THE DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF ISLAMIC CULTURE

VOLUME SIX

*Islam
in the world
today*

Editors:
Abdulrahim Ali
Iba Der Thiam
Yusof A. Taleb

PART II
ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD TODAY

The different aspects of Islamic culture

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Note: dates separated by a slash (e.g. 212/827) are given first according to the Muslim lunar calendar (AH), and then according to the Christian/common era calendar (CE/AD).

PREFACE

The UNESCO Constitution states that 'ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples through which their differences have all too often broken into war.'

Since its creation seventy years ago, UNESCO's message has been that of highlighting the value of diversity, to build understanding and dialogue, while fighting discrimination and upholding human rights.

UNESCO's Histories project is a flagship to take forward this ambition. *The different aspects of Islamic culture* makes a seminal contribution to exploring the richness of Islamic civilization, and its immense contribution to the history of humanity. In 1976, the General Conference of UNESCO launched this vital work, which has since been carried out with equal passion and determination.

The scope of these volumes is broad. They document the theological foundations of Islam, the status of the individual and society in the Islamic world, the expansion of Islam and the way in which the rights of converted peoples were preserved, the fundamental contribution of Islam to education, science and technology, as well as the cultural achievements of Islamic civilization, through literature, philosophy, art and architecture.

These volumes show how, over centuries, Islam has been a driving force in the rapprochement of cultures, and provided a framework within which diverse cultures could flourish and interact. At a time when violent extremists seek to distort the message of religion, it is critical that we share the depth of wisdom of Islam as a religion of peace, moderation and tolerance.

In the Middle Ages, the influence of Islamic civilization was felt throughout the world. From the China Sea to the Atlantic coast of Africa, people who embraced Islam adopted a set of cultural and spiritual references while preserving their own identity. Muslim thinkers and scientists, drawing on

the rich heritage of Greece, developed their own worldviews and influenced the emergence of the European Renaissance. Muslim philosophers, geographers, physicists, mathematicians, botanists and doctors made influential contributions to the adventure of science. Averroës taught at the University of Padua in Italy, and knowledge travelled with no heed across borders. Islamic culture developed a conception of the individual and the universe, a philosophy of life and art that has profoundly shaped our common history and our societies as they stand today.

This creative diversity, anchored within universal spiritual and cultural references and values, offered fertile ground for the dynamic development of scientific knowledge, artistic refinement and intellectual exchange that marked all great Islamic civilizations.

I wish to thank the eminent scholars from all over the world who have contributed to this Collection and guaranteed its high scientific standards. It is my hope that this Collection, which is now completed with the publication of volume VI, will encourage a more informed understanding of Islam, its culture, values and civilization, and promote further intercultural dialogue and the rapprochement of cultures. I am also determined that the in-depth knowledge presented in these volumes reach a wide audience, so that that young generations take pride and draw lessons from this heritage, in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding.

Irina Bokova
Director-General of UNESCO

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Chapter 4.1

RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS OF LAW

Khalifa Babikr al-Ḥassan

INTRODUCTION

Madhāhib (schools) is the plural of *madhhab* (school), and a school in its general meaning is a collection of scientific and philosophical ideas, opinions and views which are so interlinked that they form a harmonious whole.[1] In its technical sense – and this is what is required here due to its connection to jurisprudence – a school is that which an imam, a Muslim *faqīh* and a *mujtahid* (such as Abū Ḥanīfa, Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī or Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal), believes in (*dhahaba ilayhi*) and sanctions. In this way are formed the eight schools which include the four schools of the Imāmī Shīʿis, the Zaydīs, the Ibāḍīs and the Ẓāhirīs. A school has laws which are arrived at by inference and deduction from the 'roots' (*uṣūl*), or established principles underlying Islamic law (*al-Sharīʿa*), these roots being the Qurʾān, the *Sunna* (the practice of the Prophet Muḥammad), *ijmāʿ* (consensus of opinion) and the various methods of *ijtihād* (the exercise of independent reasoning), as will be explained in detail below.[2]

In other words, the schools of law represent the methods, orientations and procedures of those Imams in their legislation, their production of *fatwās* (legal opinions or rulings issued by an Islamic scholar), judicial rulings and jurisprudence in general. From these a body of laws is arrived at, which controls the lives of Muslims and organizes their society, whether in their relationship with their Creator or with each other, or their relations with non-Muslims in the wider human society. Muslims generally follow the imams in this body of laws and adhere to their opinions. Thus, there also appeared

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1. *al-Muʿjam al-wajīz*, entry '*dhahaba*'.
2. ʿUmar al-Jayyidī, *Muḥāḍarāt fī tārīkh al-madhhab al-Mālikī fī-l-gharb al-islāmī* [Lectures on the History of The Mālikī School in the Islamic West], Rabāṭ, Maktabat Dār al-Amān, n.d., p. 7.

schools and 'paths' (*ṭarīqa*) of those who imitated the imams. All those who follow a school are described in terms of their particular school, so we say such and such is a Ḥanafī, a Mālikī, a Shāfiʿī and so on. We also ascribe the name of the school to its master, for example saying the school of Abū Ḥanīfa or the school of Mālik, or the Shāfiʿī school or the Ḥanbalī school.

Aside from this, later fuqahāʾ link the term 'school' (*madhhab*) with a *fatwā* which issued from it. So we say 'the school of such and such an issue', meaning the foundation from which the *fatwā* arises. It is obvious that this latter usage is derived from the first meaning and is based upon it. It is to designate a thing by its most important part, since a *fatwā* is the most important part of a school as far as those who adhere to it are concerned.[3]

After these introductory definitions of the term 'school of law' (*madhhab fiqhī*) we will now deal with the schools in the contemporary Islamic world under three headings:

1) formation and development of the schools of law from the perspectives of time and subject matter;
2) geographical map of the schools of law in the contemporary Islamic world;
3) the influence of the schools of law on local regulations in the Islamic world and the role they played in the formation of contemporary law in non-Muslim countries.

The formation and development of the Schools of Law from the perspectives of time and subject matter

THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCHOOLS OF LAW FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF TIME

It is perhaps simplistic to say that no discussion of the formation of the schools of law can take place without mention of the basic elements which gave rise to Islamic *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) in general. These are the legal injunctions contained in the Qurʾān and the *Sunna*. This is because *fiqh* consists of nothing but deductions and inferences derived from these two sources, regardless of whether these are based on a text which requires explanation and elucidation or not. The need of *fiqh* for a text is clear since texts represent the actual subject matter concerning which explanation and clarification take place. This deduction and inference can only be achieved on the basis of an authority, an organized set of interrelated ideas and principles, and firm foundations. These are indisputably present in the texts of the Qurʾān and the *Sunna*.

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3. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

Thus, this study will trace the creation of the schools of law back to the principal developments which facilitated this. This will take place by dealing with the following points.

1. Islamic legislation began with Muḥammad's first calling as Prophet and continued for twenty-three years, this being the length of time that he lived after this until his departure to the High Companion. This era can be divided into two distinct periods. The first period, of thirteen years, was from the time when the Prophet lived in Mecca until his emigration to Medina. The first three years of this was between his receiving the first revelation in the cave of Ḥirāʾ until the resumption of revelations when they began to follow in succession.

At this time the revelations focused on summoning people to acknowledge the unity of God and to reject those false beliefs which are incompatible with the Islamic faith which is based on belief in God Alone and in His existence and attributes, the confirmation of His sending of the prophets and the divine books which preceded Islam, belief in the angels, the Day of Judgment, Heaven with all the blessings that God has prepared for those who do good in this world, and Hell with its torture that God has prepared for those who do evil. This is in addition to summoning people to acquire good morals, implanting high ideals in the human soul represented by justice and equality, keeping promises, doing good deeds, assisting one another to be pious and god-fearing, not coming together to engage in injustice, tyranny and aggression, and much besides.

During this period the Prophet did not lay down any laws directly relating to human actions apart from prayer and the ritual purity connected to it. The revelations also prohibited those grave offences which undermined society at that time such as burying daughters alive, killing children through fear of poverty, making votive offerings and sacrifices to idols and eating that over which God's name has not been pronounced.[4]

2. Legislation began during the Medinan period. This lasted ten years and extends from the emigration of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina until his passing away. He began to lay down laws after the faith had become rooted in his soul and the people were imbued with the morals of Islam. Law-making occurred in this period because it is a form of organization and this can only arise when there is a fundamental authority, that is, the authority of the Islamic faith along with the proofs and certainties which it entails. Thus, legislation was completed regarding worship, the family, arrangements for inheritance, and penalties were defined along with the basic principles governing business transactions and the proprieties of social life.[5]

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4. Ḥasan al-Shādhilī, *al-Madkhal fi-l-fiqh al-islāmī* [Introduction to Islamic Fiqh], Cairo, Dār al-Saʿāda, n.d., p. 34.

5. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Thaʿlabī, *al-Fikr al-islāmī fī tārīkh al-fiqh al-islāmī* [Islamic thought in the History of Islamic Fiqh], ed. Ayman Ṣāliḥ Shaʿbān, Beirut, Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, n.d., I, p. 74.

In sum, during the first two periods Islamic legislation had no source except the revelations recorded in the Qurʾān and the *Sunna*. The Qurʾān lays down the foundations and sets forth in detail that which requires further explanation, while the *Sunna* provides further illustration by elucidating what the *Qurʾān* says, particularizing and qualifying it, or eliciting laws for certain issues and legal cases which the Qurʾān does not specifically address. In the period of revelations, however, whether in Mecca or Medina, we notice that despite the reliance of legislation on stipulations delivered by revelation and its texts, the Prophet nonetheless exercised his own personal judgement (*ijtihād*) in some situations which required it. Regarding this, the scholars have decided on the permissibility of the Prophet using his intellect for *ijtihād* and his putting the conclusions into effect.[6] He also used to order his judges and governors in the various regions to act according to this *ijtihād* (whether exercised by him or his Companions), on the assurance that it was in accordance with revelation which traces it to sound opinion whenever this is needed. Thus, this period was dependent on revelation and its texts. The use of *ijtihād* by the Prophet and his Companions was clear proof of its legitimacy and that of the exercise of personal opinion as working and effective principles, both based on revelation and the connection between reasoning, rationality and Islamic traditions.

3. The *ijtihād* practised by the Prophet influenced the Companions and encouraged them to make practical use of it after he passed away. Indeed, they were tested with many momentous events due to the expansion of the Islamic state and its numerous conquests, in Sham (Greater Syria), Iraq, Persia and elsewhere on which God bestowed the light and justice of Islam. This was in accord with the nature of these conquests which were not invasions with the aim of looting and plunder but rather benevolent humanitarian conquests whose aim was to spread knowledge of the Islamic religion. Because of this the conquests were always accompanied by explanation, elucidation and clarification of the principles of Islamic teachings, so as to help the people deal with the events, issues and debates which they experienced and which were part of their lives.

Whatever the case, the Companions were disposed towards *ijtihād* because while the sources of Islamic law, the Qurʾān and the *Sunna*, had laid down

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6. On this, see Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī, *al-Mustaṣfā fī ʿilm al-uṣūl* [The Essential of the Science of the Roots], II, p. 356; Muḥammad b. Ismāʿil al-Bukhārī, *Kashf al-asrār ʿan uṣūl Fakhr al-Islām al-Bazdawī* [The Revealing of Secrets of the *Uṣūl* of Fakhr al-Islam al Bazdawī], n.d., III, p. 206; Taqiyy al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Ibn al-Najjār, *Sharḥ al-kawkab al-munīr* [Explanation of the Radiant Star], Riyadh, Maktabat al-ʿUbaykān, 1993, IV, p. 474; Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, *al-Baḥr al-muḥīṭ fī uṣūl al-fiqh* [The Encircling Sea on the Roots of Jurisprudence], n.d., VIII, p. 247; Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Shawkānī, *Irshād al-fuḥūl* [Guidance of the Masters], Cairo, Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1937, II, p. 313.

the immutable universal foundations, the general rules and the established truths, these sources also indicated the variables and their nature and how they were open to individual judgement and opinion and made it clear that in the absence of a text one should resort to *ijtihād* using personal opinion within the confines of the aims and aspirations of Islamic law. These sources gave the Companions the key to *ijtihād* by inviting and encouraging them to practise it during the time of the Prophet. Indeed, this had already been pointed out: 'If they had referred it to the Prophet or to those charged with authority among them, the proper investigators would have understood it from them.'[7] The Companions frequently practised *ijtihād* but it is difficult to discern the details of the process because on the one hand it was so commonly practised, and on the other because of the limited scope of the traditions (*Ḥadīth*) describing it. Although we cannot do this, this does not mean that we may ignore a very important matter when dealing with the schools of law, and that is that their first seed was planted by the *ijtihād* of the Companions. This is because when the Companions used *ijtihād* they produced different results in some situations due to variations in people's natural dispositions and the fact that some of them were aware of the Prophet's traditions (*Ḥadīth*) while others were not because they had not been told them, or because they had no confidence in some of the traditions. This is in addition to disparities in the way they understood the source texts.[8]

These differences between the Companions, albeit few in number since not many legal cases arose at that time, were passed on to the Successors who studied under them. To these differences the Successors added the results of their own *ijtihād* and opinions in response to the particular circumstances of their time and place, the requirements and nature of their environment and their dissimilar mentalities. This resulted in yet more differences between the groups of Successors.

4. In the midst of these differences and variations the schools of law began to arise when the Successors became divided into the *ahl al-ḥadīth* (those who gave pre-eminence to traditions or *Ḥadīth*), in the Hijaz (*Ḥijāz*), and the *ahl al-raʾy* (those who gave pre-eminence to personal opinion), in Iraq.

From the exercise of *ijtihād* by the *ahl al-ḥadīth* emerged the Mālikī school of law whose Imam was Mālik b. Anas (d. 179/796), the Shāfiʿī school whose imam was Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820) and the Ḥanbalī school whose imam was Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 249/855). From the exercise of *ijtihād*

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7. Qurʾān, IV:83.
8. Muṣṭafā al-Khinn, *Athar al-ikhtilāf fi-l-qawāʿid al-uṣūliyya fī ikhtilāf al-fuqahāʾ* [The Effect of Disparities in the Bases of the Roots on the Differences between the *Fuqahāʾ*], n.p., Muʾassast al-Risāla, 1402/1982, pp. 35ff.; Muḥammad al-Khuḍarī, *Tārīkh al-tashrīʿ al-islāmī* [The History of Islamic Legistation], n.d., n.p.

by the *ahl al-raʾy* emerged the Ḥanafī school of law whose great Imam was Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767).

Other schools also emerged from the methods of the *ahl al-ḥadīth* but they were not destined to continue and subsequently disappeared. These include the school of al-āWzāʿī (d. 157/774), that of Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778), of Sufyān b. ʿUyayna (d. 198/815), of Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī (d. 270/883), of al-Layth b. Saʿd the *faqīh* of Egypt (d. 175/791) and who perhaps developed an independent methodology, and the school of Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) who also developed an independent method of exercising his *ijtihād*. These schools did not last long before dying out. Thus, the Āwzāʿī school disappeared in the second/eighth century in around 170/786, the ʿUyayna school came to an end shortly after its arrival, the school of al-Ṭabarī disappeared in the fourth/tenth century, and the school of Sufyān al-Thawrī disappeared in the third/ninth century. As for Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī, his followers increased in number and his school spread to Baghdad, Persia, Africa and al-Andalus. It came to an end, however, in the sixth/twelfth century.

Although these schools subsequently died out, their Imams produced *fatwās* and legal rulings which are mentioned in the 'books of differences' (*kutub al-khilāf*), such as al-Āwzāʿī whose legal opinions are often referred to in these works as are those of Ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, the author of *Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī* (The Explanation [of the Qurʾān] of al-Ṭabarī) and the famous universal history known as the *Tārīkh al-Ṭabarī* (The History of al-Ṭabarī). In the field of jurisprudence, the 'books of differences' refer to a book by al-Ṭabarī called *Ikhtilāf al-fuqahāʾ* (The Differences between the *Jurists*).

In short, after the fourth/tenth century there were only four schools of law remaining in the Islamic world. These were the Ḥanafī, the Mālikī, the Shāfiʿī and the Ḥanbalī, all of which were followed by Sunnis.[9]

The reason we have referred to the Ẓāhirī school, which is included among the eight schools of law, is because this school, even though it was not accepted by the majority of *fuqahāʾ* and no longer has any followers, nevertheless produced a form of jurisprudence which is described in the books of Ibn Ḥazm. These are encyclopaedic works such as *Kitāb al-Muḥallā fī-l-Fiqh* (The Book Ornamented with Traditions/ The adorned Treatise in jurisprudence) and *al-Iḥkām fī uṣūl al-aḥkām* (Rules on the Roots of Law) on legal theory. He also produced many other writings on jurisprudence and its methodological foundations.

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9. Al-Jayyidī, *Muḥādarāt …*, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

5. Alongside these Sunni schools of law there were the Shīʿi schools of the Imāmīs,[10] the Zaydīs[11] and the Ibāḍīs[12] which can be called non-Sunni schools.

THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCHOOLS OF LAW FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SUBJECT MATTER

The development of the subject matter of the schools of law revolves around two other developments. The first is that of the 'branches' (furūʿ) of fiqh or the actual details of the law, while the second is that of the principles underlying the law, the 'roots' (uṣūl), and the methodology. These two are interrelated and together explain the growth of the schools of law.

Regarding the development of the branches (furūʿ), these owe their origin to the fact that shortly after the establishment of the schools in the

10. See Aḥmad Ibrāhīm, Tārīkh al-tashrīʿ al-islāmī [The History of Islamic Legistation], Cairo, Maktabat al-Thaqāfa al-Dīniyya, 1422/2001, p. 32.

11. Another Shīʿi sect is the Ismāʿīliyya who transferred the Imamate after Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq to his son Ismāʿīl. Today there are two branches of the Ismāʿīliyya: one which follows the well known Agha Khan and the second which is called the Bohra. Both of these are found in India and their followers perhaps number more than four million.

12. The Ibāḍiyya arose immediately after what is known as the Great Upheaval (al-fitna al-kubrā) in Muslim history. This was a time when some Muslims rebelled against the caliph ʿUthmān because he was favouring his relatives of the Banū Umayya, appointing them to official positions and asking them for advice and counsel. The rebels surrounded ʿUthmān and killed him. Following this, ʿAlī succeeded as caliph with many Companions giving him their oath of allegiance. Some, however, were not happy with the appointment including Ṭalḥa b. ʿUbaydullāh, al-Zubayr b. al-ʿAwwām, Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān and the Prophet's wife ʿĀʾisha. These formed an opposing front to ʿAlī and tried to depose him demanding revenge for the blood of ʿUthmān. Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr made their way to Iraq where the Battle of the Camel took place. This was between ʿAlī's army on the one hand, and the Banū Umayya, ʿĀʾisha, Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr. It was followed by the Battle of Ṣiffīn in which ʿAlī faced Muʿāwiya and his army. When Muʿāwiya sensed defeat his troops raised copies of the Qurʾān asking for arbitration. There were differences of opinion on this among ʿAlī's followers with one group accepting arbitration and the other rejecting it. Those who agreed to arbitration forced ʿAlī to accept it and he announced his reluctant consent so as to save lives. He choose Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī to be his representative while Muʿāwiya choose ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ. The arbitration ended with ʿAlī being deposed. This led to divisions within ʿAlī's camp with one group being happy with the arbitration and another rejecting it. The former rebelled against him considering him to have betrayed their trust in him. These were called the Khārijīs while those who continued to champion ʿAlī were called the Shīʿis. From this point Muslims became divided into three sects: the Khārijī's, the Shīʿis and majority of Muslims. For more details on this see Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Hādī al-Sarrāj and Khalīfa Bābikr al-Ḥasan, Tārīkh al-tashrīʿ al-islāmī wa-maṣādiruhu [The History of Islamic Legislation and its Sources], al-ʿAīn, Jamiʿat al-Imārāt al-ʿArabiyya al-Muttaḥida, n.d., pp. 107, 108.

countries and regions to which they spread, their teachings and *fatwās* were formulated in response to the environment and were affected by it. They were also influenced by the *fuqahāʾs* contributions, opinions and evaluations.

The possibilities and potential for development lay within the particular nature of each school. For example, concerning the Ḥanafī school of law, the oldest of the schools, its Imām Abū Ḥanīfa was distinguished by two characteristics which rendered his school capable of development. The first is that he was a practical *faqīh* with experience of life and people. Indeed, his biography reveals that at the beginning of his life he worked as a merchant, went into the markets and mixed with people. He was dissatisfied with the current ways of doing business and his dealings with the other merchants.[13] The second is that when Abū Ḥanīfa began to study he did not turn immediately to *fiqh* and law, but rather began his academic life by studying scholastic theology (*kalām*) and so became acquainted with theology and its fundamentals. This enabled him to be precise in his thinking and gave him a deep understanding (*fiqh*) of his faith, which is the greatest understanding (*fiqh*), as he himself said in the title to one of his books on religion. This training also gave him a theoretical frame of mind which helped him to achieve certainty in his legal enquiries. Although Abū Ḥanīfa did not persevere in his study of religion he acquired a working knowledge of it and then left it and turned his attention to *fiqh*.[14]

Due to Abū Ḥanīfa's upbringing in Kufa (*al-Kūfa*) the school of law under whose shaykhs he studied was a school of the *ahl al-raʾy*. He acquired the teachings and jurisprudence of this school directly from his teacher Shaykh Ḥammād ibn Abī Sulaymān (d. 120/737) who in turn received his knowledge from Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī (d 96/715) who studied under ʿAlqama ibn Qays al-Nakhaʿī (d. 62/682) who studied under Ibn Masʿūd, one of the Companions of the Prophet.[15] With this chain of transmission, the knowledge of Abū Ḥanīfa was connected with that of the Prophet, the Messenger who explains, who elucidates what is in the Holy Qurʾān and the maker of numerous laws on certain issues guided by the established truths and general concepts contained in the Qurʾān. Abū Ḥanīfa also received knowledge from members of the family of the Prophet Muḥammad (*ahl al-bayt*). Thus, he was a student of ʿAlī Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn, Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq and Abū Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya. In this way, the *fiqh* and *Ḥadīth*

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13. Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, *Tārīkh Baghdad* [The History of Baghdad], n.p., n.d., VI, p. 394; Ḥāfiz al-Dīn al-Kardarī, *Manāqib Abī Ḥanīfa* [The Virtues of Abū Ḥanīfa], n.p., n.d., V, p. 13; Aḥmad al-Naqīb, *al-Madhhab al-Ḥanafī: marāḥiluhu wa-tabaqātuhu wa-muṣṭalaḥātuhu wa-khaṣāʾiṣuhu wa-muʾallafātuhu* [The Ḥanafī School of Law: its Stages, Generations of Scholars, Terminology, Particular Characteristics and Writings], Riyadh, Maktabat al-Rushud, 1422/2001, I, p. 47.

14. Al-Naqīb, *op. cit.*, I, p. 47.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

IV–1.1   The tomb of Banu Amine (1886–1983), the renowned Islamic jurisprudent and theologian from Iran and one of the most outstanding female theologians of the twentieth century
© Municipality of Isfahan, Islamic Republic of Iran

of Kufa became perfected in his mind since ʿAlī, from whom the Kufans had learnt, had also settled in Kufa. The particular scholarly approach acquired from ʿAlī is reflected in Abū Ḥanīfa's books – mostly concerned with religion – which the Imam had first studied such as *al-Radd ʿala-l-Qadariyya* (Refutation of the Qadarīs) and *al-Fiqh al-akbar* (The Greatest Fiqh). Matters of legal significance are, however, found in the prophetic traditions which he transmitted and which were collected by his students Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan in their book *al-Āthār* (Traditions).[16]

The first stages of the development of subject matter are found in Abū Ḥanīfa's students whom he taught, instructed and prepared. It is stated than in preparing these students he followed a method which gave them much freedom. Thus, in his lessons he would present them with a legal problem to debate. Then, when they had formulated an opinion about it he would dictate it to them, or one of his students would record it. Sometimes, however, there would still be disagreement between the Imam and his students and in this case the opinion would be recorded along with the nature of the

16. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

dispute. In this way Abū Ḥanīfa encouraged his students to be independent in their research and points of view. He also gave them the opportunity to be independent and individual in their practice of *ijtihād* and they became *mujtahids* within the Ḥanafī school. The foremost of Abū Ḥanīfa's students was Abū Yūsuf Yaʿqūb b. Ibrāhīm al-Anṣārī (d. 183/798). This Ḥanafī *faqīh* who studied directly under Abū Ḥanīfa served on the judiciary for many years during the ʿAbbāsid period and was the chief judge (*qāḍī al-quḍāt*) under the caliphs al-Mahdī, al-Hādī and Hārūn ar-Rashīd. This appointment clearly had consequences for the spread of the Ḥanafī school, since those who became judges during his time were all from this school.[17]

Abū Yūsuf led the Ḥanafī school in a practical direction which was in conformity with the nature of the school. Thus, he wrote *al-Kharāj* (Land Tax) for the ʿAbbāsids, which describes the sources of income of the Islamic state. He also wrote *Ikhtilāfāt Abī Ḥanīfa maʿa Ibn Abī Laylā* (The Disagreements between Abu Hanifa and Ibn Abi Layla) Ibn Abī Laylā being a contemporary *faqīh* and a rival of Abū Ḥanīfa although not the founder of a school. Abū Yūsuf also wrote a book on bequests, one of the practical issues connected with judgeship. He showed his interest in the differences in legal thought between the various major Muslim centres in his *Ikhtilāf al-amṣār* (Disagreements between the Major Centres). He also wrote a book on the refutation of Mālik b. Anas. It is worth noting here that while Abū Yūsuf studied under Abū Ḥanīfa, he also studied under those who give pre-eminence to *Ḥadīth* (*ahl al-ḥadīth*). Thus, he travelled to Imām Mālik and received from him the *Ḥadīth* of the people of Medina. In such a way he brought together the people of Iraq and the people of the Hijaz and also informed the Ḥanafī school of the *Ḥadīth* he had received from the Hijazīs.[18]

Abū Yūsuf was followed by another of Abū Ḥanīfa's students, the Imām Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/805) who, like Abū Yūsuf, learnt under Mālik studying his *al-Muwaṭṭaʾ* (The Well-trodden Path). He also had contacts with Imām al-Shāfiʿī in Baghdad and debated with him. Al-Shaybānī is the author of the six books *Ẓāhirat al-Riwāya* (The External Aspects of Narration) which represent the main writings of the Ḥanafī school. Other students of Abū Ḥanīfa were Zafar b. al-Hudhayl (d. 158/774–5) and al-Ḥasan b. al-Luʾluʾī (d. 204/819).

The development of the subject matter of this school continued in this direction and the *fuqahāʾ* who came later worked to explain what was contained in al-Shaybānī's books. They also extracted from these works the foundations and principles which helped them collect his solutions and to

17. al-Sarrāj, *Tārīkh al-Tashrīʿ* …, *op. cit.*, I, p. 94.
18. al-Kardarī, *Manāqib Abī Ḥanīfa, op. cit.*, I, pp. 106 f.

organize them. Likewise, they prioritized the different opinions of the school. Most importantly, however, they used solutions to the legal problems of their time in their *fatwas* and judicial decisions. These *fatwas* were collected into books such as *al-Fatāwā al-bazzāziyya* (The *Fatwas* of al-Bazzāz) attributed to al-Bazzāz al-Kurdī (d. 827/1424), *al-Fatāwā al-khayriyya* (The *Fatwas* of Khayr) attributed to Khayru-l-Dīn al-Ramlī (d. 1081/1671) and many others which receive mention.[19]

In this way the school's subject matter developed until its *fiqh* was codified under the Ottoman State in *Majallat al-Aḥkām al-ʿAdliyya* (Codification of [Ḥanafī] Jurisprudence) in 1293/1876 and other modern codes which will be dealt with subsequently.

Such was the case with the development of subject matter as concerns the branches of *fiqh*. As for the development of the 'roots' (*uṣūl*), this takes as its starting point the sources which Abū Ḥanīfa himself established for his school, that is, the Qurʾān, the *Sunna* concentrating on the true (*ṣaḥīḥ*) traditions it contains, and *ijmāʿ* or consensus of opinion. As for the Companions, he took whatever he wanted from their statements but he did not rely on the testimony of anyone other than them.

The followers and students of Abū Ḥanīfa strove to organize these sources according to the methods adopted by the first school in which the Imam studied; that is, the school of Iraq, the 'school' of personal opinion (*raʾy*). Thus, they stipulated many conditions before prophetic *Ḥadīth* could be accepted including that it should not conflict with *qiyās* (deduction by analogy) whenever the transmitter was not a *faqīh*. They also discussed *qiyās* at length, studied the reasons for legal rulings, and *istiḥsān* (juristic preference) which is an exception from the general rules of legal theory to deal with the vicissitudes and necessities of everyday life. Moreover, they allowed themselves to prescribe laws for cases which were merely expected to occur, which in Islamic jurisprudence is called *farḍ*. All of this demonstrates the fertility of the school and its comprehensive view of the affairs of life.[20]

One aspect of the development of subject matter was the extraction and systemization of the 'roots' (*uṣūl*) from the 'branches' (*furūʿ*) which they received from their imams. Among the well known books on this are *Uṣūl al-Sarakhasī* (The *Uṣūl* of al-Sarakhsī), *Uṣūl al-Jaṣṣāṣ* (The *Uṣūl* of al-Jaṣṣāṣ) and *Uṣūl Fahkr al-Islām al-Bazdawī* (The *Uṣūl* of Fahkru-l-Islām al-Bazdawī) along with the numerous commentaries which accompanied them.[21]

The second school of law is that of the Imām Mālik who took his jurisprudence (*fiqh*) from the people of the Hijaz, as has already been

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19. al-Shādhilī, *al-Madkhal* …, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

20. Al-Sarrāj, *Tārikh al-Tashrīʿ* …, *op. cit.*, p. 138; al-Shādhilī, *al-Madkhal* …, *op. cit.*, p. 396.

21. ʿAbdu-l-Wahhāb Khallāf, *ʿIlm uṣūl al-fiqh* [The Science of *Uṣūl al-fiqh*], n.p., Dār al-Qalam, 1988, p. 22.

mentioned. He was a student of Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī (d. 124/741–2), Abu-l-Zunnād ʿAbdullāh b. Dhakwān (d. 130/747), Rabīʿa b. Abī ʿAbdu-l-Raḥmān known as Rabīʿa al-Raʾy (d. 136/753) and Yaḥyā b. Saʿd al-Anṣārī (d. 143/760). The one who had the greatest influence on him as regards *fiqh* and the exercise of personal opinion (*raʾy*), however, was Rabīʿa al-Raʾy. All these learnt from the eight *fuqahāʾ* in Medina, and the eight *fuqahāʾ* took their knowledge from ʿAbdullāh b. ʿUmar, ʿĀʾisha, ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb and Zayd b. Thābit, while these latter learnt from the First Teacher, the Messenger of God.[22]

Due to this chain of knowledge acquisition, the legal theory of Imām Mālik utilized a combination of traditions and personal opinion (*raʾy*). It was traditions, however, which were paramount and the exercise of personal opinion was always circumscribed by them, as he himself said: '*raʾy*, what is *raʾy*?' Thus, he based himself on the customary practice and the *ijtihād* of the people of Medina and took that transmitted practice into account when comparing traditions with only one narrator (*akhbār al-āḥād*). What enabled this school to grow and subsequently become established was Imam Mālik's dedication to his *fiqh*, not to mention his achieving a balance between *raʾy* and *Ḥadīth*. Thus, he used to hold classes devoted to *Ḥadīth* for his students, and other classes devoted to *fiqh* and legal issues. Similarly, his presence in Medina made it possible for people to come to him from North Africa and Egypt and receive *fiqh* and traditions from him. In this way the number of his students increased and his school spread. As is well known, Mālik wrote *al-Muwaṭṭaʾ* which is a combination of *fiqh* as represented by his personal legal opinions and the customary practice of the people of Medina, as well as his preferences in matters over which there was disagreement, and traditions from the Prophet. Since Mālik lived in Medina, the Medinan school arose out of his school and showed a preference for prophetic tradition.

The Iraqi school originated in Basra at the hands of Mālik's students who lived in Iraq. This school is close to that of Medina except that the influence of the environment in Iraq gave it a strong propensity to rely on *raʾy* such that its analysis of legal issues, its inferences from the established 'roots' (*uṣūl*) and its approach to problems of law took place by discussion and according to the methods of those who upheld the superiority of reasoning and interpretation.[23]

The Egyptian school of law was led by Ibn al-Qāsim whose legal opinions Saḥnūn recorded in his *al-Mudawwana* (The Compendium). This school adopted the procedure of the Medinan school in that it relied on the

22. Khalīfa Bābikr al-Ḥasan, *al-Ijtihād bi-l-raʾy fī madrasat al-Ḥijāz al-fiqhiyya* [Ijtihād by Personal Opinion in the Law School of the Hijaz], Cairo, Maktabat al-Zahrāʾ, n.d., p. 209.
23. Ibrāhīm Muḥammad ʿAlī, *Iṣṭilāḥ al-madhhab ʿinda-l-Mālikiyya* [The Term 'Madhhab' according to the Mālikī School], Dubay, Dār al-Buḥūth wa-Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth, n.d., p. 67.

customary practice of the people of Medina alongside *Ḥadīth*. This was also the prevailing method of the Mālikī school.[24]

In its widest meaning the Maghribī school, which includes the school of Qairouan (Qayruwān), took the same course as the school of Medina in that it adhered to traditions. This is due to the close contact with the Medinan school maintained by Muslims from the Maghreb undertaking the pilgrimage (*ḥajj*), by letters exchanged between them and interest in the *Muwaṭṭaʾ*. Likewise, the fact that the two schools were of a similar old age gave the Maghribī school a strong link with that of Medina. The Maghribī school also includes the Qarawī school which used to focus on studying the legal terms used in books, elucidating what the chapters contain, authenticating traditions, examining preferable variant legal rulings (*iḥtimālāt*), indicating defects found in traditions quoted in the books, determining the style of traditions and vocalizing the texts according to accepted usage.[25]

These first Mālikī schools helped with the development of the subject matter of the Mālikī school in the subsequent period. Later scholars devoted themselves to verifying the various kinds of traditions used as a basis for the *Muwaṭṭaʾ* and the *Mudawwana,* both of which belong to the foundational stage. They were also concerned to examine grammar so as to accord preference to one or other of the traditions (*tarjīḥ*) and their methods of research and writing increased in scope. Thus appeared books of documents, conditions (*shurūṭ*) and incidents, that is, customary practice, along with *fatwas*, legal cases and the bases of law. The school continued to develop until Mālikī jurisprudence was eventually codified by Khalīl b. Isḥāq al-Miṣrī in his well known book *al-Mukhtaṣar* (Compendium).[26]

As for the development of the roots of law (*uṣūl*) of this school, the extent of its legal understanding and the fertility of its branches (*furūʿ*) were reflected in the wide range of its roots, to the point where some scholars identified 500 of them. It seems that they understood 'roots' in the sense of rules, since the actual roots are the Qurʾān, the *Sunna, ijmāʿ, qiyās*, the customary practice of the people of Medina, the statements of the Companions, *istiḥsān*, compliance with custom (*ʿurf*), *sadd al-dharāʾiʿ* (forbidding what might lead to an unlawful act), *istiṣḥāb* (the consideration of circumstances in the process of adducing a legal argument) and *murāʿāt al-khilāf* (the recognition of disagreements among jurists).[27] These are flexible and comprehensive roots and methods and they reveal the moderate and balanced nature of this school.

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24. *Ibid.,* p. 72.
25. *Ibid.,* p. 74.
26. *Ibid.,* pp. 208f.
27. Muḥammad al-Rūkī, *al-Maghrib Mālikī limādhā?* [why is Morocco Mālikī?], Morocco, Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-l-Shuʾūn al-Islāmiyya, 2003, p. 39.

As for the third school of law, that is, the school of Imām al-Shāfiʿī, it owes its origins to al-Shāfiʿī who laid down his principles or 'roots' (*uṣūl*) before developing his jurisprudence (*fiqh*). Indeed, he is well known for writing about his *uṣūl* in his *Risāla* (Epistle). Al-Shāfiʿī dealt with *uṣūl* before *fiqh* because he came after the *ahl al-raʾy* who gave pre-eminence to personal opinion and the *ahl al-ḥadīth* who gave pre-eminence to traditions, and he was aware of their methodologies through his reading of Imām Mālik's *Muwaṭṭaʾ*. He also met with Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī, the celebrated companion of Abū Ḥanīfa, transmitted his books and disputed with him. He used to support the *ahl al-raʾy* in some instances and support the *ahl al-ḥadīth* in others. He laid down his 'roots' (*uṣūl*) and methodology in the way that he viewed them. Al-Shāfiʿī is also distinguished by his character which was formed through the numerous journeys he made and his travels between Egypt, Baghdad and the Hijaz. He was also eloquent in both poetry and prose.[28]

In terms of the branches of law (*furūʿ*) of the school, these were developed by the students of al-Shāfiʿī such as al-Buwayṭī (d. 231/845), al-Maznī (d. 264/877) and al-Rabīʿ al-Murādī (d. 270/883). The school continued to develop, and later scholars recorded the foundations of their jurisprudence and produced works within the genre 'similarities and correspondences' (*al-ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir*). They also produced *fatwas* which they collected in books such as *al-Fatāwā al-kubrā* (The Great Compilation of *Fatwās*) by Ibn Ḥajar al-Haythamī (d. 974/1566). Likewise, they wrote works examining the legal opinions of the school. Well known for this are Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Nawawī (d. 631/1233), Taqiyy al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 756/1355) and Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī (d. 926/1520).[29]

Thus did the school develop in terms of *fiqh*. As regards the roots of law, the *uṣūl*, it was al-Shāfiʿī himself who laid down the science of the roots. These are the Qurʾān, the *Sunna*, *ijmāʿ*, or the consensus of opinion, concerning which he stipulated particular conditions, and *qiyās* or reasoning from analogy. In general, his roots were limited in number because he took no account of the customary practice of the Medinans which the Mālikīs used. Indeed, he disputed with the latter on that point. Nor did he use *istiḥsān* (juristic preference) which was part of Ḥanafī methodology. As for *al-maṣāliḥ al-mursala* (considerations of public interest), he included this under *qiyās*. He made no conditions on the acceptance of traditions transmitted by only one narrator (*akhbār al-āḥād*) as did the Ḥanafīs and the Mālikīs. Al-Shāfiʿī is the author of the well known *Kitāb al-Umm* (The Exemplar) dealing with *fiqh*.[30]

The fourth school is that of the Ḥanbalīs whose founder was Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal. He was a transmitter and recorder of traditions who devoted himself

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28. Al-Khuḍarī, *Tārīkh al-tashrīʿ* …, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

29. Al-Shādhilī, *al-Madkhal* …, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

30. *Ibid.*, pp. 460, 461.

to studying the *Sunna*. Indeed, he committed much of it to memory and thus became the greatest *Ḥadīth* scholar of his age. He travelled to numerous countries searching for traditions and was instructed in legal thought by Imām al-Shāfiʿī in Baghdad. Ibn Ḥanbal was a *faqīh* who resorted to *Ḥadīth* and was characterized by his strong opinions. One such was his stance regarding the created nature of the Qurʾān during the *miḥna* (inquisition under the ʿAbbāsids) when he was tortured, beaten and imprisoned due to his assertion that the Qurʾān was not created, in contradistinction to the Muʿtazilīs who maintained that it was. His roots of law were the Qurʾān, the *Sunna*, *ijmāʿ* and the *fatwās* produced by the Companions. Since he was a member of the *ahl al-ḥadīth* who considered traditions to have overriding authority he would depend on traditions whose chains of transmission were incomplete (*mursal*) and those considered 'weak' (*ḍaʿīf*). As for *qiyās*, he only employed this when necessary.[31]

Al-Shāfiʿī's followers, and especially those who came later such as Ibn al-Qayyim and Ibn Taymiyya, made much use of *al-maṣāliḥ al-mursala* (considerations of public interest) and *sadd al-dharāʾiʿ* (forbidding what might lead to an unlawful act) in their legal theory and thus widened the concept of *qiyās* in the school.

It now remains to discuss the development of the non-Sunni schools of law which are as follows.

(a) The Zaydī school. It traces its origins to Imām Zayd b. ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 122/740). He had a favourable scholarly upbringing and memorized the Qurʾān from an early age. He learnt the sciences of *Ḥadīth* from members of the Prophet's family (*ahl al-bayt*), but also transmitted traditions from others. He also had a knowledge of theology.[32]

The *uṣūl* established by Zayd b. ʿAlī are no different from those recognized by the Sunnis. Thus, he made use of the Qurʾān, the *Sunna*, *ijmāʿ*, *qiyās*, *istiḥsān* and *al-maṣāliḥ al-mursala*.[33] The Zaydī school of law is the closest of the Shīʿi schools to those of the Sunnis, especially to the *fiqh* of Abū Ḥanīfa, and in general it only diverges from the Sunnis regarding certain legal issues such as the impermissibility of not washing the feet when ritual ablutions are being made (*masaḥ ʿalā al-khuffayn*), the impermissibility of eating an animal slaughtered by a non-Muslim and the impermissibility of marrying a woman who does not belong to a faith which has a revealed scripture (*ahl al-kitāb*). It also disagrees with the Shīʿi Imāmis regarding temporary marriage (*mutʿa*) and does not allow this.[34]

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31. *Ibid.*, pp. 472, 473.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 473.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 474.
34. Muḥammad Salām, *al-Madkhal li-l-fiqh al-islāmī* [Introduction to Islamic Fiqh], n.p., Dār al-Nahḍa al-ʿArabiyya, 1386/1966, p. 139.

The most important books produced by this school are *al-Majmūʿ al-fiqhi al-kabīr* (The Great Collection of *Fiqh*) by Zayd himself, and *al-Rawḍ al-naḍīr sharḥ majmūʿ al-fiqh al-kabīr* (The Verdant Gardens: Explanation of *The Great Collection of Fiqh*) by Sharaf al-Dīn al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī b. Aḥmad (d. 221/835). Among the students who spread the school are al-Hādī Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn al-Zāhid (d. 298/910) to whom is traced the Hādawiyya branch of the Zaydīs and who wrote *Jāmiʿ al-fiqh* (Encyclopaedia of *Fiqh*), *Risāla fī-l-Qiyās* (Epistle on *Qiyās*) and *al-Aḥkām fī-l-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām* (Regulations concerning the Lawful and Unlawful). He also established the rule of the Zaydīs in Yemen in 278/891.[35]

(b) The Imāmi school. The founder of this school is the Imām Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (d. 148/765) and so it is also called the Jaʿfariyya school. Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq was a man of piety and legal knowledge, and he had students who transmitted and disseminated this knowledge. These students include Abān b. Taghallub al-Bakrī (d. 141/758) and Jābir b. Yazīd (d. 128/746).

The 'roots' or *uṣūl* of this school are the Qurʾān, the *Sunna* as transmitted by members of the Prophet's family, that is, the *ahl al-bayt*, the statements of their imams whom they believe to be infallible, *al-ʿaql al-barāʾa al-aṣliyya* (reasoning according to the principle that an action not specifically legislated for in revelation is permitted) and *istiṣḥāb*. As regards their view of *ijmāʿ*, this is the consensus of opinion of the *ahl al-bayt*. They do not advocate the use of *qiyās* and *istiḥsān*, nor do they make use of personal opinion (*raʾy*) since this is unnecessary as they rely on the pronouncements of their infallible imams.

Their books include *al-Kāfī fī ʿilm al-dīn* (What is Sufficient in the Knowledge of the Faith) by al-Kulaynī (d. 329/940), *Man lā yaḥḍuruhu al-faqīh* (He who does not have a *Faqīh*) by Ibn Bābawayh al-Qummī (d. 381/991) and *Tahdhīb al-aḥkām* (Rectification of the Laws) and *al-Istibṣār* (Reflection) by al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067).[36]

The Imāmis differ from the Sunnis in some issues concerning inheritance, they state that divorce cannot take place except in the presence of two witnesses, that saying 'I divorce you' three times on the same occasion counts as only one statement, they forbid the marriage of a Muslim man to a woman who does not belong to a faith which has a revealed scripture, they hold marriage to be unlawful between a couple who as children were breast-fed from the same woman for fifteen consecutive times, and they permit *mutʿa* (temporary) marriage. These are apart from other issues concerning the imāmate, which caused disagreement between them and the Sunnis.[37]

35. Al-Shādhilī, *al-Madkhal …*, *op. cit.*, p. 476.
36. Al-Sarrāj, *Tārīkh al-tashrīʿ al-islāmī*, *op. cit.*, p. 162.
37. Madkūr, *al-Madkhal …*, *op. cit.*, pp. 140, 141.

(c) The Ibāḍiyya. This school of law first appeared in Basra in the second/eighth century. Among their views is that they consider that there can be as many Imāmates as there are countries. Apart from this, they differ little from the Sunnis. Among the most important differences that are known about them regarding the details of the law (*furūʿ*) is that they permit a bequest to an heir with the other heirs' consent, they uphold the compulsory bequest, they consider invalid any religious endowment (*waqf*) other than mosques, and they deny the right of pre-emption (*shufʿa*) when the pre-emptor relinquishes it even when this takes place before the sale and in a situation when the sale is from a father to his son, not the other way round, or from one marriage partner to the other.[38]

The Ibāḍī roots of jurisprudence are the Qurʾān, the *Sunna*, *ijmāʿ* and *qiyās* in the absence of an authoritative text. When there is a text they do not permit *qiyās* even when the text is transmitted by only one narrator (*khabar aḥād*). Among their works on *fiqh* are *Qāmūs al-Sharīʿa* (Lexicon of Islamic Law), *Minhāj al-ṭālibīn* (The Seekers' Road), *al-Īḍāḥ* (Elucidation), *Dīwān al-ashyākh* (Council of the Shaikhs), *al-Ḍiyāʾ* (Illumination), *Jawhar al-niẓām* (The Essence of Laws) and *Sharḥ al-nīl wa-shifāʾ al-ʿalīl* (Elucidation of Acquisition and the Curing of the Sick) in ten volumes.[39]

Geographical map of the Schools of Law in the contemporary Islamic world

Assessments of the number of Muslims in the world today vary between two billion and 1.7 billion of a total world population of six billion people. As for the Islamic states which belong to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, these number fifty-seven, bearing in mind that there are some countries which have a majority Muslim population but which are not OIC members of it, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. Likewise, some countries are not included among the Islamic states even though Muslims constitute a large proportion of the citizens, such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, Zanzibar, United Republic of Tanzania and India.[40]

The countries of the Islamic world are spread over four continents – Asia, Africa, Europe and South America – but they are mostly concentrated in Asia and Africa where there are fifty-four Islamic states.[41] About 90 per cent of them are Sunni, while the remaining 10 per cent belong to other sects as will be mentioned later.[42]

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38. *Ibid.*, p. 138.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 138; Ibrāhīm, *Tārīkh al-tashrīʿ al-islāmī, op. cit.*, pp. 29, 30.
40. Al-Jābarī, *al-Mawsūʿa al-islāmiyya, op. cit.*, p. 390.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 391.
42. Wikipedia, 'Ahl *al-Sunna* wa l-Jamāʿa'.

IV–1.2   Azhar University, madrasa and mosque in Egypt
© G. Degeorge

In what follows we will deal with the geographical distribution of the schools of law in the Islamic world, indicating the Islamic states in which these schools are well established, and according to the regions to which the states belong.

THE ARABIAN PENINSULA AND THE ARABIAN GULF

(a) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Of the four schools of Sunni law, the official and prevailing school there now is that of the Ḥanbalīs. This came about because the Saudi state was established on an alliance between Muḥammad b. Saʿūd and Shaykh Muḥammad b. ʿAbd-l-Wahhāb, who was a follower of the Ḥanbalī school. Prior to this, the inhabitants of Najd also adhered to this school, while in the Hijaz there was the Ḥanafī school with the Mālikī school in the cities. The people of al-ʿAsīr followed the Shāfiʿī school while those of al-Iḥsāʾ followed both the Mālikī and the Ḥanbalī schools. It has already been mentioned that the Mālikī school originated in Medina which was the home of Imām Mālik, but it subsequently began to lose its hold there until Ibn Farḥūn (d. 793/1319) became a judge and made

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it prominent again.[43] As for the Shāfiʿī school of law, this entered the Hijaz in the fourth/tenth century.[44]

(b) United Arab Emirates. This consists of seven emirates which belong either to the Mālikī or the Ḥanbalī schools. The school which predominates in the capital Abu Dhabi is Mālikī.

(c) Yemen. The schools of law in Yemen are either Zaydī Shīʿi or Shāfiʿī especially in Aden and the Hadhramaut. The Ḥanafī school is found in the areas around Aden.

(d) Sultanate of Oman. The Ibāḍī school is dominant in Oman, but the Ḥanbalī and Shāfiʿī schools are also found.

(e) Qatar. The most significant school of law in Qatar is that of the Mālikīs, but there is also the Ḥanbalī school which was established there by people arriving from Najd.

(f) Kingdom of Bahrain. The Mālikī school predominates in Bahrain, but the Ḥanbalī also has a presence being brought there by people arriving from Najd.

(g) Kuwait. The Mālikī school of law predominates in Kuwait.

IRAQ

At the present time in Iraq the main school of law is the Ḥanafī followed by the Shāfiʿī. The Mālikī, Ḥanbalī and Shīʿi schools are also found. It should be noted that this region has known almost all the schools since Imām Abū Ḥanīfa grew up in Kufa, and Imām Abū Yūsuf took the post of judge there under the ʿAbbāsid State. As for the Mālikī school, it appeared in Baghdad before the fourth/tenth century, some Mālikīs became judges there and they had a Mālikī *madrasa*. But after the fifth/eleventh century the school lost its hold.[45] In the early stages of its development the Ḥanbalī school was also in Baghdad since Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal grew up there. The Shāfiʿī school also once predominated in Baghdad and many cities in Khurasan, as the writers of *ṭabaqāt* (biographical dictionaries) mention.

SHAM (GREATER) THE LEVANT

(a) Syria and Lebanon. The Ḥanafī school of law is the principal school here, while one quarter is Shāfiʿī and one quarter Ḥanbalī or Shīʿi.

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43. Aḥmad Taymūr, *al-Madhāhib al-fiqhiyya al-arbaʿa* [The Four Schools of Islamic Law], Cairo, Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīda, 1421/2001, p. 76.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 65, quoting from Ibn Farḥūn's *al-Dībāj al-mudhahhab fī maʿrifat aʿyān al-madhhab* [The Gilded Brocade in Knowledge of the Leading Scholars in the School of Law].

45. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

(b) Palestine. The most important school of law in Palestine is the Shāfiʿī followed by the Ḥanbalī then the Ḥanafī then the Mālikī.

(c) Jordan. The Shāfiʿī school predominates in Jordan followed by the Ḥanbalī.

The school of al-āwzāʿī used to be in Sham but it is one of those schools which disappeared, as already mentioned. It was replaced by the Shāfiʿī school. In his *Aḥsan al-taqāsīm fī maʿrifat al-aqālīm* (The Best Divisions for Knowledge of the Regions) al-Maqdisī mentions that in the fourth/tenth century the *fuqahāʾ* in the regions of Sham were Shāfiʿī and that the Mālikī school was widely disseminated there. The Ḥanafī school was also widespread in the region, there being hardly a city or town where they did not have a presence. Perhaps the judges were appointed from the Ḥanafī school and thus they predominate up to today.

The Nile valley

(a) Arab Republic of Egypt. The most important schools of law here are the Shāfiʿī in the countryside and the Mālikī in Upper Egypt. The Ḥanafī school is also common and indeed is the school which the state follows for *fatwās* and for the judiciary. As for the Ḥanbalī school, it is rarely found.

Egypt is one of the Islamic countries with the widest spread of law schools. At an early date, Ismāʿīl b. al-Yasaʿ al-Kūfī, who was a judge for the caliph al-Mahdī in 146/763, introduced the Ḥanafī school there and it began to spread when the ʿAbbāsids seized control of the country. The judiciary, however, was not restricted to it and judges were sometimes appointed from the Ḥanafīs and sometimes from the Mālikīs and the Shāfiʿīs. When the Fāṭimids took over they introduced the school of the Shīʿī Ismāʿīlīs and appointed judges from it. This school gained ascendancy in the state, but it did not put an end to the influence of other schools with regard to religious observances because the Fāṭimids used to allow their subjects to follow whichever school of law they wished in this field in particular. The Ḥanafī school was generally weak in contrast with the Mālikī and the Shāfiʿī which used to share judgeship on occasions. When the Ayyūbid State arose they initially patronized the Shāfiʿīs and the Mālikīs. Following this the Ḥanafī school increased in size. The four schools of law held lessons in the same *madrasa*, in the same way as the judiciary was shared between them. When the Ottomans seized control of Egypt they restricted the office of judge to the Ḥanafīs. As for the Mālikī school, this was disseminated by ʿAbd -l-Raḥmān b. al-Qāsim (d. 163/779), a student of Imām Mālik. But like the Ḥanafī school, it weakened under the Fāṭimids only to return under the Ayyūbids with the Mālikī judge being one of the judges in the Ayyūbid State. As regards the Shāfiʿī school of law, Egypt became acquainted with it, after

the Ḥanafī and the Mālikī schools, when Imām al-Shāfiʿī went there. It was the first of the large Muslim centres in which this school began, but it too weakened under the Fāṭimids only to return with increased vigour during the time of the Ayyūbids. Indeed, it was the school of the state as regards the judiciary because the Ayyūbids were all Shāfiʿīs apart from the Sultan of Sham who was a Ḥanafī. Things went on in this way until at the time of the Circassian State, al-Ẓāhir Baybars employed judges from all the four schools. This practice continued up to the period of Ottoman rule in Egypt when they restricted the judiciary to the Ḥanafī school, which has remained the school of the state up to the present time. This did not affect the Shāfiʿīs and the Mālikīs, however, for the Shāfiʿīs remained in the coastal areas of the countryside while the Mālikīs hold sway in Upper Egypt. Similarly, at one time the shaikhs of al-Azhar were limited exclusively to scholars from the Shāfiʿī school. Then they were also chosen from the Ḥanafī school. After this it alternated between Shāfiʿī and Mālikī. But a Ḥanbalī has never been appointed to this position, due to the scarcity of Ḥanbalīs in Egypt, as previously mentioned.[46]

(b) Republic of the Sudan. The most important school of law in Sudan is that of the Mālikīs. The Shāfiʿī school is also found in the Barbar region in the north of the country arriving there in earlier times following the visit of a number of *faqīh*s. The Shāfiʿī school is similarly found in Sawākin in eastern Sudan as they shared the same judiciary with Yemen in early times as well.[47]

MAGHREB

(a) Kingdom of Morocco. The predominant school in Morocco is the Mālikī which is the official school of the state. In general, Islamic jurisprudence spread in the region of the Arab Maghreb by way of Qairouan, in present-day Tunisia. The Qairouanis became acquainted with the Āwzāʿī school, brought to them by the people of Sham, who migrated there during the time of the Umayyads.[48] They also came to know the school of Sufyān al-Thawrī whose academy of *Ḥadīth* was introduced there by ʿAnbasa b. Khārija al-Qayrūwānī (d. 210/825).[49] It also became acquainted with the Ḥanafī school which was

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46. On this, see *Ibid.*, pp. 57, 58, 76, 79, 80.

47. ʿAbd-l-Majīd ʿĀbidīn, *Tārīkh al-thaqāfa al-ʿarabiyya fi-l-Sudan* [The History of Islamic Culture in the Sudan], Beirut, Dār al-Thaqāfa, 1967, pp. 59–60.

48. ʿIyyāḍ, al-Qāḍī, *Muqaddimat tartīb al-madārik* [Introduction to Arrangement of Discernment], n.p., n.d., I, p. 8.

49. Al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad Shawwāṭ, *Madrasat al-ḥadīth fī Qayruwān* [The Academy of *Ḥadīth* in Qairouan], n.p., al-Dār al-ʿĀlamiyya li-l-Kitāb al-Islāmī, AH 1411, I, p. 253.

introduced by ʿAbdullāh b. Farrūkh Abū Muḥammad al-Fāsī.[50] The Ḥanafī school then became the leading school in Qairouan when Asad b. al-Furāt (d. 172/788) was appointed as judge there. This remained the case until al-Muʿizz b. Bādīs (d. 407/1016) converted the people to the Mālikī school.[51]

It was the same situation with al-Andalus which at first had the schools of al-Awzāʿī and Abū Ḥanīfa but these similarly did not last long and were superseded by the school of Imām Mālik. Thus, the Mālikī school began to spread in al-Andalus and Qairouan and its well known *madrasas* appeared in these places. Eventually the school prevailed in all the main centres of the Greater Arab Maghreb. Commenting on this, a poet says:

> My school kisses the cheek of my master's school – what do you think of my school?
> Do not disagree with the opinion of a Mālikī since most people of the Maghreb follow it.[52]

Also on this subject, in *Tārīkh al-Maghrib* (The History of Maghreb) al-Fāsī says: 'All the Moroccans are Mālikīs apart from a few who adhere to traditions (*āthār*).'[53] Similarly, Ibn Khaldūn explains the spread of the Mālikī school in Morocco, remarking: 'Bedouinism prevailed over the people of the Maghreb and al-Andalus and they did not suffer from the culture of the people of Iraq. They used to favour the people of the Hijaz because they also lived a Bedouin life.'[54] During the period of the Almohads (*Muwaḥḥids*), the Mālikī school experienced an upheaval when the Almohads called for people to act according to the Qurʾān and the *Sunna* and burnt the books of the schools of law. Also, some of them followed the Ẓāhirī school and renounced the Mālikīs and the Shāfiʿīs. It was because of this that some Shāfiʿīs went to Morocco.[55] By way of Morocco the Mālikī school entered the countries of West Africa, including Chad, Nigeria, Senegal, the Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Ghana, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Gabon, Togo and Sierra Leone.[56]

(b) Republic of Tunisia. The predominant school in Tunisia today is that of the Mālikīs. The Ḥanafī school also has a presence among what remains of the Turkish families there. The influence of the Ḥanafī school is perhaps also seen in Tunis among the judiciary, in which both Ḥanafīs and the Mālikīs

50. ʿAbd-l-Majīd Ibn Ḥamza, *al-Madrasa al-kalāmiyya bi-Ifrīqiyā* [The School of Scholastic Theology in Africa], Tunis, Dār al-ʿArab, 1406/1987, p. 37; Taymūr, *al-Madhāhib al-fiqhiyya al-arbaʿ, op. cit.*, p. 53.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 70–1, quoting from Ibn Khaldūn, *Muqaddama* [Introduction].
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 72–3.
56. *Ibid.*

were employed. Similarly, the chief mufti used to be a Ḥanafī, known as the shaikh of Islam, alongside the Mālikī shaykh of Islam. Some of the lecturers in the university of Zaytūna are Ḥanīfa while others are Mālikī. Tunisia also has some Ibāḍīs.[57]

(c) Republic of Libya. The most important school in Libya is the Mālikī. The Ibāḍī school is also present.[58]

(d) Republic of Algeria. The main school here is that of the Mālikīs. The Ibāḍī school also has a presence.

(e) Islamic Republic of Mauritania. Here the Mālikī school predominates.

W EST A FRICA

The countries of West Africa are Somalia, Djibouti, Comoros, United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Madagascar and southern Ethiopia bordering on Somalia. In all these places the most important school is that of the Shāfiʿīs, due to the influence of Yemen.[59]

I SLAMIC R EPUBLIC OF I RAN

The most important school in the Islamic Republic of Iran is that of the Imāmis. Most of the Sunnis follow the Shāfiʿī school with a few others following the Ḥanafī. Some sources indicate that in earlier times the predominant school was that of the Shāfiʿīs, and that the people also knew the school of the Ẓāhirīs. The spread of the Imāmi school resulted from the rise of the Safavids (Ṣafawīds).[60]

T URKEY

The most influential school in Turkey is that of the Ḥanafīs. When the Ottomans ruled the country they restricted the office of judge to this school

57. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
58. *Ibid.*
59. Aḥmad Muḥammad, 'al-Madhab al-Shāfiʿī fi-l-Ṣūmāl' [The Shāfiʿī School in Somalia], *Majallat kulliyat al-tashrīʿ wa-l-dirāsat al-islāmiyya*, 2007, The International African University, No. 10, August, pp. 238–49.
60. The Safavids owe their origin to Shaykh Ṣafiyyi-l-Dīn al-Ardabīlī (650–735/1252–1334) the great-grandfather of Shah Ismāʿīl al-Ṣafawī (d. 930/1522), the founder of the Safavid State (905–1135/1502–1736). He imposed Twelver Shīʿism on the Iranians by force and made it the official school of law of Iran. See Ayatollah Jaʿfar al-Sijistānī, *al-Shīʿa fī mawkib al-tārīkh* [The Shīʿis in the Procession of History], n.p., n.d., V, p. 16; ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Sallābī, *al-Dawla al-ʿuthmāniyya: ʿawāmil an-nuhūḍ wa-asbāb al-suqūṭ* [The Ottoman State: Factors behind its Rise and Reasons for its Fall], unpub., I, p. 232; ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Sallābī, *Sīrat Amīr al-Muʾminīn ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib* [The Biography of the Commander of the Faithful, ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib], unpub., III, p. 159; Taymūr, *al-Madhāhib …*, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

IV–1.3   Sankore mosque, Timbuktu, Mali, once the leading centre of
Islamic scholarship in Africa
© Stephenie Hollyman/AramcoWorld

and it spread to all the territories over which they had authority.[61] The Ḥanafī school also spread to Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. Turkey also contains the Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī schools of law, but these are less in number that the Ḥanafīs. The Ḥanafī school is also the most popular in India which, however, also contains a few Shāfiʿīs and many *ahl al-ḥadīth* who give pre-eminence to Islamic traditions.[62] The *ahl al-ḥadīth* also predominate in the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independant States such as Kazakhstan in which there is also the Shāfiʿī school, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan.[63]

SOUTH ASIA

This region includes Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam and the Maldives.[64] The main school here is that of the Shāfiʿīs.

61. Anon, *Dimūghrāfiyyat al-madhāhib* [The Demography of the Schools of Law], p. 20.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
63. *Ibid.*
64. *al-Madhāhib al-fiqhiyya wa-l-dirāsāt al-ʿilmiyya* (website).

Influence of the Schools of Law on local regulations in the Islamic world and the role they played in the formation of contemporary Law in non-Muslim countries

There are two issues here: the first is the influence of the schools of law on local regulations in the Islamic world; the second is the role the schools played in the law of non-Muslim countries.

INFLUENCE OF THE SCHOOLS OF LAW ON LOCAL REGULATIONS IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD

When dealing with the influence of the schools of law on local regulations and the legislative movement in the Islamic world, it must first be pointed out that there are two aspects to these schools: the popular, and the official. As regards the popular aspects, this is seen in that the schools provided Islamic law (*fiqh*) for their followers and for others who wished to know the legal ruling in any specific case or issue. Thus, the schools of law produced Islamic legal culture and hastened its spread, and they enabled Muslims to be aware of the rules governing both their religion and the world in general, all according to the particular school they adhered to, and the teachings of the imam they followed. This popular aspect is most clearly seen in the laws relating to ritual observances (*ʿibādāt*) for which Muslims depend on the legal thought of their Imams. Thus, for laws regarding prayer, fasting, the alms tax (*zakāt*) and the pilgrimage (*ḥajj*), which are all concerned with regulating the relationship of a Muslim with his Creator, Muslims would refer to the legal thought of their imams. The sultan could not interfere with these laws except in that he was able to set the times of prayer, handle the general supervision of the mosques and other places of worship, prescribe the dates of the month of Ramadan, oversee the collection of the alms tax and see to the general organization of the religious rite of the pilgrimage for those able to undertake it and for whom it is obligatory. For other rules apart from these finer points of law connected with the religious duties, Muslims would turn to their schools of law.

It should be noted that the ruling authorities would not interfere with the religious observances, but rather had to abide by the findings of the particular school of law that prevailed. This was especially so in cases over which there was clear disagreement between the ruling authority and the general public. This was seen when the Fāṭimid State ruled Egypt in the fourth/tenth century and imposed the legislation of its school of law in all legal matters apart from those concerning religious observances.[65]

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65. Taymūr, *al-Madhāhib …*, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

IV–1.4   British Muslim children learning about their religion in a
mosque in London
© Tor Eigeland/AramcoWorld

As concerns the official aspect of the schools of law, this is seen in that every Islamic country or kingdom would rely on a certain school for its judges and *muftis*. Thus, as already mentioned, the ʿAbbāsids appointed Imām Abū Yūsuf, the companion of Abū Ḥanīfa, as chief judge (*qāḍī al-quḍāt*). In this way the judges belonged to the Ḥanafī school and obtained their texts and legislation from it. Similarly, Imām Saḥnūn was appointed as judge of Qairouan when the Mālikī school began to spread in the Maghreb, and the office of judge was subsequently held by his companions. Later, al-Muʿizz b. Bādīs introduced the people of Africa to the Mālikī school, and the cities and villages there all had judges and *muftis* belonging to this school. [66]

In al-Andalus, Yaḥyā b. Yaḥyā al-Laythī, the Mālikī *faqīh*, was the judge and he used to rely on the Mālikī school of law.[67]

Under the Ayyūbids in Egypt the judiciary belonged to the Shāfiʿī school while afterwards the Ottomans changed it to the Ḥanafī, as mentioned above. Meanwhile, under Fāṭimid rule the judges followed the Shīʿi Imāmī school. One of the most important Fāṭimid judges was Abu-l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. al-Nuʿmān (d. 374/984) who was the first in Egypt to be called *qāḍī al-quḍāt* (chief judge), a title that was unknown at that time except in Baghdad.[68]

On the other hand, the office of judge was occasionally shared between more than one school of law, as occurred from time to time under the Fāṭimids in Egypt and the Ayyūbids. Indeed, as mentioned previously, al-Ẓahir Baybars appointed the judiciary from all four Sunni schools.

Moreover, the passing of judgement was sometimes conducted by a court of law belonging to a single school. Thus, in al-Andalus Yaḥyā b. Yaḥyā al-Laythī established a consultative council (*majlis shūrā*) consisting of sixteen members drawn from the senior *faqīh*s of the Mālikī school,[69] while the judge was called the 'judge of the community' (*qāḍī al-jamāʿa*).[70] In a previous era, the famous epistle on judgeship sent by the Caliph ʿUmar to Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī also alludes to this term.

It is necessary to point out here that despite the division of a school's activities into popular and official, the popular aspect was not without influence and authority. This becomes clear in that when the caliph appointed a judge whose school the people did not like, the governor was forced to remove

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66. Maḥmūd b. Muḥammad ʿArnūs, *Tārīkh al-qaḍāʾ fi-l-islām* [The History of Judgeship in Islam], p. 49.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 97.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

69. Muḥyī-l-Dīn al-Qara Dāghī, 'Al-Fatwā bayna al-naṣṣ wa-l-wāqiʿ wa-l-thābit wa-l-mutaghayyir' (The *Fatwā* between the Text and Reality, the Fixed and the Variable). A preliminary study presented to the seventeenth session of the Islamic Fiqh Academy Conference, p. 42

70. ʿArnūs, *Tārīkh al-qaḍāʾ* ..., *op. cit.*, p. 99.

him. For example, the Egyptians demanded the dismissal of the Ḥanafī judge Ismāʿīl b. Yaḥyā who came to them from Kufa. His school considered religious bequests (aḥbās) to be unlawful, whereas the Egyptians at that time followed the Mālikī school of law which held them to be permissible.[71] Similarly, the people of Iraq rebelled when the ʿAbbāsid Caliph al-Qādir bi-l-Ilāh (d. 422/1031) appointed a Shāfiʿī judge over them. They demanded that he be dismissed and the caliph acquiesced and did so.[72]

In the same way as Islamic states and kingdoms would use their schools of law to legislate for the judiciary, the schools were also the sources of authority for *fatwā*s. While a judicial decision is an obligatory ruling, a *fatwā* elucidates the legal ruling by providing evidence for those who question it, or generally speaking it provides information and is not compulsory.[73] The *fuqahāʾ* from the schools of law therefore consider it necessary that there be *mufti*s to whom people can turn with questions and to ask for formal legal opinions (*fatwā*s). For example, the Shāfiʿīs decided that wherever people were they should always have access to a *mufti*'s court.[74] Although a *fatwā* generally represents a collective duty (farḍ kifāya) it becomes an individual duty (farḍ ʿayn) when there is only one scholar in the region.[75]

Books were composed outlining the successive generations (ṭabaqāt) of *mufti*s belonging to the various schools, and among these would also be mentioned those *mufti*s who did not follow a certain imam, did not subscribe to his school or his legal reasoning, but who rather had their own methodology and procedures. Also included were students of early imams such as Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan from the Ḥanafī school, and al-Maznī and Ibn Surayj from the Shāfiʿī school, along with *mujtahid*s who were not among the early scholars but who followed the school and methodology of an imam, were aware of his reasoning and decisions and were able to exercise their own judgement and discrimination.[76]

The influence of the Schools of Law on the laws of personal status and religious endowments (waqf) *in the Islamic world*

In addition to the effect that the schools of law have had on judicial rulings and *fatwā*s since their creation, and their popular and official aspects, as dealt with above, they were also the source of authority for Muslim legislation

71. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
72. *Multaqā al-madhāhib al-fiqhiyya wa-l-dirāsāt al-islamiyya* (website).
73. *Al-Mawsūʿa al-fiqhiyya al-kuwaitiyya*, Kuwait, Wizārat al-Awqāf, n.d., No. 32, p.20.
74. *Ibid.*; Manṣūr b. Yūnis al-Buhūtī, *Sharḥ muntahā al-irādāt* [Explanation of the Utmost Degree in References], n.p., Maktabat al-Munīra, n.d., III, p. 458.
75. *Ibid.*
76. Al-Qara Dāghī, 'al-Fatwā' …, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

whenever this was necessary. This legislation was required for the organization and regulation of the contemporary Islamic world after Muslims had freed themselves from the darkness of unquestioning 'imitation' (*taqlīd*) of the verdicts of earlier *fuqahāʾ* which had taken root in the seventh/thirteenth century following Hulagu's conquest of the various Islamic lands and the destruction that he wreaked. This began in the thirteenth/nineteenth century when legislation on personal status and family law took place under the Ottomans. This law was based on the Ḥanafī school, which was the official school of the state, as is well known. However, it departed from what was considered preferable by the Ḥanafīs, such as the invalidity of forced marriage and divorcing the enforced husband once married.

Qadrī Pasha laid down the laws of personal status in Egypt in 647/1249, and these also included regulations relating to bequests, the limitation of legal competence (*ḥajr*), the appointing of an executor of a will and inheritance. The Egyptian State also legislated for personal status in 1920 with Law No. 25, and again in 1923 with Law No. 56. Relevant amendments were made to these laws to cater for the welfare of society at that time, and these were not bound by what was considered best by the Ḥanafī school or occasionally by any of the schools. They did take account of legal opinion even though it might be that of the Companions of the Prophet and the Successors. This legislation was followed by other laws such as the Law of Inheritance No. 77 in 1943, the Law of Religious Endowments (*waqf*) No. 48 in 1946 and Law No. 71 of 1946, concerned with bequests.[77]

In Jordan the Jordanian Law of Family Rights 1951, was issued while the Iraqi Family Law was issued in 1959. In Syria in 1953 a comprehensive statute appeared covering family law which derived its provisions from all of the schools of law. Similar laws were issued in Morocco and Algeria. Activity continued in this direction until the laws of personal status which have recently appeared in Kuwait, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. Indeed, a single integrated Arab law of personal status was drafted.[78]

In short, the majority of Muslim countries have issued laws of personal status whose basis and historical source were the school of the particular country while seeking the opinions of the other schools even though these might occasionally be non-Sunni, such as the Shīʿi Imāmi and the Ibāḍī.

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77. Madkūr, *al-Madkhal …*, *op. cit.*, pp. 101–15.
78. See al-Sarrāj, *Tārīkh al-tashrīʿ …*, *op. cit.*, p. 241ff.: 'Mabḥath al-taṭbīq al-sharʿī fī majāl al-usra' [Study on the Implementation of Islamic Law in the Area of the Family].

The influence of the Schools of Law in legislation for business transactions and civil law in Islamic countries

Legislation for business transactions and civil law took place within the Ottoman 'Codification of (Ḥanafī) Jurisprudence' (*Majallat al-aḥkām al-ʿadliyya*) published in 1293/1876. In addition to Turkey, this was also applied in Sham, Iraq and Palestine. Following this, in 1883 and again in 1949, Egyptian civil law adopted a number of necessary amendments derived from Islamic jurisprudence. In 1906, the Tunisian Law of Liabilities and Contracts was issued which was derived from Mālikī jurisprudence. The 1953 Iraqi Civil Law was similarly derived from Islamic jurisprudence.

In 1976 the Jordanian Civil Law was issued and 1984 the Sudanese Law of Business Transactions, both of which were derived from Islamic jurisprudence. Likewise, the 1985 Law of Civil Transactions of the United Arab Emirates, amended by the Law of 1987, was derived from Islamic jurisprudence and particularly that of the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī schools. Moreover, many draft civil laws were also derived from Islamic jurisprudence. Among these was the Amalgamated Arab Civil Law prepared by the Arab League, and the Legislation of Islamic *Fiqh* according to its various Schools which was prepared by the Islamic Research Academy in al-Azhar in Cairo. In general then, remarkable activity took place in the field of Islamic law as derived from the various schools and within the framework of the legislative movement and legal modernization which spread throughout the Islamic countries and, in the modern era, especially the Arab ones.

ROLE PLAYED BY THE SCHOOLS IN THE LAW OF THE CONTEMPORARY LAW

The role of the schools of Islamic law was not limited to the great service they made in providing Muslim societies with religious legal culture on the theoretical level, legal and legislative culture in the formulation of the judge's decisions, and legislation on the practical level, as dealt with above. It rather extends beyond this to the remarkable effects they have had on human society in general. This is due to the fact that these schools have been in existence for more than a thousand years and during this time there has been contact and interaction between Islamic society and other societies both in the East and the West. Regardless of the fact that this contact was sometimes negative and sometimes positive, in both cases it necessarily left its mark on law as opposed to Islamic jurisprudence and its schools. This contact and its effects are due to a number of factors, as follows:

(a)   The entry of the Muslims into al-Andulus, where they remained for at least eight centuries. History informs us that their life there was characterized by prosperity and economic security, the development

of the sciences and the flourishing of the arts and literature. This also included the blossoming of the sciences of Islamic jurisprudence and legislation, since they used to study the Mālikī school in their scientific academies and apply its rulings in their legal decisions and courts.

(b) The thriving mercantile activity between Muslims and European merchants in the Middle Ages, and in which centres of trade in Italy played a leading role in promoting relations between the two cultures.

(c) Jurists in the West became aware of the Islamic schools of law during the European occupation of some Muslim countries. They were eager to acquaint themselves with the laws that were applied in the regions over which they had control.

(d) The translation of numerous books of Islamic law into European languages as part of the cultural activity and exchange of knowledge, which began in the third/eleventh century.

These factors and their subsequent ramifications have been further investigated by contemporary scholarly research in comparative studies undertaken by international institutes, universities and academies of advanced studies, as well as in conferences and seminars which are often devoted to such subjects.

We can more precisely summarize the influence that the Islamic schools of law have had on the contemporary law of non-Muslim countries by considering the following:

(a) Spanish law was influenced by the legal culture that the Muslims left behind in al-Andalus. Thus, Spain became aware of Islamic legal terms such as *ḥākim al-madīna* (city judge), *ṣāḥib al-shurṭa* (policeman), *maẓālim* (acts of injustice), *muḍāriba* (limited partnership) and *muzāraʿa* (temporary sharecropping contract). It also benefitted from the Islamic laws governing inheritance and many other matters which there is no space to detail here.

(b) French law came under the influence of the Mālikī school with which the French became acquainted through translating Mālikī books into French, and particularly *al-Mukhtaṣar* (Compendium) by Khalīl b. Isḥāq. Indeed, Sayyid ʿAbdullāh Ḥusayn has written a book on this subject called *al-Muqāranāt al-tashrīʿiyya bayna al-qawānīn al-waḍʿiyya al-madaniyya wa-l-tashrīʿ al-islāmī: muqārana bayna fiqh al-qānūn al-faransī wa-madhhab al-Imām Mālik* (A Comparison between Positive Civil Law and Islamic Legislation: Between the Jurisprudence of French Law and the School of Imām Mālik). In this, the author establishes that some nine-tenths of French law resembles that of Islam.[79]

(c) English jurisprudence was also influenced by that produced by Muslims whether in mercantile law such as tithes, bills of exchange or legal

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79. On this see *Ibid.*, pp. 257–94, in the chapter 'al-Fiqh al-islāmī wa-l-nuẓum al-qānūniyya al-ḥadītha' [Islamic Jurisprudence and Modern Legal Systems]. Dr Sarrāj is a lecturer in Islamic legislation at the American University in Cairo.

instruments, or other Islamic laws such as those relating to public welfare (*maṣlaḥa*), the prevention of harm (*raf ʿ al-ḍarar*), that matters should be judged by their objectives (*al-umūr bi-maqāṣidihā*), the rule that precludes permission being given for liability (*munāfāt al-idhn li-ḍ-ḍamān*), the rule that custom shall prevail (*al-qāʿida muḥkima*) and other laws which English jurisprudence in its flexibility and lack of recourse to fixed documented law received from Islam.

(d) Western jurisprudence benefited from the process of development, the spirit of coherence and objectivism that generally characterizes Islamic jurisprudence and its different schools.

Above all else, the role that the Islamic schools of law played in the legal systems of contemporary non-Muslim countries is witnessed in the many international conferences which were devoted to this in the first half of the twentieth century. These include the International Congress of Comparative Law held in the Hague in 1932, which concluded with an expression of great admiration for Islamic jurisprudence, and the Universal Congress of Lawyers, also held in the Hague, in 1948, which adopted a number of resolutions in which it recognized the flexibility and importance of Islamic legislation, recommended that comparative legal studies should take account of this legislation and legal theory and urged that such studies take place.

There was also the Week of Islamic *Fiqh* convened by the Branch of Islamic Law of the International Congress of Comparative Law at the University of Paris in 1951 among whose conclusions was 'that the differences between the schools of law embrace a wealth of concepts and transactions all drawn from the legal sources is a cause of wonder, and with these Islamic jurisprudence responds to every demand of modern life and reconciles its needs.'

Finally, the Islamic schools of law could do nothing but respond to the needs of Muslim societies, and to take part in international legal culture as has been discussed, except that it developed within the framework of the immutable values of the religion of Islam, which are respect for rational thought; equality, justice, reconciliation and tolerance; the appeal to good and refined morals; and freedom and shared social responsibility.

This is the invitation: that studies should be conducted on the Islamic schools of law in terms of the aforementioned regulations and principles from which they emerged until they played a recognized multiple role in embracing and dealing with the problems of humanity today, attaining that level of tolerance that promotes more fraternal feeling, compassion and harmony both in the East and the West.

Our last entreaty is praise be to God, the Lord of the worlds.

Chapter 4.2

THE RENAISSANCE OF SUFI MOVEMENTS IN THE WORLD

Sidy Lamine Niasse

We are living in strange times indeed, when Islam, while at the centre of great social, political and cultural debates, is regarded as the great unknown. Blinded, or rather allowing themselves complacently to be blinded by the whirl of events which, often in quite sinister fashion, make the international headlines, and by the commotion aroused by certain bellicose protest movements in the Muslim world, the Western media incessantly suggest the same dichotomy: the Muslim is either an anachronistic fundamentalist perpetuating the traditions of the sixth century, frustrated, blinkered, violent and misogynous, or else an integrated moderate, secular, more believer than practicing, sharing with the rest of society the system of modern values. As if you could classify more than a billion human beings so simplistically in two opposing camps.

More rarely, some studies mention Sufism as an alternative to *jihādi* barbarity, presenting it as a peaceful, gentle and tolerant Islam. This is not, strictly speaking, a modern Islam of the kind described above. It has even a rather folkloric side (think of the mediatization of the whirling dervishes), but it does at least offer possibilities of openness and dialogue which are totally absent from fundamentalist Islam. Moreover, in contrast to the latter, it shows more flexibility in the performance of rites reaching out into the sphere of the exoteric. In a nutshell, it is a somewhat inoffensive, not to say sanitized, Islam which rather suits the West as is shown by the efflorescence of Sufi literature on the spirituality shelves of bookshops. Yet it remains suspect in the eyes of numerous Muslims, many of whom are influenced by the Wahhabi campaigns which stigmatize the worship of tombs as the favourite practice of the followers of Sufism.

In fact, Sufism, which given its diversity and complexity could not be summed up in such a portrayal, remains little known to the public at large, both in the West and in the Muslim world, except in regions where it has a

popular following, especially black Africa. This, indeed, raises the question of how to define Sufism, often taken as synonymous with Islamic mysticism, the essence of Islam in contrast to the legislation which is its shell, both a discipline of purification of the soul co-existing on the same level as other sciences such as the *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence), and an all-encompassing total vision identified with the religion itself and even transcending it in its conditioned and historic form.

In the pages which follow, rather than confining ourselves to a classic presentation of Sufism which would merely repeat the presentation of this subject in previous volumes, we will start by focusing on what, in the Sufist approach, very closely matches the spiritual needs of an epoch without signposts, before embarking on a historical and geographical overview of the multiple expressions of this phenomenon around the world. Finally, we will reflect on the decisive role that Sufism plays and could play in the promotion of interreligious and intercultural dialogue and a fairer appreciation of the potential of Islam.

Sufism and modern spirituality

The twentieth century has finally undermined the moral and spiritual landmarks of the Western world and the societies which follow its example without offering any satisfactory long term alternative.

The continuing decline of religion for three centuries, culminating in the scathing analysis of such as Nietzsche, led only to a search for substitutes which often poorly concealed their deliberate or unconscious mimicry. In many respects, for example, communism is simply a messianic atheism reducing virtue to a set of material givens whose fraternal mission piled oppression on oppression. At the same time, the modern view of religion has the merit of questioning the meaning of religion reduced to the status of social custom, leaving only the letter of the law and a naïve conviction or cynical acquiescence in soulless rituals. For many, it has become hard to believe in the way they did in the past, trusting their conscience to the care of the clergy. The result was the search for alternative forms of spirituality imported from the Far East, but often clumsily, in a way that was frequently akin to a quest for the exotic. This ineptitude has often been denounced by the likes of René Guenon, for example.

Another phenomenon marking the last century was the rise of the individual, seen as a unique entity who cannot be reduced to his or her status within a family or social group, as a subject endowed with free will and free to express it in the framework of personal development, shaking off the shackles of austere values such as duty. This led in practice to an unbridled quest for freedom and pleasure which fooled no one. This new way of seeing life goes

hand in hand with the revelations by Freud and his acolytes of the subterranean structure of the human being, with weaknesses and unacknowledged desires, culminating in an incitement to take full charge of this most obscure part of our personality.

Love and beauty, in short, have become the hallmarks of an epoch dedicated to appearances, but debased and reduced to their most trivial and material expression, valued only for itself even though it is ephemeral and of only relative worth. In other words, it is a limited and fragmented manifestation of eternal divine attributes acting on a cosmic scale.

In all the aspects of the moral revolution which marked the twentieth century, one senses the wish to go against a 2,000 year Judeo-Christian tradition by magnifying everything it abhorred, the body, pleasure in particular, and repudiating the values of faith, duty and austerity. Christianity was forced to adapt to this evolution, albeit not without a struggle, in order to stay in the game. The situation of Islam in relation to this question is different to the extent that, in essence, it has always shown both flexibility and fortitude. It has therefore been able to adapt to very different populations and places, encouraging reflection and a critical mind even in the domain of theology, and has never condemned earthly pleasures, whence the suspicion long held by other religions which charged it with being sensual. On the other hand, however, it possesses foundations and pillars which are not susceptible to any compromise. It precludes any modernizing which involves a betrayal of its values and subjection to the diktat of a modernity which does not itself know what it wants, but believes it has found a panacea in change. This explains why Islam has become the most austere of the religions in the eyes of the world, especially as certain trends deliberately publicized in the media have emphasized the fundamentalist aspect and those proclaiming themselves to be the guardians of Islamic purity. This is to forget the wealth of facets Islam has offered to the world in space and time, and to forget that at all times, facing the defenders of the letter, there have always been the champions of the spirit.

With Sufism, we find ourselves in the presence of a spirituality which could be described as modern, but which we would rather qualify as timeless or sufficiently flexible to espouse in each epoch the expression of the great existential questions which preoccupy humanity. It is a tradition which is linked to the more general phenomenon of mysticism, which does not belong to Islam as such. It has appeared since the advent of this religion, but only became organized later, with the emergence of ways and means of teaching which suited the new environment. Today, yet more mystic voices continue their work in the modern world adopting contemporary methods. The flexibility of Sufism is comparable to that of a river with ever abundant and enlivening waters. It brings life to this high-tech desert where the individual

is ultimately always an outcast. Many are those who have denounced this misleading progress which is confined only to material growth and forgets that people do not live on bread alone; they need a different food for the soul. That is why one sees many intellectuals disappointed that they have not found in their education and professional achievement the blossoming that they sought. They then seek, and find, in spirituality, that fulfilment which they consider indispensable to their life. Conversely, those who sought serenity in simple dogmatic devotion have very often been disappointed in their expectations.

The response of Sufism to the questionings of modernity

FAITH AND REASON

If we pick up on the points raised above, we see that to each of these modern questionings, Sufism offers an answer, sometimes thought out several centuries ago but still relevant. Thus, the relationship between faith and reason, the rejection of dogmatism, the letter which kills and imprisons, have been the subject of abundant reflection in Sufism, especially from the moment when Islamic civilization evolved into a kind of spiritual sclerosis.

Two men in particular incarnated both this intellectual and spiritual search: al-Ghazālī and al-Ḥallāj.

A brilliant teacher in Baghdad, al-Ghazālī had no hesitation in abandoning all and questioning everything in a retreat which lasted ten years, the fruit of which was that vast encyclopaedia, the *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn* (The Revival of Religious Sciences). Al-Ghazālī rejected both the narrow dogmatism of his contemporaries and the meanderings of philosophy, which seemed to him vain childishness. In their exaltation of reason, philosophers merely erected a new idol which must be demolished. Al-Ghazālī had understood from his own experience that doubt is a necessary stage in belief and that inquiry, an adventure into which the soul plunges without restraint, is the prelude to true knowledge. Thus, in *Deliverance from Error*, he explained:

> Since my youth, from when I was 20 to my age now of 50, I have never ceased plunging boldly into this ocean to try and swim the waves with courage, without fear or caution, and I do not hesitate to delve into any obscurity and address any problem, examine any doctrine or sect, seeking to discover the secret of any sect and group, trying to distinguish the true from the false and he who is close to tradition and he who invents it, I do not leave an esotericist without discovering the secret of his esotericism, any more than I leave a exotericist without managing to understand his exoteric doctrine.[1]

1. Translation from the French version in '*Le soufisme, avantages et inconvénients*' by …

He went on to say:

> I therefore examined my state and found that I was entangled in the attachments of the here below which encircled me on all sides. I turned to my works, the best of which were about teaching and study, and I found that in this task I was nourishing a futile and pointless knowledge on the path to a future life. I then reflected on the purity of my intentions through my teaching dedicated to Almighty God, for its motivation and purpose was the pursuit of fame and the extension of glory. I then knew for certain that I stood at the edge of a precipice and that I would fall into the furnace if I did not get hold of myself in time.

Al-Ḥallāj for his part can be considered as the father of subjectivity when, long before Descartes, he suggested the famous formula: the bold *Ana-l-Ḥaq* (I am the Truth) which cost him his life. In Sufism, there is never any question of prophecies or dreams of the absolute, but a metaphysics where faith is not belief but knowledge, which guides reason towards the principles. The Qurʾān, the holy book, is not simply a collection of laws or the elliptical chronicle of the prophetic mission of Muḥammad. What makes it timeless is that it is also a spiritual handbook whose teaching is updated with every reading by every reader as recommended by Suhrawardi, who recommended that each verse should be read as if it had been revealed to oneself. In such a context, faith can never be a cultural given superficially passed down from generation to generation, but an act, a risk-taking, a dialogue between the individual and his or her Lord.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOUL

Concerning the individual specifically, Sufism very early on developed a psychology inseparable from its goal of spiritual purification. Indeed, people draw the reasons for their existence from divine worship, but still need to be conscious of this vocation and not become lost in the labyrinth of worldly temptations, the snares put in their way, in the very depths of their heart, by their sensual spirit riven by egoism and desire. That is why, in the eyes of some scholars, Sufism is not a religion within religion but rather a discipline in the same way as jurisprudence or exegetics, essential but in a complementary relationship to other religious sciences. Adopting the classifications set out in the Qurʾān, the Sufis distinguish three great categories of the soul: at the bottom is the bestial soul, said to incite to evil (*al-nafs al-ammāra bi-l-sūʾ*), the repentant 'self-reproaching' soul after recognition of its fall, (*al-nafs al-lawwāma*), and, lastly, the soul approved by God which accepts God in return, called upon to gain Paradise. Some Sufis have added subdivisions the names of which also take their inspiration from the Qurʾān: as well as the three types mentioned above, they distinguish the *nafs zakiyya*, the soul purified after striving to eliminate the *nafs ammāra bi-l-sūʾ*, the *nafs daniyya*, which results

in total resignation leaving the individual subject to fate, and the *nafs rāḍiyya* which accepts destiny as it comes, including in its irrational dimension, and the *nafs marḍiyya* approved by God. These are not so much different souls as states through which the human being passes in succession, in the course of elevation towards divine approval.

This elevation requires an effort which is expressed in Arabic by the same term which nowadays makes the headlines: *jihād*. In the language of lawyers' it means the violent confrontation of two camps, one consisting of believers, the other of unbelievers. However, for their part, the mystics have always preferred another concept of *jihād* which also has its roots in the prophetic model. On his return from an expedition, the Prophet said: 'we are returning from the minor *jihād* to the major *jihād'*, going on to explain that the latter was the spiritual fight that people must wage against their ego, their carnal soul. Military *jihād*, described as minor, is but a parenthesis, a temporary exception to the message of peace brought by Islam, the symbol, in macro-cosmic terms, of the conflicts and challenges harboured by the soul of every human being. The *jihād al-nafs* is thus at the heart of worship, a relentless task with sublime goals despite its unspectacular appearance, a constant effort that can never be constrained in any strict form if it is not to grow into a new ritual. It is a free and open act towards others and oneself, marked by constant vigilance. Sufism thus abjures an individualism that consists of transforming the individual into a being prey to all external influences and succumbing to the lowest urges. Instead, it extols a blossoming of the individual who becomes an actor in his or her own spiritual epic, entrusted to the care of a shaykh who will play the role of midwife to the soul. Around the shaykh converge all those who share the same aspiration, forming a society that differs from ordinary society where everyone is reduced to a social function: here it is about souls who help each other, teach each other in a fraternal and peaceful environment, because the only enemy to be fought is within. This explains why, for example, in societies imbued with Sufism, women generally occupy a much more enviable position than in the rest of the Muslim world because they are considered a spiritual companion in their own right, even as the typification of the soul devoted to God, and they are actively involved in this enterprise. Moreover, many regard Rābiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya, an ascetic from Basra who lived in the eighth century, as the first mystic of Islam. Thus Sufism generates its own society without challenging ordinary society. It always respects the social structure, as can be seen in Africa, Asia and the West where Sufis, far from cutting themselves off from the world, live their spirituality to the full among others, unlike those who surround religion with the shackles of tradition and customs specific to a particular society and withdraw into closed, almost autarchic communities.

IV–2.1   Tiles from the tomb of Ibn ʿArabī (1165–1240), the Sufi
theologian and philosopher
© G. Degeorge

LOVE AND BEAUTY

Love occupies a central place in Sufism. Love of Allāh, love of the Prophet, love of the shaykh and love of one's neighbour. It thus excludes a spirit of hatred, eschews the well-worn paths of intolerance and institutes respect for others whoever they may be.

If Christianity says that God is Love, Sufism, for its part, says that there is the identity of Beloved and the Lover because Sufism seeks the extinction of the self and return to the divine. This quest follows many paths but all necessarily pass via the Prophet, the hidden treasure of creation, the very prototype of spiritual achievement. The lover of God, driven by this impulse, endeavours to acquire the qualities of the Beloved by developing a spirit of pardon and mercy, following the example of the Prophet who made himself the human reflection of divine qualities. Love and imitation of the Prophet are thus the keys to the love of God. As the Prophet is no longer of this world, it is to the person of his spiritual heir, the shaykh, that the mutaṣawwif (Sufi) will address this love and devotion which involve complete effacement before one who embodies the image and possesses the qualities of the Prophet, who

will be a reference, a model in both daily life and level of consciousness, by means of knowledge and behaviour. The master is the one who knows how to go beyond the letter, the limits of mere reason, to re-join the spirit in a permanent quest which will lead from finite knowledge to infinite knowledge. This concept of love has nothing narcissistic, worldly or superficial about it. Quite the opposite, it is a spiritual flight towards the absolute which irradiates all the individual's relationships in the world, seeing in each thing and each being the manifestation of the divine, which is goodness and beauty.

While it is true that Sufism in its early days could be likened to an ascetic movement, the movements which were formed subsequently often portray themselves as the paths of rejoicing and recognition, inviting their followers to give thanks to the Creator by reaping the beauty which He placed in the world and adding their own contribution, especially through art, poetry and music.

KNOWLEDGE, CONTEMPLATION AND ACTION

Conscious that the entire universe bears the signs of creation, Sufism teaches its disciples how to observe the universe which surrounds them, from the atom to the most far-flung galaxies in all their diversity, both human beings and animals, nature and civilization, without ever overlooking anything in their quest. The spiritual masters nourish the minds of their pupils by resorting to the widest variety of sources, the Qur'ān, and the *Sunna*, of course, but also parables, initiatory stories and thousands of examples drawn from science, history and literature. All the disciplines, without exception, are invoked in this didactic goal, without ever being confined to the Qur'ānic or prophetic sources alone, or rather refusing to give them a literal and narrow interpretation, for the universe is filled with *āyāt* (divine signs). Knowledge, as the *Ḥadīth* says, must be pursued to the borders of China, in other words, even in a distant and foreign civilization.

This observation of the world is not limited, however, to contemplation. The Sufis have long contemplated the notion of the *khilāfa* evoked in the Qur'ān. The management of the world and the development of its potential are the responsibility of humanity. It is not permitted to hide behind the authority of an abstract and remote God. To say that I am God, as does al-Ḥallāj, or that the divine is within us, setting aside the audacity of the expression, must be understood as a way of saying that I must make people live, feed them, educate them, in other words, assume divine attributes, rather than piously leaving them to God, because that would be to sink into fatalism. Humanity harbours many potentialities buried within it. Properly used, they can contribute to a positive transformation of the environment. It is the awakening of this dormant force which leads the Sufi to use this kind of shock formulation.

Far from playing the lone contemplative, Sufis do not hesitate, in appropriate circumstances, to play a role in public affairs, whether political, economic or cultural.

Sufism and interreligious dialogue

Careful as it is to preserve its integrity, Islam is often accused of intolerance towards other beliefs, although a deeper analysis of its history shows that from the outset, it sought to place its relations with other religions, especially those of the Book, under the sign of respect and dialogue.

Of all the movements in Islam, Sufism is perhaps the one which seems the most inclined to encourage dialogue with other religions, a major challenge at a time when some never cease to brandish the spectre of the clash of civilizations and not a day passes without the term crusade finding a new relevance. Some will say that this is hardly surprising if one accepts the assumption that Sufism is a composite creation borrowing its beliefs and practices from foreign sources such as Christianity or Hinduism. As an imported belief system, it has natural affinities with the spiritualties which engendered it. Without commenting on the reality of these borrowings, the existence of points of convergence between Sufism and the great religious traditions of Christianity and Judaism are undeniable. Consider, for example, the importance of the figure of Jesus as a model of holiness and self-denial, or the interest developed by Sufism in the science of letters which in places recalls the Jewish Kabbalah.

More fundamentally, however, the spirit of tolerance for which Sufism is recognized, either as a virtue or a criticism (especially by fundamentalists attached to the principle of alliance and disavowal) can be explained by its acute awareness of the Abrahamic fraternity which unites the great monotheist religions behind their divergences and differences which, very often, exist only at the level of the exoteric, the law. Although each prophet came to reveal to humanity a particular law suited to the public to which it was addressed, to its epoch and its place, the spirit of the message has remained unchanged for centuries. Even though Islam, as a revealed religion, is for that very reason the most perfect and the most universal, the fact remains that the beliefs of one and the other converge towards the same God, the same values and shared aspirations. It is thus no surprise that the Sufis like to express the transcendence of faith in all its possible forms at a particular time in history, quoting these lines of Ibn ʿArabī:

> My heart can take any form:
> A prairie for gazelles, a monastery for monks,
> A Temple for idols, for pilgrims a Mecca,
> The Tables of the Torah, the Book of the Qurʾān.

> I am the religion of love wherever its journey takes it
> Love is my religion and my faith[2]

Closer to us, el-Haj Momar Khalifa Niass, shaykh of the *ṭarīqa al-tijāniyya*, or Tijānī order, always used to say that he had a secret such that if he revealed it, the idolaters would know that they had no religion but his. The Sufi message is a message of peace and harmony in a context of globalization which brings together civilizations that are geographically or culturally distant.

In practice, this openness and tolerance is manifest in the harmonious coexistence of the Muslim and Christian communities with a strong Sufi majority such as Egypt or Senegal. Although Senegal has only 5 per cent Christians compared with 95 per cent Muslims, the former occupy a place in society which is far from marginal, quite the contrary, since they move in the highest echelons of the state. The first Senegalese President, L. S. Senghor, was a Catholic and instituted a tradition of Islamo-Christian dialogue which his successors kept up. As Aliou Diongue recalled in an article of 18 July 2006, written on the occasion of the Dakar conferences on the theme of Islam and Christianity, 'President Senghor took the initiative back in 1972 of organizing an international symposium on the subject of "Islam and Modernity".' A delegation from the Vatican took part in that symposium. In December 1991, President Abdou Diouf, in turn, announced a forthcoming international meeting on Islamo-Christian dialogue. Thus Dakar was merely inviting the rest of the world to follow in the path it had taken.[3]

The good relations in Senegal are such that both communities celebrate more or less without distinction their own and the other's festivals, as shown by a report by the American embassy in Senegal in 2004:

> The country has a long tradition of amicable and tolerant coexistence between the Muslim majority and Christian, traditional indigenous, and other religious minorities. Interfaith marriage is relatively common. Within certain families, other religious faiths, such as Christianity or a traditional indigenous religion, are practised alongside Islam. There are a number of interfaith events throughout the year that celebrate the important role of religion in everyday life.[4]

It could almost be said that inter-fraternity rivalries are more pronounced than interreligious rivalries, although, of course, the cordiality of relations between Christians and Muslims in Senegal should not mask the reality of the balance of power.

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2. From *Le chant de l'ardent désir*, selection of poems transl. into French from the Arabic and presented by Sami Ali, Paris, Sindbad, 1989.
3. Apanews.
4. International religious freedom report 2004, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2004/35379.htm.

IV–2.2   Shaykh Hassan Cissé, 1945–2008, Sufi leader from Senegal
and grandson of Ibrahim Niasse, meeting UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan in June 2004
© UN Photo/EskinderDebebe

Let us leave Senegal and look at the example of Syria and the remarkable spirit of tolerance demonstrated by the late Shaykh Aḥmed Kuftārū, grand mufti of the Syrian Arab Republic and shaykh of the Naqshbandi order, towards other religions and even other schools of thought such as communism. In a conference in San Francisco, United States, in 1990, where he discussed the Abrahamic and Adamic fraternity, he spoke of his wish to invite communist philosophers to a 'dialogue between religion and science for the purpose of effecting a reconciliatory compromise between these recalcitrant spouses.' He went on to say:

> His Holiness, Pope John Paul II, told me during a meeting with him that he read the Qurʾān every day. My response to him was that I am well versed in the Bible. It is this frank and open-minded spirit that can bring about human fraternity and eliminate all malice and discord, so that the believers in One God might coexist in affection and harmony.[5]

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5.   http://www.kuftaro.net/english/activity1.php?activity_no=1%20&%20act_no=%205.

The same spirit can be found in the speech made on the occasion of the visit of Pope John Paul II to Damascus in 2001.

SPLENDOURS AND TRAVAILS OF SUFISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Throughout its history, Sufism has been confronted with religious and other forces in varying degrees hostile to its development: intervention of foreign powers, Salafi-inspired reformism, proselytism by other religions, etc. This was probably even more the case in the twentieth century.

We will sketch out a picture, albeit one which cannot be exhaustive in the space of these few pages, by examining one by one the major regions of the Sufi world.

BLACK AFRICA

In a Muslim world, most of which fell under the colonial yoke, Sufism seemed suspect to the colonial powers because of its capacity to mobilize the population and exerted a profound hold on minds. Moreover, it is no accident that the fiercest resistance to the European invasion of black Africa came from Sufis, such as Omar Futiyyou Tall. Little by little, however, belligerent opposition gave way to a more conciliatory attitude which some called collaborationism, but which others saw instead as a mode of passive resistance, a way of limiting the ravages of colonization (which at least had the merit of putting an end to the power of the pagan kings). They accepted the fact of material domination while maintaining a barrier against imposition of another culture and spiritual alienation. Nevertheless, this relative peace was not without setbacks and mutual suspicion, and the orders continued to be subjected to close surveillance by the colonial administration. The brushes of Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba with the colonial authorities who ended up exiling him, the question of Hamallism in which religious dissidence was compounded in the eyes of the administration by a political threat, show that the hatchet of war had not been finally buried between the two parties. The attitude of the Sufi elites, albeit within a general framework of cooperation, suggested more nuanced attitudes depending on the marabouts concerned. At times they showed real attentiveness towards the authorities, but at others a detachment which could easily be seen as suspicious. While rendering considerable services to the administration, the Sufi movements took advantage of the situation to gain strength and extend their influence over the local population and sometimes far beyond, as shown by the example of El-Hajj Ibrahima Niass who brought the following of the Tijānī order to a peak.

> At the end of the colonial period, Ibrahima Niass had several million disciples in all the countries of West Africa, especially in Mauritania, Niger, Togo, Guinea, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Chad, as well as in northern Cameroon.[6]

This influence of the Sufi movements, initially spiritual, is not confined to the domain of religion but also concerns the economic and political spheres. In the Mouride order, for example, work is elevated to the rank of a sacred value and an act of worship. It is no accident that its members are the most dynamic community in Senegal on the economic front. In general, too, many marabouts have engaged in agricultural activities, especially cultivation of groundnuts. On achieving independence, unlike the nationalists in the Arab world who still held a grudge against Sufism for its attitude during colonization, relations between the marabouts and the new authorities were established on the colonial model of relatively peaceful cooperation between modern entities and traditional bodies. Even if they were rarely personally involved in the political jousting, the marabouts exercised to the full their decisive influence on their disciples during elections through the *ndigueul* (guidance on how to vote).

As is the case for Islam in general, the migratory flows from the Muslim world were accompanied by the establishment of *zawiyas* and *dayiras* (associations or assemblies) by emigrant populations seeking to continue to live their spiritual life in the foreign environment and to maintain the spirit of solidarity which binds the members of the same order against the dangers of individualism and isolation. These assemblies of expatriates maintain a living link with their sheikh. The latter willingly pay annual visits to the principal areas where the order's *zawiyas* are established and continue to provide permanent teaching using the means offered by technology. Telephone, email, websites and videoconferences allow Sufi aspirants to ask questions about their spiritual development.

THE MEETING OF EUROPE AND SUFISM

While the Muslim world was opening up to European civilization, the West was also discovering oriental spirituality thanks to the translations of Hindu, Buddhist and Sufi writings. Among scholars, the excessively external approach of the orientalist, who always judges Islam by reference to Judeo-Christianity to point out its departures from the authentic model, has been replaced by that of modern Islamology, which seeks to grasp Islamic thinking from within while underlining the relationship between the Abrahamic religions. Louis Massignon was the prime originator of this approach in his studies on al-Ḥallāj. The interest in Sufism gradually spread in certain European literary circles.

6. D. R. David, and J. L. Triaud (eds.), *Le temps des marabouts.*

Even though, for many, it stemmed only from a desire to forge a new syncretic spirituality, for others it grew into a true vocation which led them to drink at the very source of this wisdom. Shaykh Aḥmad al-ʿAlawī (1869–1934), founder of the Darqāwiyya ʿAlawiyya branch of the Shādhilī order, is the incarnation for many of the ideal master, both saint and man of his times. Through his great tolerance and open-mindedness towards the West, Shaykh Aḥmad al-ʿAlawī was able to foster the spread of the Sufi movement in Europe. He inspired the emergence of a European Sufism based on metaphysics and with a keen interest in the affinities between different religions. From this perspective, Sufism becomes an expression of the great primordial universal tradition, common to all humanity but whose particular manifestations, specific to each place and each epoch, have undergone varying degrees of distortion.

Initially attracted by Hinduism and freemasonry, René Guenon turned to the Shādhilī order with a number of his disciples, such as Martin Lings and Titus Burckhardt. Their works on Sufism and their translations of important esoteric writings like those of Ibn ʿArabī were to make a major contribution to their spread in the West, while one of his former disciples, Frithjof Schuon, was later to found his own branch of the order, the Maryamiyya. One also sees, however, the birth of a Sufism which is not necessarily attached to the Islamic tradition and which, as a consequence, does not necessarily involve conversion to Islam. In the Maryamiyya, as well as the devotion to Mary which explains the name given to the movement, other hues are added, such as the interest in the native religion of the Amerindians. European Sufism is thus a sort of hybrid Sufism always at the crossroads of cultures, sensitive to the artistic dimension of manifestations of ecstasy through song and poetry, as shown by the popularity of the whirling dervishes, *gnawas*, and the translations of Rumi's poems, revealed to the European public by the works of Eve de Vitray-Meyerovitch. Indeed, the Sufis embarked on a vast programme to disseminate their teachings, through the publication of popular works penned by the likes of Faouzi Skali or Idris Shah who revived the tradition of teaching through fable and humour, meetings and festivals of Sufi songs and music, and so on, in Europe and North Africa. Nowadays, interest in Sufism does not necessarily involve joining a particular order, but can also include participation in circles, reading works, thus leaving more individual room for manoeuvre. This is very different, for example, from the strict obedience demanded by membership of the Tijānī order and traditional orders in general which equate the absence of the master to having Satan as a guide. As Michel Chodliewicz remarked, in an interview in the *Tribune d'Octobre* (Montreuil, No 19, March 1990), a clear distinction must be made between 'the presence or absence of the taṣawwuf from the phenomenon of the vitality or decline of the *ṭuruq* (*orders*). They are two different things. There is a tendency, especially in North Africa, to connect them. The *taṣawwuf* started before there were any *ṭuruq*. It can also exist where there are none.'

Furthermore, he posited that the future of Sufism in the twenty-first century would not necessarily involve orders, as they were merely historic forms adopted by Sufism in certain contexts but in no way mandatory.

By establishing itself in the West, therefore, Sufism takes new forms, often divorced from the traditional confraternal model. Now, the age-old question of the relationship between Sufism and *Sharīʿa* is once again based on the liberties that some take with the strict observance of Islamic legislation. Nevertheless, as we have seen above, the establishment of *zawiyas* by emigrant populations, be they from Africa, the Maghreb, India or Turkey, to the extent that they live within the European population, has encouraged the meeting between the latter and Islam in general and Sufism in particular, because they saw in that religion and its mysticism the longed-for answer to their spiritual needs.

SUFISM IN THE ARAB WORLD

In the East, Sufism suffered severe setbacks with the closure of the *ṭuruq* ordered by Atatürk in 1925. Turkey had been one of the main centres of Sufi spirituality, having been the cradle of Rumi's Mevlevi order, as well as the Aleviya and Bektaşi orders. The expansion of the Ottoman Empire had contributed to the export of these orders in the area under its rule, notably in the Balkans where Sufism was one of the principal vectors of the inhabitants' conversion to Islam. It is still an integral part of the religious identity of the Muslims who live there today. In the view of Atatürk, and many other secular nationalists in the Muslim world who followed, Sufism was an obstacle to modernity, as observed by Zidan in a chapter of his book titled *Islam's fateful path:*

> In the majority of Muslim countries, especially Egypt, Algeria, Turkey and Bourguiba's Tunisia, the nationalists made the mistake of adopting for themselves the colonial prejudice against the Sufi fraternities. Like the colonialists they were fighting, these nationalists were convinced that the popular base of the Sufi orders would hinder their policies and constitute an obstacle to progress and civilization.[7]

However, the total eradication of the Sufi phenomenon has never been realistic. Despite the persecution suffered by Sufism in certain periods which led to the extinction of some branches, its vitality is undeniable. After several phases of rejection, Egypt, which is also one of the great homelands of Sufism, ultimately recognized in it an essential component of its multiculturalism, even if its activity is subject to strict control by the state, notably through the Council of Sufi Orders created in 1978. Relations between the orders and the state vary, depending on whether the state wants to use them as a bulwark against

7. Z. Meriboute: *Islam's Fateful Path.*

fundamentalism (under Nasser, for example) or alternatively espouses reformist ideas. One is reminded of the censure of the Meccan Illuminations of Ibn ʿArabī under Sadat or the proscription of a fraternity like the Burhāniyya. Sufism continues to pervade the mindset of the Egyptian population, the masses and elites alike. Since the end of the Boumédienne era, Algeria also seems to be emerging from a long period of marginalization of Sufism. As Sossie Andezian explains, the decline of the orders in Algeria after independence was linked to the disintegration of Algerian society and the re-configuring of the circles of power rather than the success of reformism.[8] Here too, as in other countries, this change of attitudes can be explained by the realization that the growth of fundamentalism is often linked to the loss of the vitality of Sufism, and where the latter prospers, Salafism cannot easily take hold.

Avowed adversary of Sufism, Salafism's main bastion is Saudi Arabia where, since the conquest of the Hijaz by the Saud family, the reformism of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb has become the state doctrine. This Manichean proposition needs refining; however, as many reformists have experienced a Sufi influence at some time in their life, such as Ben Badis or like Ḥasan al-Bannā have been members of a Sufi order. At the time, Sufism was attacked in the name of regeneration of the authentic Islamic moral standards which to the theoretician of Wahhabism went hand in hand with the political restoration of the country by Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd. Religion must be purified of all the reproachable innovations such as the worship of tombs introduced by the Sufis. Thus Mecca, which had been one of the great centres of Sufism, completely lost this aspect of its identity. Although the Fasiyya order retains some room for manoeuvre thanks to its practice of a moderate Sufism, and the presence of Egyptian migrants has revived the practice of the *dhikr*, the official attitude is to condemn outright the Sufi phenomenon. This purifying mission does not stop at the borders of the Kingdom, but targets the entire Muslim world through an active policy of spreading the Salafi doctrine through books, publications, missions of preachers and financing of mosques and institutes.

Nevertheless, the Middle East remains the cradle of Sufism thanks to Syria and Jordan where Sufi movements enjoy a degree of consideration on the part of the state. Many sheikhs belonging to the Shādhilī and especially Naqshbandi orders live there and have an international audience owing to their many relays throughout the West. They themselves are not at all unwilling to make annual trips to meet their disciples. Converts also play an important role in the development of orders in the West. Some are even at the head of certain branches. Such is the case of Nuh Keller, an American convert to Islam and currently one of the sheikhs of the ʿAlawī branch of the Shādhilī

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8. S. Andezian, 'L'Algérie, le Maroc, la Tunisie', in A. Popovic, and G. Veinstein, *Les voies d'Allah*, Fayard, 1996.

order, living in Jordan, or Ḥaj Mustafā ʿAlī, representative in America of the a*l-Ḥaydariyya al-Shādhiliyya* branch.

THE COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER COMMUNIST BLOC

The communist hold over a large swathe of the Muslim world lasting more than half a century, from Albania, through the Caucasus to Chinese Turkestan, was not without consequences for the Sufi orders in those regions. As the official position of the authorities was that of a militant atheism hostile towards all religions, their relationship with the Sufi movements was inevitably one of antagonism. Many of them were forced to go underground. Their deep roots in the local mentality and traditions, crystallized in the tombs of saints, ensured their continuity so that the collapse of the Soviet bloc revealed them more alive than ever. Thus, in the Caucasus, by a strange paradox, Sufism was more dynamic than seventy years previously and probably stronger than in many other Muslim countries.[9] It is true that in this particular case, despite being recent imports, the orders had managed to absorb the clan-based social structures in Chechnya and Dagestan. Intimately linked to the identity of these peoples, they were at the heart of the rebel and resistance movements against the Soviet oppressor, whose deportation of their members only served to strengthen their support. In China, despite the condemnation of Sufism by the authorities, added to that of a fundamentalist current long present in China and particularly aggressive since the 1980s, the underground orders kept going during the Maoist era.[10] Elsewhere in Central Asia, they found a more favourable attitude from the government, to the extent that they could bar the way to Wahhabism.

SOUTH-WEST ASIA

For several centuries, the ḥaj was the opportunity for Indonesian Sufis to meet the great sheikhs from whom they received a sufficiently solid initiation and instruction to allow them in their turn to pass on this teaching to the people of their own country. The most favoured *ṭuruq* were the Sammāniyya and the Qadariyya wa Naqshbandiyya. The advent of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia put an end to this traditional way of learning and the orders gradually adapted to local tradition.[11] Alongside the branches stemming from the traditional orders jealously guarding their orthodoxy, local mystic movements developed, shifting away from purely Islamic dogma and practices, maintaining a

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9. C. Lemercier-Quelquejay, 'Le Caucase', *ibid.*
10. F. Aubin, 'La Chine', *ibid.*
11. M. Van Bruinessen, 'L'Asie du Sud-est', *ibid.*

somewhat detached relationship with the Muslim religion, even one of open hostility (the Perlajanan movement). Independence saw the birth of new quite orthodox orders like the Wāḥidiyya of Kiai ʿAbdul Majīd Maʿruf, but they did not possess the *silsila* (initiatory link). However, they made a strong contribution to the islamization or re-islamization of the population following the troubles which accompanied the rise to power of Suharto.

Turning now to India, one realizes that, as in many colonized countries, the colonial authorities sought the support of religious leaders to ensure the acceptance of their presence by the population. It was only at the beginning of the twentieth century that some Sufi movements started making anti-colonialist demands. Sufis also took part in the actions which led to the partition of India and have retained political importance. Sufism acts as a melting pot of a syncretic culture shared by Hindus and Muslims. However, it has to confront a Wahhabi-inspired opposition from the Pakistani Government and the activism of the fundamentalist movement, *Jamaat-e-Islami*, whose ideology follows from the thinking of Maududi.

The challenges of Sufism and Sufi orders today

This real vitality of the Sufi movements should not cause us to ignore the charges levelled against them and against all movements whose principles seek the good and well-being of humanity. In the first place, there is always the risk of seeing the original doctrines exploited by people obsessed with worldly goods and ready to pervert the traditional teachings. The travesties often denounced among Sufis are, sadly, true in the case of some of them: charlatanism, withdrawal from the world on the pretext of fatalism, refusal to accept reason and exaltation of emotion. Many mystic paths are characterized by the number of their adherents but this is offset by the inactivity of their members, the distortion of precepts, and the addition of artificial and even dangerous and harmful new rules. Some take refuge behind the authority of the dead and their words, or the dreams and directives of their successors, all of it for the sole purpose of escaping reality and their own responsibility thanks to facile solutions or discourse which benumbs the population. However, all these ills are merely the result of poor comprehension or application of Sufi teaching and evaporate as soon as its authenticity is restored, always provided that people are aware of this decadence. In orders where the succession is by inheritance and not by choices based on criteria of competence or 'holiness', the original meaning of the mission of the shaykh is lost. Instead, it becomes a question of political and financial power which arouses the silent or not-so-silent indignation of their disciples. While it is often dominated by the reverence due to all descendants of the illustrious founder of the order, it may lead to a detachment from the movement or even plain and simple rejection.

The penetration of Salafism into areas traditionally attached to Sufism has found ways of turning these cracks into true splits. Thus, in the fief of the orders which is Senegal, various Salafi-inspired associations, some founded on the Wahhabi model (UCM, *al-Falah*), and others on the Algerian model of Ben Badis or the Pakistani model of Maududi (*Jamaat Ibadurrahman* formed in 1978) have found acceptance among some young Senegalese, urban and educated, weary of the excesses and deviations of a superstitious and fanatical Sufi practice, and the collusion between marabout families and power.[12]

Moreover, the rudderless epoch in which we live has encouraged the emergence of a veritable supermarket of religions in which everyone is trying to manufacture their own personal spirituality, gleaning here and there snippets of a simplified esotericism. Sufism is one of these products recently offered to this public, in a version sometimes so watered down that its Islamic roots melt into a vague universal mysticism. In one of the talks included in his work *The Sufi Tradition in the West*, Omar Ali Shah warns Sufi aspirants against this trend which he regards as typically Western and imbued with the obsession with outcomes that characterizes Western society:

> It is what they call a supermarket mentality. You go shopping. It is nothing to laugh about. When you do an exercise in the framework of Tradition and you use a technique, Zen breathing, even if the two are not mutually exclusive, they will nevertheless give rise to a degree of confusion. Although they can both be positive, they are not practised in the same way. A Zen posture requires a Zen vocation and a Zen form of breathing. You cannot take one thing and associate it with something else because it is more exciting, more convenient or more interesting and everyone else is doing it.

Of course, there have always been deviant branches within Sufism, in the sense that their doctrines or practices are very clearly heterodox and flow from a syncretism into which local traditions are mingled. Take, for example, the Bektaşi whose thinking is heavily laced with Shīʿism or the *Qalandariyya* which mixes Shamanism and Buddhism with an originally Islamic subsoil. Yet the emergence of Sufi movements which assert their independence from Islam (e.g. Universal Sufism, the Mevlevi Order of America, the Golden Sufi Center, the Sufi Foundation of America and Sufism Reoriented) inevitably creates problems and stimulates debate among traditional Sufis who, whatever the accusations of their opponents, have always asserted the Islamic origin of their practices and their inscription in the scriptural tradition (Qurʾān and *Sunna*). Criticized by the Wahhabi 'orthodoxy', harried by this esoteric fashion in vogue in the West, Sufism is more than ever called on to assert its identity between fundamentalism and pure evanescence, for its destiny is burdened

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12. A. Piga, *Les voies du soufisme au sud du Sahara.*

by that infamous yet age-old judgment: today Sufism is just a name without a reality. It was once a reality without a name.

So, is Sufism just another victim of globalization? This major phenomenon of our times, which brings with it so many questions, is the subject of much attention by Sufis. In their eyes, it symbolizes, perhaps, the long-awaited condition which alone will allow the fulfilment that the religious have sought for so many centuries, even if some have received intimations or signs heralding its coming. Ibn ʿArabī al-Khātimī believed that he had attained the ultimate stage but it was revealed to him that the time had not yet come. In his turn, at-Tijānī, while claiming the seal of *Mohammedan* sainthood, compared himself before his disciples to a revolver bullet whose trajectory had not yet ended. One day he entrusted a missive to one of his disciples, Mishri, enjoining him to give it to the man who asked him for it, and it turned out that the man in question was black, Muḥammad al-Ghālī. This symbolic event announced the conveyance of a spiritual deposit in favour of the black community, firstly in the hands of an Omar Futyu, then the Tijānī Fath order which, with Baye Niass, embarked on a true globalization of the mystic experience. It made the *Fatḥ*, or opening, once such an inaccessible elitist spiritual illumination, a reality within reach of all, making everyone the receptacle of the divine secret, transcending place and differences as expressed in these lines:

> O white man, O black man, Arab, not Arab
> Come to me, with your possessions and your person
> To attain the Opening in the here and now.

This universal effusion of the divine is perhaps what is missing in today's globalization, crushed by materiality. To whoever seeks morality, the shaykh can bring enlightenment. How else can one explain the fact that possessing everything and provision for every material need does not bring satisfaction to anyone? Since Adam, the confrontation between the temporal and the spiritual has led only to a succession of more or less happy attempts to reconcile these two poles of the being. After a period of asceticism and rejection of the world, as we have seen, spiritual leaders came to preach measured enjoyment and gratitude to God for his blessings. It is perhaps time to go further. What if, instead of crying shame at the civilization of material possessions, Sufism took up the challenge of transmuting all this potential of material things, into the plenitude of being?

Chapter 4.3

Islamic contemporary movements and Islamic political parties

Basheer M. Nafi

From the late 1970s onward, Islamic revivalist movements have engendered more debate than any other world political phenomenon. Beginning with the Islamic revolution of Iran and not ending with the 11 September 2001 attacks on Washington and New York, the political force of modern Islam never failed to arouse the interest of world public opinion. While literature on modern Islam uses different terms to describe the Islamic movements, such as revivalist, militant, radical and fundamentalist, the common denominator of these movements is their political outlook, their seeking of power in its modern, political sense.

Islamic political movements owe their emergence to objective, historical circumstances, rather than to Islamic heritage. As its birth is marked with the founding of *Jamʿiyyat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn* (*the Ikhwān*, the Society of the Muslim Brothers), in Egypt in the late 1920s, political Islam is a totally modern phenomenon, representing neither a continuity of traditional Islamic expressions, nor a return to traditions. Its vision is largely a reconstruction of traditions: Islamic traditions as they are perceived in the light of the modern. One of the aims of the Islamic political movements has been the creation of an Islamic state and implementation of the *Sharīʿa*. But the model of the state they imagine is centralized, sovereign and territorial, a state that holds the power of legislation and is in full control of land, people and socio-cultural affairs. Never in Islamic history, from the Madīnan Caliphate to the Ottoman Sultanate, has such a state ever existed.[1] As the bulk of Islamist leaders belong to the modern classes, and are the product of modern

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1. I. M. Lapidus, 'The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islam', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 6 (1975), pp. 363–85; B. M. Nafi, *The Rise and Decline of the Arab-Islamic Reform Movement*, London, ICIT, 2000, pp. 4–9; W. B. Hallaq, *The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 178–93.

education and professions, rather than the ʿulama institution, their worldview is highly indebted to modern western ideologies and political culture. Even the major instrument of Islamic power, the political organization, is modelled on modern European political organizations, especially those of ideological parties. Traditional social formations (the tribe, the extended family, the merchants' and artisans' guilds, and the Sufi associations), are usually viewed with disdain by modern Islamists.

Several developments contributed to the emergence of political Islam. First, is the process of modernization in the Muslim world. Programmes of modernization swept throughout Muslim societies from the mid-nineteenth century onward, carried out by Muslim modernizing statesmen, or imperialist administrations. The outcome of modernization was multifaceted: social, economic, and political.[2] One important result of the age of modernization was the marginalization of the ʿulama class, leaders of societies and spokesmen of Islam for centuries, and the emergence of new leaders and spokesmen, teachers, army officers, journalists, and professionals of all kinds and backgrounds. Political Islam is a manifestation of this disruptive change, as the new classes were divided between loyalty to Islam and adherence to new ideas and ideologies. Second, is the emergence of the modern, hegemonic state in the Muslim countries. The maximization of the power of the state emphasized its role in shaping society, its values and its orientation. For the modern Islamists, capturing the instrument of the state became a prerequisite to the promotion of their vision of society. Third, and equally important, is the rising sense of 'Islam under threat', engendered by the loss of Islamic world power, imperialism, and the embrace of secular culture by modernizing statesmen and the post-colonial state.

The founding period

The first Islamic political movement was the Society of Muslim Brothers. Founded in the Egyptian Suez Canal city of Ismaʿiliyya in 1928 by Ḥasan al-Bannā (1906–49), al-Ikhwān was originally a socio-religious group rather than a political organization. A teacher in profession, Ḥasan al-Bannā graduated from Dār al-ʿUlūm, a modern institute of Arab and Islamic studies. Born in the Delta village of Maḥmudiyya, he joined a local Sufi ṭarīqa.[3] But moving to Cairo, al-Bannā was disturbed by what he saw as the decadent lifestyle of the Egyptian capital city. He was also a keen witness to the heated debate about the caliphate and constitution that engulfed Egypt of the 1920s. Ikhwān's early activities focused on charitable works, building of mosques and propagating

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2. Nafi, *The Rise and Decline ..., op. cit.*, pp. 37–45.
3. On al-Bannā and the founding of the Ikhwan, see R. P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers*, London, Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 1–11; Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt*, Reading, Ithaca Press, 1998, pp. 21–129.

Islamic values. With the transfer of the society's headquarters to Cairo in 1932, and the publishing of its weekly review the next year, the *Ikhwān* acquired a national platform.

During the Palestinian national revolt of 1936–39, the *Ikhwān* played a significant role in supporting the Palestinians by organizing rallies, collecting donations and sending telegrammes of protest to the British authorities. These activities raised the *Ikhwān* profile and attracted attention to their popular influence. In the late 1930s, the *Ikhwān* were encouraged by Arab-Islamic figures surrounding King Faruq, such as Shaykh al-Azhar Muṣṭafa al-Marāghī and Chief of the Royal Court ʿAlī Māhir, seeking to strengthen the power of the Palace against the party of the majority, the Wafd Party.[4] In a speech to the *Ikhwān*'s fourth general congress in 1938, al-Bannā made strong hints about their political aspirations. Although the outbreak of the Second War World forced the *Ikhwān* to lay low, they spent the war years consolidating the organization's structure and its reach to various strata of the people.

Once the war ended, the *Ikhwān* emerged as a major political force. But al-Bannā's decision in 1941–2 to establish an armed secretive branch, *al-Niẓām al-Khāṣṣ* (or the special organization), proved to be highly detrimental to the future course of the *Ikhwān*.[5] By the late 1940s, as the monarchic regime began to lose control, the *Ikhwān*'s special organization took part in the campaign of bombing against the British presence in Egypt. The situation in the country deteriorated even further after Egypt's entry into the Palestine 1948 war, which was joined also by *Ikhwān* volunteers. As department stores owned by Jews were bombed or burned, and a judge known for issuing harsh sentences against *Ikhwān* elements was assassinated, the government found strong evidence linking the special organization to the wave of violence. Since the country was in a state of war, and emergency law had already been declared, the prime minister al-Nuqrashi Pasha issued a decision, on 18 December 1948, dissolving the Muslim Brothers Society. Al-Nuqrashi Pasha was consequently assassinated by a member of the special organization; and on 12 February 1949, al-Bannā was shot dead in downtown Cairo by a hitsquad, dispatched by al-Nuqrashi's successor, the ruthless Ibrāhīm ʿAbd al-Hādī.[6]

Al-Bannā was very much influenced by the cultural environment created by the Arab-Islamic reform movement and two of its eminent figures, Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb and Rashīd Riḍā.[7] He was a moderate Salafi, believing in the necessity to re-establish the unity of the community on the basis of the

4. Mitchell, *The Society …*, *op. cit.*, pp. 16–17; Basheer M. Nafi, *Arabism, Islamism and the Palestine Question: 1908–1941*, Reading, Ithaca Press, 1998, pp. 204–5.

5. On the *Ikhwān* special organization, see ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm Ramāḍān, *al-Ikhwān al-muslimān wa-l-tanẓīm al-sirrī*, Cairo, Roz al-Yūsuf, 1977; Mitchell, *The Society …*, *op. cit.*, pp. 58–79.

6. For detailed record of this turbulent period, see Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm, *al-Ikhwān al-muslimān: aḥdāth ṣanaʿat al-tarīkh*, Cairo, Dār al-Daʿwa, 1981, II, pp. 19–326.

7. Nafi, *Arabism, Islamism …*, *op. cit.*, pp. 160–1.

Qur'ān, the *Sunna* and *ijtihād*. But unlike radical Salafis, he accepted a mild form of *taṣawwuf* and did not reject adherence to classical schools of *fiqh*.[8] Highly alienated by the impact of modern secular culture on Islamic societies, al-Bannā's primary concern was the question of identity. This does not mean that he was entirely oblivious to pan-Islamic solidarity; yet, his agenda was respectively Egyptian, Arab, and pan-Islamic. Coming from a humble social background, his genius was to rise as one of the most powerful men of Egypt at a time when Egyptian society was profoundly class-ridden.

The absence of al-Bannā left a huge vacuum in the *Ikhwān* leadership. But by 1951, as the Wafd Party returned to power, supported by *Ikhwān* votes, Egypt's political environment had changed considerably. By the end of the year, a court ruling lifted the ban on the *Ikhwān*, who had already agreed on judge Ḥasan al-Huḍaybī as their new leader. In July 1952, a group of nationalist officers, many of whom were closely associated with the *Ikhwān*, overthrew the monarchic regime, and two years later, declared Egypt a republic. Relations between the *Ikhwān* and the military regime vacillated between mutual identification and open conflict. The *Ikhwān* sought the implementation of their own programme, while the officers, especially their charismatic leader, Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser, worked to assert their sole control of power.[9] In the fall of 1954, an attempt on Nasser's life led to the second ban of the *Ikhwān* and an all-out crackdown on their offices, assets and members. Six of their senior leaders were executed, and thousands of others were jailed for years, most without trial.

The second most influential Islamic political movement was founded in British India in 1941. Like the *Ikhwān*, the making and development of *Jama'at Islami* is very much linked to the making and development of its founder Abu-l-A'la Mawdudi (1903–79). Born to a family with strong Sufi roots and association with the Mogul Imperial court, Mawdudi received a traditional Islamic education. In Delhi in the early 1920s, he worked as a journalist, getting involved with the *Khilāfat* movement and *Jam'iyyat 'Ulama Hind* (Society of Indian *'Ulama*).[10] The abolition of the Ottoman caliphate and the emergence of the Turkish nationalist state turned him against the idea of nationalism, and led him to withdraw support from the nationalist Congress Party, and

8. Al-Bannā's vision is best illustrated in his 'Risālat al-Taʿālīm', included in Ḥasan al-Bannā, *Majmūʿat rasāʾil al-Imām al-shahīd*, Beirut, al-Muʾassassa al-Islāmiyya, 1979, pp. 353–70.

9. Mitchell, *The Society …*, *op. cit.*, pp. 105–62; ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm, *al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, op. cit.*, III, pp. 51–405.

10. On the life and education of Mawdudi, see S. V. R. Nasr, 'Mawdudi and Jama'at-i Islami: The Origins, Theory and Practice of Islamic Revivalism', in A. Rahnema (ed.), *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, London, Zed Press, 1994, pp. 99–104; A. B. K. Brohi, 'Mawlana Abul A'la Mawdudi: The Man, the Scholar, the Reformer', in K. Ahmad and Z. I. Ansari, *Islamic Perspectives: Studies in Honour of Mawlana Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi*, Leicester, The Islamic Foundation, 1979, pp. 289–312.

Jam'iyyat 'Ulama Hind, which supported the Congress. Subsequently, he left Delhi for the Deccan, where he spent most of his time reading and developing his understanding of Islam, Islamic history in India, and modern political thought. In addition to his mastering of Urdu and Arabic, he taught himself English. When he launched the journal of *Turjuman-ul-Qoran* in 1932, which would be the organ of disseminating his ideas until his death, he had already formed a vision of the position of Islam in modern India. The new Mawdudi grew a beard, returned to traditional Islamic-Indian dress, and became critical of the Muslim' unconscious embrace of local culture. For him, the question of Islam in India was no longer a question of national liberation or a minority in the midst of a non-Islamic majority, but rather a question of preservation of identity and communal survival.

In 1938, Mawdudi answered an invitation from the eminent Muslim poet and thinker Muhammad Iqbal to run a centre of Islamic education in Patan-Kut in the northern Punjab province. This was a time of rising Muslim resentment as the first Indian national autonomous administration, led by the Congress Party, started to impart non-Islamic, Indian nationalist values into school education. Three years after arriving in Patan-Kut, Mawdudi and a small group of other Muslim activists and young *ʿulama* set up the *Jama'at Islami*, of which he was elected leader.[11] From the very beginning, the *Jama'at Islami* was not meant to be a mass organization, but essentially an outfit of vanguard Muslim activists, well trained and educated, and dedicated to leading the revival of the Muslim community. The *Jama'at Islami*, still small and marginal, exercised no influence on Indian Partition and the coming of Pakistan in 1947. Although Mawdudi was not particularly enthusiastic about partition, he became a citizen of Pakistan.

For the majority of Indian Muslims who supported partition, Pakistan was seen as an Islamic state; but for Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his associates in the Muslim League, who led the movement for partition, Pakistan was envisioned as a national state for Muslims. The contrast between the emerging reality and Islamic aspirations turned Mawdudi into an outspoken opponent of the Pakistan State. The *Jama'at Islami* took an active part in the struggle for an Islamic constitution, and Mawdudi was jailed for two years. His second arrest and trial, upon which he received a death sentence, had a profound impact on his thought and career, for it was a 1955 Supreme Court decision which would ultimately save him from execution. He became more appreciative of the checks and balances embedded in the modern state system, and would soon approve of the constitution, once an article affirming the Islamic identity of Pakistan was included. His call for a total transformation of state and society would evolve into a programme of gradual change and embrace

11. On the formative period of the *Jama'at*, see S. V. R. Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 39–41.

the democratic process. In 1972, Mawdudi resigned his position in the *Jama'at* due to illhealth, continuing to publish his views and play an advisory role to his friend and successor, Muʿīn Tufayl Muḥammad.[12]

Mawdudi's early radical emphasis of Islamic identity and opposition to nationalism reflected the sense of loss that Indian Muslims experienced as a result of the Mogul downfall, British occupation and the resurgence of Hindu nationalism. Like al-Bannā, he sought the 're-education' of the community and the effecting of a Muslim re-awakening. From the late 1950s onward, Mawdudi's orientations were conditioned by the Pakistani national context and the question of Islamization.[13] His evolving moderate approach was reflected in opposition to military regimes and the widespread violence associated with the Islamic revolution in Iran. Although on social issues, including women's rights and land reform, he was mainly a conservative, still faithful to traditional Ḥanafī jurisprudential training, he was generally a modern thinker. His vision of Islam as an ideology, and of the Islamic state as a modern state, was largely indebted to modern European political thought. When he died in an American hospital in 1979, he was already regarded as a towering Pakistani figure and a highly influential Islamic one. But as an elitist organization, dominated by urban middle class membership, the *Jamāʿāt Islami*'s electoral success continued to be considerably limited. It wasn't until 1987, when the charismatic Qasi Ḥusayn of the north-western frontier province became leader, that the *Jama'at* moved to shed its elitist image and turn into a mass organization.[14]

The third major movement to appear was *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr al-Islāmī* (the Islamic Liberation Party), founded in Jordan in 1952. *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr* is the brainchild of shaykh Taqiyy-l-Dīn al-Nabahānī (1909–77) and a small group of his early associates.[15] Al-Nabahānī, a Palestinian from an established learned family, is one of the rare leaders of a modern Islamic movement to receive a formal ʿulamatic education. He graduated from the Cairo University of al-Azhar in 1932, and worked in mandated Palestine as a teacher and *Sharīʿa* court judge. The loss of Palestine and founding of Israel in 1948 left a profound impact on al-Nabahānī and his generation. His first book, *Inqādh*

12. For the political history of the *Jama'at* in Pakistan and Bangladesh, see R. Ahmed, 'Redefining Muslim Identity in South Asia: The Transformation of the *Jama'at-i Islami*', in M. E. Marty and R. S. Appleby, *Accounting for Fundamentalism*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 669–705.

13. A study of Mawdudi's thought is in Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 49–125.

14. Nasr, 'Mawdudi and Jama'at-i Islami', *op. cit.*, p. 120.

15. For an extinctive study of al-Nabahānī and *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr*, see S. Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Taḥrīr and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate*, London, Grey Seal, 1996. See also, Fayṣal Darrāj, and Jamal Bārūt (eds.), *al-Aḥzāb wa-l-ḥarakāt al-islāmiyya*, al-Markaz al-ʿArabī li-l-Dirāsāt al-Istrātijiyya, 1999, II, pp. 43–120; Khalīl ʿAlī Ḥaydar, *Tayyārāt al-ṣaḥwa al-dīniyya*, Kuwayt, Sharikat Kāẓima, 1987, pp. 135–70.

Filastīn,[16] in which he put forward a proposition for the salvation of Palestine, reflects Arab nationalist rather than pan-Islamic influences. There is evidence that he was even close to the early Baathist circles in the Jordanian capital of Amman. Gradually, however, al-Nabahānī's discussions with a small group of Palestinian friends would take an Islamic line, laying the foundation for the party that came to be known as *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr*.

Al-Nabahānī's vision revolved on the following themes: each nation (*umma*) has a principle (*mabdaʾ*) on which its existence and mission rest. The principle consists of an idea (*fikra*) and a method (*ṭarīqa*). *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr's* idea is the Islamic one and its method is that of the Prophet Muḥammad.[17] For al-Nabahānī, commitment to the Islamic idea requires the creation of an Islamic system (*niẓām Islāmī*), at the core of which is the Islamic caliphate. The method is made of three stages: first is the emergence of a vanguard group, the partisan bloc; second is the interaction with the masses; and third is the establishment of an Islamic government in a country from which the caliphate will be declared and Islamic rule begin to expand. When this theoretical strategy was formulated, al-Nabahānī imagined that it would take one to two decades to be implemented. But as the real world proved to be more tenacious, and influenced by the increasing intervention of the Arab military in state affairs, al-Nabahānī forged a scenario in which a group of Islamist officers would stage a coup to bring the party to power and help it implement its vision of the caliphate.

In November 1952, al-Nabahānī and four others of his associates submitted an application to the Jordanian authorities to set up a political party under the name of *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr al-Islāmī*. Although Jordan was experiencing a period of exceptional political openness, the application was rejected, on the ground of its contradiction to the constitution. As all following attempts to legalize the party were to fail, *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr* went underground. In the beginning, the party established a not insignificant following in Jordan, and managed to form a few cells in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, as well as among the Arab immigrant workers in the oil-producing countries. But by the late 1970s, *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr* was pushed to the margins by other Islamist movements, especially the Muslim Brothers. The party's attempts to reach power by military coups in Jordan in 1968, 1969 and 1971 were all aborted, while its endeavours to impress upon the Libyan leader Muʿammar al-Qaddāfi (1978), the Iranian Islamist leader Ayatollah Khomeini (1979), and the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein (1995), came to naught. Its non-violent programme and dedicated cadre have helped *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr* to survive; yet, the party's dogmatic vision and inflexible approach precluded it from exercising any tangible influence on the Islamic political scene. During the 1990s, however, *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr* managed

16. Muḥammad Taqiyy al-Dīn al-Nabahānī, *Inqadh Filasṭīn*, Damascus, n. p., 1950.
17. Taji-Farouki, *A Fundamental Quest, op. cit.*, pp. 37–75.

to spread into the former Soviet Muslim republics in Central Asia,[18] as well as the Muslim youth in Western Europe, especially Britain.

Unlike the Muslim Brothers, which evolved over the years from a small society into a complex political organization, *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr* was born out of preconceived ideas, a ready-made political ideology. While the *Ikhwān* were, and still are, more sensitive to the changing reality, *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr* was, and to a great extent still is, encapsulated in its early theoretical strategy. *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr*, for example, does not recognize that Muslims lived under one single caliphate for a very short period of their long history; and highly detached from the major changes that impacted modern Muslim peoples, *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr* is unable to recognize the power of nationalism. For the great majority of Muslims, the caliphate vision, which is at the core of *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr*'s discourse, seems irrelevant to their aspirations.

Challenging decades

The coming of military to power posed a serious challenge to Islamic political forces. Beginning with the first Syrian military coup of 1949, the military went on to capture the instrument of state in a large number of Arab and Muslim countries, including Egypt, Pakistan, Algeria, Sudan, Libya, Iraq, Yemen, Turkey, and Indonesia. Although military regimes were inherently non-democratic, restriction of political freedoms were only one aspect of the adverse climate with which the Islamists had to wrestle. Almost all Arab and Muslim military rulers of the 1950s and 1960s adopted a strong nationalist discourse, all claimed to eradicate corruption from the state machinery, and all promised to work for a speedy development and social justice. In the early stages, at least, the military were welcomed by the people, hoping that they would deliver what the political class had failed to do.[19] The military rulers' nationalism and populist optimism, combined with an atmosphere of emergency laws and non-constitutional conduct, halted the ascendance of political Islam, Islamists thrown in jail or forced and saw many into exile.

But as the Muslim Brothers were completely and harshly banned in Nasserite Egypt (1954–70), and the *Jama'at Islami* joined other political parties in the struggle against the military regime of Ayyub Khan (1958–69), the

18. A. Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2002, pp. 115–36.

19. On the rise of the military, see, for example, A. Abdel-Malek, *Egypt: Military Society*, New York, Random House, 1968; H. A. Rizvi, *Military and Politics in Pakistan*, India, Konak Publishers, 1989; M. R. J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change*, London, Routledge, 1994; F. Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975*, London, Hurst, 1977, esp. pp. 147–211 and pp. 288–326.

project of political Islam was gaining ground elsewhere. Unlike *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr*, reviving the caliphate did not feature very highly on the agendas of the Muslim Brothers and *Jama'at Islami*; yet, for both, commitment to Islam meant commitment to the Muslim *umma* as well. Hence, the new Islamic vision would soon spread outside of Egypt and the Indian subcontinent. From the late 1930s, Ḥasan al-Bannā was already dispatching missions to neighbouring Arab countries in order to establish branches of the *Ikhwān*. In other cases, it was the movement of *Ikhwān* and *Jama'at Islami* activists, either for work, study or as political exiles, which disseminated the vision of political Islam in other countries. Visiting Muslim activists in Egypt and Pakistan, or the print media and modern means of communications, played important roles in carrying the influence of al-Bannā and al-Mawdudi to other parts of the Muslim world. That is not to say that the large number of politically oriented Islamic organizations that began to appear throughout the Muslim world were mere copies of the Muslim Brothers and *Jama'at Islami*. In fact, the great majority of them were of local origin.

In the 1940s, Muslim Brothers organizations were founded in Palestine, Syria and Jordan. During the next two decades, other branches sprang up in Iraq, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and among Arab communities in Western Europe and North America. In the wake of the separation of Bangladesh in 1971, *Jama'at Islami* split into organizations, one in Pakistan and the other in Bangladesh. *Jama'at's* influence would reach the Indo-Pakistani communities in North America and the United Kingdom, while politically-oriented Islamic organizations were growing in Malaysia and Indonesia. In Turkey, where the republican state maintained a strict secular outlook, the first sign of political-Islamic revival was marked by the founding of the National Order Party, in 1970, by Najm al-Din Erbakan, a dynamic and German-educated engineer of Sufi background.

But as further Islamist organizations and parties were emerging in various parts of the Muslim world, the Islamic political vision was becoming more radical, at least in the Arab countries where the confrontation between the state and the Islamists was most intense. One of the major developments in the Islamic intellectual landscape was the publishing, in 1965, of *Ma'ālim fi-l-ṭarīq* (Milestones), a widely influential book of the Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Quṭb (1906–66).[20] A graduate of Dār al-ʿUlūm in 1933, Quṭb was appointed in the research department of the ministry of education. Known in Cairene circles as a literary critic, Quṭb was non-religious, perhaps even atheist. By the late 1930s, upon a sudden conversion, he became more interested in Islamic subjects. But not until 1949, when he published *al-ʿAdāla al-ijtimāʿiyya*

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20. The reference here is to a later edition. See Sayyid Quṭb, *Ma'ālim fi-l-ṭariq*, Beirut, Dār al-Shurūq, 1973.

fī-l-islām (Social Justice in Islam),[21] were his credentials as an Islamist thinker recognized. In this book, which left a profound impact on Nasser and his Free Officers, associates Quṭb condemned the Egyptian class order, called for the redistribution of land, and echoed al-Bannā in arguing that Islam does not separate between religion and state; that is not a matter of faith an belief only, but a social system as well.

Quṭb spent 1949–51 in the United States, on a scholarship granted by the Ministry of Education. His observations of life in America, not always exceptionally insightful or well informed, deepened his criticism of modern life, its materialistic drive, and its positivist outlook. Quṭb's early closeness with Nasser and the Free Officers did not preclude him from joining the Muslim Brothers in 1953. Subsequently, he sided with the *Ikhwān* in their conflict with Nasser, and was thus jailed from 1954 to 1964. Although he was not subjected to torture, Quṭb was a witness to the inhumane treatment of the Muslim Brothers in jails, and since he spent most of his prison years in hospital, he was well informed of the changes that Egypt was experiencing under the socialist, Arab nationalist Nasserite regime. While in prison, Quṭb published his commentary on the Qurʾān, *Fī ẓilāl al-Qurʾān* (Under the Shadows of the Qurʾān), and upon his release, he published *Maʿalim fī-l-ṭarīq*. Both reflected a radicalized understanding of Islam, Egypt and the modern world, far removed from al-Bannā's vision. But it was the smaller and sharper *Maʿālim* which came to be more instrumental in shaping young Islamic activists of the 1970s and 1980s.[22]

In the *Maʿālim*, Quṭb announced the world as living an era of new *jahāliyya* (ignorance, the pre-Islamic period), for man had appropriated one of the essential attributes of God: the *ḥākimiyya* (the right to rule). Perhaps influenced by an earlier treatise of Mawdudi, Quṭb argued that the belief in the oneness of God entails the simultaneous belief in *rubūbiyya* (God as the creator) and *ḥākimiyya* (God as the ruler), and that failing to submit to either is a breach of the very foundation of Islam. Responding to the dominant Arab-nationalist discourse of the 1960s, Quṭb affirmed that the Muslim's identity is defined by his belief, not his nationality. Since his vision revolved around matters of *ʿaqīda* (the principles of faith), Quṭb proposed a strategy of change, the first stage of which was the re-introduction of *tawḥīd*, the Islamic article of faith, to the present Muslims, since only by understanding the reality of Islam would they be able to distinguish between what is Islamic and what is un-Islamic. Quṭb's discourse evinces a strong sense of alienation: the turning of one of the makers of modern Egyptian culture against the 'modern'. But

21. Sayyid Quṭb, *al-ʿAdāla al-ijtimāʿiyya fī-l-islām*, Cairo, Lajnat al-Nashr li-l-Jamʿiyyīn, 1949.
22. For a study of the life and thought of Quṭb, see I. M. Abu-Rabi, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1996, pp. 92–219.

this alienation from the modern is in itself a modern position, for Quṭb's text is in its essence a call for liberation from oppression, class, and the tyranny of human reason. The problem, however, is that Quṭb's text, elegant, sharp and uncompromising as it is, is written not in the language of Heidegger or Sartre, but in the language of Islamic theology, in which Quṭb was perhaps not very well versed. Not surprisingly, whether among imprisoned Egyptian Islamists or among the young activists of the 1970s, Quṭb's writings were understood as a judgment against the entire society and system of government, a declaration of their un-Islamic nature. The hanging of Quṭb in 1966 made him the most revered martyr of modern Islam, and bestowed an additional authority on his words. Ultimately, it was the *Ikhwān's* intellectual response to Quṭb's ideas which came to halt the tide of radicalization.[23]

The rise of political Islamic movements

By the mid-1970s, almost all Muslim states were showing signs of fatigue and crisis. The Arab defeat in the June 1967 War was seen as a failure of the Arab nationalist regimes, especially Nasserite Egypt. Even Sadat's ambiguous victory in the October War of 1973 would soon be undermined by the unpopular peace treaty he signed with Israel in 1978. Different forms of socialist policies in Egypt, Syria and Algeria could not solve the problems of development. Cycles of civilian and military rule in countries such as Pakistan, Sudan and Turkey could only increase the feeling of instability and intensify the people's doubt about the legitimacy and capability of government. The oil boom of the 1970s engendered a speedy modernization in the conservative, oil-producing countries, especially Saudi Arabia, coupled with a heavy climate of corruption, which alienated great segments of society. But whereas the introduction of modern tools of control would help the ruling classes to maintain their dominant position, these tools could not safeguard the legitimacy of government. Under these conditions, the Islamic oppositional voice, in whatever terms it was expressed, became the voice of the people, signifying morality, freedom and the promise of dignified life.

