


# Human Development Report



2001

Somalia







# Human Development Report 2001

Somalia is a country in transition. After years of civil strife the nature of the Somali state has changed and Somalis have the extraordinary opportunity to reconstruct their political, social and economic systems afresh. The 2001 Human Development Report compiles and analyses the latest available data on Somalia. It provides a timely analysis of a society in transition and contributes to our understanding of its dynamics.

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'All in all our team of readers was impressed by the report, in the sense that they found it not only very interesting and useful but also very balanced with regards to the prevalent sensibilities of the Somalis.' *Hargeisa Reading Circle*



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
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### Methodology

The HDR draws upon a variety of studies and reports on Somalia over the past decade and interviews conducted by the authors. Chapter 4 was supplemented by information generated by a human rights workshop in Hargeisa with Somali human rights organisations.

The statistical data used in this report was compiled from existing databases, surveys and documentation on Somalia. The Human Development Index was calculated on the basis of a socio-economic household survey undertaken by UNDP in 2001 (see chapter 5).

A draft of the report was critically reviewed by Reading Circles in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Garowe and Hargeisa, comprising Somalis from the regional administrations, civil society organisations and business communities. The draft report was reviewed by UNDP Somalia and by other UN agencies. The human development indicator tables were reviewed and agreed upon by UN agencies, both individually and collectively through the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) health and education sectoral committees. Comments arising from these reviews were taken into account in producing the final report.

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# Foreword

The strength of a society is never put to a greater test than when it is confronted with the task of recreating itself. After years of civil strife, the nature of the Somali state has changed and Somalis have the extraordinary opportunity to reconstruct their political, social, and economic systems afresh.

Somalis are experimenting with different forms of governance. In this inherently democratic society, traditional systems of consultative and participatory governance have played a crucial role in guiding the country through a period of intense political crisis. In a break with the past model of a centralised government, civil society and the private sector are both playing crucial roles in providing social services and shaping development. For the Somali people the greatest challenge will be how to develop effective and socially sensitive systems of governance which incorporate firmly entrenched traditional norms and values with the increasingly broad acceptance and assimilation of global norms and practices.

Somalia is a country in transition and this transition is taking place within an increasingly globalised world. With more than one million Somalis living outside the country, Somali society has essentially been globalised. This presents tremendous prospects and Somalis have utilised the opportunities provided by advances in information technologies and the deregulation of trade. However, globalisation also leaves Somalia vulnerable to the vicissitudes of foreign markets, trans-national corporations, and policy-making bodies over which Somalis have no control. While the economy has shown remarkable resilience, the embargo by trading partners on imports of Somali livestock on health grounds in 1998 and 2000 also illustrates the vulnerability of economic dependence on the pastoral economy. Strengthening Somalia's position within the global economy by supporting the creation of a legal and regulatory framework for trade is important to safeguard household livelihoods.

Human rights are central to the United Nation's mission embodied in both the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In situations of civil conflict, political rhetoric and violence often distort dis-




cussions on human rights. In Somalia there is a pressing need to restore judicial systems that embrace Somali customary law, Islamic *shari'a* and secular concepts of human rights. In this respect, the challenge to governance is more about reconciling tradition with modern democratic ideals, than merely pressing for democratic reform.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has identified five initiatives that represent its vision and understanding of the challenges faced by the Somali people in laying the foundations for development:

- supporting the establishment of appropriate and sustainable system of governance
- strengthening Somalia's position in the globalisation process
- progressively transforming Somalia's economy and reducing economic vulnerability
- promoting human rights that are embedded in Somali culture
- creating opportunities for future generations

The 2001 national Human Development Report, which reviews and analyses the latest available data on Somalia, provides an opportunity to discuss these issues and their impact on human development. The 1998 Human Development Report challenged the international community to maximise Somali consultation and participation in the development process. The 2001 report has gone some way to meeting this challenge through consultations with Somalis and submitting the draft report to review by Reading Circles in Somalia. UNDP appreciates the efforts of all of those who have contributed to the report and Mark Bradbury's work in guiding the process.

Finally, it is necessary to mention that this report was mostly compiled before the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. These have had immediate repercussions for the Somali people. First, Somalia's fragile economy has been further weakened by the closure of money transfer agencies through which the all-important remittances are channelled. Second, the attacks have revived a concern that terrorist networks may be using 'stateless' Somalia as a sanctuary. The negative international image this has generated of Somalia once again misses the potentially positive contribution that Somalia has to make to the Horn of Africa region and to our understanding of countries in transition. At this time of international uncertainty what the Somali people need is not isolation, but more constructive engagement.



