Historical and socio-cultural relations between black Africa and the Arab world from 1935 to the present

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Historical and socio-cultural relations between black Africa and the Arab world from 1935 to the present

Report and papers of the symposium
organized by Unesco in Paris
from 25 to 27 July 1979

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Preface

In 1964 the General Conference of Unesco, as part of the Organization's effort to further the mutual understanding of peoples and nations, authorized the Director-General to take the necessary measures for the preparation and publication of a *General History of Africa.*

Activities in the early stages of the project (1965–70) in Africa and elsewhere consisted mainly of work on the collection of oral and written sources such as the *Guide to the Sources of the History of Africa.*

At the same time, international scientific consultations were organized to consider the methodology of the project. This led to a number of recommendations made by meetings of experts held in Paris (1969) and in Addis Ababa (1970), which launched the second phase of the project, i.e. the preparation and drafting of an eight-volume *General History of Africa* under the sole intellectual and scientific responsibility of a scholarly body, the International Scientific Committee for the Drafting of a General History of Africa.

This committee, governed by the Statutes adopted by the Executive Board of Unesco in 1971, is composed of thirty-nine members (two-thirds of whom are African and one-third non-African) serving in their personal capacity and appointed by the Director-General of Unesco for the duration of the committee's mandate. The Committee, at its first session, defined its task as follows:

Although aiming at the highest possible scientific level, the *History* will not seek to be exhaustive and will be a work of synthesis avoiding dogmatism. In many respects, it will be a statement of problems showing the present state of knowledge and the main trends in research, and it will not hesitate to show divergencies of doctrine and opinion where these exist. In this way, it will prepare the ground for future work.

The committee decided to present the work in eight volumes, each containing some 750 pages, with illustrations, photographs, maps and line-drawings. The eight volumes are the following:

Volume I *Methodology and African Prehistory*
(Editor: Professor Joseph Ki-Zerbo)

Volume II *Ancient Civilizations of Africa*
(Editor: Dr Gamal Mokhtar)

Volume III *Africa from the Seventh to the Eleventh Century*
(Editor: H. E. Mr Mohammed El Fasi)

Volume IV *Africa from the Twelfth to the Sixteenth Century*
(Editor: Professor D. T. Niane)
Volume V *Africa from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century*
(Editor: Professor B. A. Ogot)
Volume VI *The Nineteenth Century until 1880*
(Editor: Professor J. F. A. Ajayi)
Volume VII *Africa under Foreign Domination, 1880–1935*
(Editor: Professor A. A. Boahen)
Volume VIII *Africa since 1935*
(Editor: Professor A. A. Mazrui)

The drafting of the volumes began in 1972 and is still going on. In addition, it was felt that scientific studies, colloquia and symposia on related themes should be undertaken as part of the preparatory work. Such studies and meetings have been and are being organized in order to provide wider and deeper background information on the volume concerned and also to help situate it in relation to the other volumes.

The papers prepared for discussion and the exchanges of views on a wide variety of subjects at these meetings have provided valuable historical material which Unesco decided to make known as widely as possible by publishing it in a series entitled 'The General History of Africa: Studies and Documents'.

The latest meetings have been convened in connection with Volume VIII, which covers the recent history of Africa. These meetings have dealt with 'The Historiography of Southern Africa', 'The Decolonization of Africa: Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa' and 'The Methodology of Contemporary African History'. The present book, the seventh in the series, contains the papers presented at and a report of the discussions that followed a Symposium organized by Unesco on 'Historical and Socio-cultural Relations between Black Africa and the Arab World: 1935 to the Present', held in Paris from 25 to 27 July 1979. This theme was based on the recommendations made by an earlier meeting of experts in Ouagadougou, 17–22 May 1979.

The authors are responsible for the choice and the presentation of the facts contained in this book, and for the opinions expressed therein, which are not necessarily those of Unesco and do not engage the responsibility of the Organization.

The designations employed and the presentation of material throughout the publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of Unesco concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitations of any country or territory.

To keep the facts and opinions in a proper historical perspective the reader should bear in mind that the Symposium took place in July 1979 and that much has happened in Africa since that date.

Contents

Introductory note

The Paris symposium was requested to examine the following questions and, if possible, provide answers to them:

What is an Arab? What distinguishes the Arabs of African countries from those of other regions? To what extent and up to what point have life on the African continent and ties with other Africans affected their culture, religion, etc., creating a difference or a distinction between African Arabs and the Arabs of other regions? What are the relations between pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism and pan-Africanism? What are the relations between the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Arab League?

In an attempt to provide answers to the above questions, the papers and the debate at the meeting were expected to look into the following issues:

The overall positive contribution of the Arabs to the liberation of Africa; the influence of great Arab personalities such as Nasser in relation to African solidarity, and the birth of the OAU as well as the non-aligned movement (Bandung); the influence of Islam, its networks of brotherhoods and associations; the impact of Muslim trade in black slaves and the influence of Islamic law on African socio-religious structures; and the role of the 'border' states such as Mauritania, Sudan, etc.; economic and political co-operation between the OAU and the Arab League.

Consideration was given to economic relations by asking the following questions:

What kind of relations exist? Are they, in fact, relations between equals? What forms does Arab aid take? What types of co-operation exist? To what extent is 'two-way' complementarity between Arab countries and black African countries, or 'three-way' complementarity between them and Europe, possible? What are the prospects for achieving closer relations by means of air and land links, or for joint ventures to exploit resources in the Sahara, for example?

Finally, the meeting examined the nature and levels of cultural encounters and exchanges. More specifically, it looked into the question of the Arabization and Islamization of African languages and religions, as well as that of Arab and Islamic influences on other aspects of African culture. These included artistic and architectural designs and music as found in different parts of black

Africa that have been penetrated by Arabs and Islam for a long period. Papers like that of Professor Darwish were particularly useful and relevant to the overall theme.

From the material contents, their interpretation and subsequent discussions, the following points, both of which, once again, highlight the problems facing students and teachers of contemporary African history, emerged: (a) there were varied interpretations of certain events or political policies and ideologies, as well as several lines of emphasis; (b) although the period covered in Volume VIII in general runs from 1935 to the present, some authors felt a need to go back for some centuries in order to set the subject being discussed in its correct historical context. The papers presented in this book, therefore, are in-depth studies of the major issues outlined above.

The Appendices contain documents selected from those that were provided to the participants as background papers.

The policies of black African states towards the Arab world: an overview

Abdul Aziz Jalloh

Proposals for and efforts at promoting co-operation and solidarity among Third World countries are certainly not new and have their origins at least as far back as the Bandung Conference in April 1955, which proclaimed a community and identity of interests among African and Asian countries as autonomous and distinct from those of the Western and communist worlds. Cultivation of this community of interest was not only seen as good in itself, but was also mandated because of individual weakness in order to promote the political, economic and social well-being of Afro-Asian countries and thus create a more just world order.

Today the manifestations of this movement for Third World solidarity are the Conference of Non-aligned Nations and the Group of 77 at the most general level, and at more limited levels various regional integration schemes such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Andean Pact, the Central American Common Market, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Central African Economic and Customs Union, the Economic Community of West African States, and the Arab League. To these must be added various Third World producer cartels, of which the best known is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

It is readily apparent that regional organizations tend to be limited to countries that are geographically contiguous and have similar historical, social, cultural and linguistic characteristics. A departure from this general rule is the co-operation between African and Arab countries, which took a dramatic turn in 1972/73 and became institutionalized in 1977. Our purpose in this essay is to trace the historical evolution of this co-operation and assess its prospects.

The Arab world extends over several thousand miles and is bounded by the Mediterranean, the Sahara and the mountains of the Taurus range, Kurdistan and western Iran. This vast area was integrated into a centralized political system for only a brief period between the years 750 and 950 under the Omayyads and the first Abbasids and then superficially as a result of the Ottoman conquest. Linguistic and social homogeneity was rudimentary, and the region was divided into three zones: (a) the East (Al Mashraq), embracing

the countries of the Arabian peninsula and present-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq; (b) the Nile lands, made up of Egypt and Sudan; and (c) the West (Al Maghreb), which is constituted by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania.

The seven countries of the Nile and the Maghreb are thus geographically located in Africa, thereby providing a tangible link and basis of co-operation between Africa and the Arab world. The countries of black Africa, on the other hand, are made up of all the countries of the African continent, excluding South Africa and Namibia for political reasons. Even though it joined the Arab League, Somalia is not Arab linguistically, culturally or ethnically and is included among the countries of black Africa. Even more than the Arab world, the countries of black Africa are fragmented along ethnic, linguistic, cultural and political lines, and the history and nature of their ties with the Arab world differ. Given these differences in both the Arab and the black African regions, it is exceedingly dangerous to generalize about Afro-Arab relations. In what follows, our concern will be with the general outlines discernible in these relations.

The links between Africans and Arabs go far back in history. Already in the fifth and sixth centuries Arabia and Ethiopia had very close ties. The Prophet Muhammad used to advise his most trustworthy followers whom he wanted to protect to take refuge in Ethiopia in order to escape persecution from the pagans in Mecca. One of the earliest and most energetic converts to Islam was an Ethiopian named Bilal, whom the prophet made his muezzin.[1] However, the spread of the Arabs into Africa had to await the death of Muhammad in 632.

Ten years after the death of the Prophet, the Arabs had conquered the most important cities in the Middle East. Damascus was taken in 636, Jerusalem in 638, and Alexandria in 642. By 679, the Arabs had moved into Libya and Tunisia, and by the eleventh century the Arabization of the Maghreb had considerably advanced. Then a general push began southwards from Egypt, Libya and the Maghreb. By the twelfth century, the Muslim kingdom of Kanem was founded. Colonies left by the Berbers on the Senegal and Niger rivers and Lake Chad, in alliance with the local population that had been converted to Islam, played important roles in the formation of the empires of Ghana, Mali and Goa from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries and of Kanem-Bornu from the twelfth to the nineteenth century.

However, the progress of Islam and therefore of Arab influence in the savannah regions of Africa was rather slow. It was resisted by the Mossi and the Bambara and for a long time also by the Fulanis and the Hausa. It was only in the nineteenth century that Islam made rapid advances, under Alhaji Umar in western Sudan, Othman Dan Fodio in northern Nigeria, and the Mahdi Mohammed Ahmad in the Sudan. Thus when Western colonialists

arrived in the nineteenth century they found Islam dominant in the savannah regions of West Africa from Senegal to northern Cameroon.

In the eastern half of the continent, the early contact between Africans and Arabs was a bit different. As was noted earlier, Ethiopia had developed ties with the Arab world at a very early date. Muslim communities were to be found on the Ethiopian coast, and there were some sultanates even in the interior. However, relations between the Muslims and the Ethiopians were characterized by long and continuous wars, which the Sultan of Cairo tried unsuccessfully to arbitrate. In the sixteenth century Ethiopia was saved from conquest by the Somali Ahmad Gragne only as a result of the intervention of a Portuguese expeditionary force that forced the Muslims to fall back on Harar and Zayla.[2]

Contacts between East Africa and the Arab world are equally ancient. The city of Mogadiscio was founded by people from Yemen in 860. Kilwa and Mombasa were established around 957, and by the eleventh century the Arabs had reached Malindi, in present-day Kenya. With respect to Zanzibar, Arab traders and explorers are reported to have arrived there centuries before the Christian era. And it was not until the sixteenth century that Arab domination of East Africa was interrupted by the Portuguese. The depth of Arab penetration was limited, however, to the coastal regions, and it was only in the 1840s that efforts were made by the Arabs to penetrate the interior. Finally, Western colonialism arrived and put an end to attempts to create large empires similar to those in West Africa. The spread of Islam to southern Africa was also halted.

The contacts between Arabs and Africans therefore antedated by several centuries the arrival of Western colonial rule. The Arab presence stretched over long distances, from Senegal across the savannah to the Red Sea and down the east coast from Ethiopia to Tanzania. If the spread was long, its width was narrow, and vast areas of the interior and coastal regions of West and Central Africa remained untouched.

What was the explanation for the Arab penetration of Africa? The goal of spreading the Muslim religion was certainly one factor, but this was not all. The more basic explanation lies in the geography and social formations of the Arab world. The Arab world is located between the agricultural civilizations of Europe, monsoon Asia and black Africa. In the Arab world only Egypt has a peasant civilization. The rest of the Arab world was largely composed of nomads organized to carry on long-distance trade on a large scale. 'It (the Arab world other than Egypt) has therefore always fulfilled a commercial function, bringing into contact, through its role as the only middleman, agricultural communities that had no direct awareness of each other.'[3] Thus it was largely the search for profits through trade that led the Arabs across the Mediterranean and the Sahara.

The main item in this trade was gold, which came largely from the upper Senegal and Ashanti regions, the principal suppliers to the Roman Empire, medieval Europe, the ancient East, and the Arab world until the discovery of America. Other export items were ivory, gum and slaves. In return, black Africa imported drugs, perfumes, dates, salt, fabrics, horses, copper, iron bars, and weapons. Two points must be made about this trade. The first is that it was trade between roughly equal partners, at more or less the same level of technological development, and without the forcible imposition of an unequal division of labour. Thus it was beneficial not only to the Arabs but also to the Africans. 'In practice, the trans-Saharan trade was as great an achievement as crossing an ocean. Much more than local trade, it stimulated the famous cities of the region such as Walata, Timbuctu, Gao and Jenne; and it brought in the literate Islamic culture. Long-distance trade strengthened state power . . .'[4] And secondly, while destructive to black African societies, the trade in slaves was very small as compared with the Atlantic slave trade. In fact, among the West African empires, only in Kanem-Bornu did the export of slaves play an important role, because the state controlled no gold supplies. Yet this has remained a sore point in Afro-Arab relations, especially in East Africa.

Two factors in the sixteenth century dealt a major blow to Afro-Arab relations. One was warfare in the region, especially that of the Sultan of Marrakech against the empire of Gao, the result of which was an increased importance of slaves in the trans-Saharan trade. More important was the shift in European mercantile capitalism from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. This shift brought ruin not only to the Italian cities, but also to the Arab world and the African states in the savannah. Trade between Europe and the West Coast of Africa, which started in the middle of the fifteenth century, expanded rapidly, and there was a corresponding shift in the centre of activity from the savannah to the coastal regions. By the middle of the eighteenth century the first stage of Africa's integration into the world economy, with its centre in Europe, had started.[5] Similarly, the Arab world became integrated into the world economy, at first superficially by the Ottoman conquest and then more decisively by the French conquest of the Maghreb and by the First World War. With this integration of both areas into the world capitalist system, bilateral ties between them were sharply reduced, though by no means terminated, especially at the levels of religious and social intercourse. The re-establishment of relations had to await the decolonization period of the late 1950s and early 1960s.

An enduring result of the early contacts between Arabs and Africans was the spread of Islam in Africa. Colonialism did not stop this spread of Islam; in fact, it was strengthened and used in some areas, such as the Sahel, to maintain social order and progress. The presence of Islam in black Africa, however, varies tremendously. It is dominant in countries

bordering the Sahara, it constitutes an important minority in parts of East Africa, and it is virtually absent in some areas. This variation is, of course, largely a reflection of the extent of the Arab expansion into Africa. Table 1 indicates the number and percentage of Muslims in various African countries.

The significance of this large number of Muslims is that they create both religious and cultural bonds with the Arab world that could serve as the basis for mutual sympathy, understanding, and therefore solidarity between the two regions. These bonds are also being continuously strengthened. Muslims everywhere look towards Mecca and Medina as the holiest cities of Islam, and thousands of African Muslims make the annual pilgrimage. In 1973, 221,770 Africans made the pilgrimage, and a year later the figure stood at 346,711, an increase of 56 per cent.[6] In addition, many Muslim delegations make frequent visits to the Arab world in order to raise funds to promote Muslim activities in black Africa.

On the other hand, Arab countries have created agencies for the promotion of the Muslim religion and culture in Africa. Notable among these is the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, in Cairo; the Libyan Institute for the Spread of the Islamic Faith, created in 1971; the Islamic Conference, in Jidda; and the Council for Islamic Co-ordination in Africa, created by the Arab League in 1976, whose goal is to fight against Zionism, communism and Christianity.[7] Moreover, visits by Arab political leaders to Africa are frequently used to promote Islam. This was particularly the case of the late King Faisal, who devoted a large part of his journeys to African countries to visiting Mosques or Islamic institutes and meeting with religious leaders.[8]

From the earliest times, links existed between the scholars of the Sahel and the Arab world. Africans went to the University of Al-Azhar for studies, and Kanem is reported to have had a hostel for its students there as early as the thirteenth century. This pattern has continued up to the present, and a recent estimate shows that of the 4,000 foreign students at Al-Azhar more than 2,000 are from Africa. While many of these are from North Africa, it remains true none the less that there are many black African students in the Arab world, especially in Egypt.[9]

At the linguistic level, Arabic is taught in African countries, with large numbers of Muslims both in the Koranic and in modern schools. Arabic has also penetrated African languages, most notably Swahili, which is the official language in the United Republic of Tanzania and is widely spoken in Kenya, Uganda and in parts of Zaire and Mozambique, among others. About 20 per cent of the basic vocabulary of Swahili comes from Arabic, including many of its political terms, such as 'president', 'minister', 'law', 'department' and 'politics'.[10] Other languages heavily influenced by Arabic are Hausa and Fulani.

In all, therefore, it would appear that there are solid bases for co-operation and solidarity between Africa and the Arab World. This historical

TABLE 1. Muslims in black Africa

Country	Millions	% of total
West Africa		
Senegal	4.3	82
Gambia	0.5	90
Guinea-Bissau	0.2	30
Guinea	3.1	65
Sierra Leone	1.0	30
Liberia	0.3	15
Mali	3.5	60
Nigeria	31.3	47
Niger	4.2	85
Upper Volta	1.4	22
Ivory Coast	1.8	25
Ghana	2.0	19
Togo	0.2	7
Benin	0.5	16
Central Africa[1]		
Cameroon	1.0	15
Central African Republic	0.1	5
Chad	2.1	50
Zaire	0.5	2
East Africa[2]		
Ethiopia	11.8	40
Djibouti	0.1	94
Somalia	3.4	99
Kenya	1.3	9
Uganda	0.7	6
Tanzania	3.8	24
Malawi	0.8	15
Mozambique	1.0	10

1. Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Rwanda and Burundi have less than 1 per cent.
2. Zambia has virtually no Muslims, and of the remaining black African countries only South Africa has a Muslim population of more than 1 per cent.

Source: *Time Magazine* (European edition), 16 April 1979, p. 9. Taken from *Muslim Peoples, a World Ethnographic Survey*, edited by Richard Weekes.

links between the regions are about twelve centuries old, commerce between the two regions was mutually beneficial, and the large numbers of Muslims in black Africa with long and significant religious, cultural, and linguistic ties should, one would expect, make Africans want to maintain favourable ties with the Arab world. As noted earlier, the black spot in this picture is the Arab slave trade. As one author has noted,

> the Arab slave trade featured prominently in the version of African history taught by English school-masters in East Africa, for the British liked to justify their colonial presence in East and Central Africa by arguing that the original motivation was to suppress the Arab slave trade. With one stroke colonial policy-makers could discredit both the Arabs and Islam, while at the same time giving their own imperial presence a high moral justification.[11]

What is usually lost sight of is that Islam does not favour slavery, considering it one of the most regrettable practices that are tolerated. Further, Islam is overwhelmingly hostile to racial discrimination, and because of this, and in spite of the reality of racial discrimination in medieval Arab countries, Blacks were able 'to make a significant contribution to medieval Islamic civilization', especially in literature.[12] The extent to which these generally favourable historical, religious, cultural and linguistic background conditions have in fact made for African solidarity with the Arab world at the political level is our next concern.

As noted, the resumption of Afro-Arab relations, interrupted in the sixteenth century, had to await the period after the Second World War, and more specifically the decolonization phase of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Developments in Egypt were particularly important for Afro-Arab relations. Egypt had been given a form of 'independence' by the 1922 treaty with the United Kingdom, but the ultimate authority remained in British hands. The 1936 treaty supposedly granted 'full independence', but British troops were still in Egypt, and during the Second World War, British and American troops entered Cairo despite Egypt's official neutrality. Immediately after the war, official attention was focused on revision of the 1936 treaty, and subsequently, with the support of Palestinians, was turned against the newly created state of Israel. Defeat in the war against Israel plus the revelations of corruption in the handling of war supplies turned Egyptian attention to the domestic scene.

The turning point in Egypt was the revolution of July 1952, which brought Gamal Abdel Nasser to power, as well as a new Egyptian orientation towards black Africa. Nasser expressed this new interest in Africa in the following terms:

> We cannot under any conditions, even if we wanted to, stand aloof from the terrible battle now raging in the heart of that (African) continent between five million whites and two hundred million Africans. We cannot stand aloof for one important and obvious reason—we ourselves are in Africa.[13]

The 1952 revolution and the struggle to overthrow the remnants of European imperialism were observed closely in Africa, where they were considered an integral part of the anti-colonialist movement. At the Bandung Conference, Nasser emerged as the spokesman for Africa, and following the Anglo-French withdrawal after the 1956 invasion, Nasser became the anti-colonialist hero for having withstood and forced the evacuation of imperialist military forces. In return, radio Cairo started broadcasting special programmes to encourage the nationalist struggles in Africa, and nationalist fighters were welcomed and helped in Cairo.[14] Already in January 1956 the High Committee for African Affairs had been created in Cairo, and Nasser made extensive use of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, held in Cairo in December 1957, to spread his influence in Africa.

Towards the end of the 1950s, however, Egypt's role and influence in Africa decreased sharply. One reason for this was that between 1958 and 1961 Nasser was largely concerned with unification with Syria. More important was the fact that with the entry of new actors on the scene, Nasser had to contend with other challengers for leadership and influence in Africa. Foremost among these was Kwame Nkrumah, who organized the First Conference of Independent African States in Accra in April 1958. Nasser used this conference to develop ties with black Africa, but this did not stop his rivalry with Nkrumah, and soon Radio Cairo was attacking Nkrumah for co-operating with Israel. In return, at the All African Peoples Conference at Accra in December 1958, Nkrumah warned that 'colonialism and imperialism may come to us yet in a different guise, not necessarily from Europe', and proceeded to warn against 'direct Egyptian expansionism or indirect communist penetration of African areas through a willing Egypt'.[15]

At a different level, Egypt was characterized as culturally Arab, even though it was geographically in Africa, by Awolowo of Nigeria, who believed, together with Leopold Senghor, that black Africa must first unite before unity was sought with Arab Africa. This view, it should be noted, was rejected by other African leaders such as Nkrumah, who believed that the Sahara should be a bridge rather than a barrier. Finally, at the political level, there was fear that Egypt was more concerned with Arab than with African problems. Thus at the foreign ministers' meeting in Addis Ababa in May 1963 just before the creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Egyptian foreign minister was called upon to give assurances that Egypt's commitments in the Middle East and Africa were not in conflict, and Nasser was asked whether Egypt was working for Arab or African unity. To the extent that Egypt played a political role in black Africa, it was accused of intervening in the internal affairs of African states by supporting opposition and subversive groups, notably in Cameroon and Kenya.

If during the early phases black Africa's policies towards Egypt were

characterized by rivalry, suspicion and hesitation, the picture was not better with respect to other Arab countries. Few if any official contacts existed with the eastern part of the Arab world. In the Maghreb, Libya became independent in 1951, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia in 1956, while the liberation movement had started in Algeria as far back as 1945. The liberation struggle in North Africa did not attract much attention in black Africa, and after independence, these North African states were more concerned with internal pressures in the Arab world, the Arab League, the Arab–Israeli conflict and the Algerian War.

In the initial stages, black Africa adopted a neutral position on the Arab–Israeli conflict, and efforts by Arabs to inject this issue into African conferences were resented. While it is true that the Casablanca conference of 1961, in which Nkrumah, Ahmed Sekou Touré and Keita took part, branded Israel as a 'tool of neo-colonialism', it is also true that Nasser's condemnation of Israel as an instrument of colonial infiltration at the OAU founding conference in May 1963 received little support. Many African states had co-operation agreements with Israel, and at the United Nations resolutions calling for direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs received significant African support as did votes to elect Israel to a number of executive positions as representative of the Afro-Asian group.[16]

The Algerian liberation struggle, on the other hand, received widespread attention and sympathy in black Africa. It was seen as a struggle against colonialism and white settler domination similar to those present in East, Central and southern Africa. However, because of the close ties with France of many black African states, support for the Algerian liberation struggle was lukewarm at best and most of the states refused to recognize the Algerian Provisional Government. As a result, the Algerian Provisional Government was not invited to the Lagos conference of January 1962, and as a result, Tunisia, Libya and Sudan, which had agreed to the calling of the conference, boycotted it. The result was resentment among black African states, who complained that 'Arab issues' were leading to dissensions among black Africans.

In all, relations between black Africa and the Arab world got off to a bad start in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The Arab countries were largely inward-looking, and the African states, while they followed with interest and varying degrees of sympathy problems of major concern to the Arab world, did not feel themselves affected by them, nor did they want to become too deeply involved in them.[17] There was suspicion and an unwillingness to engage in mutual support. Slowly, however, things started changing in the second half of the 1960s.

The major change in black African policies towards the Arab world since the mid-1960s has been in connection with the Arab–Israeli conflict. The first step in this direction was taken in 1967 after the start of the Six-Day War

in June. If it is true that the Somali request for an emergency meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers to discuss the war was not approved, on the grounds that only the United Nations was competent to deal with the matter, it is also true that at the OAU summit in Kinshasa in September the heads of state approved a declaration in which Egypt was described as 'an African country whose territory is partially occupied by a foreign power'. Solidarity with Egypt was expressed, and a promise was made to work within the United Nations to secure the evacuation of Egypt's territory. A more dramatic action was that taken by Guinea to break diplomatic relations with Israel in support of the Arab course, the first black African country to do so.

Similar and even stronger resolutions in support of Egypt and the Arab countries were adopted at subsequent meetings of the OAU, both by the conference of heads of state and government and the Council of Ministers. At the United Nations, a similar trend was also discernible. However, between 1967 and 1971 African support for the Arab course was far from unanimous. Countries like Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Mali, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia were strongly in favour of the Arab cause, while countries like Nigeria, Senegal, Chad, Niger, Kenya and Ethiopia were moving in that direction. On the other hand, Benin, Botswana, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi and Rwanda were more on the Israeli side. The remaining countries still hesitated to take a clear position.[18]

A dramatic step in African support for the Arab cause was taken at the OAU summit in Addis Ababa in June 1971. A call was made for Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories of Egypt, Syria and Jordan as an essential precondition for a settlement of the Middle East conflict. To implement this decision, a commission of ten was created. A four-man committee composed of Presidents Senghor, Mobutu, Ahidjo and Gowon visited Tel Aviv and Cairo in November 1971 but failed in its mission. This failure was blamed on Israeli refusal to affirm the principle of non-annexation of Arab territories, while Egypt was congratulated for co-operation with the mission and a positive attitude on a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict. The failure of this mission was a surprise and disappointment to African leaders, who therefore adopted a resolution strongly critical of Israel at the OAU summit in Rabat in June 1972.

Soon after the Rabat summit, the trend towards a complete rupture between black African states and Israel started. It was preceded by Uganda's breaking off diplomatic relations with Israel in March 1972. By the end of 1972, Chad and Congo-Brazzaville had also broken off diplomatic ties with Israel. Niger and Mali took the same measures in January 1973, while Burundi and Togo broke with Israel in May and September respectively. Just before the start of the October War, Zaire also severed diplomatic relations with Israel. Thus nine black African countries broke off diplomatic relations with

Israel between June 1967 and October 1973, while Somali never had diplomatic ties with Israel.[19]

The OAU summit in Addis Ababa in May 1973 was stirred by President Boumedienne's comparison of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories with white rule in southern Africa, both of which he labelled an insult to the African continent that necessitated a uniform response from African leaders. As a result, the heads of state adopted a resolution in which they called for the respect of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people as an essential element of a just and equitable solution to the Middle East problem, warned Israel that its refusal to withdraw from Arab territories constituted an act of aggression threatening the security, territorial integrity and unity of the continent, and indicated that the OAU members might take individual or collective political and economic measures against Israel. Thus when the October War started, twenty more black African states broke off diplomatic ties with Israel in implementation of the above resolution, and by the end of 1973 only Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mauritius still had diplomatic relations with Israel.[20]

If OAU resolutions since 1973 show that black African states have moved from neutrality in the Arab-Israel conflict in the late 1950s and early 1960s to a position of nearly unanimous support for the recovery of Arab land and the rights of Palestinians, even through the use of force, it should be noted that some divergences still exist between Arabs and Africans on certain aspects of the Middle East problem. Thus on the United Nations resolution of November 1975 condemning Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination, five black African countries voted against (Central African Empire, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Malawi and Swaziland) while eleven abstained (Gabon, Upper Volta, Togo, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Zaire and Zambia). Black African countries that often abstain from joining Arab countries in voting against Israel in the United Nations are Gabon, Kenya, Malawi, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Swaziland and the Central African Empire. In addition, many African countries reportedly maintain excellent commercial relations with Israel in spite of the break in diplomatic relations.[21] Partial and incomplete as it might be, the shift in black African policies towards the Arab–Israeli conflict is striking, and a look at the factors responsible for it is called for.

One popular explanation for the change in the policies of black African states towards the Arab–Israeli conflict is that it was motivated by the hope of foreign aid from the Arab states in the light of their new-found wealth resulting from the increased price of petroleum. As noted above, however, the shift in the policies of black African states started in 1967 and gained momentum in 1971. Even before the October 1973 war, ten black African countries had no diplomatic ties with Israel. Since the oil price increase came

after the October War, this factor could hardly be said to have played a significant role.

It is of course true that some Arab states, like the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, were rich even before the quadrupling of oil prices in late 1973 and had already launched foreign-aid programmes. But Arab foreign aid, especially to black African states, was minuscule before 1974. As one author has noted, 'Before 1974 only Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya were major OPEC providers of economic assistance, and over four-fifths of their aid was in the form of budgetary grants in support of other Arab countries involved in the conflict with Israel.' Aid to black Africa was 'small and sporadic'.[22] It is estimated that from 1970 to 1974 black African states received only $63 million, or 1.4 per cent of the total aid given by the OPEC countries, with only five countries receiving more than a million dollars—Madagascar $20.3 million; Uganda $19; Senegal $11.3; Chad $8.0 and Mali $1.1.[23]

Thus there was no historical basis for black African states to expect substantial aid from the Arabs, and they could not have predicted the substantial increase in the revenues of Arab states that would result from the October War.

Finally, attention must be called to the fact that since the late 1950s, Israel had started courting black African countries and had developed a highly successful technical aid programme for black African countries in the areas of agriculture, youth training and the military.[24] For many black African countries, Israel served as a model of development in the early 1960s. There is therefore little support for the view that the change in black Africa's policies on the Middle East conflict was motivated to any substantial degree by hopes of economic gain.

The shift from neutrality to a pro-Arab position in the Arab-Israeli conflict was in part brought on by Israel itself. Its close ties with the West made it suspect as a Third World country and gave credence to the Arab charge that it was an agent of neo-colonial penetration of Africa. Even worse were its very close ties with Portugal and South Africa, the arch-enemies of black Africa. And finally, there was Israeli involvement in African conflicts. It was charged with having supported Moise Tshombe's efforts to break Katanga away from the Congo, the Biafran secessionist movement and the uprising in southern Sudan. As a result of these factors, black African states were becoming increasingly alienated from Israel by the late 1960s.

On the other side of the coin, successful Arab diplomacy played an important role in this shift. After the OAU conference in May 1963, Arab states moderated their pressures for formal resolutions condemning Israel. Egypt, which had tense relations and no diplomatic ties with Francophone states, started working for improvement in these relations and began diplomatic

exchanges in 1963–64. Whereas Arab states had previously been unconcerned with Israeli activities in Africa, this changed in 1967, and the Arabs launched a diplomatic offensive headed by King Faisal, Nasser, Boumedienne and Colonel el-Kadafi. In this diplomatic offensive, religious links with black Africa were exploited and an effective propaganda campaign was launched based on the similarities between apartheid and Zionist opposition to a multinational state. Another factor at the diplomatic level was the conciliatory policy towards Israel adopted by Mohamed Anwar el-Sadat, as manifested in his declared willingness to sign a peace treaty with Israel if it withdrew from Arab territories. From then on, Israel was the one that appeared increasingly unreasonable and intransigent. And finally there was the success of Algeria in projecting itself as a genuinely African country that was Arab at the same time. From its independence in 1962, and especially after 1965, Algiers became for African liberation movements what Cairo had been in the late 1950s, but even more so. This reinforced the school of pan-African ideology that sees the African continent as one, thus necessitating support for Egypt against Israel.

Several additional factors could be advanced to explain the change in the policies of black African states. In some instances, the break with Israel was influenced by the goal of trying to appear more radical to domestic groups (Niger, Mali, Congo-Brazzaville and Ethiopia). In other cases, the break was designed to ensure reduced Arab support for secessionist movements (Chad and Ethiopia). In Uganda dissatisfaction with relations with Israel and anxiety over the degree of Israeli presence in the country seem to have been important factors. And finally, 'The generally hostile international climate created by most of the major powers, including the Soviet Union, and of the Third World, may have been a background factor affecting African willingness to break diplomatic relations with Israel.'[25] To sum up, the change in black African policies was the result of domestic, subsystemic and systemic factors.

Given the link that Arab states themselves made between Israeli occupation of Arab territories and racism and colonialism in southern Africa, it would be surprising if another major aspect of the policies of black African states towards the Arab world were not the goal of securing Arab support in the fight against racism and colonialism in Africa. Little or no difficulty was encountered in this area, for

> most of the Arab world has no diplomatic relations with South Africa and Rhodesia . . . most of the Arab world has treated South Africa as a common enemy for many years. Arab countries like Algeria, Egypt and Libya were supporting black liberation movements in southern Africa years before black Africa recognized the Palestinians as a people with a grievance.[26]

Arab support for the liberation struggle in Africa was formalized at the Arab heads' of state conference in Algiers in November 1973. The conference called on Arab states that had not yet done so to break diplomatic ties with Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia; and an oil embargo against these countries was also decided upon. And finally, increased aid to African liberation movements was promised. Similar resolutions have been adopted in subsequent conferences of Arab states, notably the Arab League summit conference in Cairo in March 1976.[27]

The pinnacle of Afro-Arab co-operation was attained at the Afro-Arab Summit Conference at Cairo in March 1977. The call for the conference had been made at the Arab heads' of state meeting in Algiers in November 1973. Sixty states were present at Cairo, and among the delegates were thirty heads of state, six vice-presidents, eight heads of government and sixteen foreign ministers. The purpose of the conference was to elaborate the framework for Afro-Arab co-operation. Later we shall examine the economic decisions of the conference, but for the moment our concern is with the political decisions.

The political declaration adopted at the conference called for a strengthening of the fight against imperialism and support for the struggles of the people of Palestine, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Djibouti and the Comoros. Africans and Arabs agreed to support each other in their struggle, and both sides were called upon to search for new ways of politically and economically isolating Israel, Rhodesia and South Africa as long as they continued their racist, aggressive and expansionist policies. A total boycott of these three countries was agreed upon, and Israel was condemned for its policy of settlements in Arab-occupied territories and called upon to facilitate the solution of the Middle East conflict. The African states renewed their pledge not to re-establish ties with Israel so long as all Arab-occupied territories had not been evacuated. And finally, a Libyan proposal condemning the use of mercenaries was adopted. In a concrete and spectacular gesture, the Arab states promised $14 million to African liberation movements during the next three years.[28]

But the Cairo Afro-Arab conference in March 1977 did more than lay down the principles for Afro-Arab political co-operation. It institutionalized this co-operation by creating several organs: (a) The Conference of Heads of State and Government, which will meet every three years; (b) the Council of Foreign Ministers, which will meet every eighteen months; (c) the Permanent Commission made up of twelve African and twelve Arab states plus the General Secretaries of the Arab League and the OAU, which will meet twice a year; (d) eight specialized Commissions in various domains; and (e) a Co-ordinating Committee to oversee the execution of decisions.[29]

Adoption of the above political principles and the creation of institutions for reinforcing Afro-Arab co-operation signified the entry into maturity of Afro-Arab relations. It clearly did not mean that differences and problems

had disappeared, quite the contrary; but there were at least principles and institutions for confining these conflicts.

The main weakness was that Afro-Arab political co-operation was limited in scope, being restricted to the struggle against Israel and racism and colonialism in southern Africa. Problems of decolonization in Africa were now limited to Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. It is generally known that black African countries are far from unanimous in their views as to what policies should be adopted towards these three areas and it is perfectly sensible to hope and expect positive developments in the near future in Zimbabwe and Namibia. Equally, ever since Sadat visited Israel in November 1977, the solid Arab front on the Middle East conflict has been disrupted. What is to serve as the bedrock of Afro-Arab political co-operation when the problems of the Middle East and southern Africa are solved or when splits develop within each group as to policies to be adopted towards the conflicts in their respective regions? In the contemporary international system, the economic domain appears to be the most fertile area for Afro-Arab co-operation. Significant developments have also occurred in this domain in recent years.

In the 1960s, conventions were signed between African and Arab countries covering wide areas, such as commerce, technical co-operation and financial aid. Egypt and Algeria in particular have looked towards Africa as potential markets for the new industries they are creating, whereas Iraq, Syria and Jordan have manifested little economic interest in black Africa. Yet one is forced to recognize that Afro-Arab trade has made very little progress in recent years; it still hovers around 2 per cent of total trade. This is not surprising when it is recalled that both sides are heavily linked commercially with the West and know little of each other's markets. Aspects of production and consumption in the African and Arab regions are also barriers to significant trade between them, at least in the near future. Thus Afro-Arab economic relations lie mainly in the area of foreign aid.

As noted earlier, Arab countries like the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were major aid donors even before the October 1973 war, but black African countries received comparatively little of this aid. Since late 1973 a major policy goal of African states has been to increase the amount and improve the conditions of the aid they receive from the Arab countries. What triggered this change in policy was the increase in the price of oil in late 1973.

According to OECD estimates, Third World countries had to pay $11 billion more for oil imports in 1974 and $10 billion more for their imports from industrial countries than they did in 1973. In the case of Africa, the increase in the cost of oil was estimated at $1 billion. Such increases in the price of imports could not help but have serious economic consequences for many African countries, and some of them, like Kenya, Zambia, Zaire and

the United Republic of Tanzania, were forced to impose stringent austerity measures. Despite this, Third World countries in general and African countries in particular solidly backed the increase in oil prices, which they hailed as a breakthrough and a model to be followed in changing the relations between the developed and the developing worlds.[80] Henry Kissinger's charge that the increase in oil prices was responsible for having 'shattered' the development plans of many countries was rejected and the blame was placed instead on a faulty economic system that had persistently neglected development needs and underpaid Third World countries for their exports.

Support for OPEC did not, however, prevent the African states from trying to reduce their burdens with the help of Arab aid, which they felt was mandated on grounds of solidarity. The first step was taken at an emergency meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers, 19–21 November 1973. Co-operation between the OAU and the Arab League was called for, and a committee of seven was created to work out the details. A special committee was created to study the impact of oil prices on the economy of African states. At their meeting in Algiers from 26 to 28 November, the Arab heads of state accepted the principle of creating the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA) and agreed to adopt special measures to ensure the supply of oil to African states. Aid to the Sahel countries affected by the drought was also promised.

The two sides met in Cairo in January 1974, at which time the African states made two demands. One was for the purchase of oil at discount prices and the other was for the creation of a bank for the economic and industrial development of Africa. The Arabs rejected the request for special prices for oil but agreed to ensure that African states got all the oil they needed, provided the oil was not exported to third countries and that African countries buying oil from non-Arab countries continued to do so in order that oil might not be diverted from non-Arab producers to countries facing the oil embargo. An Arab Special Fund for Africa was created with an initial capital of $200 million for the purpose of granting long-term low-interest loans (1 per cent) to African states to finance their purchase of oil. Also agreed to was the creation of the ABEDA, with an initial capital of $231 million, the objective of which was to promote the development of Africa and encourage Arab investments in Africa. Finally, there were the Arab Technical Assistance Fund for Africa, with a capital of $15 million, and the Arab-African Bank, with a capital of $25 million.

In addition to the above financial organizations, created in early 1974 for the purpose of providing multilateral aid specifically to African countries, attention must be drawn to many other multilateral or bilateral agencies already existing or which were subsequently created and to which African countries could also turn for aid. Notable among these is the OPEC Special Fund, the

Islamic Development Bank, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, which extended its activities to Africa in 1974, the Saudi Development Fund, and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, which also extended its operations to Africa in 1974.[31] Thus the least one can say is that by early 1974 many bilateral and multilateral agencies had been created by the Arabs to handle their African programmes. This, however, did not prevent dissatisfaction and conflicts over these programmes. The main complaints formulated by African countries against the Arab aid programme related to the amount and management of the programme.

In 1974 OPEC aid, which is largely Arab, amounted to $3,446 million, or 2.01 per cent of the GNP of the OPEC states. For 1977, OPEC aid was estimated to be $5.741 million. OPEC aid as a percentage of GNP rose to 2.71 per cent in 1975 but then decreased to 2.29 in 1976 and 2.01 in 1977.[32] OPEC, meaning mostly the Arab countries, is therefore a major donor of aid, and its member states give far more of their GNP as aid than the OECD countries do. However, bilateral aid as a percentage of total aid was 86 per cent in 1974, 80 per cent in 1975, and 81 per cent in 1976, and by 1977 it was only 66 per cent.[33] Table 2 gives some idea about the destination of this aid. It is clear that the bulk of the aid goes to the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa, even more than Table 2 indicates because aid to Mauritania and Sudan are included in the aid given to Africa south of the Sahara. Aid to these two countries as a percentage of the total aid given to Africa south of the Sahara was 32 per cent in 1974, 50 per cent in 1975, and 77 per cent in 1976. The major African complaint has therefore been that Arab aid goes mostly to other Arab countries and that black African states receive very little of it.

Another criticism made by Africans of Arab aid is that even when such

TABLE 2. Geographical distribution of OPEC bilateral aid ($ millions)

	1974		1975		1976		1977	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
North Africa	883.27	29	2 288.66	46	1 078.11	24	996.07	26
Africa south of the Sahara	251.95	8	401.43	8	455.15	10	453.69	12
Middle East	1 114.38	37	1 225.14	25	1 337.44	30	1 182.78	31

Total OPEC bilateral aid (in millions) was $3,015.15 in 1974, $4,946.76 in 1975, $4,532.79 in 1976, and $3,763.75 in 1977.

Source: Calculated from OECD, *Coopération pour le développement. Examen 1978*, pp. 286–7, Paris, OECD, 1978.

aid is given to black African states, most of it goes to Muslim countries. Between 1974 and 1976, the black African states that received the largest amounts of aid were Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Uganda, and especially Somalia, which received $42.43 million in 1974, $72.91 million in 1975, and $33.34 million in 1976. And finally, Arab aid is criticized for being too slow in releasing funds.[34]

Already in 1974, African states were seeking to modify the Arab aid structure. The OAU, for example, recommended in June 1974 that management of the Arab Special Fund for Africa be transferred to the African Development Bank, which agreed to manage the Fund. This proposal was rejected, however, by the Arabs, who transferred management of the fund to the ABEDA in March 1976.

Africans and Arabs started meeting regularly as from February 1975 in the Committee of Twenty-four, which met alternately in Addis Ababa and Cairo. By July a draft declaration on a joint programme of action had been approved, and the next meeting was scheduled for April 1976 in Dakar. Differences between the two sides were, however, not resolved at the Dakar conference, and another meeting was held in Lusaka in January 1977. At the Lusaka conference, the Africans rallied round a Tanzanian proposal whose basic thrust was an increase in Arab aid and a transfer of the management of these funds to Africa hands. Thus the proposal called for an increase of Arab aid by $2,500 million in five years, most of which was to go to the African Development Bank. The Arab countries present in Lusaka refused, however, to take a position on the Tanzanian proposal, on the grounds that they did not have a mandate to make decisions.

Thus shortly before the Afro-Arab summit in March 1977 it appeared that no agreement would be reached on economic co-operation between the two sides. The Arab countries met by themselves shortly before the opening of the Afro-Arab summit to work out a joint response, and Egypt and Tunisia played an active role in trying to reconcile the position of the two sides. As a result, the Arabs were able to offer the following to the African countries when the conference opened: they would (a) increase grants to the African Development Bank and to the ABEDA; (b) encourage national and multinational institutions to give help to projects proposed by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA); (c) encourage Arab private investors through a system of guarantees; (d) increase trade through the granting of reciprocal preferences.

This offer was accepted even though no figures were given. On 7 March, however, Saudi Arabia announced the amount of aid it intended to grant, and it was followed the next day by Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. All told, these four countries agreed to grant $1,446 million during the next three years. Saudi Arabia was to provide $1,000 million, Kuwait $240 million, the United Arab Emirates $136 million, and Qatar $70 million.

Of this total sum $1,116 million, or 77 per cent, was to be in the form of bilateral aid, and the remainder was to be channelled as follows: ABEDA, $180 million (12 per cent); Arab Special Fund for Africa, $80 million (6 per cent); African Development Bank's African Development Fund, $37 million (3 per cent); and $33 million (2 per cent) for feasibility study projects.[35] Thus while African countries succeeded in securing increased commitments of Arab aid, they failed in their efforts at having the management of this aid transferred to African hands.

In both the economic and the political domains, the Afro-Arab summit conference in March 1977 represented a move away from ad hoc to institutionalized Afro-Arab co-operation. In that sense, therefore, one phase of Afro-Arab relations ended and a new one began. It is too early to assess how adequately this new form of co-operation has functioned. In the concluding sections of this essay, we shall therefore limit ourselves to identifying the potential hazards in the way of Afro-Arab co-operation.

A major danger in the future of Afro-Arab co-operation is the attempt of one side to try to dominate the other. The Arabs have been accused of trying to dominate both the OAU and the African Development Bank, as well as the African group in the United Nations and other international bodies and conferences. There are also charges of Arab intervention in black Africa. The role of Morocco during the Shaba and Benin invasions created uneasiness, and there are anxieties that Egypt aspires towards a similar interventionist role, in collaboration with Western powers, under the guise of trying to counter the spread of communism in Africa. Unless extreme caution is shown in these areas, the spectre of Arab 'imperialism' and 'expansionism' aiming at the 'recolonization' of the black people of Africa will be raised, with serious detriment to Afro-Arab relations.

The Arab countries must also be careful to avoid the charge that they draw a sharp distinction between Muslim countries and people, whom they support, and Christians, to whom they are indifferent. Arab support for the Amin regime and the attack upon the Tanzanian-backed movement that overthrew him has puzzled many black Africans.[36] It is widely believed that the support for Amin was due solely to the fact that he and his major domestic backers were Muslims. Libyan support for the Chad secessionist movement is also seen in this light, and, as noted earlier, the Arabs are accused of favouring countries with large Muslim populations in their aid programmes to black Africa. Understandable as it may be that the Arabs should be drawn towards Muslims and Muslim countries in black Africa, it should not be forgotten that, as shown in Table 1, there are only eight black African countries with a Muslim population of 50 per cent or more. Leaning too far towards Muslims will therefore isolate the Arab countries from a large number of black African states.

Thirdly, the Arab countries must be careful how far they push intra-Arab rivalries and conflicts on African states south of the Sahara. Arab countries, like other countries, have national and regional interests.[37] But it must not be forgotten that, as we mentioned earlier, one of the reasons why African states were hesitant about Afro-Arab co-operation was the fear that African countries might be dragged into Arab conflicts, thus diverting their attention from more salient problems.

Another point that deserves attention is the fate of Africans in countries that are largely Arab. It is true that many black African countries were sympathetic to the blacks in southern Sudan, and some supported the uprising. There are substantial numbers of blacks in Mauritania, and by some accounts Blacks are already a majority in that country. The problem of southern Sudan has been formally solved, while there are signs of increasing African-Arab tension in Mauritania. The ability of Africans and Arabs to live harmoniously in these two countries will have an important effect on Afro-Arab co-operation.

And finally, at the economic level, the Arab countries must recognize that attempts at imposing a neo-colonial division of labour on black Africa will be strongly resented and resisted. It is understandable that countries like Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia should look towards black Africa as potential markets for the industries they are creating. But this is likely to succeed and be mutually beneficial only if the Arabs are willing to stimulate the industrial development of Africa and buy manufactured goods from black Africa.

On the African side, a major change that is called for is a moderation of the economic help they expect to receive from the Arab countries. The Arabs point out that they cannot ensure by themselves the economic development of Africa and that they also have responsibilities to their Arab brethren who are poor. In this, they are on secure ground. The fact that most Arab aid goes to 'Muslim countries' should be received with greater understanding, especially since most of them are Sahel countries that rank among the poorest in the Third World. Unrealistically high expectations are likely to be unfilled and lead to acrimony and resentment.

The somewhat naive view that Afro-Arab relations can be isolated from so-called extraneous intra-Arab conflicts also needs re-examination. In the real world, problems and issues are linked, and Afro-Arab relations cannot be restricted solely to those areas desired by black African states. The African countries will have to learn how to live in what is undoubtedly a messy world and try to contain the damage.

In the final analysis, the key problem that faces Afro-Arab relations in the future is how to convert an alliance directed against third parties into a community of shared interests and values. This is by no means an easy task, as the recent history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) teaches us. Geographical, historical and socio-cultural links provide solid

ground on which to build a community. But in the final analysis, the major impetus and foundation must be that both Arab and African countries occupy the same position in the international division of labour, namely that of the periphery. The test of Afro-Arab statesmanship is the extent to which these countries come to recognize this fact and take concrete measures to build a real Afro-Arab community founded on equality, mutual gain and mutual sympathy. The foundation stone for this was laid in Cairo in March 1977. Efforts must now be directed at constructing the remaining structures.

Notes

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5. Immanuel Wallerstein, 'The Three Stages of African Involvement in the World-Economy', in Peter C. W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds.), *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa*, Beverly Hills and London, Sage Publications, 1976, p. 32.
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7. Lucia Bernardini, 'Les relations arabo-africaines avant la conférence du Caire, *Maghreb*, No. 76, April–June 1977, p. 76.
8. François Constantin and Christian Coulon, 'Le développement des relations entre l'Afrique noire et le monde Arabe en 1972', *Année Africaine, 1972*, published by the Centre d'Étude d'Afrique Noire de Bordeaux, p. 284.
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14. Adeoyo Akinsanya, 'The Afro-Arab Alliance: Dream or Reality?' *African Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 301, October 1976, p. 513.
15. Ibid., p. 515.
16. Samuel Decalo, 'Israel and Africa', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3, November 1967, p. 389.
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pp. 557–76. Of 176 resolutions and declarations dealing with foreign affairs, 94 dealt with colonialism, apartheid and racial discrimination, 64 with Africa's relations with the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies, and 9 with the Middle East.