Whether in Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, Sudan, the Palestine, signs of Islamic revivalism became evident. In the University of Cairo, a bastion of Western culture in the Arab world, the *ḥijāb* became the rule not the exception. Islamist activists controlled student unions in greater number of universities, from Khartoum and Amman to Cairo and Karachi and would soon control professional syndicates. Interest-free banking was introduced in several Muslim countries, while private schools with an additional Islamic curriculum would

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23. See, for example, Ḥasan Ismaʿīl al-Huḍaybī, *Duʿāt lā quḍāt*, Cairo, Dār al-Tibāʿa wa-l-Nashr al-Islāmiyya, 1977.

attract hundreds of thousands of pupils from various social backgrounds. Books dealing with Islamic subjects became top sellers, and Islamist voices the most influential in lecture halls or media outlets.[24] Whenever free elections were held, even under partially free conditions, Islamic parties would either win outright or make a powerful performance. Even authoritarian rulers, such as Nimeiry of Sudan, Sadat of Egypt, Qaddafi of Lybia, and Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan, would adopt an Islamic image, as commitment to Islam became a guaranteed source of legitimacy.

Yet, the Islamic political landscape of the last quarter of the twentieth century and early years of the twenty-first is no longer limited to the Muslim Brothers, the *Jama'at Islami* and *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr*. Shīʿi Muslims, like the Sunni majority, have also developed their variants of political Islam. Within the Sunni body, the situation is even more complex, as the number of Islamic political groups have multiplied, reflecting a variety of ideological convictions, a state of fragmentation and loss of authority.[25] Derivation of Islamic political legitimacy is no longer restricted to the legacy of al-Bannā, Mawdudi, al-Nabahānī and Erbakan, but also many other, qualified and non-qualified, emerging leaders, some of whom are literally unknown outside their own groups. The reasons behind this development are many: one perhaps is related to the origins of political Islam, which is largely non-ʿulamatic and, hence, implicitly non-authoritative. Second, as it is aiming at capturing state power, political Islam is consequently susceptible to the measures of political achievements. Thus, failure, or apparent failure, of a certain movement is bound to invite different visions to evolve. Third is the frustration brought about by the state's oppression. And finally is the nature of Islam as a grand narrative, liable to give rise to multiple interpretations and understandings of religious authority. Generally speaking, nonetheless, it is possible to classify Islamic political movements, according to their underlying means of

24. For a discussion of the rise of political Islam in various Muslim countries, see the collection of articles included in J. P. Piscatori (ed.), *Islam in the Political Process*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983; J. L. Esposito (ed.), *Islam and Development: Religion and Sociopolitical Change*, New York, Syracuse University Press, 1980. See also the surveys: J. O. Voll, 'Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan'; A. Sachedina, 'Acticist Shīʿism in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon'; M. Ahmad, 'Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: the Jama'at Islami and the Tablighi Jama'at'; M. Nash, 'Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia and Indonesia', included in M. E. Marty and R. S. Appleby, *Fundamentalism Observed*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1991. Also, J. P., Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986.

25. W. R. Roff, 'Islamic Movements: One or Many?', in W. R. Roff (ed.), *Islam and the Political Economy of Meaning*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987, pp. 31–52; N. Ayubi, *Political Islam*, London, Routledge, 1991, pp. 48–69; B. M. Nafi and S. Taji-Farouki, 'Introduction', in S. Taji-Farouki and B. M. Nafi, *Islamic Thought in the Twentieth Century*, London, Tauris, 2004, pp. 29–36, pp. 8–12.

expression, into six categories: popular revolution; violent opposition; military coup; national resistance; international terrorism; and reformist, democratic opposition.

1. Popular revolution: The ultimate triumph of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in February 1979, driven by a year-long mass movement, marked one of the major events in modern world history.[26] The Islamic Revolution was the outcome of a number of interacting forces: the emergence of Ayatollah Khomeini (1902–89) as a recognizable, trusted, popular leader; Khomeini's theory of *wilāyat al-faqīh*, which declared the *ʿulama* as heirs of the absent imam (the disappeared, mythical, last imam of Twelver Shīʿi Islam), responsible for establishing and running the Islamic state; and the exacerbating social and economic crisis of the Shah's regime. In early 1978, an article attacking Khomeini was published in a government newspaper. The old, uncompromising Muslim cleric had been exiled to the Iraqi Shīʿi city of Najaf since the mid-1960s, for his opposition to the Shah. Demonstrations that protested the publishing of the article snowballed into a resilient mass revolution, leading to the overthrow of the Shah, and the founding of the Islamic republic.

Although the early years of the republic were riddled with internal conflict and revolutionary violence, the long years of the Iraq-Iran war (1980–8) helped to consolidate national unity.[27] Once the war ended, and upon the subsequent passing of Khomeini, Iranian politics broke down into reformist and conservative camps.[28] The major problem facing Islamic Iran relates to the state question in Shīʿi political thought. Without *wilāyat al-faqīh*, the 'Islamic' legitimacy of the republic could not be established in the age of *ghayba* (occultation). But this legitimacy led also to the emergence of the *ʿulama* as the ruling class. It is true that in its structural foundations the Islamic republic is no different than any other modern state; yet, as the *ʿulama* assumed the ultimate role in deciding affairs of state, it has become doubtful whether power really lies with the people, who brought about the republic in the first place. From the coming of the reformist Khatami to the presidency in 1997,

26. On the Islamic revolution in Iran, see H. Algar, *The Roots of Islamic Revolution*, London, the Open Press, 1983; R. Mottahedeh, *The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran*, Oxford, Oneworld Publications, 2002, pp. 357–90; S. Irfani, *Revolutionary Islam in Iran*, London, Zed Press, 1983, pp. 79ff.; G. Rose, 'Velayat-e Faqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini', in N. R. Keddie (ed.), *Religion and Politics in Iran*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1983, pp.166–90; S. Zubaida, *Islam, the People and the State*, London, Tauris, 1993, pp. 1–37.
27. S. Gieeling, *Religion and War in Revolutionary Iran*, London, Tauris, 1999, pp. 139–63.
28. K. B. Sayeed, *Western Dominance and Political Islam*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1995, pp. 65–76.

to the rise of the conservative Ahmadinejad in 2005, this question is yet to be resolved.

2. Internal violence: In the 1980s and 1990s, Islamic violence swept through several Arab-Muslim countries. Violence in the name of Islam first broke out in Syria in the late 1970s. Although the Syrian Muslim Brothers, the main Islamic political movement in the country, was shaped by the reformist thought of its first leader, Shaykh Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī (1915–64),[29] a splinter group advocating the use of arms to overthrow the government was formed by Marwān Ḥadīd (d. 1975), in a reaction to the highly secular atmosphere introduced by the ruling Baath Party. The confrontation between the Syrian regime and Ḥadīd's followers, soon to drag in the Muslim Brothers, reached its climax with the destruction of the northern city of Ḥama, a stronghold of the Islamists, by the Syrian special forces in February 1982.[30]

In Egypt, although the rebuilt *Ikhwān* organization succeeded in absorbing most of Islamist university students of the 1970s, the majority of student activists in the southern cities of Minya and Asyūt, refrained from joining the *Ikhwān*. Influenced by Salafī and Quṭbī thought, they launched the more radical *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* in 1981, joining forces with a like-minded small *Jamaʿat al-Jihād*, led by the Islamist engineer ʿAbd as-Salām Faraj. Together, they staged the spectacular assassination of president Anwar Sadat in October 1981, with the aim of inciting an armed revolt to bring down the Egyptian State. As the revolt failed, and the assassins were tried and executed, the *Jamāʿa* turned to political and charitable activities. In an atmosphere of radicalization and the emergence of all kinds of splinter Islamic groupings, the Egyptian security forces were not particularly scrupulous in their methods. It is widely believed that, in August 1990, a security unit assassinated ʿAlāʾ Muhiyy al-Din, the medical doctor spokesman of *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya*. The violent and bloody confrontation that ensued between the government and the armed Islamists continued for the next seven years.[31]

The Algerian case was only slightly different. In October 1988, a popular uprising forced the Algerian Government to introduce multi-party democracy and liberalize the political system. Although a large number of parties were to be set up, including one by the Algerian Muslim Brothers

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29. Muḥammad Jamal Bārūt, *Yathrib al-jadīda: al-ḥarakāt al-islāmiyya al-rāhina*, Beirut, Riyaḍ el-Rayyes Books, 1994, pp. 95–40.

30. On the period of violence in Syria, see U. F. Abd-Allah, *The Islamic Struggle in Syria*, Berkeley, Mizan Press, 1983; Darrāj and Bārūt (eds.), *al-Aḥzāb wa-l-ḥarakāt …*, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 266–313.

31. On the period of violence in Egypt, see Rifʿat Sayyid Aḥmad, *al-Ḥarakāt al-islāmiyya al-rādikāliyya fī Miṣr*, Beirut, Markaz al-Dirasāt al-Istrātījiyya wa-l-Buḥuth wa-l-Tawthīq, 1998; Halā Muṣṭafā, *al-Islām al-siyāsī fī Miṣr*, Cairo, al-Ahrām, 1992, pp. 149–75; Darrāj and Bārūt (eds.), *al-Aḥzāb wa-l-ḥarakāt …*, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 121–55.

branch, it was the Islamic Salvation Front (FSI) which proved the most popular. An alliance of several Islamist trends, the FSI swept the municipal elections of 1990. The UK educated, Islamic nationalist ʿAbbāsi Madanī, and the Salafī oriented ʿAlī Bilhaj, the two most senior leaders of the FSI, had been arrested in May 1989, against a background of mass protests in the capital city. Led now by ʿAbd al-Qādir Hashshānī, a dynamic, moderate engineer, the FSI won a majority of seats in the first round of the December 1991 parliamentary elections. Before the second round was held, the army generals staged a barely camouflaged coup, abolishing the elections and suspending the constitution. The result was an outbreak of violence across the country, exacerbated by the removal of the FSI leader from the scene, either to jail or exile.[32] The generals did not rule directly, but normalization of the political process would continue well into 1999 when ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Boutiflika was elected president.

Not in a single case did the armed Islamists manage to defeat the state. The only result of the two decades of violence was the retreat of politics and maximization of state control. The Syrian Muslim Brothers abandoned the use of arms from the late 1980s. In 1997, most leaders of the Egyptian *al-Jamāʿa al-Islāmiyya* declared a complete cessation of violence, publishing several tracts criticizing the use of armed means within a Muslim society. In Algeria, the armed wing of the FSI denounced violence and joined the government's reconciliation initiative, but other, more radical, groupings are still active in the mountainous region.

3. The military coup: Except for *Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr*, none of the Islamic political movements regarded military coups as a legitimate means to reach power. While the Islamists present themselves as representatives of the people, most of the anti-Islamist regimes in the Muslim world originated in the military. Yet, in June 1989, a group of Islamist army officers, led by ʿUmar al-Bashīr, seized power in Sudan. The officers were members of the Islamic Nationalist Front (INF), led by the eminent Islamist leader and thinker Ḥasan al-Turābī. The INF evolved from roots in the Muslim Brothers', and had been an active part of Sudanese politics for decades. As Sudan entered a period of political instability in the late 1980s, and the central government lost control of the southern provinces to the rebellious Sudanese Liberation Army, the Islamists saw themselves as saviours of the country. In fact, the ruling army officers would call their regime the 'salvation government'.[33]

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32. F. Burgat and W. Dowell, *The Islamic Movement in North Africa*, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1993, pp. 247–305; E. Eldin Shahin, *Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1998, pp. 112–65.

33. For a study of the Islamic political movement in Sudan and al-Turabi's leadership, see A. El-Affendi, *Turabi's Revolution*, London, Grey Seal, 1991. For the developments after the 1989 coup, see Darrāj and Bārūt (eds.), *al-Aḥzāb wa-l-ḥarakāt …*, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 623–35.

The INF military rule alienated almost all other Sudanese political parties, waged war against the rebels in the south, and weaved ties with Islamist and nationalist forces in the Arab world. But by 1999, exhausted by war that deteriorating economy, and the hostility of neighbouring Arab and African states, the Islamist regime unravelled from within. The governing elements arrested their mentor, Ḥasan al-Turābī, and their political outfit split into two opposing parties. Subsequently, the salvation regime signed a peace treaty with the rebels in the south, took national reconciliation measures, and improved relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. But deep-seated American and European suspicions, combined with Khartoum's short-sighted policies vis-à-vis peripheral regions, engendered armed opposition movements in the western and eastern provinces of the country.

4. National resistance: In area subjected to foreign occupation, the Islamists have played the leading role in the national liberation struggle, from the late 1970s onward. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–89), the majority of resistance organizations were Islamically oriented.[34] Similarly, the Lebanese resistance to the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon (1982–2000) was led by the Shīʿi Islamist group *Ḥezbollah*, supported by Islamic Iran.[35] In the Palestinian Occupied Territories, since 1987, the Islamic Resistance Movement (*Ḥamās*), born out of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brothers, and the much smaller Palestinian Islamic Jihad, have emerged as two major groups in the Palestinian national movement. The decline of *Fateh*, the main nationalist group, after the signing of the Oslo Accord, the establishment of the Palestinian Autonomous Authority in 1994, and the outbreak of the second Palestinian uprising in 2000, reinforced *Ḥamās*'s popularity.[36] In the elections of January 2006, *Ḥamās* won a majority in the legislative council.

The Afghan Islamic organizations, however, failed to sort their differences and establish a stable government after the Soviet withdrawal, paving the way for the rise of the *Taliban* movement, another Islamist group with highly conservative views. The *Taliban* were brought down by the American invasion in late 2001; subsequently, it reemerged as armed resistance against the American and NATO forces in the war-ravaged country. Victory in south Lebanon, did not protect *Ḥezbollah* from being entangled in Lebanese divisive politics, as its religio-political ties with the Iranian leadership raised questions about its Lebanese allegiance. *Ḥamās*, too, found it easier to resist occupation

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34. O. Roy, *Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986.
35. A. Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah: Politics and Religion*, London, Pluto Press, 2002.
36. A. Tamimi, *Hamas: Unwritten Chapters*, London, Hurst and Company, 2007; Z. Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1994, pp. 53–127.

than to rule; its 2006 government would, thus, falter against opposition from Palestinian rivals and international embargo. In the three cases, complexity of the local situation, inexperience on the part of the Islamists, and foreign interventions, all contributed to the modest performance of the resistance forces in the sphere of politics.

5. International terrorism: International terrorism in the name of Islam is a recent phenomenon, patently associated with what has come to be known as *al-Qāʿida*.[37] Led by Osama bin Laden, a son of one of the richest families in Saudi Arabia and former volunteer in the Afghan anti-Soviet jihad, *al-Qāʿida* is not really a centrally-controlled organization. Initially, bin Laden expressed opposition to the American military presence in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s; however, he later embraced a global anti-American strategy, under the influence of the Egyptian militant leader Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī. *Al-Qāʿida*, a name originally given to the record of Arab fighters in Afghanistan, was first used by American officials to identify those responsible for attacks on American targets in Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen, from 1998–2000; it was then adopted by bin Laden and his followers. In 11 September 2001, *al-Qāʿida* carried out horrendous attacks on the trade centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., killing nearly 3,000 people. The attacks shocked the world, and marked a new era in world affairs and Muslim-Western relations.

Although a fringe group, *al-Qāʿida* was strengthened by the controversial American 'war on terrorism', and the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. As its influence was inflated by international media, *al-Qāʿida* attracted some other armed groups in the Muslim world, turning in effect into a loose network of militants. Apart from their sharing a belief in the use of indiscriminate violence, within and outside Muslim countries, *al-Qāʿida*'s affiliates are not necessarily of the same ideological background. Their rise in Iraq is very much associated with the impact of the American occupation; other attacks attributed to *al-Qāʿida* in Indonesia, Morocco, Spain and Britain, after September 2001, were typical terrorist operations carried out by a dedicated, small number of militants, and did not reflect a strong Muslim following.

6. Reformist, democratic Islam: Despite the high profile of the militant Islamic groups, the main currents of political Islam, and the great majority of those motivated by its ideas, are essentially reformist and democratic, whether in outlook or in means. The Muslim Brothers in Egypt, the *Jama'at Islami* in Pakistan, the *Nahḍa* Party in Tunisia, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, the Islamic Party in Malaysia, the *Tajamūʿ* Party for Reform in Yemen, and outspoken Saudi *ʿulamā*, such as Salman al-ʿUda and Safar al-Hawali, have all been active just like any political, civil

37. P. L. Bergen, *Holy War, INC., Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001; A. B. Atwan, *The Secret History of al-Qa'ida*, London, Saqi Books, 2006.

IV–3.1   Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister of Turkey,
addresses a press conference, at United Nations Headquarters in
New York, in December 2006
© UN Photo/Paulo Filgueiras

and democratic party. Either implicitly or explicitly, they are all committed to a multiparty system and peaceful alternation of power.[38] Some of them participate in elections, have representatives in their country's parliament, and have even shared in coalition governments, while others are still regarded as illegal organizations and subjected to harsh official measures. What is certain is that by exposing state corruption, opposing foreign intervention in national affairs, criticizing concentration of power, calling for social justice and transparent government, the main currents of political Islam speak on behalf of large majorities of their peoples.

In Turkey, where the republican state has been based on a radical, secular ideology, a group of members of the now defunct Islamist *Refah* Party, formed the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in 2001. Led by Tayyip Rajab Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül, themselves devout Muslims, the JDP is committed to the secular system of government. The JDP won the 2002 parliamentary elections, and for the next five years, it would run one of the most successful governments in modern Turkish history.[39] None of the other Islamic political parties is, perhaps, prepared to go as far as the Turkish JDP. Almost all main Islamic political parties call for gradual, legal and institutionalized reform of the system of government, not the revolutionary overthrow of the state; yet, Islam represents the referential framework for these parties. But the meaning of this 'referential framework', in terms of real policies, is not always very clear. According to the Muslim Brothers of Egypt, it is the will of the majority of people that will decide the nature of the relationship between Islam and legislation.

CONCLUSION

In one sense, Islamic revivalism is part of a larger world phenomenon of religious revival; in another, it is a reflection of the special relationship between Muslims and Islam, as well as the profound disruption of Muslim societies, effected by forces of modernity. But unlike Protestant fundamentalism, for example, the Islamic political movements are not expressions of a 'sacred truth', and not viewed by the Muslim masses as Puritans, even if some Islamist

38. J. L. Esposito and J. O. Voll, *Islam and Democracy*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996, esp. pp. 11–32; A. el-Affendi, 'On the State, Democracy and Pluralism', in S. Taji-Farouki and B. M. Nafi, *Islamic Thought …*, *op. cit.*, pp.172–94; N. Feldman, *After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy*, New York, Farrar, Strus and Giroux, 2003.

39. Feldman, *After Jihad …*, *op. cit.*, pp. 101–12. For the turbulent history of the relationship between the Turkish Republic and Islam, see E. Kedourie, *Politics in the Middle East*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991, pp. 93–154; B. M. Nafi, 'Islam, the Army, and Democracy in modern Turkey', *Middle East Affairs Journal*, 3–4, 3 Summer/Fall 1997, pp. 239–59.

fringes claim to be so.[40] Rather, they are the outcome of particular historical developments, and are thus largely susceptible to various historical forces. Even Islamic violence, local or international in nature, has to be understood not as a manifestation of essential Islamic teachings, but in terms of specific historical context. This is why political Islam has been, and will continue to be, an evolving phenomenon.

During the 1950s and 1960s, many Islamic political parties took part in the democratic process, when possible. Their democratic choice, however, was rarely a premeditated, conscious choice. The rise of the discourse of democracy across the world during the last decades of the twentieth century, the emergence of Islamic reformist intellectuals in many parts of the Muslim world, and the damage inflicted on Muslim societies and on the image of Islam by militant forces, engendered a powerful political culture of moderation, reformism and democratization. In many countries of the Muslim world, as the leftist opposition has effectively faded away, and the liberal entrepreneurs aligned themselves with the ruling classes, the Islamic political parties seem to be the only hope that remains for political reform and fair economic development.

Yet, notwithstanding the Turkish experiment, the way ahead for the Islamic political parties is still rough and long. The legacy of the Islamic governments in Iran and Sudan is not entirely positive.[41] While the ruling Muslim classes seem unwilling to accept democratic change, Western powers, which exercise a high degree of influence in Muslim countries, still view Islamic political parties with deep suspicion. Finally, since modernization resulted in a breakdown of consensus in Muslim societies, normalization of the position of political Islam is contingent upon the reconstruction of national consensus, not only the existence of a stable and democratic system of government.

40. On the questions raised by interpreting the Islamic political phenomenon in terms of fundamentalism, see H. Munson Jr., *Islam and Revolution in the Middle East*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1988, pp. 3–6. Cf. B. B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age*, London, Tauris, 1990, pp. 23–101.
41. For a dismissive evaluation of the Islamic political experience, See O. Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1994.

– V –

EDUCATION, HIGHER EDUCATION AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES: STATUS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

THE STATUS OF EDUCATION IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES

Abdallah R. Bubtana and Abdelwahid A. Yousif

INTRODUCTION

The rise of Muslim civilization was mainly due to emphasis on learning and knowledge acquisition and appreciation. The first verse of the Qurʾān revealed to the Prophet Muḥammad was 'Read: in the name of thy Lord' signifying the importance that the Lord attributed to learning. The Qurʾān further signified this aspect by saying 'Are those who have knowledge and those who have no knowledge alike.' In the tradition of the Prophet Muḥammad, these concepts were reinforced further. He said, 'The best form of worship is the pursuit of knowledge'; 'Seek knowledge even though it is in China'; 'The ink of the scholar is more sacred than the blood of the martyr.' These verses and sayings clearly indicate the paramount importance that Islam gave to education and knowledge. In fact these concepts became some of the most important pillars of the Islamic religion and the ones which led to the zenith of Islamic civilization.

It was Islam which associated knowledge with power, a concept which is being reinvented in contemporary times when knowledge has been confirmed as the main power for development and progress. Today there is too much talk about the need to found knowledge societies: Islam has been calling for these since its inception over fourteen centuries ago.

For more than a thousand years the Islamic Empire remained the most scientifically advanced in the world. This advancement started with emphasis on translating Greek medical and scientific writings in Damascus, Cairo and Baghdad. The centre of scientific know-how shifted eastward, and Baghdad emerged as the capital of the scientific world. In fact, the origins and sources of today's medicine, science and technology have Islamic roots and were elaborated mainly by Islamic scientists. The establishment of al-Azhar University in AD 800 marked the creation of one of the oldest institutions of

higher education in the world, which focused on knowledge, research and the pursuit of truth.

From a historical perspective, the collapse of the great Islamic empires can be attributed to lack of interest in knowledge, science and technology. The backwardness and underdevelopment witnessed on the present Islamic scene can be attributed to two main reasons: on the one hand to the colonial powers which contributed to the underdevelopment of Islamic education, and on the other hand to the low priority attributed to education and knowledge by the consecutive governments after the post colonial era.

As will be seen from the analysis of the status of education and higher education in Muslim countries, in the following parts of this study, it will be clear that the Islamic world faces major challenges and crises in the fields of education, science and technology. Available indicators for these areas place most Muslim states in a range far below developed countries and in some areas even below the averages of developing countries.

The socio-economic context of education

The fifty-seven Members States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), some of whom do not have a majority Muslim population, are different in their socio-economic levels of development and welfare. The group includes some of the richest countries of the world and some of the poorest and least developed.

Out of a total world population of 6.2 billion in 2003, the total population of OIC members for the same year was 1.38 billion. This includes Muslim populations living in non-Muslim countries. The group includes densely populated countries like Indonesia with 217 million inhabitants and sparsely populated countries like the Maldives of about 300 thousand. The population growth rate ranged from a low –0.8 per cent in Kazakhstan during the period 1995–2004, to a high 4.2 per cent in Palestine, in the same period. The overall average growth rate for OIC countries was 2.4 per cent in 2004, which is higher than developing countries and high income countries with average rates of 1.8 and 0.7 per cent respectively.[1]

Infant mortality rates, although reduced in many countries in recent decades due to improved health services, remain very high in a number of OIC members. The infant mortality rate per 1000 of the population is high in Sierra Leone (166), Niger (154), Somalia (133), Chad and Côte d'Ivoire (117) respectively. The lowest infant mortality rate is found in Brunei (5), the United Arab Emirates (7) and Kuwait (8), per 1000 of the population[2].

1. Islamic Development Bank Statistics, Occasional Paper No. 10: Financing Education in IDB member countries, 2004.
2. *Ibid.*

Twenty-two of the world's fifty least developed countries are Muslim, and members of the OIC. The GDP per capita in Member States ranges from high, (over US$ 28.000 per year in Qatar), to a lowest point of US$ 166 per year in Sierra Leone. For example, the combined GDP for all Arab States in 2002 was US$ 712.3 billion and that of Italy was US$ 1183.3.[3]

The life expectancy rate at birth for 2003 ranged from a high 77 in Kuwait, 74 in Albania, 73 in Tunisia, to a very low 41 in Mozambique, 43 in Djibouti and 43 in Uganda.

Adult illiteracy rates for 2002 fluctuated from low in Uzbekistan (1 per cent), Kazakhstan (1 per cent) and the Maldives (3 per cent), to a very high (83 per cent) for Niger, (61 per cent) for Senegal and (60 per cent) for Benin.

The proportion of the population below the poverty line was 25.4 per cent in Albania for 2002, and 64 per cent for Gambia and Mali in 1998.[4]

Among the 177 countries classified in the UNDP Human Development Index, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Sierra Leone were the lowest at 174, 175, 176 and 177 respectively. The highest OIC Member State was Brunei at (33), followed by Bahrain (40) and Kuwait (44).[5]

The previous statistics indicate the great diversity and discrepancies which exist among Muslim countries in terms of level of development, resources and the pressing problems and challenges they face. However, the overall status of the Islamic Nation (the *umma*) is judged to be low compared to both developed and developing countries. Illiteracy, poverty, disease, armed conflict and undemocratic systems of government persist in a good number of these countries.

For the purpose of this study reference to Muslim countries means those which are members of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), the Islamic Development Bank and the Islamic, Science, Education and Cultural Organization. Some of these countries have heterogeneous ethnic populations with a certain percentage of Muslims. Most countries, members of these organizations, have a Muslim majority with the exception of Benin, Guyana, Mozambique and Uganda, whose Muslim population is less than 50 per cent.

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3. M. Rashdan, 'Higher Education, Development and Democracy …', A Paper Presented to the 6th Annual Conference and Development: Challenges for the Islamic World, Washington D.C., 2005.
4. Islamic Development Bank, *op. cit.*
5. UNDP, Human Development Report 2002, New York, UNDP, 2002.

Commitment to Dakar EFA goals and MDGs

All Islamic states, which attended the World Forum on Education for All (EFA) convened in Dakar, Senegal, in April 2000, expressed their commitments to exert all efforts to achieve the six goals and the declaration and action plan adopted by the Forum. They also expressed commitment to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted by the UN Summit convened at the UN Headquarters in New York in 2000.

The six goals of the Dakar Forum deal with the achievement of major improvements in the status of education on all levels:

i)   expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children;

ii) ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality;

iii) ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met through equitable access to appropriate learning and life-skills programmes;

iv) achieving a 50 per cent improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015, especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing education for all adults;

v)   eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on ensuring girls' full and equal access to and achievement in basic education of good quality;

vi) improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence of all so that recognized and measurable learning outcomes are achieved by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills.[6]

The second Millennium Development Goal adopted by 192 heads of state and governments in 2002 was to 'Achieve Universal Primary Education in all countries by the year 2015.'

During the Forum and the Summit, international partners and the donor community expressed willingness to assist poor countries, particularly underdeveloped ones, to develop national action plans and provide financial support for the achievement of the stated objectives.

The forthcoming evaluation of Islamic systems of education in relation to the EFA goals and MDG objectives, will be based on educational indicators developed by UNESCO and its partners for the monitoring of the achievement of these goals.

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6. UNESCO, EFA Global Monitoring Report, Paris, UNESCO, 2003–4.

V–1.1   Scientific developments: a celestial brass globe with engraving and
silver inlay, from Iran AD 1285–6
© Nasser Khalili Collection of Islamic Art (Nour Foundation)

Early childhood care and education

The first Dakar goal is 'Expanding and improving early childhood care and education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children.'

Two indicators have been developed to monitor and assess progress made towards the achievement of Goal 1:

- Indicator 1: Gross enrolment in early childhood development programmes including public, private and community programmes.
- Percentage of new entrants to Primary Grade 1 who have attended some form of organized early childhood development programmes.

From available UNESCO statistics, complied by the UNESCO Institute of Statistics for Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE), the gross enrolment ratio (GER) for most Muslim countries increased during the

school years 1998–9 and 2002–3. While the highest GRE for the year 2002–3 are found in Guyana (105 per cent), Malaysia (99 per cent), Lebanon (75 per cent), the United Arab Emirates (75 per cent), Kuwait (70 per cent), Albania (47 per cent), Pakistan (47 per cent) and Bahrain (37 per cent), the lowest rates are found in Niger (1 per cent), Mali (2 per cent), Mauritania (2 per cent) and Algeria (4 per cent). The countries which recorded decrease in GRE, between 1988 and 2003, are Kuwait from 78 per cent to 70 per cent, Morocco from 64 per cent to 56 per cent, Palestine from 40 per cent to 27 per cent and Pakistan from 61 per cent to 47 per cent. (See table 1 in the annex).[7]

For some Muslim countries no statistics were provided for early childhood care and education.

The gross enrolment ratio (GER) for females in pre-primary education, in the year 2003 varies, from a high 105 per cent in Guyana, 74 per cent in Lebanon and 70 per cent in Kuwait, to medium 48 per cent in Albania, 47 per cent in the Maldives, 43 per cent in Morocco, to a low 4 per cent in Algeria, 5 per cent in Saudi Arabia and 7 per cent in Turkey. (See Table 1 in the Annex). The Gender Parity Index in most countries remains low compared to developed countries.[8]

In many states GERs are relatively high due to large investments by the private sector in this level of education such as Kuwait and Lebanon. It must be mentioned that pre-school education has not yet been considered as part of the government education programme and public financial allocation to this sector is very marginal and sometimes non-existence.

Geographic disparities persist in most countries, with the exception of small countries such as Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Tunisia. In some countries such as Djibouti, early childhood education is only provided in the capital.

No statistics are available to assess early childhood educational opportunities for children with special needs. However, it can be said that with the exception of a few countries, where civil society organizations are active, educational programmes for this category of children are still backward and marginal in most Muslim countries.

Finally, it must be said that in spite of the progress made during the period 1998–2003 in this domain, education levels in most Muslim countries remain average of developed nations and most of them are still far from achieving Goal 1 of the EFA goals adopted by the Dakar Forum.

7. UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Global Education Digest 2005, Comparing Education Statistics across the world, 2005.

8. *Ibid.*

PRIMARY EDUCATION

Goal 2 of the Dakar Forum on Education for All calls upon Member States to 'ensure that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances, and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access and are able to complete education that is free, compulsory and of good quality.'

Millennium Development Goal 2 aspires to the achievement of universal primary education.

According to Islamic Development Bank statistics, the gross enrolment ratio for most member countries increased between 1990 and 2002. Eighteen countries exceeded the 100 per cent rate and the rest are below this average. The very low averages can be found in Djibouti (40 per cent), Niger (44 per cent), Burkina Faso (46 per cent) and Mali (58 per cent). The overall average is 91 per cent, LDC's 79 per cent and high-income countries 102 per cent. In many Muslim lands more effort and investment need to be mobilized to achieve higher rates of enrolment in primary education and meet the EFA goal.[9]

The net female enrolment ratio in primary education is higher than 90 per cent in eighteen Muslim countries out of fifty-seven. Examples are: Lebanon (90 per cent), Malaysia (93 per cent), Qatar (94 per cent), Albania (94 per cent), Tunisia (97 per cent) and Suriname 98 per cent (approaching 1.00 Gender Parity Index (GPI) rate).[10]

Six states have averages below 50 per cent. These are: Niger (31 per cent), Burkina Faso (31 per cent), Djibouti (32 per cent), Guinea-Bissau (38 per cent) and Sudan (42 per cent). The Gender Parity Index for all Muslim countries is less than 1.00 although some countries are approaching this rate.[11]

In 2001, it was estimated that the number of out-of-school children was 103.4 million, 90 million in developing countries, 7.4 million in Arab States and 40.2 million in sub-Sahara Africa. It is estimated that a good percentage of these numbers is in the least developed of the Muslim countries. This is coupled with a high dropout' and students repeating school rates which persist in a significant number of these countries.[12]

The percentage of students reaching Grade five in primary education is over 90 per cent in a number of countries, i.e. UAE, Bahrain, Oman, Lebanon, Tunisia, Jordan, Iran, Algeria, Syria and Egypt. There are no statistics on a number of countries which have reached this level such as the Central Asian Republics.[13]

9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*

However, in a number of countries this percentage is lower than 70 per cent, i.e. Gabon, Bangladesh, Mauritania, and Benin. In Guinea-Bissau it is as low as 38 per cent and 49 per cent in Mozambique. Here, this phenomenon has contributed to increased percentages of street children and child labour.

These statistics indicate high rates of attrition on the one hand and contribution to increased rates of illiteracy and out-of-school children on the other. It is also indicative of the low efficiency of these systems.

The pupil-teacher ratio in primary education varies between countries according to the statistics of 2003. While the highest rates are found in countries like Chad (69), Mozambique (67), Benin (62) and Bangladesh (56), the lowest rates are found in Kuwait (13), Brunei Dar-es-Salaam (13), Lebanon (17) and Malaysia (19).[14]

The percentage of trained primary school teachers, for both sexes reached 100 per cent in Azerbaijan, Kuwait, Oman, Côte d'Ivoire and 98 per cent in Algeria. This percentage is low in a number of countries such as Mozambique 60 per cent, Benin 62 and Niger 27 per cent.[15]

One study on strengthening education in the Muslim world has indicated several examples of low quality primary education in some countries:

- In the 1998 standardized achievement tests given in Yemen to fifth graders in mathematics, science and Arabic, the percentage of students who passed the test at a satisfactory level were 3, 14 and 5 respectively.
- In 1998 a survey in Bangladesh found that only 29 per cent of all primary students had gained basic competency in reading, writing and mathematics.
- Indonesian students scored relatively low in international comparisons of reading, science and mathematics.[16]

Eight out of twenty Islamic low-income countries of twenty have qualified for receiving support from the Fast Track Initiative, launched to accelerate reaching the objective of universalization of primary education with support of donor partners. This indicates firm commitment by governments to accelerate the speed of educational provision and broaden access to primary education. These countries are Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Guinea, Guyana, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Tajikistan and Yemen.

A later section of this chapter will be dedicated to extensive analyses of the status, issues and challenges facing basic education in Muslim countries.

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14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. S. Benoliel, 'Strengthening Education in the Muslim World', US Agency for International Development, USAID, 2005.

V–1.2   Afghan women participate in the launch of the Global Action Week in 2009, a worldwide campaign advocating for free and quality education for all
© UN Photo/UNAMA

SECONDARY EDUCATION

The gross enrolment ratio for the year 2002–3 varies between Muslim countries. It ranges from a low 3 per cent in Afghanistan to a high 105 per cent in Libya. Twenty-two countries have less than 50 per cent gross enrolment rates for secondary education for the year 2002–3.

Fifteen out of the fifty-seven Member States of the OIC have achieved a gender parity rate over 1.00 on the secondary net enrolment ratio. Most of the rest are above (0.50) with the exception of Chad (0.33) and Guinea (0.48).

According to 2002–3 statistics, the proportion of students repeating a year in secondary education in some countries exceeded the 20 per cent range. Examples are: Burkina Faso (28 per cent), Guinea (25 per cent), Togo (24 per cent) and Benin (23 per cent).[17]

The same statistics show, the percentage of trained secondary school teachers, male/female reached 100 per cent in Azerbaijan and Oman and a

17. UNESCO, Institute of Statistics, *op. cit.*

low of (29 per cent) in Bangladesh, (51 per cent) in Comoros and (53 per cent) in Guyana.

In some countries, in spite of the low percentage of trained secondary school teachers, the pupil-teacher ratios are high, such as in Nigeria 35, Bangladesh 34, Burkina Faso 31 and Niger 30. In others this ratio is low such as the case of Qatar where the ratio is 10, Kazakhstan 12, Saudi Arabia 12 and Indonesia 17.

In some states, the secondary education cycle is divided into literary and scientific branches, and the highest percentage of enrolled students are found in the literary branch. This causes certain biases in the onward flow of students into the higher education cycle, where almost 70 per cent of students are enrolled in humanities, social and human sciences specialities. This causes negative effects on the graduate employment situation and is among the reasons for the apparent increase in unemployment rates in the labour markets in a number of countries.

The coherence and articulation between secondary education and higher education is very weak in almost all countries particularly as related to curriculum content.

In a study on education in the Muslim world, it was found that many secondary school graduates fail to gain the core skills they will need to function in all aspects of their life, including such skills as literacy, numeracy and critical thinking habits.

YOUTH AND ADULT LITERACY

One of the major challenges faced by many number of Muslim countries is the high rate of illiteracy among various age groups. The rate is particularly high among women and disadvantaged groups. According to available statistics many countries will not be able to achieve the EFA goal on reducing illiteracy by 2015.

According to available statistics from the Islamic Development Bank, the overall percentage of illiteracy among populations of Muslim countries, eight countries have over 50 per cent illiteracy (Bangladesh, Benin, Chad, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, Yemen). Seven countries have relatively low percentages of less than 15 per cent: Bahrain, Indonesia, the Maldives, Jordan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Very low adult literacy rates among youths aged 15–24 years are found in a number of countries. Examples are: Senegal (49 per cent), Benin (44 per cent), Chad (37 per cent), Mali (24 per cent), Burkina Faso and Niger (19 per cent) respectively.

According to estimates of UNESCO, Beirut, there were 67.9 million illiterate young people in the twenty-one countries of the Arab region (the

largest regional group of Islamic states), at the end of the 1990s. The highest number of illiterates was found in five states only: Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Morocco, and Yemen, comprising 48 million, i.e. 71 per cent of the total number of illiterates in the Arab region.

Illiteracy is dominant among females in a number of Muslim countries. The percentage of literate females in the age group fifteen and above is less than 15 per cent in Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali and Chad. In sixteen states, most of them the least developed, the percentage of literate females in the age group fifteen and above is less than 50 per cent.[18]

The Gender Parity Index for literacy is lower than 0.65 in a number of Islamic states where rates of illiteracy are higher among females and gender disparity is very clear in these countries. In spite of this a good number of countries have achieved higher parity rates, sometimes reaching 0.90 on the parity index such as Kuwait, Lebanon, Brunei-Darussalam and Kazakhstan.

FINANCING OF EDUCATION

Perhaps one of the most important challenges facing many Muslim countries is the shrinking ability of governments to devote financial resources needed to maintain systems which are equitable, efficient and of quality. Many countries, particularly the least developed ones, are unable to increase their financial allocations to education. Competing social priorities, slow economic growth, an underdeveloped private sector and huge foreign debts are the main reasons behind this situation.

According to statistics cited by UNESCO for twenty-two Muslim countries for expenditure on education for the year 2003, the share of education from GDP ranges from high in Guyana, Malaysia, Morocco and Tunisia (with 8.4, 8.1, 6.5, and 6.4 per cent respectively), to low in Indonesia, UAE, Lebanon and Togo (with 1.2, 1.6, 2.7 and 2.6 per cent respectively).

Between 1990 and 2002, expenditure on education as a percentage of overall government expenditure has increased in most Islamic states with the exception of Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Togo and Cameroon, which witnessed a decrease in the share of education from government allocations. The sharpest decreases were recorded in Togo (from 26.4 to 13.6 per cent) and Gambia (from 14.6 to 8.9 per cent).

The expenditure on various levels of education, as a percentage overall expenditure on education, varies between countries, depending on the priority attributed to each level of education. For example, the UAE, Oman, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Guyana and Bangladesh allocate more than 80 per cent of their budgets to pre-primary, primary and secondary education and

18. *Ibid.*

less than 20 per cent to tertiary education. Only Malaysia and Turkey allocate more than 30 per cent to tertiary education.[19]

Main issues and challenges

From what has been cited above, the issues and challenges confronting a good number of Muslim countries in maintaining an educational system characterized by quality and equity are very clear. Strategies and policies for the reform and renovation of existing systems must be based on these issues and challenges.

Perhaps meeting the commitments made on achieving the goals of education for all and the MDGs' goal of universalization of primary education by the year 2015 should constitute the guiding principle for policy formulation in these lands.

Enrolment in pre-primary education is very low in the majority of Muslim countries, particularly for females, and the parity index in this level is also low. The fact that most governments do not incorporate this level of education in the overall national plans, leads to an allocation of very limited financial resources for early childhood care and education. It appears from the previous trends that most countries will not achieve tangible progress towards the achievement of Goal 1 of EFA, unless policies are adopted to increase government financial allocations to this sector and provide more incentives to the private sector to increase its share in the provision of this service. Policies to eliminate geographical disparities and exclusion of children with special needs must be adopted.

The situation for the primary education sector seems a little better and progress has been made in the provision of this service. However, in some nations the female enrolment ratio is still below the developing countries average. Adopting policies to further expand access to primary education will decrease the number of out-of-school children and put a cap on one of the main sources of illiteracy. It is suggested that of the least developed Muslim countries should exert more effort to join the fast track initiative to qualify for additional support from donors and funding agencies. So far only eight of the twenty-two, labeled as least developed, have qualified for the fast track initiative for the universalization of primary education.

Secondary education in most countries suffers from a number of deficiencies and shortcomings. Access to secondary education remains limited in the majority of Muslim countries. Twenty two countries have gross enrolment ratios below 50 per cent. The repetition and dropout rates are also high in a number of states, a situation which reflects low efficiency and a

19. *Ibid.*

higher percentage of waste allocated to this system. Furthermore, in forty-two countries female enrolment ratios are less than 50 per cent.

In some countries, the division of secondary education into literary and scientific branches has led to negative consequences on the outflow of students to higher education, where enrolment in humanities and social sciences constitute the majority of students. This phenomenon has led to an over-abundance of graduates in these specialties who have no opportunity in the labour market; thus they become unemployed. This situation requires urgent policies to rectify this and address the low quality of secondary education. Policies to strengthen the coherence and articulation between secondary and higher education must be adopted.

One of the main challenges facing Islamic nations, particularly the least developed ones, is the high rate of illiteracy. This phenomenon is considered to be the main cause for low economic and development growth and the reason behind inflated rates of poverty in many countries. Available statistics indicate that all least developed Muslim countries will not be able to achieve Goal 4 of EFA through achieving 50 per cent improvement in levels of adult literacy by the year 2015. Illiteracy is dominant among females in a number of states and for cultural and educational reasons the rates may increase in future. High percentages of dropouts from primary education may lead to relapse into illiteracy and increase its percentage.

It is apparently clear that in some countries very low priority is attributed to literacy and adult education programmes which often leads to increase in the absolute number of illiterates.

Eliminating illiteracy would require a double-track strategy, to expand literacy programmes and reduce attrition and dropout rates from primary education. However, this will require an increase in the financial burden on a number of governments, which are not able to provide such an increase. Other sources of funding must be sought from the private sector and the donor community to face this formidable challenge.

The core and common challenge facing many countries, particularly the poor and the least developed ones, in their attempts to broaden access, improve the quality of education, eradicate illiteracy and reform their systems, is their limited ability to allocate the financial resources needed to achieve all these tasks. Many Muslim nations have reached their ceiling in the percentage of resources they can allocate to education from the overall government budgets. A sharp decrease in this allocation has taken place in a number of countries, such as Togo and Gambia. The competing priorities of other social services such as health, housing, etc., coupled with increasing foreign debts, may force a large number of governments to slowly shrink their share in the provision of public services, particularly education. This may happen while social demand on education is increasing due to high rates of population growth, particularly in poor countries.

Any future financial policies must take into consideration all these factors and must be based on the need to diversify sources of funding and decrease already existing waste and irrational use of limited financial resources.

Finally, it must be said the overall situation of education in most countries, requires major reforms and adjustments in its qualitative and quantitative aspects. Many Muslim states, particularly the least developed group, will not be able to meet the goals of EFA or the MDGs.

Chapter 5.2

EDUCATIONAL POLICIES IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES

Abdallah R. Bubtana and Abdelwahid A. Yousif

INTRODUCTION

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the acquisition of the Islamic faith calls for the teaching of the foundations and practices of Islam. Education and knowledge enjoy a special status in Islam. The Qurʾān and the *Ḥadīth* abound with verses and proverbs which emphasize the advantages of education and exhort Muslims to seek knowledge. In this respect, the first revelation received by the Prophet Muḥammad is quite significant. 'Read in the name of your Lord who created man from clots of blood.'[1]

The Muslim *umma* (nation) is a great conglomeration of diversities of races, languages, cultural traditions, educational systems and colonial experiences. The Muslim countries of Arabia, Africa and Asia, and Muslims living in non-Muslim countries are different in cultural, linguistic and technological environment. And yet there is a central unity based on their common belief and a spiritual unity based on the sentiment of Islamic brotherhood. However, the question of geographical diversity is minimized by the fact that in some geographical regions there exists a basic affinity of linguistic, cultural and educational traditions. The best and most harmonious example is the Arab region where twenty-two countries share the same language and culture and the same history. The same is to some extent true of the Muslim nations of West Africa.

Nevertheless, the contemporary Muslim world ranges from purely secular states which do not in their constitution recognize the role of religion in education, to the declared Islamic states where the constitution recognizes the central importance of religion in their systems of education. In between

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1. Qurʾān, XCVI.1.

these two categories fall a whole host of societies with varying normative affiliations and postures towards the Islamic ideals. There are countries where Muslims represent a majority of the population, yet there are nations where Muslims are a minority. The role of education in all these different categories will be to aim at creating cultural harmony and national unity by advocating a normative order based on shared values. The right of parents to choose the kind of education they prefer for their children is a human right and must be guaranteed by all countries.

Education policies

Education policies in Muslim countries seek to provide every child with the kind of education and training that would enable him or her to lead a balanced productive life as a human being and as a citizen of his/her country. The policies aim at responding to the needs of every country for economic and social development, especially vital to the poorest groups in the population. The policies also aim, but not on a permanent scale, at using information and communication technologies to create a knowledgeable society. While all of the Muslim states are committed to these broad policy objectives, few have succeeded in implementing that policy on a wide scale. The ever-increasing demand for education in every country, due to population growth, is beyond the budgetary limits of most governments. They have to make some hard choices which, in many cases, lead to a choice between drastic alternatives which make it difficult for policy makers to find a balance between quantity on the one hand and relevance and quality on the other. An important aspect of educational policies in Muslim countries, as is the case in all developing countries, is the fact that education is believed to be the responsibility of the public sector alone which means that the government is held responsible for planning, financing and managing education. In addition to the heavy financial and administrative burden that this concept will add to government responsibilities, it deprives the educational system of the participation of all sectors of society in shaping national policies and strategies for an education that should be based on policies acceptable to all.

However, the private sector and some agencies either provide or subsidize a limited number of educational institutions within the framework of national education policy. A central policy issue in Muslim countries is to build into the educational system the capacity to address the need of the Muslim citizen for combining the authentic knowledge of Islam and its teachings, with the knowledge and skills required for modern-day living in the twenty-first century. This is a challenge that all Muslim nations will have to meet. The challenge appears to some countries to be insurmountable because of the ignorance and sometimes the misrepresentation of Islamic thoughts

V–2.1   A nineteenth century 'Encyclopedia of Knowledge' from Iran
© National Library and Archives of the Islamic Republic of Iran

and values. Otherwise there are no contradictions between what Islam is advocating in terms of human rights, equality among people, justice, mutual respect and the establishment of peace on earth on the one hand, and what is being advocated by modern-day norms in the so-called democratic societies on the other.[2]

The goals of education

Policy makers in Muslim countries express the goals of their educational systems in different ways. But they seem to agree on a set of common denominators that summarize the core goals and objectives of education. On reviewing the different official sources of information one comes to the conclusion that the different goals viewed in totality could be summarized as follows: To

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2. UNESCO, International Bureau of Education (IBE), Geneva, *World Data on Education*, 5th edition, 2003.

1. produce individuals who are intellectually, spiritually, emotionally and physically balanced and harmonious, based on a firm belief in and devotion to God… Citizens of high moral standards, knowledgeable and competent, and who are responsible and capable of achieving a high level of personal well-being, as well as being able to contribute to the harmony and betterment of the family, and society and the nation at large.
2. provide pupils with the essential intellectual, affective and psychomotor skills in a holistic and integrated manner.
3. produce manpower with the requisite skills for economic and national development.
4. inculcate in pupils desired moral values, and promote personality and aesthetic development as well as the sense of being responsible and disciplined, and progressive by enabling them to contribute effectively towards nation-building.
5. expand basic education qualitatively and quantitatively by providing maximum opportunities for free access of every child to education.
6. have students understand Islam in a correct and comprehensive manner and provide them with the values, teachings and ideals of Islam.
7. expand educational patterns to include special education programmes, and programmes for the gifted and those with special needs.
8. provide opportunities for students to realize the concept of lifelong learning.
9. prepare citizens for meeting the challenge of technological advancement in the world.
10. guarantee the fundamentals of national culture.[3]

All Muslim countries share in these goals, even if they may have expressed them differently.

The structure of the systems of general education in Muslim countries follows the model that exists in almost every country in the world starting with pre-primary (kindergarten), primary (elementary) school, lower (junior) secondary and higher secondary school. The common practice is to have one to two years of pre-primary, nine years of primary and lower secondary and three years of higher secondary. Children are admitted to primary school in most Muslim countries at the age of six, but some admit them at the age of five. Primary and lower secondary are now combined in most countries under the title 'Basic Education'. Some states, however, provide primary education as a separate phase and combine lower and higher secondary as an independent phase. Higher secondary is generally divided into three streams: academic, commercial and technical, and vocational. There are also religious secondary schools in every country. Pre-school education is generally not included in the national educational ladder. It is normally provided by the private sector

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3. *Ibid.*

and by NGOs. The government role with regard to pre-school education is usually limited to providing technical training to teachers and supervisors, and to the supervision of the schools. The responsibility for those tasks is divided between the Ministries of Education, Social Affairs and Health.

Higher secondary education consists (in most Muslim countries) of three years of study as a follow-up phase to basic education. In a few countries, higher secondary education consists of two years. The two common objectives of secondary education are to prepare the students for higher education and/or for entry into the employment market.

Students are admitted to higher secondary education according to their abilities and interests. They are provided with specialized cultural, scientific and vocational experiences which seek to meet the existing and anticipated needs of society. Accordingly, there are two major types of secondary education:

a) Comprehensive secondary education, which provides a general common cultural base for all students, in addition to specialized academic or vocational education;
b) Applied secondary education which provides vocational training and apprenticeship.

Like other levels of education, secondary education is faced with a number of constraints related to quantity and quality. The former is mainly the result of expansion of access to basic education and the latter is due to the fact that secondary education suffers from a shortage of adequately trained staff, relevant curricula and the inability to respond to the diverse needs of students. Many secondary school graduates who miss admission to higher education dream of finding jobs immediately after graduation from school. The reality of the situation is different in the sense that the employment market does not seem to be ready to absorb secondary school graduates with no technical or vocational skills. Even those with technical and vocational skills are not readily absorbed. Hence a high rate of unemployment among secondary school leavers is a common problem in nearly all Muslim countries. It is therefore not unusual to observe that the question of reforming secondary education is an issue of major pre-occupation in all Muslim countries. Priority is given to two major areas in the reform:

The curriculum and the training of teachers. Reforming the curriculum is generally centred around an attempt to design curricula that meet the needs of all students irrespective of whether they plan to go on to higher education or to join the employment market. That would require two interrelated actions:
a) increase the options available to students to decide early enough which stream they wish to follow (academic, technical or commercial); and,
b) build bridges between secondary school and the world of work by preparing the students for existing job opportunities, and provide them with the learning

skills that can help them adapt to the requirements of the employment market, through training in the period of transition from secondary school to the world of work.

In this respect, there is a need to remember that the changing situation in contemporary societies demands not only knowledge and skills, but also positive attitudes and the ability to adapt to change. Present secondary education is far from being able to do that. The concern with reforming the curriculum has been coupled in all Muslim countries with a focus on reforming teacher training both pre-service and in-service. It is generally accepted by policy makers that a paradigm shift in teacher approach to the teaching/learning process is necessary to ensure that the teaching strategies used in classrooms are based on the principle of involving the student, who should become the centre of learning. At the same time, the teacher as a facilitator of learning should help the student acquire the necessary skills for problem-solving and lifelong learning.[4]

The trend is to improve the situation by targeting the trainers of teachers and providing them with the relevant knowledge and training skills that they can pass on to school teachers to help them achieve the curriculum objectives, and to help them promote good teaching and learning practice at all levels. Teacher training institutions, be they universities or teacher training colleges are, in many Muslim countries, beginning to see the need to accommodate information and communication technology as a positive factor in learning provision. The pressures to use technologies are increasing. But the response from teacher training institutions is slow. The technologies are currently used at two levels: to support the curriculum and methodology in teacher training, and to implement distance learning programmes. To do this effectively, there has to be a major reinforcement of the infrastructure and the human resources for running teacher training institutions. The emergence of the internet has revolutionized open distance learning in a number of ways, hence making it a more accessible option. The accessibility of distance educational systems has been enhanced exponentially by technology. Knowledge has also increased exponentially and at a very rapid pace. Teacher training institutions have to find new ways and means to reach more teachers with new and updated knowledge and innovative skills.

The systems of education in all Muslim countries are currently the subject of continuous debate, which is aimed at reforming the system to make it more responsive to the growing needs of those countries in the light of the rapid changes caused by globalization and the revolution in information and communication technologies. All Muslim states have been party to international

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4. UNESCO, *Learning: The Treasure Within*, Report of the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-first Century, p. 146.

declarations regarding the universalization of primary education, the Millennium Development Goals, the right of the child, gender equality, and many other international and regional commitments to provide education for all citizens as a human right, and as an indispensable tool for realizing sustainable development. Being directly involved in the formulation of those instruments, Muslim countries have come under a moral obligation to reform their education systems so that they can deliver what is expected of them. However, besides the external pressure, demands are mounting from within every Muslim nation for better quality education to prepare the society for the challenges of the twenty-first century. Chief among such challenges is the present mismatch between what most of the systems are offering by way of education and training, and what the employment market is looking for.

Issues of unemployment, especially among youth, poverty, and environmental degradation, and the disparities between rural and urban areas have all pushed the decision makers in the direction of reforming the systems of education and training to make them more sensitive to the needs of the individual and the society. Within the educational system itself, some new priorities have been imposed by the changing social and cultural circumstances in every Muslim country. There is a common drive in all lands to include in the curricula some new concepts and contents that are indispensable for living in a rapidly changing world, which has become a small village, and which requires its inhabitants to acquire new skills to be able to live together in peace. Tolerance and recognition of the right of the other to live in peace are the backbone of a new culture of peace that education must inculcate in the minds of the young.

On the other hand, policy makers are careful not to neglect the fundamental elements that every Muslim society must value and sustain. They endeavor to strike a balance between the spiritual and the material, and between the global and the local, to be true to their commitments to the teachings of Islam. That is, no doubt, a huge and complex task which can take years to accomplish. While some of the richer Muslim states may be able to accomplish the reform within a reasonable time span, the poor countries lack adequate resources to carry out significant reforms. They generally rely on foreign financial and technical support to carry out their educational reforms.

Languages

The diverse cultural settings in which Muslim nations are situated has been reflected in the language mosaic that the different groups speak and teach to their children in schools. One can identify four clusters that represent the language map of Muslim countries:

V–2.2   Learning to read the Qurʾān in Dhaka, Bangladesh
© Kevin Bubriski/AramcoWorld

a) There is the Arabic cluster which includes the twenty-two Arab States that use Arabic (the mother tongue) as a medium of instruction in primary schools. Some teach English or French as a second language in primary school. But all countries maintain at least one foreign language in junior secondary schools.

b) The second cluster is made up of some of the ex-French colonies in Africa. These countries (with the exception of Arab North Africa) use French as a medium of instruction in primary school; but some of them teach national languages in both primary and junior secondary schools.

c) The third cluster is made up of the ex-British colonies in Africa and Asia. The majority of these countries (with the exception of the Arab States) use English as a medium of instruction in primary schools. They maintain the same situation in junior secondary schools; but they add the teaching of a national language and another foreign (Arabic is the most common) language to the curriculum. An exception in this cluster is the Islamic Republic of Iran where Farsi is the medium of instruction in primary school. However, the language policy is frequently changed in some countries.

d) The fourth cluster is made up of the Muslim nations that were part of the former-Soviet Union. The language situation in these countries is mixed as some of them use their national language as a medium of instruction, while others use Russian. Many of these countries now introduce foreign languages, such as English, French, German or Arabic, in junior secondary school.

The issue of languages has always been a centre of debate in Muslim countries who consider Arabic, the language of the Qurʾān, an indispensable medium for conducting their religious rituals and for accessing the original sources of knowledge about Islam. They all believe that the imposition of the language of the colonizer as a medium of instruction in their primary schools, at the expense of excluding Arabic and the national languages as part of the colonial policy of cultural domination. A number of countries have introduced measures to correct that situation, but the process is long and very demanding.

One of the most important experiences in language development is the Bilingual Education Support Project in some Muslim West African countries where the formal primary school is thought to be doing very little in Islamic education and Islamic culture. Consequently, a large number of parents send their children to Qurʾānic schools which use Arabic as a medium of instruction instead of sending them to the formal school where French is the medium of instruction. Aware of the fact that the graduates of the Qurʾānic schools have limited opportunities to continue their education in the formal system or to compete for employment in the modern sectors of the economy, some governments decided to introduce bilingual education in their primary schools, and sought support from international organizations such as UNESCO and from regional institutions such as the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). Two countries in West Africa, namely Chad and Niger, submitted a project to the IDB for restructuring the Qurʾānic and Arabic community schools in order to integrate them into the formal education system. The objective of the project was to provide bilingualism (by teaching both Arabic and French) through the provision of textbooks, teachers' guides, improvement of the educational structure and support to the Directorate of Arabic Education. The project also includes construction of schools, training of personnel, pedagogical advisors, and recruitment and training of teaching volunteers. The IDB allocated an amount of $33.1 million dollars for the project which is reported to be progressing satisfactorily, and producing some positive results which have so far included:

a) Training 480 teachers;
b) Constructing 153 classrooms;
c) Training seminars;
d) A needs assessment survey under the supervision of UNESCO.

A conference was organized in Chad in June 2004 to publicize the interim results of the project among donors attracted many agencies including the African Development Banks, the Arab Bank for Development in Africa, the World Bank, the Kuwait Fund and UNESCO. The conference made some recommendations included:

1. Support for bilingual education, including bilingual technical and vocational training, in Chad and Niger.
2. Modernization of Qurʾānic schools and eradication of illiteracy.
3. Governments of Chad and Niger to sensitize development partners about bilingual education.
4. IDB and UNESCO to prepare the Second Conference on Bilingual Education and extend it to all sub-Saharan countries (Source IDB country Operation Department).

It is important to note that the concern of the Muslim countries of West Africa about the language issue goes back to the mid-1980s when a major project, 'Using the Arabic Alphabet for Writing Native and Indigenous Languages in Africa', was jointly launched by IDB and UNESCO in 1984, in response to the genuine and growing needs of many Muslim countries in Africa to use the Arabic alphabet in writing their native language and interpreting the Qurʾān.

The project's primary goals and objectives were to:

1. preserve the culture, ethnicity, and mother tongue of Muslim communities in Africa, and transmit Islamic knowledge to future generations.
2 promote the use of indigenous languages, especially when the Arabic alphabet is used to transmit scientific knowledge through computer technology.
3. strengthen the ties between African communities and the Qurʾānic alphabet to expose Muslim children to Islamic culture, history and civilization.
4. promote awareness of the basic sources of Islamic knowledge while reducing high illiteracy rates.

The project was successfully implemented by IDB, UNESCO, ISESCO and the Arabic Language Institute of Muḥammad in Morocco and the countries concerned. It was finished in 1991. Some of the most important outcomes of the project were:

The publication of a booklet containing basic reading, writing, arithmetic, health education, and ethics.
The publication of an instructor's manual.
The training of twenty-four Islamic school teachers.
The designation of eight pilot centres (schools) in Mali, Niger and Senegal.
The production for Qurʾānic schools of educational materials in different domains, including agriculture, animal husbandry and handicrafts.

Information on the follow-up to this project and its impact is lacking. But there is no doubt that such an interaction should have been supported and contained by all the countries concerned as well as by the donors.[5]

5. Islamic Development Bank (IDB), *Financing Basic Education in IDB Member Countries*, 2004, p. 57.

Related to the language issue is the question of textbooks and teaching materials. The supply of textbooks, the most widely known basic medium of instruction all over the world, is not guaranteed in every country in the Muslim world. That represents a serious constraint in poor countries, particularly among children in rural communities. In fact, even in some rich countries the availability of textbooks is as low as 10 per cent as stated by more than one Ministry of Education in a report to the UNESCO 46 Conference on Education (Geneva 2001). The reports by those nations stated that 'rural schools have virtually no textbooks'. Along with the textbooks traditional media in the form of visual aids are widely used in many countries. In others the unavailability of such media constitutes a serious gap. The most challenging development in the domain of the media of instruction is the introduction at varying degrees and levels of information and communication technologies in the educational system by quite a number of Muslim states, particularly the rich ones. The degree of use varies from country to country. While some limit their options to helping children become computer literate, a number of others such as Malaysia, Morocco, Bahrain and Turkey, to mention just a few, have opted for long term policies of transferring the entire system of education from conventional teaching to e-learning. The cost of laying the infrastructure and training teachers and technicians for such a venture is beyond the financial reach of most Muslim countries.[6]

Challenges that Muslim countries have to face[7]

The OIC Commission of Eminent Persons (CEP) submitted in July 2005 a report to the OIC which was intended to help the latter develop a strategy 'to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century'. The report covered many aspects ranging from security to information and communication technology. Education, science and technology were key areas of recommendations.

It will be sufficient for the purpose of this document to highlight some of the key challenges and the recommendations of the CEP.

UNDER EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES:

i) Low level of contribution towards science and technology, especially in the area of research and development.
ii) Lack of quality education and other flaws in the educational system.
iii) Failure to generate creative and innovative ideas.

6. UNESCO, IBE, *World Data on Education*, 2003.
7. Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), *Report of the OIC Commission of Eminent Persons*, OIC, 2005.

V–2.3   Children learn to recite the Qurʾān from memory, with their copy
boards out of view on their heads, in Djenné, Mali
© Brynn Bruijin/AramcoWorld

Recommendations:

i)   Increase budgetary allocation substantially, to provide quality education and
enhance research and development.

ii) Encourage the private sector to contribute to research and development.

iii) Establish a consortium for higher education to promote scientific research
and provide academic opportunities, *inter alia*, for those Muslim students
who cannot pursue higher education in Western institutions due to
difficulties arising after the events of 9/11.

iv) Enhance exchange of technologies among OIC countries.

v)   Strengthen COMSTECH institutionally and financially.

vi) Encourage creative, innovative and critical thinking within the education
system.

vii) OIC to develop standard high school curricula in order to remove all prejudices
about each other and the Secretary General to approach the western countries
to remove the bias against Islam and Muslims from their curricula.

viii) Special initiatives for women's education and female literacy.

ix) Modernization of the curricula of religious schools.

UNDER ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

In addition to the teaching of Islamic *ʿaqīda* and *ʿibāda* (worship), Islamic religious education should aim at promoting the awareness that:

- Islamic norms and teachings oblige Muslims to practice the virtues of peace (*salām*), moderation (*tawassuṭ*), tolerance (*tasāmuḥ*), consultation (*shūrā*), justice (*ʿadāla*), balance (*tawāzun*), patience (*ṣabr*), freedom (*ḥurriyya*), equity (*musāwāt*), brotherhood (*ukhuwwa*), and compassion (*raḥma*).
- Islam upholds the values of human dignity and recognize the equal opportunity of human beings of different religions in inter-personal relationships, in maintaining harmonious interfaith relations and in the entire process of international decision-making.
- Muslim females have equal rights as Muslim males and that both are required to pursue knowledge, be given equal opportunities to excel in their respective fields of specialization.
- the study of natural sciences and their branches is an obligation for all Muslim children in order to understand the wonderful 'signs of Allāh' in nature and in the whole universe and to harness them for the betterment of human beings.
- the proper training of teachers and production of textbooks of Islamic religious education to prepare children for the challenges of religious pluralism, globalization, the knowledge-based economy, the revolution of IT and the Moral Society are urgently needed.

UNDER EDUCATION AND PEACE

- Promote the quality of teachers, better curricula and educational materials for Islamic educational institutions as part of the efforts to prepare the *Umma* to meet the new positive and negative consequences of the globalization process.
- Integrate modern science and technology, as well as information and communication technology, into Islamic educational institutions.

UNDER THE ROLE OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN

- Support all undertakings to enhance the capacity and the role of women in the Muslim community in accordance with Islamic values of equality and justice for the betterment of humankind.
- OIC or any Member State to organize regular international conferences on the progress of women and children, in a Muslim country or outside the Muslim world.

In addition to the above-mentioned recommendations the CEP added that for Muslim nations to promote enlightened moderation, the agenda should

include: 'addressing the internal problems of Muslim countries through *educational reforms*, eradication of extremism, radicalism and sectarian violence.'

On listing the top priorities to be dealt with, the CEP had two priorities related to education. These are:

– Review and reform of Muslim religious education towards a more balanced, holistic and integrated Islamic education.
– Eradication of poverty, illiteracy and child labour or enslavement.

The report of the CEP, together with other studies carried out by Muslim countries and Muslim joint organizations and institutions, could provide the necessary elements for a strategy of sustainable development in which a reformed system of education could play an effective role.

Educational reform should concentrate specifically on the following challenges and should endeavor to find ways of meeting those challenges.

1. The question of female education which has various dimensions and implications for the structure, curriculum, management and methodology of education. An important dimension is the issue of vocational and professional education for Muslim girls, their career opportunities and aspirations.[8]

    The extent of female illiteracy and the underprivileged situation of girls as regards access to and retention in school still remains one of the greatest challenges of the world. Over the last two decades, substantial efforts have been made in Muslim countries to expand education of girls and women. Much has been achieved, but much more remains to be done for equal participation of girls in both formal and non-formal education. The education of girls and women must become a genuine policy priority, not only on ethical grounds but also because of the widely recognized key role of women's knowledge and skills in crucial areas of development.

    The effect and influence of women's education in reducing fertility rate, improving infant survival rates and levels of child health, requires no proof. It should be added that mothers' awareness of the potential benefits of education for their children will obviously encourage school attendance, and influences children's performance throughout their school careers. More resources and at the same time less orthodox strategies will have to be deployed to overcome present obstacles and enhance female participation in education.

2. Another challenge is the question of access and quality. The capacity of the systems of education must be tremendously increased to ensure access and equity for every child, particularly, at the basic education level. Expansion must be linked to quality, and that would require an increase in the internal efficiency of the system.

8. See UNESCO Institute for Statistics, *Global Education Digest*, 2005.

V–2.4   Celebrating UN World Water Day at Piramerd Basic School, in
Badawa, in the Kurdistan region of Iraq
© UN Photo/BikemEkberzade

3.   A third challenge that Muslim countries, (like the rest of the developing
word) have to face is the challenge of basic illiteracy, where more than
40 per cent of youth and adults, fifteen years and over, are said to
be illiterate. The figure rises sharply among women as on average
more than 70 per cent of women in the same age group are said to be
illiterate. Illiteracy among mothers impacts negatively on the education
of their children, as well as on the economic and the health side and
on the general well-being of their families. According to UNESCO,
out of the thirty-four priority countries selected as a first target group
(because they have either a literacy rate of 50 per cent or a population
of over 10 million persons with inadequate literacy competences), 24
are Muslim countries.[9]

4.   Another challenge relates to the growing tensions in the world which lie
at the heart of conceptualizing and realizing the goals of education. Such
tensions as enumerated by the International Commission on 'Education
in the Twenty-First Century' (1996) include:
    –   tension between the global and the local
    –   tension between the universal and the individual,

9.   UNESCO, *Literacy Initiative for Empowerment (LIFE)*, 2005, p. 39.

> – tension between tradition and modernity, and
> – tension between the spiritual and the material.

These tensions are of particular relevance to Muslim countries today. It will be necessary for education policy makers and planners to develop a new vision for education that would take these tensions into consideration.

They should, at the same time, design suitable mechanisms which will make it possible for Muslim countries to overcome these tensions through progressive and effective methodology.[10]

5. Finally, a major challenge these states must face will be how to integrate information and communication technologies into their systems of education. A pre-requisite here will be, first of all, to have a national ICT policy. Harmonized implementation of ICT in education programmes can be achieved by clearly defining the roles and responsibilities of all departments within the Ministry of Education and other ministerial departments. The use of ICT in education is now a worldwide phenomenon. It has been found to be effective in two ways: it accelerates learning, and improves quality. ICT-based learning strategies help to develop the students' ability to think creatively, to co-operate with one another, and to make sound value judgments. ICT also promotes efficient communication within the school, among schools, and between them and the Ministry of Education. Some of the Muslim states are advanced in their application of ICT, but the majority, particularly the poor ones, have not been able to make any appreciable progress in this domain.[11]

While experience of industrialized countries indicates that technology and innovations or research and development policies are key to successful development, it should be remembered that a crucial point here is that the government of the country must put in place the institutional infrastructure necessary for effective transfer of technology and for the development of indigenous technology. The availability of trained human resources and the participation of the private sector are two crucial factors of success.

10. UNESCO, *Learning: The Treasures Within*, p. 16.
11. See UNESCO, *Information and Communication Technologies in Teacher Education,* 2002. Also see OECD, Education Policy Analysis, 1999.

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Abdallah R. Bubtana and Abdelwahid A. Yousif

There are two types of educational institutions in Muslim countries; the contemporary institutions, which follow the colonial model; and the original institutions that carry all the characteristics of the institutions that were born during the early years of the coming of Islam.

With regard to the contemporary institutions, the situation in Muslim countries is not different from the situation in the rest of the world, where institutions from pre-school to secondary school are assigned the role of providing general education, and where tertiary education is carried out by colleges and universities. Other institutions that deal with research, management and planning of education also exist in Muslim countries. These research institutions, however, lack the financial and the human resources to contribute effectively to knowledge badly needed in those countries. As mentioned earlier, a report that was submitted in July 2005 to the organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) by the Commission of Eminent Persons representing 17 of the 57 Muslim nations, stated that Muslim countries suffer from a low level of research and development, a poor educational system, and a shortage of creative and innovative ideas.[1]

The fact of the matter is that Muslim countries have small scientific communities and poor quality universities. Although they have nearly a quarter of the world's population, they have only one per cent of its scientists, who contribute barely 0.1 per cent of the world's original research discoveries each year. They spend, on average, less than 0.5 per cent of their gross domestic product on research and development each year, compared to 2–4 per cent spent by industrialized countries.

However, there is in Muslim countries a distinction between what may be called a religious system of education and a 'secular' system of education within

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1. See OIC Commission of Eminent Persons' Report.

the category of formal contemporary institutions. There are in every nation a number of religious institutions that run parallel to the formal institutions, from primary to tertiary levels. Their main mission is to introduce the young to the teachings and values of Islam. These institutions are recognized by the Ministry of Education and receive support from the Ministries of Education and Religious Affairs. They are generally attended by boys and girls whose parents fear the influence of the secularism of which they accuse the modern system of education which they believe is modeled on the colonial system.

As far as the original Islamic institutions are concerned, all Muslim countries still maintain these institutions which are still very effective and widespread, particularly in the rural areas. There are currently three main types of institutions: the *kuttāb*, the mosque and the madrassa.

The *Kuttāb* (Qurʾānic school)[2]

The *kuttāb* is the equivalent of both pre-school and primary school combined. The word *kuttāb* (or maktab) derives from the Arabic root, *kataba* meaning to write. It is given the same name in nearly all Muslim states with two exceptions: in Sudan it is called al-Khalwa, an Arabic word meaning seclusion because the teacher used to be a religious person who secluded himself from the community for the purpose of worship. In Mauritania it is known as 'mahdara' or 'mahzara', a type of Qurʾānic school which combined the pre-primary, primary, intermediate and secondary schools. The common objective of the *kuttāb* has been, since its inception in the earlier years of the coming of Islam, to provide the teachings of the Qurʾān and to teach children how to perform the fundamental rituals of Islam such as ablution and prayer. It also provides the means to acquire reading and writing and elements of arithmetic. The *kuttāb* is actually a one-teacher school and the Qurʾān is the only teaching aid. It is a community-run institution and has the characteristic of being accessible to all children and youth free of charge. Children are introduced to the learning of the Qurʾān in an ascending manner starting with the shorter chapters which they have to learn by heart. Traditionally, the *kuttāb* is supported by the community, but nowadays it receives modest support from government.

While the main mission of the *kuttāb* has remained the same in all Muslim countries, attempts to modernize the Qurʾānic school are centred to include subjects similar to those taught in contemporary primary schools. The objective is that the graduate of the Qurʾānic school should have the opportunity to compete for entry to advanced levels of formal education, on an equal footing with the graduates of the formal primary school. Attempts to reform the

2. See UNESCO, Report of a Regional Seminar of Experts on Qurʾānic Schools and their Role in the Universalization and Renewal of Basic Education, 1993. Also see IBE, World Data on Education, 2003.

Qurʾānic school also included a call for the recruitment of trained teachers of secular subjects to work with the head teacher. Qurʾānic school graduates are generally accepted into religious intermediate institutions where they may continue their education up to university level. In the case of Mauritania the 'mahzara', which combines the equivalent of secondary school, includes in its curriculum studies of the Arabic language and *Sharīʿa* law. The mahzara, like all Qurʾānic schools, is basically a self-sufficient institution obtaining its requirements from the community. Again, like all Qurʾānic schools, the 'mahzara' operates all the year round, and accepts pupils of different ages. A significant aspect of the Qurʾānic schools is that they are co-educational, especially those in rural areas. Young girls sit with young boys and learn the Qurʾān and the basics of reading and writing. In some countries they provide the only opportunity for girls to get any type of education.

There has been some criticism of the methods of learning in the Qurʾānic schools which are based on memorization and rote learning. However, if the main mission of these schools is to help the child memorize the Qurʾān, what other method can they use? Critics overlook the fact that there are other important pedagogical aspects of the Qurʾānic school that aim at helping children acquire some of the important values advocated by Islam and upheld by the communities, especially those in rural areas. For example, children are required to work together to clean the school, to go out and fetch firewood and water, and in some countries where there is a school farm, they are required to work on this farm one day a week. In some countries children go out to beg for food, which is criticized by many, but many of those who give out food feel that they are performing a religious duty by supporting the learning of the Qurʾān. Two very important characteristics of teaching in the Qurʾānic school are:

a) peer teaching where elder children who have reached a higher level teach younger children under the supervision of the head teacher, and

b) the individual approach to teaching. This is a child-centred approach as children join the school at different dates throughout the year and progress in their studies according to their intellectual abilities, without being tied to a grade. In such a situation the teacher has to attend to the level of each student and dictate to him the portion or the chapter of the Qurʾān which matches his level of learning, as soon as the child has recited the previous portion or chapter he had received the day before. The amazing aspect of this type of teaching and learning is the fascinating way in which the teacher dictates from memory to as many students as may be present, giving each one of them the portion he needs sentence by sentence. It should also be noted that women also teach in Qurʾānic school. In the Maldives for example, the vast majority of Qurʾānic school teachers are women.

V–3(a).1   Traditional religious education in Djenné, Mali
© Brynn Bruijin/AramcoWorld

The Mosque[3]

The other original Islamic institution of learning is the mosque which has continued to play a significant role as a centre of learning in Muslim societies. The mosque, which began in early years of Islam, very quickly developed into a multi-purpose centre in the sense that it accommodated the political, social and religious activities of society. It provided an ideal milieu for a learning system which combined both formal and non-formal education, and which sought to integrate learning with life and promote the principles of equal opportunity and the concept of lifelong learning. The mosque is designated as the house of God – meaning that nobody can close it to the servants of God (the people). This made it possible for people to come in for learning, for prayer and whenever they liked. In the earlier centuries of Islam all sciences, with the exception of natural sciences, were taught in the mosque. Even today, it is still a centre for non-formal education where ordinary people benefit from discussion of religious matters organized by knowledgeable men. The *Ḥalaqāt al-ᶜilm* (study circles) are a well known method of learning associated

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3. See A. Yousif, *Muslim Learning in the Earlier Abbasid Era*, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Toronto, Canada, 1975.

with the mosque since ancient times. They are often devoted to the discussion in depth, of matters that relate to peoples' religious concerns.

The *Madrasa* (school)[4]

The word *madrasa* is derived from the Arabic word *darasa* meaning to study. The term means 'school' or, literally, 'place where lessons are given'. It is also an original Muslim institution. The very first such school is *al-Madrasa al-niẓāmiyya* in Baghdad which was established in the eighth century. Like the Qurʾānic school, the *madrasa* is found in all Muslim countries as a faith-based institution. Its functions overlap with those of the Qurʾānic school insofar as the teaching of the Qurʾān and the fundamentals of Islam are concerned, but it also serves other functions such as preparing civil servants and judicial officials, as well as religious functions. *Madrasa* may appear in different countries under different names, but in all cases they are recognized as a low-cost vehicle for spreading access and promoting gender equality, especially among the rural areas where children are hard to reach.

Some Muslim countries have succeeded in integrating the *madrasa* in the formal system of education (using the same public school curriculum). In Indonesia, for example, the curriculum for older children incorporated health education, as well as history and geography etc, because the majority of children who patronize *madrasas* are from low-income groups, studies by the World Bank have shown that madrasas have contributed enormously to access to education, and were also cost-effective. The cost of running the *madrasa* is estimated to be one third of the cost of running a public school with the same number of students and teachers. The integration of *madrasas* into the formal system also satisfies the requirement of involving the stakeholders (community, parents, and civil society organizations) in the education process.

The management of religious institutions is normally the responsibility of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, but in some countries the responsibility is given to the Ministry of Education and in others the two ministries assume joint responsibility for these institutions. During the last three decades a number of initiatives were launched by many Muslim states to reform Islamic educational institutions, with the objective of making them respond to changes in society covering more than religious issues. Some progress has been made, but the process will certainly take a long time.

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4. *Ibid.*

Basic education

Abdallah R. Bubtana and Abdelwahid A. Yousif

Introduction

All Muslim countries have committed themselves to the objectives of Dakar and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), but they are at varying degrees of progress towards the fulfillment of those objectives. The responsibility for education in general and for basic education in particular, rests primarily with the government in a decentralized fashion in the large countries, and in a centralized fashion in the smaller states. However, the private sector is contributing to the provision of education in different ways as (mentioned earlier in this document). Civil society has actively been involved in the process of basic education. The Muslim countries share some common denominators in their objectives of basic education, which can be summarized as follows:

> The provision of free, universal quality-basic education for every school-age child, to raise the basic education completion rate, to reduce the gender gap in enrolment, to improve the overall performance of the system, to increase access and eligibility, through improvement of the quality of education, and finally to strengthen partnership among all actors.

In fact, the policy objectives go beyond registered school children to cater to school drop-outs and out-of-school children/adolescents through appropriate forms of complementary approaches to the provision of basic education.

Included in the vision of all countries is the provision of youth and adult education programmes, an effort deemed highly important in view of the fact that adult illiteracy among Muslim countries is very high (approximately 45 per cent of the population aged 15 and above). Within the school-age group of children, most nations have made some effort to cater to the poor, the excluded and the difficult to reach. Most countries operate a basic education structure of a nine-year compulsory primary and junior secondary education.

There are a number of non-governmental organizations which collaborate with the Ministries of Education in the management of private schools and the non-formal system of education. Women's educational agencies in all Muslim countries are actively involved in educational activities. They are particularly involved in mobilization and advocacy in aid of the education of girls and women.

Basic education representing the base of the educational ladder is generally agreed upon in all Muslim nations to be as follows:

– Primary education lasting six years and catering to children aged 6 – 11
– Secondary education divided into two three-year cycles: junior secondary culminating in the junior school certificate examination, and higher secondary, leading to the high school certificate examination.

The political commitment to basic education[1]

All Muslim countries are party to international commitments to provide quality universal basic education for all. They are committed in particular to the pursuance of the Dakar Framework for Action (April 2000), and the Millennium Development Goals (the Millennium Summit 2000).

Governments are the main providers of basic education via a public system. Available data show that in Muslim countries the average gross primary school enrolment rates have risen significantly in the last two decades: from 78 per cent in 1980 to 95 per cent in 2000, according to Islamic Development Bank sources. However, these figures hide enormous disparities across and within the states. For example, while enrolment in some Arab and Central Asian countries has risen to 100 per cent, the rates in others in Africa, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, are below 50 per cent. In fact, access has declined in some places due to a number of factors, principally poverty, armed conflict, and population growth. Despite the commendable efforts made in all countries, there are still serious gaps between males and females, and between rural and urban areas. Quantitative growth apart, the quality of basic education in the majority of Muslim countries leaves a lot to be desired. Educational institutions in many countries, especially the least developed ones, are under-resourced, under-equipped and lack sufficiently qualified personnel to obtain satisfactory standards of learning achievement. The educational systems in those states face a high degree of drop-out and repetition rates. A large number of children living in semi-urban and remote rural areas still do not have access to school and many of those who do drop out before completing primary education. The reasons for dropping out and repetition in these schools are

1. See IBE, World Data on Education 2003. Also see UNESCO, EFA Global Monitoring Report: Gender and Education for all: the Leap Forward, 2003–4 and 2004–5.

of two types either the poor level of internal efficiency of the school, or the unfavourable external environment surrounding the school. Some of the common impediments in this kind of environment include severe poverty, low productivity and high population growth, leading to a situation where a country has a limited capacity to absorb the growing number of school-age children. The attitude of parents towards education, particularly of girls, in many countries is rather discouraging, due in some cases to economic reasons or to reasons, related to the distant location of the school.

The gender gaps represent a serious challenge, particularly to those nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Arab States and South and East Asia. The enrolment rates show wide disparities between boys and girls. More boys go to school than girls. But even those girls who go to school are more likely to drop out' before completing primary school. However, it must be noted that the number of girls who go to school all over these areas is increasing. It is also important to mention that girls in secondary and tertiary education outperform boys in the majority of Muslim countries. Wealth, the geographical location (e.g. urban/rural) and the level of education of the parents are all factors that have an impact on hindering or accelerating girls' progress in education. Another challenge is the degree of attainment of both sexes in primary school. Attainment actually varies from country to country and between groups of the population in the same country, ranging from 35 per cent to 84 per cent. It is fair to say that despite the great effort that Muslim governments are making to close the education gap, education in some of these countries is inadequate, coverage is insufficient, access is inequitable, the quality is poor, and too few children complete the basic education cycle.

According to UNESCO's analysis of Gender and Education (2003–4), the twenty-two Arab States have some of the lowest General Enrolment Rates (GERs) and the largest gender disparities. Those in Sub-Saharan Africa also have low GERs and striking inequalities in enrolment. Incidence of repetition is highest in Sub-Saharan Africa – above 15 per cent in about half of the countries – with repeaters sometimes reaching one-quarter of the overall enrolment. Muslim countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are part of that situation.

Educators and policy makers agree that, in general, inequality in educational participation and outcome reflects broader inequalities in society. For example, the most effective approach to the problem of gender inequality will be to work for more social change in society. Muslim countries share many of the constraints in this domain with other developing countries. Some of the most significant constraints are: dependence of girls (even after marriage) on the resources of their family, the attitude in many countries of preferring boys to girls, and the mentality of some parents to keep girls at home either to do domestic work, or to look after their younger brothers and sisters, or for their safety, especially if the school is far from their home.

GOALS OF BASIC EDUCATION[2]

The goals of basic education in Muslim countries are centred around the skills of reading, writing, mathematics, the ability to communicate effectively, and the inculcation of positive attitudes towards cooperation, work, community, national development and caring for others. The goals are extended to cover the needs of two broad categories of children with special needs, namely, the handicapped and the exceptionally gifted. It should be noted that the education of the handicapped is a domain where religious and voluntary organizations have always made a notable contribution. While separate schools for the different categories of handicapped children exist in each country, inclusive school model is gradually being adopted. With regard to gifted children, many countries have established mechanisms for identifying, encouraging and meeting the special learning needs of gifted and talented children.

Basic education is considered the foundation for a system of education, seen by nearly all countries of the Muslim world as an ongoing effort to further develop the potential of individuals in a holistic and integrated manner so as to produce individuals who are intellectually, spiritually, emotionally and physically balanced and harmonious, based on a firm belief in and devotion to God; individuals who are knowledgeable and competent, and who are responsible and capable of achieving a high level of personal well-being as well as being able to contribute to the welfare of the family, the society, and the country as a whole.

The underlying principles and goals of the national education philosophy in each country are more-or-less translated into the school curriculum, which encourages the development of well-balanced individuals who are knowledgeable, trained and skilled. Curriculum reform is a common and continuing pre-occupation in all Muslim nations. It is a concern driven by continuing change in subject content, teaching strategies and the increasing development in information and communication technology (ICT). However, not many have been able to integrate ICT into education in a major way.

Educators complain about the slow pace of reforming the systems of education where traditional approaches to teaching and learning are deeply embedded, tipping the scale in favour of rote learning and memorization instead of helping students develop creative and critical thinking skills and independent learning. The way to overcome the present dilemma would be to provide equal opportunity to every child through an increase in the provision of qualified and experienced teachers, and to ensure a greater utilization of modern technologies. Some countries have really made progress in that direction. One state reported that the purpose behind educational reform was

2. UNESCO, IBE World Data, 2003.

to have an educational system on par with the best in the world. The mission statement of the Ministry of Education in that country is to develop a world class quality educational system which would realize the full potential of the individual and fulfil the aspiration of the nation. But the majority are still struggling with the overwhelming challenge of universalizing basic education.

A major challenge that these nations have to meet is to make the educational system the driving force for sustainable development and for taking them into a developed society. To realize that kind of vision, Muslim countries face a number of serious challenges in the domain of basic education, which can be divided into two categories. The first category relates to the question of meeting the quantitative demand for quality basic education for all children. The achievement of such an objective is hampered by the lack of resources (human and financial) in the majority of Muslim countries. The second category of challenges relates to quality.

Quality versus expansion

All Muslim countries state in their educational policy the intention of providing proper basic education for all. They pledge to maintain the quality of education by controlling the quality of teaching, modernizing curricula and textbooks, improving the learning environment, and thus improving learning achievements. In practice, quality proves to be difficult to realize, particularly in countries where resources (both human and financial) are limited. Quality involves proper planning, adequate educational resources such as quality teachers and other personnel, adequate textbooks, laboratories, facilities, and a reliable system of measuring the outcome of education.

A vast number of states have to deal with high drop-out and high repetition rates in primary school, and even higher rates in junior secondary schools. The reasons behind the poor performance of pupils are due primarily to inadequacies in the system. But in a number of countries it is due to social and economic reasons related to child labour and tradition in the case of girls.

One country reports that primary education suffers from several deficiencies and shortcomings. It reports that most primary schools, especially in rural areas, do not have proper physical facilities and their retention rate is very poor – It is estimated that in this particular country, only 71.3 per cent of primary school age children (5–9 years) are enrolled in schools, and about 50 per cent of these drop-out before completing the five-year cycle. The report illustrates the high rate of wastage in the system when it states that the highest drop-out rate occurs between Grades 1 and 2: 25 per cent of boys and 40 per cent of girls drop-out before reaching grade 2. The urban drop-out rate at the national level is 32 per cent and the rural drop-out rate is estimated at 59 per cent. The male rural drop-out rate is 54 per cent and male urban drop-out rate is 26.5 per cent. The

rural female drop-out rate is 67 per cent and the urban female drop-out rate is 38 per cent. The rural drop-out rate in some provinces is as high as 75 per cent[3].

These data are not unique to this country. There are many Muslim countries, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa, which face similar situations. The issue of quality is seen as requiring that the teaching force be competent in the delivery of the curriculum. The transfer of learning, according to these countries, requires a set of knowledge, skills and attitudes from technical know-how to the creative art of teaching.

Teacher training

The teaching profession is ranked among the most respected professions in Islamic culture. Teachers are considered the bastions of ʿilm (knowledge). While this notion is still prevalent in Muslim countries, particularly for teachers in religious schools, the reality of the situation is that teachers there, like teachers in all developing countries, are generally ranked among the relatively lower-paid professionals in the civil service, particularly, those who teach at the basic education level.

The requirements for qualifications to teach in basic education (primary and lower secondary) differ from one country to another. As a common denominator, it can be said that the minimum required is a completion of a higher secondary school certificate plus training in a teacher training institute or college. However, a number of countries hire teachers below the minimum qualifications requirement, while very few prefer to employ university graduates who hold diplomas from a teacher training college or a university. The training is normally divided into two parts: theoretical and practical. It generally lasts one year. Teachers for the second cycle (junior secondary) spend two years to completing a diploma in teacher training. In addition to the pre-service training, there is a common policy in all Muslim countries for making in-service training (professional development) a part and parcel of the teacher's career in order to provide the teacher with an opportunity to update his/her knowledge about the subject he/she is teaching, and to introduce him/her to the new methods and techniques of teaching; in particular the acquisition of knowledge and skills to use ICT. In addition to the training programmes designed to improve the quality of teaching, all countries set up special programmes for training school managers to help them develop their capacity in the domain of school administration.

It is important to note that men and women in the normal system of education enjoy the same conditions of service in all Muslim countries. Some nations, such as Egypt, assign training of teachers of technical education,

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3. UNESCO, IBE, World Data on Education, 2003.

special education, arts, music, physical education etc. to specialized faculties of either a university or higher specialized institutes. Others adopt a policy of training some of their teachers abroad in areas where the country concerned does not have enough advanced knowledge and expertise.

An important aspect of teacher development is the exchange of teachers between Muslim countries. This is particularly notable among states of the Arab region where the existence of a common language (Arabic) facilitates the movement of teachers between countries. The recruitment and distribution of teachers is centralized in nearly all Muslim countries, except in the larger nations where the educational system is decentralized. In this case regional and local governments have a say in recruitment and distribution of teachers. Some of the larger countries are using distance learning to provide both pre-service and in-service training of teachers. Some of the best examples are Egypt, Nigeria and Sudan.

Finally, all countries endeavour to improve the conditions of service for teachers, especially those in basic education.

Financing basic education[4]

The financing of education in the majority of countries around the world is shared among different actors with government accepting the lion's share, especially for basic education, which is provided free of charge. Within government, the burden is, in some cases, shared between central and regional and local governments. Other contributors to the financing of education include the private sector, non-governmental organizations and international agencies. The role of these contributors is specific to the level of education and the type of school. On the other hand, international funding includes loans and grants from multilateral and bilateral donors including international non-governmental organizations. Government financing, unlike other financing, is not limited to school operations, maintenance and the payment of teachers' salaries, but covers also teacher training institutions, equipment and facilities. As stated earlier, most Muslim countries have committed themselves to the Dakar EFA Objectives and to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, a large number will not be able to meet the EFA and the MDGs targets to universalize primary education and to eliminate gender disparity by 2015. There are many reasons behind this possible delay. Many are faced with a fragile domestic resource base and institutional weaknesses which limit the capacity of governments and policy makers to design and carry out policies and strategies to improve their basic education systems. Many face

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4. See IDB, Financing Basic Education, 2004. Also see World Bank, Priorities and Strategies A World Bank Review, the World Bank, Washington, D.C. 1995.

problems of mounting debts, economic decline, rapid population growth, civil strife, and disparities between rural and urban centres. All of these problems, coupled with unequal and inefficient use of available funds, make it impossible for many countries to meet the basic learning needs of their school-age population. Some categories are left behind, especially the poor, ethnic minorities and girls. It is true to say that even some of those that have been able to meet the learning needs from a quantitative aspect, face problems over the qualitative aspects of education, due to the inability of government to set and maintain standards for quality in teaching, in management and in measuring the outcome of learning. It is obvious that in such circumstances, access to basic education is on the one hand limited in many countries because there are not enough schools, not enough space in the existing ones, or because of poor educational facilities. On the other hand, access is limited in some countries because of social and religious restrictions, or due to gender issues. The remedy in the first situation would be to secure enough funds to build more schools and boost enrolment. In the second situation, the remedy would be to commit more funds to reform the curriculum to cater to social, religious, and gender sensitivities.

The private sector is currently participating in the national effort to achieve basic education for all in all Muslim countries, either through financing or through providing educational services that may not necessarily be free. The demand for better quality education and the willingness of many families to pay for it has encouraged investment in education. Private education is currently provided via a variety of institutions, ranging from elite to religious schools, to schools that cater pupils who have dropped out of public school, each serving its purpose and having its specific features. However, all types of private schools are regulated by the government and are under the surveillance of parents and their associations. According to a sample analyzed by the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) private enrolment across that sample ranges from 0 to 39 per cent, an overall average of 9.6 per cent. This includes rich and poor countries in terms of GDP per capita. In eleven out of the twenty-four countries in the sample, the proportion of primary school enrolment exceeds 10 per cent, reflecting the relative importance of the private sector in expanding access to education. Different countries use different mechanisms for realizing private sector financing of educational services. Such mechanisms include 'cost-sharing schemes' and 'government subsidies/loans'. Besides its involvement in basic education, the private sector is widely involved in other levels of education, namely in pre-school, secondary as well as tertiary education (colleges and universities in particular). Through such involvement, the private sector is contributing quality to basic education through the preparation of many children who attend pre-school before coming to primary school, and at the same time it is contributing to the improvement of quality among graduates

of secondary and tertiary education many of whom may have some future contact with the education system such as becoming teachers.

Finally, it is important to note that in all Muslim countries, the community is always involved in the educational process as an expression of the parents' willingness to be involved in their children's welfare. An important source of financing of education is *awqāf* (endowments) and *zakāt* (paying tithes). *Awqāf* (plural of *waqf*) is an original Islamic institution through which individuals designate the income of some of their property (usually in the form of real estate) to the service of the Islamic community in a variety of forms. The most common examples are the building of mosques, hospitals, schools, libraries and orphanages. Some of the most famous higher educational institutions, such as al-Azhar University in Egypt, al-Qarawiyeen University in Morocco and al-Zaytoona in Tunisia, and many other centres of learning all over the Muslim world, were for many years financed by *awqāf*. The same is true today where education is getting a significant share of *awqāf*.

Zakāt, on the other hand, is one of the five pillars of Islam. It is the duty of every Muslim to contribute, annually, a certain percentage of the value of his wealth, provided that wealth has reached the threshold set by Islamic law as the minimum for paying *zakāt*. Although paying *zakāt* is a personal responsibility to be performed by the individual, it has, in many Muslim countries, been institutionalized, and the proceeds are used for building religious institutions and schools, or for training the poor and teaching them basic skills. In many countries *zakāt* proceeds are used for paying the living expenses, scholarships and other expenses of poor students. These two institutions (*awqāf* and *zakāt*), which are unique to Islam, can broaden the base for private funding of many aspects of education, material or technical.

BASIC ADULT AND NON-FORMAL EDUCATION[5]

This type of education is an area of educational activities directed to different segments of the population whether they are out-of-school children, youths or adults. The level of education starts with basic literacy and covers other levels and skills training. However, literacy for youth and adults is considered a high priority by all Muslim countries, as most of those countries suffer from high levels of illiteracy among youths and adults, ranging from 3–70 per cent. The rate is particularly high among women and the rural population. Educators claim that despite all the policy declarations made by the politicians, adult literacy programmes remain the poor relation of the education family; generally under-funded, and required to function with extremely limited resources and generally untrained personnel.

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5. UNESCO, IBE, World Data on Education, 2003.

V–3(b).1   Primary school children going to school in Bangui, Central African
Republic, despite the fighting taking place around them in February 2014
© UN Photo/Serge Nya-Nana

The provision of literacy and non-formal educational programmes is jointly made by government and other agencies. The programmes cover a wide range of activities beyond basic literacy. They include courses in language training, skills training, handicraft, health care and the equivalent of school programmes for those who wish to obtain qualifications that may help them get back into mainstream formal education. University Extension Programmes are part of the structure of many universities. Their main mission is to extend learning to members of the public beyond the walls of the university (extra-mural). The target groups are of three categories: the first category is that of the professionals who wish to catch up with the newest kinds of knowledge in their field of interest. The second category is made up of members of the public who wish to follow some kind of liberal studies such as literature, history, economics, or philosophy unattached to any academic award. The third category includes part-time students who require certificates, diplomas or degrees. They follow their studies either on campus or via distance learning. While the liberal studies programmes are generally provided free of charge; programmes for the two other categories are usually paid for by the students.

Non-formal education, especially literacy and skills training, represents an important educational service available to youths and adults in rural

areas. But this impact on the rural communities is limited because of the relative inadequacy of such programmes in terms of both quantity and quality. However, some states have succeeded in setting up development-oriented training programmes for populations in the rural areas. Some of those programmes are directed towards the poor, particularly women. They combine literacy, mathematical and skills training, and some of them use the micro-credit approach. Such programmes are run by NGOs, particularly women's groups, with support from different sources including government, the private sector and regional and national donors.

The importance of education for rural people stems from the fact that three billion or, 60 per cent of all the people in developing countries and half the global population still live in those areas. Three quarters of the world poor, those subsisting on less than one dollar a day, live in those areas. It is agreed at all the international forums that education can hardly meet its objectives in contributing to the achievements of sustainable development and the promotion of human rights and human dignity, if rural people, the majority of those deprived educationally, remain so deprived.

The current debate is whether the introduction of separate educational policies and programmes for rural areas is the answer. Those who argue against this approach believe that rural areas are diverse and are in a state of transition, and that the paramount need, largely neglected so far, is to adapt, adjust and redirect national educational priorities, strategies and resources to the specific conditions of diverse and changing rural communities, and that it will be essential to turn the continuing and inevitable transition of rural areas into an active and positive process of transformation. Educational programmes have to become a vital part of this transformation through a committed partnership of government, community, business, and civil society as a whole.

Muslim countries in Asia and Africa are homes to huge numbers of rural people who represent more than 70 per cent of the population, particularly those in North and Sub-Saharan Africa.

In order to achieve their objective to make education a vehicle for rural transformation, Muslim countries must look at policies and priorities for education in a new perspective. They have to re-examine their priorities with the objective of putting new emphasis on content and organization of education programmes. The major issues of access, equity, quality, relevance and efficiency have to be re-thought from the point of view of changing rural scenarios.[6] The learning needs of rural communities have grown more diverse, more complex, and more demand-driven. These include, at a minimum:

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6. See Education for Rural Transformation: Towards a Policy Framework, International Research and Training Centre for Rural Education, China, 2001.

a) early childhood care and education
b) quality primary education
c) second chance basic education for large numbers of adolescents and youths who miss or drop out from primary education
d) literacy and continuing education for youths and adults.
e) production, vocational and entrepreneurial skill development, and
f) skills, knowledge and information for improving the quality of life.

Demand in rural communities is increasingly growing for the expansion of secondary educational opportunities, greater access to tertiary education and reorientation of training, research and academic programmes to meet their needs.

There are certainly some success stories in a few Muslim countries in the transformation of rural communities. But the problem remains a serious challenge for the vast majority of those countries.

Chapter 5.3(c)

HIGHER EDUCATION AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES

Abdallah R. Bubtana and Abdelwahid A. Yousif

Higher education systems in the fifty-seven countries members of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) are diverse in their orientations, structures, programmes and levels of development. Some Islamic universities and institutions are very old and deeply rooted in the academic tradition, such as al-Azhar, one of the oldest universities of the world; some are fairly new and developed after the post colonial era.

Most existing systems have been patterned around the colonial systems of higher education. For example, in most Maghreb countries the French model is dominant, the group of Eastern block countries adopted the Soviet model and most of the rest adopted the British and American models of higher education. Although this trend is gradually changing towards Western models, the transformation is slow and difficult.

There is no doubt that, in its historical development and in the absence of a unified philosophy and strategy for the development of higher education in Muslim countries, different political ideologies have had a profound impact on the structure, content and messages conveyed by various institutions of higher education in a great number of these states. This situation has often raised questions about the relevance of systems in their national, cultural, social and economic contexts.

The diversity of systems of higher education is not only attributed to the political ideology that dominates these lands, but also to the financial and human resources available to these systems. The disparities in socio-economic and development levels between various countries are reflected in the status of higher education. While rich and oil-producing countries are able to provide financial support to maintain acceptable levels of higher education, poor countries are often suffering from major crises in mobilizing the resources needed to meet ever-expanding social demands, on higher education.

However, in spite of this diversity, all systems face some common challenges and encounter crises that are common to most of developing country systems with varying intensities.

The future development of systems of higher education will not only be affected by internal factors such as the gradual vanishing of welfare states, the diminishing of state funding to higher education and the explosion in student numbers, but also with changes in the global environment. Thus the trend towards globalization and its possible impact on higher education, the predominance of the knowledge – based economy changes in socio-economic imperatives, the increased competitivity in global labour markets and the implications of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) will eventually require major transformation and adjustment in all systems of education worldwide One recent phenomenon which has been developing on a progressive scale is the remarkable increase in the for-profit trans-border providers of higher education institutions, especially from the West, establishing branches in Muslim countries. The possible impact of this phenomenon on the future development of higher education must be assessed. The noticeable expansion of private higher education institutions which has taken place in most Muslim countries in the last few decades also needs to be studied.

The present status of higher education: quantitative indicators

The Islamic world, which has a total of almost one quarter of the world population and consists of fifty-seven countries, more than one quarter of the total number of states belonging to the UN system (most of them categorized as developing countries, a number of them are least developed countries and none in the developed countries), has one of the largest systems of higher education in the world. Due to high population growth rates in many of these countries, the higher education system will continue to expand in future to meet a highly pressing social demand. However, this expansion will be challenged and may be hampered by increasing financial crises and the ever shrinking resources available to this system.

In spite of the various challenges, the higher education systems in the majority of Muslim countries have achieved certain rates of growth and progress during the last few decades. This is reflected in the increased number of enrolled students, teaching staff, graduates as well as increase in financial resources. However, quantitative indicators do not necessarily reflect an improvement in the qualitative aspects of the system. On the contrary, they may have a negative impact on this aspect. This is actually the case in a good number of countries where responding to social demand, within limited financial resources, has partially improved access to higher education but negatively affected quality, relevance and efficiency of these systems.

Statistics on higher education enrolment for Islamic states for the year 2002–3 (the most recent year available) indicate that the total number of students enrolled in this level of education is approaching 19 million students which represents a little less than one fifth of the global total of approximately 110 million. The gross enrolment ratios (GER) for the same years fluctuate between high in Libya (58 per cent), Kyrgyzstan (49 per cent), Lebanon (45 per cent) and low in Burkina Faso (1 per cent), Chad (1 per cent) and Djibouti (1 per cent). The average is 81 per cent for the United States, 86 per cent for Finland and 74 per cent for Sweden.[1]

Although there are no precise statistics on the number of institutions of higher education in Muslim countries, it is estimated that the number of full-fledged universities has exceeded 450, both public and private; 233 are in the Arab States region. Post-secondary non-university institutions and colleges are in thousands. However no precise figure can be cited for these categories.

The number of students per 100,000 of the population in Libya is a high of 6,470, which is higher than many developed countries and a low 31 in Guinea-Bissau.[2]

The percentage of GDP expenditure on higher education also varies greatly between Muslim countries. The highest is 2.70 per cent in Malaysia, 1.46 per cent in Tunisia and 1.42 per cent in Libya, and the lowest is in the UAE 0.04 per cent, 0.19 per cent in Azerbaijan and 0.28 per cent in Indonesia. Public expenditure on higher education per student for the year 2002–3 was highest in Malaysia at US$ 11,000, Oman (US$ 7,500), Senegal (US$ 4,900), Tunisia (US$ 4,600) and the lowest in Tajikistan (US$ 278) and Kyrgyzstan (US$ 244). The averages for Europe and North America are (US$ 5,353) and (US$ 9,366) respectively.[3]

MEETING SOCIAL DEMAND: QUALITY AND EQUITY

In spite of the quantitative expansion, for most Islamic states, particularly in the African region and some countries in the Asian region, achieving an acceptable level of access for broader segments of society remains a major challenge. As mentioned above, the gross enrolment ratios are low in a good number of countries and the number of students per 100,000 reaches as low as 31 in Guinea-Bissau. In some countries this indicator is a little higher but remains low compared to averages in both developing and developed countries. It is estimated that during the last three decades the number of

1. Global University Network for Innovation (GUNI), Higher Education in the World, 2006: The Financing of Higher Education, GUNI, 2006.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*

students enrolled in higher education institutions in Muslim countries has tripled to reach about 19 million in the year 2002 which represents almost one fifth of the world's higher education.

Enrolment of female students has increased slightly in most countries. In some states such as Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Libya the ratio of female students is higher than male students. However, the overall evaluation is that female access to higher education still suffers from major inequalities in most countries.

Disparities also exist between urban and rural areas in terms of higher education provision. Although no statistics are available, from historical perspective, early development of institutions of higher education was concentrated in cities and urban centres. This trend has been changing in the last few decades. During this period many countries, have given priority to expanding higher education to rural areas. A good example of this trend is the regional universities in Sudan. In some countries governments adopted innovative strategies to provide higher education services to deprived areas and disadvantaged groups. This has been reflected in the vast growth of Open universities and Distance Higher Education Institutions. A significant number of countries have recently established Open Universities. For examples Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, Libya and Syria. The newly established Arab Open University can be cited as an example of regional institutions that aim at providing higher education services to students in all Arab countries. Providing opportunities for Arab women is high on the agenda of this University. This is considered a positive trend which will reflect positively on the future development of Islamic higher education, in terms of efficiently meeting the social demand, achieving equality and reaching those who are currently unreachable.

The recent expansion in distance higher education will have its impact on achieving the goal of lifelong education, which has been long neglected by most countries in spite of its importance.

The preoccupation with expanding access and improving the quantitative aspects of the systems, within either zero growth in budget allocations even a budgetary decrease, has negatively impacted the quality of systems and their research functions, an aspect which is highly important for the construction of well-educated societies.

One important shortcoming in the quality and relevance of higher education is attributed to over-concentration on meeting social demands through the expansion of academic programmes in the humanities and social sciences to the detriment science and technology and the professional schools such as medicine and engineering. This is attributed to the low cost of establishing programmes in the social and human sciences. This trend has led to the concentration of the majority of students in these fields. About 70 per cent of enrolled students

in a majority of countries are in social and human sciences. It is to be noticed that most of the graduates of these fields are presently unemployed in many countries. In some Muslim states the percentage of unemployed graduates is as high as 40 per cent. Coupled with low quality graduates who cannot compete in a globalized knowledge-based economy, this phenomenon is bound to worsen unless major reforms of the content, methods and techniques of higher education are undertaken. This situation has led to debate over the relevancy of higher education to social needs in general and the labour market in particular. The ability of systems to cope with globalization and the changing global environment is also being raised.

Higher education is still traditional in structure, content and method and no significant change has been noticed. The university is still the dominant institution in this sector and there have been only limited attempts to benefit from innovative modalities in developing other alternatives, such as open universities, distance education and the use of modern technology such as ICT systems. Foreign curricula inherited or imported other systems still dominate in many countries, a situation which often leads to cultural alienation and total irrelevance of the system to its sociocultural context. It must be mentioned that most of the curriculum reforms, in a number of states have concentrated on reforms of science and technology with very limited efforts in other disciplines such as Islamic studies, languages or social sciences.

During the last fifty years, most Muslim countries in Africa and Asia have lost a large number of their professionals, academicians, and scientists owing to brain drain.[4] This has deprived society of its intelligentsia, capable of reforming and fueling socio-economic development and growth. It has been estimated that a number of countries in Africa and the Arab States have lost between 60–70 per cent of scientists and professionals who graduated between the 1950s and 1980s. This phenomenon has had a negative impact on development and scientific research. This is one of the important factors leading to the gaps in development that exist between developed and developing countries. Although some nations have attempted to retrieve these imigrants, the only successful states that can be cited are South Korea and China, which are not Muslim countries

The share of the private sector in providing higher education services has been negligible in most Muslim countries with the exception of Malaysia where this share is almost 50 per cent of the total of higher education offerings. This can be attributed to two factors: firstly that the underdeveloped private sector, and secondly that in a majority of countries higher education has been the responsibility of the public sector and no policy existed to encourage the

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4. A. Bubtana, «Brain Drain» *Reversibility Versus Retention*, unpublished Paper, 1992.

private sector to provide this service. However, due to financial problems and the shrinking ability of governments to provide the financial support needed to meet social demand, legislation has been enacted to encourage the private sector to invest in higher education. In most countries, private institutions are being developed at unprecedented rates. The United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Libya are some examples of this.

A very recent phenomenon is the expansion of trans-border for-profit institutions which are being developed in many Islamic states. For example Qatar has only one national university but hosts branches of more than five foreign universities from the USA, Europe and Canada. Although this trend will lead to a certain increase in access to quality higher education, it will be important to study its impact on reinstalling the elitist system, the threat it represents to the existence of national systems and the social inequality which it may create. It is expected that the adoption of the General Agreement on Trades in Services (GATS) will lead to an accelerated expansion of this phenomenon.

THE STATUS OF RESEARCH

Underdeveloped research in most Muslim countries, particularly in the fields of science and technology, has been the main preoccupation of two conferences of Islamic ministers of higher education, organized by the Islamic Educational, Science and Culture Organization (ISESCO), in Riyadh (2000) and Tripoli (2003).

Being aware of the low status of scientific research in Islamic states and the need to promote inter-regional cooperation in this area, the Tripoli conference adopted a resolution to establish the ISESCO's centre for the promotion of scientific research, as part of the ISESCO's organizational chart, and urged Member States to extend all forms of financial and technical support for its development.

In general, the causes of underdevelopment of research activities and infrastructures in Muslim countries can be attributed to the following factors:

a) Limited financial support by governments and the private sector provided for research and development (R&D).
b) Limited numbers of scientists engaged in research activities.
c) Brain drain has further aggravated this aspect.
d) The preoccupation of higher education institutions in meeting social demands and the need to broaden access to higher education.
e) Underdeveloped private sector, which provides the bulk of financial support to R&D in developed countries.

As a matter of fact, most countries accord low priority to research due to a lack of awareness that research is the main incubator of knowledge, a factor

V–3(c).1   Children at Abu Showk camp for internally displaced persons in
North Darfur celebrate the opening of ten new classrooms in the camp's
three primary schools in 2012
© UN Photo/Albert González Farran

which the World Bank considers to be crucial for the achievement of socio-economic development. The UNDP Human Development Report for the Arab region, (2003) attributes low achievements in development and low the ranking on the Human Development Index (HDI) to knowledge deficit. The contribution of Muslim countries to research is insignificant. This is contrary to the history of Islamic science, which is recognized and appreciated today.

Islamic Development Bank statistics, for the period 1990–2002, indicate that the number of scientists and engineers working in R&D per million range between a high 1977 in Jordan, 1754 in Uzbekistan, and 1248 in Azerbaijan to a low 2 in Senegal, 3 in Cameroon and 4 in Oman. The average for high income countries is 3.449 and the world average is 1096.[5]

The same statistics on the number of technicians working in R&D per million people indicate that the highest is in Jordan (728), followed by Libya (493) and Iran (391). The lowest is Senegal (3) and Cameroon (4). The expenditure on R&D as percentage of GDP in all Muslim countries is less than 1 per cent. The average of high income countries is 2.64 per cent and the world is 2.06 per cent. The highest in high technology exporting countries is

5.   Islamic Development Bank, *op. cit.*

Malaysia with US$ 47,042 million, followed by Indonesia US$ 4,580 million and Turkey US$ 815 million.[6]

From the above analysis, it is clear that the status of R&D in almost all Muslim countries suffers from major shortcomings which need to be addressed immediately.

Within the prevailing globalized economy and the agreement between research studies and opinions that knowledge is the main fuel for development, Muslim countries must give research and development a high priority and adopt them as a strategic option to overcome underdevelopment, poverty and marginalization.

The World Bank, in recognizing the role of higher education and research, has explicitly indicated that developing and transitional states are at risk of being further marginalized in a highly competitive world economy, because their tertiary education is not adequately prepared to capitalize on the creation and use of knowledge. It further maintains that developing countries can no longer expect to base their development on human and material advantages. The competitive advantage that now counts is the generation and application of knowledge.

To prevent the knowledge, information and digital gaps from widening further, Islamic states must turn their efforts to developing high-quality higher education and research as the main incubators and disseminators of knowledge.

Funding of higher education

Perhaps most of the challenges and problems faced by heigher education and research in Muslim countries can be attributed to the financial crises faced by most systems and institutions. This is a key factor affecting access, quality and relevance of higher education and the underdevelopment of research programmes and infrastructures. This crisis may intensify in future due to the emerging trends of globalization and the possible shrinking of the state's role in financing public services, including higher education.

Available statistics indicate that between 1990 and 2000 the expenditure on higher education as a percentage of public expenditure on all levels of education increased in almost all Islamic states. For example in Malaysia it increased from 19.9 to 33.3 per cent, in Tunisia from 18.5 to 22.8 per cent. It is estimated that there has been a decrease in Comoros from 17.3 to 7.7 per cent and Gambia from 17.8 to 14 per cent.[7]

The highest percentage of GDP allocated to higher education, in Islamic nations (and one of the highest in the world) is found in Malaysia with 2.72 per cent, followed by Tunisia with (1.46 per cent) and Libya (1.42 per cent).

6. *Ibid.*
7. UNESCO, Institute of Statistics, *op. cit.*

The lowest are the UAE (0.04 per cent), Azerbaijan (0.19 per cent) and Indonesia (0.28 per cent).

Public expenditure on tertiary education per student amounts to (US$ 11,790) in Malaysia, Oman (US$ 7,563) and the lowest at (US$ 244) in Kyrgyzstan. The averages are (US$ 4,327) for Africa, (US$ 2,518) for Asia and (US$ 9,366) for North America.[8]

There are no available statistics on the private funding of higher education or the share of this sector in the overall development of research and higher education in Muslim countries. However, it must be said that the role of this sector is growing fast. But this development has been recent in many states, particularly in the Arab region. For example, the number of private universities in the Arab region increased from 26 in 1993 to 77 in 2003.[9]

It is worth mentioning the present trends of funding of higher education systems in Islamic states (most are under-funded), if continued in future will not be sufficient to meet ever increasing social demands, or to support essential reforms and transformation which all systems must undergo in order to survive the challenges imposed by changes in the environment and socio-economic imperatives.

In the light of the possible reduction in government funding which will be imposed by certain inescapable factors such as the inability of states to increase financial allocations due to various constraints such as foreign debts and the gradual disappearance of welfare states, efforts must be sought to diversify sources of funding. However, the World Conference on Higher Education (WCHE) and its subsequent meeting of partners (WCHE+5) has affirmed that 'while seeking the contribution of all stakeholders – including the private sector – to the development of higher education, states and governments should fully preserve their responsibility and engagement for its support. Leaving higher education to be shaped solely by the laws of the market would run great risk.'

THE STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The UNESCO policy paper for change and development of higher education clearly indicated that 'recent developments in education and science have reinforced the validity of the argument that since knowledge is universal, its pursuit, advancement and dissemination can be greatly enhanced by the collective efforts of the international academic community.' International cooperation in higher education has been greatly boosted by the massive introduction and use of ICTs in higher education. However, due to the fact

8. Global University Network, *op. cit.*
9. M. Bashshour, *Higher Education in the Arab Region*, Beirut, UNESCO, 2001.

that only a few Muslim countries have been highly successful in harnessing ICTs in higher education and developing appropriate infrastructures for use in exchange and dissemination of knowledge and information (such as Malaysia). It is premature to talk about using this modality for internationalization and international cooperation in higher education.

However, in using traditional modalities such as twinning arrangements, joint research projects, inter-university networking and memberships in regional and international associations of universities, the majority of institutions in Muslim countries have been successful. A number of Islamic universities are members of the International Association of Universities. Many of them are also members of regional associations such as the Arab, Asian and African Associations of Universities.

The Federation of Universities of the Islamic world (FUIW), was originally created to promote inter-Islamic university cooperation which now includes a large number of universities. The Islamic Body for Ethics of Science and Technology (IBEST) was created as a result of the adoption of an Islamic strategy for the development of science and technology. Its objective is to assist and stimulate research in science and technology, particularly the ethical aspect of these domains. Furthermore, being aware of the need to promote cooperation among Muslim countries and institutions in the field of scientific research, the second conference of Islamic Ministers of Higher Education, convened in Tripoli in 2003, adopted a resolution to establish the ISESCO Centre for the Promotion of Scientific Research (ICPSR). The aim of this centre is to support research in Islamic institutions and promote cooperation and joint research. This is considered an effective modality for inter-regional cooperation in scientific research.

Within the framework of the UNITWIN/UNESCO chairs programme, launched by UNESCO with the objective of boosting international cooperation in higher education, promoting the exchange of knowledge and technology and stemming brain drain, a good number of Islamic universities have become active members of international and inter-regional networks. Many of them have also established international UNESCO chairs in areas and disciplines of priority to their countries. For example, Indonesia is a member of the Asia-Pacific Distance and Multimedia Education Network, APDEM. Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Morocco and Palestine are members of the International Network of UNESCO Chairs in Communication, ORBICOM. A large number of Islamic universities are also members of more than sixty-five regional and international networks established within the framework of UNITWIN/UNESCO chairs programme.

Fellowships, student exchange and study abroad were among the most important aspects of academic cooperation, particularly from the 1950s to the present. Due to underdeveloped graduate and postgraduate programmes in almost all fields of studies during the post independence era, almost all

countries sent their students abroad, particularly for Masters and Doctoral studies. Some that did not have universities at the time sent undergraduate students abroad. This resulted in an immense brain drain through which almost all countries in Africa, the Arab States and Asia lost over 50 per cent of their scientists, professionals and academicians, most of them to North America and Western Europe.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

As with many systems in developing countries, the Islamic systems will face major challenges, which already exist and will persist in future with perhaps even greater intensity and impact.

The above analysis of the status and trends in Islamic higher education and the socio-economic context in which they exist is essential for understanding the conditions in which these systems function at present, and may help in predicting future trends and challenges which they must be prepared to face. These challenges will be caused by internal factors such as a growing social demand and the need to maintain equity, quality and relevance or external factors such as a globalized environment, a shifting in socio-economic imperatives, the emergence of a knowledge-based economy and the growing digital, information and development gaps between developed and developing countries.

From reading the above statistics on access to higher education it is clear that most Islamic states are far from achieving acceptable levels of access to higher education. This is a major challenge to the democratization of higher education. Enrolment of women in most countries remains very marginal and their percentage in the teaching staff and contribution to research, science and technology is far below world average. This constitutes a major challenge to equity and equality. Urban/rural disparities in the provision of higher education services persist in most countries. Efforts to provide access to marginalized groups such as people with special needs are either insignificant or do not exist. The provision of lifelong higher education and training has not been among the priorities of most institutions in Muslim countries.

All regional reports submitted to the UNESCO's World Conference on Higher Education + 5 have indicated that meeting increased demand for higher education would not be possible by relying only on traditional institutions, programmes and delivery modes, and with resources coming mainly from public funds. They pointed out that growth of enrolment (in a number of countries) has been made possible by a marked process of diversification in higher education. Important among these is diversification of sources of funding and harnessing ICTs in higher education and its utilization in distance and lifelong learning.

V–3(c).2   Girls at secondary school in Gaza, Palestine
© UN Photo/John Isaac

These alternatives have been adopted in few Muslim countries. The rest remain traditional and no major reforms or diversification have taken place.[10]

Perhaps one of the major challenges faced by most systems is the funding of higher education is a key factor in all aspects of the systems. Higher education, particularly in Islamic least developed countries, is facing a major crisis in mobilizing government resources to meet ever increasing quantitative expansion in social demands. Needs for other public services are growing, economic growth is slowing or stagnant in many developing countries, and public funding is scarce (WCHE+5).[11] This is coupled with an underdeveloped private sector and the increase of foreign debts in these countries. The trends towards globalization may also lead to a progressive shrinking of state funding to higher education.

With all these, the challenge of funding higher education is and will remain the core for systems in most Muslim countries. Unless the situation changes in the future, these systems will not be able to reform themselves, improve access, quality relevance and contributions to the construction of knowledge

10. UNESCO, Final Report of the Follow-Up to the World Conference on Higher Education (WCHE +5), UNESCO, Paris, 2004.

11. Ibid.

societies. Furthermore, improving research programmes will require massive financial investments, which may be beyond the abilities of many Islamic states. Increasing the share of Islamic systems in the global knowledge pool, presently insignificant, and their abilities to engage in equitable processes of sharing and exchange of knowledge, will remain a formidable challenge for the next decades. Thus the knowledge gap is likely qualified to increase between the Islamic and developed countries which will remain the main consumers of information and knowledge.

The African report to the UNESCO's World Conference on Higher Education +5 indicated that 40 per cent of faculty positions in the universities and 60 per cent of polytechnics were vacant in 1998. Nigeria, one of the Muslim countries, reported a 50 per cent vacancy for the same year.[12] This situation prevails in most Islamic systems of higher education resulting in high rates of faculty/student ratios that adversely affect the quality of teaching and learning. The same effect applies to research and development activities.

Due to the low priority according to the training of academic staff, low financial resources allocated to this aspect and the lack of serious efforts to reverse brain drain, this challenge will persist in the future in most Muslim countries.

Globalization will force major changes in various contexts relevant to the role and place of higher education in the global space. One of the main consequences of this phenomenon is the appearance of trans-border providers of higher education which are emerging as a result of the general agreement on free trade in services (GATS) which was initiated within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which represent the main instrument of globalization.. A large number of foreign institutions from the USA, the UK, Australia, Canada and others have already invaded a large number of Muslim countries. Although this phenomenon may have a positive impact on national systems, such as increased competitivity, improved quality and access, its negative consequences are great. In the view of many opponents, the for-profit foreign providers will re-establish the elitist systems, increase rate of exclusion, inequality and financial burdens of social services to become unaffordable to developing country citizens. It may also lead to a progressive shrinking of government subsidization to higher education. Another major concern has been raised over the ability of foreign providers to contribute to cultural development, and over their relevance to their sociocultural contexts. This aspect is of high importance to Islamic nations which have been suffering from cultural invasion and attempts to undermine Islamic cultural identity and values. This aspect calls for a thorough

12. *Ibid.*

review of this trend and its possible future impact on Islamic higher education in general, and Islamic cultural identity in particular.

The relevance of higher education to societal needs, particularly the world of work, within the globalized knowledge-based economies, is another challenge to be faced by all systems in Muslim countries. The emerging global environment has changed the socio-economic imperatives and the trend towards global labour markets, which are highly competitive, have imposed new standards for graduates, totally different from the traditional ones, now rendered obsolete by technological advances. The high rate of graduate unemployment in many Islamic states (sometimes over 40 per cent), is caused mainly by the low quality of these graduates and the irrelevance of curricula and programmes to the changing needs of the labour market. From a projection of presently enrolled students in Islamic systems of higher education, it is expected that during the coming five years almost 11 million new graduates will be seeking jobs. It is estimated that no more than 50 per cent of these graduates will meet the standards of labour markets and be able to gain employment.

Most institutions in Muslim countries remain traditional in their structure, contents and programmes, and no major reforms and renovations have been implemented except in a very limited number of countries such as Malaysia. It is in this context that most systems will be forced to face the challenge of renovation an inescapable task within the further development of knowledge-based economies. Traditional contents and methods have rendered most institutions obsolete and their graduate outputs have not acquired the up-to-date skills needed to compete in globalized labour markets, where new skills, competencies and qualifications are required. On the other hand, the contents of most curricula have been imported from abroad and often have no relevance to socio-economic and cultural contexts in which systems exist and operate. The future danger is that if existing systems are not reformed and renovated, and in light of the vicious competition from trans-border providers, national systems will be totally marginalized and may disappear from the higher education map, paving the way for the return of foreign academic dominance and the reinstallation of the elitist systems of higher education.

The issue of co-education versus gender segregation in higher education is being discussed on religious, cultural and financial levels. While in the majority of Muslim countries co-education has been adopted and colleges and universities have mixed male/female classes except for female training colleges, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait have separate institutions for both sexes. The financial burden of providing separate education for both sexes is too high for countries with limited resources. For rich nations this option remains possible but still poses financial problems. Advocates for segregated

education base their arguments on religious and cultural grounds which do not permit mixing girls and boys together in the same classrooms. The argument for and against this issue will continue in the future between those who defend secular education and others who want to re-align the education systems more closely to religious orientations.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

Based on previous developments during the last three decades, higher education systems in Muslim countries will continue to expand in order to respond to a growing quantitative social demand. However, it is not clear whether most countries will be able to totally subsidize this expected expansion or not. All available evidence indicates that due to financial problems faced by many governments, (increased foreign debts, slow growth and changes in the global environment) will force an inescapable decline of the role of the state in funding higher education and other partners will have to share in the provision of this public service. Although the private sector has started to share the financial burden its level of development and size is not large enough to bear the expected deficit caused by declining levels of state funding. Trans-border institutions will share the burden, but in a marginal way.

It is in this context, and in spite of an expected quantitative expansion, a significant percentage of people in the population age group will not have access to higher education through traditional institutions, thus constituting a major hindrance to equal opportunity and increased exclusion from higher education. Unless are adopted non-traditional forms such as distance learning and open universities this problem will persist in future.

The issue of funding will have certain implications on the system's ability to broaden access, improve quality and relevance. The ability to introduce innovative modalities such as the harnessing of ICTs in higher education, provision of distance and lifelong higher education, improved curriculum content, is contingent on the availability of financial resources.

It is expected that, during the forthcoming decades, many Muslim countries will attempt to face a growing social demand with very limited financial resources, a situation which will lead to a sharp decline in the quality of the systems and their abilities to respond to socio-economic needs. As a result of this, many countries will be forced to formulate policies to allow diversification of funding sources, such as student loans, provision of incentives to the private sector and adoption of more economical approaches for providing higher education services (such as distance and open higher education). It is expected that society will be forced to share and in some countries free higher education will be either reduced or totally eliminated. A number of countries have started to share tuition fees for enrolment in higher education.

The problem of unemployed graduates is expected to persist in future due to the inability of most institutions to produce the types of graduates who have acquired the skills and competencies needed for knowledge intensive labour markets. This phenomenon, which is considered one of the major wastes in higher education, must be addressed, particularly in cooperation with the world of work and employment institutions. A strengthened relationship and cooperation must be forged between all partners.

It is expected that, due to financial constraints, most countries will not be able to launch major reforms and renovations of their higher education systems and therefore, quality and relevance will continue to be a major challenge. The same constraints will also affect the development of research and its infrastructure.

Quality and efficiency of higher education and research will continue to be adversely affected by shortage of staff and underdeveloped research infrastructure. The preoccupation with the quantitative aspects of higher education with limited numbers of academic staff, increase the faculty/student ratio and limit the ability of staff to engage in research projects and activities. Academic staff development and training does not figure high in priorities of many Islamic institutions of higher education. Furthermore, efforts to reverse drain brain have not been serious or effective in most countries.

In conclusion, and based on the above analysis and previous trends, the future prospects of higher education in most Muslim countries do not seem to be encouraging. The challenges to be faced, both internal and external, are enormous and the appropriate responses to these challenges require firm political commitment from both governments and all other stakeholders.

Achieving socio-economic development is no longer based on human and natural resources alone, in the emerging global environment; what counts now is knowledge. The World Bank has already indicated this position and the UNDP has attributed the low ranking of many countries on the Human Development Index to what it called 'knowledge deficit'.

It is in this context that there is no solution for many developing countries, particularly the Islamic ones, to break out of underdevelopment, except by attributing high priority to education, higher education and research. These are the main pillars for the construction of knowledge societies capable of achieving leaps forward in development and growth.

Main issues and challenges

Abdallah R. Bubtana and Abdelwahid A. Yousif

This part will attempt to highlight the major issues and challenges facing educational systems in Muslim countries, in light of local and global changes taking place at the present time, which will certainly have an impact on the future development of these systems.

The changes in the global environment

A number of major developments and trends have taken place on the global level, which have had direct implications on all human activities including education: the irreversible trends towards globalization, the growing role of knowledge as the main fuel for development, the phenomenal advances in information and communication technologies, the importance of constructing of knowledge societies, the impressive social and political changes, the emergence of democratic systems of government and so on. At the same time, the world still faces major crises and threats represented by inequality and poverty, disease, open conflicts and armed struggles, ignorance and illiteracy. The gap between the haves and have-nots is growing in almost all domains: wealth, knowledge, information, and development.

These trends and challenges are the main characteristics of the prevailing global environment in which systems of education in Muslim countries must evolve, develop and operate. Furthermore, certain national challenges and trends must also be considered: the rapid population growth in a number of Muslim countries, limited financial resources and huge amounts of foreign debts in most of them, low priority attributed to education and research, slow or stagnant economic growth, an underdeveloped private sector, over-dependency on the public sector and the continued prevalence of the welfare state.

V–4.1   Makeshift, emergency UNICEF school in Kandahar,
Afghanistan, in 2007
© UNESCO

The combination of global and national trends and challenges can
never be underestimated or ignored in future policy formulation regarding
education in Muslim countries. Some of these will require major readjustments
and reorientation at all levels of education. This is the only action that will
protect these countries from being marginalized in the global environment
and the only guarantee for achieving sustainable socio-economic growth and
development and bridging the existing gaps.

M EETING COMMITMENTS OF EFA GOALS AND MDGS

From the analysis provided in the previous parts of this study, it is clear that a large number of Muslim countries still lag far behind in achieving the EFA goals and the MDG, relevant to the universalization of primary education by the year 2015.

In early childhood, remarkable progress has been achieved in a limited number of countries, in terms of expanding access on this level, but the majority, particularly the least developed countries are still far behind in this domain and therefore will not be able to achieve Goal 1 of EFA in the foreseeable future. Gender parity remains low in most countries. Provision of this service to special needs students and those in rural areas is still either marginal or non-existent.

It is worth mentioning that progress made in most countries is attributed mainly to the private sector since most governments do not include early childhood education in their educational plans.

Therefore, expanding access to pre-primary education will remain a challenge for most Muslim countries.

The situation of primary education is much better. Between 1990 and 2002 most countries made striking progress expanding access to primary education and achieved an acceptable level of equality between male and female enrolment. In a number of countries, mostly least developed ones, the GRE ratio is below 50 per cent, repetition and school drop-out rates remain high. In addition to the challenge of access, the quality of primary education is often low or unacceptable. In a number of countries students in this level fail to acquire the basic skills, particularly in language and mathematics. The percentage of trained teachers in most developing countries is as low as 27 per cent, as is the case in Benin. The pupil-teacher ratio is very high in countries like Chad, where it reaches 69. All these factors have an adverse effect on the quality and efficiency of primary education. This constitutes a challenge which needs to be addressed. (See tables in Annex.)

For secondary education, twenty-two Muslim countries have a GRE of less than 50 per cent for both sexes. In most states the gender parity rate is 0.50 or less. The percentage of trained teachers is low and the student/teacher ratio is high in a number of countries. The coherence and articulation between secondary and higher education is very weak in almost all Islamic states. With the exception of a few countries, like Malaysia, the harnessing of ICTs in secondary education is very marginal, and in some countries the efforts concentrate on the provision of hardware in the absence of proper software and trained teachers.

The quality of secondary education in most countries is judged to be low and no major reforms have taken place during the last few decades.

In addition to the challenge of access and equity, governments must face the challenge of improving the quality of secondary education through major processes of reform and renovation of this important cycle.

CURBING THE ILLITERACY PHENOMENON

Perhaps one of the main challenges facing governments of Muslim countries is living up to their commitments to EFA goals, particularly Goal 4 (achieving 50 per cent improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015). While seven Muslim countries have achieved remarkable progress in eradicating illiteracy and will meet the target, high illiteracy still persists in a number of countries, particularly the least developed ones. In these countries, high drop-out rates from primary education may lead to a further increase in illiteracy rates, coupled with the inability of these countries to develop and maintain sustainable literacy programmes. The Arab States and Sub-Saharan African states have high rates of illiteracy in all regions. By the end of the 1990s there were 67,9 million illiterates in the Arab States. Illiteracy is dominant among females in many countries.[1]

Dealing with the challenge of illiteracy enables governments to combat poverty, ignorance, disease, overpopulation, and to increase economic growth and productivity.

However, meeting this enormous challenge requires political will, human and financial resources and partnerships, particularly with NGOs, the private sector, the entire society and the international community.

It must be said that illiteracy and ignorance are contrary to the philosophy of Islam and the main causes for the deteriorating status of the nation of Islam (the *umma*). The first verse of the Qurʾān revealed to the Prophet Muḥammad was 'read in the name of thy Lord'. This was further substantiated by the Prophet saying 'the best form of worship is the pursuit of knowledge'.

CO-EDUCATION VERSUS SEGREGATED EDUCATION

Reaching a consensus regarding this issue constitutes yet another challenge for Islamic authorities. The debate between liberal and extremist educators is continuous and each group bases its argument on different factors. However, the present practice in the majority of Islamic states indicates that most of them opt for co-education at the pre-primary, primary and higher education levels. While the religious and cultural arguments tend to prohibit co-education, the liberals base their arguments on the cost effectiveness of segregation on the one hand, and on the other that existing experience of co-education did not yield catastrophic results. They further argue that in the pre-puberty cycle there is no danger of mixing girls and boys in one school.

In the large majority of Muslim countries, there is an overwhelming tendency to feminize the teaching staff at the pre-primary and primary

1. UNESCO Institute of Statistics, *op. cit.*

levels of education. The objective of this tendency is to expand employment opportunities for females who prefer this type of job.

However, reaching consensus on this issue remains a challenge for Islamic education. Furthermore, maintaining a segregated system of education in a number of countries already facing financial problems in providing educational services, may lead to further exclusion of girls from these systems. So far, the small number of rich Muslim countries that maintain segregated systems are feeling the financial burden caused by this situation.

MAINTAINING A BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR EDUCATION

One of the important objectives of all Islamic educational systems is to preserve cultural identity and religious values and produce citizens equipped with religious ethics and values. Hence, religious education must be one of the important elements of all systems. However, education can neither be totally religious nor totally secular. Surviving in the global environment requires skills that cannot be provided by purely religious institutions. It is therefore important to maintain a balance between these two orientations.

The emergence of knowledge-based economies has forced certain shifts in the imperatives of economic and technological development on the global scale. Knowledge has become the main driving force for development and competitiveness in labour markets, largely depending on the acquisition of up-to-date knowledge and skills which cannot be provided solely through religious education. Although the contribution of Muslim countries to global knowledge is insignificant and they are mainly knowledge consumers, it has become a must to disseminate knowledge produced in different sociocultural contexts. Knowledge, particularly scientific and technological, has become universal and does not belong to specific cultural orientations. It is therefore important that a Muslim citizen be equipped with knowledge. In the UNDP human development report of the Arab region, the low ranking of Arab States on the Human Development Index (HDI) was attributed to knowledge deficit among other factors.

Islam was the first religion which encouraged the pursuit of knowledge. The Qurʾān has bluntly asked 'are those who have knowledge and those who have no knowledge alike.' It was the Prophet Muḥammad who said 'seek knowledge even if you have to travel to China.' It is in this context that Muslims should not restrict themselves to knowledge which is based on religion only but must take advantage of knowledge produced anywhere (even in China) and invest it for the welfare of individuals within the context of moral and ethical values of Islam.

Very recently, particularly after 11 September, religious education came under attack and was accused of having overtones of hatred. The pressure was

strong on Islamic governments to take serious measures to reform religious education or abolish it totally. In a number of countries, Islamic institutions were targeted and many of them were closed, as in Pakistan and Yemen. The reason which was given justifying this action is that these institutions are dominated by fundamentalists and they teach extremist orientations conducive to terrorism.

There is no doubt that religious education in all Islamic states needs to be reformed and renovated. Most present curriculum content is outdated and some may instill aggressive behaviour and intolerance; these are contrary to humanistic Islamic values and ethics, which call for peace, tolerance and forgiveness. Furthermore, religious teacher training needs renewal too and systems must rid themselves of teachers who have extremist orientations that portray a negative profile of the Islamic religion. This has already happened in some countries. In the past, most of these institutions were outside government control, a situation which led to major problems from which the Islamic world is suffering. It is therefore important to keep these institutions under scrutiny and subject them to the control of the educational authorities. Achieving this task represents yet another challenge for Muslim countries.

From what has been said, it is apparently clear that neither religious education alone nor secular education alone can prepare the perfect Muslim citizen who can contribute to the welfare of the Islamic nation. Any education which provides solely spiritual training without equipping the citizen with life skills and those needed in the labour market will be contributing to the growing problem of unemployment. So far Islamic nations are already saturated with unemployed youth who graduated from religious schools and colleges which did not offer secular curricula. It is only through a combination of reformed religious education and education which is based on up-to-date knowledge that such a citizen can be developed and produced. It is in this context that many educators suggest that all religious schools must teach government-adopted curricula which provide basic life and work skills. Achieving a balance between the two orientations, which are not really mutually exclusive but complementary, is an important challenge to be faced.

THE HARNESSING OF ICTS IN EDUCATION

Recent advances in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have had major impact on systems of education in many countries around the world, particularly in developed ones. Empirical studies have proven that the harnessing of ICTs on all educational levels improves both quality and access to education. While the utilization of ICTs based methods improve

the teaching/learning processes, using ICTs as delivery systems open wider opportunities for greater segments of society to have access to education which traditional modes failed to provide, particularly for females and excluded groups; it also provides opportunities for lifelong learning and training.

In a number of Muslim countries, there have been efforts to harness ICTs in various levels of education but with the exception of a few countries like Malaysia which developed the Smart schools, the majority of Islamic states concentrated on equipping schools with computers in the absence of educational software, trained teachers and technicians. Some countries, particularly in the Gulf, are cooperating with Malaysia to develop systems similar to the Smart schools initiative. Furthermore, even the introduction of computers in education is not being done in a systematic way and according to carefully prepared strategies and plans.

It must be said the harnessing ICTs in education is not only important as a tool, but with the emergence of knowledge and information-based economies, mastering of ICT skills is one of the prerequisites for employment in the labour market.

In the Arab Ministers of Higher Education meeting in Beirut, 2002, distance education was adopted as a strategic option in education and higher education and was considered as an alternative to dealing with a whole range of problems faced by most systems of education.[2]

During the last decade, the tendency towards distance and open higher education has accelerated in many Muslim countries. Open universities were established in countries such as Malaysia, Turkey, Pakistan, Syria, Libya, Palestine. The Arab Open University was also launched as a regional institution of distance higher education. The use of ICTs in these universities varies from one country to the other. However, many of them lag in this area and they operate on a printed matter basis; the use of ICTs is very limited. In spite of this they contribute to broadening access to higher education. For example, the Turkish Open University enrolls more than half a million students and the Libyan Open University, in a thinly populated country, enrols more than 40,000 students.

The challenge of harnessing ICTs in education and higher education does not only stem from the fact that these technologies improve quality and access, but also because they constitute main pillars for the construction of information and knowledge societies.

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2. ALECSO, Arab Ministers of Higher Education, Conference convened in Beirut, 2002.

RENEWAL AND RENOVATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

There is no doubt that the majority of higher education systems in the Muslim world require major efforts in terms of reform and renovation. The trends and developments in the global environment discussed above, and those taking place in the national context, necessitate a number of transformations and adjustments to existing higher educational systems. Renewal and renovation must target all aspects, structures, contents, methods and administration.

All regional conferences, convened by UNESCO in preparation for the World Conference on Higher Education (WCHE), and the declaration of the conference itself, indicated an urgent need to reform systems of higher education, particularly in developing countries.[3] This was based on the need to adjust systems to the new mission and vision of higher education within changing social and economic imperatives.

It is evident that most institutions in the majority of Islamic countries remain traditional in all aspects, a situation which has led to low quality, irrelevance and inability to assimilate the speedy advances taking place on national or global levels. Rigid traditional and undiversified structures, outdated and imported curricula, outdated methods and techniques and inefficient management, in most cases linked to government bureaucracy, are some of the common characteristics of the majority of institutions. To cite evidence in support of this claim, let us consider the excessive numbers of unemployed college graduates in most countries. This is mainly due to the irrelevance of programmes and low quality of the systems.

It has been proven that expanding access to higher education and meeting growing social demand would necessitate a drastic diversification of the structures and programmes of higher education. Technology-based distance and open higher education is an urgent form of diversification which would contribute to broadening access and provide for lifelong education and training. It will also contribute to reducing inequality and exclusion, particularly for females.

The trends towards globalization, the emergence of knowledge-based, highly competitive economies and the inescapable need to construct knowledge societies will impose certain standards which institutions must adhere to or risk being totally marginalized or rendered obsolete. The workforce has increasingly become a knowledge workforce, which needs more advanced training and constant updating and retraining throughout life. Graduates will have to compete for jobs which require updated skills and knowledge. Unless higher education institutions in Muslim countries undergo major reforms and renovations, their abilities to produce this type of graduate will be marginal.

3. UNESCO, *World Conference on Higher Education*, Paris, UNESCO, 1998.

Higher education and research have been confirmed as important pillars for the construction of knowledge societies which are characterized by their abilities to produce, disseminate and apply knowledge. It is evident that most Islamic systems make minor contributions in this domain. Low quality and traditional higher education and underdeveloped and under-funded research are the main factors in this situation.

From the previous analyses, it is clear that the formidable challenge of reforming and renovating systems of higher education and research in most Muslim countries must be addressed and put high on the future agendas of governments.

Improve research capabilities

The contribution of higher education and research institutions in the totality of Muslim countries, to the global knowledge and technology pools, is insignificant. Therefore, most of them are knowledge and technology consumers.

Research is the main incubator of knowledge generation and production. The ability of any country to produce and use knowledge is contingent on its ability to develop and maintain research infrastructures and provide the necessary means for sustainability of research projects.

The highest percentages of GDP on research and development in Muslim countries are found in Malaysia and Turkey at 0.7 per cent (where developed countries allocate between 2 per cent and 5 per cent of their GDP to this field). The highest total expenditure on research and development in the totality of Muslim countries does not exceed 316 million dollars, while in the developed countries this amount exceeds 11 trillion dollars.

In an attempt to boost efforts of Member States in research, science and technology, ISESCO adopted a number of science and technology strategies and also established of ISESCO's Centre for the Promotion of Scientific Research. Among the most important resolutions adopted in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in 2000, was inviting member states to allocate at least 1 per cent of their GDP to scientific research and provide the necessary means to promote it.[4] In December 2005, the summit of OIC Islamic states, convened in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, endorsed a ten year plan to promote science and technology in the Muslim world. The plan aims at reducing the technology gap between much of the Islamic community and the developed world, by enhancing the level of research and development, increasing access to university education and allocating of at least 1.2 per cent of national GDP to research and development. It also urged oil producing countries to channel part of the revenues from increased oil prices to national R&D activities.

4. ISESCO, Conference of Ministers of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 2000.

All these efforts indicate that improving national capacities in science, technology, research and development constitute a major challenge for Islamic states, individually and collectively.

THE BRAIN DRAIN CHALLENGE

Many of the Muslim countries in Africa, Asia and the Arab States have lost a high percentage of their scientists, academicians and researchers, due to brain drain, between the 1950s and 1990s century. This precious wealth was never compensated for and the brain drain phenomenon had adverse effects on the development of higher education and research capabilities in Muslim countries.

The main factors behind the brain drain phenomenon were political instability, political oppression, underdeveloped graduate and postgraduate studies, underdeveloped research infrastructure, and incentives provided by the host countries, particularly in Europe and North America. Study abroad was among the causes of brain drain. The development of national graduate and postgraduate programmes in a number of Muslim countries has helped slow the trend towards brain death.

Efforts to reverse this phenomenon are not serious in most Islamic states. It is worth mentioning that some non-Muslim countries such as China and South Korea have achieved great success in re-attracting emigrants. This has been positively reflected in the remarkable advance, and progress made in these countries. However, schemes applied by these two countries did not depend mainly on providing incentives but also on the development of R&D environments conducive to their return.

Although no precise statistics are available, relevant to the magnitude of this phenomenon, it was estimated that countries such as Egypt and Jordan lost between 40 per cent to 60 per cent of their professionals and scientists between the fifties and eighties. The brain drain figures for Africa are high. Approximately 700,000 highly skilled Africans emigrated between 1960 and 1987.[5] In 1995, the World Bank estimated that about 10,000 highly skilled Nigerians were working in the United States.[6] During the last decade, due to oppression and later security, Iraq lost thousands of its scientists and academicians. There are millions of Islamic scientists, professionals and academics currently working abroad. Some of them are Nobel Prize winners. In some Muslim countries like Pakistan, returnees have contributed to the development of the nuclear capability of this country which has become the only Islamic state to join the nuclear power club.

5. Bubtana, 'Brain Drain' *op. cit.*
6. World Bank Statistics.

V–4.2   Malala Yousafzai, the young education rights campaigner from Pakistan, at the UN headquarters on her 16th birthday, 12 July 2013
© UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

As mentioned, the trends of this phenomenon have started to decline and have also been voluntarily reversed, although on a small scale. Muslim countries must give high priority to keeping the mass of scientists and professionals who have not emigrated.

Due to the importance of this challenge, and in light of the limited success achieved by national efforts and schemes to reverse the phenomenon, collective efforts by Islamic states to achieve this objective must be launched and implemented through ISESCO or the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). An idea of establishing a fund to reverse the phenomenon and retrieve emigrants could be launched by all Member States of the OIC. Furthermore, without scaring student and academic mobility and exchange, which are important to development of higher education and research, countries in cooperation with concerned international organization must adopt safeguards and measures to guarantee the return of scholars and students studying abroad. This will reduce the loss of scientific and professional capital needed for socio-economic development.

FACING FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS

Most of the problems and shortcomings witnessed today on the scene of education in Muslim countries can be attributed to the core factor of funding. With the exception of a few rich countries, the others face major problems in mobilizing the financial resources needed to maintain high quality and equitable systems of education.

In spite of the fact that governments' expenditure on education has increased in most countries and the share of education from GDP is high in some, it is certain that most governments have reached the ceiling in their abilities to finance systems of education. In the least developed Muslim countries, funding education has reached a crisis, taking into consideration high population growth, stagnant economies, huge foreign debts and competing social services. Education budgets of these countries will either witness zero growth or a decrease in the future. Dependency only on government funding, in the absence of fund-sharing from the community and international donors, will have negative consequences on educational systems in poor countries.

In the meeting which was convened by UNESCO in Mexico in February, 2006, for the E-9 group of the most populous countries in the world, representatives expressed frustration over the unavailability of funding from donors and the international community. They indicated that eradicating huge rates of illiteracy in many countries in the world is one of the main causes of poverty and under-development and should be considered a global concern. Five of the E-9 group are Muslim countries i.e. Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria and Indonesia. The same meeting discussed various modalities to assist Member States to mobilize resources to meet the EFA goals such as reducing

foreign debts for the benefit of educational budgets, and the possibility of levying international taxes to be channeled to poor countries. These proposals require extensive discussion and debate involving the countries concerned as well as donors. However, it must be said that most states are required to formulate their own funding strategies, through which diversification of funding sources must be achieved, and reduce waste and irrational use of available limited resources. This diversification may target, in addition to the community, NGOs and private funding, the channeling of some of the *zakāt* or W*aqf* Funds to educational activities the particularly those targed at destined for the poor segments of society. In the history of Islamic education, these two sources have been effective in financing educational institutions.