Randolph C. Kent  
UN Resident and Humanitarian  
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## Contributors

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## Reading Circles

Four Reading Circles critically reviewed and commented on the report. These were managed and facilitated by the Centre for Research and Development (CRD) in Mogadishu, the Puntland Development and Research Centre (PDRC) in Garowe and the Academy for Peace and Development (APD) in Hargeisa, all affiliates of WSP International. UNCU facilitated the Reading Circle in Baidoa. The report has benefited from the inputs of the following readers:

**Mogadishu:** Maryan Yusuf Sheik (COGWO), Ali Iman Shamarke, Mohamed Jama, M. H. Amin, Musa Ali

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Many people were consulted during the course of the preparation of the report.

In conjunction with the Office for the High Commission of Human Rights (OHCHR), a workshop on 'Human Rights and Human Development' was held in Hargeisa in August 2001. Participants provided an analysis of the situation of human rights in different regions of the country and included: Abdirashid Osman Jama (Somali Rights), Abdullahi Sheikh (Somaliland Guurti), Abokor Sheikh Yusuf (Isha Human Rights Organisation), Ahmed Ali Roble, Ahmed Hussein Warsame (Technical Committee of Hargeisa Massacre), Amina Mohamed Deria (National Organization for Women), Dhalmado (Mothers Development Concern), Fatuma Said Ibrahim (OHCHR), Hadiis M. Hadiis, Hassan Heis (Republican), Ismahan Abdi Salam (NEGAAD), Ismail M. Bulaale (Horn Watch), Marian Hussein Mohamed (Dr. Ismail Juma'le Human Rights Centre), Mohamed Ismail Esse



(SHILCON - Somali Reunification Women Union), Rashid Abdi Hussein (SAMCA Minority Groups), Sadia Abdi (ICD) and Suleiman Ismail (Horn Watch).

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# Acronyms

AAIN	Action Africa in Need
APD	Academy for Peace and Development
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CACAS	Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for Somalia
CAP	UN Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal
CBF	Capacity Building Facility (UNDP)
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Violence against Women
CfBT	Centre for British Teachers
CIA	United States Central Intelligence Agency
CINS	Cooperazione Italiana Nord-Sud
COSONGO	Consortium of Somaliland Non-Governmental Organisations
COGWO	Coalition of Grassroots Women's Organisations
CRD	Centre for Research and Development
DIMU	Data and Information Management Unit (UNDP)
EC	European Commission
EPI	Enlarged Programmes of Immunisation
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FRUD	Front pour la Restauration de la Democratie
FSAU	Food Security Assessment Unit
HDI	Human Development Index
HDR	Human Development Report
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Authority
ICCPR	International Convent on Civil and Political Rights
ICD	International Cooperation for Development
ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person

IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IMC	International Medical Corps
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IUCN	The World Conservation Union
LPI	Life and Peace Institute
MCH	Mother and Child Health
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (UNICEF)
NETSON	Network for Somali NGOs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NID	National Immunisation Days
NSS	National Security Service
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OHCHR	Office for the High Commission of Human Rights
PDRC	Puntland Development and Research Centre
PENHA	Pastoral and Environmental Network in the Horn of Africa
RRA	Rahanweyn Resistance Army
RVF	Rift Valley Fever
SACB	Somalia Aid Coordination Body
SC - UK	Save the Children (UK)
SCPP	Somali Civil Protection Programme (UNDP)
SNA	Somali National Alliance
SNM	Somali National Movement
SNPC	Somali National Peace Conference
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRRC	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SYL	Somali Youth League
TNA	Transitional National Assembly
TNC	Transitional National Charter
TNG	Transitional National Government
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN	United Nations
UNA	Italian Umbrella NGO

UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNCU	United Nations Coordination Unit
UNDOS	United Nations Development Office for Somalia
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHCS	United Nations Centre for Human Settlement
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Women's Organisation
UNITAF	United Nations Task Force
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
USC	United Somali Congress
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WSP	War-torn Societies Project



### People and Culture

**The people:** Somalis form the vast majority of the population, whose ethnicity is defined by a shared language, a pastoral economy, and adherence to Islam and a clan-based social and political system. Other Somalis include occupational castes, such as the Tumul, Yibr, Yahar, Midgan and Eyle. The non-ethnic Somali population includes the urban and coastal people, the Reer Hamar/Banadir and Barawanese people of mixed Arab, Persian, Pakistani, Portuguese and Somali heritage; Bantu riverine agriculturalists; Swahili-speaking Bajuni fishing communities; and Arabs of Yemen, Oman and Zanzibar descent.