18. Albert Bourgi, 'Afrique noire—monde arabe : de la solidarité politique à la coopération institutionnelle', *Revue Française d'Études Politiques Africaines*, No. 132, December 1976, p. 24.
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25. Gitelson, op. cit., p. 478.
26. Mazrui, op. cit., pp. 738–9.
27. Bourgi, op. cit., p. 26.
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32. Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économique (OCDE), *Coopération pour le Développement : Examen 1978*, Paris, OECD, 1978, p. 167.
33. Calculated from Ibid., pp. 286–7.
34. Nabya Asfahany, 'La coopération Arabo-Africaine et le sommet du Caire', *Maghreb*, No. 76, April–June 1977, pp. 78–9.
35. O'Cornesse, op. cit., p. 17.
36. See the interview with Gaffar Mohammed Nimeiri in *Newsweek*, International Edition, 11 June 1979, p. 60.
37. For the conflict shaping up in the eastern half of the Arab world see Fouad Ajami, 'Stress in the Arab Triangle', *Foreign Policy*, No. 29, Winter 1977/78), pp. 90–108. The rivalry between Egyptians and Libyans is well known.

The Arabs and the political economy of Third World solidarity

Ali A. Mazrui

In November 1975 I gave a lecture at the University of Baghdad. In my speech I argued against distributing Arab aid to Third World countries on the basis of either ideological empathy or religious affinity. I argued that the entire Third World required considerable solidarity in facing up to the legacy of injustice in the world as a whole. I certainly disagreed with the notion that Arab aid should be given first to fellow Arabs, secondly to fellow Muslims, and only thirdly to other Third World countries. I argued that this would split up the Third World into ethnic and religious camps instead of presenting a united front against the industrialized powers. I discovered in Baghdad that my critics from the left disagreed with my assertion that ideology should not play a part. But the most hostile of my critics were from the Islamic right, who regarded the proposition that they should not give priority to Muslims in the distribution of aid, not only as totally unacceptable but almost as a declaration of holy war. I remember a young man who felt particularly angry about it. He was arguing with the dean who had introduced me to the meeting. My knowledge of Iraqi Arabic was, to say the least, rudimentary. The dean, very politely, explained that the student was saying how much they had enjoyed my lecture. I knew very well that the young man was not saying that. He was about to storm out. I called him back and was offering him a paper I had written. At first he would not even accept the paper, he was so incensed. His professors were begging him to accept it. In the end the young man accepted it. But what was dramatized to me by the incident was the depth of feeling displayed by that young Muslim fundamentalist. His position was not symptomatic of the views of the Iraqi Government, which was secular and was far more likely to agree with me in that particular debate. From the religious angle, that young man represented a deep conviction that distribution of the new Arab wealth should, to some extent, be influenced by the solidarity of religion.

But this trend had to be seen in the more general context of the role of culture in economic relations. Let us first examine this issue in a comparative perspective—with a tripartite focus on Western, socialist and OPEC economic aid.

Culture in economic relations

Culture features in different stages and at different levels of the whole process through which foreign aid[1] is either requested or transmitted. In this paper we shall deal first with the role of culture in motivating aid relations. Secondly, we shall address ourselves to the cultural content of aid. Thirdly, we shall examine the cultural constraints on aid. Fourthly, we shall turn to the rules and conditions that are supposed to regulate aid relations, and see how culture affects these rules and conditions. And finally we hope to explore the general cultural consequences of foreign aid.

Aid is given and the recipients are chosen on the basis of a variety of considerations. But these multiple considerations might themselves be grouped under three general areas of motivation—charity, solidarity and self-interest. Of these three, self-interest is constant, especially in relations between nation-states. But the balance between the other two—charity and solidarity—is culturally and ideologically relative.

The charitable impulse is perhaps particularly strong in liberal political cultures. After all, charity has for a long time been regarded as one of the answers to the kind of maldistribution brought about by capitalism. The private-enterprise system recognized that poverty existed and might even expand in scale. But, at least in its initial phases, modern capitalism coupled private enterprise with private charity as a mutually reinforcing system of values. Today the United States is the leading capitalist country in the world; it also has the most elaborate system of charitable foundations and institutions. Fund-raising for different causes has attained new levels of sophistication in American society. In the course of the twentieth century the state, even in the most doctrinaire capitalist societies, has had to undertake much of the burden of welfare, but for generations this approach was resisted in favour of reliance on the private conscience of the affluent. Even today a suspicion of government-financed welfare schemes runs deep in many Western societies, and the habit of looking to private charity as the solution to poverty dies hard. It is because of these factors that liberal political culture appears to be particularly responsive to foreign aid as an area of charity.

In reality, especially in the case of official aid from one government to another, the charitable consideration is diluted by the other imperative of self-interest. Aid is often tied to make sure that it helps the trade of the donor, or serves other purposes favourable to the donor. But there is little doubt that charity as an idea plays a part in influencing liberals in Western societies in their dealing with the poorer countries of the world.

A major source of this subculture of private charity is of course Christianity itself. The notion of dying on the cross as a form of sacrifice, combined with the long tradition of Christian churches as havens for the poor

and the desolate, has helped to condition at least some sectors of public opinion in the West in directions that are on occasion responsive to the policy of helping the poorer countries. If Max Weber[2] is correct in his argument that the birth of capitalism was itself linked to the Protestant Reformation and certain Christian values, it is not surprising that an ideology of private enterprise should interact with a Christian morality of charity.

Against the background of these normative antecedents, it is not surprising that Western aid—as compared with aid from other parts of the world—scores quite high on sheer charity and tolerance. Robert McNamara's call in June 1978 for aid to Viet Nam was an evocative illustration of this line of thinking. Here was McNamara, who as the American Secretary of Defense had participated in the decision to bomb and devastate North Viet Nam and greatly undermine its agricultural capacity; now, as head of the World Bank, he became charitable enough and moderate enough to champion the cause of his former adversary. Enlightened self-interest in such situations reveals both a high level of calculating sophistication and a relatively low level of vengefulness.

Also characteristic of the liberal political culture of the West is a relatively moderate commitment to solidarity. This is linked to the ideological toleration of plurality characteristic of liberalism at home. As Western motives for aid-giving have become more sophisticated, ideological divergence on the part of the potential recipient has become a less relevant factor in determining the transaction. McNamara's proclaimed aim to help Hanoi is therefore illustrative of this trend towards enlightened liberalism.

This is not to say that Western policy-makers are entirely indifferent to considerations of solidarity with those who share with them a language. France's readiness to extend support to President Mobutu Sese Seko was legitimized partly on the grounds that Zaire was nominally the second largest French-speaking nation in the world after France. French readiness to lend support to other French-speaking countries is also an aspect of this level of cultural solidarity. Considerations of cultural solidarity in British aid are less pronounced, though the idea of the Commonwealth as an organizing principle for certain forms of aid priority continues to have some relevance. Sweden's interest in the United Republic of Tanzania is also partly influenced by a moderate level of ideological solidarity. Many Swedes see President Julius Nyerere as a social democrat of a kind, seeking to achieve a humane society comparable to the accomplishment of the Swedes themselves. But Sweden is also very liberal in its toleration of plurality in the world, and has often given aid more for reasons of charity than for reasons of normative solidarity.

On the whole, then, we may conclude that Western aid scores high on charity and also high on self-interest, but is only moderately influenced by motives of cultural or ideological comradeship.

What about aid from socialist countries like the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Cuba and China?

Like Western aid, socialist aid includes a strong component of self-interest. But unlike Western aid, aid from socialist countries scores low on straight charity. This is partly because of a sociological distrust of charity as an answer to maldistribution. Some of the same considerations that have made charity so acceptable to capitalists have made it dubious to the socialists. This is certainly one major reason why Soviet economic aid to the Third World is strikingly more modest in volume than Western aid. A related consideration concerns the socialist worry that charity can be a form of hand-out that results in incorporation in the Establishment and deradicalization. Foreign aid in the economic domain must therefore not be allowed to become an obstacle to the emergence of revolutionary consciousness among the workers. Foreign aid even when given by a socialist country has to be handled carefully lest it become an ally of false consciousness and reaction.

But while socialist aid scores low in terms of charity, for reasons which make socialist sense, it scores high on the measurement of ideological solidarity. Whenever possible the aid is designed to help promote 'progressive change', defined in ideological terms. Of course, there have been times when Moscow has had to tolerate the repression of communists by someone like the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser, and still pour Soviet aid into Nasser's Egypt. The element of self-interest and higher political goals may all too often prevail against considerations of ideological solidarity with oppressed Egyptian leftists. But since aid policy is never determined on the level of one consideration alone, we have to allow for situations of contradiction and paradox. On balance, however, it is clear that the promotion of the interests of 'progressive forces' in Third World countries is one of the major manifestations of motives of solidarity in socialist aid.

Cuban aid to Africa has been more clearly committed to considerations of ideological solidarity than Soviet aid on its own. Soviet aid over the years has gone to a variety of regimes, some of which could by no stretch of the imagination be regarded as 'progressive'. There have been Soviet projects in countries ranging from Uganda to Sierra Leone, from Mozambique to Ghana. Because the degree of Soviet involvement in Africa is more widespread than that of the Cubans, the pattern of Soviet aid is more complex. The theme of ideological solidarity is clear in the case of Cuba. Curiously enough, it is clearer still in the case of the German Democratic Republic, whose economic involvement in Africa has been selectively and competently carried out in a manner that has combined high considerations of self-interest with high considerations of 'progressive comradeship'.

Aid from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has often had a marked component of cultural solidarity. The Arab members

of the organization tend to be particularly influenced by considerations of helping, first, fellow Arabs; secondly, fellow Muslims; and thirdly, other Third World countries, provided there is some evidence of general sympathy with the 'Arab cause'.

The names of the different funds are themselves indicative of the salience of cultural solidarity. There is the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, established in 1961, with an authorized capital currently of $3.45 billion and total potential lending resources estimated at approximately $11.5 billion. The Fund awaits projects put forward by Arab governments. Then there is the Saudi Fund for Development, established in 1974, with an authorized capital of $2.9 billion and with total potential lending resources of the same amount for the time being. Although the Arab world still views aids under this fund in effect as charity, its orientation is broader than that of the Kuwaitis. One example is the loan of $35 million for port development in the Republic of Korea. Thirdly, there is the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, established in 1971 with an authorized capital of $512.8 million and potential lending resources estimated at approximately $1.93 billion. This fund has already broadened its concept of solidarity. Until 1974 its lending was limited to Arab countries, but now extends to other developing countries in Asia and Africa and to all Islamic countries. It is still not permitted by its charter to lend to Latin America; however,[3] it was not until 1976 that the first loans for non-Arab countries were made, upon the conclusion of agreements with Bangladesh, Malaysia, India, Mali and a few others. Aid to Africa gathered momentum in 1977: 21.4 per cent of Abu Dhabi loans approved during that year were for black Africa and 26.5 per cent for Arab Africa. Other Arab countries outside the African continent received an additional 37.8 per cent. The total that went to other parts of Asia accounted for 14.3 per cent. The relevance of the solidarity principle operates in clear terms, but there are different levels of solidarity important to policy-makers in Abu Dhabi. Since 1974 Arab countries have received 71.7 per cent of its loans, followed by non-Arab African countries (10.9 per cent) and Asian countries (17.4 per cent).

Then there is a whole area of multilateral lending where, once again, the principle of solidarity interacts with that of self-interest. The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, with an authorized capital of $1.3 billion and potential lending resources of $4.14 billion, is the oldest, largest and busiest of all the multilateral development institutions based on the Arab world. It is also the only fund that lends exclusively to Arab countries. But there is also solidarity with black Africa in the more recent activities of Arab financial institutions. Especially noteworthy is the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, with its headquarters in Khartoum. Established in 1974, with an authorized capital of $392.25 million, and with total potential

lending resources authorized at $1 billion, this particular Arab bank is the only Arab fund that concentrates entirely on Africa. It lends only to the non-Arab African countries, which makes it at the same time the only Arab fund that does no lending to Arab countries.

The Islamic Development Bank is, almost by definition, based on religious solidarity. It was established in 1975, and has its headquarters in Jidda, Saudi Arabia. Its authorized capital is $2.4 billion, with potential lending resources authorized at approximately the same amount. In the case of this particular fund, the imperative of self-interest is diluted by that part of the *sharia* (Islamic law) that prohibits the taking of interest. A formula has been devised to cover at least the cost of administering loans—'loan charges'—but even this form of charging comes uncomfortably close to being 'usury', according to some of the more orthodox Muslims. The membership of the Islamic Development Bank extends from Indonesia in the east to Senegal in the west, with voting power inevitably weighted in favour of those Muslim countries making the largest contributions.

A different basis of solidarity emerges from the OPEC Special Fund, established in Vienna with a subscribed capital of approximately $1.6 billion. The principle of solidarity operating here is that of 'Third World solidarity', but there is the important additional consideration of self-interest because of OPEC's need for Third World support at times of possible confrontation with Western consumers of oil. The fund draws most of its resources from Arab countries. It gives balance-of-payments support as well as project loans to Third World countries, but requires those receiving such support to spend equal amounts of their own currencies on development projects.

We have discussed OPEC aid partly because this kind of aid provides some of the clearest illustrations of the operation of the principle of solidarity in aid and loan transactions, as contrasted with the principle of straight charity on the one hand, and straight self-interest on the other. Cultural factors are particularly relevant in defining the basis of solidarity—be those factors shared religion, shared language, shared ideology, or shared class consciousness across international boundaries and in a global context. But culture also affects attitudes to questions of charity, and helps to condition one's view of self-interest.

The cultural context of aid

Apart from the cultural impact on aid motivation, there is also the question of culture as embodied in aid itself. Here we shall address ourselves, first, to direct cultural aid; secondly, to the cultural content of economic aid; and thirdly, to the cultural content of military aid.

Direct cultural aid is in turn designed either to consolidate cultural

solidarity or to expand that solidarity. For example, providing free copies of the Bible for a country that is already Christian is a case of consolidating Christian solidarity; but providing such literary aids to a country that has yet to be converted to Christianity is a case of aid motivated by evangelical expansionism. Free copies of the Koran from, say, the Arab world to an African country could either be motivated by a desire to consolidate an Islamic presence in the receiving country or to expand such a presence. Money for the building of mosques or Koranic schools is usually a case of direct cultural aid.

OPEC as a Muslim organization

Behind all these developments is the link between the political resurrection of Islam and the rise of the Arab world. Underlying the rise of the Arab world is OPEC and its entry into the mainstream of economic diplomacy.

OPEC in composition is an overwhelmingly Muslim institution. The largest oil-exporting country, as we know, is Saudi Arabia, the custodian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina and one of the most fundamentalist of the Muslim countries on the world scene today. The second largest oil-exporting country is Iran, another major Muslim country, perhaps with potential for considerable expansion as an influential power in world politics. If one regards Indonesia as the most populous Muslim country after the collapse of the old Pakistan, then Indonesia as member of OPEC is also part of the Islamic composition of OPEC.

The Gulf States are most of them very small, but precisely because they are small and possess enormous financial resources, they have surpluses capable of being mobilized for political and economic projects in different parts of the world.

Black African members of OPEC at the moment are Gabon and Nigeria. In Gabon we have as leader a convert to Islam, President Omar Bongo. In Nigeria we have an African country that best encompasses within itself the three parts of the soul of Africa—the indigenous, the Euro-Christian and the Islamic. All three forces are strong in Nigeria. What is more, the Nigerian Islamic factor has been growing in national influence since independence.

Viewing OPEC as a whole, it may be said that it is virtually two-thirds 'Islamic' in oil production and over two-thirds in number of states. Thus the emergence of OPEC and petroleum on the world scene signify the beginning of the political resurrection of Islam.

A related issue is the nature of the regimes that are in power in those resource-rich Muslim countries. It so happens that the country with the largest known reserves, Saudi Arabia, is also the most Islamic in tradition. And it was also true of Iran[4] under a monarchical system in a conservative

Irano-Islamic context. On the Arabian (Persian) Gulf there are also traditionalist rulers. There is a tendency to regard this as a cost in the equation. But it is possible to examine it as a benefit in global terms. Influence within OPEC does not lie merely in Westernized or relatively secular Muslim countries like Algeria. It lies even more among countries whose Islam has been less diluted by Westernism.

From the point of view of the Muslim world as a whole there is now a dialectic between the underpopulated but very rich and Islamically traditionalist countries on one side, and the more populous, more secular and less-endowed Muslim countries on the other. This dialectic between resource-poor populations on one side and resource-rich traditionalists on the other could change the balance between the forces of secularism and the forces of traditionalism in the years ahead.

The Palestinian question in this domain has again been a catalyst of radicalization. The idea of Saudi Arabia applying the oil weapon against the United States would have been inconceivable without an issue like Palestine and Jerusalem. So again a traditionalist country, very pro-Western, could, under the stress of war and anxiety over the future of the Palestinian question, be prepared to invoke a political weapon that would not have been readily invoked by such a regime in other circumstances.

In looking at the political resurrection of Islam one must therefore once again add the Palestinian factor as part of the totality of the picture.

It happens that Israel was created in the nick of time. After another ten years it would have been virtually impossible to create such a state. At the time Israel was created, where was the Third World on the world scene? It was mainly under colonialism. Pakistan, India and Burma were just emerging into formal independence; China was just about to experience a communist revolution; Africa, except for one or two countries, was still under colonial rule, and most of the Arab world was under regimes that were still neo-colonialist in orientation. Decisions were being taken in a world body in New York that was far less representative than it became in the 1960s.

Now imagine a vote to create Israel taken in 1957, the year of Ghana's independence, or in 1960, when seventeen new African states became members of the United Nations. Clearly the pattern of voting by 1960 would have been drastically different from what it was in 1947.

Secondly, by 1960 the Soviet Union's original inclination to vote for the creation of Israel would have been changed by the entry of the new participants in world politics drawn from the Third World. By the 1960s it would have been impossible for the Soviet Union to support the creation of Israel at the expense of the Palestinians. By the 1970s it would have been impossible even for the United States to support the creation of Israel, as distinct from its protection, at the expense of the Arabs.

Israel managed to be created just in time—in the 1940s soon after the war, with all the atmosphere of that war still lingering, with all the memories of Hitler and the martyrdom of the Jews under him, and a situation when the Third World was not a factor in the grand design of global policy-making.

Towards the future

Now that we are confronted with this situation, we have to calculate what it means for the world in the remaining decades of this century.

It seems to me that there are positive elements in the problem of Palestine from a Third World perspective. The problem has indeed helped to create greater internationalism among the Arabs. One question that now arises is whether, if the Palestine problem were to be solved tomorrow, the Arabs would become more isolationist. Would there be an Arab retreat, a lack of interest in what happens in Africa or what happens in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Latin America? One scenario before us is therefore the self-isolation of the Arab world if the Palestine question is solved and peace is restored in the Middle East.

Another scenario is the 'northernization' of the Arab world; that is to say the Arab world increasingly regarding itself as part of the developed northern hemisphere and not as part of the underdeveloped southern hemisphere. Again the question before us is whether the solution of the Middle East problem would lead in one of these two directions. Would the Arab world become more isolationist or more northern-oriented in its preoccupations?

We do not know. We do know that for the time being the fate of Palestine is a factor behind Arab interest in, say, Africa. It is conceivable that without the Middle Eastern crises many Arab countries—not all of them by any means—would have no interest at all in Africa south of the Sahara. Once again the issue of needing allies on major issues of this type leads to Third World solidarity.

As for the future of the Muslim world, there is the apparent Arab *rapprochement* with Iran, which may or may not be significant. It depends upon whether it is lasting or temporary. The solution of the Kurdish question is only one factor. But if it is a lasting one, then the reconciliation between the Arabs and Iran could be one of the most significant developments for the future of Islam in the remaining decades of this century.

The reconciliation between Bangladesh and Pakistan could also be very significant for the entire Indian subcontinent and therefore for the future of the Third World as a whole.

Thirdly, are we witnessing the reassertion of Turkey after a period of almost total absorption in the Western world? Is there a new form of Ottoman resurgence that might take place? Will the Turks opt for non-alignment?

Is the partial retreat from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) just tactical or are we witnessing a more fundamental process? If we are witnessing the resurgence of Turkey in the direction of non-alignment, then we are witnessing the reintegration of Turkey into the Third World and its revival as a significant factor in the Muslim world as a whole.

As for Africa's own resurrection, new possibilities arise. Africa's most natural allies are to be found in the Black Diaspora and the Arab world. The Arabs are within Africa. So is the bulk of Arab land. Black and African states share the Organization of African Unity (OAU). This organization and the Arab League have overlapping membership. There are possibilities of exploiting this relationship to the mutual advantage of both peoples.

The Arab oil-producers have already started the strategy of economic counter-penetration into the West. It ranges from buying real estate in the United Kingdom to controlling a bank in the United States, from acquiring a considerable share in the Benz complex in the Federal Republic of Germany to the possibility of extending a loan to Italy. The whole strategy of recycling petrodollars is pregnant with the possibilities of economic counter-penetration into the West.

As a result, the West is at once eager for the petrodollars and anxious about the long-term consequences for Western economic independence.

The Arab oil-producers are already entering the business of commercial multinationals. One important multinational in Africa is Lonrho. Kuwait has entered this domain vigorously. There is indeed a risk that the oil-producers might start playing a subimperial role in Africa.

But alongside that risk is an opportunity for a new Third World alliance to counter-penetrate the West. Once again economic power and cultural influence might be linked. As we have indicated, OPEC is heavily Muslim in composition. To repeat, it includes the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia. The largest oil-exporting country is Saudi Arabia, which also happens to be the custodian of the spiritual capital of Islam, Mecca. The second largest oil-exporter is Iran, an increasingly influential Muslim country in world affairs. Two-thirds of the membership of OPEC is Muslim, and that portion constitutes also more than two-thirds of OPEC's oil reserves.

We have also pointed out that Nigeria, another member of OPEC, symbolizes the three parts of the soul of modern Africa—the Euro-Christian, the Islamic and the indigenous religious traditions. All three are active and strong in Nigeria—and Islam is already the strongest single rival to Westernism there.

The rise of OPEC in world affairs, however transient, may herald the political resurrection of Islam. Before the end of this century African Muslims will probably outnumber the Arabs and will be making a strong bid for the shared leadership of Islam. It would not be surprising if, within the next

decade, Black Muslims direct from Africa were to be seen establishing schools and hospitals in Harlem and preaching Islam to Black Americans. The funding for this Islamic counter-penetration will probably come from the oil-producers of the Arab world. But since African Islam is distinctive from Arab Islam, and carries considerable indigenous culture within it, Islamic counter-penetration into the United States would also be, in part, a process of transmitting the African indigenous perspectives as well. Islam, Africanity and Western civilization may thus find new areas of interaction.

But at least as important as Arab money for African cultural entry into the West is the sheer potential of the black American population. The United States is the second largest black nation in the world (second only to Nigeria), and it is situated in the middle of the richest and mightiest country in the twentieth century. At the moment black American influence on America's cultural and intellectual life is much more modest than, say, the influence of Jewish America. But as the poverty of black America lessens, its social and political horizons widen, and its intellectual and creative core expands, black American influence on American culture is bound to rise again. And the links between Africa, the Arab world and the Black Diaspora may in turn find new areas of creative convergence.

Conclusion

From the point of view of the Muslim world as a whole there is now a dialectic between underpopulated but very rich and Islamically traditionalist countries on one side, and more populous, more secular and less endowed Muslim countries on the other. Libya and Saudi Arabia illustrate the former; Egypt the latter. A dialectic between resource-poor populations on one side, and resource-rich traditionalists on the other could provide the kind of transformation in the Muslim world which could change the balance between the forces of secularism and the forces of traditionalism in the years ahead.

The Summit Conference of Muslim States in Lahore in 1974—the first conference of its kind—prepared the ground on a modest basis for pan-Islamic co-operation. On balance the richer Muslim countries represented at the Lahore Conference preferred bilateral aid between Muslim countries rather than the establishment and operation of an Islamic fund. There was also a meeting of the foreign ministers of Muslim countries in Jidda in 1975, and further consultations took place both in the corridors and in the formal proceedings. An Islamic fund has come into being, but the strong preference of countries like Saudi Arabia for bilateral co-operation has continued to circumscribe the movement towards a collective Islamic fund. What is clear is that substantial aid flows are already evident. By April 1975 Western aid officials—who had been sceptical about OPEC efforts in aid—were revising their estimates. In

the words of Maurice J. Williams, Chairman of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD): 'In speed and effectiveness the aid record [of OPEC countries] had been impressive.' By early 1975 that aid already accounted for a sixth of official development aid from rich to poor countries. According to these figures of the OECD Committee, the oil states gave 1.8 per cent of their gross national product in 1974, compared with 0.33 per cent in the Western industrial states and 0.21 per cent on the part of the United States.

The main aid donors among the OPEC group were Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. Partly because OPEC is largely Islamic in composition, and partly because the 'Fourth World' of poorest countries is disproportionately Muslim, about 80 per cent of aid from oil-exporting countries has gone to Muslim countries and over half of this to Arab nations. Clearly, there is here distinct evidence of the impact of pan-Islamism on aid behaviour. If that influence continues, and if the volume of aid rises significantly, Islamic communities scattered in different parts of the world are bound to acquire additional political and economic leverage.

One of the consequences might be to deepen Muslim disaffection in those countries where Muslims are underprivileged minorities. There is already evidence of increasing Muslim militancy in some countries in Asia and Africa where Muslims until recently accepted their lot as an indigent, or neglected, or outright oppressed minority. Muslims in the Philippines have been in rebellion, and have recently been able to rely on substantial moral and financial support from Arab states. Muslims in Thailand are getting increasingly restive, and are again looking to co-religionists in the Middle East for support and sympathy. In Chad, a civil war has been raging, involving Muslims in rebellion against long years of neglect and discrimination, going back to the days of French rule and to some extent worsened after independence. Eritreans have found a new will to continue the struggle for separate national identity after years of relative victimization under an Ethiopian Christian theocracy. Other countries in Asia and Africa with disaffected Muslim minorities might do well to attempt soon to modify their status and mitigate their sense of grievance. One possible alternative is an actual rebellion, which before long is bound to attract the attention of fellow Muslims elsewhere, and which could result in considerable military capability against the government that is in power.

Clearly, some of these pan-Islamic trends are potentially creative and innovative; other aspects of those trends are potentially disruptive and divisive. New power carries both the promise of increased fulfilment and the risk of political and moral excesses. The resurrection of Islam does indeed carry the seeds of both possibilities; but at the very minimum it at least once again

enriches the human cultural heritage by starting the processes of challenging the domination of Western civilization and culture over the human race.

But what does it all mean in terms of the future of the world? And how does it help to create a new international religious order? The greatest exporters of oil at the moment are Muslims, but the greatest consumers of oil are Christians. Should the history of Islam's interaction with Christianity be newly entitled 'From the Crusades to the Crude'? In other words, should this type of structural balance in which the greatest exporters of oil are Muslims and the greatest consumers of oil are Christians be forged into a link between ecumenism, as a movement of different religions, on one side, and petroleum and technology as a basis of interlocking economies, on the other? If history is now to be traced from Saladin to Shell, and we start from a confrontation between Muslims and Christians over the Holy Land in the Middle Ages to a dialectic in which the technology of Christendom needs the oil of Islam, what we have are possible new areas of structural interdependence. The link between petroleum and ecumenism for the last decades of the twentieth century could be the basis of increasing collaboration between countries whose main religious experience is Islamic and countries whose main religious experience is Christian. Included on both sides of the divide are Africa and the indigenous heritage of which Kwame Nkrumah so eloquently reminded us long before OPEC was born.

Notes

1. For a comprehensive statement on the role of culture in world affairs, consult Ali A. Mazrui, *A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective*, New York, The Free Press, 1976.
2. See Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, translated by Talcott Parsons.
3. The section of this article covering OPEC aid draws its material mainly from John Law, *Arab Aid: Who Gets it, for What and How*, pp. 68–9, New York, Chase World Information, 1978.
4. Now officially the Islamic Republic of Iran since the overthrow of the Shah.

Afro-Arab relations: misplaced optimism

Dunstan M. Wai

During the 1970s, enthusiasts for Afro-Arab solidarity emphasized the potential benefits of political co-operation and economic partnership between sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab Middle East.[1] The interest in such a relationship gained momentum among African and Arab heads of state, culminating in their summit meeting at Cairo in March 1977. It is now time to examine both the basis of the euphoria and the prospects for the development of a comprehensive and durable relationship between the two regions.

Any attempt to analyse the multifarious social, political and economic factors that provide a more or less tenable basis for future co-operation between black Africa and the Arab Middle East is a difficult exercise. The existing literature on the subject is rhetorical, fragmentary and diffuse, and many events within African and Arab countries constantly defy prediction. Yet the subject is intriguing and intellectually challenging.

In the following discussion, we shall primarily focus on issues of religious and cultural links, political co-operation and economic partnership in the context of the debate on the New International Economic Order. For such issues we postulate two scenarios—positive and negative—predicated upon the potentials for and the constraints on future Afro-Arab relations.

Religious and cross-cultural links

What similarities and differences obtain between Africans and Arabs? How well do they know and how do they view each other? What shared functional interests exist between them? Are ideological and religious cleavages functional or dysfunctional?

The history of Afro-Arab relationships dates back at least twelve centuries. There have been two lasting effects of these contacts. First, the spread of Islam in black Africa was due to the early activities of Arab slave traders and conquerors.[2] Today millions of Africans worship in the Islamic faith, and predominantly Muslim populations are found in Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Tanzania. Second, the two most widely-spoken indigenous languages in Africa—Swahili in East Africa

and Hausa in West Africa—are heavily influenced by Arabic. As Ali Mazrui explains:

> The cultural impact of the Arabs on Africa is not merely in the religious field. It is also in the linguistic field. The most important non-European languages in the African continent are Arabic, Swahili and Hausa. All three languages have been deeply influenced by Islam. Swahili is the most international of all the indigenous languages of Africa. It belongs to the Bantu family of languages and, in terms of distribution and functional potential, it has become the most important of the Bantu languages. It has already been adopted as a national language by Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, and is taken seriously in Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi. Swahili has also posed the most serious indigenous challenge to the role of the English language in Africa. The first experiment by Black Africans to make an African language capable of serving modern and scientific needs will probably be based on the use of Swahili. Perhaps up to 20 per cent of the basic vocabulary of Swahili comes from Arabic—including the name of the language itself and much of its political vocabulary. The words for president (*raisi*), minister (*waziri*), law (*sharia*), department (*idara*) and politics (*siasa*) are all derived from Arabic.[3]

The Arabic entrepreneurial thrust into Africa also produced broader cultural links between black Africa and the Middle East. Racially mixed descendants of Africans are now found in some Arab countries, just as there are people of Arab extraction in Africa. On the positive side, they may enhance understanding between African and Arab countries, but on the negative side they may serve as a reminder of the historical circumstances that facilitated the Afro-Arab cross-fertilization.[4]

Another historical factor underlying Afro-Arab relations is a shared experience of foreign domination, exploitation and humiliation. Hitherto, this shared experience provided a framework for political collaboration in the era of decolonization. The Arabs, under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, gave enthusiastic support to African movements for independence. Subsequently, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Modibo Keita of Mali emphasized the common themes of pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism. Indeed, as Nkrumah became increasingly radical in his orientation to foreign policy, he came to share the global political vision of Nasser, and to see the Sahara desert not as a barrier, but as a link between Africans and Arabs. Pan-Africanism and pan-Arabism, as embodiments of the salient feelings, attitudes, ideologies and security concerns of Africans and Arabs, emphasized the doctrine of non-alignment in the relations of African and Arab states with the developed nations.[5] Today, the Arabs support the total liberation of Africans from minority white racist regimes in southern Africa, and equally the Africans now publicly sympathize with the Arab cause in the Middle East.[6] More often than not, there is a feeling that the similar historical experiences of Africans

and Arabs, along with their cross-cultural links and their subjugation in the international setting, can provide a viable basis for a future relationship between the two adjacent regions.

However, there are negative aspects in the long history of contacts between Africa and the Arab world. It has not always been a happy history. Rather, at times it has been tragic, as Africans remember the ravages of Arab slave-traders on their continent, the military contests, and the eras of political and religious domination. Such historical memories have been exacerbated by what seems to some to be the latter's continued racial and cultural arrogance, an attitude that often makes it difficult for Africans to view Arabs as natural allies. Arabs are stereotyped as cunning, crafty, dishonest and untrustworthy. On the other hand, Arabs view Africans as inferior and tend to be condescending towards them.[7] Arabs feel superior as conveyors of a civilized culture, mediated by the transmittal of a great religion (Islam) and language, to 'uncivilized' and 'uncouth' Africans. In some Arab countries, the word 'slave' has been used synonymously with 'Black'.[8]

Although there are millions of Black Africans who worship in the Islamic faith, the manner in which they received the religion and the manner in which they were converted to it, along with the fact that their societies and environments are different from those of the Arab 'evangelists', have produced African Muslims quite distinct from those of the Arab world. Islam in black Africa is a superstructure and not a base for the cultural traits of its converts. This is not, however, to deny the basic cultural changes that were effected by the spread of Islam.[9] For instance, traditional law eventually gave way to the *sharia*, affecting, it not wholly altering, marriage customs, property and land-usage rights, codes of conduct and so forth. But this tended to be gradual, and African Islam remains 'distinct from Arab Islam and carries considerable indigenous culture within it'.[10] We are not in any way trying to minimize the importance of religion in unifying people in different regions of the world. The point is that religion does not necessarily transcend all forms of cultural, ideological and nationalistic sentiments.

Moreover, it could be argued that in essence there are no common elements to be found in Africanism and Arabism: the two value systems, as products of the social structures and environments of Africans and Arabs, are completely different. Furthermore, the impact of European culture is considerably greater than that of Arab culture on Africa. And, although there are more African Muslims than African Christians, both groups combined number significantly less than those Africans who hold to traditional religious beliefs.

It must also be remembered that the historical experiences of European colonialism and exploitation do not necessarily have durable positive effects on relations between those who underwent such agonies. For if this were the case, African countries, and indeed, the Arab countries too, would be free

from problems of disunity. In some parts of Africa, Europeans mediated between Africans and Arabs, and then rid black Africa of Arabs, thereby putting an end to heinous and disruptive Arab slave practices (as Europeans no longer needed African slaves and hence turned against the Arabs, who still found the slave trade lucrative). The European imperialists and missionaries happily absolved themselves of guilt in the slave trade, emphasized the Arab role and fostered bad feelings between Africans and Arabs—which, given the latent antagonisms, may not have required much effort. On the whole, as already mentioned, the impact of European culture on Africa, and indeed on many Arab countries (the Maghreb), causes the peoples of these regions to have a greater cultural affinity to Europe (and America) than to each other.

On balance then, the negative rather than the positive impact of the historical and cultural contacts between Arabs and Africans prevails. The nature of the past and present relationship is asymmetrical, with few countervailing features. Black Africa has been penetrated culturally as well as economically by the Arab Middle East, but has not managed to effect adequate counter-penetration. There remains a deeply rooted historical suspicion and distrust of Arabs amongst Africans, while Arabs view Africans with cultural disdain. Differences in values and attitudes remain unabated. Hence, the absence of unifying elements between Africans and Arabs will continually impede the development of expanded collaboration between the two regions.

However, African and Arab leaders may be honest enough to recognize the inherent constraints at the human level in their quest for political alliance and economic partnership. They may institute measures to increase the degree and level of communications between their respective governments and people.[11] The net result could be an increased awareness and consciousness of the virtues of each other's culture and the eventual development of mutual respect and trust. Furthermore, Afro-Arab leaders could de-emphasize their value differences and perceptions of each other's culture while emphasizing political and economic priorities. A critical examination of these two realms of interest will show whether such optimistic speculations are warranted.

Political co-operation

All African and Arab countries are marked by great internal diversity and disparity and are themselves diverse and disparate. Nevertheless, with some variations from country to country, states in the Afro-Arab regions do have similar socio-political characteristics. First, Afro-Arab countries are communally heterogeneous, with low levels of national integration. Most of them have potential communal conflict. This problem is well known in black Africa, but it is often assumed that Arab countries are more homogeneous societies. However, as William Quandt reminds us, this is far from the truth:

The region extending from Morocco to Iran, generally referred to as North Africa and the Middle East, contains within it an extraordinary diversity of peoples. Linguistically, culturally, and in terms of national identity, the region is heterogeneous. Even Islam, which provides the most important source of integration, is split into several sects. In the past, these socio-cultural lines of cleavage have led to numerous conflicts, some of great intensity, and there is every reason to believe that communal tensions will remain a feature of Middle East society through the 1980s. Assimilation of diverse groups into distinctive national entities is proceeding slowly, and it will be some time before socioeconomic cleavages overtake communal ones as the primary axis of political conflict. The strengthening and consolidation of the nation-state system in the Middle East is likely to continue into the 1980s, however, having as one of its effects the suppression of intercommunal violence within states, to be replaced, in some instances, by communally motivated state-to-state violence.[12]

Second, African and Arab governments have poor penetrative capacities within their own borders. State institutions are weak and inefficiently run. Third, within the Afro-Arab regions, there are emerging patterns of uneven development with high levels of income inequality. Fourth, most Afro-Arab countries have uninstitutionalized means of political succession. Their national leadership is heavily influenced by the military, and their people enjoy only limited and controlled political participation. Invariably, most changes at the presidential level take place either through the gun barrel or death of the incumbent. Fifth, politics of compromise and consensus are rare in Africa and the Arab Middle East. Consequently, there is a high degree of élite dissension. Sixth, the ruling élite in both regions constantly uses preventive-detention laws against their political critics, with frequent purges of politicians and technocrats. Indeed, in some African and Arab countries, execution of real or imagined political opponents is not uncommon. Seventh, interstate conflicts have been rampant in Africa and between Arab countries.

Thus, the Afro-Arab states face similarly acute political problems. At the root of most of them is the vexed issue of legitimacy, which is far from resolved. The question, therefore, arises whether the fragility of the Afro-Arab political systems will not tend to hinder rather than facilitate interregional co-operation. It is conceivable that Afro-Arab leaders, now cognizant of the agonies and dangers of underdevelopment suffered by their societies, will foster the search for an acceptable political system that might accelerate the march to development. On the other hand, it could be argued that the problems of instability will continue for a long time, and Afro-Arab leaders may become more preoccupied with internal issues than with an idealistic search for external alliances, particularly if such efforts do not produce immediate benefits. Moreover, the irregular changes of leadership in both regions and the lack of strong political institutions handicap transactions that might lead to a broader framework for both bilateral and multilateral co-operation.

It is, however, possible that issues of mutual concern to dynamic African and Arab leaders might push them to co-ordinate their strategies, particularly at the diplomatic level. But what will be the determinant of the political health of Afro-Arab relations? According to a Libyan view:

> Arab relations with the states of the world depend on the extent of the support these states give to Arab national issues in particular, and international liberation and humanitarian issues in general. The establishment of friendship and co-operation between the two sides cannot be in the interest of one party at the expense of the other. Proceeding from this premise—our political relations with the world depend mainly on the world's attitude towards the primary Arab issue and the other Arab issues. The establishment of bilateral relations must be based on the principle of equality between the two sides.[13]

The basic issue that preoccupies the Arabs is the Palestinian question, and for the African states it is the liberation of southern Africans from minority racist regimes. For the last five years, these conflicts have been sources of political solidarity between Arabs and Africans. Since the late 1950s, when most African countries began to gain independence, the Arabs, particularly the Egyptians under Gamal Abdel Nasser, sought African support against Israel.[14] Until 1973, they had been less successful than the Israelis in winning this support. But gradually Afro-Arab states realized that they need each other in their respective crusades against racist regimes: apartheid in southern Africa and Zionism in Israel. Many African states severed diplomatic relations with Israel, and consequently the Arab states pledged to help black Africa in its determination to gain majority rule for Africans in Zimbabwe and Namibia and eliminate apartheid in South Africa.[15]

The reversal of the Israeli-African friendship, coupled with significant African support for the Arab-sponsored United Nations resolution that equated Zionism with racism, resulted in increased political and economic transactions between Jerusalem and Pretoria. Concerned with overcoming their mutual isolation and ensuring their survival, Israel and South Africa have considerably increased their volume of trade and now share information on nuclear and military technology. The minority racist regimes of southern Africa and Israel were condemned collectively by the Afro-Arab Summit Conference in Cairo:

> The Heads of the African and Arab States and Governments condemn the continuing military aggressions and all the political and economic manœuvers which imperialism is practising through the racialist regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia and their allies against sovereign states, namely Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zambia to shake the political stability of their governments and undermine their efforts to achieve economic development. The summit conference considers these

aggressions as being directed against the African and Arab world and that they constitute a threat to world peace. The conference also repudiates similar actions by Israel against Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The Heads of the African and Arab States and Governments have decided that their countries should extend and increase their countries' material support and any other type of necessary aid to enable these countries to strengthen and defend their independence. The conference condemns the Israeli authorities for persisting in changing the demographic and geographical conditions in the occupied Arab territories and for their violation of international law and UN resolutions. The conference demands that Israel should stop adopting these measures in order to create better conditions which would help a settlement in the area.[16]

But how long can the existence of common foes sustain Afro-Arab political solidarity? Could common enemies serve as a source of political alliance? It seems that the resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict and the termination of racial tensions in southern Africa could reduce the present enthusiasm for Afro-Arab political collaboration. Many African diplomats at the United Nations think that Arabs pretend to be friendly towards Africans because they need African support against Israel in international forums.[17] They argue that once the Arab–Israeli conflict is settled, the Arabs will become preoccupied with other concerns, such as relations with the northern hemisphere, and that interest in Afro-Arab unity will recede. That is, there is no basis for a long-term political alliance between groups whose initial interest in each other is prompted by identifiable common enemies. Today's enemies could easily become tomorrow's friends.

Indeed, as evidenced in the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty, two major antagonists in the Middle East have now decided to search for a comprehensive and durable peace agreement through negotiations instead of war. Should the process of peace continue unimpeded, it will lead to increased understanding and political and economic relations between Egypt and Israel. Two things will happen if such a peaceful path is followed: first, the Palestinian question will no longer be a high priority in Egyptian diplomacy, and second, Egyptian interests in Africa will shift to areas of concern other than support against Israel. Opposition to Egyptian–Israeli *rapprochement* in the Arab Middle East will not gain ground in black Africa. So far the reactions of African states to the peace process in the Middle East have been sympathetic to Egypt; and the call by the signatories of the Baghdad Pact on the OAU to condemn Egypt has landed on deaf ears.

Although the Arab–Israeli conflict has helped to create greater internationalism among the Arabs, its resolution might make the Arabs isolationist.[18] Their interest in African issues will decline, and indeed their support for the liberation of southern Africa will wane, precisely because they will not see the possibility of any further reciprocal gain. After all, Arab states, and, indeed,

for that matter, nation-states in general, are not known for their charity in international relations.

Continued Arab interest in Africa will, however, be sustained by ideological considerations. Although some Arab countries (particularly Egypt under Nasser, Syria and Algeria) have been in the vanguard of anti-imperialism in the Third World, on the whole Arab and African states do not perceive common security concerns, mainly because of ideological differences based upon global relationships. The conservative Arab oil states (particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait), Egypt under President Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat and the Sudan since the abortive communist coup against Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiri coup of 1971, all tend to be sensitive to the emergence of radicalism in African countries and flirtations with Cuba and the Soviet Union. The evidence for this is clearly shown in their support for the Somalis and the Eritrean secessionists aginst the Ethiopians. The vitriolic attacks of the Arabs against the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia have been in direct violation of the OAU charter, and yet most black African states did not publicly condemn them. It also seems that the Moroccan and Egyptian involvement in Zaire following the Shaba wars and the subsequent Saudi-Kuwaiti financial consortium for Zaire reinforced Arab interests in the internal affairs of African states and can be viewed as attempts to rescue pro-Western regimes from collapse. Some Arab countries appear willing to be used as surrogates by other powers. Respectable African states such as Tanzania have openly deplored Arab concerns in Africa and generally consider them misplaced.[19] The Arab–Israeli conflict has contributed considerably to Arab flirtations with the two superpowers, but on the whole most black African states still prefer to keep the cold-war competition out of the continent. Algeria is the sole Arab voice, so far, to sympathize with the radical African viewpoint on this issue of ideological alliances. We do not, however, foresee the development of ideological divisions amongst the Afro-Arab states along the former Casablanca/Brazzaville schism.

At present, deliberations within the OAU indicate that it is not a viable organization for the fostering of Afro-Arab relations. Instead, as Mazrui has noted, the OAU is 'becoming a mechanism by which the Arabs can politically influence black Africans'.[20] Since its founding in 1963, OAU summit and council meetings have devoted considerable time to discussions of Arab-sponsored resolutions on the Arab–Israeli conflict. The Arabs, more often than not, carry their issues from the Arab League to the OAU. And although the OAU is also 'evolving into a mechanism through which black Africans might seek economic concessions from the Arabs',[21] the overall picture tends to show that, through the OAU, the Arabs have succeeded recently in penetrating black Africa politically as they penetrated it culturally in previous centuries; and they have done so at minimal economic cost. With the exception

of the Algerian performance, the Arab presence in the OAU has not enhanced Afro-Arab solidarity.

The question therefore arises whether the OAU should not become exclusively and authentically a black African political organization, just as the Arab League is exclusively an Arab club. If Zaire or Kenya or Tanzania cannot become members of the Arab League, why should Egypt, Morocco and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya be members of the OAU? Being on the African continent should not be the sole criterion for membership in the OAU, for such a criterion renders the OAU increasingly less substantive than it might otherwise be.

Arabs and Africans can more successfully pursue joint political and economic interests outside the established regional forums of the OAU and the Arab League. Indeed, the Afro-Arab Cairo Summit of March 1977 reinforces this point. The Cairo Summit included all Arab (Asian and North African, oil producers and non-oil producers) and all African countries. The results of the Summit were more impressive than any previous Afro-Arab agreements on political and economic issues in OAU forums. It is therefore not wholly clear whether Arab presence in the OAU is a positive factor in fostering Afro-Arab relations. Our position is that it is not. Whereas the OAU and the Arab League can facilitate political and economic co-operation between the African and Arab states by co-ordinating their activities, neither the Arab nor the African countries need to belong to either regional organization.

What, then, is the future of an Afro-Arab political co-operation? Sammy Kum Buo provides a devastatingly blunt answer:

> The Afro-Arab link is tenuous and gradually but surely worsening, and both sides know it. Instead of trying to suppress or hide this fact, they should approach the situation with frankness and openness and from this position try to make things better, rather than continuing to live in a fictitious world of 'all's well that doesn't get said in the open'. As frustration mounts in official black African circles, the cosmetics of Arab policies towards black Africa are likely to be revealed in the not too distant future, to the greater embarrassment of the Arabs and other exponents of the myth of Third World solidarity.[22]

Indeed, the claim of Afro-Arab brotherhood is a myth. There are no bases for the development of a firm and comprehensive political solidarity between Africa and the Arab Middle East. First, the geographical proximity of the two regions has not led to a wider knowledge amongst peoples of their respective cultures. Second, differences in values between Africans and Arabs, coupled with divergent ideological orientations, hinder political understanding, communications and pursuits. Third, Arab concerns in Africa—for example, their support for Somalia against Ethiopia, their backing of Muslim Chadians against the central authority in Ndjaména and above all their enthusiastic help

for General Idi Amin Dada in Uganda—are abhorred in black Africa. Fourth, Afro-Arab regimes are chronically unstable within their own boundaries, and hence African and Arab leaders are chiefly concerned with maintaining themselves in power and pay only lip service to regional co-operation. Fifth, so far the Arab and African countries are not united within their own regions, and therefore the idea of Afro-Arab interregional unity is far-fetched. For all these reasons, it is an illusion to assume that Africans and Arabs will be able to build a viable, lasting framework for political co-operation. At present, these are no bases for such a framework.

Mutual economic interests among nations could encourage political understanding. Hence we turn next to the realm of economics and examine the nature of African and Arab resources, development goals and priorities with the purpose of relating these to any future economic partnership.

Economic partnership

The possibility of an economic partnership between black Africa and the Arab Middle East is based upon the recognition of the potential and the complementarity in their resources and developmental strategies. The Arab oil-producing countries have accumulated billions of dollars, particularly the underpopulated states like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Some of this money is available for investment elsewhere. Yet even with their enormous oil reserves, these countries lack industrial and agricultural resources and an adequate supply of trained and skilled manpower. They depend heavily on OECD countries for food, technology and infrastructural development.[23] The Asian Arab oil states have small populations and lack almost all other natural resources, including the most important of all, fresh water. Sheikh Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani, the Saudi Arabian Oil Minister, graphically describes the problems of these oil countries as follows:

> At the risk of vexing you, I must maintain that we are still a poor country. Not only do we lack industry, agriculture; worse still, we lack manpower. We make our young people study and we send them to foreign universities, but it takes years to obtain a degree or a technical diploma. Meanwhile we have to import engineers, technicians, specialized workers that we don't know where to house because we lack hotels. To build hotels we need contractors, but the contractors themselves need hotels to live in. It is a vicious circle that exhausts us. Among other things we lack cement. We lack harbors because we lack the cement to build them. Last, but by no means least, we lack water. We haven't a single river, a single lake. We depend on rainfall alone. For 100 years it has rained less and less frequently, for the last 25 hardly at all.[24]

Thus the abundance of oil and of surplus petrofunds will not necessarily transform the domestic economies of the Arab petroleum-exporting countries

as rapidly as was expected in the euphoria of 1974 following the quintupling of oil prices. As Arthur Smithies points out, 'despite the availability of imports, they must rely on purely domestic resources, human and material, which are in short supply. Such shortages have resulted in serious domestic inflation, which has already induced most countries to modify their development plans'.[25] However, the oil revenues have provided the Arabs with purchasing power, which in the past was almost a complete monopoly of the OECD countries.