In literature there is a convergence of opinion that Muslim countries should sharply reduce their spending on weapons and increase financial allocations to education and research, these being the top priority for development and advancement.

For Muslim countries, an Islamic fund for the support of the educational systems in poor countries should be established. It is also essential that the Islamic Development Bank should give education the highest priority in its lending and assistance strategies.

The re-establishment of reformed traditional Islamic teaching schools such as the *kuttāb*, the mosque and the *madrasa*, which were effective in means of teaching language and the Qurʾān, could also be considered as an alternative to expanding access and reducing illiteracy.

PRESERVING CULTURAL IDENTITY

During the present era, perhaps no other religion or culture has been as threatened or as viciously attacked as Islam. After 11 September, an orchestrated global campaign to undermine the Islamic religion and its culture was launched with the pretext of fighting terrorism. Much of the attack is based on a presupposed claim that Islam is an incubator of hatred and terrorism in the world. The pressure on Muslim countries to change and reform Islamic teaching was strong and overwhelming, to the extent that a number of countries have taken drastic measures in response to this pressure, including the clothure of Islamic teaching institutions.

The attacks of 11 September were used as a pretext for undermining cultural diversity, one of the main objectives of globalization. Prior to these attacks there had been a fierce resistance to the idea of cultural globalization or homogenization because it implicates the dominance of one culture and the marginalization of all others. During the last decade there has been an overwhelming consensus that cultural diversity must prevail and the dominance of Western culture has faced major resistance. Perhaps Islamic

V–4.3   UN workers from Ghana renovating a school in Taliko,
a marginalized neighbourhood of Bamako, Mali. The school had
hosted several displaced families after deadly flash floods hit the Malian
capital in the summer of 2013
© UN Photo/Marco Dormino

thinkers and intellectual leaders were the most determined in resisting cultural globalization, and this perhaps was the main reason for the present attack on Islam.

However, the threat to Islamic cultural identity started long before the prevalence of globalization through the cultural invasion manipulated by the media and the impressive advances in information and communication technologies. Some authors argue that 'presently the entire planet is being wired into music, movies, news, television programmes and other cultural products that originate primarily in the film and recording studios of the United States.' They further maintain that 'the impact of homogenization on the rich cultural diversity of communities all over the world is immense and its contours are beginning to emerge.' Islamic culture, which is one of the richest in the world, is being targeted by this phenomenon.

It is evident that whatever Islamic and spiritual teaching provided for Muslim citizens, through education and other means, was not effective enough to immure them from the impact of cultural invasion. We witness today drastic changes in the attitudes and values of the youth, display Western behaviour

and attitudes which have no relation to Islamic culture or its system of values. Some Islamic reformists, who do not defend or support Western pressure, claim anything that goes wrong with our Islamic behaviour, terrorism or otherwise, is mainly due to the fact that the present teaching of Islam has failed to instill the wise behaviour, tolerance, peace, understanding and forgiveness that are some of the main pillars of Islam. That is why they call for reform of this education system and the cleansing of the system from extremism and fundamental overtones contrary to Islam.

The education system has a major responsibility in preserving cultural identity through teaching, training and research. The challenge to achieve this important objective is enormous and the need to reform Islamic educational thought is one of the most important approaches to this challenge.

STRENGTHENING ISLAMIC COOPERATION IN EDUCATION

There is no doubt that the deteriorating situation of the Islamic nation (*umma*) in general, and education in particular poses common challenges which need to be faced by countries individually and collectively. In spite of the variations and differences among all countries spreading over three continents, strengthening Islamic cooperation dictates itself as a must for the renaissance of the nation of Islam. In the newly emerged global environment, regionalization has become an important safeguard against the negative impacts and consequences of globalization. This mechanism has proven to be efficient in reinforcing competitiveness among regional groups; the European Union is a good example. This mechanism is also effective in matters of education, scientific research, labour mobility and infrastructures.

Most of the previously analyzed issues and challenges facing Muslim countries in the field of education, higher education and research cannot be overcome by national efforts alone. They need to be supported and enforced through collective cooperation, particularly those which can be initiated through Islamic mechanisms, organizations and institutions. The existing, jointly established Islamic organizations such as OIC, ISESCO and the Islamic Development Bank and their subsidized organs, have played important roles in the past but not sufficiently. They need to be reinforced further, in order to play an instrumental role in facing common challenges.

Islamic cooperation must be based on a common vision of prevailing threats to Islam, the common objectives and the common destiny of the nation (*umma*). It is only in this context that viable and constructive cooperation can be developed and implemented. The deterioration and backwardness which have taking place since the collapse of the Islamic empire were largely

attributed to fragmentation orchestrated by colonial powers with the purpose of weakening the nation of Islam.

There are a number of pressing challenges that require immediate cooperative efforts and Islamic partnerships. Eradicating an enormous quantity of illiteracy, which if not adressed, may convert Muslim countries into ignorant nations, combatting poverty and disease, building research capacities, harnessing technology, curbing population growth, constructing knowledge societies, preserving cultural identity and protecting the environment are enormous challenges which call for joint Islamic efforts and strategies. It is true that a number of strategies, such as management of water resources and development of biotechnology in Islamic states, have been adopted; but their implementation remains doubtful unless necessary political will and resources for their implementation are made available.

The role played by the Islamic group in regional and international organizations such as UNESCO and the African Union should be coordinated further, reinforced and geared to the collective benefits of Muslim countries.

– VI –

SOCIAL ISSUES AND SOCIOCULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS

Chapter 6.1

THE IMPACT OF CHANGE AND URBANIZATION ON MUSLIM SOCIETIES

Cheikh Ba

INTRODUCTION

The twentieth century witnessed an explosion in world population. Henceforth, the world operates on a global scale and it is from there that change proceeds: European colonization, so-called communications wars, the emergence of powers and movements that claim to be or are universal. Productivism and consumerism make quantity rule, stimulating an unprecedented desire to possess in every area of life including the human relationships they involve.

Almost all the changes relating to events, times, situations, spaces, territories and interactive systems at this level have highlighted the urban. Indeed, the city is the most characteristic space and symbol of the modern organization of human activities. Urbanization was swept up into ever more global, inegalitarian flows and networks, as one crisis followed another and commercial activities and geographical mobility expanded. Throughout the twentieth century, cities were the breeding grounds of modernity and its symbols and the critical nodes of all these dynamics of change, from the political sphere to the religious. They were such powerful magnets that they ultimately acquired the status of refuge and sanctuary for huge swathes of the worlds population.

Nonetheless, modern cities, whatever their size and type, are difficult to interpret. They are paradoxical and confused places of reappropriated meanings, values and concepts, particularly for Muslim societies still largely rooted in the tradition of universality but in one way or other facing complex issues of cohesion, contact and centrality, from both the geographical and socio-political points of view.

An analysis of the shifts and transformations in such societies must therefore begin with worldwide societal and historical issues on the same scale as the demographic and geopolitical expansion of the Islamic world.

VI–1.1   Kingdom Tower (left) and Fayṣaliyyah Commercial Tower and
Hotel (right) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
© Permanent Delegation of Saudi Arabia to UNESCO

We will therefore look at how, during the twentieth century, geographically and culturally different Muslim societies were confronted in the urban environment by mechanisms of change (a set of processes and multidimensional transformations) and the dynamics that gave them form. We also need to understand how those societies managed their multiple effects or reacted to the functioning of urban systems according to their constituent parts or structures (gender, age cohorts, families, communities, singularities, spatial or human entities, etc.). We end with an historical, geographical and comparative overview of the current situations and combinations at the intercontinental level. This is a simple methodological choice that has nothing to do with any school, ideology, simplification or polemic.

From interactions to global effects

The twentieth century shaped a changing, eminently fluctuating world, marked essentially by the spread of the capitalist system throughout the planet and considerable technical capability. It was also a world with many inequalities and paradoxes. The unprecedented expansion of international relations fostered, among others, the emergence of world powers and geopolitical groupings

such as the Muslim world, while at the same time stimulating powerful political, community and cultural fragmentation processes on the same scale.

For example, the course of the century was punctuated by episodes of European colonization, long-distance international migration, a worldwide flight from the land, political change, growth and violence and the interplay of systems of orders and models. And it did not fail to influence the spectacular spatial expansion of Islam.

One of the most significant phenomena, however, was the formation of mighty urban conglomerations within which large cities with millions of inhabitants organize international flows and teaming networks (goods, services, images, airwaves). All the societies in the world were caught up in this macro-geographical cosmopolitanism.

The twentieth century was the century of the urban revolution, the most visible manifestation of which was the general dissemination of the Western urban model. That model was experienced very differently in different parts of the Islamic world and in regions undergoing Islamization.

A WORLD CONTEXT OF MULTIPLICITY AND GLOBALIZATION

The early years of the twentieth century saw a significant major development: the dismantling by 'the West' of the last Islamic empire extending into three continents: the Ottoman Empire. This was inevitably followed by realignments in its peripheral regions, from the Arabian Peninsula to Africa and the rest of Asia. The territorial hold and geographical links of Islam weakened, despite the support of centres of modern, Western-style urbanization.

The changes initiated were linked with demographic growth, the acceleration of which resulted in worldwide upheavals, multidimensional transformations and above all the destabilization of the space inhabited and developed by humans, a space that was more intensively organized in cities than in rural areas that were less and less productive. So much so that, by the end of the century, people and their activities were concentrated in, or had converged on ever-busier urbanized or urbanizing areas.

From this standpoint, an assessment of the extent and activity of the organizational centres of Islam, its space and stakeholders, now engaged in a quest for new forms of solidarity, is essential for an understanding of the trio change-urbanization-Muslim societies.

Multipolarity thus raises the question of the symbolic representation and functionality of the Islamic Umma, which is an ideal of unity in Allāh, a traditional, socio-political referent of the Islamic whole (a universal revealed religion, political and social organization, civilization, community and culture), assuming groups of lands, men and women, peoples, values, and potential responses to the requirements of a multiple and diverse world. How, in

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general, is it perceived, assumed and experienced in and by the modern city and its Muslim societies? In the countries of the north, in particular, those societies generally face, on the one hand, the complexity of the issues of the urban environment (work, egotism, proximity, secularization, quality of life, etc.), and, on the other, their own principles and values (faith, hospitality, neighbourliness, sharing, generosity, etc.). Thus the external perceptions of them in cities often lead to reductionism and stigmatization. Islam and its societies are often coldly received, perceived to be communities at risk with an ever-higher media profile in the light of security policies of containment, especially in infra-urban areas. Whereas in the Islamic tradition, the city is a sub-space of Allāh's land, which is vast, everywhere open for worship and legal work, and in which the Muslim (as a neighbour or stranger) is never an individually designated or enumerated foreigner.

Furthermore, the relationship of Muslims (ages, genders, families, sociocultural entities, etc.) with the public space of the realities of modernity sometimes becomes ambiguous and difficult, giving rise to a general problem of identity, reference (doctrinal, community, socio-political, cultural), access to services and other urban amenities, and management of what they have acquired from the host society for the generations born in the cities (concepts of society, new adaptive values and so on).

The century showed the great capacity of Muslim communities to interpret contemporary urban phenomena, however. The city, especially the major conglomeration, was gradually understood positively as a factor acting according to three processes of renewal or main sets of issues: restructuring of the geographical and sociocultural character of the world by Islam; revitalization of the legacy of a universal religion, and organized resistance to a feared weakening of the spiritual power or didactic capacity of the message of the Qurʾān in a world dominated by the idea of progress and the myths, certainties and concepts of modernity.

M USLIM S OCIETIES AND U RBAN S YSTEMS

Rapid urban growth, especially after the Second World War, caused many dysfunctions in global society: inequalities, disparities and imbalances in integration and participation. With regard to Muslim communities, for example, under the pressure of migration to the cities of Europe and America, and the population policies of the countries concerned (family, regulations on immigration and integration, control, supervision, women, youth), the variety of responses is remarkable. Many schools of thought, community groups and other forms of cultural, economic, ideological and even political development have resulted from this in various fields. The modalities have varied from one country or continent to another but, overall, the essential achievements

can be summed up in the growing visibility of the signs, symbols and human masses making their mark ever more distinctly on the landscapes and running of urban systems.

This has strengthened the attraction of large cities and capitals. At the same time, the unequal development of rural and urban areas in places of origin every year fed less and less selective migration to the cities. People of working age, the young, 'Qurʾānic' teachers and disciples, working women, traditional Muslim elites, in short, considerable swathes of Muslim societies and communities, wave after wave, made their way towards the new urbanity, towards new fronts. The front of institutions in relation to worship, legislation and the education of the young; the front of secularization or the subverted relationship of the religious to the socio-political; the front of the imitative artificialization of modern urban culture, either by eliminating Islamic references or by media influence on everything human (body, mind, heart, attire, group, etc.) or by the far-reaching dissemination of powerful globalizing models and paradigms. All these challenge the specificity of the Islamic spirit that had once made urban-centred Muslim civilization prosperous and culturally vibrant, from Medina, Damascus and Baghdad to the cities of Andalusia, Sicily, Mediterranean Africa and Central Asia.

These overall effects, actions and interactions show that the approach of the trio change-urbanization-Muslim societies could only be shifting and differential. It reveals an actual and potential diversity of situations and trends in relation to the proliferation of cities, unprecedented in the twentieth century, the quality of life of urban systems, the triumphant hybrid nature of the modern city, and the coexistence of communities.

Geopolitical situations and combinations

Going over the whole spatial area covered by Islam, we can compare the most significant facts of the situation of Muslim societies resulting from urbanization and the changes to which they are linked. The geographical reference entities are defined in terms of region, mainly because of the history and style of the global spread of Islam, but also because of the regional combinations, brought about by both general eco-geographical factors and the interplay of the flows (of migration, capital, investment, images and ideas), currents and movements (cultural and political) that marked the twentieth century, as described above.

Western Asia

This region stretches from the shores of the Black Sea in the north to the Arabian Peninsula in the south, and from the shores of the eastern Mediterranean to Iran and Central Asia. It includes the first lands of Islam

centred on the Hijāz, following a remarkable Islamic unity and a no less significant regional diversity. The people are mainly speakers of the Arabic, Farsi and Turkic languages. Urbanization is ancient and multigenerational. In the twentieth century the oil economy changed the overall population and the conditions of urban life in the framework of an Islamic consciousness fuelled by the proximity of the holy places of Islam.

From the earliest years of the century, the extension of European colonization into the region, the break-up of the Ottoman Empire and the political instability that followed contributed to a significant new development. The modern European city was grafted onto existing settlements, changing not only the factors of human mobility but also the spatial fabric of Islamic practices.

Urbanization advanced quickly, in particular inflating political capitals, major cities and the new economic centres (ports and oil cities), and changing the traditional nomadic rural life, and human relations on a large scale.

Only the real weight of tradition still limits urban influences on Muslim society as a whole, as the crises, shocks, cleavages, territorial and diplomatic reconfigurations and, above all, flows (migratory, financial and cultural) succeed one another. Although responses have varied greatly, throughout this region the reception, imitation and reinterpretation of modernity are 'westernizing', from the Mother City, Mecca (*Makka*) to the new cities, as a result of the spread of the western urban model. Thus here and there, through the urban infrastructure and fabric (places of worship, educational spaces, social services and work spaces), the transfer can be noted of some of the issues of modern societies that hamper urban life in the industrialized countries, in Europe, for example: marked social inequalities, unequal political, economic and social access; infra-urban poverty; pressure from migratory flows, and loss of the urban function of refuge and sanctuary.

Asia – Indian and Pacific oceans

This region is huge, stretching from Mongolia in the north to the East Indian archipelago in the south, from China and India in the west to the Philippines in the east.

The main features of the continental and peninsular environment are very mixed in ecological and human terms, and this has affected the particular characteristics of the trio change-urbanization-Muslim societies.

The ecology is one of the most mixed and varied in the world: some of the greatest deserts and the highest mountains in the world; some of the worst natural disasters for humans and habitat (earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons, floods, drought, monsoon, volcanic activity, etc.). The world's largest demographic blocs (China, India-Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia) are superimposed on areas that are statistically the most Islamized in the world, in

a no less unique patchwork of great civilizations (great swathes of Buddhists, Animists, Confucians, Hindus, Christians, Jews and so on).

Here religions play a crucial role in urbanization – the establishment and running of cities after many conquests and numerous pilgrimages. In the twentieth century urban growth accelerated as a result of mass migrations and other transfers to the cities, on the one hand, and of economic growth connected with long-distance trade, on the other. The region includes some of the largest conglomerations and cities in the world.

AFRICA

The trio change-urbanization-Muslim societies has extraordinary historical depth and generational context in Africa. Islamization goes right back to the ninth century. Its spread across the continent – generally southward from the Mediterranean and Sahara towards Sub-Saharan Africa – was mainly effected by Arab and Berber politicians, merchants and scholars. It was part of a city-generating dynamic that continued, although fragmented by distance, until the colonial era.

In the twentieth century Islam as a religion and regulator of life in society, particularly the trio under discussion, entered a new geopolitical and cultural context.

European colonization, particularly British and French, and its system of domination and exploitation became ubiquitous. One of its most significant characteristics was the introduction of the Western urban model, starting from basic urbanization structured by a trading economy, ports of call and trading posts and a segregated infrastructure and urban fabric. So much so that it was possible to contrast the 'white town' with the 'black town' in Black Africa and the 'Muslim town' with the 'European town', a carrier of new Western values (Christianity, scales, the account and the counter, a geometric view of the sharing and enjoyment of social space, etc.).

The growing complexity of the underdevelopment of African cities and the poorly-catered-for growth of social needs (housing, sanitation, services, urban mobility, work, and so on) meant that Muslim societies, that were mainly organized into 'brotherhoods', were permanently in a situation stemming from widespread poverty.

Poverty, worsened by demographic growth and the degenerative dynamics of rural ecosystems (recurrent drought, falling production, insecurity), led to various waves of migration, particularly to the cities. As for Muslim societies, in both the 'Arab' cities and the younger 'colonial' cities they suffered the most notable effects of the growing brutality of new ways of life concerning: the question of social cohesion; survival, particularly in poorly integrated sub-spaces (the areas just outside ancient town centres, shanty towns, peripheral areas, etc.), social housing and other effects of colonial backwardness. The

VI–1.2   A view of the Jeddah coast at night (Saudi Arabia)
© Permanent Delegation of Saudi Arabia to UNESCO

social strategies of both townspeople and rural immigrants and nomads at first came down to activating educational and socialization bodies (Qurʾānic schools and institutes, religious associations, ethnic-territorial affinities), the invasion of the informal, building a plethora of places of worship, linking groups of young people and adults with international migration networks. New trends appeared in relation to women (more visible occupation, greater freedom of speech, appearance, geographical and social mobility, growing domestic responsibilities), and children and young people working at an ever earlier age.

In this way cities began to become mixed and hybrid – quite confusedly, it is true. At the same time, a few original cases of rural, religious urbanization occurred. These were Muslim rural settlements established by guides that became real cities in which the expression of Islamic culture coexisted harmoniously with the symbols of modern urban planning. From North Africa to the Sahel and Sudanese regions, there are several notable examples, including Touba, situated in the heart of Senegal in Sub-Saharan Africa. Founded in the late nineteenth century by Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba Mbacké Khadimu Rassul, this holy Islamic centre and headquarters of the Mourīdes (Murīdiyya, a Sunni order) urbanized at a tremendous rate from the 1950s onwards and now has a population of over one million.

Everything is designed, planned and organized according to the Qurʾān, the *Sunna* of the Prophet and the teachings of the Sheikh (pure adoration, faith, piety, fervour, work, free social actions from independent community funds), and is very different from Western urban democratic models.

Now Senegal's second city, Touba is an example of rural urbanization under the aegis of the single central spiritual authority (the Caliph-General of the Mourīdes) of the Muslim community, which is scattered across the five continents. Its originality is such that it was one of some twenty cities invited for their excellent urban practices to the City Summit organized by the United Nations and held in Istanbul in June 1996. This was because of its status (freedom enshrined in a land registration document; an urban metropolis with rural administrative status, the capital of a basic rural unit known as a rural community, that of Touba-Mosquée; the largest administrative village in the world) and its particularity in terms of urban planning (radiating out from the mosque, one of the largest and most beautiful in the Islamic world; division into large housing lots made available at no charge to any Muslim applicant; self-help housing; freedom to engage in lawful economic activities; health care; free education and religious teaching).

E UROPE

Islam reached the Mediterranean shores of Europe as early as the seventh century. Muslim urbanization particularly shaped the social life and landscapes

of Spain, the Iberian Peninsula and Sicily between the seventh and sixteenth centuries.

Later, in the twentieth century, Islamization took off again as it became re-established. The cities and urbanized spaces connected with industrialization were its centres. It was based mainly on migration resulting from the dismemberment of political entities or former colonial empires in Africa and Asia. This urban-centred Islamization extended and intensified according to immigration policies, as family reunification took place and there were calls for labour, students and intellectual workers.

Although urban settlement varies somewhat in different environments, it concerns mainly poor neighbourhoods and those in difficulty that are marginalized or have more explicit problems of housing and the integration of Muslim societies into a generally Christian society in an advanced state of secularization.

Towards the end of the twentieth century some changes, shifts and trends emerged as a result of at least three major factors. First, there was the crisis of the industrial society that had itself triggered those massive flows of labour virtually pumped from the rural areas of North Africa and India, for example. This crisis is similar in scale to the various responses to the issue of migratory pressure, the acute issues of faith and Muslim religious practices in the context of a decline in religiosity in the wider society and the political threats to Muslim family and community structure, among other problems. Then there is the issue of the dynamics of the European city confronted with massive and rapid intra-urban Islamization. The style and development of urban infrastructure, fabric and functions have produced polarization and sub-spaces that give rise to multidimensional controversies (suburbs, the urban periphery, inegalitarian functional neighbourhoods, ghettoes, etc.). Last, there are the socio-political challenges to Muslim societies: those concerning land and statuses in relation to urban integration and settlement (land ownership, consolidation and restructuring of traditional frameworks; symbols); access to society in general in view of the secularization of education, and the diversity of changes in the family in view of the anonymity of relations, which is the main source of the crypto-ethnic stigmatization of which Muslims are often victims.

AMERICA

This is the region to which Islam has come most recently, and concerns more particularly the United States, Canada and the Caribbean.

In the United States, for example, Islamization was significant during the twentieth century in a space where there have been generations of immigrants of many races, but who have mainly been Christian. General social life is based

on cardinal references and values: belief, idealism, moralism, messianism, individual and entrepreneurial freedom, a culture of indifference and of time being precious, and a certain emergent nationalism.

The country is highly urbanized: three out of four Americans live in cities; there are dozens of major cities, while other conurbations have populations of several million and there are hundreds of medium-sized cities. In addition to their major economic activities, the cities have a very colourful cosmopolitanism, are divided along community lines, and are subject to a dynamic of saturation at the metropolitan level (where, furthermore, minds are haunted by social ills and crises of insecurity).

In this almost exclusively Christian urban context, the formation of Muslim communities and societies follows two currents. First, intra-urban conversions from and within African American communities in poor neighbourhoods and other ghettoes of the major cities of the east and south, from Chicago to Miami. Second, waves of migration, mainly from the Middle East, India, Pakistan, South-East Asia, Africa and Latin America, movements that were boosted by the practices of the state at the global level relating to the messianic vision and geopolitical mission of refuge, sanctuary, freedom, and universal model of American civilization.

Thus Muslim societies across the generations are very diversified but, in a context traditionally predisposed to reception, they are developing between two levels of issues: faith, and the status and values of civilization. Now, American civilization is urban life itself, it is the city perceived as change and the symbol of the messianism of the state.

The defence and experience of the values of Muslim civilization are part of a cultural approach swept up in the second half of the century by, among others, intense intellectual activity, itself underpinned by continuous migratory flows, by preaching, the image and then by writing. It has contributed to the emergence of great leaders, promoted many movements and the creation of actual Muslim structures integrated in intercontinental communications and exchange networks. In short, here, in contrast to the situation in Europe, religion has a status that makes it an integral part of civil life. The society as a whole has a religious sense that is exceptionally favourable to an Islamic experience of the multiple and accelerated mutations of American city life, despite the fact that at the end of the century a tendency to stigmatize was developing as a result of security and geostrategic issues.

Chapter 6.2

WOMEN AND THEIR CHANGING ROLES IN EDUCATION, CULTURE AND THE ECONOMY

Fawzia al-Ashmawi

INTRODUCTION

Nowadays in the West, as soon as Muslim women are mentioned, the veil springs to mind which conveys the image of the 'submissive wife'. However, contrary to this preconception, Muslim women are not in the least under the tutelage of men. Since the advent of Islam in the seventh century, they have enjoyed a separate legal personality.[1] Indeed, going back to the sources of Islam, the Qurʾān and the *Sunna* of the Prophet Muḥammad, one finds that Islam granted Muslim women a privileged status, compared to that of women in the majority of European countries from that time up to the nineteenth century.[2] For fourteen centuries, Muslim women experienced glorious periods, when they reached the highest positions of the state (under the rule of the Abbasids and the Ayyūbids from the eighth to the thirteenth centuries), and periods of decline, when they were confined at home, in a state of humiliating ignorance and stagnation (from the seventeenth to the early twentieth century under Ottoman rule).

What is the situation of Muslim women today? Why do Westerners persist in believing that Islam relegates women to second-class status, lower than that of men? To what extent can Islam be blamed for the inferior status of women in some Muslim societies up to the present day? Some researchers paint a sombre and pessimistic picture of the current situation of women in the Muslim world. Others are inclined to the more optimistic view that although the current legal and social situation of Muslim women has evolved

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1. See Muṣṭafā al-Sibāʿī, *al-Marʾa bayn al-fiqh wa-l-qānūn* [Woman between Jurisprudence and Legislation], Aleppo, al-Maktaba al-ʿArabiyya,1966.
2. Muḥammad ʿUmāra, *al-Taḥrīr al-islāmī li-l-marʾa* [Islamic Liberation of the Woman], Cairo, Dār al-Shurūq, 2002.

significantly in recent decades thanks to modernist trends and the courageous struggle pursued by women, it is still far short of actual recognition of gender equality and true female emancipation. In this regard, religious leaders and radical Islamist militants play a damaging role by their pressure on lawyers and politicians designed to force them to adopt measures against equal treatment, women's careers and access to posts of responsibility.[3]

It is true that the Qurʾān addresses the governance of Muslims' lives by giving them a code of conduct to follow in society which determines the role of each sex, but Islam cannot alone be held responsible for the inferior status of women. It is merely one factor among many, especially illiteracy, the ancestral cultural heritage, the patriarchal system, colonization and political repression.

Without going into the details of the various interpretations of the status of women in Islam in the Qurʾān and the different schools of law (*madhhabs*), we may simply observe that scriptural commentators list dozens of rights granted to women by Islam, albeit without daring to recognize that these rights are little applied in practice and that customary law (*ʿurf*) and the pre-Islamic cultural heritage still hold sway. That does not prevent modernist commentators from asserting that neither the Qurʾān nor the tradition of the Prophet Muḥammad forbids women from being educated, having a professional activity, exercising their political rights or playing a leading role in society.[4]

Despite all these assertions, it has to be said that the woman of the Qurʾān and the religious tradition differs profoundly from the woman we see in real life. The fact is that practice has its own laws which are stronger than theory and the evolution of Muslim women in reality has been determined by complex causes and the imperative demands of economic and social life.[5]

The purpose of this article is to study the causes, nature and pattern of evolution of Muslim societies over the last decades and to determine the role played by women in this evolution, particularly in the social, cultural and economic spheres. It also seeks to analyse the struggles of different categories of Muslim women at the national and international levels. It should be pointed out that all Muslim women, be they Islamist militants, westernized feminist revolutionaries or moderate liberals, have refused to assume only the role prescribed for them by a combination of religion, culture and the

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3. A. Lamchichi, *Islam, Islamisme et modernité* [Islam, Islamism and Modernity], Paris, l'Harmattan, 1994.

4. This emerges from the writings of Sheikh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī; see in this regard Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *Qaḍāyā al-marʾa* [The Question of Women], Cairo, Dār al-Shurūq, 1990.

5. M. Fahmy, *La condition de la femme dans l'Islam* [The Status of the Woman in Islam], Paris, Editions Allia, 1990.

VI–2.1   A women's sewing society in Ghana, founded as
a micro-finance initiative
© Zakat Foundation

patriarchal society. They have all questioned their personal status and their role in different spheres with demands for political, economic and social change.

The evolution of the role of women in Arab-Muslim societies

EDUCATION

Since the end of the nineteenth century, several Muslim reformers have argued for a modernization of the status of women in order to free them from the bonds of the religious conservatism which was the hallmark of societies in the Arab-Muslim world. This modernization has been taking place steadily, thanks especially to an interpretation of the Qurʾān better suited to modern times, advocated by the Arab-Islamic Renaissance movement, 'an-Nahḍa'. This movement, headed by the reformer al-Afghani, was a wake-up call to the Muslim nation in the early twentieth century after long years of torpor under the Ottoman occupation.

One of the leading lights of this reform movement was Shaykh Muḥammad ʿAbdu (1849–1905), who demanded the right of women in Egypt to education and knowledge: 'We want education for our daughters. Allāh told us "they have just as many rights as duties, in accordance with good practice", other verses of the Holy Book instruct men and women to share equally in matters of religion and daily life. Leaving our daughters prey to ignorance and idleness is an abominable crime.'[6]

Another keen reformer was Qāsim Amīn, later nicknamed the liberator of women. In his work '*Taḥrīr-al-marʾa*' (the Liberation of Women) 1897, he writes that if Egyptians wish to improve their lives, they must start at the roots. Families will only know prosperity if women are educated, share the ideas, ambitions and cares of men and share equally in all works.[7]

Several other worthy initiatives for women's education were launched in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Iran. A great campaign in favour of girls' education began. Primary and secondary schools for girls were opened in towns and villages. From the early 1930s, girls in Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria and Tunisia began to attend university, and this then occurred gradually in almost all the countries of the Arab-Muslim world.

Global education data show clear trends in the Arab countries in terms of length of primary and secondary education and the participation of girls in higher education. The education rate for girls in primary schools rose between 1999 and 2004 from 42 to 63 per cent in Yemen, from 61 to 74 per cent in Mauritania, from 66 to 83 per cent in Morocco, from 89 to 95 per cent in Algeria, and from 90 to 93 per cent in Egypt.

The various statistics on literacy show that the education rate of girls, who in the past would have left school, increased considerably during the second half of the twentieth century in various countries of the Maghreb, the Mashriq and the Gulf. The data also show that the figures for female students in higher education at least doubled in 2004 in the Arab States. Furthermore, many girls chose to study the sciences. In Bahrain, the Palestinian Autonomous Territories and Qatar, they account for almost 50 per cent of science graduates and outnumber men in the non-scientific disciplines. In higher education, although it may be hard to believe, the Gender Parity Index (GPI) was achieved in 1999 in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya.[8]

The number of primary and secondary schools for girls in Arab countries almost doubled in twenty years. This rapid progress of Arab women in the field of education is highlighted in the UNDP Arab Human Development Report

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6. F. al-Ashmawi, *La Femme et l'Egypte moderne dans l'œuvre de Naguib Mahfouz 1939–1967* [Woman and Modern Egypt in the Naguib Mahfuz Novels], Paris, Publications Orientalistes de France, 1985.

7. *ibid.*

8. *World Data on Education*, UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2006.

2002 which described the considerable progress made over the decades. 'The Arab countries have shown the fastest improvements in female education of any region. Women's literacy rates have expanded threefold since 1970. Female primary and secondary enrolment has more than doubled.' However, the report emphasizes that despite every effort and despite all the progress made, 'More than half of Arab women are still illiterate.'

That being so, and although many Muslim women still have a long way to go, it is worth pointing out that they are supported by their respective governments through programmes, initiatives and literacy campaigns aimed at encouraging them and giving them better access to education and knowledge. In particular, after ratifying the international human rights conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,[9] the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), most governments of Arab-Muslim countries found it necessary to take urgent steps to promote girls' education and to increase the age of marriage of girls (from 16 to 18 years) in order to allow them to pursue their secondary and university studies.

It is evident that access to education has given young Muslim women self-confidence, enabling them to face the challenges of a patriarchal society, assume more responsibilities and alleviate the inequalities between the sexes at all levels. Thanks to their education, Muslim women have gradually been making their presence felt as players in a process of reform, evolution and modernization which has begun despite the predominant religious conservatism.

CULTURE

It goes without saying that Muslim women have lived for centuries in patriarchal societies dominated by strict religious traditions, backward practices and customs compounded by an oppressive colonialism. All these factors constitute major challenges which women have had to meet with courage. The experience of history shows that they have proved themselves capable of meeting these challenges and changing the attitudes and behaviour of people in their societies.

Some researchers have commented that the evolution of the status of women in Arab-Muslim societies went hand-in-glove with their countries' struggle against occupation, so that this evolution occurred in parallel with the nationalist movement, as in Egypt: 'The cause of women's emancipation

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9. Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that primary education must be compulsory and free.

was supported by a number of liberal intellectuals, among them Saad Zaghlūl, Qāsim Amīn, Lutfī al-Sayyid, Tāhā Ḥusayn and many others.'[10]

Almost all women's emancipation movements were led by men, but gradually women activists close to the seats of power managed to take over the reins of evolution. One of the first Arab feminist militants was Hudā Shaʿrāwī (1879–1947). In 1923, she founded the first feminist association in Egypt. This association was behind the birth of *al-Ittiḥād al-nissāʾī al-miṣrī* (the Egyptian Feminist Union). In 1929, Hudā Shaʿrāwī and two other Egyptian women, Siza Nabarawi and Nabawiyya Mūsa managed to travel to Europe to represent Egyptian women at the Rome Women's Congress. On their return, as they disembarked from the boat which brought them home, the three pioneers dropped their veils from their faces in front of the crowd and dignitaries who had come to welcome them back in Alexandria.

This spectacular and symbolic gesture marked an important social and cultural evolution. Muslim women appearing in public with their face uncovered was a strange phenomenon, unprecedented in a conservative society where women and girls were cloistered at home, seldom went out and were always cloaked in a black full body veil or ʿabayya, and their head, hair and face covered with a face veil or yashmak. It was primarily a matter of changing people's attitude, proving that it was possible to be a respectable Muslim woman, with the face unveiled, while mixing with men in the street, in the bus or tram, the factory, the office and political demonstrations.

Women's fight continued in Egypt with Duriya Shafiq (1908–75) who founded an organization *Bint al-nīl* (Girl of the Nile), as well as the first magazine for women, bearing the same name, in which she published her goals of combating illiteracy among women and obtaining women's political rights.

With the 1952 Egyptian Revolution, a great campaign for women's education and literacy was launched. The new constitution in 1956 granted political rights to women. In 1957, two women were elected, for the first time, to the Egyptian Parliament. The first woman minister, Hikmat Abouzeid, was appointed Minister of Social Affairs in 1961. Among the leading figures who marked the social and cultural evolution of women, we should mention the Egyptian feminist militant Nawāl al-Saʿdāwī (born in 1931). A doctor by training, she is the author of several books, including *Women and Sexuality*, which outraged the religious authorities. She fought for women's right to education and led a campaign for the abolition of the sexual mutilation of which women are victims, especially in rural areas.

Parallel to the activities of this feminist protest movement, the Government of President Anwar al-Sadāt launched, through his wife, Jehan

10. Al-Ashmawi, *La femme et l'Egypte …*, *op, cit.*

al-Sadat, a new reform of the status of women. The Egyptian Family Act, hurriedly passed in 1985, is commonly called the Jehan Act. It was fiercely challenged by radical Islamists who finally succeeded in having it repealed. A few decades later, women human rights activists redoubled their efforts to promote the image of the Arab woman. Thus, in 2003, under the auspices of the League of Arab States, the Arab Women's Organization was formed. Its president is Sheikha Sabika, wife of the King of Bahrain.

At the same time, there have been similar movements in Sudan, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. Tunisia was a pioneer in this domain thanks to a radical change in the Family Code, with a new egalitarian personal status (1956) which guaranteed women access to education and the right to work, prohibited polygamy and arbitrary divorce, allowed contraception and abortion and ensured equality in inheritance. In Libya, women continued the movement to reform their status, the al-Fateh Revolution (1969) which encouraged their evolution at all levels. The Libyan Women's Union was founded in 1975, working closely with international organizations. In Morocco, women waged a historic struggle for decades against legal discrimination in order to change attitudes and family relationships. They finally obtained, in 2004, a new Family Code (*Mudawwana*) which was more egalitarian than its predecessor. Furthermore, 35 women became members of the Chamber of Representatives (Parliament) in 2004, which increased their rate of representation to 10.8 per cent instead of 0.66 per cent in 2002. In Algeria, women played a predominant role in the struggle for independence. This national struggle went hand-in-glove with a movement to reform the status of Algerian women.

In the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the evolution in the role of women is spectacular. They carried on a fight not against Palestinian men but rather against the Israeli oppressor.[11] The General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) was formed in Gaza in 1964 with the objective of enlisting women in the national struggle for the liberation of their lands. Palestinian women found a female leader in the person of Um Khalil or Samiha Khalil, a dynamic woman who, through the humanitarian institution in Ramallah, *al-Maqāṣid al-khayriyya* (the objectives of charity) helped women to acquire new capacities and to create their own enterprises in order to eliminate dependence on the Israeli economic sector. Um Khalil had the courage to stand against Yasser Arafat as a candidate in the 1989 elections for President of the 'State of Palestine'.

In Iran, on the orders of Rida Shah, women have had the right since 1936 to education, abolition of the *ḥijāb* and access to the University of Tehran. They obtained the right to vote in 1963 and four women succeeded in becoming members of the Majlis (Parliament) in 1964.

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11. G. T. Hashem, *Evolution du mouvement féministe palestinien* [Evolution of the Palestinian Feminist Movement], website of the International Civil Campaign for the Protection of the Palestinian People, March 2006.

VI–2.2   Ama Jan, Afghani educator and promoter of
women's educational rights, who was assassinated by the
Taliban in 2006
© UNESCO

In the Gulf states, it was not easy for women to take charge of their own destiny without the help of the men of their tribes and clans. The socio-cultural evolution of women was much slower in these countries, and especially in Saudi Arabia, which is a monarchy without a constitution or parliament in the sense of the separation of powers as formulated by Montesquieu. It was only in 1992 that King Fahd gave the country a constitutional law which provides that its constitution is formed from 'the Holy Qurʾān and the *Sunna* (tradition of the Prophet)'. He also created a Consultative Council (*shūrā*) in which no women held seats until January 2013. Although Saudi Arabia has

signed and ratified CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination all Forms of Discrimination against Women), it did so subject to reservations (Articles 2, 9 and 18), thus limiting the effect of its signature.

Women pioneers gradually pierced the wall of silence behind which they were cloistered. They dared in their writings to brave the conservative Wahhabi masculine junta which still prohibits women from driving a car in the Kingdom. For Badriya al-Bishr, journalist and author, 'women suffer from a straitjacket which is cultural rather than religious' and for Rugaya al-Shuaibi, Director of the NGO al-Naḥḍa, 'it is easy to modify infrastructure, but much harder to change attitudes'.[12]

In the other Gulf states, especially the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Yemen, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman, the predominant tribal tradition was considerably weakened in the last decades of the twentieth century which led to a gradual change in the sociocultural sphere. In Yemen, although the Government promotes education for Yemeni women and encourages them to take charge of their own destiny, 65 per cent of them are still illiterate (2005). However, despite social pressures and the weight of tradition, Yemeni women have successfully led active lives. In 2006, Yemen had one woman ambassador, two women ministers and one woman member of the National Assembly.[13]

In most African countries with a Muslim majority, women are faced with the challenges of rebuilding societies based on religious beliefs and customary law. In the field of education, compulsory education of girls, literacy campaigns and informal education as well as specialized programmes of the International Centre for Girls' and Women's Education in Africa (opened by UNESCO in Ouagadougou) have helped to strengthen women's education and empower them. In Senegal, since 2011, the Government has allocated 40 per cent of its national budget to education. In Burkina Faso, a quota of 40 per cent of grants is allocated to girls with the aim of increasing the number of women in universities.

In Cameroon, this evolution has been reflected, since 1984, by the creation of a Ministry of Women's Affairs, with an exceptional Muslim woman, Yaou Aïssatou, who helped to improve the condition of women in her country. In Niger, women's NGOs launched for the first time in 1991 a grand Women's March for Equal Rights. After lengthy negotiations, the National Assembly has just passed a law in favour of quotas of 25 per cent women. This system of quotas will also apply to the appointment of members of the Government.

In Mauritania, a woman, Rabiha Bint Abdel Wedoud, Minister for the Promotion of Women, pulled off a masterstroke in drawing up the Charter

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12. See the novel by B. al-Bishr, *Femmes de Riyadh* [Women of Riyadh], Paris, l'Harmattan, 2001, which aroused a storm of protest in the Muslim world.
13. See K. al-Salami and C. Hoots, *Pleure, ô reine de Saba* [Weep, O Queen of Sheba], Paris, Editions Actes Sud, 2006.

for the Promotion of Women which assigns a quota of 20 per cent of women in senior civil service posts. Ms Abdel Wedoud deserved the congratulations addressed to her, in 2006, at the 38th session of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) for her efforts to promote women's rights in Mauritania.

More or less the same social condition can be found in most of the countries of South-East Asia, where the percentage of girls in school is lower than boys at all levels, and the gap is even wider at university level. Women can be found in a limited number of industrial sectors and are corralled in junior posts. They continue to be under-represented in decision-making and policy-making bodies. Nevertheless, in the course of the last two decades, a real evolution can be seen in the role of women in social, economic and political life thanks to concepts such as informal education and micro-finance. According to the Education for All (EFA) *Global Monitoring Report 2001*, the majority of illiterates in the world are women living in four Asian countries: India, China, Pakistan and Bangladesh. However, thanks to literacy campaigns and informal education aimed at women, a clear change in women's condition has been achieved. In 2002, the King Sejong Literacy Prize was awarded by UNESCO to the Bunyad Literacy Community Council (BLCC), an NGO based in Lahore, for its pioneering work in the promotion of non-formal education of women in Pakistan.

ECONOMY

It is essential to recall that up to the mid-twentieth century, the great majority of women in Arab and Muslim countries were housewives. Although they had from the dawn of time assured the stability of the family, by taking sole charge of domestic tasks, their role of 'social bond' has never been valued and their role in the economic process remained secondary. Nevertheless, since the 1970s, the labour market in the Arab-Muslim world has begun to be feminized, especially in the textiles and electronics sectors. With the oil boom, the rich countries of the Gulf began to open up their labour market to workers from Arab countries less endowed with oil resources (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia), thus causing a shortage of male labour in the latter's labour market. Women took advantage of this.

Researchers in the sphere of women in development (WID) noticed that in 1975 the percentage of active women in the Muslim countries of Africa, South Asia and the Middle East was half that of non-Muslim countries. The ratio of women to men in the labour market was 29 per cent but close to 90 per cent in European countries. During the 1990s, the percentage of women in the workforce remained lower than the average, 18.7 per cent in the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. In predominantly Muslim countries such as Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan and Syria where cultural restrictions

discourage women from working in certain fields, the rate of women's work was very low.[14]

These low percentages could be explained by the fact that from 1950 to 1970, women in the Arab-Muslim world still did not have the same opportunities for education, qualifications and professional experience as men and they had less access to quality jobs in the public sector. From the 1970s on, in possession of a better education or university degree, women began to invade the labour market. They were chiefly employed in the services sector (teaching, health, hotels and catering and banks) where they helped to improve their conditions of work and gradually came to participate in management and decision-making in their institutions. These women progressively managed to penetrate the labour market in the countries of the Gulf.[15] Some countries hosting foreign labour experienced a dramatic increase in the participation of women in the labour force. Such was the case of Bahrain and Kuwait but not Libya or Saudi Arabia. In Kuwait, the number of economically active women doubled between 1970 and 1980, where women accounted for 18.8 per cent of all employees. In Bahrain, the rate of women in the labour force reached 11 per cent in 1981.

The governments of the Arab-Islamic countries which have ratified International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 3 have begun to modify their national labour laws and give more rights to women, starting with equal treatment with men, maternity leave, opening of workplace nurseries and one hour's rest to feed their babies. In the private sector, women graduates have pursued successful careers as lawyers, pharmacists or doctors. Others have set up their own businesses taking advantage of government policy to build the capacities of women business executives and access to micro-finance.

Indeed, micro-finance initiatives launched in India in 1992 allowed poor women to access employment and decision-making power by forming Self-Help Groups (SHGs). The success of the programme was such that in 2004 there were over one million SHG, 90 per cent of them women's groups. These SHGs are primarily concerned with social actions (sanitary infrastructure, water management, nurseries). The programme was progressively rolled out in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia. In this way, micro-finance encouraged the strengthening of women's capacity for action at economic and political levels, in both the countries of South-East Asia and the African countries of the Sahel.

In Senegal, women have become an important economic agent after obtaining the right to own and acquire land without the assistance of men. In Niger, women are in the front line in agricultural activities, feeding their families and indeed the whole country. It has been observed that women's businesses are competitive, especially in the agri-food sector. These businesses have invested

14. See *Human Development Report*, New York, UNDP, 2005.
15. V. Moghadam, *Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East*, Boulder, L. Rienner, 1993.

micro-credit funds in flagship projects such as the grain banks in Mali, essential to prevent famine. In Burkina Faso, the Women's Income Generation Support Fund (*Fonds d'Appui aux Activités Rémunératrices des Femmes* – FAARF) allows women's groups to obtain micro-credits to help them play a role in national development. The same trend can be seen in Mauritania where the first bank to facilitate women's access to credit, the Nissa Banque (women's bank), was recently formed in Nouakchott to finance micro-projects for women.

In 1999, the UNDP Human Development Indicator (HDI), which measures levels in terms of life expectancy, education and incomes, shows that apart from four Gulf states with high levels of development, almost all the other countries in the Arab-Islamic world are ranked in the medium development category. The following table shows the ranking of these countries by HDI indicator:

Arab-Islamic countries	International HDI	Arab-Islamic HDI
Qatar	40	1
United Arab Emirates	41	2
Bahrain	43	3
Kuwait	44	4
Libya	58	5
Malaysia	61	6
Oman	71	7
Saudi Arabia	77	8
Kazakhstan	80	9
Lebanon	81	10
Tunisia	89	11
Jordan	90	12
Sri Lanka	93	13
Turkey	94	14
Turkmenistan	97	15
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	99	16
Azerbaijan	101	17
Occupied Palestinian Territories	102	18
Algeria	103	19
Syrian Arab Republic	106	20
Kyrgyzstan	109	21
Indonesia	110	22
Uzbekistan	111	23
Egypt	119	24
Tajikistan	122	25
Morocco	124	26
Pakistan	135	27
Bangladesh	139	28
Sudan	141	29
Yemen	151	30
Mauritania	152	31
Senegal	157	32

VI–2.3   Rania al-Abdullah, Queen of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,
addresses the launch of the 'Class of 2015: Education for All'
campaign in September 2008
© UN Photo/Jenny Rockett

In 1995, the *World Human Development Report* introduced what it called the 'women's participation indicator', based on income, the number of professional and technical posts occupied by women and the number of seats held in parliaments. Taking into account the fact that, in the above table, the calculation of HDI took into consideration the women's participation indicator and the 'ratio', or percentage of men to women in certain specific sectors, helps explain why the countries in the Muslim world have not achieved a high HDI.

Nevertheless, progress has been made in this field, according to the 2006 annual report of the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), which in 2005 evaluated women's progress in developing countries. The efforts deployed by UNIFEM to promote budget analyses which examine the effects of allocations of public resources by gender also yielded promising results in 2005. In Morocco, the national budget for 2006 contained for the first time an annex taking into account priorities relating to gender equality.[16]

16 See UNIFEM website, publications, 2006 Annual Report.

As mentioned above, one of the indicators used to determine whether women are actively involved in the development of a country is the rate of women's representation in parliament. This indicator shows not only the political evolution of women but also their evolution in their role in decision-making at all levels in the country. According to data on the website of the Arab Women Organization,[17] in 2005, the rate of participation of Arab women in decision-making at ministerial level was 8.6 per cent on average. Arab women ministers are most often responsible for social affairs and remote from the so-called 'political' ministries (ministries of the interior, economy, foreign affairs and finance). Their parliamentary representation is the lowest in the world: according to the 2005 statistics, it stood at only 6.4 per cent compared with the global average of 13 per cent.

We believe that these low scores are due primarily to the predominance of the patriarchal character of Arab-Muslim societies. Despite the fact that the legislation had granted women political rights in many of these societies, women only actually entered parliament one or two decades later, with the exception of Egypt. The following table shows this trend as identified by the International Parliamentary Union:

Country	Year when political rights were achieved	Year of entry into parliament	Difference
Lebanon	1952	1963	11
Syria	1953	1973	20
Egypt	1956	1957	1
Morocco	1963	1993	30
Yemen	1967	1990	23
Jordan	1974	1989	15

It is worth recalling that the various political systems in these countries have had to resort to the application of quotas so as to increase the number of women in parliament. The following table shows the number of seats allocated to women in the parliaments of the Arab countries applying the quota:

Country	Number of women's seats	Total seats in parliament
Tunisia	21	182
Jordan	6	110
Morocco	30	352
Sudan	35	260

17. The Arab Women Organization was founded in March 2003. The member countries signatories to the Arab Women Organization's Convention are Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, the Syrian Arab Republic, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan and Lebanon.

Some Arab countries, however, have abolished the quota system, considering it to be unconstitutional and in contradiction with the principle of equality of men and women. These countries include Lebanon, where five women have been elected to parliament (which has 128 seats) and Egypt, where nine women were elected and four appointed by President Mubarak in 2005 (in a parliament of 454 seats). As for the Gulf States, with the exception of Oman, where two women were elected in 2003 to the Consultative Council (*Majlis ash-shura*, comprising eighty-three members), women had no success in the last elections in Qatar and Bahrain. In Kuwait, where women only obtained political rights in July 2006, several women took their chances and stood as candidates in the parliamentary elections, but none was elected to the Kuwait Parliament.

With regard to African countries, although this region is one of the poorest in the world, women's representation in legislative bodies is higher than in some of the world's wealthiest countries. In Mauritania, for example, there are thirteen women deputies out of a total of 111. Senegal has five women ministers in a government of thirty-nine members, and 19.2 per cent of deputies are women. Senegal is thus following the global trend of greater women's representation in national parliaments, with a global rate of 17 per cent. It is ranked 13th in Africa and 56th in the world, ahead of France and Italy.

Despite the rapid evolution of the role of women in some Arab-Muslim countries, it must be conceded that there is still a long way to go if Muslim women are to achieve the international average ratio defined by the UNDP criteria. The UNDP 2005 Report emphasizes that, in the Arab world, women in general suffer from inequalities between women and men, and discrimination in law and in practice in many spheres: participation in political life, amendment of laws on personal status and integration in the development process.

EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE FACE OF RADICAL ISLAMISM

With the rising tide of radical conservatism since the end of the 1970s, Islamist movements, preaching a strict fundamentalism, have opposed women's liberation movements and even demanded that women return to the home. The representatives of this radical tide took advantage of the total disarray of the Muslim world following the defeat by Israel in 5 June 1967, *al-Naksa*, to demand the imposition of *Sharī'a*, following the setback to modernization and the Western model. This radicalism spread widely in all the countries of the Muslim world with negative repercussions on the evolution of women. Women were beginning to join this radical current and were wearing the veil. Thus, half a century after the spectacular unveiling of

Hudā Shaʿrāwī, who in 1923 called on Egyptian women to reject the veil, the new trend is the return of the veil. However, it must be remembered that the wearing of the veil by young Muslim women is clearly stipulated in two Qurʾān verses ((XXIV.31 and XXXIII.59). Older Muslim women, on the other hand, are permitted to relax their dress in accordance with verse 60 of *sūra* 24 (XXIV.60). This confirms the theory advocated by a great many Muslim scholars that the wearing of the veil is closely linked to seduction and sexuality.[18]

Those who defend the wearing of the Islamic veil include Zeinab al-Ghazali, who in 1948 founded the Association of Muslim Sisters, *Jamʿiyyat al-ukhwāt al-muslimāt*. Accused of collaboration with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, she was imprisoned under Nasser then released six years later by President al-Sadat. She became very active during the period 1980–90 thanks to her column in the most popular Islamist newspaper, *al-Liwāʾ al-Islāmī*. Another militant supporter of the wearing of the veil, the journalist Safinaz Kazim wrote in her book '*Masʾalat al-sufūr wa-l ḥijāb*' (To Wear or not to Wear the Veil) (1982), that the feminist movement led in Egypt since the 1930s by Hudā Shaʿrāwī, had distanced women from Islam. She claimed that Muslim women who did not wear the veil were then the exception not the rule.

In opposition to this movement of the veil is the movement in favour of discarding the veil, headed by Nawāl al-Saʿdāwī, who in her book *The Hidden Face of Eve: Women in the Arab World* (1980) castigated the return of the veil in Muslim societies. By choosing, as the slogan for one of her lectures in Cairo in 1986, 'Raising the veil on the mind', she was roundly criticized, both by the governmental religious authorities and the radical Islamist movements. She founded the Arab Women's Solidarity Association, a non-governmental organization recognized by UNESCO and regarded as the first independent NGO working at the international level to promote women's rights in the Arab-Muslim countries.[19]

At the same time, an approach emerged that was both feminist and Islamic and that might be described as 'Islamic feminism'. It was in the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the early 1990s, that this concept of Islamic feminism was invented by women from the elite with degrees from prestigious American and European universities, often expatriates and fighting against the reformism of the mollahs who had profoundly permeated Iranian society following the Islamic revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini. Their demands were widely disseminated through the women's press directed by firm-handed women, among them Shala Sherkat, editor-in-chief of a leading magazine, *Zanan* (Women).

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18. See on this subject, ʿUmāra, *al-Taḥrīr al-islāmī li-l-marʾa, ibid*.
19. R. Roded, *Women in Islam and the Middle East*, New York, I. B. Tauris Publications.

VI–2.4   A family planning and health education session for women in rural
areas of the Hodaidah governorate in Yemen, in May 2010
© UNFPA/Fouad al-Harazi

This Islamic feminism found a favourable echo among Muslim women living in Europe and America, who condemned the patriarchal reading of the Qurʾān, and demanded a new interpretation of the holy writings more suited to the sociocultural reality of their own experience. They are very active in well-organized associations such as the network Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML). Other, similar movements have emerged, such as the Sisters in Islam in Malaysia, which denounces the weight of tradition in Islamic jurisprudence, and the Nigerian women's organization, Baobab, which works closely with Women Living under Muslim Laws.

However, male Muslim commentators have proved intransigent in the face of this innovative feminist interpretation. They remain unanimous in denying Muslim women access to the posts of Head of State or Head of Government, or even leadership of a nation (*wilāya kubrā*), since the head of a Muslim community or a Muslim state must preside over prayers (*imāma*) and command the armed forces, two tasks which, as they see it, women cannot assume.[20]

20. In Pakistan, Muslim fundamentalists, invoking this strict interpretation, tried in 1988 to
prevent Benazir Bhutto from taking up the post of Prime Minister.

In reaction to these radical pressures, in 2005 in Barcelona, militant Muslim feminists from around the world marching under the banner of the new 'gender jihad' launched a global movement for the liberation of Muslim women from what they call 'sexism in the Muslim world'. One of the leaders of this movement is Amina Wadud, who had braved Islamic customary law (*ʿurf*) by an act of transgression. In March 2005, she led Friday prayers (*imāma*) in a mixed congregation in New York. Amina Wadud emphasized that it was in the name of Islam and the values that it upheld that she was fighting for women's right to be recognized as human beings. The Qurʾān made no ontological difference between men and women. It could make reference to functions but would never establish a hierarchy between the sexes. Her initiative shocked the *ulemas* of the Muslim world and certain reactions were very violent.[21]

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE: THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS

Although many Arab-Muslim governments have ratified the various international treaties and conventions on non-discrimination against women, they have nevertheless failed to make equality between men and women a fundamental principle of their countries' legislation. Almost all these governments made reservations on ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 2, 17, 18 and 19), and the Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)[22] (Article 9, paragraph 2; Article 15, paragraph 14; Article 16 and Article 29). The additional Optional Protocol to CEDAW has still not been ratified by the majority of Islamic states.

While it is true that almost all the constitutions of Arab-Islamic countries enshrine equality between men and women, it must be acknowledged that there is discrimination in law against women. Thus, based on the Qurʾānic injunctions (IV.11) the laws on inheritance provide that the woman's share is half that of the man's. By analogy, compensation for fatal accidents or compensation paid on the death of a man (*diyya*) is double that paid for the death of a woman. Furthermore, sentences for so-called honour crimes are much lighter for men than for women. In particular, they are typically six months at most for a man who kills his wife caught in the act of adultery in the conjugal bed, while the woman who kills her husband in the same circumstances is sentenced to twenty years.

21. Extracts from the report of the First International Congress on Islamic Feminism, held in Barcelona from 29 to 31 October 2005 and organized by the UNESCO Catalan Centre, attended by over 400 Muslim women from all over the world.
22. Out of 22 Arab countries, 18 have ratified the CEDAW with reservations (2006).

VI–2.5   Members of Karamah, an association of Muslim women lawyers
for human rights, present their organization's recommendations at the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW), in March 2010 at the United Nations in New York
© UN Photo/Devra Berkowitz

In almost all these countries (except Tunisia and Egypt), citizenship is
linked to the male sex. Men transmit citizenship to their children and their
spouses. This means, in the eyes of Western defenders of equality between
the sexes, that among Muslims the male blood line is valued more highly
than the female blood line in the transmission of the right to nationality of a
country, based on blood rights. This also means in Western eyes that women's
citizenship in the Arab-Islamic countries, is a second-class citizenship, which
is a violation of Article 9 of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW.

We consider that legislation that disadvantages women in the Arab-
Muslim countries is owing to the lack of women lawyers and judges in the
legal bodies which formulate and adopt these laws. Of twenty-two Arab-
Muslim countries, only seven accord women the right to become judges. Yet
Muslim women lawyers, feminists and activists in NGOs fighting to promote
women's human rights and equality between men and women have not
given up. They are very active in various international bodies and in major
international conferences devoted to women's questions. During the United
Nations Decade for Women (1976–85), they demanded their rights to greater
equality with men while remaining true to the Muslim tradition. They played a

major role in the Beijing Fourth World Conference on Women (1995) devoted to questions of women's development and their human rights, at which the Beijing Platform for Action was adopted, and the Five-Year Review Beijing+5 held in 2000 in New York. The final document of the conference was signed by all the participating countries, including the Arab and Muslim countries.

From the first session of the new Human Rights Council in Geneva in September 2006, Muslim women's NGOs joined forces to demand, loud and clear, 'equality without reservations' and urged their respective governments to lift their reservations to the CEDAW and ratify its Optional Protocol in order to achieve real equality between men and women with respect to civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and guarantee full citizenship to women.[23]

CONCLUSION

The government of the Muslim world by men alone, for fourteen centuries, has led only to wars, violence and patriarchal societies in which women did not enjoy the privileged status accorded to them by Islam. It is time for women to participate more actively in the government of this Arab-Islamic world. However, it is important to point out that the Muslim women's liberation movement was not a conflict between men and women, as was the case in western societies, let alone a 'battle of the sexes' as it was termed by the American feminist Bell Hooks. Instead, it was rather a conflict which set Muslim women against their condition of religious, cultural, social, economic and political oppression.

It is thanks to education and their participation in social, cultural, economic and political life that Muslim women have succeeded in forging a new identity and a new active role, distinct from the passive role imposed on them by men in the past in those patriarchal societies. Their role has evolved over the generations and has developed with the passage of time. Each generation has contributed to this evolution. Nowadays, women have become very active in the media, the cinema and communications.

Thus, despite the retrograde pressures which continue to weigh them down, Muslim women have managed to assume key posts at all hierarchical levels. Four Muslim women have been political leaders of their respective countries: Benazir Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan from 1988 to 1990, Sheikh Hasina, who became President of Bangladesh in 1991, Megawati

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23. Communiqué signed by 39 women's NGOs from the countries of North Africa, the Middle East, the Gulf States and Turkey, meeting in June 2006 in Rabat, Morocco, where they launched this initiative subsequently presented at the September 2006 session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva.

Sukarnoputri in Indonesia and Tansu Çiller, Prime Minister of Turkey in 1993. These Muslim women made a brilliant success of their government responsibilities and attracted the esteem and admiration of the world.

Meanwhile, the Iranian woman lawyer, Shirin Abadi has been fighting since 1975 to defend Muslim women's human rights in Iran. She was the first Muslim woman to obtain in 2003 one of the most prestigious and sought-after international honours, the Nobel Peace Prize. For some liberal Muslim feminists, she represents the peak, at the global level, of the graph of the evolution of the status of Muslim women in modern times.

Chapter 6.3

HEALTH ISSUES

Mohamed M. Elmufti

This chapter will deal with the general aspects and critical problems of health in Muslim countries, an approach which may help towards future planning of concrete programmes.

Health may be defined as the sense of well-being within oneself, reflecting the interaction of many factors including body physiology, nutrition, economy, environment and culture. Health parameters are lowered by limited resources which diminish the availability and maintenance of modern medical equipment, facilities and public health programmes. Furthermore, the health status of any community is determined by the population size and its value system. Most of the health issues facing traditional societies today, including Muslim communities, seem to be related primarily to their rates of growth outstripping available natural resources.

Per capita total expenditure on health at average exchange rate (in US$) for representative countries (The World Health Report 2006)

Bangladesh	14	Tajikistan	11
Egypt	55	Tunisia	137
Eritrea	8	Turkey	257
Indonesia	30	United Arab Emirates	661
Iran	131	Uzbekistan	21
Malaysia	163	Yemen	32
Mali	16	South Africa	295
Morrocco	72	Spain	1541
Nigeria	22	Sweden	3149
Sudan	21	United Kingdom	2428
Syria	59	United States of America	5711
Pakistan	13		

It should be stressed that the Muslim world community, with a population of 1.2 billion today in over fifty countries, is not a homogeneous continuum, but shows great variations reflecting factors of race, language, geography, and so on. However, Muslim nations do possess a fairly unified world view that

determines prevalent attitudes towards disease, death, scientific innovation and so on. This Muslim psycho-social paradigm is derived from the Holy Qurʾān and the collected sayings and tradition of the Prophet Muḥammad, known as *Sunna*. Interpretations of Islamic precepts by religious scholars or schools have varied over the centuries and according to sect and country.

Demographic issues

World population, currently 6.5 billion, is growing by another 76 million people per year. This rapid population growth has placed incredible stress on Earth's resources. The population today is nearly four times the number in 1900. Half a billion people live in water-stressed or water-scarce countries, and by 2025 that number will grow to three billion. In the last fifty years, cropland has been reduced by 13 per cent and pasture by 4 per cent.

Muslim societies tend to have larger families, the average fertility rate being 5 births/woman by the age of 45. Between 1965 and 1990, the populations in the Maghreb and Egypt almost doubled to 59 million and 52.4 million respectively. The cumulative population of the largest Muslim countries, namely Pakistan, Indonesia, Nigeria, Bangladesh and Iran, was 194 million in 1950, reaching 673 million in 2000, and is expected to be 1,033 million in the year 2025. As a result, more than 40 per cent of the population is under 15 years of age.

Population growth has also been accompanied by increasing urbanization. In the Middle East of 1900, for example, less than 10 per cent of the inhabitants were city dwellers; by 1980, 47 per cent were urban. In 1800, Cairo had a population of 250,000, rising to 600,000 by the beginning of the twentieth century. The unprecedented influx of immigrants from rural areas brought the population of Cairo, for example, to almost 8 million by 1980. Overcrowding has direct implications on health conditions.

Despite the fact that the Middle East is a fairly prosperous area in view of its oil wealth, one in five Arabs still live on less than $2 a day. Stagnant growth, together with a fast-rising population, means vanishing jobs. About 12 million people, or 15 per cent of the labour force, are already unemployed, and on present trends the number could rise to 25 million by 2010.

The dangers of overpopulation have long been understood. Unless the human population is controlled humanely through family planning, nature will do it for us through violence, epidemics and starvation.

Water supply and sanitation

Though more than two-thirds of the planet is covered with water, only a small fraction, around 0.3 per cent, is available for human use and re-use.

VI–3.1   UNICEF representative Catherine Mbengue immunizes a child against polio in Helmand Province, Afghanistan in September 2007
© UN Photo/Khadivi

Water is essential for man's survival; deprivation for more than three days is tantamount to a sentence of death. Water is required for drinking, cooking and personal hygiene. Water is also required for sanitation, cleaning utensils and laundry. The minimum physiological requirement in temperate climate is 3 litres per person per day. Aid agencies place the daily requirement at 20 litres per person. This figure is trebled for the management of patients with cholera. Additional water is required for livestock. Imported food is a form of virtual water, since large volumes of water are required for its production, for example, one ton of grain requires 10 tons of water in its production.

Global demand for water has tripled since the 1950s, and the supply of fresh drinking water has been declining because of over-pumping and contamination. Over the next two decades our water consumption is expected to increase by an estimated 40 per cent. According to the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme, over 1.1 billion people (one person in five) were without access to safe drinking water in 2000. Each year, over 3 billion people suffer from water-related diseases resulting in 3 to 5 million deaths, mostly of children under five.

Muslim countries are mainly situated in desert and steppe regions. The ecological implications include difficulties of food production and less water availability as well as increased prevalence of infectious disease.

Availability of drinking water in different Muslim countries is variable but is generally low. In the year 2000, the proportion of the population with access to safe drinking water was only 13 per cent in Afghanistan, 27 per cent in Chad, 37 per cent in Mauritania, 39 per cent in Oman, 62 per cent in Nigeria, 80 per cent in Tunisia and 78 per cent in Indonesia. The largely Muslim Middle East and North Africa suffers from scarce natural water supplies. Renewable available water in the region dropped from an average of 3,300 cubic metres per person per year in 1960, to 1,250 in 1996, and is expected to decline to 725 cubic metres by 2025,[1] compared with a world average of 7,000. The demand is increasing sharply as a result of population growth and irrigation development.

Groundwater, the main source in many countries, is being extracted beyond its renewal rate. In some cases, governments (e.g. Libya) are tapping into fossil groundwater and initiating desalination projects. Strategies for sustainable development and management of water resources in Islamic countries, have been suggested by ISESCO.

The limited surface water has to be shared between different countries. More than 260 river basins in the world are shared by two or more countries. Scarcity brings conflict with it. In the Middle East, water will probably take over from oil as the likeliest cause of conflict. Water shortage and trans-boundary water disputes will jeopardize all health parameters and future health programs.

Infant mortality

Infant mortality, or mortality during the first year of life, is an important indicator of the overall social and economic well-being of a country.

The world average of birth rates per 1000 population is 20. It is highest in Muslim Sub-Saharan African countries (34 in Sudan to 50 in Niger) and about 30 in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Birth rates in Europe average 12, but drops to below 10 in Switzerland and Germany, as well as in Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong.

A total of 10.5 million children under 5 years of age were estimated to have died worldwide in 1999, and the great majority of these deaths occurred in developing countries. Most childhood deaths have been attributed to diarrhea, acute respiratory illness, malaria, measles, and malnutrition: conditions that are either preventable or treatable with low-cost interventions.

Various factors influence the levels of infant and child mortality. For instance, rates of childhood illness and death are much higher in the poorer

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1. N. Faruqui, *Water Management in Islam*, IDRC/UNU, Press International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the United Nations University Press, 2001.

strata of society. Illiteracy of mothers, culturally-determined attitudes with respect to health and medical care, lack of basic knowledge and awareness of health problems, poverty and the inaccessibility of health facilities all contribute to these high rates. Education of women, awareness of the importance of hygiene, the use of techniques such as oral no-therapy (ORT) in managing diarrhea, and timely immunization are factors that could save the lives of many children.

Many studies have demonstrated increased mortality risks among children born after short birth intervals, due to maternal depletion. The level of the mother's education seems crucial, the infant mortality rates being lower for mothers with some schooling.

Infant and child mortality in Bangladesh is about 100 deaths per thousand live births, reflecting poor health care facilities, lack of health personnel and medicines. In Indonesia significant numbers of the country's children are underweight (30 per cent of pre-school children) and infant mortality is in the region of 43 per 1,000.[2] Infant mortality in Egypt declined from 124 per 1000 in the 1970s to 44 per 1000 in 1999.[3] The leading causes of mortality are: diarrhoeal diseases (39.4 per cent) and acute respiratory infection (26.8 per cent).[4]

A study of the efficiency of health care in obstetrics in Nigeria, Mali and Togo showed high incidence of young mothers below 18 and low rates of prenatal visits by medical personnel and rarity of ultrasound examinations.[5] Another study in Burkina Faso revealed the risk factors for childhood mortality to include age of the mother, death of the mother, narrow birth spacing, season of birth, ethnic group, and distance to the nearest health centre.[6][7]

Clearly, infant mortality is not related to just a handful of variables. It would, therefore, be a mistake to concentrate policy actions on one or a few of these while forsaking others.

2. New Nutrition Map of Indonesia: Highlights, Widespread Infant Mortality, Underweight Children, http://www.wfp.org/, Pediatrics News, 10 July 2006.

3. O. Campbel, 'The Egypt National Perinatal/Neonatal Mortality Study 2000', *Journal of Perinatology*, 24, pp. 284–9, 2004.

4. K. M. Yassin, 'Indices and Sociodemographic Determinants of Childhood Mortality in rural Upper Egypt', *Social Science Medicine*, 51 (2), 2000, pp. 185–97.

5. W. Kunzel, Maternal and Perinatal Health in Mali, Togo and Nigeria, *Eur J Obstet Gynecol Reprod Biol.* October, 69(1), 1996, pp. 11–17.

6. H. Becher et al, 'Risk Factors of Infant and Child Mortality in Rural Burkina Faso, *Bulletin World Health Organization*, LXXXII, No. 4, April, 2004.

7. *Bulletin of World Health Organization*, LXXXII, No. 4, April, 2004.

VI–3.2   An AIDS awareness campaign in India
© Zakat Foundation

Nutrition

Needless to say, poor nutrition leads to poor health. Poverty, draught and over-population relative to available resources are basic factors in the causation of malnutrition. Young children and mothers are often the most affected. Using data from fifty-three developing countries, researchers from Cornell University have concluded that over half of those 13 million child deaths each year are associated with malnutrition, mostly of moderate forms.

More than 4.3 million Muslim children worldwide under the age of five die every year. Islamic states account for the world's highest child mortality rates, where 60 per cent of children who die from disease and malnutrition do so before their first birthday, according to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Children living in Islamic Sub-Saharan Africa experience the most severe deprivations. Child mortality rates in this region are more than double the world average.[8]

8. M. de Onis et al, 'Is Malnutrition Declining? An Analysis of Changes in Levels of Child Malnutrition since 1980', *Bulletin World Health Organization*, LXXVIII, No. 10, 2000.

Maternal mortality

Every minute of every day, somewhere in the world, a woman dies as a result of complications of pregnancy and childbirth. The world figure for the Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR) is estimated to be 400 per 100,000 live births. The majority of these deaths are avoidable. Death during pregnancy or childbirth is unlike other deaths since it happens only to young women, and not because of disease, but during what should be a normal process. The estimated number of maternal deaths in the year 2000 for the world was 529,000 according to WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA estimates. These deaths were almost equally divided between Africa (251,000) and Asia (253,000), with about (22,000) occurring in Latin America and the Caribbean, and less than (2,500) in the more developed regions of the world. In Muslim countries, some of the available MMR are as follows: Afghanistan (1,900), Niger (1,600), Mali (1,200), Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia (1,100 each), Burkina Faso, Mauritania, (1000), Nigeria (800), Senegal (690), Sudan (590), Yemen (570), and Pakistan (500).

The low social and economic status of girls and women is a fundamental determinant of maternal mortality. Low status limits the access of girls and women to education and good nutrition as well as to the economic resources needed to pay for health care or family planning services. Women suffer for their reproductive role.

In Islamic and Arab countries, many women are assisted in delivery by traditional birth attendants or only by relatives. Only 53 per cent of women have the assistance of skilled health personnel (a midwife or doctor), and only 40 per cent give birth in a hospital or health centre. Reductions in maternal mortality can be achieved primarily by improving the position of women in society, mainly through education.

Family planning

Talking of an Islamic population bomb may be malicious propaganda. But the fact remains that Muslim population increase is threatening Muslim societies with catastrophic implosion. For example, the population of Pakistan was 112 million in 1990 and would increase to 163 million in 2003. Every year, more than 3.37 million new individuals are added. Pakistan is least able to provide large additions of youngsters with food, clothing and education, and of young adults with jobs, housing and other consumer essentials, while trying to break out of the vicious circle of poverty. Uncontrolled population growth in most Muslim countries, by depleting available sources of life, is weakening the fabric of society, and generating tensions, internal instability and external war.

In Muslim communities today, family size remains large. Family planning, with few exceptions, is hindered in practice, and contraceptive use is low.

A survey in 1998 showed that modern contraceptive methods are used by only 38 per cent of married women of reproductive age in Turkey, the most secular Muslim state.

Many sectors of Muslim societies e.g. peasant and nomad, do not have a system of social security. Consequently, the only 'insurance' that parents have in their old age is by having children to support and care for them. Furthermore, since the infant and child mortality rates are quite high, there is a greater craving to have more children. Family planning has little relevance in such a cultural context, in which a large progeny is seen as a source of pride. Large progeny is also favored in rural and nomadic communities, because it is a source of extra labour, e.g. to run the farm or herd. In tribal communities, sizeable progeny also acts as a deterrent versus other clans. This last perspective is sometimes amplified by politicians in the context of national defense against potential modern enemies.

The Holy Qurʾān correctly presents marriage and children as a gift from God to be cherished and enjoyed, thus encouraging marriage, for the happiness of the individual and stability of society. The prevalent interpretation of religious tradition remains the background to the uneasy attitude towards medically-based approaches to control population growth. Muslim sheikhs repeat, as a matter of tradition, in every marriage ceremony, the saying of the Prophet Muḥammad that enjoins Muslims to marry and reproduce, a saying that had its correct motivation when the Muslim community was small and threatened. Nowadays, the element of quality of life seems to be unrecognized by Muslim religious teachers. Some argue that Islam does not permit contraception or abortion and that family planning is 'un-Islamic'.

Earlier *fuqaha* were more accommodating. Imām al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), supported the use of contraceptive practice for a number of different reasons including economic factors to alleviate hardship on the family. On the other hand, the majority of Islamic legal schools have permitted withdrawal or coitus interruptus, called ʿazl, as a method of contraception. By analogy, the use of other barrier methods, such as the condom and diaphragm, is also allowed by some. As early as the ninth century, female contraceptive techniques like intra-vaginal suppositories and tampons, were also the subject of both medical and judicial discussions in Islam. Ibn Sina in his *Qanūn* lists 20 birth control substances and physician Abū Bakr al-Rāzī in his *al-Ḥāwī* lists 176 birth control substances. While medical manuals listed the different female contraceptive options and their relative effectiveness, legal positions differed only around whether the consent of the husband was necessary or not.

Modern methods of contraception e.g. tubal ligation and vasectomy pose greater difficulty. Some religious leaders argue that sterilization does permanent harm to a person and is, therefore, unacceptable to Muslims. Others argue that reversible sterilization is permitted.

Some Muslim countries have legalized certain forms of contraception. Iran, Turkey and Tunisia, for example, allow both tubal ligation and vasectomy, while Jordan and Egypt do not allow either. Some governments in the Muslim world are actively involved in the distribution of contraceptives, free of charge. Oral contraceptives are freely available in pharmacies, but usually taken at doctor's advice.

Prevalent laws permit abortion, but only for the most serious reasons. Where women do not have ready access to contraceptive services, they often turn to abortion to avoid unwanted births. In Kazakhstan, for example, where contraception has been difficult to obtain from government or private sources, the abortion rate is high: for every 1,000 women of childbearing age, 44 have an abortion each year. In Tunisia, by contrast, the abortion rate is relatively low; 9 per 1,000 women of reproductive age.[9] But increasing numbers of middle class women do seek abortions for birth control reasons, and doctors tend to be cooperative in this respect.

Theoretically, the notion of family planning is compatible with the teachings of Islam, but its adoption varies across the Muslim world. At the end of the Iran-Iraq war in the late 1980s, the Iranian Government renewed its interest in family planning amidst deteriorating economic conditions. The country's National Birth Control Policy was issued in 1989 to persuade the public of the need for family planning, through newspaper reports, television spots and Friday prayer speeches. Iran's family planning programme today is considered a model for developing nations and other Muslim countries. Infant, child and maternal mortality have all declined, and contraceptive use has risen from 37 per cent of married women in 1976 to 73 per cent in 1997. Between 1976 and 1996, the literacy rate for all women six years and older almost doubled to 74 per cent.

In 1983, Turkey legalized sterilization and abortion up to ten weeks of pregnancy. In 1998, an estimated 38 per cent of married women of reproductive age were using a modern contraceptive method. Still, withdrawal remains the most commonly practiced means of contraception. In sharp contrast to Iran's family planning programme, Pakistan's has suffered long years of neglect and frequent policy changes that accompanied political upheavals. Until recently, there has been no consistent government policy and limited involvement on the part of non-governmental organizations and international donors. Although many Pakistani women report being aware of contraceptives, their contact with family planning workers is limited. An extremely conservative view of Islam prevails in most parts of the country. Levels of literacy remain very low among women. It is estimated that the government's Family Planning

9. H. Boonstra, 'Islam, Women and Family Planning: A Primer', *The Guttmacher Report on Public Policy*, IV, Number 6, December 2001.

Programme currently serves only about 15–20 per cent of the population; non-governmental organizations reach another 5 per cent. The religious milieu in Pakistan opposes family planning as 'un-Islamic', and couples commonly cite religious concerns as their reason for not practicing contraception. As a result, contraceptive prevalence is only 18 per cent.

In many respects, Bangladesh is very much like Pakistan. The two countries were one nation for twenty-four years, until 1971 when East Pakistan seceded. Both countries are poor and overcrowded. But in Bangladesh, unlike Pakistan, the government has consistently supported family planning over the past thirty years. Between 1975 and 1997, contraceptive prevalence among married women rose from 7 to 43 per cent. The government recently raised the legal age of marriage for women to 18 and is encouraging women's education and workforce participation, since only 8 per cent of the workforce is female, and women have little independence.

Home to the world's largest Muslim population, Indonesia's highly institutionalized Family Planning Programme has reduced the fertility rate from 5.9 children per woman to 2.6 over the past thirty years. Although it faced initial resistance in the 1960s, the government engaged religious leaders in the policy dialogue to reach consensus and ease concerns about certain methods, like the use of intra-uterine devices.

Egypt, another populous Muslim country, presents an acute picture of the problems of overpopulation. Egypt's population was 19 million in 1947. It rose to 36.6 million in 1976, reaching 50.4 million in 1986. In the year 2000 alone, the population rose by more than 1.3 million. Egypt's total population was 66.5 million by January 2001 and is expected to be 95.6 million by 2026. In other words, a baby is born in Egypt every 23 seconds swelling the population by 112,000 persons every month. Although Egypt's overall arithmetic population density in 1990 was only about fifty-four people per square kilometre, close to 99 per cent of all Egyptians lived along the banks of the Nile, i.e. in 3.5 per cent of the country's total area. Average population densities in the Nile Valley exceed 1,500 persons per square kilometre; one of the world's highest densities. The highest population density is in Cairo, where it reaches 2,136 person per square kilometre, according to the Egypt Human Development Report (2003). According to the governmental Department of Statistics, 11 million Egyptians are unemployed. Additionally 7.6 million people work in the informal sector. And yet, over half a million people reach employment age each year, while the economy is growing too slowly to provide them with jobs.

Food requirements rise proportionately with population size, and Muslim countries have been forced to import food and rely on foreign aid to cope with the needs of their growing populations. For example, Egypt's average annual consumption of wheat is 170.5 kilogrammes per capita. It thus requires nearly 11 million tons of wheat annually to feed the population. However, Egypt

VI–3.3   Health checks made in Sudan in May 2011 by a member of the Nepalese special forces of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), during a medical campaign in Kuma Garaḍāyāt, a village located in North Darfur
© UN Photo/Albert González Farran

only produces 7 million tons, and thus has to import another 4 million every year (40 per cent), and wheat can cost up to LE480 per ton.

The result of unremitting population growth is clearly a vicious cycle of poverty and indeed mass misery, ill health, illiteracy and unemployment. Egypt, the most populous Arab country, is also situated in the centre of some twenty Arab States, some of which may be richer due to oil wealth, but all poorer in terms of water and other natural resources. Egypt's excessive population, depletion of food and proliferation of disease in Egypt, will all have tectonic reverberations across the whole Middle Eastern and North African region.

Hunger, social unrest, extremism and political weakness are the outcome of disproportionate population growth. An absence of family planning will result in a weak multitude enduring more hardships.

Epidemics

Epidemics have existed for centuries. Smallpox spread as a pandemic in the fourteenth century. Syphilis was recognized after the great geographical

explorations. However, apart from isolation and quarantines, little could be done about epidemics in those days. Edward Jenner's experiment using cow pox in 1798 was the first step towards inducing immunity against an infectious disease. Louis Pasteur in France, around the middle of the nineteenth century, discovered bacteria as the cause of infection, while Koch in Germany two decades later established bacteriology and his disciples developed immunization.

Viruses were identified at the beginning of the twentieth century. Immunization against polio, a viral disease, became feasible by the mid 1950s. Since its inception, the polio eradication programme has reduced the incidence of paralytic polio by 99 per cent, from some 350,000 cases a year to fewer than 1,000. A decade ago, polio had been virtually eradicated. In 2001, only 483 polio cases were reported worldwide. In 2005, 1,004 new cases were reported globally mainly due to interruption of polio immunization in some parts of Nigeria. The dispute began when Datti Ahmed, the head of the Kano state *Sharīʿa* Supreme Council, which administers Islamic law, claimed that polio vaccines contained the HIV virus that causes AIDS and that it had been deliberately contaminated to sterilize Muslim women in order to reduce the size of the Muslim population as part of the war on terrorism. The allegations led the governments of Kano and two other states, Kaduna and Zamfara, to forbid innoculations for ten months. Similar rumors had also been circulating in Indonesia that polio vaccination was contrary to Islamic dietary law, because the manufacturing process included the laboratory cultivation of polio virus in cells derived from the African green monkey.

However, the vaccine has been declared safe, *ḥalāl* and acceptable, by Islamic leaders all over the world. Furthermore, such authorities have declared that it is *ḥarām* not to allow vaccination, as this would expose children to dangers of the disease. The incident, however, shows how fragile the confidence in science is in our Muslim communities. Endogenous medical doctors and scientists seem to exert less influence on public opinion than religious sheikhs.

AIDS/HIV

Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is associated with infection by two types of retrovirus: HIV-1 and HIV-2. The resultant immune deficiency predisposes the sufferer to secondary fungal, protozoal and viral infection as well as to cancer. HIV-2 is less virulent, and is common only in West Africa.

Genetic sequencing data suggest that HIV first invaded the human population around 1930. Scientists believe that HIV might have come from the African green monkey or through a laboratory accident. AIDS was, however, first recognized in Los Angeles and New York in 1981, and the virus identified

two years later. Groups at highest risk are homosexuals, IV-drug abusers and blood transfusion recipients.

The AIDS pandemic is still spreading ruthlessly and has consequently become a major health problem worldwide, despite enormous efforts to control its spread. In December 2005, the AIDS Epidemic Update estimated that nearly five million new HIV cases occurred in that year and about 3.1 million people died of AIDS-related illnesses. Of that total, 2.2 million occurred in Africa alone, where some 6,000 people die of the disease *each day*, more deaths than caused by wars, famines or floods. In East Africa, the number of cases of AIDS has been doubling about every ten months. In Muslim African countries, HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate is 5.4 per cent (7.9 million cases). In 2005, in Nigeria alone, the largest African state and where 60 per cent of the population is Muslim, it was estimated there were 220,000 deaths from AIDS. The country has 930,000 AIDS-orphans.[10] However, in sub-Saharan African countries, there seems to be a negative relationship between HIV prevalence and being Muslim,[11] i.e. Muslims are affected less in comparison with non-Muslims.

By comparison, according to World Health Organization data,[12] prevalence rates in Arab and Asian Muslim states are low; 0.3 per cent and 0.1 per cent respectively. In Middle Eastern countries, the official number of people suffering from the disease is about 750,000. Epidemiological studies seem to indicate that HIV is transmitted mainly by heterosexual (mainly non-marital) contact, blood transfusion and peri-natal transmission. In less than 10 per cent, homosexual contact and intravenous drug use were recorded.[13] In 2002, the number of HIV/AIDS victims in Sudan was estimated at about 500,000 (23 per cent of the total number for Arab countries combined), although the registered cases were less than 10,000. The disease is prevalent in the southern regions, and mainly affects males in the age groups 15–39.

International efforts to control the HIV pandemic have achieved partial success in many developed countries and some of the developing countries. Limited resources in underdeveloped countries make health education and other preventive strategies difficult to implement. Additionally, the limited access to anti-retroviral medications in under developed countries has compounded the problem.

The AIDS epidemic is not only a health issue but also a socio-economic and security threat. The effects of high HIV incidence on millions of individuals, on

10. UNAIDS, Epidemiological Fact Sheet Nigeria, update 2004.

11. P. B. Gray, 'HIV and Islam: is HIV Prevalence Lower among Muslims?', *Social Science Medicine*, 58(9), pp. 1751–6, 2004.

12. C. Lenton, Will Egypt Escape the AIDS Epidemic?, *Lancet*, 349(9057), 1005, 1997.

13. T. A. Madani et al., 'Epidemiology of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Saudi Arabia; 18-year Surveillance Results and Prevention from an Islamic Perspective', *BMC Infectious Diseases*, 4, -2334-4-25, 2004.

family life and on economic life in general, are devastating. By killing millions of adults, AIDS reduces the workforce, exacerbates famine, and makes orphans of millions of children. The World Bank Group points out that the loss of human capital to HIV/AIDS will cause the economic collapse of many highly infected countries.

In some countries, there have been notable successes in the fight against AIDS. Instead of denying the reality of the danger of the disease, Senegal's Government began to take energetic measures to prevent the spread of the infection soon after its recognition. As a result, the country, where 92 per cent of the population is Muslim, has now one of the lowest rates of HIV infection in Africa. Senegal stands as one of Africa's success stories in the fight against AIDS. An estimated 2 per cent of a population of 10 million is thought to carry the HIV infection. This compares to rates of between 20 and 30 per cent in other countries of the continent.

Compared to other regions of the globe, the Muslim world appears to have avoided the worst devastation of AIDS, most probably due to the traditional condemnation of promiscuity and drug use. It is estimated that between 5,000 and 31,000 Egyptians were living with HIV in 2003, representing an infection rate far below that of the United States, where as many as 950,000 people are thought to be infected. The US rate is one for every 311 people, nearly eight times as high. But this seemingly unthreatening situation conceals an imminent AIDS upsurge within the Muslim world. In Indonesia, for example, WHO reports that HIV infections jumped approximately 62 per cent, to 210,000 cases, during 2003.

Throughout the Muslim world there is a need to recognize that HIV is here to stay for at least the coming years, and that a pro-active approach should be adopted, enlisting the support of religious institutions, mosques and Imams in the fight against AIDS. Prostitution has to be carefully controlled and prostitutes should be required to have regular medical check-ups and thoroughly educated on the risks from HIV/AIDS.

Regarding health education, AIDS remains, in the Arab and Muslim world, a taboo subject that people find difficult to discuss. Sexual habits, condom usage, prostitution and gay sex are all issues that remain difficult to address. The discussion of sex with teenagers, girls in particular, is seen as indecent.

Stigma and discrimination against people living with HIV/AIDS is commonplace, although devoid of a religious basis. This fear, found even amongst healthcare workers and a proportion of doctors, is largely due to misunderstanding about the mode of transmission of infection. For example, nurses will bring medication to a patient with AIDS, but refuse to help him ingest it. After the patient's death, funeral rites may be denied.

The efficacy of the female condom has been well established in preventing HIV transmission. Mass condom distribution, which dominates

the agenda of the WHO and UNAIDS, often provokes resistance from Muslim religious clerics who argue that the increased availability and advocacy of condoms may promote a condoning view of casual sex that is not only morally corrupt but also counter-productive in the fight against AIDS. Nevertheless some countries, including Tunisia, Iran and Morocco, are developing large-scale HIV prevention programmes. But other Muslim Middle Eastern nations still see AIDS as someone else's problem, and resist an aggressive AIDS approach.

Disillusionment with the Western model of AIDS prevention – in both practical and moral terms – has led many to seek alternative responses to AIDS, e.g. early marriage and polygamy. Nevertheless, homosexual behavior as well as prostitution and drug abuse are present in Muslim societies and AIDS remains a hidden menace. Many Muslim countries are offering anonymous blood testing and are tackling intravenous drug addiction and providing HIV diagnosis and treatment.

Blood transfusion is an important route for HIV infection, and blood donation services need constant modernization.

Hepatitis

Hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection is a serious global health problem, with 2 billion people infected worldwide. The 10th leading cause of death, HBV infections result in 500,000 to 1.2 million deaths per year caused by chronic hepatitis, cirrhosis, and hepatocellular carcinoma. In Western countries, the disease is relatively rare and acquired primarily in adulthood, whereas in Asia and most of Africa, chronic HBV infection is common and usually acquired peri-natally or in childhood.

Transmission of the virus is parenteral with use of unsterile syringes or surgical instruments in dental clinics, for example. Other procedures such as tattooing and circumcision carried out by non-medical personnel are also common routes of infection. Hairdressing without sterilization of instruments is another.

More efficacious therapies, mass immunization programmes, and safe injection techniques are essential for eliminating HBV. Safe and effective vaccines against HBV infection have been available since 1982. Mass immunization programmes, initiated by the World Health Organization in 1991, have dramatically decreased the incidence of HBV infection. However, not all countries have adopted these recommendations. Antiviral treatment with interferon alfa and lamivudine is the only way to reduce morbidity and mortality from chronic HBV infection. However, prolonged treatment is often necessary to prevent relapse on cessation of therapy.[14]

14. D. Lavanchy, *Journal of Viral Hepatitis*, XI, p. 97, March 2004.

The hepatitis C virus (HCV) is also a major cause of chronic liver disease in the world. WHO estimates that 3 per cent (170 million) of the world's population is chronically infected with HCV. Sub-Saharan Africa is reported to have the highest HCV prevalence rate (5.3 per cent) and a concurrent HIV epidemic. Co-infection with hepatitis virus B and C, inevitably leads to lethal liver cirrhosis and hepatocarcinoma.

Egypt has the highest prevelance of HCV in the world: 12 per cent or over 7 million people, reaching 45 per cent among adults older than forty years of age in rural areas. This tragic fact can be traced to failure of aseptic methods, during a campaign by the Egyptian Ministry of Health, using intravenous injection treatment for bilharziasis, with tartar emetic,[15] between 1960 and 1982. By the mid-1980s, the effective oral drug, praziquantel, replaced parenteral treatment for schistosomiasis in the entire country. Nevertheless, by the 1990s HCV had replaced schistosomiasis as the predominant cause of chronic liver disease. Co-infections with schistosomiasis cause more severe liver disease than infection with HCV alone. As complications of HCV usually occur after twenty years of infection, the peak impact of the Egyptian outbreak has not yet occurred.[16]

Parasitic diseases

MALARIA

Malaria is probably the most important parasitic disease that affects humans, attacking about 300–500 million people, mainly in the tropics. Malaria causes the deaths of up to 3 million people each year. Muslim tropical countries from Nigeria and Sudan in Africa to Bangladesh and Indonesia in Asia are among the vulnerable populations.

Malaria is a major public heath problem in South-East Asia (SEA). Of eleven countries of the region, ten countries are malaria endemic. SEA accounts for 30 per cent of the global morbidity and around 5 per cent of the global mortality due to malaria (excluding Africa) .

Malaria causes about 3,000 death a day, over 90 per cent of which are in Sub-Sahara Africa. It is both a disease of poverty and a cause of poverty, slowing economic growth by 1.3 per cent per year in endemic areas. The disease is deeply rooted in poor communities, hampering national development and taking away major shares of health budgets.

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15. A. Fontanet and C. Rekacewicz, *Epidemiology and treatment of HCV infection in Egypt*, Institut Pasteur, 2005.
16. G. T. Strickland, *Hepatology*, May, 43(5), pp. 915–1022, 2006.

Malaria is, however, a treatable condition and most deaths from malaria are the result of social deprivation and associated lack of health awareness or access to health care.

Long term malaria chemoprophylaxis is not, however, a realistic option for people living in malaria-endemic areas. Use of insecticides treated nets (ITBN), soaked in permethrin, reduces mortality rates by 60 per cent. Sleeping under ITBN nets is thus advocated for all children in endemic areas.

SCHISTOSOMIASIS

Schistosomiasis or bilharziasis is caused by trematode blood flukes that infect over 200 people worldwide. The disease is one of the major global public health problems. Although schistosomiasis is usually regarded as a urinary tract disease and haematuria, it is also a major cause of severe liver disease. Apart from its local organ damage, schistosomiasis generally impairs body growth and leads to serious morbidity in a small proportion of affected people. Urological bilharziasis may lead to kidney failure and bladder cancer.

The worm for this disease responsible was discovered by the German physician Tudor Bilharz, while working in Cairo in 1851. Schistosomiasis is mainly a disease of tropical Africa. The Nile Delta is also an area of high endemicity for Bilharziasis which affects 10 per cent of Egyptians. Prevalence of infection is highest amongst the 5–14-year-old age groups. The pathological pattern of the disease has been altered by the building of the Aswan Dam.

Disasters and armed conflicts

Apart from immediate casualties, mass population movement is the major outcome of disasters and armed conflicts alike. Displaced populations or refugees are at high risk of dying from common illnesses, such as diarrheal diseases, respiratory infections, measles and malaria. Under such situations, simply providing tents, blankets, food and medicines is not sufficient. Emergency public health measures constitute the basic and most effective response to mass population movement. For example, in order to reduce water-borne diseases, at least 15 litres of water should be supplied per person per day. One water point should be made available for every 250 persons. A minimum of one latrine needs to be provided for every 20 people and solid waste must be disposed out.

Although the risk of global international war may have receded, the Muslim world has had, in the last decade or so, its share of conventional wars between sovereign states, e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq (1991 and 2003) and

Lebanon (2006). Racial and religious intolerance have been responsible for conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo and Sudan.

A combination of all these factors has led to a complete breakdown of government and social order in Somalia, a condition now termed 'failed state'. The Crisis States Research Centre defines a 'failed state' as a state that can no longer perform its basic security and development functions, or exercise effective control over its territory and borders. The US magazine Foreign Policy runs a yearly 'Failed States Index' based on 12 determining factors including massive movement of refugees and internally displaced peoples, legacy of vengeance-seeking, group grievance, criminalization and delegitimisation of the state, progressive deterioration of public services, widespread violation of human rights, and intervention of other states. The top ten failed states for 2006 were Sudan, Congo, Ivory Coast, Iraq, Zimbabwe, Chad, Somalia, Haiti, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Failed states also challenge orderly ones by boosting immigration pressures. In the next twenty years, the world's population is projected to grow from around 6 billion to 8 billion. Nearly all of the increase will be concentrated in poor countries. Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, faces an excruciating combination of high birth rates, poverty and widespread AIDS infection that threatens social disintegration and governmental collapse.

CONCLUSION

Islam has nurtured and preserved the quest for knowledge. In the words of the tradition, 'the ink of the scholar is more sacred than the blood of the martyr.' Similarly, a strong sense of community pervades Islamic teachings. Excessive population growth and modern health problems and epidemics are now threatening the very fabric of Muslim communities.

The health status of any community is an index of its prosperity and stability. Although the health of the population may appear as a secondary function of the state, it profoundly affects that country's future prospects. Unfortunately, a review of health issues facing Muslim communities worldwide clearly reveals many negatives. Sadly, little serious effort is being made or planned to rectify the situation.

Certain modern health requirements to deal with these problems may appear to contradict some of our religious teachings. However, conservative interpretations of Islamic instructions are or should be open to revision in the light of reason. The Andalusian physician Ibn Khatima witnessed the fourteenth century pandemic arriving at his home town Almeria in 1348–9. He wrote a great treatise entitled 'Provision of pursuer's requisite regarding the incoming disease' or *taḥṣīl gharaḍ al-qāṣid fī tafṣīl al-maraḍ al-wāfid*, which

I published recently.[17] In his treatise, Ibn Khatima clearly describes the infectiousness of the plague through direct contact or use of victims' clothing or bedding. He then successfully reconciles his empirical observations with two apparently contradictory sayings of the Prophet Muḥammad, which formed the basis of prevalent religious thinking at the time. In other words precedents exist for reconciling observed facts gleaned through modern technique with religious tradition.

The annual health budget in most developing countries, including Muslim ones, is less than US$ 10 per head. Of 56 billion US dollars spent annually on medical research worldwide, about 90 per cent is spent on the health needs of the richest countries, which represent only 10 per cent of the world's population. Only 10 per cent of the budget addresses the needs of 90 per cent of the world's population. On the other hand, developing countries, Muslim nations included, do spend comparatively huge budgets on armament. Funds for health projects and population control can only be generated by a change of priorities.

Clearly, Muslim societies are facing health problems of on a serious scale. A joint effort is required. There is an urgent need for an Islamic Organization to fund, take decisions and implement plans. Muslim countries should also set up, finance and train relief medical services able to deal with disasters and the side effects of war.

17. The full text is included in the author's book, *History of Epidemics*, in Arabic, published by the Institute of Scientific Research, Libya, 2005.

The influence of Islam on global civilization

Gholamreza Aavani

Islam is both a religion and the creator of a world civilization. It is a religion based on divine revelation to the Prophet Muḥammad, believed by all Muslims to be the last prophet of God sent to humankind in this cycle of human history. It is also a world civilization, in the sense that like all other religions such as Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism it has produced and cultivated a unique culture and civilization, embracing many ethnic groups and cultural zones, coming at the end of the other religious civilizations. It has had great impact on them and in its turn Islamic civilization has been influenced by them.

There are some points which might help us in a better understanding of Islam as a world civilization. First, we should bear in mind that Islam is a universal religion, accepting the validity and authenticity of all divine revelations and sacred books before it. It is not, moreover, an autochthonous religion based on the salvific monopoly of a certain race, ethnic group or geographical zone. It takes upon itself the protection of all the 'people of the Book' and that is why it is perhaps true to say that in the traditional Islamic world, devotees of other religions have had a more or less peaceful coexistence with Muslims. This might explain why they have been most instrumental in conveying both the heritage of their respective civilizations to Islam and in transmitting Islamic culture and civilization to others, as we observe in the translation movements both from and into Arabic, the sacred language of Islam, and it might also explain why some minorities such as Jews have chosen Arabic instead of Hebrew as the language of philosophical, scientific and even religious discourse as the Spanish Jews in Andalusia.

Islam created a civilization that was able to establish itself in the middle belt of the ancient world over a millennium. It was able to produce great intellectual figures in the fields of science, medicine, mathematics, philosophy,

technology, arts, crafts, architecture, literature, statesmanship, commerce and navigation, which not only for many centuries made it a leading light in global civilization, but also induced many changes in other cultures and civilizations, particularly the Western.

Due to the emphasis of the Qurʾān and the prophetic traditions on the significance of knowledge of any kind, and that it should be sought and mastered, no matter from whatever source it comes, Muslims consider it a pious duty to search for knowledge in all cultures and climes and to seek wisdom 'even unto China' as the Prophet ordained. So there was tremendous intellectual activity in the Muslim world as is well attested by Ibn al-Nadīm, the compiler of the famous *Fihrist* or (The Catalogue), which is a bookseller's manual of available books in tenth century Baghdad. The Catalogue is noteworthy in many respects, including the information it conveys concerning the very extensive translation activity of Greek astronomical, mathematical, medical, philosophical and scientific works, among many other disciplines. Apart from the pre-Socratics, Plato and Aristotle, translation of the works of philosophers such as Theophrastus, Proclus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, Ammonius, Themistius, Epaphroditus, Simplicius, John Philoponus, Gregory of Nyssa, Theon of Smyrna and some neo-Platonists are mentioned, and many others. A brilliant concatenation of the works of Aristotle, together with commentaries, is referred to. It could be safely said that Aristotle was for the first time studied wholesale in the Islamic world, because in Greek Byzantium, since scholars were more inclined to Plato, they had no use for Aristotle for their theological purposes, and again in Alexandria more attention was paid to his physical treatises, and in the Latin West he was almost unknown but for the translation of two of his logical works by Boethius. Muslim philosophers, such as Averroës, knowing no Greek, were able to make a deep etymological study of certain Greek words such as being (to on) and nature (physis) by collating different translations.

Alexander, after conquering Egypt and Asia up to India, made Hellenism a universal phenomenon and Greek the *lingua franca* of the Eastern Mediterrannean and Middle East. The latter itself was the cradle of the Abrahamic religions (Judaism and later Christianity and Islam) and this geographical propinquity between Hellenism and the Abrahamic religions made them share a common heritage in succession.

In the pre-Islamic era, apart from Alexandria and Byzantium, there were other main seats of Greek learning and Christian theological schools, of which one can mention Antioch, Edessa (also called Ruha), Nisibis, Qinnisrin and Raas al-ʿAyn, in addition to the city of Harran, the inheritor of the old Babylonian and Hellenistic cultures, where the theological debates along with the translation of Hellenic and Hellenistic works took place. When these centres were incorporated into the Umayyad and Abbasid Empires, Muslims had easy access to an enormous treasury of ancient and classical sources.

Another great centre of learning, famed for its medical, astronomical and philosophical studies, was the city of Jundishapur in southern Iran, founded probably by Shapur I and enjoying an international acclaim for its Persian, Indian and Syriac-speaking Christian scholars. When in 529 the Academy of Plato was closed by edict of the Emperor Justinian, the scholar took refuge at the court of Anushirawan, the Sassanid King, and they are said to have taught in Jundishapur until he signed a peace treaty with Justinian in 632, one of whose articles stipulated that the refugee philosophers, among whom figured Damascius and Simplicius, should pursue their philosophical studies unmolested. Some translations of the works of Aristotle into Middle Persian, or Pahlavi, are attributed to scholars in Jundishapur. Moreover, this university was well known for its great hospital and even the court physicians of the Abbasid caliphs were chosen from among its alumni.

Even if sporadic works of translation were made during the Umayyad and early Abbasid period, by scholars such as Ibn al-Muqaffaᶜ, 'the logician', who translated some of the logical works of Aristotle from Pahlavi into Arabic, the serious work of translation seems to have been initiated in Baghdad during the reign of Harūn ar-Rashīd who commissioned his court physician Ibn Masāwayh with the task of translating ancient medical works into Arabic. An even more serious step was taken by the Caliph al-Maʾmūn, who established the *Bayt-al-Ḥikma* or the (House of Wisdom), which undoubtedly was the best centre of translation in the ancient world. It was patronized by the Caliph and his cultivated Persian viziers such as the Barmakids and the Naubakhtis, who amply financed their scholarly projects and supplied them with letters of recommendation to secure the best manuscripts. Apart from Ibn Masāwayh whom al-Maʾmūn appointed as the first head and director of Bayt-al-Ḥikma, we have the names of other translators and their translated works, of whom we mention only the most distinguished ones for brevity's sake. They, together with their works, are mainly mentioned by Ibn-al-Nadīm in his *Fihrist*: Yaḥyā (Yūḥannā) ibn al-Biṭrīq, Hajjāj ibn Maṭar, the illustrious Ḥunayn ibn Isḥāq, his son Isḥāq ibn Ḥunayn, his nephew Hubaysh and his pupil ᶜIsā b. Yaḥyā, ibn Naᶜima al-Ḥimṣi (d. 835), Abū Bishr Matta ibn Yūnus (d. 940), Yaḥyā b. ᶜAdī (d. 974), Qusṭā b. Lūqā, Abū ᶜUthmān al-Dimashqī (d. 900), Abū ᶜAlī b. Zurᶜa (d. 1008) Ḥasan b. Sūwār (d. 1017) and Thābit b. Qurra of Ḥarran, to name only the most distinguished.

Almost all translations were done by Syriac-speaking Christians who were quite familiar with the translations already rendered from Greek into Syriac, but having found older and better manuscripts, tried to produce much more exact and reliable translations than those available in Syriac. A letter from Ḥunain, perhaps the most distinguished of those mentioned above, explains how they acquired and collated the manuscripts and after establishing an *editio-princeps*, found the best translator from among those who had mastered the

VI–4.1   Planispheric map of the old and new worlds, from
nineteenth century Turkey
© Nasser Khalili Collection of Islamic Art (Nour Foundation)

subject and then edited the text by collating it with the original edited Greek manuscript.

This immense translation movement brought about a vast philosophical literature and a galaxy of philosophers and scientists which were unrivalled in the age in which they flourished. We will first give a short synopsis of the historical events which led to the presence of Muslims in both Spain and Sicily, before considering in detail the influence of these philosophers and scientists on world civilization, focusing in particular on their impact on the physical and intellectual sciences, philosophy, and other elements of culture broadly considered.

Muslims in Spain

In July 710 a party of Muslims crossed the Strait of Gibraltar (probably named after Tariq the general leading the group), and in the following year (711) it was reinforced by an army of 7000 men, who were able to defeat the Visigoth king, Roderick. By about 715 with little resistance they were able to conquer the main cities of Spain or enter into treaty relationships with the local rulers.

In 750 Muslim political hegemony shifted from the Umayyads in Damascus to the Abbassids who made the newly-constructed city of Baghdad their new capital. In the brutal massacre of the Umayyad princes, one, called Abd-ar-Rahman, managed to escape to North Africa whence he was invited to Spain to become the first of the Umayyad dynasty of Cordoba. The Umayyad princes were able to extend their jurisdiction to Spain except for the more adamant tribes and districts in the north of modern Spain. Umayyad sovreignty reached the peak of its power in the reign of Abd-ar-Rahman III (912–61), who by the time of his death had unified the greater part of the Iberian Peninsula. But by the beginning of the tenth century the Umayyad State disintegrated into thirty independent 'party kings' (*reyes de taifas*) and in 1085 the city of Toledo was captured by the Christian army. The Muslims appealed to the Almoravids (*al-Murābiṭūn*), the Berber rulers of North-West Africa, who defeated the Christian army and ruled Islamic Spain (Andalusia) from 1090 to 1145, when they were succeeded by another Berber dynasty called Almohads (*al-Muwaḥḥidūn*) who ruled over Islamic Spain until 1223. Thanks to the rivalries and dissensions among Muslim rulers, Christian sovreigns were able to capture Cordoba in 1236 and Seville in 1248. The last stronghold of Granada, famous for its architechural monument Alhambra, was conquered and incorporated into the United Kingdom of Aragon and Castile in 1492.

Muslims in Sicily

In 652 Syracuse was seized and soon the Muslim fleet was able to attack the Byzantine fleet. In 827 the Aghlabid rulers of Ifriqiyya (North Africa) invaded

Sicily. Palermo was captured in 831, Messina around 843 and Syracuse in 878, and the occupation of the island, except perhaps its northern regions, was completed by about 902. However, when the Aghlabid rulers were defeated by the Fatimids in 909, Sicily became a Fatimid province.

In the first half of the eleventh century, some Norman knights, including Robert Guiscard, settled in southern Italy. After defeating the Byzantines, he invaded Sicily together with his brother Roger and succeeded in occupying the entire land by 1091. Roger's son, Roger II (1130–54) and the latter's grandson Fredrick II Hohenstaufen were very influential in transmitting Islamic sciences and culture, to the extent that they have been called 'the two baptized sultans of Sicily'. Their courts were the meeting places of literary men, scholars, religious savants and philosophers, some of them unrivalled in their age. Three of the Norman kings of Sicily even assumed Arabic titles. Roger II called himself al-Muʿtaz bi-Ilāh, William was al-Hadi-bi-amri-Ilāh, and William II was al-Mustaʿīz bi-Ilāh. These Arabic titles even appeared on their coinage and inscriptions. Roger's mantle, preserved in the Vienna Museum, is that of an oriental emir, with embroidered kufic inscriptions.

The Islamic element is more evident in the financial administration of the Sicilian court where financial departments were modeled on the different Arab diwans and where even Fatimid coins were in circulation. The Norman kings took over some features of the Muslim art of war and employed Muslim military engineers, recruited Muslim soldiers and adopted their art and architecture of fortification.

A lot of guesswork has been done, especially by Muslim scholars, about the influence of the Christian Crusades on European culture and civilization. After the seizure of Toledo (1085) and Sicily (1091) by Christian forces, the background was set for a wholesale attack to capture Jerusalem. The whole of Christendom was unified for fulfill what they considered to be a sacred task and the holy war of Christians against Muslims known as the Crusades was begun. The first Crusade (1095–9) ended in the conquest of the Holy Land and the election of Godfroi de Bouillon as the *Advocatus* of the city. It was followed by a second (1145–9) and a third Crusade (1189–92). A crusade was even launched to capture Egypt (1217–22) which, of course, failed.

The physical sciences

Most scholars are of the opinion that the influence of the Crusades on the West was more military and cultural, and possessed less of an intellectual nature. However, Islamic presence in Spain and Sicily from the eighth century onwards and the European presence in the Levant during the crusading period led to the adoption of many features of Islamic culture.

Even if Islam started among Bedouin Arabs, it was also the religion of the town-dwellers. In other words, it was also the religion of civilized and urban life. As such it promulgated a life of aristocratic culture in all its vigor and plenitude as is seen in Islamic Spain, which set an exemplary model to be emulated by other nations of Europe.

Commerce and trade are two distinctive features of Islamic civilization. It is even said that Islam spread to some regions such as East and West Africa and especially to South-East Asia through business; Islamic civilization not only caused a burgeoning of commerce in Europe, but also functioned as the intermediary between East and West. Travel was made easy and a sort of free-trade contributed to the material prosperity of Western man.

Muslims also devised more refined methods and systems of agriculture in Spain. The irrigation system was improved and modelled on the one prevalent in the Middle East. Many new plants, some of which have Arabic derivations, were introduced into Islamic Spain, following the improvement of irrigation. There are, moreover, many Spanish words pertaining to irrigation which have an Arabic derivation. Again with the cultivation of mulberry trees the silk industry flourished; flax was cultivated and linen was produced and exported.

The science of mineralogy was again developed in Spain. Mines such as iron and copper ore were quarried and exported to Europe, and so was the cinnabar from which mercury was extracted. There are accounts of the production of gold, silver and lead, and also of the extraction and exportation of precious stones. The European textile industry demanded the supply of alum, which was imported from Egypt.

The Fatimids, the rivals of the Abbasids in Baghdad, for their expansionist ambitions needed timber and iron for their ships, which they imported from Italy. This encouraged Italian merchants to travel to Egypt and finally through the Red Sea, Yemen and the Persian Gulf to India or through eastern Europe, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Central Asia to China.

In the wake of commerce and trade there flourished in Europe the art of ship-building, seafaring and navigation, of which Europe borrowed many elements from Muslim navigators. Prior to the Muslim conquest of Spain, medieval Europe scarcely knew anything about India and beyond and mistakenly believed that beyond Christendom, the rest of the globe belonged to the Muslim realm. Through contact with Muslims, Europeans gradually turned into great naval powers, able to discover the Cape of Good Hope and finally the new American Continent.

Muslims, generally speaking, transmitted to Europe three inventions which caused a great upheaval in Western culture: the Indian decimal system in arithmetic together with the discovery of the cipher (derived from the Arabic *ṣifr*); the use of the mariner's compass in navigation, which reportedly they

VI–4.2   Medieval treatise on Iranian music, thirteenth century
© National Library and Archives of the Islamic Republic of Iran

borrowed from the Chinese (which however, has recently been cast in doubt);
and the use of block and moveable type for the purpose of printing, which
finally led to the art of modern printing by Gütenberg. The Europeans also
borrowed knowledge of gunpowder and used it for artillery.

Muslims were also instrumental in preparing more accurate navigation
charts. The Arab geographer Idrisi, living at the court of Roger II of Sicily
and under his patronage, produced the most complete description of the
world known to Muslims up to that time and made seventy maps (ten for

each of the seven climes). His book of geography and cartography came to be known as *The Book of Roger*.

As the result of these inventions and discoveries there ensued a more pleasant and luxurious lifestyle than what we witness in the so-called Dark Ages. There was a proliferation of luxury goods, such as sumptuous textiles, linens, woolens and silks. The techniques of the ceramic industry developed and the art of tile-painting was introduced from the Middle East. The art of jewelry developed to a great extent; again wood-carving and ivory-carving and inlaid work flourished considerably; a grandiose style of architecture as witnessed in the extant monuments of Islamic Spain was developed, in which the horse-shoe arch was frequently used.

The impact of the Crusades on medieval literature is also evident in epic poetry such as the twelve poems having Godfroi de Bouillon as their theme, in the so-called *Chansons de geste*, the Crusade songs and poems, in histories and chronicles and the Romances. The troubadours are traced by some scholars to the Hispano-Arabic culture and to the court poetry in Arabic in the Iberian Peninsula.

The intellectual sciences

Islamic Sciences are usually divided into transmitted and intellectual sciences. The former, comprising sciences such as lexicography declension, syntax, history, jurisprudence, *Ḥadīth* transmission and Qurʾānic exegesis, enjoyed a glorious existence, and in some instances reached the acme of perfection, in the Islamic period of Spain, but waned to extinction after Christian reconquest. But the so-called intellectual sciences such as philosophy, mathematics, physics, astronomy and others were the focus of much attention and concern after the Reconquista.

In the Middle Ages before the scholastic period, little was known about Greek philosophy and science in the Latin West. All that was known about Aristotle, for example, was the Latin version of *The Categories* and the *De interpretatione of Aristotle*, by Boethius, which together with the Latin translation of the *Isagoge of Porphyry* by the same author constituted the staple stock of logical studies. With the Christian conquest of Toledo in 1085, and the possession and access to its great library, there started the great translation movement into Latin of the masterpieces of philosophy and science, comparable to that which took place in Baghdad about three centuries earlier. This stupendous translation movement was directed by Raymond (1126–51) Archbishop of Toledo, in which the works of Aristotle, al-Farābī, Averroës, Avicenna, al-Ghazālī, Ibn Gabirol, al-Kindī, Maimonides, Avempace and many others were translated. Among the more well known translators one can mention Dominicus Gundissalinus, John of Spain (Johannes Hispanus),

Avendehut (probably Ibn Daoud), Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187), Alfred Sareshel (Alfredus Anglicus), Daniel of Morley, Henricus Aristippus, the Jew Solomon, Herman Germanicus and Michael Scot.

To give but one example, one of the most prolific of these translators was Gerard of Cremona. Fortunately we have a list of his works drawn up by his pupils and appended to his translation of Ptolemy's *Almagest* (1175). He had rendered into Latin seventy-one works mentioned in the catalogue, besides, perhaps, a score of others. Three of these works are logical, several are mathematical and the list includes works on astronomy and astrology, but the longest list of all in the catalogue is medical: Avicenna, Galen, Hippocrates and others.

Michael Scot, another well known translator, first appears at Toledo as the translator of al-Bitrogi's *On the Spheres*. By 1220 he had rendered into Latin Aristotle's *On Animals*, but he is mainly responsible for the translation of Averroës' philosophical works into Latin, which he wrote both in Toledo and in Sicily, another main centre for the translation movement. Some of these translators did not know Arabic and used intermediaries, especially Jews, who played the same role in Toledo as the Syriacs had played in Baghdad. Some of the well known Jewish translators are: Master Andrew, Petrus Alphonsi, John of Seville, Avendeuth, Solomon.

Contemporary Jews in Europe were either Sefardi, whose language of communication was Arabic like the Jews of Spain, or those who spoke other European languages and who were known as Ashkenazi. Sefardi Jews were conversant with other great centres of learning, such as Cairo and especially Baghdad, and were very instrumental in the translation movements. Europeans were also well acquainted with many schools of thought such as Muʿtazalite and Ashʿarite (loquentes), of which there were no Latin translations. The transmission of their ideas, no doubt, can be traced to Jewish intermediaries. Jews were important in another important respect in that they translated the philosophical or scientific works first into Hebrew and then into Latin and in certain cases in reverse order. Again, some of the works translated were by Jewish authors, such as Maimomides, Ibn Gabirol and others. We are not going to mention here the details of the translated works into Latin, but suffice it to say that all the masterpieces in science and philosophy which were the mature fruits of Islamic civilization were translated into Latin in a full sweep. Simultaneously an attempt was made to translate the Greek authors, not through Arabic intermediaries, but directly through the Greek originals, which allowed medieval Europeans to rediscover their ancient classical heritage.

Islamic Science and Western culture

Prior to the great translation movement there were sporadic attempts at incorporating Islamic sciences. A significant example is the case of Gerbert of

VI–5.3   A planispheric brass astrolabe from Morocco,
c. eighteenth century
© Nasser Khalili Collection of Islamic Art (Nour Foundation)

Aurillac, who became Pope Sylvester (999–1003). He was much interested in Islamic sciences, studying mathematics for three years in Catalonia (967–70) and probably also astronomy, and mastered them to such an extent that he was far ahead of any other mathematician in medieval Europe. He devised some teaching aids for the exposition of the Ptolemaic conception of the universe, was familiar with the use of the astrolabe and introduced a new form of abacus for calculation, which might be considered as the first recorded use of the decimal system in Europe.

Before the use of Arabic numerals, Europeans had employed Roman numerals, which were not amenable to most mathematical operations. The effective introduction of Arabic numerals is generally attributed to the publication in 1202 of the *Fiber Abaci* of Leonardo Fibbonacci of Pisa, in which the author showed how the use of 'ten signs' simplified arithmetical

operations. Use was made of zero in the decimal system. The English 'cipher' and 'zero', the French 'chiffre' and the German 'Ziffer' are all related to Arabic *ṣifr*, which means 'empty'.

It should be mentioned also at this juncture that Muslims were the inventors of the science of 'algebra' which derives its very name from the Arabic 'aljabr' and was the title of a book by the famous mathematician al-Khwarïzmï (from whose name is also derived the name 'algorithm'). It is also the title of another book by the famous poet, astronomer, mathematician and philosopher Umar Khayyam, who, under the patronage of the Seljuk Malik Shah, instituted the Malikshahi calendar, which was more accurate and far ahead of the Gregorian calendar.

Mention must be made of the advances made in astronomy in Islamic civilization. For example, we may cite al-Farghani from Transoxiana. The twelfth-century Latin version of his *Elements of Astronomy* influenced European experts in that science. Al-Battānī, another eminent Muslim astronomer, made accurate astronomical observations and compiled a catalogue of fixed stars. His great treatise, known in medieval Europe as *De Scientia Stellarum*, influenced European astronomy until the Renaissance. Great advances in making accurate astronomical observations were made by establishing observatories in the main Islamic cities such as Baghdad, Cairo, Rayy, Maragha and Samarqand. The influence of Islamic astronomy can again be witnessed in the fact that at least some astronomical tools and gadgets bear names of Arabic or Persian derivation. Muslim scholars took successful strides in the science of optics. Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen) with rare skill combined the experimental investigation of optical phenomena and the analysis of results by mathematics. His influence continued through Robert Grosseteste, Roger Bacon, John Peckham, Witelo, Leonardo da Vinci and Johannes Kepler.

Muslim influence in European culture is also evident in medicine which can only be illustrated here by a few examples. al-Rāzī (Latin: Rhazes) has been acclaimed as the greatest clinician of Islam and the Middle Ages. His medical encyclopedia *al-Ḥawī* (Latin: *Continens*) was a major medical text and reference book in the medieval period. He was also known for his specialized work on measles and smallpox. Another major work in medicine was *al-Qanūn* (The Canon) of Avicenna which had an important influence upon European medical theory and practice for six hundred years until the dawn of modern medicine.

In Spain the medical tradition was maintained by the Zuhr family, of which the most distinguished member is Ibn Zuhr (Avenzoor). His *Kitāb al-taysīr*, containing many excellent clinical observations, was translated both into Hebrew and Latin and was also influential in European medicine.

Finally we must mention the significant textbook in medicine compiled by the famous philosopher Ibn Rushd (Averroës). His *Kitāb kulliyyāt fi-l-Ṭibb* (*Colliget*) was an encyclopedia in anatomy, physiology, pathology and diagnosis.

VI–4.4   The statue of Averroës standing in his hometown of
Cordoba, Spain
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The influence of Islamic philosophy

Europe was not the direct heir of the Greek sciences and philosophy. They were transmitted to Europe through Muslim scientists and philosophers of whom we shall mention the most important.

The first Muslim philosopher who was to be known by the Christian world was al-Kindī, who was of Arab extraction. The Middle Ages were acquainted only with a portion of his extensive writings. His treatise *On the Intellect* was the focus of much attention in medieval Europe, because, in elucidating the function of the intellect, it shed light on the nature of abstraction and hence the nature of universals.

The next great philosopher is al-Farābī with whom the scholastics were familiar through the translation of some of his books, especially *On the Intellect and the Intelligible* (*De Intellectu et Intellecto*), and his treatise *On the Enumeration of Sciences*. He is well known through his metaphysical distinction between essence and existence, which was much admired by the scholastics, especially St. Thomas Aquinas. His theory about the nature of prophecy and its relationship to philosophy was also known in the scholastic period. The four-fold division of intellect in Albertus Magnus (1– Intellect in potency; 2– Intellect in act; 3– The acquired intellect or intellectus adeptus; 4– Agent intellect) can be traced to Farābī.

Two of the greatest Muslim philosophers whose writings had a far-reaching impact in Europe are Avicenna (Ibn Sina) and Averroës (Ibn Rushd). Avicenna, unlike Averroës, was a great help for scholastic theologians in reconciling reason and revelation and in combining the natural and philosophical explanation of being with an equally natural and philosophical doctrine of salvation. The translation of his *magnum opus al-Shifa* (*Sufficentia*), comprising all the branches of philosophy, was a major textbook in the scholastic period.

Avicenna passed to the scholastics certain notions and distinctions which were to exert an enduring influence in European thought. One can mention for example his precise analysis of the essence-existence distinction, his theory of the self-evidence of the notion of existence and its primacy over quiddity, his conception of transcendentalia (being (*ens*), thing (*res*), necessity (*necesse*) and unity (*unitas*) and so on), which were all introduced into scholastic metaphysics. Avicenna's metaphysics is also significant in another respect. By emphasizing that only 'being as being' is qualified to become the proper subject matter of the first philosophy and not God or the first principles and causes, as the earlier commentators had surmised, he was able to separate ontology from theology by separating the *Metaphysica Generalis* from *Metaphysica Specialis*, a distinction which was introduced for the first time by Avicenna in the mainstream of philosophy.

Avicenna is also well known for his proof of the existence of God based on the necessity-contingency distinction. As a matter of fact, the five ways for proving the existence of God (the '*quinta via*' of Thomas Aquinas) and the precise elucidation of all their metaphysical presuppositions are to be found in the works of Avicenna, especially in his *Sufficientia*.

The most famous Muslim philosopher of Islam in the West and in Spain was without doubt Averroës (1126–98), who was known as 'the Commentator'. He wrote three kinds of commentary on Aristotle's works, short commentaries or compendia; middle commentaries which expanded Aristotle's doctrine in some detail; and the greater commentaries in which the text of Aristotle was given in lemmata which are followed by an extensive and detailed commentary. Most of these commentaries were translated into Latin and Hebrew at a time when most of the works of Aristotle were not available in Latin or Hebrew. The translation of Averroës' works, especially the greater commentaries, made the texts of Aristotle available to European scholars.

The theory of 'monopsychism' was attributed to Averroës, it denies the existence after death of the individual soul, and was severely criticized by St. Bonaventura and St. Thomas Aquinas. He also came to be known and criticized for the 'double truth' theory, which is not literally found in his extant works but was attributed to him by his followers at the University of Paris, who came to be known as 'Latin Averroists'. Finally, it should be noted that certain misinterpretations made by Averroës were of great importance in the influence of Islamic ideas on the West. For example, Averroës wrongly believed that Avicenna considered being to be an 'accident', and this blatant misunderstanding was noted by such scholastic philosophers as St. Thomas Aquinas.

CONCLUSION

There are many other facets of Islamic culture and civilization which have affected other cultures, Eastern and Western. For example, one could speak about the impact of Islam in the domain of arts, such as music, calligraphy and architecture, to name only the most significant. One could again elaborate on the esoteric teachings of Islam, such as Sufism, and their reciprocal impact on other religions. But it should be considered that in these fields, a great deal of research has yet to be done in order to get clear-cut solutions to these queries. Nonetheless, the influences of Islamic thought and culture on the sciences and on philosophy, especially in Europe where they were to have a crucial role in the development of modern global civilization, are clear and indisputable.

– V I I –

MUSLIM MINORITIES IN THE WORLD TODAY

INTRODUCTION

Nahid Afrose Kabir

The total Muslim population of the world, comprising approximately 1.6 billion people, is spread over Asia, Africa, Australia, Europe and the Americas.[1] Muslims live in various countries both as majority and minority populations. The Muslim world is thus made up of different racial and ethnic groups. Muslims practise the same aspects of Islamic culture – names, dress codes and eating and drinking habits – and they are a distinct cultural group, separate from the non-Muslim population. Most Muslims feel a strong affiliation with the broader Islamic community (*umma*) and have a constant desire for greater Islamic political unity within the 'Abode of Islam' (*dār-al-Islām*). The centrepiece of unity among Muslims is the Qur᾽ān – the very word of Allāh (God). The Qur᾽ān provides the same message for all Muslims, although interpretations of that message differ across the various Muslim groups and because of the different levels of textual meaning. Muslims' devotional practice rests on what are known as the five pillars of Islam: *kalima* (belief in one Allāh and Prophet Muḥammad as Allāh's prophet), *ṣalāt* (prayer five times a day), *zakāt* (almsgiving), *ṣawm* (fasting), and *ḥajj* (pilgrimage). Muslims have two important festivals each year: *Eid-ul-Fiṭr*, which is celebrated immediately after the month of fasting, *Ramaḍān*, and *Eid-u-l-Aḍḥā*, the feast celebrated after *ḥajj* on the tenth day of *Zi-l-Ḥajj*.

About 87 per cent of all Muslims in the world are Sunnis and about 13 per cent are Shīʿite.[2] There are further divisions within the Sunnis and Shīʿites, though all believe in the five pillars of Islam. The followers of Sunnism are divided into four schools of law (*fiqh*, or jurisprudence): Ḥanafī, Malikī, Shāfiʿī and Ḥanbalī.

1. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, Washington, DC, Pew Research Center, 2009, http://www.pewforum.org/Mapping-the-Global-Muslim-Population.aspx, accessed 12 November 2012.
2. S. H. Nasr, *The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity*, New York, Harper One, 2002, p. 65.

Wahhabism and Salafism are really offshoots of Ḥanbalism. Both Wahhabism and Salafism are very much opposed by the vast majority of Sunnis and also by Shīʿites.[3] In contrast to the traditionalist branches of Islam, the Wahhabis and Salafis reject the importance of juridical schools and advocate a direct relation to the revealed text of the Qurʾan. The Wahhabis and Salafis denounce the celebration of *Eid-e-Milad-un Nabi* (birthday of Prophet Muḥammad), and Sufism. Sufism is a mystical movement that preaches tolerance and recognition of the commonality between all religions through poetry, lyrics, music, songs and chanting of different kinds and in many dialects.[4]

Indeed, Muslims form a heterogeneous group, but despite this there have been hostilities between Muslims as a whole and non-Muslims at different periods of time. In the East, the Muslim world faced hostility during the campaigns of the Mongols and the Crusaders, and in the West, the Spanish, Portuguese, Norman and French rulers were oppressive to many Muslims, for example during the Spanish Inquisition. At a later period, the European colonial powers, while establishing their hegemony in Asia and Africa, attempted to suppress Muslims.[5] Yet Idris El-Hareir observed,

> Attempts to convert the population to Christianity, and to Westernize them and encourage the adoption of a European lifestyle, were unsuccessful. Colonialism did, however, succeed in creating a fifth column which tried to serve colonialism, even after its demise, but it was thwarted by liberators and nationalists in the Arab and Islamic lands.[6]

Yet the 'Muslim question' still remains very vivid in the predominantly non-Muslim countries. Particularly after the 11 September 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers, some non-Muslims perceive Muslims as terrorists. Muslim women who wear *ḥijābs* (headscarves) are vilified, and some politicians claim that their culture is Judeo-Christian and that Muslims do not fit into that culture. They prefer to ignore the fact that Jews, Christians and Muslims all come under the Abrahamic tradition.[7] Of course, some Muslims have committed acts of terrorism, but the victims have been both Muslims and non-Muslims. It is important to note that about 358 Muslims died in the World Trade Center attacks,[8] but the irony is that sometimes non-Muslim

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3. *Ibid.*, pp. 68–70.
4. For further details see N. A. Kabir, *Young American Muslims: Dynamics of Identity*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2013.
5. I. El-Hareir, 'Epilogue', in I. El-Hareir and El-Hadji Ravane M'Baye (eds), *The different aspects of Islamic culture: The spread of Islam throughout the world*, III, Paris, UNESCO Publishing, 2011, pp. 881–5.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 884.
7. N. Kabir, 'Muslims in Australia: The Double Edge of Terrorism', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, XXXIII, No. 8, 2007, pp. 1277–97.
8. J. L. Esposito, *The Future of Islam*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 30.

VII–i.1   The courtyard of the Huaisheng Mosque, Guangzhou, China,
considered to be one of the first mosques ever built outside of Arabia
© Nik Wheeler/AramcoWorld

societies (particularly some media) fail to emphasise that Muslims have also
been victims of the terrorist acts of a few Muslims (who can be lethal but
constitute a tiny minority of the 1.6 billion Muslim population worldwide).

In 2007 when I was commissioned to write a chapter on the Muslim
minority in Australia and New Zealand and neighbouring islands, I was the
author of *Muslims in Australia: Immigration, Race Relations and Cultural History*.[9]
In 2013, I completed writing all the chapters for this section of the edited
volume *Islam in the World Today*, VI, and in the meantime I wrote two books,
Young British Muslims: Identity, Culture, Politics and the Media, and *Young American
Muslims: Dynamics of Identity*,[10] and commenced my new project on Muslims
in India. As I did my research on Muslims in Australia, Britain, America and
now India, I interviewed many Muslims aged 15 and over. Muslim participants
of my study overall felt very connected to their host countries but they were
concerned about some politicians' divisive rhetoric, racial profiling and the
media stereotype of Islam and Muslims.

 9. N. Kabir, *Muslims in Australia: Immigration, Race Relations and Cultural History*, London,
     Routledge, 2005.
10. N. A. Kabir, *Young British Muslims: Identity, Culture, Politics and the Media*, Edinburgh,
     Edinburgh University Press, 2010; Kabir, *Young American Muslims …*, *op. cit.*

VII–i.2   The Tomboul Jamiya in Shumen, Bulgaria, one of the largest
mosques in Europe
© Stephen Lewis/AramcoWorld

For this section of the edited volume, *Islam in the World Today,* VI, I rely
on both primary (newspaper articles, unpublished reports and interviews) and
secondary sources (literature). I retrieved most of the newspaper articles from
the Factiva and News Bank databases. I was born in Bangladesh (then East
Pakistan), and lived in Pakistan (West Pakistan), the Middle East and the USA
for many years. I speak fluent Bengali, Urdu, Hindi and English. My language
skills and wide cultural exposure assisted me to understand the issues many
Muslims are encountering in countries with Muslim minorities. It also assisted
me in writing this section of the edited book.

This section of the edited volume, *Islam in the World Today*, VI, contains
seven chapters (including the conclusion). In Chapter 7.1, 'Muslim Minorities
in Western Europe', I examine Muslims' placement in thirteen countries of
Western Europe. I discuss how some countries have politicized the Muslims
as the 'other', and how the policies of some countries are more extreme than
the other Western European countries. In Chapter 7.2, 'Muslim Minorities
in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus', I discuss the situation of Muslim
minorities in twenty-three countries, and compare their status with the majority
populations. Some Muslims have witnessed the break-up of Yugoslavia, and
the dismemberment of the Soviet Union. They were particularly marginalized
during this process. In Chapter 7.3, 'Muslim Minorities in the Americas and

the Caribbean', I examine the pattern of Muslim immigration to seventeen countries. Due to the availability of more published literature, I was able to study Muslims in North America in depth. Also, Muslims in North America appear to be more vigilant about contemporary issues that are impacting on them. In Chapter 7.4, 'Muslim Minorities in Africa', I examine the situation of minorities in West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, the Horn of Africa, and Southern Africa. I discuss Muslim issues in seventeen countries. Many African countries have a history of conflict and violence, so in that framework Muslims have faced many challenges. In Chapter 7.5, 'Muslim Minorities in Asia', I discuss Muslims in the following sequence: India, China, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Nepal. Muslims' issues in Asia range from discrimination, to communalism, to separatism. Though non-Muslims and Muslims have been living in their countries for many centuries, after 9/11 suddenly Muslims became the 'other'. In Chapter 7.6, I examine the varied immigration histories of Muslims in Australia, New Zealand and the neighbouring islands of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, East Timor, New Caledonia and Vanuatu. Australia and New Zealand have similar British colonial histories, so the race relations pattern and immigration policies in both countries were similar. But in countries like East Timor Muslims are ethnically the same people as the majority, but there have still been issues of Muslim marginalization. Finally, in the concluding chapter, I discuss some of the contemporary issues and developments that I have not discussed earlier. I also make suggestions for improvements within the Islamic community, and between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

Muslim minorities in Western Europe

Nahid Afrose Kabir

There is a clear connection between the Muslim minority in Western Europe and the Muslim colonies in Asia and Africa. In the aftermath of decolonization, people started migrating to the West for better economic opportunities, and because the West needed their labour to improve its economy. Muslims entering the Western world brought with them their culture and religion, which was very different to the mainstream European, predominantly Christian, society. In this chapter I briefly discuss the historical connections between Islam and Western Europe and why Muslim populations have increased in the last three to four decades. I also indicate how some countries have politicized the Muslims since 9/11 as the 'other', and how some countries, in dealing with the contemporary social and geo-political issues, have tried to incorporate Muslims as one of 'us'. To study this diversity, I examine thirteen Western European countries. Table 7.1.1 shows the Muslim minority populations and percentages in each of the countries I discuss in this chapter.

Table 7.1.1: Muslim minority populations in
Western European countries[1]

Country	Muslim population	Percentage of the total population
Austria	338,000	4.4
Belgium	364,000	3.5
Denmark	270,000	5.0
France	6,000,000	9.6
Germany	3,000,000	3.6

1. The information in Table 7.1.1 is derived from a variety of sources from different years (as I have mentioned in the text). It should be taken as an approximate comparison between the countries.

Country	Muslim population	Percentage of the total population
Greece	370,000	3.5
Italy	1,000,000	1.7
Malta	1,000	0.2
The Netherlands	945,000	5.8
Spain	1,000,000	2.3
Sweden	300,000	3.0
Switzerland	350,000	5.0
United Kingdom	1,600,000	2.7

Austria

The Muslim presence in the Austro-Hungarian Empire dates back to the Ottoman Turkish military encounter in Central Europe which was in the sixteenth century. After 1730 a community of Muslim merchants was established in Vienna. In 1781 Emperor Joseph II pursued the Toleranzpatent (Declaration of Tolerance), which was beneficial for Muslims. In 1874 Islam was granted legal recognition by the Austrian State (on the basis of which the Islamic Religious Community in Austria was officially recognized as a legal, corporate body in 1979). In 1878 Austria officially gained the former Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were occupied in 1874 and subsequently annexed in 1908. This brought about one million Muslims under Austrian rule.[2]

On 15 April 1909 Austria implemented a so-called 'Statute for the autonomous administration concerning affairs of the Islamic religion, foundations and schools'.[3] After the First World War, Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the South Slav kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (soon renamed Yugoslavia). During the first Austrian Republic (1918–38) a few Muslims who lived in Austria organized a Union for Islamic Culture, but in 1939 it was dissolved by the Nazis. After the Second World War the Organization of Austria's Muslims (1951) and an international humanitarian organization, the Jamiʿat ul-Islam (1958–62), were established.[4] Since the Second World War the Muslim population in Austria has grown and Islam now ranks third (after the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches) in terms of religious adherents. In 1979 the first mosque (the Vienna Islamic Centre) was opened near the United

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2. S. Kroissenbrunner, 'Islam and Muslim Immigrants in Austria: Socio-Political Networks and Muslim Leadership of Turkish Immigrants', *Immigrants and Minorities*, XXII, No. 2/3, 2003, p. 191.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 192.

4. *Ibid.*

Nations Headquarters in Vienna.[5] In 2001 about 338,000 Muslim believers, most of them Sunnis, made up 4.4 per cent of Austria's total eight-million population. About 45 per cent were Turkish in origin, and 15 per cent were from the former Yugoslavia.[6]

The Islamic Religious Community in Austria (IRCA), established in 1979, represents the interests of Muslims in Austria and promotes and develops relations between the Muslim community and the Austrian State. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York there were incidents of verbal abuse in public places and some Muslim women were too scared to go out. Hateful remarks were made by teachers to their Arab students and a Muslim graveyard was vandalized. One Catholic bishop caused an uproar by describing the Prophet Muḥammad as a 'fanatic' in a magazine interview, but no physical violence was reported.[7] The ICRA became more active by cooperating with the wider Austrian society in interfaith dialogues and fundraising programmes; for example, in 2002 it raised funds for flood victims in Austria.[8]

Clearly some mainstream Austrian Muslims have been trying to improve relations with the wider society, but at the same time some radical Muslims have been distorting the image of Islam with their extreme views. For example, in 2005 it was reported that four mosques in Austria – three in Vienna and one in Graz – were under police scrutiny because they refused to cooperate with the rest of the Islamic religious community. These radicals did not explicitly profess their basic values – for instance, recognition of democratic values, rejection of violence and living peacefully side by side. Mainstream Muslims have distanced themselves from these mosques.[9] It was also disturbing to mainstream Austrian Muslims when some radical Muslims in Linz demanded that all female teachers, believers or infidels, wear head scarves in an elementary public school in Linz.[10]

Overall, Austria represents a model country of tolerance in Western Europe. On 14 April 2008, on the occasion of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue, the City of Vienna named a square 'Muhammad Asad Platz'. It is located outside the main entrance of the United Nations headquarters in Vienna at Wagramerstraße 5 in Vienna's 22nd district. This is

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5. *Ibid.*, p. 192.

6. D. Aronssohn, 'In Catholic Austria, Muslims Worried about Future', *Agence France-Presse*, 14 October 2001.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Kroissenbrunner, 'Islam and Muslim Immigrants in Austria' …, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

9. 'Austrian Paper says Four Mosques under Observation', *BBC Monitoring European*, 18 July 2005.

10. D. Rinehart, 'A Clash of Cultures is Headed our Way', *Vancouver Sun*, 28 October 2006, p. 4.

the first traffic area to be named after a Muslim, not only in Austria but in the whole of Western Europe.[11] Muhammad Asad was a great Austrian visionary, who earned international recognition by building bridges between religions. Muhammad Asad was born in Leopold Weiss in 1900; he was a Jew who converted to Islam and translated the Qurʾān into English. He died in 1992.

Austria has taken several steps to promote a better understanding of Islam in Europe.[12] For example, in 2003 the first Conference of European Imams was organized in Graz, at which the imams emphasised the principles of pluralism and democracy. They also stressed women's right to education, employment and the vote. In 2006, during the crisis over cartoons depicting the Prophet Muḥammad's 'cartoon crisis', Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik invited the then Foreign Minister of Denmark, Per Stig Møller, the Danish Bishop of Lolland-Falster, Steen Skovsgaard and the Grand Muftis of Syria and Bosnia-Herzegovina to a meeting in Vienna. In 2006 the second Conference of European Imams was held in Vienna. The imams emphasised the commonalities of the Abrahamic religions and asked people to increase their understanding of different cultures and faiths. In 2009, with a view to reaching out to the younger generation, the symposium 'Identity and Participation: Cross-Cultural and Muslim Youth in Europe' was held in Vienna.

Belgium

The need for labour in the mining companies led to the arrival of some foreign workers in Belgium. In 1923 about 10 per cent of the Muslim miners came from both Muslim and non-Muslim countries, such as Poland, Italy, Morocco, Algeria, Yugoslavia and Hungary. In 1927 about 14 per cent of the miners were Muslims, with most coming from Algeria. In 1936 a royal decree instituted a work permit programme, which aimed to protect the Belgian market from foreign workers, but 'guest' workers were permitted to work if they were employed on a temporary basis. After the Second World War an acute shortage of labour led Belgium to welcome immigrants. In 1969 and 1970 Belgium signed agreements with Tunisia and Algeria to recruit labourers. However in the 1970s Morocco sent the largest number of people to live and work in Belgium.[13]

In 2005 Muslims in Belgium numbered 364,000 and this was 3.5 per cent of the total of about 11 million Belgian people. Moroccans formed 55 per cent

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11. 'Vienna Dedicates Square to Muslim Scholar, *Austria Today*, 14 April 2008.
12. Austrian Foreign Ministry, 'Dialogue with the Muslim World and Islam in Europe', http://www.bmeia.gv.at/en/foreign-ministry/foreign-policy/international-cultural-policy/dialogue-of-cultures.html, accessed 14 December 2009.
13. T. De Raedt, 'Muslims in Belgium: A Case Study of Emerging Identities', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXIV, No. 1, 2004, p. 14.

of the Muslim population followed by Turks (33 per cent).[14] Other Muslims were from Algeria, Tunisia, Pakistan, Iran, the former Yugoslavia, Lebanon and Sub-Saharan Africa. There are about 380 mosques in Belgium and Islam is among the six religions officially recognized by the government, entitling it to some subsidies. Belgian Muslims received 3.5 per cent of the $523 million given out in 2000.[15] This money is traditionally allocated for teachers, religious leaders, schools and places of worship, and the Muslim Executive Council is in charge of monitoring the grant.

Since 1989 Belgium has been subdivided into three linguistic and cultural communities: Flemish-speaking, French-speaking and a small German-speaking community. Children in secondary schools have to choose to study a second or third language: English or French in the Flemish-speaking (south Belgium) part; Flemish or English in the French-speaking part. The fourth language is sometimes German (in the German-speaking community) or Spanish (in some schools). It is an irony that neither Arabic nor Turkish is taught in the regular curriculum of Belgian education despite Belgium's emphasis on integration. Though in the 1980s the Royal Commission for Immigrant Policy declared that diversity was acceptable, the education system appears to put emphasis on their 'preferred' assimilation.[16]

Since 9/11 Muslims in Belgium have faced resistance from some sections of the wider Belgian society. Incidents have ranged from verbal abuse to the murder of a Moroccan teacher in Antwerp in November 2002. In 2009 the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance reported that Muslims had experienced resistance in both employment and housing. The commission reported that Muslims were singled out by police, and some Muslim students encountered violence.[17] Although Belgium's High Court ruled that a Muslim woman wearing a *ḥijāb* (headscarf) could not be denied an identification card, conservatives in Belgium's parliament wanted to introduce a ban on Muslim women wearing the *ḥijāb*.[18] In January 2004, inspired by the French President Jacques Chirac's call for the ban of Islamic headscarves and other overt religious symbols in state schools in France, two Belgian senators called for similar legislation to combat what they say is Islamic sexism. One of the Socialist Senators, Anne-Marie Lizin, stated, 'The veil amounts to oppression of the individual in the name of religion.'[19]

14. 'Muslims in Europe; Terrorist Attacks', *The Times*, 26 July 2005, p. 6.
15. 'Belgium: An Overview', *Frontline*, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/front/map/be.html, accessed 17 December 2009.
16. De Raedt, 'Muslims in Belgium' …, *op. cit.*, pp. 17, 18, 22.
17. 'Belgium: An Overview' …, *op. cit.*
18. *Ibid.*
19. P. Siuberski, 'French Ban on Islamic Headscarves Sparks Fierce Debate in Belgium', *Agence France Presse*, 18 January 2004.

VII–1.1   Regent's Park Mosque and Cultural Centre, London
© Tor Eigeland/AramcoWorld

Though Belgium has not passed any laws to ban the *ḥijāb*, the Athenée Royal High School in Brussels, which has a large number of immigrant students, banned the wearing of *ḥijābs* in 2004. The school's administrator, Francis Lees, said, 'We have changed our rules to forbid the wearing of headscarves in the school because the situation was no longer tenable. Some pupils have since left the school, but we have been able to break out of our ghetto'.[20] A French teacher of Moroccan origin at the school said he was convinced that if Belgium passed an anti-headscarf law, 'most of the girls would conform with it'. He further said, 'They're not going to play with their futures for the sake of that. We shouldn't exaggerate the influence of Islamists'. Several Muslim groups said in a joint statement that a ban on Islamic headscarves and veils 'would deprive Muslim citizens of the pleasure of exercising their civic rights'.[21] Five years later, the Belgian French-speaking liberal party Reformist Movement (MR) announced that they wanted a *burqa* (full veil) ban all over the country. It was foreshadowed that the MR faction leader in the Senate, Christine Defraigne, would propose such legislation. They believed that 'A burka is a piece of clothing which completely covers the body'.[22] MR faction leader Defraigne did not want people to walk about in public unrecognizable. Opponents thought the regulation was superfluous, since the *burqa* remains very marginal in Belgium.[23]

When I visited Brussels and Leuven in 2008, I did not see any Muslim women wearing a *burqa*. It occurs to me, therefore, that the banning of the *burqa* could lead to an Islamic resurgence in Belgium, because Muslim women would be keen to assert their identity (as many have done in France and Britain). I met some Moroccan Muslim men (taxi drivers and shop owners) in Brussels, who were proud that many of their countrymen lived in Belgium. I also noticed that some people do retain their Moroccan/Islamic identity when they renovate their houses according to the Moroccan style – for example, with separate men and women's meeting/lounge rooms.[24] However, the Open Society Institute report on Muslims in Europe found that many Muslims in Belgium are marginalized in the labour market. In 2004 the unemployment rate among Moroccans and Turks was 38 per cent, which was five times higher than the national unemployment rate of 7 per cent.[25]

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*

22. 'Belgium: Proposal to Ban Burka', *De Redactie,* 3 September 2009, http://islamineurope. blogspot.com/2009/09/belgium-proposal-to-ban-burkas.html, accessed 18 December 2009.

23. *Ibid.*

24. Notes taken from a meeting with a Belgian academic architect, Leuven, Belgium, 30 October 2008.

25. Open Society Institute, *Muslims in Europe: A Report on 11 EU Cities*, New York, Open Society Institute, 2009, p. 111.