**Religion:** Islam (*sunni*)

**Spoken languages:** Somali, a Cushitic language, is the main language, with two main dialects, *af-maxaa* spoken by the majority and *af-maay* spoken by Reewin inter-riverine groups. Swahili is spoken by coastal groups such as the Bajuni and the Mushunguli in the Juba regions. Arabic, English and Italian are also commonly spoken.

**Written language:** Somali

### Politics

**Government:** Central government collapsed in January 1991. Since then administrations performing public functions have been established in the Northwest (Somaliland) in 1991; the Northeast (Puntland) in 1998; Bay and Bakol in 1999; and since 2000 in Mogadishu (Transitional National Government).

### Geography

**Land area:** 637,657 km<sup>2</sup>

**Coastline:** 3,300 km

**Location:** between longitudes 41°E and 51°24'E and latitudes 11°30'N and 1°30'S

**Highest peak:** Shimber Berris (2,407 m) Sanag region

**Largest towns:** Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Burco, Berbera, Bosaso, Garowe, Galkaiyo, Kismayo, Berbera, Baidoa

### Climate

**Temperature:** 27°C (mean average)

30°C – 45°C (maximum)

20°C – 30°C (minimum)

Coldest (December-February)

Hottest (May-August)

Luuq and Bardheere are the hottest places in Somalia

**Main seasons:** *Gu* rains (April-June)

*Haga'a* dry season (July-September)

*Deyr* rains (October-November)

*Jilaal* dry season (December-March)

**Rainfall:** Mean annual of less than 500 mm

50 mm along the northern coast

500 mm in the northern highlands

150 mm in the interior plateau

330-500 mm in the southwest

## Demography

**Population:** 6.38 million

**Population density:** 10 persons per square kilometre

**Population growth rate:** 2.76%

**Internally displaced persons:** 300,000

**Somali refugees:** 246,400 (neighbouring countries only)

## Land Use

**Pastoral land:** 45% of total land area

**Arable land:** 13% of total land area

**Forest and woodland:** 14% of total land area

**Unclassified:** 28% of total land area

## Livelihoods

**Pastoralism:** 59% of the population practice nomadic and semi-nomadic or agro-pastoralism

**Agriculture:** 17% of the population practice sedentary agriculture

**Urban:** 24% of the population live in urban settlements

## Economy

**Principal exports:** Livestock (sheep, goats, camels, cattle)

**GNP per capita:** US\$ 200

**GNP:** US\$ 1.3 billion

**External debt:** US\$ 2.6 billion

**Remittances:** US\$ 300-500 million per annum

**Donor aid:** US\$ 115 million (pledged) in humanitarian and development aid in 2000

## Health

**Average life expectancy:** 47 years

**Infant mortality rate:** 132 per 1,000 live births

**Under-five mortality rate:** 224 per 1,000 live births

**Maternal mortality rate:** 1,600 per 100,000 live births

**HIV/AIDS prevalence:** <1%

**Access to health services:** 28%

**Doctors:** 0.4 per 100,000 persons

## Education

**Adult literacy:** 17.1%

**Primary school enrolment:** 13.6%

## Water and Sanitation

**Access to clean water:** 23%

**Access to sanitation:** 52%

## Infrastructure

**Main ports:** Berbera, Bosasso, Kismayo, Mogadishu (closed), functioning beach ports in Merka and El Ma'an

**Main airports:** Baidoa, Balidogli, Berbera, Bosasso, Galkaiyo, Hargeisa, Mogadishu (closed)

**Roads:** 21,830 kms (2,800 kms paved)

See chapter 5 for detailed data tables and references.