So far, however, the Arab oil giants have invested billions of dollars in OECD countries, mainly in the United Kingdom and the United States, and not in Africa or other Third World areas. First, the Arabs feel safe financially and politically in investing in Eurodollar markets. Second, they have a larger volume of economic transactions with the OECD countries than with any other region. Third, Arab investments in the Western industrialized countries serve as a form of counter-penetration by Third World countries into the region that has for centuries dominated global commerce and politics. This might increase Arab bargaining power with the OECD countries. But it could also have a countervailing influence on the Arabs in that their petrodollars can be held hostage in the event of political confrontation with the West.

As regards the sub-Saharan African countries, they offer opportunities for both aid and investment from the Arab oil-producing states. For although the African and the Arab countries have weak infrastructures and therefore must improve them, their resources and developmental needs differ in that their economies exhibit a degree of complementarity. Black African countries, with the exception of Nigeria, Angola and Gabon, lack oil resources and consequently are dependent on oil and oil-based imports such as fertilizer and gas for their agricultural development. The Arab world as a whole is, however, an area where chronic food shortages exist. Such shortages include food grains, edible oils, sugar and livestock. Africa could become a source of some of these agricultural products.

There is, therefore, a potential economic complementarity in the fields of food and energy between Africa and the Arab Middle East. And indeed, both regions have already agreed in principle to produce and supply their respective markets on a priority basis as far as possible. African food production with Arab aid will help diversify sources of Arab food imports. Afro-Arab economic partnership will also act as a spur to domestic economic development in Arab oil-producing countries in that Arab investment in Africa will widen markets for certain domestic industries, such as petrochemicals. This will also serve to reduce African dependence on OECD petrochemical products. The total flow of trade between Africa and the Arab Middle East would thereby be greatly increased.

Arab financial flows and aid to Africa and to the Third World in general would undoubtedly increase Arab influence in the recipient countries

as well as in international institutions such as the United Nations, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. This would also serve to counterbalance both Western-bloc and Eastern-bloc influences on the poor countries and could eventually enhance Third World solidarity and reinforce non-alignment. The assumption here is that issues of petrofunds and 'bread and butter' would predominate and prevail over ideological rhetoric in Afro-Arab countries. But in the final analysis the manner, direction and degree of utilization of surplus petrofunds could be a critical influence on economic and political stability or lack of such stability, regionally as well as globally.

The increasing availability of 'surplus' Arab petrodollars led to the creation of Arab financial institutions for channelling aid to the needy and non-Arab countries of the Third World. These institutional channels for the granting and distribution of funds include bilateral aid agencies: the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED); the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (ADFAED); the Saudi Development Fund (SDF); and the Iraqi Development Fund (IDF). There are four multilateral institutions: the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA); the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD); the Islamic Development Bank (IDB); and the OPEC Special Fund. Except for KFAED and AFESD, all these agencies were established in or after 1974; and despite the inclusion of 'Arab Economic Development' in three of the agencies' titles since 1976, all except AFESD (which directs its aid to the Arab part of Africa) have been providing loans outside the Arab world.

The Arab oil-producing countries participate fully in the OPEC aid facility, namely the OPEC Special Fund, and make contributions, grants and loans to existing multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and others. Through such channels, Arab aid (and OPEC aid as a whole) is taking a variety of forms.

> Bilateral aid includes long-term and medium-term balance-of-payments support grants and loans, project aid, central-bank-to-central-bank deposits, and banking guarantees underwriting commercial loans to developing countries. Multilateral aid involves straight contributions to international development agencies, as well as the creation of new multilateral institutions.[26]

BADEA, which was created by the Arab League in 1974, began operation in 1975 with an initial funding of $231 million. It co-finances projects with the World Bank, the African Development Bank and OECD members. Its funded projects range from a cement plant in Benin, the Selingue dam in Mali and livestock in Senegal to a maize project in Tanzania and airport construction in Lesotho. Tables 1, 2 and 3 show the range of African projects partly or

TABLE 1. Lending, 1975–78, by the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa

Beneficiary	Purpose	Amount ($ millions)	Approval date	Amortization period[1]	Interest rate (%)
Benin	(1) Cement plant	8.0	Nov. 1975	25	6
	(2) Feasibility study	0.1	Nov. 1976	— *Grant*	—
	(3) Port facility	4.6	July 1978	n.a.	n.a.
Burundi	(1) Sewerage system	4.0	June 1976	25	2
	(2) Highway	6.0	Mar. 1978	20	2
Cameroon	(1) Port facility	10.0	Nov. 1975	25	4
	(2) Paper pulp plant	10.0	Nov. 1977	11[2]	7
Chad	Agricultural project	7.8	July 1978	n.a.	n.a.
Comoros	Feasibility study	0.1	Oct. 1977	— *Grant*	—
Congo	Railway	10.0	Nov. 1977	25	4
Gambia	Rural development	3.3	Mar. 1976	25	2
Ghana	(1) Cocoa project	5.0	Nov. 1975	25	4
	(2) Kyong dam	10.0	Mar. 1977	17	6
Guinea	Cement plant	4.8	July 1977	17	5
Guinea-Bissau	Feasibility study	0.1	July 1978	— *Grant*	—
Kenya	Rural development	5.0	Mar. 1976	25	4
Lesotho	Airport	6.0	Mar. 1978	18	4
Liberia	(1) Industrial estate	3.2	Nov. 1975	14[3]	5
	(2) Electric power	3.9	Mar. 1978	13	7
	(3) Free-port zone	7.1	July 1978	n.a.	n.a.
Madagascar	(1) Highway	5.0	Nov. 1975	25	3
	(2) Electric power	10.0	Nov. 1977	20	4
Mali	(1) Selingue dam	15.0	Mar. 1976	25	2
	(2) Rural development	5.0	Mar. 1977	25	2
Mauritius	Electric power	10.0	June 1976	15	4
Niger	Highway	7.0	Nov. 1976	25	2
Rwanda	(1) Rural development	5.0	June 1976	25	2
	(2) Electric power	6.0	July 1977	20	4
Sao Tome	Cocoa project	5.0	July 1978	n.a.	n.a.
Senegal	(1) Livestock project	1.6	Nov. 1975	25	2
	(2) Fishing port	7.2	Mar. 1977	20	5
Sierra Leone	Electric power	5.0	Mar. 1976	15	4
Tanzania	(1) Maize project	5.0	Nov. 1975	20	2
	(2) Construction materials production	10.0	July 1977	15[2]	7
Uganda	Textile plant	4.7	Mar. 1978	15	4
Upper Volta	(1) Railway	10.0	Nov. 1975	25	2
	(2) Rural development	4.5	June 1976	25	2

TABLE 1 (*continued*).

Beneficiary	Purpose	Amount ($ millions)	Approval date	Amortization period[1]	Interest rate (%)
Zaire	(1) Water supply	10.0	Nov. 1975	25	4
	(2) Palm-oil project	4.4	July 1978	n.a.	n.a.
Zambia	Highway	10.0	June 1976	25	4
Multinational (Ghana, Ivory Coast, Togo)	Cement plant	10.0	Nov. 1975	15	6
Multinational (Sahel region)	Emergency aid	15.0	July 1978	n.a.	n.a.
Central African Bank	Development loans	5.0	July 1978	n.a.	n.a.

1. Grace period five years unless otherwise indicated. Total amount committed by BADEA for 1975–78: 279.4 million.
2. Three-year grace period.
3. Four-year grace period.

Sources: *ABEDA Annual Report*, 1975, 1976, and 1977 issues; BADEA and SAAFA loans; ABEDA press releases, various issues; *Middle East Economic Digest* and *Middle East Economic Survey*, various issues.

TABLE 2. Lending by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, 1975–78

Beneficiary	Purpose	Amount (millions dinars)[1]	Approval date	Amortization period[2]	Interest rate (%)
Democratic Yemen	(1) Highway	4.5	June 1975	40	1.5
	(2) Technical assistance	0.1	Dec. 1975	—	—
	(3) Fisheries project	2.7	Nov. 1976	17	3.0
Afghanistan[3]	Sugar plant	8.85	June 1977	22	3.9
Bangladesh[3]	(1) Manu river project	2.3	June 1975	33	1.5
	(2) Rural electrification	6.4	June 1975	22	2.0
	(3) Electric power	6.7	June 1978	n.a.	n.a.
Benin	Highway	2.75	Apr. 1978	n.a.	n.a.
Burundi	(1) Coffee project	0.4	July 1976	26	3.0
	(2) Highway	1.75	Nov. 1977	25	3.0

TABLE 2 (*continued*).

Beneficiary	Purpose	Amount (millions dinars)[1]	Approval date	Amortization period[2]	Interest rate (%)
Cameroon	Song-Loulou dam	4.5	Feb. 1977	25	4.0
Chad	Electrification survey	0.2	Dec. 1975	— *Grant*	—
Comoros	(1) Highway	1.8	June 1976	39	1.0
	(2) Planning studies	0.1	June 1976	— *Grant*	—
Congo	Railway	4.0	Dec. 1976	17	4.0
Gambia	(1) Transport survey	0.3	Dec. 1976	— *Grant*	—
	(2) Highway	4.4	July 1977	n.a.	n.a.
Ghana	Electric power	9.0	Apr. 1977	20	4.0
Guinea	(1) Road survey I	0.15	June 1975	— *Grant*	—
	(2) Telecommunications	2.7	June 1976	18	4.0
	(3) Road survey II	0.1	Mar. 1977	— *Grant*	—
Guinea Bissau	(1) Transportation survey	0.2	June 1975	— *Grant*	—
	(2) Airport	2.0	May 1978	n.a.	n.a.
Lesotho	Airport	1.2	June 1978	n.a.	n.a.
Liberia	Highway	2.2	June 1978	18	3.5
Madagascar	(1) Highway	2.1	Apr. 1977	16	4.0
	(2) Electrical power	2.9	May 1978	25	3.5
Mali	Selingue dam	5.0	Oct. 1976	26	2.5
Senegal	(1) Fisheries survey	0.2	Sept. 1975	— *Grant*	—
	(2) Livestock project	1.2	Dec. 1976	25	3.0
Tanzania	(1) Textile plant	4.5	July 1975	22	4.0
	(2) Textile plant expansion	2.8	1978	n.a.	n.a.
Uganda	(1) Livestock development	5.75	June 1975	25	2.5
	(2) Sugar and power surveys	0.2	June 1975	— *Grant*	—

1. KFAED lending before April 1975 (the onset of fiscal 1975/76, when non-Arab lending began) amounted to some KD. 160 million. Total amount committed by KFAED for 1975–78: 93.95 million.
2. KFAED loan grace periods are somewhat irregular; for those 1975–77 loans where complete data are available, the grace period averaged 5.1 years, and they ranged from 1.9 to 10.4 years.
3. Not African or Arab.

Sources: *KFAED Annual Reports*, 1974/1975, 1975/1976 and 1976/1977 issues; *Middle East Economic Digest* and *Middle East Economic Survey*, various issues.

TABLE 3. Lending by the Saudi Arabian Development Fund, 1975–78

Beneficiary	Purpose	Amount (millions riyals)	Approval date	Amortization period[1]	Interest rate (%)
Cameroon	Song-Loulou dam	105.9	Feb. 1977	20	2
Congo	Railway	88.3	July 1976	20	4
Gabon	Railway	70.6	Apr. 1978	20	n.a.
Gambia	Airport	23.3	Feb. 1977	20	2
Ghana	Electric power	114.7	Feb. 1977	20	2
Guinea	Feasibility study	6.0	Jan. 1977	20	2
Guinea Bissau	Food-industry complex	15.3	June 1978	20	2
Liberia	(1) Electric power	68.0	June 1978	20	2
	(2) Bridge	30.6	June 1978	20	2
Kenya	Water and sewer project	85.0	June 1978	20	2
Mali	(1) Various development projects	21.0	Feb. 1976	20	2
	(2) Selingue dam	52.95	Feb. 1977	20	2
	(3) Livestock project	46.85	Feb. 1978	20	2
Niger	Housing and grain storage	20.3	July 1976	20	2
Rwanda	Highway	17.65	Oct. 1976	20	2
Senegal	Highway	125.6	Jan. 1978	20	3
Uganda	Agricultural development	105.0	May 1975	20	2

1. Grace periods on SFAD loans were quite variable, especially during 1975. Beyond 1975 all carried a 5-year grace period. In 1975 and 1976, the grace period ranged from 3 to 12 years, and averaged 4.9 years. Total amount committed by SAFD for 1975–78: 997.05 million.
Sources: *SAFD Annual Report*, 1975/1976 and 1976/1977 issues; *Middle East Economic Digest* and *Middle East Economic Survey*, various issues.

wholly funded by Arab funds. As can be seen from these tables, most of the total amount committed by the Arab financial institutions has been for infrastructure, including transport, energy and mining-related projects. Undoubtedly, such aid is seen as the precondition for other forms of development. Infrastructure is also of specific interest to potential investors, since the decision whether or not to invest in an industry or a natural resource is often conditioned by the availability of adequate water, power and transport facilities.

Most of the Arab aid to black Africa has gone to those countries with a predominantly Muslim population or whose heads of government are Muslim converts. This is not surprising in that countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya have Islamic evangelical designs. Also, 'unofficial aid', or transnational rather than bilateral aid, has been given to Muslim minorities in Sierra Leone, Kenya, Ghana, Chad, Benin and Upper Volta. Most of this is for educational and missionary work. Arab multilateral aid through BADEA has, however, underemphasized the religious criterion in contrast to Arab bilateral aid channelled through Arab national financial institutions. But although BADEA's President, Chedly Ayari, has also emphasized that aid is extended regardless of political orientation, a country like Malawi has been excluded because it has maintained diplomatic relations with Israel. And so far BADEA aid is concentrated heavily, as already noted, on infrastructure—45 per cent of its approved loans—compared with 20 per cent each for industry and for agriculture.

To make the most of the geological and economic potential of their respective regions, the Afro-Arab countries have recognized the importance of OECD sources of technology and trained manpower. Thus donor Arab countries prefer to elicit a long-term involvement of multinational corporations (MNCs) from the OECD countries in the implementation and operation of any African development projects financed by their money. They consider the MNCs as 'the most potent instrument of technology, access to markets and industrialization',[27] and they support the 'open door' policies of liberal investment codes, tax privileges and the like that are used by so many developing countries to attract foreign firms. The insistence of Arab investors on the role of MNCs is clearly shown in their contracts with African countries as evidenced in the following statement:

> It is standard international procedure that in the implementation of specialist industries . . . to look to a party of international repute who can supply all phases of such ventures . . . the factory supply and erection, the overall management, and the eventual sales must be linked under one hat . . . only those industries established with major organizations providing supply, constant flow of personnel, information on changing technologies, and an up-to-date knowledge of world markets are successful.[28]

The OECD countries and their MNCs have recognized the immense investment opportunities available: they stand to make profits from Arab aid and investment contracts in Africa and in other regions of the Third World. They feel, however, that the Arabs should provide the bulk of finance for such African development projects and that they (OECD states and corporations) would merely provide project appraisal, token participation, technological know-how and equipment. The African countries definitely welcome the involvement of a

third party, even if it has OECD connections, to defuse seeming Arab hegemony. This trilateral economic relationship would serve to diversify African sources of aid, finance and technology and might therefore avoid further neo-colonial cleavages. It could enhance interdependence rather than reinforce dependence.

Although the idea of triangular co-operation between Africa, the Arab Middle East and the OECD countries and MNCs is attractive to all three parties, there are some precautionary measures that would have to be taken before it could become effective in equitable terms. The OECD-Arab participation in the triangular relationship must be carefully co-ordinated and scrutinized in order to prevent Africa from becoming a dumping ground for OECD products and technology facilitated by Arab petrofunds. Hence, care must be taken to employ appropriate technology that can be adapted to local African conditions and circumstances. African and Arab countries must also try to acquire training in intermediate technology to reduce their external dependence. As the BADEA President, Chedly Ayari, has noted, such a 'triangular equation is a good thing, but it should not be a game of two passives and one active, with Africa an open market, Arabs giving money, and Europe the only active member. That is what I call neo-colonialism and the Arabs do not want to finance neo-colonialism. But if the three partners are active, that will be good'.[29] In short, Africans and Arabs must avoid being passive while the OECD countries and corporations try to sell them inappropriate and expensive technology.

The African countries should be able to choose the development projects they want according to their developmental needs. On the other hand, these must be economically viable projects that can be beneficial to some Arab needs, for example, food. The triangular co-operation should be designed to relax rather than reinforce the ties of dependency. It should not serve as a means to promote certain economic and political structures that may seem desirable from the donors' standpoint, but undesirable from the recipients' perspective. All three parties must agree, therefore, on flexible contractual terms predicated upon a desire for an interdependent world.

This leads us to whether the dynamics of Afro-Arab relations could result in the emergence of a formidable regional power that would strengthen the position of the Third World as a whole in its quest for a New International Economic Order (NIEO).[30] Proponents of NIEO see poverty in the less-developed countries (LDCs) as deriving mainly from integration into the international economy on unfavourable terms via exploitation by MNCs, denial of access to rich markets, and unreasonably low prices for commodity exports. They argue that all poor countries are subject to such inequities and distortions, so that there exists a two-class division on a world scale and hence a solidarity of interests tying all poor countries together. The LDCs' plan to

effect a NIEO entails proposals for: revision of the international trading system and commodity-marketing arrangements; increased availability of public investment funds and further exchanges of industrial technology; relief from growing debt repayment burdens; and improvements in the rate and concessional elements of development assistance flows.

If the cogency of such arguments and proposals for a NIEO were recognized by and acceptable to all Afro-Arab states, then they could easily co-ordinate their resources and strategies for overhauling the present international economic arrangements. That would be a step forward in the harmonization of their economic interests. The Afro-Arab world could then become an effective voice in international forums. Indeed, the Afro-Arab economic future would look much better than at present in terms of cohesion within the region and impact outside it. But such a joint stand on international economic issues would necessitate a basic agreement on ideology and foreign policy among all the Afro-Arab states. As of now, there is no ideological consensus between Africa and the Arab Middle East, nor does much consensus exist within either area.

The future of an economic partnership between tropical Africa and the Arab Middle East will have some basic problems to confront. Although Africa has enormous agricultural and mineral resources, it faces acute difficulties itself. Jane Coles' distressing description of these problems is no exaggeration:

> While political, social and economic factors vary greatly from country to country, as do climatic and geographical features, and the share of the national budget allocated to agriculture, certain obstacles to agricultural expansion are fairly common in some parts of Africa: poor soils, a high incidence of disease, scarce or uncertain rainfall, reliance on root crops, scarcity of ground water, shifting cultivation which exhausts soil fertility, the inadequacy of mechanization, high transport costs, and poor distribution. The traditionally accepted technical solutions to combat these problems—buying fertiliser, building irrigation dams, immunizing animals, introducing new strains of crops, importing tractors, etc., are expensive. Moreover, many economists have argued that they are inappropriate and frequently unsuccessful.[31]

At present, many African countries are unable to meet all their own food demands because food production lags behind the region's requirements. In the decade 1960–70, most African countries did not give priority to agricultural investment, and by 1970 food imports by black African countries were 'equivalent to 15 per cent of the region's domestic production. For instance, between the 1960s and the 1970s, imports of cereal increased by 38 per cent'.[32] A part of the explanation for such dependence on food imports lies in low agricultural labour productivity, and in the fact that priority has been given to export crops. This emphasizes the continuation of the colonial interests in Africa,

which was considered a region for agricultural produce and importation of manufactures.

Furthermore, the infrastructures of African countries are not yet well developed. The region as a whole has weak administrative capacities (obstacles to rapid agricultural development), inadequate socio-economic structures, insufficient investment in infrastructures, poor institutional set-ups for the extension of credit and marketing, and a scarcity of trained and skilled manpower. It seems, therefore, that African development priorities may be in conflict with Arab needs and expectations from Africa. Infrastructural development could facilitate large-scale agricultural schemes, and yet it may not be profitable for the Arabs to invest in such projects, which do not bring them immediate benefits. Thus the Arabs could become increasingly reluctant to grant aid to Africa and to invest in African development schemes, instead of concentrating on safe and lucrative investments in the OECD countries. They may still give African countries some money and attention but in meagre amounts that would not significantly enhance the Afro-Arab partnership.

It must also be remembered that the Arab oil-producing countries can expect to get most of their food requirements from the underexploited agricultural regions of the Arab world itself. Indeed, the Arabs are aware of this fact, and they have singled out the northern region of the Sudan for massive agricultural development. The Sudan has enormous amounts of land for growing grain, sugar, corn, sesame and groundnuts and for raising cattle for protein. The Arab Organization for Agricultural Development (AOAD) has also conducted a region-wide survey for increased agricultural and animal production in Syria, Iraq, Morocco and Somalia. According to John Waterbury, if all these regions were to be brought together under the umbrella of a regional plan, the Arab world could feed itself by the year 2000.[33] So far, the Arabs have embarked on mobilizing surplus oil earnings towards this end. How crucial then is black Africa for Arab food needs? At present, not very, and not very much in the future either. Hence, the potential for Afro-Arab economic co-operation based on complementary resources is vastly exaggerated.

Moreover, oil is non-renewable. It is not an everlasting resource, and therefore the primary source of Arab wealth is not permanent. Furthermore, gradual increases in the absorptive capacity of the major Arab donors will lead to more use of petrofunds internally. Like all financial and other types of aid-donors, the Arabs are reluctant to grant aid without strings. Some of the aid to black Africa and to the Third World in general is distributed out of religious considerations. As can be seen in the tables, the beneficiaries of Arab aid in Africa are those countries with predominantly Muslim populations. Also Arab money has served to promote the national interests of its donors in the recipient regions. It is, for instance, no coincidence that Somalia and Uganda under Amin received substantial Arab aid and investment. On the

other hand, Malawi, which has maintained diplomatic and indeed close relations with Israel and was critical of Arab 'genocide' against Africans in the southern Sudan, has so far received no Arab money.

The important point to grasp here is the prospect of the development of a broader ideological 'fracture line' developing between Arabs and Africans. If that happens, then Africans might forgo Arab aid and investments in Africa. It is also conceivable that the black African states may conclude that their commercial, trade and indeed economic relationships directly with the OECD countries are, in general, more mature, stable and reliable than their present shaky and uncertain economic transactions with the Arab Middle East might indicate. After all, Africa can get loans directly from the OECD banking institutions where the Arab petrofunds are deposited. Indeed, Africans on the whole feel content with their familiarity with the OECD countries and are not ready to accommodate Arab 'petrodollar imperialism'. Generally, aid from the European Economic Community (EEC) to Africa and bilateral aid from some OECD countries to Africa compare favourably with Arab aid to Africa.

Although Afro-Arab countries produce mainly raw materials and belong to the Third World, it must be remembered that the Third World is not a monolith. Its parts have different economic systems and are at different stages of industrialization. Above all they do not agree on all economic issues. Within the Arab world itself there are disagreements—for instance between Algeria and Saudi Arabia—on the kind of economic relationship that should be cultivated with the OECD countries. Neither Arab nor African states agree on issues of international economic relationships. Thus it is more than likely that the Africans and the Arabs will disagree in their approach towards NIEO.

Future trends in Afro-Arab relations

Despite centuries of contact between sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab Middle East, the peoples of the two regions are still rather blind to each other's cultural virtues, political potential and economic opportunities. A good deal of stereotyping occurs in Africa *vis-à-vis* the Arabs; and the converse is also true. Hence, if relations between and among them are going to improve, the areas of ignorance and prejudice must be overcome. Attempts at increasing knowledge and communications between Africans and Arabs were promised at the Cairo Summit. Such efforts led Ibrahim Abu-Lughod to conclude that:

> We have moved beyond co-operation on the basis solely of our common experiences of colonial domination and for merely nationalistic, self-interest oriented purposes. In viewing the cumulative actions of Arabs and Africans since World War II, we see the growing awareness of each other as real human beings and with it, an increasing appreciation of one another on the basis of individual merit. This process is finally

occurring independently of Europe. Previously, Arabs and Africans had studied each other from British and French text-books! Now the study continues on a bilateral basis and Africans and Arabs meet in Cairo rather than in London. The authenticity with which they view each other today is reflected more and more in the Arab press. This new awareness and sensitivity is bound to affect the policy output of these states.[34]

One would like to hope that these observations reflect what is actually happening at present rather than wishful thinking about what one would like to see happening.

However, a critical examination of Afro-Arab relations tends to show that the optimism that has been voiced is misplaced. The nature of the historical relationship between the Arab world and Africa is lopsided: whereas Arabs have been able to penetrate Africa, Africans have not counter-penetrated the Arab world. African memories of the slave activities of Arabs in Africa are deep and they tend to inhibit candid communications and a free flow of ideas between the two peoples. Moreover, the apparently condescending Arab attitude towards Africans compounds the difficulties in evolving a positive relationship. Negative psychological predispositions on both sides will continue to hamper development of closer horizontal and vertical relationships. The lack of mutual knowledge and respect, and the absence of a genuine commitment to correct this problem will hinder transactions and interactions among Arabs and Africans in the future.

Nor are we persuaded that Arabs and Africans have shared functional interests. On the political level, there are no fundamental issues of solidarity. Opposition to colonialism, apartheid and Zionism will not lead to firm Afro-Arab co-operation when such problems disappear. Rather, resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict and of the racial crises in southern Africa will deprive Arabs and Africans of subjects that have so far facilitated diplomatic co-operation between them in international forums.

Moreover, Africans and Arabs have not yet arrived at firm collective views within their own regions. There are many shifting dimensions, many different blocs with diverse perspectives influenced by various factors such as security, ideology, leadership and the aims of individual states. On both sides there exist political forces that tend to negate the potential for collaboration between them. Although the Arabs have increased the number of their diplomatic missions in black Africa and though the Arab League have opened regional offices in Kenya, Nigeria and Senegal, the OAU has not opened regional offices in the Arab world and only a few black African countries have diplomatic representation in it. Such diplomatic imbalances reinforce the image of asymmetrical Afro-Arab relationships.

At present, both the OAU and the Arab League lack the ability to co-ordinate development projects effectively, many of which exist only on

paper. The sources of weakness in both organizations lie in their administrative incapabilities, lack of a coherent and unifying ideology, intraregional disputes and the absence of strategies for the improvement of collaboration within and between them. Like most international organizations, they are neither authoritative nor supranational. Their future role in promoting Afro-Arab interregional co-operation remains illusive.

On the economic level, the Asian Arab states that possess most of the 'surplus' petrofunds generally look at investment risks with growing conservatism rather than dynamism. They are likely to continue to direct their money towards safer investments in the OECD countries. So far the Arab concessional aid flow constitutes a small percentage of the overall resource flow to Africa; and with a dwindling surplus in most Arab countries, there is no likelihood of its increasing. Moreover, political and religious, rather than economic and developmental, rationales have been and will continue to be behind Arab decisions to invest in Africa.

Another factor that needs no emphasis is that Arab and African countries have different developmental needs and goals: what the Arabs are likely to give is oriented towards capital-intensive projects, while what the Africans need is labour-intensive schemes. For agricultural development, Africa requires the use of intermediate rather than advanced technology. But the MNCs which Arabs engage for the execution of projects they fund in Africa are most likely to prefer using the latter to the former.

Rather than search for a NIEO, many Arab states would prefer to remain close to and, indeed, to be fully incorporated into the old economic order rather than to establish a new and unfamiliar one. Although the conservative Arab members have continually followed the radical members of OPEC in raising oil prices, it is inconceivable for them to support the overhaul and transformation of the present international economic system.

In the years ahead, then, Afro-Arab transactions will probably continue on about the same level. But Afro-Arab co-operation in international forums will progressively decline as the Arabs continue to oppose Egypt in its search for a durable peace settlement with Israel. Most African states are explicitly or implicitly sympathetic to President Sadat's position and hence they will likely incur the wrath of the Arab oil giants. Furthermore, the final resolution of the Middle East and the southern African conflicts will lead to the demise of any semblance of diplomatic co-operation at the interregional and international levels. Already there are signs of increasing conflicts and confrontations between some African and Arab states.[35] We do not foresee much likelihood for the evolution of a comprehensive economic partnership between sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab Middle East in the next decade.

Notes

1. For sympathetic writings on Afro-Arab solidarity, see the following: Zdenek Cervenka, 'The Afro-Arab Alliance', *Africa*, Vol. 31, March 1974, pp. 76–9; 'Afro-Arab Relations: Exploitation or Cooperation?' *Africa*, Vol. 34, June 1974, pp. 47–8, and 'The Emergence and Significance of the African-Arab Solidarity', *Instant Research on Peace and Violence*, Vol. 4, 1974, pp. 102–9; Colin Legum, 'Africa, the Arabs and the Middle East', *Africa Contemporary Record; Annual Survey and Documents*, Vol. 6, 1973/74, London, Rex Collings, 1975, A3-A14: Ali A. Mazrui, 'Black Africa and the Arabs', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 53, July 1975, pp. 725–42; Elliot P. Skinner, 'African States and Israel: Uneasy Relations in a World Crisis', *Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 2, Spring 1975, pp. 1–23; Ralph Uwechne: 'Afro-Arab Solidarity', *Africa*, Vol. 29, January 1974, pp. 8–9; and E. C. Chibwe, *Afro-Arab Relations in the New World Order*, London, Julian Friedman Publishers, 1977.
2. See I. M. Lewis, *Islam in Tropical Africa*, London, Oxford University Press, 1966.
3. Ali A. Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations: the Diplomacy of Dependence and Change*, pp. 130–1, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1977.
4. For the impact of the Arab slave trade on black African attitudes towards the Arabs, consult Aryeh Oded, 'Slaves and Oil: The Arab Image in Black Africa', *The Weiner Library Bulletin*, Vol. 27, No. 32, 1974.
5. See Colin Legum, *Pan Africanism*, New York, Praeger, 1968.
6. See Doudou Thiam, *The Foreign Policy of African States*, London, Phoenix House, 1965; OAU Council of Ministers, 10th Session, CM/Res. 134 [x], Addis Ababa, February 1968; also OAU Resolutions in Algiers, September 1968, AHG/Res. 53 [v], AHG/Res. 56 [vi].
7. Most African diplomats who have dealings with their Arab counterparts express this feeling in various discussions I have had with them.
8. This is particularly true in Egypt, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.
9. I am indebted to Dr Constance B. Hilliard for pointing out the fundamental differences between African Islam and Arab Islam.
10. Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations*, p. 287.
11. For succinct discussion of the process of regional integration and the factors that facilitate it, see Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, *The Integration of Political Communities*, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1964.
12. William Quandt, 'Prospects for Communal Conflict in the Middle East in the 1980s' (The 1980s Project of the Council on Foreign Relations), New York, McGraw Hill, 1978.
13. *Tripoli Radio Home Service*, 11 February 1976, cited in Colin Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol. 9, 1976/77, A76.
14. The late Gamal Abdel Nasser was, however, overtly careful in pressing his point against Israel among African leaders who had cordial relations with Israel.
15. It was assumed by the black African OAU members that their northern African colleagues would prevail on the Arab Asian states, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which traded with South Africa.
16. The Afro-Arab 1977 Cairo Summit communiqué.
17. Interviews with some African diplomats at the United Nations in New York.
18. See Ali A. Mazrui, 'The Barrel of the Gun and the Barrel of Oil in North-South Equation', *Alternatives*, Vol. 111, 1977–78.
19. See 'Tanzania Rejects Western Domination of Africa', statement by President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere to foreign envoys accredited to Tanzania, June 1978, Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1978.

20. Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations*, p. 151.
21. Ibid., p. 151.
22. Sammy Kum Buo, *Africa Report*, September-October 1975.
23. Particularly the United States and Western European countries.
24. Interview with Sheikh Yamani, *New York Times Magazine*, 1977.
25. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata and Robert Mabro, The OPEC Aid Record, *World Development*, Vol. 7, No. 2, February 1979, p. 167.
26. Arthur Smithies, 'The Economic Potential of the Arab Countries, A Report Prepared for Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense', Rand Corporation, November 1978, pp. vi–vii.
27. Z. A. Nasr, 'The Kuwait Fund and Trilateral Co-operation, KFAED', February 1977, cited in Willard Johnson, 'African-Arab-Western Industrial Country "Trilateral" Co-operation: A Note of Caution', Cambridge, Mass., MIT Department of Political Science, unpublished paper, 1978, p. 2.
28. Ibid., p. 6.
29. Ibid., p. 9, interview with Dr Chedly Ayari, *Journal of African Development*, January 1976, cited.
30. For a detailed discussion on this subject, see Roger D. Hansen, *Beyond the North-South Stalemate* (1980s Project/Council on Foreign Relations), New York, McGraw Hill, 1979.
31. Jane Coles, 'A Matter of Bread and Butter', *Africa*, Vol. 91, March 1979, p. 60. See also Chapters 10 and 11.
32. *Africa*, Vol. 90, February 1979.
33. John Waterbury, 'The Middle East in the Context of North-South Relations', New York, Council on Foreign Relations 1980s Project, 1978. (Mimeo.)
34. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, statement made at a meeting on 'Relations between Africa and the Arab Middle East', New York, The Rockefeller Foundation, May 1978.
35. For instance, Libyan-Chadian border conflicts; quarrels between Ethiopia and the Arab states, particularly Nimeiri's Sudan and Sadat's Egypt over Ethiopia's desire to build six dams on rivers that feed the Nile, and over Arab support for the Somalis and the Eritreans.

Africa and the Arab–Israeli conflict

Ali A. Mazrui

Africa's orientation towards the Arab–Israeli conflict can be periodized into, first, the years of Africa's political impotence (1948–57), the years of Africa's political ambivalence (1957–70), the years of Africa's political solidarity with the Arabs (dated in the 1970s generally) and the future years of possible political conflict and greater economic integration (possibly the last two decades of the twentieth century onwards). Let us explore these four periods in the light of the basic interrelationship between two regions of the world that are caught up in the continuity of shared history and the contiguities of political geography.

The years of impotence

Israel was created when black Africa was virtually non-existent as a political force in world affairs. Liberia on the west coast and Ethiopia on the east were the only sub-Saharan African members of the United Nations at the time that the world body voted on partition. Liberia was strongly under the influence of the United States, and its official attitude to partition was a child of that influence. Ethiopia, newly liberated from the Italians, who had been allies of the Nazis, was in no condition to assert a strongly independent line, in spite of Ethiopia's concern for the status of Jerusalem. The rest of black Africa was under alien occupation, without a voice in world affairs, without a say in what has turned out to be one of the most persistent problems in the politics of the twentieth century.

Africa's impotence in these matters went further back in the century to the days when it was even contemplated creating a Jewish state within Africa. At the beginning of the century the British government contemplated offering parts of Uganda and Kenya for Jewish settlement. There was thus briefly the possibility of an Israel created in East Africa. But the Zionist leaders would contemplate East Africa only as an extension or overseas province of a Jewish state in Palestine.

On 21 December 1902, Joseph Chamberlain made the following entry in his diary:

If Dr Herzl were at all inclined to transfer his efforts to East Africa, there would be no difficulty in finding suitable land for Jewish settlers. But I assume that this country is too far removed from Palestine to have any attractions for him.[1]

Dr Theodore Herzl, the founding father of Zionism, later recorded in his own diary that Chamberlain had offered him Uganda. But Herzl declined, saying:

Our starting point must be in or near Palestine. Later on we could also colonize Uganda; for we have vast numbers of human beings who are prepared to emigrate. We must, however, build upon a national foundation; that is why the political attraction of El Arish is indispensable to us.[2]

In his biography of Joseph Chamberlain, Julian Amery has pointed out that Chamberlain offered the Zionists not only a part of Uganda, but also parts of the highlands of Kenya, which later became known as 'the White Highlands'. According to Amery 'there is no better white man's country anywhere in the Tropics'.[3] At the time Kenya as a territorial entity, with its modern boundaries, did not exist, and parts of what is today Kenya were deemed to be part of Uganda. What is clear is that so great was Africa's political impotence as we entered the twentieth century that large tracts of African land were being offered by a major Western country to the Zionist movement for Jewish settlement. It is possible for some East Africans today to feel, as they contemplate the predicament of the Palestinians: 'There, but for the grace of God, go we.'

When finally in 1948 the Jewish state was established within the old Palestine and war broke out between the Arabs and the Israelis, black Africa was still too politically neutralized to be factor one way or the other.

The second Arab–Israeli war—the Suez crisis of 1956—occurred when much of Africa was still under colonial rule. But a new political awareness was now evident in different parts of Africa, and for at least some African countries independence was on the horizon. Because the second Arab–Israeli war in fact included two major powers, the United Kingdom and France, there was a new sympathy at least for Egypt though not necessarily sympathy for the Palestinian cause. Nasser as President of Egypt was transformed by the Suez war into a world figure almost overnight, and certainly into the hero of many African and Asian nationalists.

We may therefore say that the beginnings of the years of African ambivalence lie in part in the Suez war. But the formal point of black Africa's entry into modern world politics occurred the following year, in 1957, when Ghana became the first black African state to be liberated from European colonialism, in a manner that signified the initiation of the process of liberation for the continent as a whole. The chapter on Africa's political impotence in the twentieth century was coming to a close.

The years of ambivalence

After he became the head of government of a newly independent African country, Kwame Nkrumah soon developed into the most important spokesman of black Africa's aspirations and perceptions of world events.

In his first address to the United Nations in 1960, Nkrumah called upon the Arabs to recognize 'realities'. The creation of the state of Israel in 1948 might have been less than legitimate, but Nkrumah noted the reality of Israel's existence, and called upon the Arabs to grapple with it.

Arab spokesmen at the United Nations entered their own rebuttals. Apartheid in South Africa was an existing reality; so was the government that was implementing it. But the existence did not necessarily justify either the diplomatic recognition of the regime in Pretoria or the approval of its policy of apartheid. In any case, recognizing a reality may sometimes have to be distinguished from accepting that reality. A cancerous growth could be a reality, and yet it might require surgical removal as an assertion of non-acceptability.

Nkrumah had in fact cultivated some friendly relations with Israel, and entered into aid transactions with the Jewish state.

Less than a year after Nkrumah's 1960 address to the United Nations he was signatory to the African Charter of Casablanca. The Charter's resolution on Palestine noted that:

> Israel has always taken the side of the imperialists each time an important position had to be taken concerning vital problems about Africa, notably Algeria, the Congo and the nuclear tests in Africa, and the Conference, therefore, denounces Israel as an instrument in the service of imperialism and neo-colonialism not only in the Middle East but also in Africa and Asia.[4]

It was true that Israel sided with France diplomatically on the issue of Algeria's independence, and less understandably took positions sympathetic to Congolese (Zairian) conservatives like Moise Tshombe and hostile to the more nationalistic assertiveness of Patrice Lumumba. Nkrumah's own position on the first crisis of the Congo was clearly in the reverse order of identification from that adopted by Israel. And yet there was considerable international surprise about Nkrumah's decision to be a party to the Casablanca condemnation of Israel. The president of Ghana felt compelled to reiterate that position in public.

And yet the basic ambivalence on Nkrumah's part remained. The verbal denunciation of Israel did not immediately alter Ghana's relations with the Jewish state. Technical co-operation between the two countries continued. The ambiguous nature of this period of Afro-Arab relations generally was dramatically captured in Nkrumah's own contradictions.

A related aspect of the ambivalence was black Africa's own internal ideological division. Those black African states that were to the left of centre were inclined towards the Arab cause, however modestly. On the other hand, those black states that were right of centre in their general ideological orientation were inclined towards the Israelis. And so, leftists and neo-leftist leaders like Nkrumah, Nyerere and Sékou Touré showed some basic understanding of the Arab cause, though often combined with economic and diplomatic relations with Israel. On the other hand, rightist leaders like Hastings Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, President Félix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, and Mzee Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya tended to have more pro-Israeli sympathies. In the attitude of Kamuzu Banda there was even a marked anti-Arab assertiveness rather than merely sympathy for Israel.

But why were African leaders who were left of centre in their general ideological positions also inclined to be more sympathetic to the Arabs? One reason is connected with their interpretation of pan-Africanism. Trans-Saharan pan-Africanism is a view of African solidarity that refuses to recognize the Sahara as politically relevant and insists instead on the unity of the whole African continent, rather than the unity merely of black Africa. Trans-Saharan pan-Africanism is therefore basically Afro-Arab in vision. It seeks to unite the Arabic-speaking states of North Africa with the black states south of the great desert. African leaders who are left of centre in their ideological orientation tend to be trans-Saharan in their definition of the duties of African unity. Their vision prevailed as the basis of the Organization of African Unity, which of course includes both Arab and black states.

Another reason why leftist and neo-leftist Africans tend to sympathize with the Arabs is their perception of Israel as a settler country, comparable to the settlement of whites in southern Africa. Large numbers of Jews from other parts of the world were encouraged to settle in Palestine, partly displacing the local inhabitants and scattering them to refugee camps elsewhere.

A related consideration that has conditioned the views of leftist and neo-leftist African leaders is the perception of Israel as a piece of the Western world unjustly lodged into the heartland of one of the richest and strategically most important parts of the Third World. Israel is thus viewed as a form of direct territorial penetration by the West at the expense of non-Western people.

A related view is that which has at times been expressed by spokesmen of the government of the United Republic of Tanzania to the effect that Israel was created to satisfy Western guilt over the persecution of the Jews in the West, but in a manner where the price was paid by the Arab people. Western sense of shame over the German concentration camps was thus appeased by Palestinian refugee camps in the Middle East. A final factor that draws African leftists towards the Arab cause is their acceptance of Arabs as allies in general

anti-colonial movements, ranging from the struggle against apartheid to the struggle for a new international economic order.

But in general from 1957 to 1970 the deep ambivalence of black Africa towards the Arabs and the Israelis remained. Ideological differences among the Black Africans themselves helped to divide loyalties and sympathies. Even those Africans keenly sympathetic to the Arabs continued to have diplomatic and economic relations with Israel in spite of all. The contradictions of diplomacy and of the dialectic of underdevelopment in black Africa helped to give Israel a temporary role as benefactor and donor.

The years of solidarity

This period certainly centres on the decade of the 1970s, but it does not begin with the October war or the 1973 quadrupling of the price of oil by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). By the time the war broke out a trend was definitely under way that implied a growing African solidarity with the Arab cause in the Middle East. Some commentators in the West, especially those sympathetic to the position of Israel and the Zionist movement, attributed African severance of relations with Israel in 1973 to the new oil power of the Arabs. What should be borne in mind is the precise chronology of events in 1973. It is simply not correct to assume that African moves in the direction of solidarity with the Arabs began when OPEC demonstrated its capacity to quadruple prices at the world level, nor did African solidarity with the Arabs emerge following the Arab oil embargo of the United States and the Netherlands. Signs of a major shift in African sympathies were discernible before these events took place.

The meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that very year of 1973 occurred before any of these three events had taken place—that is to say, before the outbreak of the October Arab–Israeli War, the application of the Arab oil embargo against some Western countries, and before OPEC's decision to multiply the price of oil four times.

At the meeting in May of 1973 of the heads of state of the OAU, the Arab position was articulated carefully by the President of Algeria, Houari Boumedienne. He compared the occupation of Arab lands by Israelis with the penetration of African lands by alien races in southern Africa. 'Africa', he said, 'cannot adopt one attitude towards colonialism in southern Africa and a completely different one towards Zionist colonization in North Africa.' He argued that since the 1967 June War, the Israelis had occupied the Sinai peninsula all the way to the Suez canal. The area was nearly a third of the total land of Egypt. The Algerian President pointed out that this occupation of a third of an African country was an insult to the African continent as a whole. It was comparable in implication to the Portuguese occupation of

Angola and Mozambique as imperial territory, as well as comparable to the remaining areas within the African continent under alien subjugation.

The OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted on 29 May 1973 a tough resolution asserting that respect for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people was essential for any just and equitable solution of the problem of the Middle East.[5] What is more, the resolution fell short of guaranteeing the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Israel as envisaged in Security Council Resolution 242. The OAU resolution went even further, warning Israel that continuing occupation of Arab territory constituted an act of aggression that threatened the security of the African continent and might compel members of the OAU to take, either individually or collectively, political and economic measures against Israel.

If such a resolution was capable of being passed unanimously in May 1973, months before either the Middle East war or OPEC's muscle-flexing, opinion in Africa was indeed shifting more significantly towards the Arab cause.

President Idi Amin Dada of Uganda, so unpredictable in a variety of ways, turned out to be setting a precedent when he broke off Uganda's relations with Israel on 30 March 1972. That was a year and a half before the October War and the oil crisis. Also in 1972, Chad and the People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) broke off diplomatic relations with Israel.

In 1973 itself, but before the October War, other African countries had become disenchanted with Israel for a number of reasons, ranging from a growing belief that Israel had become a mini-bully in the Middle East to strains in the relations between Israeli technical assistance personnel in individual countries and the authorities of those countries. Niger broke off relations in January 1973, followed closely by Mali—once again well before the war and the politics of the new power of OPEC. In May 1973 Burundi, a country with a radical foreign policy, followed the same direction. Togo joined the ranks in September 1973, again before the expected deadline of the war and OPEC power. And even in October 1973, the month of the outbreak of the war, there was a surprise before that war erupted into history. In October 1973, while addressing the United Nations, President Mobutu Sese Seko surprised the world by changing his attitude towards Israel. He told the General Assembly of the United Nations that he had been forced to chose between a friend, Israel, and a brother, Egypt. He criticized Israel's territorial expansion. Explaining his break with Israel the President of Zaire said:

> We have taken this decision at a great risk, because many of our officers—and I myself—have received military training at the hands of Israel officers who came to our country at our expense. By declaring this decision to the world from the largest Jewish city in the world [New York City], I mean to stress the fact that Zaire will never back down and will carry out the duties of African co-operation.[6]

What emerges from this chronology is the simple fact that a trend in favour of the Arabs and against Israel was strikingly manifest before Arab petro-power had become unmistakable.

On balance since 1973, the West has shifted from a basically pro-Israeli position to a new ambivalence. On the other hand, Africa has shifted from a basically ambivalent position to a more clearly pro-Arab orientation.

Secondly, it is much easier to demonstrate that the West shifted from pro-Israelism to Arabism as a result of Arab petro-power than it is to prove that Africa moved from ambivalence to pro-Arab orientation as a result of the quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC in the last few weeks of 1973.

But why did Africa move from ambivalence to a pro-Arab shift? A number of factors were relevant here.

First, the 1967 war did become proof that the issue was not simply Israel's right to exist, but Israel's expansionism.

Secondly, occupation of part of Egypt began to be widely interpreted as occupation of part of the African continent.

Thirdly, Israeli intransigence began to emerge more clearly after the efforts of the OAU in 1971 to mediate or at least create an atmosphere of conciliation between the two countries. A small subcommittee, composed of distinguished African leaders (Presidents Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon, Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Mobutu of Zaire and General Yakubu Gowon, Head of State of Nigeria) became a kind of task force to ascertain the positions of Egypt and Israel. Their experiences reinforced the growing realization in black Africa that the real obstacle to peace in the Middle East was not the fanaticism and obstinacy of the Arabs but the basic intransigence and expansionist tendencies of Israel.

A fourth factor that prepared the ground for the African severance of relations with Israel concerned Israel's carelessness in the choice of diplomatic personnel represented in black African countries, as well the choice of technical personnel who were supposed to help African countries in their developmental efforts. Some of the people chosen for these tasks turned out to be singularly insensitive to the concerns of African countries and alienated important sectors of opinion during their tenures of duty in African countries.

Fifthly, there was Israel's growing cordiality with South Africa and its implications for the rest of the continent. Trade between Israel and South Africa began its dramatic increase, sometimes quadrupling previous performances, from 1972 onwards. Co-operation in the industrial domain between South Africa and Israel also seemed to be laying the foundations of even deeper economic integration, including very carefully worked-out schemes of steel production. Thirdly, there was the more ominous consultation reportedly taking place between South Africa and Israel on techniques of counter-insurgency. If Israel had been so successful in containing the activities of the

Palestinians, how could South Africa learn from that experience so as to contain the activity of Black liberation fighters, especially in the years ahead? Fourthly, and to some people the most ominous of all, was the possibility of nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa. Israel would be providing the higher sophistication and expertise, on one side, and South Africa would be providing the actual resources of uranium and capital in the processing and manufacture of military nuclear capability.

All these factors were fairly fundamental in the events that led to the relative consolidation of African-Arab solidarity in the 1970s. And what all this means is that Arab petro-power was not the cause of a pro-Arab shift in Africa.

But has Arab petro-power been a major factor in stabilizing that shift? This latter question needs an affirmative answer. It is true that the availability of actual or potential Arab resources has helped to consolidate solidarity that might easily have been dissipated in the face of Western efforts, as well as Israel's own diplomatic counter-moves. The new capacity of the Arabs to make a contribution to African development has at least served to provide an alternative to Israeli contributions to the same process, which were offered with such enthusiasm in the 1960s. Arab contributions are also, at least potentially, a supplement, and at worst an alternative, to developmental contributions from the Western world as a whole.

The future years of greater tension and conflict

What may happen in the future is, on one side, greater structural integration between the Arab world and Africa as Arab money finds new avenues of investment in Africa, Arab policy-makers find new justification for aid to Africa, and Arab trade finds both new sources and new markets in sub-Saharan parts of the continent. This interaction would in fact result in genuine integration between the two regions.

But structural integration carries always the risk of normative and ideological disagreements. It may well turn out to be that the last fifteen to twenty years of the twentieth century will be characterized by, on one side, new levels of familiarity between Africans and Arabs and, on the other side, new areas of disagreement and differences of opinion on priorities.

The new banks and financial institutions that are being created in the Arab world to help African development are part of this integration. The participation of the Moroccans in stabilizing Shaba province in Zaire is also connected with this change. The future of Afro-Arab relations remains uncertain. President Sadat's initiative with his visit to Jerusalem may have divided the Arabs and that is a set-back, though it forced the Americans to take a more even-handed interest in the Arab–Israeli conflict, and that is a

gain. But Sadat's initiative also confused the Africans, and that is also a set-back. Sadat went to Jerusalem in quest of a dream. As the British poet Robert Browning wrote:

> Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp
> Or what's a heaven for?

And yet heaven is often unattainable. What may well turn out to be within the bounds of possibility if the forging of deeper link between the Arab nations and the lands of the Black peoples at a higher level.