A few Muslim acts of terrorism have been unhelpful to the image of the many Muslims in Belgium who pursue a moderate path. Belgium has had two major terrorist trials in recent years. In 2003 Nizar Trabelsi, a 33-year-old Tunisian, was sentenced to ten years in prison after he admitted his plot to drive a car bomb into a Belgian air base where US nuclear weapons were stored. In 2004 a Brussels court sentenced four men for their involvement in plotting a terrorist attack and for having links with al-Qaeda.[26] In 2006 under Belgian anti-terror laws a Belgian court found three men – Abdelkader Hakimi, Lahoussine El Haski and Mustapha Lunani – guilty of belonging to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group linked to terrorist attacks in Madrid and Casablanca, and sentenced them to about six years in jail. The 2003 bombing in Casablanca killed thirty-two people and the 2004 train bombings in Madrid killed 191 people. Khalid Bouloudou was convicted of being a local organizer for the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group and for providing indirect support to the Madrid Train Bombings and the Casablanca Bombings.[27]

Denmark

In the 1970s Muslims arrived from Turkey, Pakistan, Morocco and the former Yugoslavia to seek employment in Denmark. In the 1980s and 1990s the majority of Muslim arrivals were refugees and asylum seekers from Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Bosnia. Access to housing and employment has been a source of concern for Muslims in Denmark. In 2005 Muslims constituted 5 per cent (270,000) of the total Danish population (5.4 million). There are two mosques in Copenhagen. One is called the Islamic Cultural Centre (attended mainly by Arabs and Pakistanis), and the other is Kopenhag Kocatepe Camii (mainly Turkish).[28] The Muslim community in Denmark is well organized under a Muslim Union. There are also Islamic schools in Denmark. Most of the Muslims in Denmark are technicians, workers and small businessmen.[29]

After 9/11 Muslims were considered to be the 'other' at the political level. For example, after the 9/11 incident Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen met with some immigrant organizations and demanded that Danish Muslims pledge allegiance to the Danish constitution, ensure that they would allow women to marry whom they wanted, respect the ideals of democracy, and not put the Qurʾān above the constitution. Critics wondered why the prime minister connected Muslim marriages with the 9/11 incident,

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26. 'Brussels: Islamic Terror Suspects on Trial', *The Irish Examiner*, 3 November 2005.

27. 'Belgium Convicts Three in Terror Case', *Associated Press Newswires*, 17 February 2006.

28. 'Muslims in Europe: Country Guide', *BBC News*, 23 December 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4385768.stm#france, accessed 25 February 2010.

29. A. M. Kettani, *Muslim Minorities in the World Today*, London, Mansell Publishing, 1986, p. 47.

and why he doubted the loyalty of Danish Muslims. The fourth paragraph of the Danish constitution states that the Evangelical Lutheran Church is the country's state church. So the national identity of Denmark is still fundamentally Christian, though its constitution grants religious freedom.[30]

In September 2006 Denmark made worldwide news when the Danish daily newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* printed cartoons featuring the Prophet Muḥammad. It was offensive to many Muslims, particularly since one cartoon depicted the Prophet Muḥammad with his turban shaped like a bomb. Some Muslims' reactions to the cartoons turned violent with attacks on Danish embassies in several cities including Beirut and Damascus. Some Muslims worldwide also boycotted Danish products.

At the time of writing this chapter, Muslims in Denmark were facing resistance in constructing their mosques in the capital city, Copenhagen. In August 2009 the city council approved the construction of a Shīʿite Muslim mosque with two 104-foot-tall minarets in an industrial area on the site of a former factory. The mosque was designed to include some Persian-Islamic art. The conservative Danish People's Party was critical of the mosque and claimed that it was linked with the 'Iranian regime'. As one party member commented, 'The Iranian regime is based on a fascist identity that we don't want to set foot in Denmark'.[31] At this time a Sunni mosque was in the process of construction and the Danish People's Party tried to associate the mosque with Saudi funding; the Muslims said that it had no Saudi connection.[32]

The fact that Muslims in Denmark are building mosques shows that they are happy with their settlement and consider Denmark to be their new 'home'. But resistance from the wider society makes their settlement challenging, especially the constant fight for Muslims' constitutional rights and religious freedom.

France

Historically, the French Empire encompassed many Muslim countries, including Algeria. However, until the twentieth century Muslim migration to France was negligible. There were only 1,000 Muslims in France in 1900. After the First World War France encouraged Algerian migration due to her labour shortage. In 1924 the Muslim population in France was 120,000, and by 1950 it had reached 240,000. After the independence of the colonies, especially

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30. G. Schmidt, 'Islamic Identity Formation among Young Muslims: The Case of Denmark, Sweden and the United States', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXIV, No. 1, 2004, pp. 33–4.

31. J. Tagliabue, 'Push to Build Mosques is met with Resistance', *The New York Times*, 12 November 2009, p. 11.

32. *Ibid.*

Algeria, many Muslims migrated to France. By 1982 the Muslim population in France was about 2.5 million people, making it the second largest religion in the country (after Roman Catholicism). With the growth of the Muslim population, Muslims have established mosques and Qurʾānic schools. By 1982 there were about 410 makeshift mosques in France, and the Jami Mosque in Paris had all the facilities necessary for a Muslim Community Centre.[33]

The Muslim population in France has continued to grow since the 1980s and now includes people from Bangladesh, Pakistan, India and the Middle East, Turkey, Iran and the former Yugoslavia. In 2005 Muslims in France constituted about 9.6 per cent (5–6 million) of the total population (62.3 million),[34] the largest Muslim population in Western Europe. The biggest Muslim group is from North Africa; Algerians and Moroccans have contributed the largest number, followed by Tunisians. Turks and West Africans form the next largest group. There are about eight 'grand mosques', 120 normal mosques, and more than 1,000 places of worship.

In 2004 a ban on religious symbols in public schools provoked a major national row; it was widely regarded as being a ban on the Islamic headscarf. French politicians argued that the ban went back to the strict French code of *laïcité* – the separation of church and state that was written into French law in 1905. It should be noted that when the headscarf was banned in public schools in 2004, the Jewish skullcap and large crucifixes were also forbidden. However there has been much more heat and energy applied to eradicating the 'Islamic headscarf' than any other religious symbol.[35] French politicians and the media believed that the Islamic headscarf represented 'Islamic radicalism, a trend toward "communalism" and the oppression of women in poor suburbs'.[36] Some Muslims objected that the law violates their right to express their religious beliefs and cultural identity, and that Muslim girls wear the scarf out of choice – and not because it is enforced by their parents. Critics have surmised that it was feared that the far right politician Jean-Marie Le Pen (founder of the National Front Party) might win the election, so former French President Jacques Chirac (1996–2007) and President Nicolas Sarkozy (from 2007) (both from the Union for a Popular Movement Party) embraced 'radical secularism' and supported the ban on headscarves for their political gain in order to obtain the far right votes.

French politicians may have been successful in their political agenda in banning Muslim women's headscarves, but they have not been able to address the poverty and unemployment in certain areas of France. In 2005 there was

33. Kettani, *Muslim Minorities …, op. cit.*, pp. 35–7.
34. 'Muslims in Europe: Country Guide' …, *op. cit.*
35. C. Joppke, *Veil: Mirror of Identity*, London, Polity Press, 2009.
36. J. R. Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, State and the Public Space*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 1.

widespread and prolonged rioting among mainly immigrant communities across France.[37] In 2009 the death in custody of the Arab Muslim Mohammed Benmouna, aged 21, caused two days of rioting in the French town of Firminy.[38] *Reuters News* reported that President Nicolas Sarkozy, who was elected in 2007, had promized a 'Marshall Plan' for deprived suburbs known as 'sensitive urban zones' (ZUS), which contain a high proportion of people from an immigrant background and where unemployment, poverty and school drop-out rates are high. Until 2009 nothing had been done and the rate of unemployment of young immigrant (mostly Muslim) men aged 15 to 24 had increased to 41.7 per cent, compared with less than 25 per cent for the same age group nationally. Also a third of ZUS residents lived under the poverty line set at 908 euros ($1,365) per month, compared with 12 per cent in the rest of the country.[39] Of all the groups, second-generation Moroccan and Algerian immigrants are particularly disadvantaged in the French labour market.[40]

By 2010 the debate had shifted from Muslim women's *ḥijāb* to the *niqāb* (face veil) and the *burqa* (a head-to-toe garment that covers the hair and face). In 2008 a Moroccan Muslim woman of Salafi adherence, Faiza X, was denied French citizenship because she wore a *burqa*; it was considered 'she has not assimilated enough into society'.[41] The woman said that she did not know anything about secularism or her right to vote. Critics accuse the French justice system of using secularism as an excuse for instilling fear of Islam in the wider society. The French Council of State's ruling said that Faiza X had

> adopted a practice of her religion incompatible with the essential values of the French community, notably with the principle of equality of the sexes, and therefore she does not fulfill the conditions of assimilation listed in the country's Civil Code as a requirement for French citizenship.[42]

The council also said that the decision to refuse her citizenship did not aim to 'attack her freedom of religion'.[43] On the other hand, Mohammed Bechari, President of the National Federation of French Muslims, asked, 'Where does it begin or end, what we are calling radical behavior? Will we see a man refused citizenship because of the length of his beard … or a man who is dressed as a rabbi or a priest?'[44]

37. 'Muslims in Europe: Country Guide' …, *op. cit.*
38. 'Death Sparks Riots', *The Times*, 10 July 2009, p. 43.
39. After Riots, France Fails to Improve Poor Suburbs', *Reuter News*, 30 November 2009.
40. OSI, *Muslims in Europe* …, *op. cit.*, p. 111.
41. 'French Query Citizenship Ban for Muslim Veil', *The West Australian*, 18 July 2008, p. 31.
42. *Ibid.*
43. *Ibid.*
44. *Ibid.*

VII–1.2   The Freimann Mosque in Munich, Germany
© Tor Eigeland/AramcoWorld

In February 2010 Jean-François Cope, parliamentary floor leader of Mr Sarkozy's ruling UMP party, introduced draft legislation to ban the *niqāb*. Polls show the majority of French people back a face-veil ban. President Sarkozy wanted parliament to pass a non-binding resolution rather than a law. Other lawmakers, including those from the leading opposition Socialist Party, were against any measure. Many critics have asked why the debate was taking place at all, since it affected such a small number of women. Some argue it was diverting discussion from more serious problems, like the economy. Others claimed it represented a bid by Mr Sarkozy's conservative UMP party to attract far-right voters for regional elections in March.[45] On 12 April 2011 the French Government banned wearing the *niqāb* (face veil) in public, including walking on the street, taking public transport, and going to hospital or to school to pick up children. The penalty for wearing the *niqāb* in a public space is 150 Euros and lessons in French citizenship. Women were only allowed to wear *niqābs* inside mosques or private cars, and they could be stopped by traffic police while driving.[46]

Despite the measures to curb their religious and cultural identity, French Muslims are showing loyalty to their host country. While France engaged in the *burqa/niqāb* debate, a French Muslim soldier died in the war in Afghanistan. Born in Senegal, Harouna Diop died in Afghanistan on 13 January 2010 when insurgents blew up his armoured military vehicle. In spite of the 'Muslim question', when a survey was conducted in 2009 about 49 per cent of the Muslims in France felt a sense of belonging to France.[47]

Germany

Muslim contact with Germany goes back to the Ottoman period when Muslim soldiers migrated to Prussia, and when some Germans converted to Islam. There are mosques in Germany that are more than two hundred years old. The influx of Muslim migration in Germany took place in the 1960s with the migration of Turk workers and other guest workers from the northern shores of Africa.[48] Some intellectuals and academics from Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan also moved to Germany during the 1970s, and Muslims from Bosnia, Albania, Macedonia and Kosovo fled from ethnic

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45. 'France Continues Debate on Banning Face Veils in Public', *Thai News Service*, 2 February 2010.

46. A. C. Paris, 'Niqab Wearers take to Streets as Sarkozy's Ban on Face Veils in Public Spaces Begins: Police Union says New Law "Infinitely Difficult" to Apply Rights Campaigners Attack Rising Islamophobia', *The Guardian*, London (UK), 12 April 2011, p. 15.

47. OSI, *Muslims in Europe …*, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

48. J. Blaschke (ed.), *Multi-Level Discrimination of Muslim Women in Europe*, 2nd revised ed., Berlin, Edition Parabolism, 2004, p. 51.

disputes in the Balkans, seeking to work, trade, study or even to benefit from the social security and health services provided by the German Government for its citizens. Most of the Muslim communities in Germany intended to stay for a short period of time before returning home as soon as their living and political conditions improved, so they were considered to be temporary guests by the German Government. However, after thirty years, some of these communities have reconsidered their status and begun asking for German nationality, rendering Islam an integral part of German life.[49]

In 2004 Muslims in Germany comprised 3.6 per cent (3 million) of the total German population (82.5 million).[50] The majority of these Muslims were Turks. In December 2001 there were 1,947,000 Turkish nationals resident in Germany, including an estimated 500,000 Kurds. Many Turks are self-employed. Some analysts see this as ghettoization of the Turkish community because Turkish employers tend to employ their own people. Turkish workers may start with certain jobs within the enclave but later they manage to become business owners themselves, which would have been impossible outside the enclave. In other words, immigrants are better off if they remain as close as possible to their ethnic group. Some analysts observe that many German-Turkish entrepreneurs who have more mainstream customers may go bankrupt because of their lack of cross-cultural competencies – for example, knowledge of two languages (German and Turkish) and the cultural skills that enable understanding of mainstream German culture. On the other hand, some observers consider that in most immigrant economies imbalances clearly exist. Entrepreneurship may not be possible for all Turkish people, so they end up doing unskilled work and thus remain in an inferior position.[51] In general, many Turks work in marginal and low-paid jobs that lead to segregated lives, and second-generation Turkish nationals in Germany are almost twice as likely to be unemployed than the national average.[52]

There is evidence that women are discriminated against in the labour market if they wear the veil.[53] Germany was the next country (after France) in Europe to legislate against Muslim women wearing the headscarf, ostensibly

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49. S. Bibars, 'The Law Versus Social and Cultural Realities', *The International Politics Journal,* 2004, http://www.siyassa.org.eg/esiyassa/ahram/2004/4/1/FILE3.htm, accessed 27 February 2010; see also, R. Mandel, 'Shifting Centres and Emergent Identities: Turkey and Germany in the Lives of Turkish *Gastarbeiter'*, in D. F. Eickelman and J. Piscatori (eds), *Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration, and the Religious Imagination,* London, Routledge 1990, pp. 153–71.

50. 'Muslims in Europe: Country Guide' …, *op. cit.*

51. A. Pecoud, 'Self-employment and Immigrants' Incorporation: The Case of Turks in Germany', *Immigrants and Minorities,* XXII, No. 2/3, 2003, pp. 247–61.

52. OSI, *Muslims in Europe* …, *op. cit.,* p. 111.

53. *Ibid.,* p. 126.

not because it is a religious symbol but because of it is a 'symbol of female subjugation'. The difference between the German and French restriction on the wearing of the *ḥijāb* is that the German ban has been applied to teachers and not to students. In April 2004 Baden-Würtemberg was the first state to ban the headscarf; apparently other German states are in the process of doing so.[54] The paradox in both France and Germany is that authorities have failed to understand that in these countries the wearing of the *ḥijāb* has been primarily a matter of choice rather than of imposed patriarchal subjugation. It appears that the act of Muslim women making their religious and cultural values more conspicuous is being perceived by some Western nations as a threat to their own religio-cultural brand, which is predominantly Christian.

In spite of some restrictions imposed by the wider society, Muslims in Germany have various Islamic centres, institutions and associations, such as the Turkish Islamic Union of the Institute for Religion – the biggest Islamic organization in Germany comprising around 800 Islamic associations; the Central Council of Muslims in Germany; the Union of Islamic Cultural Centres; and the Islam Council. Since 9/11 these organizations have been involved in interfaith dialogues to enhance a positive perception of Islam in Germany. German building law recognizes the importance of places of worship, and despite some legal disputes about the height of minarets, considered by some as an encroachment on the dominant Christian culture, there are some 2,000 mosques in the country.[55]

Greece

Since the ninth century there have been intellectual links between the Hellenic and Muslim worlds when the Abbasid Caliph al-Mamun established the Bait al-Hikma (House of Wisdom) and gathered together Greek and Muslim scholars. Al-Mamun had Hellenic scientific and philosophical works translated into Arabic and thus created a synthesis between Islam and Hellenic civilization. Later, in medieval times, trade links were established between Greece and the Muslim world. But with the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 and the later expansion of Ottoman rule to south-eastern Europe, including Greece, the Greco–Muslim relationship became critical.[56] It was during this period that some Christian Gypsies and Pomaks converted to Islam. Later Muslim immigrants (mainly Egyptians and Pakistanis) began to arrive in Greece in the 1970s, and the first major wave of immigrants from Asia, Africa and the former Yugoslavia arrived in the 1990s. In 2003 there were

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54. Joppke, *Veil: Mirror of Identity, op. cit.*
55. Bibars, 'The Law Versus Social and Cultural Realities' …, *op. cit.*
56. T. Dokos and D. Antoniou, 'Islam in Greece', in S. Hunter (ed.), *Islam: Europe's Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural and Political Landscape*, Westport, CT, Praeger, 2002, p. 176.

an estimated 370,000 Muslims in Greece, approximately 3.5 per cent of the total population. A contemporary Muslim presence of both indigenous and immigrant Muslims is found mostly in Western Thrace (northern Greece). The Muslim minority of Western Thrace numbered 112,000 people, composed of three different ethnic groups: Turks who numbered 56,000, Pomaks amounting to 38,000, and 18,000 Gypsies.[57]

Islam is officially recognized by the Greek constitution as a 'known religion'. In Western Thrace the Greek Government performs several functions. First, it appoints *muftis* (Muslim jurists) and respects Islamic family law, which is unique in the European Union, as Greece is the only state that has a system of legal pluralism based on the religious denomination of individual citizens. Second, it administers Islamic endowments (*vakif*). Third, it trains Muslim teachers through the Special Academy of Thesaloniki (*idhiki pedagogiki akadimia*), which was established in 1968. Finally, it administers Islamic religious schools (*madrasa*). Though Western Thrace appears to be an ideal place for Greek Muslims, the Muslim minority has for many years been the victim of administrative discrimination, and the region remains one of the most underdeveloped in the European Union.[58]

In 2003 the Association of Muslims in Greece was established. Located in Athens, it aims to address the issues of Muslims in Greece. Until that time there were only a few makeshift mosques or prayer halls for Muslims in Athens but not an official mosque. In the early 1990s the roof of a luxury hotel in the city centre was used as a mosque by Muslim businessmen from the Middle East, mainly from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon, most of whom had moved to the Greek capital during the first Gulf War.[59] In June 2000 the Greek Parliament approved the establishment of the country's first Islamic cultural centre and mosque in Athens (since the Ottoman era). The decision for the mosque project to be financed by the government of Saudi Arabia was at first not regarded as controversial. Both the mosque and the centre were to be constructed in Paeania in an area about 20 km east of the centre of Athens comprising 35,000 square metres, before the 2004 Olympic Games. However in 2003 there was serious opposition to the construction of the mosque by the Greek Orthodox Church, Paeania's council, the opposition party New Democracy, and local residents. Arguments against the mosque building varied from the fact that Paeania was close to the airport, and it would 'convey a distorted image of the country to freshly-arrived foreign

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57. D. A. Antoniou, 'Muslim Immigrants in Greece: Religious Organization and Local Responses', *Immigrants and Minorities*, XXII, No. 1/2, 2003, p. 161.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 163–4.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 165–6.

visitors'.[60] Paeania's council proposed that 'the mosque be built in western Athens instead – a working class area hosting the bulk of the city's Muslims'.[61] The most common objections against the mosque and the cultural centre were that the establishment of the Athenian central mosque and the Islamic cultural centre would encourage large numbers of Muslim immigrants to settle in Paeania, thus downgrading the quality of daily life. It would also result in the devaluation of property.

The Greek Government remained firm that it would allow the construction of the mosque and the Islamic centre because it wanted to boost its credentials with Muslim countries by opening the mosque while the world spotlight was on Athens during the 2004 Olympics. A few mainstream Greeks supported the establishment of the Athenian central mosque and the Islamic cultural centre because it would neither affect the region nor the local inhabitants, and cited as an example the existence of a Hindu temple in the area for more than fifteen years, which, so far, had not caused any problems.[62] Nevertheless, due to serious opposition by a majority of Greek people, the construction of the proposed mosque and the Islamic centre has been blocked. At the time of writing, Athens was the only European capital that had neither a mosque nor a cemetery for its 700,000 Muslim population.[63]

In other aspects, Muslims who are Greek citizens enjoy full civil rights; for example, they have the right to establish associations, unions and political parties as well as to vote and be elected. However there are some illegal Muslim immigrants who are desperate to legalize their immigration. Similar to Spain (1985), Italy (1987) and Portugal (1992), in 1998 Greece introduced a two-stage policy of legalization of foreigners.[64] In the first stage illegal immigrants submit applications for a temporary residence permit (a white card); in the second stage those who have attained a white card and showed proof of both legal employment and registration with the Social Insurance Board can then apply for a restricted residence permit (a green card). These immigration procedures do not involve religious affiliations but after the 9/11 2001 Twin Towers tragedy in the USA, the legalization process for Muslims in Greece has become exceedingly difficult.[65]

60. 'Planned Athens Mosque Puts Islam too Much in Spotlight – Greek Orthodox Church', *Agence France Presse,* 3 September 2003.

61. *Ibid.*

62. Antoniou, 'Muslim Immigrants in Greece' …, *op. cit.,* p. 171.

63. N. El-Ghandour, 'A Mosque and a Cemetery: Too Much to Ask?: Introducing the Greek Muslim Community', *Islam Online,* 12 February 2009.

64. Antoniou, 'Muslim Immigrants in Greece' …, *op. cit.,* p. 156.

65. *Ibid.,* p. 156.

Italy

The presence of Muslims in Italy was first noted in the ninth century when Arabs and Berbers from Tunisia conquered Sicily. Southern Italy remained under Muslim rule until the Normans invaded in the eleventh century. Some Muslims lived as slaves in Lucera under the Normans. Yet there were also good relationships between Emperor Frederick II of Sicily and the Muslim rulers. For example, Frederick II communicated with Muslim rulers with regard to matters of state and science. He sent envoys to Tunis and Morocco.[66] In contemporary Italy, however, the composition of the Muslim population is different. In 2005 there were about 1 million Muslims, which was nearly 1.7 per cent of Italy's total population of about 58 million. The largest number is from Morocco (34 per cent), followed by Albania (27 per cent), and Tunisia (10 per cent). Other Muslims have arrived from Senegal, Egypt, Bangladesh, Algeria, Bosnia, Iran, Nigeria, Turkey and Somalia.[67] In the early 1970s the Union of Muslim students in Italy organized prayer halls in several university towns. The first mosque was built by Middle Eastern students (Syrians, Jordanians and Palestinians). Now there are many mosques, but resistance to mosque building is increasing.

Two issues need immediate attention in the Italian context: first, there are issues within the Muslim community itself; and second, the anti-Muslim attitudes of some Italians are impacting on Muslim settlement in Italy. Regarding the first issue – dissension within Muslim groups – there are at least three major organizations that assume exclusivity and are unwilling to cooperate in power sharing with other Islamic groups. This has also made it difficult for the Italian Government to deal with Muslim issues.[68] The Islamic Cultural Centre in Rome is supervised by a board of ambassadors from Islamic countries and is closely associated with Saudi Arabia and the Muslim World League. It views itself as the valid representative of Muslims because its officials have contacts in Rome. But the Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy dismisses the Cultural Centre in Rome on the grounds that it is a foreign body and has no contact with the grassroots level. The third competitor for sole representation of Muslims in Italy is the Islamic Religious Community located in Milan. This organization is run by Italian converts to Islam of the Sufi ideology.[69]

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66. J. A. Taylor, 'Freedom and Bondage among Muslims in Southern Italy during the Thirteenth Century', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXVII, No. 1, 2007, pp. 71–7.
67. 'Muslims in Europe; Terrorist Attacks', *The Times*, 26 July 2005, p. 6; J. A. Toronto, 'Islam *Italiano:* Prospects for Integration of Muslims in Italy's Religious Landscape', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXVIII, No. 1, 2008, p. 62.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
69. *Ibid.*

Since 2000 the presence of Islam and Muslims in Italian public spaces has become the subject of an increasingly intense debate; much of the debate has been initiated by the anti-immigration Northern League, a key member of the coalition government, embarking on an aggressive anti-Muslim campaign.[70] For example, during a rally in October 2000 protesting against plans to build a small mosque in the city of Lodi near Milan, some of the banners carried by protestors boasted that pig's urine had been poured on the ground where the mosque was to be built. A daily disinformation campaign, still ongoing, appeared in the party's newspaper, *La Padania*, and a rally in Verona called 'Stop Islam' was launched with accusations and insults directed at the Prophet Muḥammad. In November 2000 the Lega Nord Mayor of Rovato, near Brescia, began an initiative to prevent non-Catholics from approaching within 15 metres of churches, on the premise that in some Muslim countries non-Muslims are forbidden from entering mosques and that non-Muslims are prohibited from entering the holy city of Mecca. In various cities ruled by mayors belonging to the League, such as Varese, Bergamo and Treviso, there was a campaign to close down existing Muslim prayer halls. The number of incidents and the offensive language used was unprecedented in Italy.[71]

In June 2002, the *West Australian* newspaper printed a copy of a fifteenth-century Giovanni di Modena fresco depicting the Prophet Muḥammad being tortured in hell. This was accompanied by a report that Islamic terrorists linked to al-Qaeda planned to destroy Bologna's fourteenth century cathedral because it contained the medieval fresco of the Prophet Muḥammad. The publication of the fresco in this newspaper was offensive to some Muslims (even in a distant land such as Australia), and it prompted an objection from an Islamic leader who held that publishing the photograph with the report caused profound hurt, stress and anger among the Muslim community in Australia, and that the press should respect religious sensitivities. Such images could once again generate the division and hatred that existed during the Crusades.[72] Therefore, such paintings would be painful to the Muslim minority living in Italy. On the other hand, an Italian convert to Islam, Adel Smith, filed suit in an Italian court to have all crucifixes removed from the Italian school his children were attending.[73] Though Adel Smith did not represent mainstream immigrant Muslims, he received immense publicity from the media.

70. S. Allievi, 'Sociology of a Newcomer: Muslim Migration to Italy: Religious Visibility, Cultural and Political Reactions', *Immigrants and Minorities*, XXII, No. 2/3, 2003, p. 151.

71. *Ibid.*

72. N. Kabir, 'Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Australian Media, 2001–2005', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXVI, No. 3, 2006, p. 320.

73. S. Arie, 'Muslim Wins Italian Court Ban on Crucifixes in Classroom', *The Guardian*, 27 October 2003, p. 15.

After 11 September 2001, some immigrant Muslims were considered to be terrorists or supporters of terrorism. For example, some Muslim leaders and imams in an Islamic centre in Milan have been subjected to police investigations for allegedly recruiting *mujāhidin* (fighters of the *jihād*) and sending them to Afghanistan (some of them were prisoners in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba). In addition, some people arrested have been allegedly involved in logistical support to alleged al-Qaeda terrorists, and some are also suspected of preparing attacks on American institutions in Italy.[74]

Some mainstream Italians demand that Muslims be loyal to Italy. In 2002 the Italian author Oriana Fallaci wrote a book entitled *The Rage and the Pride* (*La Rabbia e l'Orgoglio*), fuelling anti-Muslim sentiment. It was a bestseller in Italy, and sold half a million copies within hours of its release.[75] It should be noted that when the ruling party is right-wing, then minorities become more vulnerable. In 2008 Italy's Northern League, the key component of Italy's current Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's governing coalition, proposed new legislation that would effectively halt construction of new mosques. The bill, which Roberto Cota, the league's Chief of Deputies, was expected to send to parliament, would require regional approval for the building of mosques, and a local referendum was to be held on 'no minaret or loudspeakers calling the faithful to prayer, and sermons to be in Italian, not Arabic.'[76] When Switzerland decided to ban the construction of minarets in a referendum in November 2009, Italy's Northern League was quick to welcome the decision.[77]

Though race relations are intense in some sections of the wider Italian society, when I visited Rome in December 2005 I sensed the multicultural fervour of Italy. I visited the Christmas Fair held at the Piazza Navona in Rome and noticed there were many stalls run by Asians. I met a few Bangladeshi people (Bangladesh is my country of origin) at the stalls who were very pleased when I spoke to them in our native language (Bengali). One of the stall owners said that the entire population of his village in Bangladesh was now in Italy. Initially, they had hurdles settling in a new country, but they overcame those difficulties by supporting each other during hard times. Also they were happy that the Italian Government had agreed to legalize illegal immigrants after ten years. In a roadside stall in Rome I was also surprised to see that the owner was wearing a *lungi* (a Bangladeshi garment which looks like a *sarong* worn around the waist)!

It is believed that between 4 and 8 million people live illegally in Europe. Illegal migrants come from Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and the Middle East

74. Allievi, 'Sociology of a Newcomer' …, *op. cit.*, p. 151.
75. Kabir, 'Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Australian Media' …, *op. cit.*, p. 318.
76. P. Bompard, 'Italy Bid to Block New Mosques', *Financial Times*, 25 August 2008, p. 7.
77. 'The World from Berlin – "Germany Would Also Have Voted to Ban Minarets" ', *Spiegel Online International*, 30 November 2009.

and most of them choose to stay permanently. Low fertility rates and aging populations, coupled with a higher level of education among mainstream Europeans, have led to labour shortages in low-paying sectors of the workforce. In Southern Europe, the informal economy provides work for the paperless within these areas, something that politicians are unwilling to admit to the public.[78] Southern Europe needs these illegal immigrants to run their informal economy, but at election times illegal immigrants are turned into a political football. Therefore, the complex informal economy of Italy has benefitted both minorities and the Italian Government.

Malta

Islam was introduced to Malta when Muslims captured the island from the Byzantines in 870. Malta returned to the Christian European powers with the Norman conquest in the eleventh century. However, Muslims were allowed to practise their religion until the thirteenth century. This was similar to Sicily, Italy, where Normans allowed Muslims to remain as Muslims and did not force them to convert. For example, al-Idrisi was a Muslim Arab nobleman who worked in the court of Roger, and wrote a geography book called *al-Kitāb al-Rujari* (The Book of Roger).[79] Eventually the Muslim presence in Malta ceased to exist, perhaps after the area came under the Spanish Empire.[80]

In 2005 there were several hundred Muslims out of a total Maltese population of 400,000. Included were people from the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Earlier, in 1978, the first mosque known as the Islamic Cultural Centre in Malta was established by the Islamic Call Society, whose headquarters are in Tripoli, Libya. The centre comprises the mosque, administrative offices, a primary school and the imam's house. The centre also helps refugees and prisoners. The centre promotes cross-cultural understanding with mainstream Maltese people.[81] In 2005 Muslims in Malta numbered 1,000 which constituted 0.2 per cent of the total population.[82]

78. S. Karlsson, 'Informal Economy Pulls Migrants to Europe: Why Border Control will Never Curb Illegal Migration', *Policy Innovations*, 7 October 2009, http://www.policyinnovations. org/ideas/commentary/data/000145, accessed 16 December 2009.

79. 'Arab Heritage in Malta', 23 April 2006, http://baheyeldin.com/writings/culture/arab-heritage-in-malta.html, accessed 16 December 2009.

80. P. Muscat, 'Ramadan and Islam in Malta', *Yemeni Times,* 12 August 2009, http://www. yementimes.com/DefaultDET.aspx?i=893&p=report&a=2, accessed 16 December 2009.

81. *Ibid.*

82. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, Washington, DC, Pew Research Centre, 2009, p. 32, http://www.pewforum.org/Mapping-the-Global-Muslim-Population. aspx, accessed 4 December 2012.

VII–1.3   Elders in Paris, France
© Tor Eigeland/AramcoWorld

In 2005 when I visited Malta I found it to be a predominantly Christian (Catholic) country. Several places though did remind me of the presence of Muslims. For example, the name of the city of Mdina reminded me of Medina in Saudi Arabia, and some people's visible appearance was Arab like. I spoke to some mainstream Maltese people who said they were descendants of Arabs and their language contained a few Arabic words. I also visited a refugee hostel while I was in Malta where I met some African Muslim refugees who lived in destitute conditions. They were looking for jobs, which were rarely available in the small island of Malta.

The Netherlands

Islam is a well-known religion in the Kingdom of the Netherlands because Indonesia was its colony until 1949. However, the first Muslims to settle in the Netherlands itself were Moluccans who left Indonesia in 1951 when it became an independent republic. In the mid-1960s Dutch labour agreements with Turkey and Morocco led to the arrival of cheap and unskilled labourers. Shortly before Suriname became independent in 1975 a sizeable group of Surinamese immigrants also arrived in the Netherlands. In 2005, according to the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics, Muslims constituted 5.8 per cent (945,000) of the total Dutch population (16.3 million), with the majority coming from Turkey, Morocco and Suriname.[83] Other Muslims, many arriving as refugees, have come from Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Ethiopia, Egypt, Afghanistan, the former Soviet Union and Bosnia. The majority are Sunni Muslims, though there are a large number of Alawites among the Turkish community.[84] In 2007 there were about 436 registered and active mosques and Islamic places of worship. About 225 Islamic places of worship were managed by Turkish organizations, 139 by Moroccans, and 47 by Surinamese and Pakistanis.[85]

Whereas there is a diverse Muslim community in the Netherlands, there are also pockets of marginalized, under-class and under-educated Muslims in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and Den Haag. Muslims from Turkish and Moroccan backgrounds have migrated to the Netherlands with very low standards of formal education, and their children in the Netherlands appear to have low educational standards as well. On the other hand, among Iranians

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83. 'Muslims in Europe: Country Guide', *op. cit.*

84. Factsheet, *Islam in the Netherlands*, November 2002, http://home.deds.nl/~quip/archief/culture/Islam%20in%20Nederland.html, accessed 11 January 2010; '945,000 Muslims in Netherlands Jan 1, 2004 – CBS', *Dutch News Digest*, 20 September 2004.

85. E. Bartels and I. De Jong, 'Civil Society on the Move in Amsterdam: Mosque Organizations in the Slotervaat District', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXVII, No. 3, 2007, p. 459.

and Afghans educational levels appear to be relatively high.[86] There is a lot of pressure on Muslims to integrate, and critics of integration say that the Dutch Government is not addressing the problem of poverty but has tacitly imposed 'state-sanctioned assimilation'.[87]

Race relations between some Muslims and non-Muslims became intense with the production of the film *Submission.* It was directed by the late Theo van Gogh and written by the Somali-born Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a former member of the Dutch House of Representatives for the Peoples' Party for Freedom and Democracy (she also calls herself an ex-Muslim). *Submission* was shown on the Dutch broadcasting network on 29 August 2004. The film is about women's oppression in Islam and some verses of the Qur'ān were written on a supposedly naked woman's body. This was insulting to some Muslims, and in November 2004 Theo van Gogh was brutally murdered by a 26-year-old Dutch Moroccan; following the murder Aayan Hirsi Ali went into hiding.[88] In 2008 another short film, *Fitna*, was released by a Dutch MP, Geert Wilders, and attributed violence to Islam. It showed selected excerpts from Suras of the Qur'ān, aligned with media clips and newspaper cuttings showing violence committed by Muslims. Wilders said that he considered Islam and the Qur'ān to be a danger to his country. Soon after the release of the film, Muslims residing in the Netherlands held a peaceful demonstration and carried banners saying 'Islam's message: peace and calm'.[89] Police in both Amsterdam and Rotterdam were active in reducing tensions in the weeks preceding the release of the film. For example, in Amsterdam the police organized a meeting to ensure that the local Muslim community understood their legal position, including their right to file a complaint about it.[90]

Muslims in the Netherlands have internal issues that need to be addressed. For example, some people in the Somali community circumcise their daughters, a cultural practice that poses a health risk.[91] Another issue has to do with service provision. Some women play an active role in Muslim organizations by providing Arabic lessons, Dutch language and sewing tuition to women members. But in other areas there is discontent that an all-male

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86. H. Van Amersfoort and J. Doomernick, 'People from the Middle East in the Netherlands', *Immigrants and Minorities*, XXII, No. 2/3, 2003, p. 181.

87. M. S. Merry and J. A. Milligan, 'Complexities of Belonging in Democratic and Democratizing Societies: Islamic Identity, Ethnicity and Citizenship in Netherlands and Aceh', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXIX, No. 3, 2009, pp. 313–14.

88. A. Deutsch, 'Dutch get Tough on Terror', *Sunday Mail,* 27 November 2004, p. 1.

89. 'Muslims in Netherlands Protest against "Anti-Islam" Film – Iran Agency', *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, 31 March 2008.

90. OSI, *Muslims in Europe …*, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

91. E. Bartels, 'Female Circumcision among Immigrant Muslim Communities: Public Debate in the Netherlands', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXIV, No. 2, 2004, pp. 393–9.

management is reluctant to provide women with such activities. For example, a Moroccan woman who tried for many years to organize activities for women was opposed by the mosque council. In her opinion the mosque could do more to promote emancipation and integration of Muslim women. Finally, she set up her own women's organization, *Nisa for Nisa*, to help isolated women integrate and participate in society.[92] There is also disagreement among Muslim men of diverse backgrounds on issues such as the beginning of Ramadan (month of fasting) and the beginning of *Eid ul Fitr* and *Eid ul Aḍha* (Muslim celebrations). The Turkish immigrants normally rely on astronomical calculations, which are given in advance and in accordance with Turkey's calculations. The Suriname community relies on local visibility (moon sighting) in the Netherlands, whereas the Moroccans normally follow the decision of Saudi Arabia. These disagreements are not exclusive to Muslims in the Netherlands.[93] They are common among Muslims residing in the West.

Spain

Spain has a strong historical connection with Muslims. In 711 Spain was invaded by Islamic troops from North Africa and the Middle East, and Muslims (the Moors) ruled Spain for almost eight centuries until their rule came to an end in 1492. They have left a strong Islamic legacy, particularly in architecture. Like other Western European countries, new Muslim arrivals began to migrate to Spain in significant numbers in the 1970s. In 2005 Muslims in Spain constituted 2.3 per cent (1 million) of the total population (43.1 million).[94] The majority of Muslims in Spain are foreigners, though some people in Ceuta and Melilla (two autonomous cities of Spain, located in North Africa) are of Moroccan origin. Muslims in Spain have various skills; for example Algerians are engaged in agriculture, especially fruit picking; Pakistanis are involved mainly in mining and in the textile industry; Iranians are engaged in commercial activities; and Moroccans are employed in construction work, industry and agriculture.[95]

The first Muslim association in Spain, Associación Muslamana de España, was created in 1971 for cultural purposes and there are about 400 Muslim prayer halls and mosques. In 1992 an agreement was signed between

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92. Bartels and De Jong, 'Civil Society on the Move in Amsterdam' …, *op. cit.*, p. 463.

93. K. Van Nieuwkerk, 'Time and Migration: Changes in Religious Celebrations among Moroccan Immigrant Women in the Netherlands', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXV, No. 3, 2005, p. 388.

94. 'Muslims in Europe: Country Guide' …, *op. cit.*

95. B. L. Garcia and A. I. P. Contreras, 'Islam in Spain', in S. T. Hunter (ed.), *Islam, Europe's Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural, and Political Landscape*, West Port, CT, Praeger, p. 164.

the Muslim Association and the Spanish State, which was a significant recognition for Muslims in Spain because it allowed the creation of a specific legislative body to regulate the basic principles of the Muslim community's religious practices. It recognized the Islamic Commission of Spain, which consisted of representatives of the two major Muslim federations: the Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities and the Union of Islamic Communities in Spain. The Islamic Commission of Spain manages different aspects of religious practice and trains and appoints religious staff; it also supervises the incorporation of Islamic religious education into the national educational system.[96]

In spite of all these positive developments, the Muslim minority in Spain have faced resistance from some sections of the wider community. For example, in February 2000 violent riots against the Maghrebian workers in El Ejido (Almeria) proved to be one of the most serious racist demonstrations in contemporary Spain. El Ejido is an agricultural region where one tenth of the workers are immigrants. They work in agriculture picking and planting fruits and vegetables. These are low-paid jobs which most Spaniards are reluctant to do. The local community alleged that there had been a rise in crime rates due to the increased number of new immigrants, but police said that there was no evidence that the immigrant community was more engaged in crime than anyone else.[97] A few months later a similar demonstration was held in the Ca n'Anglada quarter, a popular suburb in Terrassa (Bacelona). All these disturbances took place at Muslim religious places, such as mosques and *ḥalāl* butchers' shops. In the aftermath of 9/11, Muslims in Spain (like most Muslims in Western Europe) did not escape the Islamophobic attitudes of some mainstream people, and racist slogans were painted on walls and individuals attacked in various Spanish cities.[98]

In 2004 Spain was badly shaken when terror attacks by suspected radical Islamists killed 191 people on Madrid commuter trains. Spain handled the situation very efficiently. Though the interior minister José Antonio Alonso announced plans for more police in cities with large Muslim populations, to crack down on mosque building and *jihād*-preaching imams, the new socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero maintained a conciliatory policy and did not execute such a radical plan. Instead, a board was set up called the Foundation of Pluralism and Peaceful Coexistence based on accords signed between the government and Islamic, Jewish and Protestant representatives in 1992. Mercedes Rico Carabias, Director-General of Religious Affairs and

96. J. Moreras, 'Muslims in Spain: Between the Historical Heritage and the Minority Construction', *The Muslim World*, XCII, 2002, p. 133.

97. 'Mutual Fears behind Spain's Race Riots', *BBC News*, 8 February 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/635514.stm, accessed 18 February 2010.

98. Moreras, 'Muslims in Spain' …, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

member of the board, believed that Spain had moved away from the restrictive French model of allowing only state-approved mosques. Ms Carabias said, 'It is very important that the Muslim community is not put under suspicion.' Instead she hoped to give Islam the same status as other religions. 'In Spain, the problem is plurality. We have now changed from being a totally Catholic country, and we have to respect that.'[99] The chief task of the foundation was to bring Islam into mainstream society by such means as paying for social programmes and encouraging imams to learn Spanish. This was obviously a step towards constructive integration.

Sweden

In the eighteenth century Sweden formed an alliance with the Ottoman Empire, and Muslims in Sweden were granted freedom of worship. The new wave of Muslims in Sweden, however, have mostly been refugees and asylum seekers because until the late 1980s Sweden had the most liberal refugee policy in Europe. In 2005 Muslims in Sweden comprised 3 per cent (300,000) of the total population (9 million), with significant groups from Turkey, Bosnia, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria. There are several mosques in Sweden, such as in Malmö and Stockholm.[100]

Sweden wishes to practice a liberal religious policy. In 2004, at the time when France was debating banning the *hijab*, the Swedish Government discouraged such discussion because it 'would go against this Scandinavian country's tradition of liberalism.'[101] There have been moments of tension between Muslims and the wider community, such as when the Swedish daily newspaper *Nerikes Allehanda* published the drawing of the Prophet Muḥammad by Swedish artist Lars Vilks on 24 August 2007. The drawing depicted Prophet Muḥammad's head on the body of a dog. Muslims believe images of the Prophet are forbidden and also consider dogs to be impure. This led to violent protests in Pakistan, Iran, Egypt, Jordan and Afghanistan, but the Swedish Muslim protest was peaceful. Swedish Prime Minister Frederik Reinfeldt invited diplomats from around twenty Muslim countries to diffuse the tension through dialogue.[102]

In 2009 *CBN News* reported that Malmö, Sweden's third largest city, has a population of one-quarter Muslims, and in the Rosengaard section of Malmö

99. 'Al-Andalus Revisited – Spain and Islam', *The Economist*, 30 July 2005, p. 376.
100. 'Muslims in Europe: Country Guide' …, *op. cit.*
101. G. Branchereau, 'Sweden, Fearing Divisions, Rejects French Headscarf Ban', *Agence France Presse,* 10 February 2004.
102. New Zealand Press Association, 'Sweden PM to meet Muslim Diplomats over Sketch Row', *New Zealand Press Association*, 7 September 2007.

the unemployment rate is 70 per cent. Malmö has been very accommodating towards immigrant Muslims and a local Muslim politician, Adly Abu Hajar, declared that 'the best Islamic state is Sweden!'[103] Nevertheless, international Israeli–Palestinian political developments have agitated some Muslims in Malmö. For example, in March 2009 when Israel played Sweden in a Davis Cup tennis match in Malmö, an estimated 6,000 Swedish people including many Arabs and Muslims protested against the Israeli presence in the city, and hundreds attacked police. Almost no fans were allowed inside to watch the tennis series, because authorities feared possible violence against the Israeli team.[104]

Overall, mainstream Swedish society appears to have handled the 'Muslim question' well. The Swedish Democratic Party, which stands for traditional Christian values and limits on immigration, says that they have been stigmatized by the Swedish media as 'fascist and bigoted'. The discouragement on the *ḥijāb* debate by the Swedish Government in 2004 was also constructive. However, it was broadly felt that Muslim women should not go overboard with their *niqāb* (face veil) or *burqa* because it hinders basic integration or communication with other people. For example, in 2004 a school excluded two Somali girls who wore the *niqāb*. Later they were re-admitted after agreeing to keep their faces uncovered. Schools in Sweden have their own policy. Rather than having one policy for the whole country, like centralized France, the Swedish education authority allows each school to run its own affairs.[105]

Switzerland

Historically Switzerland has been a place of religious tolerance. The first Muslim European Congress, which was held in Geneva in September 1935, aimed to reform Muslim education in Europe.[106] In 2001 Switzerland was home to about 350,000 Muslims, constituting less than 5 per cent of a country of 7.7 million. Most Muslims in Switzerland are from Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo and Turkey. Over the past fifty years Muslim communities have built more than 150 mosques, mostly in homes, garages or in industrial areas. Only four minarets can be seen in the country, with another two under construction. Since the late 1980s Switzerland has seen the rise of a right-wing populist campaign against minorities. Damir Skenderovic, Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Fribourg near the capital Bern, has noted that in

103. D. Hurd, 'Malmö, Sweden: Growing Muslim Influence', *CBN News*, 16 March 2009, http://www.cbn.com/CBNnews/556299.aspx, accessed 2 March 2010.

104. *Ibid.*

105. Branchereau, 'Sweden, Fearing Divisions, Rejects French Headscarf Ban', *op. cit.*

106. M. Kramer, *Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 142–53.

the 1990s the campaign was about 'the stranger' or 'the other', mainly in the form of asylum seekers. But in the twenty-first century 'the focus is on one specific group, namely the Muslim immigrants.'[107]

The Swiss constitution guarantees freedom of religion, but in 2009 the right-wing Swiss People's Party (SVP), Switzerland's biggest party, along with the conservative Federal Democratic Union, proposed the banning of the construction of minarets because it was believed they were a symbol of 'the political will to take power' and establish *Sharīʿa*, or Islamic law. They also believed that Switzerland already suffered from thousands of forced Muslim marriages.[108] The two parties succeeded in gathering 100,000 signatures within 18 months, and called a referendum on the minaret issue. Under Switzerland's system of direct rule, the referendum is binding. On 29 November 2009 the referendum passed with a clear majority of 57.5 per cent of the voters in 22 of Switzerland's 26 cantons. The vote against was 42.5 per cent. Since the ban gained a majority of votes and passed in a majority of the cantons, it will be added to the constitution.[109]

Propaganda placards against the building of the minarets were circulated in order to incite fear among the general population. One poster showed a veiled woman before a Swiss flag penetrated by several black minarets. The picture was accompanied by the words: 'Stop. Yes to a ban on minarets'.[110] Hisham Maizar, who heads the Federation of Islamic Umbrella Organizations, representing almost half the Islamic centres in Switzerland, stated, 'They claim that minarets will spread like mushrooms. It's unacceptable that minarets are presented like rockets and that the pictured woman symbolises an attitude with which female Muslims can't identify.'[111]

On 12 December 2009 about 500 protesters gathered outside the parliament in Bern to condemn the ban on the building of new minarets. Some had placards reading 'Islam' and 'We are Muslims, not Hitler'. Nicolas Blancho, a Muslim Swiss co-organizer of the demonstration, told the crowd that Muslims are not seeking to impose *Sharīʿa* law in Switzerland. The minaret ban also drew widespread criticism internationally, with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, calling the ban 'deeply discriminatory, deeply divisive and a thoroughly unfortunate step for Switzerland to take'.[112]

107. R. Smith, 'Switzerland: Muslims Targeted in the Name of Minarets', *Inter Press Service*, 27 October 2009.
108. N. Cumming-Bruce and S. Erlanger, 'In Bastion of Tolerance, Swiss Reject Construction of Minarets on Mosques', *The New York Times*, 30 November 2009, p. 6.
109. *Ibid.*
110. Smith, 'Switzerland: Muslims Targeted in the Name of Minarets', *op. cit.*
111. *Ibid.*
112. 'Swiss Man Builds Mock Minaret to Protest Ban', *al-Arabiyya*, 12 December 2009.

VII–1.4   The Shah Jehan Mosque, Woking, Surrey, UK, the oldest
purpose built mosque in Britain, opened in 1889
© Tor Eigeland/AramcoWorld

The banning of the construction of minarets in Switzerland reflects the fear of Islam among many mainstream Swiss people, and the right-wing SVP party succeeded in manipulating this concern. However, 42.5 per cent of people voted against banning minarets. French Switzerland (including Geneva) rejected the constitutional ban but German Switzerland (including Zurich) voted for it. As soon as the majority of Swiss people voted to include a ban on minarets in their constitution, Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf, the Swiss Justice Minister, assured the world that it was 'not a vote against Islam.'[113] Some mainstream Swiss people were also sympathetic to the Muslim cause. For example, a shoe shop owner, Guillaume Morand, who was not a Muslim, built a mock minaret as an extension of his chimney and sprayed it with gold paint in defiance of the constitutional amendment. Morand commented, 'It was scandalous that the Swiss voted for the ban. Now we [the Swiss] have the support of all the far-right parties across Europe. This is shameful.'[114]

United Kingdom

Britain has been in touch with the Muslim world since the seventh century through trade contacts with Egypt and Palestine, which had come under Muslim control. It is likely that Britain also conducted trade with Muslims residing in Andalusia (Muslim Spain and Portugal). Later records indicate the presence of Arab Muslims in London from the twelfth or thirteenth centuries, presumably for trade purposes. From the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, British relations with Muslims were cordial. In 1587, following in from the steps begun by her father King Henry VIII, Queen Elizabeth I arranged a defence treaty with the Ottomans, and later Britain formed political links with Muslim territories as far away as India and Persia.[115] From the nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries, when Britain colonized many predominantly Muslim territories, some Muslims from Bengal (India), Yemen and Somalia began to arrive in Cardiff and London. Yemeni and Somali people have settled in Cardiff since the late nineteenth century. Yemeni sailors settling in Cardiff's Tiger Bay registered a house for use as a mosque as early as 1860. In Liverpool the Muslim community was indigenous in character, led by a Muslim convert, the Manx solicitor Abdullah Henry William Quilliam. In the 1880s Quilliam converted to Islam in Morocco, where he became an *alim* (Islamic scholar). In the 1890s Quilliam established the Liverpool Mosque and the Muslim Institute. In the early 1940s some South Asian Muslims purchased

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113. C. Caldwell, 'No Minarets, Please', *The Weekly Standard*, 14 December 2009.

114. 'Swiss Man Builds Mock Minaret to Protest Ban', *op. cit.*

115. H. A. Hellyer, 'British Muslims: Past, Present and Future', *The Muslim World*, XCVII, No. 2, 2007, pp. 226–7.

three houses in London's East End and converted them into the East London Mosque and the Islamic Cultural Centre.[116]

The 1960s and 1970s saw a rise in the number of Muslims in Britain as immigrants from British colonies and Commonwealth countries arrived. In 2001 there were 1.6 million Muslims in the United Kingdom (2.7 per cent of the total population of the UK). British Muslims were predominantly South Asian (43 per cent Pakistani, 16 per cent Bangladeshi, 8 per cent Indian, and 6 per cent from other Asian backgrounds), approximating 75 per cent of the total British Muslim population. Approximately 12 per cent of Muslims were white (5 per cent with UK heritage) and approximately 8 per cent were of African origin.[117]

After the Second World War the influx of 'coloured' (both Muslim and non-Muslim) immigrants met resistance from a section of the wider British society. In particular, working-class people living in the poorer areas to which the new immigrants gravitated were sensitive to the disruptions that immigration caused to their everyday lives. Attitudes to the newcomers were often hostile. In the 1960s a right-wing Conservative members of parliament, Enoch Powell, was critical of the influx of 'coloured' migrants to England as they were 'incapable of ordinary and decent family life.'[118] In the 1970s and 1980s the National Front (later the British National Party, BNP) exhibited overt racism against the 'coloured' immigrants. Later, after the 7/7 London bombings which killed fifty-two people (including one Muslim girl), the BNP exploited the situation, and became overtly anti-Muslim.[119]

Overall, Muslims in London are economically marginalized people. In 2006 the Mayor of London published *Muslims in London*, a report based on data from the 2001 census and other sources, where he acknowledged that there is a 'systematic pattern of discrimination against Muslims' and, of all the faiths in London, Muslims are the most disadvantaged people. The report found that London's 600,000 Muslims were less educated, less healthy and less likely to have a job or to own a home than non-Muslims.[120] The report highlighted the fact that 43 per cent of working age Muslims in London had

116. H. K. Ansari, 'The Woking Mosque: A Case Study of Muslim Engagement with British Society since 1889', *Immigrants and Minorities*, XXI, No. 3, 2002, p. 6; M. S. Sheddon et al., *British Muslims between Assimilation and Segregation*, Leicestershire, Islamic Foundation, 2004, pp. 2–18.

117. Office for National Statistics, 'Census 2001', http://www.ons.gov.uk/census/index.html, accessed 28 May 2009.

118. P. Ward, *Britishness since 1870*, London, Routledge, 2004, p. 134.

119. For further details see, N. A. Kabir, *Young British Muslims: Identity, Culture, Politics and the Media*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2010.

120. Mayor of London, *Muslims in London*, 2006, pp. 41–75, http://www.london.gov.uk/gla/publications/equalities/muslims-in-london.pdf, accessed 28 May 2009; M. Smit, 'Muslims Worst off in London', *Newsquest Media Group Newspapers*, 25 October 2006.

no qualifications, compared to 27 per cent of average workers. At this time 1 in 12 Londoners was a Muslim, but only 42 per cent aged 16 to 24 were economically active compared with 60 per cent of the general population. Economically active people are defined as being in employment or unemployed and looking for work. Just 15 per cent of Muslim women over 25 worked full time, compared with 37 per cent of women in the general population. Seventy per cent of Bangladeshi and Pakistani children in London were living in poverty. Thirteen per cent of Muslim men and 16 per cent of Muslim women reported their health as 'not good', compared with 8 per cent of the general population. Only 38 per cent of Muslims owned their own home, versus 56 per cent of the general population and a third of Muslims across Britain lived in households that were overcrowded. This figure jumped to over 40 per cent in London.

The *Muslims in London* report called on the government to do better research, to investigate discrimination and to increase Muslim representation on public bodies. Mayor Livingstone said that he hoped the report would combat some of the ignorance, prejudice and Islamophobia stirred up by some sections of the media. The Secretary General of the Muslim Council of Britain, Dr Muhammad Abdul Bari, noted that the groundbreaking report documents the needs of the community and identifies policy initiatives. Dr Bari said, 'The report is a role model for other major cities in Britain and even for mainland Europe.'[121] The report showed that overall Muslims in Britain felt very connected to Britain. As the Birmingham Muslim City Councillor, Salma Yaqoob, said:

> Contrary to popular perception, most British Muslims want to integrate into broader society. I was not surprised by the findings of a study by the Open Society Institute published late last year [2009], showing that British Muslims are the most patriotic in Europe. Whereas 78 per cent of the UK's Muslims felt themselves to be British, only 49 per cent and 23 per cent of Muslims in France and Germany considered themselves French and German, respectively. The British model of multiculturalism makes it easier for immigrant communities to breathe, feel accepted and identify with their new homeland and nationality.[122]

In my book, *Young British Muslims: Identity, Culture, Politics and the Media*, I also found that many young British Muslims felt connected to Britain. They were critical of some issues, such as the media and the politicians' 'othering' of Muslims on the *niqāb* and the *Sharīʿa* law debate, yet many felt that Britain was their 'home'.[123]

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121. 'Livingstone Publishes Report on Barriers Facing London Muslims', *Morning Star*, 24 October 2006.
122. S. Yaqoob, 'Doing it for Ourselves', *New Statesman*, 15 February 2010, p. 40.
123. For further details, see Kabir, *Young British Muslims …*, *op. cit.*

Conclusion

Since 9/11 many Muslims in Western Europe have faced challenges in their everyday lives. For example, in France Muslims are confronted with 'radical secularism' where the *ḥijāb* is banned in public/state schools. In Switzerland, the banning of minarets in mosques could be interpreted as 'religious intolerance'. The cartoons of the Prophet Muḥammad in Denmark and Sweden in the name of 'freedom of speech' ridiculed Islam. On the other hand, Muslim protests against the presence of the Israeli Davis Cup team in Sweden exhibited anarchism. Muslim women in Western Europe enjoy diversity, but if they insist on wearing the *niqab* (face veil) in public, such as in schools or the workplace, they are bound to generate antagonism because it hampers communication. Discontent among Muslims, as discussed in the Italian context, is also not helpful.

The most important issue that should be addressed is Muslim placement in the labour market. In December 2009 the Open Society Institute published a report, *Muslims in Europe: A Report on 11 EU Cities*. It was based on over 2,000 one-to-one interviews and more than sixty focus group interviews of Muslims living in eleven cities in seven European Union states – Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Overall, the study found that Muslims in these eleven cities were an economically marginalized community. For example, Muslims were almost three times more likely to be unemployed than their non-Muslims counterparts (19.8 per cent of Muslims were unemployed, compared with 6.8 per cent of non-Muslims). About 64.8 per cent of Muslim university graduates were employed in higher skilled positions, compared with 85.3 per cent of non-Muslim university graduates. Non-Muslim university graduates were 1.6 times more likely than Muslim university graduates to be employed in modern professional occupations. About 72 per cent of Muslim women were employed, but they were mostly concentrated in clerical or service occupations. Only about 2 per cent of Muslim women held managerial positions. Finally, Muslims born in an EU state were just as likely to be unemployed as Muslims born outside an EU state, but EU-born non-Muslims are slightly more likely to be employed than non-Muslims born elsewhere.[124]

The majority of Muslims have become an integral part of their new 'home' in Western Europe, yet many still experience discrimination, exclusion and suspicion. This complex situation presents Western Europe with one of its greatest challenges: how to effectively ensure that minority peoples enjoy equal rights and social cohesion in a climate of political and social tension, global economic recession, and rapidly expanding diversity. Muslim communities should pay more attention to education and integration, and the wider society should open up more avenues for Muslim employment.

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124. OSI, *Muslims in Europe …*, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

Chapter 7.2

MUSLIM MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE CAUCASUS

Nahid Afrose Kabir

The Muslim communities that live today as minorities in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus have survived the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the break-up of the state of Yugoslavia, and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union. In some places Muslims constitute a majority, for example in the Russian republic of Dagestan, but they still have minority status because the central power lies with the federal government. Some countries in Central Europe have an Islamic heritage, such as Poland, whereas in other Central European countries Muslims are seen as new immigrants.

The interest in minorities is heightened in Eastern European countries and the Caucasus because these countries are keen to become members of the European Union (EU) due to economic benefits, such as easier trade, use of the same currency, and better job prospects for their residents in other EU member countries; and an important criterion for membership of the EU is protection of minorities.[1] In this chapter, I discuss the situation of Muslim minorities in Eastern and south-eastern Europe, Central Europe and the Caucasus, and compare their status with the majority. Table 7.2.1 shows the Muslim minority populations and percentages in each of the countries I discuss in this chapter.

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1. *The European Parliament*, brochure, Germany, 2008, p. 20.

Table 7.2.1: Muslim minority populations in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus[2]

Countries	Muslim population	Percentage of the total population
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,522,000	40
Croatia	4,437,460	1.3
Serbia	244,000	3.2
Montenegro	111,000	17.7
Republic of Macedonia	680,000	33.3
Slovenia	47,000	2.4
Bulgaria	920,000	12.2
Ukraine	456,000	1.0
Hungary	24,000	0.2
Rumania	100,000	0.5
Czech Republic	1,000	0.1
Slovakia	5,000	0.1
Estonia	2,000	0.1
Poland	48,000	1.0
Russia/Russian Federation[3]	16,482,000	11.7
Georgia	423,000	9.9

Muslims in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe

Yugoslavia was formerly a multinational state composed of six republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia, and the two autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina in Serbia. The republics comprised many ethnic and religious groups, which opposed the domination of the strongest ethnic group, the Serbs, and called for greater national and political rights. In the 1990s Yugoslavia was broken up into different countries.[4]

2. The information in Table 7.2.1 is derived from a variety of sources from different years (as I have mentioned in the text). It should be taken as an approximate comparison between the countries.

3. The republics of Russia/the Russian Federation include Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia-Alania, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Tatarstan (also discussed in this chapter).

4. The Yugoslav Wars were a series of violent conflicts in the territories of the former Yugoslavia that took place between 1991 and 2001. Serb nationalists desired 'ethnically clean' Serbian areas in the former Yugoslavia that could be united with Serbia proper and thereby establish a Greater Serbia.

About 250,000 people were killed by wars and 'ethnic cleansing' in these new countries.5 In the entire process of ethnic cleansing, Muslims suffered the most.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The war in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (known as the Bosnian War) lasted from March 1992 to November 1995. The anti-Muslim onslaught or 'ethnic cleansing' in the Balkans was justified by Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević when he contended that many Serbs had been killed by the Ottoman Turks during the war of Kosovo in 1389.[6] On 1 March 1992 the European Community declared that it would recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina as an independent and sovereign state following a national referendum in February 1992. Serbs, who comprised 31 per cent of the population, largely boycotted the referendum, while Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), who comprised 45 per cent, and Croats (17 per cent) overwhelmingly voted for independence.[7] In 2001 the Muslim population was 1,522,000, which comprised 40 per cent of the total population.[8]

In August 1995 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened after the Srebrenica massacre in which 8,000 Bosnian men and boys were killed by the Army of Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb Army) under the command of Serbian General Ratko Mladić.[9] In December 1995 the Dayton Agreement signed by the Presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Alija Izetbegović), Croatia (Franjo Tuđman) and Serbia (Slobodan Milošević) brought a halt to the fighting, roughly establishing the basic structure of the present-day state. The UN Security Council agreed to keep the European Union's peacekeeping force in Bosnia until 2009. In 2008 Bosnia and Herzegovina received €54 million to secure its economic recovery.[10]

5. M. Rosenberg, 'The Former Yugoslavia', 2005, http://geography.about.com/od/politicalgeography/a/fmryugoslavia.htm, accessed 23 December 2008.
6. R. E. Turkestani, 'The Muslim Predicament in the Balkans: Tito's Legacy', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XVII, No. 2, 1997, p. 325.
7. M. R. Khan, 'From Hegel to Genocide in Bosnia: Some Moral and Philosophical Concerns', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XV, No. 1/2, 1994, p. 6.
8. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population,* Washington, DC, Pew Research Center, 2009, p. 31, http://www.pewforum.org/Mapping-the-Global-Muslim-Population.aspx, accessed 4 December 2012.
9. C. Del Ponte, 'The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Ratko Mladic', *International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*, 10 October 2002, http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mla-ai021010e.htm, accessed 16 January 2009.
10. EU, 'Delegation of the European Commission to Bosnia and Herzegovina', 2008, http://www.europa.ba/?akcija=vijesti&akcija2=pregled&jezik=2&ID=343, accessed 23 December 2008.

According to a research report in 2008, 'The war in Bosnia resulted in the displacement of millions of civilians, most of them women. Ten years after the civil war, many of them were still living as refugees in their country of origin or abroad.'[11] It also reported that many Bosnian refugee women were suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.[12] Under an international treaty, Bosnia was supposed to be mine-free by March 2009. Since the war ended, mines have claimed 1,665 victims, including 487 fatalities. As late as 2008, nineteen people were killed and 18 others maimed.[13]

After 1995 anti-Muslim sentiments existed in some sections of the non-Muslim community. In 2006 a mosque in the southern Bosnia and Herzegovina city of Mostar was attacked by a rocket-propelled grenade. The mosque, which had been damaged during the 1992–5 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, had been rebuilt by returned Bosnian Muslims. Since the end of the war Mostar has remained ethnically divided between Catholic Croats, who control the western part of the city, and Bosnian Muslims on the eastern side. The grenade incident coincided with the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.[14]

Since the war, Bosnia has been divided into two mini states – a Bosnian Serb republic (Republika Srpska) and a federation of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. In 2008 a Bosnian Islamic organization sued Bosnian Serb authorities for €32 million ($41.6 million) compensation for the wartime destruction of mosques.[15] Amid internal tensions, health crises and economic underdevelopment, Bosnia and Herzegovina will have to make an enormous effort in order to be accepted into the EU. This acceptance appears to be far-fetched and unrealistic. On 22 October 2008 Olli Rehn, EU Commissioner, stated that Bosnia and Herzegovina must put EU-related reforms at the top of its political agenda and address the priorities of the European Partnership, including state and institution building.[16]

11. 'Mental Health: New Mental Health Findings from University of Zurich Described', *Women's Health Weekly,* 27 December 2008.

12. *Ibid.*

13. W. J. Kole, 'Deadline to be Missed – by Decade War-Torn Country got an Extension to Remove the Hazards, but Money to do the Work is Lagging', *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 22 December 2008, p. 17.

14. 'Bosnian Mosque attacked by Grenade', *Xinhua News Agency*, 10 October 2006.

15. 'Bosnia: Muslims want Compensation for Lost Mosques', *The Associated Press*, 11 December 2008.

16. O. Rehn, 'Overcoming Stalemate – A Must for EU Integration for Bosnia and Herzegovina – Speech by EU Commissioner Rehn', 22 October 2008, http://www.europa-eu un.org/articles/en/article_8240_en.htm, accessed 23 December 2008.

CROATIA

In 1993 it was estimated that more than 250,000 Muslim refugees from Bosnia had sought shelter in Croatia. Another estimate was that 100,000 Bosnian Muslims had lived in Croatia while it was part of the former Yugoslavia and became citizens after it gained independence in 1991.[17] However, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that ever since Bosnian-Croat forces, backed by the Croatian army, entered Bosnia's war against the Serbs, and responded with a vigorous offensive in March 1993, there has been a growing number of incidents against Bosnian Muslims in Croatia. Muslims living in Croatia have experienced harassment because of evictions of Bosnian Muslims from state refugee centres; police have harassed Bosnian Muslim refugees; and some Bosnian refugees have been forcibly conscripted into the Croatian army. Both Muslim refugees and citizens were terrified that they could be expelled from Croatia and forced to return to the small amount of territory controlled by the Muslim-led Bosnian Government.[18]

In May 1996 Semso Tankovic, chairman of the Party of Democratic Action in Croatia, announced that the position of Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) in Croatia was worse than it was seven or eight years ago. In the previous system Bosniaks had been active in politics, public and cultural life and in the management of many prominent Croatian companies, but now 'all the Bosniaks have been removed from public functions'.[19] In February 1997 it was reported that at least 3,000 Bosniaks who resided in Croatia as indigenous settlers would not be able to vote in the April county and municipal elections because they did not possess citizenship certificates (*domovnica*) or have Croatian citizenship, although previously they all had Croatian republican citizenship in the former Yugoslavia.[20]

However, the Croatian Government's relationship with Muslims started to improve after 2002 when Croatian Prime Minister Ivica Račan signed an agreement with the Islamic community in Croatia (and the Serbian Orthodox Church). The agreements granted the right to religious expression, and allowed representatives of the Islamic communities to act in the capacity of pastoral workers in hospitals and penitentiaries. In workplaces and in the military no-one would be compelled to eat food that was not in keeping with their religious practice. The Islamic community would be funded €427,000

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17. J. S. Landay, 'Muslims in Croatia Face Rising Incidents of Expulsion and Bias', *The Christian Science Monitor*, 24 June 1993, p. 1.

18. *Ibid.*

19. 'Text of Report by the Hanau-based Newspaper "Nova Bosna" on 29 May', *BBC Monitoring Service: Central Europe and Balkans*, 31 May 1996.

20. 'Bosnian Radio says Muslims in Croatia Discriminated Against', *BBC Monitoring Service: Central Europe and Balkans*, 26 February 1997.

from the state budget. This pact was welcomed by the President of the Islamic community in Croatia, Mufti Sevko Omerbasic, as a significant agreement because it would enable them to express their faith freely and promote Islamic values towards EU integration.[21]

According to the 2001 census the population of Croatia was 4,437,460 and Muslims comprised 1.3 per cent (57,687) of the total. In September 2004 Mufti Omerbasic said in a media statement that Muslims in Croatia had secured a stable position in society. He voiced his satisfaction that a mosque had been built in the northern Adriatic city of Rijecka and the Faculty of Islamic Sciences was opened in Zagreb.[22] There was also a beautiful mosque in Peščenica, Zagreb, and there were plans to build mosques in Osijek, Sisak and Karlovac.[23]

SERBIA

The period of 'ethnic cleansing' had a great impact on some Muslims in Serbia. In 1992 four members of a Serbian paramilitary force, the 'Avengers', abducted sixteen Muslims in Serbia and took them to Bosnia where they were tortured and killed. In 2005 the Avengers were sentenced to imprisonment for up to twenty years.[24] It is alleged that Muslims were systematically tortured in Serbia in the early 1990s.[25] However, in 2009 Muslims in Serbia numbered 244,000 which constituted 3.2 per cent of the total population.[26] But according to Serbian Islamic Community information, Muslims formed 10 per cent of the population in Serbia, and there were 200,000 of them in Belgrade.[27]

In 2004 the President of the Islamic Religious Community of Serbia and Belgrade, Mufti Hamdija Effendi Jusufspahic, said that Serbian Muslims came from different ethnic backgrounds and included Albanians, Bosniaks, Romas and Goranies. Mufti Jusufspahic believed that if Serbs wanted to live in a truly democratic state they must guarantee Muslims their basic religious rights, such as the right to build mosques, and the right to bury themselves in Islamic graves after death. The Mufti requested the local councils to include locations for construction of mosques in the towns' urban planning so that Muslims in sixteen Belgrade suburbs could build their mosques, as did other religious

21. 'Croatian Premier Signs Agreement with Orthodox, Muslim Communities', *BBC Monitoring European*, 21 December 2002.

22. 'Omerbasic says Position of Muslims in Croatia Good', *Hina*, 9 September 2004.

23. M. E. Salla, 'Traveling the Full Circle: Serbia's "Final Solution" to the Kosovo Problem', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XVIII, No. 2, 1998, pp. 229–30.

24. 'Serbs Convicted of Killing Muslims', *The Independent*, 16 July 2005, p. 24.

25. M. Bodul, 'Where are the Mosques?', *The Washington Times*, 16 August 1992, p. 2.

26. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*, p. 32.

27. 'Islamic Leader says Muslims in Serbia do not have Enough Rights', *BBC Monitoring European*, 3 May 2004.

communities.[28] Though there are about 190 mosques in Serbia, Muslims in some cities such as Novi Sad gather for prayers in low-profile areas, most likely because they fear persecution.[29]

Some Muslims have faced vilification in Serbia. For example, on 17 March 2004 a crowd of about a thousand youths smashed the windows of the Islamic community centre in Novi Sad, capital of the ethnically mixed Vojvodina, an autonomous province in Serbia, and removed the flag of Vojvodina from the Vojvodina Legislature, burning it to shouts of 'This is Serbia'.[30] The next day, the Bajrakli Mosque in Belgrade was set on fire, which destroyed the Islamic community's administrative centre and library; their records were lost, the safe was emptied and computers were stolen or destroyed. A stream of diplomats from Western and Islamic countries, civic officials, Serbian Government officials, and ordinary Serbs and Muslims arrived at the mosque the morning after the attack to express support, offer help and condemn the violence. The great majority of the mosque attackers were teenagers identified by witnesses as football hooligans and members of Obraz, a militant Orthodox young gang. In conjunction with this attack two Albanian-owned businesses were vandalized, and the attackers also damaged a McDonalds in the centre of Belgrade, vandalized two UN vehicles, and stoned a police cordon guarding the American embassy.[31] It was alleged that the attack was sparked by the burning of the Serbian Orthodox Churches in Kosovo.[32]

At the same time, in the southern Serbian city of Nis, the nineteenth-century Hadrovic Mosque was severely damaged by arsonists that same evening. Demonstrators laid down in front of the fire engines to prevent them from reaching the blaze. Mufti Jusufspahic criticized the police for not doing enough to protect the mosque. The mosque attacks were a severe setback to the efforts of Serbian authorities to show the world that they had adopted a course of tolerance after the ethnic and religious hatred associated with the regime of former Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milošević, who was then standing trial for war crimes in the Hague. Two years later, on 18 and 19 October 2006, the Hadrovic Mosque in Nis was again attacked. This time the Serbian Ministry of Religion condemned the barbaric attacks on the mosque

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28. *Ibid.*
29. A. Alibašić, 'Serbia', in J. S. Nielsen, S. Akgönül, A. Alibašić and E. Račius (eds.), *Year of Muslims in Europe*, IV, Leiden, Brill, 2012, p. 524.
30. M. Mracevich, 'Anti-Muslim Violence Rocks Serbia', *Transitions Online*, 19 March 2004.
31. *Ibid.*
32. 'Kosovo Rioters burn Serb Churches', *BBC*, 18 March 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3525168.stm, accessed 1 January 2009.

and Islamic believers in Nis and apologized to all Muslims in Serbia because of the insults to which they were exposed.[33]

There are concerns about the growth of radical Islamists (the Wahhabis) in Novi Pazar in Serbia. In March 2007 six men were arrested for planning to attack members of the local Muslim community. The police said that they also uncovered weapons, including rocket-propelled grenades, 10 kilos of plastic explosives and automatic assault rifles hidden in a small cave. The local Muslims called the Wahhabis 'fundamentalist Muslims' who want to establish a pure and original form of Islam in the region, as practised in much of the Arabian Peninsula. The traditional Sunni, mainly Turkish-influenced, version of the faith practised in the Balkans is inconsistent with the ideology of the Wahhabis so Sunnis were also apprehensive about their growth in the region.[34]

In October 2007 it was reported that Serbian police intervened in an internal conflict within the Muslim community and twisted the arm of the Vice-President of the Councils of Elders of the Islamic Community [IZ] in Serbia; they also hit Imam Elvedin Tokovic on the head with a police baton. The Muslim community asked the Serbian government not to intervene in their internal affairs.[35] Finally, in 2008 the spiritual head of the Islamic Community of Serbia (IZS), Reis-ul-Ulema Adem Zilkic, said it was possible to overcome the rifts among Muslims only within the Islamic Community of Serbia as an umbrella organization for all Muslims in the country. Zilkic explained that Muslims in the IZS believed that Serbia was their state 'Because they are born in it and they suffered much in it like the rest of the citizens living in it suffered'. He further said, 'We want to build a more certain and better future. We want to live in abundance and we want to join Europe and integration processes, but we want to do this under one state, framework which is called Serbia and within IZS.'[36] At the time of writing this chapter (2008), Serbia was not recognized as a candidate country, but only as a 'potential candidate country' for EU membership. Therefore, both the Muslim and non-Muslim Serbian communities have to work hard to achieve European integration.

33. 'Serbian Ministry Condemns Attack on Mosque, Muslims in Southern Town', *BBC Monitoring European*, 19 October 2006.
34. N. Wood, 'Serbs Raid "Radical Islamist" Camp', *International Herald Tribune*, 5 April 2007, p. 4.
35. 'Muslim Leader Alleges Serbian Police Brutality in Mosque', *BBC Monitoring European*, 7 October 2007.
36. 'Serbia's Reis-ul-Ulema says "Umbrella" Islamic aimed to Overcome Rifts', *BBC Monitoring European*, 10 October 2008.

VII–2.1   Interior view of the Jumaya Jamiya, Plovdiv, Bulgaria
© Stephen Lewis/AramcoWorld

MONTENEGRO

In 1992 the United Nations expelled the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a rogue state for its abuse of human rights. In 2001 after the arrest of Slobodan Milošević, Serbia and Montenegro (former Yugoslav republics) regained their status as non-discriminatory regions on the world stage. In 2003 the state Union of Serbia and Montenegro was restructured into a loose federation of two republics called Serbia and Montenegro. They were only united in certain political areas, such as defence. In June 2006 a referendum divided them into independent countries.[37] On 15 December 2008 Montenegro officially applied to join the European Union as a candidate country. Candidate countries must meet a number of democratic, economic and legal standards before they are

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37. Serbia (including the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo) and Montenegro were the last (non-secessionist) republics of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On 4 February 2003 it was renamed the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, and officially abolished the name 'Yugoslavia'. However, on 3 and 5 June 2006, respectively, Montenegro and Serbia declared independence, thereby ending the Yugoslav state. Kosovo declared independence in 2008.

allowed to join the union. Montenegro has promized reform, although (as part of Serbia) it has had a bad human rights record.[38]

In 2003 Montenegro's Muslims comprised 17.2 per cent of the total population. They are mostly Sunnis, divided into three ethnic groups – Bosniaks, Montenegrins and ethnic Albanians. Orthodox Christians (followers of the Serbian Orthodox Church) comprise 74.24 per cent of the population, and Roman Catholics comprise 3.5 per cent.[39]

REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

In 2002 about 33.3 per cent of the Republic of Macedonia's total population were adherents of Islam, the fourth largest Muslim population in south-eastern Europe by percentage after Kosovo (90 per cent), Albania (70 per cent) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (48 per cent).[40]

Torbesh is the name given to the Macedonian-speaking (mainstream) Muslim minority community living in the Republic of Macedonia. Other Muslims in Macedonia are Albanians, Turks, Romas, Egyptians and Bosniaks.[41] It is claimed that Torbeshes identified themselves as Turkish until the time the Ottomans left the region as a result of the First Balkan War in 1912. During the Balkan Wars, and later during the Second World War, Torbeshes were subject to the 'forced assimilation' policies of Bulgarian authorities.[42] After the Second World War, when the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was established, Torbeshes (as well as Macedonian Christians) were compelled to adopt an ethnic Macedonian identity.

However, in 1970 the Association of Macedonian Muslims was established with the agreement and support of the authorities, probably as a means of keeping Macedonian Muslim aspirations under control. The association held its first meeting in 1970 at the monastery of Saint John Bigorski in western Macedonia. The rationale of the association is reminiscent of the Greek policy

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38. EU Business, 'Montenegro Formally Applies to Join European Union', 16 December 2008, http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1229351535.73, accessed 23 December 2008.
39. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 32; Central Intelligence Agency, 'Montenegro', *World Factbook,* 2008, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mj.html, accessed 27 December 2008.
40. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 32; Wikipedia, 'Republic of Macedonia', http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Macedonia#cite_note-50, accessed 23 December 2008.
41. A. Dikici, 'The Torbeshes of Macedonia: Religious and National Identity Questions of Macedonian-Speaking Muslims', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXVIII, No. 1, 2008, p. 27.
42. During the Second World War most regions of Macedonia were annexed by Bulgaria.

concerning the Pomaks: 'Torbesh are local people, i.e., Macedonians; but the Ottomans converted them forcefully.'[43]

After the independence of Macedonia in 1991 Torbeshes began to express their ethnic identities and religious freedom. However, during the civil war fought between the Macedonian government and ethnic Albanians in 2001, though Torbeshes demonstrated Macedonian nationalism and supported their government, mainstream Macedonian demonstrators in Bitola considered Torbeshes to be the 'other' and burnt down their houses and shops.[44]

Today within the Muslim community there is pressure on Torbeshes to integrate either within the Albanian or Turkish identity. Torbeshes worry that under such pressure they will lose their separate ethnic identity.[45] Overall, Muslims in Macedonia have been peaceful. Only during the Prophet Muḥammad cartoon controversy did the Macedonian Muslims protest in front of the Danish honorary consulate in Skopje, Macedonia. A group of about 1,500 chanted 'Allāh is one' in front of the building.[46]

SLOVENIA

The Slovene lands were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until the latter's dissolution at the end of the First World War. In 1918 Slovenes joined Serbs and Croats in forming a new multinational state, which was named Yugoslavia in 1929. After the Second World War Slovenia became a republic of the renewed Yugoslavia which, though communist, distanced itself from Moscow's rule. Dissatisfied with the exercise of power by the majority Serbs, Slovenes succeeded in establishing their independence in 1991 after a short ten-day war.[47]

According to the figures from the 2002 census, Slovenia is home to 47,000 Muslims, 2.4 per cent of the Slovene population. Thus Muslims are the second-largest religious community: Roman Catholics comprise 57.8 per cent of the Slovenian total population. Despite their numbers, the Muslim

43. During the communist regime, the Serbianization-Bulgarization and Serbianization-Macedonization policies caused deep damage to the cultural identity of Torbeshes. It led the people to believe that Ottomans converted them to Islam though there is no historical record to show that Ottomans carried out an Islamization policy. See Dikici, 'The Torbeshes of Macedonia: Religious and National Identity Questions of Macedonia-Speaking Muslims', *op. cit.*, p. 30.

44. Dikici, 'The Torbeshes of Macedonia: Religious and National Identity Questions of Macedonian-Speaking Muslims', *op. cit.*, p. 36.

45. 'Islamic Centre Head says Macedonian Muslims will not allow Radicalism to Flourish', *BBC Monitoring European*, 4 September 2006.

46. 'Caption Only: Muslims Protest in Many Nations', *Deseret Morning News*, 11 February 2006, p. 4.

47. Central Intelligence Agency, 'Slovenia', *World Factbook,* 2008, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/si.html, accessed 24 December 2008.

community in Slovenia is still one of the few in Europe not to have a mosque. In 2004 Muslims faced resistance when they proposed to build a mosque on the outskirts of the capital city, Ljubljana. Nearly 11,000 signatures were collected in opposition to the latest planning proposal. A referendum was organized on the issue, pending a decision from Slovenia's constitutional court. Michael Jarc was the city councillor leading the petition against the mosque. It was widely believed that a mosque would bring terrorist threats.[48] Slovenia became a EU member in 2004.[49]

BULGARIA

Historically speaking, Muslims in Bulgaria were considered to be national enemies. When the Balkan Wars broke out in south-eastern Europe in 1912–13 between the Balkan League (Bulgaria, Montenegro, Greece and Serbia) and the Ottoman Turks, Bulgaria sustained the heaviest casualties in the war. Since then Turks have been perceived as a barbarous, bloodthirsty and backward people. The term 'Turks' was perceived as 'all Muslims', whether they were ethnic Turks (who formed the bulk of the Muslim population in the Ottoman Europe), Slav Muslims, Muslim Roma, Tatars or Circassians. All were subjected to the same level of ethnic hatred. Even Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks) were treated like Turks or the 'other'.[50]

Pomaks (ethnic Bulgarian Muslims) did not enjoy specific minority rights and were often treated as second-class citizens. In the 1920s the Bulgarian administration started Bulgarization of Pomak Muslims. Pomaks were prevented from attending Turkish schools and were forbidden to open private schools. In July 1942 the Bulgarian parliament passed a new law that authorized Pomak names to be changed to Bulgarian ones. Many Turkish and Pomak village names were changed from Turkish to Bulgarian. Muslim Gypsies were also forced to change their names. Pomaks were sometimes subjected to conversion to Christian orthodoxy.[51] Again between 1960 and 1976 approximately 200,000 Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks) were forced to replace their names with conventional Bulgarian names. Many religious leaders who resisted the assimilation campaign were arrested, imprisoned

48. T. Smith, 'Mosque Bid Stirs Feelings in Slovenia', *BBC News*, 2 April 2004, http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3590841.stm, accessed 24 December 2008.
49. 'Member States of the EU', http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm, accessed 24 December 2008.
50. U. Brunnbauer, 'The Perception of Muslims in Bulgaria and Greece: Between the "Self" and the "Other"', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXI, No. 1, 2001, pp. 41–2.
51. O. Turan, 'Pomaks, Their Past and Present', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XIX, No. 1, 1999, pp. 69–83; Brunnbauer, 'The Perception of Muslims in Bulgaria and Greece', *op. cit.*, p. 44.

VII–2.2   A decorated ram, destined for a Muslim wedding, is carried
through the streets of Ribnovo in Bulgaria
© Stephen Lewis/AramcoWorld

or killed. Muslim practices, such as circumcision of male Muslim children, were prohibited.[52] Discrimination and prejudice against Muslims at school, especially in history classes where a black stereotype of Ottoman history was drawn, played a considerable role in strengthening ties and religious feelings among Muslims, including Turks, Pomaks and Gypsies, because all these Muslim groups identified themselves with the Ottomans. The relationship between Muslim groups, that is, to Pomaks, Gypsies and Turks, was stronger than with Bulgarians since they were forced to unite against the Bulgarization process and attempts to assimilate the Islamic cultures.[53]

With the end of communism in 1990, and with its new government, Bulgaria began the contentious process of moving towards political democracy and a market economy while combating inflation, unemployment, corruption and crime. The country joined NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007. However, to Pomaks the harsh reminder of the former regime still

52. A. Kusat, 'The Influence of Minority Feelings on the Formation of Religious Concept and Individual Identity: The Case of Bulgarian Muslims', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXI, No. 2, 2001, p. 368; see also M. Neuburger, *The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 2004.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 368.

remains. They have retained their Bulgarian names that the local security forces forced upon them. Like other Muslim minorities in Bulgaria, Pomaks had to perform their military service in construction camps. Pomaks, Turks or Muslim Gypsies were rarely recruited into the Bulgarian army. Christian missionary activities are still directed at Pomaks. In some places Pomaks could not teach their children Turkish through their primary schools (for example in Satofca, a large Pomak village near Goce Delcev). Even today many Pomaks are apprehensive that they would be persecuted if they called themselves 'Pomaks'. Some of them still prefer to be addressed as 'Bulgarian Muhammedans' because it is safer.[54]

In 2001 Bulgarian Orthodox Christians comprised 82.6 per cent, Muslims 12.2 per cent, and other Christians 1.2 per cent of the total population.[55] There are more than 1,500 mosques in Bulgaria, but many are shutting down because of two factors. Mustafa Haci, Bulgaria's Grand Mufti said:

> The first goes back a long time ago, during the communist rule, when Islamic schooling was forbidden, and this has led to the current severe shortage of imams. The other factor is the limited resources of the Fatwā House to pay imams' salaries (which are paid by the Muslim community).[56]

Like other south-eastern European countries, some mosques in Bulgaria have been attacked; for example, in 2006 the Kazanlak mosque in Sofia was set ablaze when a bottle of inflammable liquid was thrown at it. The Bulgarian parliament condemned the incident.[57]

Another group of Muslims, Romas, like Turkish Muslims, face double discrimination on account of both their ethnicity and religious identity. The position of all Roma, both Muslim and non-Muslim, in both Bulgaria and wider Europe is dire. Roma are one of Europe's most hated and disenfranchised groups. Faced with rampant societal intolerance, Bulgaria's Roma population suffered an increase in alienation and discrimination in 2002 and 2003.[58] Throughout this period Roma populations have been forcibly expelled from some areas by ethnic Bulgarians, and have faced epidemic police violence and

54. Turan, 'Pomaks, Their Past and Present', *op. cit.*, p. 79.
55. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, p. 31; Central Intelligence Agency, 'Bulgaria', *World Factbook,* 2008, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bu.html, accessed 24 December 2008.
56. Hany Salah, 'Imams Scarcity Closes Bulgaria Mosques', *Islam Online*, 22 September 2008, http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1221720230322&pagename=Zone-English-News/NWELayout, accessed 24 December 2008.
57. 'Bulgarian MPs Slam Mosque Attack', *OnIslam*, 27 July 2006, http://onislam.net/english/news/europe/415351, accessed 24 December 2008.
58. Islamic Human Rights Commission, *Briefing: Bulgaria's Muslims: From Communist Assimilation to Tentative Recognition*, UK, Islamic Human Rights Commission, 2003, http://www.ihrc.org.uk/show.php?id=684, accessed 29 December 2008.

harassment, including the deaths of a number of Roma people, discrimination in the provision of social welfare and housing, societal violence that caused the deaths of many Roma at the hands of racist and neo-Nazi gangs, and media hysteria directed at Roma. In several Bulgarian cities, including the capital Sofia, state schools refused to admit Roma children. Roma areas have been punished with mass electricity cuts and enforced segregation, with attempts in some Bulgarian towns to construct four-metre walls around Roma areas. Many Romas reside in Third World poverty conditions.[59]

However, at the end of 2005, the Bulgarian Government adopted a Health Strategy for Disadvantaged Persons, which envisaged a number of measures for disease prevention among Roma and enhanced health education of young Roma. Bulgaria also hosted the international launch of the 2005–15 Decade of Roma Inclusion, thus signalling its determination to address a backlog of problems with Roma and other minorities in this country. The initiative was adopted by eight countries of Central and south-eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Slovakia. National budget allocations were made annually for implementation of the plans.[60]

Muslims in Central Europe

Like Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, Islam was not new to some Central European countries. Under the communist regimes, Islam was restricted (like other religions), but now it has come back and some Central European countries are witnessing a new wave of Muslim immigrants, as discussed next.

UKRAINE

Ukraine was formerly a part of the USSR, and Islam came to Ukraine in the fourteenth century through Tatar Muslim traders and immigrants. In 1944 Joseph Stalin deported Crimean Tatar populations to Central Asia (particularly Uzbekistan) as punishment for supposed Tatar collaboration with the Germans. Crimea is now an autonomous republic of Ukraine. The 1944 deportation remains a painful chapter in the history of Crimean Tatars; it is estimated that almost half of the deportees died during the journey or shortly afterwards. However, since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Crimean Tatars have returned to their homeland.[61]

59. *Ibid.*
60. 'Government to Adopt National Programme for Improvement of Roma Housing Conditions', *Bulgarian News Agency BTA*, 2 February 2006.
61. Minorities at Risk, 'Assessment for Crimean Tatars in Ukraine', 2003, http://www.cidcm. umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=36904, accessed 29 December 2008.

The massive influx of Crimean Tatars from Uzbekistan has led to overcrowding, limited housing and greater pressure on formerly Tatar lands that are now occupied by other groups. Furthermore poor health conditions relative to other groups in Ukraine continue to plague Crimean Tatars. The economic situation means that Ukraine has had difficulty supporting this influx, and insufficient funds have been made available for effective resettlement. Political resistance remains against the idea of giving priority to Crimean Tatars over Ukrainians and Russians.[62]

In 2007 Crimea was home to some 300,000 Tatars. Over the past decade the Ukrainian Government has allocated some $10 million annually to help Tatars resettle in Crimea. Half of them have been allocated plots of land. But Crimean Tatars say they are still struggling to find their place in Ukrainian society. Many of them say they continue to face discrimination and higher unemployment than Crimea's Slavic majority population.[63]

In 2007 Muslims in the Ukraine numbered 456,000 which constituted 1 per cent of the total population.[64] Yet there is resistance to Muslims in some sections of the wider society. In 2006 Ukrainian Muslims condemned the reprinting of a cartoon featuring Prophet Muḥammad in the Ukrainian newspaper *Segodnya* as 'provocation'.[65] In 2008 the Crimean Muslim Council, the Muftiate, won a landmark battle in court over building a mosque in Simferopol.[66] However, there are also concerns (including from Muslims) about the spread of Wahhabism in the region.[67]

The Roma people are another disadvantaged group in the Ukraine, some of whom are Muslims. A survey in 2001 found that 37 per cent of Ukrainian Roma said that life was difficult but tolerable; the majority said that life had become intolerable.[68]

HUNGARY

Historically speaking, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia were under Ottoman rule so Islam is not new to these countries. The census of 2002 registered about

62. Ibid.
63. V. Prytula, 'Ukraine: A Bittersweet Homecoming for Crimea's Tatars', *Radio Free Europe Documents and Publications*, 5 September 2007.
64. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*, p. 32.
65. 'Ukrainian Newspaper Judged for Reprinting Offensive Cartoons', *BBC Monitoring Ukraine and Baltics*, 12 February 2006.
66. 'Muslims in Ukraine's Crimea Win Mosque Case', *BBC Monitoring Ukraine and Baltics*, 16 February 2008.
67. 'Followers of Strict Islam Active in Ukraine', *BBC Monitoring Ukraine and Baltics*, 16 April 2008.
68. A. Tanner, 'The Roma of Ukraine and Belarus', in Arno Tanner (ed.), *The Forgotten Minorities of Eastern Europe*, Helsinki, East-West Books, 2004, p. 95.

24,000 Hungarian Muslims making up 0.2 per cent of the total population.[69] In September 2005 it was reported that the Hungarian Islamic Community (MIK) would ask politicians to grant freedom of religion to Hungary's Muslim residents. MIK held that the National Security Office repeatedly raised suspicions of terrorism with Muslim communities or individuals purely on the basis of their religion. MIK complained that, despite repeated requests, Muslim inmates had no access to *ḥalāl* (Islamically permissible) food and Islamic religious care in Hungarian prisons. MIK also blamed the authorities for preventing the construction of mosques in Hungary, and for hindering family re-unification if one of the parties comes from an Arab State.[70]

In 2005 MIK complained about the growing number of anti-Islamic statements in the press, and protested about the appearance in Budapest of posters abusing Muslims as potential terrorists.[71] Hungarian Muslims found the publication of the Prophet Muḥammad's cartoons in several Hungarian newspapers offensive.[72] In 2004 a Palestinian-Hungarian dentist, Dr Saleh Tayseer (an imam and administrative head of the Hungarian Islamic Temple), was suspected of plotting a bomb attack on a Jewish target and was detained for two months. Later he was set free because of lack of evidence. In 2008 the Budapest Court awarded 2 million forints (€8,300) in compensation for the false accusation.[73] Hungary became a member of the European Union in 2004.

ROMANIA

In 2007 there were 100,000 Muslims in Romania, a country of 22 million people. More than 80 per cent of Romanians are Orthodox Christians. Romania's influential Orthodox Church has good relations with Muslims. In 2005 an Islamic militant group in Iraq released three Romanian hostages and their Iraqi American guide upon the requests of Romanian Muslims and Saudi cleric Salman b. Fahd al-Udeh.[74]

69. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
70. MTI Eco, 'Muslims in Hungary Protest against Discrimination', *MTI – Econews*, 30 September 2005.
71. *Ibid.*
72. 'Hungary's Muslims Condemn Cartoons, Government Sees No New Threat', *BBC Monitoring European*, 7 February 2006.
73. European Jewish Press, 'Hungarian Court Awards Compensation to Wrongly Accused Palestinian', *European Jewish Press*, 1 October 2008, http://www.ejpress.org/article/30725, accessed 29 December 2008.
74. 'Romanians' Captors say they were Freed at the Request of Saudi Cleric', *Agence France Presse*, 23 May 2005.

Muslims in Romania are also concerned about the spread of terrorism. In 2007 the spiritual leader Mufti Murat Yusuf believed that most Muslims in Romania practised a moderate Sunni form of Islam, and explained the need to amend Article 13 of the Law of Religion. This article imposed respect between religions, and respect of each citizen towards other religions and their values, so that the freedom of expression must not humiliate other practices. Mufti Yusuf feared that Muslim extremists might take undue advantage of the clause, and spread their extreme religious ideology.[75]

However, some sections of the wider Romanian society tend to be provocative against a religion in the name of free speech. In 2007, when British writer Salman Rushdie's book *Satanic Verses* was translated into the Romanian language with an initial print run of 5,000, Romania's Orthodox Church condemned its publication as it was considered it might hurt Muslim sentiments.[76] The Iranian Embassy in Bucharest said that the book should be banned. But free speech advocates in Romania criticized the call of the Iranian Embassy.[77] Romania became an EU member in 2007.

THE CZECH REPUBLIC

In 2005 the Muslim community in the Czech Republic was 1,000 which constituted 0.1 per cent of the total population.[78] A majority of Islamic adherents in the Czech Republic were foreigners (some came from the Balkans, the Caucasus and Arab countries). There are two mosques, one in Brno, south Moravia, and the other in Prague. The Islamic foundation in Brno faced protests against mosque construction and therefore their mosque was built without a minaret in 1998.[79] The Brno Mosque was vandalized four times up to 2008.[80] Although the Czech constitution guarantees full freedom of religion and religious association, Czech legislation does not provide for a full separation of church (or mosque) and state. To be eligible for state subsidies,

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75. Rompres, 'The Spiritual Leader of Muslims in Romania, Mufti …', *Rompress*, 15 January 2007.

76. The *Satanic Verses* was first published in 1988 in Britain. In 1989 Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini issued a religious edict calling for Rushdie's death and accused him of blasphemy against Islam.

77. 'Romanian Orthodox Church Condemns Publication of Romanian Translation of "Satanic Verses" ', *Associated Press Newswires*, 21 December 2007.

78. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*, p. 31.

79. J. Richter, 'Country's First Mosque Celebrates 10-year Anniversary', 2 July 2008, http://www.radio.cz/en/article/105718, accessed 30 December 2008.

80. P. Bokuvka, 'Mosque in Brno Damaged. Again', *The Czech Daily Word*, 27 October 2008, http://czechdaily.wordpress.com/2008/10/27/mosque-in-brno-damaged-again/, accessed 30 December 2008.

religious associations must be registered, and in order to be registered they must gather petitions from more than 10,000 members. It is difficult to obtain such signatures as many Muslims are reluctant to sign the petition due to a fear of persecution.[81]

In 2008 it was reported that Muslims living in the Czech Republic complained about a 'steep increase in Islamophobia, anti-Arabism and anti-Muslim moods' in the Czech Republic. According to a survey, 60 per cent of Czechs are afraid of danger coming from Muslims and almost half are afraid of a direct terrorist attack. Three-quarters did not want Muslims to build mosques in the Czech Republic, although they had no negative experience with them. The media was blamed for fuelling prejudice against Muslims. Some high ranking security officials also held anti-Muslim sentiments.[82] The anti-Islam camp in the Czech Republic involved Czech Buddhist Olga Ryantova, an evangelical Christian fundamentalist, secular liberal feminists, Roman-Catholic traditionalists, opponents of the Turkish EU membership, and proponents of the separation of church and state who view Islam as a religion of governance.[83] In 2004 the Czech Republic became an EU member.

SLOVAKIA

In 2005 it was reported that about 5,000 Muslims lived in Slovakia out of a total population of 5 million. To gain official registration, which would make their imams eligible for state wages and would enable them to teach their faith in schools, Muslims have to collect at least 20,000 signatures from their supporters.[84] Under such registration laws, the Muslim community in Slovakia would cease to be a religious community and be given civic association status. This law is clearly discriminatory because tiny religious communities would lose their religious identity. In 2005, according to a survey, over 40 per cent of respondents thought that Islam was a worse religion than others. Over 61.5 per cent of respondents said that they did not want a mosque built in their neighbourhood.[85]

81. J. Schneider, 'Muslim Minorities and Czech Society', in Pamela Kilpadi (ed.), *Islam and Tolerance in Wider Europe*, Budapest, Open University Institute, 2006, p. 133.
82. C. T. Kanceler, 'Muslims in Czech Republic want a Debate on Islamophobia', *CTK Daily News*, 8 September 2008.
83. Schneider, 'Muslim Minorities and Czech Society', *op. cit.*, p. 133.
84. 'Slovak Muslims Drop Religious Community Registration Idea', *BBC Monitoring European*, 8 April 2007.
85. TASR, 'MVK: People don't want Muslims and Mosques in Slovakia', *TASR, Tlacova Agentura Slovenskej Republiky*, 3 October 2005.

VII–2.3   Ethem Bey Mosque, in Tiranae, Albania, where worshippers
are gathering for Ramadan prayers
© Larry Luxner/AramcoWorld

ESTONIA

In the year 2000 there were about 2,000 Muslims in Estonia which constituted 0.1 per cent of the total population.[86] Estonian Muslims have plans to build a mosque one day. In 2001 it was reported that the Muslim community had insufficient funds and were not united enough to build a mosque. On the other hand, the planned mosque also faced resistance from some sections of the wider community. For example, in 2001 member of parliament and Tallin City Councillor, Liina Tonisson (of the Centre Party), told the *Essti Paevaleht:*

> We have no reason to hinder the building of a mosque, but Estonia is a country with European culture, and Islamic belief does not really belong here … I hope that for the building of the mosque the city provides land in a less significant location.[87]

However, Estonia is trying to accommodate Muslims into the wider community; it became a member of the EU in 2004. In 2008 it was reported that the Qurʾān was published for the first time in Estonian, and had been on the bestseller list for months.[88]

POLAND

The first group of Polish Muslims was the Tartar Poles, who have been living in Poland for several centuries. The second group was composed of immigrants from Arab countries who came to Poland in the 1970s. The third group comprised Muslim refugees from Bosnia. The oldest Tartar Polish mosques at Bohoniki and Kruszyniany in eastern Poland are not used much as there are few Tartar Polish families in these places. The newest mosque in Gdansk was named after Jamal-ad-din al-Afghanī, the father of pan-Islamic philosophy who grew up in the city. In 1990 an Islamic educational and cultural centre was established at Bialystok. Muslims in Poland are moderate people, but in 1993 they attracted mainstream attention when the Muslim Brotherhood Association took a Warsaw publishing company to court for publishing Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses.*[89]

In 2006 there were about 48,000 Muslims in Poland constituting 1 per cent of the total population.[90] On 6 February 2006 Polish Muslims again

86. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.,* p. 31.
87. M. Huang, 'A Mosque with View', *Central Europe Review*, 22 January 2001, http://www.ce-review.org/01/3/amber3.html, accessed 30 December 2008.
88. M. Tubalkain, Trell and Abdul Turay, 'Islam makes Inroads in Estonia', *The Baltic Times*, 9 April 2008.
89. T. Marciniak, 'A Survey of Muslim Minorities in Poland', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XVII, No. 2, 1997, pp. 353–5.
90. Pew Research Center. *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.,* p. 32.

made news when they demanded an apology from the *Rzeczpospolita Daily* for publishing cartoons featuring the Prophet Muḥammad. The next day the editor-in-chief of *Rzeczpospolita Daily* apologized to all those who felt offended by the publication of the cartoons.[91] To some people, Muslims in Poland remain unknown people or aliens, as in 2008 a survey of almost 25,000 people in Poland showed that 46 per cent held unfavourable opinions of Muslims.[92] Poland became an EU member in 2004.

The Muslim minority in the Caucasus

The Caucasus is a geopolitical region located between Europe and Asia. In this section I will discuss Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia-Alania and Dagestan, which are the republics of Russia in North Caucasus; and the independent Georgia in South Caucasus.

RUSSIA/RUSSIAN FEDERATION

In 2002 Muslims in Russia numbered 16,482,000 which constituted 11.7 per cent of the total population.[93] During the communist era, Islam was suppressed and its followers persecuted, as were Christians and other religious groups. Mosques were destroyed and only four official Muslim directorates were allowed to function for the entire Soviet Union – which then included a further 40 million Muslims in Central Asia. Since the collapse of communism, Islam has seen an extraordinary revival. There are now more than 1,200 mosques in the autonomous republic of Russia (there are twenty-one republics in the Russian Federation).[94]

In 2007 Gallup Poll found that one in four Muslim women in Russia (25 per cent) wears the *ḥijāb*, or Muslim headscarf, in public places at all times, while a similar number (28 per cent) say they do so sometimes. In some cases, Muslim women are willing to do so in the face of challenges from Russia's Government. In 2003, for example, a group of Muslim women in Tatarstan, with the help of a Protestant lawyer, successfully defended their right to be

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91. MZJW, 'Gauden Apologetic, but not Enough for Muslims', *Polish News Bulletin*, 7 February 2006.
92. Asia Pulse Pty Limited, 'Surge in Islamophobia: Survey', *The Press Trust of India Limited*, 18 September 2008.
93. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
94. M. Binyon, 'Mother Russia's Islamic Revival; Faith; The Register', *The Times*, 20 October 2007, p. 77; S. Gradirovski and N. Esipova, 'Gallup Presents … Russian Muslims: Religious Leaven in a Secular Society', *Harvard International Review*, XXX, No. 1, 2007, p. 58.

photographed for their civil identity papers with their heads covered.[95] In the Soviet years one could not purchase the Qurʾān. Since 1991, however, more than ten new translations have been produced in Russia.[96] The communist regime also forbade Muslims to perform the ḥajj, but now Muslims are allowed to perform this pilgrimage. The Islamic revival in Russia is a positive development, but in several Russian republics there exists strong confrontation between Muslims and non-Muslims in some sections of the Russian society.

A growing number of Islamic books (excluding the Qurʾān) fall into the banned list under Russia's 'extremism law'. Moreover, Russian authorities declared the followers of the 'less moderate Islam', Wahhabism, Salafism and Hizb-ut Tahrir movements, to be outlaws and repress them at every opportunity. Their members are arrested, interrogated, extradited and condemned, and in the Caucasus they are frequently tortured or murdered. The official representatives of the Russian *umma* often support the persecution of less moderate movements, believing that the extremism of individual Muslims and sects runs counter to their strategic goals.[97] One Muslim who worked in the Caucasus for some time commented that many Muslims in North Caucasus are moderate people, but there are a few hardliners. The Muslims who hold responsible positions in the government belonged to the Russian old guard. Therefore, they are still loyal to the federal government. Russia is not yet a democratic country as far as repression against minorities is concerned.[98]

The Republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia and North Ossetia-Alania

Chechens are an indigenous people of Northern Caucasus, who inhabited the region 4,000 to 6,000 years ago. The Chechen language belongs to the Nakh-Daghestani branch of the Caucasian linguistic family. After the Second World War Joseph Stalin accused Chechens of collaboration with the Nazis and deported the entire Chechen population to Soviet Central Asia. In 1957 Khrushchev allowed the deported Chechens to return.[99] The distressing

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95. *Ibid.*

96. *Ibid.*

97. *Ibid.*

98. Conversation with the author, Perth, Australia, 26 December 2008. See also W. Richmond, 'Russian Policies towards Islamic Extremism in the Northern Caucasus and Destabilization in Kabardino-Balkaria', in M. Gammer (ed.), *Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus*, London, Routledge, 2008, pp. 93–4.

99. E. Sokirianskaia, 'Ideology and Conflict: Chechen Political Nationalism Prior to, and during, Ten Years of War', in M. Gammer (ed.), *Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus*, London, Routledge, 2008, p. 106.

stories of deportation helped to build Chechen national identity, which can be seen among present-day Chechens.[100] While the majority of Chechens practise Sunni Islam, the collapse of the Soviet Empire saw a rise in Sufi brotherhoods in the region. Chechens first tried to recreate their national statehood in 1991. It was an outcome of a national revolution and eventually led to a protracted separatist war, which still goes on.[101]

Historically speaking, Ingush society did not join Chechens in the anti-colonial struggle during the Caucasian War (1817–64); however, a majority of the Ingush people converted to Islam as a reaction to Russian colonial expansion and protracted war. Now they are predominantly Muslims of the Sufi *tariqas* (tradition).[102]

During the nineteenth-century Caucasian War, Ossetians were considered to be Russia's allies in the Caucasus. On 20 June 1990 the North Ossetian people became the first autonomous republic of the Soviet Union, being renamed the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania in 1991. The predominant religion in the republic is Russian Orthodox Chrisitianity, and about 30 per cent of the population is Muslim.[103]

On 1 September 2004 the Chechen problem was brought to the world's attention with the horrendous Beslan tragedy. A group of thirty-two pro-Chechen gunmen raided a school in the town of Beslan in the Russian republic of North Ossetia, holding more than 1,000 children and adults hostage for three terrifying days. A total of 331 people were killed, most dying in a bloody gun battle when Russian special forces stormed the school gymnasium where the hostages were being kept, which the militants had littered with mines and bombs.[104] The Chechen rebels demanded that Russian President Putin withdraw the troops from Chechnya, with the Chechen Republic remaining part of the Commonwealth of Independent States and within the ruble zone, and ensure that peacemaking troops from the international community were brought into Chechnya.[105]

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100. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

101. *Ibid.*

102. E. Sokirianskaia, ' "Reliable" and "Unreliable" Peoples: The Ingush-Ossetian Conflict and Prospects for Post-Beslan Reconciliation', in P. Kilpadi (ed.), *Islam and Tolerance in Wider Europe*, Budapest, Open University Institute, 2006, pp. 49–50.

103. *Ibid.*

104. 'Beslan Militant gets Life Sentence', *The Guardian*, 26 May 2006.

105. Sokirianskaia, ' "Reliable" and "Unreliable" Peoples', *op. cit.*, p. 47. The main religion in Chechnya and Ingushetia is Sunni Islam, and the main religion in North Ossetia is Russian Orthodoxy. Chechen separatists are an indigenous and largely self-sustaining force motivated by nationalist more than Islamic goals. See C. J. Chivers and S. L. Myers, 'Chechen Rebels Mainly Driven by Nationalism', *The New York Times*, 12 September 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/12/international/europe/12russia.html, accessed 16 January 2009.

VII–2.4   Bosnian Muslims wait at a checkpoint manned by Bosnian and Croatian police officers in the Muslim enclave of Stari Vitez, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in May 1994
© UN Photo/John Isaac

The Beslan terrorists consisted of Chechens, Ingush, Ossetians, and 'individuals of Slavic nationality', and the Beslan events sparked repercussions against the minorities in the Prigoroodny District of North Ossetia. On 4 and 5 September all Ingush and Chechen students were asked to withdraw from their programmes in North Osseita and were transferred to other regional universities.[106] Ingush patients were moved to other hospitals. Even women and sick children seeking urgent hospital treatment were harassed by anti-Ingush groups of citizens. In 2005 and 2006 nine cases of disappearances of Ingush civilians took place in the Prigorodny district. One of the disappeared was found dead with marks of severe beatings and torture. None of the crimes were investigated and no-one has been arrested or charged for them.[107]

The Ingush reaction to the Beslan tragedy received no coverage in the press. In fact the Ingush Government promptly expressed condolences to the Ossetian people and planned to attend burial ceremonies (to which they were denied access), and Ingush children collected money and toys for the children

106. Sokirianskaia, ' "Reliable" and "Unreliable" Peoples', *op. cit.*, pp. 50–4.
107. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

of Beslan, but the humanitarian aid convoy was stopped at the border and sent back to Ingushetia. Furthermore, the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Ingushetia offered their assistance to the Ossetian law enforcement agencies during the hostage crisis but that remains unknown to the wider Ossetian community. The Ingush people were outraged at the acts of the terrorists but the Ossetian people were not convinced.[108] The North Ossetian people held the Ingush people collectively responsible for the Beslan tragedy, and believed that the Beslan terrorist act was a planned action by all of the Ingush people with the Chechens.[109] For the terrorist act of a few Chechens and Ingush people, all the Ingush Muslims and Chechens are perceived as the 'other' in Ossetian society.

REPUBLIC OF DAGESTAN

Dagestan is the southern-most Russian republic, lying between Chechnya and the Caspian Sea. In 2001 more than 90 per cent of Dagestan's 2 million-plus people were Muslims (Sunni Islam). Some Dagestanis were concerned that Wahhabism had begun to take hold in Dagestan.[110]

In August and September 1999 the Chechen rebel commander Shamil Basayev and the Saudi-born Wahhabi leader Ibn al-Khattab invaded Dagestan. Many were slaughtered, villages were destroyed and 32,000 people were displaced. Dagestanis spontaneously organized citizen militias and appealed to Moscow for military assistance. The invaders were driven out of the republic, killed, imprisoned or forced into hiding. On 16 September 1999 the Dagestani Assembly enacted legislation outlawing Wahhabism.[111]

In 2001 Colonel Abdulmumin Bagomedov, Chair of Counter-terrorist Operations of the Dagestani Division of the FSS, was concerned about the growth of religious extremists. Bagomedov stated that Dagestan was a transit territory that possessed oil refineries and means of transport, including railroads, pipelines, and sea routes. There are international interests in the oil monopolies in Dagestan. In the interest of its own economic affairs, Dagestan is trying to protect the republic from foreign extremist infiltration.[112]

There are also issues within the Dagestani Muslim community. In 2004 some Dagestani Muslims raised concerns about the poor quality of the education of some imams and their low-level Russian language skills. Therefore, some clergy have failed to win the minds of the majority of the population, and

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108. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
109. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
110. R. B. Ware, 'On the Roots of Extremism', *The Moscow Times*, 1 November 2001.
111. *Ibid.*
112. WPS Russian Media Monitoring Agency, 'Invisible Frontline', *Defense and Security*, 19 January 2001.

thus Islam remains synonymous with primitive and unappealing traditions and customs.[113] On the other hand, there have been cases of inter-religious conflict. In 2005 more than twenty people were injured in a fight between traditional Muslims and members of a Wahhabi sect in the Dagestani town of Derbent. The Dagestani minister for ethnic policy, information and external relations, Zagir Arukhov, said the fight was the result of an intra-denominational dispute over the way some rites should be performed.[114]

REPUBLIC OF KABARDINO-BALKARIA

Kabardino-Balkaria, a tiny republic with a predominantly Sunni Muslim population of less than 900,000, is squeezed between Russia, Georgia and the Russian republics of Karachaevo-Cherkessiya and North Ossetia. Islamic revivals in Kabardino-Balkaria have been popular among young people in the 15–30 age group. Apparently older Muslims of Kabardino-Balkaria tend to trust the security forces and view the younger generation with suspicion as radicals educated in Turkey or the Arab world. The situation escalated on 24 August 2003 when a shoot-out occurred between police and suspected militants in the village of Baksan, north of Nalchik. In reaction to this event, and to rumours that Chechen rebel commander Shamil Basayev was in Kabardino-Balkaria, officials closed mosques throughout the republic in September. Over 100 people were arrested, many of whom were brutally tortured by the police. In 2004 militants assaulted the anti-narcotics police headquarters in Nalchick, killing four policemen and appropriating 200 firearms. Throughout 2004 security forces discovered quantities of explosives in the possession of some of their detainees.[115]

Russian security authorities are concerned about the increase of radical elements. However, the Russian Government's racial profiling policy towards extremism could be enticing some young Muslims to radicalism as a method of contesting their government.[116] For example, some Muslims wear beards with trimmed moustaches, but that does not necessarily mean that they are radicals. Nevertheless in the 111-page handbook issued by the federal government to border guards in Northern Caucasus, the only means of identifying a 'Wahhabi', as opposed to a 'traditional' Muslim, is 'a beard and shortened

113. 'Russia: Dagestani Paper Unhappy about Clergy's Low Educational Level', *BBC Monitoring Caucasus*, 12 May 2004, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-21306172_ITM, accessed 10 October 2008.

114. Interfax Information Services, 'Over 20 said Injured in Fight between Muslims in Dagestan', *Interfax News Service*, 10 April 2005.

115. Richmond, 'Russian Policies towards Islamic Extremism in the Northern Caucasus and Destabilization in Kabardino-Balkaria', *op. cit.*, pp. 93–4.

116. *Ibid.*

pants.' The handbook also stated that the 'fundamental of Wahhabism' is 'to rule society and government.' The handbook later contradicts itself by declaring that the Wahhabi movement is divided into two trends: moderate and radicals.[117] The following discussion on Muslims in Tatarstan (which is a republic of Russia, located in the centre of the East European Plain but not placed in the Caucasus) reveals the frustration of some young Muslims.

REPUBLIC OF TATARSTAN

On the collapse of communism, Tatar leaders, like those in Chechnya, pushed for independence, but were bought off with promises of greater autonomy and by the huge rise in oil revenue. The Kremlin now sees Tatarstan as an example to trumpet abroad of a moderate Muslim establishment that collaborates with Russian Orthodoxy and with the secular government in Moscow.[118] Many Tatar Muslims are proud of their dual Tatar and Russian identity, and can speak both languages. Nevertheless some Muslims are concerned about the fundamentalist elements gaining sway in the republic's Muslim communities as there have been some alarming events. In 2002 a group of Tatar Muslims destroyed an Orthodox Church that was under construction, and two Tatars, fighting alongside the Taliban, were captured in Afghanistan.[119]

Under communism there were no proper training schools for the hundreds of muftis, imams and religious officials needed to revive Islam, and so in the early 1990s many young Tatars were sent abroad to Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to study. It is alleged that after their return these young men tended to denounce local practices as un-Islamic and demanded the kind of puritanical version of Islam they had learnt from the jihadists in the Middle East.[120] In order to keep Islamic propaganda away from the young, the Muslim Board of Tatarstan founded an Islamic university in 2000. More than 120 young men study the Qurʾān and Islamic law in the new institution. They have teachers from Middle Eastern countries who teach Arabic. The university did not accept women, however, despite the fact that there were some active Muslim women in the republic.[121]

The spread of terrorism could be a genuine concern for the people of Tatarstan. But sometimes innocent people have been indiscriminately stopped and searched, or accused either of terrorism or Wahhabism; some were arrested in a school and a mosque during prayers and immediately thrown

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117. *Ibid.*
118. M. Binyon, 'Mother Russia's Islamic Revival; Faith; The Register', *The Times*, 20 October 2007, p. 77.
119. L.-J. Perreault, 'Tatarstan', *Russian Life*, 1 March 2003, p. 54.
120. Binyon, 'Mother Russia's Islamic Revival; Faith; The Register', *op. cit.*, p. 77.
121. Perreault, 'Tatarstan', *op. cit.*

behind bars. In some cases they are simply be shot or beaten to death and everything is blamed on street hooliganism. The social organization with a nationalist agenda, the All-Tatar Public Centre (ATPC), appealed to the UN and other world bodies, as well as to the leaders of Russia's Tatarstan, to take steps to prevent the further persecution of ethnic Muslim organizations under the pretext of fighting world terrorism and extremism. They stated that young Muslims (for example, the Shaydullin brothers, Rustam, 13, and Ilmir, 18) were allegedly involved in setting up the illegally armed formation Islamic Jamaat with the purpose of carrying out terrorist acts on industrial facilities in Kazan, Naberezhnyye Chelny and Nizhnekamsk. It was claimed that they were 'terrorists' who fantasised about building a 'World Islamic caliphate' on Russian territory. The ATPC held that these children have been rightly imprisoned but questioned why they were being tried by a closed court. They asked why no access was allowed for the independent media and human rights and public organizations. The ATPC was concerned that the Stalinist oppressive 'troika', used to punish opponents in the past, still prevailed in post-communist Russia.[122]

GEORGIA

Like Russia, Georgia has been a Christian majority country for centuries. Nevertheless, it has long had a significant Muslim population. In the Middle Ages and early modern period, intensive contact between Georgia and the Islamic world helped to introduce Islam into Georgia. After the conquest of Tbilisi by Arabs in the eighth century, the city became the capital of an Islamic emirate for decades. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Ottoman Turks and Iranian Savavids controlled much of the country. However, under Muslim rule the remaining Tbilisi Christian population could practise their religion.[123]

In 2002 Muslims in Georgia constituted 9.9 per cent of the total population.[124] In recent years, the centrality of orthodox Christianity in the Georgian national consciousness has increased and this was reflected in the change of their national flag from a secular emblem to five crosses in 2004.[125] The majority of Muslims live in the autonomous Republic of Azaria in Georgia's south-west. For the most part, Azarians have traditionally thought

122. 'Tatar Public Body Protests at Russia's Persecution of Young Muslims', *BBC Monitoring Caucasus*, 19 December 2006.

123. G. Sanikidze and E. W. Walker, *Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia*, Working Paper, Berkeley, CA, Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, 2004, pp. 3–4, http://bps.berkeley.edu/publications/2004_04-sani.pdf, accessed 27 December 2008.

124. Central Intelligence Agency, 'Georgia', *World Factbook*, 2008, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gg.html, accessed 27 December 2008.

125. Sanikidze and Walker, 'Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia', *op. cit.*, p. 5.

VII–2.5   A view of Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia
© Tor Eigeland/AramcoWorld

of themselves as 'Georgians' (their native language was Georgian) because ethno-linguistic ties have prevailed over religious bonds in political affairs. Tensions between Christians and Muslims flared up during the 1855 Crimean War, and the Turkish-Russian War of 1877–8, when many Azarians took the Turkish side. Azaria was incorporated into Russia under the terms of the Treaty of Berlin of 1878.[126]

There is only one mosque in Batumi (the capital of Azaria) and few mosques in the villages. Muslims in Georgia still have close ties with Turkey. They receive funding for the construction of new mosques from Turkish citizens of Georgian origin. A considerable number of young Azarian Muslims have received an Islamic education in Turkey. The Islamic administration in Turkey, *Diyanet*, is active in this regard. However, there are frequent complaints in local newspapers that the government has failed to monitor the quality of education that young Azarians were receiving in foreign religious institutions. There are fears that some Azarians are becoming Wahhabi in orientation, and thereby endorsing a more puritanical version of Islam.[127]

Meskhetia, like Azaria, is another Muslim-populated region in south-western Georgia. Islam came to Meskhetia in the sixth century, with the arrival of a nomadic tribe of Turkish origin. Thereafter the establishment of the Ottoman landowner system in the region aided Islamization. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, most Meskhetian peasants were still Christians, while the nobility were mostly Muslims. After the Russian-Ottoman War (1828–1929) Armenians began to settle in the region, and they became the largest community by the end of the nineteenth century. The region was incorporated into the Russian empire in 1829. During the Second World War Muslim Meskhetians were forcibly deported to Central Asia (internal exile) by Stalin because of their alleged collaboration with the Nazis. Of the 120,000 Meskhetians who were packed into cattle wagons and deported from Meskhetia to Uzbekistan, more than 10,000 perished en route.[128] These Muslims were desperate to return to their homeland but they faced resistance from the Georgian authorities. Nevertheless when Georgia became a member of the Council of Europe, Tbilisi promized to make greater efforts to facilitate repatriation.[129] It is feared that the return of Muslim Meskhetians might stir inter-ethnic tensions.[130] In 2007 Georgia put in place an appropriate framework

126. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
127. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
128. D. Brennan, 'Guram Mamulia: Lifelong Campaigner for Georgia's Persecuted Meskhetian Minority', *The Guardian*, 5 April 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2003/apr/05/guardianobituaries.usa, accessed 27 December 2008.
129. A. Gegeshidze, 'Conflict in Georgia: Religion and Ethnicity', in P. Kilpadi (ed.), *Islam and Tolerance in Wider Europe*, Budapest, Open University Institute, 2006, p. 66.
130. R. M. Cutler, 'Eurasia Insight: R. Cutler: Focus on Ethnic Armenians in Georgia', *Open Society Institute*, 6 December 1999, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db 900 sid/

to facilitate the return of the Meskhetians. The law sets out conditions that prospective returnees have to meet in order to be repatriated. However, the legal text appears to be complicated as the applicant has to fill out the application in Georgian or English, as required by law (which means that it would be difficult for an ordinary person to make sense of those provisions). However, many Meskhetians still remain keen to return to the birthplace of their ancestors, though they know that they could face economic hardship.[131]

Another Muslim group of people who were considered by mainstream Georgians a threat to their stability and national security were the Muslim Kists of Pankisi. Kists are descendents of Vhenchens and Ingush (they call themselves collectively Vainakhs) who migrated to the region from the north in the 1830s. One of the reasons for migration was economic hardship; another was the desire to escape the consequences of blood feuds. In addition the leader of the highlanders in the North Caucasus war, Imam Shamil, strictly enforced Islamic law in areas under his control, which some Chechen and Ingush found oppressive. As a result they fled to the south. Finally Kists were moved by the Tsarist authorities to a single area in Pankisi in the late 1860s.[132]

The religiosity of the Kists appears to have grown considerably in recent years. There is also evidence that there are large numbers of Wahhabis in the region. However, there are tensions between Wahhabis and believers who adhere to traditional highlander forms of Islamic worship. The local Kists oppose the hardline stance of the Wahhabis. For example, there was considerable local opposition to the effort of the Wahhabis to establish a *Sharīʿa* court in Duisi.[133] However, some Kist Muslims of Pankisi are alleged to have posed a threat to Georgian stability and national security. In the late 1990s the Russian Kremlin began accusing officials in Tbilisi of assisting Chechen rebels. But the Georgian authority denied this allegation and said that it has been capable of controlling crime in its territory.[134]

In the Abkhazia region of Georgia Islam co-existed with Christianity and local pagan beliefs prior to the mid-eighteenth century. However, throughout the 1990s there has been an ongoing struggle between the Georgian authorities and Abkhazia. In recent years (2004), descendents of the Muslim *Muhajirs*

ACOS-64CA8F? Open Document, accessed 27 December 2008. Armenians hold bitter feelings against the Turks. They believe that they were persecuted by the Ottoman Turks. So perhaps, being a substantial number in Meskhetia, they are also resistant to the return of the Muslim Meskhetians who have a Turkish background.

131. N. Bolvadze and D. Alechkevitch, 'OSCE Minorities Commissioner seeks Stable Solution to Plight of Meskhetians', 18 November 2008, http://www.osce.org/item/34962.html, accessed 31 December 2008.

132. Sanikidze and Walker, 'Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia', *op. cit.*, pp. 26–7.

133. *Ibid.*, pp. 26–9.

134. Gegeshidze, 'Conflict in Georgia: Religion and Ethnicity', *op. cit.*, p. 66.

from Turkey have been returning to Abkhazia. There is little evidence of the presence of extremist elements in Abkhazia, though absence of any fieldwork in this region has kept things unclear.[135]

Finally, Georgia's Muslim Azerbaijanis, who initiated the country's New Muslim Democratic Party, were frustrated and posed a threat to Georgia's stability. In 2004 there were about 600,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis in Kvemo-Kardi on the border with Azerbaijan. Economic conditions have kept these people marginalized. Land has never been distributed or privatized among Azerbaijanis, so they are forced to rent it from ethnic Georgians (or use it with their permission). As a result, ethnic Azerbaijanis believe they are discriminated against by the government. The high unemployment rate among ethnic Azerbaijans in Georgia has added to the instability of the region.[136]

On 20 June 2006 the National Assembly of the Azerbaijanis of Georgia invited representatives of Georgia's Muslim minorities to the Turkish city of Erzurum to discuss the establishment of a political party in Georgia. The conference was attended by eighty delegates consisting of ethnic Azerbaijanis, Muslim Ossetians, Chechens (Kistins), Ingush, Turkish-Mesheti, Adjar, Abkhaz and Muslim Georgians. As a result of the discussions, it was agreed that a congress of the Muslim Democratic Party of Georgia would be established. According to the final declaration of the conference, the party will respect the 'peace and territorial integrity of Georgia', though the statement was not signed by the Abkhaz delegation.[137]

It appears that the three countries – Turkey, Azerbaijan and Russia – have roles to play to ensure equality for the Muslim minority in Georgia. Turkey needs to watch whether its religious and cultural exchanges with Muslims in Georgia are having a positive impact. Georgia's (and Russia's) accusation that Turkey is infiltrating hardline Muslim ideology in Georgia should be investigated and addressed. Georgia's neighbouring country, Azerbaijan, has an ongoing issue with Armenia over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh territory which is located in Azerbaijan.[138] It is widely believed that only an international peacekeeping force can make a truce work.

Russia, the dominant force, wants to play a singular role in these power politics. So does Turkey, Azerbaijan's ally. Azerbaijanis are afraid of Russian dominance, but Armenians welcome it. Armenians, in turn, dread the possibility of Turkey's interference. Muslims everywhere were already angry

135. Sanikidze and Walker, 'Islam and Islamic Practices in Georgia', *op. cit.*, p. 21.

136. Gegeshidze, 'Conflict in Georgia: Religion and Ethnicity', *op. cit.*, p. 67.

137. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

138. M. Specter, 'Armenians Suffer Painfully in War, but with Pride and Determination', *The New York Times*, 15 July 1994, p. 3. Azerbaijan is located in South Caucasus. It is a predominantly Muslim country with an 85 per cent Shīʿa population. Armenia is a predominantly Christian country in South Caucasus.

about the brutal Serbian assault on Europe's largest Muslim community in Bosnia. To many Muslims, Armenia's seizure of Nagorni-Karabakh feels like more of the same.[139] Many Muslims are also sympathetic to the Chechen nationalistic cause. In such a complex situation, some Muslims in Georgia may continue to feel vulnerable.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has revealed several aspects of Muslim issues: Muslims at the collective and individual levels; and inter-community issues, such as lack of integration, communication and awareness by policy makers of the divisions within the Muslim community. In general, Muslims are identified collectively as one homogeneous group. For example, in 2002 the Croatian Prime Minister Ivica Račan granted Muslims (and the Serbian Orthodox Church) the right to religious expression. Then in 2006 the Serbian Ministry of Religion condemned the attacks on the Hadrovic mosques in Nis. And in 2006 when fire set ablaze the Kazanlak mosque in Sofia when a bottle of inflammable liquid was thrown at it, the Bulgarian parliament condemned the incident. Ridiculing the Prophet Muḥammad by publishing the cartoons in newspapers in Ukraine and Hungary was offensive to the Muslims of the respective countries. The publication of the controversial book *The Satantic Verses* in the Romanian language offended some Muslims in Romania. On the other hand, by publishing the Qurʾān in Estonian, Estonia is trying to include Muslims in the wider community.

In particular cases (at the individual level), Bosnian (Bosniak) refugees remain disadvantaged by their poor health and postwar trauma. In Macedonia, Torbeshes remain disadvantaged not only in the wider community but also in the Muslim community where they face pressure to conform with Albanians and Turks. Though Bulgaria is a member of the EU, the Pomak question remains to be addressed. Pomaks' cultural identity was erased during the Bulgarization of Bulgaria, and they still recall those sad memories. Some Roma people, particularly Roma Muslims in different European countries such as Bulgaria and Ukraine, are underprivileged. They need facilities to maintain their religious life, for example access to water five times a day for ablutions to perform *ṣalāt* (prayers), and this is not always available. Tartars are keen to return to Poland, and they need assistance with resettlement. The Ingush people (Sunni Muslims) in North Ossetia have been more marginalized after the Beslan tragedy. For example, a 2005 calendar published by the North Ossetian Ministry for Nationalities entitled 'In Ossetia, as a Unified Family' mentioned dozens of nationalities. It included 610 Avars, 232 Poles, and 114

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139. G. Dyer, 'Armenia must Learn Greed is Dangerous', *The Toronto Star*, 4 June 1992, p. 23.

Turkmen, completely ignoring the second largest nationality – the 21,000 Ingush.[140]

In some European countries, such as Poland, Islam was historically not unknown because Muslim Tartars lived there for several centuries. However, a survey in 2008 revealed that 46 per cent of Polish people did not like Muslims. Earlier, perhaps, Polish Tartars maintained a low profile or integrated into the mainstream society through language and work (and as discussed many were deported to Central Asia after the Second World War). The 2008 poll result presumably indicated that the Muslims who were new immigrants were not liked by the Polish people.

Some Muslims' lack of integration into the wider community could be a factor in the mainstream populations' unfamiliarity with the Muslim minority. Some global events such as the tragedy of 11 September 2001, the London bombings and the negative portrayal of Muslims by some media have impacted on the wider community. Under the circumstances, it is important that Muslims make an effort to be a part of the wider community. As Dr Ali Kettani, author of *Muslim Minorities in the World Today*, said:

> Islamically, it will not harm the Muslim community to absorb the characteristics that are not contrary to the Islamic principles. One of these characteristics is the learning of the language of the majority (which will not be harmful if Muslims are able to keep on learning Arabic, the language of the Qurʾān); the wearing of its dress, provided it does not violate the decency of dress advocated by Islam; and the absorption of minor social habits which are not Islamically objectionable. However, members of a Muslim community should refrain from … dropping of Muslim names, the adoption of promiscuous habits; the absorption of alcoholic beverages.[141]

The lack of communication within the Muslim community also needs to be addressed. For example, some Muslims holding high authority in the Caucasus still represent the 'old-guard' and tend to be loyal to the federal government, while they do not understand the young people. Governments should be careful not to taint all Wahhabis with terrorism. There are ideological differences among different sects of Sunni Islam such as Sufi, Deobandi, Brelvi, Salafi and Wahhabi, and there are frictions among these groups. Racial profiling of young Muslims may lead to more social tensions.[142]

Whereas in Stalinist Russia many Muslims were deported elsewhere, post-communist Russia has generally accommodated its Muslim population.

140. Ekaterina, ' "Reliable" and "Unreliable" Peoples', *op. cit.*, p. 53.

141. A. M. Kettani, *Muslim Minorities in the World Today*, London, Mansell Publishing, 1986, pp. 10–11.

142. On generational conflict see Richmond, 'Russian Policies towards Islamic Extremism in the Northern Caucasus and Destabilization in Kabardino-Balkaria', *op. cit.*, p. 93.

Muslims in Russia now have mosques, women can wear the *ḥijāb*, and people have started performing the *ḥajj*. However, in the capital city, Moscow, there are only four mosques: not enough to serve 2.5 million Muslims. Muslim leaders say attempts to build more have been blocked by local officials, who fear angering Moscow's ethnic Russian majority.[143] Some Russian Muslims feel it is necessary to create areas for *ṣalāt* (prayers) in public places and establishments, such as train stations, airports, universities and institutes. The Chechen problem needs international attention. The power politics involving Russia, Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan could be unhelpful to the Muslim minority in Georgia. Overall, both Muslim and non-Muslim leaders appear to be keen that their countries either become EU members, or retain membership, and for humanitarian purposes this is definitely 'a way forward'.

143. M. Mainville, 'Russia has a Muslim Dilemma', *San Francisco Chronicle*, 19 November 2006, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/11/19/MNGJGMFUVG1. DTL, accessed 25 December 2008.

Chapter 7.3

MUSLIM MINORITIES IN THE AMERICAS AND THE CARIBBEAN

Nahid Afrose Kabir

Muslim contact with the Americas began as early as the fourteenth century. It is speculated that in 1312 Mansa Abu Bakr travelled from the Senegambian region of the African coast to the Gulf of Mexico.[1] Then in the fifteenth century Christopher Columbus sailed to the Americas with two Muslim captains.[2] From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries some Muslims in West and Central Africa were enslaved and brought to North and South America. In the nineteenth century they also arrived in the Americas as indentured labourers. Muslims began to migrate to the Americas of their own free will in the late nineteenth century, particularly from Syria and Lebanon. During the twentieth century Muslims from various countries migrated to the Americas.[3]

In this chapter, I discuss the pattern of Muslim immigration to seventeen countries, which I have grouped regionally in this sequence: North America, Central America, South America, the Andean States and the Caribbean. I wrote this chapter using an amalgam of in-depth and fragmented information. Consequently, I have discussed some countries, such as Jamaica whose Muslim population is tiny, in detail because there were enough available sources. For other places, such as Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador, Puerto Rico, Paraguay and Uruguay where the Muslim population is between 1,000 and 3,000, there was little up-to-date information available. Table 7.3.1 shows the Muslim minority populations and percentages in each of the countries I discuss in this chapter.

1. S. Nyang, *Islam in the United States of America*, Chicago, ABC International Group, 1999, p. 12.
2. A. N. A. Muhammad, *Muslims in America: Seven Centuries of History (1312–2000)*, 2nd ed., Beltsville, MD, Amana Publications, 2001, p. 3.
3. Nyang, *Islam in the United States of America*, *op. cit.*, pp. 12–17.

Table 7.3.1: Muslim minority populations in the Americas and the Caribbean[4]

Countries	Muslim population	Percentage of the total population
Canada	842,200	2.5
USA	2,454,000	0.8
Mexico	110,000	1.0
Panama	24,000	0.7
Guatemala	1,200	0.007
Honduras	11,000	0.1
Argentina	859,185	2.1
Brazil	2,186,132	1.1
Venezuela	94,000	0.4
Chile	166,017	1.0
Colombia	14,000	1.0
Jamaica	5,000	0.2
Guyana	55,605	7.2
Trinidad and Tobago	147,594	12.0
Suriname	94,328	19.6
Haiti	4,000 approx.	0.04
Cuba	9,000	0.1

Muslims in North America

Muslims in North America are from diverse backgrounds. Those who have settled in Canada were mostly immigrants, whereas in the United States the early Muslims were enslaved people brought from Africa. Slaves were unable to retain their Islamic heritage, so recent Muslim history in America also began with the arrival of immigrants. In 2007 the Muslim population in Canada was 2.5 per cent, whereas in the United States it was probably about 0.8 per cent.[5] The United States does not record census data by religion, which creates an information vacuum on human rights issues and leaves researchers of religious minorities in the dark.

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4. The information in Table 7.3.1 is derived from a variety of sources from different years (as I have mentioned in the text). It should be taken as an approximate comparison between the countries.

5. M. Adams and A. Langstaff, *Unlikely Utopia: The Surprising Triumph of Canadian Pluralism*, Toronto, Viking Canada, 2007, p. 108; Pew Research Center, *Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream*, 2007, p. 3, http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf, accessed 24 April 2010.

CANADA

The earliest presence of Muslims in Canada was recorded in the census of 1871 when they numbered thirteen. By 1911 there were about 400 from Turkish and Syrian backgrounds. By 1911 the Muslim population had risen to 1,500. From 1911 to 1951 the growth of Muslim settlement in Canada was very slow.[6] In 1951 there were about 3,000 Muslims. In 1981 the Muslim population was 98,160 and in 1991 it rose to 253,260.[7] In 2007 they numbered 842,200, which, as stated earlier, comprises about 2.5 per cent of the total Canadian population of 33,099,000.[8] In the contemporary period, Muslims have migrated to Canada for various reasons, such as better economic opportunities, improved educational facilities for their children, political pressure in their country of origin, fleeing persecution (in the case of asylum seekers), and family reunion (to be with family members who had already migrated to Canada).[9]

Canada's first mosque, the al-Rashid Mosque, was built at Edmonton, Alberta in 1938 from funds raised by the Arab community. As the Muslim population increased, mosques were also built in other places.[10] By 1989 there were about 100 mosques and some employers recognized their Muslim employees by giving them a day off during *Eid-ul-Fitr*.[11] The first organization to represent Muslims in Canada was the Council of Muslim Communities of Canada, based in Mississauga, Ontario.[12] By 2003 several other Muslim organizations were established that dealt with education, youth and religious affairs: the Canadian Islamic Council, the Muslim Association of Canada, the Muslim Canadian Congress and the Canadian Muslim Union. The Canadian Council of Islamic-American Relations deals with human rights issues. The Islamic Society of North America and the Islamic Circle of North America deal with Muslims in both Canada and the United States.

By 2007 about 60 per cent of Canadian Muslims lived in Ontario. They were mostly from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Somalia. Another 21 per cent lived in Quebec, mostly from French-speaking Morocco and Algeria. The other 19 per cent were spread out in the rest of Canada.[13] As the Muslim

6. B. Abu-Laban, 'The Canadian Muslim Community', in E. H. Waugh, B. Abu-Laban and R. B. Qureishi (eds.), *The Muslim Community in North America*, Edmonton, Alberta, University of Alberta Press, 1983, pp. 75–92.

7. S. McGonough and S. Alvi, 'The Canadian Council of Muslim Women: A Chapter in the History of Muslim Women in Canada', *The Muslim World*, XCII, 2002, pp. 79–97.

8. Adams and Langstaff, *Unlikely Utopia, op. cit.,* p. 108.

9. Abu-Laban, 'The Canadian Muslim Community', *op. cit.,* p. 78.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 80–1.

11. 'Police Infiltrating Groups Canadian Muslims Charge', *The Toronto Star*, 4 January 1991, p. 16.

12. 'Muslims in Canada: A Century of Growth', *The Globe and Mail*, 25 March 1989, p. 3.

13. Adams and Langstaff, *Unlikely Utopia, op. cit.,* p. 109.

population began to grow there were adjustment issues emanating from both the Muslim community and the wider society. Muslims from diverse backgrounds had to become acquainted with the English language and the Canadian way of life. On the other hand, it was difficult for some mainstream Canadians to adjust to the influx of immigrants whose way of life was very different, with respect to appearance, dress and mannerisms. In 1971 Canada officially endorsed and placed an emphasis on multiculturalism, though in some sectors of society Muslims were viewed as the 'other.' Also, in 1971 when researching social studies text books used in the schools in Ontario, authors McDiarmid and Pratt found the words used most often to describe Muslims were: infidels, fanatic, great, devout and tolerant. Whereas the words used to describe Christians included: devoted, zealous, martyr, great, famous.[14] When referring to immigrants generally, McDiarmid and Pratt observed:

> Prejudice still manifests itself in textbooks, but because it has been less respectable it is more subtle. Immigrants may no longer be called 'shiftless and vicious', but there are still instances where they are referred to as 'a problem' or 'a swarm'. It may be that these terms have a more immediate effect on readers' attitudes than would more obvious discriminatory references.[15]

In a follow-up study in 1975, Kenny found some Canadian textbooks considered Arab and Islam to be synonymous. In one textbook the author asserted, 'Islam was born among the nomads of Arabia, who were "wholly illiterate", and for whom "caravan raiding was a cherished pastime".'[16] In the mainstream Canadian media, information about Muslims first appeared when Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini declared a *fatwā* (religious ruling) – a death sentence – against the author Salman Rushdie. The media focused on Salman Rushdie's freedom of speech and were extremely critical of those Muslims who found Salman Rushdie's book *The Satanic Verses* 'blasphemous and insulting'.[17] *The Toronto Star* soon reported the comment of the Shīʿite Muslim, Hudda, who lived in Kitchener, Ontario, and who justified Khomeini's *fatwā* as 'legitimate'. Hudda's wife, Sabira, was described as wearing 'a long robe and

14. G. McDiarmid and D. Pratt, *Teaching Prejudice*, Toronto, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1971, p. 41, cited in Abu-Laban, 'The Canadian Muslim Community', *op. cit.*, p. 83.

15. McDiarmid and Pratt, *Teaching Prejudice*, *op. cit.*, p. 25, cited in Abu-Laban, 'The Canadian Muslim Community', *op. cit.*, p. 83.

16. L. M. Kenny, 'The Middle East in Canadian Social Science Textbooks', in B. Abu-Laban and F. Zeadey (eds.), *Arabs in America: Myths and Realities*, Wilmette, IL, Medina University Press International, 1975, pp. 133–47, cited in Abu-Laban, 'The Canadian Muslim Community', *op. cit.*, p. 83.

17. 'Muslims in Canada', p. 3.

a scarf called a ḥijāb that completely covers her hair. She will not shake hands with strangers.'[18]

In 1990, at the outbreak of the Gulf War, some Muslims observed that their mosques were under surveillance as the Canadian authorities feared that Canada would be infiltrated by terrorists. A Muslim leader, Youssef Mouammar, observed that since August 1990 when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, numerous commentaries, pictures and cartoons were shown in the media that linked the Islamic religion with terrorists or with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.[19] During the first Gulf War (1990–1) there was a backlash against visible Muslims. So intense was the repercussion that Muslim women who wore the ḥijāb were told to 'go back home'. An imam in Edmonton found a pipe bomb outside his house, and several people who had the name 'Hussein' received threats over the phone.[20]

In 1998 an Egyptian cleric, Imam Wagdy Abdel Hamid Mohamed Ghoneim, who was also a senior accountant in the Egyptian finance ministry, demanded a formal apology and financial compensation from the Canadian Government because he was strip-searched by custom officials when he crossed the border from Detroit, Michigan, to Windsor, Ontario. The Canadian immigration port authority said that Imam Ghoneim 'was held on suspicion of being a member of Hamas, a Palestinian extremist organization.'[21]

In 1998, after a six-month analysis of the editorial content of *The Star*, *The Globe and Mail*, *Montreal Gazette*, *Ottawa Citizen* and *Toronto Sun* and rating them in that order, the Canadian Islamic Congress found that all of these newspapers presented Islam negatively. They frequently used words such as 'militant Muslim groups' and 'Islamic guerrillas'. The principal investigator of this study, Mohammed Elmasry, commented, 'There is an image created out there that a Muslim is a violent person or a terrorist or someone who believes in a backwards religion.'[22] The study concluded, 'Too often a religion, like Islam, is compared to a region, like the West – an inaccuracy that misinforms and misleads the public.'[23] Elmasry commented that Muslims worldwide were very diverse, and different groups interpret the Qurʾān differently. He went on

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18. M. McAteer, 'Rushdie Sentence Valid Claims Young Shiite Leader', *The Toronto Star*, 13 October 1990, p. 2.

19. 'Police Infiltrating Groups, Canadian Muslims Charge', *The Toronto Star*, 4 January 1991, p. 16.

20. 'Muslims in Canada fear Gulfwar Backlash', *Kitchener-Waterloo Record*, 20 February 1998, p. 8.

21. 'Egyptian Cleric Seeks Apology, Damages from Canada', *Reuters News*, 12 January 1998.

22. B. Turnbull, 'Media called Biased against Muslims Toronto Star Worst Offender, Study by Islamic Group Says', *The Toronto Star*, 24 September 1998, p. 28.

23. *Ibid.*

to say that the majority of Muslims do not condone violent acts, but the media tends to lump all Muslims together in the event of a terrorist act.[24]

After the 9/11 terrorist attack on New York, some Muslims in Canada experienced repercussions on a larger scale. Muslims were asked by their leaders to maintain a low profile, but police reported a rise of hate crimes after 11 September 2001, particularly an attack in Ottawa which left a 15-year-old boy badly injured, a suspicious fire at a Hamilton Hindu temple, and frightening attacks on mosques in Montreal, St Catharine's and Oshawa.[25] On 21 September 2001 the Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien delivered an emotional speech at Ottawa's Central Mosque, telling Muslims across Canada he was ashamed that Muslims had been harassed and threatened in the wake of terrorist attacks in the United States.[26] In 2002 the Canadian Council of American-Islamic relations prepared an interim report card that documented 120 anti-Muslim hate incidents across Canada since the terrorist attacks. They included ten death threats, thirteen cases of violence and twelve attacks on mosques and Islamic centres. Some Canadian Muslims were also racially profiled at airports, and some subsequently missed their flights.[27] A Muslim woman who had fled from persecution in Iraq reported that she was beaten on a city bus in Ontario and that the attack provoked laughter from the other passengers.[28]

In 2006 when the Danish cartoonist drew the controversial cartoons of the Prophet Muḥammad some Muslims in Canada demonstrated peacefully outside the Danish consulate in Montreal and Toronto.[29] In 2010, after the attempted Christmas Day bombing by Nigerian Muslim Abdul Mutallab on board Northwest Airlines Flight 253 en route from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan, in December 2009, twenty imams of the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada issued a *fatwā* (Islamic religious ruling) in which they denounced attacks against Canada and the United States, which was 'a step forward' for social cohesion.[30]

Some Muslims in Canada have progressed well at the political level. For example, at the time of writing this chapter in 2010, at the federal level, Yasmin Ratansi was a member of parliament and Omar Alghabra and Wajid Khan

24. *Ibid.*

25. T. Harper, 'PM "shamed" by Hate Crimes against Muslims in Canada – Brings Message of Tolerance to Ottawa Mosque', *The Toronto Star*, 22 September 2001, p. 9.

26. *Ibid.*

27. 'Arabs, Muslims in Canada fear being 9–11 "Scapegoats" ', *The Hamilton Spectator*, 23 March 2002, p. 3.

28. 'Ontario: Muslim Mother says Beating on Bus a Sept. 11 Backlash', *National Post*, 30 January 2002, p. 9.

29. 'Muhammad Cartoons: A Timeline', *CBC News*, 11 February 2006, http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/islam/Muhammad_cartoons_timeline.html, accessed 15 April 2010.

30. Editorial, 'A Welcome Fatwa', *The Globe and Mail*, 15 January 2010, p. 16.

were former members of parliament. At the provincial level, Yasir Naqvi was a member of the Ottowa Provincial Parliament, and Mobina Jaffer was appointed a senator in 2001. The recognition of Muslims at the governmental level is important for the sake of integration, but for most Canadian Muslims success in the labour market is still evasive. For example, in 2007 about 45 per cent of adult Muslims held university degrees compared with 23 per cent of the national total; yet in terms of income Muslims were far behind the national total. This disparity needs to be addressed, particularly for the sake of the Canadian-born young Muslims facing discrimination in the workplace.[31]

United States

Muslim contact with America commenced during the 1700s when Muslim slaves were brought from Africa. Records show that a few Muslim slaves in the United States became famous. For example, Kunta Kinte, who was brought from Gambia in 1767, tried hard to hold onto his Islamic heritage. Kunta Kinte is depicted in Alex Haley's book (and the television show) *Roots*.[32] Some Muslims fought in the Revolutionary War; for example, Peter (Saleem) Salem, a former slave, fought in the Battle of Bunker Hill against British troops in 1775.[33] Slaves were not allowed to develop institutional structures in the form of mosques or graveyards, so they could not establish an Islamic heritage for their descendants.[34]

Muslims, particularly from Syria and Lebanon, began to migrate to the industrial cities of the mid-west in small numbers before the First World War. More Muslims began to arrive in the interwar period from Albania, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Syria, Lebanon and the Indian subcontinent. By the early 1920s mosques had been built in Maine (1915), Connecticut (1919), Highland Park, Michigan (1919), Michigan City, Indiana (1925), Brooklyn, New York (1926), Pittsburg (1930) and Sacramento, California (late 1930s).[35] However, the first purpose-built mosque, the Mother Mosque of America, was built in Cedar Rapids, Iowa in 1934. As the community grew, Muslims founded the Federation of Islamic Associations of the US and Canada (FIA) in 1953. The Muslim presence was gradually recognized by the higher American authorities. In 1954

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31. Adams and Langstaff, *Unlikely Utopia, op. cit.*, pp. 100–2.