## Fikrad Guud

### Marxaladda Kala Guurka ee Soomaaliya

Sanadkii 1991kii waxay dunida ku noqotay argagax markii Soomaaliya uu harqiyey dagaalka sokeeye, dowladii ay duntay ayna masiibo bani'aadamnimo oo aan horay loo aragi ka dilaacday. Saamaynta ay dumidda dawladdu ku yeelatay horumarinta aadanaha waxay ahayd mid qoto dheer, oo qusaysa qurgooyada nafaf badan, Qax gudeed oo balaaran (IDPs) iyo dhoofid banaanka ah, dumid hay'adihii siyaasiga ahaa, burburid kaabayaashii ijtimaaciga ahaa iyo kuwii dhaqaalaha iyo waliba waxyeelo deegaanka ah. Soomaalidu sharafdhaba dawladda la'aanta ka soo gaaray waxaa ka mid ah xayiraadda dhinaca socdaalka caalamiga ah, xaqiridda dhinaca dhaqdhaqaaqada dhaqaalaha iyo la'aanta heer qaran iyo caalamiba ee ilaalinta iyo nabadgalyada. Dagaalka sokeeye wuxuu su'aal ka abuuray jiritaanka hal qaran oo Soomaali ah wuxuuna kashifay kala duwanaanshaha bulshada Soomaaliyeed iyo dhaqankeedaba. Saas oo ay tahay, Soomaali badan oo qurbaha ku nool ayaa lacag ay ka soo diraan dibadda maalgalin xooggan ugu sameeyey wadanka. Belowga qarniga cusub Soomaaliya waxay gashay marxalad cakiran oo isbedel siyaaso, dhaqaal iyo bulshaba leh.

Inkastoo Soomaaliya aysan yeelan dawladda kaliya oo dhexe tan iyo 1990-kii, hadana arimaha

siyaadda, dhaqaalaha iyo horumarkuba ma istaagin. Bilowgii sagaashanaadkii wuxuu ahaa xili ay dawladdu kala daadasho iyo qoqobnaa awood siyaasadeed halkaas ka jirtey oo ay aasaasmeen qaabab is-xukun oo kala duwan oo heer bulsho, degmo iyo gobolba ah si ay u buuxiyaan duleelaadka (vacuum) dawladda dhexe. Tan iyo 1998-kii, qaabkii kala daadashada dawladda siyaasadda qabqablanimada ee uu caanka ku ahaa horaantii 1990-kii waxay jidka u xaartay qaab deegaanow iyo horumar isbahaysi siyaasadeed oo balaaran oo ku dhisan si nidaamsan, islamarkaasana ku dhisan qaabab awoodeed oo aan isku dhac wadan (less violent). Maamullo ayaa waqooyiga ka samaysmay tan iyo 1991-kii dhinaca waqooyi galbeed Jamhuuriyadda 'Somaliland' iyo iyadoo 1998-kii la dhisay 'Puntland' kuwaas oo leh maamul dadweyne oo fuliya qaybaha aasaasiga ah ee dawliga. Tan iyo 1999kii dhaqdhaqaaqa Wax iska caabinta Rahanweyn (RRA) ayaa bilaabay inuu sameeyo maamul u keenay nabadgalyo labada gobol ee koofureed ee Bay iyo Bakool oo ku sugnaa nabadgalyo xumo joogto ah tobaneeyadii sano ee la soo dhaafay. Horumarka siyaasadeed ee ugu weyn ee samaysmay tan iyo 2000 wuxuu ahaa abuuridda dawladda ku meel gaarka ah (TNG) oo fadhigeedu yahay Muqdisho. Tani waa mirihii ka soo baxay shirweyne dheer oo dib u heshiisiin qaran ah. Dawladda ku meel gaarka ah waxaa laga sugayaa in ay xaliso dagaalada dheeraaday ee dhibay koonfurt Somaliya in ka badan tobaneeyo sano. Aqbalaadda dawladda ku meelgaarka ah laga aqbalay Golaha Guud ee Qaramada Midoobay, Ururka Jaamacadda

Carabta iyo ururkii hore ee Midowga Afrika waxay Soomaaliya u keentay in si rasmi ah looga matalo ururadaan caalamiga ah markii ugu horaysay muddo toban sano ah.

Kala daadashada siyaasadeed iyo tan dhaqaale ee ka dhacday Soomaaliya uma badna in ay si buuxda isu bedesho maamulada gaarka ah ee jirana waa kuwo weli aan saldhigan oo koraya (evolving). Si kastaba ha ahaatee waxaa jira xoogag dhaqaale iyo kuwo bulsho oo u muuqda in ay u baahanyihiin hab iyo nidaam balaaran. Soo ifbaxa qaababka xukuumadeed ee awoodaha siyaasiga ah ee maamul goboleed-yada iyo koritaanka xarumaha magaaloyinka sida Hargeysa, Garowe, Boosaaso iyo Beydhaba, waa mid tilmaamaysa wadiiqada isku imaatinka. Marka lagu lamaaneeyo soo yaraan-shaha baahida bani'aadamnimada oo ay keentay ka soo raynta nabadgalyada iyo nafiska cadaadiska cimilada, sansaamahaan ayaa astaan u noqonaya suurtagalnimada marxalad isbedel horumar oo Soomaaliya ku yimaada.