Notes

1. See Julian Amery, *The Life of Joseph Chamberlain*, Vol. 4, especially pp. 262–5, London, Macmillan, 1961.
2. Cited by Amery.
3. Ibid.
4. Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide*, Appendix 15.
5. Resolution 71 (X) adopted on 28 May 1973. Consult also Zdenek Cervenka, *The Unfinishde Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU*, especially pp. 163–6, London, Julian Friedman, 1977.
6. For a report on Mobutu's break, consult *The New York Times*, 6 and 9 October 1973; see also Ali A. Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change*, Chapter 7, pp. 130–55, London, Heinemann Educational, 1977.

Black African civil wars in the context of Afro-Arab relations

J. Isawa Elaigwu with Dunstan M. Wai

Since 1960—Africa's popularly recognized year of independence—the continent has witnessed a number of civil wars, in Zaire (formerly Congo-Leopoldville), Sudan, Nigeria, Chad and Ethiopia, and an imminent one in Zimbabwe. Generally, civil wars are a form of political instability, that is:

> a condition in political systems in which the institutionalized patterns of authority break down, and the expected compliance to political authorities is replaced by violence, intended to change the personnel, policies or sovereignty of the authorities through injury to persons or property.[1]

This form of instability entails the use of violence, which essentially punctuates the processes of state- and nation-building.[2] According to Morrison, Mitchell, Paden and Stevenson,[3] at least three types of political instability can be identified in a state.

One of these is élite instability, involving intra-élite turnover as a result of conflicts among élite groups. Coups d'état and government reshuffles are indications of this form of instability.

Communal instability involves greater and more extensive use of violence. It makes demands for the restructuring of the authority pattern in a state. Communal instability may have its sources in ethnic, racial or religious conflicts among groups. Among the indicators of this form if instability are civil wars, rebellion and irredentist movements.

The third type is mass instability—a still more extensive spread of violence in the system, leading to revolutions. It indicates the fundamental breakdown of authority, as illustrated recently by Iran.

In this paper we are concerned with civil wars as a form of communal instability. While rebellions (as in the Sudan in 1966 and 1970) and irredentist movements (as in Ethiopia's Ogaden province) are interesting, our focus is on black African civil wars. For this purpose civil war is defined as a form of communal instability 'in which one or more communities engage in violence to alter their authority relationships within the national unit, mostly by attempted secession'.[4] In this process the authority of the central government

is challenged by a subnational ethnic, racial, religious or geopolitical unit as it seeks to alter the authority relationships in the state or establish itself as a sovereign nation-state. Often civil wars (whether in the United States, Nigeria, Pakistan or Ethiopia) are grave challenges to the existing state, emanating from a non-recognition of the central government as the legitimate authority over the territory involved in secession.

This leads us to the issue of black African civil wars. Africa has had a number of civil wars, which cannot be given adequate treatment in this paper. However, our main task is to look at civil wars that have taken place in the context of Afro-Arab relations. In a continent suffused with a number of 'pans'—whether these be pan-Arabism or pan-Africanism—it is not easy to isolate essentially 'black African civil wars'. The Sudanese civil war, for example, involved both Black Africans in the south and Arab Africans in the northern part of the country. Does this not therefore bring up the issue of who is 'black African' and who is 'Arab'?

For the purposes of analysis, we shall define an Arab country as any country that uses Arabic as its main language of communication—at least over 60 per cent of the population should be able to speak or write in Arabic. This makes the Maghreb countries, together with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Egypt, as Arab as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Yet it may be argued that to a large extent the Sudan could be seen as an Arab country, even though we believe that Sudan is more of a link between the Arab world and black Africa.[5] Of course, we are very much aware that the Arab world is not homogeneous. In this paper, therefore, we have chosen four civil wars—in Nigeria, Chad, Sudan and Ethiopia—as black African civil wars that highlight Afro-Arab relations in the context of conflicts in the continent. We shall show how these black civil wars excited reactions from the Arab world and the reasons for such civil wars. But first, let us look at the modalities of conflict and then proceed to delineate a number of arguments that will be put forward.

Modalities of conflict: Arab intervention in black African civil wars

As mentioned earlier, civil wars usually involve at least two parties, the central government and the rebellious subnational unit, thus forming a dyad. In the civil wars we shall be discussing, there are two belligerents in a tripartite conflict situation. The third party is the Arab bloc of countries, which may include such countries as Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. The presence of Arab countries in these civil wars creates a triadic pattern of relationship, as in Figure 1.



FIG. 1. Pattern of a civil war.

Actor A represents any Arab country or countries that intervene (actively or passively)[6] in the civil war between actors X and Y in country C.

Following David Wilkinson[7] we argue that in the context of a civil war in country C, A as an outside third party (for whatever reasons) has three possible ways of becoming involved in the conflict. First, it could declare its support for X or Y, thus probably altering or appreciably skewing the conflict situation in favour of the supported actor. Secondly, it could mediate between X and Y, in which case it must be careful, for its credibility as a mediator would always be on the line. Or thirdly it could become a third contestant in the whole conflict situation into which it implodes. The third party's presence or action therefore becomes crucial, even in civil wars.[8]

On the basis of the above theoretical framework, we should like to argue, first, that Arab countries have intervened (actively or passively) in many black African civil wars, thus transforming a dyadic interaction of conflict into a tripartite conflict situation;[9] second, that in some cases Arab intervention has accentuated instability and made conflict resolutions in some of these countries more difficult; third, that reasons for Arab intervention in black African civil wars include factors that are essentially ideological, religious (or religio-cultural), regional diplomatic manoeuvres, security, economic, and at times miscellaneous, factors, such as the personality of the incumbent leader of the concerned Arab country; fourth, that such activities and types of Arab intervention (bilateral or multilateral) vary from arms supplies, financial aid, credits for arms purchases, military instructors/volunteers and regular army units to the use of Arabs as surrogates; and fifth, that these actions affect wider networks of Afro-Arab relations and the resolution of Black Africa's civil wars.

In order to illustrate the above points, we shall use our four cases—Nigeria, Sudan, Chad and Ethiopia. We are cognizant of Arab activities in Zaire (as direct actors or surrogates in the Simba and Shaba wars) but space constrains our treatment of these. We shall look at each of these civil wars to show (a) their causes and (b) the motives and mode of Arab intervention. This will be our next focus.

Black African civil wars: the context of Arab intervention

In our brief case-studies we shall deliberately discount the actions of other external forces that are not Arab countries, for the purpose of highlighting the nature of Afro-Arab relations. We are aware that many Western and Eastern countries have been involved in these wars, but they are not of immediate concern to us here.

What about the Nigerian civil war? What was the nature of Arab intervention, and what effect did such intervention have on the outcome of that civil war?

The Nigerian civil war: solidarity of Arab action

After independence on 1 October 1960, mutual suspicions and fears of domination among various Nigerian groups had led to a series of political conflicts. The disputes over the census exercises of 1962 and 1963, the crisis of 1962 in the Western Region, the 1964 federal elections and the 1965 Western Region elections are examples of conflict issues that posed challenges to Nigeria's conflict-resolution mechanism.

In response to the political tensions in Nigeria, the military intervened in the country's politics in January 1966. The nature of the January 1966 coup and subsequent events led to the massacre of people from the former Eastern Region (particularly the Ibos) in May 1966. Intramilitary suspicions and conflicts led to another coup in July 1966. The July coup was important because it failed to establish the authority of the federal government over the Eastern Region. The Eastern Region became quite autonomous in its relations with the federal government. Attempts to bring about a peaceful settlement of disputes between the federal government and the government of the Eastern Region failed. The Aburi peace talks in Ghana (4–5 January 1967) did not resolve the conflict.

Given the rising political temperature in the country and anxiety among the populace, many Nigerians felt that the country was drifting into a greater crisis. Thus, when the Eastern Region declared its secession from the rest of

Nigeria—as the Republic of Biafra—it was an anti-climax. Most people had expected that secession was not far off. But the secession itself was symptomatic of the failure of Nigeria's resolution mechanism to cope with, or resolve, the conflicts that pestered the life of the state. The secession itself was a challenge to Nigeria's statehood; it questioned the legitimacy of the central government to represent the geographical territory known as Nigeria.

In response to the declaration of secession, the federal government vowed to 'crush the rebellion'. The result was a civil war that lasted thirty months (July 1967–January 1970).[9] What was the role of Arab nations in this civil war?

In this civil war, the Arab nations opted for the first modality of action by declaring support for the Federal Military Movement of Nigeria. In doing so, the Arabs appreciably skewed the battle at the diplomatic war-front against secessionist Biafra. As John de St. Jorre pointed out, the Arabs 'were, to a man, behind the Federal government'.[10]

Nigeria's former Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon, also confirmed that:

> We had a lot of support from the Arab World—from Egypt and Algeria in the main. But, of course, other [Arab] countries also gave us varying degrees of support . . . As far as moral support was concerned, they gave us full moral support. They also sympathized with the Federal cause. So when it comes to the question of world opinion, at least you can . . . say that Arab opinion was solidly behind us, and not for Ojukwu. In Middle East, I think the only one that Ojukwu had was Israel.[11]

What was the nature of this solid Arab support for Nigeria's central government? The mode of support varied from one country to the other in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia, for example, came to the federal government's aid when the latter was short of foreign currency to purchase arms and equipment for the prosecution of the war. It gave Nigeria between $500,000 and $600,000,[12] and offered old equipment no longer needed at home, such as rifles. Libyan support was mostly moral. The government allowed Nigeria the use of Libyan air space for transporting some equipment bought from the Soviet Union, and denied the secessionists similar privileges. Colonel Moummar el-Kadafi would not even allow the secessionist envoys to enter his country.

Of all the Arab countries, perhaps the strongest practical aid came from Egypt and Algeria. When the federal government needed pilots to cope with the secessionist air threat, Egypt came to its rescue. The federal government hired retired Egyptian pilots to train Nigerians in the use of new Soviet aircraft. These Egyptian pilots were used for certain operations.[13]

Algeria (and its leader, President Houari Boumedienne) was the greatest supporter of Nigeria. Nigeria's General Gowon confirmed this: 'Algeria was the greatest support that we had in the OAU and in the Arab World.'[14] Not only

did Algeria supply Nigeria with some equipment,[15] but much of Nigeria's equipment was transited through Algeria. Perhaps the greatest service Boumedienne did for Nigeria was his staunch stand behind the country at the 1968 OAU Conference in Algiers. That was one of the turning points in the battle against the internationalization of Nigeria's civil war: 'It was the one that made sure that the world did not poke its nose in the affair of Nigeria, and that it was first of all Nigerian and African.'[16]

Thus there was no doubt that the Arab world supported one of the belligerents in the Nigerian civil war. This support affected the reaction of the OAU and therefore its stand on the Nigerian crisis, and one may argue that the OAU stand subsequently prevented direct intervention by extra-African forces. It was not surprising therefore, that the Biafran leader, General Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, referred to the Organization of African Unity as the 'Organization of Arab Unity'.[17] But what were the main reasons for Arab support for Nigeria's federal government?

A number of reasons come to mind. Nigeria had a large number of Muslims who went on pilgrimage to Mecca every year. This had over the years established good relations between Nigeria and the Arab world. The former Northern Region had even refused to recognize Israel and in fact had rejected Israeli aid in 1963.[18] Moreover, the 'Biafran' propaganda of a Muslim-Christian civil war boomeranged, at least so far as relations with the Arab world were concerned. Arab sympathy was with Nigeria, which had large number of Muslims.

Nigeria's support for the Arab cause at the United Nations seemed to have, in some way, extracted a reciprocal action from the Arab world.[19] Moreover, some radical 'African' Arab nations, such as Algeria and Nasser's Egypt, felt that Nigeria should not be allowed to disintegrate. In a united Nigeria they saw a hope for Africa, while a balkanized Nigeria would only facilitate neo-colonial supremacy in the continent.

It may be suggested that Arab support for Nigeria did eventually help towards the emergence of a united Nigeria. The Arab countries did not see themselves as having any direct interest at stake that would encourage them to participate as contestants. But the Arab role in Nigeria's war was different from that in the Ethiopian civil war, to which we shall now turn.

Ethiopia: cracks in the kingdom

The main cause of the Ethiopian civil war is to be found in the Eritrean demand for self-determination and the Ethiopian Government's insistence on national unity. Eritrea occupies a strategic position on the Red Sea coast. It is not only of great interest to the Arabs but also to the Ethiopians who are landlocked and to the United States, which would not want the Red Sea to

come under complete Arab control. The Soviet Union is also a keen participant in the politics of the Horn of Africa.

Eritrea was an Italian colony until 1941, when it was handed over to the British administration. In 1952 an autonomous and separately administered Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia, against the wishes of many Eritreans. A number of actions taken by the Ethiopian Government further alienated Eritreans. The Ethiopian Government in 1955 abolished Arabic and Tigrinya as official languages—languages mainly spoken by Eritreans, who are predominantly Muslim. Secondly, the Ethiopian Government abolished Eritrea's federal status in 1962 and made it a province of a unitary Ethiopia. The Eritrean secessionist movement then began to fight a government that, they argued, had robbed them of their right to self-determination and was heavily dominated by Christians.[20]

Today, there are three main liberation movements in Ethiopia. The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF), and the ELF-PLF. These have been involved in a civil war that has taken many lives over a seventeen-year period. What role have Arab countries played in this war?

Reversing their policies in the Nigerian civil war, the Arab countries have strongly supported various liberation movements. ELF-PLF, for example, is heavily financed by Saudi Arabia,[21] while ELF and EPLF are supported by other Arab countries, particularly the radical ones such as Iraq, Syria and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.[22] These countries have supplied the Eritrean secessionists with money and weapons. Until recently, arms were supplied to the liberation movements from the Soviet Union and China.[23] Such arms and money came through Arab countries. Eritrea's location made it even easier to supply this aid. Eritrea is 'surrounded' by friendly Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, the Democratic Yemen and Sudan. Thus ammunition, weapons, food and medicines were often off-loaded along the 870-kilometre Red Sea coast and then moved inland.[24]

Many assaults on government positions by secessionists came from across the Sudanese border, and there are no fewer than 20,000 Eritrean refugees in Sudan. Even when Sudan made a gesture at peaceful settlement in 1975 (after the Dergue's offensive against Eritrean secessionists) the reactions of Arab countries were very revealing. Arab countries threatened an oil embargo against Ethiopia (although most of Ethiopia's oil came from Iran). Anwar Sadat of Egypt warned the Ethiopian government to stop bloodshed by all means. An influential Kuwaiti newspaper rejected President Nimeiri's proposals for peace in Ethiopia and called on all Arab countries to back the legitimate struggle' of the Eritrean people. It declared that 'Eritrea cannot accept a solution along the lines of that adopted in southern Sudan' and that any peace moves must 'be based on the creation of an independent government in Eritrea'.[25]

Again in 1978, after the visit of Ethiopia's Head of State, Mengistu Haile Mariam, to Moscow and Havana, the Libyan Government feared the presence of Cuban combat forces fighting against Eritrean secessionists. To pre-empt such a move, the Libyan hotspur, Colonel el-Kadafi, was quoted by Osman Salih Sabbe (a secessionist leader) as having warned Mengistu that the Libyans would not stand idle if Cubans intervened militarily.[26] Given the presence of Libyan troops in Uganda at that time, such a threat could not be taken lightly.

Arab support for the Eritrean cause had become so manifest that an African magazine said in an editorial:

> We cannot easily appreciate the jihad battle-cry of many Arab States with their professed commitment to pan-Africanism and brotherhood with black Africa. Kuwait, for instance, is interested in nothing short of an independent Moslem State of Eritrea, and two Arab countries have dropped threats of an oil embargo against Ethiopia. We need not repeat the often-made point that no 'friend' of Africa is helping her future by fanning primordial embers.[27]

The Ethiopian leader, Colonel Mengistu, made a similar point when he claimed that in order 'to weaken Ethiopia, reactionary Arab regimes organized, trained, armed and financed the secessionist elements'.[28] But why did Arab nations support the Eritrean secessionists after they had opposed the disintegration of Nigeria?

Eritrea has more direct relevance to the interests of Arab countries. While Arab countries chose the first option—to support one of the belligerents (as in Nigeria)—this support has an undercurrent of strong Arab interests. There is the religio-cultural affinity of Eritrea with similarly Islamic Arab states. Secondly, Egypt and Sudan depend on the Nile, and the Blue Nile has its source in Ethiopia. It was no wonder that Mengistu emphasized this point: 'We are cognizant of the fact that Egypt and Sudan have basic interests in the waters of the Nile and we expect them to respect our established rights and fundamental rights.'[29] Was this a threat? Or was it an expression of fear of Arab intentions to see Ethiopia disintegrate so that they could exert influence at this source?

Furthermore, there is the strategic importance of an independent Eritrea to Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia and Democratic Yemen. Not only would a sovereign Eritrea cut off Ethiopia from its outlets at Massawa and Assab; it would also give the Arabs complete control of the Red Sea—a prospect that makes the United States shudder. Mengistu has accused the Arab states of trying 'to deny Ethiopia its rightful and historical position on the Red Sea in order to turn the Red Sea into an Arab Lake'.[30]

Perhaps an additional reason for Arab support for Eritrean secessionists is the Arab intention to establish regional solidarity around the Red Sea.

Somali has already joined the Arab League. Linked to this may be the motive of expanding Arab influence in black Africa—an increasingly crucial issue, especially since 1967.

The Ethiopian civil war lasted seventeen years. It took a military solution to reunify Ethiopia, no matter how tentative. By January 1978 Eritrea posed a real threat to the Ethiopian government through a number of successes. However, by February–March 1978, Eritrea had experienced serious reverses. Since the renewed 'energy' of the Ethiopian forces after the Ogaden War, the central government had established control over most of Ethiopia. Moreover, the Soviet Union, one of the principal sources of arms for Eritrean rebels, was now on the side of the central government; so was the Democratic Republic of Yemen. Secondly, Sudan, a 'long rear base' for the insurgents, normalized relations with Ethiopia, following the work of an OAU Mediation Committee in Sierra Leone.[31]

Thus, the role of Arab states in Ethiopia has been destabilizing. It has accentuated conflict rather than helped towards peaceful solutions. But even the Ethiopian civil war was different from the civil war in Chad, where the roles of some Arab countries have alternated between being active contestants and being mediators. What is Chad's experience?

Chad: the tripartite war of the desert

Since independence in 1960 the Republic of Chad has had a series of political conflicts. The government of President Tombalbaye had been dominated by the southerners, who were also mostly Christians. The northern Muslims, who are the majority, had been given very little participation in post-independence governments.

The situation was worsened by President Tombalbaye's order banning all political parties except his own Union pour le Progrès du Tchad. Among the banned parties was the predominantly Muslim Parti National Africain. The northern politicians then resorted to 'extra-constitutional' measures to change the system.[32]

Initially, the rebellion took the form of banditry across the Sudanese border. By November 1965 the rebels had started killing government officials, a toll which increased to 1,231 by August 1966.[33] This led to a threat by the government of Chad that it would expel all Sudanese nationals unless the latter stopped providing refuge for the rebels who had taken on the label of 'gouvernement de la République Islamique du Tchad'. It seemed that the Sudanese government, which was a huge recipient of Saudi aid, was behind the rebels' actions. Much of the initial phases of the fighting took place along the Chad–Sudan border, but by 1969 it had spread to the northern parts of the country.

In 1966, the Frolinat (Front pour la Libération Nationale du Tchad)

was formed, and (despite its internal fissures) came to represent the aspirations of the Islamic north that had been deprived of political power. The greatest Arab support came from the Libyans. This was the point of rupture between Hissene Habre and Goukkouni Oueddei. Habre did not feel that any alliance with the Libyans was patriotic, since they had occupied Chad's Aozou strip since 1973. This area is reputedly rich in uranium and manganese. The Libyan Government maintains between three and four thousand troops in this area to back its claims. This makes the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya a contestant in the Chad war.

However, Goukkouni saw the situation as one of priorities. 'It is not possible', he said, 'for us to fight against two enemies. So we have to make up our minds what are our priorities.'[34] The Libyans thus became mentors to Goukkouni after Abba Siddick, the erstwhile spokesman of the Frolinat, had been declared *persona non grata* by Tripoli.[35]

With Goukkouni as an ally, arms, men and money from Tripoli went to support this faction's fight against the government of President Felix Malloum. Armed with Soviet arms supplied by the Libyans, Goukkouni's forces in 1977 captured the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) region from government forces. The beginning of 1978 witnessed further successes for Goukkouni. His forces took over control of Faya-Largeau and Faya, badly defeating government forces in spite of the support given to the latter by French gendarmes.[36] In reaction to el-Kadafi's activities in Chad, President Malloum broke diplomatic relations with Tripoli, and began the process of taking its accusations to the United Nations Security Council. The Libyan Government denied involvement, though it admitted its moral support for its Muslim co-religionists in the Frolinat.[37]

At the instance of Sudan (in view of its own internal situation), Tripoli convened a peace conference at Sebha. This conference was attended by Niger's President Seyni Kountche, Sudan's Vice-President Kassim Ibrahim and Chad's President Malloum. No Frolinat representative was invited. As a result of the Sebha meeting, Chad and the Libyan Government were to end their dispute and establish diplomatic relations. Tripoli was to make a financial loan to Chad and was to persuade the Frolinat forces to accept a cease-fire. Thus from the position of a contestant, Libya was to become Chad's patron, and a mediator in the war. Of course, Colonel el-Kadafi wanted to establish a regional northern front comprising Sudan, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Chad, as a counterweight to Egypt. He had just helped to reconcile President Nimeiri of Sudan with his political enemy, Sadik-el Mahdi. But the cease-fire did not last long and fighting resumed again.

Meanwhile, under French pressure Malloum had arranged peace with Hissene Habre of the Force Armée du Nord (FAN). Habre was to be Prime Minister and the northerners were to be given greater participation in the

new government. With the appointment of Habre, the Libyan troops which had backed Frolinat's advance on the capital started to withdraw to their strongholds in Tibesti and the Aozou strip. It was understood that this Libyan withdrawal was prompted by fighting between Goukkouni and the pro-Libyan Acyl Ahmet's factions of the Frolinat. Goukkouni had turned against Libyan influence in Chad and had been actually imprisoned at Sebha by Tripoli.[38] But he soon escaped to join his group.

At Ndjaména, friction between Habre's men and Malloum's supporters came to a crisis point when, on 12 and 13 February, Habre's men and Colonel Wadal Kamougue's soldiers fought for the control of the capital city.[39] In the light of this conflagration, Nigeria called a peace conference in Kano early in March 1979, to reconcile Chad's political leaders. It was reported that Habre received encouragement for his pre-emptive attack on Malloum from the Saudi-financed mosque (inaugurated in January 1978) and from conservative Arab traders anxious about the advance of the radical Frolinat (Goukkouni). This is again another interesting dimension of Arab participation in Chad's war.[40]

With the loss of control over Goukkouni, Tripoli then turned to Abba Siddick, whom it had deported earlier, as a potential head of Libyan assault in Chad, while Acyl Ahmed was to play the part of field commander. Meanwhile Goukkouni had emerged as the head of the Provisional Council after the Kano accord. On 20 April 1979, the provisional government under Goukkouni issued a statement accusing Libyans of a large-scale invasion of Chad. The Libyans retorted by describing the accusation as a 'baseless fairy tale' and stressed non-recognition of the Council of State as legal, since 'the country was so disorganized that nobody could speak authoritatively on behalf of the people'.[41] The disaffection between the Libyans, on the one hand, and Habre's FAN and Goukkouni's Frolinat, on the other, had gone to such an extent that Habre and Goukkouni had reportedly refused the presence of Libyans, the pro-Libyan 'Vulcan force' under Acyl Ahmet, and Abba Siddick, at the second Kano Conference.

After the delegates returned to Chad from Kano, a member of the Provisional Council, Abubakar Abderrahman, leader of the 'Third Army', died.[42] His lieutenant, Mohammed Shawa, became the leader of the 'Third Army' and soon emerged as the new Prime Minister. It seems that at this point Goukkouni and Habre had out-smarted Tripoli. For they were also members of the new Council. But Tripoli was reported to be planning its offensive. Colonel Kamougue of the new southern 'secessionist' force against the government of Shawa was said to have visited Tripoli for aid. And there was also a report of a Libyan plane carrying arms which crashed in central Chad on 25 April.[43] What was the actual Libyan interest in Chad?

It does seem that initially Tripoli ostensibly supported the northerners because they were, as el-Kadafi put it, 'co-religionists'. But this does not seem

to make sense when in April 1979, after the establishment of a government dominated by northern Muslisms, the Libyans still opposed it. The interests seem to be essentially economic and regional. It would seem that Libyan claims to the Aozou strip and Tibesti have a lot to do with the uranium and manganese deposits in those areas. Also, oil reportedly exists in an appreciable quantity in southern Chad. A Libyan Arab Jamahiriya with influence at Ndjaména would be in a good position here, even though the Libyans are also oil-rich.

Furthermore, el-Kadafi seems isolated in northern Africa. His relations with Egypt are still poor, and only recently has his image become reluctantly accepted in Sudan. A Chad under Libyan influence would form a good regional Sahara-zone counterweight against Egypt. In Chad we see a civil war that involves an Arab nation as a contestant. There is no doubt that el-Kadafi's government represents a destabilizing influence in Chad. It will not be surprising to see Libyans back the new southern secessionist movement against Shawa's government. After all, there have been reports of new fighting among members of Shawa's government. What about Sudan, Chad's neighbours?

Sudan: the tenuous link

Sudan is regarded as the link between the Arab world and Africa. But thir linkage role has been a real problem for Sudan. It has meant a very cleas distinction between the Arab north, which has political power, and black African southern groups, which regard themselves as underdogs in Sudan. For many southerners, independence in 1956 had meant 'a reign of terror'.[44]

The civil war in Sudan had its origins in the southern protest over northern political domination. The secessionists had four grievances: (a) 'political domination of the Arab north'; (b) the north's attempt to Arabize the south; (c) discrimination in jobs, salaries, educational opportunities; (d) discrimination in allocation of resources for the development of the south.[45] The revolt had started in 1955 in Equatoria on a small scale. It was, however, the repressive measures of the government of General Ibrahim Abboud in 1963 that provided the greater impetus for the rebellion. Its numbers increased by thousands, attacks were launched at Pacalla and at the Kajo-Kaji police post.

In the initial stages of the war only spears, bows and arrows, and guns captured from northerners were available to the secessionists. But in 1965 'the whole complexion of their campaign altered when they came into possession of quantities of arms which had originally been transported, with Khartoum's help, from Algeria and Egypt through southern Sudan to the Congolese Simbas'.[46]

The secessionist groups were highly fragmented until General Joseph Lagu brought all forms of military resistance under appreciable control.

By 1971 he had become the accepted leader of the southern Sudanese Liberation Movement. There had been allegations of Israeli involvement in southern Sudan.[47] Israeli officers, helped by German mercenaries ('Veterans of Biafra') were said to have trained and supplied the secessionists with arms and medical kits. The Sudanese secret police alleged that General Lagu had been in close personal touch with Israel, and had even sent Anyanya warriors there to be trained.[48]

In terms of Arab involvement, perhaps, the role of Egypt was the most conspicuous. Egypt intervened on the side of the Sudanese government. By the end of 1970 Egyptian forces in the Sudan were estimated at between 5,000 to 10,000 men. This number did not include the large numbers of advisers and technical advisers.[49] In addition, Egypt has an Army College in Khartoum, and was reported to have given air and ground support for Sudanese government forces in southern Sudan. Examples include the attack by Egyptian pilots on the Ansar Island of Aba in March 1970, and the use of two Egyptian commandos in the attack on the rebel stronghold of Owing-ki-Bul on 25 January 1971.[50]

Why did Egypt take so much interest in the Sudanese civil war, which, though it lasted for seventeen years, was 'ignored' by the rest of Africa and the world community? The traditional relationship between Egypt and Sudan is probably a crucial issue here. Moreover, an Egypt dependent on the Nile is not likely to tolerate the emergence of a hostile political group in southern Sudan. Egypt can use Sudan as an air base. There was a report that 100 Egyptian Migs were at Wadi Saidna airport in north Khartoum, out of the range of Israeli jets.[51] In addition, the northern Sudanese are Arabs, of the same race and religion as Egyptians. Such socio-cultural factors were important aspects of support in the civil war.

In 1972, at the instance of Ethiopia, a peace settlement was reached that gave southern Sudan autonomy within Sudan. Egyptian intervention did not help the government of Sudan attain a military victory. Peace came at the conference table.

Implications of the civil wars

In the cases treated above, we have found two examples of Arab support for central governments against secessionists—in Nigeria and Sudan. In Nigeria the civil war ended by a military victory for the central government. Arab exports were indispensable to Nigeria's government in a number of ways. We may argue that the support helped to usher in relative political stability in Nigeria. So far, the horse backed by the Arabs in Nigeria has proven to be the right one. There has been no serious communal violence since 1970.

However, the situation is different in Sudan. Arab support for the

Sudanese government did not lead to a military victory. Perhaps Arab countries succeeded more in Nigeria than in Sudan in contributing to stability on the continent. In the end, however, Sudan found peace at the conference table, and President Nimeiri was anxious to avoid any eruption of communal violence or civil war in the future. His attempt to improve relations with Ethiopia, his mediatory role in Chad and subsequent reconciliation with Tripoli can all be seen partly as an attempt to avoid civil wars in neighbouring states (Chad and Ethiopia) that could spill over into Sudan. Such a spill-over might have the effect of resuscitating 'Anya Nya'—something Nimeiri would rather do without.

Given the arbitrary nature of Africa's boundaries, and the potential for secessionist movements in most African countries, we argue that Arab support for the maintenance of a country's territorial integrity is positive for the stability of the continent. However, support for secessionists has negative effects on Africa's stability. Hence, the Libyan action in Chad is a highly destabilizing element in that country's developmental process. If Tripoli's designs finally succeed, not only will the ticklish issue of border conflicts be reopened, but a new precedent (a variant of Nyerere's) for violation of the OAU charter will be set. In the Libyan case, we would be having a neo-imperial force in North Africa, backed by a 'barrel of oil'.

Many African states would become suspicious of Arab intentions in Africa, especially since no African leader would want to see the present boundaries changed. The Arab support for Eritrean secession has similar connotations. After all, it is an inconsistent policy for Arabs to support the government in one country and secessionists in another. Arab countries, therefore, do not seem to have a consistent policy for Africa in their Arab League. After all, Boumedienne of Algeria contributed greatly to Africa's support, in 1973, for the Arab cause.[52] As he stressed, such support should deserve reciprocity from Arab nations. Perhaps, forms of Arab reciprocity should include finding peaceful solutions to problems of communal stability in each country—whether or not one of the parties is Arab or Muslim. They should help to dampen rather than escalate conflicts.

Furthermore, the inconsistent pattern of Arab involvement in black civil wars makes the Arabs susceptible to allegations that they aggressively push their self-interest at the expense of African states. Already many African states complain of unfair dealing in Afro-Arab relations, especially with regard to oil prices. An image of Arab countries as conflict-generators, rather than conflict-dampeners, may complicate the existing relationship—a relationship that has paid Arab countries well at the United Nations and in the Arab–Israeli conflict.

Conclusion

We do not pretend to have been exhaustive in our treatment of black civil wars in the context of Afro-Arab relations. We have tried to show how and why Arab countries intervene in such wars. We have argued that in the four cases treated—Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan and Chad—Arab countries have been inconsistent. This inconsistency, we have stressed, reveals the motive for each intervention. These motives include ideological, religio-cultural and regional diplomatic manoeuvres, and economic and other miscellaneous factors.

Our cases show that while in Nigeria Arab intervention helped that state to maintain its territorial integrity, in many other areas Arab intervention has escalated communal violence and interrupted the processes of political development, especially in Chad.

But the Arab world and Africa need each other. It will be in their interests to minimize such areas of conflict as are apt to disrupt the inchoately good Afro-Arab relations. One of such areas is the Arab use of petro-power to alter the boundaries of African states—a most sensitive issue in Africa.

Notes

We are indebted to Professor Billy Dudley for the useful insights he gave us regarding some key aspects of this paper.

1. D. G. Morrison, Robert C. Mitchell, J. Paden and H. M. Stevenson, *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook*, New York, The Free Press, 1972, p. 122.
2. State-building refers to the ability of the central government of a state to penetrate and control subnational groups. By *nation-building* we refer to the issue of creating unity among the various groups in a state. See Gabriel Almond and B. Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1966; and L. Binder, L. Pye, P. Coleman, J. La Palmombala Verba, and M. Weiner, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*, New Haven, Conn., Princeton University Press, 1971.
3. Morrison et al., op. cit., p. 124.
4. Ibid., p. 124.
5. The new President of Southern Sudan's High Executive Council, General Joseph Lagu, claims that: 'Arabic is widely spoken and one can say that it is the lingua franca even here (S. Sudan). I mean spoken Arabic, not written. English is by far the written language of the South, though.' *Africa*, No. 80, April 1978, p. 24. It may be noted, however, that one of the sources of the Sudanese civil war derives from an attempt to Arabize the South.
6. By intervention we mean an 'action taken by an actor designed to change in some way the dyadic interaction process going on between two other actors'. David Wilkinson, *Cohesion and Conflict: Lessons from the Study of Three-Party Interaction*, London, Frances Printers (Pictures) Ltd, 1976, p. 37. This intervention could be active when the third party takes action to 'influence the dyadic interaction process', and passive when the mere presence of the third party is given salience by the dyadic actors' recognition of its potentiality as a third party.

7. Wilkinson, op. cit., Chapter 3.
8. 'In exerting an influence the third party alters the pay-off matrix and this sometimes causes the members of the dyad to act differently from what they would have done if the third party had not been there.' (Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 35.) 'The dyadic interaction may arise simply because the third party is there, or the third party may take steps to initiate the process' (p. 35).
9. A few readings on the Nigerian civil war: Zdenek Cervenka, *A History of the Nigerian War: 1967–1970*, Ibadan, Onibonoje Press, 1971; N. U. Akpan, *The Struggle for Secession in Nigeria, 1966–1970; A Personal Account of the Nigerian Civil War*, London, Frank Cass, 1971; John de St. Jorre, *The Nigerian Civil War*, London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1972.
10. St. Jorre, Op. cit., p. 216.
11. Interview: General Yakubu Gowon.
12. Interview: Gowon.
13. St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 315. It is interesting that both St. Jorre and Gowon were at pains to show that these were not, in the strictest sense, mercenaries. As Gowon put it, 'We would not call them mercenaries as you would normally call them, because this was a very friendly country trying to help another country—more or less like the proper military support that you normally would have between countries that, for example, have a defence pact or something similar. But because our relations with Egypt were so good, they were prepared to do that.' (Interview.) However, Gowon wanted it made clear that these (pilots) were not the regular pilots of the Egyptian Air Force.
14. Interview: Gowon.
15. Although it is understood that there were later misunderstandings over this.
16. Interview: Gowon. And he added: 'For the solid support we had from them, Nigeria must never forget the role of Algeria in helping to end the Nigerian crisis—not only moral but also practical support they gave us in many respects. Certainly in the person of good old Boumedienne, Nigeria had a very good friend—a very trusted friend indeed.'
17. St. Jorre, op. cit., p. 219.
18. See J. P. Mackintosh, *Nigerian Government and Politics*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1966; also C. S. Phillips Jr., *The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy*, Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1964.
19. 'You might probably say that they understood and supported our case implicitly. I suppose, again, because we had understood and given moral support for their case in the Arab world.' (Interview: Gowon.)
20. Morrison, et al., op. cit., p. 238; G. K. N. Trevaskis, *Eritrea: A Colony in Transition, 1941–52*, London, Oxford University Press, 1960, Chapter V; Robert Hess, Ethiopia, in G. M. Carter (ed.), *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States*, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1966.
21. *Africa*, No. 82, June 1978, p. 31.
22. *Afriscope*, Vol. 5, No. 4, April 1975, p. 8.
23. The Ogaden crisis and the switch in alliances has brought Soviet support for the new socialist Ethiopian government against Eritreans.
24. *Afriscope*, April 1975, p. 9.
25. Quoted in *Afriscope*, April 1975, p. 10.
26. *Africa*, No. 82, June 1978, p. 31.
27. *Afriscope*, April 1975, p. 6.
28. *Africa*, No. 79, March 1978, p. 15.
29. Ibid., pp. 14–15.

30. Ibid., p. 14.
31. *Africa*, No. 79, March 1978, p. 25.
32. Morrison et al., op. cit., p. 209.
33. Ibid., p. 208.
34. *New African*, April 1979, p. 14.
35. He then went to Algiers, from where he had been operating, albeit from a very weak position.
36. The French have been a very important factor in this war. Between 1968 and 1971, the French maintained 5,000 combat troops in Chad, combating the Frolinat. *Africa*, No. 82, June 1978, p. 43.
37. *Africa*, No. 80, April 1978.
38. *New African*, April 1979, p. 18.
39. Colonel Kamougue was the Chief of Staff of Malloum's army and a hardcore southerner opposed to Malloum's approach to ending the civil war. He has reportedly gone south to organize a secessionist force against the Shawa-Habre-Goukkouni government.
40. *New African*, op. cit., p. 16.
41. *Africa*, No. 94, June 1979, p. 32.
42. Died under mysterious circumstances. Some argue that he was shot by his men for refusing to support the new Habre-Goukkouni alliance.
43. *Africa*, No. 94, June 1979, p. 32.
44. Cecil Eprile, *War and Peace in Sudan, 1955–1972*, London, David and Charles, 1974, p. 95.
45. Morrison et al., op. cit., p. 350. Other reasons include the history of Arab slave trading in southern Sudan in the nineteenth century.
46. Eprile, op. cit., p. 96. These arms were abandoned following their defeat in the revolt against Tshombe's regime or sold by them for food as they fled accross the border into Sudan.
47. Ali Mazrui, *Soldiers and Kinsmen: The Making of a Military Ethnocracy*, Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage, 1975. Mazrui argues that Israelis were using Uganda as a base for helping members of the 'Anya Nya'. A Sudanese spokesman has made similar allegations.
48. Eprile, op. cit., p. 140. See Chapter 7 for details.
49. Ibid., p. 137.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Zdenek Cervenka, *The Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU*, Uppsala, Friedman Publishers, 1977, Chapter IX. Forty-two African countries had broken diplomatic relations with Israel by 19 November 1973 (p. 164).

Religion in Afro-Arab relations: Islam and cultural change in modern Africa

Hatim M. Amiji

This study explores the impact of Islam on modern African history and the Islamic factor in relationships between the Arab world and black Africa.[1] While Islam is an important factor in Afro-Arab relations, Africa and the Arab world are also linked by geography, common interests and overlapping historical patterns. The majority of the inhabitants of North Africa and eastern Sudan are linguistically Arab, and the African continent provides 75 per cent of the total land area and population of the member states of the Arab League.[2] The Sahara Desert and the Indian Ocean act not as barriers but as bridgeways between the Arab nations and their southern neighbours. The spread of Islam was facilitated through these common zones of cultural interaction by traders and clerics.

Islam in Africa does not exist as a distinct African version separate from Islam in the Arab world. Islam is a universal and catholic faith. To be a Muslim does not mean to be an Arab, nor does it involve a replacement of African values by Arab ones. It has been suggested by a number of African writers that Islam may be seen as an African religion, totally adapted to the African milieu.[3] Western scholars[4] who have sought to explain African Islam as folk-Islam or Islam of the 'little' tradition and Arab Islam as Islam of the 'great' tradition have posed a Western dichotomy that does not exist in the Muslim world. Within any Muslim community in black Africa or in the Arab world there are strong differences in the religious understanding and the observance of Islamic ritual between those who are well versed in Arabic and committed to their faith and those whose devotion and knowledge may not be so deep. Hence the differences are not to be explained in terms of a 'pure' or 'impure' Islam but rather in terms of education, depth of religious understanding and commitment as a Muslim. Though there may be differences in form, certain fundamental rituals and beliefs are universal and unalterable. Islam flourished in Africa because, in the words of W. C. Smith, 'Islam has the quality of having something profound, relevant and personal to say directly to all sorts of people of every status, background, temperament and aspiration'.[5] In the search for a world view transcending parochial tribal vision, Islam offered to Africans a universalistic ethos that, unlike Christianity, was neither tainted by nor associated with colonialism.

Diffusion of Islam and the process of Islamization in sub-Saharan Africa

In Africa today there are no reliable census figures for the number of Muslims, Christians and animists to be found in each country. When available, such figures are less than trustworthy, since the motives for falsification are many. Existing census figures are usually incorrect as well as obsolete by the time they are available. Demographers have tended to underestimate Muslim populations. Our conservative figures, taken from a variety of sources (see Table 1), indicate that one out of every three Africans is a Muslim. Of these half live in

TABLE 1. Distribution of Muslim populations in Africa.

A *Time* magazine special report of 16 April 1979, 'The World of Islam', estimates that the world Muslim population is 750,000,000. Close to 20 per cent of these Muslims are inhabitants of Africa. Figures show that approximately one in every three Africans is Muslim, and the African Muslim population is distributed equally between those living north and those living south of the Sahara. Islam holds a solid majority in North and North-East Africa, with the exception of Ethiopia, which is more than 25 per cent but less than 50 per cent Muslim. Islam is also very strong in West Africa and has a significant following in the central African nation of Chad and in the United Republic of Tanzania on the East African coast. The following table compares the Muslim population in each nation in 1962 and 1977. The sources cited for 1962 often show quite different figures, which is confusing. The 1977 figures are more consistent, yet should also be noted with some reservation, given the difficulty of obtaining accurate religious statistics. None the less, the table gives a fairly representative general picture of the strength of Islam in Africa. The figures are percentages of the total population of each country.

Country	1962[1]	1962[2]	1977[3]	1977[4]	1977[5]	1977 average
Algeria	91	99	98.8	—	97	98
Angola	—	< 1	—	—	—	—
Benin (ex Dahomey)	38	7	*c.* 14	9	16	13
Botswana (ex Bechuanaland)	3	< 1	0–1	—	—	—
Cameroon	33	20	*c.* 20	14	15	16
Central African Empire	66	3	5	5.8	5	5.3
Chad	94	50	52–60	58	50	55
Comoro Islands	—	—	*c.* 75	100	80	85
Congo (ex Congo-Brazzaville)	11	< 1	0–1	—	1	—
Djibouti (ex Afars and Issas, and French Somaliland)	100	98	96	100	94	97
Egypt (UAR)	96	92	—	91	91	91.5
Ethiopia	44	31	33–40	40	40	39
Gabon	20	< 2	0–1	0.01	1	0.5
Gambia	71	84	*c.* 80	86	90	85

TABLE 1 (*continued*).

Country	1962[1]	1962[2]	1977[3]	1977[4]	1977[5]	1977 average
Ghana	40	5	12	12	19	14
Guinea	66	60	*c.* 65	76	65	69
Guinea-Bissau	50	20	35	38.2	30	34.4
Ivory Coast	15	15	23	24.6	25	24.2
Kenya	15	4	3	7.3	9	6.4
Lesotho (ex Basutoland)	2	< 1	0–1	—	—	—
Liberia	10	20	13–14	26	15	18
Libya	96	96	97.2	—	98	97.6
Madagascar	18	17	5	1.2	7	4.4
Malawi (ex Nyasaland)	23	9	20	11	15	15.3
Mali	95	60	77	68	60	68.3
Mauritania	100	98	97.5	—	96	96.75
Morocco	98	95	98	—	95	96.5
Mozambique	7	5	10	15	10	11.6
Namibia (South-West Africa)	5	< 2	0–1	—	—	—
Niger	89	75	85	85	85	85
Nigeria	54	40	45–48	47.2	47	47
Rhodesia-Zimbabwe	2	< 1	0–1	—	0.05 R-0.50	0.27
Rwanda-Burundi	4	—	0–1	1	B-1	0.75
Senegal	83	70	76	82.6	82	80
Sierra Leone	11	25	*c.* 25	50	30	35
Somalia	100	*c.* 99	99	100	99	99
South Africa	2	0.6	*c.* 1	2.5	1.2	1.6
Sudan	82	80	60–65	70	72	68.2
Swaziland	1	< 2	0–1	—	—	—
Tanzania (ex Tanganyika and Zanzibar)	T- 27 Z-100	14	30	33	24	29
Togo	9	3	10	13.5	7	10.2
Tunisia	95	95	96	—	92	94
Uganda	23	3	7.5	5	6	6.16
Upper Volta	71	15	*c.* 20	25	22	22
Zaire (ex Congo-Leopoldville)	5	2	0–1	1.5	2	1.5
Zambia (ex N. Rhodesia)	2	< 1	0–1	0.01	1	0.5

1. Muhammad Brelvi, *Islam in Africa*, Appendix II, pp. 597–8.
2. Tareq Y. Ismael, 'Religion and UAR African Policy', p. 50, adapted from Jacques Baulin, *The Arab Role in Africa*.
3. Alard von Schack, 'Black Africa and its Arab Neighbours to the North', p. 108.
4. Joseph Cuoq, 'Le monde arabo-islamique et l'Afrique', pp. 5–6.
5. Richard Weekes, *Muslim Peoples*, Appendix I, pp. 499–527.

Africa south of the Sahara and an equal number in North Africa. Unlike North Africa, eastern Sudan and the Horn, where Muslims are numerically in the majority, the Islamic population of sub-Saharan Africa is scattered, and separated by communities of Christians and adherents of traditional religions. In the savannah countries of West Africa—Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Gambia, Niger and Chad—Muslims are clearly in the majority. In Ethiopia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and Upper Volta, Muslims constitute 22 to 47 per cent of the population. In these countries Muslims have significant influence because of their numeric strength. There are very few Muslims in western Zaire, Angola, Zimbabwe and the Republic of South Africa, or generally in central and southern Africa. In Malawi, Uganda, Kenya, Ghana and the Central African Empire the Muslim population varies between 6 and 15 per cent. With the exception of Mauritania and Somalia, none of the sub-Saharan countries are officially incorporated as Islamic states with Islam as the state religion. Nevertheless those countries with a numeric preponderance of Muslims and the 'presence of a diffused neo-Islamic culture' may be labelled Muslim states.[6] It should be remembered that while the bulk of the Islamic population is found in the savannah region, the map of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa continues to change owing to conversion.

Before we examine the impact of Islam on African cultures and the Islamic factor in Afro-Arab relations, a brief sketch of the spread of Islam through Africa is essential. Among the first converts to Islam were Africans living in Mecca, including Bilal ibn Rabah, the muezzin (caller to prayer) of the Prophet. Before Muhammad left Mecca for Medina, in A.D. 622 (the Hegira from which Muslims date their era) early Muslims had found refuge in Ethiopia. Although there has been rapid and successful Islamic proselytism in modern times, it is important to note that Islam has enjoyed a southward expansion into Africa for many centuries. The dissemination of Islam in Africa has been neither uniform nor steady. It was accomplished by many methods. Trade, war, peace and diplomacy, as well as less easily formulated factors such as the psychological search for security and the universal appeal of the Islamic faith, facilitated the process of Islamization.

Islam swept into North Africa on the shoulders of the militant Arab conquerers around A.D. 633 and in a very short time was established across North Africa from Egypt to the Atlantic coast of Morocco and as far south as the edge of the desert. Eventually these North African territories were not only Islamicized; they were also Arabized. Arab customs, language, and literature became the norm, while local customs were so successfully assimilated that the inhabitants began to refer to themselves as Arabs.[7] Similarly, in the eastern Sudan, Islam entered as the religion of the Arab conquerers and gave this part of the world a firm Arab imprint.

Islam has deep roots in the *Bilad as Sudan*. The diffusion of Islam into sub-Saharan Africa was multidirectional and followed the pre-Islamic routes linking North Africa and southern Arabia to sub-Saharan Africa. Islam made its first documented appearance in sub-Saharan Africa during the early part of the tenth century. By this time the whole of sub-Saharan Africa lay exposed to Islam through the great caravan routes that led across the Sahara to the north and in the east to the ports of the Red Sea coast and Indian Ocean. It was principally through the agency of individual merchants, small mercantile family groups and the diaspora of trading communities that Islam was first introduced in both West and East Africa. In the West the early missionaries of Islam were the camel-owning Berbers, who controlled trans-Saharan trade in partnership with the Soninka of the old empire of Ghana.[8] The conquest of the kingdom of Ghana by the Almoravids in 1076 hastened the Islamization of the Soninka and led to the further spread of Islam throughout the western Sudan. From the twelfth century onwards, it was the Sudanese Muslims themselves who were the chief propagators of the new faith. Their simultaneous expansion of trade and political domination allowed the influence of Islam to be felt in larger areas of the western Sudan. The Malinka passed it to the Songhay along the bend of the Niger, who in turn transmitted Islam to the Hausa of modern northern Nigeria. Thus Islam was relayed from west to east in the great empires of medieval West Africa.

In the north-east the nomadic Somali played a similar role both through their control of the caravan trade and through their western and southern migrations from their homeland in the north-east corner of the Horn of Africa. Other mercantile groups, such as the Tukulor and the Dyula, once they were converted, spread the frontiers of the faith through their trading connections. Yet Islamization was not merely a by-product in an effort to carve out commercial spheres of influence in broad areas of Africa. Many of these traders created independent communities or had separate quarters in predominantly non-Muslim towns along the trade routes. The growth and vitality of some of the important commercial centres of medieval West Africa, such as Kankan, Kano, Kong, Kumbi, Jenni, Salaga and Timbuktu, are directly attributable to the activities of Muslim traders.

Associated with the traders were Muslim clerics. Their role remains to be investigated; yet a few recent studies have shown their significance. In many cases the clerics were also merchants. Additionally the clerics functioned as faith-healers, scribes, secretaries, diviners and consultants to African rulers. Animist kings and their courts often found it useful to employ the services of these Muslim specialists. Conversion of the ruling élite within a local culture was often an important factor in the spread of Islam. Once adopted as the royal religion, Islam provided a ruler certain very useful materials and ideological tools he could use to reinforce and justify his

position. A good example is the use of Islam made by al-Hajj Askia Muhammad Ture of the Songhay Empire after usurping the throne from the Sunni dynasty in 1493.[9]

Besides serving as consultants to rulers, many clerics had considerable influence on the promotion of scholarship. One of the most notable clerics was al-Maghili, who travelled through West Africa and maintained residences at Katsina, Gao and Takedda. His teachings left their imprint on the quality of Muslim life in these areas. Similarly the Aquit family[10] of Timbuktu played a prominent role in the transmission of Islamic learning during the time of the Mali and Songhay empires. Scholars from the western Sudan making the pilgrimage to Mecca often stopped in Hausaland and Bornu to visit teachers and rulers. The travels throughout West Africa of these itinerant preachers contributed to the circulation of ideas and made Islamic religious education available to many persons. The advance of Islam was also helped by its literate character, for as a religion with a book it demanded a basic level of literacy from its adherents. Because of this, as John Hunwick has noted, wherever Islam spread, literacy in Arabic was encouraged through the establishment of Koranic schools and *madrasas* (schools of higher learning). Once Arabic was established as the language of religion, it was also employed in worldly affairs—for historic record keeping, trade accounts, and as a common system of communication both within West Africa and between the West African states and North Africa. Such records were important to the consolidation and administration of the Sudanic empire-states. Islam also received an impetus from the subsequent development of vernacular literature in African languages such as Fulbe, Hausa, Somali and Swahili. These languages have incorporated a good percentage of words of Arabic origin.[11] In medieval West Africa Arabic had a status and influence equivalent to that held by Latin in Europe during the Middle Ages.