32. Muhammad, *Muslims in America: Seven Centuries of History, op. cit.*, pp. 9, 15.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

34. G. M. Haniff, 'The Muslim Community in America: A Brief Profile', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXIII, No. 2, 2003, pp. 303–4.

35. AANM Educational Series, *Arab Americans: An Integral Part of American Society*, Dearborn, MI, Arab American National Museum, 2009, p. 16; Abdus Sattar Ghazali, *The Mosques in America: A National Portrait by CAIR*, 2001, http://www.amp.ghazali.net/html/mosques_in_us.html, accessed 9 May 2010.

VII–3.1   The Islamic Centre, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, USA, the first purpose
built mosque in the USA
© Katrina Thomas/AramcoWorld

US President Dwight Eisenhower inaugurated the Washington Mosque by cutting its ribbon.[36]

After the change in federal immigration law in 1965 a wave of highly educated Arab Muslim immigrants arrived in the US, and from the 1970s more Muslims from South Asia migrated. By 2000 the number of mosques was 1,209. Many Muslim organizations were established to address Muslim issues. Some notable ones are the Islamic Society of North America, the Islamic Circle of North America and the Muslim American Society.[37] It is difficult to determine a definite number of the Muslim population in the United States because the US census does not ask about religious identity. However, in 2007 the Washington-based Pew Research Center estimated that there were about 2.35 million Muslims in the USA, which constituted 0.8 per cent of the total population (299,398,000).[38] Another estimate revealed that in 2007 two-thirds of American Muslims were immigrants; and one third were native-born.

36. Haniff, 'The Muslim Community in America', *op. cit.*, pp. 303–4.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 307, 310.
38. Pew Research Center, *Muslim Americans*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

People of South Asian origin – Afghans, Bangladeshis, Indians and Pakistanis – comprised 34 per cent of American Muslims. Arab Americans comprised 26 per cent, while about 20 per cent were US-born African Americans, most of whom were converts or the offspring of converts. The remaining 20 per cent were from Africa, Iran, Turkey, Albania and other places.[39] In the 1950s and 1960s two prominent African Americans who converted to Black Islam (Nation of Islam) and later embraced Sunni Islam were Malcolm X (radical leader of the Black Power movement), and the boxer Muhammad Ali Clay (formerly Cassius Marcellus Clay Jr).

From the 1970s to the 1990s, along with the gradual increase in the Muslim population, Americans were also becoming more conscious of the Muslim world, generally through sensational news reports on the Iranian Revolution (1979); the Iranian hostage crisis (1979–81); the Libyan terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland that killed all 259 passengers (1988); the Salman Rushdie affair (1989); and the Oklahoma bombing (1995). The Iranian hostage crisis was followed by a public backlash against Iranians in the United States, during which one Iranian student was killed in 1979. Burning of Iranian flags and shouting of 'Arab go home' became regular events; and emotional bank tellers refused to cash many Iranian students' cheques, leaving them without money for tuition, rent and food.[40] In 1995 after the Oklahoma bombing by a non-Muslim, Timothy McVeigh, some Muslims in America, particularly Arabs, were vilified by some members of the wider community. After 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks vilification against Muslims intensified. Barrett observed:

> A Gallup poll in 2006 found that four in ten Americans admitted feeling prejudice against Muslims. Nearly one quarter said that they would not like to have a Muslim as a neighbor. Four in ten would require Muslims to carry special identification cards and undergo more insensitive security checks at airports. Among American Muslims, 40 per cent told the Zogby International polling firm in 2004 that they had suffered discrimination since 9/11. Many Muslims in the United States have doubts about whether they are accepted as 'real' Americans.[41]

Research in 2008 found that the lives of Muslims in America had become exceedingly difficult because of the *USA Patriot Act*.[42] It was found that in the five years since 9/11 the Bush administration held 6,472 individuals under 'terrorist' or 'anti-terrorist' programs. Some of the people alleged to be

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39. P. M. Barrett, *American Islam: The Struggle for the Soul of a Religion*, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007, pp. 6–7.
40. See N. Kabir, *Muslims in Australia: Immigration, Race Relations and Cultural History*, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 157.
41. Barrett, *American Islam, op. cit.*, p. 6.
42. T. Gaskew, *Policing American Muslim Communities*, Lewiston, Edwin Mellen Press, 2008.

terrorists were not charged with this matter, but were found to be involved in other minor offences such as violation of disability insurance law, failure to file a tax return or providing false statements. By 2006 the vast majority had been released without receiving any prison term, though the overzealousness of the Bush government had succeeded in generating fear within the wider society.[43]

Within the Muslim community there are several issues that need to be addressed. Overall Muslims in America are law-abiding people and appreciate their settlement in the United States. Nevertheless academic Muqtadar Khan observes that two images govern Muslims' minds: 'America the democracy' and 'America the colonial power'.[44] Those who believe in 'America the democracy' are the majority of Muslims and they are peaceful. But believers in 'America the colonial power' are 'Muslim isolationists', who argue that Muslims must strive to revive the institution of the *khalīfa* (caliphate) which will take care of all Muslim problems.[45]

Muslim isolationists are in the minority; they might be peaceful, but they hold a different ideology. On the other hand, 23-year-old Nigerian Abdul Mutallab's failed attempt to blow up a Detroit-bound Northwest Airlines flight on 25 December 2009 with explosives tucked in his underwear shows that a very small minority of Muslims are a threat to all communities, both Muslim and non-Muslim. Some researchers have observed that since 9/11 imams in America have been asked to speak against acts of terror, but few such voices have been heard. Although there have been many good things happening between Muslims and non-Muslims since 9/11, such as interfaith discussions, polls indicate that many Americans do not understand Islam and are concerned about homegrown terrorism.[46]

Muslim women in America are in a relatively disadvantaged position. Unfortunately Muslim women who wear the *ḥijāb* (headscarf), and to a lesser extent the *jilbāb* (long coat) are further disadvantaged. And these are not the only aspects of culture that work against their acceptance. For example, a Bangladeshi mother might expect her daughter to live the lifestyle she had in Bangladesh. Her daughter would not be allowed to integrate with mainstream Americans. She would not be allowed to go to parties or stay out late at night.[47] On the one hand, there is pressure from the wider society that Muslims should

43. J. L. Esposito, *The Future of Islam*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 163.
44. M. Khan, 'Constructing the American Muslim Community', in Y. Haddad, J. Smith and J. L. Esposito (eds.), *Religion and Immigration*, Walnut Creek, CA, Altamira Press, 2003, pp. 175–98.
45. *Ibid.*
46. J. I. Smith, *Islam in America*, 2nd ed., New York, Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 185.
47. Y. Haddad, J. Smith and K. Moore, *Muslim Women in America*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006.

integrate, and on the other hand, strong cultural barriers are leading to a breakdown in communication and acceptance.

African-American Muslims' grievances stem from colonialism, slavery and 'the dream of whiteness.'[48] African-American Muslims connect themselves more with the Black American movement and the early Black American 'Islamizers' such as Noble Drew Ali and Eiljah Muhammad.[49] But these Muslims are often misunderstood by immigrant Muslims. For example, a first-generation immigrant Muslim was not informed that there were African-American Muslims in his city before the 1960s, and his views about black Muslims were not complimentary.[50]

Since 9/11 there have been efforts by both Muslims and Christians to create a better understanding through dialogue, but the lectures by Pope Benedict XVI on 12 September 2006 in Regensburg, Germany, angered Muslims worldwide.[51] In his lecture, the Pope quoted the criticism of Islam made by the Byzantine emperor Manuel II Palaiologos in the fourteenth century: 'Show me just what Muḥammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.'[52] Though Pope Benedict XVI soon apologized to the Muslim world, a month after the Regensburg speech Muslim scholars sent an open letter expressing their concerns.[53] On the first anniversary of that letter (13 October 2007), they sent another letter, 'A Common Word between Us and You' in an effort to improve relationships between the two religious communities. Since then over 300 leading mainstream Americans and evangelical leaders and scholars have endorsed a statement 'Loving God and Neighbor Together' and there is a website 'A Common Word' where many individuals and groups have posted their comments.[54] This website obviously is a step forward for peace, understanding and mutual respect.

Some Muslims have fared well in different facets of American society. For example, Muslim icons include the boxer Muhammad Ali and the basketball player Kareem Abdul-Jabbar. In art and entertainment, Muslims such as the

48. S. A. Jackson, 'Black Orientalism: Its Genesis, Aims and Significance for American Muslims', in P. Strum and D. Tarantolo (eds.), *Muslims in the United States*, Washington, DC, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2003, pp. 21–38.

49. *Ibid.*

50. E. E. Curits IV, *Muslims in America: A Short History*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. xi.

51. Esposito, *The Future of Islam, op. cit.*, pp. 187–8.

52. T. Bacani Jr., 'Critical time for our Pope', *Manila Standard* (Philippines), 19 September 2006.

53. 'Pope Sorry for Offending Muslims', *BBC News*, 17 September 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5353208.stm, accessed 9 May 2010.

54. Esposito, *The Future of Islam, op. cit.*, p. 189.

Rythm and Blues songwriter and producer Muhammad Luqman Abdul-Haqq (Kenny Gamble) have done well.[55] In politics there have been elected Muslim officials, for example Larry Shaw, State Senator of North Carolina; Yusuf Abus Salaam, City Councilman of Selma, Alabama; Kazi Miah, City Councilman of Hamtramck, Michigan; John Rhodes, Councilman of North Las Vegas; and Lateefah Muhammad, City Councilwoman of Tuskegee, Alabama. There were also Muslims in some other important positions: Hassan al-Amin was appointed a district judge in Prince George County, Maryland; and two Muslims, Osman Siddique of Bangladeshi origin and Zalmay Mamozy Khalilzad of Afghan background, served as US ambassadors to other countries.[56] At the time of writing this chapter, there were two Afro-American Muslim Congressmen: Keith Ellison was a member of the US House of Representatives from Minnesota, and André D. Carson was the US House of Representatives member from Indiana. But due to lack of census data by religion, the total Muslim placement in the American labour market cannot be evaluated.

Muslims in Central America

Of the countries in Central America, Mexico has the largest Muslim population (1.0 per cent) followed by Panama (0.7 per cent). Other countries such as Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica have small Muslim populations of between 1,000 and 3,000.[57] In this section, I discuss Panama, Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras.

MEXICO

In the sixteenth century crypto-Muslims (people who secretly practised Islam) came to Mexico with their Spanish colonizers. The Andalusian Muslims were called Moriscos which meant Moor-like converted Catholics. During the Spanish Inquisition many Muslims of the Andalusian nation (occupied by Catholic monarchs) were forcibly converted to Catholicism. The so-called

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55. Muhammad, *Muslims in America, op. cit.*, pp. 75–81.

56. *Ibid.*, pp. 75–81.

57. The Central Intelligence Agency's factsheets indicate that Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica have 0.0 per cent Muslims. See Central Intelligence Agency, 'An Analysis of World Muslim Population by Country', *World Factbook*, 2009, http://www.factbook.net/muslim_pop.php, accessed 4 April 2010. However, the Pew Research Center indicates that there were a few Muslims in these countries, between 1000 and 3000: Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, Washington, DC, Pew Research Centre, 2009, http://www.pewforum.org/Mapping-the-Global-Muslim-Population.aspx, accessed 12 November 2012

Moriscos fled the persecution of the Spanish Inquisition in their homeland and came to Mexico as soldiers, while others came as craftspeople and traders. However, most Muslims hid their Islamic identity just as they had done in Spain.[58] Between 1574 and 1815 about fifty Muslims were burnt alive in Mexico because they refused to convert to Catholicism.[59] The descendants of the Andalusians could not remain Muslims because of persecution, but they left behind an Islamic heritage in architecture and furniture. As historian Kettani observed, 'Their style (*mudajjan*: the tamed one), with its twinned windows, floor and wall tiles, as well as in ceilings, is now an integral part of Mexican culture.'[60] In 1821 Mexico gained its independence.

After 1857, when the Mexican Government relaxed its policy on religion, Arabs from Greater Syria migrated to Mexico. The third wave of Muslims arrived in the 1970s. By 1991 Mexican Muslims numbered around 40,000.[61] Some Mexicans have converted to Islam; in 2002 it was estimated that about 500 families had converted.[62] Regarding the freedom of religion enjoyed by Muslims in Mexico, the *Boston Globe* reported:

> Five hundred years after Spanish priests told Mexico's Indians to accept Roman Catholicism or face eternal hell, a new group of missionaries are again preaching about the path to salvation. Only this time, the message is different. 'There is no god but Allāh, and Muhammad is his messenger', Juan Gomez Gomez recited solemnly, translating from an Arabic message scrawled on the front of his two-room house on the outskirts of this colonial Mexican city.[63]

In 2009 there were 110,000 Muslims (about 1 per cent) among Mexican's total population of 111,211,789.[64] They comprise both Sunni and Shīʿa Muslims, and other offshoots of Islam. For example, some Spaniards are members of Murabitun, a Muslim order that has been active in England, Chechnya, South Africa and Germany. The Murabitun are converts to the mystical Sufi strain of Islam, and are outside the more mainstream Shīʿite and Sunni branches. Their ideology is a more 'communal, anti-capitalist and anti-Semitic form of Islam'.[65]

58. A. Kettani, 'Islam in Central America', in A. M. M'Bow and A. Kettani (eds.), *Islam and Muslims in the American Continent*, Beirut, Center of Historical, Economical and Social Studies, 2001, pp. 465–6.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
60. *Ibid.*
61. *Ibid.*, p. 473.
62. J. McGirk, 'Rival British-Born Mullahs Battle for the Loyalties of Mexico's Muslims', *Independent On Sunday*, 11 August 2002, p. 16.
63. M. Lloyd, 'Islam takes Root among Mexico's Poor: Religion finding Fertile Ground among Mayans', *The Boston Globe*, 24 November 2002, p. 6.
64. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
65. S. Hayward, 'Islam Competing for New Converts', *Charleston Gazette*, 29 June 2003, p. 7.

VII–3.2   Little girls at school in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, whose grandparents were refugees from Palestine, perform a traditional Arab dance in the costumes of their family's Palestinian home towns
© Larry Luxner/AramcoWorld

A convert from Murabitun to Sunni Islam, Gomez, explained the differences: 'The Murabitun don't adhere to the Koran and are 'condescending' to the indigenous. They invent things. They sing and dance. They make things up that are not in the Koran.'[66]

After 9/11 some Muslims were vilified because of their visible dress. Even Catholics who in some way resembled Muslims were yelled at to 'go home'. For example, the devout Catholic Hector Hernandez whose mother was Lebanese and father was Mexican was told 'go home' because he had an olive complexion and a trimmed beard. Hernandez remarked, 'They think I'm a terrorist, that I'm going to blow something up … They're nothing but racists. It's racism.'[67] Muslims in Mexico were also concerned about media stereotypes about terrorist act in various parts of the world.[68]

But overall, Muslims in Mexico have come a long way from the Spanish Inquisition to diversity. The Centro Cultural Islamico de Mexico,

66. *Ibid.*
67. R. Huang, 'Terror Attacks Increase Curiosity about Islam', *The News*, 15 October 2001.
68. 'Muslims Concerned over Recent Media Accusations', *IPR Strategic Information Database*, 8 December 2004.

an organization headed by Imam Omar Weston, looks after Muslim issues. Matamoros, the Mexican city facing Brownsville (Texas, USA) on the Rio Grande, means Moor-Slayer; it was named after a Mexican general (1779– 1814). It reminds Muslims of the Mexican general who persecuted Muslims during the Spanish Inquisition. Historian Kettani noted that it is 'a shameful name that should have been changed.'[69]

Panama

The first Muslims to arrive in Panama were African slaves from the Mandinka tribe in the 1550s; they were brought by Spaniards to work in the gold mines.[70] Due to the Spanish Inquisition, Muslim slave importation was prohibited by Spanish laws; but the laws were violated for commercial benefit. It was recorded that in 1552 about 500 slaves reached the Atlantic Coast of Panama, having escaped from a sinking boat. Under the leadership of Bayano, the slaves fought off the colonizers and formed a Muslim community in the area near the River Bayano. Though Bayano made a truce with Panama's colonial governor, Commander Pedri de Ursua, the Governor captured Bayano and sent him to Peru; later Bayano was sent to Spain, where he died.[71]

The next phase of Muslim arrival began in the early twentieth century when some Indians (including Muslims) came to Panama to work on the construction of the Panama Canal. Their number was very small (around twenty) in 1908, and they assimilated with the wider society. In the 1920s a new group of Indian tradesmen, mainly from Gujarat, migrated to Panama. Palestinians migrated to Panama in the 1960s, and later Lebanese Muslims in the 1980s.[72] In 2009 the Muslim population in Panama was 24,000, which was 0.7 per cent of the total population (3,360,474).[73] In 1982 the first Islamic Center, Fundacion Islamica de Panama, was established, followed by a big mosque with Islamic architecture called the Jama Masjid. In 2010 there are about ten mosques in Panama.

Muslims in Panama are mostly Sunnis, though some Panamanians are also influenced by the Nation of Islam. A few Christian Panamanians are also converting to Sunni Islam.[74]

69. Kettani, 'Islam in Central America', *op. cit.*, p. 466.

70. M. A. al-Ahari, 'The Caribbean and Latin America', in D. Westerlund and I. Svanberg (eds.), *Islam Outside the Arab World*, Richmond, Surrey, Curzon, 1999, pp. 443–61.

71. *Ibid.*

72. Kettani, 'Islam in Central America', *op. cit.*, p. 495.

73. Central Intelligence Agency, 'An Analysis of World Muslim Population by Country'.

74. J. Keyser, 'Influx of Muslim Immigrants Attracting Americans to Islam', *Ohio News*, 27 November 2000, http://www.islamfortoday.com/ohio.htm, accessed 4 April 2010.

GUATEMALA

In the twentieth century Arabs from Lebanon and Palestine migrated to Guatemala, though most of them were Christians. In 1983 some Palestinian Muslims rented a small apartment in Guatemala City and used it as their first mosque. Later, in 1987, they established the Islamic Daʿwa Mosque of Guatemala (Spanish: *Mezquita de Aldawaa Islámica*). Another mosque, the Mezquita Baitul Awwal (1989), is run by the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, which is regarded as an offshoot of Islam. Muslims in Guatemala form a tiny minority. In 2009 they numbered only 1,200 in a total national population of about 13 million.[75]

HONDURAS

Muslim immigration to Honduras took place in the twentieth century, particularly when Palestinians were displaced after the Israeli occupation of their land. In 2005 there were about 11,000 Muslims out of a total population of about 7 million (0.1 per cent).[76] Most Muslims were self-employed, for example as shop owners. As the number of Muslims grew, as in Guatemala, the people of Honduras used a small rented apartment as their mosque. Later they raised funds and managed to establish the Centro Islamico De Honduras mosque in San Pedro Sula.[77]

Muslims in South America

In South America the largest Muslim population in 2009 was in Argentina (2.1 per cent), followed by Brazil (1.1 per cent). Other countries such as Uruguay and Paraguay had tiny minorities.[78]

ARGENTINA

In the sixteenth century the Moriscos were the first Muslims to arrive in Argentina. Although the practice of Islam did not continue with these first Muslims, they left an impact on the Gaucho tradition. In the nineteenth century, the Argentinian writer Domingo Sarmiento claimed that he was the descendent of Bani al-Razin in Eastern Spain.[79] Between 1850 and 1860

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75. 'Islam in Guatemala', *Wikipedia*, 2009, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_Guatemala, accessed 3 April 2010.

76. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

77. Kettani, 'Islam in Central America', *op. cit.*, pp. 480–2.

78. See Central Intelligence Agency, 'An Analysis of World Muslim Population by Country'; see also, Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*

79. A. Kettani, 'Islam in Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay', in *op. cit.*, pp. 570–1.

the first Muslim immigrants came from Syria. The second wave of Muslim immigrants arrived between 1870 and the First World War, and the third wave came between 1919 and 1926 after the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Almost all Muslims in Argentina were of Arab origin but they were mostly known to the wider society as 'Turks' because they came from countries that were ruled by the Ottomans.[80] In 2009 it was estimated that the Muslim population in Argentina was around 859,185, which was about 2.1 per cent of the total population of 40,913,584.[81] The majority of Muslims are Sunnis followed by Shiʿas, Alawis and Druze, and a small number of Sufis. In 1986 El Centro Islamico de La Republica Argentina (CIRA) was established to deal with Muslim issues. CIRA also offers social and cultural activities, such as courses in the Arabic language, Islam and even Arabic cooking to help sustain the cultural heritage. CIRA finance comes from private donors and from the rent of some properties. In 1996 Saudi Arabian King Fahd and a group of Saudi businessmen donated $10 million for the construction of the King Fahd Islamic Center in Buenos Aires. It includes a mosque, school, exhibition hall, convention centre and sports arena.[82]

It appears that some first and second generation Muslims in Argentina are keen to integrate with the wider society. For example, some second generation Syrian and Lebanese immigrants (both Muslims and non-Muslims) have entered the armed forces.[83] But the third generation is more inclined to retain their exclusive Islamic identity. According to Omar Ahmed Abboud, Secretary of CIRA, 'The first generation came to make money, the second generation dedicated themselves to spending it, and the third generation, profoundly Argentine, decided to return to Islam.'[84] Professor Ricardo Shamsudin Elia of CIRA observed that this affiliation with Islam by the third generation was due to the impact of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.[85]

In the past decade there have been incidents concerning Muslim women and the *ḥijāb*. For example, in 2005 the National Registry of Persons refused a Muslim women her identity card because she was photographed wearing an Islamic headscarf. In refusing the card officials cited a memo from a Judicial Issues Department official which said that hair should not be covered in ID photos. The same memo, however, mentioned that religious figures can

80. P. Brieger and E. Herszkowich, 'The Muslim Community of Argentina', *Muslim World*, XCII, No. 1/2, 2002, p. 157.

81. Central Intelligence Agency, 'An Analysis of World Muslim Population by Country'.

82. *Ibid.*

83. G. Jozami, 'The Path from Trade to Power: The Sons of Syrians and Lebanese in the Military and in Foreign Affairs in Argentina (1920–1962)', *Muslim World*, XCII, 2002, p. 174.

84. Brieger and Herszkowich, 'The Muslim Community of Argentina', *op. cit.*, p. 160.

85. *Ibid.*

wear their traditional attire. The President of the Argentine Muslim Women's Union expressed her dismay at this 'act of discrimination'.[86]

Certain incidents of terrorism by minority Muslims in Argentina have impacted on the majority. On 17 March 1992 a bomb at the Israeli Embassy in Argentina killed twenty-nine people. In 1994 an attack at the Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina (Argentine Jewish Mutual Aid Association, MIA), an historic Jewish community building, killed almost 100 people. Members of the Argentine Islamic community were suspects and the Arab Muslim population on the border area shared by Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil, better known as 'La Triple Frontera', has been under constant surveillance.[87]

There have also been occasions when diversity in Argentina has been duly acknowledged. In 2007 the Muslim and Jewish communities celebrated together, respectively, the start of Ramadan, the holy month of Islam, and 'Rosh Hashana', the Jewish New Year. The celebration was held in Buenos Aires on the San Martín Square, headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Culture of the Republic of Argentina. On this occasion the Secretary of Religion, Guillermo Oliver, emphasised the need for interfaith dialogue in the country. He stressed that such a positive atmosphere 'needs care like a garden and this gathering is a small step forward for the difficult situations in the world where there is no peace'.[88]

BRAZIL

The arrival of Muslims in Brazil took place in four phases. First, in the sixteenth century when slaves from West Africa were brought to Brazil (then a Portuguese colony) to work on plantations. Some of the enslaved African Muslims were imams and alims (learned scholars) who succeeded in converting some other slaves to Islam. The Portuguese called alims 'Male' which came from the Arabic word *mu'allim* or teacher. The Male or *mu'allims* established mosques and Qur'ānic schools, and strong Muslim communities in Bahia, Rio de Janeiro and San Luis de Marinon. In the nineteenth century Brazilian African Muslim slaves wanted their freedom from the Portuguese authorities and led a war of liberation in 1807, known as the 'Revolt of the Male'. The war was long and bitter, but by 1835 the Muslims were defeated and persecuted, and their Islamic institutions, schools and mosques were destroyed. The revival of the Spanish Inquisition led the Brazilian Portuguese authorities to forbid any affiliation to Islam and declared the death sentence

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86. 'Muslim Woman says Argentine Authorities Denied her ID over Headscarf', *Agence France Presse*, 18 March 2005.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

88. Misna, 'Jews and Muslims Worship together in Argentina', *Spero News*, 15 September 2007, http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?idarticle=11046, accessed 2 April 2010.

for any Muslim. As a result, many Black African Muslims fled the country, others converted to Christianity, while some kept their faith secret.[89]

The second group of Muslim immigrants came from Greater Syria (a part of the Ottoman Empire) in the late nineteenth century; the third group of immigrants comprised Palestinians and Lebanese who migrated after the First and Second World Wars; and the fourth group were Lebanese who moved to Brazil after the Lebanese civil war in the 1970s.[90] In 2009 the Muslim population was 2,186,132, which was 1.1 per cent of the total population (198,739,269).[91] Most of the Muslims in Brazil are Arabs, many of whom are restaurant owners. There are a few mosques in Brazil, including the Mosque Brazil (the first mosque built in Latin America; construction began in 1929) but there is a shortage of learned imams; only a few hold university degrees in *Shariʿa*. Some mosques have closed down because of lack of funds for imam training and falling mosque attendances.[92]

Some Muslims in Brazil have been a United States security concern,[93] for example, the presence of Hezbollah at the Tri-Border Region of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina since the 1980s. About 50,000 people of Arab descent live in this area, which is well established with Islamic schools and various Arabic language television channels. In 1995 al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and the 9/11 mastermind Khaled Sheikh Mohammad visited Brazil for about three weeks, and it is alleged that a charity was set up to help finance Osama bin Laden. In 1996 Marwan al-Safadi, a resident of the area, was alleged to be a part of the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993.[94]

The Brazilian constitution prohibits any kind of restriction on the exercise of religion, provided it does not violate the law. However, in 2004 some Christian and Muslim leaders in Brazil criticized the Vatican when a ban on Christians marrying Muslims was announced. It was not clear then if the ban was restricted only to Brazil.[95]

89. A. Kettani, 'Islam in Brazil', *op. cit.*, pp. 615–17.

90. *Ibid.*

91. Central Intelligence Agency, 'An Analysis of World Muslim Population by Country'.

92. H. Salah, 'Brazil … Few Imams, Closed Mosques', *Islam Online*, 11 June 2009, http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&pagename=Zone-English-News/NWELayout&cid=1243825288434, accessed 29 March 2010.

93. N. M. Ferrand, 'Islamic Terrorism in Latin America', *The Menges American Report*, 11 March 2009, http://www.il-rs.org.br/ingles/arquivos/The_Americas_March_11_2009.pdf, accessed 2 April 2010.

94. *Ibid.*

95. 'Concern over Vatican's Christian-Muslim Marriage Ban', *IPR Strategic Information Database*, 24 May 2004.

VII–3.3   Fundacion Islamica de Honduras, a mosque in San Pedro Sula, is
the spiritual centre for Muslims in the area
© Larry Luxner/AramcoWorld

Muslims in the Andean States

The Andean Region comprises the six states that share the Andean mountain chain in South America. These countries also have a tiny minority of Muslims, for example Venezuela (0.4 per cent), Chile (1 per cent) and Colombia (1 per cent). Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru also have a tiny minority of Muslims, ranging from 1,000 to 3,000.[96]

V ENEZUELA

In 1498 Columbus landed in Venezuela and noticed that the local people were living in houses on stilts in the lake. Therefore, he named it 'little Venize', that is, 'Venezuela' in Spanish.[97] Muslim history in Venezuela is similar to other South American countries. First, the persecuted Moriscos fled to Venezuela

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96. See Central Intelligence Agency, 'An Analysis of World Muslim Population by Country'; see also, Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*, pp. 32–33.
97. A. Kettani, 'Islam in the Andean States', in A. M. M'Bow and A. Kettani (eds.), *Islam and Muslims in the American Continent*, Beirut, Center of Historical, Economical and Social Studies, 2001, p. 514.

with Spanish colonizers in the sixteenth century. Then came slaves from Africa in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By the nineteenth century, however, Islam had become a myth and was no longer practised, though their cultural heritage was retained through literature.[98] In his work the author Rafael Dongales y Mendez (born in 1878) expressed pride in his Islamic and Andalucian heritage.[99] Venezuela remained a Spanish colony until 1812, and in 1830 it separated from Greater Colombia.

The Muslim population in Venezuela appears to have grown after the Second World War. In 1970 the total number of Muslims was about 30,000, and in 2009 there were about 94,000 Muslims in Venezuela, which was 0.4 per cent of the nation's population (26,814,843).[100] These Muslims are mostly of Lebanese, Syrian and Palestinian origin. In 1993 the biggest mosque in Latin America, the Mosque of Sheikh Ibrahim al-Ibrahim or the Caracas Mosque, was built in Caracas, Venezuela. The *St Petersberg Times* reported:

> Since 1498, when Spanish sailors planted a cross on a beach in a land they later called Little Venice, Roman Catholicism has been the dominant religion in Venezuela. Now, against the emerald green shoulder of an Andean ridge, a slim white minaret rises 370 feet to a crown of a star and crescent. Mirroring modern Venezuela's religious tolerance and its oil realpolitik, artisans here are putting the finishing touches on what will be the biggest mosque in Latin America. Rising higher than the Catholic Cathedral a few blocks away, the new minaret is the highest in the West.[101]

Venezuela does not have any history of Islamic fundamentalism; however, in the 1960s a number of Venezuelan leftists joined radical Palestinian groups, including the terrorist known as Carlos the Jackal. In 2003 a Venezuelan man was arrested at Heathrow airport with a hand grenade and a copy of the Qur'ān in his luggage, but police said that the suspect was not linked to al-Qaeda.[102] In 2006 when the Danish daily newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* printed cartoons depicting the Prophet Muḥammad as associated with violence, (for example, one cartoon depicted the Prophet Muḥammad with his turban shaped like a bomb), hundreds of Muslims in Venezuela burnt American and Danish flags in protest.[103]

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98. *Ibid.*, pp. 509–10.
99. *Ibid.*
100. *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 509–10; Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
101. 'Mosque in Caracas is Highest in West', *St Petersburg Times*, 3 January 1993, p. 18.
102. 'Airline Passenger Packed live Grenade, Qur'ān in Luggage', *Calgary Herald*, 14 February 2003, p. 6.
103. Corky Siemaszko, 'No crisis when Cartoons ran Egypt', *New York Daily News*, 11 February 2006, p. 12.

CHILE

Like other Latin American countries, Chile was influenced by Andalusian Muslim culture, particularly in literature.[104] Arabs' direct contact with Chile, however, began in 1854 when they were first recorded in the census.[105] Salma Elhamalawy noted that in 1854 two 'Turks' (people from Greater Syria under the Ottomans) lived in Chile and this was mentioned in both the censuses of 1865 and 1875. According to the 1885 census, the number of 'Turks' had risen to 29, though their religion was not noted, that of 1895 registered the presence of 76 'Turks', 58 of them Muslims. They lived mainly in the north of Chile in Tarapacá, Atacama, Valparaiso and Santiago. In 1920 the census showed that the number of Muslims had increased to 343 men and 59 women. The greatest numbers were in Santiago and Antofagasta, with 76 in each province.[106] By 1926 it was estimated that Muslims in Chile numbered 1,000,[107] and in September 1926 the first Islamic institution of Chile, the Society of Muslim Union of Chile, was established in Santiago. Later, in October 1927, the Society of Mutual Aids and Islamic Charity was formed.

Over the years the Muslim population in Chile has grown. By 2009 it was 166,017 (1 per cent), of the country's total population of almost 17,000,000.[108] Most are from Syrian and Palestinian backgrounds, and some are converts to Islam. The earliest mosque, built in Chile in the 1990s, was the al-Salam Mosque in Santiago. In 1995 another mosque was inaugurated in Temuco, and in 1998 a new one was built in Iquique. The Islamic Chilean Corporation of Temuco, founded in October 2001, now plays an important role in promoting Islamic values and addressing misconceptions and mainstream Chilean prejudices after 11 September 2001.[109]

COLOMBIA

Historian Kettani noted that the first Muslims in Colombia were the Andalusians in the seventeenth century.[110] They left an Islamic heritage behind them, including the prevalence of Arabic names for both boys and girls. Kettani also appreciated the open mind of some non-Muslim Colombian

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104. Kettani, 'Islam in the Andean States', *op. cit.*, pp. 549–50.
105. S. Elhamalawy, 'The Muslim Presence in Chile: Origins and Dreams', http://www.israinternational.com/component/content/article-42/rokstories/269-muslim-presence-in-chile.html, accessed 5 April 2010.
106. *Ibid.*
107. Kettani, 'Islam in the Andean States', *op. cit.*, p. 550.
108. Central Intelligence Agency, 'An Analysis of World Muslim Population by Country', *op. cit.*
109. Elhamalawy, 'The Muslim Presence in Chile: Origins and Dreams', *op. cit.*
110. Kettani, 'Islam in the Andean States', *op. cit.*, p. 526.

authors, for example Don Azakiel, who criticized the conservative Catholic Church and praised Islam and its rich civilization. Some also learnt the Arabic language.[111]

Between the two World Wars some Muslims migrated from Syria and Lebanon, and in the 1960s and 1970s many Palestinians and some Lebanese moved to Colombia.[112] In 2005 the Muslim population in Colombia was 14,000, about 1 per cent of the total population.[113] As the number of Muslims grew, several Islamic organizations were established, including Islamic centres in San Andrés, Bogotá, Guajira, Nariño and Santa Marta. There are also primary and secondary Islamic schools in Bogotá and Maicao. Maicao's Mosque of Omar Ibn al-Khattab is the second-largest mosque in Latin America.

Muslims in the Caribbean

In 2009 the Caribbean's largest Muslim populations were centred in Suriname (about 20 per cent), Guyana (7.2 per cent) and Trinidad and Tobago (12 per cent), where many Muslims are of East Indian descent. Other Caribbean countries such as Jamaica, Puerto Rico and Barbados have a small number of Muslims, whereas Belize, the Bahamas and Grenada have not recorded a Muslim population.[114] Though Jamaica has only a small number of Muslims, I shall discuss it first because it has been well researched by other scholars.

JAMAICA

Islam came to Jamaica with Moorish sailors when Columbus discovered Jamaica in 1494. Subsequently, in 1503, Islam was reinforced with the importation of Moorish slaves. In 1655 the British captured Jamaica from the Spaniards and turned it into a British colony, establishing a major sugar plantation. Plantation owners prospered so well that the phrase 'rich as a West Indian planter' was coined. The sugar industry required labourers so the British colonizers purchased African slaves, though many of them resorted to fierce resistance.[115]

At the arrival of the British in Jamaica, many Spaniards fled to the neighbouring islands and a combination of Moorish slaves and members of the free African community escaped into the mountains and formed the

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111. *Ibid.*
112. *Ibid.*, pp. 527–28.
113. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*, p. 33.
114. See Central Intelligence Agency, 'An Analysis of World Muslim Population by Country', *op. cit.;* see also, Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*
115. 'General Information: History of Jamaica', http://www.seejamaicacheaply.com/history_jamaica.html, accessed 7 March 2010.

Maroon societies. For about eighty years, the Spanish Maroon (descendants of fugitive slaves) waged *jihād* (struggle) against the British, who tried to re-enslave the Maroons.[116] Finally, in 1739, the British 'Red Coats' concluded a peace treaty with the Maroons and granted them self-government and rights to the mountainous lands they inhabited.[117] Nevertheless, conflict between the 'white planters' and the ex-slaves continued. In 1832 slave leaders such as Mohammad Kaba, Sam Sharpe and George Lewis, who were 'crypto-Muslims', called for an 'island-wide' *jihād* against the ruling class. The *jihād* of 1832, known as the Baptist Rebellion, was suppressed but it hastened the Emancipation Act of 1833 and by 1838 the slaves were completely emancipated. In the process of the brutal suppression of slaves, the 'white' planters destroyed the West African Islamic heritage.[118]

Some of the Maroon leaders had Arabic-sounding names, such as Mohammad Kaba, Ghani, Quao and Cuffee. This further establishes the presence of Muslims in the historical context. Historian Afroz notes that the governance of the Maroons was based on consensual authority or *shūrā*. Even the treaty began, 'In the Name of God, Amen', which in Qurʾānic terms is *bismillāh*, a phrase which was never heard in Christian Europe.[119] In the Maroon societies, about 57 per cent of the slaves belonged to the African ethnic groups such as Mandinka, Fula, Ashanti and Hausa to work in the Jamaican plantations. The Muslim presence is also revealed through autobiographies written in Arabic by Muslim slaves. For example, Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, a Mandinka slave assigned to Magistrate Robert Madden, revealed through his writings that he was a son of a family learned in Islamic jurisprudence from the city of Timbaktu. He received his advanced Qurʾānic learning from the city of Jenne and Bouna. Afroz observes, 'So strong was Abu Bakr's Islamic teaching that even after thirty years of bondage in Jamaica he still knew the Qurʾān "almost by heart".'[120] Like many African Muslim slaves, Abu Bakr had several masters, and in the process was baptised as Edward Donellan, though he remained Muslim at heart. He was one of the few slaves who were able to return to Africa upon his manumission in 1834.[121]

A later encounter of Jamaica with Muslims was the influx of indentured labourers from Mughal India in the 1850s. They came under

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116. S. Afroz, 'The Jihad of 1831–1832: The Misunderstood Baptist Rebellion in Jamaica', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXI, No. 2, 2001, pp. 227–43.

117. 'General Information: History of Jamaica'.

118. S. Afroz, 'Invisible yet Invincible: The Muslim Ummah in Jamaica', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXIII, No. 1, 2003, p. 214.

119. Afroz, 'Invisible yet Invincible', *op. cit.*, p. 213.

120. *Ibid.*

121. *Ibid.*

contract, usually for a number of years, to work for another person or a corporation. Often these contracts were without any monetary reward, but in exchange for accommodation, food, other essentials, training or passage to a new country. After working for the contractual term, the labourer was then free to farm or take up a trade of his own. This later generation of Indian Muslims built mosques. For example, in 1957 the Masjid ar-Rahman was built in Spanish Town and in 1958 Masjid Hussain was built in Westmoreland. Jamaica gained its independence in 1962.[122]

Muslims in contemporary Jamaica form two groups: Jamaican Africans are mostly followers of the Nation of Islam, and immigrant Muslims are of Indian descent, and follow mainstream Sunni Islam. The Nation of Islam has grievances against the 'white' ruling class whom they view as 'oppressors'; whereas immigrant Muslims view people as 'equals'. Besides these ideological differences there are also cultural differences.[123] In 1981 the establishment of the Islamic Council of Jamaica brought unity among Black and Indian Muslims.[124] In 2008 the total number of Muslims in Jamaica was 5,000 (0.2 per cent of the national total of about 2.7 million).[125] Jamaican African Muslims form 70 per cent, Muslims of Indian descent 20 per cent, and recent immigrants 10 per cent of the total Muslim population.[126] There are about ten mosques in Jamaica. During *jumma* (Friday) prayers, the congregation is often so big, even for a spacious mosque such as Masjid al Mamoor (part of the Jamaica Muslim Centre), that they have to pray on the driveway and sidewalk.[127] This diversity of mosque congregations is described in this *New York Daily News* report:

> Although there is no strict dress code, older men generally dress in full-length white or light-colored robes and sandals while younger men wear formal and casual street clothes. Teenagers sport baseball caps, baggy jeans, khakis and sneakers.
> Regardless of the mode of dress, congregants, whose members come from a variety of countries including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Guyana, Yemen, Haiti and Egypt, kneel, bow and prostrate themselves in unison during prayers, which are led by an imam.[128]

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122. *Ibid.*, p. 215.
123. Interview with an immigrant (Sunni) Muslim, Florida, 14 March 2010.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 216.
125. US Department of State, *Jamaica: International Religious Freedom Report,* 2008, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108531.htm, accessed 28 March 2010.
126. Afroz, 'Invisible yet Invincible', *op. cit.*, p. 216.
127. M. Mbugua, 'Full House, and then some at New Jamaica Mosque', *New York Daily News*, 19 August 1998, p. 3.
128. *Ibid.*

VII–3.4 A seventeenth-century bargueno, or wooden chest, from Ecuador,
housed in the Museum of Colonial Art in Quito, reveals Mudejar influences
© Maria Luisa Fernandez/AramcoWorld

Some Muslims in Jamaica feel that they are viewed as the 'other'. In 2009 a
Nigerian-born woman (married to a Jamaican man), Marufat Tijani, principal
of the Islamiyya Basic School at the Islamic Council of Jamaica, commented,
'People look at Muslims as terrorists because of the way the world blames
terrorism on Islam … All the Muslims in the world are being judged because
of terrorism.'[129] Tijani regretted that Muslim men are viewed as 'oppressors',
and that Islam is blamed for Muslim men's behaviour towards women.
Tijani noted that such male attitudes are cultural rather than religious. Tijani
stated, 'Arabs before Muḥammad had their dirty ways of treating women as
property and [women] belong to the men forever. Some persons still have
that idea, but that is culture. That is wrong in Islam.'[130]

The economic composition of Muslims in Jamaica is as follows.
Indigenous Muslims are self-employed or engaged in farming, and a few hold
government jobs. Recent immigrant Muslims are from the Indian subcontinent,
Africa and the Middle East, some of whom are academics, medical doctors,

129. L. Redpath, 'Islam in Jamaica: One Woman's Story', *Jamaica Gleaner*, 29 July 2008,
     http://www.jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20080729/life/life1.html, accessed 28
     March 2010.

130. *Ibid.*

nurses and businessman, though many of these Muslims are unemployed. Lack of education and appropriate skills have led to high unemployment of Muslims aged between their teens and late 1940s.[131] In 2007 a survey by the *Jamaica Gleaner* newspaper found that overall 44 per cent of jobless Jamaicans aged 18–24 lacked work skills. Under the headline 'No jobs for slobs – Lack of education, skills, wrong attitude render youth unemployable', the newspaper reported 8 per cent of young people in that age range had given up looking for a job entirely.[132] Though the national economy looked bleak, at the time of writing some Muslims fared well in Jamaica. For example, Naim Bashir, who is also known as Jimmy Cliff, has earned international recognition as the best reggae singer, and some Jamaican Muslims have done well as academics and scientists.[133]

GUYANA

It is believed that there was Muslim contact with Guyana long before the arrival of Columbus. Arabic coins of the eighth century have been found along the Venezuelan coast. Therefore it is speculated that a Moorish ship from Spain or North Africa could have crossed the Atlantic around AD 800 and reached Venezuela and neighbouring regions such as Guyana and Suriname.[134] Guyana has a history of colonization by the Dutch and later by the British in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries respectively. Many African slaves were brought to Guyana to work on sugar plantations some of whom were Muslims. In 1763 there was a major slave revolt in Berbice against the Dutch, and the leader of the revolt was Cuffy (probably Abdul-Kafi), which is another indication of the presence of Muslims in Guyana in the early years. Later the slaves were defeated and re-enslaved by the Dutch. Because the planters were hostile to Islam, some of the enslaved Muslims hid their identities. Later the British were considered even more harsh, supported by Christian missionaries.[135] After the emancipation of slaves in 1838, the British brought in Indian indentured labourers (comprising Hindus and Muslims). The census report of 1921 showed 18,410 Muslims and 244 Parsis in Guyana; by 1931 there were 21,792 Muslims and 74 Parsis. By 1920 there were about

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131. Afroz, 'Invisible yet Invincible', *op. cit.*, p. 219.

132. 'Unemployable youth. (Jamaica)', *Caribbean Update*, 1 August 2007.

133. Afroz, 'Invisible yet Invincible', *op. cit.*, p. 221.

134. A. Hamid and W. Baksh, 'Islam in Guyana', in A. M. M'Bow and A. Kettani (eds.), *Islam and Muslims in the American Continent*, Beirut, Center of Historical, Economical and Social Studies, 2001, pp. 353, 357.

135. *Ibid.*, pp. 358–9, 363.

fifty mosques in Guyana; however, Muslim literacy skills were very poor because Muslims were confined to sugar plantations.[136]

Guiana (or British Guiana) became an independent state on 26 May 1966, and the new state adopted the name Guyana, derived from an Amerindian word meaning 'land of many waters.' A Guyanese Muslim migrant in America spoke of their history:

> I am originally from Guyana. My forefathers came from Afghanistan and Pakistan which was one India at that time. I am the fourth generation of that family. My family came because Guyana was a colony of Britain. They were brought as cheap labour. They came as Muslims so we have our Muslim identity.
>
> [Now] Guyana offers freedom of religion. They have two public holidays, *Eid-ul-Fitr* and *Yum an-Nabi.* On Fridays people have time off to go to the mosque. The relationship between Muslims, Christians and Hindus is good. It is an open society.[137]

In 2009 there were about 55,605 Muslims in Guyana, comprising about 7.2 per cent of the total population of 772,298.[138] Most of Guyana's Muslims are Sunnis, about half of whom are descendants of East Indian labourers who were brought to work on British sugar plantations in the nineteenth century. In Guyana Muslim groups have increased their community involvement by opening their own schools, ambulance services and religious teaching institutions. There are also 125 mosques and a few Islamic schools. The state-owned international airport at Georgetown has opened a prayer room in its main departure terminal for Muslims.[139]

Indian Muslims are faring well in business; they control a considerable portion of the national economy. Some African Muslims are also self-employed, but a majority of African Muslims remain economically marginalized in the Guyanese labour market.[140] The Guyanese Government has given a public holiday to each of the major religious groups for special occasions such as Good Friday, Easter Monday and Christmas for Christians; *Phagwah* (spring festival) and *Divali* for Hindus; and *Yum an-Nabi* (Birthday of Prophet Muḥammad, *Eid ul Fitr* and *Eid ul Adha* for Muslims.[141]

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136. A. Hamid, 'Muslims in Guyana Part 1', http://www.nur-ul-islam.org/sitebuildercontent/ sitebuilderfiles/muslimsinguyanapt1.pdf, accessed 31 May 2010.

137. Interviewed by the author, Florida, 16 April 2010. It should be noted that Afghanistan was an independent country, while Pakistan was a part of India before 1947.

138. Central Intelligence Agency, 'An Analysis of World Muslim Population by Country'.

139. 'Guyana's Airport Opens Prayer Room for Muslims', *Associated Press Newswires*, 22 September 2003.

140. Hamid and Baksh, 'Islam in Guyana', *op. cit.*, pp. 369–70.

141. *Ibid.*, p. 370.

Certain incidents in Guyana have been disturbing for Muslims. For example, in 2002 the Anglican Reverend Patrick Sookhdeo, of Pakistani descent, who grew up in Guyana as a Muslim and later converted to Christianity, commented:

> I believe we face a much greater threat from Muslim communities within our own countries than we realize. What we are dealing with is the increasing radicalization of groups within our societies that would have their own agenda … Historically, Islam has never learned to live as a minority because its basis exists in power. Therefore, how does it reconstruct itself in Western societies? My own feeling is that what will happen in British society – I am waiting to see whether it will happen in the US – Muslim societies will emerge within Western countries where they will develop their own patterns of social *Sharīʿa* [Islamic law].[142]

In 2004 a heavily armed police force raided an Islamic school in Georgetown, Guyana, in search of a Shīʿa Muslim, Muhammad Hassan Abrahemi, director of the International Islamic College of Advanced Studies, who had been abducted a few weeks earlier. Police thought that he was hiding in this school. Islamic leaders criticized the heavy-handedness of the police and accused them of traumatising the students.[143]

In 2007 four men were arrested for allegedly plotting to bomb JFK Airport in New York; and in conjunction three men were taken into custody by authorities in New York and Trinidad. Russell Defreitas, 63, a naturalized US citizen from Guyana, was arrested in Brooklyn and arraigned in a federal court. Kareem Ibrahim, a Trinidadian, and Abdul Kadir, a former Guyanese parliamentarian and municipal mayor, were detained in Trinidad, while US officials sought their extradition. A fourth man, Abdel Nur, a Guyanese national of Pakistani descent, was still at large and believed to be in hiding in Trinidad.[144] It was alleged that Kadir and Ibrahim belonged to Jamaat al-Muslimeen, a radical Sunni group (mostly of Black Muslims converts) that launched a bloody 1990 attempt to overthrow Trinidad's Government. Both Kadir and Ibrahim were Shīʿa Muslims and thus members of a tiny minority within a minority. This was apparently the first case of Shia Muslims plotting a US terror attack.[145] The Guyanese Muslim community in Guyana and the US were shocked by the news that their fellow countrymen had allegedly plotted

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142. 'Muslim initiative; Anglican Priest Believes West is Underestimating Zeal of Islam', *The Washington Times*, 16 January 2002, p. 2.

143. 'Police raid on Islamic School in Search for Missing Cleric Prompts Criticism from Muslim Leaders in Guyana', *Associated Press Newswires*, 19 April 2004.

144. A. Faiola and R. Shulman. 'In "Little Guyana" Disbelief Over Terrorism Arrests; "We're Kind of a Peaceful People"', *The Washington Post*, 4 June 2007, p. 6.

145. *Ibid.*

to bomb fuel tanks and pipelines at John F. Kennedy International Airport and they condemned such alleged behaviour.[146]

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago became independent from Britain in 1962. Trinidad and Tobago was first colonized by the Spanish in the fifteenth century and came under British control in the late eighteenth century. By 1802 about 20,000 enslaved Africans lived in the colony. They came mostly from the West African coast of Mandingo. Like slaves in Jamaica and Guyana, those in Trinidad and Tobago received barbaric treatment from their masters. Some of them were further disadvantaged because they were 'Mohammedans' (Muslims). In one instance, an Anglican Minister in Tacarigua, Trinidad, depicted his anxiety over the Mandingo Muslims, complaining to the governor that this group existed without 'clerical instruction':

> Many of them are nominally Mohammedans who are under the influence and guidance of five (so-called) Mandingo priests by whom they were instructed in portions of the Koran, one only of this number can write, to whom they seem to look up with great reverence.[147]

The minister's account showed that at one point he planned to 'eradicate the heresy'.[148] In other words, he wanted to exterminate the Muslim slaves. With the abolition of slavery, Indians arrived as indentured labourers. Names such as Khan, Causmolle, Furreed, Emambocus, Omrudee, Allar, Muhourun and Faizan show that there was a Muslim presence in the mid-nineteenth century. During the indentured period there were about 23,000 Muslim labourers. Historian Ibrahim observed that many of them 'suffered slave master brutality as their African predecessors did, and faced hostility from African slaves themselves who viewed them essentially as scab labourers.'[149] When the indentured period ended, many Indians returned to India. However, in 2009 the Muslim population in Trinidad and Tobago (of mostly East Indian background) constituted 12 per cent (147,594) of the total population (1,229,953).[150] Trinidad and Tobago values equality as its national anthem states: 'Here every creed and race find an equal place.'[151]

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146. *Ibid.*
147. M. Ibrahim, 'Islam in Trinidad and Tobago', in A. M. M'Bow and A. Kettani (eds.), *Islam and Muslims in the American Continent*, Beirut, Center of Historical, Economical and Social Studies, 2001, p. 297.
148. *Ibid.*, p. 298.
149. *Ibid.*, p. 299.
150. Central Intelligence Agency, 'An Analysis of World Muslim Population by Country', *op. cit.*
151. Ibrahim, 'Islam in Trinidad and Tobago', *op. cit.*, p. 307.

Several Muslim organizations flourish in Trinidad; for example, the largest is the Anjuman Sunnat-ul-Jamaat Association, which was founded in the 1930s and represents about 80 per cent of the nation's Muslims. In addition, the Trinidad Muslim League, the Islamic Trust, the Tabligh Jamaat and the Islamic Missionaries Guild of South America and the Caribbean all have significant numbers of members.

Some Muslims have held important government positions. For example, Kamaluddin Mohammed, Muriel Fatima Donawa McDavidson and Shamsuddin Mohammed have all served as government ministers in the republic of Trinidad and Tobago. Some Muslims, such as Justice Shaffie Shah and Justice Clem Razac, have served as High Court judges.[152] A glimpse of the Muslim community in Trinidad in the 1980s is provided by a Trinidadian-born Muslim woman, Khadija, aged 21 (settled in the United States):

> Actually when I was in Trinidad, I went to a Muslim school. It's called Trinidad Muslim League School, TML. But I was very young (attended grade 1 and 2), so we never wore *ḥijāb* and stuff, but we always wore long uniforms. Green and white were the colours … After my mom got married, she started wearing the *ḥijāb*, because she married into the Maulana's [imam's] family. So she started changing the way she dresses and stuff. And that's how generally we always knew that when we get older, we have to put on this, no matter what.[153]

However, the presence of the militant Islamic group Jamaat al-Muslimeen, which attempted a coup in Trinidad in 1990, is having a negative impact on some mainstream Muslims. The aforementioned JFK plotters were believed to be members of this group. Some Muslims in Trinidad were also reluctant to travel to the United States as they feared repercussions. For example, Anisa Hosein, a 38-year-old housewife, said Muslims were already targeted in the United States, Canada and Britain and the latest allegations would only make it worse:

> We're going to be singled out, questioned, interrogated, maybe strip-searched just because we wear certain clothes, look a certain way … As long as I can avoid going there, I would, because I want my dignity and self-respect intact … I'd go to other countries that would not treat me as a terrorist.[154]

The apprehension of Anisa Hosein is an example of how with every act of Muslim extremists mainstream (moderate) Muslims are affected by being viewed as the 'other'. For example, an American-born man of Trinidadian background, Afzal, aged 21, recalled:

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152. *Ibid.*, p. 307.
153. Interview conducted by the author, Florida, 20 March 2010.
154. L. Hutchinson-Jafar, 'Trinidad Muslims Wary about Travel to US', *Reuter News*, 12 June 2007.

> When 9/11 happened I was actually still in middle school. I was still young and it really was difficult at first because a lot of people thought just because I was Muslim, I was part of the attacks. Either they'd do jokes, or meant it in saying I was a terrorist, or things like that because of my last name and first name, and stuff like that. Because [of my last name] they were really harsh sometimes.[155]

Afzal said that when he was distressed his father told him:

> This brings opportunity for people to learn, because in the next couple of years, you'll see people have open ears to Islam and would want to see what this Islam religion is all about. But what is happening [terrorist acts] is not the real Islam.[156]

Later, when I asked Afzal about his national identity, he said:

> I would consider myself American-Trinidad kind of thing. I do speak with more an American accent than anything. When you grow up here, you pick up the accent and stuff like that. So I would consider myself more American-Trinidad background.[157]

When I asked Afzal whether it is difficult to be a Muslim in American society he replied:

> To me, not really. I mean, it's very free. I've been very active at the school. Since I started university as a student, I've been always, every semester, giving a lecture to students about Islam. I believe that really helped the school understand what Islam is, and really helped them to gain more knowledge on Islam.

Both Khadija's and Afzal's interviews indicate the presence of Islam in Trinidad, and how this presence has been carried to the United States.

SURINAME

Suriname, formerly Dutch Guyana, borders Guyana (the former British Guiana). Suriname was a Dutch colony (except for a certain period when it was under the British) which became independent in 1975. As in other Caribbean countries, the first group of Muslims were slaves from Africa who were chained and transported in the seventeenth century. The second wave of Muslims were indentured labourers from India who arrived in the late nineteenth century. Along with the Indians came some Afghans. The third group of Muslims were mostly from Java, Indonesia, who also came in the late nineteenth century. The Javanese (and Indians) in Suriname worked in plantations as indentured labourers

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155. Interview conducted by the author, Florida, 26 March 2010.
156. *Ibid.*
157. *Ibid.*

up to 1930. Afterwards, when the plantations shut down, they worked on the agricultural plots given to them by the government.[158]

In 2009 Muslims in Suriname constituted 19.6 per cent (94,328) of the total population of 481,267.[159] Three distinct Muslim communities still live in Suriname: the Javanese from the Indonesian archipelago, who have been living in the country for more than fifty years; Indo-Pakistanis, who came as indentured labourers over 100 years ago; and the growing African-Surinamese Muslim community.[160] Surinamese Muslims belong mostly to lower and middle socio-economic groups and are predominantly engaged in agriculture. The Muslim community lacks adequate religious teachers, its madrassahs are inadequately equipped, and there are no funds to teach Islam to the younger generation.[161] In 2001 the first all-male Djamia School was founded to train Muslim imams and teachers. The school was built mostly with local donations.[162]

Haiti

In 1626 Haiti was conquered by the French. The French colonizers imported slaves from Sub-Saharan Africa and Islam came to Haiti with some of these slaves.[163] However, many of the Muslim slaves from West Africa were forcibly baptised though many Maroons secretly maintained their Islamic faith. If someone was found to be a Muslim, the punishment was death.[164] Many Muslim slaves fought for the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804), which was a conflict on the French colony of Saint Domingue, which eventually led to the elimination of slavery and establishment of the Republic of Haiti in 1804. Newspaper columnist Cook observes:

> One such slave, Dutta Boukman, who was smuggled in from Jamaica, received his name because he could read, and his French masters reported he read upside down which indicated he most likely was reading Arabic and, at that, feasibly, the

158. I. Jamaluddin, 'Islam in Surinam', in A. M. M'Bow and A. Kettani (eds.), *Islam and Muslims in the American Continent*, Beirut, Center of Historical, Economical and Social Studies, 2001, pp. 423–30.

159. Central Intelligence Agency, 'An Analysis of World Muslim Population by Country', *op. cit.*

160. R. Chickrie, 'The Afghan Muslims in Guyana and Suriname', 2003, http://www.guyana.org/features/afghanguyanese_muslim.html, accessed 1 April 2010.

161. Jamaluddin, 'Islam in Surinam', *op. cit.*, p. 457.

162. A. Belfor, 'Muslims in Suriname Found New School to Train Islamic Religious Teachers', *Associated Press Newswires*, 9 October 2001.

163. A. Kettani, 'Islam in the Caribbean', in M'Bow and Ali Kettani (eds.), *Islam and Muslims*, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

164. G. Cook, 'Islam in Haiti', *The Muslim Observer*, 28 January 2010, http://muslimmedianetwork.com/mmn/?p=5727, accessed 4 April 2010.

Koran. This description is an unquestionable fact although legend claims he was a Voo-Doo [African-derived faith] priest, but 'revisionist' Haitian scholarship suspects that he was a Muslim. Nonetheless, his death by decapitation in a 1791 rebellion, which he commanded, raised the demand, again, that led for freedom and the finally successful Black Haitian Revolution for Independence in which the Muslims, who were instrumental in that War, spoke Arabic to confuse their enemies![165]

In the 1920s the second wave of Muslims came to Haiti from Arab countries, especially from Morocco.[166] Islam grew slowly in Haiti. By 2002 Muslim men distinctive in their *topi* (Muslim cap) and beards, and women in *ḥijāb*, could be seen on the streets of several cities. From the mosque *Āzān* (calls to prayer) could be heard: '*Allāhu Akbar, Allāhu Akbar, Allāhu Akbar, Allāhu Akbar, La ilāha illā Allāh*' – 'God is great, God is great, God is great, God is great, there is no god but God.'[167] However, after the 9/11 tragedy in the United States, Muslims in Haiti quickly condemned the terrorist act, and Muslim congregant Racin Ganga said:

> Allāh says that if a man kills another man it is as if he has killed all humanity. The people who did what they did in New York, they are not even human. Islamic people should use the weapon of their love, because violence, as we've seen here in Haiti, will not take us anywhere.[168]

Muslims have been active in politics in Haiti. For example, from 2001 to 2004 Nawoon Marcellus was the first Muslim elected to the Chamber of Deputies, Haiti's lower house of parliament.[169] In 2009 Muslims in Haiti numbered 3,000–5,000, representing approximately 0.04 per cent of the total population (9,035,536), and there were a dozen mosques.[170] Many Haitian Muslims have migrated to the United States for better economic opportunities.[171] It is estimated that in 2010 about 800,000 Americans of Haitian descent lived in the US, mostly in Miami, New York, Boston and Chicago. When they heard news of the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, Haitian Muslims in the US sent aid to their fellow countrymen.[172]

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165. *Ibid.*
166. *Ibid.*
167. M. Deibert, 'Mohammed's Religion Finds a Place in Haiti', *Reuters News*, 13 June 2002.
168. *Ibid.*
169. *Ibid.*
170. Central Intelligence Agency, 'An Analysis of World Muslim Population by Country', *op. cit.*
171. M. S. Bortot, 'Haitian-American Muslim Collects Relief Supplies for Haiti', *America.gov*, 20 January 2010, http://www.america.gov/st/develop-english/2010/January/20100119 163959smtotrob0.1980707.html, accessed 4 April 2010.
172. *Ibid.*

CUBA

In the sixteenth century Islam arrived in Cuba with African slaves. In subsequent centuries Andalusian Muslims came to Cuba, but their Islamic heritage could not be retained. Later, between 1850 and 1930, Arabs migrated to Cuba. Most of the migrants were Christians, though some were Muslims. Maria Deriche, whose father was a Muslim, came from Palestine in 1912. She recalled that Cuba was a transit point for Arab immigrants going to the United States or other places in the Caribbean. Arabs initially worked as day labourers, and gradually they established businesses as fabric traders, or retailers of hardware, jewellery and furniture.[173] In 2005 the total Muslim population in Cuba was 9,000 which was 0.1 per cent of the total population. Many Muslims have settled in Havana, and the Islamic Association of Cuba is based there.[174] At the time of writing this chapter in 2010, Muslims in Cuba did not have proper mosques. There was no al-Qaeda presence except for the people held in the US Navy base at Guantanamo Bay. However, Cuba has been listed in the US terrorist list.[175] In January 2010 the *Global Post* reported:

> Because the US State Department has designated Cuba's communist government as a 'state sponsor of terror', Cuban travelers will be pulled aside [at US airports] for extra security checks under the TSA [Transportation Security Administration] policy. Travelers from Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen will also be subject to the added screening measures.[176]

After the 23-year-old Nigerian man Abdul Mutallab's alleged attempt to blow up a Detroit-bound Northwest Airlines flight on 25 December 2009 with explosives tucked in his underwear, the new Transportation Security Administration policy introduced a Millimetre Wave technology for passenger security screening. This would obviously impact on all passengers, particularly Muslims.

173. S. Hurlich, 'Cuban-Arabs: Another Rich Legacy of Cuba', *Outlook*, Nov./Dec. 2010, http://www.cubasolidarity.com/aboutcuba/topics/race/0311cubanarabs.htm, accessed 7 April 2010.

174. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

175. N. Miroff, 'Pat-Down for Nigerians, Pakistanis … and Cubans', *Global Post*, 7 January 2010, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/cuba/100105/tsa-screening, accessed 7 April 2010.

176. *Ibid.*

CONCLUSION

Muslims in the Americas and the Caribbean have come from enslavement to freedom, and from migration to this region of their own free will. The enslavement period was a time of conflict, resistance and bloodshed and the Spanish Inquisition was a dark chapter in Christian-Muslim relations. Since the 1970s the Muslim population in this region has grown steadily, which many would regard as a sign of progress. Muslims now have schools, mosques and associations to retain their religion and heritage. Nevertheless since 9/11 many Muslims have been viewed as the 'other', and more research into the ramifications of this typically discriminating treatment is vital. Both Muslims and non-Muslims need to engage in communication and dialogue to erase the misconceptions associated with Islam. More work opportunities for young Muslims should be made available, and the intercultural and intergenerational conflict within the Muslim community should be addressed. As discussed, due to the scarcity of resources, I was unable to gather in-depth information on the Muslim minority in many parts of South America and the Caribbean. Researchers who are willing and able to undertake qualitative research on the Muslim minorities in this region might find it very fruitful.

MUSLIM MINORITIES IN AFRICA

Nahid Afrose Kabir

Islam first spread in North Africa in the seventh and eighth centuries. Muslims from Arab countries settled in the desert and semi-desert regions all the way across Africa, and some areas became predominantly Muslim countries such as Sudan and Somalia. Later from the twelfth century onwards, Christianity spread inland when the European colonial powers established themselves on the African coast. The line where Islam and Christianity meet runs across Africa about 1,100 km north of the equator (except in Ethiopia, where Christians have the highlands and Muslims the lowlands).[1]

In this chapter, I examine Muslims' placement as a minority in the Christian majority African countries. I first discuss the Muslim minorities in West Africa, followed by Central Africa, then the Muslim minorities in East Africa followed by the Horn of Africa, and finally, Muslims in Southern Africa. It should be noted that some places may fall under the definition of both East Africa and Southern Africa, for example Mozambique. In this chapter I have discussed Mozambique in the Southern Africa section.

Table 7.4.1 shows the Muslim population and the Muslim percentage of the total population in each of the countries I discuss in this chapter.

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1.   G. Dyer, 'Religion an Increasing Source of Strife in Africa', *Japan Times*, 18 February 2012.

Table 7.4.1: Muslim minority populations in African countries[2]

Country	Muslim population	Percentage of the total population
Ghana	3,787,000	15.9
Liberia	483,000	12.2
Côte d'Ivoire/Ivory Coast	7,745,000	36.7
Nigeria	78,056,000	50.4
Central African Republic	395,000	8.9
Democratic Republic of the Congo	943,000	1.4
Gabon	140,000	9.5
Kenya	2,793,000	7.0
Tanzania	13,218,000	30.2
Uganda	3,958,000	12.2
Rwanda	182,000	1.8
Eritrea	1,854,000	36.5
Ethiopia	28,063,000	33.9
Malawi	1,955,000	12.8
Mozambique	5,224,000	22.8
Zimbabwe	109,000	0.9
South Africa	731,000	1.5
Botswana	8,000	0.4
Lesotho	1,000	0.1
Swaziland	2,000	0.2
Zambia	58,000	0.4

West Africa

In the eighth and ninth centuries Arab and Berber merchants who traded gold with the people of West Africa introduced Islam. There are now Muslim majority countries in West Africa such as Senegal and Mali. Other sources suggest that North African Arab soldiers engaged in the slave trade around ancient Ghana brought Islam to the region. When the Arab governors and

2. The information in Table 7.4.1 comes from different years (as I have mentioned in the text). It should be taken as an approximate comparison between countries. This table is derived from Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2009, pp. 30–1, http://www.pewforum.org/newassets/images/reports/Muslimpopulation/Muslimpopulation.pdf, accessed 4 December 2012.

traders were informed of the enrichment of West Africa through trading gold and slaves, they became involved in the region and thereby introduced Islam.[3]

Ghana

Islam was first introduced in northern Ghana through invasion and trade in the sixteenth century. By the seventeenth century muslims were present among the Gonga, the Dagomba and the Wala in northern Ghana. In southern Ghana, Islam was introduced through trade and British external intervention. By the eighteenth century Islam had spread among the Asante people In southern Ghana.[4] In the 1870s British colonists brought the first batch of Muslim troops to Ghana. They were stationed in Accra, Elmina and Keta. By 1886 the British authorities were paying a salary to one 'Mohammadan Priest' in each of the military posts, and Muslims were given government land to settle and build mosques.[5] The most prominent Islamic scholar in Ghana was Alhaj Imoru (Umar) who migrated from Northern Nigeria to the then Gold Coast (the former name of Ghana) in the late 1890s.[6] After his death his students propagated Islam until the late 1930s.[7] Gradually Muslims became more integrated in the north and thereby maintained their distance from the south.[8]

Ghana is now a secular state and the social and administrative structures of the country were not changed or reformed to become an 'Islamic' state.[9] In 1909 the capital city Accra had about 1,500 Muslims and in 2003 a huge Muslim concentration could be found in Accra, Nima, Sukura and Ashaiman – areas generally referred to as Zongos.[10] In 2000 Muslims in Ghana numbered 3,787,000, which comprised 15.9 per cent of the total population.[11] Islam is a recognized religion there. Ghana observes national holidays on *Eid-ul-Fitr* and *Eid-ul-Adha.*

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3. I. Bah, *Islam in the Volta Region: A Case Study of Ave Afiadenyigba*, MA Thesis, University of Cape Coast, 2010, p. 12.
4. N. Samwini, *The Muslim Resurgence in Ghana since 1950: Its Effects upon Muslims and Muslim-Christian Relations*, Piscataway, NJ, Transaction Publishers, 2006, pp. 22, 38.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
6. Bah, *Islam in the Volta Region, op. cit.*
7. A. R. Alhassan, 'Muslims Meet for Peace: Accra Chosen as Venue for Historic International Conference', *Accra Mail* (Ghana), 17 January 2003.
8. Samwini, *The Muslim Resurgence in Ghana since 1950, op. cit.*, pp. 37–8.
9. H. Weiss, 'Reorganizing Social Welfare Among Muslims: Islamic Voluntarism and Other Forms of Communal Support in North Ghana', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, XXXII, No. 1, 2002, p. 92.
10. Alhassan, 'Muslims Meet for Peace', *op. cit.*
11. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*

VII–4.1   East African Qurʾān, from the eighteenth century
© Nasser Khalili Collection of Islamic Art (Nour Foundation)

Like other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, Muslim non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been active in Ghana. There is a general consensus among Sufi scholars, Islamists and Wahhabis on the proper collection of *zakāt*. Also, voluntary almsgiving or *ṣadaqa* is well established among the Muslim community. However, there is no proper institution for the redistribution of *zakāt*. Some say there is a lack of unity among Muslims, while others say that people are too poor to pay *zakāt*.[12] Muslim NGOs are becoming controversial in Ghana. Welfare projects are sold to (external) donors in a package that also includes building a mosque and educational centres. Normally, the mosque is built quite quickly. But there is a lack of funding to maintain clinics, health centres and schools. The Muslim NGOs do not have enough local resources to sustain existing institutions.[13]

In January 2003 Ghana hosted a three-day international conference on Muslim minorities in Africa. The conference was organized at a time when Islam was under attack as a result of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the

12. Weiss, 'Reorganizing Social Welfare Among Muslims', *op. cit.*, p. 92.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

Twin Towers. It aimed to foster solidarity among member African states and address the fundamental problems of the Muslim minorities in the world, the foremost of which was identified as poverty.[14]

L IBERIA

Liberia is the only black state in Africa never subjected to colonial rule, and it is the oldest republic on the continent. In 2008 the Muslim population was 483,000, which was 12.2 per cent of the total population.[15] The predominantly Muslim tribes in Liberia are the Mandigo, Vai, Gbandi and Mende.

The Muslim Mandingo community in Liberia has been economically affluent. During economic crises, it supported the Liberian Government. Yet this created inter-ethnic antagonism against the Muslim Mandingo business community, even though this community has supported all political leaderships in Liberia. Two civil wars (1989–96 and 1999–2003) claimed about 150,000 lives (and Muslim Mandigos were among the victims).[16] The main causes of the civil wars were ethnic divisions, a corrupt political system and economicz disparities.[17] As Liberia was trying to recover from the second civil war of 1999–2003, a sectarian war erupted between Christians and Muslims in 2004.[18] Since 2003 the United Nations has kept a peacekeeping force in Liberia to facilitate humanitarian assistance. In 2005 Ms Ellen Johnson Sirleaf won the presidential election. She was still in power in 2012 (when this chapter was written). Ellen Sirleaf is the first elected female head of state in Africa. Jointly with Leymah Gbowee and Tawakel, Sirleaf was awarded the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize for their non-violent struggle for the safety of women.

Though commercially successful, the Muslim Mandingo ethnic group in Liberia did not occupy a position in the political mainstream. They also felt discriminated against when they sought administrative and government

14. Alhassan, 'Muslims Meet for Peace', *op. cit.*

15. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

16. A. M.D. Sirleaf, 'Islam and its Political Development in Liberia: The Case of the Muslim Mandigo Ethnic Group and the Liberian Civil Conflict; A Prospect for Post Conflict Religious Diversity and Solidarity', no date, www.blacology.com/…/DrSirleafResearchBRDI%20 Publication.doc, accessed 10 November 2012.

17. P. Vinck, P. Pham and T. Kreutzer, *Talking Peace: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Security, Dispute Resolution, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Liberia*, Berkeley, CA, Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley, 2011, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/ files/HRC/Publications_Talking-Peace_06-2011.pdf, accessed 16 November 2012.

18. 'Sectarian Violence Erupts in Liberia', *NBC News*, 29 October 2004, http://www.msnbc. msn.com/id/6362928/ns/world_news/t/sectarian-violence-erupts-liberia/, accessed 16 November 2012.

positions.[19] Apart from the indigenous Muslim Mandingo, there are other Muslim ethnic groups in Liberia, and many UN peacekeepers are Muslims. Mosques are being built and renovated. Some of the visiting Muslim peacekeepers have married Liberians and their children are considered to be Muslims.[20]

CÔTE D'IVOIRE OR IVORY COAST

Côte d'Ivoire gained independence from France in 1960. Though Côte d'Ivoire was a model of economic prosperity and political stability from the 1960s to the 1980s, and the Ivoirians claim it to be the 'Kenya of West Africa',[21] the northern part of the country (mainly populated by Muslims) was economically neglected. In 1974 the income per capita of the four northern departments was significantly below the national average. Over the years public investment in the north improved, yet in 1998 the northern regions and the northern ethnic groups still remained marginalized compared to their southern counterparts.[22] The Muslim community often believed that their government favoured Christians, particularly the Roman Catholic Church. Many senior government officials have been Catholics. The northerners or Muslims were viewed as the 'other' and the 'enemy within'.[23]

In 2005 the Muslim population in the Republic of the Ivory Coast was 7,745,000, which was 36.7 per cent of the total population.[24] Northern Ivorian Muslims and pan-Islamic charitable bodies have been running Islamic schools since the 1980s. The Association of Muslim Students of Côte d'Ivoire and the National Islamic Council have been playing a positive role in society.[25] Yet from 2002 to 2004 civil war erupted in Côte d'Ivoire and divided the mainly Muslim north and Christian south. It resulted in more than 1,000 deaths, and many civilian casualties. The rebels called themselves the *Mouvement Patriotique* de Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI). They demanded that President Gbagbo step down and called for elections to be held within six months. MPCI particularly

19. Sirleaf, 'Islam and its Political Development in Liberia', *op. cit.*

20. 'Muslims in Liberia', 15 August 2008, http://www.30-days.net/muslims/muslims-in/africa-west/liberia/, accessed 16 November 2012.

21. T. Eluemunor, 'Why the Cote d'Ivoire Disaster is Echoed in the Country's Crisis', *Daily Nation*, 22 February 2008.

22. R. Nordås, 'Identity Polarization and Conflict: State Building in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana', paper presented at the 49th International Studies Association Convention, San Francisco, CA, 26–29 March 2008, p. 18, http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ISA_identitypolarizationconflict.pdf, accessed 17 November 2012.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

24. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

25. N. Benga, Book Review of *Islam, Histoire et Modernité en Côte d'Ivoire* by M. Miran, Paris, Karthala, 2006, *African Studies Review*, L, No. 2, 2007, pp. 223–4.

emphasized that they were for the rights of the Muslim majority in the north as they felt that Muslims were discriminated against.[26]

Within the Muslim community, girls' marriage at an early age has been a matter of concern to some people. 12-year-old girls have sometimes been forced to marry distant relatives of the same clan about two or three times their age. Sociologists and scholars of Islamic law have noted that West African Muslims have accepted the tradition because they believed that it promoted social stability, cemented bonds between clans and prevented promiscuity. But activists and medical professionals have observed that pre-adolescent marriage can lead to mother and child death during childbirth and Africa has high maternal mortality rates.[27]

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA

In 2003 the Muslim population of Nigeria was 78,056,000, which constituted 50.4 per cent of the total Nigerian population.[28] Nigeria won independence from British rule in 1960. It consists of about 270 ethnic tribes but the most prominent is the Hausa-Fulani group (mostly Muslims) located in northern Nigeria. Other ethnic groups include the Yoruba in south-western Nigeria (mostly Anglicans) and Igbo (predominantly Roman Catholics) in south-eastern Nigeria. Nigeria's political history is complex. The Yoruba people in the south-west are driven by nationalism with an emphasis on self-determination, and a possible sovereign Yoruba nation – Odua Republic (a tentative name for an imagined nation) – that will emerge should the independent Nigeria fail. They are competing with other ethnic groups to control natural resources.[29] Up till 2009, the Yoruba of south-western Nigeria were involved in a number of episodes of political violence related to general elections, which revealed the tight competition that exists in political power struggles among some ethnic groups that constitute the Federal Republic of Nigeria.[30]

It appears that the Christian-Muslim conflict has a political orientation. The army dominated by Muslim officers of the north worked as a facilitator

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26. Nordås, 'Identity Polarization and Conflict', *op. cit.*, p. 1.
27. S. Buckley, 'African Girls Forced to Wed Despite Law Ivory Coast Tradition Outweighs Ban, Protests over Taking Child Brides', *The Dallas Morning News*, 28 December 1997, p. 16A.
28. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*, p. 30.
29. A. S. Ajala, *Yoruba Nationalist Movements, Ethnic Politics and Violence: A Creation from Historical Consciousness and Socio-political Space in South-western Nigeria*, Working Paper No. 105, Mainz, Germany, Institut für Ethnologie und Afrikastudien, Universität Mainz, 2009, http://ubm. opus.hbz-nrw.de/volltexte/2009/2061/pdf/diss.pdf, accessed 16 November 2012.
30. *Ibid.*

of the presidency during the thirty years of military rule in Nigeria. In 1999 Olusegun Obasanjo, a former Christian military dictator, won the presidency with a lot of support from northern Muslim voters because they were displeased with the corruption in the Muslim north. In 2000, *Sharīʿa* law was imposed across all the northern states, which was in violation of the Nigerian constitution and of non-Muslim rights. It was an attempt to polarize views over religion and to increase opposition to President Obasanjo. This was followed by religious riots which killed about 10,000 people in the cities across the north over four years.[31]

Many Nigerians argue that the real reason for the violence is neither ethnic nor religious; rather it is about land, scarce resources and political power. Poverty, joblessness and corrupt politics drive extremists, both Muslim and Christian, to commit horrendous atrocities. Although Nigeria earns billions of dollars in oil revenue annually, the majority of Nigerians get barely a dollar a day.[32] The conflict is greatest in the Middle Belt region, which is a mixed area and as a result very volatile. The conflicts are normally based on ethnic division, class and occupational differences, and between people who are indigenous and who have settled more recently. Tens and thousands of people were killed in this area in the last ten years due to the sectarian conflict.[33]

Though there are incidents of violence carried out by the Yoruba Christians in the south, the media highlights the incidents involving the Muslims, for example, Amina Lawal's case. In 2002, under *Sharīʿa* law, Lawal's pregnancy was taken as proof of adultery and she was sentenced to death by stoning. Worldwide condemnation of the case, and a campaign mounted by human rights organizations, eventually led to Lawal's acquittal. If the sentence had been carried out, she would have been buried up to her neck in sand then pelted with rocks.[34] In 2005 the backlash against the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muḥammad led to killings and burning of churches.[35]

In Nigeria the Islamic sect known as Boko Haram (meaning 'Western education is a sin') has been terrorizing non-Muslims in the north. They are responsible for killing innocent non-Muslims and destroying churches. Boko Haram has existed since 1900 but it initially aimed to propagate Islam using

31. 'Politics, Polio and Religion not Bedfellows', *New Vision* (Uganda), 13 July 2004.
32. Meg Handley, 'The Violence in Nigeria: What's Behind the Conflict?', *TIME*, 10 March 2010, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1971010,00.html, accessed 13 October 2012.
33. United States Institute of Peace, *Ameliorating Christian/Muslim Conflict in the Middle Belt of Nigeria*, October 2010, http://www.usip.org/node/7329/, accessed 16 November 2012.
34. 'Appeal Court Quashes Death Verdict On Amina Lawal', *Vanguard* (Nigeria), 26 September 2003.
35. Y. Mugerwa, 'Kampala', *The Monitor* (Kampala, Uganda), 26 February 2006.

peaceful methods. Since it has resorted to violence, mainstream Muslims in Nigeria do not support it.[36] In 2007 Umaru Musa Yar'Adua became Nigeria's first civilian (and Muslim) president. On 5 March 2010 President Yar'Adua died and on 6 May 2010 Vice President Goodluck Jonathan was sworn in as President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the fourteenth head of state. In spite of all the tensions, there have been efforts by both Muslims and Christians to promote harmony and social cohesion. For example, Imam Muhammad Ashafa and Pastor Jame Wuye began an initiative for healing and reconciliation.[37]

Central Africa

Islam in Central Africa was mainly introduced by Arab traders in the tenth century.[38] Later, Muslims from North Africa moved to Central Africa. Muslims from the Indian subcontinent also settled in Central Africa.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

The Central African Republic (CAR, formerly the French colony of Ubangi-Shari) became independent in 1960. After three decades of military rule, a civilian government was formed in 1993. In 1995 the Muslim population in the Central African Republic was 8.9 per cent.[39] The indigenous Muslims are the Rungas tribe living in northern Central Africa. Other CAR Muslims are mostly of Arab descent. More recently, businesses in the CAR have been established by Lebanese Muslims, and other African Muslims from Senegal and Chad. Sometimes Muslim students go to Sudan and Saudi Arabia for their education. There are several mosques and some Islamic schools in the CAR.[40]

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

In the 1920s some Muslims from British India, particularly Gujarat, established themselves as shopkeepers in Zaire (the former name of the Congo). There

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36. S. Eyoboka, 'Only Spiritual Leaders Can Make Peace to Reign – Sheikh Adangba', *Vanguard* (Lagos, Nigeria), 24 June 2012.

37. DVD, *The Imam and the Pastor*, April 2009, http://www.usip.org/publications/dvd-imam-and-pastor, and http://www.fltfilms.org.au, accessed 13 October 2012.

38. G. Shepperson, 'Islam in Central Africa: A Historiographical Document', *The Society of Malawi Journal*, LIX, No. 2, 2006, pp. 1–5.

39. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*, p. 30.

40. 'Understanding Muslims in Central African Republic', no date, http://www.30-days.net/muslims/muslims-in/central-africa/car/, accessed 29 October 2012.

were constant movements and business connections with other Indian Muslims in East Africa, Kenya and Uganda. Some Muslims from North Africa moved to Zaire. Muslims, like other local groups, witnessed Zaire's independence from Belgium. But the 1963 rebellion led to political instability so some Muslims moved to Uganda, and those who stayed behind became victims of 'Zairisation', which meant the expropriation without compensation of every business that belonged to foreigners.[41]

In 1997 Zaire was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In 2005 it was estimated that about 3.8 million people were killed in the civil war and ethnic strife over control of wealth and resources.[42] The country has vast natural resources but its economy has declined sharply since the mid-1980s. Civil war has reduced national output and government revenue. It has increased external debt and contributed to the deaths, famine and disease of millions of people. Foreign businesses have curtailed operations and investment in the Congo due to economic uncertainty and lack of proper infrastructure.[43]

The people of the Congo are still recovering from their long, volatile history. In 2007 the Muslim population of the Democratic Republic of the Congo was 943,000 which was 1.4 per cent of the total population.[44]

GABON

Gabon gained independence from France in 1960. In 2009 the Muslim population in Gabon was 140,000, which constituted 9.5 per cent of the total population.[45] Gabon's President Omar Bongo Ondimba was a Sunni Muslim who ruled from 1967 to 2009. His son Ali Bongo Ondimba (also a Muslim) was elected president in 2009.

Compared to other Central African countries, Gabon appears to be progressive in Muslim affairs. For example, the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs of Gabon is a young institution that looks after Muslim affairs. Religious schools, both Muslim and Christian, are required to register with the Ministry of Education, which is charged with ensuring that these religious schools meet the standards required for public schools. The government does not contribute funds to private schools, whether religious or secular. The Gabonese Government grants public holidays such as Easter, All Saints Day, Christmas, *Eid-ul-Fitr* and *Eid-ul-Adha.*[46]

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41. W. Langewiesche, 'Congo from the Cockpit', *Vanity Fair*, No. 563, 2007, p. 162.
42. A. Wertheim, 'Spotlight on Democratic Republic of the Congo', *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, 9 February 2005.
43. *Ibid.*
44. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
45. *Ibid.*
46. 'Islam in Gabon', *Wikipedia*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_Gabon, accessed 16 November 2012.

In 2004 the first national conference for the Muslims of Gabon was held in the capital city, Libreville, on the theme 'United for the sake of a flourishing and tolerant Islam.' During the conference, the heads of some thirty-four Islamic societies of Gabon signed an agreement to coordinate Islamic works on the theme of the conference.[47]

In April 2012 the Islamic Conference of Information Ministers was held in Libreville.[48] It was attended by representatives from fifty-seven member states of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which is the largest intergovernmental organization after the UN. At the conference, the largest group representing Muslim countries agreed to launch a media campaign with the purpose of raising awareness of anti-Muslim hate movements in the world, while being aware of the problems faced by Muslims residing as a minority in different countries. The chairman of the conference, Blaise Louembe, the Gabonese Minister of Digital Economy, Communications and Post, told the audience that there was a need to support dialogue, solidarity and consultation among the OIC member countries, stressing that it was important to address Islamophobia through diplomatic dynamism. He also proposed an awareness-raising campaign that would eliminate violence advocated by some extremist movements, and assured the OIC members that Gabon was ready to lead these projects.

President Ali Bongo Ondimba stated that the conference was of great importance because it focused on sensitive media issues. Ondimba agreed with other members that Islamophobia needs to be addressed and that a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism, extremism and radicalism should be adopted. President Ondimba recognized that the first victims of extremist ideology were the Muslims. The OIC meeting in Gabon adopted several resolutions to strengthen media coordination among the fifty-seven member countries. According to one resolution, the OIC adopted a comprehensive media plan directed at audiences outside of the OIC member states and Gabon would be in charge of executing it. Saudi Arabia allocated $25 million to create a special fund to promote the positive image of Islam among non-OIC media. Other member states are also expected to contribute to this fund. The programme targets media in key world capitals.[49]

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47. *Ibid.*
48. 'Gabon: Muslim States Agree to Media Blitz in Fight against Islamophobia', *The Muslim News*, 23 April 2012, http://www.muslimnews.co.uk/news/news.php?article=22211, accessed 16 November 2012.
49. *Ibid.*

VII–4.2   Prayer and celebrations for Eid-al-Fitr at the Muslim Sporting
Ground in Nairobi, Kenya
© UN Photo/Milton Grant

East Africa

Muslim settlement in East Africa took place in three phases. Early settlement was in the coastal region under Bantu tribal leadership. The second period was called the Shirizi (or Shirazian) when Muslims, mostly Arab and Persian traders, settled along the eastern coast of the continent and on the Comoros Islands between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries.[50] It appears that Islam was widespread in the Indian Ocean area by the fourteenth century. When Ibn Battuta from the Maghreb visited the East African littoral in 1332 he reported that he felt at home because of the presence of Islam in the area. The coastal population was largely Muslim, and Arabic was the language of literature and trade.[51] The third period, the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, witnessed the

50. J. Vittori and K. Bremer, *Islam in Tanzania and Kenya: Ally or Threat in the War on Terror?: Overview*, Colorado: US Air Force Academy, 2009, pp. 2–3, 6–7, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA536072, accessed 16 November 2012.

51. A. Y. Lodhi and D. Westerlund, 'African Islam in Tanzania', *Islam for Today*, March 1997, http://www.islamicpopulation.com/africa/Tanzania/African%20Islam%20in%20 Tanzania.htm, accessed 16 November 2012.

arrival of people from Yemen and Oman.[52] When the Portuguese arrived in the coastal areas in the sixteenth century, Islam was already established in East Africa and many ruling families had ties of kinship with Arabia, Persia, India and South-East Asia through maritime contacts. By the early eighteenth century, the coastal Muslims managed to oust the Portuguese with the help of Omani Arabs.[53]

The majority of Muslims in East Africa belong to the Shāfiʿī school of Sunni Islam. Indians predominantly belong to the Ḥanafī school, and a few belong to the Salafist sub-sect of the Ḥanbalī school of thought. Sufism is also practised by some Muslims in East Africa. The Aḥmadiyya (an offshoot of Islam) also exist in East Africa, particularly in Zanzibar. Among the Shīʿa Muslims (a minority compared to the Sunni Muslims), Ismailis are dominant in East Africa.[54]

KENYA

Africa's oldest mosque, Congo Mosque, is in the Kwale county of Kenya. The mosque has existed for over 500 years, dating back to when Arabs visited the coast and introduced Islam.[55] In 1895 Kenya became the British East African Protectorate and was formalized as a British colony in 1920. From 1952 to 1959 the largest Kenyan tribe, the Kikuyu, led the 'Mau Mau' insurgency that eventually led to the independence of Kenya in 1963.[56] In post-independence Kenya, the state prohibited the establishment of political parties based on religion. Muslim associations that dealt with educational, religious and social issues were controlled by the state.[57] Muslims are, however, granted freedom of worship, the preservation of *Sharīʿa* law and retention of *Sharīʿa* courts, but the latter are restricted to family matters. Many Somalis have also settled in Kenya and remain tribally connected to Somalia. With the civil war in Somalia in the 1990s, Kenya witnessed a further influx of Somali refugees.[58] In 2003 the Muslim population in Kenya was 2,793,000, which constituted 7 per cent of the total population.[59]

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52. *Ibid.*
53. *Ibid.*
54. Vittori and Bremer, *Islam in Tanzania and Kenya, op. cit.,* pp. 6–7, see also, G. Schlee with A. A. Shongolo, *Islam and Ethnicity in Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia,* Suffolk: James Currey 2012, pp. 71–5.
55. 'Congo Mosque Receives Seafront Title Deeds', YouTube, 13 February 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5J7ci8rGjb8, accessed 16 November 2012.
56. Vittori and Bremer, *Islam in Tanzania and Kenya, op. cit.,* p. 10.
57. *Ibid.,* p. 12–14.
58. *Ibid.,* p. 7.
59. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.,* p. 30.

Islam is largely controlled by the Kenyan Government. In 1973 the Supreme Council of Muslims of Kenya was set up as an umbrella organization to look into Muslim issues but it remained under the supervision of Kenyan cabinet officials. The Kenyan Government also appoints the chief *qāḍī* (judge) who acts as government advisor on Muslim-related issues such as inheritance, marriage, divorce and religious endowments under *Sharīᶜa* law (for family matters). The chief *qāḍī* appoints local *qāḍis*, whose appointments are approved by the president.[60]

Kenya has many internal problems such as poverty, corruption and tribalism. Muslims argue that they are being discriminated against in the job market. They speculate that they are marginalized in the workplace because of their Muslim-sounding names. They are also viewed as slave traders who caused suffering to black Africans.[61] Ethnic minorities such as Kenyan Somalis are viewed as the 'other' by some of the mainstream Kenyans. Many Kenyan Somalis say that Kenyans welcome whites, blacks and Indians to invest in Kenya but Kenyan Somalis, Somali Somalis or Somalis from the diaspora are looked upon with suspicion. Kenyan Somalis believe that they have been subjected to ethnic profiling and harsh measures by the police.[62]

Kenyan Muslims have sometimes been internally divided along geographical, ethnic and doctrinal lines. For example, Muslims include both 'Arabized' and 'African' Muslims such as the Badawis, Baluchis, Bohras, Somalis and Swahilis. There are both Sunni and Shīᶜa Muslims including the Shīᶜite Ismailis (followers of the Aga Khan). Muslims are also sometimes divided through their respective mosques. Yet in the 1990s the Kenyan Muslim leadership rallied to condemn Salman Rushdie's *Satanic Verses*, and denounced the active Christian presence in Kenyan education and politics.[63]

Kenyan Muslims are not all well educated and well placed in the labour market. In rural areas some have complained that 'proselytizing Christians ran the country's schools', so they preferred to send their children to the madrassas. However, in the 1990s some advanced schools emerged; for example in 1990 the Madrasatul Munawarrah School in Nairobi was attended by more than 700 students.[64] In urban areas too, Christian-Muslim relations have sometimes been hostile. For example, in December 2000 Christian and Muslim youths fought a running battle in Nairobi. The incident started when Muslim youths complained that wooden kiosks were installed too close to a mosque. When kiosk vendors marched on the mosque, Muslims responded by

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60. Vittori and Bremer, *Islam in Tanzania and Kenya, op. cit.*, pp. 14–15.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

62. A. Amin, 'Pain of Bring a Kenyan Somali', *The Nation* (Kenya), 3 November 2011.

63. C. A. Quinn and F. Quinn, *Pride, Faith and Fear: Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 113, 115.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

burning a church and a seminary.[65] Nevertheless, many Christians and Muslims live peacefully in the same neighbourhood. Interfaith dialogues are also taking place in Kenya. Muslims are gradually becoming politically assertive. In 2009 Muslim representation in the Kenyan parliament was thirty-two seats in a 222-member parliament.

In 1998 al-Qaeda simultaneously bombed US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dār es-Salaam, Tanzania. The attacks killed 224 Kenyans, Tanzanians and Americans and wounded 4,000 people. The United States became concerned that East Africa would become a breeding ground for al-Qaeda (along with the Horn of Africa).[66] Since then the Horn of Africa, and Kenya in particular, have become a focus of US counter-terrorism programmes.[67] In 2002 there was another terrorist attack on a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, which killed sixteen people. The chairman of Kenya's main Muslim group, the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims, immediately condemned the attack, stating, 'The perpetrators of the attacks have no regard for human life and were enemies of Muslims of Kenya.'[68]

TANZANIA

Muslims settled mainly along trade routes in Tanzania. Sufi leaders mainly spread Islam in south-east Tanzania. Tanzania (mainland Tanganyika) gained independence from Great Britain in 1961. The Zanzibar Archipelago received its independence in 1963 and joined Tanzania in 1964. In 2004 the Muslim population in Tanzania was 13,218,000, which comprised 30 per cent of the total population.[69]

Tanzania is a secular country which guarantees freedom of religion though (like Kenya) forbids the formation of religious political parties. Muslims have mostly settled in the Zanzibar Archipelago (a semi-autonomous region). Schools are all nationalized with quota systems for all tribal and ethnic groups including Muslims. Yet Tanzanian Muslims complain that they are discriminated against by Christians. Particularly, Muslims in the Zanzibar Islands have complained that they are treated as foreigners rather than Tanzanian citizens.[70]

65. *Ibid.*, p. 120.
66. Vittori and Bremer, *Islam in Tanzania and Kenya*, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
67. Joshua Hammer, 'The African Front', *New York Times*, 23 December 2007, http://www. nytimes.com/2007/12/23/magazine/23kenya-t.html, accessed 16 November 2012.
68. 'Africa Rejects Al-Qaeda's Radical Islamism', *The Independent*, Gambia, 6 December 2004.
69. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
70. Vittori and Bremer, *Islam in Tanzania and Kenya*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

From the late 1970s (particularly after the Iranian Revolution) Islam in south-east Tanzania entered a new phase. A new group of people known as the *Anṣār* (influenced by Salafi thinking) have been trying to indoctrinate the marginalized Muslims into their beliefs. They differ from mainstream Muslims in their style of praying. Their main demand is for a revision of ritual practice. The *Anṣār* are in direct conflict with the Sufi ideology or the ideology used by Muslim reformists in Africa known as *bida*, 'innovation'.[71] The *Anṣār* want Muslims to practise the way of life that the Prophet Muḥammad maintained during his lifetime. The *Anṣār* insist that every aspect of Muslim practice should be in accordance with the Qurʾān and *ḥadīths*.[72]

The *Anṣār* are also in opposition to other Muslims who follow witchcraft or indigenous ritual practice.[73] Their dress code is more Western. They follow Western street fashion such as running shoes, low-cut blue jeans, basketball shirts and Islamic caps, and grow beards.[74] *Anṣār* women wear the *ḥijāb* in public spaces and sometimes the *niqāb*.[75] It is speculated that the *Anṣār* are funded through international Muslim organizations which help them build schools, mosques and health centres. But mainstream Muslims are not happy with the *Anṣār*'s overseas monetary assistance. In Lindi the Muslim Council of Tanzania (Bakwata) received funding from Kuwait to build a mosque, and this was done to contain the influence of the *Anṣār* on the general Muslim population.[76]

In 1998 the US Embassy at Dār es-Salaam was bombed by al-Qaeda–affiliated Muslims and the number of casualties was immense. Tanzanian Muslim President Kikwete believed that eradicating poverty in Africa was essential for homeland security. In 2005 in a speech at Boston University President Kikwete suggested, 'If belief is the potential of radicalism, then poverty is the fertilizer.'[77] He emphasized, 'Poverty tends to disintegrate people from the larger territorial community only to integrate them in their community of believers.' He further suggested that to hungry people concepts such as nation building, the spirit of democracy or human rights do not mean anything. Poor people will do anything for one or two meals. President Kikwete stressed, 'Poverty can destroy all that we have achieved at

71. F. Becker, *Becoming Muslim in Mainland Tanzania, 1890–2000*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 262–3.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 267.

73. *Ibid.*

74. *Ibid.*, p. 262.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 271.

76. *Ibid.*, pp. 269–70.

77. C. R. Stith, 'Radical Islam in East Africa', *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, DCXXXII, No. 1, 2010, p. 57.

the national or global level, and therefore it should continue to be addressed seriously at both levels.'[78]

UGANDA

In 1844 the first Muslims came to Uganda. They came as traders, and the most influential Muslim was Ahmed b. Ibrahim.[79] Islam was introduced to Uganda during the rule of King Kabaka Suuna II. When King Kabaka was slaughtering innocent people, Ahmed b. Ibrahim said that no one had the right to take away the lives of 'creatures of Allāh'. King Suuna did not convert to Islam but he was so impressed with Ibrahim's comments that he memorized several chapters of the Qurʾān. Later, Suuna's son Kabaka Muteesa embraced Islam and declared it the state religion in Buganda (later named Uganda). Yet the spread of Islam was not as systematic as Christianity. It spread intermittently with the arrival of traders and refugees.[80] In 1962 Uganda gained its independence from Britain.

Under British colonial rule Muslims felt that they were discriminated against because the rulers feared that the Western-educated, English-speaking Muslims were likely to be displeased with British rule and might organize a revolt. Later in the 1960s, under the Ugandan Government, Muslims felt that they were subjected to discrimination on the basis of their religion. Their status in the wider society was reduced to 'third-class' citizen.[81]

Under Idi Amin's regime (1971–79), however, pro-Islamic policies such as promotion of Islamic education, making Friday a non-working day for public employees, making the state a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference and introducing the news broadcast into Arabic were major steps to promote Islamic identity in Uganda.[82] But in August 1972 Idi Amin declared an 'economic war' against the Asians and Europeans in Uganda and expropriated land from them. He ordered Asians who were not citizens of to leave the country, and within three months all 60,000 had left, most of them for the UK, and some to Kenya and other African countries.[83] In 1972

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78. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

79. Y. Museveni, 'NRM United Muslims, says Museveni', *New Vision* (Kampala, Uganda), 19 March 2008 (President Museveni's full speech at the opening of the national mosque at Old Kampala).

80. *Ibid.*

81. K. P. Tibenderana, *Islamic Fundamentalism: The Quest for the Rights of Muslims in Uganda*, Kampala, Fountain Publishers, 2006, p. 100.

82. *Ibid.*

83. I. Bagchi, 'Idi Amin had Targeted Indians in 70s', 15 April 2007, http://articles.timesofindia. indiatimes.com/2007-04-15/india/27882308_1_devang-raval-museveni-indians, accessed 16 November 2012.

Mahmood Mamdani, a political scientist, was expelled from Uganda by Idi Amin because of his Asian origins.[84]

In 2002 the Muslim population in Uganda was 3,958,000 which comprised 12.1 per cent of the total population.[85] There are several Muslim NGOs, most of which are based in foreign Islamic countries and are foreign-funded. The Islamic African Relief Agency, the International Islamic Charitable Foundation and the Muslim World League have played an important role in the Islamic revival in Uganda. They built schools, medical centres and mosques.[86] Yet in Uganda Islam is still a misunderstood religion. Most non-Muslims think that in Islam a man can divorce his wife or wives at will. In 2002, during Amina Lawal's trial and her conviction for adultery by the *Sharīʿa* court in Nigeria, the Archbishop of Kampala, Uganda, His Eminence Emmanuel Cardinal Wamala, condemned Lawal's conviction and called for the abrogation of the specific law under which she was convicted. Cardinal Wamala described it as 'a bad law and unfair' and '*Sharīʿa* law can be wrong'. Muslim critics said that such statements form Cardinal Wamala are not helpful. Cardinal Wamala should know that *Sharīʿa* or Islamic law cannot be abrogated by the people.[87]

RWANDA

In the eighteenth century, Islam was introduced in Rwanda by Arabs and African Muslim (Swahili-speaking) traders of East Africa. Later, Indian (including Muslim) traders came.[88] However Islam in Rwanda was marginalized due to three factors: colonialism, missionaries and the Muslims themselves. During the colonial period (under the Belgian administration), Islam was seen as a threat to Christianity. The missionaries known as the White Fathers exploited anti-Arab and anti-Islamic feeling among Europeans. Muslims were treated with hostility by some members of the wider society who regarded Islam as a religion of the most despised Swahili foreigners. Within the Muslim community, there was dissension between Arabs and Indians.[89]

In 1962 Rwanda was separated from Burundi and gained its independence from Belgium. After the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, some people chose to convert to Islam because they witnessed aggression meted out by some Catholic and Protestant leaders in the genocide. About 800,000 Tutsi were

84. S. M. Idris, 'Withdrawal of Mahmood Mamdani's Citizenship by Uganda Government', *Economic and Political Weekly*, XX, No. 30, 27 July 1985, p. 1253.
85. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*, p. 31.
86. Tibenderana, *Islamic Fundamentalism, op. cit.*, p. 102.
87. *Ibid.*, pp. xxi–xxii.
88. Rwanda can also be considered part of Central Africa.
89. S. Bakatu-Bulabubi, book review of *L'Islam et les 'Swahili' au Rwanda* by Jose Hamim Kagabo, *Journal of Religion in Africa*, XXI, Fasc. 2, 1991, pp. 176–7.

slaughtered in 1994. During the mass killing, Hutu militias had the place surrounded but Hutu Muslims did not cooperate with the killers. They said that they felt more connected to their religion than to their Hutu ethnicity, so Muslim Tutsi were spared. The executive secretary of the Muslim Association of Rwanda, Ramadhani Rugema, said, 'Nobody died in a mosque. No Muslim wanted any other Muslim to die. We stood up to the militias. And we helped many non-Muslims get away.'[90]

Human rights groups have documented how some Christian religious leaders orchestrated the genocide of the Tutsis by the Hutus and vice-versa. During the genocide, some Muslims gave shelter to Christians. For example, Jean Pierre Sagahutu, aged 37, a Tutsi who converted to Islam from Catholicism after his father and nine other family members were slaughtered, said, 'I wanted to hide in a church, but that was the worst place to go. Instead, a Muslim family took me. They saved my life.' Another Muslim convert, Aisha Umimbabazi, aged 27, said, 'If it weren't for the Muslims, my whole family would be dead. I was very, very thankful to Muslim people during the genocide. I thought about it and I really felt it was right to change.'[91]

In 2002 the Muslim population in Rwanda numbered 182,000, which constituted 1.8 per cent of the total population.[92] Muslims are mainly concerned about their own local issues and their primary focus is to put their lives back together. In 2004 Rwanda's Muslim Association's leader proudly declared, 'Our first priority is our country. Muslims in other countries face many problems, too, but we focus here more than on Afghanistan or Iraq. In Rwanda, there is no al-Qaeda.'[93]

BURUNDI

Like Rwanda, Islam was introduced by Arabs, African Muslims (Swahili-speaking) and Indian traders. In 1962 Burundi gained independence from its colonizer, Belgium. Like the Rwandan Muslims, during the 1993 genocide when the Hutus killed many Tutsis, many Muslims in Burundi did not participate in the massacres.[94] In 2007 the Muslim population in Burundi

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90. M. Lacey, 'Rwanda's Growing Faith: Islam 10 Years After the Slaughter', *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), 7 April 2004, p. 1.

91. E. Wax, 'Islam Attracting Many Survivors of Rwanda Genocide', *Washington Foreign Post Service*, 23 September 2003, p. A10.

92. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

93. Lacey, 'Rwanda's Growing Faith', *op. cit.*

94. X. Luffin, 'Muslims in Burundi: Discretion and Neutrality', *Quartier Asiatique*, ISIM newsletter, III, No. 1, 1999, p. 29, https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/17300, accessed 17 November 2012.

was 180,000 which constituted about 2 per cent of the total population.[95] As the number of Muslims is growing in Burundi, they are also asserting their rights in their country. For example, in 2005 Muslim leaders demanded that the government should regard them as Burundians. They rejected the label 'Swahili' and asked their government to simply call them 'Muslims' or 'aba Islam' in their local Kirundi (Bantu) language. Muslim leaders asked their government to acknowledge the fact that they were discriminated against in the wider society, and that they should be provided with equal representation in various sectors, particularly in government positions. They recommended that the Burundian Government should provide 'legal recognition' of Muslims' two Eids, *Eid-ul-Fitr* and *Eid-ul-Adha.* They suggested that their religious officials (sheikhs and imams) should receive the same treatment as other religious leaders. They also suggested that Muslims should be granted freedom of worship and be allowed to construct mosques. Muslims should be allowed to exercise their democratic rights, including their freedom of speech to be critical of the politicians who used divisive rhetoric.[96]

Horn of Africa

ERITREA

Historically, Muslims in Eritrea have been influenced by different schools of thought at different times. For example, the Shāfiʿī school was introduced by traders from Yemen, the Malikī legal rite was introduced by the people of Sudan and the Ḥanafī *madhhab* was officially introduced by the Ottomans.[97] In 1890 Eritrea became an Italian colony, which was occupied by the British in 1941. In 1952 the United Nations established it as an autonomous entity federated with Ethiopia as a compromize between Ethiopian claims of sovereignty and Eritrean aspirations for independence. But ten years later when the Ethiopian emperor, Haile Selassie, decided to annex Eritrea, it led to a thirty-year armed struggle.[98] Muslims and Christians both played a major role in the struggle for independence.[99]

95. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.,* p. 30.
96. 'Burundi Muslims Denounce their Exclusion and Call for Equal Treatment', *BBC Monitoring Africa* (London), 28 April 2005, p. 1.
97. J. Miran, 'A Historical Overview of Islam in Eritrea', *Die Welt des Islams*, XLV, No. 2, 2005, p. 179.
98. 'Eritrea Profile', *BBC News Africa*, 18 January 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13349078, accessed 15 June 2012.
99. Miran, 'A Historical Overview of Islam in Eritrea', *op. cit.,* pp. 211–12.

In 2002 the Muslim population in Eritrea was 1,854,000, which comprised 36.5 per cent of the total population.[100] Since independence in 1991, the Eritrean Government, though secular, has been looking into Muslim affairs. The office of Mufti (the Muslim national spiritual leader) was re-opened and Uthman al-Amin was appointed Grand Mufti in 1992. The government also reinstated the *Sharīʿa* courts (for family matters), *waqf* (*ṣadaqa/*charity) councils and an *ʿumra* and *ḥajj* committee. Religious schools and institutes were also re-opened in the mid-1990s. Saudi Arabia provided financial support for the construction of mosques.[101] In post-independence Eritrea, however, there also seems to be a re-awakening of mutual suspicion between Christians and Muslims. The Eritrean Government accused the government of Sudan of assisting 'Islamic fundamentalist' groups to destabilize Eritrea.[102] In 2009 Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed, a 38-year-old Swedish resident from Eritrea, travelled to Somalia to receive military training from al-Shabab, an al-Qaeda–linked terrorist organization. In 2010 Ahmed was transferred to the United States, and if convicted he will face ten years' imprisonment.[103]

ETHIOPIA

The presence of Muslim traders in Ethiopia can be traced to the eighth century. Sometimes Muslims traders' presence was despised by the Christian ruling class. They were denied ownership of land and were prevented from serving in the army and participating in the political and social sectors of the country. Muslims were not allowed to build mosques, observe Islamic holidays and practise their religion. The Muslims' situation slowly improved in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and finally in the late twentieth century Islam received recognition in Ethiopia.[104]

After the overthrow of the military dictatorship (which ruled the country from 1974) in May 1991, Islam in Ethiopia witnessed a religious and cultural revival. Muslim newspapers and magazines began to be published where Muslims made their issues known to the wider community, for example the reorganization of the Islamic council. Under democratic rule, the number

100. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

101. Miran, 'A Historical Overview of Islam in Eritrea', *op. cit.*, p. 213.

102. S. A. Hussein, 'The Conflict in Eritrea Considered', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XVIII, No. 1, 1998, pp. 7–8.

103. L. Remizowski, 'African Man Tied to Somali Terror Group Pleads Guilty', *CNN*, 14 June 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/13/justice/new-york-al-shabaab/, accessed 16 November 2012.

104. H. Ahmed, 'Coexistance and/or Confrontation? Toward a Reappraisal of Christian-Muslim Encounter in Contemporary Ethiopia', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, XXXVI, No. 1, 2006, pp. 6–7.

of Ethiopian pilgrims travelling to Mecca and Medina increased, the *daʿwā* movement (Islamic preaching) emerged, and Islamic schools and colleges, bookshops and travel agencies were established. Yet in some government schools wearing the *ḥijab* (headscarf) and offering ritual prayers within the premises of the schools were prohibited, though the prohibition was not strictly enforced.[105]

In 2007 the Muslim population in Ethiopia was 28,063,000, which constituted 33.9 per cent of the total population.[106] In 2012 some Muslims are concerned about the government's interference in internal Islamic matters. It was reported that Prime Minister Meles Zenawi inflamed some Muslims because it was alleged that he was attracting Western money and support in the name of fighting extremism.[107] Muslims are themselves divided about the rise of Wahhabism in Ethiopia as some view them as radical Muslims. But when the Ethiopian Government interfered by installing unelected Muslim leaders who favoured the establishment of an Islamic school with foreign funding, some Muslims went out on the streets after Friday prayers in April 2012 protesting that the government should respect their rights, and leave Muslims to determine their own destiny. Some federal police beat and killed a few protestors, leading more people to join the protest.[108]

Southern Africa

In some southern African countries such as Malawi, Islam was introduced through trade. But in general, Islam in southern Africa arrived much later than in East or West Africa. The spread of Islam was delayed in due to colonial power plays. In 1508 the Portuguese occupied Mozambique and executed many Muslims, and gradually established their naval power on the Indian Ocean. Later the Dutch defeated the Portuguese, took control of naval power in the Indian Ocean, and transported Muslim prisoners from their colony in the Indonesian Archipelago to Southern Africa, particularly South Africa.[109]

105. Ibid., pp. 16–17.
106. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*, p. 30.
107. 'Muslims Outraged by Heavy-Handed Government Interference', *Ethiopian Review*, 28 April 2012, http://www.ethiopianreview.com/content/37893, accessed 2 September 2012.
108. E. M. Kiros, 'Ethiopian Muslims and Their Struggle for Rights', 19 July 2012, *Pamzabuka News*, http://allafrica.com/stories/201207201105.html, accessed 16 November 2012.
109. G. G. Nkrumah, 'Islam in Southern Africa', *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 52, 1991, pp. 94–7; N. Ahmed, *Islam in Africa*, no date, http://historyofislam.com/contents/the-classical-period/islam-in-africa/, accessed 16 November 2012.

VII–4.3   Mufti Shaykh al-Amin Osman al-Amin of
Eritrea, renowned for encouraging Muslims and Christians
to work together in Eritrea
© Lorraine Chittock/AramcoWorld

Malawi

The Malawian people first came in contact with Islam through the Swahili-speaking Muslims of the east African coast, through trade. The Swahili-speaking traders were Africans and Arabs who traded cloth and beads in exchange for slaves and ivory. By the early twentieth century, Islam was particularly strong among the *Lomwe,* the *Yao* and the *Chewa* ethnic groups of Malawi.[110]

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110. E. Mandivenga, 'Muslims in Zimbabwe: Origins, Composition and Current Strength',
Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, V, No. 2, 1984, p. 396.

To many Malawian Muslims, Islam is their cultural heritage and they are more inclined to isolate their social life from non-Muslims by practicing endogamy and strictly adhering to their religion. Most Malawian Muslims marry Muslims. If they marry a non-Muslim Malawian woman then the local spouse embraces Islam, and their children automatically take their father's religion.[111] In 1998 the Muslim population was 1, 955,000, which constituted 12.8 per cent of the total population.[112]

Mozambique

By the 1530s the Portuguese had penetrated from the Zambezi to Sena to establish themselves in trade. But here they faced fierce competition from Muslim merchants and that led to violent measures against the Muslims.[113] Later in the mid-eighteenth century, Indians (including Muslims) were allowed to enter Mozambique for trade. However, Muslim Indians often termed such business 'kaffir (un-believer) trade', or 'native trade' or 'kaffir trucks'. The Indian population was predominantly men who had left their families behind, while some married local women.[114]

In 1975 Mozambique gained independence from Portugal. Yet after independence the Muslim leadership was discredited because it had cooperated with the colonial authorities. Muslims were harassed; for example pigs were thrown into mosques. Later, in the 1980s, the situation began to improve for Muslims with the enactment of the 1989 Law on Religious Freedom. Like other religious groups, Muslims were allowed to own and operate schools. Although all places of worship nationalized by the state in 1977 have been returned to their respective organizations, Muslim communities have complained that other properties such as schools, health centres and residences are still held by the government.[115]

In 2003 Muslims in Mozambique numbered 5,224,000, which was 22.8 per cent of the total population.[116] Muslims in northern Mozambique have been historically more established, particularly in Angoche and

111. E. Mandivenga, 'The Migration of Muslims to Zimbabwe', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, X, No. 2, 1989, p. 516.
112. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*, p. 30.
113. S. Von Sicard, 'Islam in Mozambique: Some Historical and Cultural Perspectives', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXVIII, No. 3, 2008, pp. 475–6.
114. T. Oishi, 'Indian Muslim Merchants in Mozambique and South Africa: Intra-regional Networks In Strategic Association with State Institutions, 1870s–1930s', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, L, No. 2–3, 2007, pp. 291, 300.
115. Sicard, 'Islam in Mozambique', *op. cit.*, p. 483.
116. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*, p. 7.

Mozambique Island.[117] In northern Mozambique, Islam and matrilineal traditions co-exist. On reaching puberty, girls are subjected to initiation rites, that is, their gender role, notions of sexuality and cultural identities are passed to them by the older generation.[118] One of the health concerns in Mozambique is the increasing spread of HIV/AIDS. In 2009 HIV prevalence among adults of 15–49 years was estimated at 11.5 per cent.[119] It is interesting to note that the different Islamic groups (the Sufis and the Wahhabis) have differences but all believe that the use of condoms is *ḥarām* (illicit) whether in marriage or outside marriage. They believe that only God should determine the number of children a woman has, and human beings should not interfere with God's decision.[120]

ZIMBABWE

Indians, particularly from Gujarat, settled in Zimbabwe (formerly Southern Rhodesia) as early as 1901. Some immigrated voluntarily for economic reasons, and others were imported by the British colonists as indentured labourers to work on the railroads. From example, about 500 Indian labourers were imported to build the Beira-Umtali railways. As the numbers of Indians grew, European traders felt threatened by their presence as it was affecting their trade. In 1982 in an editorial *The Rhodesian Herald* described Indians as follows: 'He can always undersell his neighbours next door or the street, because both he and his employees live in a fashion so cheap and nasty that no white man can follow his example and preserve health and strength.'[121]

Due to resentment against Indian traders, in 1904 the British administrators imposed immigration restrictions on them. The number of Indians was reduced yet some remained because the country still needed cheap labour. They are Sunni Muslims of the Ḥanafī *madhab* (school of thought).

Muslims of Malawian origin are the largest group in Zimbabwe. After the British colonization of Zimbabwe in 1890, the Malawians (including Muslims) came to Zimbabwe to work in the farms, plantations or in mines. Malawians were a more accepted group of labourers who were kept as long-term labourers with low wages. Malawian Muslims were Sunni Muslims who belonged to the Shāfiʿī school of thought.[122] The Varembas are considered

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117. L. J. K. Bonate, 'Matriliny, Islam and Gender in Northern Mozambique', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, XXXVI, Fasc. 2, 2006, p. 148.

118. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

119. UNICEF, 'Mozambique: Statistics', no date, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/mozambique_statistics.html, accessed 7 June 2012.

120. Bonate, 'Matriliny, Islam and Gender in Northern Mozambique', *op. cit.*, p. 155.

121. Quoted in Mandivenga, 'The Migration of Muslims to Zimbabwe', *op. cit.*, p. 510.

122. Mandivenga, 'Muslims in Zimbabwe', *op. cit.*, pp. 393–9.

to be descendants of Arabs or a mixed breed of Arab and Portuguese settlers. They are considered nominal Muslims but, under the influence of the Malawian and Indian Muslims, they are returning to Islam.

In 1982 there were 58,920 Muslims comprising Indians, Malawians, Mozambicans and Varembas.[123] In 2006 the Muslim population in Zimbabwe was 109,000, which constituted 0.9 per cent of the total population.[124] In 1975 the Council of Imams (*Majlisul-Ulama*) was established. It has been working as the highest judicial body that arbitrates on issues relating to Islamic law and customs, such as marriage and inheritance according to *Sharīʿa* law. In the 1980s there were about forty mosques in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe Islamic mission has taken the initiative to provide Islamic education for Muslim children. It is funded by Zimbabwe's Muslims and Saudi Arabia.[125]

SOUTH AFRICA

The first Muslims in South Africa probably arrived in the seventeenth century when they were brought as slaves and political prisoners from South-East Asia (they were known as Malays) to Cape Province to serve the Boers. The second group that migrated to South Africa were Muslims from India. They mainly worked on plantations in Natal and Transvaal, or as merchants. The third group of Muslims are known as the Zanzibaris, who have mostly settled in the Durban area. They are descendants of slaves and some are from the Makua people (from Mozambique and Malawi) who were brought to work on plantations in Natal. In the government records, Indian Muslims were classified on the basis of their ethnicity as 'Asiatics' or 'coloured'.[126]

In 1893 Britain granted responsible government to Natal in South Africa. At that time the total population of the colony was 470,000 blacks, 45,000 whites and 46,000 Indians. There was great concern among Natal residents that Indians were working at a cheap rate, and that there was 'unfair competition' from Indian traders. Soon the Natal Government passed the *Immigration Restriction Act 1897*, which required new immigrants to pass an education test in any European language. Through this test the 'undesirable' immigrants/aliens were excluded from entering Natal (This policy was later adopted by Australia in 1901: see Chapter 7.6).[127]

123. Mandivenga, 'The Migration of Muslims to Zimbabwe', *op. cit.*, p. 511.
124. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.
125. Mandivenga, 'Muslims in Zimbabwe', *op. cit.*, pp. 397–8.
126. D. Westerlund, 'Ahmed Deedat's Theology of Religion: Apologetics through Polemics', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, XXXIII, Fasc. 3, 2003, pp. 265–6.
127. M. Yap and D. L. Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concessions: The History of Chinese in South Africa*, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 1996, p. 44.

The majority of the Muslims in South Africa were of Indian heritage, and they were normally placed in between the whites/Europeans and the indigenous African/black population in society's racial hierarchy. However, at that time (the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), religion was not a category of discrimination; it was essentially race that was the criterion of discrimination. For example, in the township of Johannesburg, the population was monitored through various legislation that promoted racial segregation between indigenous workers and European settlers. Generally, coffee and cheap drinks were sold by street vendors or in casual huts. Indian merchants worked as hawkers, peddlers, general dealers and restaurant owners, instead of working in the European-owned shops. The South African Government imposed many restrictions on trading licences but overall the Indian merchants were successful in their retail businesses.[128]

With the enactment of apartheid laws in 1948, racial discrimination was institutionalized. Along with the black majority some Asians were also victims of the segregation system.[129] Under the apartheid government, the *Group Areas Act 1950* forced the Muslim community to re-locate to non-white residential areas and threatened their mosques with demolition.[130] Many Muslims played an important role in the struggle against apartheid injustices.[131] Imam Abdullah Haron, an outspoken critic of apartheid, was killed by police while in detention in 1969. Imam Haron's funeral procession was attended by 30,000 mourners.[132] In the 1980s some young Muslims were vocal about their opposition to apartheid. It is believed that the establishment of an Islamic state in Iran with the Iranian Revolution in 1979 may have inspired young Muslims in South Africa to be vocal against the injustices of apartheid.[133]

Muslims as a minority were vulnerable against Christian religious attacks. They were often assaulted by Christian evangelists who carried out door-to-door propagation of Christianity. This led a Muslim named Ahmed Deedat of Indian heritage to come to the fore and defend Islam.[134] In 1957 Deedat founded the Islamic Propagation Centre with the intention of informing non-

128. Oishi, 'Indian Muslim Merchants in Mozambique and South Africa', *op. cit.*, p. 309.

129. 'Ahmed M. Kathrada', *South Africa: Overcoming Apartheid, Building Democracy*, no date, http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/people.php?id=171, accessed 30 November 2012.

130. A. R. Omar, 'From Resistance to Reconstruction: Challenges Facing Muslim-Christian Relations in Post-Apartheid South Africa', in B. F. Soares (ed.), *Muslim-Christian Encounters in Africa*, Leiden, Netherlands, Brill Academic Publishers, 2006, p. 280.

131. *Ibid.*

132. *Ibid.*

133. Westerlund, 'Ahmed Deedat's Theology of Religion', *op. cit.*, p. 266.

134. *Ibid.*, p. 267.

Muslims about Islam. Deedat's Islamic missionary activities known as *dawa* and his lecture series spread beyond South Africa.[135]

In 1984 Muslim activists in Cape Town formed an organization called Call of Islam which engaged in the struggle against apartheid with their non-Muslim counterparts.[136] In 1996 an Islamic organization called People against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) was formed. Its core members were working-class Muslims from Cape Town. PAGAD may have had noble intentions but it was soon allegedly involved with gang shootings. Since 1998 sixteen PAGAD members have been convicted of crimes and fourteen have been acquitted. Subsequently, the US State Department listed PAGAD as a terrorist organization. In 2000 the South African Government proposed an anti-terrorism bill that allowed police to hold suspects for fourteen days without bail. The United Ulama Council of South Africa protested against the bill saying that it would violate the due process of law and 'the right to be presumed innocent.'[137] In 2012 PAGAD still existed as a small group.[138]

In 2001 the Muslim population in South Africa was 731,000 which comprised 1.5 per cent of the total population.[139] The majority of South African Muslims are Sunnis. Most Muslims seeking to become *ulamas* (learned scholars) prefer to be educated in South Asia or an Arab country such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Compared to the sub-Saharan region, the Sufi order was not as popular in South Africa but now some Muslims are endorsing the Sufi ideology. From the socio-economic point of view, Muslims with South and South-East Asian backgrounds belong mostly to the middle class, while most Zanzibaris work as unskilled labourers.[140]

In the post-apartheid period, both Muslims and non-Muslims have been playing an important role in maintaining harmony. When the Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan from the United States visited South Africa in 1996, President Nelson Mandela lectured on tolerance by stating that South Africa rejects racism and sexism. President Mandela said, 'Islam is a religion which if practised, disallows racialism, racism, injustice, tyranny and oppression.'[141] As I discussed in Chapter 7.3, some members of the Nation of Islam have grievances against the 'white' ruling class whom they view as 'oppressors'.

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135. *Ibid.*
136. *Ibid.*, p. 281.
137. Quinn and Quinn, *Pride, Faith and Fear, op. cit.*, p. 142.
138. 'PAGAD "People Against Gangsterism & Drugs"', 6 September 2012, http://www.pagad.co.za/, accessed 16 November 2012.
139. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*, p. 31.
140. Westerlund, 'Ahmed Deedat's Theology of Religion', *op. cit.*
141. Associated Press, 'Farrakhan Visits with Mandela – South African President Lectures him on Tolerance', *The Dallas Morning News* (Johannesburg, South Africa), 29 January 1996, p. 8A.

South African Muslims are also keen to maintain peace and racial harmony. For example, in 2010 prominent Muslim leaders condemned the terror threat during the FIFA World Cup in South Africa. Maulana Abdul Khaliq Allie of the Muslim Judicial Council said, 'As Muslims in South Africa living in a post-apartheid era, who enjoy the liberty, equality, and freedom of our country, we are committed towards the development and growth of this country … We condemn any attempts to disrupt the World Cup.'[142]

Though Muslims enjoy freedom of worship, there is prejudice in a section of the wider South African community. In 2002 the right-wing Afrikaners, the *Boermag*, aimed to establish an exclusive Afrikaner homeland, bombed a few public facilities including a Soweto mosque located in a black township. The fact that the mosque was targeted meant that Islam was viewed as a threat. The right-wing Christians strongly felt that the South African state policy of religious pluralism was unduly privileging Muslims.[143] Yet there was recognition of Muslim leadership. In 2004 Ebrahim Rasool was elected as the Premier of Western Cape and he remained in that position until 2008. In July 2010 Rasool was appointed South Africa's ambassador to the United States.

CONCLUSION

In the seventh and eighth centuries Islam spread to Africa mainly through contact with Arab traders. Trade varied from the slave trade to gold, ivory and other goods. Later, from the eighteenth century onward, Indian Muslims settled in some African countries. Sometimes the spread of Islam was hampered by colonial powers who viewed it as a threat to Christianity. In the contemporary period, many African countries remain politically unstable. Three main issues need to be addressed in Africa: education, unemployment and poverty. The political instability has not been helpful for Muslims' educational and employment opportunities. And Muslim youths in Africa are facing high unemployment.[144] As discussed earlier, Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete identified poverty as a source of radicalization. Islamists can use disparities of wealth to radicalize Muslims. To reduce radicalization, African Governments should seek aid from developed countries to assist their Muslim communities. Also, African Governments should expand their secular efforts to compete with radical elements.[145]

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142. M. Williams, '2010 Terror Threat Condemned', *Cape Argus* (South Africa), 15 April 2010.
143. Omar, 'From Resistance to Reconstruction', *op. cit.*, p. 290.
144. Quinn and Quinn, *Pride, Faith and Fear*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
145. Stith, 'Radical Islam in East Africa', *op. cit.*, p. 64.

In the African countries where Christians are a majority, their governments should work with the Muslim community to address the disparities in wealth and employment opportunities between Muslims and Christians. There is also a concerted effort by some Christians to convert people by providing them social services, better education and job opportunities. This is not helpful. The Muslim community should also address certain issues that impact mostly on women; for example, girls' early marriage and lack of women's education. Some politicians' divisive rhetoric is also not helpful. Yet some African countries such as Ghana have taken steps towards reconciliation through dialogue with non-Muslims. Ghana organized conferences to address the international media bias against Islam and Muslims. Muslims in Rwanda have played an exemplary role by giving protection to non-Muslims during genocide.

Further research is vital in some African countries where Muslims form a tiny minority. For example, Muslims in southern Africa countries such as Angola comprise approximately 1 per cent of the population (2002). In Botswana the figure is 0.4 per cent (2001), Lesotho: 0.1 per cent (2005), Namibia: 0.4 per cent (2005), Swaziland: 0.2 per cent (2006) and Zambia: 0.4 per cent (2000).[146] Due to lack of primary and secondary sources, I was not able to include information on Muslims in these countries. The respective governments of these countries should undertake initiatives to learn more about the situation of Muslims in their countries.

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146. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*, pp. 30–1.

Chapter 7.5

MUSLIM MINORITIES IN ASIA

Nahid Afrose Kabir

Muslims had contact with Asia from the seventh century. In some Asian countries where Muslims are minorities, Islam arrived at a later date. Generally speaking, Muslim minorities share a similar history with their non-Muslim counterparts; for example, Indians have a 5,000-year-old civilization. Many Muslims also share the same ethnic culture as their non-Muslim counterparts: they may speak the same language. Though they may form one people, regrettably, there have been conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims in the form of communal violence, separatist movements and oppression. I also examine some of the tensions existing within the Muslim communities. In this chapter, I discuss Muslim minorities in this sequence: India, China, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Nepal. Table 7.5.1 shows the Muslim minority populations and percentages in each of the countries I discuss in this chapter.

Table 7.5.1: Muslim minority populations in Asia[1]

Countries	Muslim population	Percentage of the total population
India	160,945,000	13.4
China	21,667,000	1.6
The Philippines	4,654,000	5.1
Thailand	3,930,000	5.8
Vietnam	157,000	0.2
Sri Lanka	1,711,000	8.5
Myanmar	1,889,000	3.8
Nepal	1,231,000	4.2

1. The information in Table 7.5.1 is derived from a variety of sources from different years (as I have mentioned in the text). It should be taken as an approximate comparison between the countries.

VII–5.1   The Taj Mahal, Uttar Pradesh, India
© UNESCO/Patricia Alberth

India

Muslim contact with India can be traced as early as the seventh century when a few Arab traders appeared on the Malabar Coast. They married Malabari women and their descendants are known as Māpillas or Malabari Muslims.[2] In AD 711 Sindh (a province of the Indian subcontinent, now part of Pakistan) was invaded by the Arab governor Muhamad b. Qasim, but his influence did not extend beyond Sindh. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries Muslim influence increased in the region in the form of Turkish invasions. Later, under the auspices of the Delhi Sultanate, Islamic domination spread all over northern India, and by 1320 it had reached the southern coastline. During the Mughal rule, Muslim control spread throughout the whole of India, and so it

2.   The Māpillas are the Muslim community in Kerala and the neighbouring states and territories of India. The Portuguese, Dutch and British have attempted to convert Māpillas since the fifteenth century. Many Muslim Māpillas have resisted such conversion. See H. Randathani, *Mapilla Muslims: A Study on Society and Anti-Colonial Struggles*, Calicut, Other Books, 2008; S. F. Dale, *Islamic Society on the South Asian Frontier: The Māpillas of Malabar 1498–1922*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980.

was during the thirteenth century, after the capture of Delhi by the Turks and the Afghans, that the Muslim community in India became well established.[3] Under British rule (1757–1947) there was occasional communal tension but in general Muslims in India lived amicably with other religious groups. With the partition of India in 1947 (which was politically oriented), many Muslims moved to Pakistan, and thus India became a Hindu majority country.

In 2009 the Muslim population was 160,945,000, which constituted 13.4 per cent of the total population.[4] In terms of absolute numbers, India has the third largest Muslim population in the world, after Indonesia and Pakistan respectively.[5] Though Hinduism is the dominant religion in India, freedom of religious choice is clearly protected in the constitution whereby everyone can freely renounce their religion or change it for another. For instance, those born Muslim can remain Muslims all their lives, renounce Islam and become unbelievers, or embrace another religion, notwithstanding the Islamic law on apostasy. Similarly, any non-Muslim may embrace Islam. In other words, apostasy has no place in the public law of India, since the state cannot enforce the dictates of any particular religion on apostasy or conversion to Islam.[6]

Some Indian Muslims have greatly contributed to the development of modern India during the pre-independence and post-independence periods. Historically speaking, Muslims have made a rich contribution to the development of Indian art, music, literature, architecture and administration. The Taj Mahal, built by the Mughal Emperor Shahjahan, is regarded as one of the wonders of the world. Muslim politicians such as Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Badruddin Tyebji left their legacy in the Indian freedom struggle from British colonization. In the field of acting Nargis, Surayya, Shabana Azami, Dilip Kumar, Aamir Khan and Shah Rukh Khan are well known. Among singers Shamshad Begum, Mohammad Rafi and Talat Mahmood are all very popular. In Indian classical music Bismillah Khan, Ustad Bade Ghulam Ali Khan and Ustad Amjed Ali Akbar Khan are held in high esteem. In the field of sports Nawab Pataudi, Sayed Kirmani, Salim Durrani and Mohammed Azharuddin are internationally renowned cricketers.[7]

However, these people are not representative of the general Muslim population in India because Muslims are an economically disadvantaged

3. M. B. Mistry., 'Muslims in India: A Demographic and Socio-Economic Profile', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXV, No. 3, 2005, p. 400.

4. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, Washington, DC, Pew Research Centre, 2009, p. 5, http://www.pewforum.org/newassets/images/reports/Muslimpopulation/Muslimpopulation.pdf, accessed 29 November 2012.

5. *Ibid.*

6. T. Mahmood, 'Freedom of Conscience and Conversion to a Minority Religion: Legal Parameters and Social Realities', in T. Mahmood (ed.), *Minorities and State at the Indian Law*, New Delhi, Genuine Publications, 1991, pp. 59–91.

7. Mistry, 'Muslims in India', *op. cit.*, pp. 413–15.

group.[8] More than 90 per cent of Indian Muslims are small and marginal farmers, artisans and workers. Being engaged in such occupations makes them poor, while their low level of education and lack of skills do not allow them to enter high-income occupations. In modern industry and trade, Muslims rarely own big businesses or have positions in large-scale industry or business and generally lack strong entrepreneurial skills. There is not a single Muslim industrial house among the fifty that exist in India, and at the lower end of the scale most Muslims are poor.[9]

Communalism and communal violence are among the grave problems facing Muslims in India. Communal tensions existed prior to the partition of India because of the British policy of 'divide and rule' and sometimes religious sensitivities led to riots. For example, the cow is regarded as sacred in the Hindu religion, while Muslims eat beef. In the post-independence period, political reasons have remained at the root of conflicts. Scholars have observed that in the Hindu–Muslim communal riots in India, it is invariably Muslims who suffer the greatest losses.[10] Proportionately more Muslims are killed and more Muslim property is destroyed. In the 1950s, riots took place in eastern India and East Pakistan. In 1961 and 1964 there were riots in Jamshedpur, Rourkela and Jabalpur. Major riots took place in Ranchi, Bihar in 1967 and in Ahmedabad in Gujarat in 1969. In the 1970s and 1980s major communal riots took place. In many of these riots nearly 1,000 Muslims were killed. In 1992–3 dreadful riots took place in Bombay in which 3,000 Muslims perished. From 1992 to 2003 the Muslim community in India faced a series of communal riots and communal violence, among which the most serious was the Babri Masjid (Babri mosque) incident.[11]

Communal conflicts leading to violence and genocide in the 1990s began in November 1990 with *rathyatra* (a chariot procession) led by a prominent leader of the Bharatiya Party (BJP), L.K. Advani (later Deputy Prime Minister of India). These conflicts eventually led to the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayudhya on 6 December 1992 and further communal riots between Muslims and Hindus. Thousands of Muslims were killed from Ahmedabad and Surat in the West to Bengal in the East.[12] Hindu Indians argue that the Babri Masjid was built at the command of the Mughal Emperor Babur on the birthplace of Ram (a Hindu god) over the site of a demolished temple in 1528. Some scholars argue that there is no concrete evidence to prove that

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8. *Ibid.*, p. 409.

9. *Ibid.*

10. Z. Kausar, 'Communal Riots in India: Hindu-Muslim Conflict and Resolution', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXVI, No. 3, 2006, pp. 353–70.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

Babri Masjid was built on the site of a temple or that it was built after the demolition of a temple.[13]

Ten years later there was further conflict between Hindus and Muslims. On 27 February 2002 the Ahmedabad-bound Sabarmati train was set on fire and fifty-eight passengers including twenty-six women and twelve children were burnt to death. It is alleged that the *kar sevaks* (Hindu volunteers) harassed the Muslims travelling in the train and provoked them to carry out such a heinous crime. This tragedy led to violence in Gujarat. From 28 February to 2 March 2002, sixteen of Gujarat's twenty-four districts were entangled by organized armed mob attacks in which 2,000 lives were lost, 270 mosques and religious and cultural monuments were destroyed and the Muslim community of Gujarat suffered an enormous loss worth 35 billion Indian rupees.[14]

Apart from the Babri mosque incident in the 1990s, there are other mosques that remain intact in India. Some of the old mosques speak of the length and richness of the Indian Muslim heritage. For instance, the Jama Masjid built in Delhi in 1656, the Moti Masjid built in Delhi in 1660, the Mecca Masjid built in Hyderabad in 1694 or the Sidi Saiyyed built in Ahmedabad in 1573 – all stand as emblems of Muslim identity. There are madrassahs (Qurʾānic schools) and Islamic schools in India. However, many Indian Muslims are concerned about the decline of their language. Urdu is considered by many people to be the *lingua franca* of Muslim India. India has produced some great Urdu poets such as Mir Taqi Mir, Mirza Ghalib and Muhammad Iqbal. While most Indian languages are region-based, Urdu is supra-regional. It strengthens the bonds between Muslims residing in different regions of India, like Bihar, Panjab and Madras. Where Urdu is not a mother tongue of Muslim communities, it is still the vehicle of religious and cultural expression, as in Kashmir and Panjab. In Kashmir Urdu also holds together three disparate regions of the state, Jammu, Kashmir and Laddakh.[15] Urdu has been recognized as one of the official languages of India in the Indian constitution, but it is alleged the central and state governments have contrived to liquidate Urdu. Since the partition of India in 1947 Urdu has been eased out of educational institutions, courts and administrative and government offices. Consequently, a large number of young people stopped learning Urdu.[16]

Mainstream Hindus are moderate people but a minority group – the *Hindutva* group – emphasises the superiority of the Hindu race. The *Hindutva* movement aims to turn India into a *Hindu Rastra* (Hindu State), which is also

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13. *Ibid.*, pp. 356–7.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 359.

15. O. Khalidi, 'Urdu Language and the Future of Muslim Identity in India', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, VII, No. 2, 1986, p. 396.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 396.

VII–5.2   The Makkah Masjid, Hyderabad, India
© Nik Wheeler/AramcoWorld

the aim of political parties such as Vishwa Hindu Prashad (VHP), Rastriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (RSS), Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and some extreme sections of the Hindu community, so that they remain economically and politically dominant in India on the basis of communal politics.[17] Since the 11 September 2001 tragedy some Muslims in India have been uncomfortable. These people think that they are under surveillance by the *Hindutva* group, and that their mosques are closely watched. They also think that their *Tablighi* (Muslim preaching) activities are under surveillance, and there are proposals to legislate against conversion to another religion. Indian Muslims are afraid that the American international campaign against terrorism will provide both a cover and an excuse for the forces of *Hindutva* to achieve their anti-Islamic goals and objectives.[18]

The majority of Indian Muslims are law-abiding people. But a few Muslim extremists are creating tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims. Since the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 the Kashmir dispute between them has become an intractable one. They have fought three wars over their respective claims to Kashmir in 1947, 1965 and 1999 and this has not been

17. Kausar, 'Communal Riots in India', *op. cit.*, pp. 359, 361.
18. M. N. Siddiqi, 'Muslims and Violence', in I. Danish (ed.), *Muslims in India: Perceptions and Misperceptions*, New Delhi, Global Media Publications, p. 53.

resolved. So whenever there is an act of terrorism by Muslim extremists, India tends to blame Pakistan for giving refuge to Indian Muslim extremists. Indian authorities believe that Pakistan has been the main source of arms, ammunition and training for religious terrorist groups that operated in the Punjab in the past and for those that operate in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of India.[19] On the other hand, Pakistan holds that it has been a victim of terrorism. The several assassination attempts on the former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto show that Pakistan is also not immune to terrorism.

The Glasgow airport bombing in the United Kingdom in June 2006 revealed that a few Indian Muslims have endorsed political Islam. These Muslim extremists interpret the Western world's policies for the Islamic world as blasphemous, and believe that the West is still practising imperialism for its own economic and national interests (some believed the Western invasion of Iraq had imperialistic motivations such as the lust for oil).

On 30 June 2007 an Indian engineer, Kafeel Ahmed, and a British-born doctor of Iraqi heritage, Dr Abdullah, allegedly carried out a failed attack on Glasgow airport. They are believed to have driven a burning Jeep Cherokee packed with explosive material into the airport terminal building in Glasgow, Scotland. Kafeel Ahmed received burns to 90 per cent of his body. He was taken to a hospital and was treated in intensive care but died in August 2007. After the Glasgow bombings the Indian authorities seized recorded CDs of inflammatory speeches by al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and propaganda against the United States and Britain from Kafeel Ahmed's house in the southern Indian city of Bangalore. The CDs were allegedly connected with the British terrorist plot.[20]

Overall, Muslims in India are an economically disadvantaged people. Their Islamic identity, which is symbolized by their language Urdu, is becoming extinct. The alleged acts of terrorism committed by a few Muslim extremists are not helpful. They have a negative impact on mainstream Muslims, and also encourage Hindu extremists to pursue their goal of dominating Muslim interests and identity.

China

In AD 651 Caliph Uthman (Hazrat Uthman Rathiallāhu Anhu) sent an Arab ambassador to the court of T'ang Emperor Kao-tsung in Chang'an,

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19. B. Raman, 'Al Qaeda in India', *Rediff India Abroad*, 4 April 2003, http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/apr/04spec.htm, accessed 13 August 2008.
20. 'Bin Laden's Speeches Found in Kafeel Ahmed's House in Bangalore', International Reporter, 10 July 2007, http://www.internatcccionalreporter.com/News-2370/Bin-Laden-speeches-found-in-Kafeel-Ahmed%e2%80%99s-house-in-Bangalore.html, accessed 20 November 2007.

the present day Xi'an. From that time on, hundreds and thousands of Arab and Persian merchants, scholars, diplomats, artists and religious leaders came to China either by sea or by land and spread the Islamic religion. Some of them settled in the coastal cities, where they built homes, married Han (native Chinese) women, and practised Islam.[21]

Historically speaking, some Chinese Muslims have left their legacy on Chinese society. For example, Ma Yize Maidz (921–1005) was the minister of astronomy. He introduced the Arabic system for measuring time and counting days. Liang Jie Gu was an osteopath who enjoyed fame for his medical techniques. Zheng He is held in high esteem both by Chinese Muslims and non-Muslims. His achievements in navigating, opening up sea routes for China, boosting China's prestige, and making China a patron to countries along the south-eastern waterways were unprecedented in the fifteenth century.[22]

Chinese Muslims take pride in having built the first mosque outside of Arabia – in Guangzhou (Canton) – the Guang Ta Si, the 'Luminous Tower Mosque.' It was named 'Luminous' because of its minaret, which allowed fishing boats and other sailing boats to see their way from a distance. Other mosques in China include the Qi Lin Si (Qing Jing) or Unicorn Mosque in Quanzhou in Fujian province, Zhing Jue Si in Nanjing; and Crane Mosque in Yangzhou by the bank of the Grand Canal. An estimated 24,000 mosques, and 29,000 religious leaders now exist in Xinjiang province.[23] Beijing has forty-six mosques, five of which are for women. Shanghai claims about forty mosques.[24]

The Han are the mainstream Chinese people. Hui Zu is a general term for all Muslims in China – Hui (Chinese Hui), Uyghurs, Tarters, Uzbecs, the Hasaks, Taziks, Kurketz, Sala, Dongxiang and Bao'an – whether equestrian, pastoral or nomadic. Today most Chinese Muslims live in Xinjiang and the north-western provinces of China.[25] The Muslim population is approximately 30 million. About 20 million are Hui, concentrated mostly in north-western China. Another 8.5 million are Uyghurs living in Xinjiang province.[26]

Taoism is the largest spiritual discipline, followed by about 30 per cent (400 million) of the total Chinese population. Buddhists are the second largest religious group in China, making up between 11 per cent and 16 per cent of the

21. H. Y. Chang, 'Muslim Minorities in China: An Historical Note', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, III, No. 2, 1981, p. 30.

22. A. M. Lynn, *Muslims in China*, Indianapolis, IN, University of Indianapolis Press, 2004, pp. 31–42.

23. J. Levy, 'Xinjiang Province – The Islamic Jihad Battlefront in China', *American Thinker*, 11 April 2008, http://www.americanthinker.com/2008/04/xinjiang_province_the_islamic.html, accessed 6 August 2008; E. Wong, 'Wary China Restricts its Muslims', *The New York Times*, 27 October 2008, pp. 1, 4.

24. Lynn, *Muslims in China, op. cit.*, p. 18.

25. *Ibid.,* p. 1.

26. Levy, 'Xinjiang Province', *op. cit.*

VII–5.3 Afaq Khoja Mausoleum, Kashgar, China
© Tor Eigeland/AramcoWorld

adult population. Christianity is China's third-largest officially recognized religion, followed by Islam. The Horizon surveys indicate that less than 4 per cent of the adult population identifies as Christian. According to the 2000 census, ethnic groups closely associated with Islam numbered approximately 1.6 per cent of the total population.[27]

Chinese Hui Muslims, culturally similar to the majority of Han Chinese, follow Islamic dietary laws and some Muslim dress customs. Uyghurs are historically nomadic people of Turkic Indo-European origin who can be traced back to the 700s. Uyghurs have a separate language, culture, religion and identity from the dominant Han (native) Chinese. They live in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, which is large and sparsely populated, representing one sixth of China's total land mass. It borders Tibet, Russia, Kazakistan, Kyryzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Indian state of Kashmir. Uyghurs hold a multiplicity of identities, including Muslim, Uyghur, Turkish or Chinese.

It is said that during Mao Zedong's rule (1945–76), Chinese authorities exerted pressure on all religious groups to conform to Chinese communist

27. Pew Forum 'Religion in China on the Eve of the 2008 Beijing Olympics', http://pewforum. org/docs/?DocID=301, accessed 12 August 2008; see also Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, p. 28.

ideology. A Muslim reporter visited the Tung-si Mosque, and observed some people busy reading. Later he found out that they were studying Mao's political theories inside the mosque. Also it was reported that in 1956 the Islamic Academy of Peking was teaching the political and ideological goals of the government along with Arabic and Islamic teachings.[28] From 1966 to 1979, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, initiated by the Chairman of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong, included a ban on all religions.[29] The Cultural Revolution was particularly devastating for minority cultures. During this period many religious buildings, churches, temples, monasteries and cemeteries were shut down, sometimes looted and destroyed. Many people were persecuted or beaten to death.[30] After Mao's death, certain changes were seen. Muslim leaders in China were queried by visiting Arab journalists concerning the scope and content of China's policy of religious freedom. They were told about the constitutional changes that ensure that each citizen has the right of religious belief, the right of disbelief, the right to the spread of atheism, and guarantee the Muslim faithful that they will no longer be subjected to persecution and humiliation.[31]

Muslim (all ten Hui Muslim nationalities) revivalism in the People's Republic could be seen during the 1989 'Rushdie affair'. In November 1988 the publication of Salman Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses* enraged the Muslim world and led to worldwide protests. Muslims considered *The Satanic Verses* denigrated Islam, the Prophet Muḥammad and the Qurʾān. In China about 3,000 Muslims marched in Beijing (home of 200,000 Muslims), some 20,000 marched in Lanzhou and about 100,000 in Xining. Smaller groups were spotted in Urumqi, Shanghai, Inner Mongolia, Wuhan and Yunnan. Together with their conformist slogans shouted according to Communist Party directives: 'Uphold the constitution', 'Respect China's freedom of religion', 'Uphold the party's nationality and religious policies' and 'Love our country', there were calls for 'Death to China's Salman Rushdie', 'Love our religion', and even '*Allāhu Akbar*' (Allāh is great).[32] Later in 2006, during the Prophet Muḥammad's cartoon incident when the Danish cartoonist caricatured the Prophet Muḥammad, there were again protests from Chinese Muslims.[33]

28. A. A. Bagader, 'Muslims in China: Some Popular Middle Eastern Perceptions', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, III, No. 2, 1981, pp. 60–2.
29. R. MacFarquhar and M. Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution*, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Bagader, 'Muslims in China', *op. cit.*, pp. 60–2.
32. R. Israeli, 'Muslim Revivalism in China', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XVII, No. 2, 1997, pp. 272–3.
33. Levy, 'Xinjiang Province', *op. cit.*

VII–5.4   Brilliant colours and patterns decorate the Niujie Mosque in Beijing. The architecture, the colour schemes and the floral paintings are typically Chinese, while the depictions of what are likely earthenware vessels hint at Central Asian influences.