Tobaneeyadii sano ee Soomaaliya aysan lahayn dowlad dhexe oo shaqaynaysa, beey'ada caalamiga ah waxay martay ibedelo muhiim ah. Isbedeladaas waxaa ka mid ah dhamaadkii dagaalkii qaboobaa, dib u habayntii ganacsiga caalamiga ah, qaniimada dhaqaalaha iyo awoodda siyaasadda oo isugu urutay reer galbeedka, iyo soo ifbaxa dimoqraadiyadda dhexdhexaadka ah oo tilmaan u noqotay is-xukun wanaagga (good governance). Habkii horumarka ee dawladu hogaaminaysay waxaa ka saramaray hab hor-

murka uu suuqu hogaaminayo. Xuquuqda aadanaha ayaa safka hore ka gashay arimaha caalamiga. Nidaam goboleedyada ayaa kaalin weyn ku yeeshay mowduucyada dhaqaalaha iyo siyaasadda ee arimaha dawliga ah. Waxaa dhacay horumar deg-deg ah ee teknolojiyadda isgaarsiinta. Kaalmadii caadiga ahayd ee horumarinta ayaa hoos u dhacday, maadaamaa aan dowladda loo ictiqaadin cidda kaliya ee wakiilka ka ah horumarkana, nidaamyada bixinta iyo maamulidda kaalmaduna waa ay isbedeleen, tiyoo ay kordheen tirada, qaniimadda iyo saamaynta hay'adaha aan dawliga ahayni (NGOs). Isbedeladaani waxay saamayn ku yeeshen horumarka aadanaha ee Somaliya, isbedelada halkaas ka dhacayana waa mid qayb ahaan ku yimid laqabsiga saamaynadaan dibadda ah.

Isbedeladaan gudaha iyo dibaddaba ah waxay soo bandhigayaan loolan gaar ah oo ku wajahan horumarinta horumarka aadanaha. Warbixinta Horumarinta aadanaha waxay bixinaysaa hab lagu darso saamaynta ay isbedeladaanu ku leeyihiin dadka Somaliyeed.

## **Horumarinta Aadanaha**

Tan iyo 1990-kii hay'adda Qaramada Midoobay ee Barnaamijyada Houmarinta (UNDP) iyo hay'adaha la shaqeeya waxay horumarinayeen fikirka horumarinta aadanah. Sida uu u dhigay ninkii lahaa dhismaheeda aasaasigaa, marxuum Maxbub al Xaq, horumarinta aadanuhu waxay u jeedaa 'in ay dadka u saamaxdo inuu yeesho kala



doorasho baahsan'. Sanooyin badan Waxsoosaarka Guud ee Qaranka (GNP) kaga aada qofkiiba ayaa ahaa cabirka salka ah ee horumarka. Waxaa cadaatay tani inaysan ahayn tilmaan la isku halayn karo, si kastaba ha ahaatee, waayo wadamo badan oo waxsoosaarkooda guudi ee ku aadan qofkii run ahaan sareeyo ayaa ku guulaysan waayey in ay u turjumaan horumarkaas horumar ay muwaadiniintoodu gaaraan. Waxaa intaa dheer dadyow badan ayaa hagaagida dakhliga iyo helidda maadadu eyana muhiimadda koowaad u lahayn marka la barbardhigo xoriyadda dhaqanka iyo diinta ama dareenka bulshada. Isagoo dadka siinaya kaalinta ugu muhiimsan ee habka horumarinta aadanaha, horumarinta aadanuhu waxay horumarka ka egeysaa mid aan ku ekeyn oo kali ah koboca dhaqaalaha balse waxay bixinaysaa cabir xagga tayada ah ee horumarka (fiiri sanduuqa 0.1).

Tan iyo 1990-kii, heer caalam, gobol, qaran, qayb qaran ee warbixinada Horumarinta Aadanaha waxay noqdeen mid ka mid ah mabaadi'da UNDP ay u adeegsato horumarinta iyo cabiridda horukacyada horumarinta aadanaha. Dumitaanka waqtiga dheer jirtay ee dawladdii Soomaaliyeed macnaheedu waxaa weeye in aanay jirin meel qura iyo cod midaysan oo jiheeya siyaasadaha horumarinta.