In addition to the clerics and traders, Muslim artisans—goldsmiths, dyers, weavers, iron-workers and butchers, carpenters and masons were valued highly in the non-Muslim areas of West Africa. The Mande and Hausa held a virtual monopoly on glass and bead production and trade on the Ivory Coast in the nineteenth century. The Muslim craftsmen often tended to settle among non-Muslim populations. Proximity and intermarriage facilitated the spread of Islam in both rural and urban areas. Such situations offered significant opportunities for religious and cultural interaction. Certain aspects of Islamic culture infiltrated into animist life despite little overt proselytism.[12] Such things as Koranic amulets, Muslim dress, luxury goods and Islamic magic were readily accepted.[13]

The influence of the traders was paramount to the continuous advance of Islam in all parts of West Africa, including the forest states. The frontiers of Islam and trade moved simultaneously, one helping the other. A wide-

ranging effect of Muslim commercial penetration was the creation of a network of contacts between North Africa and West Africa. As I. M. Lewis has written,

> by establishing trading colonies and sometimes later states, these Muslim merchants created a wide-flung, supratribal network of trade . . . Through their organization in dispersed corporations or guilds they were able to wield considerable economic influence within the various states and communities in which they operated. Thus an eighteenth-century Dyala merchant in Timbuktu might well employ agents buying gold in Ashanti in the south and others selling it in Fez in the north.[14]

The fall of the Songhay Empire in 1591, due to a Moroccan invasion, created a socio-economic as well as religious crisis for the fortunes of Islam. It led to a set-back in the process of Islamization, which continued until the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century revivalist movements in the western Sudan and forest-belt areas of West Africa. These revivalist movements (the jihads of Uthman dan Fodio (1754–1817), Sheikh Ahmad of Masina (1775–1845) and al-Hajj Umar (1794–1864) established Islam much more firmly and provided the inspiration for its further expansion both during the colonial era and in the present.[15]

Islam made a simultaneous appearance in East and West Africa during the tenth century. However, there are many significant differences between the process of Islamization and the history of its spread in West Africa and Islamization in East Africa. The East African coast and the offshore islands have always been part of the Indian Ocean complex of maritime culture and trade. Arab elements existed in settlements along the coast in pre-Islamic times. While Muslims were present in small numbers in Kilwa, Zanzibar and Mogadiscio since the late ninth or early tenth century, significant Islamization of the coast did not occur, despite the claims of Swahili chronicles, until the twelfth century.[16] The Islamic merchant cities grew wealthy through trade in ivory, gold and slaves. They had contacts throughout the Middle East, India and East Asia, and were culturally Afro-Islamic.[17] Periodically the settlements received immigrants from Oman, Muscat, southern Arabia (Hadramaut and Shir) and the Persian Gulf area. Interaction between these immigrants, earlier Arab settlers and the indigenous coastal people (the Bantu) gave rise to a new language, Swahili, which is an amalgam of Bantu dialects and Arabic/Persian vocabulary, and a new people, the Waswahili.[18]

There is considerable controversy regarding the origins of Swahili civilization and its role in the history of the Islamization of East Africa. Certain writers have attempted to explain Swahili civilization and East African Islam as a modified version of Arab culture and religion.[19] Use of this so-called 'invader approach to African history' distorts the basic African nature of Swahili culture. In a recent article I have tried to put to rest this Asiatic bias

in the historiography of the East African coast.[20] Neither East African Islam nor Swahili culture is Arabian. Arabs never migrated to East Africa in sufficiently large numbers to duplicate the experience of North Africa and the eastern Sudan. While these later areas became both Islamicized and Arabized, in East Africa foreign—i.e. Arabic, Indian and Persian—cultural elements were assimilated and absorbed by the indigenous African cultures. The synthesis resulting from this process was the Swahili civilization, of which Islam is an important element. Because of its maritime outlook and economic connections with the East, the Swahili coastal community remained essentially a closed society and did not penetrate inland.

The inland spread of Islam and trade was restricted by this outward orientation, besides being confronted by a type of containment characterized by tribal migrations, which ran from south to north and west to east or in opposite directions to the spread of Islam and trade. Coincidence with tribal migrations, in addition to extensive trade, had played a major role in West African Islamization. But in East Africa no coastal Muslims had ventured inland until the nineteenth century. Trade goods were brought to the coast through a localized process of exchange and barter among inland groups during the early period of trade, and during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by caravans organized by strong trading groups such as the Wakamba, the Wanyamwezi and the Wayao.[21] Their caravans came to the coastal settlements and, having concluded their trading activities, returned to the interior. A few of the traders from the interior may have become Muslim and remained on the coast. Conversion to Islam meant detribalization and assimilation within the Swahili community. Islamicized inland traders did not return to convert their tribes. The physical difficulties of travel through the dry inland Nyika region probably contributed to the restriction of Islam. The presence of resistant decentralized groups such as the Maasai and the Galla presented possibly another limitation when compared to the large centralized West African kingdoms, whose conversion facilitated the spread of Islam. Furthermore, the volume of trade in East Africa was much smaller than that in West Africa. It was not until the second half of the nineteenth century, after the consolidation and rise to power of the Omani Sultanate of Zanzibar, and the linkage of the East African markets to the world capitalist economic system, that Arab-Swahili caravans pushed into the interior in search of trading goods. The traders' presence prepared the ground for later conversions. Swahili-Islamic settlements were constructed in such places as Tabora (Kazeh) in central Tanzania, Ujiji on the shore of Lake Tanganyika, in Malawi in central Africa, and in Umanyema in eastern Zaire.[22] Islam also spread into Uganda via Arab and Swahili merchants. The first Arab reached the court of the Bagandan King Mutesa in 1844.[23] Beginning in the mid-1840s there was a determined effort to spread Islam in Buganda, but the expansion

of Islam there, and in other areas of Africa, was frustrated by the arrival of European colonialism and Christian missionaries during the 1880s. The Baganda Muslims were defeated by Lugard and the Muslims of the eastern Congo routed by the mercenaries of Leopold II of Belgium. But despite the introduction of another convert-seeking religion, some new vistas for Islamic expansion were provided by the opening up of the interior through communication networks. The employment of Muslims in the colonial administrative bureaucracies led to increased contact between Muslim and non-Muslim Africans. The use of Swahili as a lingua franca and greater trade and economic opportunities enhanced the status of Muslims. It has been suggested that such increased benefits for Muslims encouraged the rate of conversion to Islam. After the First World War the settlement of Muslim veterans in the rural areas of Kenya and Tanzania also provided new channels of Islamic influence.

In the twentieth century Islam has spread rapidly through many areas hitherto untouched by Islamization. This is partly a continuation of the earlier historical processes; however, certain new factors have accelerated the pace of Islamization.[24] The first of these factors is the colonial influence in Africa during the past century, an influence which radically changed the previous African social, political and religious situation. Colonial economic exploitation, the growth of modern communications and urban areas, the cultural arrogance of European rulers and Western education all brought about a deterioration of old communal ties and a loss of identity.[25] Traditional religions could no longer meet the needs of the new world; detribalization loosened family and kinship ties, which in turn loosened the authority of the traditional religion. Western impact also created a dichotomy that had previously not existed between the secular and the religious, thus causing a sort of religio-social vacuum and depriving Africans of a sense of security. Reassuringly, Islam provided a sense of 'belonging'.

The second factor that contributed to the expansion of Islam is the resurgence of the Muslim states in North Africa, particularly in the period after the Second World War. These states, especially Egypt, played an important role in furthering the growth of African nationalism and Islamic radicalism. The third factor is a composite of unusually favourable circumstances which, along with certain inherent Islamic qualities, render Islam attractive to the peoples of tropical Africa. This factor has not received adequate attention and will be the focus of concern here.

Islam has been presented by Africans to Africans as an 'African religion'. Islam knows no colour bar. Though Arabs are not totally free of racialism, their manifestations of racialism are tempered by the Islamic sense of brotherhood. Islam in its essentials is simple and clear, and in its non-essentials vague and complicated. It has a simple creed—'there is no God but God and Muhammad is his messenger', and conversion is achieved by the believing

recitation of this creed. The so-called five pillars of the Islamic faith—profession of faith, prayer, alms-giving, fasting and pilgrimage to Mecca—are left largely to an individual's conscience. Islam has no 'church' as such and no priestly class; and no particular standards of learning or observances are required to become or remain a Muslim. Islam is resilient and provides generous scope for 'particularism' and ritualism. There is much in Islam that is compatible with traditional African religions and social customs. Islam experiences little difficulty in harmonizing the animistic notion of a higher god with Allah, and the cult of ancestors with the pantheon of Islamic jinns, spirits and saints (*walis*).[26] Traditional beliefs and customs, so long as they do not contradict the fundamental tenets of Islam, are given official recognition under the principle of *Dastur* (customary law).

Dastur is treated as a source of practical law parallel to the sharia. Islam's ethic tolerates and in significant respects accords with that of animist Africa. It is not just dancing and tribal drums which Islam accommodates, but beliefs as well. Polygamy is the outstanding example frequently cited by Westerners. However, too much can be made of this point. Because tropical Africa is traditionally polygamous, the Islamic provision obviously does not provide an active reason for conversion. Additionally, Islam does not demand change in the structure of the home; no premium is placed on change from an extended family to a monogamous family unit, as is the case with Christianity.[27] The importance of genealogy and kinship in Islam is also in harmony with certain traditional African beliefs concerning one's relationship to one's ancestors and relatives.

While permitting flexibility, certain Islamic rituals and influences are uniform throughout the sub-Saharan area. The Muslims calendar, with its public rituals, especially the fast of Ramadan, the celebration of the birth of Muhammad (*Maulid*) and the observance of the *Idd* (holiday) celebrating the conclusion of the hajj pilgrimage, gives uniformity to the regulation of life where great differences from one group to another may have existed in pre-Islamic times. Similarly, Islamic architecture, Muslim dress, Islamic regulations concerning food and drink, the spread and use of Arabic and the observance of Islamic law all contribute to the creation of a Muslim way of life. Islamic legal and moral precepts set standards of public behaviour and help preserve the collectivist tendencies of African cultures.[28]

Owing to its own tribal origins, Islam has been particularly suited and geared to tribes, especially nomadic tribes. Historically the largest percentage of Islamic converts have been tribal people. There is hardly a nomadic tribe north of the equator that has not accepted Islam. For conversion purposes a 'tribal' aspect can conveniently replace the 'brotherhood' aspect of the Islamic message. Islam is also geared in a larger sense to the African environment, in which religion and society are one. Islam supports the African

world view, which Christianity and Western secularism tend to destroy. There is a day-to-day rhythm of Islamic communal life that does not depend upon the adoption of alien trappings.

While there are few specific studies on the patterns of Islamization or how Islam infiltrates a typical African environment, several writers have recently offered some broad frameworks within which the patterns of Islamization may be studied. It seems that Islam is adopted into the African milieu in specific stages, without violent changes to traditional life. The initial penetration of Islam into an African village, state or tribe usually comes with the arrival of a Muslim merchant, cleric (*marabout* or *malam*), refugees who may be employed to provide religious and social services such as divination, prayer and rainmaking for animist patrons. Humphrey Fisher calls this the 'quarantine stage'. Islamic orthodoxy is safe, as there are no converts and hence no one to bring heterodoxical beliefs and observances into the Muslim community. This was the position of Islam in the ancient kingdom of Ghana and in the mid-nineteenth century Arab-Swahili settlements in the East African interior. The 'quarantine stage' gives way to a 'mixing stage' as local people begin to convert in increasing numbers. This conversion may follow the conversion of the ruling élite or it may be conversion without sanction from the ruler. At this time people profess Islam, consciously adopting Islamic practices and beliefs, yet simultaneously retaining some of their pre-Islamic traditions and customs. Such was the case in northern Nigeria just before the jihad of Uthman dan Fodio.

A third stage takes place when the village or state proclaims its Islamic identity by building Koranic schools and mosques, publicly observing Islamic festivals and establishing closer contact with other parts of the African Muslim world. The third stage is preceded, or sometimes followed, by reform—the last of the phases in this cycle. Reform may come several centuries after the community has entered the second or third stage of Islamization and is often the result of both internal and external influences. In the nineteenth century reform movements led to the jihads, which aimed at creating theocratic Islamic states in West Africa.

These four stages of Islamization neither start at the same time everywhere nor advance everywhere at the same pace. Indeed, one may find examples of all four stages in almost any period. The progress of Islamization is not uniform. Should a great Islamic empire break up while in the 'mixing stage', as did the medieval empire of Mali, refugees may find themselves in animist areas and back in the 'quarantine stage'. The defeat of the Baganda Arab-Swahili party in the 1890s by the British and their Baganda Christian allies similarly halted the process of Islamization and created a 'quarantine' period for the few Muslims remaining in Buganda.[29]

Islam can be spread by any Muslim; all Muslims may perform every basic

religious function. As we have seen, Islam has been successfully spread in Africa by merchants, marabouts and artisans, just as it was spread among the early Turkish peoples by mobile Muslim populations. Muslim merchants and marabouts have a remarkable ability for absorption into village and tribal life. Dispensing amulets, talismans, medicine and advice, they eventually become indispensable to the community. Indeed, as Lansine Kaba has observed, the Muslim clerics and marabouts are closer to the average African than are the Western-educated African élite.[30]

The Muslim religious orders or *tariqas* (Sufi brotherhoods), have played and continue to play an essential role in the dissemination of Islam in Africa. The most influential of these orders are the *Qadiriyya* and the *Tijaniyya*, both of which have lodges in all parts of Africa and emphasize special devotion and practices. In a large measure, the vitality of Islam in Africa has depended on the strength and dynamism of these orders. As Thomas Hodgkin has pointed out, in the minds of some Africans to become a Muslim and to join a brotherhood 'are often in practice synonymous'.[31] These orders remain important as a denominational base for worship and for strengthening the concept of a pervasive religious society. Often associated with the orders are the cults of saints, who act as mediators and are invoked to bridge the gulf which separates man from God and the grace of the Prophet. Pilgrimages and visitations to the tombs of such saints as Habib Saleh at Lamu, Kenya; Amadou Bamba at Tuba, Senegal; and Shayk Husayn Bililae in south-eastern Ethiopia, are very popular, especially during the festivals marking the anniversaries of their deaths. The cults, together with Islamic magical apparatus, offer answers to life's unforeseen problems and a sense of personal security and peace not found in the lofty eschatological doctrines of Islam. These saint cults supplement the spirit-possession cults of pre-Islamic eras, for example the Hausa Bori cult, the Zar spirit in Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia; and the Pepo spirits of the Swahili coast. They are particularly important in the lives of women, since official Islamic religious life is often male-centered.

In addition to the older tariqas, some new orders were established during the colonial period, for example the Uwaysiyya of Shaykh Uways bin Muhammad al-Barawi (d. 1909) in southern Somalia and the East African coast; and the Mouridiyya of Shaykh Amadou Bamba (d. 1927) in Senegal. The Mouridiyya order and the Khatmia and Ansar in Sudan have had significant influence on the economic and political lives of their countries.[32] Even in a socialist secular state such as Tanzania, while it is difficult to gauge the direct influence of the tariqas, most members of the Baraza la Wazee (Council of Elders) of the CCM (the ruling party in Tanzania) are members of the Uwaysiyya and Shadaliyya orders. In the words of Crawford Young, 'in Africa Islam and its brotherhoods have been the primary basis of politically relevant identity'.[33] Besides the brotherhoods, scores of Muslim associations

and sectarian groups (e.g. East African Muslim Welfare Association, the Bilal Muslim Mission of the Shia Ithna Ashari, the Bohras and the Ismaili Muslims, all of East Africa; and the Subbanu Muslim Association of West Africa) have all contributed to the propagation of Islam and the welfare of the Muslim community.

In summary, Islam expanded and spread to sub-Saharan Africa through a multiplicity of channels. Its effects on indigenous African societies have been highly varied. For the most part Islam pursued the paths of least resistance. The dissemination of the Islamic faith was marked by slow and steady advances. Notwithstanding the sporadic and infrequent influence of the jihad, it was a peaceful, slow proselytization that has made Islam such an important element in African culture.

Islam, politics and culture in the twentieth century

African Muslims have a strong tradition of resistance to colonial rule. Their resistance has been inspired by the religious conviction that Islamic society must be ruled by an Islamic leader. This is consistent with the Islamic principle that spiritual and secular matters cannot be separated. Hence the purpose of government is to facilitate the observance of the sharia and to maintain the Islamic way of life. Religion regulates and legitimizes the state and its policies. Many of the states of nineteenth-century North and sub-Saharan Africa were either explicitly founded on the basis of this principle or were influenced by it. It is hardly surprising that when European imperialists began to occupy African lands some of the most persistent resistance to the imposition of colonial rule was organized by Muslim leaders. Among those motivated by Islamic fervour were Samori Toure of the Mandinka empire, Muhammad Admed Mahdi in the Sudan, the Sanusi in Libya, Abdel Kadir of Algeria, Atahiru in northern Nigeria, Mubarak al-Mazrui on the Kenyan coast, and Muhammad Lamine, Lat Diop and Ahmadu Bamba in Senegal.

Similar resistance was led by Bwana Heri and Abushiri al-Harthi against the German colonizers on the Swahili coast of East Africa (modern Tanzania). They were influenced by the teachings of the Somali Shaykh Uways bin Muhammad al-Barawi (1846–1909).[34] Shaykh Uways' teachings led to the formation of the Uwaysiyya, a new branch of the Qadiriyya order that is very popular in southern Somalia and parts of the East African coast. Also among resistance movements inspired by Islamic teachings were the proto-nationalist jihad of Shaykh Muhammad Abdullah Hasan (1864–1920) against British, Italian and Ethiopian imperialists in Somaliland in 1900–20; and, further north in the Sudan, a concerted Islamic movement of the Mahdiyya led by Muhammad Ahmed (1845–85) which called upon Muslims of all denominations to resist Anglo-Egyptian occupation of the Sudan.

A more recent example of the continuing tradition of opposition to colonial rule is the Wahhabiyya Islamic reform movement in French West Africa during years after the Second World War. It was aimed at both religious and political reform. According to Wahhabi doctrine and practice, Islam constituted a framework binding secular and spiritual affairs. Politics was a struggle for cultural, religious and political freedom as well as a means to assure that Islamic traditions were maintained correctly and not lost or corrupted.[35]

The Wahhabiyya movement took its inspiration from the teachings of Muhammad Abdul al-Wahab of Saudi Arabia. Wahhabi influences entered West Africa with pilgrims returning from Mecca and the return of graduates who had encountered both modernist Islamic reform movements and secular nationalist movements at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo. The West African Wahhabi formed two important groups—the Subbanu al-Muslim, which led the Subbanu educational reform movement, and the Union Culturelle Musulmane, which became an interterritorial organization involved in Islamic affairs—affairs that because of Islam's all-encompassing nature included politics.

The Subbanu used education to attempt the transformation of society. By establishing Koranic superior schools that gave a modernized Islamic education, the Subbanu created an alternative to Western education. Wahhabi doctrine was preached in vernacular languages at public meetings and was sometimes voiced in open challenge at the mosques.[36] Wahhabiyism was conservative in theory, since it sought to re-establish a 'pure' Islam. The Wahhabi did not accept 'new' ideas as innovations. Certain 'new' ideas were acceptable either because they were predicted by the Koran or because they could be legitimized by Koranic interpretation. Yet their reformist fervour made the Wahhabi appear radical in the eyes of the colonial administration and the '*grands marabouts*' of West Africa, who feared that Islamic reform movements would undermine their authority.[37]

Their fear was justified since reform of the status quo was a common goal of Wahhabi Muslims and nationalists. 'The nature and outlook of the opposition to traditional leadership connected political radicalism and religious dissent during the period of the drive for autonomy.'[38] As Lansiné Kaba has pointed out, to the Wahhabi independence and unity were indispensable to the triumph of a purified Islam:

> Islam, within the context of the anti-colonial struggle and the task of rehabilitating the African personality, immediately appeared as the single most powerful ideology at the disposal of the nationalists . . . The more Islamic the orientation of the [nationalists'] propaganda, the more it permeated the masses. Thus, reform and nationalism became complementary.[39]

In French West Africa the expansion of the Wahhabiyya reform movement coincided with the emergence of the RDA (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain) as the major political force working for decolonization in West Africa. As individuals many Wahhabi joined the RDA. The Wahhabi's chief political goal was to achieve the establishment of a democratic state that relied on the Koranic notions of freedom, equality, and *ijma* (consensus).[40] A shared perception of the necessity for a radical reformation of society, opposition to colonial rule and Westernization, as well as a lack of concern for ethnicity, made it possible for Islamic leaders, especially the Wahhabiyya, to co-operate with secular leaders. Here Islam showed itself as a positive and unifying force. Similarly, the importance of Islam as a radical and dynamic force reasserted itself during the nationalist struggle. To quote Ken Post,

> in areas where Islam has long been established, in northern Cameroon, northern Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Guinea, Senegal and Mauritania, it has profoundly affected the process of elite-formation produced by the social changes of colonial rule. In some of them it offered an alternative cultural tradition and even indigenous political systems and provided ways of obtaining power and influence other than the purely modern ones.[41]

In Guinea, Sekou Touré and other leaders of the PDG could claim they were adhering to 'pure' Islam when they pointed out the abuses of the colonial system and its indigenous collaborators.[42] The radicalism of Islam came from the failure of the marabouts to withstand European intervention. The reformists felt that this came from a failure to adhere properly to the 'true' practices of Islam. In many Muslim communities European invasion produced a reaction that blended resistance and Islamic reform.

During the First World War neither British nor German colonial authorities were adverse to claiming (when they thought it would serve their interests) that they were the protectors of Muslim interests. The British were particularly sensitive to the anti-European and anti-colonial sentiments expressed in journals, newspapers and books that called for pan-Islamic unity. These works, originating in Cairo and Istanbul, were circulated among the Ulema of East Africa, with whom they were very popular. This explains to some extent the British paranoia over the so-called 'Mecca letters' allegedly written by the Sharif of Mecca and urging East African Muslims to rise up against colonial rule in defence of the Islamic world.[43]

Unlike the experience in West Africa, during the first part of the twentieth century there was not a coherent organized, and systematic reform movement on the East African coast.[44] However, the influence of Salafiyya ideas was felt through the circulation of reformist newspapers such as *Al-Islah* (Reform), which began publication in Mombasa in 1932. *Al-Islah* was the project of Sheikh Al-Amin bin Ali Abdallah bin Nafi Al-Mazrui, whose work had a

lasting effect on reform. Sheikh Al-Amin urged the Muslim community to build its own schools, since the colonial government failed to appreciate the importance of Islamic culture and values.[45] A number of Koranic schools and madrasas were established throughout the 1930s. In 1936 the first Muslim coeducational school, the Ghazali Muslim School, was opened. Despite the growth in Islamic education and calls for reform and steadfastness, as A. I. Salim has noted, by the mid-1930s 'the Arabs and Swahili [of Kenya's coast] had been reconciled to the compromise government schools providing basic Arabic and Quran [*sic*] lessons . . . [A] pan-Islamic alliance was proving less and less of a practical idea . . . in the fight against [racial] discrimination or the fight for privileges . . . religion took second place to race'.[46] Fear of pan-Islamism and radicalization of East African Muslims remained a constant anxiety of the British governments in Kenya and Tanzania throughout the 1940s and 1950s. It was in an attempt to undercut the appeal of Islamic nationalist and anti-imperialist messages emanating from Cairo that the British colonial government encouraged the establishment of the East African Muslim Welfare Association under the patronage of His Highness Aga Khan III and the Sultan of Zanzibar. The British colonial government contributed financially to the establishment of the Mombasa Institute of Muslim Education (MIOME), which was to be an East Africa-wide institution providing secondary and post-secondary secular education to Muslim youth within an Islamic religious and cultural environment.[47]

The colonial governments tended to discourage Islam, but their relationship to Islam was ambiguous. They often used Islam for political expediency. Muslim leaders who were willing to collaborate or co-operate were favoured. This 'special friendship' could possibly assure submissive populations and undermine Muslim solidarity by causing an antagonized separation between collaborators and resisters. The British High Commissioner Frederick Lugard had initiated this policy in northern Nigeria during the early twentieth century by rewarding collaborative emirs with economic and social privileges and decorations, and by generally helping to maintain their status quo. The British pursued this same policy in Zanzibar. Some members of the traditional Muslim élite, such as the emirs of northern Nigeria, the Sultan of Zanzibar, the *Grands Marabouts* in Senegal, and prominent marabouts in other areas of French West Africa, were motivated to collaborate in part through a genuine belief that a stable government that permits even the semblance of the Muslim way of life to survive is preferable to anarchy. There are strong precedents in classical Islam for this mode of action.

However, in the final analysis colonialism did not help the spread of Islam. Koranic schools suffered from a lack of state funds and because of competition with Western secular schools, which were supported by state tax revenues. The colonial economy reduced the role of the traditionally active

Muslim traders. No longer able to obtain bank loans or goods in large quantities, and inched out by large European companies and the monopolization of retail trade by Indians in East Africa and by Syrian and Lebanese merchants in West Africa, the African Muslim traders were left with only petty trade.

These economic, socio-political and psychological frustrations spurred the growth of Islamic reform movements and simultaneously the beginnings of African nationalist associations. As Ali Mazrui has shown, Muslim political apathy can be turned into radical political fervour.[48] Among the earliest supporters of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in Tanzania were the Swahili Muslim traders.[49] These small-scale urban traders were joined by the Westernized Muslim élite, whose economic and political opportunities had also been curtailed by the colonial structure. The calibre of Islamic leadership plays an important role in the political attitudes and activism of Muslims. Islam tends to have a conservative tone, especially in situations where Muslims are in the minority or on the defensive. The conservatism of northern Nigerian Muslims during the independence period was due to a sense of insecurity in relation to the better-educated non-Muslim southerners. Orthodoxy was used as a defence mechanism. In addition to the conservative Northern People's Congress led by the emirs, northern Nigeria also had the radical Islamic movement Yab Wazifa, which supported Aminu Kano's Northern Elements Progressive Union. None the less, Islam was a positive force for African nationalism. In countries with large Muslim populations, Islam provided a sense of unity and solidarity as a basis for mustering a nationalistic response. This factor was especially important in societies where 'the racial identity of the Africans was not and is not now sufficiently strong to sustain the unity of the African community'.[50] In addition, Islamic religious orders had long-established traditions of organization, discipline and collective action. Once the secular nationalist leadership had established a good relationship with these brotherhoods, they could use these existing religious organizations to disseminate information and to rally participation for the nationalist cause.[51]

Islam and modern Afro-Arab relations

Separatist and irredentist movements have also used Islam as a rallying cry. The Islamic factor in separatist and irredentist movements is partly a legacy of the boundaries carved out by European powers during the colonial period. While pre-colonial African states, especially in the savannah regions of West Africa and the Sudan, had emerged in accordance with cultural and geographic zones stretching from east to west, the colonies were established on a north-south axis. Thus the new African states that achieved independence within colonial-imposed boundaries have inherited diverse ethnic populations and,

usually, a cleavage between a Muslim north and Christian and animist south. The Sudan is a classic example of this north–south dichotomy. Arab countries naturally supported the northern Sudanese, while the primarily non-Muslim southern Sudanese were 'strongly supported morally and materially by Christian organizations all over the world'.[52] The Sudanese conflict was resolved by granting autonomy to the south. In both Nigeria and Chad this north–south cleavage is also clear. The effects in Nigeria have been noted. In Chad a similar northern Muslim versus southern Christian and animist situation was further aggravated by Algerian and Libyan support of the northern Muslim Frolinat movement and Libyan annexation of a portion of Chadian territory said to contain uranium deposits but also a source of contention between Chad and Libya that dates back to nineteenth-century Sansui expansion.[53]

Arab leaders have from time to time used Islamic solidarity as a way to support separatist and irredentist movements within African states. The Eritrean secessionist struggle, led by Muslims against the 'Christian' government, was launched by a liberation movement that had been founded in Cairo. Syria, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Iraq have given money, arms and training to the various liberation organizations, while Tripoli supported the Ethiopian government.[54] On the East African coast Somali nationalists staged a serious irredentist movement. They aimed at incorporating the Ogaden Province of Ethiopia and the northern frontier region of Kenya, as well as what is now Djibouti (all areas that contain a high percentage of Somali Muslim inhabitants), with the new state of Somalia to form a Greater Somalia. A shared Islamic faith, common history, language and culture were their reasons for demanding unification.[55] Further south, the Mwambao, an Arab-Swahili secessionist movement on the Kenyan coast during the late 1950s, was similarly motivated by common historical and religious ties. The Waswahili claimed it was a historical accident, provoked in the interests of British colonization, that caused the coastal strip to be linked to the colony of Kenya. The movement was short-lived and provoked firm opposition from the Kenyan nationalist parties. Both the Arab-dominated Zanzibar Nationalist Party and the Egyptian Government opposed the move for autonomy on grounds of pan-African sentiment.[56] In West Africa an antagonistic muddle in which Morocco asserted an irredentist claim to Mauritania during the late 1950s and early 1960s led to Mauritania's emphasis on its African rather than its Arab–Islamic identity. But since the resolution of that conflict Mauritania has joined the Arab League and proclaimed Islam the official state religion.

These dilemmas create problems in Afro-Arab relations. A number of Arab countries have sought to develop 'special relationships' with African states on the basis of Islamic affinity. These 'special relationships' are not necessarily welcome. Though there are few clearly documented cases in which

Islam played a major role as an instrument of foreign policy, Egypt's African policy under Nasser presents a good example.

During the early 1950s an attempt to augment and strengthen Islam in sub-Saharan Africa became a conscious part of an Egyptian foreign policy which was 'aimed at creating a sense of community, cultural loyalty and political integration'[57] throughout Africa. Egyptian President Nasser recognized and emphasized the historic interrelationship between Arab Africa and black Africa. As part of a multifaceted plan to cast Egypt as the cultural and political centre of Islam, Africa and the Arab world, to create Islamic solidarity as a counter to a sensed Israeli threat, and to encourage the liberation of African states from colonial domination, Egypt extended a rare combination of somewhat paternalistic care and concrete assistance to the nations of black Africa. Various aid and technical-assistance programmes, consisting of training technicians in the United Arab Republic (UAR) and providing agricultural experts, doctors and teachers for African states were launched; the UAR signed commercial, cultural and loan agreements with a number of African states, and thousands of Egyptian scholarships were awarded to African students to enable them to complete their studies in Cairo, particularly at Al-Azhar, the well-known centre of Islamic learning.[58] Egypt also offered industrial-development loans at very low interest rates, as well as serving as a haven for exiled African nationalists. Egypt not only allowed nationalist movements to set up offices in Cairo but also helped further the nationalists' effectiveness through the use of radio broadcasts. The Voice of Africa was subsidized by the Egyptian government. By 1961 the radio broadcasts were heard in twenty-two different languages throughout north-western and eastern Africa. Radio Cairo developed special programmes to encourage the nationalist struggle, and Islamic teaching was used to expand the African 'circle'.[59]

Nasser envisioned the hajj, an international gathering of Muslims, as a focal point for Islamic solidarity. In his words:

> The pilgrimage should be a great political power . . . a regular political congress wherein the leaders of Muslim states, their public men, their pioneers in every field of knowledge, their writers, their leading industrialists, merchants and youth draw up in this universal Islamic Parliament the main lines of policy for their countries and their co-operation together until they meet again. . . . When I visualize . . . [the millions of Muslims in the world] I have a great consciousness of the tremendous potentialities that co-operation amongst them all can achieve: a co-operation that does not deprive them of their loyalty to their countries but which guarantees for them and their brethren a limitless power.[60]

Nasser's vision of a powerful pan-Islamic entity included the establishment of Egyptian political philosophy as the dominant ideology. In 1956 the newly established Institute of African Affairs was to include a 'special studies' section

for the missionaries who would be sent to Africa from Al-Azhar University and the Ministry of Education and Instruction 'to teach, preach and give instruction in the fundamentals of religion and by this means preach Egyptian politics'.[61] But the quest to establish 'an Islamic front at the governmental level' was abandoned. Nasser attributed this failure to the Baghdad Pact, claiming that the linking of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Iraq with the United Kingdom made it difficult for an Islamic conference to meet on a political basis. Thereafter the idea of an Islamic front was pursued on a 'popular level'.[62]

In the 1960s some African leaders opposed the Egyptian use of Islam as an instrument of foreign policy. They were particularly suspicious of Egypt's Kiplingesque sense of mission to black Africa. Some leaders also distrusted Egypt's brand of Islam, and the marabouts were naturally concerned lest this modernist Islam should weaken their control and influence over their followers.[63] Despite these objections Egypt continued to use Islam in its foreign policy. At the Second Afro-Asian Islamic Conference at Al-Azhar in 1965 'unqualified support' for the Arab position on Palestine was achieved by connecting the Palestinian cause with religion.[64] Similarly, according to Ruth First, the Libyans supported the view that 'since Islam united Arabs and Muslim Africa, it was surely no more than a short step from being Muslim to becoming pro-Arab and anti-Israel'.[65] Saudi Arabia specifically attempted to draw attention to Jerusalem as the second holiest city of Islam and thus make its liberation from Israeli occupation a sacred Muslim duty.

The Islamic factor in the triangular foreign relations of Israel, the Arab world and Africa is not clearly defined. Foreign policy in most African countries is determined by a highly secular political leadership. In countries with heterogeneous populations the leaders are aware of the need to maintain good relationships among the animist, Christian and Muslim elements within their populations. Islam cannot provide a basis for foreign relations, yet it may provide an additional bond when common interests already exist. Arab countries, particularly Egypt, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Saudi Arabia, have sought to Islamicize the Arab–Israeli conflict, especially the Palestinian issue, and thereby arouse sympathy and gain support from African Muslims. But it is doubtful that any African countries, with the exceptions of Somalia, Mauritania and the Sudan, were motivated to discontinue relations with Israel on the grounds of Islamic solidarity.

By the 1970s, disillusionment with Israel came despite Israeli financial, technical and military assistance to many developing African nations. It was based on a number of factors, such as anger over Israel–South Africa connections. Israel's refusal to withdraw from territory occupied during the 1967 war was seen as a threat to 'territorial integrity'. Additionally, Islamic solidarity may be seen as a reflection of the closer relations between the Palestine Liberation Organization and African liberation movements in

Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa; and generally between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. As Ali Mazrui has pointed out, the growth of the Sahara has coincided with a shrinkage of the political distance between black Africa and Arab Africa. The OAU serves both as a mechanism through which the Arabs can attempt to influence the politics of black Africa as well as a means through which black Africa can seek economic concessions from the Arabs.[66]

Religion plays an important role in the allocation of Arab aid to Africa. Many observers of Afro-Arab relations have noted the congruence between the African recipients of Arab aid and their Islamic affiliation. This linkage between aid and religious affiliation is a clear policy objective of Arab donors, and was noted as such by the Kuwaiti Finance Minister in 1974: 'The major portion of our international financial aid will be put at the service of Arab countries and to assist Muslim countries, particularly in Africa.'[67] Of course Arab aid to Africa did not begin in 1974. Prior to the quadrupling of the oil prices in 1973 and the resulting increase in the balance of payments of oil-producing states, aid from such Arab countries as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States was already being given in small measure. Much of it was for 'Islamic purposes' and was given to individual African countries and institutions. Since that time Arab aid efforts have developed both multilateral and bilateral arrangements. Among the multilateral assistance institutions are such agencies as the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, the Special Fund for Africa established by OPEC, and the Fund for Arab-African Technical Assistance under the direction of the Economic Council of the Arab League. Grants and loans from these agencies are allocated partly to offset balance of payments problems by African countries, but to a greater extent to finance economic and agricultural projects. They have gone to states that cover the African political spectrum from left to right, both Muslim and non-Muslim. Before we turn to the bilateral efforts of Arab national aid funds two other multilateral institutions should be mentioned. Although their activities are worldwide, their money comes from OPEC countries and a good portion of their disbursements are made to black Africa. These two institutions are the Jidda-based Islamic Development Bank and the OPEC Special Fund, with headquarters in Vienna. The Islamic Development Bank has a huge capital of $2.4 billion, much of it contributed by Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Tripoli. Among its thirty-two contributing members, ranging from Afghanistan to the Yemen Arab Republic, about half are African. It is one of the few international aid instruments that operates under the Islamic law of *riba* (i.e. no interest is charged). However, it provides loans even to non-Muslim developing states as long as they contain Muslim communities. Among the first five nations to receive loans, three were from Africa: Cameroon, Sudan and Somalia.[68] Multilateral aid, though politically motivated, is relatively free from religious bias.

However, the bulk of Arab aid to African countries is channelled through bilateral arrangements and is given primarily to Muslim Arab and Muslim African states. Chibwe estimates that close to 90 per cent of Arab aid is bilateral. The total amount of bilateral aid is difficult to assess, owing to the reticence of both recipients and donors. Further, Islam has fairly strict guidelines regarding the manner in which aid is to be given From data kept by such international financial institutions as UNCTAD, OECD and IBRD, Chibwe gives the following figures for aid in 1974: actual bilateral aid disbursements from Arab states to African countries totalled $178 million; of this the largest amount went to Sudan, $70 million; Mauritania and Somalia each received $25 million; Senegal $5 million; Guinea $5 million; and Uganda $2 million (while Uganda is not strictly speaking a Muslim country, its head of state was Muslim in 1974, and Islam played an important role in Uganda's internal politics).[69]

Arab states have also given help to Muslim minorities in Sierra Leone, Kenya, Ghana, Chad, Ethiopia, Benin and Upper Volta. Such aid is primarily designated for the construction of mosques, clinics and schools, and for the propagation of Islam. Mazrui estimates that as at 1975 only 6 per cent of all Arab aid went to black African countries that are neither Arab nor Muslim.[70]

The Islamic orientation of Arab aid may be explained in part by the fact that African Muslim countries are among the poorest in the world. The Arab notion of aid is still tempered by the Islamic concept of distributive justice. It is the religious obligation of every Muslim to help other Muslims. Islam plays an important role in the life of such countries as Saudi Arabia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. These states are less secular and possess a greater surplus oil wealth than other Arab countries. It is estimated that the UAE gives the largest amount of aid of any country in the world, 10 to 11 per cent annually of its GNP.[71]

Since much of Arab aid is given on a person-to-person basis, Arab heads of state may give aid to fellow Muslim African leaders in the spirit of the Arab-Islamic ethic of hospitality and generosity to one's guests. African Muslim leaders often go to Saudi Arabia on pilgrimage and to other Arab nations on official visits. Announcements of aid are made at these times, as well as when Arab leaders visit the African countries.[72]

While aid is an important factor in Afro-Arab co-operation, neither its magnitude nor the manner in which it is distributed are particularly appreciated by Africans. Both Muslim and non-Muslim Africans have criticized the meagreness and inadequacy of Arab aid to Africa, especially at a time of severe drought in the Sahel region and during the economic crises which have troubled Africa since the 1973 increase in oil prices. Non-Muslim Africans are also unhappy about the Islamic orientation of Arab aid. Given the heterogeneity of African societies and the potential for religious ethnic cleavages between

animists, Christians and Muslims, Arab aid targeted for 'Islamic purposes' adds a destabilizing influence to African politics. In the interest of developing pacific and harmonious Afro-Arab relations, religious aid might be better channelled through non-governmental charitable institutions.

Conclusion

The Arabs and Africans have a long history of collaboration and conflict. Islam has played a vital role in that interaction, and no matter what shape future Afro-Arab relations take, the survival of Islam in Africa is not at stake. Islam has proven itself a resilient cultural and spiritual force in black Africa.

TABLE 2. African Muslims and the hajj pilgrimage.

Country	Total number of pilgrims, 1973	Total number of pilgrims, 1974[1]
Algeria	22 945	49 025
Benin	351	527
Cameroon	2 245	4 422
Central African Empire	277	323
Chad	2 798	4 921
Egypt	36 452	89 617
Gambia	379	579
Ivory Coast	966	1 165
Mali	1 729	2 628
Mauritania	956	1 677
Morocco	14 923	27 632
Niger	2 454	7 030
Nigeria	38 839	51 764
Senegal	3 233	3 403
Somalia	2 842	3 767
Sudan	33 222	42 084
Tunisia	8 168	10 785
Uganda	2 774	3 107

1. The September 1978 hajj was the largest in history, attended by more than 2 million people (*Time*, 16 April 1979, p. 42). Many of the pilgrims were from Africa; unfortunately a breakdown by country is not available. The rise in the popularity of the pilgrimage is a testament to the revival of Islam. The hajj has had and will continue to have important cultural and social consequences for the growth and reaffirmation of Islam in Africa, because it tends to encourage orthodoxy and helps in breaking down regional differences in the observance of Islamic ritual. Selected statistics are from Joseph Cuoq, 'Le monde arabo-islamique et l'Afrique', p. 6; and the Ministère des Finances et de l'Économie, Service des Statistiques, *Résultats globaux concernant le pèlerinage de 1394 (1974)*, Riyadh, 1974, 25 pp.

The recent resurgence of Islamic fervour in the Middle East, following the deposition of the Shah and the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran, has drawn world attention to the political role of Islam. It is too soon to predict what this newly found Islamic revival and fundamentalism will do for Afro-Arab relations. However, I see two trends in contemporary African Islam. One, which has received the most comment and attention from Western observers, is the continuous expansion of Islam in black Africa. The second and less-noticed trend is the increase in Islamic orthodoxy. Urbanization, growth of communications, greater popularity of the hajj pilgrimage (see Table 2), ease of travel and particularly the availability and spread of transistor radios have contributed to greater linkages between once isolated communities and cultures, and the centres of Islamic orthodoxy in Africa and the Arab world. Local variation in the practices of Islam tend to disappear, and what is emerging in some parts of Africa is a uniform orthodox Islamic culture. In spite of the importance of the Salafiyya tradition of reform in sub-Saharan Africa, the great majority of African Muslims are conservative and cautious and are more likely to turn to orthodoxy than to Islamic modernism.

Notes

For full information on the shortened references to authors and publications, see the Select Bibliography.

1. This paper does not include consideration of the Asian Muslim communities in East Africa, the Ahmadiyyah Muslim movement in East and West Africa, or the Lebanese and Syrian Muslims in West Africa. On the Asian Muslim communities, see my article in Kritzeck and Lewis. On the Ahmadiyyah, see Fisher.
2. This figure has been reduced by the recent expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League; but it is likely that this is only a temporary situation.
3. See the introduction in Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya—Islamic Reform and Politics in French West Africa.* Also see the preface in Cheikh Hamidou Kane, *Ambiguous Adventure*, 1962, rptd. New York, Macmillan, 1974, p. x. Kane is quoted as saying that 'if Islam is not the only religion of West Africa it is the first in importance. I wish to say also that it is the religion of the Western African's heart'.
4. See S. J. Trimingham, *The Influence of Islam upon Africa*, New York, Praeger, 1968, *Islam in West Africa*, *Islam in East Africa*; Kritzeck and Lewis; and Anderson.
5. Smith, p. 25.
6. For a definition of 'Muslim state' see Mazrui, 'Islam . . .', p. 274.
7. Abu-Lughod, 'Africa and the Islamic World', in John Paden and Edward Sonja (eds.), *The African Experience*, Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1970, Vol. I, pp. 522–53.
8. See E. W. Bovil, *The Golden Trade of the Moors*, 2nd ed., London, Oxford University Press, 1968; and Nehemia Levtzion, *Ancient Ghana and Mali*, London, Methuen, 1973.
9. John Hunwick, 'Religion and State in the Songhay Empire, 1464–1591', in Lewis, pp. 296–317. See also Anne Pardo, 'The Songhay Empire under Sonni Ali and Askia

Muhammad: A Study in Comparisons and Contrasts', in D. F. McCall and N. R. Bennet (eds.), *Aspects of West African Islam*, Boston, Mass., 1971. (Boston University Papers on Africa, 5.)

10. See Ivor Wilkas, 'Abu Bakr al-Siddiq of Timbuktu', in Philip D. Curtin (ed.), *Africa Remembered*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1967.
11. John Hunwick, 'The Influence of Arabic in West Africa', *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, Vol. 7, 1964.
12. Lewis, p. 26.
13. For the importance of Islamic magic in the non-Muslim societies of West Africa see H. J. Fisher, 'Hassebu: Islamic Healing in Black Africa', in M. Brett (ed.), *Northern Africa: Islam and Modernization*, London, Frank Cass, 1973, pp. 23–47. See also Ivor Wilks, 'The Position of Muslims in Metropolitan Ashanti', in Lewis, pp. 331–4.
14. Lewis, p. 25.
15. Murray Last, 'Reform in West Africa: the Jihad Movements of the Nineteenth Century', in J. F. Ade Ajayi and Michael Crowder (eds.), *History of West Africa*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1973, pp. 1–29.
16. The Swahili chronicles tend to telescope Islamic history on the coast and link it, in an attempt to claim higher pedigree, to the glories of the first two centuries of Islam in the Middle East. See Neville Chittick, 'The Shirazi Colonization of East Africa', *Journal of African History*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1965, pp. 263–73. Also, Chittick, *Kilwa*.
17. See A. G. Matthew, 'Islamic Merchant Cities in East Africa', London, *Times*, 26 January 1956, p. 5.
18. On Swahili coastal settlements, see Freeman Granville, *Medieval History of the Coast of Tanganyika*, London, Oxford University Press, 1962; and also Chittick, *Kilwa*.
19. See Trimingham, *Islam in East Africa*; Anderson, *Islamic Law in East Africa*; R. Coupland, *The Exploitation of East Africa*, London, 1938, and *East Africa and its Invaders*, London, 1939; and Abu-Lughod. For similar views expressed in a more recent article see Alard von Schack, 'Black Africa and its Neighbours to the North', *Aussen Politik* (German foreign affairs review), Vol. 28, January 1977.
20. See 'The Asiatic Bias in the Historiography of the East African Coast', in *Hadith, Journal of the Kenya Historical Association*.
21. On trading caravans from the interior to the coast, see E. J. Gray and Birmingham, *Pre-Colonial African Trade*, London, 1975.
22. See Norman R. Bennett, *Miramba of Tanzania ca 1840–1884*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1971. Also see Obed.
23. See E. J. Gray, 'Ahmed bin Ibrahim', *Uganda Journal*, Vol. II, 1947, pp. 80–97.
24. On religious conversion in recent African history, see Robin Horton, 'African Conversion', *Africa*, Vol. XLI, 1971, pp. 85–108. Also, Humphrey J. Fisher, 'Conversion Reconsidered: Some Historical Aspects of Religious Conversion in Black Africa', *Africa*, Vol. XLIII, 1973, pp. 27–40.
25. On loss of identity, including loss of Islamic identity, in the face of Westernization, see Cheikh Hamidou Kane's novel *Ambiguous Adventure*.
26. Benjamin Ray, *African Religions: Symbol, Ritual and Community*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1976, p. 175.
27. F. G. Afolabi-Ogo, *Yoruba Culture*, London, 1966, p. 187.
28. On the Islamic contribution to national integration in former French West Africa, see Ruth Morganthau, *Political Parties in French-speaking West Africa*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964, pp. 264–5.
29. On patterns of Islamization, see Fisher, 'Conversion Reconsidered . . .', p. 31. See also Trimingham, *The Influence of Islam upon Africa*, op. cit.

30. Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya*, pp. 258–9.
31. Thomas Hodgkin, 'Muslims South of the Sahara', *Current History*, June 1957, p. 348.
32. On the Mourides of Senegal see Cruise O'Brien, *The Mourides of Senegal*. On the role of the Khatmia and Ansar, see Trimingham, *Islam in the Sudan*, London, 1949.
33. Crawford Young, *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1979, p. 21.
34. See Bradford Martin, 'Muslim Politics and Resistance to Colonial Rule: Shaykh Uways bin Muhammad al-Barawi and the Qadiriyya Brotherhood in East Africa', *Journal of African History*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1969, pp. 471–86.
35. Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya* . . ., p. 255.
36. Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya* . . ., p. 96.
37. Anti-Wahhabi feeling was fuelled by colonial administrators such as Marcel Cardaire, head of the Bureau of Muslim Affairs in French West Africa during the 1950s. Cardaire wrote a book entitled *L'Islam et le terroir africain*, Bamako, Imprimerie du Gouvernement, 1954. A 1958 article by Louis Axel, 'Le danger du Pan-Islamisme pour l'Afrique noire', states that 'the teaching of Al-Azhar is extending its hold on the African Muslism . . . the true danger to the West and France is from the Wahhabiyya, which comes from Cairo and which aims at destroying the old brotherhoods not only for the purpose of religious reform but also with the firm will to eliminate from Africa everything that is related to Christianity or the West . . . the collusion of pan-Arabism with pan-Islamism is closer and closer—and the dangerous grouping of all Muslims under the banner of the Arab League has never been as great as now'. (From the article in *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, No. 674, 1958, pp. 36–50.) Quoted in Kaba, 'The Politics of Quranic Education among Muslim traders in the Western Sudan: the Subbanu Experience', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1976, p. 415.
38. Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya* . . ., p. 252.
39. Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya* . . ., p. 257.
40. Kaba, *The Wahhabiyya* . . ., p. 130.
41. Ken Post, *The New States of West Africa*, Baltimore, Penguin, 1964, p. 52.
42. Ibid., p. 51.
43. See Brad Martin, 'Shaykh Uways bin Muhammad al-Barawi and the Qadiriyya Brotherhood in East Africa', p. 475.
44. Salim, p. 159.
45. Ibid., p. 162.
46. Ibid., p. 167.
47. Active colonial encouragement of MIOME and the East African Muslim Welfare Association was pointed out to me during a recent trip made to gather materials on Muslim voluntary associations in East Africa.
48. See Ali A. Mazrui, 'Islam, Political Leadership . . .', p. 257.
49. See Henry Bienen, *Tanzania: Party, Transformation and Economic Development*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 43–7.
50. Abu-Lughod, p. 435.
51. Abu-Lughod, 'Africa and the Islamic World', op. cit., p. 564.
52. Mazrui, 'Black Africa and the Arabs', p. 737.
53. First, pp. 222–3.
54. Frances D. Cook, 'Robin Hood'? The Politics and Promises of OPEC Aid to Black Africa', pp. 37–8. (Unpublished paper, 1978.)
55. See I. M. Lewis, *The Modern History of Somaliland*, London, 1965, and Vernon McKay, 'Islam and Relations among the New African States'.
56. Salim, pp. 227–31.