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In spite of the established presence of Muslims in China, the majority Han people have often misunderstood people of Islamic faith and looked upon them as 'different'.[34] In the job market, to avoid discrimination, Muslims working with non-Muslims try not to mention their faith. Chinese Muslims call the Islamic religion the 'Small Faith' or *Xiao Jiao*. The root reason is that the Han and other non-Islamic ethnicities comprise the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. Therefore the mainstream faith becomes 'Big Faith' or *Da Jiao*.[35]

It is said that Uyghurs in Xinjiang maintain an informal ethnic apartheid, as they prefer to live in isolation. They view the Chinese as inferior occupiers and equate Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism with idolatry. On the other hand, the mainstream Han population view Uyghurs as non-Han inferior Chinese and portray them as untrustworthy and troublemakers.[36] Uyghurs have been discriminated against in employment and are victims of economic

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34. Lynn, *Muslims in China, op. cit.*, p. 19.
35. *Ibid.*
36. Levy, 'Xinjiang Province', *op. cit.*

deprivation in an underdeveloped area. Drug use, particularly opium and hashish, is rampant and has added to their hopelessness and poverty. A high incidence of AIDS due to heroin injection appears to have attracted little government intervention to combat the problem.[37] Xinjiang is rich in oil, gas and mineral deposits. It also has numerous military installations and, until 1996, nuclear facilities, giving it significant and strategic military importance to China.

It is alleged that Uyghurs are pushing for a separate state through militant activities. The Islamic jihadists of China's Xinjiang are alleged to be linked to the Taliban in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda. Their terrorist methods and ideology resonate with the larger Islamic jihadist goal to overthrow existing governments and install a religious theocracy.[38]

The first major uprising of Uyghur Muslims took place in north-western China in 1990 with a series of protests. As a result, China deployed troops and began to conduct military exercises in the region. In 1997 Uyghur Islamists were responsible for several bombings, including the destruction of a bus in Beijing. In 2004 Uyghurs trained by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) were suspected of involvement in an explosion in Balochistan, Pakistan, in which three Chinese engineers were killed.[39]

However, in July 2004 Amnesty International reported: 'Since 9/11 the Chinese Government has been using "anti-terrorism" as a pretext to increase its crackdown on all forms of political or religious dissent in the region.' In February 2004 a group of seven Uyghur acrobats touring Canada applied for asylum in the country. One of the group, a juggler, said that despite being Muslims they had been forced to eat pork and drink alcohol and denied the right to attend mosques in China. After they sought asylum in Canada there were reports that their families were being threatened.[40] Amnesty International further reported that over the last three years, tens of thousands of people have been detained on 'anti-terrorism' grounds in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in north-west China. Those who were previously labelled 'separatists' by the Chinese authorities are increasingly being termed 'terrorists'.[41]

Amnesty International's report reveals that the government has shut down a number of mosques and banned some religious schools and practices, as it tightens restrictions on the religious rights of Uyghurs, most of whom

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37. *Ibid.*

38. *Ibid.*

39. *Ibid.*

40. Amnesty International, 'China: New Report Shows "War on Terror" a Cover for Fresh Repression of Uyghurs in North-West China', 2004, http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=15471, accessed 11 August 2008.

41. *Ibid.*

are Muslims. This clampdown has been more severe than on other Muslim peoples in China, apparently as part of a wider anti-Uyghur repression. Tens of thousands of Uyghur books have also reportedly been burnt and the Uyghur language has been banned from most university courses at Xinjiang University. Amnesty International said, 'At current levels of repression, the space for independent expression of Uyghur cultural or religious identity is narrowing dangerously.'[42] Amnesty International's report highlights cases such as:

> Shaheer Ali's: reportedly executed in China last year after being forcibly returned from Nepal in 2002 even after he had been recognized as a refugee by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Nepal. He had been awaiting resettlement when he was detained by Nepalese immigration. According to one eyewitness, he was later taken away with at least one other detainee by officials from the Chinese Embassy in Nepal. While in Nepal, Shaheer Ali had described eight months of torture in a XUAR (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) prison in 1994. He said he was beaten with shackles, given electric shocks, and had metal nails pushed under his toenails in an attempt to make him confess to various offences.[43]

Muslims in China are also under tremendous pressure to assimilate with the wider community. Some Muslims can achieve upward mobility in the labour market through assimilation. The Min Kao Han are ethnically Uyghur, but culturally and linguistically they have taken on many ethnic Chinese characteristics.[44] They are favoured for admission into Chinese society and receive political and employment advantages over their co-ethnics who remain linguistically/culturally Uyghur. However, these advantages do not always materialize and the social costs are high. The Min Kao Han are generally excluded from the Uyghur Muslim community because they are viewed as 'not good enough Muslims', while they encounter discrimination from the Han for their Islamic identity. Many Min Kao Han favour Western clothing to

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42. *Ibid.*
43. *Ibid.* It appears that the alleged acts of terrorism continued after 2004. In 2005, during the Eid-al Adha celebrations, two explosions from suicide bombings near the Kazakstan border in Xinjiang killed thirteen people and injured eighteen. In January 2007 Chinese police raided an East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) terrorist training camp (allegedly linked to al-Qaeda) close to the Afghanistan and Pakistan borders. The raid, in which 18 terrorists died, yielded a large explosive and weapon cache. In August 2008 a grenade attack in the city of Kashgar, in Xingiang, killed sixteen police and injured sixteen just three days before the Olympic Games were due to begin in Beijing. The ETIM was alleged to have been behind this terrorist act. Such violent acts are impacting both on mainstream Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese. See Levy, 'Xinjiang Province'; 'Olympic Terror Fears Grow after 16 Police Killed in Grenade Attack', *The West Australian*, 5 August 2008, p. 1.
44. J. Taynen, 'Interpreters, Arbiters or Outsiders: The Role of *Min kao Han* in Xinjiang Society', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXVI, No. 1, 2006, pp. 45, 47.

VII–5.5   The Niujie Mosque (or 'Oxen Street Mosque') dates from AD 997,
making it the oldest mosque in Beijing
© Peter Sanders/AramcoWorld

refrain from being conspicuous Muslims. Their children are drawn to Chinese movies, TV shows and music, and are more prone to identify themselves as Chinese than Muslim.[45] A disproportionately low number of Uyghurs hold high-level government jobs, but of those that do most are Min Kao Han. Their key to success has been their proficiency in written and spoken Chinese. They live mostly in urban centres of Xinjiang, whereas 70 per cent of their agricultural Uyghur counterparts live in rural areas.[46]

The Chinese Government officially declares itself to be atheist. It recognizes five religions – Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Taoism and Buddhism – but it tightly regulates their administration and practice. Its heavy handedness in Xinjiang is preventing Muslims from practising their religion freely. Large signs are posted by the front door of some mosques that are more Communist Party decrees than Qur'ānic doctrines. For example, the imam's sermons (*khuṭba*) at Friday prayer must run no longer than a half-hour. Prayer in public places outside the mosque is forbidden. One rule on the wall says that government workers and non-religious people may not be 'forced' to attend services at the mosque. Some Chinese officials contend that insurgent

45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*

groups in Xinjiang pose one of the biggest security threats to China, and the government says the 'three forces' of separatism, terrorism and religious extremism threaten to destabilize the region. But some scholars of Xinjiang and terrorism experts argue that heavy-handed tactics like restrictions on Islam will only radicalize more Uyghurs.[47]

Colin Mackerras observes that since 11 September 2001, Chinese authorities have intensified racial profiling, so 'people [Muslims] who may not have any terrorist inclinations have seen themselves branded as terrorists and treated as such.' Mackerras notes, 'Just as the Chinese State reacts when it feels threatened, so the Uyghur resentment against both the Han and the Chinese State increases when they feel under pressure as Muslims.' Mackerras argues, 'The Chinese State may wish to "play safe" … But for Muslims, and especially for Uyghurs who suffer most suspicion from the Chinese State, "playing safe" just looks like injustice and anti-Islamic prejudice.'[48] It would, therefore, intensify Uyghurs' 'religious identity, and to some extent also ethnic identity.'[49]

The Philippines

Islam was established in the Philippines as early as the fifteenth century, with the arrival of Arab and Malay Muslim traders who converted some of the island's native inhabitants. There were extensive Islamic sultanates in Mindanao and Sulu (southern Philippines) and Islam was in the process of spreading to the northern islands of Mindoro, Luzon and the Visayas.[50] The Philippines were linked with other Islamic regions in South-East Asia and Jolo (in the Philippines) was the centre of the trading network that extended north to China and west to Java.[51]

The Philippine Islands became a Spanish colony during the sixteenth century. For about four hundred years the Moros (Filipino Muslims who share the essential beliefs of Islam but have absorbed indigenous practices into their daily lives) resisted Spanish rule.[52] In 1898 following the Spanish-American War, the Philippines were ceded to the United States. In 1935 they became a self-governing Commonwealth. In 1942 the islands fell under Japanese

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47. E. Wong, 'Wary China Restricts its Muslims', *The New York Times*, 27 October 2008, pp. 1, 4.
48. C. Mackerras, 'Some Issues of Ethnic and Religious Identity among China's Islamic Peoples', *Asian Ethnicity*, VI, No. 1, 2005, p. 11.
49. *Ibid.*
50. R. J. May, 'The Situation of Philippine Muslims', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, V, No. 2, 1984, pp. 427–8.
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Ibid.*

occupation during the Second World War, and US forces and Filipinos fought together during 1944–5 to regain control. On 4 July 1946 the Republic of the Philippines attained its independence. The Philippines have now been labelled the only country in Asia whose Christian followers constitute 90 per cent of the country's population, and the Muslim minority constitutes less than 10 per cent.[53]

Filipino Muslims saw their homeland progressively integrated into the larger Philippine society, under the regimes dominated first by the Americans and then by Christian Filipinos from the north. The post-war period saw a shift of migration patterns which brought a large number of settlers into areas that impinged upon the customary land ownership of Muslim and tribal groups. Alienated from their land and threatened with economic and political exploitation, some Moros resorted to violent action.[54] The earlier confrontations with the government in the 1950s tended to be localized but gradually they took the form of militant Moro nationalism. The 'Jabidah massacre' of 1968 brought the situation of Philippine Muslims to the attention of the international Islamic community. This happened when between twenty-eight and sixty-four Moro army recruits undergoing training in sabotage, jungle warfare, and guerilla tactics in Corrigidor Island, just off Manila Bay, were summarily executed by their military trainers in late March 1968.[55]

The 1970s saw the emergence of a new type of Moro leadership when young educated and radical people established the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).[56] The Moro National Liberation Front first appeared in the early 1970s, fighting for an independent Moro nation. The group signed a peace agreement with the Manila Government in 1976, but this failed to survive. Another agreement, signed in 1996, gave predominantly Muslim areas a degree of self-rule, setting up the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The ARMM is composed of the mainland provinces of Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur, and the island provinces of Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Basilan. As part of the deal, the MNLF chairman and founder of the group, Nur Misuari, was installed as the new regional governor. But his rule ended in violence in November 2001 when he led a failed uprising and he was imprisoned. Another MNLF leader, Parouk Hussin, took over as ARMM governor in 2002.[57]

53. A. P. Anshari, 'The Legal Impediments to the Application of Islamic Family Law in the Philippines', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXVII, No. 1, 2007, p. 94; see also, Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*, p. 29.

54. May, 'The Situation of Philippine Muslims', *op. cit.*, pp. 427–8.

55. *Ibid.*

56. *Ibid.*

57. 'Guide to the Philippines Conflict', *BBC News*, 10 August 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1695576.stm#abu, accessed 17 August 2008.

VII–5.6   A gateway bearing a carved stone inscription in Arabic
at the Xian Mosque
© Nik Wheeler/AramcoWorld

The ethno-nationalism of Filipino Muslims in ARMM gave rise to other separatist groups. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is a more militant rebel group, which split from the MNLF in 1977. The MILF has a long-term aim of creating a separate Islamic state in the southern Philippines, but analysts say the group may well settle for a certain degree of Muslim autonomy. The MILF puts more emphasis on its Islamic roots than the MNLF. Many of its senior figures are clerics.[58] In 2008 the Philippine Government offered MILF a federal state and control of vast resources to end the decades-old rebellion in the southern Philippines. But with the start of fresh violence the peace pact failed. MILF rebel commanders believed that the Philippine Government had designed the agreement to fail.[59]

Abu Sayyaf is the smallest and most radical of the Islamic separatist groups in the southern Philippines. It is best-known for a series of kidnappings of Western nationals and Filipinos, for which it has received several large ransom payments. In June 2002 US-trained Philippine commandos tried to rescue three hostages being held on Basilan Island. Two of the hostages – one

58. *Ibid.*
59. 'Philippines Back to Square One on Muslim Peace Deal', *The West Australian*, 22 August 2008, p. 29.

an American citizen – were killed in the resulting shootout. The group has also claimed responsibility for a series of bomb attacks over the years, including an attack on a passenger ferry in Manila Bay in February 2004 that killed 100 people. Abu Sayyaf's stated goal is an independent Islamic state in Mindanao and the Sulu islands, but the government views the rebels as little more than criminals, and refuses to hold any form of talks with them.[60]

Historically speaking, Muslims in the Philippines have been disadvantaged in education, health and infrastructure. For example, in the 1970s research found that the province of Lanao del Sur ranked forty-first out of the sixty-six provinces in the Philippines with regard to access to various social services such as education, health and infrastructure. Life expectancy was also lower in Lanao del Sur than in other provinces.[61] In 1939, 95 per cent of the people of Lanao del Sur, also known as the Maranaos (Maranao is the most commonly spoken language in the province), aged 25 and over were listed as never having gone to school, compared to approximately 68 per cent of Filipinos belonging to other ethnic groups. By 1975 the situation had improved marginally with 75 per cent of adults in the province having attended school.[62] However, the 1975 data show that about 80 per cent of adult females in Lanao del Sur have never gone to school, compared to only 70 per cent of adult males.[63]

Another important factor inhibiting more rapid development in Lanao del Sur is the presence of certain cultural patterns among the Maranao themselves. Centuries of active resistance to outside control have left the Maranao reluctant to participate in any form of 'modernization' that will rob them of their ethnic and religious identity. For example, minority Muslims in the Philippines have traditionally been suspicious of public schools since they are 'troubled at entrusting their children – Allāh's most precious gift – to the public school system, with its books written by Christians, speaking the language of Christians and teaching Christian values.'[64] Another factor is social stratification within Maranao society itself. For instance, the status of Maranao women appears to be somewhat lower than that accorded to men, due to their lower levels of educational attainment and ability to speak the national language of the country. The elite group which is rich could afford to let their children attain a high level of education while the masses of very poor parents cannot afford even a single year of education, for their sons and daughters. Recent data available on school enrolment patterns indicate a shift

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60. *Ibid.*
61. M. A. Costello, 'Trends in Social and Economic Status of the Maranao in the Philippines: 1939–1975', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, III, No. 1, 1981, pp. 159–73.
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Ibid.*
64. *Ibid.*

towards more widespread participation in the primary and secondary school systems.[65]

In 2006 the International Religious Freedom Report noted that approximately 14 per cent of the school population in Mindanao attended madrassas (Islamic schools). Estimates of the number of madrassas across the country varied widely; government officials estimated the number at more than two thousand. Of these, more than half were located in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Most madrassas did not meet the department's accreditation standards for curriculum and adequate facilities. The Madrasa Development Coordinating Committee manages financial assistance to the madrassa system from local and international sources.[66]

In September 2005 the government began implementation of its unified curriculum, designed to integrate madrassas into the national education system. Several private madrassas began training educators to teach maths, science, English and Filipino, in addition to sectarian subjects. The government hopes to certify Islamic schools that offer a full range of courses in the coming years, allowing their graduates to enter public high schools or colleges. In addition, public elementary schools that had at least twenty-five Muslim students were ordered to begin offering Arabic language instruction and classes on Islamic values.[67]

In the Philippines freedom of religion is enshrined in the constitution, which states, 'The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.'[68] However, some ethnic and cultural discrimination against Muslims has been recorded.[69] Young Muslim professionals have reported that some employers generalize that Muslims have less education. Muslims reported that they have difficulty renting rooms in boarding houses or being hired for retail work with their Muslim names or if they wear distinctive Islamic dress. Therefore, they sometimes resort to using Christian pseudonyms and western clothing.[70] Over the past sixty years efforts by the dominant Christian population to resettle in traditionally Muslim areas such as Mindanao have displeased many Muslim residents. Many Muslims have observed that Christian proselytizing is a form of resettlement. In this process, Muslims are deprived of their homeland and cultural identity, including their religion. Despite this, amicable ties among religious communities are common, and many participate in

65. *Ibid.*

66. US Department of State, 'Philippines: International Religious Freedom Report 2007', http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2007/90151.htm, accessed 8 June 2008.

67. *Ibid.*

68. Anshari, 'The Legal Impediments to the Application of Islamic Family Law in the Philippines', *op. cit.*

69. US Department of State, 'Philippines', *op. cit.*

70. *Ibid.*

interdenominational efforts to alleviate poverty. Interfaith groups such as non-government organizations that include Catholic, Islamic and Protestant representatives continue to support the Mindanao peace process.[71]

The freedom of religion principle in the Philippines constitution protects Islamic family law regarding marriage and divorce. It also recognizes the *Sharīʿa* civil law system as part of national law which applies only to Muslims.[72] However, the *Sharīʿa* courts of the Philippines are under the supervision of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the constitutional power to review on appeal the decisions of the *Sharīʿa* District Court. Since the Philippines is a non-Muslim country, there is every possibility that the decision of the Supreme Court will deviate from the basic teachings of the *Sharīʿa*.[73] However, even if such a decision runs counter to the basic teachings of the *Sharīʿa*, it will become part of the Islamic legal system in the Philippines.[74] Some Muslim community leaders (ulamas) have argued that the government should allow Islamic courts to extend their jurisdiction to criminal law cases, and some have supported the MILF's goal of forming an autonomous region governed in accordance with Islamic law.[75] Politically, the enactment of Islamic family law was designed to redress Muslim grievances in the southern Philippines. The solution of the Mindanao problem through peaceful negotiation would have a better prospect for the development of Islamic law in the country.

Thailand

As in other parts of South-East Asia, trade was the most important reason for the migration of Muslims to central Thailand. During the seventeenth century the Thai economy was not a fully developed market economy but was rather an administered one. Both Thai and European records indicate that the King of Ayudhya (the old capital of Siam or Thailand) controlled both domestic and foreign trade, and gave opportunities to foreign traders.[76] Because of this economic and political climate, many Muslims established themselves in the Ayudhya capital and became successful traders.

One of the most influential ethnic trading communities in seventeenth-century Ayudhya was Iranian Muslims.[77] Some of these Muslims settled in Bangkok and took part in the expansion of the teak industry in Thailand,

71. *Ibid.*
72. Anshari, 'The Legal Impediments to the Application of Islamic Family Law in the Philippines', *op. cit.*
73. *Ibid.*
74. *Ibid.*
75. US Department of State, 'Philippines', *op. cit.*
76. The Ayudhayan period lasted for four centuries, 1348–1767.
77. R. Scupin, 'The Socio-Economic Status of Muslims in Central and North Thailand', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, III, No. 2, 1981, pp. 162–90.

becoming prosperous businessmen. Muslim merchants from India also migrated to Central Thailand during the Ayudhyan period. There was a healthy trading relationship between India and Thailand.[78] Evidently, an important diplomatic trading relation was established between King Narai and the Mughal emperors; for at the National Museum in Bangkok there is a lacquer bookcase depicting Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb Alamgir (1658–1707) next to Louis XIV of France.[79]

From 1850 onwards (the present Ratanakosin period) Thailand changed from a predominantly subsistence economy to a predominantly monetary economy. This led to the development of specialized occupations for which indigenous Thais were not trained. For example, some Indian and Pakistani Muslims were hired to act as postal agents to read, write and deliver incoming foreign mail.[80] The majority of Indian Muslims who settled in the Bangkok area were Gujarati speakers from north India. Gujaratis are well known for their mercantile trade. A small contingent of Indonesian Muslims migrated to Bangkok in the nineteenth century. They established small businesses related to the Thai-Indonesian trade in cloth, batik products and molasses.[81]

Another group of Muslims who settled in Ayudhya before the eighteenth century were from Cambodia. Cambodian Muslims have a long history going back to the Champa kingdom in what is now known as Vietnam. The Chams came to Thailand as a result of Cambodian internal and external political affairs. They came as war captives due to Thai-Cambodian conflicts during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, or as political refugees following civil disturbances within Cambodia. Many Chams settled in the central plains and eastern part of Thailand, and many eventually settled in the Bangkok area. Traditionally, Chams were engaged in agriculture, and some were fisherpeople and boat builders.[82] By far the largest group of Muslims in Bangkok are the descendants of peoples from the southern provinces of Thailand and parts of Malaysia. Originally they were rice paddy farmers. But with increasing urban expansion their land was purchased by developers and much of the area used for Muslim rice paddies became upper-middle class housing for upwardly mobile Thais.[83]

In 2000 Thailand's ethnic composition was: Thai 75 per cent, Chinese 14 per cent and other 11 per cent. The religious composition was: Buddhist 94.6 per cent, Muslim 4.6 per cent, Christian 0.7 per cent and other 0.1 per

78. *Ibid.*
79. *Ibid.*
80. *Ibid.*
81. *Ibid.*
82. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

cent.[84] Muslims are by no means a monolithic group although officially they are known as 'Thai-Islam' or 'Thai-Muslim'. One official source estimates that Muslims number around 14 per cent of the Thai population. An internal Muslim official account with grassroots contacts claims that they make up 10 per cent of the total Thai population.[85] Yet in 2009 the Pew Research Center found that Muslims in Thailand numbered 3,930,000, which constituted 5.8 per cent of the total population.[86]

Thailand as a nation is customarily divided into four distinct geographical regions: northern, north-eastern, central and southern Thailand. Southern Thailand includes four provinces that border on Malaysia: Narathiwat, Satul, Yala and Pattani.[87] Eighty-five to ninety per cent of the residents in these southern provinces are Muslim and most of these Muslims reside in rural areas. The north-eastern region bordering Laos and Cambodia has very few Muslim residents. In the central and northern regions of Thailand the minority Muslim population is concentrated in the urban areas.[88] Since 1932, when the absolute monarchy changed to a democratic system, the nation's various constitutions have included the principle of religious freedom for all Thai people. Thailand's first constitution decreed under Article 13 that individuals have the right to hold religious beliefs.[89]

There are more than 3,000 registered mosques in Thailand which are the centre of the Muslim community. They are used for social activities and religious services. Thai Muslims are allowed to study Islam in secondary schools to university level. Some women wear religious clothing (*hijāb*) in government schools and the workplace. There are many private Islamic schools (*ponohs*) in provinces where Islam and Arabic are taught. Some Muslims travel abroad for religious studies in Islamic countries.[90] Muslims in northern and central Thailand have integrated well into the wider community. But in the south there is a long history of resentment towards the central government, dating from 1902, when Siam, as Thailand was then known, annexed the Islamic Kingdom of Pattani (present-day southern Thailand).

84. Central Intelligence Agency, 'Thailand', *World Factbook*, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/th.html, accessed 14 August 2008.

85. O. F. Bajunid, 'The Muslims in Thailand: A Review', *Southeast Asian Studies*, XXXVII, No. 2, 1999, p. 222.

86. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

87. Scupin, 'The Socio-Economic Status of Muslims in Central and North Thailand', *op. cit.*

88. *Ibid.*

89. Students Voices, 'Solidarity among Muslims and Buddhists is not out of Reach', *Bangkok Post*, 30 October 2007, http://www.bangkokpost.net/education/site2007/svoc3007.htm, accessed 14 August 2008.

90. *Ibid.*

VII–5.7   Worshippers leaving a mosque by bicycle in Malaysia
© Burnett H. Moody/AramcoWorld

The conflict in southern Thailand has been viewed from different angles by various analysts. The majority of foreign security analysts have interpreted the conflict from the perspective of political Islam. They have alleged that southern Thai Muslims are connected with international jihadist movements such as al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). On the other hand the majority of the reports in the Muslim world view the conflict as a religious one between an oppressive Thai Buddhist state and its repressed Muslim minority. Others see it as a conflict between two ethno-religiosities, those of Thai Buddhism and Malay, with the latter taking a Malay-Muslim nationalist and separatist stance.[91]

Some analysts argue that Malay-Muslim resistance in southern Thailand is based exclusively on Malay identity. According to Malay history, which separatists use to legitimize resistance, the Kingdom of Pattani was a traditional Malay polity that had survived more than a millennium. The Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909, which effectively closed the northernmost borders of the Malay Muslim world, was seen as an act of Anglo-Siamese complicity that forcibly incorporated seven Malay sultanates into Siam. This history is often juxtaposed in the popular imagination with the 'golden age' when Pattani was a trading hub as well as a centre for excellence in Islamic studies, which British and Thai colonialists contrived to eliminate.[92]

It is alleged that the separatists in southern Thailand have long been reliant on international connections. At various times, the leadership of separatist groups either operated out of or obtained shelter and support from Egypt, Syria and Malaysia. Malay sympathy with the separatists can be very strong because of their common historical background. Southern Thai Muslims who are ethnically Malay have cross-border ethnic and religious relations with Muslims of Kelantan in Malaysia and also Indonesia. Many young Thai Muslims also travel to the neighbouring countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and also India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iran and Egypt seeking education to reinforce their religious and ethnic identities. Travel to and education in Muslim countries may affect Thai Muslims' perceptions about their ethno-religious identity, reinforcing some salient ethnic and religious features in the local context.[93]

Foreign-educated Muslims have also played a significant role in the weaning of local syncretic Islam to a more puritan form. Hence, the Salafi-Wahhabi Islamic reformist movement amongst the Muslims of Thailand has

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91. I. Yusuf, 'The Southern Thailand Conflict and the Muslim World', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXVII, No. 2, 2007, pp. 319–39.

92. J. C. Liow, *Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and Politics*, Washington, DC, East West Center, 2006; see also, W. K. Che Man, *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand*, Singapore, Oxford University Press, 1990.

93. Yusuf, 'The Southern Thailand Conflict and the Muslim World', *op. cit.*, p. 326.

succeeded in transforming Thai Islam along puritan lines, resulting in the marginalization of the traditionalist section within contemporary Thailand. Yet Islamic-related global events such as wars in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq do draw pan-Islamist sympathies from local Thai Muslims. Foreign Muslim foundations also contribute to the building of mosques and *pondoks/madrassahs* (religious seminaries) in Thailand. For example, the Yala Islamic College has beneficiaries in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait, and the Saudi-based International Relief Organization (IRO) has been the biggest donor to Islamic social projects in southern Thailand. Such support and the acquisition of education in the Muslim world have made some mainstream Thais suspicious of Thai Muslims. Thai Muslims greatly resent this for, though separatism in the south has a long history, there is no proof that all the Thai Muslims educated in the Muslim world are involved in anti-state activities.[94]

However, it cannot be denied that some Muslims in southern Thailand have been violent. On 4 January 2004 an arms store was attacked and plundered causing the deaths of four soldiers. Criminal fires were started in a score of schools near Narathiwat. These incidents marked the resumption of the troubles in the southern Muslim provinces. Initially the Thai Government explained it as the work of 'bandits', then of separatists. But the imposition of martial law in the province as soon as the following day, and the sending of military reinforcements, immediately showed the heavy-handedness of the Thai Government. The proclamation of martial law, far from preventing further trouble, launched the region into a cycle of outrages, assassinations and attacks with an almost daily list of victims, mostly military, police and Thai civil servants, but also monks. On 28 April 2004, after more than three months of uninterrupted violent incidents, 108 insurgents, mainly youths armed with machetes including some inside the Kru Se Mosque in Pattani where they had taken refuge, were killed.[95] In October 2004 at least seventy-eight Muslim men suffocated or were crushed to death in southern Thailand as they were being taken to military barracks in packed army trucks after a demonstration. It happened after six people were killed when security forces tried to break up the protest. The death toll of at least eighty-four was Thailand's second-highest that year. It happened during the month of Ramadan. Ahmad Somboon Bualang, a sociologist and retired university lecturer in Pattani, said, 'I'm absolutely shocked. For people to die like this during Ramadan, in the Muslim fasting month, is tragic. Suffocating to death is … more violent than being shot to death. These people suffered greatly in dying.'[96]

94. *Ibid.*, pp. 326–7.
95. M. Gilquin, *The Muslims of Thailand*, Bangkok, IRASEC, Silkworm Books, 2002, pp. 129–30.
96. E. Nakashima, '78 Thai Muslims Die After Protest', *Washington Post*, 27 October 2004, p. 18.

VII–5.8   The Azhar Mosque, locally called the 'Masjid Cambodia', serves
the Cambodian Cham Muslim families of Vientiane, Laos
© Stephanie Hollyman/AramcoWorld

In October 2004 the then Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
apologized for the deaths of Muslims in the month of Ramadan. In 2006
a special commission on the violence in the Muslim-dominated south
noted that separatism and religious extremism are aggravating the strife
but that the root causes are poverty, alienation and government neglect.
The National Reconciliation Commission presented its report on the
violence in Thailand's southernmost provinces. It reported that the almost
daily bombings and drive-by shootings by alleged Muslim separatists have
killed 1,300 people in the past two-and-a-half years. The chairman of the
commission, former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, said the root
causes – poverty, injustice and a lack of good schools – were common
throughout Thailand. Anand Panyarachun observed that the situation in
the south has been aggravated by differences in religion, ethnicity, language
and the interpretation of history.[97]

97. S. Bobb, 'Poverty in Thailand Blamed for Unrest in Muslim South', *Voice of America*,
5 June 2006, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-06/2006-06-05-voa29.cfm
?CFID=25760066&CFTOKEN=26508259, accessed 14 August 2008.

Vietnam

Vietnamese Muslims have a long history going back to the Champa kingdom in what is now known as Vietnam. The Champa kingdom flourished as a Hindu-Buddhist state from the second century AD up until its defeat at the hands of the Annamese (southern Vietnamese) in 1471. Although no precise date can be given for the appearance of Islam in Champa, it is clear that there were Arab and Persian settlements there as early as the second half of the eighth century. Middle Eastern traders have been travelling to China since the seventh century, so it is likely that Champa was an important node on this route between the two countries.[98] After the collapse of Champa, Islam was accepted as a popular religion by the Chams. After the Annamese victory in 1471, Cham refugees fled to Malacca, Java and Cambodia. Afterwards Islam slowly took root among the Cham refugees, mainly through the influence of the Malayan-Indonesian culture.[99]

In 2006 the total population of Vietnam was 84 million. About 85 per cent of Vietnamese are Buddhists, and Muslims constitute one per cent of the total population.[100] Today there are three types of Vietnamese Muslims. The Champa or Cham Muslims are the indigenous people of Vietnam and they form the majority of Muslims. The second group are the descendants of mixed marriages between local Vietnamese and Muslim traders such as Arabs, Indians, Indonesians, Malaysians and Pakistanis. The third group are Muslim converts. Throughout the ages, the local Vietnamese interacted with Muslim traders who lived in Vietnam. They were drawn to their teachings and therefore they embraced Islam. For example, the entire village of Tân Bøu in Tân An province converted to Islam.[101]

There are twenty-one masjids (mosques) and *sarao* (daily prayer rooms) in Vietnam. Some of them are very old masjids. In An Giang/Chau Phu province (near the Mekong Delta) the ar-Rohmah Masjid was built in 1414, and renovated in 1994. This masjid lies on an islet in the Hau Giang river. Muslims here need funds to aid poor pupils in their Islamic studies. The al-Mubarak Masjid was built in 1750. It was classified as of historical interest by the government. It serves 200 Cham families of about 1000 Muslims. The al-Aman (Katambong) Masjid was built in 1965. About 210 Cham families pray

98. Scupin, 'The Socio-Economic Status of Muslims in Central and North Thailand', *op. cit.*, p. 168.

99. *Ibid.*

100. 'Muslims Population Worldwide', 2006, http://www.islamicpopulation.com/asia_islam.html, accessed 15 August 2008; see also, Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*, p. 29.

101. 'Who are Vietnamese Muslims?', http://www.angelfire.com/vt/vietnamesemuslims/compVM.html#cvm, accessed 15 August 2008.

here, with an Islamic school for 150 pupils. Due to the scarcity of agricultural land-people here mainly earn a living by animal husbandry such as goats, though some are involved in business.[102]

The majority of Vietnamese (Cham) Muslims live in the Mekong Delta, which is also inhabited by other Vietnamese of different religious denominations such as Buddhists and Christians. But Cham Muslims are alleged to live an isolated life.[103] They reside in compact, exclusively Cham neighbourhoods 'away from polluting pigs and dogs', and live in close proximity to mosques in order to meet the requirements of daily prayers. They follow a strict Islamic code.[104] They do not drink alcohol or consume pork, and they eat *ḥalāl* food, which in practice means they do not eat in Vietnamese restaurants or accept invitations to eat at Vietnamese or Chinese people's homes.[105] They do not attend the cultural celebrations of other ethnic groups such as their Kinh, Khmer and Chinese neighbours. Nor do they marry outside their religion. However, some Cham Muslims deny that they live isolated lives. A cafe owner in Chau Phong said:

> Our ethnic Viet neighbours say that the Cham are prejudiced against them. We keep to ourselves, don't share food with them and don't marry them. That is not true. Anyone who enters the religion is able to marry a Cham person.[106]

It appears that the indigenous Vietnamese (or Cham) Muslims in rural areas of Vietnam (near the Mekong Delta) are isolated. However, Muslims of diverse backgrounds live in the urban areas. The mosques built in the urban areas also show signs of the presence of different ethnic groups. For example, An-Noor Masjid was built in Hanoi/Hoan Kiem (the capital city) in 1890 by Indian traders and renovated in 1950. It serves 20 Viet Muslims and those from embassies. The ar-Rahim Masjid was built in Ho Chi Minh in 1885 by Malaysian-Indonesian Muslims. More than 200 people pray here. The most multicultural masjid in Ho Chi Minh is the Dong Du Street Mosque.[107] It was in built in 1935 by Indian Muslims. It is attended by Muslims of diverse cultures including white and black Americans.[108]

Overall, Cham Muslims are economically marginalized. Abdul, a 50-year-old from the Chau Doc region working as a health professional in Ho Chi

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102. 'List of Masjids and Suraos in Vietnam', http://www.angelfire.com/vt/vietnamese-muslims/masjidList.html, accessed 15 August 2008.

103. Philip Taylor, *Cham Muslims of the Mekong Delta: Place and Mobility in the Cosmopolitan Periphery*, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 2007, p. 96.

104. *Ibid.*

105. *Ibid.*

106. *Ibid.*

107. 'List of Masjids and Suraos in Vietnam', *op. cit.*

108. Taylor, *Cham Muslims of the Mekong Delta*, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

Minh, held that after the unification of South Vietnam and North Vietnam in 1975, Cham Muslims were the most affected group. He observed:

> Under the Republic [of Vietnam, South Vietnam] the Cham mostly practised trade. The main commodity we dealt in was fabrics, at a time when fabric and clothing were very scarce in the Vietnamese countryside. A number of large traders travelled abroad to purchase goods, some working in conjunction with Chinese traders. The majority distributed the fabric and clothing to local markets in Vietnam and Cambodia. Many Cham worked for the Americans and republic regime as personal assistants, security guards and drivers. Consequently quite a few picked up English.[109]

With the end of the war and the unification of the country, the Cham suffered a severe reversal of economic fortunes. National reconsolidation was seen as an economic blow to the Cham. Abdul said:

> After 1975 professions such as security guards and traders became untenable and many Cham were forced to return to New Economic Zones. However, on returning home many found that in their long absence, their land had been taken over by Vietnamese settlers. The state, both republican and socialist, had a policy to redistribute land to the landless, but in practice many Cham did not benefit from this. In addition the New Economic Zones were poorly resourced and a great many of them failed. Post 1975 was an extremely hard time for the Cham.[110]

There is discontent among some Cham Muslims that the Vietnamese Government is not doing much to improve their situation. Though education is free the additional costs for uniforms, books and other study materials and coaching are beyond the capacity of an average Cham family. So the parents tend to withdraw their children from study at a relatively young age. The Cham do not receive scholarships to pursue higher studies. There is no system of minority people's dormitory schools for the Cham people, as there is for the minority Khmer people. However, Vietnamese minority peoples are awarded two extra points (out of a possible total of twenty points) to boost their chances of passing and gaining entrance into a higher level of study. But it is very difficult for the Cham people to achieve high grades (and the remaining eighteen points), as they cannot afford to attend private coaching classes.[111]

Sri Lanka

The first wave of Muslims to arrive in Sri Lanka came from the Arab world. As Arabs expanded eastwards to China, they also reached Sri Lanka. There is

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109. Quoted in Taylor, *Cham Muslims of the Mekong Delta*, p. 226.
110. *Ibid.*
111. *Ibid.*, p. 237.

evidence of the presence of Muslim merchant settlements in Sri Lanka as early as the seventh century. The second wave of Muslims who came to Sri Lanka was from South India. They were the descendants of earlier Arab traders who had settled in South Indian ports and married Malabari women. Sri Lankan Muslims remained indigenous, representing a mixture of Sinhalese, Arab and Tamil origin, and spoke Tamil with overtones, sometimes known as Tamil-Arabic. In the fifteenth century, with the arrival of the Portuguese and later the Dutch, 'Moors' (Portuguese Muslims) and Malays from Indonesia added to the existing Muslim population.[112]

In 2001, Muslims in Sri Lanka numbered 1,711,000, which comprised 8.5 per cent of the total population (the estimated total population was about 20 million).[113] Sri Lanka is reported to be the latest addition to the list of countries where Muslims are persecuted and chased out of their homes. Many Muslims have been murdered, Muslim women raped, the children abused and their properties looted and destroyed. Some Muslims speak Tamil, so it is believed by some sections of the wider community that they are associated with the separatist Tamil Tigers. On the contrary, Muslims are generally not sympathetic towards a division of the country along ethnic lines. They prefer a united Sri Lanka to a divided one.[114] Regrettably, on 4 August 1990, when 300 Muslims prostrated (bent down for *sijda*) for the *isha* prayer (the evening prayer) in a mosque in Kattankudy, they were killed by cadres of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.[115] It appears Muslims in Sri Lanka are placed between a rock and hard place.

Myanmar

Islam was introduced to Myanmar (formerly Burma) by Arab traders in the seventh century. Arakan was ruled by Muslims from 1430 to 1784. Muslim rule ended when the King of Burma Bodawpaya and later the British colonial rulers took over Arakan.[116]

In 2008 Muslims comprised about 4 per cent of the total Myanmar population of 48 million.[117] There are four ethnically distinct Muslim commu-

112. A. Ali, 'The Muslim Factor in Sri Lankan Ethnic Crisis', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XVII, No. 2, 1997, p. 254.

113. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

114. Ali, 'The Muslim Factor in Sri Lankan Ethnic Crisis', *op. cit.*, p. 256; S. B. C. Halaldeen, 'Muslims have a Case in Sri Lanka', *Muslim Forum*, http://www.geocities.com/mforumsl/ lw3.htm, accessed 26 November 2008.

115. 'Kattankudy Mosque Massacre', *Wikipedia*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kattankudi_ mosque_massacre#cite_note-xin-8.2F4.2F90-mmtt-0, accessed 26 November 2008.

116. D. M. Ridzam, 'World Still Silent on Plight of the Rohingya', *New Straits Times (Malaysia)*, 6 August 2012.

117. Central Intelligence Agency, 'Myanmar', *World Factbook*, 2008, https://www.cia.gov/ library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html, accessed 27 November 2008.

nities in Myanmar: the ethnically Chinese Hui with roots in Yunnan, Indian and Pakistani Muslims who arrived with British colonial rule, the ethnically Burmese Muslims who were converted by Indian and Arab traders in the ninth and tenth centuries, and the most disadvantaged group, the Rohingyas. Rohingyas share a border and a common cultural heritage with Bangladeshi Muslims, and live in Myanmar's north-western Rakhine state.[118]

In the capital city, Yangoon, there are about 100 mosques, while there are 700 more in other parts of the country. There is a Muslim body of scholars known as the Council of Myanmar Scholars, and this body coordinates all the activities concerning Muslims and serves their interests.[119] Muslims in Myanmar are working towards the industrial development of the country, and one import and export business is owned by a Muslim.[120] However, that is not representative of all Muslims. As discussed, Muslims are not treated the same in all parts of the country. For instance, the Muslim Rohingya is one of seven ethnic minority groups which were formed under the Myanmar constitution of 1974, but human rights groups including Amnesty International have documented a catalogue of abuses by the Myanmar military junta. An amendment to the citizenship laws in 1982 deprived Rohingyas of citizenship, suddenly making them illegal immigrants in their own home. Amnesty International said they were subjected 'to various forms of extortion and arbitrary taxation; land confiscation; forced eviction and house destruction; and financial restrictions on marriage.'[121] Rohingyas continue to be used as forced labourers on roads and at military camps.[122] Many Rohingyas live in destitute conditions as refugees in Bangladesh.

Nepal

It is believed that in the fifteenth century the first Muslims settled in Kathmandu. Kashmiri traders were probably the first Muslims to arrive, followed by Afghans, Persians and Arabs.[123] In 2001 Muslims in Nepal numbered 1,231,000, which constituted 4.2 per cent of the total population (the estimated total

118. C. Ozturk, 'Myanmar's Muslim sideshow', *Asia Times*, 21 October 2003, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EJ21Ae01.html, accessed 26 November 2008.

119. 'Myanmar: Muslims Playing their Rightful Role', http://www.islamicpopulation.com/Myanmar-Muslim.html, accessed 26 November 2008.

120. *Ibid.*

121. B. Morgan, 'Myammar's Muslims', *Islam Online*, http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1190886078169&pagename=Zone-English-Muslim_Affairs%2FMAELayout, accessed 26 November 2008.

122. *Ibid.*

123. 'Nepali Muslims', *Nepali Times*, 10–16 September 2004, http://www.nepalitimes.com.np/issue/213/Nation/2047, accessed 26 November 2008.

Nepalese population was about 30 million).[124] The majority of Muslims live in the mountainous areas adjacent to the border with India. Many of them are unskilled labourers or small-scale subsistence farmers, with a few civil servants. Sheikh Muhammad Nassir al-Abboudy, Assistant Secretary General of the Makkah-based Muslim World League, said that the Muslims of Nepal were incapable of combatting their backwardness in social, economic and political matters, nor were they able to combat (Christian) missionary activities, which impact on the Muslim population in general.[125] It is also alleged that sometimes Muslims in Nepal are denied the right to practise every aspect of their religion by their Hindu rulers.[126] It is imperative that international humanitarian organizations examine the situation of the Muslim minority in Nepal.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed the minority position of Muslims in eight Asian countries. The Muslim minorities in all eight states encounter subtle pressures to assimilate. Muslims who have integrated into the wider community have fared better in the job market. But not all Muslims are advantaged in this regard. There have been communal tensions in India. The conflicts between Hindus and Muslims and the rise of a few extremist Muslims has an impact on Muslims in India in general. For my research on Muslims in Australia, I wished to interview an Indian-Australian Muslim couple. They did not consent to the interview, saying that they were better off both socially and economically in Australia than they were in India. Similarly, an Indian-Australian interviewee regretted that their mother tongue, Urdu, was on the verge of extinction and that there was no hope for Muslims in India.

Chinese Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang region are relatively disadvantaged compared to Muslims living in urban areas such as Beijing. There is a lot of pressure on Chinese Muslims to integrate within the wider community. In that way, visible Muslims (for example women who wear the *ḥijāb*) are encountering resistance in the job market. Also when Muslims protested about the Salman Rushdie issue, they first had to declare allegiance to China. So in China there is freedom of speech but it has its limitations. I came to know about the repression in Xinjiang from a Chinese-Australian Muslim who said that there was an earthquake in Xinjiang in 2003, but the Chinese Government did not

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124. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

125. 'Muslims in Nepal (Report)', http://www.islamicpopulation.com/nepal_muslim.html, accessed 26 November 2008.

126. National Preparatory Committee, Nepal, *Racial Discrimination in Nepal: A Summary*, WCAR NGO Networking Meeting, 27–29 April 2001, http://209.85.173.132/ search?q=cache:aEEJ2VJTYSAJ:www.ncard.org.np/docs/Wcar.pdf+muslims+nepal+d iscrimination&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=4&gl=au, accessed 27 November 2008.

draw it to the world's attention, because they do not care about this Muslim province. Later a report confirmed that a total of 261 people were killed in a devastating earthquake that jolted the Jiashi and Bachu counties in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in north-west China.[127]

Mainstream Chinese and Thai people appear to be apprehensive about Muslims in general. A Chinese-Australian (non-Muslim) girl thought Muslims in China were violent because her mother narrowly escaped death in a bus explosion in China. In 2004 two Thai visitors (non-Muslims) in Australia told me that generally speaking, mainstream Thai Buddhist people view Muslims as 'terrorists' as they judge them accountable for the violence in southern Thailand. They also referred to the beheading of the British hostage Ken Bigley (the husband of a Thai woman) committed by Iraqi militants and shown in video footage.[128] Moreover, the Thai visitor added that in Thailand they had a conservative government which used Buddhist monks to exploit peoples' sentiment in their favour.

Muslims in the Philippines and Vietnam are also underprivileged groups. In July 2008 the Philippine Government took steps towards reconciliation with the Muslim separatists. But with the start of fresh violence in the southern Philippines the peace deal soon failed. The peace deal would have paved the way to end forty years of bloodshed that has left more than 120,000 people dead and tens of thousands displaced.[129] Finally, in October 2012, the Philippine Government signed a peace deal with the Muslim separatists to form a new autonomous region in the south. Under the promizing autonomous government, Muslims will have greater political powers and more control over resources.[130] In the Vietnamese context, Cham Muslims residing in the Mekong Delta seem to be the most disadvantaged, and their isolationist stance will not improve matters. Muslims in Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Nepal are experiencing repression. International humanitarian organizations should evaluate their position in their respective countries. The Muslim leaders and imams (spiritual leaders) of the respective regions also need to play a vital role. They need to address the extremists' issues and integrate into the wider community through dialogue. However, the socio-economic marginalization of the Muslim minorities in Asia needs international attention. Further research in this area is imperative.

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127. 'Death Toll of Xinjiang Earthquake Rises to 261', *People's Daily*, 25 February 2003, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200302/25/eng20030225_112287.shtml, accessed 17 August 2008.

128. 'Bigley's Wife tells of her Grief', *BBC News*, 9 October 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3729158.stm, accessed 17 August 2008.

129. 'Philippines Back to Square One on Muslim Peace Deal', *op. cit.*

130. 'Philippines Sign Peace Deal with Muslim Rebels', *ABC News*, 16 October 2012, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012–10–15/philippines-sign-peace-deal-with-muslim-rebels/4314410, accessed 29 November 2012.

Muslim minorities in Australia, New Zealand and the neighbouring islands

Nahid Afrose Kabir

The varied histories of Muslim settlement in Australia, New Zealand and the neighbouring islands of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, East Timor, New Caledonia and Vanuatu each have a different pattern. The need for labour in Australia, New Zealand and Fiji encouraged Asian labourers to migrate to these countries. The race relations pattern and immigration policies in Australia and New Zealand were similar. Both Australia and New Zealand were colonized by British people who settled permanently in these countries and formed the majority population. But the British colonizers were a minority in Fiji and left in 1970. East Timor, which was a part of Indonesia until it received its independence in 2002, is predominantly a Catholic country. The majority religion in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, New Caledonia and Vanuatu is Christianity; Muslim populations in these islands form a tiny minority.

This chapter outlines Muslim history in Australia and New Zealand in some detail, followed by a brief sketch of the neighbouring islands. This account is based on the author's in-depth research on Australia since 1999, and recent research on New Zealand, conventional literature, and internet sources for neighbouring islands. Table 6.1 shows the Muslim minority populations and percentages in each of the countries I discuss in this chapter.

Table 7.6.1: Muslim minority populations in Australia, New Zealand and neighbouring islands[1]

Countries	Muslim population	Percentage of the total population
Australia	476,300	2.2
New Zealand	35,976	0.9
Fiji	53,000	6.3
Papua New Guinea	2,000	0.03
Solomon Islands	….[2]	0.1
East Timor/Timor-Leste	43,000	3.8
New Caledonia	7,000	2.8
Vanuatu	….[3]	0.1

Australia

Muslim contact with the continent of Australia took place before European settlement, when in the seventeenth century the Macassarese people came to the north coast on fishing expeditions. Then a few Muslim convicts arrived in Australia in the early 1800s. But the first Muslim settlement took place in the 1860s with the arrival of some Afghan camel drivers. In the 1870s and 1880s more Afghan camel drivers arrived in Australia to meet the demands of exploration and building infrastructure in the vast interior of this new nation. Some Indians also came to Australia during this period and worked alongside the Afghans.

In the 1870s Malays worked as pearl divers in western Australian waters, particularly in Broome. They were single men and came as indentured labourers under contract, usually for three to seven years. They often worked without any monetary reward, in exchange for accommodation, food, other essentials, training or passage to a new country. The Malay indentured pearl divers were retained for a long time as, like other Asian divers, they provided cheap labour and acclamatized more easily than Europeans to the conditions and the requirements of the industry.[4] Javanese Muslims arrived in Mackay,

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1. The information in Table 7.6.1 is derived from a variety of sources from different years (as I have mentioned in the text). It should be taken as an approximate comparison between the countries.
2. The precise number is not known; see, Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, Washington, DC, Pew Research Center, 2009, p. 28, http://www.pewforum.org/newassets/images/reports/Muslimpopulation/Muslimpopulation.pdf, accessed 4 December 2012.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
4. N. Kabir, 'Muslims in Western Australia, 1870–1970', *Early Days: Journal of the Royal Western Australian Historical Society*, XII, No. 5, 2005, p. 551.

Queensland (some with families) as indentured labourers in the early 1880s to work in the sugar industry. Then, after working for the contractual term, the labourers were free to farm or take up their own trades.[5] There were incidents of exploitation against some indentured labourers. Therefore, several acts, such as the *Master and Servants Act 1842* and the *Imported Labour Registry Act 1874* (amended 1882 and 1884) were introduced to protect the indentured labourers.[6]

Some migrant groups were more disadvantaged than others in the course of their settlement in this country. As ethnic groups Afghans and Indians encountered unequal treatment in the social and economic spheres just as did other non-white people such as Aborigines, Chinese, Malays and Javanese. Both Afghans and Indians came as single men during the colonial period.[7] Hostilities against them were economic and racial rather than religious, and these patterns were similar during both the colonial and 'White Australia' periods. They were referred to as an inferior 'coloured' race, the increase of which, apart from working at cheaper rates and lowering the mainstream standard of living, would also result in racial contamination if they married either Aborigines or white Australians.[8] Similarly, Malays were not permitted to marry Aborigines or white Australians,[9] and usually visited their families back home after a few years.[10]

The Afghans (and some Indians) lived in the 'Ghan towns' where the chief characteristic was segregation from the white community. Their numbers were small so their Islamic practices did not constitute a threat to the dominant population. They were allowed to build mosques and their imams were also permitted to enter Australia for short periods of time.[11] Similarly, Javanese Muslim immigrants in north Queensland did not encounter any resistance in practising their religion but, due to economic hardships, they were unable to teach Islam to the next generation.[12]

5. N. Kabir, 'Mackay Revisited: The Case of Javanese-Australian Muslims, 1880–1999', *Asia Pacific Migration Journal*, XVI, No. 3, 2007, p. 408.
6. Kabir, 'Muslims in Western Australia, 1870–1970', *op. cit.*, p. 552.
7. The Afghans and Indians came as free labourers and were responsible either to their Afghan or Australian employers.
8. N. Kabir, *Muslims in Australia: Immigration, Race Relations and Cultural History*, London, Routledge, 2005, pp. 70–2.
9. K. Keeffe, *Paddy's Road: Life Stories of Patrick Dodson*, Canberra, Aboriginal Studies Press, 2003, pp. 124–31.
10. Kabir, 'Muslims in Western Australia, 1870–1970', *op. cit.*, p. 421.
11. N. Kabir, 'The Economic Plight of the Afghans in Australia, 1860–2000', *Islamic Studies*, XLIV, No. 2, 2005, pp. 230–1.
12. Kabir, 'Mackay Revisited', *op. cit.*, pp. 421–2.

In the 1890s Australia experienced an economic depression. There was a shortage of employment opportunities, and non-Europeans were alleged to have worked at low rates, thereby 'taking away' the jobs of the white labourers. Apart from economic fears, as discussed earlier, there were also racial concerns. By 1901 virtually all parliamentarians, Protectionist, Labour or Free Traders, supported the ideal of a 'White Australia' which would exclude non-Europeans from the country.[13] In 1901 the *Immigration Restriction Act* initiated the 'White Australia' period, which reduced the number of Asian labourers. Under this Act all aliens who attempted to enter Australia had to submit to a medical examination at their first port of call, and to a dictation test of fifty words in any language chosen by the immigration officer. This test was crudely discriminatory because it was administered in a language unlikely to be understood by the applicant; shamefully, it remained on the statute book until 1958. The 'White Australia' policy was effective; it resulted in a rapid decline of non-European migrants to Australia after 1901, and to the deportation of many existing aliens.[14]

During the 'White Australia' period many Afghans applied for naturalization (an act that conferred the rights and privileges of a British subject upon an alien) but all were denied because they were classified as 'Aboriginal natives of Asia.'[15] However, some Asian labourers (including Muslims) were allowed to stay during the 'White Australia' period because Australia needed their labour. For example, the Javanese in Queensland were allowed to stay as there was a shortage of workers in the Queensland sugar industry. Indians were technically British subjects because their country was a British colony. However, they were denied economic and political rights – again because they belonged to a non-white race. Many Indian labourers brought with them their sons under the age of 21 and the men later visited their families in India.[16]

In the 1920s Australia witnessed the arrival of Albanians who, being Europeans, were not subjected to the restrictions of the 'White Australia' policy. They worked mainly as agricultural labourers and land clearers and were allowed to bring their families with them. But during the Second World War, because Italy had occupied Albania, Albanians were viewed as 'enemy aliens', and some of them were interned.[17]

The Muslim population was very small during the 'White Australia' period. In 1947 it numbered 2,704.[18] Between 1964 and 1966 the immigration policy

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 412–13.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Kabir, *Muslims in Australia, op. cit., op. cit.*, pp. 74–8.
16. N. Kabir, 'Muslims in a "White Australia": Colour or Religion?', *Immigrants and Minorities*, XXIV, No. 2, 2006, p. 204.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 200–2.
18. W. Omar and K. Allen, *The Muslims in Australia: Religious Community Profile*, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1996, p. 23.

shifted, with an emphasis on integration; and finally in 1973 a multicultural policy was introduced which aimed to impart equal opportunities to all Australians irrespective of their race, colour, ethnic origin or religion. Turkish and Lebanese Muslims arrived in relatively large numbers in 1969 and 1970 respectively, and the 1980s saw a bigger rise in the Muslim population overall. The immigration intake since the 1970s has mostly been for economic reasons and because of Australia's need for labour, while some immigrants have been accepted under a humanitarian category.

By 1986 the Muslim population had risen to 109,523.[19] As their numbers grew, some Australian Muslims faced resistance in the labour market and in the establishment of their mosques. In 1986 the Muslim unemployment rate was 28 per cent compared to the national unemployment rate of 9 per cent.[20] Unfortunately, this influx of Muslims coincided with an economic recession in Australia. Various explanations were put forward for the disadvantaged position of Muslims in the job market. Some suggested that this country had never been exposed to foreign culture. The Muslims' low level of English proficiency was another factor. Muslim women's restrictive lives and Muslims' lack of familiarity with mainstream culture could have been contributory factors. Another explanation was that many immigrants were unskilled. However, interviews with some highly skilled people, and Australian Bureau of Statistics census data, revealed that the dominant society favoured hiring people of their 'own cultural kind'.[21]

In the 1980s one of the major social grievances of Muslims was Australians' resistance to their attempts to build mosques. Such resistance could have been for reasons of racism or the perception that the spread of Islam was a cultural threat, or simply because of noise or parking factors. There was also a growing concern that Muslims would spread terrorism through the mosque congregation. Some Australian letters to city councils revealed the 'fear of reprisals from a group of religious fanatics who have a reputation worldwide for violence',[22] though it must be acknowledged that not all Australians opposed Muslims' efforts to establish mosques. In some cases local councillors manipulated fear among the local residents, and fought court cases using taxpayers' money, but this was a costly venture for the new immigrants, and delays were inevitable.[23]

19. Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1986 Census of Population and Housing (unpublished data purchased by the author from ABS).
20. *Ibid.*
21. N. Kabir, 'Muslims in Australia: The Double Edge of Terrorism', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, XXXIII, No. 8, 2007, p. 1292.
22. N. Kabir, 'Muslims in Australia: Immigration, Race Relations and Cultural History', *The Sydney Papers*, XVII, No. 2, 2005, p. 68.
23. Kabir, *Muslims in Australia, op. cit.*, pp. 175–96; Kabir, 'Muslims in Australia: The Double Edge of Terrorism', *op. cit.*, pp. 1287–90.

During the 1990–1 Gulf crisis, some Arab and Muslim Australians in Sydney protested against Australia's involvement in the war. It was reported that one poll published in an Arabic newspaper showed that 82 per cent of Arab and Muslim Australians supported Saddam Hussein. This was interpreted by the media and the wider community as a form of disloyalty because the Iraqi leader had declared a *jihād* against the West. However, some Arab and Muslim Australians, especially veiled women, became unfortunate victims of the repercussions even though they remained neutral or loyal to Australia during the crisis. Some Muslim women were beaten in shopping malls; other suffered hate mail, death threats, bomb threats and vandalism. This maltreatment of innocent people cannot be dismissed by saying that the wider society viewed these people as 'enemies'. Other factors such as ignorance and racist beliefs also contributed to the dreadful plight of Muslims from August 1990 to February 1991.[24]

In 1996 the Muslim population in Australia had risen to 200,902.[25] But the Muslim unemployment rate of 25 per cent remained high compared to 8 per cent for United Kingdom and Irish-born Australians, and 9 per cent for the Australian-born and national total, in spite of the fact that Muslims' skill levels were almost equivalent both to the Australian-born and the national total. Muslims were also better represented in higher education than the other groups.[26]

By 2001 the Muslim population had reached 281,578, and with the increase in numbers certain criminal issues labelled Muslims as a religious category.[27] For example, gang rapes were directly linked to Islam. In 2000 Australian-born Bilal Skaf of Lebanese origin led groups of up to fourteen Lebanese-Australian men who committed three gang rape attacks against young white women, some as young as 14. For these crimes Bilal Skaf is serving a 31-year prison sentence, and will be eligible for parole in 2033. He was originally sentenced to fifty-five years with a 40-year non-parole period, but that was modified several times upon appeal. Skaf's brother, Mohammad Skaf, has been sentenced to a maximum of fifteen years for the same pack rape of a 16-year-old girl.[28]

Such horrendous incidents tend to taint all Muslims. Some major newspapers directly alleged that Muslims of Middle Eastern origin from south-western Sydney were gang rapists. Several articles, radio talkback shows and letters to the editor condemned Middle Eastern Muslims. Muslim leaders have protested against the crime being made an issue based purely on race

24. Kabir, 'Muslims in Australia: Immigration, Race Relations and Cultural History', *op. cit.*, p. 69.

25. Australian Bureau of Statistics: 1996 Census of Population and Housing.

26. *Ibid.*

27. Australian Bureau of Statistics: 2001 Census of Population and Housing.

28. 'Jail for Rapists', *The Advertiser*, 29 July 2006, p. 44.

or religion, arguing that it is a local problem regardless of the background of these people, and should be solved within the context of the Australian community.[29]

In August 2001 Afghan asylum seekers arrived in the Norwegian freighter MV *Tampa.* It was assumed that these refugees were Muslims and they should not be allowed to enter Australia. Prime Minister John Howard refused to allow the ship entry into Australian waters. Because the boat people were picked up in the Indonesian sea rescue zone he requested the ship return to international waters. Some Australian commentators held that, under the present climate of international terrorism, the Howard government was justifiably concerned about the security and sovereignty of the country. Howard's critics argued that, as it was an election year, the refusal to accommodate the asylum seekers was motivated by political reasons. Two months after the *Tampa* refugee crisis, at the Liberal Party election campaign launch, John Howard pledged to repel all asylum seekers. He declared, 'We will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come.'[30]

The *Tampa* crisis was soon followed by the 11 September 2001 attack on the United States and a consequent worldwide backlash against Muslims. In Australia some Muslim women wearing the *ḥijāb* and men of non-Caucasian appearance were verbally and physically abused; several mosques, Islamic schools and colleges were vandalized; Islamic centres received hate mail and threats and Islamic school buses were damaged. On 22 September 2001 at around 3 a.m. the Kuraby Mosque in Brisbane, made of timber and iron, was burnt down by an arson attack. This was, however, an isolated incident. The 11 September 2001, tragedy was as much a shock to Australian Muslims as it was to the wider society, but Muslims were the ones subjected to intolerance.[31]

On 12 October 2002 the Bali bombings killed 88 Australians (including one Muslim) and some Australian Muslims encountered further repercussions from a small section of the wider community. These incidents also precipitated a debate about whether Muslims should be allowed to migrate to Australia, with some politicians, journalists and letter-writers arguing that Muslims do not fit into this Judeo-Christian society. It was also surmised that the Muslims' holy book, the Qurʾān, teaches Muslims to treat non-Muslims harshly and that Islamic immigration would bring terrorism into this country.[32]

In the wake of the Bali bombings in 2002 laws were enacted to combat possible terrorism on Australian soil. But critics say that these laws

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29. Kabir, *Muslims in Australia, op. cit.,* pp. 288–95.
30. *Ibid.,* pp. 295–334.
31. *Ibid.,* pp. 305–17.
32. *Ibid.,* p. 316.

have jeopardized basic human rights.[33] The *Australian Security Intelligence Organization Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003* proscribed seventeen worldwide organizations as terrorist and granted the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) the power to arrest a person on suspicion for interrogation purposes. Under this Act, a person could be held for up to seven days without charge, without legal representation, without appearing in court, and without the right to silence.[34] Under the new anti-terrorism laws a medical student of Pakistani background, Ul-Haque, was charged in November 2003 for receiving training from the terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Toiba. But in November 2007 a New South Wales Supreme Court judge ruled there had been misconduct by ASIO and Australian Federal Police officers for 'kidnapping, falsely imprisoning, and violating the civil rights' of Ul-Haque. This was because Ul-Haque's involvement with Lashkar-e-Toiba occurred before it was branded a terrorist organization.[35] In July 2007 an Indian-born physician, Mohammad Haneef, was charged with helping a terrorist organization, and kept in custody for nine days. The charges were later dropped because of insufficient evidence.[36] In 2010, the Australian Government awarded Mohammad Haneef monetary compensation because he was wrongly detained on terrorism related charges in 2007.[37]

The already poor race relations between (some) Lebanese Muslims and members of the wider community reached a climax in December 2005 with the Cronulla riots in Sydney, triggered by a fight between three surf lifesavers and a group of four Lebanese-background young men. The Australian lifesavers had reportedly insulted their assailants with public taunts that 'Lebs can't swim'.[38] On the other hand, it was claimed that a pack of Lebanese males would often come to the beach and verbally abuse local women with phrases such as 'you're a slut', 'you Aussie slut' and 'you should be raped'.[39] Following the fight, the popular media, notably tabloids and talkback radio, fanned the flames and on 11 December 2005 about 5,000 young people, many draped in

33. S. Poynting and V. Mason, 'Tolerance, Freedom, Justice and Peace? Britain, Australia and Anti-Muslim Racism since 11 September 2001', *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, XXVII, No. 4, 2006, p. 380.

34. *Ibid.*

35. M. Scheikowski, 'Judge Accuses ASIO of Kidnapping Man', *The Courier Mail*, 13 November 2007, p. 15.

36. S. Akbarzadeh, 'Muslim Aussies Must Win the War on the Home Front', *Herald Sun,* 2 September 2009, p. 30.

37. 'Haneef "delighted" with Compensation', *Northern Territory News,* 23 December 2010, p. 12.

38. S. Poynting, 'What Caused the Cronulla Riot?', Commentary, *Race and Class,* XLVIII, No. 1, 2006, pp. 85–92, see p. 86.

39. R. Barclay and P. West, 'Racism or Patriotism? An Eyewitness Account of the Cronulla Demonstration of 11 December 2005', *People and Place*, XIV, No. 1, 2006, p. 77.

Australian flags, converged on Sydney's Cronulla beach and attacked people
of Middle Eastern appearance. The next day a group of young Lebanese
Australians launched a reprisal by smashing shops and cars and threatening
people who got in their way, even physically attacking some. In general, the
Australian media blamed the riots on Muslims.[40]

In 2006 the number of Muslims in Australia had climbed to 340,393
which constituted 1.7 per cent of the total population. Muslim unemployment
was still relatively high at 12.7 per cent, compared to 4.7 per cent of the
total population.[41] Muslim issues do not receive a political platform because
Muslim political representation is poor. Victoria has one Turkish-born
Muslim Member of Parliament, Adem Samyurek at state level. Until 2010,
there was no Muslim representation at the federal level. A Pakistani-born (of
Indian descent) candidate, Irfan Yusuf, was the endorsed Liberal candidate
for the federal seat of Reid in Sydney for the 2001 federal election. Similarly,
Ed Husic of Bosnian background was the endorsed Labour candidate for
the federal seat of Greenway in Sydney for the 2004 federal election. Both
these Muslim candidates were unsuccessful although both the seats were
largely populated by Muslims. Ed Husic said that he was a victim of a smear
campaign and that some voters circulated pamphlets declaring that he 'was
a devout Muslim fighting for a better deal for Islam in Greenway.' Husic's
opponent was promoted as a 'good Christian'.[42]

Finally, Ed Husic won the federal seat of Chifley in western Sydney at
the 2010 election.

There have been reports of ethnic politics involving leadership issues
within the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils. AFIC derives most of its
income from rent on land that houses Muslim schools across the country, and
the certification of *ḥalāl* food. There has been a feud over AFIC's distribution
of finance financial distribution, and also conflict between Pakistanis and
Indian Fijians over leadership.[43] Some Muslim associations such as the
Lebanese Moslem Association in Sydney and the Canberra Islamic Centre
are not affiliated with AFIC.[44] AFIC is considered to be a voice for Muslim
Australians but the dissension among its members is not helpful.

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40. N. Kabir, 'What Does it Mean to be Un-Australian?: Views of Australian Muslim students
in 2006', *People and Place*, XV, No. 1, 2007, pp. 62–79; N. Kabir, 'The Cronulla Riot: How
One Newspaper Represented the Event', Refereed TASA/SAANZ Joint Conference
Proceedings, University of Auckland, 4–7 December 2007.

41. Australian Bureau of Statistics: 2006 Census of Population and Housing.

42. Ed Husic, 'Islam and Australia: Can a Muslim get Elected to Parliament in a War on
Terror', *The Sydney Papers*, XVIII, No. 1, p. 94.

43. R. Kerbaj, 'Muslims Feud on Group's Finances', *The Australian,* 5 June 2006, p. 5.

44. 'Canberra Islamic Group Steers Clear of National Federation', *ABC News*, 4 June 2006,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2006-06-04/canberra-islamic-group-steers-clear-of-
national/1769324, accessed 7 November 2007.

Overall, Muslims are feeling more connected to Australia now than in the past.[45] In 2011, the population had risen to 476,300 which constituted 2.2 per cent of the total population.[46] There are now ten Islamic primary schools in Australia, eleven combined primary and secondary schools, and approximately 100 mosques, mainly in New South Wales and Victoria. The community's organizational base includes well over 100 groups representing the interests of Muslims at the local or regional level. Additionally, Islamic councils representing the broader Muslim community have been established in all Australian states and territories. They come together in a peak national body, the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils. Whereas most Australians would consider that the gradual growth of the Muslim population in Australia is a positive development, the right-wing element of the press and the federal parliament have largely been unsympathetic, especially in the period 2001–6.

In February 2007 the Australian Commonwealth Government provided funding of $8 million to the University of Melbourne, Griffith University and the University of Western Sydney to establish an Australian National Centre of Excellence for Islamic Studies, which is a positive step towards identifying Muslim issues and addressing these concerns through research and development of new policies. In 2010, the International Centre for Muslim and Non-Muslim Understanding was established at the University of South Australia. Australian Commonwealth Government and the South Australian State Government have granted $10 million to conduct research that would promote better understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims.

New Zealand

The pattern of Muslim settlement in New Zealand has been similar to Australia. Whereas official British settlement in New Zealand commenced in the 1840s, small numbers of Muslims arrived in the 1870s. According to the New Zealand census, most of these Muslims worked in the goldfields along with Chinese immigrants. Oral testimonies of later generations indicate that in the earliest decades of the twentieth century there were a handful of Gujarati Indian men (including Muslims) who opened small shops, mainly in towns south of Auckland. Over time, they brought their sons to New Zealand to help in the shops, while their families remained in India.[47]

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45. N. Kabir, 'Why I Call Australia "Home"?: A Transmigrant's Perspective', *M/C Journal*, X, No. 4, 2007, http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0708/15-kabir.php, accessed 18 December 2012.

46. Australian Bureau of Statistics: 2011 Census of Population and Housing.

47. W. Shepard, 'New Zealand's Muslims and their Organizations', *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies,* VIII, No. 2, 2006, p. 10.

New Zealand's immigration policies were also similar to those of Australia. In 1899 *The Immigration Restriction Act* was enacted, with a language test to restrict the inflow of non-European people. The white working class feared that their jobs were being taken away by cheap Asian labourers and apparently politicians manipulated the fear for their own political gain.[48] It was also feared that marriage between people of colour and white settlers would contaminate the population, so racial intermarriage was discouraged. Immigration policies were further restricted after the First World War when the Returned Servicemen's Association and trade unions feared that capitalist attempts to recruit cheap labour would depress the wages of local workers. Hence the *Immigration Restriction Amendment Act 1920* was passed to limit further Asian immigration.[49] The Muslim population of New Zealand remained low in 1939.[50]

However, after the Second World War immigration restrictions in New Zealand were relaxed. Among the refugees accepted for immigration were some Muslims from Turkey and the Balkans. The new immigrants were assisted by the mainly Indian Muslims in Auckland. The censuses of the 1950s reported about 200 Muslims in the country. Then in the mid-1960s, under a more liberalized immigration policy, a small number of South Asian Muslims, including Fijian Indians and some skilled migrants, arrived in New Zealand. The small Muslim community had reached 2,500 by 1986.[51]

The 1987 Fijian *coup d'état* led to an influx of Fijian Indians, many of whom were Muslims, and subsequently the continuing uncertainties in Fiji have led more Fijians to migrate to New Zealand. The 1990s saw the arrival of Somalis, initially as refugees and later under family reunion provisions. Other groups of Muslim refugees came from Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo and Kurdistan.[52] New Zealand is noted for its generous refugee policy. In 2001, when the Australian Government rejected 438 refugees from Afghanistan arriving on the *Tampa*, the New Zealand Government accepted and settled 208 of them.[53]

Under a points system the New Zealand Government has also encouraged immigrants from professional and wealthy backgrounds, which has led to the arrival of a number of people from the Middle East.[54] According to the census of 2001 there were 23,631 Muslims in New Zealand,

48. S. D. Webb and J. Collette, *New Zealand Society: Contemporary Perspectives*, Sydney, John Wiley & Sons Australasia, 1973, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–9.

49. *Ibid.*

50. Shepard, 'New Zealand's Muslims and their Organizations', *op. cit.*, pp. 9–10.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

53. S. Poynting and V. Mason, 'The Resistible Rise of Islamophobia: Anti-Muslim Racism in the UK and Australia before 11 September 2001', *Journal of Sociology*, XLIII, No. 1, 2007, pp. 61–78.

54. Shepard, 'New Zealand's Muslims and their Organizations', *op. cit.*, p. 11.

representing 0.7 per cent of the population.[55] In 2006 the Muslim population numbered 35,976, a 490 per cent increase since 1991.[56] In addition there were some non-permanent residents, such as overseas students studying at tertiary institutions. In New Zealand the significant majority are Christians of all denominations and people with undeclared no religious affiliation. Muslims are surpassed by Hindus, who are nearly twice as numerous, and Buddhists (Hindus number 63,985 and Buddhists number 52,392).[57] Of the Muslims a significant number are Shīʿites (mainly Iraqis and Afghans), but the majority are Sunni Muslims. A small number of New Zealanders have become Muslims through marriage.[58]

Muslims there have a nationwide umbrella organization, the Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ). Several smaller, especially regionally based organizations, are affiliated with FIANZ. FIANZ's main function appears to be to establish communication among Muslims and to advise on spiritual matters by exercising theological leadership through the presence of an appointed board of ʿUlama (Islamic scholars) who are entitled to issue fatwā (rulings). The board consists of seven imams, who have to hold a university degree in Sharīʿa (Islamic religious law) and who lead the congregations of New Zealand's seven mosques.[59] FIANZ is also involved with the certification of meat as ḥalāl. It cooperates with the Meat Industry Association (MIA), a trade organization that represents major New Zealand meat processors, marketers and exporters. There is a huge ḥalāl meat export market to the Middle East. In 2004 ḥalāl meat exports to the Islamic world were in excess of NZ$200 million.[60]

There have been two Islamic schools in New Zealand. One was a coeducational Islamic school, al-Madinah School, and another was a girls' school, Zayed College.[61] In 2005 the New Zealand Government took over the country's only Islamic coeducational school, al-Madīna School in Mangere, Manukau City, because it was alleged that the school was prioritising religion

55. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
56. Census 2006: New Zealand Census of Population and Dwellings; see also John Roberts, 'Census Reveals Religion in Aotearoa Changing, Ebbing', 2007, http://www.methodist.org. nz/index.cfm/Touchstone/February_2007/Census___religion, accessed 17 November 2007; see also, Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, p. 28.
57. *Ibid.*
58. Shepard, 'New Zealand's Muslims and their Organizations', *op. cit.*, p. 11.
59. E. Kolig, 'An Accord of Cautious Distance: Muslims in New Zealand, Ethnic Relations and Image Management', *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies*, V, No. 1, 2003, p. 27.
60. I. Clarke, 'Essentialising Islam: Multiculturalism and Islamic Politics in New Zealand', *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies*, VIII, No. 2, 2006, p. 88.
61. Shepard, 'New Zealand's Muslims and their Organizations', *op. cit.*, p. 24.

at the expense of the curriculum and segregating staff and students according to gender. It is now a state school.[62]

Muslims in New Zealand have not yet found a political voice. Though a Muslim of Pakistani heritage, Dr Ashraf Choudhury, was elected a Member of Parliament, he has separated Islam from politics, in line with secularized New Zealand's state–church separation. Apparently, he does not see his role as adding an Islamic voice to the parliamentary process.[63]

There have been isolated instances of conflict between mainstream institutions and Muslims in New Zealand. One such case, the so-called *burqa* case, revealed the complexities of multiculturalism. In a civil case before Auckland District Court two Afghan women who were called as witnesses initially refused publicly to unveil. They were wearing *burqa*-type clothing and argued that under the *Bill of Rights Act 1990* their religious right to wear Islamically prescribed clothing should be preserved. However, this form of dress was seen as inconsistent with Western court protocol. A lengthy enquiry followed. It discussed the differences between customary cultural/religious prescriptions, region-specific features and *Sharīʿa*-prescribed (i.e. canonical) laws, not unlike the debate in Islamic scholarly reformatist circles themselves. After a lengthy consultative process lasting for several months, during which the court case was suspended, a fifty-page, tightly argued legal verdict on the issue ruled that the women must unveil but they were allowed to remain behind a screen to shield them from the public gallery and most of the court staff. It was made clear that no precedent was meant to be set and future cases should be dealt with on individual merit.[64]

There have also been instances of conflict within the Muslim community. For example, in 2003 there were disputes over control of the al-Noor Mosque in Christchurch. For a long time the well-established South Asian Muslims had effective control of the Muslim Association of Canterbury (MAC) that owned the mosque. However, conflict arose when recent Somali and Arab arrivals wanted to gain control of the MAC and the mosque. Although all were members of the Muslim community, the South Asian, Somali and Arab Muslims had very different culturally based understandings of the religion, and very different socio-economic positions in New Zealand society. The Arab Muslims who were the leaders of the Arab and Somali faction perceived South Asian Islam as corrupted by cultural practices alien to Islam, in

62. S. Dye, 'Government takes Over Islamic School', *The New Zealand Herald*, 29 June 2005, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10333294, accessed 9 October 2007.
63. Kolig, 'An Accord of Cautious Distance', *op. cit.*, p. 28.
64. E. Kolig, 'A Gordian Knot of Rights and Duties: New Zealand's Muslims and Multiculturalism', *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies*, VIII, No. 2, 2006, p. 58

contrast to their purer understanding of the religion.[65] On the other hand, prominent members of the South Asian community, who were more educated professionals, regarded the modern Middle Eastern understanding of Islam as tainted by 'Wahhabi fanaticism and extremism' in contrast to their own 'moderate' interpretation of the religion which they saw as being truer to the real Islam. Therefore the South Asian community was extremely upset to see the mosque coming under the control of Arabs (and some Somalis) who they considered to be corrupting Islam.[66]

Another serious dispute within the Christchurch Muslim community was over the certification of *ḥalāl* meat. In 2004 it was alleged that FIANZ had certified non-*ḥalāl* meat for the export market. But FIANZ and the Meat Industry Association disputed this allegation. For most New Zealanders this dispute was understood as a conflict between 'extremist' and 'moderate' Muslims, that is, between Somali and Arab Muslims on the one hand, and South Asians on the other.[67]

Before 9/11 there were several incidents of harassment and violence directed against Muslims in New Zealand by members of the wider community. In 1990, during the Gulf War, graffiti was sprayed on Islamic centres in Wellington. In 1998 a mosque was burned and gutted in an arson attack in Hamilton. After 9/11 vilification against Muslims increased. Many Somali Muslims suffered personal assaults in several cities; Egyptian Muslims were harassed while picnicking and Muslim women wearing *ḥijābs* were harassed in supermarkets and their husbands were vilified on the streets. After the London bombings in July 2005 graffiti was sprayed on an Auckland mosque; and in Dunedin dung was thrown on Muslim women and eggs were thrown at the mosque.[68] Moreover, Muslim religious attire has sometimes been a source of discrimination.

Newspaper headlines, 'Pork Sent in Mail to Muslims' (*The New Zealand Herald*, 28 September 2004) reported tensions between Muslims and some members of the wider community. *The Dominion Post* (28 September 2004) reported that racist hate letters, some stuffed with pieces of pork, were being sent to Wellington Muslims. The letters were sent mainly to Somali families in Miramar. One contained a cartoon showing pigs carrying a coffin saying: 'Muḥammad the Pig's Funeral'. Next to the word funeral was scrawled in Arabic the word 'Amen'. Another contained a score card of conflicts between Israel and Islam since 1948 – and the message: 'Get out of Israel Islamic pigs'. Wellington Somali Council Vice-Chairman Adam Awad said that, though the letters appeared to be the work of Jews, he suspected they were from

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65. Clarke, 'Essentialising Islam', *op. cit.*, pp. 84–5.
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Ibid.*, pp. 88–9.
68. Shepard, 'New Zealand's Muslims and their Organizations', *op. cit.*, p. 17.

someone trying to create tensions between the two groups, and that the Jewish community in Wellington were their friends.[69]

In the 2005 election campaign some politicians such as Winston Peters of the New Zealand First Party exploited fears about Muslims being potential 'threats to national security'. Newspaper headlines at the time included: 'Peters warns of Muslim Serpents' (*The New Zealand Herald*, 29 July 2005) and 'Peters Claims Muslim Group Funding Radical' (*The New Zealand Herald*, 11 August 2005).[70] Winston Peters was elected member of parliament in 2005.

In December 2006 a Muslim airline passenger dressed in religious attire had planned to read religious texts on the flight and had gone to the toilet to perform ablutions before take-off. He spent about ten minutes in the toilet. The airline staff viewed him with suspicion, escorted him from the plane, checked his passport (he had dual citizenship and was not travelling on a New Zealand passport) and did not allow him back on the flight because he had upset the flight crew.[71]

After 9/11 the first casualty of the new security laws (*New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969*, section 2(d)), was an Algerian-born refugee Ahmed Zaoui.[72] Zaoui was a supporter of the Islamic movement in Algeria, and was an active member of the largest Islamic party, Islamic Salvation Front, in Algeria. But due to the Algerian Government's abuse of human rights, Zaoui fled to Europe through Morocco in August 1993, later learning that he had received a death sentence in absentia by an Algerian court. Sadly his applications for asylum in Belgium and Switzerland were either refused or went unanswered, and he spent nineteen months in a Belgium jail. He had to live under appalling conditions with his wife and children, and was subjected to constant confinement and harassment. Finally, the family was deported to the small African country of Burkina Faso, from where they went to Malaysia in January 2000. Then in 2002 Zaoui left his family in Malaysia and flew to Auckland to seek asylum.[73]

In March 2003 Zaoui was alleged to be a security threat to New Zealand and the government refused to grant him refugee status. Zaoui was again

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69. 'Hate Mail stuffed with Pork Sent to Muslims', *The Dominion Post*, 28 September 2004, http://www.pluralism.org/news/article.php?id=8112, accessed 10 October 2007. In Australia there were reports of pigs' heads and blood being thrown into several mosques.

70. Clarke, 'Essentialising Islam', *op. cit.*, p. 70.

71. D. Cheng, 'NZ Muslim Tagged Flight Risk over Toilet Use', *The New Zealand Herald*, 9 December 2006, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10414594, accessed 10 October 2007.

72. N. Lafraie, 'Ahmed Zaoui, A Victim of 9/11: Impact of the Terrorist Attacks in the United States on New Zealand Refugee Policies', *New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies*, VIII, No. 2, 2006, pp. 119–21.

73. *Ibid.*

imprisoned despite the Refugee Status Appeal Authority's (RSAA) finding that he was a legitimate refugee. Zaoui's case became a lingering legal battle between his legal team and the New Zealand Government, with most of the court rulings going in favour of Zaoui.[74] Zaoui was released from prison on bail in 2004 and lived with the Catholic Benedictine order in Newton, Auckland. Finally in September 2007 New Zealand Security Service withdrew its objections, thus allowing him to remain in New Zealand.[75]

Many skilled people (including Muslims) are disadvantaged in the New Zealand labour market. Their qualifications are not recognized and some have since moved on to places such as Australia where the opportunities are better.[76] Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, such moves are also problematic because in 1996, 2001 and 2006 the unemployment rate of Australian Muslims was three times higher than the national total. In 2006 research conducted by Massey University on new settlers found that immigrants and refugees from South Africa, Asia and other ethnic communities in the study were disadvantaged in New Zealand's labour market. A frustrated Asian immigrant said that he repeatedly received regretful responses claiming that other applicants were better than him. Others expressed annoyance that their overseas qualifications were not recognized and they had to undergo further study in New Zealand to gain local qualifications before they were accepted. In some cases refugees could not afford the study costs. As an Iraqi medical doctor said he was not informed when he applied to migrate to New Zealand, that he would have to sit a New Zealand exam at the cost of $5,000 in order to practise medicine. One South African immigrant who arrived in New Zealand six days earlier said that, in spite of his fifteen years of experience in the related field, he was asked for his 'Kiwi experience'. The survey found that Muslims and people of Middle Eastern origin who were not Muslims felt particularly discriminated against in the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Some Muslims were trying to hide their identity to avoid discrimination.[77]

In 2001 Somalis experienced unemployment rates four to five times higher than the national average. New Zealand labour force statistics for 2001 revealed that Somali women had the second highest female unemployment rate of 42.9 per cent, a labour force participation rate of only 26.9 per cent (compared to 60.1 per cent for the 'all women' category), and only 14.8 per

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74. *Ibid.*, p. 121.
75. H. Dewes and M. Field, 'Freed Zaoui "No Longer a Threat" to NZ', *The Press* (Christchurch), 14 September 2007, p. 1.
76. Shepard, 'New Zealand's Muslims and their Organizations', *op. cit.*, p. 11.
77. 'New Zealand Immigration News: Employment Discrimination Faced by Migrants', *New Zealand Immigration News*, 14 September 2006, http://news.emigratenz.org/2006/09/14/employment-discrimination-faced-by-migrants/, accessed 8 October 2007.

cent were in paid employment. These rates for Somali women have been attributed to structural constraints, language barriers, and non-transferable skills and qualifications.[78] Thus the resettlement of refugees in residential areas has made access to employment in industrial or commercial sites difficult. Many Somali women do not have formal qualifications, and few have degree-level qualifications, a pattern that is changing as more Somali young people complete tertiary education in New Zealand.[79]

The majority of Somali migrants are practising Muslims, but the observances of *ṣalāt* (prayer) and the fast of Ramadan do not match the pattern of New Zealand working days or Christian holy days. However, *ṣalāt* is permitted almost everywhere at universities and workplaces. Somali women's highly visible religious clothing, prescribed gender interactions and traditional family roles have also been found to influence their employment status. For example, their long headscarf is sometimes perceived as a communication barrier and a health and safety hazard in the work environment. Women wearing headscarves have reported resistance and discrimination in the workplace, and some view them as a major factor contributing to their unemployment. 'Western practices of hugging, kissing, touching, shaking hands, and flirting between men and women [are] strictly prohibited in Muslim teachings; and these practices have restricted the type of work environment deemed acceptable to some Somali migrants.'[80]

However, some positive developments have taken place since the late 1990s, such as interfaith dialogues between Muslims and non-Muslims and 'open days' in mosques. 'Islam Awareness Week', first held in Dunedin in 1999, was held nationally in 2004, sponsored by FIANZ. The television programmes created by the Voice of Islam Trust and broadcast in the Auckland and Christchurch areas were also helpful. Since 9/11 some mainstream New Zealanders have been particularly helpful,[81] for example, the Catholic Benedictine order in Newton, Auckland which supported Ahmed Zaoui during his ordeal. With every crisis, such as vandalism in mosques, the

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78. H. A. Jelle, P. Guerin and S. Dyer, 'Somali Women's Experiences in Paid Employment in New Zealand', *New Zealand Journal of Employment Relations*, XXXI, No. 2, 2006, p. 62; see also E. Kolig and N. Kabir, 'Not Friend, not Foe: The Rocky Road of Enfranchisement of Muslims into Multicultural Nationhood in Australia and New Zealand', *Immigrants and Minorities*, XXVI, No. 3, 2008, pp. 266–300.

79. *Ibid.*

80. *Ibid.* In the Australian context, both the Australian-born Muslim male and female unemployment rates were three times higher than their non-Muslim counterparts in 1996 and 2001. Perhaps Islamic names and attire were barriers in the job market. See N. Kabir and R. Evans, 'Muslims and the Australian Labour Market, 1980–2001', *Immigrants and Minorities*, XXI, No. 3, 2002, p. 79; Kabir, 'Muslims in Australia: The Double Edge of Terrorism', *op. cit.*, p. 1293.

81. Shepard, 'New Zealand's Muslims and their Organizations', *op. cit.*, p. 34.

wider community has been supportive of Muslims. There has been symbolic recognition of Muslims at the government level, including the presentation of honours to six Muslims for their community service, and a celebration of *Eid ul-Fitr* at Parliament in connection with the twenty-fifth anniversary of FIANZ.[82] The election of the aforementioned Pakistani-born Ashraf Choudhury in 2002 and in 2004, though he did not specifically represent the Muslim voice, is a credible sign of social cohesion. But on 5 February 2006 Muslims in New Zealand were particularly offended when the *Dominion Post* in Wellington and the *Christchurch Press* printed disrespectful drawings of Prophet Muḥammad. The newspapers later apologized and said that they would not republish them.[83] Many Christian individuals also supported Muslim complaints about the Prophet Muḥammad cartoons.[84]

Fiji

Muslims first arrived in Fiji between 1879 and 1916 mostly as Indian indentured labourers to work in the sugarcane fields during British colonial rule.[85] With the establishment of the Fiji Muslim League in 1926, Islam became an established religion in Fiji. In 2007 Muslims numbered 53,000 which comprised 6.3 per cent of the total population.[86]

The practice of Islam was essentially a private affair during the indentured labour system in which labourers were required to work eight hours per day for five and a half days a week in the plantation fields, for the sum of one shilling for an eight-hour shift. Like their Hindu compatriots, Muslims arrived in Fiji as temporary indentured labourers for economic gain. The conditions of work, as described above, allowed little time for religious practices. The hierarchical structure of the indenture system was as follows: a British owner occupied the top position, followed by a white manager, and finally the Indian *sarder* (foreman) who kept the labourers under total subjugation. Indentured labourers were not allowed to question the higher authorities about their working conditions. After completing their indenture, some of the labourers picked up other occupations, such as farming, working in a laundry and hairdressing.

However, with the increase in numbers of Muslim Indians in Fiji because of indenture and migration, gradually Muslims established their Islamic

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82. *Ibid.*, pp. 17–18.
83. Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand (FIANZ), media release, 8 February 2006, http://www.fianz.co.nz/, accessed 10 October 2007.
84. Shepard, 'New Zealand's Muslims and their Organizations', *op. cit.*, p. 35.
85. J. Ali, 'Islam and Muslims in Fiji', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, XXIV, No. 1, 2004, pp. 141–54.
86. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population, op. cit.*, p. 28.

identity through various organizations such as the Anjuman-I Hidayat-ul-Islam (1915), the Anjuman Ishiat el Islam (1916) and Anjuman-e-Islam (1919), and finally the Fiji Muslim League in 1926.[87]

In 1970 when Fiji received its independence from the United Kingdom Fijian Muslims asserted themselves more under the Fijian Government. By 1995 there were twenty-one Sunni primary schools, eight Sunni high schools, one Ahmadi primary school and one Ahmadi high school. There was also a surge of mosques and *markazes* (madrassas) to teach Muslims the recitation of the Qur'ān, and Muslim associations were established to meet women's social and religious needs.[88]

Fiji has witnessed three military *coups d'état* since 1987, which were racially based in favour of indigenous Fijians. Religious minorities, particularly Muslims, have faced some difficulties. For example, the recognition of Islamic laws governing marriage, divorce, burial and other Islamic ceremonies has been lost in Fiji's race relations politics.[89] Since the *coups d'état* some Muslim Fijians have moved to Australia and New Zealand. However, the presence of various mosques and Muslim associations reveal the diversity of Fiji.

Papua New Guinea

Most people in Papua New Guinea live together in small clans. Few number more than a hundred people, and many are even smaller. The people are related to each other, and they trace their ancestry back to the founder of the clan.[90] In traditional clan life, everyone was involved in religious ceremonies which included carving idols, worshipping the spirits of the dead, and dancing and feasting in a certain manner. But with the European contact in the sixteenth century, missionaries changed some of their customs by introducing Christian teachings.[91]

In July 2007 the total population of Papua New Guinea was 5,795,887.[92] A large majority is Christian (96 per cent in 2000); though many combine their Christian faith with indigenous beliefs and practices. There were about 2,000 Muslims in Papua New Guinea (0.03 per cent) in 2003.[93] In 1988 Muslims set

87. *Ibid.*, p. 151.

88. *Ibid.*, p. 152.

89. *Ibid.*, p. 153.

90. B. Jinks, *New Guinea Government: An Introduction*, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1971, p. 8.

91. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

92. Central Intelligence Agency, 'Papua New Guinea', *The World Factbook*, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/pp.html, accessed 5 November 2007.

93. 'Islam in Papua New Guinea', *Wikipedia*, 2007, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_Papua_New_Guinea#_note-3, accessed 5 November 2007.

up the first Islamic centre and by 2007 there were six more. The first mosque was built in Port Moresby. Though the number of Muslims is negligible; there have been incidents of discrimination and Islamophobia against them. For example, the Home Minister, Andrew Kumbaka, said, 'Islam is a dangerous and a very serious threat to the peace and unity of [PNG]', so that 'the advent of and propagation of the Islamic religion will be a future time-bomb for PNG', thus 'PNG must remain a Christian country for a better future'.[94] According to the United States Department of State's annual report on religious freedom, Muslims were subjected to sporadic minor attacks such as small fires at or in the only mosque in the country. When the Muslim community applied to the Land Board for permission to acquire land on which to build a mosque, some churches objected, claiming that the nation had a historically Christian character.[95]

Solomon Islands

The Solomon Islands consist of an archipelago of 992 islands to the north-east of Australia. In 2006 the population was 533,672, which is predominantly Melanesian with smaller Polynesian, Micronesian, Chinese and European communities.[96] About 98 per cent of the inhabitants identify as Christians. A small minority of Melanesian people have embraced Islam, though this religion had no historical presence in the region.[97] Historian Clive Moore has observed that there is the beginning of an indigenous Muslim community in the Solomons. There are about 200 Muslim converts on the island of Malaita and a lesser number in Honiara. These are mostly men as their wives and families have not converted. Some observers note that Muslims number somewhere between a few hundred and a few thousands. McDougall comments, 'With a national population of just over 400,000 in 1999, even the highest estimates would have Islam as only about 1 per cent of the total population, although significantly higher in Honiara and other areas where converts are concentrated.'[98] The Pew Research Center estimated that in 1999 Muslims in the Solomon Islands comprised 0.1 per cent of the total population.[99]

94. *Ibid.*
95. *Ibid.*
96. Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Solomon Islands', 2007, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/solomon_islands/index.html, accessed 7 November 2007.
97. D. McDougall, 'Becoming Sinless: Converting to Islam in the Christian Solomon Islands', *American Anthropologist*, CXI, No. 4, 2009, pp. 480–91.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 483.
99. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

VII–6.1   A Muslim woman stands in front of the An-Nur Mosque, the
largest mosque in Timor-Leste, situated in the capital of Dili
© UN Photo/Martine Perret

Anthropologist McDougall observes that there were two waves of
conversion in the Solomon Islands. First, after the national independence of
the Islands in 1978, some indigenous people converted to Islam when they
came in contact with Muslim expatriates who came to work at the regional
universities or in Honiara. Therefore most of these converts (or reverts)
were well-educated and held formal employment in towns. Islam spread from
them to their family members and friends. The second wave of Islam came
after 11 September 2001 in the wake of civil conflict at the Solomon Islands.
Outsiders, for example Australian Muslims, provided assistance to the locals,
and in that way some people came in contact with Muslims and embraced
Islam. The second wave of converts was less educated and held less secure
employment. The number of Sunni Muslims is growing, though there are
also a small number of Ahmadiyya (offshoot of Islam).[100] Some members of
the wider society see the growth of Islam as a threat. Reverend Eric Takila,
Chairman of the Solomon Islands Christian Association and Bishop of the
South, commented:

100. McDougall, 'Becoming Sinless', *op. cit.*, pp. 480–91.

> In the light of what is going on in the world today, and also for the security of the nation, we have some concern about the presence not only of Muslims in the country but also other religions that begin to come into the Solomon Islands. As you know, we have just been through a dark time, and right now we are working on mending and healing this nation from the ethnic crisis, and if we do have other people coming in with different motives and attitudes, it could cause problems for us.[101]

Like in other predominantly non-Muslim nations, Islamic visibility was seen as a threat to the wider society. Some Muslim Solomon Islanders say that their Islamic attire is conspicuous and people sometimes shout at them as 'terrorists', but they are happy with their conversion. Few of the converts were disappointed with Christianity, as McDougall observed: 'Having tried to reform their lives by being "born again" in Christ several times over, they turned to Islam as the way forward for themselves and their community.'[102]

East Timor/Timor-Leste

Indonesia invaded East Timor soon after the Portuguese withdrew in 1975 and forcefully tried to subdue the East Timorese who resisted the occupation. In 1999 Indonesia finally released the country from its control. The United Nations Security Council established a UN mission in East Timor (UNTAET) in 1999 to oversee a referendum in which the East Timorese voted for independence. UNTAET acted as a transitional administration while the new nation was built. It received full independence on 20 May 2002. In 2005 the total population was 857,000.[103] The majority of the East Timorese is Christians (90 per cent Roman Catholic, 3 per cent Protestant). Religious minorities include Muslims (3.8 per cent, including the former Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri, of Yemeni ancestry), Hindus (0.3 per cent) and Buddhists (0.1 per cent); traditional animist minorities make up the remainder.[104]

Relations between East Timorese Christians and Muslims have not been cordial. In the early days of the transition to independence there were attacks on both Muslims and mosques. In 2000 about 265 Muslims were forced to 'live in a ghetto' after being stoned for a week and intimidated by Catholics. The Muslims were forced to take refuge in Dili's An-Nur Mosque complex. The animosity was partly a repercussion from the Indonesian Government's

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101. Quoted in McDougall, 'Becoming Sinless', *op. cit.*, pp. 480–91.
102. McDougall, 'Becoming Sinless', *op. cit.*, p. 486.
103. 'Country Profile: East Timor', *BBC News*, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1508119.stm, accessed 7 November 2007.
104. 'East Timor', *Wikipedia*, 2007, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_Timor, accessed 7 November 2007; Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

occupation of East Timor. A Muslim leader at the an-Nur Mosque, Jamal Chaniago, said, 'This is home now. We want to live here. We don't want to go back to Indonesia.' So some non-Muslim East Timorese view their Muslim counterparts as enemies. An unemployed coffee trader who lived at the mosque said, 'When we go to the market, the Timorese tells us we are not wanted here. They say, "Go back". They call us trouble makers even though we have caused no trouble here.'[105] In December 2002 a riot erupted in the capital city, Dili, and a mosque was attacked, as was East Timor's Muslim Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri. Though a minority group, East Timorese Muslims have mosques in Dili, Los Palos, Baucau and Viqueque. Fortunately, tensions have eased through interfaith dialogue.[106]

New Caledonia

Settled by both Britain and France during the first half of the nineteenth century, New Caledonia was made a French possession in 1853. It served as a penal colony for four decades after 1864. Agitation for independence during the 1980s and early 1990s ended in the 1998 Noumea Accord, which over a period of fifteen to twenty years will transfer an increasing amount of governing responsibility from France to New Caledonia. The agreement also committed France to conduct as many as three referenda between 2013 and 2018, to decide whether New Caledonia should assume full sovereignty and independence.

New Caledonia is 1,500 km away from Australia and 1,800 km from New Zealand. It has a population of 200,000,[107] with several indigenous cultures. The Melanesian community of New Caledonia exists within its indigenous tribal structure. The Kanak culture is expressed in twenty-eight different languages. In 2007 its religion was Roman Catholic (60 per cent), Protestant (30 per cent) and other (10 per cent). Islam arrived in New Caledonia more than one hundred years ago.[108] The first Muslims were Arabs from Algeria and Morocco. Later, Muslims came from Indonesia to work in the mines. Muslims have settled throughout New Caledonia, especially in Bourail (in the

105. R. Chandrasekaran, 'In East Timor. A Crucible of Tolerance; Once Welcome Muslim Minority Persecuted as Nation Struggles with Newly Won Independence', *The Washington Post*, 8 June 2000, p. 23.

106. Progressio Interfaith, 'Faith and Post-Conflict Peace Building in East Timor', 2007, http://ciir.live.poptech.coop/interfaith/AssociatesInternal/92094/east_timor/, accessed 7 November 2007.

107. Central Intelligence Agency, 'New Caledonia', *The World Factbook*, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nc.html, accessed 15 November 2007.

108. *Ibid.*

north) and Le Mont-Dore. In 2005 there were about 7,000 Muslims, which constituted 2.8 per cent of the total population.[109] An Islamic centre has been built in Noumea, and there are plans to build another in Bourail.[110]

Vanuatu

Multiple waves of colonizers, each speaking a distinct language, migrated to Vanuatu (formerly New Hebrides) in the eighteenth century. The British and French, who settled the New Hebrides in the nineteenth century, agreed in 1906 to form an Anglo-French condominium, which administered the islands until independence in 1980, when the new name of Vanuatu was adopted.[111]

In July 2007 Vanuatu's total population was 211,971.[112] Its religion was 82.5 per cent Christian, 5.6 per cent indigenous beliefs, and others about 10 per cent.[113] There are about 200 converts to Islam. Islam was introduced to Vanuatu by Henry Nabanga of Mele village. By 1987 a number of other people outside Mele had embraced the faith and the first mosque was established in 1992 in Mele.[114]

CONCLUSION

Of all the countries discussed in this chapter, Australia has had the longest contact with Muslims. The pattern of Muslim settlement in Australia and New Zealand is similar. Islam is growing in the neighbouring islands of Australia. The lack of literature on Muslims in Australia's neighbouring islands has led me to employ online sources.

Since 9/11 some Muslims in Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, East Timor and Papua New Guinea have been finding life difficult. The resistance some Muslims have been facing in Australia and New Zealand could be interpreted in racial and religious terms; whereas in the neighbouring islands the conflict has had a more religious dimension, for example, the case of East Timor. In Australia and New Zealand, Muslim issues are sometimes discussed in

109. Pew Research Center, *Mapping the Global Muslim Population*, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
110. 'Islam in New Caledonia', *Wikipedia*, 2007, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_New_Caledonia, accessed 15 November 2007.
111. 'Vanuata', Wikipedia, 2007, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam_in_Vanuatu, accessed 15 November 2007.
112. Central Intelligence Agency, 'Vanuatu', *The World Factbook*, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nh.html, accessed 15 November 2007.
113. *Ibid.*
114. S. Joy, 'Muslims in Vanuatu', *Daily Post*, 19 October 2004, http://www.news.vu/en/living/religion/muslims-in-vanuatu.shtml, accessed 15 November 2007.

interfaith discussions, radio programmes and other media outlets. Some members of the mainstream population have also come forward to assist Muslims such as Ahmed Zaoui in New Zealand. The Howard government in Australia was generally not empathetic but in 2007 it contributed $8 million to three universities to address Muslim issues. However, the existing ethnic political situation among Muslims in Australia and New Zealand is unhelpful. The number of Muslims in the neighbouring islands is negligible and perhaps they are also struggling minorities in their current geo-political environments. Clearly there is a need for further academic research on the voiceless Muslim minorities in the neighbouring islands.

EPILOGUE

Nahid Afrose Kabir

I commenced writing chapters on Muslim minorities in the world today in 2007 and completed them in 2013. In 2005 my first book, *Muslims in Australia*, was published. In 2010 my second book, *Young British Muslims*, and in 2013 my third book *Young American Muslims*, were published. These books were mainly based on interviews that I conducted in these respective countries. The research methodology for this section (Muslim Minorities in the World Today) was mainly based on primary (unpublished) and secondary (published) materials. In this chapter I begin with a brief summary of all the chapters, followed by a discussion of some recent actions by non-Muslims that have affected Muslims. I also discuss some issues within the Muslim communities that need attention. I conclude by pointing out some positive steps but I note that more effort is needed both by Muslims and non-Muslims to create a cohesive society.

Brief summary of the chapters

In Chapter 7.1 I noted that, since the seventh century, Muslims had historical connections in Western Europe, particularly Britain, through trade. The Muslim Moors ruled Spain for several centuries. Yet since 9/11 many Muslims in Western Europe have faced challenges in their everyday lives. For example, in France Muslim women are barred from wearing the *ḥijāb* in public/state schools. In Switzerland constructing minarets on mosques is banned. The cartoon of the Prophet Muḥammad in Denmark in the name of 'freedom of speech' ridiculed Islam. There has been resistance to mosque building in Greece and Italy. I also discussed issues within the Muslim community.

In Chapter 7.2 I observed that Muslims' contact with some Eastern European countries commenced from the ninth century. In the modern

period, due to the break-up of some countries such as the former Yugoslavia and the USSR, Muslim minorities in their respective countries remained disadvantaged. Thus, Bosnian (Bosniak) refugees remain disadvantaged by poor health and postwar trauma. Though Bulgaria is a member of the EU, the Pomak question remains to be addressed. Some Roma people, particularly Roma Muslims in different European countries such as Bulgaria and Ukraine, are underprivileged. There were issues within the Muslim communities, too. For instance, some Muslims holding high authority in the Caucasus still represent the old guard and tend to be loyal to the federal government, while they do not understand the young people.

In Chapter 7.3 I discussed the fact that the first Muslims in the Americas and the Caribbean were slaves. Later, different groups of Muslims arrived through trade and as indentured labourers and many migrated to the region of their own free will. Since the 1970s the Muslim population in this region has been growing steadily, which many would regard as a sign of progress. Muslims now have schools, mosques and associations to retain their religion and heritage. Nevertheless since 9/11 many have been viewed as the 'other'. Some visible Muslims who wear the *ḥijāb* and *burqa* remain disadvantaged, and men with beards and *topis* may become victims of racial profiling.

In Chapter 7.4 I noted that Muslims (and Arabs) have had contact with some African countries since the seventh century through trade. Later, from the nineteenth century, Indian Muslims migrated to Africa. In the colonial period there was sporadic resistance to the spread of Islam in some countries. In the contemporary period some African countries are recovering from civil wars, and some are still involved in sectarian conflict. Within the Muslim community sometimes traditional practices take precedence over human rights, for example girls' early marriage. Some Muslims have complained that proselytizing Christians are attempting to convert poor Muslims by providing food and other essential commodities.

In Chapter 7.5 I found that Muslims have had contact with Asian countries since the seventh century through trade and diplomatic ties. In the modern period there have been conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims in some Asian countries, like, the Uyghur in China remain suppressed. There have been separatist movements in southern Thailand and the Philippines. In some areas of the Philippines, Christians proselytize resettled Muslims. In China some Muslims feel that they would gain better jobs if they assimilated with the majority's way of life. In Vietnam Cham Muslims are the most marginalized people. They still need to recover economically in the post-Vietnam war period.

In Chapter 7.6 I have discussed that, in the Pacific region, Australia's first contact with Muslims (Macassarese people from Indonesia) was in the seventeenth century. Muslims have been arriving in large numbers since the

1970s. But like in other Western democracies, they have been viewed as the 'other' by some sectors of the wider society. Sometimes politicians, particularly in Australia, have used the debate on asylum seekers to their political advantage. In New Zealand some Somali people remained disadvantaged in the labour market. Within the Muslim community, there have been issues between Arab and Somali Islam.

Some issues that still need to be addressed

EUROPE

In 2011 the Pew Research Center found that tensions still persist between the Muslim and the Western worlds. Many non-Muslim people residing in the West view Muslims as 'fanatical and violent', while many Muslims in the Middle East perceive 'Westerners as selfish, immoral and greedy'.[1] However, the latest Pew Global Attitudes survey found that tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims in the USA and Europe have subsided compared to their findings in 2006.[2] But my research shows the Muslim minority still remains vulnerable in some sectors of Western society. For example, on 12 April 2011 the French Government banned the wearing of Muslim women's *niqāb* (face veil) in public, including walking on the street, taking public transport, going to hospital and going to school to pick up children. The penalty for women wearing a *niqāb* in a public space is €150 and lessons in French citizenship. Women are only allowed to wear *niqābs* inside mosques or private cars, and they can be stopped by traffic police while driving.[3]

In the Netherlands Geert Wilders, the leader of the Freedom Party, has been an outright critic of Muslim immigration. Wilders has made inflammatory remarks against the holy Qurʾān, which he calls a fascist book. He believes that the Qurʾān incites 'to hatred and calls for murder and mayhem.'[4] In 2007 Wilders told the

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1. Pew Research Center, *Muslim-Western Tensions Persist: Common Concerns about Islamic Extremism*, Pew Global Attitudes Project, 21 July 2011, http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/07/21/muslim-western-tensions-persist/, accessed 3 January 2013.

2. Pew Research Center, *The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other*, Pew Global Attitudes Project, 22 June 2006, http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/06/22/the-great-divide-how-westerners-and-muslims-view-each-other/, accessed 3 January 2013.

3. A. C. Paris, 'Niqab Wearers Take to Streets as Sarkozy's Ban on Face Veils in Public Spaces Begins: Police Union Says New Law "Infinitely Difficult" to Apply Rights Campaigners Attack Rising Islamophobia', *The Guardian* (London, UK), 12 April 2011, p. 15.

4. B. Macintyre, 'The Blond Bombshell Blows in, Looking for a Fight – Banned and Threatened, Geert Wilders is Shaking the Liberals of Europe, Ben Macintyre Writes', *Times* (London, England), 3 March 2010, p. 4.
   'Geert Wilders Cleared of Hate Charges by Dutch Court', *BBC News*, 23 June 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13883331, accessed 3 January 2013.

Netherlands Parliament, 'It is an absolute necessity that the Koran be banned for the defence and reinforcement of our civilization and our constitutional state.'[5] In 2008 he released a fifteen-minute film entitled *Fitna* (strife) that provoked outrage across the Muslim world. As Ben Macintyre says,

> 'It [the film] opens with an image of the Koran, followed by footage of terrorist attacks and a litany of stonings, beheadings, honour killings, homophobia and child marriages. It ends, predictably, with the Danish cartoon of the Prophet Muḥammad.'[6] In January 2009, based on anti-Islamic comments and the controversial film *Fitna*, Wilders was charged with inciting hatred and discrimination. In 2011 Amsterdam judge Marcel van Oosten accepted that Wilder's statements were directed at Islam and not at Muslim believers. Judge Marcel van Oosten presided that it was 'acceptable within the context of public debate'.[7]

In Norway on 22 July 2011 Anders Behring Breivik killed seventy-seven people in the Workers' Youth League's Summer Camp of the Labour Party in Oslo and on Utoya Island by bombing and shooting young people. Breivick claimed that he was protecting Norway from Islamic immigration. On 24 August 2012 Breivik was convicted and sentenced to twenty-one years in prison.[8] Some East European countries have not become members of the European Union, which indicates that their human rights records have not met the EU membership criteria. Many Muslims still remain marginalized in these countries.

USA

In the USA there have been Islamophobic incidents from time to time. In the week of 22–6 October 2007, some Americans observed 'Islamo-Fascism Awareness Week' on 114 college and university campuses. The organizers aimed to protest against the violent oppression of women in Islam and advertised in campus newspapers and circulated pamphlets on that issue. They also showed documentaries such as *Obsession* and *Suicide Killers*, and organized panel discussions and talks by controversial speakers such as former Senator Rick Santorum, Ann Coulter, Robert Spencer, Nonie Darwish, Wafa Sultan, Michael Medved, Dennis Prager and Daniel Pipes.[9] When I was conducting research on the identity of young American Muslims

5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. 'Geert Wilders cleared of hate charges by Dutch court', *op. cit.*
8. 'Anders Behring Breivik', *New York Times*, 24 August 2012, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/b/anders_behring_breivik/index.html, accessed 3 January 2013.
9. Terrorism Awareness Project, 'Islamo-Fascism Awareness Week', 2007, http://www.

VII–e.1   Chinese prayer rugs in a mosque in Lanzhou, China
© Nik Wheeler/AramcoWorld

some participants also mentioned Islamo-Fascism Awareness Week as they were distressed by the Islamophobic attitude of this group. I was told by a student in San Francisco (when I attended a conference there in 2009) that during Islamo-Fascism Awareness Week some students on their campus held up the Hamas flag and threw shoes at it. The Hamas flag is green in colour and has the *shahāda* (first pillar of Islam) written on it.

In 2010 Terry Jones, the pastor of a small Florida church, vowed to mark the anniversary of the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks on the United States and honour the deaths of almost 3000 people by burning a copy of the Qurʾān. The day was also set to coincide with the Muslim festivities for *Eid-ul-Fitr*. Pastor Jones said the Qurʾān burning was intended 'to remember those who were brutally murdered on 11 September', and to send a warning 'to the radical element of Islam'.[10] This made worldwide news and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen warned that it would be a security risk for the troops present in Afghanistan. Pastor Jones temporarily suspended the idea of burning the Qurʾān, but on 20 March 2011 he presided over the burning of a copy of the Qurʾān at his Dove World Outreach Center in Gainesville, Florida.

terrorismawareness.org/islamo-fascism-awareness-week/, accessed 3 January 2013.

10. It is important to note that about 358 Muslims died in the World Trade Center attacks: see J. L. Esposito, *The Future of Islam*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, p 30.

Regrettably, the burning of the Qur'ān sparked deadly attacks in Afghanistan.[11] On Friday 1 April 2011 in Mazar-e-Sharif, northern Afghanistan's largest city, thousands of protesters came out of the large Blue Mosque and marched towards the United Nations mission a mile away. The angry mob entered the compound chanting 'Death to America', burned the US flag and killed seven UN workers. Demonstrations also spread throughout the country.[12]

Under the pretext of free speech, in September 2012 the movie *Innocence of Muslims* by controversial director Sam Bacile (a Coptic Christian whose real name is Nakoula Basseley, who resides in California) was uploaded onto YouTube. The film upset some Muslims because it portrayed the Prophet Muḥammad in a derogatory manner. In Benghazi, Libya, a few Muslims were so outraged that they killed some innocent Americans: the United States Ambassador to Libya, J. Christopher Stevens, and three other Americans in the US Consulate. However, the US Government is investigating whether the attack on the US Consulate in Libya was a planned attack to mark the eleventh anniversary of the 9/11 attacks.

On 5 August 2012 Wade Michael Page, a 40-year-old US army veteran (he served in the army for six years until 1998), shot dead six people and injured three more in a *gurdwara* (Sikh temple) in Oak Creek, Wisconsin. Officials in Wisconsin identified the shooting as a possible act of 'domestic terrorism', but many people in the Sikh community suspected that the attack was a hate crime, and the most violent crime against Muslims and Sikhs since 11 September 2001.[13] Sikhs have sometimes been mistaken for Muslims because of their appearance (their turbans and beards).

AUSTRALIA

There are many Islamic schools in Australia but some Australians are still fearful of Islamic institutions. In October 2007 Muslims sought approval from Camden Council to establish an Islamic school at Camden. They were provided a site by the Qur'ānic Society, which is a Sydney-based Islamic charity organization. But it met with fierce resistance from the local people. In 2008 the estimated residential population in the Camden area was 53,394. The majority of Camden residents were Christian, and only 402 residents were Muslims. The local people expressed their opposition to the school through letters to the editor. There were environmental and traffic concerns but the

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11. 'US Church Vows Koran Burning will go on', *The West Australian*, 8 September 2010, http://au.news.yahoo.com/thewest/a/-/world/7901560/us-church-vows-koran-burning-will-go-on/, accessed 8 September 2010.
12. 'Ban Koran-Burning? If Islam Becomes a Protected Faith, Free Expression will be no More', *The Washington Times*, 8 April 2011, p. B01.
13. W. Pavia, 'Sikh Massacre Gunman "Led White Power Band" – United States', *Times* (London), 7 August 2012, p. 26.

locals were more concerned that they would lose their Australian identity, Muslims do not integrate, Muslims would bring trouble and crime into their neighbourhood, and there was fear of Islamic invasion. Apart from the letters to the editor, there were concerted campaigns by local non-Muslims by leaflets, emails, internet networking, text messaging, a public rally and petitions sent to the Camden Council opposing the proposed Islamic school. Two pigs' heads with an Australian flag draped between them were found on the proposed site on 28 Novembre 2007. Some conservative politicians also capitalized on this incident. Fred Nile's Christian Democratic Party's candidate Godwin Goh exploited locals' sentiment with biblical references. Finally, on 27 May 2008 Camden Council rejected the application on planning grounds.[14]

Asia

The Muslim minorities in some Asian countries have been victims of communal riots and even genocide. For example, in Assam, India, on 18 February 1983 Lalung tribespeople surrounded fourteen villages of Bengali-speaking Muslims in Nellie and set their homes on fire. It has been estimated that more than 3,000 Bengali Muslims were killed (the official count was 1,800).[15] In July 2012 riots between the ethnic (non-Muslim) Bodo people and immigrant Muslims of Bangladeshi origin broke out in four districts of Western Assam claiming about eighty lives, mostly Muslims of Bengali origin.[16] It displaced nearly 400,000 Bengali-speaking Muslims from their homes.[17]

The Rohingya people (Muslims of Bangladeshi origin) are the most marginalized people in Burma. They were brought to Burma as indentured labourers during British rule. In 1962 the Rohingya were stripped of their citizenship rights. In 1978–79 about 300,000 Rohingya were expelled, and they took refuge in Bangladesh. The controversial *Burma Citizenship Law* of 1982 reduced them to the status of 'third class citizens' and classified them as 'foreigners who entered Burma as immigrants during the British colonial period.' In 1991 a large number of Rohingya were once again expelled to Bangladesh.[18] In June 2012, under the Burmese military government, Rohingya Muslims were massacred by Buddhist members of the Rakhine ethnic group,

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14. R. J. Al-Natour, 'Folk Devils and the Proposed Islamic School in Camden', *Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies*, XXIV, No. 4, 2010, pp. 573–85.

15. M. Jaleel, 'Indian Express: State of Inertia', *Indian Express* (India), 8 August 2012.

16. S. Bhaumik, 'Assam Violence Reverberates across India', *Al Jazeera*, 16 August 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/08/201281572950685537.html, accessed 3 January 2013.

17. Riot – Hit Return to Relief Camps', *Times of India* (Mumbai, India), 2 September 2012.

18. D. M. Ridzam, 'World Still Silent on Plight of the Rohingya', *New Straits Times* (Malaysia), 6 August 2012.

VII–e.2   The Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin mosque in BatuApoi,
Brunei Darussalam
© Tor Eigeland/AramcoWorld

and a few mosques were bulldozed.[19] According to a UN report, about 26,500 members of the persecuted Muslim Rohingya minority were made homeless by arson, looting and murder. Besides, 75,000 people were living in makeshift refugee camps.[20] It is unfortunate that Aung San Suu Kyi, who has been a champion of democracy for the majority Burmese people, has been silent on the plight of the Rohingya.[21]

AFRICA

Generally speaking, women are marginalized in many Muslim societies. They are subjected to early marriage, fewer educational opportunities and abide by the rules of patriarchy where men are dominant. For example, Muslims have

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19. K. Denby, 'Mosques Bulldozed in "Ethnic Cleansing" – Burma has Responded to a Local Conflict by Flattening Muslim Neighbourhoods, Kenneth Denby Reports from Sittwe', *Times* (London, England), 19 September 2012.
20. K. Denby, 'Thousands Flee as Religious Killings Threaten Reforms – Ethnic Cleansing Claim over Attacks on Muslims Burma', *Times* (London, England), 29 October 2012.
21. K. Denby, 'Suu Kyi's Failure to Step in is Shocking', *Times* (London, England), 19 September 2012.

lived in South Africa for many years but Muslim marriage issues, particularly the implications of divorse for women, have been overlooked. South African mainstream couples who married legally usually take an equal share of material possessions when their marriage ends in divorce. But women married under Islamic law are often denied equal rights and left in poverty. For many years South African Muslims asked for the implementation of Muslim Personal Law. While the South African Government is willing to pass a bill incorporating Muslim Personal Law, there is dissension within the Muslim community on this matter. Some Muslim leaders oppose government intervention, arguing, 'South Africa's secular constitution cannot be allowed to supersede Islamic law.' They do not wish *Sharīʿa* law to be compromized by the secular constitution.[22]

Wearing the *ḥijāb* is contested in Muslim communities. Some say that it is religious, while some say that it is cultural, and that Islam merely emphasises modesty. Some women choose to wear the *ḥijāb* and *burqa* to pay due respect to the teachings and traditions of the Prophet Muḥammad known as the *Ḥadīth* or *Sunna*.[23] But in 2010, in 25,000 face-to-face interviews in nineteen countries in Sub-Saharan Africa,[24] the Pew Research Center found that in most countries at least 50 per cent of Muslims said that women should not have the right to decide if they should chose to wear a veil; instead the decision should rest on the society as a whole.[25] In this case, tradition would be the deciding factor. Also, the circumcision of girls (female genital mutilation) is most common in the predominantly Muslim countries of Mali and Djibouti. But in Uganda it is a more common practice among Christians than among Muslims.[26] It is problematic that the Western media presents female genital mutilation as an Islamic practice because it is a cultural practice in some parts of the world. Yet this practice is brutal and should be stopped.

In 2010 the Pew Research Center also found that in the sub-Saharan region generally people found conflict between religious groups was a bigger problem than unemployment, crime or political corruption. Some believed that religious and ethnic conflict are often related. For instance, nearly six in ten Nigerians and Rwandans said that religious conflict was a very big problem

22. 'SA Battle over Muslim Women's Rights', *BBC News*, 10 September 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8237097.stm, accessed 3 January 2013.

23. See N. Kabir, *Muslims in Australia: Immigration, Race Relations and Cultural History*, London, Routledge, 2005; see also, A. A. Engineer, 'Islam and Feminism', *Dawn.com*, 3 June 2011, http://dawn.com/2011/06/03/islam-and-feminism/, accessed 3 January 2013.

24. The nineteen countries were: Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.

25. Pew Research Center, *Tolerance and Tension: Islam and Christianity in Sub-Saharan Africa*, 15 April 2010, pp. 3, 44, http://www.pewforum.org/executive-summary-islam-and-christianity-in-sub-saharan-africa.aspx, accessed 3 January 2013.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

in their country.[27] In Nigeria, Muslim and Christian conflict prevails, whereas in Rwanda, the conflict is between Christians of different ethnic groups. Many Africans, both Muslims and non-Muslims, were concerned about religious extremism. Some Muslims said that they were more concerned about Muslim extremism than Christian extremism and some Christians said that they were more concerned about Christian extremism than about Muslim extremism.[28] When a region remains under constant conflict, religious minorities are vulnerable and more marginalized.

Limitations of this study

Due to the scarcity of resources, I was unable to gather in-depth information on the Muslim minorities in South America and the Caribbean, Pacific islands, South and South-East Asia and parts of Southern Africa. Qualitative research on the Muslim minorities in these regions is vital. The respective governments in these countries should promote research to learn more about the situation of Muslim minorities in their countries.

CONCLUSION

Throughout this section of the edited volume, I have tried to find out the placement of the Muslim minorities in their respective countries. I found that Muslims have had historical contact with most countries, particularly through trade with the Islamic/Arab world. In the contemporary period, particularly after 9/11, the 'Muslim question' has come to the fore. Many non-Muslim people want to know more about Muslims, their religion, way of life and thinking, and whether they are peaceful. Some politicians and media stereotype Muslims as 'backward', 'violent' and 'oppressors' for their own political or commercial gain. Sometimes, some Muslims have been provoked to aggression through offensive cartoons of the Prophet Muḥammad, and sometimes they have been massacred by their non-Muslim counterparts. In some places, Muslim minorities have resorted to separatism, seeking more freedom and autonomy.

In Muslim communities, youth and women's issues have been largely neglected. There is division among them (though many non-Muslims consider them to be a homogeneous group). Some Muslims consider themselves to be better Muslims, and look down on their counterparts as the 'other.' There is a communication gap between some leaders and Muslim youth. Women's equal space in the society and educational opportunities are often ignored.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 44.
28. *Ibid.*

Amidst this complex situation, the condition of Muslims will improve if young people are given a voice in their community. They should be encouraged to integrate with the wider non-Muslim society, which means that they should practise their religion and retain their culture but at the same time they should interact with the wider society through inter-school activities, debates and sports. Muslim girls should be allowed to pursue higher education. Wearing the *niqāb* at workplaces especially in schools while teaching children is a barrier to communication, and that is not helpful to the children.[29] Conflict between Sunnis and Shīʿas, or Wahhabis and Sufis, is not helpful. Muslim leadership should both consider the issues existing within Islamic communities, and promote integration within the wider society. In times of crisis, for example the Prophet Muḥammad's cartoons, Muslims can have their voices heard through peaceful rallies.

Politicians and the media should accept Muslim minorities. Playing a divisive role during elections is not helpful. After 9/11 many non-Muslims want to learn about Muslims. Highlighting only Muslim aggression is not helpful. As the Pew Research Center found in their survey, in Africa some people are more concerned about Christian extremism, and I have found that Hutu Muslims in Rwanda protected their Christian counterparts during the genocide. Such news does not get coverage in the mainstream media. Of course, sometimes the media has been compassionate to Muslim minorities, such as *The Australian* newspaper during the *Tampa* refugee crises in 2001, but during the Cronulla riots it took the side of the wider society.[30]

The Swedish Government has taken a conciliatory approach towards Muslim minorities, and after the 2004 Madrid bombings the Spanish Government handled the situation carefully instead of labelling a certain religious group. As Idris El-Hareir pointed out, 'after the events of 11 September 2001, every day Islam continues to attract more converts in all parts of the world.'[31] Some governments have given funds to universities and other venues to open up centres to address the 'Muslim question', and build a bridge of understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims. Yet it is imperative that policy makers take initiatives to address some core problems impacting on Muslims, for example, the high unemployment rate and inequality.

29. N. A. Kabir, *Young British Muslims: Identity, Culture, Politics and the Media*, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2012, pp. 143–68.

30. N. Kabir, 'The Cronulla Riot: How One Newspaper Represented the Event', in B. Curtis, S. Mathewman and T. McIntosh (eds.), *Public Sociologies: Lessons and Trans-Tasman Comparisons: TASA/SAANZ Conference*, Auckland, Department of Sociology, University of Auckland, 2007, http://www.tasa.org.au/conferences/conferencepapers07/papers/268.pdf, accessed 3 January 2013.

31. I. El Hareir, 'Epilogue', in Idris El Hareir and El Hadji Ravane M'Baye (eds.), *The different aspects of Islamic culture: The spread of Islam throughout the world*, III, Paris, UNESCO Publishing 2011, p. 885.

– V I I I –

P O L I T I C A L   I S S U E S

INTRODUCTION

El-Tayeb Zein al-Abidin

The collapse of the Communist Bloc in the early 1990s and the escalation of the globalization process have strengthened the trend towards a westernized political system, all over the world. The Western countries, led by the United States, tried to project their mature political system of 'liberal democracy' as the end model of human history that all nations should emulate, irrespective of their different cultures and social development. They managed to influence the United Nations to adopt democracy as the symbol of good governance. It is decided that in peace operations the United Nations should continue to treat democratic governance as 'the only plausible basis for a sustainable politics in conflict societies'. Upon an initiative from the United States, the United Nations established in September 2005 a fund called the 'United Nations Democratic Fund' to provide grants to civil society, governments and international organizations in order to carry out programmes that strengthen democracy. In his second inaugural address (January 2005), President Bush said 'it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.' However, his hard-fought model in Iraq and Afghanistan to spread democracy in the Middle East did not prove attractive or successful.

Despite the recognition that Western democracy has contributed a great deal to human freedom, protection of human rights, rule of law, smooth transfer of power, etc, this does not mean it is the only political system that all nations in different places and cultures should accept and emulate. Western democracy in its long history has not been infallible, it carried the germ of racial discrimination and sexism since its inception in Athens in the fifth century BC; during three centuries of European colonialism in Africa and Asia; even in the most open democracy of the United States where the majority of black citizens could not vote until the 1960s because of discriminative restrictions;

and under the apartheid regime of the white minority in South Africa where the majority Africans had no political rights until the collapse of the regime in the 1990s. That long history of evolution shows that modern democracy has matured through many centuries of conflict, political struggle, social interaction and cultural exchange among imperial powers, states and societies. It is not the full creation of one civilization or one culture.

The universal civilization of the present times is a shared heritage of many cultures and different civilizations over the long history of humanity, each civilization making its characteristic contribution and impact according to its values, beliefs and traditions. Islam, as a world religion, made its mark on human history by contributing to world civilization in the areas of humane teachings, noble values, arts and sciences. The first instruction of God to the Prophet Muḥammad at the beginning of his message, conveyed through Angel Jibril, was 'Read!'; Jibril repeated the word three times, the Prophet answered, 'But I am illiterate', and so was the rest of his society. The first Qurʾānic chapter goes on to say: 'Read and thy Lord is most generous, who taught by the pen; taught man what he knew not' (XCVI.4–5). That was the ignition point which converted that illiterate society to one which loved the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge. Muslim authors translated into Arabic books from the devastated libraries of the ancient civilizations of Egypt, Iran, Greece, India, China and Rome, making them available to humanity at large. Books by Ibn Sīna (Avicenna), Abu-l-Rayḥān al-Bayrūnī, Ibn Rushd (Averroës) and Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen) were part of the curricula of high ranking European universities for many decades, and they influenced prominent theologians like St. Thomas Aquinas and pioneer scientist Roger Bacon. The historians of Western thought denied or ignored the contribution of Islamic civilization for a long time although it was close to their doors in *al-Andalus* (Spain), North Africa and Egypt. However, some prominent historians, like Arnold Toynbee, Sir Thomas Arnold, the French Gustave Le Bon, the German Adam Metz and others tried to show the contribution of Islam to human civilization and European renaissance. Nevertheless, it is not yet public knowledge even among the educated elite of the West.

Islam has made a specific contribution in the area of politics and government which enjoying freedom, equality, openness and accountability. That was also ignored by the writers of Western political thought. In this age of intensive communication among nations, explosion of knowledge and information, universal challenges and common interests, the history of thought and civilization should be based on more objective and factual grounds to enhance understanding among nations and cultures.

Islam, as the last message of God to humanity, is a complete way of life rather than a creed of beliefs and rituals. It aims to guide man in all aspects of life in order to lead a just, moral and beneficial existence. This is why

the concept of worship (*ʿibāda*) is a wide one: all human activities can be a form of worship of God. The Qurʾān says: 'I have not created jinn and men except for that they should worship Me' (LI.56). Thus, Islam, as a community based religion, cannot afford to exclude political affairs from the guidance of God. The Prophet Muḥammad himself established the first known state in central Arabia, which catered to the administration of law and justice, defense, external relations, social security and so on. His long chain of successors continued the tradition of government for many centuries under the title of 'caliphate', until it was abolished by Atatürk in 1924; the history of Islam is almost identical with the history of the Muslim caliphate. It reflects the strong link between Islam and politics.

Many verses in the Holy Qurʾān and traditions of the Prophet speak about matters related to politics, guiding the community on what is to be done and what is not to be done. Muslim jurists are in consensus that the establishment of a government 'caliphate' is a must for Muslim society. The early Muslims were aware of their political identity, so much so that the two major groups in Medina (*Muhājirūn* and *Anṣār*) started debating the selection of a political successor to the Prophet even before his burial. Abū Bakr was not chosen to the office because he belonged to a big clan or because he was the closest relative to the Prophet, choice being based on personal merits and hard struggle for the cause of Islam. The free consultative *Bayʿa* (homage) given to Abū Bakr by the Medina community marked the beginning of the Muslim political system, the caliphate. The caliphate, which continued for 15 centuries in different parts of the Muslim world, is still attractive to many conservative Muslims who feel that it is the ideal political system that should be implemented even today. It has its strong points which make it so attractive.

The Islamic caliphate united the fragmented, unruly Arab tribes in the Arabian Peninsula under one administration, gave them an enlightened rational system of belief, a fair system of legislation, entrusted them with a mission to the world, and motivated them to struggle hard to spread the mission of God. It facilitated the establishment of their vast empire and rich civilization. The Islamic traditions in the Qurʾān and *Sunna* gave numerous instructions to guide political matters. However, those instructions did not provide a comprehensive or detailed system of government, but they constituted values and principles of governance which need to be adapted to suit different societies at different places and times. Even the immediate successors of the Prophet followed different steps and procedures to select caliphs. In other words, there is no such a thing as one Islamic system of government! What is binding is to follow the values and principles set in the traditions in a way that suits the circumstances of the particular society.

VIII–i.1   Shirin Ebadi, Nobel peace prize winner and human rights lawyer,
speaking at a conference on the contribution of Islam to world peace and
civilization in October 2009 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York
© UN Photo/Devra Berkowitz

We attempt to summarize below the important Islamic principles, related
to politics, which have enriched and expanded the idea of democracy since
the seventh century AD, although it was cultivated in the most uncongenial
primitive society of central Arabia.

Justice (*ʿadāla*): Maintenance of justice is the whole purpose of the
revealed messages of God and the main justification for political authority.
The Qurʾān says: 'We verily sent Our messengers with clear proofs, and
revealed to them the Scripture and the Balance (symbol of justice), that
mankind may observe right measure' (LVII.25); 'Lo! God commands you that
ye restore deposits to their owners, and if ye judge between mankind, that
ye judge justly'(IV.58). Other Qurʾānic verses and traditions of the Prophet
speak about the necessity of implementing justice even if it is in favour of
a bitter enemy or against a close relative, or if it is in the interest of a weak
person against a noble one. Justice is an absolute value in Islam which should
not be compromized. Muslims glorify *al-khilāfa ar-rāshida* because of its high
standard of applying justice.

Shūrā (consultation): This means deliberation on a matter (public or
private) by the concerned parties in order to reach the appropriate decision.
The word is mentioned twice in the Qurʾān, once as an attribute of the
believers that they conduct their affairs by *shūrā* (XLII.38); the second time

as a clear instruction to the Prophet himself that he should consult with his people on public affairs (III.159). The Prophet practiced *shūrā* widely, to the extent that Abū Hurayra, one of his close companions, said that he had never seen anybody more consultative with his companions than the Prophet. (*al-Tirmidhī*). *Shūrā* in public affairs is obligatory on rulers and its resolution is binding on them; it becomes more so when it requires some sacrifice from the ruled. According to the practice of the Prophet those who were consulted included four categories: everybody concerned, tribal chiefs, experts on matters related to their expertise, and persons of opinion and wisdom on delicate and complicated issues.

Bayʿa (homage): This term means free allegiance given to the ruler by the populace who recognize his authority in return for implementing justice based on *Sharīʿa* rulings. The Prophet was given *Bayʿa* on a number of occasions: by *Anṣār* leaders to protect him in Medina, by women who accepted Islam and pledged to abide by its ethics, by the people of Medina who recognized his political authority, and by the believers who promised to fight with him in Ḥudaybiyya. The concept of *Bayʿa*, as an expression of allegiance to the new ruler, continued all through the history of the caliphate, even after it lost its meaning under hereditary systems. Theoretically, jurists made the free *Bayʿa* a condition to recognize the authority of the new caliph.

Equality: Islam considers all people descendants of Adam, the first prophet to humanity. The fact that Adam was created of clay means that nobody has a distinction by right of birth over others. The Qurʾān confirmed the principle of equality, 'O mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another. Lo! The noblest of you, in the sight of God, is the best in conduct' (XLIX.13). Thus, men and women are equal in their rights and duties before God. Other traditions confirmed that there is no distinction between people because of colour, race or gender; it is faith in God that makes a difference.

Freedom: Islam considers freedom as part of human dignity; it is one of its merits over angels (who obey God all the time). In exception to the rest of all creation, only human beings have the freedom not to obey God and they should not be compelled to do so. The Qurʾān says, 'Then whosoever will, let him believe, and whosoever will, let him disbelieve' (XVIII.29). If man is free to choose his god, then he is free about other matters which are less important. Muslims since early times followed different *madhāhib* (different schools of thought) and organized themselves in different political groupings.

Accountability: Muslims are supposed to obey their rulers as long as they rule with honesty and justice. They have the right to advise and censure them if they commit wrongs. Enjoining good and preventing evil, is a well established principle in Islam. Since all human beings are fallible, they have to be subjected to correction.

Security of basic needs: the ruler and society are required, in Islam, to make all efforts to secure the basic needs for all people, especially the poor and the weak. *Zakāt* is meant to be the major institution used by the state as a social net to meet the basic needs of the poor, elderly, indebted and handicapped people and the traveller. The state may resort to other means, if *zakāt* is not enough to cover all needy people. Society is instructed to give *ṣadaqa* (charity) to needy people, especially relatives and neighbours.

Chapter 8.1

POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

El-Tayeb Zein al-Abidin

During the last days of the Abbasid Caliphate (749–1258), the Muslim world was divided into regions and small states governed by military commanders under the name of the Abbasid caliph, or by rebel movements in southern Arabia and North Africa. The legitimacy of the caliph, which used to be based upon *Bayʿa* and *shūrā* during the *Rāshidūn* era (632–61), shifted to the personal authority of the caliph as a political symbol for the unity of the *umma*. From the twelfth century on, the source for legitimacy among regional dynasties became the defence of Muslim lands against various invaders: Crusaders, Mongols or Romans. In traditional juristic writings, the state does not exist as a corporate institution with a legal personality; governmental institutions are legitimate because they are authorized by God and divine law (*Sharīʿa*). The Ottoman caliphate (1281–1923), which succeeded the Abbasids, managed, by the first quarter of the sixteenth century, to control the Mameluke Muslim dominions of Syria and Egypt, and later it annexed the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa. Although the Ottomans did not control the entire Muslim world, they nevertheless gave a form of protection against European colonialism. Other centres of power were the Safavids in Persia and the Mughal in the Indian sub-continent. When the Ottoman caliphate was weakened by the eighteenth century, it lost its grip on the Muslim world, which became exposed to the rising European colonial powers. Consequently, it was arbitrarily divided into small entities according to the wishes of the European powers who ruled them directly or indirectly; most of those entities became the 'nation-states' of present times!

The European colonial rule which continued over most of the Muslim world for 50 to 150 years, imposed its own laws, system of administration, language and civic education. When Muslim countries gained their independence in the 1950s and 1960s, national aspirations were to unite in one form or another. That was denied them by the powerful Western countries, which had divided them in the first place. Gradually, the emerging nation-states became

acceptable, the rulers welcomed the status quo and common people lived with it. The formation of the Arab League (1945) which comprised twenty-two states, and the Organization of Islamic Countries (1969) which included fifty-seven states, were attempts to seek some form of association among Muslim countries, though both organizations were ineffective in solving real problems. The colonial rulers handed power after independence to monarchs, tribal chiefs, westernized elites or military commanders who had led the independence movements. The people did not have a real say in selecting their governments. The organization of government in each country continued, to a great extent, as it used to be during the colonial era. The transfer of power was hereditary in the case of monarchies, or by quasi-elections that were quickly interrupted by military juntas, or monopolized by the leaders who led the liberation movements. Thus, organization of governments in the Muslim world was largely influenced by the sudden disappearance of the Ottoman Empire, the imposed colonial administration, the Jewish occupation of Palestine, foreign pressure and lack of democratic traditions. The common people were not politically involved in the choice of the government system; they accepted the choice of their leaders.

Types of governments

The fifty-seven member countries in the OIC represent almost the whole Muslim world, but the most important states according to population size, the economic power and cultural influence are Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran and Malaysia in eastern and southern Asia; Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria in the Arab world; Turkey in Europe; Morocco and Algeria in North Africa; Nigeria and Senegal in Sub-Saharan Africa. We will focus on those countries when it comes to details of political systems and institutions. Generally speaking, the types of governments in the OIC countries go significantly in their constitutional forms, political attitudes and ideological orientations. From a constitutional perspective, they vary between monarchies and republics, military and civilian, unitary and federal; politically some are semi-democratic while others are authoritarian, some are capitalist and others are socialist; and from an ideological point of view some governments are Islamic while others are secular. In other words, different types of governments are found in the Muslim world with similar characteristics to those in the third world. Monarchies exist in the Arab world, probably the only executive monarchies that remain. Some of them are constitutional monarchies like Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain; others exercise absolute power as in Oman and Saudi Arabia. However, monarchies proved over the years to be more stable: their transfer of power was smooth in most cases, their policies were cautiously wise and more responsive to the welfare of their people. Many monarchies faced military coups; they were only successful in Egypt (1952), Iraq (1958), Yemen (1962), and Libya (1969). It was Egypt which set the example for the Arab armies to seize power, although Egypt's policies and system of

government changed dramatically after the demise of Gamal Abdel Nasser. The experiments of military rule were no longer attractive to the general public nor to the politicians who used to support them; some military governors tried to change to civilian rule, allowing elections and multi-party systems.

The republics that were established by general elections after independence did not live long; military juntas seized power and continued in office until they were overthrown by other juntas or by public uprising, as happened twice in Sudan (1964 and 1985) and Indonesia (1998). Republics, even when they hold elections and allow political parties to function, do not often change the government in power as in the case of Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen and the new republics of Central Asia. However, the majority of Muslim governments are quasi-democratic, hold elections and allow some form of pluralism; the best examples of democratic governance are Senegal, Mali, Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey. Senegal and Malaysia are among the few which have not experienced *coups d'état* since their independence. Few of those states are parliamentarian while the majority are presidential with enormous executive powers that cannot be checked by the judiciary or the legislature. Most of those semi-democracies are fragile and do not meet the required standards of human rights. The explanation, as correctly analysed by David Smock of the USIP, 'has more to do with historical, political, cultural, and economic factors than with religious ones.' It is absurd to say that Islam is incompatible with democracy, when it was the only religion which instructed its prophet to consult his people on public affairs (Qurʾān, III.159), and allowed his immediate successors to hold office by public consultation. Even in monarchies, one party systems and quasi-democracies, there is a tradition of informal consultation with tribal chiefs, heads of clans, religious scholars (ʿulama) and expert technocrats, which reflects a form of participation in decision-making. The problem arises when this process is not institutionalized, and when its outcome is not binding upon the ruler.

Governments which call themselves Islamic or follow *Sharīʿa* laws are limited in number: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, Pakistan, Mauritania, Bahrain and Oman. Among these states, Iran is more democratic than the others in the sense that it holds regular elections which lead to a peaceful transfer of power, mainly between religious conservatives and reformists, and a high degree of division of power exists between the executive, the legislative and the judiciary. Even though not everybody is allowed to contest elections, the Guardian Council vets those who are qualified to compete or not, according to their Islamic credentials. Iran's complex political system combines elements of a modern Islamic theocracy with democracy. However, there are powerful unelected institutions that control the system such as the Supreme Leader (*Murshid*), the Guardian Council, the Judiciary and the Expediency Council. Furthermore, those institutions are dominated by conservative elements whose priority is ideology rather than democracy. Pakistan has done little to

deserve the title of an 'Islamic republic' despite its ideological constitution of 1973 and the Islamic laws introduced by General Zia-ul-Haq in the early 1980s, but the *ḥudūd* (limited prescribed punishments that are mentioned in the Qurʾān and *Sunna*) and prohibition of interest have never been applied. There are countries which proclaim that Islam is the state religion, like Egypt, Algeria, Bangladesh, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Qatar, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates.

What does it mean to be an Islamic state? Most important is the implementation of *Sharīʿa* laws that include *ḥudūd*, prohibition of interest on loans and deposits, collection of *zakāt* (alms tax), segregation of women, prohibition of fornication (*zinā*) and drinking alcohol. Interestingly, countries which apply these criteria have completely different types of government that range from executive monarchies to theocratic democracy to military rule and quasi-democracy. Despite their professed Islamism, the majority of legislation in those countries is not based on religious texts; it is borrowed from other experiments, mostly Western, or the outcome of human *ijtihād* (independent judgment) on the basis of *maṣlaḥa ʿamma* (common interest) which Islam allows. In the area of personal status (marriage, divorce and inheritance), the vast majority of Muslim countries implement *Sharīʿa* rulings in strict or liberal form, and applied in specialized courts. The reason behind their long continuity is that they carry the approval of the people and reflect long traditional practice.

The professed secular governments are few in the Muslim world, such as Turkey, Senegal, Syria, Gambia, Guinea, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso and the former republics of the Soviet Union. Turkey is the strictest secular state, with the military and the judiciary considering themselves the guardians of constitutional secularism. However, in the last two general elections (2002 and 2007) the public gave huge support to the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has clear Islamic roots, enabling it to twice form the government. Some Islamic intellectuals in the Arab world started to defend the AKP pragmatic model, saying that the programme of economic development, political stability and combating corruption which is followed by the AKP is no less Islamic than the implementation of *Sharīʿa* laws. A major Islamic party in Morocco borrowed the name and the approach of the Turkish party. Ironically, secular governments do control religious institutions like *waqf* (endowments), mosque sermons, *zakāt* donations, *ḥajj* (pilgrimage) arrangements, *fatwā* (religious opinion) councils, etc. Outright military governments are gradually disappearing, but they still remain in Chad, Libya and Mauritania, while others changed their apparent military character as in Egypt, Yemen, Algeria and Sudan. Because armies are usually more westernized than other institutions, one would expect their rule to be more secular than in democratic regimes. This is true in many cases as in Arab revolutionary regimes, Turkey, Indonesia and Nigeria. But there are exceptions, in the term of some religious-minded

generals, such as Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan, Nimeiry and al-Bashir in Sudan, and
Zia-ur-Rahman and H. M. Ershad in Bangladesh.

The one-party system is also shrinking, though it exists in countries like
Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and Turkmenistan. Most Muslim states follow
the unitary system but federal constitutions have been adopted in Nigeria,
Malaysia, Pakistan and recently Sudan. Almost all Muslim countries follow the
free market economy, i.e. capitalism; even the old socialist states of Algeria,
Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria started to open up after the collapse of
socialism in the Soviet Union, and the growing trend of globalization.

To sum up, even by third world standards, the democratization process in
the Muslim world is slow and the standard of human rights leaves much to be
desired. There is no real transfer or division of power, the top executive having
enormous powers that can barely be checked by any other body. It is due to
the internal cultural process, and the influence of Western powers, namely the
USA, in support of authoritarian regimes that follow pro-Western policies,
that have had an impact in preserving those authoritarian regimes. Although
the principles of justice, *shūrā*, *bayʿa*, equality, freedom and accountability are
basic teachings in Islam, and practiced in Arabia more than one thousand years
ago, Muslims are yet to institutionalize these principles into political concepts
and legislation that suit modern times. Hope may lie in moderate Islamists to
lead this process in the near future, if the climate of freedom and pluralism
prevails in the Muslim world.

Legislative assemblies

Almost all Muslim states, irrespective of their democratic character, have
legislative or consultative assemblies. Many of them are elected, but not
always in a fair election; the absolute monarchies appoint their consultative
assemblies but try to make them representative of local groups: regions,
tribes, and classes. The military and one-party systems run sham elections to
bring their own supporters to power, in addition to direct appointees by the
president. Even though the jurisdiction of those assemblies is limited, they may
criticize the civil service or the lack of some services or even the government
itself, but they cannot change it or expel ministers, and they may not reject a
bill submitted by the government. Usually the king or military leader or the
president is not accountable to the assembly and cannot be questioned by its
members. The status of the legislative assembly represents, more or less, the
degree of political freedom as practised in society at large. Even when the
assembly is bold enough to criticize government policies, it is not reflected by
the media because of internal or external censorship. Thus, it does not play
a role in educating the public about political matters. Most countries have
one legislative assembly but a few have bicameral ones, like Egypt, Pakistan,
Nigeria, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Yemen, and recently Sudan. It is common

VIII–1.1   A speaker from the Shura Council of Saudi Arabia addressing the
World Conference of Speakers of Parliaments, convened by the
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in September 2005 at the UN Headquarters
©UN Photo/Evan Schneider

practice in federal states, for the elected lower house to have more legislative
powers while the upper house, with less jurisdiction, takes care of the
interests of the federating units. In a few countries, the election of assemblies
partially follows proportional representation as is the case of Turkey, Egypt,
Indonesia and Sudan. Indonesia gives representation to the military and
professional groups, probably hoping that the military will be satisfied by its
share (100 of 550 members) and will not attempt to seize the government.