### **Sanduuqa 0.1: Qeexidda horumarinta aadanaha**

Laba qeexid shaqood ee horumarinta aadanaha ayaa lagu kala isticmaalaa warbixinada Horumarinta Aadanaha. Tan hore waa mid gaar ah oo fure u tahay tiradu oo ka kooban saddex tilmaamayaal – Cimri nololeedka, heerka waxbarashada dadka waaweyn iyo wax soo saarka guud ee dhabta ah inta kaga aaddan qofkiiba. Tan ayaa markaa laga soo saaraa guud ahaan heerka horumarinta aadanaha ama qaymaha wadan kasta. Tan ayaa hadana loo isticmaalaa in lagu qaymeeyo laysuguna dhereriyo horukaca horumarinta aadanaha ee wadamada iyo gobolada oo dhan. In kastoo tusmadu wakhti dheer la hagaajinayey si ay muuqaal macquul ah nooga siiso horumarinta aadanaha, waxaa lafahmay in ay nisbo ahaan tahay cabir aan bislayn oo lagu qiimeeyo dhacdada (phenomenon) aadka u adag, qanigana u ah Horumarinta Aadanaha. Qeexidda labaad ee warbixintaan loo isticmaalayo waa mid balaaran oo aan la xadadi karin. Waxay ka hadlaysaa mawduucyo badan oo kala duwan oo ay ka mid yihiin nidaamka ilaalinta caafimaadka, heerka waxbarashada, cuntada iyo nafaqada, dakhliga iyo baahida, xuquuqda aadanaha, deegaanka iyo nabadgalyada aadanaha.

Dhab ahaantii, khilaafka ka jira sharcinimada maamulada gaarka ah ayaa muujinaya kala duwanaanshaha baahida horumarinta iyo waliba rabitaanada kala duwan ee dadka Soomaaliyeed. Warbixintaani waxay raadinaysaa in ay sharaxdo sansaanka muhiimka ah ee horumarinta aadanaha ee Soomaaliya.

## **Ujeedada Warbixinta Horumarinta Aadanaha ee 2001<sup>da</sup>**

Sanadkii 1998dii UNDP waxay soo saartay warbixintii koowaad ee horumarinta aadanaha ee Soomaaliya(HDR)<sup>2</sup>. Warbixinta oo ahayd warbixintii ugu horaysay ee laga sameeyo wadan aan dawladi ka jirin, waxay bixisay taariikhihii dheeraaday ee mashaakilaadka siyaasadeed iyo mid

aadaminimaba ee Soomaaliya. Waxay taxliil ku samaynaysaa sababaha siyaasadeed iyo kuwa dhaqaale ee hoos udhaca horumarka aadanaha waxayna daraasad ku samaynaysaa mawduucyada waxbarashada iyo is-xukunka. Soo jeedinta go'aamada iyo wixii lagu ogaaday warbixintaas waxaa lagu soo koobay Sanduuqa 0.2.

Waxaan ka hadlaynaa ma aha oo kaliya sida ay bulshadu u qaybsantahay, laakiin sida ay isu bedsheyna waa in lagu daraa<sup>3</sup>. Tabaha korloogu qaadayo horumarinta aadanaha ee Soomaaliya waa in ay ka warqabaan isbedelada Soomaaliya ka dhacayey tobankii sano ee la soo dhaafay. Warbixinta Horumarinta Aadanaha ee 2001 waxay darsaysaa sansaanka bulsho-dhaqaale ee tan iyo 1998-kii. Iyadoo isu soo uruurisay xogihii ugu dan-

beeyey ee horumarrinta aadanaha ee Soomaaliya, Warbixintani waxaa loola jeedaa in lagu caawiyo hogaamiyayaasha bulshada Soomaalida iyo go'aan qaatayaasha caalamiga ah, deeqbixiyayaasha iyo hay'adaha gargaarka siday u qaabayn lahaayeen horumarinta aadanaha iyo tabaha aadaminimo ee Soomaaliya.