57. Tareq Y. Ismael, 'Religion and UAR African Policy', *Journal of Modern African History*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1968, p. 49.
58. Vernon McKay, 'The Impact of Islam on Relations among the New African States', pp. 182–4.
59. A. J. Meyer, 'Israel and the Arabs in Africa', *Harvard Review*, Vol. 1, No. 3, Spring 1963, p. 11.
60. Nasser, pp. 77–8.
61. McKay, 'The Impact of Islam . . .', op. cit., p. 183. He cites 'An African Policy for Egypt', *Egyptian Economic and Political Review*, Vol. 2, August 1956, p. 22.
62. Ismael, 'Religion . . .', op. cit., p. 54.
63. See McKay, 'The Impact of Islam . . .', op. cit., p. 168.
64. See Ismael, 'Religion . . .', op. cit., p. 55.
65. First, p. 222.
66. See Mazrui, 'Black Africa and the Arabs', pp. 728–34. Also Zdenek Cervenka, *Unfinished Quest for Unity: Africa and the OAU*, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1977. On Israeli relations with South Africa, see Elliott P. Skinner, 'African States and Israel: Uneasy Relations in a World of Crises', *Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Spring 1975, pp. 1–23. Also Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, 'South Africa and Israel's Strategy or Survival', *Africa Forum*, Vol. 20, No. 3, April–May 1977, p. 54.
67. Quoted in Maurice J. Williams, 'The Aid Programs of the OPEC Countries', *Foreign Affairs*, January 1966, p. 311.
68. See James Buxton, 'The Expanding Aid Effort', *Financial Times*, 26 September 1977.
69. E. C. Chibwe, *Arab Dollars for Africa*, London, 1977, p. 10.
70. World Bank data quoted in Mazrui, 'Black Africa and the Arabs', op. cit., p. 740.
71. See Buxton, op. cit.
72. Kaba, *The Politics of Quranic Education* . . ., p. 420.

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Language in Afro-Arab relations: the interaction between Arabic and African languages

Mohamed H. Abdulaziz

One of the most interesting subjects of study in the cultural history of mankind is the outcome of cultural and linguistic contact between different peoples and civilizations; it is now widely recognized that one of man's greatest conflicts is that of culture. Expressing it in positive terms, successful measures to resolve cultural antagonisms between peoples and nations should provide a sound basis for co-operation in other aspects of human endeavour.

In this paper an attempt will be made to trace the historical interaction between Arabic and certain African languages, in the context of current aspirations to foster cultural, economic and political co-operation between African and Arab peoples.

Linguistic evidence shows that in Africa there have always existed languages grouped as Afro-Asiatic that are genetically related to the Semitic languages of the Middle East, of which Arabic is a major representative. Greenberg[1] mentions five co-ordinate branches of Hamito-Semitic (or Afro-Asian), namely (a) Semitic, (b) Berber, (c) Ancient Egyptian, (d) Cushitic and (e) Chaddic. The Cushitic group includes languages like Somali and Galla spoken as far south as northern Kenya. Of the Chaddic group of languages the best-known representative is Hausa. Such linguistic evidence points to the strong possibility that a very large portion of North Africa and the areas around the Horn must have had a linguistic affinity with the Semitic-speaking areas of western Asia, including the Arab peninsula, as far back as prehistoric times.

Modern historians record the relationship between East Africa and the Arabian peninsula as dating back at least two thousand years. According to Greek historians of the second century B.C., Ethiopia and south Arabia were under the same Himyarite rulers. The Greek *Periplus* also refers to the close cultural and commercial links between East Africa and southern Arabia. Such contacts led to the presence of Arab settlers in north-eastern and eastern Africa even before the birth of Christ. Likewise, mention is made in Arabic literature of prominent black military and literary figures in the Arabian peninsula before the advent of Islam. Among the great poets of African origin were Antarah ibn Shaddad (A.D. 525–615), whose great ode remains one of

the famous seven odes nailed in golden letters on the Al-Kaaba, the great Muslim holy shrine in Mecca. Another great literary figure of African origin was Al-Shanfara, who was considered an accomplished poet in Arabic. Then there was Bilal, the trusted companion of the Prophet and the first muezzin of Islam, who is recorded as having possessed outstanding eloquence in Arabic. Al-Mutanabbi (b. A.D. 915), one of the greatest Arab literary figures of all time, had Kāfūr, virtual ruler of Egypt in the mid-tenth century, as his literary patron. Kāfūr was a black African, born a Nubian slave.

Likewise, some of the greatest literary figures writing in an African language like Swahili were men of direct Arab descent. For example, Sayyid Abdullah bin Ali bin Nassir (A.D. 1720–1820), the author of the famous classical poems, *Al-Inkishaf, Mashairi ya Liyongo* (Songs of the 'Swahili prince' Liyongo) was of Hadhrami (south Arabian) descent; so was Aidarus (*c.* 1749), author of the *Hamziyya*, the famous interlinear translation into Swahili of Al-Busiry's *Qasida Umm-al-Qura.*

The Arabic language in sub-Saharan Africa

Arabic learning really began to influence sub-Saharan Africa with the advent of Islam, although, as hinted above, contact between Arabic and certain African languages had existed even before Islam.

In West Africa, Islam and Arabic were introduced in the early centuries of the hegira, mostly by Al-Murabitin and mainly from areas now constituting Morocco and Tunis, to the northern parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Islam also moved along the West Coast of Africa to such areas of the coast as Yorubaland. Arabic and Islam also spread as a result of the trans-Saharan trade carried on by Arabs and Arabized Muslims, especially the Sanhaja and Tuareg. It would seem that the first group of West Africans to accept Islam were the Fulani, and through them the Hausa. By the sixteenth century an important centre of Arabic learning had already been established in Timbuktu. When this city was conquered, in the latter part of the sixteenth century, a number of centres of Arabic learning grew up to the south in Kano, Katsina, Bornu and Kanem. These centres were visited by some leading Arabic-speaking itinerant scholars, notable among whom was Mohammad b. Abd al-Karim al-Maghili (d. 1504) who established himself in Kano. Other smaller centres of Arabic learning sprang up, especially near courts of local rulers. Such centres taught such traditional Islamic subjects as theology, jurisprudence, Sufism, the exegesis of the Koran, the Hadith (or the Prophetic traditions), and aspects of the Arabic language, especially grammar, correct usage, rhetoric and semantics. At the lower levels, especially in Koranic schools, children were taught to read and write in Arabic script and to recite the Koran. It was from such an education system that literacy in Arabic and a literate tradition

using the Arabic script for writing Hausa developed. For example, Uthman Dan Fodio (1754–1817) the great Fulani religious leader who led a holy war, his brother Abdullahi and his son Mohammad Bello wrote between them over a hundred and fifty works in the Arabic language. Another great West African Arabist was Umar bin Said Futa Jalon (nineteenth century), from Senegal, who studied in Hejaz, Arabia, and established important centres of Arabic learning in West Africa. There were other significant writers in Arabic, such as Ibn Al-Sabbagh and Abdulla Sikka (both seventeenth-century scholars); the former had his circle in Katsina while the latter established himself in Kano.

Hausa had vigorous indigenous oral verse in the form of praise songs, long before the literary influence of Arabic emerged. With the Islamic reformist movement of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there developed in Hausaland a local Islam-inspired literature using Arabic verse forms. The presence in Hausa of long and short syllables similar to those of Arabic meant that Hausa could borrow both the metric and the rhyme patterns of the various Arabic verse forms. Thus Hausa verses were written using such Arabic forms as *Basit*, *Kamil*, *Tawil*, *Mutaqarib* and *Khafif*, side by side with poems cast in indigenous verse forms.

As a result of the sustained contact between Arabic and such West African languages as Hausa, Fula and Yoruba, there was free borrowing of words of Arabic origin. Up to the beginning of the twentieth century, most writing in Hausa and Fula (and to some extent Yoruba) was done using the Arabic script. Even with the introduction of the Roman script, writing of letters and documents can still be found in the Arabic script among the Hausa, Fulani and Yoruba peoples. For example, the Hausa newspaper called *Gaskia* (Truth) was originally published wholly in Arabic script. It changed to Roman script during British rule, but reverted to Arabic script on certain pages during the Nigerian civil war of 1966–70, simply for the practical purpose of making the newspaper available to a wider audience.

In East Africa there has been a long, sustained contact between Arabic and the Semitic and Cushitic languages of Ethiopia and Somalia on the one hand and between Arabic and the coastal Bantu languages on the other.

The teaching and learning of Arabic must have already started by the second or third century of the hegira, in the coastal city-states of Mogadiscio, Kismayu, Pate, Lamu, Malindi, Mombasa, Zanzibar and Kilwa. When Arab geographers like Ibn Batuta (fourteenth century), Al-Idris (twelfth century) and Al-Masudi (thirteenth) visited the east coast of Africa, Islamic cities were already flourishing. The Muslim city-states (referred to by early Portuguese travellers as Moorish towns) were comparable in architecture and general style of life to the more prosperous medieval towns of North Africa and the Arab peninsula. There was considerable intermarriage between the Arab immigrants and traders and local inhabitants of these coastal towns, giving

rise to an African Islamic culture with Swahili as its language of expression. Arabic was the language of formal education and learning in general. Through Koranic schools and mosque colleges the Swahili-speaking people were introduced to Islamic theology, jurisprudence, the exegesis of the Koran, the Hadith or Prophetic tradition, philosophy, and the various classical Arabic literary works, both religious and secular, all of which came to have a profound influence on the development of Swahili. There is a strong belief that a literate and literary tradition in Swahili had already grown up by the thirteenth century, using the Arabic script. Owing to cultural and in some cases ethnic contact with the Arabian peninsula, especially the Hadramaut, Oman, the Gulf areas, Yemen and Hijaz, the Swahili language borrowed freely from Arabic. In fact, Arabic became to Swahili what Latin and Greek were to European languages as sources of lexical borrowing, especially in the cultural and learned fields. It is estimated that at least 30 per cent of the vocabulary of modern Swahili is of Arabic origin.

The influence of Arabic on Swahili also extended to literary forms. Almost all Swahili verse forms using metric and rhyme patterns were adopted from existing Arabic forms and adapted to suit the structure of this Bantu language. All the five Swahili forms of metric composition, namely 'shairi', 'utendi', 'takhmis', 'utungo wa Hamziyya', and 'uimbo', were inspired by Arabic poetic forms. The themes, too, especially those that philosophize about life or deal with religious matters, are close to similar themes in Arabic poetry.

When European colonization of the east coast of Africa took place, from the last decade of the nineteenth century, Europeans found the Africans of these coastal towns already living an urban life, comparable to the medieval civilization of Europe in material terms and possessing well-established literate and literary traditions using the Arab script. The first missionaries to land in places such as Mombasa and Zanzibar found Swahili the language best equipped, in terms of relevant vocabulary, to translate the Bible, since this language had already been used for centuries to translate the Koran and other religious works.

African languages as vehicles of modernization

It is interesting to observe that such African languages as Swahili, Hausa, Yoruba and Somali, which have had a literate tradition using the Arabic script, are among the most adaptable as vehicles of modern expression. All these languages are used as national and official or semi-official languages in the respective regions where they are recognized. Swahili, for example, is the national language of Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania, and one of the national languages of Uganda and Zaire. It is no doubt one of the fastest developing languages in Africa. In Tanzania and Kenya it is used as a

language of parliamentary debate and political organization. In Tanzania it is the sole medium of instruction throughout primary education, and steps are being taken to extend its use as a medium in the higher schools. In that country it is also used as the official language of civil-service correspondence, of the armed forces and the police, of the lower courts and parastatal organizations. This has meant the setting up of language councils, committees, institutes and departments where the teaching of this language and research into it are undertaken.

In spite of the long contact now between Swahili and such a powerful language as English, Arabic remains one of the two most important sources of borrowing of technical, scientific and cultural words, the other source being English, since the majority of users of Swahili now are more likely to know English than Arabic. Knowledge of Arabic is still confined to small Muslim communities along the coast. The following is a short list of modern words in Swahili borrowed from Arabic:

jamhuri, republic
uhuru, freedom, independence
raisi, president
waziri (*wizara*), minister (ministry)
maudhui, theme, subject
taslim, cash
ilmu, science
tafsiri, translation
wastani wa gharama, average cost
azimio, resolution
hifadhi ya ardhi, soil conservation

It is of linguistic interest to note that colloquial Arabic as spoken by immigrant Arabs in the coastal towns of East Africa, such as Mombasa and Zanzibar, is gradually being influenced by Swahili in regard to the borrowing of words and even idiomatic patterns. The sociological explanation is that most of the immigrant Arabs have come from the Hadramaut (or southern Yemen) and Oman. The majority were from working-class groups, often illiterate in modern standard or classical Arabic. And since the urban areas of the East Coast represent a more modern urban setting with a higher material civilization than parts of southern Arabia, or simply because of the presence of facets of culture alien to their own in their original home, the local Arabs borrow freely from Swahili. This is particularly true of Arabic-speakers who are for one reason or another culturally cut off from centres of modernity in the Arab world. The following are a few Swahili or Swahilized words that are frequently heard among Arabic speakers: *gari*, vehicle; *simu*, telephone; *mkebe*, tin; *siagi*, butter; *barua*, a letter; *spaki*, electricity.

Sometimes we get interesting Swahili idioms translated literally into Arabic, making them incomprehensible to a Middle Eastern Arab:

piga simu	*dhrub siim*	make a telephone call (lit. strike seymour)
funga (*goli*)	*asaba*	score (a goal) (lit. tie a goal)
kula dawa	*kul dawaa*	take medicine (lit. eat medicine)

There is also a tendency for the second generation of immigrant Arabs born in Africa to grow up as bilingual speakers of Swahili and Arabic, with one or the other as their stronger language. Among them there is a free mixing of Swahili and Arabic, even in one sentence, or as topics shift. In fact, it is such unstable bilingual speakers who have always enriched Swahili with Arabic words. For many Swahili speakers on the coast it is 'uppish' to interlace Swahili with Arabic phrases and idioms, as upper-class Englishmen used to do with French or Latin phrases.

Swahili in the Arab peninsula

In recent years there has been a fairly large immigration of Swahili-speaking people of Omani origin leaving Zanzibar and other parts of the coast of East Africa for Oman. Many of these immigrants are well educated and some are professionals. They now constitute a significant proportion of the civil service in Oman, especially in Muscat. Swahili in Muscat is a strong second language to Arabic. In the United Arab Emirates one finds small pockets of Swahili-speaking families here and there. Even in Jidda one finds immigrant Swahili-speaking families still maintaining their home language when speaking among themselves.

The place of language in Afro-Arab cultural co-operation

In the last four years a number of meetings of subcommittees, conferences and symposia have been held to discuss the question of Afro-Arab co-operation in the economic, political and cultural fields. At the Afro-Arab symposium held in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, from 14 to 18 December 1976, one of the resolutions adopted with reference to cultural co-operation was that Arabic should be taught in all major universities in Africa and that the major African languages should be introduced in Arab universities. The Afro-Arab summit conference of March 1977 held in Cairo stressed, among other aspects, co-operation in the social, cultural and educational fields.

The Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (ALECSO) seems, from its objectives, well placed to promote greater research into the linguistic and literary heritages of the Arab and African peoples. In the section on cultural co-operation the following are included: (a) publication of a joint Afro-Arab encyclopaedia; (b) study of the historical relations between Arab and African countries; (c) establishment of a journal to which African and Arab intellectuals may contribute articles; (d) formation of a joint Arab-African organization for the preservation of African manuscripts in Arabic, through annotation, translation and publishing; and (e) promotion of cultural

contacts between the Arab and African countries. The question of the role of language in such cultural endeavours should be given the serious attention it deserves.

It is gratifying to note that Arabic is now taught in a number of universities in African countries. In Nigeria departments of Arabic studies exist in the Universities of Ibadan, Zaria and Kano (Abdulla Bayero University). Arabic is also taught in the University of Ghana, Accra, and during the last academic year it was introduced as a component of a degree programme in the University of Nairobi. In the University of Nairobi great interest was generated when Arabic was introduced. It was expected that about six students might enrol for the course. To everybody's pleasant surprise twenty-five students enrolled; more wanted to enter the Arabic first year B.A. course, but facilities in terms of teachers and teaching materials do not yet allow this. The course in Nairobi was organized with the help of ALECSO, which provided a professor of Arabic of great learning and experience. It is most pleasing to see young Kenyans from different parts of the country, many of whom had never seen the Arab script before, doing their first-year examination in Arabic. Most of them would like to continue if facilities were made available.

Arab countries should likewise think seriously about introducing departments of African studies in at least the major universities if cultural co-operation is to be effectively fostered. Such institutes or departments could offer African languages as subjects of university study. There are departments and programmes of Arabic and African languages in many European, American and Asian universities, and the time is opportune for African and Arab universities to do the same, if current aspirations to promote cultural co-operation are to be transformed into reality.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to survey the linguistic impact resulting from contacts between Arabic and major African languages like Swahili, Hausa, Fula and Somali. Major parts of sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab countries of North Africa and the Arab peninsula have had very close cultural, commercial, political, economic and linguistic links from time immemorial. Geographical proximity and natural travel routes along the great rivers, across the seas and land enabled the peoples of these areas to develop all forms of links, including ethnic, which are still manifest. Our main concern has been linguistic interaction between Arabic and African languages. It was shown that some of the great literary figures in Arabic were Black Africans; similarly some of the classical works in African languages were written by people of Arab stock. The provision of the Arabic script constituted the most significant contribution of Arabic to languages such as Hausa, Swahili, Yoruba, Somali, Fula and

Berber, and through Arabic medieval science and civilization were introduced to black African peoples.

Use of the Arabic script enabled African writers and learned men to record their history, literature and other aspects of their culture in written form and therefore made possible the growth of thriving literate and literary traditions in African languages. Today hundreds of thousands of pages of written material in African languages exist in Arabic script in various archives in institutes in Africa, Europe and America. Many of these manuscripts have already been analysed; still many more await researchers.

Contact with Arabic, one of the greatest languages of learning in the Middle Ages, greatly enriched the lexicon of the African languages concerned.

Swahili has influenced local dialects of Arabic, and one should not be surprised if Somali, Ethiopic languages and Hausa have equally influenced local Arabic dialects where Arabic-speaking communities have lived side by side with speakers of African languages.

Contact between Arabic and African languages is still continuing, and if the various resolutions of Afro-Arab meetings on cultural matters are seriously followed up, there should emerge greater understanding of Arabic and African languages respectively in African and in Arab countries. A start could be made at the university level in those countries where Arabic and African languages are not taught at all. The possibility of introducing Arabic and selected languages at lower levels of education such as secondary and high schools should be seriously explored. After all, French, English and German are widely taught in secondary and high schools in Arab and African countries.

Unesco, ALECSO, the OAU, and Arab and African universities can play positive roles in promoting closer cultural links between Arabic-speaking and sub-Saharan African countries. Such links are necessary if broader areas of co-operation are to be established on a firm basis.

Note

1. J. H. Greenberg, *The Languages of Africa*, The Hague, Mouton, 1966.

The arts in Afro-Arab relations: the legacy of Islam in architecture and sculpture

Ali Darwish

By general definition and tacit understanding, the expression the 'arts of Islam' refers to all the arts of the Muslim peoples, whether those arts be religious or non-religious, without raising the question by what criteria they are considered Islamic in a religious sense. Perhaps one would like to believe that the reason for this indifferent definition is that the Muslim theologians' hostility towards all forms of representational art did not entirely succeed in stopping their development along non-Islamic lines, and one would be further tempted to ask yet another question, namely to what extent the art of Islam has borrowed its forms from pre-Islamic times, and, assuming that it has done so, is it still an Islamic art? There is ample evidence to show that during the period of the first four caliphates, artists continued to work in the pre-Islamic styles.

What then is the justification for this definition, which often leads to misunderstandings about the art of Islam? In this context, many scholars now share the more acceptable opinion that in Islam this separation of life into religious and non-religious spheres does not exist, since the Koran is both a spiritual and social law, and therefore the Koran together with the Sunnah (*taqrīr*)—next to the book of God—regulate both common law and the fundamental acts of everyday life. Perhaps in this sense, the works of art with figurative subjects, found in quite a few Muslim countries, commissioned and enjoyed by the caliphs of Islam, such as al-Mansūr, al-Amīn, and al-Mu'tasin, to mention only a few, who could afford to spurn the religious prohibition, are also among the works of art today regarded as Islamic.

On the contrary, however, in Islam figurative art does not hold a prominent place in the order of artistic values. Just as Western viewers find the non-figurative art of Islam remote, tranquil, cold or merely repetitive in style and content, so figurative art does not have a direct appeal in the spiritual or non-spiritual life of Islam and hence is excluded from the centre of Islamic civilization. The Muslims themselves—and this is particularly applicable to the Arabs—had no developed feeling for either pictorial or plastic art. In fact, early Islamic figurative art is seen to be still a meeting-point of many influences, to such an extent that, had it not been for the practice of early

Muslim craftsmen to incorporate inscriptions into their designs, perhaps many of their works would have been ascribed to Europe. Further still, what might be termed Muslim religious painting did not make its appearance until the beginning of the fourteenth century. As Arnold has shown convincingly, its derivation was from the art of the Oriental Christian churches, particularly the Jacobite and Nestorian ones.[1] And as Philip Hitti asserts, 'such Muslims as cared to ignore the teaching of their theologians had first to employ Jacobite or Nestorian painters until the Muslims themselves had time to develop their independent artists'.[2]

But there have always been exceptions to this, and Persian art of the early period of Islam, especially its miniatures, is one example that could, in defence of the Prophet's declaration against the *muṣawwirūn* (portrayers), be liable for condemnation, since their little paintings admitted the representation of living creatures. Most theologians of Islam maintained that the representation of men and animals was the prerogative of God alone. But although indulging themselves in this impious practice of artistic creation, Persian miniature painters turned away from portraiture, which could have constituted a more serious form of self-assertion. Furthermore, because of their conversion to Islam, and where the new conception of authority prevailed, they abandoned their early hereditary interest in the Achaemenid and Sassanian periods in favour of gradually transforming the motifs transmitted to them by Muslim conquerors into something entirely Islamic. After all, the religion of Islam requires no icons, and the exceptions do not change the rule; there is not a single mihrab that is decorated with human figures.

This is clearly and precisely what is evidenced by the architectural forms in Islam, forms devoid of images, visibly unreal, simple but dignified, which express the spirit of the new religion and attempt to develop the essence of Islamic civilization in its interracial and international relationships. Thus we have an example of the history of an architectural growth that bears an important relation to various stylistic developments according to the country of its adoption. The type would inevitably be modified and changes effected to suit different civilizations and the social life of each individual country, producing in course of time what has been variously designated Muslim or Islamic, Arabian, Sarecenic and Muhammadan architecture, though this last usage is objectionable in that Muslims are not worshippers of Muhammad. So the character of the style becomes difficult to describe because of its variation in countries whose people have differed in origin, each reflecting its own historical, cultural and environmental peculiarities. It is characteristic of Islamic architecture, therefore, that in every country or even region the architectural style and building materials are adapted. In other words, the resources available for building have varied, each influencing building methods and modifying the style.

In many countries, in spite of the strength of the connection with Arabia and the cultural interplay between Islam and those countries that fell under Islamic influence, the cultures were formed independently of full Arabization. For instance, Persia did not at any time lose the identity it had possessed almost from the beginnings of recorded history; its features remained identifiable even in the systems imposed by the Arabs. In black Africa, although Islam dominated the life of the Islamic settlements, the Africans themselves in turn modified the character and life of the community so as to create a new system capable of assimilating the fundamental assumptions of Islam. But at the same time it should be pointed out that differences in the Islamic pattern of life do exist between one part of Africa and another, for instance, between west and east, resulting in somehow identifiable patterns of Afro-Islamic culture, which again depend on where the influence came from and the nature of each individual basic culture itself.

To understand and appreciate the Islamic architecture of black Africa, like that of any other part of the Islamic world, a natural corollary would be to apply the same general methods of analysis, by comparing one style with another, and by distinguishing the many influences that have contributed to the formation of each style. This can be done by recognizing the products of separate cultures, discerning stages of historical development, and detecting the interaction of different traditions. In this method of study, the least explored and more complex analysis to apply is that of the religious influence itself, especially referring to those aspects relating to the opinions of the major sects of Islam, their implications and impacts on religious architecture. Even taking into account the four orthodox schools of Sunnite Islam, because of the analogy and consensus of opinion—apart from the Koran and tradition—changes of decorative elements, however minor, are to be expected. So in this case it would be necessary to isolate each feature of decoration, and then trace the combinations and composition of each separate item. Relating the varieties of small changes and peculiarities to their proper sectarian groupings is an even more difficult task. East Africa, for instance, is predominantly Shāfi'ī, since its Islam derives from South Arabia, but then there are the orthodox Indians who are Ḥanafis originating from the dominant rite in India. Mālikites are to be found in northwestern Uganda among the Nubian tribes. But apart from Sunnite Islam there are also the 'Ibāḍiyya, which was introduced with the Arab influx from Oman, and the Ithnā'asharriya, from Pakistan, Iran and Bahrain. The same observation is to be made in other parts of black Africa, but it cannot be substantiated in an essay of this size.

Distinguishing other influences—historical, cultural, climatic, geographical and social, to mention some—which contributed to the stylistic formations, is of great importance, at least in an introductory manner, but again it cannot and should not be done in an article of this type. It would be

equally proper to discuss a number of the principal writings on each country in black Africa so as to provide some historical background to indicate the influence of Islam in forming the Afro-Islamic culture, as an introduction to the study of both religious and secular buildings, but this is impossible. Perhaps it should be mentioned here that there is much to read about the Saracenic or Islamic architectures of Turkey, Syria, India, Persia, Egypt, Spain and so on, but very little (or none at all) on black African countries, even those countries that have a fairly large number of Islamic buildings.

But one of the most striking things about Islamic art is that in the whole repertory of its unique style and content, uniformity is the characteristic, and religion its unifying force. In this sense it is possible to talk about it as an art that includes all the artistic creations of the adherents of Islam, and to look at it in this short essay as a panorama of activities common to all, for spiritual ideas spread easily. A close similarity between an elaborate floriated Kufic inscription (dated probably to the early years of the twelfth century) on a stone grave cover at Sīrāf, on the east coast of the Persian Gulf, and an inscription in the Kizimkazi-Dimbani Mosque at Zanzibar, which bears a date equivalent to 1107, forms a good example of a cultural unification in spite of the wide geographical range of this art. These stylistic decorative scripts used in Persia and Zanzibar also have affinities with Ghaznavid inscriptions of the eleventh and twelfth centuries and, more distantly, with the floriated Kufic in the façade of the Mosque of al-Ḥākim (990–1003), and the mihrab of al-Afdal in the Mosque of Ibn-Ṭulūn, in Cairo.

Like most of the problems posed by Islamic art, the question of the growth and character of Islamic architectural decoration has never been thoroughly discussed. The few works written on the subject, mostly dealing with specialized and concentrated themes or techniques, are not numerous enough to allow many generalizations. If we take Iran alone as an example, there is such an accumulated mass of available material that what has been done so far could be described only as having prepared the ground for further discussion. And if we turn to the central themes of ornaments on Islamic architecture—which would be impossible to discuss in its entirety—it will only be a matter of recording random thoughts in an effort to show some order. The aim, therefore, will be to point out some of the most important and most common of the themes.

We shall begin with Arabic calligraphy, as the most ambiguous of them all. Its object in Islam is to perpetuate the word of God, and because of the fact that the Koran was revealed in the Arabic language the script itself serves to arouse, in all Muslims, deep emotions,[3] immediately evoking in them a feeling of a special tie with the Almighty. We often hear or read that the Koran translated into another language is no longer truly the Koran. It cannot be reproduced in translation without loss, and if it is to be appreciated

it should not be heard in a language other than Arabic. So we cannot fail to understand the universal use of Arabic as a unifying force among all Muslims of the world, and it is not difficult either to appreciate the script as one of the themes that have, in a sense acquired iconographic[4] significance. Its application on mihrabs, or mihrab walls, in particular, which often display Koranic passages, becomes a perpetual reminder to the believers of the existence of God, a strong and living voice of the sacred Book, bringing about a growing emphasis on the religious life itself. The appearance of writing on mosque façades and entrances gives Islamic architecture its precise identification in the same way that statues do to cathedrals. The influence of calligraphy on other forms of art, such as painting, metal work, book-illumination, etc., is appreciable, but will not be a matter of concern to us here.

There are numerous stylistic forms of writing, ranging from the bold, angular Kufic to simple but superbly perfected *naskhi*. In Kufic script alone there are at least six different varieties, the oldest type being the simplest of all, boldly standing out on a plain simple background, a specimen of which is to be found in the early mosques of Cairo. Then there is a type that gives the letter a more decorative character, where motifs are interlaced, with the script spreading outwards, or occasionally originating from the upper edge of the band of writing, growing inwards. This type, known as floriated Kufic, has been referred to earlier, in connection with the inscriptions found in Sīrāf, Zanzibar and Cairo. Another type, commonly used in the ornamental borders of Korans, but not so much on buildings, has its letters detached from ornamental, usually vegetal, motifs. Flury, in his essay on Kufic inscriptions,[5] prefers to describe this type as a Kufic with continuous undulating scrolls, and believes it originated in Ghazna. The plaited Kufic is the most impressive because of the introduction of varieties of decorative elements in the script. Although it maintains the charateristic feature of its ancient original boldness, the later development of intricate effects within the letters enhanced by additional presentation of varieties of plaited motifs—hence the name—has changed the entire form into a unique style of its own. The Zanzibar inscriptions, being floriated and plaited in style, exhibit an essence of this order between certain words, as Flury has rightly observed. The bordered Kufic is again of a unique and rare type, named for its clear division between the script proper and the ornamental border. In this arrangement a display of separate horizontal zones, a band of writing at the bottom and a border of ornamental motifs above it, betokens the style. Lastly, there is the rectangular Kufic, characterized by its rectangular form, shaping all its letters into a strict geometrical order. It is a style most suitable for brick architecture, where the brick and the script merge to form a happy blend of the two harmonious shapes.

The majority of these Kufic styles used elsewhere in the mosque architecture of the Muslim world are not to be found in black African Islamic

architecture, with the exception of the plaited and floriated Kufic that adorns the mihrab of Kizimkazi mosque in Zanzibar. There are a few other dated inscriptions, though rare, in Somalia and the Comoro Islands. The most famous, bearing a date equivalent to 1238 at the entrance, records the start of construction of the Jamia mosque of Mogadiscio, while a second inscription, in the mosque of Arba Rukn in the same city, records the death of Khusrau ibn Muhammad, in 1269.

Stylistically, the twelfth-century Zanzibar Kufic and those that have close parallels in Mogadiscio and the Comoros are of a type widely used during the eleventh and twelfth centuries respectively, and rarely in the thirteenth century, in many countries—such as Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, Syria and Egypt, as well as in the Islamic buildings of the USSR. It was most commonly and constantly used by calligraphers as a motif in which decoration and architecture were blended. Many examples of this style of script, contemporary with those of East Africa mentioned earlier, can be given. For instance, this type of script appears at Bistam, Iran, on the tomb tower of a saint, Bayazid al-Bistami, dated to around 1120. The same type of Kufic lettering decorates the main entrance archway to the great Diyarbakr mosque, in Turkey, although the mosque is of the early Islamic Syrian type. Again, the minaret of Jam, in Afghanistan, with Koranic quotations (also common on towers in eastern Iran) dates, according to its inscription, from 1153 and exhibits the same type of Kufic. Similarly, the minaret of the Jāmi'i mosque of Aleppo, which belongs to the eleventh century, and is the earliest monument of Seljuk architecture in Syria, has Kufic inscriptions of this exact type. The southern mausoleum built for Jalal ad-din-al-Ḥusayn in Ferghanah, in the city of Uzgend, USSR, dated 1187, has the same type of Kufic lettering, which covers considerable space decoratively on the inside arch at the entrance to the mausoleum and on the pillars as well as on the entrance-porch façade.

Though the Kufic script is believed to have originated in al-Kūfah, in Mesopotamia, in Iraq, it was later carried to many parts of the Islamic world, where it underwent a sort of independent development. And although the lettering was employed earlier, for instance on a tombstone found in the cemetery of Old Cairo, dated by its inscription as A.H. 31 (A.D. 751–2) and now in the Arab Museum of Cairo,[6] by the end of the twelfth century it had been transformed into the round naskhi script, as distinguished from the sharply angular form. The latter script was commonly and freely used with very fine and delicate effect during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries on buildings and woven textiles, as well as on miniature paintings. But this is true for a number of other styles of Arabic script that developed and flourished in many corners of the Islamic world, and whose production in the long run excelled in elegance and beauty. These are *thuluth*, *dywany*, *riq'ā*, *fārisy* and others created by calligraphers in their search for new expressiveness, and

developed in a fashion that seemed best suited for their compositional purposes. Like Kufic, these other types of scripts are combined with infinitely varied systems of Islamic design, so skilfully interwoven that the supremacy of this art has been recognized and given the name Arabesque, though the term is often used in the wider sense to include purely geometrical forms. In this way, in architecture, there developed a rhythmic manner of filling any given space with interlaced forms suited to the whole fabric of Islamic architectural design.

With the exception of the few isolated cases discussed earlier,[7] where Kufic script was used as architectural decoration in black Africa, it is impossible to determine what other types of decorative Arabic writing were used; and here we disregard the modern Islamic architecture of Africa, inasmuch as others elsewhere, of the same period, have not been discussed. Most of the plasterwork, beams, skirtings or timber cornices, on which decoration is applied, have been destroyed, particularly in the early Islamic architecture of the East African coast with which the writer is more familiar.

Before other themes of decoration are discussed, a brief explanation of the mihrab as a 'prayer-niche' is necessary. This part of the mosque has acquired special sanctity in the eyes of Muslims, and therefore it consistently displays varied forms of particularly rich decoration. But it must be remembered that the types of decoration differ according to their environment, and to some extent because of impacts due to sectarian beliefs and traditions.[8] So variations in the tendency and seriousness in the method of ornamentation between extremism, moderateness and simplicity should be expected. This makes the wall (*qiblah*) a vital part of the mosque to be studied, since it exhibits the most stylistic changes of Islamic decorative art. Early mosques evidently show simple niches; it was only gradually that the mihrab became a focal point of the decoration of the mosque and appropriated for itself a symbolic theme of eschatological writing. The exact history of its development[9] is obscure, although the mihrab of the Dunaysir mosque in Turkey, built in A.D. 1200, indicates that something profound was already taking place in decorative art. It may also be pointed out that writing was not the only element of decoration on mihrabs; other decorative themes of embellishments such as geometrical patterns and stalactite ornaments, to mention only a few, were also used both within the mihrab proper and in the frame that was provided for the mihrab arch. In many cases the combination of two or more of these elements produced the best result.

A second theme of ornamentation was geometry, an important element of design that was developed and controlled, alongside of other themes, with increasing technical facility, producing results of extraordinary inventiveness. At any rate, there is no doubt that the possibilities and vitality making for an endless variety of geometrically conceived patterns were as great as those

of other themes of decoration and their adaptability even greater. But as Professor Oleg Grabar points out, 'a study on Central Asian ornaments has shown that practically all the geometric designs can be achieved simply with a ruler and a compass and that almost all designs can be reduced to a series of comparatively simple geometric shapes'.[10] None the less, it is notable how much expression was attained by Muslim artists within this seemingly flexible formula.

The development and technical varieties of geometrical designs have been used to emphasize certain decorative details in some other minor elements of architectural ornamentation. One of these decorative elements, which is to be described briefly, is what is known as a 'boss', a moulded decoration used to create greater relief in designs. It is used especially to give what may be called a sculptural contrast between different types of two-dimensional designs. The history of its origin is rather obscure, though it is evident that bosses were employed by builders of early times, as they may be seen on the walls of the Ajanta caves of India (200 B.C. and A.D. 700), and on the sculptured entrance to the ancient Buddhist temples of Mohamoggallana and Sariputa, at Sanchi. They were also applied on the ninth-century pottery of Susa known as Barbotine ware[11] as moulded decoration, and were widely employed on Islamic buildings from as early as the eighth century down to the present time on palaces, tombs and mausoleums, as well as on mihrabs.

Not all mihrabs have bosses: it seems that the common practice was, and still is, that either the mihrab was decorated with bosses at the time of its construction or never—not as a motif that was added to the mihrab at a later date. Vegetal and floral motifs as well as Arabic script, in addition to geometric patterns, appear in varying degrees of forms. In East Africa and in other parts of the continent, the spandrels of mihrab arches are frequently decorated with inset carved coral bosses. Less frequently these also appear on tombs and on door spandrels. The twelfth-century Kizimkazi coral bosses are unique, both in type and purpose, because they were specifically designed to take a Kufic inscription that is the only one of its kind on the whole of the East African coast. The inscription on the boss (left side of the mihrab) was for the first time deciphered in its entirety by the writer.[12] The fifteenth century Jamia mosque of Mnarani in Kenya has a fine collection of ornate bosses on which the combination of floral, geometric and vegetal motifs is carved with great delicacy. Bosses of similar intricacy, if not more striking, are found in the Kilwa small-domed mosque, in Tanzania, where pseudo-Kufic calligraphy was the key inspiration for the central abstract, interlaced design. Perhaps further study of the middle part of this melodiously rhythmic design may reveal an Arabic word arranged in a 'repeat-pattern' formula. This, like the Makutani palace boss of Kilwa, which was developed independently of vegetal models and has its central part made up of a geometrically conceived 'star' pattern,

may be compared with the star design on the tiled ceiling of the Karatay madrasah of Konya, in Turkey. On the other hand, the boss on a dated tombstone of A.H. 866 / (A.D. 1476) from Mombasa, which is of a closely similar type in geometric design to that of other tombs near the Gedi palace and Mnarani, could be compared with the central parts of the two flat bosses of the tiled mihrab in the mosque of Sokollu Mehmet Pasha, in Turkey, built in 1571–72, and similarly with the carved side of the sarcophagus of Khwajah Abdalla Ansari (Gazur Gah, 1428). Apart from the Kizimkazi boss, all the other examples are fifteenth century. Later examples of bosses in the region of the East African coast and Somalia are much simpler, requiring far less skill and showing that previous 'pattern principles' had been completely ignored or not properly understood. The reason for this was probably either a lack of informed and tasteful patronage or the individual feeling of the patron rather than any difference due to date. Proper inquiry into this area of study may reveal a fruitful and more convincing explanation.

The use of ceramic fragments as applied decoration may be considered comparable to moulded bosses in terms of creating greater relief in designs. The fragments were specially moulded to fit certain areas of the walls. This medium of decoration was more peculiar to Iran, and the technique is thought to have originated in Parthian times and reappeared in the Middle Ages.[13]

In a number of early mihrabs on the East African coast, and elsewhere in Africa, particularly in the Comoro Islands, imported decorative porcelain was commonly employed on mihrabs as applied decoration. For instance, the broken fragments of some of the original bowls, excavated at the foot of the wall of the Jamia Mosque of Chwaka, on Pemba Island, proved to be celadon-glaze pottery of the Ming dynasty, while some of the fragments with incised patterns on the inside of the bowls were judged to date from the Sung dynasty (A.D. 960–1279).[14] The number of bowls set into many buildings—religious and secular alike—varied from a few pieces to as many as over fifty.[15] But apart from the fact that this technique was already known in Parthian times, it does not necessarily mean that this Persian medium of decoration has directly influenced the African technique of ceramic insets.

In seeking the origins of the Islamic architecture of Africa,[16] belonging to the middle period,[17] the best method of analysis is suggested by Garlake, who writes that 'it is only by an exhaustive comparison of the most minor elements, by isolating each feature of decoration . . . that a sequence of development is traceable'.[18] This might be a natural and convenient course to adopt, a method that may be called the 'selective stylistic framework' of the decorative element. Throughout such an analysis, basic importance would be placed on selecting those groups of decorations which have common elements.

For instance, an analysis of this sort reveals that the mihrab of Chwaka Jamia and that of Ras-Mkumbuu, both in Pemba and the only two mihrabs

that form a single group, are strikingly different from mihrabs such as those of Shengejuu, Kichokochwe and Chaoni, and those of Fundo Island, Kiwani and Mtangani, all along the East African coast. The latter mihrabs form groups that have similarities, and in their aesthetic qualities they fall far short of Chwaka Jamia. The study of these groups that have common factors in the subsequent deterioration of technical and aesthetic standards therefore shows a clear chronology of traditional East African architecture and its decoration. Perhaps a reasonable explanation here, then, would be that since a local craftsman lived in a society where the art of religious building was still in its infancy, and where he was likely to be faced with limitations as regards constructional techniques and the knowledge of applying the creative design to architecture, he would be unlikely to produce results equal to or better than those that could be produced only by an artisan of greater experience, such as an artisan from a country where architecture had achieved a more profound expression. Conversely, a similar explanation can be given in the case of India following the Arab invasion, where in the course of the cultural development of the Indo-Islamic architecture, which started during the period of the Slave Kings[19] in the thirteenth century, a Muslim patron in India had to depend largely on Hindu building craftsmen to carry out his projects. Thus the earliest Indian mosques were built by conquerors in a land where masons were plentiful and highly skilled in their own traditional work. This explains the fact that the rich inspiration that affected the early Indo-Islamic architecture came from the already existing tradition of the art of temple building. The same observations should be applied to explain certain peculiarities of Afro-Islamic architecture, though no serious studies have been carried out so far on this subject.

It is true that the mosques as well as the domestic buildings of black Africa are much smaller than those of other Islamic countries, yet certain elements common to the more sophisticated and larger buildings of major cities are also common to the less sophisticated buildings of the much smaller settlements. Similarly, the same elements common to the early Islamic architecture may also appear in the architecture of the later medieval periods. As for the architectural character, there are variations; developments were not necessarily closely related to one another, for the same themes were established in many techniques, and certain countries preferred some techniques or themes to others. This is all the more so in relation to religious architecture, where Muslim architects, or the men they employed, evolved a scheme of building more suited to express the spirit or the new religion. Thus it has become a tradition for a mosque builder to look for a loftier character in the early buildings of religious character, and those responsible for such types of building in Africa are no exception to this traditional rule, as a mosque has always been universally the important feature of the building art. In this way,

such an established custom enabled the style of building to survive, though its development depended largely on the skill and imagination of the builders.

The work of a period is not to be judged by a single building but by the average. The long period of Islam in Africa, which produced thousands of mosques and domestic buildings, could be expected to show a striking evolution in style. Here reference is made more to the imaginative creativity and the aesthetic sophistication in the art of decorating a building. It is remarkable that, in many cases known to the writer, where the buildings show changes in style the new elements indicate a decline in architectural merit. But the absence of vast stylistic developments should not be attributed to the lack of talent alone. The question of how to follow a new concept, in this case a recognized tradition in the new art of building and its already established decorative order, was a difficult and serious one, because any attempt to produce a completely new style (of ornamentation) perhaps would have been considered alien to the requirements of that tradition and even be rejected by the society. We have seen this happening in the arts of other religions. In this instance changes and modifications would certainly take a long time to develop; basic and radical changes should not often be expected. Ornamental style was therefore very slow to develop, with frequent throw-backs to decorative devices of earlier times.

The whole repertoire of the basic minor decorative elements that embellish both mosques and houses of the middle and later periods of black Afro-Islamic architecture is comparatively limited. The buildings vary in compositional qualities but are apparently uniformly distributed in time and space for over five centuries, as Peter Garlake has observed, particularly in the Islamic architecture of the East African coast, where they show more conclusively a single clear style of local architecture.[20]

Sir Banister Fletcher, in his *History of Architecture*, has recorded over ten different arches[21] used in Saracenic architecture, including Arabian, Persian, Turkish, Indian, Syrian, Spanish and Egyptian. The number would have been greater if the horseshoe arch had included the pointed and rounded horseshoe; multifoil the Moorish multifoil type; and ogival the lancet, dropped, equilateral and Moorish ogival, and so on. In the Saracenic architecture of black Africa four types of arches are commonly used in religious and domestic buildings; these are the pointed Saracenic or Persian ogival, the Arabian type of rounded arch, the trefoil arch, and the archivolt (raised outer arch order), this last not common but widely distributed. There are two types of pointed Saracenic arches: the first is slender and elongated, definitely more attractive and graceful, and the other shorter and less pointed at the apex. The latter displays the characteristic feature of the middle classic period and occurs abundantly in the mihrabs and other buildings throughout East Africa, and elsewhere in Africa, but the first type, belonging to the early classic period,

is scarce, and strikingly different from all other arches. The only example of its type[22] in East Africa is to be found in the four arched doorways in the eastern wall of the Tumbatu mosque. Describing the arch in 1920, Pearce wrote that 'to-day we see it battered and crumbling, but in its decrepitude the touch of the true artist in stone is evident in its perfect proportion and grace of design. It is composed of the roughest blocks of rock, there is no embellishment whatever, and yet its merit is obvious'.[23] The design of the Tumbatu arched doorways is not different from that of arched doorways found in the mosques, shrines, mausoleums and tombs of Iran. For instance, the Tumbatu arch shows close similarities to the interior arches in the Masjid-i-Jami of Isfahan (A.D. 1088); to that of the entrance to the shrine in Bistam (1299–1313); to the blind arch of the Gunbadh-i-Surkh of Maraghah (1147); to the doorway of the Mausoleum of Yusuf Kathir in Azerbaijan (1161–62); and to the arched niche of a Khangah (Muslim equivalent of the monastery) in Natanz, central Iran, dated between 1304 and 1325. Apart from the Tumbatu (a much smaller island off the north-west of Zanzibar) pointed arch, the only other arch of similar type is to be found in the thirteenth-century tower of Mogadiscio, in Somalia.[24] The rounded arch is scattered all over Africa, and is particularly well known in Zanzibar and the Pemba Islands, and all along the Tanzanian and Kenyan coastal settlements.

Like the arch, a niche as a decorative theme may be called architectural. It is a known feature of Islamic art that had originally a structural meaning but was later transformed into a purely decorative device with endless possibilities of ornamental surface compositions. The extensive use of niches, whether blind or real, reduplicated or of simple rectangular shape, whether used sparingly or numerously, is a characteristic common to India and East Africa at large. Such a characteristic, to the knowledge of the present writer, is not to be found in other parts of the Islamic world such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, Turkey, the USSR, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt. And even if such a characteristic was present in the architecture of Islam of other countries, then its use was too small and insignificant for us to assume that it was from those countries that the African coastal style was derived. But since this characteristic feature is so widely present in Indian architecture, so widely, frequently and extensively used as to be easily recognized as exclusively Indian, it may be reasonably assumed that the coastal builders of the middle and later periods were of Indian origin. Sites in Shela, Lamu and Gedi, to mention some in Kenya would amply justify this statement, judging from the extensive use of well-proportioned niches that cover large surfaces of the walls of domestic buildings there.

In concluding this essay, we come to the final theme of artistic activities in Islam: sculpture, as an art of carving used purely for decorative reason. We have already discussed in detail the iconoclastic tendency in Islam, which

strictly forbade the preoccupation with human and animal forms, a restriction that led to the rich decorative development of the entire spectrum of Muslim art. We need not repeat ourselves on this issue because we know that figural sculpture in Islam is missing almost entirely and that the few known exceptions are of no significance.

A brief reference to sculpture in wood will thus be added to the one on buildings to supplement this already long discussion of architecture. Other media of sculpture such as marble and stucco, rock crystal and jade, ivory and metal, will be excluded for lack of space, and because most of them play only a minor role in architecture.

In reality, wood carving shares a stylistic vocabulary with other decorative arts, although as in other forms of art regional variations exist. The most extensive use of Islamic woodwork can be traced in Egypt with all its historic sequence, going back to the seventh century A.D. In Persia there developed a special inlay work, known as *Khātam-Kārī*, in which geometrical patterns and other floral motifs made of ivory were glued on wood to form meticulous compositions, whereas in Egypt wood was used more to make openwork lattices. In north Persia, where wood was plentiful, decorated wooden pillars (in deep porches) were extensively used in the building of rural mosques. In other countries the wood-work tradition in architectural decoration is also traceable, especially in those countries where the availability of this basic material posed no problem. In most cases ornamental sculpture of the Islamic period developed from the heritage of a solid pre-Islamic tradition.

Inside mosques and domestic buildings, structural features such as ceilings, doors, windows, screens (isolating the sanctuary) and projecting balconies were made of wood. Despite its perishable nature, there is evidence that timber was used extensively in Islamic architecture of the East African coast, on ceilings, doorways and windows, as well as balconies, from the fifteenth century to the present day. The most intricate geometric and floral motifs of the few surviving wooden projecting balconies of the mid-nineteenth century buildings in Zanzibar have close affinities, both in style and in technical efficiency, with the wooden balconies of buildings in Bushehr (Iran) and Bahrain. In the old days a fine door was considered a most important part of an Arab house on the East African coast, a custom and tradition still being followed by the native population, although today treated as a modest affair. The subject of the antique Arab door in East Africa, a flourishing trade to this day, still awaits serious study.

Some wooden carved designs that include figural motifs of bird and animal forms occur in many domestic buildings all over the Islamic world, except in mosques and on liturgical objects, such as the *minbar* or the lectern for the Koran. A minbar or pulpit is a feature of the Friday (congregational)

mosque, occurring as early as the eighth century in the Near East. Nothing much is known of it in black Afro-Islamic buildings. It is to be found in a very limited area of north-west Africa from the ninth century to the present. Peter Garlake believes that it cannot be an indigenous development of East Africa, nor is there a direct link in East Africa back to an early period. He concludes that there is no other link between the coastal architecture of East Africa and north-west Africa.[25] This architectural feature is never found in East Africa before the eighteenth century.