Opposition forces

Since pluralism is curtailed in most Muslim countries, serious opposition forces
are clandestine movements or banned political parties or groups, which tend to
be Islamist, liberal or socialist. The Islamists constitute the major opposition
force in most Muslim countries, especially in the Arab world. The popular
Muslim Brotherhood is banned in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria
and in all Gulf monarchies; it is allowed under different names in Yemen,
Jordan, Sudan, Malaysia and Morocco. Political Islamists are also permitted
to work in Pakistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Bahrain, Nigeria and Bangladesh. Legal
Islamic parties tend to accept the rules of the democratic game, but some

observers doubt that these parties could transfer power if they are elected. Those pessimists have no solid proof for their doubts; there is not a single case in which an Islamic party held power by election and kept it indefinitely; however, anti-democratic announcements are made by some Islamic groups and individuals who usually stand outside the arena of practical politics. Apparently this argument is used to justify banning a popular movement from gaining power in a legitimate way, as in the cases of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria and al-Nahḍa Party in Tunisia. Since the 1970s, extreme and violent groups of Islamists have started to operate in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Afghanistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Pakistan. Some of those violent groups, like *al-Jamāʿa al-islāmiyya* (Islamic group) of Egypt, *al-Qāʿida* and *al-Jihād* justify their actions on the basis that the non-implementation of *Sharīʿa* in any Muslim country makes the government, or even the silent members in society, infidels who deserve to be executed. *Al-Jamāʿa al-islāmiyya* has the merit of having revised its religious thought, publicly disowning violence in 2002. The leaders of the *Jamāʿa* wrote several books on the subject of revision, which were published in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

The lack of political freedom in the Muslim world, economic hardship, foreign occupation and American intervention in the internal affairs of Muslim countries are behind the growing trend of violence among Islamists. They feel frustrated and desperate about their own grievances and the bad conditions of their country. Violent groups hardly exist in democratic and plural states like Turkey or Senegal which openly profess secularism, but do exist in authoritarian countries like Saudi Arabia and Morocco, despite their religious credentials. Resistance groups against foreign occupation as in Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq are a different matter. The majority of ordinary Muslims give some form of support to armed resistance against foreign occupation, on the basis that 'what has been taken by force can only be regained by force', according to the famous statement of Gamal Abdel Nasser after Israel occupied Sinai in June 1967. They call this a legitimate *jihād.*

The socialists, on the other hand, formed strong opposition to conservative and pro-Western powers in the 1960s and 1970, but the situation changed after the defeat of Egypt in the Six-Day War and later the collapse of the communist bloc. However, socialist parties are still legitimately active in Morocco, Yemen, Syria and Algeria, though they are no longer a strong opposition force. The nationalists and the liberals do not form strong opposition and they are allowed to work in quasi-democratic states. They are tolerated because they do not enjoy wide popular support and do not project any threat to the regime in power.

Political parties

The Arabic word '*ḥizb*', which currently means 'political party', occurred more than twenty times in the Qurʾān, signifying group or faction. It occurred in a positive sense as 'party of God', *ḥizbullāh*, (V.56); in a negative connotation as 'party of the devil', *ḥizbu al-shayṭān* (LVIII.19); in a neutral sense 'each party is pleased with what it has' (XXIII.53); all the plural usages of the word '*aḥzāb*' (about twenty times) are in the negative sense. Thus, religious-minded people and many *ulemas* took a negative interpretation of the concept of political parties, assuming they were not approved by Islam. The use of the word '*ḥizb*' in the sense of a political party is a recent one, dating from the beginning of the twentieth century. It came slowly, unconsciously and hesitatingly to acquire the political connotation as borrowed from European ideas. In 1907 two parties were formed in Egypt: the Umma party (*Ḥizb al-umma*) and the National Party (*al-Ḥizb al-waṭanī*), both secular national parties, though the latter had a tendency towards pan-Islamism. The early political parties which were founded at the beginning of the twentieth century in the Arab world, Ottoman Empire, Indian sub-continent, Persia and North Africa tended to be more like movements or factions.

The movements aimed to mobilize the whole society in order to serve a cherished general cause such as the liberation of the country as *al-Wafd* of Egypt, or a religious goal as the case of the *Jamaʿat-i Islami* in the Indian sub-continent, or a pan-Arabism objective as pursued by a number of Syrian parties during the Ottoman era. Movements, whether Islamic, nationalist or pan-Arab, hardly accepted the idea of competitive political parties because of its divisible implications for the *umma.* Islamic movements, for a long time, avoided using the word *ḥizb* attached to their names as shown in the cases of the Muslim Brotherhood (*Jamāʿat al-ikhwān al-muslimīn*), *Jama'at-i Islami* of Pakistan, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria (*Jabhat al-inqādh al-islāmī*), the Islamic Action Front of Jordan (*Jabhat al-ʿamal al-islāmī*), the National Islamic Front of Sudan (*al-Jabha al-islāmiyya al-qawmiyya*), the Islamic Group in Lebanon (*al-Jamāʿa al-islāmiyya*), Ḥamās in the Gaza strip (*Ḥarakat al-muqāwama al-islāmiyya*), etc. As a matter of fact, political Islamists have only recently accepted the idea of multiple parties in a democratic society. Sheikh Ḥasan al-Bannā (1906–49), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, condemned party politics (*al-ḥizbiyya)* in Egypt. However, Islamic political organizations have come a long way since al-Bannā; decades of harassment and persecution taught them that it would be better for them to compete peacefully with other political parties than suffer the oppression of authoritarian regimes. Many active Islamic parties in Egypt, Yemen, Pakistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Sudan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Jordan, Morocco, and so on, accepted to coexist with others in a plural democratic society. Some showed their readiness to cooperate and form alliances with socialists and secularists as happened in Yemen, Sudan, Pakistan, Malaysia and Algeria. This does not

mean the disappearance of ambivalence among all Islamic organizations toward competitive party politics in an open society. Established traditions die hard.

Political factions were usually established by dignitaries and elites in the capital city to enhance their chances of being called, by the effective authority in the country, to form the government. Movements and factions are not typical democratic political parties which compete on equal bases to win general elections. In many Muslim countries at the time, it was the ruling government which determined the character and composition of a parliament, rather than the other way round. Moreover, the parties function under a restricted freedom of expression and association, the arbitrary authority of a monarch and a colonial power which had its preferences of who should win in elections. This was in addition to the social conditions of poverty, illiteracy, ethnic and sectarian divisions rampant in society. Under such circumstances, it was difficult for political parties to work smoothly and develop to maturity. A survey conducted in 2007 in five Arab countries (Morocco, Jordan, Algeria, Palestine and Kuwait), which have experience in regular elections and a multi-party system, showed that the major factors that influence the voter's choice for a candidate are agreement with the candidate on important political issues, the level of his education and his commitment to religion, and the least influential factors are his political party and his tribal links.

The World Information Access (WIA) at the University of Washington ran a survey in 2007 on the websites of political parties in over fifty Muslim countries. It found that 1,070 political parties exist in sixty-three countries, but only 356 were active online. The majority of them are secularists. They were classified according to ideological categories as follows: over half the political content online belongs to liberal, conservative or socialist parties. A third of the content belongs to 'other' political parties, which includes nationalist, green and populist parties. A very small portion belongs to Islamic fundamentalist parties. This survey cannot be representative of the actual situation of political parties on the ground, because the internet is not widely used for politics in the Muslim world; it favours the well-off elites, the educated and westernized groups. It is no surprise that the majority of the sample turned to be secularists, liberals or conservatives. Elsewhere, the report mentions that the percentage of Islamic fundamentalist parties on internet was 4 per cent and the Islamic secularists was 6 per cent. The term 'Islamic secularists' is difficult to define!

It is true that most governments in the Muslim world are in the hands of secularist parties, either a dominant government party or a coalition of parties picked by the ruling authority in the country. It is a situation that reflects the degree of freedom allowed to political parties and the fairness of elections when they are held, rather than the real popular support enjoyed by these parties. In many cases freedom of association is restricted, elections are manipulated by governments and the absolute leader, president or monarch, can form the government irrespective of election results. However, elections in Muslim

countries in the last two decades have shown that moderate Islamic parties are making steady progress when a reasonable degree of fairness is observed. The Islamic National Front in Sudan for the first time became he third biggest party in the election of 1986, winning all twenty-one seats allotted to the North; the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria gained an overwhelming majority in 1992 but the military intervened to cancel the undesirable result; the leader of *Nahḏatu-l-ʿulama* of Indonesia, Abdurrahman Wahid was captured the presidency in 1999 and his party (the National Awakening Party) gained the second-most seats in parliament; the Justice and Development Party won an absolute majority in the Turkish elections of 2002 and 2007, which had never happened to any political party in decades; the new Justice and Development Party in Morocco came second in both elections of 2002 and 2007; the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, despite the fact that it has been banned for more than half a century and suffered tough intimidation from government agencies, came a strong second eighty-eight seats in the election of 2005; the Islamic Action Front of Jordan won more than one third of the parliamentary seats in 1993, which scared the government into changing the rules of the game before the next election; the Yemeni Association for Reform came second to the ruling party of president ʿAlī ʿAbdallāh Ṣāliḥ in 2003; Hamas won the majority vote in the Palestinian election of 2006; and similar success stories can be said about Islamic political parties in Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq and Afghanistan.

However, political parties in the Muslim world suffer from many weaknesses: the political culture of authoritarian behaviour and low respect for the rule of law; political instability; restriction of political freedom and manipulation of elections; ethnic sectarian and regional influences on political affiliation; divisions within political parties; and poor resources of finance. Nevertheless, if political freedom prevails in the Muslim world and elections are held regularly and fairly, the situation of political parties will change for the better in the near future.

The role of Ulemas in politics

In Islam there is no intermediary institution, like the church, between the believer and God. However, ulemas as scholars of Islamic studies are accepted in Muslim societies as interpreters of *Sharīʿa* laws. The religious opinion they give, called *fatwā*, is not God's judgment but their own understanding of religious texts in The Qurʾān and *Sunna*. In many Muslim countries there is an official body, council or individual, which is authorized to issue the religious verdict on different matters. The general public does not usually go by the official *fatwā* but by the opinion of the *ʿālim* (scholar) whose knowledge, piety and integrity they trust. Those trusted ulemas have played a significant role in the public and personal lives of Muslims throughout history, especially in the case of *Shīʿī* Muslims who are obliged to follow the opinions of a

competent religious jurist (*marjiᶜ taqlīd*). Historically, Muslims all over the world followed certain schools of religious thought (*madhāhib*) founded by distinguished scholars like Imām Jaᶜfar al-Ṣādiq (d. 756), Imām Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 767), Imām Mālik ibn Anas (d. 795), Imām al-Shāfiᶜī (d. 820) and Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 855). They were all critical of the Abbasid caliphs, and their schools of thought prevail all over the world. The role of the religious scholar (*ᶜālim*), according to Imām al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), is to be the teacher and guide of the *sultan* (ruler) in conducting the affairs of his people. The ulemas are supposed to be courageous in confronting the rulers with their mistakes and injustices, fulfilling the *Ḥadīth* of the Prophet which is narrated by Ibn Māja: 'the best *jihād* is to give truthful advice to an unjust ruler'. The ulemas exercise their power through two major ways: influence on public opinion, and legitimization (or not) of the ruler and his policies. Since, unlike bureaucrats, ulemas live and operate within close proximity of their audience in mosques, *madrasas* (schools) or at religious occasions and social gatherings, they can easily communicate directly with people. Islam, as a comprehensive way of life, is conducive to mass political mobilization. Most of the violent Islamic groups legitimize their actions according to a *fatwā* given by a religious authority that they trust. The ulemas are expected to protect the *umma* from the arbitrary powers exercised by unjust rulers. Many ulemas in the history of Islam lived up to that standard until their names became legends among people, such as Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 778), Imām al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), al-ᶜIzz ibn ᶜAbd al-Salām (d. 1262), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328). The *Shīᶜī* Muslims go beyond that to make the grand jurist the actual ruler on behalf of the Hidden Imām, known as *Wilāyat al-Faqīh* (mandate of the jurist).

In the Ottoman Empire, the ulemas had a large influence over politics because secular institutions had to be subordinate to religion. As interpreters of religion, the ulemas became powerful in state affairs. They also enforce religious law through the offices of *muftī* (who gives the religious opinion) and *qādī* (judge) who enforces the religious verdict. The Ottomans had a strict hierarchy of ulemas, who were employed by the state. The highest office is Shaikhul Islam (the chief official jurist), who was chosen by royal warrant from amongst the distinguished *qādīs* of important cities. He had the power to confirm new sultans and his *fatwā* had the authority over the community. Nevertheless, he exercised his jurisdiction under the authority of the caliph. The Turkish reformists were against the authority of those conservative ulemas over state affairs, which explains the animosity shown to them after the collapse of the caliphate. However, the constitutional secularism of Turkey did not prevent the government from affiliating the department of religious affairs to the office of the prime minister.

In conservative Saudi Arabia, the Islamic clergy fulfills the role of counsel to the king and they have jobs in various governmental institutions. They control

influential religious establishments: The Ministry of *Ḥajj* and Endowments, the Association of Senior Jurists (*Hayʾat kibār al-ʿulamāʾ*), the Muslim League (*Rābiṭat al-ʿālam al-islāmī*), the Grand Mosques of Mecca and Medina, and an active department for missionary activity with a network in many countries. In times of crises and need to take decisions on delicate matters, the Saudi government seeks their support and usually it gets what it wants. This was clear when Juhayman al-ʿUtaybi seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979, the government needed a *fatwā* to overrun them by force inside the sacred building; another instance was when the government invited American troops in 1990 to invade Iraq from Saudi territories and when it had to change some of the strict rules of pilgrimage due to the huge numbers of people coming to *ḥajj* from different parts of the world. After all, the founder of the Saudi dynasty, Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd, managed to overcome the diverse tribal affiliations and increase the size of his kingdom when he allied himself with the leader of the Salafi movement, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, in mid-eighteenth century. That cooperation between the royal family and the leaders of the salafi school still exists today. The Iranian ulemas, who control Iran's religious institutions and depend on its private finance, had a tradition of political activism: they took part in the constitutional Revolution of 1905–11, sided at the beginning with premier Mosaddegh in nationalizing the British oil company in 1953, and headed the Islamic Revolution of 1978–79. They continue to control the major political institutions in the state. In Afghanistan, the commanders of the *mujāhidīn* (freedom fighters) recruited the Taliban, the students of religious schools, to fight the Soviet army and later NATO troops. The ulemas have been involved all the way in the *jihād* struggle and in influencing political decisions; they still pressure the government to abide by the *Sharīʿa*.

Secular Arab rulers like Abd al-Nasser of Egypt, Saddam Husayn of Iraq and Hafiz al-Asad of Syria attempted to break the influence of the ulemas after their rise to power. Religious institutions of *waqf*, mosques, schools and *zakāt* donations were put under government control. They brutally suppressed Islamic organizations and any attempt to dilute their governments' secular ideology. After some time, they were obliged to acknowledge the power of religion, and tried to use Islamic symbols and history in order to strengthen the regimes' popularity. The communication revolution of television broadcasting and internet made it easier for people to learn about religious opinions outside the sphere and control of their governments; they would be influenced by ulemas whom they had never seen. Another development is the establishment of ulemas' association outside the control of governments like the International Union of Muslim Scholars (*al-ittiḥād al-ʿālamī li-ʿulamāʾ al-muslimīn*) headed by Shaikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi and the *Sunna* Association of ʿUlemas in Iraq. Ulemas, in many countries, operate as part and parcel of the state apparatus, contribute to political stability and encourage change and development within reasonable limits. However, in cases

VIII–1.2   A view of the Parliament of Lebanon during a speech by UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in January 2009
© UN Photo/EskinderDebebe

of antagonistic religious policies and foreign intervention or occupation, the ulemas may lead the opposition for change and liberation. They did just that against the Shah of Iran, the communist regime of southern Yemen, Suharto of Indonesia, Musharraf of Pakistan, the occupation of Palestine, the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Labour unions, professional associations and student unions

The Muslim world has witnessed a form of professional organization in Anatolian Turkey since the fourteenth century, known as 'Islamic Guilds'. The guild was formed by artisans working in the same trade, headed by a *shaikh* selected by the members of the organization. It was estimated that in the seventeenth century there were 250 guilds in Cairo, 160 in Aleppo, 80 in Tunis and 60 in Algiers. The role of the guild was to regulate the production of goods, maintain a professional code of ethics, oversee prices (particularly during times of crises), maintain good relations among members and supply labour. They provided a link between tradesmen and authorities who governed the urban population and the market (*sūq*). Taxes were levied on the basis

of lists drawn up by the *shaikhs* for their guild members. The modernization process started with Muhammad Ali in Egypt, who created new agencies for administration. European colonialism took over the principal economic sectors and industrial production, gradually led to the disappearance of the guilds which could no longer stand Western competition.

Modern labour unions came into being after the Second World War; the first to be established in the Arab world were in Egypt, Tunisia and Sudan by the mid-forties of the last century. This created the opportunity for them to play a political role against European colonial rule, a tradition which continues until today against Israeli occupation of Arab lands. Even when Egypt and Jordan exchanged diplomatic relations with Israel, the trade unions in the two countries refused to normalize relations with the 'enemy'. At present, almost all Muslim countries allow the organization of trade unions, including Gulf countries, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar which have labour committees. Membership in unions in the Gulf states is restricted to citizens, excluding expatriates. All Arab unions are affiliated with the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU) which was established in Cairo in 1956, but since 1977 has been based in Damascus. In its last conference in March 2008, the Confederation promised that the year 2008 would be devoted to the struggle to strengthen the rights and freedoms of trade unions in the Arab world. It shows that the degree of freedom of association is still restricted after half a century of existence. An Islamic union was established in Geneva in 1981, under the name of the International Islamic Federation for Work (IIFW). It was founded by trade unions in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sudan, Morocco and Jordan, which were under the control of Islamists who were unsympathetic to their governments. ICATU is against the Islamic federation because it is afraid that it might divide Arab trade unions. IIFU held its last conference in July 1999, its central issue being to support the Islamic shrines in Jerusalem (*al-Quds*). An important objective of IIFW was to support liberation causes and strengthen Islamic brotherhood. However the Federation was too weak to achieve its objectives.

It is fair to say that the freedom and independence of trade unions in Muslim countries reflect the degree of political freedom allowed. In countries with a pluralistic democracy like Turkey, Indonesia, Senegal, Nigeria and Malaysia, trade unions are at liberty to defend the negotiating positions of their members even during strikes, and they can take political stands against the government of the day. In less democratic countries like Morocco, Yemen, Iraq, Tunisia, and Sudan, trade unions may be freely elected and defend the rights of their members but the right to strike is very restricted. However, trade unions do not always abide by these restrictions; in Morocco about 607 strikes took place in the period 1996–97; in Egypt, where strikes are banned by law, eighty labour strikes occurred in 1998. But the unions cannot indulge in politics against the

VIII–1.3   The inauguration of Somalia's first parliament in two decades, in Mogadishu, 20 August 2012. Some 215 of the total number of 275 Members of Parliament were sworn in at the ceremony. Here, copies of the Qurʾān are laid out ahead of the swearing-in ceremony
© UN Photo/Stuart Price

government, and they have to coexist with its arbitrary power. In authoritarian countries like Syria and Libya, trade unions are well under the control of the government and are assiociated of the regime. All Arab governments allow or encourage political stands against Israeli occupation of Arab lands, especially in Palestine, or against Western mockery of the Prophet Muḥammad and the religion of Islam; however, street demonstrations which may get out of hand are forbidden.

Professional associations like those of lawyers, doctors and faculty members are allowed to function in many Muslim countries. Again, this depends on the degree of freedom society in general. It is difficult to falsify elections of professional associations, but governments attempt to influence these elections as much as they can in order to bring 'safe' elements to the executive committees of these associations. Being more educated and middle class-oriented, these associations are not likely to be manipulated by governments, but at the same time they do not like to act in political opposition to the government or as an ally of an opposition party. However, in some cases they act against military dictators, as happened in Sudan in 1964

(Abboud's regime) and in 1985 (Nimeiry's rule), and under General Suharto in Indonesia (1998), and General Musharraf in Pakistan (2007–8). The one-party dominated regimes of Libya, Syria, Egypt and Tunisia, control labour trade unions and professional associations as well, and use them to further the party agenda.

Student unions exist in most Muslim countries, especially in democratic and quasi-democratic ones. In some states they are prohibited, like Saudi Arabia and other Gulf emirates, with the exception of Kuwait and Bahrain. Military regimes do not tolerate student activities and tend to ban them, especially at the beginning of their rule. One-party regimes control student unions as they control trade unions and professional associations. Quasi-democratic states attempt to make the student unions the service organizations which do not interfere in politics except in national issues approved by the government. The Egyptian regime, despite the country's ancient universities and huge student population, interferes in the formation and activities of student unions through the university security police. The Cairo Administrative Court ruled, in November 2008, that the university security police was unlawful and should be abolished and substituted for civilian security guards under the authority of the university president. It is not surprising that Muslim student unions flourish more in Western countries, and involve themselves in political matters on local and international levels, such as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS) in Britain and the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO). Some of these organizations are used by opposition forces against their authoritarian governments, which do not allow political freedom. This has happened in different countries at different times, as in the case of Iran, Syria, Libya, Sudan, Iraq, Egypt and others. The International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO) was founded by Muslim students in Europe in the 1970s, but it expanded to include a number of unions in Muslim countries like Sudan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, Indonesia and Kuwait. The federation is financed by some Gulf countries and controlled by Islamists. The major competing groups among students are the Islamists, the socialists and the nationalists. The Islamists managed to dominate several student unions for long periods of time in Kuwait, Sudan, Pakistan, Malaysia, Morocco and Egypt. Some unions were active in politics and played a significant national role, as happened in Sudan in 1964 when the Khartoum University Student Union instigated the popular uprising which overthrew General Abboud; it played a similar role against general Nimeiry in 1985. The unions in Iran, Kuwait, Malaysia and Indonesia were also influential in their countries' politics. Iran is attempting to establish an international body for students in the Muslim world. It called for a general conference by the

end of November 2008 under the slogan, 'for the cause of Islamic unity and solidarity'. Student unions from 14 Muslim countries were invited; it is likely that Iran will succeed in its venture since no other major Muslim country is ready to take the initiative.

Organizations of civil society

The term 'civil society' refers to all non-governmental and commercial bodies. We have already dealt with some of them (political parties, trade unions, professional associations and student unions). In this section we shall deal with NGOs that work in other areas such as relief, development, social services and human rights. Those organizations are to be found in almost all Muslim countries, but in many they are not free of government interference. Some charitable organizations were established by welthey Islamists in Gulf countries to work in the areas of relief, social services and *da°wā* (missionary), in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Examples of these organizations include: *al-Hay²a al-khayriyya al-islāmiyya al-°ālamiyya* (International Islamic Charity Organization) in Kuwait, and *Jam°iyyat Qatar al-khayriyya* (Qatar Charity Association); some were formed by governments like: *al-Majlis al-islāmī al-°ālamī li-l-da°wā wa-l-ighātha* (the International Islamic Council for Da°wā and Relief) established by al-Azhar in Egypt, and *Hay²at al-ighātha al-°ālamiyya* (the International Relief Organization), founded by the Saudi Government. After 11 September and the American pressure on Gulf states, Arab governments put the financing and activities of charitable organizations under strict supervision. Egypt tries to control relief organizations sponsored by professional associations under Islamist leadership, and NGOs that work in the area of strengthening democracy and human rights. The latter type of organizations are forbidden in several Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and are harassed in quasi-democracies like Tunisia, Algeria and Sudan. However, NGOs are spreading in the Muslim world and gradually gaining legitimacy and power. They may act as forerunners to strong political parties in the future.

Turkey led the way to strengthen NGOs in the Muslim world. In May 2005 it organized an international conference of NGOs; more than 300 NGOs from forty countries attended the occasion. It was addressed by top government ministers and the Secretary-General of OIC. The outcome was the creation of the Union of Non-Governmental Organizations of the Islamic World (UNIW); Istanbul was chosen as its headquarters. By April 2008, UNIW had 130 member organizations. Its objectives are: to ensure sustainable development, protect principal rights and freedoms, introduce Islamic culture and values, and support all attempts targeting cooperation and solidarity in the Islamic world.

The Muslim world has no choice but to move forward on the path of freedom, equality, accountability, human rights and justice. Political systems and institutions should be based on these values, which have been entrenched in Islamic teachings for many centuries; but they are also in demand today for progress and stability.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS

Eltigani Abdulgadir Hamid

PREFACE

Identifying the sources of socio-political changes and making predictions about the direction of their development poses a unique challenge for social scientists. Many of them have noticed, for instance, that Muslim societies from the eighteenth century to the present have been profoundly disrupted and transformed, but the reasons such disruption and/or transformation and what forces affected it remain a matter of debate.

Various factors have readily been identified: the breakup of Muslim dynasties, economic decline, internal religious conflict, and the establishment of European economic, political and cultural domination.[1] These forces are, presumably, responsible for the creation of national states, for the modernization of agriculture and industrialization, for the major changes in class structure, and for the acceptance of secular nationalist and other modern ideologies that radically altered Islamic ways of thinking and behaving.[2] Hence there is no dearth of factors offered, but the trouble is in understanding why these factors are bundled together, and which of them is more significant than the others.

To explain social changes and/or political transformations a scholar usually relies on explanatory frameworks and paradigms that would necessarily involve theoretical assumptions. The tendency, for instance, to neglect certain elements in the phenomenon and to stress another is not an uncommon practice. One analyst noticed such a tendency among scholars who specialize

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1. I. M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. xxi.
2. *Ibid.,*

in South East Asia. They tend, he says, to see the history of the region 'as shaped by influences external to the region rather than as a product of an internal dynamics.'[3] This observation also holds true in the case of Middle Eastern Muslim societies.

Much weight has rightly been attributed to European colonialism and its legacy, particularly to the role that the colonial state played in transforming traditional structures and creating new centres of power. In contrast, indigenous political forces and cultures, local elites and various elements of stability and continuity have usually been neglected. If ever mentioned, these elements are often mentioned in the context of an internal 'decline' that beset societies long before the advent of European colonialism. Claims have long been made that Muslim societies, with their factionalism, ceaseless civil wars, and intrinsic hostility to change, have witnessed a 'comprehensive decline' before any European intervention. Focusing on the way in which these societies have been organized, some scholars have concluded that Muslim rulers possess absolute power and exercise it directly, without the mediation of intermediary groups, or institutions; whereas the ruled are divided vertically into separate social groups. As a result, these societies have often been stationary and retrograde. In other words, this 'backwardness' is inherent in Muslims' own social structure and traditions, a strong reminiscence of Wittfogel's concept of 'oriental despotism'.

Building on this argument, other scholars and students of Muslim societies contended that the beginnings of the Arab-Muslim cultural 'reawakening' also began with 'external factors'; namely the European occupation (particularly Napoleon's expedition of 1798), which awakened them from their 'medieval slumber'.[4] The role of the pre-colonial indigenous movements of Islamic reform is either ignored or underestimated, though some of them were important precursors of political and intellectual developments that had an impulse of their own.

As if the denial of the 'internal dynamics' were not enough, some scholars have also resisted the suggestion of a possible continuing line of development in the history of Islamic societies. Their opposition is based on the grounds that there are important divergences and distinctiveness in Islamic history that dos not warrant any suggestion of a unitary Islamic history. Hence they tend to see Islamic revivalism as a product of 'combinations' of forces and events rather than a 'culmination' of a line of development of Islamic politics.[5]

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3. J. D. Legge, 'The Writing of Southeast Asian History', in N. Tarling ed., *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, I, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 6.

4. P. Hitti, 'The Possibility of Union Among the Arab States', *The American Historical Review*, XLVIII, No. 4, July 1934, p. 724.

5. *Ibid.*

In this chapter, an attempt has been made to discern general patterns of Islamic revivalism in terms of cycles of crisis and resurgent responses, thus advancing the thesis that the history of Islamic societies constitutes a structural unity with periodic patterns. Space does not allow a full review of the writings of political developments in the Muslim world. To set limits to our inquiry, we propose to define political development as a function of a social system that facilitates popular participation in governmental and political processes at all levels, and the bridging of regional, religious, caste, linguistic, tribal, or other divergences. It is a process of instituting organizations and procedures, as well as bringing citizens into active participation in the public affairs of their societies. (These two processes are of course related, but they are also analytically distinct, for mass participation must be preceded by a complex political system.) Conceived in this way, political development is regarded as a continuing multidimensional process. This urges us to examine not only the forms of organization and political objectives, but also the methods of domestic mobilization of capabilities and ingredients of power; namely, moral legitimacy and popular support.

Our purposes in this chapter are two: first, to present a brief assessment of pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism, the two interrelated 'ideas' that have inspired reformist movements in the older Islamic world and have given leading present-day proponents of Islamism and nationalism their basic outlook. We will trace the evolution of modern ways of thinking and acting that grew up in urban centres in Istanbul, Cairo and Damascus, from where their influence radiated into the wider Islamic world. Our focus will be on the influential teachers and scholars who developed and promoted value orientations and attempted, in terms of these values, to organize and evaluate the social reality and to convert others to the same mission. We will not be concerned only with their 'ideas' but also with their 'interaction': that is to say, their interaction with the late Ottoman rule and early colonial regime, as well as the social context that stimulated such ideas. Special attention will be given to elite formation, intra-elite rivalries, and inter-elite alliances.

Our second purpose is to examine the imperialist impact on Muslim societies, which was embodied in the creation of domestic structures of political power, and to investigate the ensuing post-colonial political struggles and alliances among contending old and new elites in Muslim countries. An attempt will be made to discern, first, their endeavours to modify or transform the colonial situation, and replace it with a viable political order. Second, we will examine the modifications and reformulations that these ideologies themselves underwent in their post-colonial, nation-building efforts.

The overall structure of this chapter follows substantive topics. After this introductory note on modes of interpretation among social scientists, we will present an account of pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism, not as a

simple narrative history, but rather as an attempt to examine elite formations, alliances and interactions. Examining these two movements against the broader, external and internal political background lays the groundwork for later sections on the East-West confrontation during the Cold War era, the non-alignment movements and regional Muslim organizations. The chapter then concludes with final remarks on those features which constitute the crux of political developments in the Muslim world.

Pan-Islamism

From about the middle of the nineteenth century Muslims all over the world began to witness a new phase of military defeats: from India, where the Mughal Empire collapsed, to Central Asia, where the Russians conquered Samarkand and annexed Bokhara, to North Africa, where the British occupied Egypt and French Tunisia, to East Africa where the Germans declared Dar al-Salam their protectorate. This imperial onslaught and the ensuing military defeats and humiliations convinced Muslims worldwide not only to tolerate the Turkish sultan but to look to him for protection and leadership.

It was within these settings that some intellectuals, most of whom were closely associated with the Ottoman authorities, began to entertain the idea of forming an Islamic brotherhood, or pan-Islamism, that would unite Muslims under the leadership of the Ottoman Caliphate. At the same time, and since the seat of the Caliphate was in Turkey, Islamic country to Europe in terms of wealth and knowledge, it would not be inappropriate, they thought, to make it the centre of that Islamic brotherhood, from where the light would radiate to Asia and Africa. This line of thinking became, under Sultan Abdul Hamid, an official policy.[6] But seeing that the imperialistic assault had cultural as well as political and military aspects, some of the exponents of pan-Islamism also began to look for ways of 'reforming' Islamic societies and not only uniting them. This idea of social and political reform, based on a deeper renewal of Islamic thought, was greatly advanced by the works of two prominent thinkers: Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–97) and Muḥammad ʿAbdu, but it is al-Afghani who is usually credited with being the pioneer of this concept of reform in the late nineteenth century.

Information on al-Afghani's upbringing and early doctrinal affiliations is very little and controversial, but his first public appearance was in 1871 in Istanbul when some conventional ʿulama were offended by his philosophical views, and accordingly al-Afghani had to leave for Egypt.

Based in Cairo during the rule of Khedive Ismaʿil Pasha, al-Afghani began to attract young scholars and writers, among them Muḥammad ʿAbdu,

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6. B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1969, p. 342.

who was to become the main exponent of the reform movement, and Saad Zaghlul, the founder of the Wafd party. But being unrestrained in expressing his political views and in criticizing the existing order, al-Afghani was deported from Egypt in 1879. After a short stay in India, he arrived in Paris where, being the indefatigable fighter against imperialism that he was, he published an anti-British newspaper, *al-ʿUrwat al-wuthqā* (the Indissoluble Bond), together with his former disciple Muḥammad ʿAbdu.

Al-Afghani was not only intent on presenting Islam as a base for resistance to foreign oppression; he was also keen on presenting it as a base for opposition to dictatorial regimes. In 1879, he published a remarkable essay, *Despotic Government,* where he gave an account of why Muslim societies (the Easterners) had not developed republican governments. He gave three reasons: the long experience that Muslims have had under arbitrary rule of despots, the superstitions that have infiltrated their minds and distorted their perception, and the persistence in opposing true sciences. Understandably, people who are politically suppressed and whose minds are clouded with ignorance cannot aspire to a constitutional (limited) government (*al-Ḥukāma al-muqayyada*).[7]

Al-Afghani's arguments found many supporters. Although he ceased to be an active participant in the political struggles of the day, his call for a thorough critique of *taqlīd*, his conception of Islam as a source of inspiration for parliamentary democracy as well as a base for resisting oppression and opposing dictatorial regimes, have all earned him the reputation as a great thinker.

Al-Afghani, however, was not alone in attributing the backwardness of Muslim societies to the widening scientific and technological gap that stood between them and Europe. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, when most of the great Muslim empires suffered dramatic collapse, Muslims began to ask a desperate and seemingly insoluble question: how could it be conceivable that Europeans, nonbelievers as they were, achieved economic and military superiority, crushed Muslim armies, so much so that Muslim institutions were everywhere shrinking and crumbling before the European onslaught.

Seeing the phenomenal success of European society, particularly in areas of military technology, Ottoman sultans and officials wanted to appropriate 'those aspects of European civilization which seemed responsible for the Europeans' success.'[8] Industry and science were thought to be the secret of

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7. L. M. Kenny, 'Al-Afghani on Types of Despotic Government', *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, LXXXVI, No. 1, (January-March, 1966), pp. 20–4. For the Arabic text see Maḥmūd Abū Rayyaḥ, *Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī*, Cairo, Dār al-Maʿārif, 3rd ed., 1980, pp. 73–8.

8. W. H. McNeil, *The Rise of the West*, Chicago & London, 1963, p. 694

European success and, hence, both Mahmud II in Turkey and Muḥammad Ali Pasha and his descendants in Egypt were intent on building and maintaining European-style armies, factories and schools. But Europe was not only factories and armies; it was also the source of liberalism and nationalism. Creeping into the minds and hearts of the new literate governing elite, which was created by the reform, were ideas of secular liberalism and nationalism, which led in the nineteenth century to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire.

Throughout his lectures, debates and writings, al-Afghani called upon Muslims not only to revolt against European domination, but also to open their minds to new ways of thinking and to acquire the new sciences and technologies that the European countries had developed.[9] Al-Afghani attracted many disciples, but it was Muḥammad ʿAbdu who took his ideas to heart and disseminated them faithfully. This is not, however, to mask the fact that Muḥammad ʿAbdu had gradually distanced himself from al-Afghani, pushed aside his brand of pan-Islamism, and presented a rather more balanced theory of gradual social change and intellectual reform.

ʿAbdu was born in 1266/1850 to a humble family in the al-Behera province in Egypt. He was sent to Tanta where he received the normal, modest education of young men of his class. A little later he associated himself with a Sufi relative who introduced him to the works of Mohammad al-Madani al-Maghrabi al-Shadhali. Around 1866 he went to Cairo to study at al-Azhar University Mosque, and upon his graduation in 1877 he was offered the position of editor of the *al-Waqāiʿ al-miṣriyya*, the official Egyptian gazette that was founded by Muḥammad Ali in 1832. The turning point in his life, however, was when he joined the circle of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani who 'shook him out of his mystic speculations and headed him towards the turmoil of politics', as one reviewer of his works puts it.[10]

In a mood of passionate patriotism, Muḥammad ʿAbdu participated, like many others, in the rebellion of ʿUrabi Pasha and, consequently, he was exiled to Beirut. During his residence there he married a Lebanese woman and came into contact with many intellectuals, thus cementing the bonds that have always bound Syria to Egypt.[11] At the some time he reunited with al-Afghani in Paris, where they worked together on issuing *al-ʿUrwatu-l-wuthqā* (the Firmest Bond),

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9. See for instance his article on *Saʿādat al-umam* (Happiness of Nations) in: Muḥammad ʿUmāra, *al-Aʿmāl al-kāmila li-Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī*, Cairo, al-Muʾssasa al-Miṣriyya al-ʿĀmma lil-Taʾlīf wa-l-Nashr & Dār al-Kātib al-ʿArabī, n.d. pp. 173–9.

10. A. S. Fulton, 'Cheikh Mohammad Abdu', *Bulletin of the Oriental Studies*, University of London, IV, No. 4, 1928, p. 869. On Abdu's personal impressions about al-Afghani, see Dr. Muḥammad ʿUmāra, ed., *al-Aʿmāl al-kāmila li-l-Imām al-shaykh Muḥammad Abdu*, 5 Volumes, Cairo, Dār al-Shurūq, 2nd ed., 2006, I. p. 525.

11. R. Gottheil, 'Mohammed Abdu, Late Mufti of Egypt', *The Journal of American Oriental Society*, XXVIII, 1907, p. 194.

the journal that became the mouthpiece of Islamic reform in the nineteenth century in the Muslim world.

Muḥammad ʿAbdu, however, differed with al-Afghani, returned to Egypt, re-entered government service, and adopted a conciliatory approach toward the British Government. He was soon appointed (by Khedive Hilmi Pasha) to the position of Grand Mufti of Egypt in 1899, but he took the opportunity to introduce, in the face of bitter opposition, a number of religious, legal, and institutional reforms which would have a far-reaching impact inside Egypt and beyond. He managed, for instance, to reform the teaching at al-Azhar and the practice of the native tribunals, to develop and apply an advanced method of *tafsīr*, and to unleash a literary revival in Egypt.[12]

The closing down of the *al-ʿUrwat al-wuthqā* in Paris was followed by the appearance in Cairo of a new journal, *al-Manār*, which rapidly became the organ of the moderate reformers. Encouraged and supported by Muḥammad ʿAbdu, Rashīd Riḍā became the outstanding editor, writer and ideologue of the *Salafi* reform movement.[13] Under his guidance *al-Manār* became an influential platform on which cultural, political and social issues around Islamic thought and society were discussed. It was in *al-Manār* that the daily lectures of Muḥammad ʿAbdu on *tafsīr*, *ṭabāʾiʿ al-istibdād* of al-Kawakibi and *al-Khilāfa* of Rashīd Riḍā himself were regularly serialized, side-by-side with the political news of the Islamic world. Thus, *al-Manār* was a pioneer in assuming the key role of making its readers accustomed to the plea for an Islamic revival through solidarity of believers, reform of Islamic thought, and religious institutions.

In order to have a better understanding of these broad themes, however, one has to examine the 'nature' of the reform and/or 'modernization' which Afghani and ʿAbdu introduced; in what ways this phase of modernization was different from earlier phases and forms of modernization (e.g., Young Turks and Mohammad Ali); and how it affected the subsequent evolution of Islamic thought and organization.

The difference between ʿAbdu and the earlier phase of reform rests on the very concepts of 'reform' and 'progress' themselves. Reform and progress, as conceived by ʿAbdu, should stem from the individual's consent and cannot be imposed from above (the state) or outside (Europe). That is why both Afghani and ʿAbdu were adamant in their disapproval of religious *taqlīd* and political tyranny, and in their yearning for *ijtihād* (free inquiry) and representative government. In order to develop, their argument goes, Muslims need more than good governance. They need to undertake soul-searching efforts to strip their

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12. H. A. R. Gibb, 'Islam and Modernism in Egypt, a Review', in *International Affairs*, XII, No. 4, July, 1933, p. 566.

13. For a good sample of the political material published in al-Manār, see Wajīh Kawtharanī, *Mukhtārāt siyāsiyya min majallat al-Manār*, Beirut, Dār al-Ṭalīʿa, 1980.

faith of superstitious innovation, and the scholastic formulations that obscured its original, rational teachings. It is only then that 'reconciliation' can be reached between Muslim societies and the forces of the modern world.[14]

It is interesting to note how Afghani/ʿAbdu's critique of *taqlīd* resonated with Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb's earlier attack on *taqlīd* and *bidaʿ*. This agreement was unintended but it nevertheless paved the way for a later rapprochement (in the mid 1920s) between the two trends of thought. Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (1115–1201/1703–87) was a vigorous puritanical leader from Arabia. He became known because of his rejection of *taqlīd*, (that is the blind acceptance of established opinions on religious matters), and because of his strong condemnation of many *Sufi* teachings and practices (e.g., veneration of holy saints and their graves).[15] The rise of the Wahhabi movement originated in Arabia in the eighteenth century, stimulated a radical approach that attempted to brush aside centuries of innovation and return to what was seen as the pure origins of the faith of the *salaf.* This concept of *salaf* and *salafiyya* has more than one meaning. In its wider sense, it is used as a reference to the intellectual attitude of those 'modern' thinkers and reformers who aspire to follow, exclusively, the example of the companions of the Prophet and the succeeding generation who founded the Islamic schools of law (the *salaf*), but it is also used in a vague sense as a reference to the intellectual attitude of the Wahhabi movement of Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb.

Hence, it can be argued that both Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and Muḥammad ʿAbdu belong to the *salafiyya* reform movement in the broader sense of the term. Going beyond this point, one immediately notices that the type of reform on which Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb embarked is tantamount, as one scholar put it, to a 'complete social and moral reconstruction of Muslim society'.[16] This does not easily conform with the trend of Islamic reformism that al-Afghani, ʿAbdu and others promoted, and which can be interpreted as: (i) an intellectual effort not only to liberate the Muslim mind from superstitions, such as those preached by the Wahhabis, but also to ground it in the modern rational sciences of the West; (ii) a social reform movement that attempts to challenge the conservative religious establishment, revive

14. For more details see Muḥammad Abduh, *al-Aʿmāl al-kāmila, op. cit.,* III. pp. 238–57 where he speaks about *jumūd al-Muslimīn wa-asbābuhu* (Reluctance of Muslims and its Causes).

15. Works of Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab were collected and published in several volumes by Mohammad Ibn Saud Islamic University under the title: *Muʾallāfāt al-shaykh al-Imām Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb*, Riyadh, n.d.

16. B. W. Andaya, 'Religious Developments in Southeast Asia', in N. Tarling (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 558.

educational institutions, and open avenues to modern ways of learning; (iii) a political programme to resist European domination and re-establish an Islamic polity that transcends local and ethnic particularities, and bases itself on the common principles of the *Sharīʿa* and loyalty to the one Islamic *Umma*.

Notwithstanding its short-lived ascendancy in Egypt, the Afghani/ʿAbdu endeavour of reform was of significance for later intellectual and political developments in the wider Islamic world in at least three ways: (i) it paved the way for the emergence of 'new men' whose claim to leadership depended primarily upon their ideas and personal qualities; (ii) it assisted in the use of Islam, together with national sentiment, as an ideological weapon against European domination; (iii) it created internal stimuli for free inquiry (*ijtihād*), self-development, and self-rule, thus opening up the possibility of reforming educational and political institutions. It set in motion a modernist/reform movement, based in Cairo, with an attempt to strip the faith of the scholastic tradition that obscured the prophetic mission.

A discussion of al-Afghani/ʿAbdu revivalism would, however, be incomplete without the inclusion of two important figures: Rashīd Riḍā and al-Kawakibi. Like Muḥammad ʿAbdu before him, Rashīd Riḍā was first attracted to the ideas of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, particularly the idea of pan-Islamism under the auspices of the Ottoman Sultan Abdul-Hamid. But what distinguished him from al-Afghani was his call for a religious society to be based in Mecca (not Istanbul) and his leanings towards the Arabs as the one Muslim segment that had supremacy in religious affairs. The idea behind this society was not to weaken the Ottoman Empire, as Arab nationalists would like, but to foster Muslim unity, to abolish sectarian differences, and to revive the teachings of the *salaf*, i.e., the companions of the Prophet who predated sects and schools of law. Seeing his emphasis on Arabs and the Arabic language, some scholars have concluded that Rashīd Riḍā was an ʿArab nationalist', though his nationalism may be better described as 'Arab religious nationalism'.[17]

Witnessing the abolishment of the temporal powers of the Ottoman sultan, the policy of 'Turkification', which was followed by the abolishment of the caliphate itself, Rida began to entertain the idea of 'setting up an absolutely independent Arabia, including Syria and Mesopotamia under the Sharif of Mecca.[18] The latter, it should be recalled, had already been convinced by British officials (e.g., Sir Henry McMahon and others) to start a rebellion against Ottoman rule and seek to rule himself with British assistance.

17. M. Haddad, Arab Religious Nationalism in the Colonial Era: Rereading Rashid Rida's Ideas on the Caliphate, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, CXVII, No. 2, April-June 1997, p. 257.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 263.

VIII–2.1   An Iranian book of sentences about holy war, aimed at Russian troops occupying Iran in the mid-nineteenth century
© National Library and Archives of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Fearing that the destruction of Ottoman rule would also involve the occupation of both Turkish and Arab lands, Rida was keen to show his loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. But when he saw that the collapse of the latter had become inevitable, particularly when it sided with Germany in the First World War, he changed his mind and began to entertain two options: to forge an Anglo-Arab alliance that would guarantee Arab independence after the war,[19] or to work for the re-establishment of an Arab empire as a substitute for the Ottoman one.[20]

Rida, however, dropped the idea of an Arab empire and withdrew his support from the Sharif of Mecca when the latter's secret agreements with the British Government to compromize the independence of Iraq and Syria became known. Rida was also disappointed by the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) between the British and the French Governments, and he turned against the British, the French, and the Sharif of Mecca.[21] Instead, he

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19. M. O. Haddad, *Rashid Rida and the Theory of the Caliphate: Medieval Themes and Modern Concerns*, Ph.D. Thesis, USA, Columbia University, 1989, p. 172.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 192.

turned his attention to the then rising power of Muhammad ibn Saʿud, and began to cultivate relations with him. This political shift toward Ibn Saʿud also coincided with an ideological one. Rida's 'increasingly conservative direction in which he was taking the ideas of his mentor, ʿAbdu, began to converge with the puritanical fundamentalism of the Wahhabis' as one scholar noticed.[22]

Rida wrote his well known treatise *al-Khilāfa aw al-imāma al-ʿuẓma* (The Caliphate or the Grand Imamate) in 1922, immediately before Turkish nationalists abolished the sultanate. He called for the establishment of an elected government that centres on *ahl al-ḥal wa-l-ʿaqd*, that is, the people who bind and unbind. This group, he argueds, should include not only the ʿ*ulamā* and jurists, but also the leaders of society, such as merchants, doctors, engineers and agriculturists, managers of companies, leaders of political parties, and lawyers.[23] In Rida's view, these elements would be elected by the people along democratic lines and their rule would represent the *ijmāʿ* (consensus) of the *umma*.[24] In this respect Rida had no reservation on circumscribing the power of the caliph, and emphasizing the role of the *umma* as the source of legislation. And it is here that Rida's conception of the caliphate comes closer to the ideas that al-Kawakibi, another important element in the al-Afghani-inspired reform movement, had published in *al-Manār* more than two decades before.

Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1854–1902) was born in Aleppo to a family of Kurdish origin. He was educated in a traditional local school. Although he occupied various positions in the Ottoman civil service, al-Kawakibi was a revolutionary and a sharp critic of Jamal Pasha, the wali of Aleppo. When confrontation between the two reached an impasse, al-Kawakibi secretly left Syria in 1899 and went to Egypt, as al-Afghani and Rida had done, where he immediately began to serialize sections of his two masterpieces *Ṭabāiʿ al-istibdād* (The Nature of Tyranny) and *Umm al-qurā* (The Mother City).

The central theme in these works is to expose the nature of despotism, to re-formulate Islamic political values, and to re-institute them in the modern world. After thirty years of research, it had become crystal clear to him that the main cause of the 'disease' was political tyranny, which he defined as the absence of any specific legal link between the government and the *umma*. The remedy ought to be, he thought, through constitutional consultation (*al-shūrā al-dastūriyya*). In these writings al-Kawakibi boldly made the observation that political tyranny stems out of religious tyranny, and that each reinforced the other. The logical conclusion he drew from this is that religious reform is the surest and shortest way to political reform.

22. M. Wegner, *Islamic Government: The Medieval Sunni Islamic Theory of Caliphate and the Debate over the Caliphate in Egypt, 1924–1926*, Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Chicago, Illinois, December 2001, p. 207.
23. Haddad, *Rashid Rida and the Theory of the Caliphate …, op. cit.*, p. 205.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 205–6.

Being an Arab subject under Ottoman rule, facing the arbitrary rule of Sultan Abdul Hamid and his walis, and witnessing the emergence of the nationalist ideology of the Young Turks, it was only natural for an activist like al-Kawakibi to advocate an autonomous Arab State. What was conspicuously novel was the idea of separating the caliphate from the secular government. Hence al-Kawakibi's big idea in his *Umm al-qurā* is presented in the form of an imaginary Islamic conference held in Mecca two years before the closing of the nineteenth century.

Another central theme of al-Kawakibi was to revive Islam by returning to the true religion of the Arab ancestors who laid the foundations of both intellectual and political life. But along with this idea of religious reform he added the notion of a shared territorial entity; that is to say, the Arab nation possesses a distinct geographical entity, of which the most important elements are Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Arabia. These four countries stand as the nucleus of the Arab natural homeland. But that is not all. In addition to territory (and blood) there is also language, and it was here that al-Kawakibi's ideas merged into the stream that was started by Muḥammad ʿAbdu. For indeed it was the latter who saw the revival and development of the Arabic language as a necessary medium of Islamic intellectualism. Incidentally, this focus on reviving Arabic became an important source of a 'religious nationalism' for the emerging pan-Arabism movement.

Thus, al-Kawakibi's inclination towards limiting the role of religion in the public domain also brought him closer to secular Arab nationalists as well as to the Syrian Christian elite, whose affinity with the West and loyalty to Britain was not a secret. 'His circle of friends', George Antonius contends, 'was large and varied: it included Christians and Jews as well as Muslims, for he practiced what he often proclaimed, that patriotism was above distinctions of creed.'[25]

In sum, the religious reform advocated by ʿAbdu, Rashīd Riḍā and al-Kawakibi, and the political programme that stemmed from it, varied in some minor details, but their starting principles were the same: a resort to the authentic original sources (Qurʾān, *Sunna* and *salaf*), an urge for the exercise of human reason, and a call for a responsible (elected) government. And most of their political and intellectual activities which were based on these principles were intended to revitalize the Islamic *umma* in the face of the then overwhelming Western domination. But since each of those scholars was engulfed in a distinct political situation and grappling with various facets of Western influence, it is not unusual to encounter inconsistencies and shifts in their thinking and positions. Some of them, for instance, at one point, saw British imperialism as

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25. Quoted in S. Silsby, 'George Antonius: The Formative Years', *Journal of the Palestine Studies*, XV, No. 4. Summer, 1986, p. 90.

the eminent threat that ought to be fought, whereas others adopted policies of compromize and accommodation. They even believed in the compatibility of Islam with European principles of good governance, i.e., that is best in European civilization is either derived from Islamic sources or has parallels in Islamic tradition, and adopting these things is nothing more than returning to what is authentic in Islamic tradition. Along the same lines, some of those reformers supported the Young Turk nationalists who were revolting against the Ottoman sultan, while others supported the latter.

It is also worth noting that pan-Islamism gradually began, notwithstanding its earlier universalistic overtones and/or Ottoman leanings, to nurture a nascent pan-Arab tendency. Political activists like al-Kawakibi, and ideologists like Rashīd Riḍā and to a lesser degree Muḥammad ʿAbdu were among the precursors of this pan-Arabism, though they are normally considered as the founders of pan-Islamism. To them neither nationalist concepts nor nationalist sentiments are necessarily alien to Islamic thought. They did not wholly separate Islamism from Arabism, as it has often became the case in later decades. They understood that Islamic politics might be infused with nationalistic interests, but they failed to anticipate that the Islamic revivalism and development for which they strove, could eventually be jeopardized by entrenched particularistic interests and extreme nationalism. Nor did they think that the growth of national loyalties and sentiments that they started would reach its fruition at the expense of loyalty to the Islamic *umma*.

In his conclusion of *Rashid Rida and the Theory of the Caliphate* (1989), Mahmud Haddad argues that the Salafiyya reform movement 'did not develop a popular following' and that it remained 'elitist and socially thinly based'.[26] Looking at the limited number of followers that the reform movements attracted, his observation is true. But it is also true that this 'socially thinly based elite', was itself created by those reformers. And the creation of an elite and broadening its concerns is an aspect of change which is no less important than mobilizing the masses. Be that as it may, this should lead us to examine the fortunes of the more popular, mass-based movement; namely, pan-Arabism.

Pan-Arabism

Arab Nationalism, the idea that all Arabs must and could be unified in a single nation-state, originated firstly as a minority opposition movement in the Ottoman Arab provinces (e.g., Syria, Palestine and Iraq) around the late nineteenth century. In the view of Philip Hitti, the Arab nationalists' fire was ignited mainly by Syrian intellectuals, more specifically, Christian Lebanese

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26. Haddad, *Rashid Rida and the Theory of the Caliphate …*, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

educated at the American University of Beirut. Hence Arab nationalism, he boldly proclaims, received its first impetus from American ideology.[27]

Taking sharp issue with this argument, other writers have, however, traced the origins of the pan-Arab self-view back to indigenous sources; to the pre-First World War writings of Muḥammad ʿAbdu, al-Kawakibi and Rashīd Riḍā, and to the subsequent writings of Muhib al-Din al-Khatib, Shakib Arslan, and ʿIzzat Darwaza.[28] The ideas and concepts expounded by those writers found their way to school textbooks which were widely used in Palestine and Syria.

Equally importantly, other historians have tried to explain the rise of Arab nationalism in terms of a conflict among Syrian urban notables around the turn of the twentieth century. A growing number of those notables,

> lost their jobs and thus their stake in the Ottoman system;
> it was they who first turned the dormant idea of Arabism into
> a vehicle for expressing their grievances with Istanbul and for
> regaining their positions. By contrast, many notables who
> managed to hold onto their posts supported the empire until the
> collapse of its authority in the Syrian provinces in 1918.[29]

It was in this educational, political and economic environment that generations of schoolboys and students, including the two prominent founding fathers of the Baath party, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, were brought up. Neither of these two scholars was educated at an American university. The first was an Orthodox Christian, whereas the second was a Sunni Muslim. Both of them were born to Damascene merchant families, received their general education in Syria, and had their university degrees from the Sorbonne in Paris. Returning to Syria in the 1920s, the two friends took teaching positions but, inspired by rising tide of Arab nationalism, they soon abandoned their teaching careers, delved into politics, and created the Baath party in 1947.[30] The Party's envisaged goals were to achieve freedom from

27. P. Hitti, 'The Possibility of Union among the Arab States', *The American Historical Review*, XLVIII, No. 4., July 1943, p. 725.

28. ʿIzzat Darwaza (d. 1984) was a Palestinian historian whose writings included a series of books on the history of Arab nationalism and Shakib Arslan (d. 1946) was a Lebanese writer and politician who was influenced by al-Afghani and ʿAbdu. For bibliographic notes on them see *al-Mawsūʿa al-ʿarabiyya al-ʿālamiyya*, Riyadh, Muʾassasat Aʿmāl al-Mawsūʿa li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 1996, Vol. X, p. 304 and I, p. 480, respectively.

29. P. S. Khoury, Continuity and Change in Syrian Political Life: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, *The American Historical Review*, XCVI, No. 5., December 1991, p. 1384.

30. Salah al-Din al-Bitar, Interview in: Marie-Christine Aulas, Eric Googlund, Jim Paul, 'The Major Deviation of the Baath', MERIP Reports, No. 110, *Syria's Trouble*, November-December 1982, p. 22. Apart from Aflaq and Bitar, mention should be made of Zaki al-Arsuzi, who is believed to have founded the Baath Party in 1940. At that time Aflaq and

foreign control, to unite all Arabs in a single state, and to enact social justice for the poor.

But in addition to individual initiatives, political parties are also products of their time. One prominent feature of this period was the collapse of Ottoman rule, the expansion in its place of the British and French colonial powers, and the intensified popular Arab demand for independence, particularly in Syria, Iraq and Palestine. Arab Nationalism became the most dominant trend in these countries, and many politicians, writers and school teachers began to identify themselves as Arab nationalists. Its effect on Middle East history has become, one writer remarks, as compelling as that of Marxism on modern Europe.[31]

Preempting such a new political force, it was the British policy makers who pledged, during the First World War, to support Arab independence in return for an Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire.[32] The revolt began under the leadership of Husain, the Sharif of Mecca, where the Turkish forces in Hijaz were defeated in 1916, along with the Arabs' massive support in the 1917–18 offensives against Turkish garrisons in Syria. But far from honouring its promise of Arab independence, the British Government issued the Balfour Declaration (2 November 1917) supporting the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, and secretly signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement (16 May 1916) that became the blueprint for the division of the Arab territories into zones of British and French influence. Working through the League of Nations, the British and French Governments managed to create the Mandate system, where Syria and Lebanon were given to France, and Iraq and the newly created Jewish National Homeland in Palestine were given to Britain.

These postwar settlements were responsible for the intensified popular Arab rejection of the West,[33] and prompted Arab nationalists to call fervently for an all-embracing Arab union throughout the period between the two World Wars. Diagnosing the sources of Arab problems, Aflaq and Bitar highlighted the imperialist design of dividing the Arab nation into small contending entities, and the establishment of pro-Western ruling families like, for instance, the Hashimites in Iraq and Jordan.

By the end of the Second World War, most of the Arab countries had won their independence, but that independence was won, in the view of Albert

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Bitar were leading a different party, *al-Iḥyāʾ al-ʿarabī* (Arab Revival), but in 1947 the two parties merged, probably against the wish of al-Arsuzi, and that was considered to be the official date of birth for the party. See Salīm Barakāt, *al-Fikr al-qawmī wa-ususuh al-falsafiyya ʿind Zakī al-Arsuzī*, Damascus, 3rd ed., 1984, p. 33. In 1953, Akram al-Hawrani and his group also joined the party.

31. B. Rubin, 'Pan-Arab Nationalism', *Journal of Contemporary History*, XXVI, No. 3/4, September 1991, p. 535.

32. Silsby, 'George Antonius: The Formative Years', *op. cit.*, p. 82

33. *Ibid.*, p. 83

Hourani, by manipulation of political forces, both internal and external. Those manipulators, i.e. the ruling families and their Western-educated allies (who were brought up under colonial rule), did not possess the skill and appeal needed to mobilize popular support in the new circumstances of independence, or to create a 'national' state in the full sense. Their interests, understandably, lay in the preservation of the existing social and economic order, rather than in changes in the direction of greater social change.[34] This is what explains, in Hourani's view, the tendency of these post-colonial regimes to break up after independence, leaving the way open to new movements and ideologies, which would blend the elements of nationalism, Islamism and social justice in a more appealing fashion.[35]

The communists, the Arab nationalists, and the Muslim Brothers are examples of the new forces that began from the late 1940s, to play a significant role in opposition both to imperial rule in its last phase and to the succeeding, post-colonial ruling families, particularly in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Some of these elements were secular revolutionaries, coming from lower-class families, who attempted to establish new polities, and some were religion-oriented reformers who attempted to establish a kind of Arab religious nationalism. None of them wanted, however, to restore the old (Ottoman) order or to empower the incumbent dynasties that succeeded it. They strove, instead, to establish centralized, unified political orders over which they could exercise political power and set the national goals without being checked by internal traditional authorities or external superpowers.

Although it is hard to point to a particular event as the turning point in history, it would not be inappropriate if we identify as one the merger in 1951 between Aflaq's Baath and Haurani's Arab Socialist Party, according to which the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party (ARSP) was formed. In the view of some writers, this union 'was essentially a marriage of convenience consummated under the pressure of unusual events'.[36] But compared with the other fragmented political forces, the Baath party emerged as the strongest united front of the day. Fortunately for the newly formed party, one year later, in July 1952, a sensational military coup took place in Egypt. It was executed by the young Free Officers who managed, under their energetic leader, Nasser, to overthrow a tottering monarchy, and to seriously disrupt the prevailing Egyptian social, economic and political structures. With President Nasser and his colleagues tightening their grip over the Egyptian state apparatus, it seemed that the dawn of Arab nationalism had come, and that the real centre of power, which was held for so long by foreign embassies, traditional

34. A. Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, London, Faber & Faber Ltd.,1991, p. 403.

35. *Ibid.*

36. N. M. Kaylani, 'The Rise of the Syrian Baath: Political Success, Party Failure', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, III, No. 1, January 1972, p. 14.

politicians and exiled intellectuals, had shifted to the military officers; and there was much to encourage them to extend their newly acquired power far and wide.

As might be expected, such a revolutionary thrust captured the imagination of many Arabs, especially those Arab nationalists in Syria and Iraq whose efforts were constantly frustrated either by foreign rule or despotic monarchy. By the mid-1950s, and particularly in the wake of the Israeli attack on Egypt, Nasser's popularity among Arabs was rising at a phenomenal rate.[37] That was when the leaders of the ARSP began to see the value of bringing together Baathist ideology and Nasser's dynamic leadership. Should it materialize, they thought, such an amalgamation would put the Arab nation decisively on the track of unity, freedom and socialism.[38]

It was in support of these lines of thinking, that a delegation of Syrian military officers, supported by prominent Baath leaders, went to Cairo and urged Nasser to agree to the union of Syria with Egypt. Nasser agreed but only on condition that all political parties in Syria be dissolved in favour of a single party modelled on the Egyptian National union.[39] With the exception of the communists, most of the Syrian parties agreed, and on 1 February, 1958 Egypt and Syria became the United Arab Republic, constituting a major turning point in the history of Arab nationalism.

The triumphant emergence of the Egyptian Free Officers, together with their growing influence in the region, prompted the Western powers, mainly Britain and the USA, to form the Baghdad Pact (1955). A year later, Britain, France and Israel launched a joint attack on Egypt. Scared and/or encouraged by these hostile actions, the Iraqi nationalists decided to stretch their military muscles. An organization Iraqi Free Officers was formed under the leadership of 'Abd al-Karīm Qāsim who swiftly launched a successful coup in 1958, thus terminating the monarchy and instituting a modern republic based on nationalist principles. But unlike their Syrian counterparts, the Iraqi Free Officers did not rush into a union with Egypt. When a faction of pro-Nasser nationalists revolted against Qasim in 1959, he crushed them ruthlessly with the support of the Communist Party and Kurds. It took the Iraqi Baathists almost ten years to reorganize their forces and seize power in 1968 in a bloodless coup carried out mainly by pro-Western officers with some of their senior military men.[40] By that time, Nasserism had lost its appeal and the leading Syrian Baathists were forced into exile.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
39. J. F. Devlin, 'The Baath Party: Rise and Metamorphosis', *The American Historical Review*, XCVI, No. 5., December 1991, p. 1400.
40. J. Galvani, *The Baathit Revolution in Iraq*, MERIP Reports (Middle East Research and Information Project), No. 12, September-October, 1972, pp. 7–8.

On the other hand, the union between Egypt and Syria did not last for more that three years, and it ended in failure, bitterness and disappointment on both sides. It turned out that the difficulties and differences 'within' were far greater than the dangers 'without', and the defenders of the Union were few, and weak.[41] From then onward pan-Arabism became overshadowed, in Egypt and Iraq but particularly in Syria itself, by 'regionalism', where the region, not the Arab nation, became the focus of the Baathists.

Relying on their military allies, the Syrian 'regionalists' used force to oust the Aflaq/Bitar faction from the leadership of the party in February 1965.[42] As a result the Baath party split into two factions: the Syrian military/civilian coalition, and Aflaq and his Syrian associates. As the losing side, the latter faction was forced into exile whereas the winning Syrian coalition embarked on yet another power struggle among themselves. Out of the ashes of that struggle, new leaders, Salah Jadid and Hafiz al-Assad, began to emerge. Being the Defense minister, the latter was overwhelmed by the defeat of the Syrian forces by the Israelis in June 1967. When the party decided to remove him from all position, Assad managed to launch his own bloodless coup to 'correct', as he put it, his opponents' deviations.[43]

On the Iraqi front, the fortunes of pan-Arabism were as bleak as its Syrian counterpart. Although Aflaq and his Syrian associates were given asylum in Iraq and remained there as the legitimate leadership, the real power lay in the hands of al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein, together with their tiny group of kinsmen from the Takrit district. In 1979, Saddam discovered a 'plot' against himself, pushed al-Bakr into retirement and executed a score of colleagues, thus completing his control on all instruments of government and remaining in power hereafter for two and a half decades.[44] At this juncture, it would be interesting to note how the Baathist ideology slid from pan-Arabism through regionalism and parochialism into a one-man enterprise.

The question often arises as to why, on the one hand, the Syrian Baathists and Egyptian Nasserites, who willingly formed the 'United Arab Republic',

41. Reflecting on this setback, or *naksa*, as it is usually referred to in Arab nationalists' discourse, Michael Aflaq asserted that the staunch enemies of Arab unity are those who claim to be Arab nationalists and advocate Arab unity, and not the colonialists or Zionists. See his *Maʿrakat al-maṣīr al-wāḥid*, Beirut, al-Muʾassasa al-ʿArabiyya li-l-Dirasāt wa-l-Nashr, 3rd ed., 1979, p. 74.

42. J. F. Devlin, 'The Baath Party: Rise and Metamorphosis', *op. cit.*, XCVI, No. 5, December, 1991, p. 1403.

43. On the inner crisis of the Syrian Baath and the subsequent rise of Hafiz al-Assad, see H. Batatu, *Syria's Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables and their Politics*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 170–5.

44. Devlin, *ibid.*, p. 1405. For more details on the emergence of Saddam Husain and the establishment of his Baath regime see C. Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 193–204.

failed to maintain a workable relationship. And just why, on the other hand, the Syrian and Iraqi Baathists, who belonged to the same ideology, fell out with each other. The reason lies, in part, in the clandestine, conspiratorial behavior of these groups. However, it could also be argued that Nasserism, by virtue of its revolutionary orientation, pushed forward certain norms, forces, and institutions that were in direct opposition to existing Syrian and Iraqi political and military practices resulting in prolonged inter-military rivalries and struggles.[45] This is not to ignore the foreign factor, for union among Arab nationalists was not in the interest of the Western powers which were working to prevent any regional alliance that might threaten the Israeli presence or hurt Western interests.

Moreover, the Egyptian Free Officers were viewing their movement as the model for liberating movements in all the Arab countries. In addition to attacking British interests in the region, Nasser's main concern was to undermine the legitimacy of the pro-Western monarchies established after the fall of the Ottoman rule in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq, thus lending a supportive hand to co-nationalists Free Officers everywhere and encouraging them to seize power. This interest in universalizing or implementing the Egyptian model has frequently brought against them and their leader, Nasser, the charge of expansionism.'[46]

In addition to charges of expansionism, attempts to universalize the 'nationalist model' have also resulted in acute tensions and bloody confrontations at the domestic level. One of the earliest enterprises of revolutionary, nationalist-oriented regimes in Egypt and elsewhere was a concerted attack on Islam, or what was regarded by them as reactionary religious forces. In such states as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Tunisia, and Turkey, religious establishments have been either disestablished or brought under state control. However, these measures and the growth of despotism that accompanied them did not pass unchallenged, the more so in Egypt where President Nasser began to crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwān Muslimūn*). The latter had existed in Egypt and most Arab countries long before Nasser came to power, and like the Arab nationalists, the Muslim Brotherhood also was bent on seizing power and establishing an Islamic state that would be based on the principles of the *Sharīʿa*. Nasser, and later on Saddam Hussein and Hafiz al-Assad, saw in the Muslim Brothers a grave danger to their regimes not only because of their ideology, but also because of their grass-roots organizations.

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45. More details on the competition and rivalry between Baathism and Nasserism are to be found in D. Tibi, *Arab Nationalism: between Islam and the Nation-State*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1997, pp. 208–12.

46. P. J. Vatikiotis, *Dilemmas of Political Leadership in the Arab Middle East: The Case of the U.A.R.*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1944, XXXVII, No. 2, April, 1961, p. 198

VIII–2.2   Women parliamentarians of the Afghan Lower House (Wolesi Jirga or 'House of the People') arrive to be sworn into the newly elected Afghan parliament in Kabul in January 2011
© UN Photo/Eric Kanalstein

Neither of these nationalist leaders was intent on reviving Islamic institutions, but knowing the importance of Islam as a link between their regimes and the tradition-bound masses, they attempted at times to provide a nationalist interpretation of Islam and use it as an instrument of national policy.[47] But after its showdown with the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954, the Nasserite movement took a decided socialist thrust: partially as a reaction to its bloody confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood who were then symbolizing political Islam, but also as a gesture of rapprochement with the Soviet-led Socialist bloc. From then onward, Arab nationalism would adopt a vague 'socialist' component.

Seeing this vagueness and the overlapping nature of the prevailing ideas among its leaders, many scholars have warned against the literal content of political pronouncements, and the outward utterances of politicians. Surprisingly, one of the founding fathers of Arab socialism agrees with this. A few weeks before his assassination, in July 1980, Salah al-Din al-Bitar answered a question about the ideological deficiencies of the Baath in this

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47. *Ibid.*, p. 192.

way: 'Following the *coup d'état* in 1966, there was profound dissention within the party. Everyone had his theory, and had his social doctrine; since the party didn't have any … As soon as we came to power we nationalized the banks … without having any idea of the social complexities involved … it was not socialism, but simply the advancement of bureaucracy.'[48]

To discern the roots of ill-defined Arab socialism, some writers have tried to connect it with the trio of the Syrian Christians (Farah Anton, Shibli Shumayyil and Naqula Haddad) who lived in Egypt in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but it was found that 'the stream bed of Muslim socialism ran through somewhat different territory from its Christian counterpart'.[49] Leaving the quest for origins aside, Arab socialism was mainly strengthened by the support of the Soviet Union and its East European allies. It was Russian patronage of Arab socialism coupled with Western unreserved support for Israel that brought these Arab nationalist regimes into the orbit of the East European brand of socialism and, by necessity, into the centre of the East-West confrontation of the Cold War era.

The East-West confrontation in the Cold War era

In the view of some scholars, the Cold War was a source of a new imperialism: 'It is a declared goal of the United States, not merely to prevent Soviet and Chinese expansion but to check the spread of a political doctrine.' This could not be achieved, in O'Brien's view, without close surveillance of all the countries which are deemed vulnerable to this doctrine of communism, and especially all under-developed nations whose poverty was thought to make them likely to succumb to this ideological disorder; and not only surveillance but discreet guidance, and when necessary economic pressure and open or secret political intervention was needed.[50]

The evolution of the US strategic interest in the Middle East goes back to the early 1950s, when American policy makers began to view the oil-rich region as strategically and economically indispensable to them, though it was also highly vulnerable to Soviet influence.[51] Accordingly, American analysts

48. Salāḥ al-Dīn al-Bīṭār, interview in *Maʿrakat al-maṣīr al-waḥid, op. cit.*, Michel Aflaq noted that socialism did not stem out of a genuine conviction but merely as a response to criticism, p. 40.
49. D. Reid, 'The Syrian Christians and Early Socialism in the Arab World', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, V, No. 2, April, 1974, p. 191.
50. Quoted in I. Brown, 'Studies on Non-Alignment', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, IV, No. 4, December, 1966, p.
51. R. J. McMahon, 'United States Cold War Strategy in South Asia: Making a Military Commitment to Pakistan, 1947–1954', *The Journal of American History*, LXXV, No. 3, December, 1988, p. 813.

proposed that an Allied Middle East Command (AEC) be established and urged the British Government that Pakistan, in particular, be included in it.

Historically, there have been at least three main goals of US foreign policy in the Muslim world that are commonly cited: denying the region to the Soviets, maintaining oil supplies from the region, sustaining stability by supporting the status quo, and support of Israel. These goals are either justified by democratic principles, as in Israel's case, or by an anti-communist stance, as in the case of Iran (during the regime of the Shah) and Saudi Arabia. The method of safeguarding these American interests was in 'building up the military power of these states (its allies) to serve primarily as a check on anti-Western political movements and states in the region'.[52] As anticipated, all these goals, which rely on the vast transfer of sophisticated arms in the region, have led to strong negative consequences. Instead of maintaining the status quo and guaranteeing the oil flow to the West, the transfers of armaments escalated Israeli-Arab hostilities, fuelled internal conflicts, and disrupted the oil flow.

In April 1952, the American president received a report from his National Security Council detecting some alarming trends in the region. 'Currently, the danger in this area (Middle East) … arises', says the report, 'not so much from the threat of direct Soviet military attack as from acute instability, anti-Western nationalism and Arab-Israeli antagonism that could lead to disorder and eventually to a situation in which regimes oriented toward the Soviet Union could come to power.'[53] Nothing was closer to the truth than this statement, for in less than a year the Free Officers launched their first successful coup in Egypt, scrapped the century-old monarchy, and re-oriented Egyptian foreign policy into a totally different path.

During the early years of the Egyptian Free Officers' regime, American policy makers cherished the hope that they could win over the charismatic Colonel Nasser as a potential ally, but subsequent events belied their expectations. For a variety of reasons, Nasser became a key force behind anti-Americanism in the Arab world. To counter the spread of both Nasserism and communism in the region, the US initiated and funded (together with NATO) the Baghdad Pact of 1955, as a worldwide chain of anti-Soviet alliances. It was meant to bring into the Western orbit all Arab and non-Arab nations (Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq) that lie on the Soviet southern border. Although the member countries never went into actual combat, the political atmosphere that accompanied the treaty succeeded only in provoking Arab nationalists everywhere, particularly in Iraq. Dissatisfaction with what

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52. J. P. Miglietta, *American Alliance Policies in the Middle East, 1945–1992*, Oxford, Lexington Books, 2002, p. 19.

53. Quoted in, McMahon, *op. cit.*, p. 827.

was seen as the 'anti-Arab' stance of the Iraqi monarchy had paved the way for a bloody nationalist coup in July 1958. Nuri al-Said, then Prime Minister of Iraq, was captured, shot, and quickly buried, while crowds in the streets of Baghdad were shouting, according to Time Magazine's report, 'Nasser, we are your soldiers'.[54] Similar sentiments of anti-Western Nasserism had shown themselves in Syria a year before, and were translated into action when the Syrian Baathists joined forces with President Nasser and created the United Arab Republic, as mentioned earlier.

The Soviets, on the other hand, saw the treaty as an 'aggressive' action directed against its interests. Consequently, the USSR began consistently to support any Arab government pursuing anti-Western foreign policy, regardless of its internal political system. In India, Nehru was also alarmed. He saw the Baghdad Pact as an attempt to bring Cold War rivalries to South East Asia.

Besides their unequivocal support of Israel, American policymakers also saw their long alliance with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia, the three pro-Western conservative monarchies, as the most important components in US foreign policy during the Cold War. Of these three, Iran was regarded as the most strategic ally that would help in preserving US interests in the Gulf region, as well as providing access to listening posts within Iran in order to maintain surveillance on the Soviet Union.[55] In addition to that, the Shah of Iran provided covert assistance to resist Soviet allies in the region as well as military assistance to pro-Western governments. This is not to mention that both the Saudi and Iranian Governments were staunch opponents of the Baathis regime in Iraq, the regime that hovered over the oil-rich but fragile, pro-Western Gulf states.

Understandably, 'Arabs considered the Soviet Union to be the only real counterweight to the excessive pressure from America in favor of Israel. The feeling in the capitals of the radical and even not so radical Arab countries was that their countries would be politically and military incapacitated, if not for the counterbalancing presence of the Soviet Union in the region.'[56] These 'feelings and wishes' of many Arab States gave the Soviet Union a strong presence in the region, and aborted all efforts by the US to 'expel' Soviet influence from the Middle East.[57]

To be sure, the growth of Soviet influence in the region has also a long history, but it reached its fruition only in South Yemen, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The Russians do lend their support to nationalist leaders, but that support has often been manipulative. Like American policymakers, the Russians also give

54. Time Magazine, *Revolt in Baghdad*, July 21, 1958.

55. Miglietta, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

56. H. Trofimenko, *Russian National Interests and Current Crisis in Russia*, England, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1999, p. 230.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

priority to their own national and ideological interests. Whenever they judge the time ripe for revolution they would not hesitate for a moment to overthrow their former national bourgeois allies and raise their own communist cadres to power.

When President Sadat decided to expel the Russian military experts from Egypt in July 1972 and to turn the tide of Soviet influence in the region, he was looking to the Americans for support. America was of course interested in preventing the spread of Soviet influence but it was not in a position to start a military confrontation with Russia.

By the early 1990s Russia began, for a variety of reasons, to exclude itself from the Middle East, and to put an end to its traditional role in the region. The process began when Russia aligned itself with the US in condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in joining the US-led coalition, and in signing on 9, September 1990 a Soviet-American joint statement on the Persian Gulf crisis.[58] The demise of the Cold War, along with the diminishing role of the Soviets, prompted many quarters in the Middle East to search for alternative options.

Alternative routes: inter-governmental organizations

By the end of the Second World War it became clear that the Arab national movement had achieved one of its great aims; every Arab State had become independent and no foreign forces remained on Arab soil. But along with this progress, Arab unity had died down and the Israeli Government had confirmed itself in Palestine and in the region. In the new era two obstacles stood in the way of Arab development: inter-Arab divisions and the Arab-Israel conflict. 'The dilemma of the Arabs', as the foreign editor of the *Observer* once put it, 'is that a backward, weak and divided Arab world can never solve the Palestine question in its favour. But so long as the conflict with Israel exists it helps to keep the Arab world backward, weak and divided.'[59]

To overcome such a dilemma, some Arab leaders began to realize that the nation-state, per se, might not be a suitable vehicle for unity. Seeking 'alternative routes', they started to consider inter-governmental organizations, summit conferences and regional cooperation as possible means of cooperation and development. It is in this vein that a number of organizations were established in the Muslim world, and it may help to clarify this discussion if we present, in the following section, a brief account of these interrelated organizations and the role that they might play.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
59. R. Stephens, 'The Great Powers and the Middle East', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, II, No. 4, summer 1973, p. 11.

THE NON-ALIGNMENT MOVEMENT

From the late 1940s onward, the developing countries, including Arab and Muslim countries, witnessed a new burst of energy that was propelled by a variety of forces, foremost among which was the achievement of independence and the establishment of national states. Scores of those independent states began to feel a need to emphasize and strengthen their newly acquired political status, and to keep away from the highly constrictive alliances with super power. That feeling materialized in the form of the non-alignment movement that came to the fore of the international scene in the 1960s.

In the view of some of its exponents it was meant to denote a sort of neutrality with respect to attachment to military alliances, whereas others equated it with non-involvement in either the Soviet or the Western block. Refusing to join either of the two super powers, twenty nine Afro-Asian countries, all of which were newly independent, met in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955. In addition to promoting economic and cultural cooperation among themselves, they were also intent on expressing their opposition to colonialism and neo-colonialism. One can of course mention many versions of non-alignments, but what concerns us here is that most of the Arab and Muslim leaders, especially President Nasser who was one of the architects of the conference, saw non-alignment as a means of strengthening their own position against the US-Israeli alliance.

As expected, the US Government, which had already lost Egypt, was not in a position to lose Pakistan and thus undermine its worldwide defence system against the Soviet Union. Consequently, in 1953, the US provided military aid to Pakistan, an act that was seen by India, the main pillar of non-alignment, as supplying Pakistan with arms which could be used against her. In response, India began to oppose not only US foreign policy but the entire system of what Nehru saw as 'capitalist-imperialism'. At this point communist Russia found a formidable ally in India, when Nehru (like President Nasser) began to see the Soviet Government as a bulwark of opposition against the West, and when the flames of the cold war put the non-alignment movement in jeopardy.

THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

Aspirations for unity and cooperation among Arab and Muslim countries have never died, and they were partially met in 1944 when a loose association of independent Arab States managed, under the leadership of Nahas Pasha, Egypt's prime minister, to establish the League of the Arab States. Though it remained ineffective in terms of collective political action, the League has nevertheless succeeded as a tool of crisis-management, especially during times

of inter-Arab conflicts, in keeping open the lines of communication among Member States.

Commenting on the experience of the Arab League in its first five years, one researcher hinted that it might frustrate rather than foster the very purpose for which it was formed. 'In its efforts to create an exclusive, self-sufficient Arab world in the Near Eastern cauldron of great rivalries, (the League) has had neither the resources nor the requisite strength to accomplish its tasks. The League's failure must not be considered merely the failure of the Arab States alone, but also of a too widespread belief that such local arrangements, by themselves, can form the basis for regional peace and stability.'[60]

THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)

Between 1948 and 1967 the Arabs fought three wars against Israel, but far from achieving their goals, these wars helped only to confirm the positions of the United States and the Russians in the region, to strengthen the Israeli-US alliance, and to deepen the already existing frictions among the Arab States themselves. Facing these realities, the Palestinian elite, most of whom were either Baathists or staunch supporters of President Nasser and his brand of Arab nationalism, began to lose faith in the possibility of Arab unity, particularly so after the break-up of the union between Egypt and Syria in 1961. It became evident to them that the 'liberation' of the Palestinian occupied lands should not necessarily depend upon the achievement of 'Arab unity'. This is what prompted Yasser Arafat and Khalid Khalaf, who were then leading the Palestinian Students' Union at Cairo University, to stress self-reliance and, backed by a few Palestinian groups, to create the Fateh Organization in the early 1960s. But that fledgling organization did not assume importance until the first Arab Summit Conference in 1964 decided to adopt 'practical resolutions necessary to ward off existing Zionist danger … and to organize the Palestinian people to enable them to carry out their role in liberating their homeland and determining their destiny.'[61]

It is interesting to note how the 'revolutionary' Arab nationalists, together with the conservative camp, extricated themselves from the burden of liberating the Palestinian occupied lands, threw it onto a newly created entity, and returned to their backseats. Later events were to show that the self-same

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60. P. Seabury, 'The League of Arab States: Debacle of a Regional Arrangement', *International Organization*, III, No. 4, November 1949, p. 642.

61. Quoted in R. Hamid, 'What is PLO', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, IV, No. 4, Summer, 1975, p. 93.

VIII–2.3   Residents of Samatiguila, Côte d'Ivoire, participate in the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)'s information campaign for a peaceful electoral environment in October 2010
© UN Photo/BasileZoma

rivalries that undermined the pan-Arab movement had crept into the Palestinian organizations.

The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

In the wake of an attempt to burn down Al-Aqsa Mosque in the Israeli occupied city of al-Quds (August 1969), the leaders of the Muslim world hurriedly met in Rabat (Morocco) in September 1969 and decided, among other things, to establish what has become known as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). The OIC was meant to strengthen solidarity among Member States, to promote cooperation in the political, economic, social and cultural fields, and to advance the struggle of all Muslim peoples to safeguard their dignity, independence and national rights.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

In the absence of a clear ideology, economic considerations and interests supersede all types of divisions, such as those between the secular Nasserites and the Wahhabi Saudis, or the revolutionary Palestinians and the conservative Gulf sheikhs. Toward the end of the 1960s President Nasser's leadership ran

into difficulties, in part because of the humiliating defeat in the 1967 war against Israel, in part because of the fragmentation and factionalism among his Arab allies, and in part because of the acute economic situation inside Egypt itself. Accordingly, he began to show signs of wanting to relinquish power and grew increasingly conciliatory.

An opportunity presented itself in August 1967 at meeting in Khartoum, Sudan, heads of Arab States agreed to financially support, the Palestinian cause as well as the bordering countries, that is to say, Egypt and Syria. In itself this was a great relief and a sign that the inter-state conflicts, particularly between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, were partially resolved. From then onward a rapprochement between self-proclaimed revolutionary/ progressive Arab States and conservative but stable and rich Arab countries began to develop.

But in the view of some researchers, that rapprochement had a drastic impact not only on the balance of power in the region but also on the future of the pan-Arab movement. It brought about 'a restructuring of power relations in the Arab world' where the frontline states of Egypt, Syria and Jordan became financially dependent on the conservative oil-exporting countries in the Gulf. This dependence was formally sealed at the conference of Khartoum (August 1967), where Nasser was forced to make his *compromesso storico* with King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. In Khartoum, the collective Arab leaders, pressed by King Faisal, opted for a new, 'positive strategy'. This was where 'pragmatic' Arabism was for pan-Arabism, and *tharwa* (wealth) substituted for *thawra* (revolution).[62]

On 6 October 1973, the third war flared up between Israel and the Arab countries, namely, Egypt and Syria. Fulfilling his earlier promises to the Egyptians and threats to Washington, King Faisal responded with a total oil embargo and the other oil producing Arab States followed suit.[63] That step heralded a new era of inter-dependence of politics and oil where the Arab-Israeli conflict began to intermingle with oil exports to Western countries. As a result, a transfer of power from former centres of Islamic civilization (Egypt and Syria) to the Gulf states took place, whereas the Gulf states themselves began to see themselves not only as oil exporters and brokers of power, but as a political community conscious of its own identity and aware of the importance of its own unity.

Hence, a group of six Arab Gulf countries (Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE) agreed, during the Islamic Summit that was held in Saudi Arabia in February 1981, to form what has come to be known

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62. P. Aarts, *The Arab Oil Weapon: A One-Shot Edition?*, Abu Dhabi, The Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, No. 34, 1999, p. 5.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).The main objective of the GCC is to establish a Gulf cooperative identity on political, economic, oil and security matters.[64]

Opinions are divided as to how this sub-region of the Gulf, which is firmly tied to the political and military protection of the US, will respond to the Arab-Israeli conflict, to the inter-Arab rivalries, and to the non-Arab, anti-Western revolutionary neighbour: Iran.

CONCLUSION

By the early decades of the twentieth century and upon the collapse of Ottoman rule, the elite of the Middle Eastern Islamic societies began to feel the brunt of European colonialism. Whether British or French, colonial regimes had an enormous impact on these societies. They disrupted their old structure of power, created new aristocracies, and instituted new norms. Nevertheless, the colonial regimes also brought into existence an intellectual and political opposition elite who began to revisit and criticize their traditions, suggest a new course of action, and mobilize various indigenous social forces against what they saw as an imperial onslaught.

Among these responses there are at least three: the strict traditionalists who wanted to preserve the form and letter of religion; the secular reformists who sought to adopt immediately Western ideas and methods; and the 'third way' reformers, the adapters, who rejected both positions and wanted, instead, to 'reconcile' traditional Islamic thought to the demand of modern progress.

Understandably, internal contradictions and tensions developed among the elite on the one hand, and between them and the post-colonial, pro-Western Arab dynasties on the other. Ironically, these 'internal tensions' have served, among other factors, as a source of change in the Arab world. Through the fostering of religious and cultural nationalism, and the penetration of the post-colonial military establishment, Arab nationalists were able, from the early 1950s, to seize governmental power in Egypt, Iraq and Syria.

But raising themselves into power, those Arab nationalists exercised authority in a high-handed and arbitrary fashion: the party system was abolished, trade unions were banned, and all media outlets were brought under government control. Not unexpectedly, these measures precipitated enduring conflicts and bitter internal strife, particularly when the communists and the Muslim Brotherhood resorted to force.

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64. M. S. al-Sabban, *Viability of Industrial Integration within the Gulf Cooperation Council*, Ph.D. thesis, University of Colorado, 1981, p. 60.

Facing an unrelenting Western action, starting with the Balfour Declaration through the French repression in Algeria, the ill-conceived Baghdad Pact, and the 1956 attack on Egypt, most of these regimes became immensely radicalized. With assistance from the Soviet Union, which was itself engaged in a deadly war against the US, anti-Western sentiment engulfed the entire Arab world and endangered the very existence of the few remaining conservative, pro-Western regimes' (Peter Mansfield, reviewing Vatikiotis *Conflict in the Middle East*).

The twenty years between 1948, when the Arab States lost their first war against Israel, and 1967 when they lost their third war against the same enemy, saw three developments which were to have far-reaching effects on the political evolution of contemporary Middle Eastern politics. These were: the gradual superseding of Anglo-Russian rivalry by US/Soviet rivalry in the Middle East, the establishment of a strategic US-Israeli alliance in the Arab region, and the emergence of a Palestinian nationalist movement under the leadership of the PLO. It was in response to these changes and/or engagement with them that the pan-Arab movement reached maturity and attained great prominence in the Middle East.

But the outbreak of sporadic wars between Israel and the Arab countries absorbed the energies of these countries for nearly three decades, resulting in a state of poverty, apathy and frustration; the ideal climate for religious fundamentalism. This is not to imply, however, that poverty breeds fundamentalism, as is often claimed, but it is to recognize the important role that religion (Islam) plays in articulation of popular protest. And it is here that we begin to see the emergence of the neo-Islamic revivalist movements (commonly called 'fundamentalist') aspire to replace the Arab nationalist regimes which have clearly run out of steam.

In addition to external wars, inter-Arab rivalries and conflicts have also taken their toll. For almost four decades following the Second World War, the radical-conservative division has dominated Middle Eastern politics, as much as the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab world was torn between those countries whose systems of government were conservative, and those that saw themselves as revolutionary, popular and democratic.

Given the limited public support that those secular nationalists command, along with the repressive systems of governance they erected, most of them chose to rely on building up military forces, thus diverting economic resources that might have been put into the educational and health sectors. Accordingly, most of these regimes became, during the Cold War era, increasingly dependent on foreign aid, especially from the Soviet Union. As a result, a sizable number of Arab populations, impoverished and disillusioned with pan-Arab ideology, lent their support to the Islamists who wanted to bring religion back to the political centre stage.

It must be remembered that the political field in all these countries has always been dominated either by communists and/or secular nationalists, with religion on the sidelines.'[65] With the triumph of the Iranian revolution in 1979, and the subsequent Iran-Iraq war, the region re-entered a period of turmoil, and the role of religion has been greatly emphasized, albeit in the form of a Shī'a/Sunni struggle for power.

65. S. Zubaida, 'Reading History Backwards: Review Essays', *Middle East Report*, No. 160., September-October 1989, p. 40.

– I X –

ECONOMY

ECONOMIC RESOURCES OF THE MUSLIM WORLD

Ali Fatemi

Population

The total population of the OIC member countries is 1.43 billion. However, the distribution of population is not uniform across the entire region; Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia with 27 per cent and 22 per cent have the highest percentages of the total population of OIC respectively. On the other hand, Europe and Central Asia (after the Latin America and Caribbean which contains only two OIC member countries) has the lowest percentage of population.

Figure 1

According to the World Bank classification, of 57 OIC countries, 53 are classified in the emerging and underdeveloped category.

Figure 2

For the most recent date, 2007–8 statistics, annual average growth rate of population is 2.13 per cent, which is significantly higher than the world rate of 1.27 per cent. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East with 2.72 per cent and 2.62 per cent respectively have been the most rapidly growing regions of OIC while the Latin America and Caribbean has had the lowest population growth rate.

Figure 3

In 2007, the average fertility rate in OIC countries was 3.3 per cent which is significantly higher than the world average of 2.58 per cent. However, the fertility rate is not equivalent across the entire regions and there is a substantial difference between low income countries and the rest.

Figure 4

The distribution among age groups is almost uniform across the entire region. In 2007 the population of working age (15–64) constituted 63 per cent of the total population. OIC member countries are quite young with children constituting 32 per cent of their total population, and the proportion of elderly is less than 6 per cent for the region.

Figure 5

Education

Education is an essential tool for human resource development, and a necessary ingredient for sustainable socio-economic growth. It helps reduce poverty by increasing productivity, by reducing fertility and improving health, and by equipping people with the skills they need to fully participate in society. As can be seen in Figure 6 the primary level education has the largest enrolment, followed by the secondary level and then the tertiary. However the structure of enrolment is not uniform among OIC member countries. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia with 81 per cent and 79 per cent enrolment

in primary school have the highest percentage rate in the basic literacy and foundation of the educational system. In contrast they have the lowest enrolment ratio in secondary and tertiary education across the entire region. Out of 57 OIC member countries 25 (or 43 per cent) are located in South Asia and Sub-Saharan region, and by the classification of World Bank 88 per cent of these countries are located in the low income classification. This implicitly indicates that the enrolment structure is highly dependent on the income level. It can be seen in Figure 6 that the chance of receiving a secondary and tertiary education is far greater in high and upper middle income countries.

Figure 6

Health and human development

In addition to education, health is also considered as an important determinant of socio-economic development and has a large influence on the quality of human capital and productivity. Life expectancy and infant mortality rates are the two most important indicators for measuring human health. It can be seen in Figure 7 that Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia a child mortality rate of 82 and 76 child per thousand live-births have the highest rate respectively among OIC members.

Figure 7

Comparing child mortality by the income level shows that there is a substantial gap between low income countries and others.

Figure 8

The average life expectancy at birth for OIC member countries is 63 years which is lower than the world average of 66 years.

Figure 9

The gap in life expectancy between low income countries in OIC and high income is substantial. Low income countries are expected to live 20 years less.

Figure 10

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
Apart from child mortality and life expectancy, other indicators such as number of physicians per 10,000 population, number of children under 5, moderately or severely under weight, number of people living with HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis case detection rate, are being used for measuring human health across countries. Figures 11 to 14 below show the situation of these indicators across OIC member countries.

Figure 11

Figure 12

Figure 13

Figure 14

The OIC high income groups, with 2.3 per cent of the total population, has 22.8 per cent of the OIC GDP and spends 14.9 per cent of the OIC total health expenditure. OIC middle income countries, with 45 per cent of total population, have 59 per cent of total GDP and spend 67 per cent of the OIC total health expenditure. However, as shown in Figure 15, low income countries just spend 17 per cent of the OIC total health expenditure.

Figure 15

Gender and development

Gender equality is not only essential for promoting social justice, but it is also important for economic growth and poverty reduction. However, gender inequalities still prevail in many cultural, social and political systems. Figures 16 and 17 show the Gender Parity Index for adult literacy and gross enrolment rate in primary and secondary education. Although women constitute 48 per cent of the total population of OIC member countries, female literacy and labour force participation stand 84 per cent and 42 per cent respectively, and this is more conspicuous in low income countries.

Figure 16

Figure 17

527

Income and poverty

Improvement in standard of living is the major aim of all countries and the GDP per capita, with all its limitations, is often used as an indicator for economic well-being. Using these criteria, only fourteen OIC member countries have higher GDP per capita than that of the world average which was $10,400 in 2008. This means that out of 1.4 billion people living in OIC member countries 1.1 billion or 84 per cent are below the world average income per capita. Of these fourteen countries nine of them are located in the Middle East, and all except Lebanon are oil exporting countries. See Figure 18.

Figure 18

Figure 19

Figure 19 represents the national poverty rates in OIC member countries. It can be seen that the gap between the poor and the rich OIC countries is substantial. Almost 50 per cent of the population in low income OIC countries lives in poverty. Income distribution is an important concern in economics. The Gini coefficient index which measures income equality, as indicated in Figure 20, is relatively high for OIC countries.

Figure 20

EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT SITUATION

As indicated in Figure 21, although the population of working age constitutes 63 per cent of the total population in OIC countries, the unemployment rate ranges from close to 19 per cent in most, except high income countries, where it drops to 6 per cent.

Unemployment rate

5.5%
13.4%
23.3%
17.8%

- Cat. 4
- Cat. 1
- Cat. 2
- Cat. 3

Source: UNDP, 2008

Figure 21

According to the United Nations Classification only 19 per cent of the OIC countries are in high human development[1] classification while 56 per cent are in the medium category and the remaining 26 per cent are classified among the low human development group.

Human development index

18.52%
55.56%
25.93%

- High Human Development
- Low Human Development
- Meduim Human Development

Source: UNDP, 2008

Figure 22

1. The Human Development Index is comprised of three sub-indices that measure health and lifespan, education and knowledge, and standard of living. It attempts to describe achievement of development goals related to quality of life using data that can be compared across countries and time. More information is available at http://hdr.undp.org.

Economics and financial flows

In 2008, as far as economic weight is concerned, the OIC countries with a GDP of $8,918 billion accounted for only 12 per cent of the world total GDP by Purchasing Power Parity measure.

The annual growth rate for that year was 5.2 per cent. But this rate was not uniform across the member countries. Europe and Central Asia and the Middle East with 6.9 per cent and 6.3 per cent respectively had the highest rate of growth, while East Asia and the Pacific with 3.9 per cent were at the bottom. The region's growth rate was, however, higher than the world average of 3.8 per cent.

Figure 23

Figure 24

Today the most important economic issue for all countries around the world is improving the standard of living of their citizens, and the GDP per capita is often used as an indicator for standard of living. In terms of

GDP per capita only 14 OIC member countries have a higher standard of living than that of the world average per capita, which was $10,400 in 2008. This means that out of 1.4 billion people living in OIC member countries, 1.1 billion or 84 per cent are below the average standard of living. From these fourteen countries nine are located in the Middle East, and all except Lebanon are oil exporting countries.

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
Figure 26

Among OIC countries the services sector with 46 per cent makes the largest contribution to the GDP, industry with 34 per cent and agriculture at 19 per cent take the second and third positions.

However, this distribution of sectorial contribution is not uniform among member countries. Low income countries' share of agriculture is 30 per cent and that of industry only 26 per cent. In contrast, high income countries have less than 2 per cent in agriculture and as much as 62 per cent in industry.

Figure 27

The overall inflation rate among the group was 10.7 per cent in 2008. However, again there was no uniformity among this group of countries with respect to the rate of inflation. In 26 OIC countries the rate varied between 10 per cent and 20 per cent. In five countries, named Azerbaijan, Guinea, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, the rate was higher than 20 per cent. Guinea stood out among these countries with a 30 per cent rate of inflation. Only 9 countries managed to have an inflation rate below 5 per cent.

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
Figure 29

In 2005, the latest year for which we have detailed information, FDI (foreign direct investment) in OIC countries amounted to $29,663 million. However, most of this amount was invested in the upper and middle income countries.

Foreign direct investment – net inflows – 2005 (million current $US)

$6,164

$13,399

$10,100

Cat. 1
Cat. 2
Cat. 3

Source: WRI, 2008

Figure 30

The amount of official development assistance and aid in OIC countries was $21,749 million; 75 per cent of this amount was allocated to low income countries.

Official development assistance and Aid 2005 (million current $US)

$1,077

$4,319

$16,353

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
Figure 31

Governance and Institutions

The level of freedom, governance and transparency of a country makes it more suitable for economic growth and improved international relations, including the attraction of foreign investments; good governance is also an indicator of and related to the level of democracy in a country. The OIC data shown in Figures 32 and 33 indicate an overall low level of civil liberties and political rights, both on the richer and poorer side of the spectrum; it seems that in the case of the

OIC, the level of income is not necessarily related to the freedom enjoyed in the country. The region ranking worst is North Africa, with the Middle East and Europe and Central Asia not far behind, most likely because of the cultural resemblance of those regions. Low political rights are often associated with low political competition and tend to be harmful for the economy.

Figure 32

Figure 33

Press freedom and digital access are two measures of the attempted level of control of the government on media and information. Not surprisingly, the region ranked in a very similar fashion as in the political rights and civil liberties indices, the situation being the worst in Turkmenistan (96th ranking) and Uzbekistan (90th ranking). The bulk of the countries are situated over the 50th ranking bar. On the other hand, digital access seems to grow with the level of income of member countries: the ones with the highest income level (category 4 countries) rank four times better than countries with the lowest income (category 1 countries), still only three countries break the 50th point ranking threshold, and those are Kuwait (51) Malaysia (57) and the Emirates (64).

Figure 34

Figure 35

Figure 36

The first and most cumbersome barrier to entrepreneurship in developing countries is the administrative services. The time and cost of registering a business might put off many potential foreign entrepreneurs, leaving only the best connected and those willing to play the corruption game in the market. Associated with the other transparency problems stated above, this can affect both the innovation and the competitiveness within the local market. These constraints seem to diminish as the income level of the country rises, making the countries already at higher income levels better investment climates.

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
Figure 38

According to Transparency International (see Figure 39), overall, the OIC lacks transparency. Corruption is still rampant even though attempts are being

made to tackle these problems. Measures such as the OIC Anti-Corruption Forum in 2006 are among measures being taken to improve the situation. Still to this date only five countries have a Corruption Perception Index over 5 (Malaysia, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE).

Corruption perception index 2008

2.3 2.9 3.7 5.1

Cat. 1
Cat. 2
Cat. 3
Cat. 4

Source: Transparency International

Figure 39

Energy Consumption and Resources

Energy is a good indicator of the development of a country, its consumption (Figures 40 and 41) hints at how industrialized a country is, and what level of comfort the population is enjoying. How this energy is produced indicates the level of sustainability at the current rate of consumption. Energy reserves are strategic; the larger the resources of these reserves, the more independent a country is.

The OIC is extremely heterogeneous in terms of energy consumption: the Middle East, East Asia and Pacific and North Africa, as oil and gas producing regions, enjoy a steady supply of fossil fuel, giving no incentive to diversify their productions into different, more environmentally friendly and sustainable sources. On the other hand, population in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa populations depend mostly on solid biomass for their everyday needs, both the production capacity and the distribution grid are lacking; the lack of funding also prevents the development of the important potential hydro-electric and geotermal resources of Africa. As a whole, the OIC is dependent on fossil fuels for over 80 per cent of its energy needs. Nuclear energy sources are negligible because only Pakistan has access to this technology in the OIC and its development is limited under anti-proliferation treaties.

Figure 40

Figure 41

538

Even though the total consumption of energy has increased accross the board, the per capita consumption in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Europe and Central Asia has remained stable in the period 2000–5. Because of the growth in population and the slow rate of development of the countries, the population is not enjoying any increase in living standards through an increase in energy consumption.

Figure 42

The OIC controls almost 70 per cent of the oil reserves of the planet, and ten of the thirteen members of OPEC are also OIC members. This gives the OIC an incredible political power and offers a significant stream of revenue to these countries; it traces a clear line between the OIC countries that do have oil (or gas) and the ones who do not; this could be a barrier to further cooperation and development of intra-OIC partnerships. The situation is somewhat similar for gas reserves, as the Middle East holds 39 per cent of world reserves and the OIC represents a total of 57 per cent of the same.

Figure 43

Proven gas reserves

East Asia & Pacific	5%
Europe & central Asia	5%
Middle East	39%
North Africa	4%
South Asia	1%
Sub-Saharan Africa	3%
Rest of the world	43%

Source: WRI, 2000

Figure 44

The increase in imports is consistent with the increase in consumption of the non-oil producing regions and North Africa. But for East Asia and Pacific and the Middle East, there is an increase in imports as a percentage of total consumpton: as they are exporting crude fuel, they are importing refined products for their national consumption. This is an important additional cost for those countries where oil is also very often subsidised.

Fuel imports, million toe

East Asia & Pacific
Europe & central Asia
Middle East
North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: WRI

Figure 45

540

There is a clear inverse correlation between access to electricity and dependency: solid fuel is used is South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa as a substitute supply of energy. In Europe and Central Asia, their use seems to be complementary rather than an alternative, the region does have an electricity grid that it inherited from the Soviet Union but it is ridden with problems such as inefficiency, a lack of production capacity and investment in the sector and illegal leakage.

Figure 46

The World Energy Council states that a consumption of energy of 500kWh/y per person is necessary to ensure decent standards of living. If we consider an unequal distribution of electricity use within these countries, we can imagine that in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, a large share of the population needs alternative sources of energy to subsist.

Per capita electricity consumption, KWh

- East Asia & Pacific: 3,485
- Europe & central Asia: 2,134
- Middle East: 5,384
- North Africa: 1,452
- South Asia: 301
- Sub-Saharan Africa: 260

Source: WRI, 2005

Figure 47

Climate & Atmosphere

Climate and atmospheric issues are global as they are shared resources and they affect every country. It is also an area where externals play a role: emitters of greenhouse gases are not always the ones suffering the most direct and dreadful consequences. Because a significant number of OIC countries are situated in already water-stressed areas and an important share of their population depends on rainwater, the OIC is particularly vulnerable to changes in climate; therefore it should arrange for a limited growth in its emissions while maintaining economic growth. Within the OIC, there are forty countries where the Kyoto protocol is in force, showing a certain concern for the subject; still, some regions have a very important level of emissions.

The Middle East region is the biggest emitter within the OIC. In Qatar and the Emirates, emissions reach a high of 51 tons and 26 tons of CO_2 per year per person respectively. In these countries, high energy consumption has been used to prop up economic growth, at a high environmental cost.

East Asia and Pacific has known an important increase through the 1991–2004 periods, because of the widespread deforestation in the region and the tremendous increase in population. South Asia is threatened by climate change: rising sea levels are displacing millions of inhabitants in Bangladesh; still the CO_2 emissions of the region have risen sharply with the increase in population and cutting of wood for energy production.

Figure 48

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
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
Figure 51

The following gases are greenhouse gases that have a warming power far greater than the CO_2: methane has a warming power 72 times greater than CO_2 over 20 years, nitrous gases have a warming power on average 300 times

greater, and fluorinated gases have a warming potential tens of thousands times greater than CO_2. This is why the use of the last category of these gases for industrial use is more and more regulated. A large quantity of nitrous gases is found in Africa and South Asia as it is a byproduct of nitrogenous fertilizers or animal waste used in place of fertilizer.

Figure 52

Figure 53

Figure 54

Water resources and fisheries

WATER RESOURCES

The growth of the population, the change in water consumption patterns and the impact of climate change on precipitation have made the management of water resources an increasingly crucial subject for governments, especially in areas where access to water has always been problematic. Some regions of the OIC have already been suffering from water scarcity.

Figure 55

There are important discrepancies in the distribution of the renewable water ressources amongst OIC countries (Figure 55). The East Asia and Pacific region claims by itself 43 per cent of the total, while North Africa holds a meager 1.3 per cent. The per capita comparison (Figure 56) proves itself even more stunning, with two regional averages, the North African and the Middle Eastern, dipping below 1000m³/capita. Eighteen countries lie below 1000m³/capita, and three more are below 1700m³/capita (Figure 57). Those two critical thresholds are considered by the World Bank as increasing the likelihood of water stress. Water stress is defined as a state where demand for water exceeds the available supply, limiting food production and development and damaging total water ressources in the long term. It occurs in the event of lower than expected depth of precipitation.

Figure 56

Figure 57

547

When compared to the renewable water resources, withdrawal per capita (Figure 58) gives a sense of how sustainable the consumption of water is, and how water stressed a region is. A ratio of consumption to renewable ressources of 0.2 or more indicates a stress and 0.4 or more indicates severe stress. Thus South Asia (0.21) should be considered as stressed while Europe and Central Asia (0.41), North Africa (0.81) and the Middle East (0.97) should be classified as severely stressed. Clearly long term sustainability solutions need to be implemented for the last two. Sub-Saharan Africa encounters yet a different problem, that of accessibility and quality of water.

Figure 58

The sectorial use of water shows that Categories 1–3 are very much in line with the world average which is 70 per cent for agriculture, 20 per cent for industry and 10 per cent for domestic use, which is expected from developing countries deriving a large share of their GDP from agriculture. But Category 4 derives only about 1 per cent of its GDP from agriculture, which is comparable to the average of developed countries of 1.6 per cent. Still these countries consume as much as 45 per cent of their water withdrawal for agriculture, when the Category 4 average is 68 per cent. From this observation we can conclude that agricultural practices in those countries are wasteful and unsustainable when keeping in mind that most Category 4 countries are situated in severely water-stressed regions.

Figure 59

Fish production

According to Figures 60 and 61, displaying the total fish production both capture and aquaculture, OIC countries seem to follow global trends, in which capture production has seemingly no growth and aquaculture maintains a strong growth. However the difference in growth between the East Asia and

Figure 60

Pacific region and the rest of the OIC can only be explained by the extent of unexploited marine resources when the activity is almost saturated in other regions and growth, especially in capture, can only be achieved by extending the fishing areas into deeper and more remote waters, or increasing the number of species that are being produced.

Figure 61

FISH AND FISHERY TRADE

The intensification of both Exports and Imports (Figures 62 and 63) over the 2000–7 period is coherent with both the increase in production and the growth in global trade and GDP enjoyed during these years.

Figure 62

Figure 63

Biodiversity

Awareness about the necessity of preservinge and managing the natural resources of the planet has been developing since the end of the twentieth century; it has become clear that it allows countries to achieve better living and sustainability in the long term. But as critical a subject as it might be, developing countries sometime have difficulty managing the short-term development constraints and the long term environmental protection principles. We will try to assess what the resources of the OIC countries are in terms of biodiversity and protected areas, and how they are managed. Yet another difficulty is the transnational nature of these resources, making regulation and control a complex issue and leaving these areas vulnerable to externalities.

The Category Four protected land in the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN I–V) groups together areas where the IUCN is intervening actively in the management of the area to ensure the respect for the habitat and life of the local wildlife. As shown in Figures 64 and 65, these areas are spread out all around the world in quite uniform fashion. They are grouped around regions of high biodiversity like the Sundaland region in East Asia, the Guinean forest in Sub-Saharan Africa or the Mediterranean Sea. The East Asia and Pacific region has a larger concentration of IUCN I–V area because islands foster the development of endemic species and unique ecosystems, making this region one of the most biodiverse in the world; this also explains the large number of marine and coastal protected areas in the region (Figure 66).

IUCN I–V protected land (% of total land)

East Asia & Pacific
Europe & central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean
Middle East
North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
World

Source: WRI, 2006-2007

Figure 64

IUCN I–V protected land

10,097
13,277
2,332
51,653
15,056
3,621
16,428

East Asia & Pacific
Europe & central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean
Middle East
North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: WRI, 1992-2003

Figure 65

Marine & littoral protected areas

41
38
50
34
7
24
280

East Asia & Pacific
Europe & central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean
Middle East
North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: WRI, 2006-2007

Figure 66

Wetlands include all freshwater such as lakes, marshes, rivers. These are both extremely valuable and exposed; they suffer a wide range of afflictions such as invasion by alien species, pollution, overexploitation and climate change. Still it is very important to protect them, as freshwater is a precious economic resource, especially in the already water-stressed OIC, but also as they shelter a large number of species. The North African lakes are a temporary habitat for many migratory birds during their journey. Most of these wetlands are concentrated in Africa (Figure 67) where they are facing increasing pressure because of the growth and urbanization of population.

Figure 67

Areas classified by UNESCO as biosphere reserves are managed by local authorities and have agreed on protecting the local ecosystem while developing a sustainable long term human activity, teaching and implementing the best practices among the locals, such as environmental education. These zones are divided in three parts: a core preserved and used for research purposes, a buffer and then a transitional area, where activity is gradually increased. Of 553 reserves in the world, only 55 (or a mere 10 per cent) are in the OIC (Figure 68), mostly in North and Sub-Saharan Africa; it certainly does not demonstrate the absence of such areas but rather the willingness and the ability to deploy the necessary infrastructure. This example is representative of the careless way in which the preservation of natural resources is handled in less developed countries. But changes are needed to achieve durable improvements in the living standards of the populations.

Number of biosphere reserves

6

4

0

25

11

1

14

East Asia & Pacific

Europe & central Asia

Middle East

North Africa

South Asia

Sub-Saharan Africa

Figure 68

As it is an important source of revenue and food, fish is a good example of how the loss of biodiversity can have a direct impact on daily life. Overexploitation in both North and Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in the Mediterranean Sea (Figures 69 and 70), is forcing fishermen to extend their capture to new species, further and deeper in the water or to keep smaller fish, as the usual specimen are becoming more scarce. A different threat to fish species can be destruction of habitat, like the reduction of the Aral Sea in Europe and Central Asia, showing an extremely high proportion of endangered species.

Number of fish species

2,516

4,512

822

866

1,305

324

389

East Asia & Pacific

Europe & central Asia

Latin America & Caribbean

Middle East

North Africa

South Asia

Sub-Saharan Africa

Figure 69

Figure 70

East Asia and Pacific and South Asia are the two regions with the highest rate of endangered species for both mammals (Figures 71 and 72) and birds (Figures 73 and 74), as they are also the regions where deforestation is rampant. The two can be linked and loss of habitat could be one of the most important threats to biodiversity; this is especially daunting in an insular region with a large number of endemic species like the East Asia and Pacific region.

Figure 71

Number of threatened mammal species

East Asia & Pacific

Europe & central Asia

Latin America & Caribbean

Middle East

North Africa

South Asia

Sub-Saharan Africa

211

330

94

22

112

76

69

Source: WRI, 2007

Figure 72

Number of bird species

East Asia & Pacific

Europe & central Asia

Latin America & Caribbean

Middle East

North Africa

South Asia

Sub-Saharan Africa

2,805

2,819

1,460

4,292

2,281

1,829

13,144

Source: WRI, 2004

Figure 73

Number of threatened bird species

East Asia & Pacific

Europe & central Asia

Latin America & Caribbean

Middle East

North Africa

South Asia

Sub-Saharan Africa

177

187

101

3

121

48

66

Source: WRI, 2007

Figure 74

556

The trade data (Figures 75 to 79) show that in the absence of an economic incentive to protect animals that can be valued either as pets or for their pelts, large-scale capture or hunting takes place. It is conspicuous in the case of live parrots in Sub-Saharan Africa, and with primates in East Asia and Pacific, where large-scale slaughter is taking place. This shows that it is only with the involvement of the populations, not just the commitment of institutions, that preservation of wildlife can be achieved, and this can only be done through education and the aligning of common and individual interests.

Figure 75

Figure 76

Net imports of crocodilian skins

−15,665

⠿	East Asia & Pacific
⊠	Europe & central Asia
░	Latin America & Caribbean
▨	Middle East
▩	North Africa
◩	South Asia
■	Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: WRI, 2002

Figure 77

Net imports of lizard skins

−580,751

⠿	East Asia & Pacific
⊠	Europe & central Asia
░	Latin America & Caribbean
▨	Middle East
▩	North Africa
◩	South Asia
■	Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: WRI, 2002

Figure 78

Net imports of snake skins

−769,047

⠿	East Asia & Pacific
⊠	Europe & central Asia
░	Latin America & Caribbean
▨	Middle East
▩	North Africa
◩	South Asia
■	Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: WRI, 2002

Figure 79

Land use and human settlements

The countries of the OIC are grouped into regions along lines of the diffusion of Islam, the two historical cradles of Islam being the Middle East and North Africa; they still represent today an important area within the OIC, although Sub-Saharan Africa has become the single biggest region with a size of 1.170 billion hectares (Figure 80). Still within the regions the differences in size of countries are important: the five biggest countries – in millions of hectares – being Kazakhstan (270), Algeria (238), Sudan (237), Saudi Arabia (200) and Indonesia (181), while the smallest – in thousands of hectares – are the Maldives (300), Bahrain (710), Comoros (186), Brunei (527) and Palestine (602).

Total land, 100 ha

214,537
480,791
35,276
576,719
1,170,328
576,020
109,226

- East Asia & Pacific
- Europe & central Asia
- Latin America & Caribbean
- Middle East
- North Africa
- South Asia
- Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: WRI, 2007

Figure 80

The OIC countries are characterized by a high percentage of dry lands (Figure 81) – arid but not desert land where water is the primary constraint for growing food. Dry lands represent over 50 per cent of the total area in Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. On the other hand, the East Asia and Pacific and Latin America being small islands and coastal countries, have close to no dryland at all.

Dryland as % of total area

- East Asia & Pacific
- Europe & central Asia
- Latin America & Caribbean
- Middle East
- North Africa
- South Asia
- Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: WRI, 1999

Figure 81

559

This is not reflected in the repartition of agricultural land, Europe and Central Asia holding similar proportions. The reduction of North Africa's share is due to the presence of the Sahara Desert. The explanation for the presence of an important agricultural area in those two arid regions can be found in the intensity of agricultural input, especially water, through the use of irrigation, but also in the use of different, more resilient crops.

Agricultural area, 1000 ha

54,308
328,745
559,605
1,794
48,606
312,653
101,132

East Asia & Pacific
Europe & central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean
Middle East
North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: WRI, 2007

Figure 82

The distribution of agricultural land between crops and pastures (Figures 83 and 84) across regions seems fairly similar, meadows and pastures representing about three times on average the crops and arable lands, with the notable exception of East Asia and Pacific, which is the only region where crops represent a larger area.

Arable land & permanent crops, 1000 ha

45,093
59,131
130,521
515
17,222
27,870
56,673

East Asia & Pacific
Europe & central Asia
Latin America & Caribbean
Middle East
North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: WRI, 2007

Figure 83

Figure 84

As expected, there is a strong negative correlation between the presence of dry lands and forest coverage (Figure 85), with most of the OIC forest resources concentrated in the East Asia and Pacific region. The concentration of areas with high canopy coverage might partly explain the preference for crops over livestock, for reasons of limited mobility of the cattle, the second explanation being the culture of high yield crops such as rubber and palm oil.

Figure 85

The deforestation phenomenon (Figure 86) in Sub-Saharan Africa can be explained by the high dependency of the population on solid biomass for energy. In both regions over 80 per cent of the population uses wood for heating and cooking. In East Asia and Pacific, the causes for deforestation are different; it seems to be a conjunction of the expansion of the timber industry, clearing for

tree crops plantations, transition of small investors to different crops, and wild fires that are causing the rapid reduction of the forest in this region.[1]

Figure 86

The density of population (Figures 87 and 88) varies highly from one region to another: South Asia is the cradle of two of the most densely populated regions in the world – Bangladesh and Pakistan – as opposed to very scarcely populated countries like Guyana and Suriname, the least densely populated region of Latin America and Caribbean. The trend is a logical increase of density, which matches the population trend across the OIC countries.

Figure 87

1. J. Lewis and T. P. Tomich, *Agents of Deforestation in Sumatra: The Big, the Small, and the Unaccounted*, 2002.

Population density, persons per square kilometre

- · · · · East Asia & Pacific
- —— Sub-Saharan Africa
- —— Europe & central Asia
- ++++ Middle East
- —·–· North Africa
- —— Latin America & Caribbean

Source: Sesric

Figure 88

Urban population is growing much faster than total population (Figure 89). This is a phenomenon of rural exodus, where the youth of the poorest countries is attracted to cities. It is strongest in South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia and Pacific, where urban population is expected to be respectively 39 per cent, 43 per cent and 63 per cent in 2010, up from 34 per cent, 34 per cent and 46 per cent in 1995. This inflow of population results in the creation of slums near the cities and is aggravating the housing problem. In East Asia and Pacific and Sub-Saharan Africa, over 80 per cent of the urban population live in those slums (Figure 90), making them huge baskets of poverty where violence and crime are abundant.

Urban population as % of total population

- · · · · Middle East
- —— North Africa
- —— East Asia & Pacific
- ++++ Europe & central Asia
- —·–· Latin America & Caribbean
- —— South Asia
- ——— Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: WRI, 2008

Figure 89

Figure 90

This new urban population is concentrated largely in rapidly growing, medium sized cities (over 100k inhabitants); also the level of income of the region seems to condition the existence of the larger cities (over 1 million inhabitants). Thus, the Middle East and North Africa are the most urbanized countries, with over 20 per cent of the population living in a metropolis (Figure 91).

Figure 91

Food and agriculture

Production across the OIC is growing, as well as its population, making agriculture both a potential resource and a potential weakness; securing a stable

and sufficient food supply is a sine qua non condition for the realization of economic growth. Over the last twenty years, production has grown, almost doubled in OIC countries (see Figure 92), with the exception of Europe and Central Asia, which faced a severe decline in the 1990s with the fall of the USSR and barely started to recover by the end of the decade; and in Latin America and Caribbean where production remained constant.

Figure 92

Surprisingly, South Asia is the region within the OIC that produces the most cereals; one might expect it to be Sub-Saharan Africa because of the very large total area devoted to crops and arable lands. In the same fashion, North Africa produces as much as the Middle East with a lot less land devoted to those cultures. The explanation may be found in the different agricultural inputs and their intensity, resulting in significant differences in yield.

Figure 93

One expects the intensity of those inputs to vary across regions because of different crops being cultivated, the natural constraints and the scarcity of those inputs in a given region. Figures 94, 95, 96 and 97 show the level of use of each of the four major agricultural inputs in the different regions;

Sub-Saharan Africa's low productivity is clearly explained by the low level of three of these outputs – machinery, fertilizer and water – the two former being a consequence of the level of development of the Sub-Saharan countries, while the latter results from the scarcity of water and the absence of a distribution system. Because of the lack of irrigation (Figure 98), the production level varies with the depth of precipitation, which explains the year-on-year changes. Both the accessibility of water and the required technology makes it very challenging to implement irrigation systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. The task is further complicated by the structure of ownership of the land, with small individual farms rather than large operations.

On the other hand, South Asia enjoys high productivity because of its high irrigation level (~40 per cent of total land), allowing for a good use of water resources, and the incredible amount of labour available, Bangladesh reaching a high of 7.9 people per hectare; tractors and fertilizer are also slightly more in use. This makes South Asia a model of extensive agriculture, with a high employment and use of water resources but limited use of chemicals to prop up short-term production. It explains why a larger proportion of its land is organic (Figure 98): not necessarily by intent, more likely as a consequence of the methods used. But extensive agriculture poses the problem of finding new arable land and thus contributes to deforestation.

East Asia and Pacific and the Middle East would be the models of intensive agriculture for the OIC countries, with a very high use fertilizer (over 500kg/ha in both cases). It clearly improves the yield of crops, as the output of the Middle East is surprisingly high considering the climate and regional constraints. These practices should raise questions of environmental damage and long term sustainability as the least noxious amount of fertilizer in an intensive agricultural setup (to minimize damage without needing to expand the agricultural land to maintain production levels) is around 240kg/ha.

Europe and Central Asia is shown to have an unusually high number of tractors per 1000ha compared to the other OIC countries; it seems they are mostly rusty heirlooms from the Soviet era, as six out of eight countries in this region are ex-USSR members.

The North African production is concentrated at over 75 per cent in Egypt, with an irrigation rate close to 100 per cent and a model of intense agriculture, with a higher level of mechanization. The other countries in the group have a very low production, with an irrigation rate hovering around 4 per cent.

Figure 94

Figure 95 (a)

Figure 95 (b)

Water intensity of agriculture (m³/ha/yr)

Legend:
- East Asia & Pacific
- Europe & central Asia
- Latin America & Caribbean
- Middle East
- North Africa
- South Asia
- Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: WRI, 2000

Figure 96

Irrigated land as % of agricultural land

Legend:
- • • • • South Asia
- Latin America & Caribbean
- North Africa
- ++++ Europe & central Asia
- —·—·— Middle East
- East Asia & Pacific
- – – – Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: WRI

Figure 97

Organic land as a proportion of total agricultural land

Legend:
- East Asia & Pacific
- Europe & central Asia
- Latin America & Caribbean
- Middle East
- North Africa
- South Asia
- Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: WRI, 2006

Figure 98

568

Consumption of cereals (Figure 99) is not distributed equally amongst the populations of the different regions of the OIC: Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa consume roughly the same amount of cereals as South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia and Pacific, where the population of the former are about half that of the latter. This is also reflected in the number of calories per person per day (Figure 100); a higher consumption of cereals per capita is translated into better nutrition.

Figure 99

Figure 100

As a result these countries heavily rely on imports to satisfy their needs. As shown in Figure 101, the Middle East and North Africa depend on imports for 40 per cent of their total consumption, where as South Asia has dipped below the 5 per cent threshold. The decline of North African imports around

1996, in a long term growth trend, matches the embargo on Libya. Also, the significant increase in Europe and Central Asia import is due to the end of the Soviet era in those countries, an aforementioned decline in production in conjunction with a change in habits. Overall, the dependency on imports is increasing, both because of the rapid increase in population, and because market mechanisms are increasingly used as responses to food crises, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, which suffered severe drought in the second half of the 1990s and the 2000s, and is consequently still heavily dependent on food aid (Figure 102), when at the same time, the rest of the OIC is being weaned.

Figure 101

Figure 102

The grain fed to livestock is an additional use of the production of cereal; the more meat is produced and consumed, depending on the income and habits of each region (Figures 103 and 104), the more cereals are diverted for this use, further increasing demand.

Calories from animal products as % of total intake

- · · · · Europe & central Asia
- —— South Asia
- **——** Latin America & Caribbean
- ++++ Middle East
- —·—· East Asia & Pacific
- —— North Africa
- – – – Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: WRI

Figure 103

Grain fed to animals as % of consumption

- · · · · Middle East
- —— North Africa
- **——** Europe & central Asia
- ++++ East Asia & Pacific
- —·—· Latin America & Caribbean
- —— South Asia
- – – – Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: WRI

Figure 104

Chapter 9.2

ZAKĀT, WAQF AND ṢADAQA AND THEIR ROLE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY

Elsiddig Talha M. Rahama

INTRODUCTION

Islamic economics represent a set of principles and rules that govern the economic activity of the Islamic state and are mentioned in the Qurʾān and the *Sunna* of the Prophet. They are applied in line with the conditions of time and place and address the economic problems of the community according to an Islamic perspective on life.

The principles and sources of Islamic legislation are all derived from the Holy Qurʾān, the *Sunna* of the Prophet, consensus (*ijmāʿ*), reasoning from analogy (*qiyās*) and other sources. They have played a key role in the formulation of the provisions and procedures of Islam in the contemporary world in following the principles of the worship of God.

When studying the concepts of Islamic economics and their role in public life it is necessary to examine the basis of the concept of worship and the origin of humankind on Earth who was created primarily for the purpose of worshipping God Alone ('And I did not create the jin and humankind except to worship Me').[1] The concept of worship has ramifications and corollaries which indicate that the role of humankind in the universe is one of construction. This makes us realize that the appointment of humankind as successor on Earth and its consequent responsibility to make it flourish is the call to Islam. Islam has always supported all projects of construction, development and discovery in every area of life and considers nature and its various constituents as a framework for further innovation and research ('A sign for them is the Earth that is dead. We give it life and produce grain from

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1. Qurʾān, LI.56.

it of which you eat. And We produce therein gardens of date palms and vines. We make springs gush forth therein so that they can eat the fruit thereof, and their hands have not made it. Will they not, then, give thanks?')[2]

All of this came as confirmation and clarification of humanity's role on Earth, the importance of that role and thus the importance of human beings who were honoured above all creatures so that they could fill the Earth with life and cultivate it in accordance with the principles of harnessing resources and enrichment.

Thus, humankind was created and was conceived primarily to worship God. Linked to this is the need to make the Earth flourish, to construct and take over successorship of the Earth by submitting to God. Not to worship God is unbelief (*kufr*) and is a defect in the basic human condition.

Islam is the religion of an integrated life, 'a life of both the world and the hereafter'. It must therefore possess an economic system distinct from all other economic systems since it is a divine system with regulated characteristics and components. The other systems are human creations and there is a great difference between what humans create and what is created by God. The Islamic economic system is not influenced by individual wishes or by material desires except insofar as these serve the overall objectives of this comprehensive integrated system. Like other important activities in Islamic thought, economics issues from the values of faith. It is ultimately part of the worship of God, which is the reason why He created humankind on Earth and made it thrive. There are many economic consequences, both positive and negative, which result from ignoring this divine commission.

From the beginning, the concepts of Islam have focused on a number of procedures and principles on which was built the Islamic approach to economic and social solidarity. This approach includes *zakāt* (obligatory alms tax), *waqf* (religious endowments), *ṣadaqa* (voluntary alms) and benevolent loans (*qarḍ ḥasan*) which are considered to be essential components in tackling the problems of poverty, unemployment and the other threats facing humanity.

The concepts of *zakāt*, *waqf* and *ṣadaqa* represent a practical and integrated approach to the eradication of poverty, disease and unemployment. These concepts have already played a significant role during the purposeful course of Islam and are still needed in today's world which is suffering from increasing rates of poverty and a widening gap between the rich and the poor.

There is an increasing number of poor and a widening gap between the rich and the poor. Indeed, the number of poor people in the world has reached three billion or about 50 per cent of the population with a daily per capita income of less than two dollars. Unfortunately, a large proportion of

2. Qurʾān, XXXVI.33–5.

these are living below the poverty line with a daily per capita income of one dollar, while at the same time there are 176 billionaires in the world whose wealth is equivalent to the gross national product of 45 countries. At the same time 41 countries out of the total 206 countries control 80 per cent of the world's economy, while 165 countries control only 20 per cent of it.

According to the statement of the Secretary General of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, 'The human poverty index in these countries has increased from 27 per cent in 2007 to 38 per cent in 2011'. Similarly, according to official poverty lines more than 365 million people suffer from poverty and these represent more than 33 per cent of the population of these countries. Moreover, approximately 200 million people suffer from extreme poverty having an income of less than one dollar per day.

The problem of poverty is one of the greatest issues affecting the whole world and the world of Islam in particular. The danger lies in the negative effects that poverty has on the various areas of religious, intellectual and economic life, and on health. Intensified efforts are required to overcome or at least mitigate the effects of this problem especially since the Islamic world possesses the bulk of global wealth. It is clear that poverty, is one of the growing social problems. It is also clear that the historical development of the problem and the failure of all attempts to solve it confirm that relying solely on the classical material approach is not enough. What is needed is to examine other approaches to removing the deficiencies and imbalances of the past. Islam provides an integrated approach to the problem of poverty and puts dealing with it at the very heart of the religious faith of the Muslim.

We must focus on the Islamic view of poverty and then examine the way it tackles it. Thus, we find that Islam maintains that there are two kinds of poverty, that is, material and spiritual. As for material poverty, this is a deficiency in the material situation and the absence of the needs and necessities which people require. As for spiritual poverty, this afflicts the soul and the spirit whereby people lose vital qualities such as feelings of contentment and satisfaction. It may be that poverty exists in the presence of material wealth such that the soul remains poor, and perhaps the poverty of the soul exists in the presence of material poverty. A tradition (*ḥadīth*) from the Prophet makes the issue clear: 'Wealth does not lie in the abundance of possessions but rather in the richness of the soul.'

Islam has therefore viewed poverty in its two manifestations, material and spiritual, as a problem, indeed a catastrophe, from which one must seek refuge in God, as in a tradition from the Prophet: 'O God, I seek refuge in You from poverty'. The Prophet linked poverty with unbelief in the supplication, 'O God, I seek refuge in You from unbelief and from poverty'. He also said,

'Seek refuge in God from poverty and want'. Islam considers wealth to be a blessing which requires thanks: 'He found you in need and enriched you'.[3]

The approach of Islam to the treatment of poverty is comprehensive and urges those who suffer from it to play their part in dealing with it. This is done by focusing on the individual and preparing and encouraging him or her to work and to assume their responsibilities by emphasizing that work brings rewards, and that through it one can do without the help of others and achieve wealth and riches. On the other hand, Islam emphasizes that society and the state also have important roles to play. It is for this reason that *zakāt* and *waqf* were established as supreme institutions to act as the social bond of the community and to remove disparities. Then *ṣadaqa* and the giving of all kinds of charitable gifts were instituted. These were followed by benevolent loans so as to provide more protection and security and to put an end to poverty and unemployment in Muslim society.

Zakāt

Zakāt is the third pillar of Islam according to the words of God to the Prophet Muḥammad: 'Islam is built on five [pillars]: testifying that there is no god but God and that Muḥammad is the Messenger of God, establishing prayer, paying *zakāt*, fasting during the month of Ramadan and pilgrimage to the House of God for those who are able.' The term *zakāt* in the Arabic language is derived from *zakāt* which means prosperity, purity and blessing. It was called *zakāt* because according to Islamic belief it increases the wealth which it provides and protects it from harm, as Ibn Taymiyya said, 'The soul of the one who gives charity becomes pure, his wealth increases and he is cleansed and becomes more spiritual'. As for its definition as a technical term, it is that part of a wealthy person's assets which is set aside for the poor and needy.

The rationale behind *zakāt* is that it cleanses the soul of avarice. It is one of the highest degrees of social solidarity and leads to unity and mutual responsibility. It is worship of a financial kind. It is also a means to gain the mercy of God, as the Qur'ān says, 'My mercy encompasses all things, so I will ordain it for those who do right and pay the alms tax (*zakāt*)'.[4] It is a condition for deserving the assistance of God, as the Qur'ān says, 'God will certainly aid those who aid His cause. God is Strong, Mighty. These are those who, if We give them authority in the land, establish prayer and pay the alms tax (*zakāt*)'.[5] It is a requirement for the brotherhood of religion, as the

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3. Qur'ān, XCIII.8.
4. Qur'ān, VII.156.
5. Qur'ān, XXII.40–1.

Qurʾān says, 'If they repent, establish prayer and pay the alms tax (*zakāt*) they are your brothers in religion'.[6] It is one of the characteristics of a believing society, as the Qurʾān says, 'The believers, men and women, are protectors of one another. They enjoin what is just and forbid what is evil. They establish prayer, pay the alms tax (*zakāt*) and obey God and His Messenger. God will show mercy to them. God is Mighty, Wise'.[7] It is one of the characteristics of those who visit the houses of God, as the Qurʾān says, 'The mosques of God will be visited and maintained by those who believe in God and the Last Day, establish prayer, pay the alms tax (*zakāt*) and fear only God.'[8] It is also one of the characteristics of the believers who will inherit Paradise, as the Qurʾān says, 'those who pay the alms tax (*zakāt*) … are the inheritors who will inherit Paradise.'[9]

The *Sunna* confirms the status of *zakāt*. It is related from Ibn ʿUmar that the Messenger of God said, 'I have been ordered to fight the people until they testify that there is no god but God and that Muḥammad is the Messenger of God, establish prayer and pay the alms tax (*zakāt*)' (al-Bukhārī and Muslim). It is related that Jarīr ibn ʿAbdullāh said, 'I have given my oath of allegiance to the Messenger of God that I will establish prayer, pay *zakāt* and be sincere and true to every Muslim' (al-Bukhārī and Muslim). Elsewhere, it is related from Ibn ʿUmar that the Messenger of God said, 'Islam is built on five [pillars]: testifying that there is no god but God and that Muḥammad is the Messenger of God, establishing prayer, paying *zakāt*, fasting during the month of Ramadan and pilgrimage to the House of God for those who are able' (al-Bukhārī and Muslim).

Zakāt is a certain portion of wealth enjoined by God for the use of beneficiaries whom He names in the Qurʾān, or it is a certain sum of money set aside for a particular group of people. The term *zakāt* is applied to the portion of wealth taken from the one who pays it. In the language of the Qurʾān and the *Sunna zakāt* is also called *ṣadaqa*, as the Qurʾān says, 'Of their wealth take alms (*ṣadaqa*) so that you purify them and sanctify them. And pray on their behalf, for your prayers are a source of relief for them'.[10] Similarly, in sound tradition when the Messenger of God sent Muʿādh ibn Jabal to the Yemen he told him, 'Summon them to testify that there is no god but God and that I am the Messenger of God. If they obey you, inform them that God has enjoined upon them five prayers to be performed every day and night. If they obey you in this tell them that God has imposed on them that they provide

6. Qurʾān, IX.11.
7. Qurʾān, IX.71.
8. Qurʾān, IX.18.
9. Qurʾān, XXIII.4–11.
10. Qurʾān, IX.103.

ṣadaqa from their wealth and which will be taken from the rich among them and given to their poor' (al-Bukhārī).

As enumerated in the Qurʾān, zakāt is given to eight categories of people: ʿAlms (ṣadaqāt) are for the poor, the needy, those who collect [the alms], those whose hearts have been reconciled [to truth], for those in bondage, those in debt, in the cause of God and for the wayfarer. It is enjoined by God. God is Knowing, Wise.'[11] Thus, the beneficiaries are:

1. The poor, who cannot acquire what suffices them.
2. The needy, who can barely acquire what suffices them and may not be able to satisfy their needs.
3. Those who collect the alms and who deal with zakāt, since in Islam zakāt is a fully-integrated system which requires someone to implement it and give it their full attention. For this reason the Lawgiver, the Wise, has permitted these workers to be remunerated from the zakāt.
4. Those whose hearts have been reconciled to truth, who wish to be attracted to Islam or at least to stop their aggression towards Muslims.
5. Those in bondage, who are slaves and bondsmen and bondswomen who wish to gain their freedom; that is, those who have arranged with their owners to be released on payment of a certain sum. These may be given zakāt so that they can become free.
6. Those in debt, whose debts have accumulated, and who may receive zakāt to repay their debts.
7. In the cause of God. This refers to voluntary fighters in the cause of God and not to every kind of charitable work. It does not include those who work for charitable associations or organizations and so on. Similarly, zakāt cannot be used to finance their activities and to meet their expenses. The fatwa which denies this is a monstrous error and it is forbidden to abide by it since it contradicts the text of the Qurʾān and the traditions from the Messenger of God.
8. The wayfarer, that is, the traveller who might have run out of money while away from his or her country and who may be provided with zakāt to enable a return home.

As for the social benefits of zakāt, these are:

1. It meets the needs of the poor who represent the majority in most countries.
2. It strengthens Muslims and improves their circumstances. For this reason, one area of concern of zakāt is fighting in the cause of God as mentioned above.
3. It removes the resentment and grudges harboured by the poor and the destitute. When the poor see the rich enjoying their wealth and their

11. Qurʾān, IX.60.

lack of any access to it, they will perhaps feel animosity and hatred towards the rich because they pay no heed to their rights and do not meet their needs. However, if the rich give them some of their wealth at the beginning of every year these feelings will disappear and will be replaced with affection and harmony.

4. *Zakāt* leads to a rise in wealth and an increase in its blessing. This was mentioned in a tradition related by the Prophet who said, '*Ṣadaqa* does not reduce wealth' which means that although providing alms reduces material wealth it will not reduce its increased blessing in the future. Indeed, God will provide recompense and bless the giver for the donation.

5. In giving *zakāt* an individual will see his or her wealth extend and be dispersed. When some wealth is donated its influence spreads and many people will benefit from it. It is the opposite when wealth circulates solely among the rich and the poor receive none of it.

All these benefits of *zakāt* demonstrate that it is needed in order to reform both the individual and society. *Zakāt* is the main tool of Islam in the fight against poverty and in transferring wealth from the rich to the poor. It is the third of the five pillars of Islam after the two declarations of faith (*shahāda*) and the establishment of prayer. This means that Islamic legislation to eliminate poverty proceeds from and begins with the pillars of Islam. It is well known that it is more important to obey a pillar than a compulsory religious duty (*farḍ*) and an obligation (*wājib*), and this in turn shows the degree of importance that Islam gives to the eradication of poverty.

During the caliphate of Abū Bakr aṣ-Ṣiddīq, the state declared war on those who refused to pay *zakāt* and waged war against them because of this. It became clear that in origin they were apostates from Islam.

MODELS AND EFFORTS TO SUPPORT AND DEVELOP *ZAKĀT*

Academies of Islamic jurisprudence around the world are concerned with the necessity of *zakāt* and its implementation. Thus, we find that the Council of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy, a subsidiary organ of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, whose eighteenth session was convened in Putrajaya, Malaysia, 24–29 Jamāda II 1428/9–14 July 2007, stated that:

> Having regard to the research papers received by the Academy concerning the activation of the role of *zakāt* in the fight against poverty, and in view of the need of the Islamic community to organize *zakāt* institutionally in terms of collection and distribution in a modern and disciplined manner compatible with the rules of the Islamic *Sharīʿa*, the Council of the Academy calls upon the competent *zakāt* authorities in the Islamic world to cooperate and work towards the establishment of joint projects to assist the poor and the needy.

The Council also recommends:

1. Urging individual Muslims to pay their *zakāt* to the bodies that are established by state authority so as to ensure that it reaches the eligible recipients, and to activate the religious, developmental, social and economic role of *zakāt*.
2. Employing all audio and visual media outlets to educate the community on the importance and the constructive role of *zakāt* in improving economic and social conditions.
3. Developing accounting criteria for the *zakāt* pool which are compatible with the *Sharīʿa*.
4. Developing *zakāt* accounting models as guidelines for every *zakāt* pool which assist in their practical application in accordance with the criteria of the *Sharīʿa* concerning *zakāt*.
5. Using information technology, industry, communications networks and satellite channels to enlighten Muslims about contemporary *zakāt* issues and the role of *zakāt* in achieving the social and economic development of the Islamic community.

It is noticeable that Islamic countries employ differing systems of *zakāt*. Some of them have passed laws to regulate the collection and distribution of *zakāt* at the national level, such as Pakistan, Sudan and Kuwait. Others have directed individuals and institutions to provide their *zakāt* through private organizations. Yet others have striven to exempt bodies which provide *zakāt* from paying taxes and other dues.

We therefore find that the collection and distribution of *zakāt* within the world of Islam is set on a positive future course that aims to reduce poverty in the community. Thus, academies of Islamic jurisprudence have been established constantly to provide fatwas and legal directives and in this way to respond to the many legal questions concerning the collection and distribution of *zakāt*, to revitalize the religious duty of *zakāt* and to emphasize its social and economic role.

In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia the Department of Zakat and Income was established and a decree was issued in 1950 stating that individuals and companies must pay *zakāt* whether this be in commercial goods, livestock, crops, fruits or grain, and that it should be collected and distributed by specific departments and agencies within the Kingdom.

In Yemen a law concerning *zakāt* was issued in 1999. The Department of Religious Duties (*maṣlaḥat al-wājibāt*), under the aegis of the Ministry of Finance, supervises its collection and distribution which are carried out through the General Directorate for Zakat Crops and Fruits and the General Directorate for Gold, Silver and Commercial Goods, both of which have branches in every region. The Department of Religious Duties gives the cash proceeds of *zakāt*, amounting to more than five billion riyals, to the state which distributes it to the eight groups of beneficiaries mentioned above.

Zakāt and other donations taken in kind are distributed by the Department itself.

In Sudan a law on *zakāt* was passed in 1984 which makes it obligatory for Muslims to collect *zakāt*. It also imposed a social solidarity tax on non-Muslims but not at the same rate as the *zakāt*. Due to the existence of loopholes in the law it was modified, a Chamber of Zakat was established in 1986 and a new law of *zakāt* was issued which made a distinction between *zakāt* and taxes and separated the Chamber of Zakat from the Ministry of Finance. The loopholes were eventually closed by means of a third law in 1990. This went into great detail on the subject of *zakāt* funds, forced the Sudanese who worked abroad to distribute *zakāt* in their home regions, and charged the Chamber of Zakat with the implementation of the laws through the court. In 2000, the proceeds of *zakāt* in Sudan amounted to 9.11 billion Sudanese pounds.

In 1406/1986, *zakāt* was separated from taxes and an independent Chamber of Zakat was established as a legal entity. In January 1988, the Council of Ministers appointed the first secretary-general of *zakāt*. The Chamber came under the auspices of the Ministry of Social Welfare and its jurisdiction was extended to include all provinces of the country. Specialized departments at the regional level were established for collection and distribution. As for the administrative structure at this time, it consisted of a number of centralized directorates and units, these being:
1.   General Directorate for Collection
2.   General Directorate for Beneficiaries
3.   General Directorate for Research, Education and Training
4.   Directorate for Institutions and the Role of Social Welfare
5.   Department of Financial Affairs.

Pakistan issued a comprehensive law on *zakāt* in 1980 which was applied to all Muslims there, although individuals have the right of appeal and to petition for exemption. The state receives the *zakāt* apart from the tithe (*ʿushr*). The *zakāt* from financial entities, such as banks, is taken at source, while *zakāt* from gold and silver, commercial and industrial merchandise, the produce of fishing and agriculture, livestock, current accounts and any other assets are left to the donor to give to whomever he or she considers is deserving.

In Malaysia the systems for collecting and distributing *zakāt* vary throughout its thirteen provinces. In some of the provinces the state collects and distributes it, while in others this is left to those who pay it in accordance with provincial law. From 2010 it is planned to launch the first global fund for the investment of the proceeds of *zakāt* by collecting $750 million. The fund aims to invest in private equity units in compliance with Islamic law and also in social projects.

In Libya the state collects the *zakāt* on crops and fruits, livestock, gold, silver and other metals but leaves *zakāt* on money, including bank accounts and all financial assets, and on commercial goods to their owners to distribute to the beneficiaries. Thus, monetary assets are not subject to the obligatory levy.

THE ZAKAT HOUSE IN KUWAIT

The Zakat House in Kuwait is considered to be a leading institution at the present time. Since its inception as an independent government body in 1982 it has played an active role and has been able to eradicate poverty in Kuwait through its many projects, which are not restricted to the poor and orphans but also extend to setting up offices for needy families, of whom 2,689 have taken advantage of the offices' services. As well as providing the families with interest-free loans, the offices also look after science students and create innovative projects for such as the Feast of Immolation (*ʿīd al-aḍḥā*), banquets for breaking the fast during Ramadan and street water-dispensers and pilgrims to Mecca and Medina.

The Zakat House has extended its activities outside Kuwait by coordinating and integrating itself with governmental, non-governmental and international organizations. The value of charitable aid it has provided throughout the Muslim world to various projects that reduce poverty amounts to more than 80 million Kuwaiti dinars.

The General Secretariat of Awqaf in Kuwait has prepared a report on the charitable activities relating to *waqf* which has also had a positive impact outside Kuwait thanks to the fraternity of Islam.

One example of the activities of the Zakat House is the orphan sponsorship project outside Kuwait which began in 1983 with the cooperation of 500 charitable associations and foundations. There are more than 50,000 orphans in 48 countries. Total spending on the project is 40 million Kuwaiti dinars, and it is currently active in 36 countries in cooperation with 67 bodies.

EGYPT

The Egyptian Organization for Zakat was founded with the welcome and significant support of senior state officials and major public figures. It was officially registered in the Ministry of Social Solidarity in 2008 (AH 1429) and is composed of the International Zakat Organization, al-Azhar mosque, the Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Federation of Egyptian Chambers of Commerce, the Associations of Egyptian Businessmen and the Nasser Social Bank.

ALGERIA

In 2003, through the efforts of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Awqaf and in an attempt to reduce the poverty rate, the Zakat Fund was established to act on the national level. It drew on the experiences of some Arab and Islamic countries which preceded it in this area. Those who administer the Zakat Fund hope that it will be both appropriate and effective in addressing the problem of poverty in Algeria.

Waqf

Waqf means to 'stop' someone from consuming or using a thing and employing its benefits and revenues for charitable purposes. By its very nature *waqf* is a kind of investment because it is the holding of fixed assets in order to produce benefits, profits and gains. Its nature is one of growth. The legality of *waqf* is based on the Qurʾān, the *Sunna* and the consensus of the Muslim community (*ijmāʿ*). As for the Qurʾān, it demonstrates the legality of *waqf* in general terms in God's words 'You will not achieve righteousness until you spend out of what you love'.[12] One of the Companions of the Prophet gave charity out of his most beloved possessions when this verse was revealed. Thus, al-Bukhārī and Muslim narrated that Anas ibn Mālik said (according to the text of al-Bukhārī):

> Abū Ṭalḥa had the largest number of datepalms from amongst the Anṣārs of Medina. His most cherished possession was a garden called the Well of Ḥāʾ which was adjacent to the mosque. The Messenger of God used to enter the garden and drink from the fresh water there. When the verse 'You will not achieve righteousness until you spend out of what you love' was revealed, Abū Ṭalḥa said, 'O Messenger of God, God has revealed that verse and my most cherished possession is the Well of Ḥāʾ. I donate it as charity for the sake of God. I desire the righteousness it brings and the future rewards it will earn me from God. So do with it as God shows you.' The Prophet said, 'Divide it among your relatives'.

In addition, Abū Hurayra reported that the Prophet said, 'When a man dies his deeds come to an end, apart from three things: ongoing charity (*ṣadaqa*), knowledge which gives benefit and a pious child who prays for him.' The meaning of ongoing charity is explained in the *Sunan* of Ibn Māja where the Prophet says, 'Among the actions and good deeds of a believer which will stay with him after his death are knowledge he has disseminated, a pious child he has left behind, a copy of the Qurʾān he has bequeathed, a mosque he has built, a lodging for travellers he has built, a water channel he has dug and

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12. Qurʾān, III.92.