Warbixinta Horumarinta Aadanaha ee 2001da waxay kaloo wax ku kordhinaysaa fahamkeena nashaadka (dynamics) marxaladda isbadalka ee Soomaaliya iyadoo la darsayo saddex xoog oo samayn ku leh horumarka aadanaha kuwaasoo abuura fursado iyo loolamo: caalamiyeynta; lahaanshaha gaarka ah; iyo xuquuqda aadanaha. Arintaan iyada ah, Warbixintani waxay u jeeddaa in ay sharaxdo horana u mariso falanqaynaha ku

### **Sanduuqa 0.2: Talo soo jeedin kooban ee warbixinta horumarinta aadanaha Soomaaliya ee 1998**

Warbixinta horumarinta aadanaha ee 1998dii waxay talooyin dhowr ah u soo jeedisay deeq bixiyahaasha, Hay'adaha samafalka, iyo dadka siyaasadda jaangooya:

**Ka qaybgalka Soomaalida:** Waa in uu jiraa la tashi balaaran iyo ka qaybgalin Soomaalida ee barnaamijyada horumarinta caalamiga ah. Dumarku gaar ahaan waa in ay cod weyn ku yeeshaan fagaarayaasha lagu jaangoynayo kala mudnaanta horumarinta.

**Is-ukun Wanaaggsan:** Barnaamijyada kaalmadu waa inay dhisaan maamulka awoodda isxukunka ee deegaanka iyo ururada bulshada ee shacabka ah.

**Gargaarka iyo Horumarinta:** Deeq bixiyayaashu kaalmada aadaminimo oo ay siinayaan Soomaaliya waa in ay bar bar socotaa rabiataanka niyadda buuxda leh (commitment) kor uqaadidda awoodda Soomaalida ee mustaqbalka iyadoo kor loo qaadayo horumarinta aadanaha, gaar ahaan waxbarashada iyo dhaqdhaqaaqa dhaqaalaha ee kor u qaadaya shaqo helidda.

**Bulshada:** Hay'adaha caalamiga ahi waa in ay taageeraan dadaalada lagu yareynayo isticmaalka qaadka.

**Deegaanka:** Dadaalada caalamiga ahi waa inay taageeraan dhiirgaliyaana dadaalada gudaaha ee ilaalinta deegaanka.

aadan dabeecadaha is bedeleya ee dawladnimada Somalida iyo xaaladaha caalamiga ah, iyo sidii xoogagaan laysugu xiri lahaa siday kor ugu qaadi lahaayeen halkii ay horumarinta aadanaha dib u dhigi lahaayeen.

## Mawduucyada Warbixinta Horumarinta Aadanaha ee 2001<sup>da</sup>

### **Sansaanka Horumarinta aadanaha: Ma sideedii bay ku socotaa mise waa isbadashay?**

Toban sano oo dagaal sokeeye iyo dumis dawladeed kadib, horumarinta aadanaha ee Soomaaliya si aan la aqbali Karin ayey u hooseysaa. Boqolaal kun oo Soomaali ah ayaa macaluul ku nool, waxayna u dayacanyihiin dhibaatooyinka qulqulatooyinka siyaasadeed, suuqyada caalamiga ah iyo cimilada. Isla mar ahaantaas dad ayaa dhaqaale ahaan ka faa'iday oo tobankii sano ee la soo dhaafay waxaa jiray horumar la taaban karo ee dhinacyada isgaarsiinta iyo kaabayaasha dhaqaalaha. Isbadalada dhaqanka ayaa iyana ka muuqda kaalinta xoogagga dhaqanku kaga jiraan is-xukunka oo kor u kacay, kaalinta weyn ee dumarku ku leeyihiin dhaqaalaha iyo saamaynta ay ururada diintu ku leeyihiin arimaha bulshada, dhaqaalaha iyo siyaasadda.

*Cutubka 1* aad wuxuu darsayaa xaaladda horumarinta aadanaha ee Soomaaliya. Iyadoo ka shidaal qaadanaysa qoraalada iyo wararka la hayo, Warbixinta Horumarinta Aadanuhu waxay tixgalin siinaysaa su'aalo dhowr ah:

- Waa maxay sansaanada muhiimka ah ee horumarinta aadanaha?
- Heerka horumarinta aadanuhu ma ka sareeyaa mise waa ka hooseeyaa siduu ahaa 10 ilaa 15 sano ka hor?
- Sansaamuhu ma isku si bey u saameeyeen gobolada oo dhan iyo qaybaha bulshada?