Finally, it may be noted that in order to give an account of the nature of Islamic architecture, an attempt has been made here to define the different decorative categories of this artistic activity without going into detail about the varied ethnic surroundings, for the rule remains the same everywhere. Though the temptation to trace foreign influences in African Islamic architecture (especially referring to those areas with which the writer is most familiar) could not be avoided, it should be understood that the equilibrium of the artistic rule of expression did not allow much change under Islam.

Notes

1. Thomas W. Arnold, *Painting in Islam*, Oxford, 1928, Chapter III; also cited by Philip K. Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, 7th ed., p. 420.
2. Cf. Hitti, op. cit., p. 422.
3. Unlike the Gospels, the Koran is considered by all Muslims as a divine speech, and since it is written in Arabic, the script is immediately associated with the word of God. Inscriptions on mihrabs often carry Koranic passages.
4. Without necessarily creating illusions.
5. S. Flury, an Asia Institute book, *Survey of Persian Art from Prehistoric Times to the Present*, Vol. I.
6. See Hasan Muhammad al-Hawari in al-Hilal, Vol. XXXVIII, 1930, pp. 1179–91.
7. See p. 142.
8. See pp. 141–2.
9. Cf. the unpublished Ph.D. thesis by Géza Fehérvári, University of London, entitled 'The Miḥrāb: Its Origin and Development down to the Seventh Century A.H. (Thirteenth A.D.), which examines the etymological origin of the word *miḥrāb*.
10. Quoted by Oleg Grabar, without mentioning the source, in his book *Islamic Architecture and its Decoration*, A.D. *800–1500*, p. 80.
11. David Talbot Rice, *Islamic Art*, p. 57, ill. 31.
12. Previous to this, one word had been identified with clarity by Professor S. Flury, but the rest of the inscription was considered impossible to decipher. Until 1968, the reading of the inscription was not contained in any publication. For reference see pp. 199–203 of an unpublished Ph.D. thesis (1968) by Ali Darwish, entitled 'An Examination of Islamic Influences on Certain Aspects of the Decorative Arts in Selected Areas of the Offshore Islands and Coasts of East Africa'. Also see Figure 3.
13. Cf. Oleg Grabar and Derek Hill, p. 75.
14. F. B. Pearce, *Zanzibar, the Island Metropolis*, London, 1920, p. 69.

15. Reference is made to Tundwa Mosque, in Kenya, studied by Peter S. Garlake, and to information cited on p. 47 in his book *The Early Islamic Architecture of the East African Coast*, London, 1966.
16. Referring to Islamic architecture of Africa south of the Sahara.
17. A date of about A.D. 1300 is perhaps a convenient point at which to divide 'early' from 'late' Islamic architecture for the purpose of study. On the other hand, for convenience of analysis, Garlake divided the periods into the early—commencing in the fifteenth century—developed and neo-classic styles, followed by simplified and derived classic.
18. Cf. Garlake, op. cit., p. 14.
19. See John Terry, the *Charm of Indo-Islamic Architecture*, p. 2.
20. See Garlake, op. cit., p. 42.
21. Sir Banister Fletcher, *A History of Architecture on the Comparative Method*, London, 1956, p. 963.
22. See Ali Darwish, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Fig. 6, p. 292.
23. Pearce, op. cit., p. 401.
24. Apart from the Tumbatu and Mogadiscio pointed arches, the writer is not aware of any strictly similar arches in other parts of black Africa, except a few of the equilateral type in the Comoro Islands.
25. Cf. Garlake, op. cit., pp. 74–5.

Appendices

1. Declarations, programme, organization and method for co-operation adopted by the First Afro-Arab Summit Conference, Cairo, 7–9 March 1977

Declaration and Programme of Action

I. PREAMBLE

1. We, the Kings and Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity and of the League of Arab States, meeting in Cairo from 7 to 9 March 1977;
2. *Considering* the Charters of the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States;
3. *Recalling* the decisions taken and the resolutions adopted, at various levels, particularly at the 8th Extraordinary Session, the 23rd and 24th Ordinary Sessions of the OAU Council of Ministers, as well as at the 6th and 7th Arab Summit Meetings and at the 62nd and 63rd Ordinary Sessions of the Council of Ministers of the League of Arab States, with a view to strengthening co-operation between the States;
4. *Conscious* of our multiple ties and interests by reason of geography, history and culture and our desire to promote co-operation in the political, economic and social fields, and by reason of our joint struggle against domination and exploitation in all their forms;
5. *Appreciating* the ties of friendship, brotherhood and good neighbourliness existing between African and Arab States;
6. *Guided* by a common will to strengthen understanding among our peoples and co-operation among our states so as to fulfil the aspirations of our peoples for the consolidation of Afro-Arab brotherhood;
7. *Determined* to strengthen the ties between our States and peoples by establishing common institutions;
8. *Considering* the common interests and aspirations of the African and the Arab peoples;
9. *Convinced* that Afro-Arab co-operation falls within the framework of common action by all developing countries in order to increase co-operation among themselves, on the one hand, and on the other, to intensify efforts to establish a new, fairer and more equitable international economic order;
10. *Determined* to harness our natural and human resources for the general progress of our people in all spheres of human endeavour;

11. *Bearing* in mind the principles and provisions of the Algiers Charter, the Lima Declaration, the African Declaration on Co-operation, Development and Economic Independence, the Declarations, Resolutions and Programme of Action for Economic Co-operation of the Fourth Summit of Non-Aligned Countries, the economic and decolonization provisions of the Declaration of the Lahore Islamic Summit and of the Solemn Declaration of the Summit of the Kings and Heads of State of the Member States of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries, the Declaration and Programme of Action for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order adopted by the Sixth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States, and the Declaration and Programme of Action of the Dakar Conference on Raw Materials and Development;
12. *Hereby decide* to adopt this Declaration and Programme of Action defining the principles and framework of collective and individual action by African and Arab countries for Afro-Arab Co-operation.

II. PRINCIPLES

13. Political and economic co-operation between African and Arab States shall be founded in particular on the following principles:
(a) Respect for the sovereignty, security, territorial integrity and political independence of all our States;
(b) Equality of all States;
(c) Permanent sovereignty of States and peoples over their natural resources;
(d) Non-aggression and inadmissibility of occupying or annexing territories by force;
(e) Non-interference in the internal affairs of other States;
(f) The safeguarding of mutual interests on the basis of reciprocity and equality;
(g) Peaceful settlement of differences and disputes in a spirit of tolerance;
(h) Joint struggle against domination, racism and exploitation in all their forms to safeguard world peace and security.

III. FIELDS OF CO-OPERATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION

A. Fields of co-operation

14. African and Arab countries undertake to develop their relations at both the bilateral and multilateral levels on a comprehensive and long-term basis of co-operation in the following fields:
(a) Political and diplomatic;
(b) Economic and financial;
(c) Commercial;
(d) Educational, cultural, scientific, technical and information.

B. Political and diplomatic co-operation

15. African and Arab countries *reaffirm* their adherence to the policy of non-alignment, an important factor in the struggle for:
(a) The freedom and independence of nations;
(b) The establishment of world peace and security for all States;
(c) The universal application of the principles of peaceful co-existence;
(d) The democratization of international relations;
(e) Equal rights in co-operation;
(f) Economic development and social advancement.
16. *Condemn* imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, zionism, apartheid and all other forms of racial and religious discrimination and segregation particularly in Africa, Palestine and the occupied Arab territories;
17. *Reaffirm* their support for African and Arab causes and *undertake* to co-ordinate their action at the international level, in particular, at the United Nations, on questions of common interest. To this end, African and Arab groups in international bodies shall establish close co-operation;
18. *The two parties* shall continue to give their political, diplomatic, material and moral support to African and Arab national liberation movements recognized by both the OAU and the League of Arab States;
19. The Member States of the two parties shall endeavour to establish and strengthen their diplomatic and economic representations in each other's countries and shall promote contacts between their similar national, political and social institutions.

C. Economic co-operation

20. Desirous of realizing the widest economic co-operation, the two parties resolve to expand, strengthen and intensify co-operation in the following fields:
(a) Trade;
(b) Mining and industry;
(c) Agriculture and animal husbandry;
(d) Energy and water resources;
(e) Transport, communications and telecommunications;
(f) Financial co-operation.

Trade:
21. The two parties decide to take the necessary measures to:
(a) Establish direct commercial relations;
(b) Supply on a priority basis, as far as possible, their respective markets;
(c) Facilitate direct African and Arab trade including the establishment of preferential trade regimes;
(d) Encourage and promote co-operation between trading organizations and business enterprises and participation in Trade Fairs;
(e) Establish co-operation between African and Arab banking institutions and African and Arab insurance and reinsurance companies;
22. To this end, they request the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to

prepare, in collaboration with the African Development Bank, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa and the Economic Commission for Africa, studies of African and Arab markets with a view to encouraging Afro-Arab trade.

Mining and industry:

23. In conformity with the policy pursued by the two parties with respect to control by States over their natural resources and the realization of optimum value for their raw materials, the two parties

Decide to:

(a) Co-operate in a systematic survey of their natural resources with a view to developing their rational utilization and exploitation;

(b) Intensify industrialization through the exploitation, marketing and transportation of their mineral and raw materials and encourage investment ventures in these fields;

(c) Develop financial and technical co-operation, encourage research in all industrial and mining fields and agree on the adequate conditions of this co-operation through the establishment of joint enterprises or the granting of donations and loans.

Agriculture, forestry, fisheries and animal husbandry:

24. *The two parties decide to:*

(a) *Develop* agriculture through the introduction of modern and advanced techniques in the fields of production, distribution and storage;

(b) *Promote* the modernization of animal husbandry and the improvement of breeds and animal production;

(c) *Ensure* the rapid and substantial increase in food production through direct investment, joint ventures and other methods of co-operation in the fields of animal and food production as well as the exploitation of forestry and the marketing of timber products;

(d) *Exchange* information and research results aimed at improving the living conditions of rural populations with special emphasis on rural infrastructure.

(e) *Take* necessary steps, within an acceptable framework, to assist African and Arab countries in the maximum processing of their raw materials prior to exportation;

(f) *Agree* on modalities for financial and technical co-operation for the realization of joint action for the development of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries.

Energy and water resources:

25. The two parties decide to ensure effective control by each State of its own energy resources.

26. The two parties decide that States or competent national African and Arab institutions agree to:

(a) *Promote* prospecting operations of all sources of energy including oil, their exploitation, transportation and storage and to work to develop investments in these operations;

(b) *Exchange* information, experiences and technology in the field of energy;
(c) *Promote* the exchange of information and make use of acquired experiences and appropriate technology in order to improve climatic and desert conditions, as well as of appropriate methods concerning the exploitation of rivers, lakes, basins and ground water resources;
(d) *Co-operate* for development purposes, within a mutually acceptable arrangement, in the exploitation of hydro-electric and other forms of energy on a regional basis wherever possible;
(e) *Intensify* the use of other sources of energy such as solar, thermal, nuclear and other sources of energy as well as research in this area with a view to accelerating economic development, halting the process of desertification and soil erosion and combating drought in Africa.

Transport, communications and telecommunications:
27. With a view to facilitating communications between African and Arab States, the two parties *resolve* to:
(a) *Accelerate* the development of modern infrastructure of roads, railways, airlines, inland waterways and shipping which constitute an important basis for the development of Afro-Arab co-operation;
(b) *Establish*, according to priorities, links between national road, rail and airline networks in order to facilitate the rapid and economical transport of people and goods in accordance with bilateral or multilateral agreements;
(c) *Undertake* studies with a view to establishing consortia of shipping companies which will enable them to operate with greater efficiency, share the use of terminal and maintenance facilities, and explore the possibilities of technical innovation in transport and communications;
(d) *Effectively* strengthen co-operation between airline companies with a view to enhancing the expansion and rationalization of air services;
(e) *Improve* existing postal and telecommunications networks and expand them according to priorities;
(f) *Co-operate* in the implementation of subregional and continental projects in the fields of telecommunications, roads and railways.

Financial co-operation:
28. *The two parties decide to:*
(a) Take all necessary measures that will promote effective financial co-operation on terms that would provide security and guarantees through:
  (1) bilateral direct long-term loans, on the most favourable terms possible for the two parties, direct investments as well as joint financial ventures;
  (2) multilateral long-term loans, on the most favourable terms possible, for the financing of projects, including feasibility studies;
  (3) Afro-Arab participation in international financial consortia for the financing of joint projects in Africa and the Arab world.
(b) *Facilitate* mutual preferential access, both of African and Arab financial institutions to each other's capital markets, in compliance with rules and regulations prevailing in each country;

(c) *Invite* the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States to co-operate with the African Development Bank, the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa and other specialized institutions in the search for an adequate formula for closer economic, financial and technical co-operation; in particular through the setting up of Afro-Arab financial institutions and the drawing up of an Afro-Arab agreement governing investments;
(d) *Invite* the African Development Bank (ADB) and the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA) to co-ordinate their investment activities and to engage in the joint financing of multinational African projects.

D. Co-operation in the social, cultural and educational fields

29. With a view to achieving better understanding between African and Arab peoples and states, the two parties agree to reinforce links in the social, cultural and educational fields through the conclusion of appropriate agreements on:
(a) Cultural missions and festivals;
(b) Scholarships, training programmes and sports;
(c) Labour and trade union activities;
(d) Co-operation in the information media such as the press, news agencies, communication satellites, radio and television;
(e) The exchange of appropriate information and experiences and assistance in the solution of social problems such as the settlement of nomads.

30. In view of the human and cultural role played by tourism in the promotion of better understanding, the two parties also agree to encourage and facilitate tourism and to enhance co-operation in this field, in particular, through investments and joint ventures in the tourist industry.

E. Scientific and technical co-operation

31. The two parties decide to:
(a) *Promote and co-ordinate* research activities through the exchange of scientific and technical information and studies;
(b) *Establish* joint consultancy services and specialized training institutions;
(c) *Provide* direct technical co-operation involving the provision of training grants and fellowships in the field of science and technology;
(d) *Expand* technical co-operation to ensure the availability of experts.

IV. INSTITUTIONS

32. With a view to enhancing closer co-ordination of Afro-Arab co-operation activities, and to assist in the implementation of this Declaration and Programme of Action, the two parties decide:
(a) to establish a joint Standing Commission, at ministerial level, to follow up periodically and ensure the implementation of the provisions of this Declaration and to explore new horizons of co-operation;

(b) to grant each other observer status at the meetings of their respective organizations when matters of common interest are to be discussed;
(c) that the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States shall establish, as soon as possible, representation to the respective Secretariats of both Organizations with a view to maintaining close and continuous working relationships for the implementation of Afro-Arab co-operation;
(d) to invite corresponding African and Arab institutions, in various fields, to take all necessary measures to establish close working relationships that would facilitate co-operation and the co-ordination of their activities.

33. This Declaration was issued in Cairo, on the 9th (Ninth) of March 1977. The Arabic, English and French texts of this Declaration are equally authentic.

In witness whereof, we have appended our signature.

Democratic People's Republic of Algeria
People's Republic of Angola
The State of Bahrain
People's Republic of Benin
Republic of Botswana
Republic of Burundi
United Republic of Cameroon
Republic of Cape Verde
Central African Empire
Republic of Chad
Republic of Comoro
People's Republic of Congo
People's Demogratic Republic of Yemen
Arab Republic of Egypt
Republic of Equatorial Guinea
Socialist Ethiopia
Republic of Gabon
Republic of Gambia
Republic of Ghana
Republic of Guinea
Republic of Guinea Bissau
The Iraqi Republic
Republic of Ivory Coast
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Republic of Kenya
The State of Kuwait
The Lebanese Republic
Kingdom of Lesotho
Republic of Liberia
People's Socialist Arab Masses of Libya
Democratic Republic of Madagascar
Republic of Mali
The Islamic Republic of Mauritania
Mauritius

Kingdom of Morocco
People's Democratic Republic of Mozambique
Republic of Niger
Federal Republic of Nigeria
The Sultanate of Oman
Palestine
The State of Qatar
Republic of Rwanda
Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Republic of Senegal
Republic of Seychelles
Republic of Sierra Leone
Democratic Republic of Somalia
Democratic Republic of Sudan
Kingdom of Swaziland
The Syrian Arab Republic
United Republic of Tanzania
Republic of Togo
The Tunisian Republic
Republic of Uganda
State of the United Arab Emirates
Republic of Upper Volta
The Arab Republic of Yemen
Republic of Zaire
Republic of Zambia

Declaration on Economic and Financial Co-operation

The First Afro-Arab Summit Conference, meeting in Cairo from 7 to 9 March, 1977:

Considering that the African and Arab peoples are waging a joint struggle for shouldering the burdens of development, for putting an end to domination, subservience and exploitation, and for taking steps towards the establishment of a new, just international economic order;

Conscious of the fact that backwardness and the economic problems from which the African and Arab peoples suffer have been originally created by modalities of exploitation and colonialism over long centuries, and that they are inherent in the unequal nature of the current framework of international economic relations, as well as the nature of the current international economic order which is basically designed to serve the interests of exploiting industrialized states;

Out of the conviction of Afro-Arab States that the cause of Afro-Arab liberation and development is indivisible;

Noting that Afro-Arab co-operation has already taken positive strides towards contribution in the process of development and enabling Afro-Arab peoples to control their own natural resources and wealth;

Noting also that the volume of Afro-Arab co-operation in the economic and financial spheres has increased seven-fold in the last three years, that it has been mostly founded on preferential bases and easy terms compatible with the current economic conditions, and the consolidation of the sources of the Afro-Arab monetary institutions, led by the Arab Bank for the Economic Development of Africa, and the Arab Funds for African Loans, the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African States, the African Development Bank, and the Funds for bilateral Afro-Arab Cooperation;

Decides at this historic stage, to adopt an integrated long-term plan for Afro-Arab Co-operation in the economic and financial spheres, which include:

1. Encouraging national and multilateral financial institutions to extend technical and financial assistance to undertake feasibility studies of the development and infrastructural projects in Africa preparing their financing, including the four projects proposed by the Economic Commission for Africa;
2. Enhancing the resources of national and multilateral financial institutions working in the field of African development;
3. Enhancing the financial resources of the African Development Bank through loans from Arab financial markets at the most favourable terms possible;
4. Increasing the resources of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa to enable it to contribute more to meeting African development needs;
5. Consolidating commercial relations among the African and Arab States through reciprocal preferential treatment;
6. Co-ordinating the financial aid provided by Arab States and multilateral financial institutions, in order to consolidate the impact of this aid on development in the recipient African States;
7. Encouraging Arab investments particularly through the realization of establishing joint Afro-Arab projects; and working for the establishment of a system to guarantee Arab investments in the African countries;
8. Promoting the placement of Arab capital in African countries whether in the form of direct investments, loans or deposits;
9. Encouraging technical co-operation among African and Arab countries;
10. Increasing bilateral assistance extended to African countries through national funds;
11. The Standing Committee shall, in close collaboration with African and Arab specialized institutions (particularly the ECA, ADB, ABEDA), endeavour to ensure the quick implementation of the above provisions particularly paragraphs 3, 4, 7 and 10.

Political Declaration

1. The First Conference of Heads of State and Government of the OAU and the League of Arab States met at Cairo from 7 to 9 March 1977.
2. The African and Arab Heads of State and Government, guided by the faith of their peoples and the promotion of Afro-Arab Co-operation based on the principles and objectives of the Charters of the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States and on the application of their common political will as expressed in their relevant resolutions and decisions adopted by the Summit Conference of their respective Organizations, examined and adopted the Draft Declaration and Programme of Action prepared by the meeting of the Joint Ministerial Council at Dakar from 19 to 22 April 1976 dealing with cooperation in the political, diplomatic, economic, financial, commercial, educational, cultural, scientific, social and technical fields.
3. The Afro-Arab Summit Conference reaffirms its commitment to the principles of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence and to the establishment of a just international economic order.
4. The Afro-Arab Summit Conference affirms its commitment to the principles of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, non-aggression, self-determination, and the inadmissibility of the occupation or annexation of territories by force and the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts.
5. The African and Arab Heads of State and Government reaffirm the need to strengthen their peoples' united front in their struggle for national liberation and condemn imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, zionism, apartheid and all other forms of discrimination and racial and religious segregation, especially under the forms in which they appear in Southern Africa, Palestine and the other occupied Arab and African territories. In this connection they express their full support for the struggle of the peoples of Palestine, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) for the recovery of their legitimate national rights and the exercise of their right to self-determination and affirm their support for the political unity and territorial integrity of the Comoros.
6. The Afro-Arab Summit Conference invites the OAU and the League of Arab States to exchange information regularly on the development of the common struggle for the liberation of their respective peoples in Africa and the Middle East to enable Member States to play an effective and positive role in this respect.
7. The African and Arab Heads of State and Government condemn the constant military aggressions as well as other political and economic manoeuvres carried out by imperialism through the racist regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia and their allies, against the sovereign States of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Zambia, with the aim of politically destabilizing the governments of these countries and of sabotaging their efforts for economic development. The Summit regards such aggressions as directed against the Afro-Arab world and a threat against world peace. The Conference also condemns similar activities carried out by Israel against Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the people of Palestine. Further, the African and Arab

Heads of State and Government decided that their respective countries should provide and increase their material support and any other type of assistance required to enable these countries to consolidate and defend their independence.

The Conference condemns the Israeli authorities for their persistence in changing the demograhic and geographic features of the occupied Arab territories in violation of the international law and United Nations resolutions. The Conference demands that Israel should desist from taking such measures, with a view to creating better conditions to facilitate the establishment of a settlement in region.

8. The Afro-Arab Summit Conference decides that increased efforts be made within the OAU, the Arab League and the United Nations and all other international forums to find the most effective ways and means of accentuating at the international level the political and economic isolation of Israel, South Africa and Rhodesia so long as the regimes of these countries persist in their racist, expansionist and aggressive policies. To this effect, the Summit Conference affirms the necessity to continue to impose total boycott, political, diplomatic, cultural, sporting and economic and in particular the oil embargo against these regimes.

9. The Afro-Arab Summit Conference expresses its strong conviction that the implementation of the Declaration and Programme of Action on Afro-Arab Co-operation will constitute a significant turning point in history for the strengthening of all forms of ties between them, the consolidation of their political independence and sovereignty particularly their permanent control over their natural resources, in the struggle of the peoples of the Third World and the maintenance of world peace and security.

10. The Afro-Arab Summit Conference, after a thorough examination of the situation, expressed great concern about the problems of Palestine, the Middle East, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Fully convinced that these causes are Afro-Arab causes, the Summit decides to extend its total support to the peoples struggling against the racist and zionist regimes and to the Frontline States bordering confrontation zones for their assistance to the National Liberation Struggle.

11. The Conference strongly condemns the practice of mercenaries and undertakes to eliminate this phenomenon in Africa and the Arab World.

12. The Afro-Arab Summit Conference further decides to take all necessary measures to promote direct economic and financial relations and exchanges of every kind especially commercial, cultural, educational, scientific and technological between African and Arab States.

13. The African and Arab Heads of State and Government express their unshakeable faith in Afro-Arab Co-operation and declare their determination to undertake to mobilize all their energies and exert all their efforts to attain the objectives laid down in the Declaration and Programme of Action on Afro-Arab Co-operation with a view to strengthening further understanding among all their peoples and creating indissoluble ties of Afro-Arab fraternity based on strong and lasting foundations.

Organization and Method for the Realization of Co-operation

In addition to the Joint Afro-Arab Summit and the Joint Council of Ministers, the following joint bodies shall be created to ensure the realization of Afro-Arab Co-operation as defined in the Declaration and Programme of Action on Afro-Arab Co-operation:

1. Standing Commission.
2. Working Groups and Specialized Panels.
3. Co-ordinating Committee.
4. Ad Hoc Court for Commission of Conciliation and Arbitration.

I. JOINT SUMMIT CONFERENCE AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

The Afro-Arab Summit shall be held every three years and the Joint Ordinary Meeting of the Council of Ministers shall be held every eighteen months.

II. STANDING COMMISSION

Composition: The Standing Commission shall be composed of 24 Ministers twelve of whom shall be appointed by the Organization of African Unity and twelve by the League of Arab States or their Representatives who must be at least of Ambassadorial rank, the two Secretaries-General of the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States.

The Chairmanship: The Chairmanship of the Group of Twelve of the Organization of African Unity and of the Group of Twelve of the League of Arab States shall be Co-Chairmen of the Standing Commission.

Meeting and Venue: The Standing Commission shall meet in ordinary session twice every year alternately at the Headquarters of the two Organizations unless in case of an invitation extended by a Member State. By agreement of the two Chairmen, an extraordinary session of the Commission shall be convened when necessary.

The dates and duration of such meetings shall be fixed after consultation between the Chairmen and the Secretaries-General of the two Organizations.

Terms of Reference: The Standing Commission is entrusted with the implementation of Afro-Arab Co-operation and shall follow up its development in the various fields. It shall examine and direct co-operation towards the political, cultural, social, technological and economic objectives as envisaged in the Declaration and Programme of Action on Afro-Arab Co-operation.

To this end, the Commission shall take the appropriate decisions:

It shall, inter alia:

(a) Ensure the implementation and follow-up of decisions of the Conference of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers;

(b) Consider issues raised by each party and work out the necessary proposals to be submitted to the Council of Ministers for the promotion and strengthening of Afro-Arab Co-operation;
(c) Set up the necessary working groups on the various aspects of Afro-Arab Co-operation and define their terms of reference and rules of procedure;
(d) Approve the projects proposed by the appropriate working groups;
(e) Deal with matters relating to general organization and co-ordination in the establishment of co-operation;
(f) The Standing Commission may, if necessary, propose a joint Extraordinary Meeting of the Council of Ministers.

III. WORKING GROUPS AND SPECIALIZED PANELS

Working Groups and Specialized Panels shall be established in accordance with the Declaration and Programme of Action on Afro-Arab Co-operation in the following fields as the necessity arises:
(a) Trade;
(b) Mining and industry;
(c) Agriculture, forestry, fisheries and animal husbandry;
(d) Energy and water resources;
(e) Transport, communications and telecommunications;
(f) Financial co-operation;
(g) Educational, social, cultural and information;
(h) Scientific and technical co-operation.
The Standing Commission may set up other Working Groups.

Composition: Each Working Group shall be composed as far as possible of an equal number of experts and specialists from both sides. Each side shall, as far as possible, ensure the continuity of the terms of office of the members of the Group.

Each of the two sides shall appoint a Chairman for each Working Group and shall inform the Chairman of the other side of its choice. Each Working Group shall appoint a Rapporteur.

Each Working Group may consult specialists from the public or private sector when necessary.

Terms of reference

1. Each Working Group shall submit any appropriate proposal, within its competence, to the two Chairmen, especially with regard to the selection and implementation of projects with due consideration of the instructions issued by the Standing Commission.
2. The Working Groups shall submit their proposals and recommendations to the Standing Commission to take necessary measures in this respect.
3. Each Working Group may, after consultation with the two Chairmen, decide to set up specialized panels to undertake any specific assignment within the former's terms of reference.

4. The Working Groups shall each define, within the framework of its competence, the terms of reference of the specialized panels as well as the method of work of these panels.
5. The Working Groups may terminate the assignment of any Specialized Panel.

IV. CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

The Co-ordinating Committee shall be responsible, under the authority of the Standing Commission, on the one hand, for co-ordinating the work of the various Working Groups and, on the other, for ensuring the implementation of decisions taken. Within the limits of these powers, the Co-ordinating Committee shall deal exclusively with matters of a practical and administrative nature requiring urgent decisions.

Composition: The Co-ordinating Committee shall be composed of:

The Chairman of the Committee of Twelve and the Secretary-General of the OAU, on the one hand, and the Chairman of the Committee of Twelve and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, on the other;

The Co-Chairmen and Rapporteur of each of the Working Groups concerned, if the Co-ordinating Committee deems it necessary.

V. AFRO-ARAB AD HOC COURT OR COMMISSION OF CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION

An Afro-Arab Court or Commission of Conciliation and Arbitration shall be set up charged with the legal interpretation of texts governing Afro-Arab Co-operation and any disputes that may arise. The Status and Composition of such an Institution shall be laid down by a meeting of experts to be convened under the auspices of the OAU and the Arab League.

VI. MEANS OF ACTION

A Special Fund shall be established for the running of the executive bodies of Afro-Arab Co-operation. This Fund shall be financed on a 50 per cent contribution from each of the two Organizations' regular budgets. Individual and voluntary contributions could be made to this Special Fund.

The budget of the Special Fund shall be approved by the Standing Commission.

This Fund shall be administered by the Secretaries-General of the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States under the control and responsibility of the Co-ordinating Committee which will regularly report to the Standing Commission.

2. Report on the first session of the Afro-Arab Working Group on Financial Co-operation, Cairo, 25–28 September 1977

1. The Afro-Arab Working Group on Financial Co-operation held its First Session at the Headquarters of the League of Arab States in Cairo from 25–28 September 1977 in pursuance of the resolutions of the Standing Commission on Afro-Arab Co-operation in its First Session held in Yaoundé, Cameroon.
2. Dr Sayed Nefal, Acting Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, who opened the session and addressed the members of the Group, underlined the Arab will to consolidate Afro-Arab Co-operation.
3. In its First Working Session, the Group agreed upon the appointment of two Co-Chairmen, the representative of Togo for the African side and the representative of Kuwait for the Arab side.

The Group also agreed that the rapporteur shall be chosen from amongst the representatives of the Arab States when a meeting is held in an Arab Capital, and from amongst the representatives of the African States when held in an African Capital.

The representative of the United Arab Emirates was accordingly chosen rapporteur.
4. The Group further considered the draft agenda and adopted it.
5. Rules of Procedure: the Group agreed to work in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the Standing Commission on Afro-Arab Co-operation.
6. The Group took note of the reports of the OAU and the LAS Secretaries-General on the work of the Standing Commission at its First Session held in Yaoundé, 30 May–1 June 1977. This report comprises a summary of the viewpoints which were clarified at the deliberations concerning the means of implementing the declaration of Afro-Arab economic and financial co-operation.
7. The Group then moved on to discuss the basic item of the agenda, namely, studying the means of putting into force the declaration of economic and financial co-operation which was adopted by the First Afro-Arab Summit in Cairo with a view to submitting a report on it to the Second Session of the Commission to be held in Cairo on 28 November 1977.
8. At the outset of the discussion on this item, the Chairman of the African side explained his position and then the Chairman of the Arab side expressed his viewpoint.
9. During two sessions, a general discussion took place. The two sides expressed their interest in arriving at a joint simplified formula for the implementation of the Programme on Financial Co-operation. It was agreed, after each side explained its position, and subsequent to the clarifications made by the delegates of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, and the African Development Bank, to discuss the Arab proposal submitted at Yaoundé, item by item.

10. The Arab side agreed upon the proposal submitted by the African side concerning the amendment of paragraph (a) of the Arab proposal in such a way as to provide that in addition to the Arab Bank the ADB shall be designated for receiving projects from the African States.
11. The African side agreed that the concerned African State shall submit the preliminary study of its projects.
12. At the request of the African side, the Arab side agreed to amend paragraph (b) of the Arab proposal in such a way as to provide for the participation of ADB with BADEA in undertaking the economic and technical studies of the projects. It was decided that the African and Arab Banks shall consult with the Working Groups on these studies.
13. A lengthy discussion on item (c) of the Arab proposal submitted at Yaoundé took place. The two sides doubled their efforts within the framework of the powers accorded to the delegations participating in the meeting, to arrive at an identical viewpoint. The deliberations which took place assisted each side to arrive at a better understanding of the other's viewpoint though they had not been able to reach a unified stand on paragraph (c). It was agreed, therefore, to record the texts of the proposal of each side, the Arab and the African, and to include them in the report of the Working Group, which will be referred to the Standing Commission in its forthcoming meeting in November.
14. *The Group's decisions on the methods for the application of Afro-Arab Financial and Economic Co-operation:* In consideration of the above-mentioned, the Group agreed as follows:

(a) After a preliminary study, the African State or States concerned shall forward the project to BADEA or ADB.
(b) ADB or BADEA shall study the economic and technical aspects of the project in consultation with the Working Groups if ADB or BADEA deems it necessary.
(c) *The Arab side proposes:* The project, together with the technical and economic studies prepared by the specialized Working Groups and ADB shall be forwarded by BADEA to the Arab Development Funds for decision.
The African side proposes: The project together with the technical and economic studies prepared by the Specialized Working Groups and the ADB shall be forwarded for decision to the Arab Development Funds in consultation with the Standing Commission on Afro-Arab Co-operation, for final decision.

15. Under 'any other business', the Arab side submitted a proposal which was accepted by the African side to lay down a Programme of Action for the Working Group on Afro-Arab Co-operation, so that it may be able to carry out its functions under the resolutions adopted by the First Afro-Arab Summit Conference. Therefore, it was agreed that each side shall submit an outline for a practical programme to realize this objective, and that the Group shall hold a meeting for the consideration of this programme at a date to be fixed by joint consultations between the Administrative Secretary General of the OAU and the Secretary General of the League of Arab States.

Youssel El Hassan,
Rapporteur,
Representative of the United
Arab Emirates

3. Report of the second session of the Standing Commission for Afro-Arab Co-operation, Cairo, 28–29 November 1977

1. The second meeting of the Standing Commission for Afro-Arab co-operation was held in Cairo at the Headquarters of the League of Arab States from 28–29 November 1977 under the Co-Chairmanship of the Chairmen of the African and Arab Groups, H. E. Edem Kodjo, the Foreign Minister of Togo and H. E. Ambassador Taher Radwan, the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia.
2. Present were the 24 member States of the Standing Commission, namely, on the African side: Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Comoro, Egypt, Gabon, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger and Togo. On the Arab side: Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco and United Arab Emirates. Some other OAU member States participated as observers and representatives from BADEA and ADB participated as well in that capacity.
3. The Chairman of the African Group called the meeting to order. The Prime Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt His Excellency Mr Mahmoud Salem addressed the opening session. In his statement he welcomed members of the Commission and emphasized the importance and inevitability of Afro-Arab Co-operation.
4. The two Co-Chairmen and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States in their statements expressed their thanks to the Egyptian Prime Minister and likewise stressed the importance of Afro-Arab Co-operation.

CONDUCT OF BUSINESS

5. The Standing Commission reviewed and approved the Provisional Agenda document (OAU-LAS/ST.COM/1(II)) as follows:

(1) Adoption of the Agenda.
(2) Formation of Bureau and Drafting Committee.
(3) Organization of work.
(4) Report on the First Session of the Standing Commission on Afro-Arab Co-operation meeting in Yaoundé (Cameroon).
(5) Joint Report of the two Secretaries-General of OAU and LAS on Afro-Arab Co-operation activities from June to 28 November 1977.
(6) Report on the outcome of the Afro-Arab Working Group on Financial Co-operation meeting in Cairo.
(7) Draft Budget of the Special Fund for the Running of the Executive Bodies of Afro-Arab Co-operation 1 June 1978 to 31 May 1979.

(8) Formation of the three Afro-Arab Working Groups in the framework of Afro-Arab Co-operation.
(9) Reports of Institutions active in the field of Afro-Arab Co-operation.
(10) Any other business.

6. The Standing Commission completed the constitution of the Bureau by appointing Cameroon and Kuwait to serve on the Bureau as rapporteurs.

The Drafting Committee was also formed of the representatives of Botswana, Kenya and the United Arab Emirates and Morocco besides the two rapporteurs.

CONSIDERATION OF THE AGENDA ITEMS

7. The Standing Commission took note of the report of the First Session of the Standing Commission on the Afro-Arab Co-operation meeting in Yaoundé, Cameroon. (Doc. OAU-LAS/ST.COM/2(II).)

8. The Standing Commission took note of the Joint Report of the two Secretaries-General on the activities of the two Secretariats in the field of Afro-Arab Co-operation during the periods extending from 1 June 1977 to 28 November 1977. (Doc. OAU-LAS/ST.COM/3(II).)

9. The Chairman of the Working Group on Financial Co-operation submitted a report on the conclusion of the meeting of their Working Group which was held in Cairo from 25–28 September 1977. (Doc. OAU-LAS/ST.COM/4(II).) The Standing Commission adopted items (a) and (b) of the report with the final wording to read as follows:

(a) After a preliminary study, the African State or States concerned shall forward the project to BADEA or ADB.
(b) ADB or BADEA shall carry out an economic and technical assessment study of the project in consultation with the Working Groups if ADB or BADEA deems it necessary.

As regards paragraph (c), it was amended by the Commission to read as follows:

The project, together with the economic assessment studies prepared by the Working Groups and ADB shall be forwarded by BADEA to the Arab Development Funds for decision, taking into consideration the priorities and guidelines established by the Standing Commission.

10. The two Secretaries-General presented the Draft Budget of the Special Fund for the Running of the Executive Bodies of Afro-Arab Co-operation. The Standing Commission adopted the total amount of US$700.924 to be equally shared between the two organizations.

11. After the presentation of the report on the formation of the three Working Groups (Doc. OAU-LAS/ST.COM/6(II)) and following information submitted by the Arab side the Standing Commission decided to establish the following additional four Working Groups:

(i) The Working Group entrusted with agriculture, forestry, fisheries and animal husbandry.
(ii) The Working Group entrusted with mining, industry and water resources.
(iii) The Working Group entrusted with transport, communications and tele-communications.

(iv) The Working Group entrusted with co-operation in the educational, social, cultural and information fields.

In view of the fact that the budget approved in the First Session of the Standing Commission had provided for the expenditure of four Working Groups only the Arab Group undertook to cover any deficit incurred by the establishment of a fifth Working Group during the current fiscal year expiring on 31 May 1978.

12. The Commission heard the comments of Dr Al Shazly Al Ayari, Chairman and Director General of BADEA on the activities of the Bank and FASA. (Doc. OAU-LAS/ST.COM/6(II).)

FORTHCOMING SESSION

13. The Commission decided that the Secretaries General shall fix the date and venue of the forthcoming session in May 1978 after holding the necessary contacts.

Rapporteurs

Representative of the United Republic of Cameroon Hajji Haman Dicko	Representative of the State of Kuwait Soliman M. al-Shaheen

4. Report of the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU on Afro-Arab co-operation activities, Tripoli, 21–28 February 1978

The operational basis for an organized Afro-Arab co-operation drive was laid down by the First Afro-Arab Summit Conference held in Cairo. The OAU Secretariat, in collaboration with the League of Arab States Secretariat, started the implementation of the joint Summit resolutions in March 1977.

The First Session of the Standing Commission on Afro-Arab Co-operation in Yaoundé, Cameroon, in May/June 1977 saw the inception of the executive bodies for Afro-Arab cooperation, set up by the joint Summit Conference. The report of the Administrative Secretary-General to the Twenty-ninth Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers in Libreville, Gabon (CM/834(XXIX)) and annexes reviewed the outcome of the First Standing Commission Session. It was in the light of the Council's deliberations on this report that resolution CM/Res.576(XXIX) was adopted. The resolution defined to the General Secretariat the best methods for accelerating the implementation of the Afro-Arab co-operation programme.

Following the Twenty-ninth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers and the Fourteenth Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Libreville, Gabon, the OAU Secretariat, in collaboration with the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States, started drawing up a joint programme of action as follows:

(a) As regards the meeting of the Working Group on Financial Co-operation, the two Secretariats agreed on the following:
    (1) The meeting shall take place at the League of Arab States Headquarters in Cairo from 25–28 September 1977.
    (2) Representation on the Working Group shall be at the level of financial experts from Member States of OAU and League of Arab States.
    (3) In pursuance of an OAU decision dividing Africa into five geographical regions, it was decided that the Working Group be composed of 10 financial experts, five each from OAU and League of Arab States countries.
(b) The Second Session of the Standing Commission on Afro-Arab Co-operation was supposed to be held in any of the countries members of the League of Arab States but finally it took place at the Headquarters of the League of Arab States in Cairo on 28 November 1977.

In accordance with resolution OAU-LAS/ST.COM/Res.2(I) adopted by the First Session of the Standing Commission, the OAU Secretariat, in collaboration with the League of Arab States Secretariat drew up a report on the debate of the First Session of the Standing Commission on the measures to be taken for the implementation of the Declaration on Afro-Arab Economic and Financial Co-operation

adopted by the Joint Summit Conference. This report will constitute the working paper for the Working Group on Financial Co-operation. The OAU Secretariat, also together with the League of Arab States Secretariat, drew up another brief report defining the terms of reference of the Working Group in the light of the relevant resolution adopted by the First Session of the Standing Commission.

The General Secretariat convened a meeting at Ambassadorial level of the OAU Committee of Twelve on Afro-Arab co-operation at its Headquarters in Addis Ababa on 16 September 1977. The meeting reviewed the outcome of the First Session of the Standing Commission and discussed the measures taken by the General Secretariat in order to adopt a unified African position at the meeting of the Working Group on Financial Co-operation. It was also agreed during the Committee meeting that the Working Group be formed of experts from Member States representing the five geographical regions of the OAU and not of financial experts from African financial and technical institutions. Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Kenya and Togo were chosen to send financial experts to represent the African side. The League of Arab States on the other hand asked Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Kingdom of Morocco to appoint financial experts to represent the Arab side at the Working Group meetings.

In the meantime, the African Development Bank (ADB), the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) were invited to attend the Working Group's meeting.

The Group met at the League of Arab States Headquarters in Cairo from 25–28 September 1977. The representatives of the nominated Member States from both sides participated in the meeting which was also attended by the ADB and BADEA as observers. The ECA apologized for its absence owing to previous engagements.

The Working Group thoroughly discussed economic and financial co-operation, reviewed the position which crystallized during the first session of the Standing Commission and revised the Commission resolution so that the ADB should play an effective role in examining African projects which are submitted to Arab national funds for financing (Annex I, Report of the Working Group on Financial Co-operation).

However, it is noted with regret that most of the African representatives to the meeting of the Working Group on Financial Co-operation were not financial experts but rather diplomats. In fact some of them received last-minute instructions from their countries to attend the session. We hope this would not happen again when the African side on other Working Groups on co-operation is nominated.

Meanwhile, the General Secretariat has circulated the report on the outcome of the Working Group meeting to Member States of the OAU Committee of Twelve on Afro-Arab Co-operation.

In the field of information, the Arab Ministers of Information Conference held in Tunis had adopted a resolution authorizing the League of Arab States Secretary-General to contact his OAU counterpart and discuss the convening of a joint conference of Arab and African Information Ministers. The subject was included on the Agenda of the African Information Ministers Conference in Kampala, Uganda. A resolution, adopted by the Conference, welcomed the idea and called

upon the Administrative Secretary-General and the competent OAU bodies to discuss with the League of Arab States Secretary-General the necessary operational and financial measures for holding the conference before the end of 1978. The OAU Secretariat has held preliminary discussions on the issue with the League of Arab States Secretariat and contacts are still underway to fix the date and venue of the Conference and prepare the agenda and relevant documents.

The OAU Secretariat has worked in close collaboration with the League of Arab States Secretariat to ensure the continuity and promotion of political and diplomatic co-operation in all fields and at the various levels. Both organizations have continued to extend their mutual support to African and Arab causes at all international forums. The OAU General Secretariat will endeavour to keep up this exchange of views and co-ordination of positions on all problems of common interest to both organizations.

Actually, when hostilities intensified and the situation deteriorated in the Horn of Africa, the matter was discussed by the League of Arab States Council of Ministers. On the other hand, the OAU Secretary-General contacted his counterpart of the League of Arab States in order to unify the efforts exerted within the framework of Afro-Arab co-operation to reach a peaceful settlement to the current conflict between brothers in the region. The League of Arab States Council did in fact adopt a resolution calling for the settlement of the conflict by peaceful means and requesting the League of Arab States Secretary-General to hold urgent contacts with the OAU Administrative Secretary-General in a bid to find a solution within the framework of Afro-Arab co-operation.

The OAU General Secretariat has, in collaboration with the League of Arab States Secretariat, prepared for convening the Second Session of the Standing commission on Afro-Arab Co-operation. A ten-item agenda was drawn up and endorsed by the two OAU and LAS Committees of Twelve. The meeting's documents and the draft budget of the Special Fund for the Running of the Executive Bodies of Afro-Arab Co-operation during the period from 1 June 1978 to 31 May 1979 have been prepared and invitations extended to the ADB, BADEA and ECA to attend the Standing Commission meetings.

Pursuant to the resolution adopted by the First Session of the Standing Commission which stipulates that—as an interim measure—all African projects and applications for assistance be referred to BADEA, the General Secretariat has sent all such projects and applications received from OAU Member States to BADEA and asked the LAS Secretariat to follow up the matter in order that prompt decisions may be taken thereon. BADEA has in fact informed the OAU General Secretariat that it had already started examination of the documents it had referred to it.

Meanwhile, the General Secretariat convened a meeting at Ambassadorial level of the OAU Committee of Twelve on Afro-Arab Co-operation in Addis Ababa on 17 November 1977. The meeting examined and discussed the documents prepared for the Standing Commission session scheduled for 28 November 1977. The Committee of Twelve endorsed the Agenda for the Commission's Session and added a new item on the position of the Special Fund for Assistance to Africa (FASA). It also reviewed the report on the outcome of the meeting of the Working Group on

Financial Co-operation and recommended that it be presented to the OAU Committee of Twelve when it meets at Ministerial level in Cairo immediately before the Standing Commission's session.

As regards the setting up of three Working Groups for Afro-Arab co-operation in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the First Session of the Standing Commission, the Committee of Twelve approved the General Secretariat's proposals that the three Working Groups be responsible for the following:

(1) A Working Group for agriculture, forestry, fisheries and animal husbandry.
(2) A Working Group for mining, industry and water resources.
(3) A Working Group for transport, communications and telecommunications.

The meeting of the OAU Committee of Twelve authorized the Secretary-General to pursue his contacts with BADEA and the LAS General Secretariat, and urge them to take the necessary measures regarding the African projects and applications for assistance referred to BADEA particularly as both LAS and BADEA were eager to learn the Committee of Twelve's views on the issue.

During the same meeting, the Committee of Twelve also authorized the Secretary-General to hold talks with his LAS counterpart in order to obtain the necessary funds for the implementation of certain important and urgent resolutions adopted by the last Session of the Council of Ministers. These resolutions are: CM/Res.563(XXIX) on the OAU programme for co-operation and assistance, CM/Res.571(XXIX) on the search for funds for the transportation of food supplies to Chad from African ports of embarkation up to the area of distribution and CM/Res.555(XXIX) on assistance to the Comoros.

The OAU Committee of Twelve, meeting at Ministerial level on 28 November 1977, endorsed the recommendations of the OAU Committee of Twelve, meeting at Ambassadorial level on 17 November 1977 at the OAU Headquarters. It also elected His Excellency the Foreign Minister of Togo as Chairman of the OAU Committee of Twelve on Afro-Arab Co-operation and Co-Chairman of the meeting.

The OAU and LAS Secretaries-General and their assistants held several meetings immediately before the Second Session of the Standing Commission on Afro-Arab Co-operation in Cairo to finalize the documents for the Session.

The Co-ordinating Committee for Afro-Arab Co-operation which is composed of the Chairmen of the two Committees of Twelve and the OAU and LAS Secretaries-General met at the LAS Headquarters in Cairo on 27 November 1977. It examined the documents prepared by the two Secretariats for the Standing Commission Session and endorsed the Agenda and documents.

On the evening of 28 November 1977, the Second Session of the Standing Commission for Afro-Arab Co-operation was officially opened by the Prime Minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt at the LAS Headquarters in Cairo under the co-chairmanship of the Chairmen of the OAU and LAS Committees of Twelve, His Excellency Edem Kodjo, Foreign Minister of Togo and His Excellency Ambassador Taher Radwan, Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to LAS. Present were the representatives of the 24 Member States of the Standing Commission as well as the representatives of other African non-member States, ADB and BADEA who attended as observers. The ECA was absent.

Here below was the meeting's agenda:

(1) Adoption of the agenda.
(2) Formation of the Bureau and Drafting Committee.
(3) Organization of work.
(4) Report on the First Session of the Standing Commission on Afro-Arab Co-operation meeting in Yaoundé (Cameroon).
(5) Joint Report of the two Secretaries-General of OAU and LAS on Afro-Arab co-operation activities from 1 June to 28 November 1977.
(6) Report on the outcome of the Afro-Arab Working Group on Financial Co-operation meeting in Cairo.
(7) Draft Budget of the Special Fund for the Running of the Executive Bodies of Afro-Arab Co-operation during the period from 1 June 1978 to 31 May 1979.
(8) Formation of the three Afro-Arab Working Groups within the framework of Afro-Arab co-operation.
(9) Reports of institutions active in the field of Afro-Arab co-operation.
(10) Any other business.

The Commission completed the formation of the Bureau by appointing the Representatives of Kuwait and Cameroon as Rapporteurs and also set up a six-man Drafting Committee, three from OAU Member States (Botswana, Kenya and Cameroon (Rapporteur)) and three from LAS (United Arab Emirates, Kingdom of Morocco and Kuwait (Rapporteur)). Items 6, 7, 8 and 9 were the subject of lengthy debates during the Commission Session.

As regards the report on the outcome of the meeting of the Working Group on Financial Co-operation, the Committee spent a long time and lengthy discussion on sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph (14) concerning the final decision for financing African projects. Through these discussions and taking into account the different points of view expressed, the following text was adopted by the Standing Commission:

> The project, together with the economic assessment studies prepared by the Working Groups and ADB shall be forwarded by BADEA to the Arab Development Funds for decision, taking into consideration the priorities and guidelines established by the Standing Commission.

As regards the budget of the Special Fund for the Running of the Executive Bodies of Afro-Arab Co-operation, it was decided after a lengthy debate to add to the budget the cost of convening a fifth Working Group, as budget estimates provided only for the meeting of four Working Groups during the financial year 1 June 1978 to 31 May 1979. Thus the total amount of appropriations approved by the Commission is US$700,924.00 to be equally shared by OAU and LAS.

As regards the setting up of Working Groups, the Arab side proposed, after a thorough discussion of the issue, the setting up of a fourth Working Group in addition to the three existing ones. But as the budget proposed during the first session covers the meetings of three Working Groups as well as that of the Working Groups on financial co-operation which had met earlier, the Arab side undertook to cover any deficit resulting from the setting up of a fifth Working Group during the financial year ending 31 May 1978. The additional Working Group proposed by the Arab side will deal with 'co-operation in the educational, social, cultural and information fields'.