ṣadaqa he has given from his wealth while he was alive and healthy. These will stay with him after his death.'

There are two kinds of *waqf*:

1. Charitable *waqf* (*al-waqf al-khayrī*) which the donor of the *waqf* endows either for the benefit of certain groups of people, such as the poor, the needy and the infirm, or for particular public charitable institutions which benefit society such as mosques, hospitals and schools.

2. Family *waqf* (*al-waqf al-ahlī* or *al-dhurrī*) which the donor of the *waqf* endows initially for their own benefit or for that of any other person or persons, even though it may eventually be made over to a charitable organization. Thus, the donor endows the *waqf* to him- or herself, then afterwards to his or her children, then after them to a charitable organization.

Waqf has an important role to play in society. This is seen first in it being an exemplary model for society, in its promotion of morals, its fostering compassion and encouraging rapprochement and mutual understanding between communities and peoples. Its role is also to strengthen the community by contributing to the economy, education and the call to Islam and to support the poor and the needy. *Waqf* plays a similarly important role in the development of independent institutions in society and in maintaining the integrity of the community and the family through the resources which the charitable endowments provide. Its active role is also seen in the social sphere where it is employed alongside other resources such as *zakāt* and *ṣadaqa* to provide society with many of its necessary requirements.

As regards the contribution of *waqf* to social development, this is seen in its support of social justice and solidarity and in its addressing the social problems of unemployment, illiteracy and poverty. *Waqf* also has a part to play in social care and the furtherance and actualization of civilization. Likewise, it contributes to the provision of social security and economic and social stability. It also has a role in confronting globalization and in countering the influence of foreign organizations. *Waqf* also helps alleviate the social burdens of the state and the budget deficit.

Indeed, *waqf* has played a significant role in Islamic societies, both past and present, and has contributed to their survival. It has continued to provide institutions within Islamic society with the resources which ensure their vitality, their stability and their continued existence. *Waqf* has made numerous positive contributions to modern societies by being a source of funding for Islamic projects as well as filling many gaps and making the necessary provision for many deserving people, the poor and the needy.

Waqf has also played a developmental role in the many cases with which it has been involved throughout previous eras. Thus, in the field of education *waqf* has contributed to the dissemination of knowledge and the establishment

of schools and libraries; in the field of health it has founded hospitals; in the field of religion it has built mosques and encouraged the call to Islam, while in the field of economics it has financed various activities.

Similarly, *waqf* plays a prominent role in the social sphere through helping to deal with various crises, providing social justice and social solidarity, caring for the weak and the needy and strengthening and consolidating society.

Waqf contributes to overcoming the problem of class differences by distributing resources to particular strata of society so as to help them meet their needs and to transform them into productive forces. By providing the poor and the needy with care and guaranteeing their requirements through the various charitable endowments, their standard of living is gradually rising and the gap between the classes is closing. This is especially the case when *waqf* meets the needs of the disabled or those unable to work. Indeed, one of the development objectives of Islam is for increased production to be coupled with fair and equitable distribution and for parity between people's standards of living. By transferring units of wealth or income from the rich to the poor or those without an income so as to achieve some kind of balance in distribution, *waqf* removes the divisions between groups and classes in society. The success of charitable *waqf* in this regard has resulted in a prevailing atmosphere of security and confidence in society and in the removal of the enmity and hatred which may exist between the classes.

Waqf participates in the distribution of a proportion of wealth to the classes in society and helps them meet their needs, and since there is a demand for the commodities which meet those needs, society is moved along. It also helps to prevent inalienable assets from disappearing and gives the right of disposal to the beneficiaries of *waqf.* It therefore looks to both the present and the future. It guarantees continuing reward for the donor of *waqf* even after death and it conserves some wealth to be distributed to future generations.

Waqf has played a prominent role in the integration of Islamic society and the instilling of mutual compassion. It has surpassed all other means and methods of charitable support.

The gradual disappearance of *waqf* in our time is due to the weakness of religious faith, the prevailing ignorance of the rules of the *Sharīʿa* and the lack of awareness of the importance of *waqf* in society.

The concept of *waqf* in Islam includes all immovable property such as real estate, land and houses, and such as movable property, profit and rented property.

In Muslim society *waqf* has generally been the linchpin of all human, social, cultural and economic collaboration and the call to Islam. It is involved in many areas, has many methods of procedure and its breadth and diversity allow everyone to bestow charity in every place and time.

At its peak, *waqf* played was effective in achieving development in its broadest sense, in fields including science, society and economics. Its educational role began in the mosque which was not only a place of worship and prayer but also a source of learning such that students used to enter it to receive instruction in the various branches of knowledge from scholars and teachers. Thus, in Islamic civilization the mosque initially acted like a school and many scholars came out of it. The character of educational *waqf* evolved from the mosque, which was the centre of education, to the *kuttāb* which was a small school teaching children reading, writing, the Qurʾān and mathematics. Although the *kuttāb* continued, educational *waqf* went on to embrace the schools which became widespread particularly after the Islamic conquests. These were subsequently associated with libraries when donors of *waqf* schools realized how important books are in the acquisition of knowledge. They therefore funded libraries to facilitate the learning process.

As for social development, the social services provided by *waqf*s have diversified and many Muslims have donated their property to build hospitals and to treat the sick. *Waqf* endowment documents reveal the scrupulous and successful management which the *waqf* hospitals enjoyed, in addition to health care. A further example of the diversification of social services provided by *waqf*s are endowments to assist those who are unable to meet the expenses of the religious duty of the pilgrimage, to help poor girls get married and to build homes for orphans, the elderly and the blind.

Due to a number of factors, *waqf* has also played an important role in economic development. First, it has helped to reduce and stabilize prices because of the ease of obtaining inexpensive commercial premises in markets established by endowment. This resulted in a reduction in prices and an increase in commercial activity more than in those markets not established by endowment. It also resulted in a reduction in prices in other markets such that they experienced brisk trade and were able to keep pace with the endowed markets. Thus, *waqf* endowments in markets greatly helped to force merchants to keep their prices low. Second, *waqf*s have helped to reduce unemployment, to provide job opportunities and to develop skills. Third, *waqf* has assisted the poor sector to obtain wealth which they could not have otherwise reached. This has helped to increase the demand for many goods and services which, if not for *waqf*, would have been restricted to the rich. In turn, this has helped to stimulate trade and the exchange of money and goods. Fourth, in addition to stimulating trade which led to a growth in the economy, water dispensers or endowed water-basins located on important trade routes encouraged commercial activity and facilitated the passage of trade caravans and transportation between towns and villages.

The idea of *waqf* is based on the concept of the development of a third sector distinct from all private and government sectors, and on giving this

sector responsibility to engage in a range of activities which, by their very nature, cannot be subjected to the authoritarian practices of the state. *Waqf* also helps to keep these activities free of the pecuniary incentives of the private sector. This is because these activities are concerned with charity, good deeds, compassion and cooperation and not with individual profit or the exercise of the power and authority of law.

This represents a high point in the Islamic system which was able to assign particular importance to a third economic sector and to protect and encourage legal experts such that some rulers and rich people converted their wealth into *waqf*s for reasons of charity, thereby preventing the rulers who came after them from confiscating and misusing it. From the beginning, the Islamic system decided that any human society, and in particular Islamic society, needs to engage in social and economic activities which are not motivated by the maximization of profit and personal gain, because these activities are concerned with piety and charity. This is a voluntary matter based on self-sacrifice and relinquishing personal advantage.

Waqf is the taking of part of the productive wealth of society away from the sphere of personal gain and government decision and allocating it to activities concerned with public social services. The *Sharīʿa* has determined that these activities and services are human needs and are not restricted solely to Islamic society. On the contrary, they are also for non-Muslims. Indeed, it is part of the justice of the *Sharīʿa* that it decided that non-Muslims may also make a religious endowment for their descendants and they may stipulate that those of them who become Muslims should not benefit from it.

The role that *Waqf* can play in the growth and development of Muslim society

1. Transforming charitable acts from individual initiatives into permanent institutions.
2. Ensuring social welfare by providing shelter, clothing, medicine, medical treatment and drinking water for the poor and the destitute.
3. Supporting and developing educational institutions which deal with memorization of the Qurʾān, and education centres, schools and universities which teach languages, computing, crafts, applied and theoretical sciences, and so on.
4. Preserving the independence of mosques and ensuring their future existence, their maintenance and servicing, and supporting their role in the service of the community.
5. Developing administrative and organizational capacity for long term investment by keeping accounts and records.
6. Disseminating the culture of *waqf* and encouraging people to adopt it.

7. Supporting and encouraging the financial institutions of banks, capital markets and stock markets to make *waqf* contracts so that they can undertake their role in assisting economic growth.
8. Drafting legislation and laws to organize and establish *waqf* and its various institutions.
9. Providing tax exemptions on *waqf* fixed assets.
10. Creating legal formulas for the management and supervision of *waqf*s.
11. Integrating *waqf* endowments into sources of funding for education and health services, and establishing legal frameworks and administrative procedures for this purpose.
12. Developing mechanisms for *waqf* investment and integrating them into Islamic finance systems, and activating and creating *waqf* shares.
13. Creating an integrated network of information regarding *waqf*s in order to monitor issues and problems, proposing mechanisms for development and exploring future prospects. This is linked to the establishment of numerous research centres and academic programmes dealing with *waqf* studies. These centres seek to promote the culture of *waqf* within the framework of an integrated cultural vision issuing from the mission of *waqf* and informed by transformations in economics, information, society and politics. The centres also monitor the current state of *waqf*s and contribute to the development and management of its institutions, investments and distribution of resources.

Ṣadaqa

God said, ordering His Prophet Muḥammad, 'Tell My servants who have believed that they should establish prayer and spend out of the sustenance We have given them, secretly and openly, before the coming of the Day in which there will be no bartering or befriending.'[13] God also said, 'Spend in the cause of God'[14] and 'O you who believe, give of the good things you have earned'[15] and 'So fear God as much as you can … Listen and obey and spend in charity for the benefit of your souls. Whoever is saved from the greediness of his soul, these are the successful.'[16]

As for the traditions which demonstrate the merit of ṣadaqa, the Prophet said, 'God will speak to everyone amongst you without any interpreter between them. The man will look to his right and see nothing but [the deeds] he has done before. He will look to his left and see nothing but [the deeds] he has done before. He will look in front of him and see nothing but the Fire before

13. Qurʾān, XIV.31.
14. Qurʾān, II.195.
15. Qurʾān, II.267.
16. Qurʾān, LXIV.16.

his face. So protect yourselves from the Fire even if it is with the help of half a date' (al-Bukhārī and Muslim).

Anyone considering the texts which enjoin the giving of *ṣadaqa* and its desirability will realize the merit which it brings and which is not exceeded by any other act, to the point where ʿUmar said, 'I was told that the acts compete with one another and that *ṣadaqa* says, "I am the best of you".'[17]

KINDS OF *ṢADAQA*

1. Undisclosed *ṣadaqa*. This shows more sincerity than *ṣadaqa* which is given openly. In this regard, God said, 'If you give alms (*ṣadaqa*) openly it is well, but if you hide it and give it to the poor it is better for you.'[18]
    Thus, God told us that if *ṣadaqa* is given to the poor in secret this is better for the donor than giving it openly and in public. However, God said that it may be hidden only when it is given to the poor, and He did not simply say, 'If you conceal it then it is better for you'. This is because some kinds of *ṣadaqa* cannot be concealed, such as equipping an army, constructing a bridge and digging a water channel. As for giving *ṣadaqa* to the poor, it is better that this be hidden and done in secret and that people think that the donor is not giving charity and has nothing. They will then not want to thank and reward him. It is a more meritorious act of charity to give *ṣadaqa* with sincerity and not hypocrisy and seeking the people's approval. Concealing *ṣadaqa* is preferable to revealing it to the people. The Prophet therefore commended concealed *ṣadaqa*, praised the man who gave it in this way and said that he is one of the seven people who will be in the shade of God's Throne on the Day of Resurrection. Thus, God made this more meritorious for the donor and said that by doing it he would atone for his sins.[19]
2. Giving *ṣadaqa* while one is healthy and strong is better than a bequest after one has died, or while in sickness or dying, as the Prophet said, 'The best *ṣadaqa* is given while you are well, hoping to be rich, niggardly and in fear of poverty. Do not delay until the time approaching death and say, 'Give this to so-and-so, and give this to so-and-so.' And it has already belonged to so-and-so [since it is too late]' (al-Bukhārī and Muslim).
3. *Ṣadaqa* that is donated after performing a religious obligation (*wājib*), as in the words of God, 'They ask you how much they are to spend. Say, 'What

17. Muḥammad al-Albānī, *Ṣaḥīḥ al-targhīb wa-l-tarhīb* (The Sound Traditions from *al-Targhīb wa-l-tarhīb* [Inspiriting and Disheartening]).

18. Qurʾān, II.271.

19. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, *Ṭarīq al-hijratayn wa-bāb al-saʿādatayn* (The Road to the Two Migrations and the Door to the Two States of Bliss).

you can spare''[20] and the Prophet's words, 'There is no *ṣadaqa* except that given by a wealthy man' (al-Bukhārī) and the tradition 'The best *ṣadaqa* is that given by a wealthy man' (al-Bukhārī).

4. For a person to spend as much as he or she is able and can sustain while possessing little and being in need, according to the Prophet's words, 'The best *ṣadaqa* is that given by someone who is poor and never someone who has means' (Abū Dawūd). He also said, 'One dirham is better than a thousand'. When he was asked how this could be the case, he replied, 'A man had two dirhams and he gave one of them away as *ṣadaqa*, while another man went to his great store of wealth, took 10,000 dirhams and gave them as *ṣadaqa*' (al-Nasāʾī). Al-Baghawī said

    A man may choose to give *ṣadaqa* from the surplus of his wealth and retain something since he is afraid of the afflictions of poverty. Then he perhaps feels remorse for what he has done, denigrates himself because of it and gives all his wealth to the people. The Prophet did not rebuke Abū Bakr because he renounced all his wealth since he was aware of the power of his belief and his trust in God and did not fear that he would feel hardship like others would. A man should not give *ṣadaqa* when his family needs him or he is in debt since it is more important to support one's family and to repay a debt. This is the case unless the man is known for his forbearance, puts others before himself and seeks to renounce his wealth like Abū Bakr. The Anṣār put the Emmigrants (*muhājirūn*) before themselves and God praised them with His words, '… they give them preference over themselves even though poverty was their lot'.[21]

5. Spending on one's family, as in the Prophet's words, 'When a man maintains his family anticipating a reward in the hereafter, this can be considered as *ṣadaqa* from him' (al-Bukhārī and Muslim) and his words, 'There are four dinars: a dinar you gave to a needy person, a dinar you gave to free a slave, a dinar you spent in the way of God, and a dinar you spent on your family. The best dinar is the one you spent on your family' (Muslim).

6. *Ṣadaqa* given to one's relatives.

KINDS OF ONGOING *ṢADAQA*

1. Providing water and digging wells, as the Prophet said, 'The best *ṣadaqa* is to provide water' (Ibn Ḥanbal, Abū Dawūd, al-Nasāʾī and Ibn Māja).
2. Providing food. When the Prophet was asked what the best deeds are in Islam, he replied, 'Providing food and giving greetings to both those you know and those you do not know' (al-Bukhārī and Muslim).

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20. Qurʾān, II.219.
21. Al-Ḥusain ibn Masʿūd al-Baghawī, *Sharḥ al-sunna* (Illucidation of the *Sunna*). The Qurʾānic verse is LIX.9.

3. Building mosques, according to the Prophet's words, 'Whoever builds a mosque desiring with this the countenance of God, God will build for him a house in heaven' (al-Bukhārī and Muslim) and on the authority of Jābir that the Messenger of God said, 'Whoever digs a well, no thirsty jinn or man or bird will drink from it but that God will reward him on the Day of Resurrection. And whoever builds a mosque even as small or smaller than a grouse's nest, God will build for him a house in heaven.'[22]

4. Spending to disseminate knowledge, distributing copies of the Qurʾān, building lodgings for travellers and spending on those who are weak such as orphans and widows. Abū Hurayra related that the Prophet said, 'Among the actions and good deeds of a believer which will stay with him after his death are knowledge he has disseminated, a pious child he has left behind, a copy of the Qurʾān he has bequeathed, a mosque he has built, a lodging for travellers he has built, a water channel he has dug and *ṣadaqa* he has given from his wealth while he was alive and healthy. These will stay with him after his death' (Ibn Māja).

Certainly, giving donations at some times has more merit than at others, such as during Ramadan, as Ibn ʿAbbās said, 'The Messenger of God was the most generous of people. He was at his most generous during Ramadan when Gabriel use to come to him every night and teach him the Qurʾān. When Gabriel used to come to him the Messenger of God was more generous than the blowing wind' (al-Bukhārī and Muslim). Similar is giving *ṣadaqa* during the first ten days of Dhū-l-Ḥijja since the Prophet said, 'Of all the days when good deeds are done none are more beloved to God than these days', meaning the first ten days of Dhū-l-Ḥijja. People asked the Prophet, 'O Messenger of God, not even striving (*jihād*) in the cause of God?' 'Not even striving in the cause of God', he replied, 'apart from a man who does it by putting himself and his wealth in danger and does not return with anything' (al-Bukhārī). Giving *ṣadaqa* is the most meritorious deed that draws one near to God.

Among the best times to give *ṣadaqa* is when the people are suffering hardship, in dire need and poverty, as God said, 'He would not attempt the uphill road. What can make you know what the uphill road is? It is the freeing of a slave or giving food on a day of severe hunger.'[23]

> It is one of the blessings of God for His servant to have wealth and possessions. And it is the greatest blessing for him to be a helper of God in obeying Him. How blessed is virtuous wealth belonging to a virtuous man! [al-Bukhārī]

Thus, the concept of *ṣadaqa* is an important and basic tool within Islamic economics for dealing with the problems of poverty, disease and

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22. Muḥammad al-Albānī, *Ṣaḥīḥ al-targhīb wa-l-tarhīb*, *op. cit.*
23. Qurʾān, XC.11–14.

unemployment that the world is experiencing today. *Ṣadaqa* represents a renewed reality for interacting with others and achieves solidarity and mutual assistance.

THE BENEVOLENT LOAN (*AL-QARḌ AL-ḤASAN*)

A benevolent loan is that which is given in kindness by the lender to the borrower to be repaid without any increase in the amount loaned. As used in the Qurʾān, the term indicates money that is spent on the needy so as to seek reward in the hereafter.

The benevolent loan is divided into two types:

1. A loan between the servant and his or her Lord. This is given by a Muslim to help his or her fellow without taking anything in return, seeking reward in the hereafter. It includes spending in the various causes of God such as *jihād*, orphans, widows, the elderly and the poor. The term 'loan' (*qarḍ*) is used six times in the Qurʾān with this meaning. For example, in *Sūrat al-Baqara* God says, 'Fight in the cause of God, and know that God is Hearing, Knowing. Who is he who will give God a beautiful loan (*qarḍ*) so that God will multiply it for him many times? It is God Who gives you want or plenty and to Him shall you be returned.'[24]

2. A loan between a Muslim and his or her fellow. The following tradition is quoted in the *Musnad* ('supported' traditions) of Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal: 'Whoever grants a poor person time to repay a debt, for each day he allows before the debt is due he will be credited the likes of it as *ṣadaqa*. And when the debt is due and he grants yet more time, for each day he allows he will be credited twice the sum as *ṣadaqa*.' Elsewhere, Anas ibn Mālik related that the Messenger of God said, 'On the night I was taken up to the heavens I saw written on the gate of heaven "*Ṣadaqa* will be returned with ten times its like, while a loan (*qarḍ*) is worth ten times this." 'O Gabriel', I said, "How can it be that a loan is better than *ṣadaqa*?" He replied, "Because the beggar begs while possessing something, whereas the one who asks for a loan only does so when in need".'

The importance of implementing the concept of benevolent loans results from the different vicissitudes of life which confront people and which they are unable to deal with except by taking a loan. For example, if they wish to get married, take medical treatment, study at university or build a house, all these require financial outlay which those of limited income cannot afford.

The legal framework for the benevolent loan is that of solidarity and communality in the life of society. This is because its legal focus is on those in

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24. Qurʾān, II.244–5.

dire need whose own personal resources or those provided by such as *zakāt* do not suffice them. It is one of the ways of commerce with God and is based on charity. It cannot be one of the ways of commerce with people that is based on justice. A benevolent loan is a voluntary contribution to social solidarity which is almost equivalent to the statutory or obligatory contributions such as *zakāt* and all the various kinds of *ṣadaqa* and pledges which are a legal duty (*wājib*), whether these are sanctioned by the text of the Qurʾān or sound traditions from the Prophet. These all directly contribute to a single area of concern; that is, social solidarity. Similarly, they all have one basic aim, which is to help the needy whether these are individuals or classes within society.

When Islamic banks were established they began to offer benevolent loans. These loans included money that the banks received as profit from foreign trade and which according to their regulations was made to conform with the different approaches to charity. The loans play a role in funding without any return or profit, while asking for guarantees that they will be repaid. Indeed, many Islamic banks have begun to fund the vulnerable sectors of society by providing benevolent loans to such as students and women. This would be an excellent way to provide funding if adopted by all Islamic banks:

- It is the simplest means of financing since the client receives a sum of money which he or she cannot borrow from the bank and possibly with no specified date of repayment.
- When repayment is due, the client pays it without any interest or increase in the original sum.
- If the date of repayment has not been specified then the debt is repaid when the lender asks for it but without any interest or increase.
- When providing benevolent loans the bank will usually ask for a security from the client the value of which must be higher than the value of the loan. The borrower bears the costs of the administrative procedures to make the contract for the loan.
- The benevolent loan is used for personal finance or to meet a temporary problem such as to pay off credit cards.

HOMES FOR ORPHANS, THE INFIRM AND THE ELDERLY

In the countries of the Islamic world, and under the auspices of the Ministries of Social Affairs and Welfare, institutional homes have been established for the care of orphans, the elderly, widows, persons with disabilities and those with special needs. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt and some other Muslim countries, especially in Asia and Africa, have presided over the creation and supervision of these homes. This represents an important aspect of care and provision for vulnerable sections of society.

CONTINUING EFFORTS IN COUNTRIES OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD TO DEAL WITH POVERTY IN ISLAMIC SOCIETIES

Programmes to tackle poverty based on the organization and collection of funds such as *zakāt* and *waqf* are reducing and eliminating poverty. They appeal for additional and unconventional sources of funding which will form an integral part of the anti-poverty strategies. The aims of these strategies are:

a)   In the short term, to guarantee sufficient means for living (to sustain the poor).

b)   In the long term, to facilitate the success of development programmes for the fight against poverty.

c)   To provide financial resources to support those programmes which depend on the third sector (charity).

d)   To focus the proposed resources on meeting the immediate needs of the poor and spending the surplus on setting up profit-generating enterprises which, in the case of *zakāt*, will be solely for the poor, or, in the case of *waqf*, the poor will only benefit from the returns.

The efforts include the following:

a)   Creating laws and regulations governing the affairs and institutions of such as *zakāt* and *waqf*.

b)   Selecting an appropriate administrative structure for the implementation of *zakāt* and *waqf*.

c)   Meeting the need to move from individual to institutional work.

d)   Applying legal thinking and scientific research to the emerging issues of such as *zakāt*, *waqf* and *ṣadaqa*, and continuing the valuable efforts of mosques, specialized legal seminars and the International Islamic Fiqh Academy which is concerned with *zakāt* affairs.

e)   Monitoring the estimated proceeds of *zakāt* and returns from *waqf* investment.

THE ROLE OF THE ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK

The Islamic Development Bank is an international financial institution which was established pursuant to the Declaration of Intent of the Conference of Finance Ministers of Muslim Countries held in Jeddah in Dhu-l-Qaᶜda 1393/December 1973. The bank was officially opened on 15 Shawwāl 1395/20 October 1975. Its aim is to foster the economic development and social progress of the peoples of the member countries along with Muslim societies in countries which are not member countries, both collectively and independently and in accordance with the principles of the Islamic *Sharīᶜa*. The functions of the bank include providing various kinds of financial assistance to commerce and to fight poverty by means of human development, economic cooperation and strengthening the role of

Islamic finance in economic and social growth. The bank is charged with creating and managing private funds for specific purposes, including a fund to assist Muslim societies in non-member countries, and with taking over the supervision of private financial funds. The bank must use its financial resources in ways which are compatible with the provisions of the Islamic *Sharīʿa*.

Among the responsibilities of the Bank is to assist in the development of the foreign trade of member countries, to promote trade between them especially in capital goods, to provide them with technical assistance, and to offer training to employees who undertake a variety of economic, financial and banking activities in Islamic countries. All this is done in accordance with the provisions of the Islamic *Sharīʿa*.

- Despite the efforts that have been made, programmes dealing with the fight against poverty need to receive more attention and focus.
- The vision of the Islamic Development Bank up to 1440/2020 is a 'vision for human prosperity' which forms part of the second strategic focus for reducing poverty.
- The vision emphasises the fact that the institutions of *zakāt* and *waqf* have great potential which should be explored to ensure their success.
- The institutions of *zakāt* and *waqf* can make an effective contribution to the establishment of a social and national safety net.
- There is a focus on reducing poverty within the member countries and Muslim societies.

The broad policies adopted by the IBD to reduce poverty are:

1. Conscious efforts to develop projects which have a direct influence on reducing poverty, particularly in the least developed countries.
2. Paying more attention to issues related to the reduction of poverty in the design and development of projects.
3. Gaining the involvement of international financial organizations so as to enhance and develop the human capital of the poor by focusing on basic education, vocational rehabilitation, women's education, the eradication of illiteracy and improving health services.
4. Widening the scope of assistance provided to the private sector in order to concentrate more on rural development and on increasing the incomes of small farmers and the poor in rural areas.
5. Strengthening the role of *zakāt* and *waqf* institutions in their support of projects and programmes to reduce poverty in the member countries and other Islamic societies. The bank aims to achieve this through initiatives such as:
   a) Special aid programmes.
   b) The World Waqf Foundation.
   c) The Waqf Properties Investment Fund.
   d) The Islamic Research and Training Institute.

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ISLAMIC RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE (IRTI)

1. Conducting research and undertaking studies on poverty, and holding seminars and meetings for the exchange of experience of fighting poverty within the member countries.
2. The setting up of a group to create programmes for fighting poverty and integrating *zakāt* and *waqf* into these.
3. The setting up of a group concerned with increasing capacity, especially in small institutions.
4. The implementation of a programme to support *zakāt* and *waqf* in Africa which includes:
   a) Raising awareness of the *zakāt* and *waqf* institutions.
   b) Establishing model institutions of *zakāt* and *waqf* in Africa.
   c) Paying attention to research and field studies on *zakāt* and *waqf.*
   The programme covers a broad geographical area. At the current stage it has started in four African countries. If this meets with success the bank is hoping to extend the experiment to include the remaining African countries.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF ORPHAN CARE PROGRAMMES:

1. Sponsoring orphans resulting from the tsunami.
2. The bank has assumed responsibility for supervising the sponsorship programme for some orphans in Aceh province in Sumatra, Indonesia, after the 2004 earthquake.
3. The bank has organized a campaign to raise funds for this and other programmes.

THE ISLAMIC SOLIDARITY FUND FOR FIGHTING POVERTY (THE WAQF FUND)

1. The fund was announced during the annual conference of the Bank convened in Senegal earlier this month.
2. The Fund aims to support programmes to fight poverty in the member countries of the bank.
3. The targeted financial resources for the fund are $10 billion.
4. Twenty-eight countries have announced that they will contribute a total amount of $1,601 million to the Fund.
5. The fund was inaugurated in accordance with the resolution of the Mecca Extraordinary Summit in 2005.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing shows the importance of implementing the procedures of Islam to tackle the problems of poverty and unemployment by applying the concepts of such as *zakāt, ṣadaqa, waqf* and the benevolent loan. This confirms the strength of Islam as a comprehensive system covering all aspects of economic, social and political life. We notice that these concepts, which for centuries have not been put into practice in our Islamic society, must now be employed so as to deal directly with the problems of poverty, unemployment and disease, and so that the world can meet the challenges which threaten its survival. They are therefore essential tools for the progress of the peoples and nations of the world today.

In many countries of the world these tools have been implemented and formulated within the framework of constitutional and legal systems, and their procedures and paths of development have multiplied due to the frequent conferences on *zakāt* and *waqf*. Some countries with Muslim minorities, such as the Russian Federation and Mauritius, have contributed to these developments.

Institutions of social solidarity are becoming daily more widespread. These are represented by chambers of *zakāt*, ministries of *waqf*s and Islamic affairs, institutions and associations of *ṣadaqa* and social support, in addition to companies of social solidarity based on the principles of donation and which are considered to be the Islamic alternative to life insurance based on the concept of usury.

Institutions of Islamic economics within both Islamic and non-Islamic countries have proliferated, thus confirming the success of the Islamic model in tackling poverty, unemployment and other problems, and also in stimulating and encouraging production, which confirms the viability of the approach in dealing with changing circumstances.

If these important institutions in Islamic economics are used and managed well they will have make a direct contribution to providing adequate support. They will bring about the desired change, eliminate poverty, stimulate production, help to ease the burden on the government and achieve public and national participation in creating economic growth.

Table 1: Indicators of poverty in Islamic countries

Division of Islamic Countries	Population		Absolute Poverty		Extreme Poverty	
	Number (millions)	Percentage	Number (millions)	Percentage	Number (millions)	Percentage
Islamic countries in Asia	581.7	53.3	184.8	50.8	111.6	57
Islamic countries in Europe	106.6	9.8	27.2	7.5	7.8	4
Islamic countries in Africa	129.4	11.8	67.8	18.6	49.7	25.4
Arab countries	273.2	25.1	83.9	23.1	26.7	13.6
Total	1091.4	100	363.7	100	195.8	100

Table 2: *Zakat* estimates / percentage of GDP

	Country	Percentage
1	Egypt	4.9
2	Indonesia	2
3	Pakistan	4.4
4	Qatar	3.2
5	Saudi Arabia	3.4
6	Sudan	6.2
7	Syrian Arab Republic	3.1
8	Turkey	7.5

DEVELOPMENT POLICIES

Ali Fatemi

Human Resources

Giving a detailed picture of human development in the Islamic world, according to the large number of Muslim nations with their varied geographical distributions and population, is very difficult. The 2008 Human Development Report, issued by the United Nations Programme, indicated that the Islamic world covers all three divisions of human development (high, medium, and low). However most of the Islamic world lies in the middle and low categories, which means that Islamic nations are required to increase their focus on human development. In this section we attempt to examine the trends of major human development indicators in OIC countries.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX (HDI) FOR OIC COUNTRIES

The Human Development Index is an attempt to describe the achievement of development goals related to quality of life, using data that can be compared across countries and time. It is aggregated from three indicators: life expectancy at birth as a proxy for longevity, adult literacy rate and gross enrolment ratio as a proxy for knowledge, and real GDP per capita as a proxy for income. Based on the value of HDI, the Development Programme UNDP classifies countries by their level of human development into three different groups: High Human Development (HHD) with HDI values (0.0800–1.00), Medium Human Development (MHD) with HDI values (0.500–0.799) and Low Human Development (LHD) with HDI values (0.00–0.499).

As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the Human Development Index for OIC had insignificant improvements during 1990–2005. In 1990, 46 per cent of the OIC countries were classified as low human development countries. However, from 1990 to 2005 just eight of eighteen low human development countries succeeded to move to the medium human level and only four of nineteen medium human development countries succeeded in moving to HHD.

Figure 1

Figure 2

HUMAN POVERTY INDEX (HPI) FOR OIC COUNTRIES

The problem of poverty in OIC countries is an ambiguous issue that stems from the complex socio-economic structure of each individual country.

The Human Poverty Index is an attempt to measure the standard of living in a country thought the following indicators: longevity measured by the probability at birth of not surviving to the age of 40; knowledge measured by adult literacy rate; and decent standard of living measured by the percentage of

population not using improved water sources and percentage of underweight children under the age of five.

During 1999–2007 the Human Poverty Index dropped from 34 per cent in 1999 to 31 per cent in 2007. However, as is shown in Figure 4, the trend was not uniform across the entire region; for example Guyana in Latin America had an upward trend during these years. There is also a big difference between high income and low income countries with an 11 per cent and 31 per cent rate of poverty respectively. Although HPI had a downward trend in most of the region during 1999–2007, this was slight progress, and it is observed that more than 50 per cent of the total population in seven OIC countries were still suffering from poverty. Five large states – Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Bangladesh and Sudan – with a cumulative population of 733 million people have 232 million people living below the poverty line. The incidence of poverty in these countries is slightly above 33 per cent.

Figure 3

Figure 4

PROGRESS OF OIC TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGs)

In 2001, recognizing the need to assist impoverished nations more aggressively, UN Member States adopted the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which contain eight goals to be achieved by 2015. This section summarizes the progress of the OIC toward the MDGs programme.

Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty hunger

In Figure 5 the percentage of severely underweight children is not uniform across the entire region. South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa with 12.6 and 7.6 percent respectively have the highest rateb of severely underweight children among OIC countries. Most of the regions except East Asia and Pacific and North Africa had a downward trend during 2000 and 2006. In East Asia and Pacific, Indonesia had a 6.2 per cent growth rate and Djibouti in North Africa had a 7.4 per cent growth rate during these years.

Severely underweight children under age 5, by region

Source: United Nations Development Programme

Figure 5

Goal 2: Total net enrolment ratio (NER) in primary education

Figures 6 and 7 demonstrate the fact that total net enrolment in primary education had an upward trend in the entire region, from 1999 to 2007. However, there is still need for more effort to achieve the 2015 target. Also, as can be seen, the gap between low income countries and others is substantial.

Total net enrolment ratio (NER) in primary education, by income level

Figure 6

Total net enrolment ratio (NER) in primary education, by region

Figure 7

Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women

As shown in Figures 8 and 9 the trend in all OIC countries other than high income countries was upward. In high income countries the Gender Parity Index (GPI) is greater, meaning that the number of female students enrolled at secondary level of education is greater than the number of male students. However, the

ratio on average is 0.74 in low income countries, which demonstrates that there is a huge gap between low income and high income countries. By World Bank classification, of fifty-seven OIC member countries, twenty-six of them are located in the low income classification. This implies that 45 per cent of OIC member countries still face the challenge of reaching the 2015 target.

Figure 8

Figure 9

Goal 4: Reduced child mortality

Figures 10 and 11 show that the child mortality rate has decreased. However, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia have a child mortality rate of 142 and 110 per 1000 live births respectively, the highest child under five mortality rate among OIC countries. During these years, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia succeeded in decreasing their average from 178 in 1990 to 142 in 2005, and from 164 to 110 respectively. This means that on average 36 and 54 more children have been saved in these countries respectively. It has been reported that the high number of child deaths in most of these countries is due to diseases such as HIV/AIDS and malaria, and inequality in accessing health services due to differences in income, gender, race, rural/urban residency and ethnic background. Conflict is also an important contributor to the high rate of under-five mortality.

Figure 10

Figure 11

Goal 5: Improved maternal health

Maternal health improved during the years 1995 to 2006, as indicated in Figures 12 and 13. However, in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia only 50 per cent and 54 per cent births were attended by member of health staff. This implies that 43 per cent of OIC countries are very far from the 2105 target.

Figure 12

Figure 13

606

Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

According to Figure 14, except for low income countries, the average tuberculosis prevalence rate per 100,000 population had a downward trend from 1990 to 2006. In low income countries it increased from 334 in 1990, to 384 in 2006. The reason for this increase is related to the increasing number of people with HIV/AIDS, who can easily contract tuberculosis infections. According to the region, this indicator had an upward trend in OIC member countries.

Figure 14

Figure 15

Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability

As demonstrated in Figures 16 and 17, the percentage of the population who use better drinking water sources increased from 1995 to 2006. In low income countries most of the progress was gained by the Sub-Saharan region with an increase of 8 per cent, in contrast to South Asia, where the percentage decreased by 1 per cent. However, despite this progress, it seems that the probability of reaching the 2015 target is still low, particularly when the wide rural-urban gap in access to improved drinking water in these countries is considered.

Figure 16

Figure 17

Goal 8: Develop a global partnership for development

The number of internet users per 100 had an upward trend from 2000 to 2006, as demonstrated by Figures 18 and 19. However, the slope of the trend is not uniform across the regions. East Asia and Pacific with a 200 per cent growth rate during 2000 and 2006 have the steepest internet user trend.

Figure 18

Figure 19

Migration in the OIC

Heavy migration is a phase through which all emerging countries go. It serves them as a means of development and is necessary for both host and origin countries, but migration must also be channelled to prevent adverse effects. For emerging countries, migration is a way to diversify part of the income of a family to make it more resilient to local downturns and increase consumption through the spending of remittances, amongst other benefits. For host countries, where the labour market is often segmented, the flow of migrants is a pool of both unskilled workers willing to take jobs that the locals look down upon, and skilled technicians in sectors with a high demand. But such advantages can only materialize through discussions and agreements at the policy level, as little can be done to stop those movements. Over the last decade, as policymakers have become more educated about migration, barriers to the movement of human capital have gradually disappeared: most countries either encourage or do not intervene in the migration of their population, within the OIC. Still, the OIC is facing the challenges of both emigration and immigration. As member countries reach different levels in their economic development, they decide on migration patterns and management related to them.

MIGRATION TO THE OECD COUNTRIES AND RUSSIA

Emigration is not a remedy for the lack of economic activity. It is the by-product of a new and booming economy; thus the migration of workers is a way to counterbalance the instability of such a rapidly growing environment. It is natural that most migrants would come from lower middle income countries where the biggest transformation occurs: the transition to a more industrial economy and the rapid growth of cities. It takes time to establish migration channels, and the migrants of lower middle income countries – which already have a significant pool of nationals abroad – enjoy a learning curve advantage. The incentive for emigration is not quite as strong in low income countries, and the means for migration are not readily available; the flow of migrants is thus smaller both in absolute terms and in migration rates, as shown in Figure 20. Still, this represents the foundations of future, stronger flows being built as indicated by the growth in the number of migrants. Upper middle income countries have the highest migration rates (around 0.8 per cent) but a much smaller total population base; emigration from upper middle income countries peaked in 2002, as they were hit by the tightening of policies in the host countries, and pull factors are not as strong in the sending country as in the poorer countries.

Migration rates, migrants per 1000 of population

Figure 20

Number of migrants to the OECD countries, by thousands

Figure 21

North Africa and Europe and Central Asia are the two closest regions to Western Europe, where the bulk of the OECD countries are found. The relative ease of migration, coupled with historical and cultural ties developed with those countries, explains why these two regions are the most important source of OIC migrants; they are also routes through which migrants from other regions – mostly Sub-Saharan Africa – transit with the hope of reaching Europe. Emigration from the Middle East is directed mostly towards the United States and stems in majority from Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, which are the most developed non-GCC countries in the region.

Number of migrants by origin, by thousands

Figure 22

Percentage origin of migrations in 2005

Figure 23

The top receiving countries today are the United States, Spain, France, Italy and Germany, which embody some of the strongest migration channels on the planet, such as North-Africa to Western Europe. As the growth of Spain soared in the last decade, more and more migrants stayed instead of continuing to France; the same phenomenon is noticeable in Italy with migrants from Central Asia. Germany has for a long time welcomed a large number of emigrants from Turkey. Canada is hosting migrants, most of them hoping to then move to the United States, which is the single largest host country for OIC emigrants. Since 2002 these countries have tried to staunch the flow of migrants, even more so since the beginning of the crisis in 2007; demagogic talks, especially during a downturn, easily target migrants, and then translate into a tightening of policies.

Figure 24

Because of this, migrants who hoped to transit through other OIC countries, like Morocco or Turkey, end up staying, by choice or by force, in those countries, which incidentally become host countries, creating a shock as their economies are not ready for such a transition.

The case of Europe and Central Asia is different again, with an important flow towards Russia stemming from the CIS countries, where many Russians living in those countries before the break-up of the USSR have been returning to the Russian Federation.

MIGRATION WITHIN THE OIC

In addition to the immigrants settling as a by-product of the migration flow to the OECD, some countries – in the middle income classification – are becoming regional attraction centres.

West Africa has always been a territory of intense movements of populations and circular migration, both of which were impaired since the dawn of the colonial era by artificial political boundaries. Since the Abuja Treaty of 1991, Africa has committed itself to union, and one of the most important criteria is the free movement of people; from this initiative was born the Economic Community of West African States (ECWAS). The African Common Position on Migration and Development, signed in 2006, embodies this new will to tackle the political and security issues brought by migration, and to foster its positive economic aspects. As of 2000, total inter-regional migration in West Africa represented 7.5m people,[1] roughly

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1. *Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa, Migrations*, ECOWAS-SWAC/OECD, 2006.

ten times the number of migrants from West Africa to Europe. Because of rising unemployment in the region, there is a diversification in the countries of destination,[2] with more and more West Africans taking the Saharan road to Europe, through Algeria and Morocco, where they now represent 52 per cent of the illegal migrants intercepted while trying to enter Spain. Those who do not succeed end up staying in those transit countries.[3] There is also a replacement dynamic where the emigrants from the more dynamic countries like Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire or Cameroon, the three big receiving countries in West Africa, are being replaced by regional immigrants.

Turkey's role has been evolving since the 1990s. It has long been a sending country, mostly to Germany, but with its economic development and its location making it a gateway to the EU, it has been confronted to the reality of growing immigrants and asylum seekers' flow coming from both the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, etc.) and the countries from the former Soviet Union, entering the country through the very lax visa system. As it aims at preserving a strong national identity, Turkish law makes it extremely difficult for non-Turks and non-Muslims to settle permanently or legally in the country; in turn it forces people either to go underground or migrate further to Europe.[4] Turkey will have to change its policies on migration and asylum to respect the rights of migrants and refugees as it tries to enter the European Union. The second regional attraction country that has recently emerged is Kazakhstan, due to it phenomenal growth, its natural resources and the cultural similarities with the other CIS countries, although with the current economic crisis, it has taken steps to restrict the number of contracts to foreign workers.

IMMIGRATION TOWARDS THE GCC COUNTRIES AND LIBYA

The oil producing countries differ from the other OIC members because of their high revenues stemming from the exploitation of natural resources. The GCC countries are Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain, and are concentrated in the Middle East region. They are characterized by a high rate of temporary immigration due to the lack of domestic labour supply. Owing to cultural reasons, citizens of these states have looked down upon menial work, and thanks to the relative ease brought by the presence of resources, a large share of the population can afford to stay idle.

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2. A. Adepoju, *Changing Configurations of Migration in Africa*, Migration Policy Institute, 2004.
3. H. de Haas, *Morocco: From Emigration Country to Africa's Migration Passage to Europe*, Nijmegen, Radboud University, 2005.
4. Turkey: A Transformation from Emigration to Immigration, Kemal Kirisci Center for European Studies, Bogaziçi University, 2003.

This immigration trend started in the 1960s and exploded after the first oil shock in 1975, when the profits from oil production increased tremendously due to the overnight increase in oil prices. To answer this newfound demand, foreign labour had to be used. It was a large success as population of the GCC countries jumped from 7,766 million in 1970 to 13,700 in 1980, and to 33,075 in 2005. In some countries like the UAE and Qatar, foreign labour makes up to 75 per cent of the population, even more in the private sector. Originally, this demand was met by the neighbouring Arab states, especially Egypt and Sudan, from which millions of people left to settle in the GCC countries, but also less educated citizens from the Maghreb. The main concern at the time was for the migrations to remain temporary, which proved difficult, considering the cultural and religious similarities of the sending and receiving countries. Because of those cultural factors, but also of the higher cost of Arab labour, from the 1980s, the trend started to shift as Muslim Asian migrants, primarily from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia but also India and the Philippines arrived, and now represent half of the foreign workers in the GCC countries. This phenomenon was reinforced by the 1991 Gulf War during which 700,000 immigrants moved to Dubai and Qatar, where the booming construction industry has needed a lot of unskilled labour. They are cheaper, less unionized, often single, and have fewer incentives to remain in the host country. Still, it is difficult to control the flow of Arab migrants, especially to Saudi Arabia, a large number of immigrants deciding to stay illegally after their pilgrimage to Mecca.

The case of Libya is different again, as it is an oil producing country, that has encouraged immigration (the IOM estimated that 10.6 per cent of the population was constituted of foreigners) from Sub-Saharan Africa as part of its Pan-African policy to meet its labour needs – even more so since the 1992 embargo, a turning point which made Libya look for allies and leadership potential in Africa – but also as a transit route to Europe through Italy and Malta. The main countries to have sent labour to Libya are Chad, Sudan, Niger and Nigeria. In 2000, the embargo was lifted, triggering a change in Libyan policy, and the government has since been taking a tougher stand, in particular regarding illegal migration. In collaboration with Europe, the main target of transit migrants, 145,000 illegal migrants were deported between 2003 and 2005.[5] With a net migration rate around 0.4 between 2000 and 2005,[6] the Libyan government believes the emigration level is good and should be maintained, while immigration should be reduced.

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5. H. de Haas, *Trans-Saharan Migration to North Africa and the EU: Historical Roots and Current Trends*, University of Oxford, 2006.
6. Source IOM – Country Facts and Figures

Managing the impacts of migration

Migration has both positive and negative effects: their management aims at magnifying the good, and alleviating the bad, knowing that force and restrictions usually have little or counter-productive effects on migration.

The first problem that is posed, the one that government tend to worry about the most, is the 'brain drain', particularly in the low income countries; it is a phenomenon where an important proportion of educated citizen emigrate, damaging the local economy through lost productivity and technological advancement gains, and nullifying the return on education for the state. It is true that the migration rate of people increases with education,[7] sometimes up to a dramatic level as in Suriname or Guyana (90 and 86 per cent respectively); a combination of poor opportunities at home, often combined with instability, balanced with the booty of perceived opportunities abroad, makes it ever difficult to retain educated workers, who are better informed and more able to migrate; they are also being targeted by selective migration policies in host countries. Preventing or curbing migration is preposterous, costly and ineffective, if attempted by either the sending or receiving country alone. The best incentives are projects and investments fostering economic and social development in the home country. Yet it is possible to limit the damages of brain drain and turn it into a brain gain.

This can be achieved through the courting of the existing diasporas, by strengthening the relationship of these expatriates, who have garnered an important education, experience or technology abroad – that might not have been accessible in their country – with their more often than not, expatriates are willing to collaborate with research, development, investment projects in the host country. Diasporas have formed themselves into networks like The Network of Arab Scientists and Technologists Abroad (ASTA), the Iranian Scholars Scientific Information Network, the Moroccan Association of Researchers and Scholars Abroad (MARS) and the Tunisian Scientific Consortium (TSC), with or without the intervention of governments, which often present themselves as non-political, non-profit organizations. The UNDP has created TOTKEN programmes (Transfer of Technological Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals), which has proven successful in tightening the bond between countries and their migrants, for example: TOKTEN for Lebanon, the Return of Qualified Expatriate Nationals to Pakistan or the Programme of Assistance to the Palestine People[8].

The second way is exploiting the return potential of these skilled expatriates, as a large number of all emigrants ho as a desire to eventually to return home. Pakistan was a precursor in this domain, with the creation of the

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7. Andrew Burns and Sanket Mohapatra, *International Migration and Technological Progress*, 2008.
8. Mercy Brown, *Using the Intellectual Diaspora to Reverse the Brain Drain: Some Useful Examples*, South Africa, University of Cape Town.

Higher Education Commission (HEC) and the Foreign Faculty Hiring Programme (FFHP), designed to grant Ph.D. financial support to Pakistani nationals, and hire them afterwards, although temporarily. They also survey Pakistani Ph.D. graduates who research abroad, asking them what criteria might influence their decision to return. In a more general manner, returning expatriates are offered jobs, housing, cultural acclimatization services to facilitate their resettlement process.

The positive financial aspect of migration for the countries of origin is remittances; it is the single most important source of external financing for the less developed countries, larger and more reliable than both FDI and OIA; it is also the flow that is less likely to be diverted through corruption or inefficiency. In the last ten years, the remittances level has exploded for the low and lower middle income countries, as the number of migrants has grown, and economic conditions abroad have been favourable; these remittances are a form of insurance against local unemployment for the families of the migrants, and in turn transform into consumption and local investment. For countries like Tajikistan or Lebanon, it is a vital resource, as it amounted to 45.5 and 23.7 per cent of GDP in 2007 in these countries respectively. Upper middle income countries have seen a decline in net inflows, as they are being transformed into emigration countries and the growth of outflows outweighs that of inflows. Improvement to the flow of remittances can be made, by reducing the costs of sending remittances, and helping expatriates reduce the foreign exchange risk. Morocco, as one of the biggest remittances receivers has made a number of banking innovations targeting immigrants, like the 'Groupe Banque Populaire du Maroc' with dual Dirham/Euro accounts easily accessible from all over the world from which one can easily transfer money to Moroccan accounts. The next step is the securitization of future remittances as a source of cheap, well-rated source of financing.

Figure 25

Appendix A: Classification of OIC countries by Income and Territory[9]

Low income countries – Category I

Territory	Country
Europe and Central Asia	Kyrgyzstan
Europe and Central Asia	Tajikistan
Europe and Central Asia	Uzbekistan
Middle East	Yemen
South Asia	Afghanistan
South Asia	Bangladesh
South Asia	Pakistan
Sub-Saharan Africa	Benin
Sub-Saharan Africa	Burkina Faso
Sub-Saharan Africa	Chad
Sub-Saharan Africa	Comoros
Sub-Saharan Africa	Côte d'Ivoire
Sub-Saharan Africa	Gambia
Sub-Saharan Africa	Guinea
Sub-Saharan Africa	Guinea-Bissau
Sub-Saharan Africa	Mali
Sub-Saharan Africa	Mauritania
Sub-Saharan Africa	Mozambique
Sub-Saharan Africa	Niger
Sub-Saharan Africa	Nigeria
Sub-Saharan Africa	Senegal
Sub-Saharan Africa	Sierra Leone
Sub-Saharan Africa	Somalia
Sub-Saharan Africa	Sudan
Sub-Saharan Africa	Togo
Sub-Saharan Africa	Uganda

9. Data from The Annual Economic Report on the OIC Countries, 2008.

Lower middle income countries – Category II

Territory	Country
East Asia and Pacific	Indonesia
Europe and Central Asia	Albania
Europe and Central Asia	Azerbaijan
Europe and Central Asia	Turkmenistan
Latin America and Caribbean	Guyana
Latin America and Caribbean	Suriname
Middle East	Iran
Middle East	Iraq
Middle East	Jordan
Middle East	Palestine
Middle East	Syria
North Africa	Algeria
North Africa	Djibouti
North Africa	Egypt
North Africa	Morocco
North Africa	Tunisia
South Asia	Maldives
Sub-Saharan Africa	Cameroon

Upper middle income countries – Category III

Territory	Country
East Asia and Pacific	Malaysia
Europe and Central Asia	Kazakhstan
Europe and Central Asia	Turkey
Middle East	Lebanon
Middle East	Oman
North Africa	Libya
Sub-Saharan Africa	Gabon

High Income Countries – Category IV

Territory	Country
East Asia and Pacific	Brunei
Middle East	Bahrain
Middle East	Kuwait
Middle East	Qatar
Middle East	Saudi Arabia
Middle East	United Arab Emirates

Chapter 9.4

AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Fathy Sid Ahmed

INTRODUCTION

Islamic countries have varying potentialities and this variation makes a comparative study of the existing indicators extremely complex. To address this problem, the Islamic countries have been divided into two groups according to the similarity in their potential.

The first group includes those states showing least economic growth based on criteria provided by the Committee for Development Policy of the United Nations. These criteria are low income, human resource weakness and economic vulnerability. The criteria are generally employed in order to add countries to the list of least developed countries or to remove them from it. The list includes twenty-one Islamic countries: Afghanistan, Eritrea, Uganda, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Senegal, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, the Maldives, Mauritania, Niger and Yemen.

The second group includes those Islamic countries with emerging economies and which have crossed the threshold of least developed countries according to the above-mentioned criteria. These countries are Morocco, Jordan, Libya, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Turkey, Syrian Arab Republic, Indonesia, Egypt, Tunisia, Malaysia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Iraq and Bahrain.

This chapter will review the course of development in the fields of agriculture, industry and research. This will be done by employing the standardized indicators for the countries belonging to the first group and other standardized indicators for the countries belonging to the second group, in addition to the role of information and communication technology and the media.

Agriculture

CONTRIBUTION TO THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP)

a) Islamic least developed countries

Table 1 shows the overall gradual decline in the relative share of agriculture. This reveals a complex pattern in which agricultural production in some Islamic countries with least developed economies continues to increase its contribution to GDP, whereas in some other countries it is declining and occasionally rapidly falling.

We also find that the contribution of agriculture to GDP increased in the periods 1980–83 and 2000–3 in more than one third of Islamic countries considered to be least developed, and in more than one third of Islamic countries with least developed economies in which the contribution of agriculture is gradually decreasing. There are five countries in which agricultural output is declining as a share of total value added. This is more than one third of its level in the period 1980–83. This decrease is due to a significant expansion in the industrial sector and particularly in the exploitation of oil and electrical power.

Table 1: The contribution of value-added agriculture in the periods
1980–83 and 2000–3
(average percentage of total value added)

Country	Average % 1980–3	Average % 2000–3	% increase and decrease
Afghanistan	0	56	–
Bangladesh	10	6	(40.00)
Benin	33	24	(27.30)
Burkina Faso	57	34	(40.40)
Chad	40	38	(5.00)
Comoros	27	46	70.37
Djibouti	0	4	–
Eritrea	0	15	–
Gambia	39	32	(17.95)
Guinea	23	24	4.35
Guinea-Bissau	48	57	18.75

Country	Average % 1980–3	Average % 2000–3	% increase and decrease
Mali	44	41	(6.82)
Mauritania	24	20	(16.67)
Niger	32	39	21.88
Senegal	23	18	21.74
Sierra Leone	54	47	(12.96)
Sudan	36	41	13.89
Uganda	51	36	(29.41)
Yemen	0	14	–

Source: UNCTAD estimates based on data provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Bank, 2005.

b) Average annual growth rate of agricultural production

Table 2 shows that the contribution of the workforce in the agricultural sector has begun to decline in every Islamic country with least economic growth. However, the relative contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP is increasing in Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Zambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Sierra Leone and Panama. The relative contribution is fixed or decreasing in the remaining countries.

The table also shows the average annual growth rate of total agricultural production in Islamic countries considered to be least developed.

Table 2: Agricultural production: total average annual and per capita growth rate

Country	Relative contribution of agricultural product in:				Annual average growth rate (%) of total agricultural production*					Average annual growth rate of per capita agricultural production				
	Total work force		GDP											
	1990	2002	1990	2004	1990–4	2000–4	2002	2003	2004	1990–99	2000–4	2002	2003	2004
Afghanistan	70	66	00	529	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bangladesh	65	54	30	21	0.1	0.9	2.2	3.0	–1.3	–2.3	–1.2	0.2	0.9	–2.3
Benin	64	52	36	36	6.3	7.5	9.3	15.2	2.9	2.8	4.7	6.3	12.2	0.2
Burkina Faso	92	92	28	31	5.8	8.6	3.7	6.2	0.7	2.8	5.5	0.6	3.2	–2.1
Chad	83	73	29	61	1.5	3.9	–1.1	–0.3	5.7	–1.3	0.9	–4.1	–3.1	0.6
Comoros	78	73	39	41[b]	2.7	1.1	–0.5	2.9	0.2	0.3	–1.7	–3.3	0.1	3.8
Djibouti	82	78	3	4[d]	–4.9	2.9	33	6.4	0	6.2	1.2	1.4	4.9	–1.3
Eritrea	80	77	22	15	35.8	–2.5	–22.1	13.7	–0.8	35.3	–6.0	–24.9	9.6	–4.4
Gambia	82	78	29	32	0.9	–11.0	–40.1	9.8	–3.8	0	–13.4	–41.7	6.8	–6.1
Guinea	87	83	24	25	5.0	2.9	1.4	3.3	2.4	1.2	1.3	–0.1	1.9	0.8
Guinea-Bissau	85	82	61	71	1.4	1.9	–1.8	2.5	5.2	–1.8	–1.1	–4.7	–0.6	2.2

Mali	86	80	46	38[b]	2.6	6.1	−6.6	15.6	−1.1	−0.2	2.0	−9.2	12.1	−42
Maldives	33	21	0	0	3.7	3.1	9.4	0.2	1.0	0.7	0.1	6.2	−2.6	−2.1
Mauritania	55	52	30	19	−1.1	2.1	5.6	2.4	0.5	−3.5	−0.9	2.5	−0.7	−2.5
Niger	90	87	35	40[b]	3.0	5.9	2.5	7.8	−1.4	−0.3	2.2	−1.2	−4.0	−4.9
Senegal	77	73	20	17	1.5	−5.0	−35.7	36.2	−0.8	−1.0	−7.3	−37.1	−0.9	−3.2
Sierra Leone	67	61	32	53	−1.1	4.8	4.8	5.4	−0.9	−1.2	0.7	0.5	1.0	−4.4
Sudan	69	59	43[e]	39[a]	8.2	2.8	−3.2	9.6	−3.6	5.7	0.6	−5.4	73	−5.7
Uganda	85	79	54	32	2.1	2.2	4.1	−2.9	3.7	−1.0	−1.0	0.9	−6.0	0.3
Yemen	60	48	24	15	4.3	2.1	−0.7	−0.7	4.6	−0.7	−1.8	−4.2	−4.1	0.9

* Source: UNCTAD, differences based on data provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Bank, 2005.

Base year 1999–2001.

a. 2002; b. 2001; c. 1993; d. 2000; e. 1996; f. 1998.

There is a decline over time for all countries apart from Guinea-Bissau, Uganda and Yemen.

* Development indicators of agricultural land resources, the productivity of the agricultural labour force and the average annual growth rate of food production

Table 3 shows the proportion of arable land used for agriculture as a percentage of the total land, the percentage of land under irrigation, the average number of agricultural workers and the total consumption of fertilizers in the Islamic least developed countries over a period of ten years, 1980–3 to 2000–3.

The Table reveals that the proportion of arable land in Eritrea, Afghanistan and Yemen reached 30.1 per cent, 20.7 per cent and 15.6 per cent respectively. We also find that the countries with the lowest percentage are Comoros, Maldives, Niger and Djibouti. The percentage of the other countries varies between 6 per cent and 90 per cent. As for the change in the average agricultural worker's share of agricultural land (number of hectares per worker) between the two periods, in half of the countries this is negative while in four countries it is zero. The change in the other countries varies between −33.3 per cent and 100 per cent.

As for the consumption of fertilizer (number of kilogrammes per hectare) between the two periods, we find that the rate of consumption has declined in three countries, showed no change in four countries, and increased in other countries.

Table 4 shows labour productivity in the agricultural sector in Islamic countries with least developed economies between the two periods 1980–3 and 2000–3. It also shows that during this period labour productivity in agriculture began to increase in fifteen countries, while there was no productivity in Somalia and the Maldives. We also find that it began to decrease in four countries, these being Sierra Leone, Senegal, Niger and Gambia.

Table 3: Indicators of agricultural land* resources

Country	Arable land as a percentage of total land	Irrigated land	Average agricultural land per agricultural worker (number of hectares per worker [%])			Total fertilizer use (number of kilogrammes per hectare)	
	1994	2000–3	1980–3	2000–3	Between 1980–3 and 2000–3	1980–3	2000–8
Afghanistan	20.7	7.1	1.8	1.3	−27.8	6.4	1.8
Bangladesh	71	49.5	0.3	0.2	−33.3	49.8	165.1
Benin	6	0.1	1.2	0.8	−33.3	3.1	0.1
Chad	15	0.1	1.6	1.3	−18.8	1.3	4.9
Comoros	–	–	0.6	0.5	−16.7	0	2.3
Djibouti	–	0.1	0	0	0	–	–
Eritrea	30.1	0.3	–	0.4	–	–	11.8
Gambia	22	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.6	11.4	2.6
Guinea	20	0.8	0.5	0.5	0	0.4	1.9
Guinea-Bissau	10	1.8	1.0	1.1	10.0	2.5	4.4
Mali	10	0.7	0.6	1.0	66.7	5.4	8.8
Maldives	–	–	0.2	0.4	100	0	0

Country	Arable land as a percentage of total land	Irrigated land	Average agricultural land per agricultural worker (number of hectares per worker [%])			Total fertilizer use (number of kilogrammes per hectare)	
Mauritania	66	0.1	0.4	0.8	100	2.0	3.9
Niger	–	0.2	3.9	3.2	−17.9	0.3	0.3
Senegal	–	1.4	1.1	0.8	−27.3	8.6	13.7
Somalia	90	0.5	0.4	0.4	0	1.5	0.5
Sudan	14	14	2.3	2.2	−4.3	5.6	3.9
Uganda	84	0.1	1.0	0.8	−20.0	0.1	1.0

* Agricultural land is land planted with both annual and permanent crops.

Source: Compiled by the researcher.

Table 4: The agricultural labour force as a percentage of the total
workforce and labour productivity in the agricultural sector

Country	Agricultural labour force as a percentage of the total workforce		Labour productivity in the agriculture sector	
	1980–4	2000–3	1980–3	2000–3
Afghanistan	72	64	239	251
Bangladesh	71	54	223	307
Benin	67	53	264	572
Burkina Faso	92	92	128	165
Chad	87	74	151	214
Comoros	80	73	305	367
Djibouti	84	78	0	69
Eritrea	0	77	0	63
Gambia	84	79	290	233
Guinea	90	83	0	221
Guinea-Bissau	87	82	185	249
Maldives	48	21	0	0
Mali	88	80	172	223
Mauritania	69	53	207	283
Niger	91	87	189	168
Senegal	80	73	275	264
Sierra Leone	69	61	532	282
Somalia	78	70	0	0
Sudan	72	60	378	680
Uganda	87	79	202	228
Yemen	69	49	0	495

Labour productivity has been calculated by using the value-added indexes based
on the value of the fixed dollar in the year 2000.
a) The labour force is that part of the population which is economically active.
b) Labour productivity in the agricultural sector is the ratio between the value
     added and the economically active population in the agricultural sector.

Source: Compiled by the researcher.

Table 5 shows the total food production and the proportion of net per capita food production during the periods 1995–9 and 2000–4 and the years 2002, 2003 and 2004. It also shows the extent of the reliance of most Islamic countries with least economic growth on rain for their food production. We find that total food production fluctuates from year to year and that its production varies from one year to the next. This is similarly the case with net per capita food production. In the period under study we find that in three countries, namely Guinea-Bissau, Uganda and Yemen, there is a significant improvement in the development of total food production and the proportion of net per capita food production.

Industry and Manufacturing

Table 6 shows the contribution of value added to industry in the Islamic countries with least economic growth between the periods 1980–3 and 2000–3. From the table it is clear that the percentage increased in fourteen countries while there was no change in Sudan. As for the remaining countries, the percentage decreased between the two periods.

Table 7 shows the contribution of value added to the manufacturing industry. We find that this increased in Bangladesh, Benin, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Guinea, Senegal, Uganda and Yemen, while it decreased in Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania and Sudan. This is due to an increase in mining and the extraction of oil. We find that there is no contribution of value added in Chad, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan.

Table 8 shows the annual growth rate of the manufacturing sector for the periods 1980–90 and 2000–4 and the years 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004. It is clear from the table that the annual growth rate of the manufacturing sector increased to 7.4 per cent, 5.4 per cent, 2.0 per cent, 20.9 per cent, 5.9 per cent and 5.3 per cent in Bangladesh, Benin, Guinea, Mali, Senegal and Yemen respectively, while it remained relatively constant or very slow in the other countries.

Table 5: Food production - total and per capita average annual growth rate

Country	Total food production					Net per capita food production				
	1990 1994	2000 2004	2002	2003	2004	1990 1994	2000 2004	2002	2003	2004
Afghanistan	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bangladesh	0	0.9	2.5	3.0	–1.4	–2.4	–1.2	0.4	1.0	–3.4
Benin	4.2	9.1	6.1	23.0	3.2	0.8	6.2	3.3	19.7	0.5
Burkina Faso	7.2	6.8	–1.5	7.2	–4.6	4.2	3.7	–4.3	4.0	–7.3
Chad	2.6	3.9	–1.4	3.3	1.1	–0.4	0.9	–4.3	0.3	–2.0
Comoros	2.7	1.1	–0.5	2.9	0.2	–0.3	–1.7	–3.3	0.1	–2.6
Djibouti	–4.9	2.9	3.3	6.4	0	–6.3	1.2	1.4	4.9	–1.3
Eritrea	36.4	–2.5	–22.2	13.9	–0.8	35.7	–6.0	–25.1	9.7	–4.4
Gambia	0.5	–11.1	–40.2	9.8	–3.8	–2.9	–13.5	–41.8	6.8	–6.1
Guinea	5.0	3.8	3.9	3.5	2.5	1.2	2.2	2.5	2.0	0.9
Guinea-Bissau	1.6	1.8	–1.9	2.5	5.4	–1.6	–1.1	–4.8	–0.5	2.2
Maldives	3.7	3.1	9.4	0.2	1.0	0.7	0.1	6.2	–2.6	–2.1
Mali	2.8	3.8	–1.4	9.4	0.9	0.1	0.7	–4.3	6.2	–2.2

Country	Total food production					Net per capita food production				
Mauritania	−1.1	2.2	5.6	2.4	0.5	−3.5	−0.9	2.5	−0.7	−2.5
Niger	2.9	6.3	2.4	8.7	−1.3	−0.4	2.5	−1.2	4.8	−4.8
Senegal	−1.7	−5.6	−36.3	35.4	−0.9	−0.9	−7.4	−37.7	32.3	−3.3
Sierra Leone	−1.3	4.9	5.0	5.4	−1.0	−1.4	0.8	0.9	1.0	−4.7
Somalia	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Sudan	9.4	2.7	−2.9	9.4	−4.1	6.9	0.4	−5.1	7.1	−6.1
Uganda	1.7	2.0	3.6	−2.4	3.3	−1.4	−1.2	0.4	−5.5	−0.1
Yemen	4.2	2.0	−0.7	−0.8	4.8	−0.7	1.5	−4.2	−4.3	1.3

Source: Compiled by the researcher from UNCTAD estimates based on data from the Food and Agriculture Organization.

Table 6: The contribution of value added to industry
for the periods 1980–3 and 2000–3 and the average percentage
of the total value added

Country	Average for 1980–3	Average for 2000–3	Percentage of increase/decrease
Afghanistan	0	21	
Bangladesh	17	26	
Benin	13	14	
Burkina Faso	19	16	
Chad	12	16	
Comoros	8	13	
Djibouti	0	14	
Eritrea	11	10	
Gambia	13	14	
Guinea	25	36	
Guinea-Bissau	19	14	
Mali	14	23	
Mauritania	29	30	
Niger	20	17	
Senegal	17	21	
Sudan	20	20	
Uganda	11	21	
Sierra Leone	29	34	
Yemen	0	46	

Table 7: The contribution of value added to the manufacturing
industry for the periods 1980–3 and 2000–3
and the average percentage of the total value added

Country	Average for 1980–3	Average for 2000–3	Percentage of increase/decrease
Afghanistan	0	0	
Bangladesh	11	16	
Benin	6	9	
Burkina Faso	16	11	
Chad	0	0	
Comoros	2	5	
Djibouti	0	3	
Eritrea	0	14	
Gambia	5	5	
Guinea	0	4	
Guinea-Bissau	15	–11	
Mali	4	–3	
Mauritania	18	–9	
Niger	7	7	
Senegal	1	13	
Sudan	11	8	
Uganda	1	10	
Sierra Leone	0	0	
Yemen	0	5	

The contribution is based on the value of the fixed dollar in 2000.

Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, 2005.

Table 8: The annual growth rate of the manufacturing sector
and its contribution to the total GDP (%)

Country	Contribution to the total GDP			Annual growth rate						
	1980	1990	2004	1980 1990	1990 2000	2000 2004	2001	2002	2003	2004
Afghanistan	–	–	18[a]	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Bangladesh	14	13	16	5.2	7.2	6.5	6.7	5.5	6.7	7.4
Benin	8	8	9	5.1	5.8	5.9	9.0	5.5	4.6	5.4
Burkina Faso	15	15	14	2.0	1.6	2.2[h]	8.1	–0.3	0	–
Chad	11	14	7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Comoros	4	4	4[c]	4.9	1.7	1.3	4.1	–0.6	1.4	1.0
Djibouti	–	5	3[k]	–	–7.3	–	–	–	–	–
Eritrea	–	9[f]	11	–	8.2[g]	6.6	8.0	10.0	3.5	2.5
Gambia	6	7	5	7.8	0.9	4.2	2.7	4.5	4.7	4.7
Guinea	–	5	4	–	4.0	2.0	5.5	6.0	–4.0	2.0
Guinea-Bissau	14	8	9	9.2	–2.0	14.6	5.9	14.4	27.5	6.0
Maldives	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Mali	7	9	3[c]	6.8	–1.4	5.3	–14.0	22.7	–5.5	20.9
Mauritania	13[b]	10	9	–2.0[d]	–1.3	5.9[n]	5.9	–	–	–

Country	Contribution to the total GDP			Annual growth rate						
Niger	4	7	7[c]	2.7[d]	2.6	3.9[h]	3.4	3.3	5.0	–
Senegal	11	13	13	4.6	4.0	5.3	5.1	10.1	0.3	5.9
Sierra Leone	5	5	5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Somalia	5	5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Sudan	7	–	9[a]	4.8	4.4	−7.5	−16.2	2.1	–	–
Uganda	4	6	9	3.9[m]	14.1	5.0	7.0	5.3	4.0	4.0
Yemen	–	9	5	–	3.7	2.5	3.3	4.8	2.0	5.3

Source: UNCTAD estimates based on data provided by the World Bank and World Development Indicators for 2006.

a. 2002; b. 1985; c. 2003; d. 1985–90; e. 1990; f. 1993; g. 1993–2000; h. 2000–3; i. 1989; j. 1989–90; k. 2000; l. 1998; m. 1983–1990; n. 2000–1; o. 1994–2000; p. 2001; q. 2000–2.

Research, information and communication indicators

Table 10 shows the public spending on agricultural research in Islamic countries considered to have least economic growth during the periods 1980–9, 1990–9 and 2000–1. It is clear from the table that the change in public spending during the above-mentioned periods as a percentage of the total GDP was extremely slight in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mauritania, Uganda and Yemen, while it was zero in Niger and negative in both Sudan and Mali. It is therefore evident that the level of public spending on research and development activities in these countries was very low.

Table 11 deals with the information and communication indicators for Islamic countries considered to have least economic growth (2001). This is on the basis of indicators for the increasing spread of information and communication technology and which measure the gap in digital technology according to the following four components:
–   development of information and communication technology;
–   connectivity, which is a measure of the extent of development of the infrastructure of wired and wireless communications (2);
–   access, which measures the use of connectivity (3);
–   policies, which measure annually the competition in the Internet service providers market.

Specific indicators have been employed to reveal change in the four components and to measure them.

It is clear from the table that of all the Islamic countries considered to have least growth, Maldives is the most prepared in the field of information and communication technology. The indicator measuring the spread of information and communication technology for this country is 0.3565, that is, twice the average indicator for the least developed countries in the world, which is 0.1778. Similarly, the level of competitive strength in the telecommunications sector is low in most Islamic countries considered to be least developed, with the exception of Sudan, Guinea-Bissau and Malawi.

The data reveals that despite the rapid expansion of the mobile phone network in many of these countries, they remain different from the other developing countries in terms of their preparedness to utilize information and communication technology.

The gap in digital technology and in the provision of electricity has compounded the problems of both. This has resulted in a proportionate lack of technology compared with the rest of the world, a major barrier to the acquisition of modern technology for large-scale production.

CONTRIBUTION TO THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP)

Islamic countries with emerging economies

i) Contribution of agriculture, industry and services to GDP

Table 9(a) shows the contribution of agriculture, industry and services to the GDP in the Islamic countries with emerging economies in 2006.

Table 9 (a), (b) and (c) are exclusively OIC countries with emerging economies. Tables 10, 11 and 12 deal with Islamic LDCs.

Table 9(a) shows the contribution of agriculture, industry and services to GDP in 2006 in the Islamic countries considered to be developing.

Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt and Malaysia made the largest agricultural contribution to GDP in 2006, ranging from 15–20 per cent, while Malaysia and Iran (Islamic Republic of) made the largest contribution of industry to GDP in 2006, ranging from 45–50 per cent. As regards the contribution of services to GDP in 2006, Tunisia made the largest contribution followed by Côte d'Ivoire, Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates.

ii) Agricultural and non-agricultural potential

Pakistan has the largest agricultural area estimated at 18.33 million hectares. It is followed by Iran (Islamic Republic of), Turkey and Kazakhstan, which in 2004 had 7.650, 5.125 and 3.556 million hectares respectively. This is seen in Table 9(b). As regards employment in agriculture in these countries in 2004, in the rest of the Table, we find that Indonesia, followed by Pakistan, Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire have the largest proportion of agricultural workers, ranging from 44.8 per cent to 55.2 per cent.

iii) Agricultural production indicators for 2005

Table 9(c) shows the agricultural production indicators for 2005 for the Islamic countries considered to be developing. These indicators include crop cultivation, production and productivity, in addition to indicators for livestock production, type of animal and numbers. There are also indicators for fish and sea food production.

Public spending on agricultural research in Islamic countries for the periods 1980–9, 1990–9 and 2000–1

Table 10 compares public spending on agricultural research during three periods. The figures reveal the fluctuation and decline of the proportion of money spent over time.

Information and communication indicators

Table 11 shows indicators for information and communication collected from the Development Fund of the United Nations Development Report of 2005. It contains the various post offices, the distribution of daily newspapers, the numbers of those who have radios, and personal computer and Internet users for every 100,000 people. It is clear that the proportion varies between one country and another.

Changes in ranking in the spread of information and communication technology

Table 12 reveals the ranking of a number of selected Islamic countries for the period 1995–2002. These rankings have been compiled from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

Table 9: Islamic countries considered to be developing
9(a): The contribution of agriculture, industry and services
to GDP in 2008

Country	Agriculture		Industry		Services	
	Contribution to GDP (%)	Major crops	Contribution to GDP (%)	Raw and manufactured products	Contribution to GDP (%)	Main services
Algeria	8.0	wheat, citrus fruits, grapes, olives and livestock products	30.0	petroleum and natural gas, minerals, food industries, textiles, chemicals, trade and construction materials	30.0	
Côte d'Ivoire	20.0	cocoa, coffee, palm oil and rubber	22.0	minerals, diamonds, food and fabric industries, car industry and coin minting	57.0	

Egypt	15.0	tomatoes, rice, cotton, grapes, strawberries, wheat, maize, potatoes, oranges, sorghum, animals and fish				
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	10.0	potatoes, legumes, vegetables, fruits, cotton, sugar cane, tea, tobacco and livestock products	45.0	oil, cement, sugar and foodstuffs industries, handicrafts	45.0	general information and technology services, etc.
Lebanon	7.0	grain, grapes, vegetables, olives and tobacco	21.0	visual engineering, construction and food industries	72.0	tourism, information and technology services
Malaysia	15.0	rice, vegetables, fruit, livestock and wood industries	50.0	electronic industries	50.0	information and technology services, tourism, etc.

Country	Agriculture		Industry		Services	
	Contribution to GDP (%)	Major crops	Contribution to GDP (%)	Raw and manufactured products	Contribution to GDP (%)	Main services
Tunisia	12.0	wheat, sugar and olives	28.0	petroleum, natural gas, phosphates, iron, the manufacture of leather fabrics and foodstuffs, wood and paper industries	60.0	tourism, information and technology services, etc.
UAE	3.0		n/a	furniture manufacturing, petroleum and gem industries	45.0	tourism and petroleum services

The Islamic countries considered to be developing
9(b): Agricultural and non-agricultural potential, 2004

Country	Million hectares of cultivated area			Employment in agriculture (%)	Employment outside of agriculture (%)
	Irrigated area	Alternative area etc.	Total area		
Algeria	0.569	39.387	39.966	22.9	77.1
Bahrain	0.005	0.001	0.006	2	98
Cameroon	0.026	9.134	9.160	47.9	52.1
Côte d'Ivoire	0.073	19.827	19.900	44.8	55.2
Egypt	3.409	–	3.409	33.3	66.7
Indonesia	4.803	26.184	30.987	55.2	44.8
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	7.650	55.362	63.012	24.6	78.4
Iraq	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Jordan	0.750	0.929	1.004	10.1	89.9
Kazakhstan	3.556	204.228	207.784	18	82
Kuwait	0.013	0.141	0.154	1.1	98.9
Lebanon	0.104	0.225	0.329	2.8	97.2
Libya	0.470	14.980	15.450	4.7	95.9
Malaysia	0.364	6.505	7.870	15	25
Morocco	1.445	28.931	30.376	33.5	66.5
Oman	n/a	n/a	n/a	6.4	93.6
Pakistan	18.230	4.000	27.230	48.9	51.1
Qatar	0.013	0.008	0.021	2.7	97.3
Syrian Arab Republic	1.333	12.491	13.824	26.2	73.8
Tunisia	0.394	9.39	9.784	23.14	76.86
Turkey	5.215	35.429	40.644	28.3	71.1
UAE	0.076	n/a	0.550	3.9	96.1

Source: Statistics from the Food and Agriculture Organization, 2004.

The Islamic countries considered to be developing
9(c): Agricultural production indicators, 2005

Country	Plant production indicators				Livestock production indicators		Fish and sea food production indicators		
	Crop	Area in 1000s of hectares	Production per 1000 hectares	Productivity: kilogramme per hectare	Type	Number in 1000s	Fresh water fish	Salt water fish	Sea food
Algeria	wheat	1601	2415	1506	sheep	1909	338	121558	4715
	potatoes	103	2157	20.916	goats	3590			
	sugar	685	1033	1509	cattle	1586			
	tomatoes	42	1023	24164	rabbits	1400			
	melons	43	858	20119					
Bahrein	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Cameroon	*	345	2139	619.7	poultry	31000	75337	56085	12260
	sugar cane	145	1450	10000	cattle	6000			
	*	254	1356	53414	goats	4400			
	*	58	1300	22414	sheep	3800			
	maize	550	1023	1861	*	1350			
Côte d'Ivoire	*	1156	4991	4318	poultry	33000	4866	48926	624

	magnolia	232	2198	8049	sheep	1523			
	cassava, palm oil	249	1882	7570	cattle	1500			
	plantain	390	1350	3462	goats	1192			
	cocoa	1694	1286	759	*	345			
Egypt	sugar	135	17091	126626	poultry	95000	573080	94843	12605
	wheat	1262	8185	6486	rabbits	9250			
	maize	948	7698	8120	ducks	9200			
	tomatoes	195	7600	38974	rice	9100			
	rice	613	6125	9988	sheep	5150			
Indonesia	grain	15.3	58954	3860	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	*	16.12	18804	11663	n/a	n/a			
	legumes	51.666	8.68225	1608	n/a	n/a			
Iran	wheat	6499	14500	2231	sheep	54000	111534	304708	22393
	sugar beet	199	5273	265614	goats	26500			
	sugar cane	55	4723	86012	cattle	8800			
	potatoes	195	4284	21971	honey-comb	3400			
	tomatoes	130	4200	32308	turkeys	2000			

Country	Plant production indicators				Livestock production indicators		Fish and sea food production indicators		
	Crop	Area in 1000s of hectares	Production per 1000 hectares	Productivity: kilogramme per hectare	Type	Number in 1000s	Fresh water fish	Salt water fish	Sea food
Iraq	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Jordan	tomatoes	11	599	53295	poultry	25000	911	160	
	potatoes	5	172	35486	sheep	1890			
	cucumber	2	166	104541	goats	516			
	olives	65	113	1752	rabbits	70			
	aubergines	3	99	33772	cattle	68			
Kazakhstan	wheat	8325	11066	1309	rabbits	60000	31315		
	potatoes	206	2521	12267	poultry	255500			
	melons	43	670	15569	sheep	11409			
	tomatoes	25	516	20640	cattle	5204			
					goats	2000			
Kuwait	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	poultry	32500	185	2993	n/a
					sheep	900			
					goats	150			
					*	28			
					*	5			

Libya	dates	16	240	15000	poultry	25000		10	46329	n/a
	onions	12	235	19184	sheep	4500				
	potatoes	10	195	19480	goats	1265				
	tomatoes	10	190	42105	?	123				
	grapes	4	125	8929	cattle	90				
Lebanon	potatoes	20	500	25000	poultry	35000		370	3418	105
	oranges	11	230	20909	goats	430				
	tomatoes	4	230	58974	sheep	340				
	legumes	4	160	42105	?	123				
	grapes	4	125	8929	cattle	90				
Malaysia	rice	3620	75650	20898	poultry	185000		66009	105498	235268
	sugar	676	2240	3313	rice	16003				
	cocoa	179	642	3587	*	2168				
	bananas	26	530	20385	cattle	801				
	*	41	430	10488	goats	271				
Morocco	sugar beet	66	3302	50405	poultry	137000		1510	899450	83791
	wheat	2966	3043	1026	sheep	16872				
	potatoes	62	1479	23809	goats	5332				
	fruit	22	1206	54548	cattle	2722				
	*	2180	1102	506	?	1522				

Country	Plant production indicators				Livestock production indicators		Fish and sea food production indicators		
	Crop	Area in 1000s of hectares	Production per 1000 hectares	Productivity: kilogramme per hectare	Type	Number in 1000s	Fresh water fish	Salt water fish	Sea food
Pakistan	sugar cane	967	47244	40074	poultry	166000	175191	309888	29827
	wheat	8358	21612	2586	goats	56700			
	rice	2621	8321	3174	buffalo	26300			
	cotton	3102	4429	1428	sheep	24900			
	maize	1042	3110	2984	cattle	24200			
Qatar	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Syrian Arab Republic	wheat	1905	4669	2450	poultry	23705	13303	3334	343
	beet	25	1150	46000	sheep	19651			
	tomatoes	15	946	64760	goats	1296			
	*	1326	747	579	cattle	1083			
	olives	5000	620	1240	*	393			
Tunisia	wheat	962	1627	1612	poultry	64000	1784	91002	18314
	tomatoes	27	960	36090	sheep	7213			
	olives	1500	600	400	turkeys	4400			

	sugar	381	465	1220	cattle	686			
	melons	28	350	12500					
Turkey	wheat	9300	21000	2258	poultry	296876	22468	339896	47089
	sugar beet	336	113800	41017	sheep	25201			
	tomatoes	260	9700	37308	cattle	10069			
	*	3599	9000	2501	goats	6609			
	potatoes	160	4170	26064	?	4590			
UAE	dates	186	760	4086	poultry	15000	n/a	89900	601
	tomatoes	2	240	104348	goats	1520			
	aubergines	–	20	66667	sheep	580			
	pumpkins	1	20	30303	camels	250			
	*	1	16	23208	cattle	115			

Table 10: Public spending on agricultural research in Islamic countries
during the periods 1980–9, 1990–9 and 2000–1

Country	Average				Average of the proportion of total agricultural GDP			
	1980–9 (a)	1990–9 (b)	2000–1	Change (a–b)	1980–9 (a)	1990–9 (b)	2000–1	Change (a–b)
Burkina Faso	4.0	7.9	–	3.9	0.9	0.9	–	0.4
Guinea	–	4.4	3.5	–	–	0.6	0.3	–
Mali	12.1	11.3	–	0.8	1.3	1.0	–	–0.3
Mauritania	–	1.9	2.4	–	–	0.8	1.0	–
Niger	5.7	5.6	–	–0.1	0.7	0.7	–	0
Senegal	23.6	15.2	–	–8.4	2.6	1.4	–	–1.1
Uganda	–	7.8	10.2	–	–	0.4	0.5	–
Yemen	–	16.2	–	–	–	0.5	–	–

Source: ASTI online, 2006 - secretariat of UNCTAD World Development Indicators in 2005.

Table 11: Communication and media indicators

Country	Post offices per every 100,000 citizens	Daily newspaper circulation	Radio ownership per 100,000	TV ownership per 100,000	Telephone ownership	Collular subscribers	Personal computer users	Internet users
	2004	2001	2001	2003	2003	2003	2003	2003
Afghanistan	2	5	132	4	2	10	–	1
Bangladesh	7	53	50	61	5	10	8	2
Benin	2	5	110	33	9	30	4	10
Burkina Faso	1	1	33	12	5	20	2	4
Chad	0	0	242	5	2	10	2	2
Comoros	4	–	141	23	17	–	6	6
Djibouti	1	–	84	76	15	30	22	10
*	2	–	484	53	9	10	3	2
Gambia	1	2	394	15	29	80	14	19
Guinea	1	–	49	17	3	10	6	5
Guinea- Bissau	1	5	44	40	8	–	–	15
*	67	20	129	128	105	230	70	53
Mali	1	1	54	27	6	20	2	3

Country	Post offices per every 100,000 citizens	Daily newspaper circulation	Radio ownership per 100,000	TV ownership per 100,000	Telephone ownership	Collular subscribers	Personal computer users	Internet users
Mauritania	1	1	151	44	14	130	11	4
Niger	0	0	66	119	2	10	1	17
Senegal	1	5	142	39	22	60	21	22
Somalia	–	1	53	17	8	20	2	7
Sudan	1	26	271	378	27	20	6	9
Uganda	1	2	127	15	2	30	4	5
Yemen	1	15	64	298	28	30	7	5

Source: United Nations Development Fund – Human Development Report 2005.

a. Latest year available.

b. Date refers to 1987.

c. Date refers to 2002.

Table 12: Changes in ranking concerning the spread of information
and communication technology among a number of selected
countries in the period 1995–2002

Country	1995 (a)	2002 (b)	Difference between (a) and (b)
Bangladesh	107	145	38
Burkina Faso	140	159	19
Chad	138	155	17
Djibouti	113	147	24
*	86	56	36
Mali	132	157	25
Sudan	99	129	32
Uganda	144	154	10
Yemen	102	136	34

Source: UNCTAD

This ranking is available for 165 countries in 2002 and 154 countries in 1995 with an approximation of the lowest rank in the spread of information and communication technology.

Chapter 9.5

MUSLIM WORLD IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY

Ali Fatemi

Economic structure of OIC countries

The fifty-seven member countries in the OIC, spreading over the four continents, do not make up a homogenous economic group, but rather have a high level of heterogeneity and divergence in economic structure and performance. This diversity could be an important asset, but it can also be a constraint. By World Bank classification, twenty-six OIC member countries are currently classified as low-income countries and twenty-five are middle-income countries (eighteen lower middle-income and seven upper middle-income) and only six OIC member countries are classified as high-income countries, all of them oil exporting countries.

Figure 1

655

As illustrated in figure 2, a close examination of the structure of the economies of OIC members demonstrates that in most income levels except high level income countries, the service sector has the highest share of GDP while industrial and agricultural sectors retain the lowest share respectively. It should be noted that, in high income countries where industry is dominant, it is the oil exporting sector that dominates. This production structure indicates that the majority of OIC countries are producers of primary products. Because of this, the foreign trade partners of the OIC countries are mostly developed countries.

Figure 2

International and regional cooperation among OIC countries

In Islam, unequal distribution of wealth and income is accepted and treated as a fact of life. However, this does not mean that the existence of wide disparities in distribution of income and wealth are condoned. On the contrary, Islam insists on fraternity and brotherhood among all members of the Islamic community. So far, however, the driving force of Islam that brings Islamic countries under the umbrella of the OIC has not been able to create the necessary momentum required for taking bold initiatives toward closer economic and trade links among the member countries.

Of the 425 million people estimated to be in absolute poverty in OIC countries, most of them are in the low-income states such as Bangladesh, Nigeria and Pakistan. These three countries with a combined population of 310 million people have 210 million living below the poverty line. Followed by South Asia, the highest level of intra-regional poverty is in Sub-Saharan Africa,

where close to half of the region's populations are poor. The high incidence of poverty in the OIC is one of the primary development challenges, which the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Bank and other leading international institutions have targeted in their initiatives to combat severe poverty in the world.

The accumulated experience of decades has proven that among the broad ranges of strategies for successful poverty alleviation trade has a central role in helping to achieve this goal. Shining examples of major emerging economies such as China and India are best explanations of how trade has succeeded where aid had failed.

FOREIGN TRADE IN OIC COUNTRIES

Figures 3 and 4 below show the exports and imports of OIC member countries during 1996–2006. In 2006 the total export and import of OIC member states reached a value of US$ 1,239 and US$ 865 billion respectively, i.e. an increase of 20 per cent and 12 per cent per annum. Primary[1] products constituted an estimated 62 per cent of Member States exports with during this period. In contrast the overall imports of the OIC countries were composed of manufactured[2] products, which accounted for about 69 per cent of their total imports during the same period (1996–2006).

Figure 3

1. Primary products include food products, non edible raw materials and mineral fuels.
2. Manufactured goods include manufactured articles, machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, miscellaneous manufactured articles and transaction.

Total export of OIC countries (billion $)

Figure 4

As indicated in Figures 5 and 6, foreign trade partners of OIC countries are mostly developed countries. However, during recent years the share of OIC trade with developing countries has increased.

Foreign trade partners of OIC countries (export, in %)

Figure 5

Figure 6

Today, although multilateral trade liberalization goes on within the World Trade Organization, regional cooperation has also become essential between countries, and the success stories of the European Union, NAFTA, APEC, ASEAN and MERCOSUR are living examples of liberalized trade and successful regional economic integration. In the next section we are going to examine the Intra-OIC trade by looking at trade relations among OIC Member States.

INTRA-OIC TRADE IN OIC COUNTRIES

The global growth of intra-OIC trade (intra-OIC exports + intra-OIC imports) made a remarkable increase during 1996–2006, growing from US$ 88 billions in 1996 to US$ 338 billion in 2006.

Figure 7

This increase is mostly due to the expansion of trade of the countries listed in Table 1. These countries account for about US$ 219 billions (intra-OIC exports + intra-OIC imports), i.e., 65 per cent of intra-OIC trade, of which about half is carried out by three countries, namely, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey.

Table 1

Countries	Intra-OIC Merchandise Exports and Imports	Share of intra-OIC Exports & Imports
Saudi Arabia	40,35	11.93%
United Arab Emirates	35,59	10.52%
Turkey	34,12	10.08%
Malaysia	22,86	6.76%
Indonesia	21,29	6.29%
Iran	21,09	6.23%
Syria	16,6	4.91%
Pakistan	17,02	5.03%
Egypt	10,99	3.25%
Total	219,91	65.00%

However, the share of intra-OIC exports and imports in the overall trade of OIC is low. Intra-OIC exports increased from 17 per cent in 1996 to 20 per cent in 2006 the intra-OIC import increased from 20 per cent in 1996 to 34 per cent in 2006. While at the same period, export to developed countries represented 53 per cent and imports from developed nations to OIC countries constituted 57 per cent of their total trade in average.

Table 2 shows the main intra-OIC exporters and importers during recent years

Export & import structure	Top five exporting countries	Top five importing countries
Machinery and Transport equipment	Turkey	Saudi Arabia
	Malaysia	United Arab Emirates
	Indonesia	Malaysia
	Saudi Arabia	Iran
	United Arab Emirates	Oman
Miscellaneous Manufactured Products	Turkey	United Arab Emirates
	Indonesia	Turkey
	Malaysia	Saudi Arabia
	Saudi Arabia	Iran
	United Arab Emirates	Syria
Fuels	United Arab Emirates	Indonesia
	Saudi Arabia	Pakistan
	Nigeria	Malaysia
	Algeria	Egypt
	Kuwait	Turkey
Food Products	Indonesia	Iran
	Iran	Saudi Arabia
	Saudi Arabia	United Arab Emirates
	Turkey	Turkey
	Syria	Syria
Chemicals	Saudi Arabia	Turkey
	Turkey	Syria
	Iran	United Arab Emirates
	Malaysia	Pakistan
	Indonesia	Iran
Non-Edible Raw Materials	Turkmenistan	Iran
	Indonesia	Turkey
	United Arab Emirates	Pakistan
	Egypt	Bangladesh
	Saudi Arabia	United Arab Emirates

Figures 8 and 9 show the export and import structure of OIC countries during 2001 to 2006. The intra-OIC exports and imports structure is dominated by primary products, which are composed of mineral fuels, food products and edible raw materials.

Figure 8

Figure 9

INTRA REGIONAL TRADE IN OIC COUNTRIES

Based on the 2006 Islamic Center for Development of Trade (ICDT) annual report, potential intra-regional trade was estimated at more than US$ 365 billion, while at that time the real trade was closer to US$ 64.5 billion, i.e. 17.67 per cent of potential total trade.

Table 3

Area	Intra-Regional Exports observed in 2006 (million US$)	Intra-Regional Potential Exports (million US$)
Sub-Saharan Africa	5522.88	18419.34
Asia	23269.14	74045.01
GCC	20049.73	201341.20
Middle East	13213.61	57799.44
AMU	2399.83	13590.43
Total	64455.19	365195.42

The potential and real trades for each region are shown in Table 4.

Table 4

Region	Countries	Intra-Regional Exports observed in 2006 (million US$)	Intra-Regional Potential Exports (million US$)	Share of observed Intra-Regional Exports in Total Exports	Share of Potential Intra-Regional Exports in Total Exports	Performance Rate of the Potential
Sub-Saharan Africa	Benin	86.73	1373.53	22.25%	81.92%	6.31%
	Burkina Faso	34.11	880.26	8.14%	69.56%	3.87%
	Cameroon	231.58	3408.78	4.94%	43.36%	6.79%
	Chad	1.07	720.09	0.05%	24.01%	0.15%
	Comoros	0.07	3.31	0.22%	9.41%	2.11%
	Côte d›Ivoire	1615.29	2299.20	19.86%	26.07%	70.25%
	Djibouti	225.79	3.77	66.33%	3.18%	5989.53%
	Gabon	86.51	4481.72	1.85%	49.46%	1.93%
	Gambia	1.41	31.09	3.86%	46.93%	4.54%
	Guinea Bissau	25.40	12.25	19.16%	10.25%	207.39%
	Mali	7.65	661.05	1.98%	63.53%	1.16%
	Mozambique	0	19.47	0.00%	0.81%	0.00%
	Niger	85.04	299.33	19.88%	46.63%	28.41%
	Nigeria	2397.54	2319.11	4.45%	4.31%	103.38%
	Uganda	33.99	144.14	4.94%	18.07%	23.58%
	Senegal	504.19	791.35	36.98%	47.94%	63.71%
	Sierra Leone	2.42	69.83	1.16%	25.28%	3.47%
	Somalia	11.19	0	3.73%	0.00%	
	Sudan	0.88	406.06	0.02%	6.65%	0.22%
	Togo	154.60	339.13	27.21%	45.06%	45.59%
	Total	5522.88	18419.34	6.25%	18.19%	29.98%

	Afghanistan	69.58	354.43	25.33%	63.34%	19.63%
	Azerbaijan	589.02	1.063.80	9.24%	15.54%	55.37%
	Bangladesh	175.62	2429.86	1.38%	16.18%	7.23%
	Brunei	1414.07	7867.49	20.89%	59.50%	17.97%
	Guyana	8.13	9.85	1.19%	1.44%	82.57%
	Indonesia	6136.06	17451.79	5.40%	13.97%	35.16%
	Iran	1384.65	3863.30	1.96%	5.28%	35.16%
	Kazakhstan	2074.51	2237.34	6.92%	7.42%	92.72%
Asia	Kyrgyzstan	300.55	148.71	37.74%	23.07%	202.11%
	Malaysia	6253.60	32054.17	3.89%	17.19%	19.51%
	Maldives	0.49	45.74	0.29%	21.53%	1.07%
	Pakistan	1962.46	5191.71	11.41%	25.42%	37.80%
	Suriname	16.46	18.59	1.33%	1.50%	88.53%
	Tajikistan	204.09	137.04	14.59%	10.29%	148.92%
	Turkmenistan	1708.49	500.11	27.06%	9.80%	341.62%
	Uzbekistan	971.36	671.10	19.63%	14.44%	144.74%
	Total	23269.14	74045.01	5.36%	15.28%	31.43%
	Albania	11.48	2230.75	1.64%	76.46%	0.51%
	Egypt	2317.34	9492.74	11.22%	34.12%	24.41%
	Jordan	1348.93	1684.73	25.08%	29.49%	80.07%
Middle East	Lebanon	1012.09	5174.12	39.94%	77.27%	19.56%
	Syria	2569.74	9041.52	5.71%	26.92%	16.44%
	Turkey	4882.38	29695.03	5.71%	26.92%	16.44%
	Yemen	63.43	480.54	0.98%	6.99%	13.20%
	Total	13213.61	57799.44	8.40%	28.63%	22.86%

Region	Countries	Intra-Regional Exports observed in 2006 (million US$)	Intra-Regional Potential Exports (million US$)	Share of observed Intra-Regional Exports in Total Exports	Share of Potential Intra-Regional Exports in Total Exports	Performance Rate of the Potential
Gulf Cooperation Consil; GCC	Saudi Arabia	9028.42	15875.08	4.75%	8.06%	56.87%
	Bahrain	1593.59	23594.69	7.99%	56.27%	6.75%
	United Arab Emirates	5464.22	24324.05	4.89%	18.62%	22.46%
	Kuwait	680.55	61718.64	1.61%	59.75%	1.10%
	Oman	1935.14	9012.02	8.20%	29.37%	21.47%
	Qatar	1347.81	66816.72	3.96%	67.15%	2.02%
	Total	20049.73	201341.20	4.75%	33.38%	9.96%
Arab Maghreb Union; AMU	Algeria	597.15	5813.96	1.11%	9.86%	10.27%
	Libya	666.07	1754.39	1,69%	4.34%	37.97%
	Morocco	169.71	2867.37	1.28%	17.97%	5.92%
	Mauritania	14.01	61.08	1.00%	4.22%	22.94%
	Tunisia	952.89	3093.64	8.03%	22.09%	30.80%
	Total	2399.83	13590.43	2.01%	10.39%	17.66%

According to Table 4 the average intra-regional trade between OIC countries is about 22 per cent of their total trade, while Asian countries with 31.4 per cent have the highest intra-regional, and GCC with 10 per cent has the lowest rate. As indicated by these statistics, the intra-regional trade between Islamic countries is widely under-exploited. The gap between realized exports and potential exports might be the result of a great number of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, as well as lack of maritime lines and other convenient means of transportation for shipment of goods.

TARIFF BARRIERS IN OIC COUNTRIES

During 1995 to 2005 the share of countries with average tariffs higher than 20 per cent dropped sharply from 64 per cent to 38 per cent. At the same time the number of countries with moderate tariff barriers ranging between 10–14 per cent rose from 12 per cent in 1995 to 29 per cent in 2005. However, the number of low tariff countries has not changed during these years. Among OIC countries Turkey, Indonesia and the Gulf Cooperation Council member countries are the most open countries as far as trade is concerned.

The average tariff which is applied to all products is 13 per cent in OIC countries; however, with respect to certain countries this tariff is four points lower, i.e. 9 per cent for transition countries, and it is 11 per cent for oil exporting countries. Tariffs are higher for agricultural products (13.3 per cent) than for industrial products (12.2 per cent).

Development and achievements of economic cooperation among OIC countries

In this section we provide an overview of the most important developments and achievements of economic and financial cooperation among OIC countries.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Economic cooperation between OIC member countries started its work in the Second Islamic Summit Conference which was held in Lahore, Pakistan on 22–24 February 1974. The objectives of the OIC economic cooperation activities in the early years were as follows:

- Eradication of poverty, disease and ignorance in Islamic countries
- Ending the exploitation of developing countries
- Regulating the terms of trade between developed and developing countries in matters of supply of raw materials and import of manufactured goods and know-how

- Ensuring the sovereignty and full control of the developing countries over their natural resources
- Mitigating current economic difficulties of developing countries arising from price increases and other factors; and
- Mutual economic cooperation and solidarity among Islamic countries.

In dealing with the economic cooperation, the OIC established various organizations such as: Economic and Social Research and Training Center for Islamic Countries (SESRIC, 1987 in Ankara, Turkey), the Islamic Center for Development of Trade (ICDT, 1979 in Casablanca, Morocco), Islamic Center for Technical and Vocational Training (ICTVTR, 1987 in Dhaka, Bangladesh), International Association of Islamic Banks (IAIB, 1977), the Organization of Islamic Ship Owners Association (OISA, 1981), Federation of Consultants of Islamic Countries (FCIC, 1986), Federation of Contractors in Islamic Countries (FOCIC), the Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ICCI, 1979) and the Islamic Development Bank, (IsDB, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia).

Table 5 summarizes the most important developments of economic cooperation among OIC countries:

YEAR	EVENT
May 1977	The Eighth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) approved the General Agreement on Economic, Technical and Commercial Cooperation. The Agreement came into force in April 1981
1979	The Tenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM), resolved to organize a high level meeting for an overall review of the totality if the economic issues of interest to the member countries in an effort to evolve a common position in line with the global preparations being undertaken within the framework of the UN.
January 1981	The Third Islamic Summit approved the ten-sector OIC Plan of Action to Strengthen Economic Cooperation among Member States. In line with this, during the Summit the Heads of State also concluded the establishment of the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial Cooperation (COMCEC).
June 1981	The Twelfth ICFM adopted the Agreement for Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments. The Agreement entered into force in February 1988.

YEAR	EVENT
1984	The COMCEC became operational in the Fourth Islamic Summit Conference, and adopted the Short Term Programme for the promotion of trade among OIC countries. It also approved proposals to establish multilateral financial schemes in order to promote intra-OIC trade among the member states.
1987	In the Fifth Islamic Summit Conference, COMCEC membership was extended to all OIC member states.
1988	In order to promote intra-OIC trade among member states, the Export Financing Scheme (EFS) became operational under IsDB.
October 1990	The sixth session of the COMCEC adopted the Framework Agreement for the Establishment of a Trade Preferential System among the member states of the OIC.
October 1991	The Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment and Export Credit (ICIEC) became operational.
1992	The Agreement on the Multilateral Islamic Clearing Union was accepted in the Eighth COMCEC Session.
December 1994	The seventh Islamic Summit endorsed the Strategy and Plan of Action to strengthen economic and commercial cooperation among the OIC member states. The fields of cooperation covered in the 1994 Plan of Action were food, agriculture and rural development; industry; energy and mining; foreign trade; transport and communications; tourism; money, banking and capital flows; technology and technical cooperation; human resource development; and environment. In the framework of the 1994 Plan of Action four experts' group meetings were held: 'Money, Finance and Capital Flows' 1997, in Turkey, 'Foreign Trade' 1997 in Pakistan, 'Technology and Technical Cooperation' 1998 in Turkey and 'Implementation of the OIC Plan of Action in the Area of Tourism' 2005 in Tehran. These meetings concluded with a number of cooperation projects idea.
June 2005	The 30th IDB annual meeting concluded the establishment of the International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC), under which all trade financing activities of the IDB would be drawn together.

YEAR	EVENT
December 2005	During the third extraordinary session of the Islamic Conference a new cooperation agenda under the heading of 'The Ten-Year Plan of Action to Meet the Challenges Facing the Muslim Umma in the 21st Century' was initiated.
November 2007	In the twenty-third session of COMMCEC, the establishment of ITFC was approved. The ITFC assumed its function on January 2008.

FINANCIAL COOPERATION

As indicated earlier, the Plan of Action which was endorsed in 1994 allocated a separate section to money, banking and finance. This section contains the basic objectives regarding the cooperation framework in the fields of banking and finance: the idea of promoting and developing capital markets, facilitating the flow of financial resources and direct foreign investment flows among member countries through the gradual removal of restrictions on capital movements and ensuring investment protection and guarantees.

In line with the OIC Plan of Action, a sectoral Expert Group Meeting (EGM) in the area of money, banking and finance was started in 1997 was started in Istanbul. At the EGM the following projects were proposed:

- The implementation of a training programme for the establishment and development of capital markets and stock exchanges in OIC member countries
- Trading of securities issued in the member countries in the international market of the Istanbul Stock Exchange
- Participation of member countries in the Federation of Euro-Asian Stock Exchange located in the Istanbul Stock Exchange and the establishment of an OIC stock exchange.

In 2001, at the twenty-eighth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, Ankara and Casablanca were requested to undertake the necessary studies on a mechanism for the possible establishment of an Islamic Stock Exchange Union and Stock Clearing House. In the following year, they submitted their reports to the eighteenth COMCEC meeting and subsequently it was decided the SESRTCIC and the ICDT should continue to follow up and jointly study the subject. The joint report entitled Stock Exchange Alliances and Cooperation among the OIC Member States of the SESRTCIC and the ICDT was submitted to the twentieth Session of the COMCEC. The said report suggests a loose form of cooperation in order to create a proper

environment for inducing higher and more integrated and sophisticated forms of cooperation.

In the twentieth Session of the COMCEC, it was also requested that the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) hold a meeting of representatives of the stock exchanges of member countries to prepare the ground for launching a framework of cooperation with the IDB, SESRTCIC, the ICDT and the ICCI. The first round table meeting was held in Istanbul on March 2005. The meeting was attended by the representatives of a number of OIC stock exchanges. In the meeting it was agreed on launching an 'Islamic Stock Exchanges Forum' (ISEF) through which cooperation among the stock exchanges of the OIC member countries would be continued. It was also decided that the Forum would meet twice a year. For further cooperation, it was agreed to establish two working committes, namely the Technical Committee and the Information Technology Committee. The Technical Committee, which is composed of the Amman Stock Exchange, Muscat Securities Market, Istanbul Stock Exchange, Tadawul-Saudi Stock Market, Palestine Stock Exchange and Dubai Financial Market, is deals with the following topics:

- Creating indices
- Introducing Islamic Depository Receipts
- Exploring cross listing opportunities
- Bridging with other Islamic exchange and institutions
- Exchanging staff and providing training opportunities for them
- Preparing questionnaires and surveys for the assessment of the stock exchange
- Defining areas of cooperation.

The Information Technology Committee, which is composed of the Istanbul Stock Exchange, Tehran Stock Exchange, Dubai Financial Market and Bursa Malaysia Berhad, is working on the following:

- Assessing the technological level of participating stock exchanges
- Creating a data centre.

Arab National and Regional Development Institutions

Along with the cooperation among OIC member countries, an organization named Arab National and Regional Development Institutions (ANRDI), established in 1975, has consistently maintained a commendable level of assistance to developing countries, particularly the low-income countries. At the end of 2001, the total assistance of Arab National and Regional Development Institutions amounted to US$70 billion for developing countries. The Arab National and Regional Development Institutions consists of eight institutions:

- Arab multilateral aid institutions:
- Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
- Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development
- Arab Gulf Programme for United Nations Development Organizations
- Islamic Development Bank
- OPEC Fund for International Development

Arab bilateral aide institutions:

- Abu Dhabi Fund for Development
- Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
- Saudi Fund for Development

Table 6 summarizes the most important information about these eight development institutions:

Institution	Year of Establishment	Purpose
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA)	1974	1. Extending and coordinating Arab aid to non-Arab Africa 2. A forum for board discussions of cooperation between African and Arab countries.
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (Arab Fund)	1971	Contributing to the financing of economic and social development projects in Arab states.
Arab Gulf Program for United Nations Development Organizations (AGFUND)	1981	AGFUND cooperates with UN agencies, NGOs and other organizations in an effort to help the neediest and most vulnerable groups in developing countries, particularly women and children. All of the financial assistance provided by AGFUND is in the form of grants.
Islamic Development Bank (IsDB)	1975	1. Project financing and technical assistance 2. Foreign trade financing 3. Asset management 4. Waqf Fund operations.

Institution	Year of Establishment	Purpose
OPEC Fund for International Development	1976	Promoting cooperation between OPEC member states and other developing countries. All non-OPEC developing countries are eligible for fund assistance; however, priority is given to the countries most in need and to most disadvantaged segments within their populations. Apart from its lending operations, the Fund also makes outright grants in support of technical assistance, food aid, research and other activities.
Abu Dhabi Fund for Development	1971	1. Offer economic aid to Arab, African, Asian and other countries in support of their economic development, in the from of loans or capital participation in projects 2. Establish or participate in the establishment of financial institutions which complement the purposes of the Abu Dhabi Fund and help create and foster a financial market in the Emirates 3. Issue guarantees and other such undertakings specified in the executive regulations to complement the purpose of the Abu Dhabi Fund 4. Employ temporarily available liquidity in productive types of investment 5. Provide expertise and technical assistance in various fields of economic development ; and 6. Perform any other activities or services that may be necessary for the realization of the purposes of the Fund.
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development	1961	1. Extending loans, guarantees and grants 2. Providing technical assistance services 3. Participating in the capital of development institutions; and 4. Representing the state of Kuwait in regional and international organizations.

Institution	Year of Establishment	Purpose
Saudi Fund for Development	1974	Providing united, concessional loans to developing countries with the aim of helping them implement their development plans and, where necessary re-structure their economies. Projects that promote the social and economic well-being of poor people in low-income and least developed countries are accorded special emphasis.

Figures 10 and 11 show the total capital endowments and total commitments and disbursements of the *Arab National and Regional Development Institutions*.

Total capital endowment (million $)

39,160

31,089

Authorized Capital

Paid-In capital & reserves

Figure 10

Total capital and disbursements (million $)

66,214

46,398

Commitments

Disbursements

Source: ANRDI 2002

Figure 11

Figures 12 and 13 show the total capital endowments and total commitments and disbursements of the eight development institutions that are members of the Arab National and Regional Development Institutions.

Figure 12

Figure 13

Figure 14 shows the distribution of projects financing as of year end 2001.

Distribution of project financing (in %)

6	
7.3	19.4
10.8	Energy
	Transportation & telecommunications
11.5	National development banks
	Agriculture & agro-industry
18.3	Water supply & sewerage
0.6	Industry
26.1	Education and heallth
	Other

Source: ANRDI 2002

Figure 14

The figure 15 shows the geographical distribution of aid as of year end 2001.

Geographical distribution of aid as of year end 2001

Africa 52 countries

Europe 10 countries

North America 2 countries

Latin America & the Caribbean 32 countries

Asia and Oceania 45 countries

Source: ANRDI 2002

Figure 15

The problem of debt of OIC countries

The debt problem of OIC member countries is a serious problem which slows down the development efforts and economic growth of these countries. During 2005–2007, out of the fifty-seven OIC member countries, eleven were severely indebted countries, eleven were moderately indebted, and twenty-five were less indebted. Table 7 displays the situation of indebtedness of OIC countries according to their income classification.

Table 7

Income Group	Severely Indebted[3]	Moderately Indebted[4]	Less Indebted[5]	Not Classified
Low Income	Comoros Gambia Guinea Guinea-Bissau Somalia Togo Burkina Faso Sierra Leone Sudan	Bangladesh Côte d'Ivoire Kyrgyzstan Mozambique Pakistan Mali Mauritania Niger Uganda	Afghanistan Benin Chad Nigeria Senegal Tajikistan Uzbekistan Yemen	
Middle Income	Lebanon Syria	Cameroon Turkey	Albania Algeria Azerbaijan Djibouti Egypt Gabon Guyana Indonesia Iran Jordan Kazakhstan Malaysia Maldives Morocco Tunisia Turkmenistan Oman	Libya Palestine Suriname
High Income				Brunei Kuwait Qatar United Arab Emirate Bahrain Saudi Arabia

3. EX/XGS>220%, where EX is the total external debt and XGS is the export of goods and services
4. 132%<EX/XGS<220%
5. EX/XGS<132%

As shown in Figure16, the total external debt of OIC countries increased from US$ 558 billion in 1996 to US$ 833 billion in 2007, with an average growth rate of 3.82 per cent per annum. However this trend is not uniform across the entire region. The total external debt was decreased in low income and lower middle income countries by 0.6 and 0.2 per cent respectively per annum, but it increased by 11 per cent in upper middle income countries.

The distribution of external debt is not uniform among OIC member countries. Until 2004 the lower middle income countries had 38 per cent of the total external debt, and the highest share, but later the upper middle income countries replaced them.

Figure 16

Analyzing the structure of debt is also important, since it has direct effect on the process of repayment, rescheduling and relief. Total external debt is made up of long term debt, short-term debt and use of IMF credits. Long term debt is also made up of private non-guaranteed debt and public and publicly guaranteed debt.

Figure 17

Figure 17 shows that long term debt constitutes the largest component of the external debt in OIC member countries. In 2007, the share of long term debt in the total external debt was 81 per cent. Short-term debt constitutes 18 per cent of total external debt and use of IMF credits is just having 1 per cent, the smallest component of total external debt. Figure 18 shows that more than 76 per cent of long term debt consists of public and publicly guaranteed debts.

Figure 18

Figures 19, 20 and 21 demonstrate the situation of debt structure in low income countries, lower middle income countries and upper middle income countries. A similar structure can be observed in different income group levels.

Figure 19

Figure 20

Figure 21

Figure 22 shows the debt-GNI ratio[6] in OIC countries. The average debt-GNI during 1996 to 2007 is more than 100 per cent, which is far higher than the critical limit of 80 per cent, defined by the World Bank for severe indebtedness. It means that the growth rate of external debt is higher than that of GNI, implying the debt burden, on average, is heavy in OIC countries.

6. The debt-GNI ratio estimates the burden of the country's external debt on its productive capacity and gives an indication of the degree of its solvency. A high ratio signifies that the rate of growth in external debt is higher than that of GNI.

680

Figure 22

However, the debt-GNI ratio is not uniform among all the OIC member countries and there are huge variances. Table 8 lists the five high debt-GNI OIC member countries during 1996–2007.

Table 8

Country	Debt-GNI Ratio (1996–2007)
Indonesia	706%
Guinea-Bissau	347%
Turkey	436%
Guyana	195%
Mauritania	156%

Figure 23 shows the debt-export ratios[7] of OIC member countries from 1996 to 2007, which is significantly higher than the critical limit of 220 per cent defined by the World Bank for severe indebtedness.

7. Debt export of GS ratio, estimates the equivalent number of years of exports required to repay a country's total outstanding external debt.

Figure 23

Table 9 lists the five high debt-export OIC member countries from 1996 to 2007.

Table 9

Country	Debt-export Ratio (1996–2007)
Somalia	1,702%
Sudan	10,66%
Guinea-Bissau	13,87%
Sierra Leone	741%
Comoros	661%

The figure 24 shows the debt-service ratio[8] of OIC countries. The debt-service ratio decreased from 15 per cent in 1996 to 9 per cent in 2006, meaning that the credit worthiness of OIC countries has improved during these years.

8. The debt-service ratio measures the credit-worthiness of a country, i.e. that reflects the ability of a country to continue borrowing.

682

Figure 24

The impact of globalization on OIC countries

Globalization has a wide scope with dimensions of economic, political, social, cultural and communication importance. It is the process of increasing the connectivity and interdependence among the people, companies and governments of different nations. The most prominent pro-globalization[9] organization is the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the year of establishment of WTO, 1 January 1995, 112 countries became members and at the end of the second year the total number of member countries reached 128. Since then 19 others have become members, bringing the total to 147. Regarding OIC countries, since the establishment of WTO, 39 OIC countries became members – Table 10 and 11 – others are in the process of joining.[10]

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9. The pro-globalization camp argues that globalization brings about greatly increased opportunities for almost everyone, and increased competition is a good thing since it makes agents and production more efficient.
10. Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Comoros, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Libya, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Yemen.

Table 10

Albania	Guinea Bissau	Nigeria
Bahrain	Guyana	Oman
Bangladesh	Indonesia	Pakistan
Burkina Faso	Jordan	Qatar
Brunei Darussalam	Kuwait	Saudi Arabia
Cameroon	Kyrgyz Republic	Sierra Leone
Chad	Malaysia	Suriname
Côte d'Ivoire	Maldives	Togo
Djibouti	Mali	Tunisia
Egypt	Mauritania	Turkey
Gabon	Morocco	Uganda
Gambia	Mozambique	United Arab Emirates
Guinea	Niger	

Economic globalization can be measured in different ways. The KOF index of globalization,[11] provided by the Swiss Institute of Technology, measures globalization through the economic, social, and political dimensions. In this section we concentrate on economic globalization which is constituted of: 1) actual economic flows, and 2) Economic restrictions. Figure 25 shows the level of integration of OIC member countries into the global system during 1990 to 2006. The degree of globalization increased from 40 in 1990 to 55 in 2006, with an average growth rate of 2.2 per cent per annum. In high income countries the average index is 71, and in low income countries it is 40. According to a regional classification, East Asia and Pacific has been more integrated into the world economy and South Asia has been less globalized.

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11. The KOF Index of Globalization measures the three main dimensions of globalization:
   - economic
   - social
   - and political.
   In addition to three indices measuring these dimensions, we calculate an overall index of globalization and sub-indices referring to
   - actual economic flows
   - economic restrictions
   - data on information flows
   - data on personal contact
   - and data on cultural proximity.
   Data are available on a yearly basis for 208 countries over the period 1970–2007.

KOF index for OIC countries
(by income level)

Source: Swiss Institute of Technology

Figure 25

KOF index for OIC countries
(by region)

Source: Swiss Institute of Technology

Figure 26

Integration into the world economy is a powerful means for countries to promote economic growth, development and poverty reduction. In this respect, although OIC countries, particularly South Asia, gained success during the last two decades, compared to the world and developed economies, OIC countries are generally less open economies (Table 11). On the other hand, in comparison with developing countries, only 14 states performed better than the developing countries, with an average of 49 units. Developing countries increased by 41 per cent from 41 units in 1990 to 58 units in 2006, and recorded a higher increase in KOF compared to OIC countries.

Table 11

KOF index	1990	1995	2000	2006
OIC Countries	40	44	49	55
Developed Countries	68	73	81	81
Developing Countries	41	47	53	58
World	47	52	59	63

– X –

EPILOGUE

Islam today

Abdelwahab Bouhdiba

'Islam today' conjures up such a plethora of burning issues that it is difficult not to plunge straight into a terrible discussion of the insane violence that has taken hold of so many of its peoples, torn between anxiety about the present and hopes for the future.

When work began some thirty years ago on *The different aspects of Islamic culture*, of which these are the last few pages, no one could have imagined that the ill winds of history would transform the Islamic world into hell on Earth in a matter of decades. How did matters come to this pass? How can they be resolved? How, above all, can the painful issues be elucidated and reductive temptations from within and without be avoided? Moreover, what can be done to withstand the sophistry of the terrorist hydra?

Is it not the role of Islam itself, its followers and its elites, to eschew undue alarm, but rather to analyse the present and keep the doors of hope wide open now and in the future? When the waters are muddied, when history hesitates and falters and when anguish prevails, then messages and promises have more value and greater sway over the future. Through the rough and tumble of existence, Islam has always maintained, more so now than ever before, that, faced with the absolute transcendence of God, who never abandons them, human beings have an infinite capacity to surpass themselves. Whether they live their lives in solitary meditation or in the heat of collective action, as individuals people remain responsible beings. Both heaven and hell are to be found within them: it is the authenticity of their faith, the clarity of their will and the effectiveness of their acts that bring out the one or the other. This message, adjusted for the present and for delivery to a world in turmoil, must be restated forcefully.

In the last two centuries, history and geography have combined to put Muslims in an unenviable position: firstly in lands that could be colonized and, secondly in the underdeveloped world. Some of them are still in that unfavourable position, some have 'emerged' and others are trying to do so. Some live in a far-from-restful opulence, others are caught between the devil

and the deep blue sea, but they all deal with the challenges of the moment in their own way.

The first challenge is that of population growth, galloping in some countries and transitional in others. In all cases, age-group imbalances exacerbate economic inconsistencies, the breakdown of ways of life, inordinate needs, intolerable injustices and smouldering or noisy futile revolts. Young people, torn between the passion for life and the frustrations of living, are disgruntled at social contradictions. Our old countries are very young: two thirds of them were established less than forty years ago. Historically, in the same way as many other peoples, Muslim peoples have invested unreservedly in their young people with varying degrees of success. They saw themselves in the young and through them experienced present glory and future security. The *futūwa* was concomitantly moral capital, guard and army. This spontaneous but highly organized institution cemented the culture of urban communities and of nomadic or sedentary tribes. It imparted fresh vitality to the collective awareness as each generation rose. Times have since changed so much that most people now barely remember it. The centuries-old solidarity is much weakened. Is intergenerational divorce becoming reality? It is true that conventional intergenerational conflict has changed in meaning and direction. The gap is widening not only between choices and assertive truths, but also between views of the world and, worse yet, forms of 'socialization' that are increasingly rooted not in a specific identity but in a multifarious world scene that is therefore an equivocal source of univocal conceptions of self, the other and the world. Galloping population growth alone is assumedly not at issue here. Even if it slowed down or were reversed, its effect would remain. The now scandalous socio-economic imbalances, the distribution of wealth, employment, resources for meeting old or new needs and the mushrooming of those needs have driven often unexpected discontinuities. Demographic transition has rarely brought economic, cultural and, above all, civic and political change. How many armed and helmeted young people have therefore been lured by the siren call of terrorism?

Illiteracy – which is not confined to reading and writing – is wreaking havoc. It could conceivably have been eradicated easily owing to the 'religion of the book'. 'Read' is a Qurʾānic command, the first in the Revelation. Yet it has been estimated that among Muslims, 40 per cent of men and 80 per cent of women can neither read nor write. It has been pointed out that, in 1830, illiteracy was not a feature of occupied Algeria but of conquering France. Implacably pursued by the Duc d'Aumale, the Emir Abdelkadir held writing schools *kuttāb* in his *shmala* and travelled with an immense library that was as nomadic as he was. Today, Algeria has almost eradicated illiteracy, but the same cannot be said of a great many other countries.

X–1.1   Refugees attending classes in a school built by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Wad Sherif
refugee camp, Sudan, in June 2007
© UN Photo/Fred Noy

In truth, the modern school system has not always lived up to expectations in Muslim countries, and it is questionable whether success at school has really enabled graduates to make their way in life. It is estimated that at the end of the last century academic exclusion – usually the prelude to social exclusion – was rampant, sometimes affecting half of all school-age children, and that barely a quarter of children reached baccalaureate level. School is followed by higher-education hurdles and, although very few do manage to obtain degrees, those qualifications are hardly marketable. A type of young person – the literate unemployed, the jobless graduate – previously unknown in the Muslim world, has now emerged. Society looks askance at the mass of the excluded and affects not to be responsible for the situation. It often uses a rather specious expert term – 'educational waste' – which applies to the bulk of the population. Whether or not they have gone through school or are well or very poorly socialized, many young people are also educated in the parallel school of the street, legal or illegal emigration, drugs, delinquency and, now, terrorism. Of course, many nonetheless succeed. They create their own benchmarks, make good careers for themselves at home or, if they are excellent, abroad in the industrialized countries, owing to the brain drain. The question now is whether the education system has become a means of uprooting youth. Nonetheless, owing to social mobility, the education system is a valuable channel of communication among generations and social classes, and with the wider world.

In fact 'street education' is now giving way to 'internet education'. Young people are inadvertently putting in place the building blocks of 'cyber-Islam'. The strongest rival to state education is the parallel Internet education that is hardly integrative and uproots people somewhat more. It is the ultimate spontaneous institution, welcoming people with open arms, enabling young people excluded from or having little contact with the surrounding world easily to escape into the virtual world. Owing to digital technology, youth outside the system or who do not like it move into a more compelling but equally ill-defined system. On Facebook, these children of Islam join in with the most ambiguous world scenes. Unverifiable assertive views are stated furtively and then held uncritically. Owing to youth 'cyber-Islam', young people are organized into remote masses and community spirit is gradually destroyed. Such situations, unprecedented in Islam, are yet to be understood and analysed, but lessons must be learnt from them and equally unprecedented solutions must be found.

Needless to say, not all Muslims have been affected to the same extent by such dysfunctions, and other societies – emerging or otherwise, traditional or post-modern – face the same problems. It is more important to Muslims, however, to fathom the ways in which Muslim societies experience these ills and innovations and in which renewal is slowly but surely taking place.

It must be stressed immediately, however, that internal and external observers widely share a sense of failure. To quote Olivier Carré's, 'no modernist ideal, whether nationalist or socialist, whether or not labelled "Islamic", has to date managed to engage the Muslim world in a significant process of economic development. Yet Islam is not by nature opposed to science and industrialization'. (Encyclopédia Universalis X, p. 195).

These words, still topical today, certainly contradict ideas widely bruited in the last century about Islam as a factor of underdevelopment. Countless national and regional development strategies have been drawn up, but with uneven success. Is this the outcome of bad governance and, if so, why? In truth, owing to the real weakness of states, the caricatured interplay of parties – or simulacra thereof in single or multi-party systems – corruption, favouritism and nepotism, most Muslim societies are doomed to mark time or to take one step forward and two steps backward. As many modern states have failed, radical reform must be implemented. Some consider that only an Islamist response is possible in the Islamic world. Most consider, however, that matters religious are at risk of being subsumed under the political and thus reduced to vulgar ideology.

Despite appearances, excesses and setbacks, the democratic nation-state, whether republican or monarchist, is still the most appropriate and the only legally, politically and civilly available framework for governing people and providing them with the means for development, fulfilment or merely a decent life. In countries where it has been established as a viable and strong structure, it has proven its worth. Elsewhere, it is still being sought amid the travails of history. Islam is in essence a unifying force and somewhat incompatible with tribalism or venturesome warlords. It is well known that it is through the paroxysms of violence that peoples prove themselves. Islamic peoples are obviously no exception; it is simply that in their case the dialectical confrontation of centrifugal and centripetal sociocultural forces very often makes the emergence of such a state particularly difficult.

It is often said that violence is the vice tempting all religions. It matters little that mass burnings and the Inquisition are unknown to Islam which has combated all vigorous forms of dogmatism. Belief that one holds 'the Absolute' is an open door to fanaticism. Fundamentalism is then common and, in the Islamic world in particular, this is no exception either. It is this all-too-human tendency that leads to excesses. In the Islam of yesteryear, as in Islam today, these matters were topics for marginal, but nonetheless genuine, debate. Kharijism has featured in many episodes in its long history. Marginal, marginalized or self-marginalized, its name indicates that it is outside the ranks and announces its specificity. It capitalizes on the errors and poor governance of princes. Political, civil, economic and cultural mismanagement has always bolstered people's good conscience by providing reasons for taking irreversible

X–1.2   Attabari Elementary School – A young girl at the blackboard,
in Sanaᶜa, Yemen, in 2007
© UNESCO

action. Many consider that the term 'terrorism' today merely refers to the latest embodiment of a religious person who is sometimes oppressed but always corrupt and opposed in all cases to both Sunni and Shiite orthodoxy, to strict Islamic reasoning and to the spirit of the Qurʾān. Orthodoxy has always triumphed over these heresies. Therefore terrorism will pass, but the great social problems will remain.

From the anthropological standpoint it is evident that Islam today is vibrant and vigilant and that it faces the same challenges as many other cultural regions. In the generalized turmoil, in which it is not alone, it does have trumps and has therefore overcome many serious challenges successfully. Internal challenges have been covered above. External challenges are equally pressing. Nearly all Islamic countries – or Nations of the Prophet, to quote Xavier de Planthol – became a global issue in the last century. Their fate was sealed at the Congress of Berlin in July 1878, when a new world map was drawn in the interests of only the then industrialized powers, bent on securing their worldwide presence regardless of geography, history and the wishes of the people concerned, who were reduced to silence and servitude. That date is crucial to any understanding of Islam today and to any surmise about its future. At that Congress, the Ottoman Empire lost all of its European provinces, while the others barely survived. Their fate was settled some forty years later

in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, secretly negotiated in 1916 by France and Great Britain, pending the great division of the spoils four years later in the Treaty of Sèvres. In the meantime, however, the Balfour Declaration (1917) was signed, leading to deadlock in Palestine for nearly one century. Muslims worldwide are indubitably distressed by the Palestinian tragedy, the repeated profanation of Islamic Holy Places, particularly al-Qods, and the pitiless repression of the region's Arabs, including many Christians. The West's complicity fuels the fantasies of the adepts of violence on both sides. By clinging tirelessly to the single, fallacious and hackneyed justification of one party's 'security' at the expense of the other, by obstinately turning a deaf ear to the cries of suffering of some and a blind eye to the crimes against humanity of others, thus uncritically accepting the policy of blackmail, the West is making Muslims' reconciliation with each other and with the West difficult.

A new factor, petroleum, must be considered. In his important book, *Allah est grand* (Allah is Great) (Payot 1927), Mohamed Essad Bey discerningly analysed this accursed new factor. With blasphemous humour, he rightly wrote these terrible words (which I shudder to repeat), 'God is great, but oil is even greater', by which he meant that people on the ground forget very quickly the divine and human laws of justice and equity and are driven only by profits, financial rules and oil-based reasoning. Nearly one century later, those words have lost none of their biting force. Only a few years ago, one great power (with the approval of all of the others, which now claim they had been duped) sought to draw a new map of this most explosive of regions in order to sketch out a New Greater Middle East, with clearly defined petroleum-related borders. All are aware of the catastrophic results, above all for the people concerned. Think-tanks are merely Pandora's boxes, as Iraq, Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, as well as Syria, Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, Mauritania and many others know only too well. Where rivers of blood flow today, black gold is not far away.

The terrible upheavals within Islam cannot be separated from the world's strange, unquenchable thirst for gas and oil. On the ground, the dice played by some great powers triggers civil wars, which may or may not involve terrorism. The deal in the world poker game mainly involves Muslims. Petroleum could simply be the post-modern embodiment of the accursed tree (*al-shajara al-malᶜūna*) mentioned in the Qurᵓān which produced a trial (*fitna*) for the people (XVII.60). However that may be, globalization and the computerization of the world, in addition to petroleum, have transformed Islam into a vulgar strategic issue. These are unprecedented contexts – or 'structures' – that make it complicated and more difficult to understand Islam today, because it is more contextual than ever.

Islam today may not be discussed without stressing that one of the most urgent tasks, in addition to eradicating terrorism, is to help to end the

suffering of oppressed women for which it has been unduly blamed. Islamic ethics is premised on ethics of purity and of male and female physical and moral modesty. Purity lost can be recovered through purification, ablutions and prayer. Modesty is an individual's enduring moral quality in harmony with chastity and sensuality. They constitute the bounds of education in human predispositions. Enclosure of women, their exclusion and all oppressive practices are alien to the letter and spirit of the Qurʾān. They are anti-Islamic forms of behaviour that are due to customs and vary in nature and form from one society to another. The mission of Islam, an emancipating religion by definition, is to combat such practices. On this point, as on many others, despite significant progress, much must still be done to update Muslim education and pastoral endeavours.

It is often said that Islam is a total, totalizing or even totalitarian religion. The idea behind that assertion is that it claims to regulate public and private conduct through moral rules, laws and jurisprudence, but this is assuredly true of all religions. From an anthropological standpoint, the question is what it does and how it does it. The social is never entirely determined by the religious. Quite the contrary, the religious is part of the social and is more or less deeply and lastingly consistent with it. As it may be in the minority in one place and in the majority in another, it is therefore not always affected in the same way. Islam and the social groupings that it claims to convert, or simply bribe, always have views about each other and often enter into violent or peaceful debate. As a result Islam is always nuanced contextually. The social can never be reduced to the religious in this situation or the religious to the social. It is a universal truth that in the Islamic world, as elsewhere, the social cannot be explained by a single factor or even imputed only to a so-called principal cause, which is always the same. Of course, groups that claim to belong to one non-orthodox strand of Islam or another can always manipulate it, take advantage of it and even market it for better or for worse. Secular groups can do the same. The only relevant questions are how Islam can be a positive factor of social change when roles have been thus redistributed, what its status is as such and what other social components it can affect or even create entirely. It is therefore important to bear this reference in mind in order to appraise the actual situation of Islam. First, it must be repeated that Islam – cyber-Islam and Islam generally – is now truly global. In Europe, North America and elsewhere, it is no longer an intruder, although it is sometimes considered strange and therefore disturbing. Muslims now contribute significantly to Western countries – not only as workers – because trade and finance are highly developed and benefit host countries as much as countries of origin. The integration of so many senior executives with a wide range of expertise, of thousands of skilled and unskilled workers of all kinds and of artists who are so averse to the idea of integration in countries of origin and host countries

X–1.3   The continued vitality of Qurʾānic calligraphy: a stained glass
composition from 1984 by Egyptian calligrapher Ahmad Mustafa,
representing verses from the Qurʾān that refer to the bounty of the sea
© Hussain A. al-Ramadan/AramcoWorld

alike and are thus unclassifiable all go towards making Islam universal. They all contribute, as part of their culture, a particular, albeit sometimes distorted, world view. The dialectics of self and other created by legal and illegal migration, the brain drain and their economic, financial and cultural baggage, are thus immense and fruitful.

Migrants bring their internal wealth and heritage with them, while their hosts offer openness and opportunities. Everyone benefits. Economic, social and cultural life are renewed thoroughly, expressing the vitality of Islam, whether it is a minority or majority religion. The legal and administrative distinctions may not be exaggerated or ignored. In daily life, despite the tragic nature of many situations and the ambiguous levelling wrought by the globalization of information technology, Islam cannot be reduced to a mere issue in the smouldering and raging conflicts that blight the planet. It is not only the consequences but net profits that must be calculated and preserved for the benefit of the genuine unity of humanity, to which Islam makes a great contribution. In the West today, Islam is enriched as much as it enriches. The task now is to include and integrate the minority into the majority and, perhaps more importantly, vice versa, and this process is indeed already well

X–1.4   Islam around the world: the first United States postage stamp to mark an Islamic holiday, celebrating Eid. It was issued on 1 September 2001
© US Postal Service/AramcoWorld

under way. The internal and external renewal described in so many recent literary works is thus under way. Tahar Ben Jelloun's *La nuit sacrée* (Sacred Night) and, previously, Ahmadou Kourouma's *Le soleil des indépendances* (The Glimmer of Independence) and Amin Maalouf's *Samarkand* have enriched both French literature and Islam, which is expressed on each page. The same is true of the great school of Arabic poetry written in the Diaspora by Zidan and Naʿīma, for example. Does it belong to the Americas or to the East?

Renewal can be seen in the Islamic world. Suffice it to walk through the new cities in the Gulf and Malaysia or through Jakarta and Casablanca and to be struck unfailingly by the good use made of the technological resources of concrete, steel, glass and other new materials and by the great potential for using electricity and electronics to design all kinds of public and private buildings, villas, hotels and mosques. It may not be to everyone's liking, but modern architecture is recreating the Islamic city, while mostly retaining traditional stylistic features as much as possible in functional and unprecedented ultra-modern city planning. The two Holy Mosques in Mecca and Medina, so many times rebuilt, extended and enlarged to meet the requirements of worship and accommodate the large number of the faithful, show that Saudi civil engineering – and engineering in general – has drawn on the most recent, most sophisticated and boldest technical innovations in managing so many delicate situations, some of which were genuinely problematical, with of the utmost rigour and concern for security, while creating a unique style and atmosphere. The sense of the sacred, the grandeur of humanity, but also of the humble tasks of daily life, everyday matters and the world of prayer are catered for here as they were in so many of the region's buildings in the past. Architecture is costly and considered a noble and major art form, but the so-called minor art forms have not been ignored. Arabic (and Persian and Turkish) calligraphy, while maintaining its demanding traditional standards, is becoming freer through renewal. Massoudi and Quraishi are transforming it by freeing Arabic letters in order to free the people to whom they refer. Nja Mahdaoui is shattering and recomposing it, in much the same way as the believers themselves.

Islam may not be discussed without mentioning poetry. Whether in Arabic, Persian or Turkish, poetry expresses the disarray and the anguish of Muslims struggling against the shackles of tradition and the endless oppression of dictatorship, whether open or thinly veiled. Whether it conforms to the rules of metre and rhyme or breaks and plays with them, it continues to sing of love and the joys of life and to express with fury, revolt, tenderness or derision the Muslim condition. Ṭouqān, Darwīsh, Adonīs, Qabbānī, Bayātī, Badr Shakir al-Sayyāb, Mufdī Zakarīa and many others have carried the voice of Islam very far afield. Before them, Chawqī and Chabbī expressed the sufferings and hopes of the peoples. In exile, Jibrān, Abu Madhī, Naʿīma and

others, too, have contributed to the renewal. While they are not always Muslim by confession, they are by culture, and through their presence in the United States of America participate together in the universal. Through poetry and art, Islam shatters the local and even the regional, and so contributes to the liberation of humanity throughout the contemporary world.

Islam has transcended borders and reached the highest world levels in other ways, as is evidenced by its four Nobel prize-winners in fields as varied as nuclear physics (the Pakistani Abdus Salam), literature (the Egyptian Naguib Mahfouz), peace (the indefatigable Iranian Shirin Ibadi for her human rights work) and economics (the Bangladeshi Muhammad Yunus for his promotion of micro-credit).

The novel – a new form in Muslim culture – and the performing arts have reached great heights, not through grandiloquence, imitation or over-hasty generalization, but by describing and deploring suffering in daily life. Naguib Mahfouz's *Cairo Trilogy*, Tayib Salih's *Season of Migration to the North* and Yaşar Kemal's *Memed, My Hawk* voice the concerns of the humblest – youth, women, the rebellious, the oppressed, day-labourers, people with no prospects. The bitterness of the human condition, too, is described in modern Islamic literature. One outstanding autobiographical novel, the cry of Layla Baalbaki's *I live* (*Ana aḥyā*), was an important factor in the awakening of female awareness, calling on women to rise up in Islamic lands. By dealing with personal experience, the novel has, as expected, reached the sublime.

The performing arts, equally new to Islamic culture, have now burst onto the scene. After being denigrated for so long, they, too, attained the universal almost immediately and are still the brightest reflection of Islam's renewal. Tawfiq al-Hakim's plays have been translated into many languages and performed throughout the world, thus boosting Arab and Muslim awareness. The film industry – and Arab, Turkish and Indian television serials, many of which were worthless films or commercial serial productions that all too often stultify the masses excessively – has produced some brilliant masterpieces. Apart from the great Youssef Chahine, attention is now drawn to the portrayal by a genius, a young Iranian woman armed only with a very ordinary camera and almost no budget, of humanity in its entirety. Samira Makhmalbaf, following in her father's pioneering and innovative footsteps, captivated the 2000 Cannes Festival at the tender age of 20. Her two films, *Blackboard* and *Apple*, are prodigious feats of truth and commitment. When she received tributes from UNESCO, she responded as a good Muslim should by saying 'People are moved by these films because the stories they tell are not Iranian but universal.' Without frills or commercial trappings, her films deal with two of the scourges of the Muslim world – the oppression of women and illiteracy. The poor teacher in *Blackboard*, trudging like a social outcast from village to village in search of pupils with her blackboard on her back,

is unforgettable: everyone shrinks from this outsider because drug and arms trafficking across the borders between Iran and Afghanistan is far more lucrative and much less boring than school. *Apple*, a moving drama about two girls shut up at home, who gaze at the star-spangled sky through the bars, is equally memorable. One image, worth a thousand doctoral theses, sheds a harsh light on the sufferings and solitude of so many Muslim women: a little girl passes her arm between the bars holding a plastic cup to pour a thread of scarce, precious water on a puny wilting plant growing in an old tin. Such simple things tell a tragic tale that is certainly universal, but above all tells the story of oppressed women in so many Islamic countries today.

The Islamic arts and crafts are all flourishing. There is of course talk of decline and, from an economic standpoint, this is true in that, as local demand is now largely met by imported or locally produced industrial products, demand for craftspeople's work has fallen, leading to unemployment and the closure of traditional souks. The constantly renewed creative tradition is, however, not dead: Indian craftsmen at the foot of the Taj Mahal continue to encrust marble with semi-precious stones, weavers in Kairouan and Tabriz continue to make gorgeous carpets, while the coppersmiths in Istanbul, the leatherworkers of Fez, the glassblowers of Damascus and many others use their imagination to produce things of beauty every day. Painters and calligraphers, too, show that the creative seam is far from exhausted. Materials may change, tools may be modernized and forms, designs and the juxtaposition of colours may be developed, while the item may functionally become mere decoration, but the style remains. The breath of a centuries-old but still vibrant culture continues to imbue the item that serves the same purpose, which is to reflect the Muslim spirit that is inseparable from the human spirit. It reproduces as it creates and creates as it renews archetypal forms in which the past is reborn in the present and, as it does so, delights the beholder. Owing to tourism, art and craftsmanship, the breath of Islam can be felt in the four corners of the world and in the humblest homes.

Slowly but surely, means of expression are being renewed. The languages of Islam are being radically renewed. The Qurʾān, as the word of God carrying a Revelation valid for all time, is immutable, but its exegesis has been undertaken a thousand times through the ages. Its language remains unchanged and is learnt globally, as it was fifteen centuries ago. This holy register of Qurʾānic language remains in the classical tradition, ceaselessly rejuvenated through the ages. In parallel, another register, the modern Arabic that is used by the mass media – especially television and the press – the modern novel, theatre and the administration, has developed. The Arab League Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ALESCO), in close cooperation with the Arabic Academies of Cairo and Damascus, watches jealously over its development. Accordingly, transcending the colloquial forms of the language,

X–1.5   Prayers at the Maouloud Festival in Timbuktu, Mali, in January 2014
© UN Photo/Marco Dormino

an effective tool has been produced by simplifying the complicated grammar of Arabic and creating a wealth of new terms. The same holds true for Farsi and Urdu, which have been similarly renewed. Most striking, however, are the audaciously proactive and modernist changes to Turkish. They are truly spectacular: the Latin alphabet has replaced the Arabic; the phonetic rules have been simplified; and a new vocabulary has been invented, including a plethora of modern technical terms and the exclusion of forms borrowed from Arabic and Persian that weighed so heavily on classical Turkish. The whole process was minutely orchestrated and boldly programmed, creating almost a new means of expression that broke completely with the past. This has been achieved at a price, though, for ordinary Turks cannot read anything written in their language before 1923 but, in a matter of a few years, illiteracy was virtually eradicated. Never in human history has linguistic reform been so rational or so well thought-out.

The time has come to mention the intense, impassioned debates in the Islamic world on theological matters. Jacques Berque considered them 'stalled', disregarding the fact that in Islam, theology is inseparable from exegesis and jurisprudence, as all matters are subsumed under *fiqh*. There are now two immense 'modern' commentaries of the Qurʾān: Sheikh Muhammed Abdu's *Manār* and Sheikh Taher Ibn Ashur great *Taḥrīr wal-Tanwīr*. Berque

clearly knew nothing about the important work of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy which, although located in Jeddah, is not Wahhabi, as it has been established by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which brings together all strands of Islam. It has worked steadily on jurisprudence, tackling the burning issues of modernity – female education, women's rights, the requirements of international finance – and of contemporary medical ethics – birth control, abortion, genetic manipulation, medically assisted procreation, organ transplants and so on. The Academy is not and cannot be orthodox, and is open and enlightened in its own way.

Great debates on 'secular' ideas, often free from and unbridled by conformism and orthodoxy, are held everywhere, although they are not always well received. Some arise from studies in the human sciences, which are always topical. There is an undeniable demand for anthropological knowledge in all disciplines, while objective science is opening up new horizons to Muslims, their elites and governments. In the last three-quarters of a century, a wealth of information has been amassed everywhere in the Islamic world in addition to that provided by foreign researchers and international organizations. It has broadened considerably and changed the Muslim peoples' knowledge about themselves, and the archaic classical compilations have been replaced by expert views. The Egyptian Hassan al-Saati, a pioneer in empirical field research, has transformed people's perception of social exclusion, the lot of working people, housing, town planning and even of prostitution. More recently, Bakader, a Saudi, has shed new light on youth, culture and literature. They are but two of many.

As long as anthropologists were content to research the 'context' in Islamic countries, they were tolerated and even viewed positively by right-thinking people, as some researchers were demonstrably quite pious. Some, however, overstepped the mark and began to subject the sacred, its sources, its substance and the Revelation to analysis in order to reveal the 'met text' itself. Averroes's good old solution of reaching a single truth by two means – the rational and the prophetic – are no longer of any use. Radical critique of the sources of the sacred therefore only undermines it and reduces it to the phenomena through which it is revealed. Averroes's two conciliating means have destroyed each other, and the truce is over.

It has been suggested that the new anthropologists have strayed from their area of expertise. Many consider that they are simply confusing the gnoseological and the ontological and are forgetting that their truths are merely relative and provisional and are only methodologically valuable. This is indeed a debate among specialists, but it has spread to the street and has been given much media coverage. The most serious aspect of the situation is that these anthropological ideas are regarded as blasphemous attacks on public order. That is a sign of intolerance on the part of the new free thinkers of

Islam, but the debate must continue as it denotes the vibrancy of Islam. It is more important to realize that many Muslims do not identify with ideas that seek openly to deconstruct consensual Islamic thought, doubtless preferring the positivity of the research that they wish to deconstruct.

Far more positive are the debates that, by avoiding sterile polemics, carry forward Iqbal's immense work, which still subsists nearly one century after the death of that giant of Islamic thought. His lectures in Hyderabad and Madras in 1927—8 are still relevant. In his half-rational, half-Sufi view of the world, people are seen as co-makers of their own destinies. *Ijtihād* is an inalienable human capacity shared by all, which alone can produce 'the perfect person'. For Iqbal, Islam is depth of soul, pure spontaneity and complete self-awareness. The thoroughly Islamic dogma of the absolute transcendence of God does not in any way imply that human beings are alone. The completion of prophecies delivers them, and the ultimate Revelation of the Qur'ān is enough for them. Once they have reached full maturity, people can draw on refined reason and historical experience for guidance without following the paths charted in the Revelation alone. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, of which some major ideas have been mentioned here, is a forceful work that is still topical. Many other Muslim philosophers, including Badawi, from Egypt, and Lahbabi, from Morocco, could be quoted here.

Every culture has its night watchmen, whose role is to light up the path, maintain what is essential and bring about renewal. In Islamic culture, whether triumphant or dormant, that role is played by youth, women and intellectuals. They keep hope alive and construct what is essential. The present and future rest on their shoulders. Islam knows that it can rely on them to free it of the hatred inherent in terrorism that does so much harm and does not represent it at all. The only hatred itself is hateful. Islam is reciprocal love; it joins humanity to God and God to humanity. The absolute transcendence of God is the basis of people's autonomy, making them fully responsible for themselves, others and the world. Freedom is free only if the individual chooses between good and evil. Today's Muslims need more than ever to apply the values of peace, justice, freedom, work and respect for nature that are the sole foundations of civilization. Their major battle, currently under way, must be waged to reform education, modernize the status of women, eradicate poverty, rationalize employment and rebuild culture. This is an immense development task that can be achieved only by bringing into play the full potential of the social, the cultural and the natural spheres. It is only on this condition that Islam could regain its meaning and learn to live in the world as the sublime, enduring revelation of God's splendour.

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Islamic culture, which is still vigorous in spite of its great
antiquity, set out to develop side by side a vision of the
individual and of the universe, a philosophy and an art of living
that can be seen in the impressive remains of its heritage
that is an essential part of the whole of humankind's. Halted for
a time by adverse historical conditions, this culture none the less
found the strength within itself to re-emerge.

Its fidelity to its roots does not prevent it from keeping up with
the times and participating in contemporary forums and the
stirring dialogue of cultures.

This series of volumes on the manifold facets of Islamic culture
is intended to acquaint a very wide public with such matters
as: the theological bases of the faith and principles that constitute
the bedrock of the overall structure; the status of the individual
and of society in the Islamic world; the expansion of Islam
since the Revelation: the Arab, Asian, African and European
spheres espousing the new faith and the way in which the rights
of converted peoples have been upheld; the vital contribution
of Islamic civilization to the adventure of human knowledge
in science and technology; the educational and cultural
manifestations of Islamic civilization in literature, the visual
arts and architecture; finally, Islam today between loyalty to its
past and the inescapable conquest of modernity.