 419, 424, 431f., 443f., 445f., 449f., 452–9, 461–9, 471–3, 476f., 479–82, 487–9, 491–7, 499
 University of Cordoba, 37
 University of Timbuktu, 58
 Upper Senegal-Niger, 144, 147
 ʿUrābī, Aḥmad (Colonel), 105f.
 USSR, 326, 330, 403f., 406–13, 416, 419, 422f., 432, 459f.

V

Valée (General), 74
 Valencia, 33

Valladolid, 29
 Venice, 34, 38f., 66, 71, 87
 Verdun, 139, 143, 161, 216
 Vietnam, 211, 320, 461, 471
 Visigoths, 37
 Volga, 169, 409, 412

W

Wallenstein, 43
 Washington, 168, 328, 331, 339, 370,
 376, 382, 415, 419, 444, 453–5,
 457f., 461f., 464f., 467–9, 475, 482,
 487–9, 492, 494f., 499
 West, 35, 38, 44, 123, 173, 179,
 213–15, 239f., 259, 266, 278, 290,
 292, 350, 356, 360, 372, 376, 385,
 388, 393, 395, 399, 401f., 404, 413,
 417, 431, 455, 460, 465, 468, 472f.,
 475f., 479–81, 486
 West Africa, 56f., 91, 135–8, 143, 145,
 147–9, 164, 198, 201
 West Bank, 231, 318, 320, 332–4, 337,
 341–3, 346, 485
 Western Pakistan, 259, 266, 356, 360
 White Nile, 106f.
 Wilhelm II, 139, 162
 Wilson (President), 113, 149, 161, 165,
 210

World Trade Centre (WTC), 457, 460f.,
 465, 467, 473, 475f., 481, 487f.

X

Kiménes (Cardinal), 65

Y

Yandarbiyev, 427
 Al-Yāzījī, 173
 Yeltsin, Boris, 403, 406f., 413, 422–4,
 427
 Yousof, Ahmed, 121
 Yugoslavia, 167, 282, 403, 416

Z

Zaghlūl, Saʿd, 108f.
 Al-Zahra, 75
 Zaidān, Jūrjī, 173
 Zaleh Square, 377
 Zavgayev, Dokhu, 422
 Zayyānids, 63f., 68, 70
 Zīdān (Sultan), 34

Islamic culture, which is still vigorous in spite of its great antiquity, set out to develop side by side a vision of the individual and of the universe, a philosophy and an art of living that can be seen in the impressive remains of its heritage that is an essential part of the whole of humankind's. Halted for a time by adverse historical conditions, this culture none the less found the strength within itself to re-emerge.

Its fidelity to its roots does not prevent it from keeping up with the times and participating in contemporary forums and the stirring dialogue of cultures.

This series of volumes on the manifold facets of Islamic culture is intended to acquaint a very wide public with such matters as: the theological bases of the faith and principles that constitute the bedrock of the overall structure; the status of the individual and of society in the Islamic world; the expansion of Islam since the Revelation: the Arab, Asian, African and European spheres espousing the new faith and the way in which the rights of converted peoples have been upheld; the vital contribution of Islamic civilization to the adventure of human knowledge in science and technology; the educational and cultural manifestations of Islamic civilization in literature, the visual arts and architecture; finally, Islam today between loyalty to its past and the inescapable conquest of modernity.

Cover:

Stucco (8th to 9th century),
Ibn Tulun Mosque, Cairo (Egypt)

92-3-100132-1



9 789231 001321