Under the item entitled 'Reports of Institutions Active in the Field of Afro-Arab Co-operation', BADEA submitted a file which included the following:

(1) List of the projects financed by Arab development institutions in Africa up to October 1977.
(2) The main stages of Afro-Arab co-operation.
(3) Data on Arab aid to Africa.
(4) Loans provided by BADEA to African States.
(5) Loans and resources of the Special Arab Aid Fund for Africa.

The President/Director General of BADEA, Dr Chedly Ayari, reviewed the activities of the institutions concerned with Afro-Arab co-operation and explained that BADEA has doubled its capital. Accordingly, its lending capacity to African States has increased two-fold. BADEA also drew up a comprehensive five-year plan of activities. Dr Ayari further said that organs concerned with Afro-Arab co-operation have exerted maximum effort since the Afro-Arab Summit in Cairo to put this co-operation into effect. BADEA submitted working papers to the two meetings held by the Presidents of Arab National Funds in April and November 1977 which agreed to undertake the financing of a large number of African projects. The total amount of appropriations earmarked for non-Arab African States since last March is estimated at US$400 million. The assistance and loans made available by Arab States for economic development in Africa range between 3 and 4 per cent of their gross national product (GNP) whereas the industrialized countries, contributions to Africa do not exceed 0.4 to 0.5 per cent of their GNP.

On another topic, Dr Ayari said that relations between BADEA and ADB, characterized by a spirit of co-operation and a constant exchange of information, are growing closer. He also disclosed that BADEA, in collaboration with African, Arab and international financial and economic institutions, has been able to compile about 400 African projects, 350 of which are national and 50 regional. He emphasized that the data communicated would serve only as an indicator and are by no means inclusive.

As regards the position of the Special Arab Assistance Fund for Africa (FASA) the President of BADEA said that the contributions so far received and held by FASA are US$84 million. Another US$51 million are in arrears, thus bringing the total amount of the Fund to US$135 million.

Following this introduction and the information supplied by the President of BADEA, the Standing Commission carried out a thorough discussion on the matter and took note of the reports. It then wound up meetings on the evening of 29 November 1977 and issued a report on the outcome of its deliberations and resolutions. (Annex 2, Report of the Second Session of the Standing Commission on Afro-Arab Co-operation.)

In accordance with the authorization given to the Administrative Secretary-General by the OAU Committee of Twelve on Afro-Arab Co-operation, he and one of his assistants met in Cairo on 30 November 1977 with LAS Secretary-General and the President/Director-General of BADEA who were also accompanied by assistants. During the meeting, the OAU Secretary-General submitted a memorandum containing some urgent requests and asked for prompt decisions thereon. The meetings of the four Working Groups agreed upon during the Second Session of the Standing Commission also came under discussion, particularly as regards their

formation, date of meetings and terms of reference. It was agreed that representation on these groups is to follow the same lines as those of the Working Group on Financial Co-operation. In this regard, the General Secretariat would like Member States to hold consultations in order to decide which countries are to represent the African side on the four Working Groups and advise LAS accordingly. It was further agreed that the Working Groups will convene during March, April and May. The President of BADEA said that the Bank had prepared a draft proposal outlining the terms of reference of the various Working Groups linking both BADEA and ADB to their activities, and that the draft would be channelled to the two Secretariats for consideration and adoption as a working paper for the Working Group meetings. On the other hand OAU Secretariat has asked ADB and the ECA to help in the preparation of the documents necessary for these meetings.

Meanwhile, during the same meeting LAS Secretary-General referred to other joint activities which could be financed from the Arab Technical Assistance Fund to Africa supervised by LAS and suggested that the relevant details might be worked out in co-ordination and co-operation between the two Organizations.

In pursuance of a Council of Ministers resolution, the draft budget drawn up by the OAU Secretariat for establishing a permanent executive secretariat in Cairo will be discussed by the Council of Ministers in its Thirtieth Session.

Furthermore, in a bid to strengthen the Afro-Arab co-operation service within the General Secretariat and in view of the heavy load of work, a new post for another co-ordinator has been proposed in the OAU 1978/79 budget.

The budget of the Special Fund for the running of the Executive Bodies of Afro-Arab Co-operation for the financial year 1978/79 has been included in the budget of the Organization after being approved by the Standing Commission in its second session and shall be shared equally by the LAS and the OAU.

With regard to African labour activities, the Arab Trade Union and the Organization of African Trade Union Unity held a conference in Algiers from 16–21 October 1977 to discuss Afro-Arab co-operation in the fields of labour and trade unions. The General Secretariat, which was unable to attend the meeting owing to the lack of necessary appropriations and preoccupation with preparation for other meetings taking place at the same time, conveyed its best wishes for success to the Conference.

On the other hand, the OAU Labour Commission had, during its second session in Tripoli, Libya, adopted a resolution on Afro-Arab co-operation in the fields of labour and social issues related to workers and employment. The resolution calls for convening a joint meeting of Arab and African Labour Ministers. The General Secretariat is taking the necessary measures for the implementation of the said resolution and a report on the issue will be submitted to the Third Session of the Labour Commission in Tunis next April.

The OAU General Secretariat has also got in contact with the Islamic Conference Secretariat in Jidda for immediate assistance for economic development projects in Africa and to African countries affected by drought and natural disasters in conformity with Resolution CM/Res.589(XXIX). It was agreed that a meeting between the Secretary-General of the OAU and the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference should take place at Jidda on 9–10 February 1978.

In conclusion, we are now facing a difficult and cruel period in establishing the structures and giving them the appropriate shape, and in looking for a common language that enables us to translate our aspirations. Therefore it is not possible to establish any balance sheet of concrete results. But both Secretariats will deploy every effort to surmount difficulties which can be attributed to differences in method and style in order to prepare in cohesion the actions that can express the reality of Afro-Arab co-operation.

5. Recommendations of the Symposium on Afro-Arab Cultural Relations, Cairo, 17–18 May 1978

At the Afro-Arab Symposium held at the Institute of Arab Research and Studies in Cairo on 17 and 18 May 1978 under the auspices of the Institute of Arab Research and Studies in co-operation with the AAPS[1] and the African Society, discussion centred on Afro-Arab cultural relations. A group of Arab and African scholars and writers discussed at length and in depth problems and prospects of cementing and consolidating Afro-Arab co-operation in all fields. (See the List of Participants.)

Among the issues discussed, it was recognized that the general problems facing Afro-Arab countries and peoples today are: colonialism, settler colonialism, apartheid and racism in general. The problem of the culture of the Afro-Arab peoples in relation to Zionism and apartheid in particular and colonialism in general was extensively discussed. Concern was particularly centred on how culture can be converted into an instrument for liberation and development. In this regard, it was considered important to introduce into current political concepts and methods of analysis the lesson that the Afro-Arab continuum—which has its roots in history and is justified by the present socio-economic conditions of Afro-Arab countries—must be maintained, strengthened, consolidated and perpetuated.

In view of this, the following recommendations emerged from the dialogue:

1. The fostering of continued and intensified interaction between Afro-Arab countries.
2. Encouragement of continued dialogue and exchange of ideas and research findings between Afro-Arab scholars and writers.
3. Institutionalization of these contacts through academic exchange programmes at university and cultural institutes through the formation of Afro-Arab scholars' and writers' associations in all fields. Such institutionalization should extend to mass movements in the Afro-Arab continuum.
4. Specifically, the following tasks were urgent, pressing and possible:
   1. Giving special importance to the study of comparative settler colonialism through the organs of the OAU and the League of Arab States.
   2. Funding of research programmes on culture and existing social realities in the Afro-Arab world:
      (a) Illiteracy and ignorance among the masses in both the Arab world and Africa.
      (b) Mutual dissemination of information in the mass media and educational programmes in the Afro-Arab countries. In this regard, a special fund

1. African Association of Political Sciences.

should be set up for the translation of works with particular emphasis on current research and other scholarly works already done by Afro-Arab scholars into Afro-Arab languages and other working languages in the Afro-Arab countries.

(c) Rectification of erroneous ideas pertaining to the mutual image of both Arabs and Africans in each respective region.

(d) Publication of books and journals by Afro-Arab scholars on Afro-Arab problems.

(e) Preparation of a scheme for an encyclopaedia dealing with the history and culture of Afro-Arab countries.

(f) Calling upon Afro-Arab governments and Specialized Agencies such as the Arab League, OAU and ALECSO to make funds available to assist the already existing professional organizations and other cultural institutions which specifically deal with current affairs in both regions.

(g) Encouraging the establishment of programmes and courses on Arabic language, literature and civilization in African universities within the framework of ALECSO's comprehensive world programme for the diffusion of the Arabic language and culture outside the Arab world. This should be supported by appropriate funds to be allocated for professorships and stipends in this field.

The meeting urged the formation of an Arab Political Science Association which can co-ordinate its activities and functions with its counterpart (the African Political Science Association).

Participants unanimously expressed their gratitude to both universities of Kuwait and ALECSO for their generous financial allocation which had made it possible for the symposium to take place.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Arab side

Professor Safey El Din Abulezz, Head of the Institute of Arab Research and Studies.
Professor Mohamed Mahmoud El Sayad, Head of Department of Geographical Research and Studies, Institute of Arab Research and Studies.
Dr Ahmed Sidky Dajani, Head of Department of Historical Research and Studies, Institute of Arab Research and Studies.
Dr George Jabour, Head of Department of Political Research and Studies, Institute of Arab Research and Studies.
Dr Yahia Al-Gamal, Head of Department of Legal Research and Studies, Institute of Arab Research and Studies.
Dr Fouad Haschem, Head of Department of Economics, Institute of Arab Research and Studies.
Dr Mahmoud Khairy Issa, Dean of Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences.
Dr Fouad Sakar, Dean of Faculty of Arts, Cairo University.
Dr Abdullah Goneimy, Head of Department of Geography, University of Kuwait.

Dr Abd El Malek Auda, Head of Political Sciences Department, Faculty of Economics, Cairo University.
Dr Mohamed Fatehallah Khateeb, Professor of Political Sciences, Institute of Arab Research Studies.
Professor Mohamed Omar Bashir, Dean of Faculty of Higher Studies, University of Khartoum.
Professor Ibrahim Sakre, Professor of Political Sciences, Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences.
Dr Saleh Kharfy, Arab Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization.
Dr Abdel Ghani Saudi, Institute of African Studies, Cairo University.
Dr Khaireya Kassimiya, Professor in Department of Historical Research and Studies, Institute of Arab Research and Studies.
Professor Gamal Zakareya Kassem, Professor of History, Faculty of Arts, Ein Shams University.
Dr Awatef Abd El Rahman, Professor, Faculty of Communication, Cairo University.
Dr Ali El Din Hilal, Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences.

African side and members of the Executive Committee of the African Political Science Association

General Secretary: Professor S. Mushi (Tanzania), Professor of Political Sciences, University of Dar es Salaam.
Vice-President for Central African Region: Professor Wang Metuge (Cameroon), Professor of Political Sciences, University of Zaria (Nigeria).
Vice-President for Eastern Africa Region: Professor Nabudere (Uganda), Professor of Political Sciences, University of Dar es Salaam.
Vice-President for Western Africa Region: Professor Emmanuel Hansen (Ghana), Professor of Political Sciences, University of Legon (Accra).
Vice-President for Northern Africa Region: Mr Helmy Sharaawi (Egypt), Assistant Secretary-General.
Member: Professor Okwudiba Nnoli (Nigeria), Professor of Political Sciences, University of Nsuka (Nigeria).
Research Director: Professor Yash Tandon (Tanzania), Professor of Political Sciences, University of Dar es Salaam.

6. Paper presented by the Arab side at the Symposium on Afro-Arab Cultural Relations, Cairo, 17–18 May 1978

1. The subject of Afro-Arab relations has been one of the most important topics of concern to the Arab League since its establishment as a regional organization representing a large sector of the Third World. Owing to regional and objective factors, African problems have attracted the attention of the Arab League authorities. Starting from the resolution adopted by the League's Council in 1953, which stresses 'co-operation and Afro-Arab solidarity', this attention has been developing and led to the meeting of the Afro-Arab Summit Conference in March 1977. That Conference set a working programme for Afro-Arab co-operation under the title of the 'Cairo Declaration'. The Arab League resolutions laid special emphasis on the promotion of intellectual and cultural relations between the Arab homeland and the African continent. The League entrusted its specialized agencies to pursue their efforts in this field particularly because the Cairo Declaration had laid special emphasis on this aspect.

2. Two historical stages can be distinguished in the relationship between Arab culture and African culture. The first occupies the period that lies between the 1953 statement mentioned above and the Arab Summit Conference held in Algeria in 1977, while the second stage extends from this Conference to the present time.

The first stage is characterized by vague vision and lack of standardization of Afro-Arab relations in general, although it represented a rising curve in the direction of the target. Stress on the cultural field, however, was weak, for the relations were particularly affected by a wider issue, namely liberation from colonization.

On the other hand, the second stage has been characterized by stability and clarity of objective. During this stage the various aspects of Afro-Arab relations have been taken into consideration. Special emphasis has been placed on the cultural side, relating it to the issues of liberation and development.

3. In this context the 1953 resolution of the League's Council did not concentrate on the cultural dimensions in detail, but dealt with them summarily leaving the particulars to the specialized agencies. Since 1950 the Arab League departments concerned with cultural co-operation have concentrated on activities in the African area. This can be seen in the increase of scholarships granted to African students to enable them to pursue their studies in the Arab universities. Africa had need of Arab intellectual support in the continent's confrontation with imperialism in its various aspects, especially in connection with liberation issues, most important of which is intellectual and cultural freedom.

4. One year after the establishment of the Organization of African Unity, however, cultural co-operation became a reciprocal cause. With the escalation of the Middle East crisis and the South African crisis, co-ordination of information efforts became of supreme importance. So, since 1964, in accordance with the standing resolutions of the League's Council, the Arab League has given special regard to boosting its Information Offices in African countries with a view to concerting the issues of common struggle in one intellectual and cultural framework, and to orienting the African public opinion towards the support of Arab testing issues. This policy proved successful, as observed in the official and popular approval of the African Summit Conference Declaration of 1967, which expressed African anxiety with respect to the serious situation on the borders of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and as also observed in the general support of the resolution passed by the OAU Cabinet in the latter's ordinary session held in Addis Ababa in February 1968 after the Israeli aggression on Arab countries. The OAU Cabinet recommended that the Member States support the Arab cause in every respect, including cultural and information fields. The Sixth Summit Conference held in September 1968 adopted this recommendation, and included it in its agenda and the agendas of the conferences to follow.

In the committee of African wise men formed in accordance with a resolution passed by the 8th African Summit Conference held in June 1971 to follow up the Middle East problem, the Senegalese President, Léopold Senghor, a member of this Committee, expatiated on the intellectual and cultural aspects which connect the Arab side to the African side.

The question of Afro-Arab co-operation in all fields as a whole, and particularly in the intellectual and cultural spheres, became clearer in the 9th African Summit Conference held in Rabat in June 1972, especially in connection with information related to the Arab cause. Consequently the African response immediately after the October War was the quickest and the most relevant to Arab objectives. This is evident from the resolutions of the 8th extraordinary session of the OAU Cabinet held in Addis Ababa immediately after the October War to discuss the future of Afro-Arab relations in general in the light of the grave events which concerned African public opinion at that time and with a view to setting a clear practical policy with regard to those relations.

5. This leads us to the discussion of Afro-Arab relations in the second phase, the characteristics of which we have already mentioned. This phase, contrary to the previous one, began with African initiative, which bears witness to the success of the positive role played by the Arab movement throughout the first phase.

The second phase started with the formation by the OAU of a committee of seven members to communicate with the League of Arab States in accordance with the resolutions of the OAU Cabinet in its extraordinary session of November 1973. The Arab Summit Conference, held in Algeria and attended by this seven-member African committee, drew up an outline of the general principles governing Afro-Arab co-operation.

Intellectual, scientific and cultural co-operation was extended to include the technical side. The seven-member committee dealt with this new development which they included in the agenda of the meeting held in Addis Ababa in December 1973.

In its second meeting held in January 1974, also in Addis Ababa, the committee discussed the question of cultural, scientific, technical and intellectual co-operation from every aspect. The Secretary-General of the League of Arab States was informed of developments that had taken place in this field from the point of view of African States.

The Arab League Council in its 61st session held in Tunisia discussed the suggestions submitted by the seven-member committee. On the African side, it was also discussed by the OAU Cabinet in its 23rd ordinary session held in Mogadiscio in June 1974. The policy set by the OAU Cabinet was ratified in the Dar es Salaam Declaration issued by the seven-member committee in its meeting in August 1974.

In his meeting with the Administrative Secretary of OAU, the Secretary-General of the Arab League discussed this framework which includes certain points concerning scientific and cultural co-operation. African summit meetings followed, one of which was the 12th meeting held in Kampala to emphasize the political dimension alongside the technical dimension of Afro-Arab cultural co-operation. In its 65th session, the Arab League Council stressed the importance of rejecting racial discrimination on cultural grounds and the necessity of cultural exchange and transfer of technology among developing countries, old and new, in Africa. The programme of Afro-Arab co-operation known as the 'Dakar Declaration' (April 1976) was similarly drawn up. This programme was discussed and approved at the summit level in the Afro-Arab Summit Conference held in Cairo in March 1977 under the title of the 'Cairo Declaration'. Cultural co-operation among Arab and African countries represents a prominent feature of this Declaration, as it called for developing the role played by OAU and the League of Arab States authorities responsible for co-operation especially in the cultural area which is considered the widest and richest of all. The Technical Aid Fund is responsible for financing cultural co-operation activities in accordance with items 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article 4 of its Rules of Procedure.

The Arab Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization, as one of the Arab League agencies, has accordingly shouldered the responsibility of following up these recommendations. Its Cultural Department formed a committee of experts for the study of the relation between Arab culture and African culture with a view to submitting a final report to be considered as a starting point for scientific seminars to be held for this purpose. The report of the experts raised a number of issues before the meeting which the committee held at the Institute of Arab Research and Studies in Cairo from 29 November to 1 December 1977. Many recommendations were proposed, and an objective framework, within which the Afro-Arab cultural co-operation and the programmes to be carried out by ALECSO could be dealt with, was outlined.

6. The above review shows that there is an objective unity parallel to the dynamic unity which has expressed itself throughout the historical current of Afro-Arab relations. The roots of this objective unity should be explored and its dimensions defined. This calls for the preparation of a working paper dealing with the various aspects of this unity.

7. *Historical roots of the cultural relations between the Arabs and the Africans.* There is no denying that the historical relations between the Arab and African civilizations are as old as written history. History records population movements

and the mingling, as well as the exchange and sharing of ideas amongst the peoples. Seas and deserts were not obstructions in this respect. Under Islam, which has been spreading in Africa since the seventh century A.D., Afro-Arab relations had a new dimension that made Africa a universal centre of civilization, and the Arabic language the medium of thought and culture in Africa. It had a clear impact on African languages, some of which were written in Arabic letters. Arab-African universities played a prominent role in the dissemination of culture in many parts of Africa.

The advent of various European colonizers had, all the same, a common strategy which aimed at the creation of a new type of African, different in tongue, mind and feeling, and connected with the European civilization in his manner of thinking, style of expression and way of life. The creation of such a new man was the guarantee for European existence in Africa. The new policy used education as a means of implementing this strategy. Curricula were set with the aim of training employees to assist in administration and government, in a way which severed the African from his attachment to his heritage. In this respect, education curricula in Arab countries and African countries were similar. In the meantime the colonizers resorted to the revival of tribal fanaticism, the creation of internal divisions among the people and the weakening of national awareness—a policy which was bound to accentuate differences in many of the countries which they eventually left. The colonizers have also tried to disconnect the north of the continent from the south, inventing what they called white Africa and black Africa, Northern Africa and sub-Saharan Africa—terms which can hardly stand firm before the current of history.

It is thus incumbent on us to reconsider the choice of dimensions fit to be a foundation for a new structure of cultural relations to be invested for the interest of the Arabs and Africans as well, with a view to asserting their personality and raising the standard of their life. We have also to confute the presumptions of the colonizers which they used as a means to divert these relations from their ends and lead them away from the right path, exchanging them for new Afro-French or Afro-English relations.

To erect the new structure on sound bases, we have to probe colonialism and its impact on Afro-Arab relations, the falsifications which it presented as historical truths, the poisons it infused among the inhabitants of the continent to create antagonisms, making Arab and Black values, and African cultures in general, appear foreign to the culture of the modern age in the areas of production and administration. In our study, we must ponder particularly on African existence in Arabic literature and Arab existence in African literature. It is in this context that we must give consideration to the questions of linguistic fragmentation in Africa, the connection of the Arab educational structure with its African counterpart, and the place of both cultures, African and Arab, in human culture.

Writers and historians are requested to be objective when extracting from foreign authors ideas connected with Afro-Arab relations, and to give special regard to the exposition of the bright aspects in these relations which enhance the relations between the Arabs and Africans, for many foreign writers have deliberately distorted these relations and even destroyed them.

It would be worthwhile to establish a special body to concern itself with

collecting documents and Arabic manuscripts dispersed in various African places and in libraries all over the world. These documents require verification and publication, especially those written in Arabic characters. The body we establish should encourage the publication of anything connected with Afro-Arab relations before and after Islam, and also try to form a joint Afro-Arab organization to concern itself with African and Arabic monuments, and with the exchange of experience and information about museums and exhibitions in accordance with the resolution adopted by Unesco at the eighteenth session of its General Conference.

8. *Impact of Arabic and African cultures on each other.* Communication between the Arab homeland and the African continent rested on mutual respect and effect. So cultural relations grew and flourished until the geographical discoveries and European colonization brought about the decline and freezing of these relations. There had certainly been a network of Afro-Arab relations before colonialism, running through a number of channels. The Arabs were in contact with West, Central and East Africa. But the role these channels played began to decline since the colonial invasion, losing their economic importance at first and their cultural significance later. To be sure, there were Arab movements that tried to stop this intruding cultural invasion, such as the Sunusi movement, the concepts of which travelled along the caravan roads and spread in many parts of the continent. Such movements left their traces on the struggle of the Africans against European invasion. They might have abated for a time, but the recent Afro-Arab awakening after independence argues for restoring to these communications their historical significance. We should, therefore, study the interaction between Arabic culture and African cultures by a comprehensive social method which takes into consideration the reciprocal effects of the various social phenomena both in Arab and African societies, carrying out at the same time a comprehensive survey and collection of historical heritage and folklore, behaviour types and creation patterns, which reflect the Arab image in the African popular thinking, as well as the African image in Arab popular thinking. This should be done with the aim of developing cultural and informative communication among the Arab and African peoples, extending to the ordinary person and to intellectuals who are not specialists, particularly the new young generation.

The African cultural movement suffered an observable alienation for a long period of its history to such an extent that it was almost isolated from the social reality of the continent. It was a copy of the response of African intellectuals to Western culture, negative or positive, and not a direct expression of the African reality. In this way African thought was detached from the universal intellectual movement because of the cultural polarizations that took place during the process of the cultural containment carried out by European countries.

It was thus not surprising to find the African intellectuals isolated from Arab culture as much as the Arab intellectuals were isolated from African culture.

We should like to emphasize in this study from the very start the fact that we do not take it for granted that the African intellectual movement has only one meaning in its confrontation with the Arab intellectual movement. As a matter of fact the African intellectual movement is internally diversified more or less in the same way as it is separated from the Arab cultural movement. This state of affairs

is as worth considering as are the factors that are shaping the African cultural movement and that are expressed in conferences and festivals, as well as in the publication of literary works which help or hinder the interaction of African cultures, including Arabic culture.

We have no doubt that there are certain currents in the African cultural movement and in the Arabic cultural movement which stand in the way of an instant cultural meeting on the ground of the continent. There are at the same time other tendencies which might help drive the cause to its real magnanimous ends. Thus it is essential to study the currents of the cultural movement in Africa in the framework of Arabicism and negroid trends as well in the framework of pan-Africanism, and the national liberation movements.

9. *Negative effects of European colonization on Afro-Arab relations.* This point involves many issues, such as the shape of Afro-Arab relations before the geographical explorations, the impact of European colonization on the disintegration of Afro-Arab relations, and the negative effects in the cultural field which were a result of colonialism. In this respect research workers should realize that Afro-Arab relations were flourishing and strong before the deep intrusion of the Europeans in the continent, and that the European invasion weakened these relations to the greatest extent, especially after the transfer of the scientific centres from the interior of the continent to the coasts. In this context we should emphasize the contribution of the Africans to the Arabic culture which is represented in the preservation of the Islamic culture in its declining stage, and the spread of this culture in African regions, which influenced the African reformation movements. On the other hand, we should study the situation of Arab colonies in Africa, their role and interaction, positively and negatively, in African societies, historically, politically, socially and culturally, throwing light on the common characteristics in the Arab and African struggle in the confrontation of colonial powers.

10. *Reconsideration of some prevailing concepts.* To attain the object of our study we have to reconsider some of the concepts propagated by European colonialism with a view to separating the northern side from the southern side of the desert. We have also to face the false ideas disseminated by the Europeans in the matter of Afro-Arab relations. Such presumptions must be studied by a methodology which attributes phenomena to their causes, without excuse or defence, concentrating on the common interest and the positive aspects shared by both Arabs and Africans. Here we see the importance of the role which could be played by both Arab and African intellectuals and specialists to delineate the true picture and correct false concepts.

11. *The language problem.* From the linguistic point of view, Africa is considered one of the most complex regions. The introduction of European languages—French, English and Portuguese—added to this complexity, the effects of which reached the curricula of schools and universities. The Arabic language, as a language of culture, had already started to spread in the continent. Many of the local languages, especially the most common ones—Swahili and Hausa—had been influenced by it. Those two languages—both written in Arabic script—represent the contact and marriage between the Arabic element and the African element. They were a model of the common life of the Arabs and Africans throughout many

centuries. The current of history enriched this cultural aspect through the close relations based on religious and spiritual links, as well as commercial relations.

It is thus essential to promote the studies which deal with the *rapprochement* between African languages, to improve the situation and position of the Arabic language among African languages, and to probe the influence of Arabic on these languages and the role played by colonialism to restrain its spread. It is also important to encourage its dissemination among the intellectuals, simplifying its reading and writing, for it is a language of thought and culture at a level no lower than that of foreign languages which the cultivated persons borrow and use in writing together with their local languages. This requires reconsideration of educational structures in both Arab and African countries.

12. *Educational systems and structures.* Before reconsidering educational structures, we must carry out a comprehensive survey and comparative studies of the various systems and structures in both the African and Arab countries, as an introduction to a reconciliation between those systems. We have to start by listing the African academic bodies concerned with Arabic culture as well as the Arabic bodies concerned with African culture. We have also to study the picture of Africa in school syllabi in Arab countries and the picture of the Arabs in school syllabi in African countries, and that with a view to presenting an objective, truer picture. We should, moreover, encourage Arabic studies of the African issues as well as African studies of Arab issues. To realize this aim, there must be a kind of co-operation between African and Arab institutes. Furthermore, the educational systems ought to introduce new types of syllabus compatible with the requirements of the African and Arab regions which seek to confront the economic, social and cultural challenges of the modern age. The co-ordination of the relations between Arab universities and African universities and the exchange of experiments, information and academic and administrative experience has now become an urgent necessity. This requires some kind of co-operation between the Federation of Arab Universities, the Federation of African Universities, the Higher Educational Council of OAU and other governmental and non-governmental organizations in both regions.

It might be useful to establish an Afro-Arab university on the lines of the United Nations University in Tokyo, a university concerned with the cultural issues which face the Arabs and the Africans, with the study of the ideal methods for the transfer and rooting of technology, developing the integrated efforts of both the Arab and African regions, seeking the methods of checking the brain drain and emigration of efficient and experienced persons from both regions. This could be done in such a way as to employ the surplus of one region in the other. The proposed Afro-Arab university can also try to find a suitable method for the production of university textbooks at the Afro-Arab level, and establish joint publishing houses to supply the Arab and African universities with the required books and to put a limit to our dependence on imported books, which means obtaining knowledge from foreign countries.

13. *The stage of national liberation.* The conferences held by the African and Asian writers have provided an opportunity for dissolving the special tendencies existent within the African cultural movement and removing the barriers standing between culture and policy. The liberation role of writers has became indisputable.

Writers have dealt courageously with most of the political and social issues of the continent in the light of an advanced concept of the role of books and culture. These conferences have in fact been meetings where narrow parochial feelings were transcended, and the function of culture in confrontation with colonialism and its role in political and social liberation explained. Arab and African issues have been discussed in these conferences with unanimous zeal.

Owing to the importance of unified efforts at the cultural level, it became essential to make an effort to carry out a comprehensive survey of the Afro-Arab relations in the various multilateral or bilateral fields, to study the currents of the African cultural movement, translating and publishing its literature with a view to strengthening relations between Arab and African intellectuals. It is also necessary to encourage participation on a large scale by the Arab intellectuals in African scientific and professional associations and federations, to boost the relations of these associations and federations with their Arab counterparts, to pay special attention to the translation of cultural and intellectual works connected with the contemporary Arab reality into the written languages of the continent, to translate on a large scale the African cultural and intellectual works into Arabic and to encourage bilateral agreements between Arab and African States. These agreements should include the setting up of cultural centres, and the exchange of students and educational and cultural groups. It is also essential to concert the activities of the League of Arab States and those of the Organization of African Unity, and to call for the establishment of an Afro-Arab cultural council to sponsor these trends and support them.

14. Arab culture and African cultures were not highly appreciated in scientific circles in Europe, while the people of Africa themselves gave little heed to the study of their neighbours' culture. The Arabs did not care to study African culture, nor did the Africans care to study Arab culture. But the tendency towards cultural unity or at least cultural integration requires great attention to this question. It also requires the orientation of students towards research on African cultures, including Arab culture, and their place in human civilization, and the preparation of an African encyclopaedia emphasizing the various aspects of African civilization and its role in the development of universal civilization.

15. Considering that the legal system in any society is the expression of the social, economic and cultural relations in that society, and considering that the African and Arab societies like all other societies have their own legal systems, it is our duty to study the sources of those systems, which include convention, Islamic and Christian religions, as well as secular systems, whether Latin or Anglo-Saxon. Convention is the principal basis of African legal systems. It might seem different in the various parts of Africa, but the aspects of similarity, in fact, exceed those of difference. Western writers have given their attention only to the differences. But it is time the Arabs and Africans studied their traditions and discovered to what extent they have been related to the needs of their societies, and how far they are similar although they seem different. In point of fact, African and Arab legal systems are resemblant, and thus a comparative study is required, and the concerned institutes should have regard to this trend.

16. The gist of it all is the fact that the relations between the Arab homeland and the African continent are a historical truth which has been for some time concealed

by political factors, but both Arabs and Africans have now revealed the truth which they extracted from the international situation, from common bitter experience and destiny problems. The Arab and African have now been liberated, and, therefore, we must all make use of the favourable positive circumstances in the area of mutual co-operation, especially in connection with the education and bringing up of the next generation who will be responsible for the advancement of the continent, north and south.

7. Paper presented by the African side at the Symposium on Afro-Arab Cultural Relations, Cairo, 17–18 May 1978

This paper touches upon some key issues and questions relating to Afro-Arab co-operation and solidarity today, highlighting them in a frank and objective approach.

Only a few of the fundamental questions are mooted owing to the magnitude and historical depth of Arab-African relations. At present, the potential historical foes of both peoples have not only improved their techniques of manipulating both regions to their own advantage, but have also increased the intensity of their aggression culturally, politically, economically and militarily. It is imperative that such fundamental problems should be reflected upon with scholarly vision, particularly at a time when neo-colonialism is resorting to new tactics and strategies in an effort to assert its domination.

The problem of Arab and African peoples is the problem of liberation, not only from racism and colonialism, but also the liberation of the Arab and African masses from poverty, illiteracy and exploitation. Thus, it is only in the context of the comprehensive connotation of the term liberation that Afro-Arab co-operation and solidarity can be accurately measured and correctly judged.

The first factor is that of culture in general. Historically, Africans and Arabs have interacted immensely and intensively, and their cultures have nurtured and cross-fertilized one another in a productive manner. However, some erroneous ideas supervene amongst all Africans and Arabs, which tend to mar or tar each other's image. This may be attributed to the way culture has been utilized in history as something immutable, worthy of providing past glory and heritage. Accordingly, culture becomes what the past was and its purity or non-purity is gauged today according to the content of historical heritage. The values and customs of the past tend to be confused with the social realities of peoples at present. The dynamic aspect of values and customs is thus relegated to a secondary order, although they emanate directly from the present conditions of social existence. When culture is seen purely in terms of tradition, present-day realities become obscured and the unified force of culture becomes divisive and confusing. The past cultural heritage, consequently, has no meaning unless it helps in expounding and understanding the realities of the present, contributes to the solving of today's problems and points to the path of future development.

Afro-Arab universities have not helped in solving these prolems, nor have the majority of the Afro-Arab intellectuals played a positive role in this respect. Instead, we have African or Arabic studies in the Afro-Arab universities largely concerned

with the Islamic studies, classical Arabic, fifteenth-century folklore, etc. These areas of concern are important, and they must be continued. But more important still is the need for African and Arab universities to promote scientific studies of social life in Afro-Arab countries today. In this respect, the translation of works on Africa by Arab scholars into English, French, Portuguese, Hausa and Swahili is essential. In like manner, works of African scholars on current African problems should be available in Arabic. The Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African and Arab Countries has an opportunity here to pull Arab and African talents together to cement Afro-Arab cultural links. In accordance with the present-day social existence, there should not only be an exchange of experts in all fields between African and Arab countries, but an increased effort should be made to create forums for African and Arab intellectuals and scholars to work together in various organizations and institutions and to minimize suspicion and chauvinism that exist at the scholarly and intellectual level.

At the level of the masses, the problem of ignorance which creates prejudices among the people has to be solved through the process of political education and literacy.

The African and Arab workers, peasants and artisans need to be informed more thoroughly about the world around them, about the evils of racism, Zionism and colonialism, and about the causes of their poverty and ways and means of overcoming these maladies. A programme of political education which is designed to liberate the minds of the African and Arab workers, peasants and artisans from prejudice against one another is of prime necessity. Here again lies a challenge to the Afro-Arab intellectuals and scholars to design such programmes and create the necessary forms of expression by which such programmes can be articulated through the radio, television, assemblies, etc. Any form of cultural understanding which does not relate to the people's daily experiences, and which is not grounded on the vast majority of the people as a whole, is bound to fail, and words like solidarity and co-operation become nothing but mere platitudes of politicians and academicians in conferences and other forums.

So the first major hindrance to positive and meaningful Afro-Arab co-operation can be attributed to ignorance and prejudice which result from a view of culture as being equivalent to tradition, custom and heritage in a manner diverted from the people's actual existence today.

The result of all this is mutual misunderstanding which will surely be capitalized on by our common enemies to divide and weaken both Arabs and Africans.

The second factor is related to differences in Arab-African outlooks on questions pertaining to ideology and the appropriate pattern of development. Such differences impose tremendous obstacles on our joint struggle for liberation and enable our common enemies to implement the classical doctrine of 'divide and rule'. Needless to mention that the higher the degree of congruence in our ideological orientation, the higher will be the degree of effective co-operation.

The third factor influencing Afro-Arab co-operation is the nature of the relationship between individual states in the African and Arab world and the multinational corporations. This factor is closely linked with the prevailing ideologies and attitudes towards the appropriation of suitable patterns for development. International

monopoly capital may appear on the surface to be one of secondary importance. However, when examined and analysed with scientific rigour, its role is significant in many cases. No wonder then that there exists an unholy alliance between South Africa and Israel, since both ensure the survival of international monopoly capital. The end result of the effect of multinational corporations in Afro-Arab countries is not only manifested in politico-economic dependency, but also determines the political orientation and affiliation.

The fourth factor is related to the levels at which Afro-Arab co-operation is operating today. Two major levels can easily be identified, namely the multi-state level exemplified in the Organization of Arab Unity, the League of Arab States (and the affiliated agencies and organizations of both) and other regional groupings, and the national or state level.

At both levels, it is very safe to say that ideology, relationship to multinational co-operations, and culture outlook all affect and determine the level and intensity of co-operation. At the multi-state level, compromises and diplomatic nuances become effective ways to keep co-operation afloat. On the other hand, in some cases decisions in the interest of both African and Arab peoples are taken at the multi-state level for ideological reasons.

What conclusions can we draw from all this? The first conclusion is that the Afro-Arab world is strongly divided: it is divided at the leadership level (Afro-Arab leadership conceptions of the nature and aims of the liberation struggles in Palestine and southern Africa, for example, are different). It is torn by petty nationalism. Above all, the masses of the Arab and African peoples, the peasants, workers and artisans are isolated from one another in all ways.

The second conclusion is that our enemies are exploiting these divisions, perpetuating them and reaping heavily from them. The repercussions of all this on Afro-Arab co-operation are clear. We are losing!

So what is to be done? Our first task is to examine again the whole concept of Afro-Arab co-operation. In this respect, we must address ourselves more thoroughly to this question: Co-operation for whom and for what? Once this is done, we must find better ways to move forward. We must move from structural and mechanical co-operation to organic solidarity.

Such is our task. It is the task of African and Arab intellectuals and scholars. It is the task of our statesmen and leaders. We owe it to our people, and we must not fail them.

8. Report of the Fourth Ordinary Session of the Afro-Arab Standing Commission, Kuwait, 3–5 December 1978

1. The Afro-Arab Standing Commission held its Fourth Ordinary Session from 3 to 5 December 1978 in Kuwait under the co-chairmanship of His Excellency Moumouni Djermakoye Adamou, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Niger and Chairman of the OAU Committee of Twelve, and His Excellency Abdul Aziz Hussein, Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs of Kuwait, and Chairman of the Committee of Twelve of the League of Arab States.

2. The representation on the African side was as follows: Algeria, Botswana, Cameroon, Arab Republic of Egypt, Gabon, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Niger, Togo and the Secretary General of the OAU. On the Arab side the representation was as follows: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, State of Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Lebanon, Mauritania, Palestine and the Secretary General of the League of Arab States.

Also present at the meeting as observers were Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and the Sudan, as well as the African Development Bank, BADEA, the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African and Arab Countries, ECA, AFESD, ALECSO and UNDP.

3. The meeting was officially opened, on behalf of His Highness the Emir of the State of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al Ahmed Al Sabbah, by the Acting Prime Minister, Minister of Information, Sheikh Jaber Al Ali El Salem Al Sabbah.

4. When H. E. The Acting Prime Minister was escorted out of the Conference Hall, the Commission resumed its work in camera and elected the following Bureau: *Co-Chairmen:* African side, Niger; Arab side, Kuwait. *Rapporteurs:* Botswana for the African side, Morocco for the Arab side. *Drafting Committee:* Algeria, Nigeria, Somalia and Tunisia.

5. The Standing Commission then adopted the following Agenda:

(1) Report of the Co-ordinating Committee.
(2) Joint Report of the two Secretaries-General of the OAU and the LAS.
(3) Report on the work of the African and Arab specialized institutions regarding the implementation of the recommendations of the Third Ordinary Session of the Standing Commission.
(4) Establishment of the Afro-Arab Specialized Panels.
(5) 1979–1980 Draft Budget of the Special Fund for running the Executive Bodies of Afro-Arab Co-operation.
(6) (a) The Economic and Financial Report of BADEA (from June to December 1978).
(b) The Report of the Arab Fund for Technical Assistance to African and Arab countries.

(7) Draft Agenda of the First Ordinary Session of the Afro-Arab Ministerial Conference and its date and venue.
(8) Dates and venues of: (a) The joint meeting of the African and Arab Ministers of Information. (b) The joint meeting of the African and Arab Ministers of Labour.
(9) Any other business.

6. The Commission examined the joint Report of the two Secretaries-General on the activities of the two Secretariats for the period June 1978 to December 1978 and it was adopted. The Commission reiterated the need to invite the Heads of Working Groups to sessions of the Standing Commission whenever their reports are to be considered. The Commission agreed that full records of meetings are kept and distributed.

7. The Commission considered the report on the outcome of the work of the specialized African and Arab institutions and the document relating to the establishment of the Afro-Arab specialized panels, which had earlier been examined by the Co-ordinating Committee at its meeting. It was felt that the report on the work of the specialized African and Arab institutions had only identified areas of concern in various fields without providing any detailed study of the problems.

In adopting the two documents under review, the Standing Commission decided:

(a) To maintain the existing Working Groups.
(b) To enlarge the mandate of the Working Group on Finance to cover financial, economic and trade matters and to amend its name accordingly.
(c) To invite the Specialized African and Arab Institutions, particularly ADB, BADEA, and ECA to work closely with the two Secretariats in the execution of Afro-Arab co-operation programmes.

8. The Commission considered the Draft Budget for 1979/80 submitted to it, and it was approved. The two General Secretariats were entrusted with the responsibility of working out unified financial rules and regulations regarding the management of the joint Special Fund.

9. During the consideration of the economic and financial reports of BADEA and AFTA, the Commission also heard oral reports from the President Director-General of BADEA, the Executive Secretary of AFTA and the representative of ADB. Thereupon it called on the Arab and African financial institutions to strengthen their existing co-operation and co-ordination so as to serve better the cause of Afro-Arab co-operation.

10. The Commission adopted the following Draft Agenda of the First Session of the Afro-Arab Council of Ministers:

(1) Official opening:
Address by the Head of State of the Host country;
Addresses by the Chairmen of the African side, the Arab side and the two Secretaries-General of the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States;
(2) Adoption of the Agenda;
(3) Election of the Bureau and Drafting Committee;
(4) Organization of work;

(5) Joint report on the activities of the two General Secretariats of the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States in the various fields of Afro-Arab co-operation;
(6) Report of the two General Secretariats on the activities of the economic, financial and technical institutions concerned with Afro-Arab co-operation;
(7) Promotion of the means of co-operation between States of the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States in political and boycott fields against the racist regimes in Southern African and the Zionist regime in occupied Palestine;
(8) Any other business.

It should be noted that item (5) of the Agenda was concerned with the general issues of Afro-Arab co-operation, while item (6) dealt with specific and technical issues of co-operation.

11. The Commission left the question of the date and venue of the First Ordinary Session of the Afro-Arab Ministerial Conference to the two Secretaries-General for decision. At this juncture, the Chairman announced that the Socialist Peoples' Libyan Arab Jamahiriya offered to host this Conference.

As regards the date and venue of the meeting of the First African and Arab Ministers of Information, the Commission welcomed the invitation extended by Tunisia to host this Conference, and mandated the two Secretariats to decide upon the date in consultation with the Government of Tunisia.

Furthermore, the Commission asked the African side to decide upon the date and venue of the First Joint Afro-Arab Ministers of Labour Conference.

12. The Commission extends its deep gratitude and appreciation to the Emir of Kuwait and to his Government and people for hosting this Session of the Standing Commission for Afro-Arab Co-operation and for the efforts they have exerted to ensure the success of the Session.

9. Summary record of the proceedings of the Symposium on the Historical and Socio-cultural Relations between black Africa and the Arab World from 1935 to the Present, Paris, 25–27 July 1979

The symposium was attended by the following invited experts: Professors M. H. Abdulaziz (Kenya), H. M. Amiji (Tanzania), K. Chater (Tunisia), Abdel Aziz El Douri (Jordan), A. A. Jalloh (Cameroon), A. Laroui (Morocco), A. Zebadia (Algeria), J. I. Elaigwu (Nigeria), A. Musuka (PAF), A. Darwish (Kenya).

The following experts were invited but regretted they were unable to attend: Mr N. Shamuyarira (Zanu), Mr Boubacar Barry (Senegal), Mr A. Miquel (France).

The following did not reply: Mr E. Kodjo (OAU), Professor J. Zacharia Kacem (Egypt), Mr M. Zouber (Mali).

The following members of the Bureau, who were already in Paris, also took part in the discussions: Professors B. A. Ogot, Cheikh Anta Diop, F. A. Albuquerque Mourao, Th. Obenga, J. Devisse; so did H. E. Mr M. El Fasi (editor of Volume III of the *General History of Africa*), Dr I. Hrbek (co-editor of Volume III), Professors J. F. Ade Ajayi (editor of Volume VI) and Ali A. Mazrui (editor of Volume VIII).

Of the members of the International Scientific Committee invited, the following were present: Abbé Kagame, Dr G. Mokhtar.

Professor Fage regretted he was unable to attend.

The following did not reply: Mgr T. Tshibangu, Professors H. Djait and I. El-Hareir.

The Secretariat of Unesco was represented by: Mr Emmanual Pouchpa Dass, Director of the Division of Cultural Studies, representing the Director-General; Mr Maurice Glélé, Programme Specialist, Division of Cultural Studies; Mr Augustin Gatera, Division of Cultural Studies; M^{me} Monique Melcer, Division of Cultural Studies; M^{lle} Marie-Florette Lengué, Division of Cultural Studies; M^{lle} Michèle Vallès, Division of Cultural Studies.

Among the observers invited by Unesco, the following participated in the symposium: Dr A. F. Sorour (ALECSO); Mgr R. Frana (Holy See); Mr Ibrahima Kaké (Société Africaine de Culture).

The following did not reply: Association of African Universities, African Cultural Institute.

The Symposium was opened by Mr Pouchpa Dass on 25 July at 10 a.m.

The Symposium appointed a Bureau to direct its work, composed as follows: Chairman of the Symposium, H. E. Mr El Fasi; President of the Scientific Committee, Professor B. A. Ogot; Vice-Chairman of the Symposium, Professor

J. F. Ade Ajayi (Member of the International Scientific Committee); Discussion leader, Professor Ali A. Mazrui; Rapporteur, Professor K. Chater.

The first meeting was held on Wednesday, 25 July 1979 at 10 a.m. at Unesco Headquarters in Paris. Mr Pouchpa Dass, representing the Director-General of Unesco, opened the discussion after welcoming participants and recalling the objectives of the meeting, which were to study the historical and socio-cultural relations between black Africa and the Arab world from 1935 to the present, in relation to the preparation of Volume VIII of the *General History of Africa.*

Mr B. A. Ogot, President of the International Scientific Committee for the drafting of a *General History of Africa,* and Mr Ali A. Mazrui, editor of Volume VIII, both defined the background for the meeting, which was intended to highlight Afro-Arab relations, a complex and important theme that had hitherto been neglected.

Professor H. Amiji then introduced the discussion theme relating to religion in Afro-Arab relations. With reference to the process of Islamization, a number of speakers pointed out that Islam had been essentially spread through Africa by native Africans (pilgrims, traders, isolated travellers . . .). It was therefore not imposed either by conquerors or by 'propagators of the faith' in the service of Muslim states. Solidly implanted in Africa, Islam became a local religion.

Other speakers considered that no reference should be made in this book, which was intended to be an essentially historical study, to theological aspects of Islam. It should rather be considered as a sociological fact and a practical reality.

Moreover, it was agreed that Afro-Arab relations should not be limited solely to the impact of Islam. Afro-Arab solidarity was in reality the result of several factors: the common fate of the colonials and their determination to achieve emancipation followed by independence; the fact of belonging to the Third World; economic interests; cultural affinities and ideological options.

Some participants recommended that an objective study should be made, within the framework of that volume, on the reactions of the religious confraternities during the struggle for independence and nation-building, with specific emphasis on the different aspects of Islam (reformism, fundamentalism, etc.).

Professor M. H. Abdel Aziz introduced the discussion theme relating to language and literature in Afro-Arab history. The participants emphasized the interaction between Arabic and African languages.

Professor A. Darwish introduced the theme relating to the arts in Afro-Arab history. During the discussion, emphasis was placed on the influence of Muslim art in West and East Africa and on the impact of sub-Saharan music, dancing and architecture on the countries of the Maghreb.

In relation to the discussion theme concerning war, Dr. J. I. Elaigwu presented a paper on the black African civil wars in the context of Afro-Arab relations. The discussion dealt specifically with the attitudes of certain Arab countries during those African conflicts. It was especially noted that there had been no deliberate Arab or African policy of intervention nor had any common positions been adopted in that respect. The attitude of certain countries could be explained by ideological rifts, political interests, or the desire for economic and other advantages, within the context of bilateral relations, and it was therefore necessary to analyse the complex nature of the alliances formed during the African civil wars.

Mr Ali Mazrui introduced a study on Africa and the Arab–Israeli conflict. He emphasized the changing attitudes in Africa towards the Arab–Israeli conflict, in which he distinguished three phases: (a) the years in which Africa had no political influence (1948–1957); (2) the years in which Africa was politically ambivalent (1957–1970); (3) the period in which Africa showed solidarity towards the Arabs (from 1970 onwards).

Mr Abdul Aziz Jalloh introduced a paper on the policies of black African states towards the Arab world.

During the discussion on those two topics, some speakers stressed the causes of the changing African attitudes towards the Arab–Israeli conflict, namely:

(1) Israel's alignment with the Western world;
(2) Israel's collaboration with the apartheid regime in South Africa;
(3) the evolution of Arab diplomacy from 1967 onwards;
(4) the role played by the Palestinians among Africans with the aim of making their cause more widely known;
(5) the desire for Afro-Arab economic co-operation.

The discussion theme relating to economic policies in Afro-Arab relations was introduced by Mr Ali Mazrui. A document prepared by Mr Dustan Wai entitled: 'Afro-Arab relations: misplaced optimism', was also introduced during the discussion of that theme, as an annex to the document by Professor Ali Mazrui.

Speakers emphasized the weaknesses in the exchanges between the Arab and the African countries, due to the inadequacy of the infrastructure (particularly transport), and to over-similar development policies (manufacture of the same products . . . giving rise to competitive markets), etc.

Some speakers mentioned the difficulty of achieving a concerted economic policy. Other stressed the need to establish wide Afro-Arab co-operation, with a view to contributing to the establishment of a new international economic order.

Professor Ali Mazrui, the editor of Volume VIII, introduced a paper on liberation and decolonization in the context of Afro-Arab relations.

During the discussion, some speakers explained that the movement of Afro-Arab solidarity which has emerged during the wars of liberation could not be accounted for merely by the attitude of a few leading political figures. It was rather the result of broad public opinion and popular movements (student and workers' movements) which it was necessary to analyse. An attempt should also be made to bring out the role of liberal opinion and the way it developed in the colonizing countries.

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