Warka hadda la hayo waxay tilmaamayaan in sansaanada horumarka aadanuhu ay tahay mid aan kala soocnayn. Halka xoogaa horumar ah laga sameeyey tasmayaasha horumarinta aadanaha saddexdii sano ee na soo dhaaftay, kuwaas oo ay ka mid yihiin tirada dadka dugsiyada is qoray, dhakhliga qofkiiba heli karo, iyo Tusaha Horumarinta Aadanaha, oo lagu cabiro 0.284, waxay wadanka dhigtay meel ku dhow salka cabirka aduunka ee horumarinka aadanaha. Horumarkan yar ee ka yimid qaybo ka mid ah tilmaamayaasha horumarinta aadanaha waxaa sal u ah hoos u dhaca heerarka dagaalada hubaysan iyo qaxa dadweynaha marka loo eego horaantii iyo bartamihii 1990aadkii.

### **Sansaanka Dadka**

- Waxaa jira sansaan wanaagsan oo xagga dadka ah. Tirada dadka qaxootiga ah iyo kuwa barakacayba wey yaraadeen saddexdii sano ee la soo dhaafay, taasoo tilmaamaysa xaaladda nabadgalyo oo hagaagtay. Si kastaba ha ahaatee u guuridda xarumaha waaweyn a dhaqaalaha sida Muqdishu, Hargeysa, Bosaaso, Burco, Galkacyo iyo Baydhaba waxay abuurtay caqabado hor leh oo dhanka horumarinta aadanaha ah

ee adeegyada iyo shaqo helidda oo ah mid calaamad u ah magaalowga deg-degga ah.

■ Dadka ugu liita waa dadka barakacay, qaxootiga soo laabanaya, reer magaalka faqiirka ah, raa-catada cayrta ah iyo bulshada beeralayda ah ee wabiyada koofureed ku nool.

## Sansaanka Nabadgalyada Aadanaha

■ Dagitaankii dagaalada ee inta badan Soomaaliya tan iyo bartamihii 1990-kii waxay la macno ahayd dhimashooyinkii dagaalka la xiriiray, xaaladihii deg-degga ahaa ee nolosha khatar galinayey, dhaqdhaqaaqa qoxootiga iyo barakaca gudaha oo is dhimay. Xaaladda nabadgalyada si guud looma qaadan karo. Halka xaaladda nabadgalyada ee waqooyigu ay nisbo ahaan nabadoontahay, daganaansha la'aanta aan la qiyaasi karin ee nabadgalyada ee inta badan koofurta Somaliya waxay xanibtay gaaritaanka kaalmada aadaminimo. Nabadgalyada iyo gaaridda kaalmada aadamiga ah si weyn ayeey u hagaagtay gobolada Bay iyo Bakool tan iyo 1999-kii, markii ay RRAdu xukunka qabsatay. Dhulkan qaniga ah ee beeraley-raacatada (agro-pastoral) ah ee gobolkan si culus ayaa loogu dagaalamay markii uu socdey dagaalkii sokeeye, xalinta dagaalada goboladaanuna waxay calaamad u noqon kartaa mid ka mid ah isbedelada muhiimka ah ee dagaalada tobanka sano. Saamaynta ay xaaladda Soomaaliya ku yeelankaraan dagaaladii Maraykanka lagu qaaday Sebteembar ee 2001<sup>da</sup> waa sabab wel-wel leh.

■ Sansaanka whakhtiga fog ee cunto heliddu waxay tusayaan waxoogaa ka soo reyn ah. Ka

dib masiibadii daadaka Elniinada (El-Niño floods) ee 1997 – 1998-kii iyo abaarihii 1998-1999-kii wax soo saarka mirahu ee sanadkii 2000 waxay ahaayeen kuwii ugu fiicnaa muddo todoba sano ah. Wax soo saarka beeraha ee guud, si kastaba ha ahaatee, weli aad ayuu uga yaryahay heerkii dagaalada ka hor, kororka labada kun ahina waa uun ka nafis gaaban. Waxaa la filayaa in gurashada miruhu ay hooseeyso qaybo ka mid ah koofurta waayitaanka roobabka guga awgeed. Arinta muhiimka ahi waxay tahay, hoos u dhaca dheeraaday ee ganacsiga xoolaha nool wuxuu saameyn ku yeeshay dhaqaalaha reer guuraaga, xayiraadda soo dajinta xoolaha nool ee dawladaha Gacankuna ee 1998-kii iyo 2000-kii waxay si weyn hoos ugu dhigtay awoodda wax gadashada ee inta badan qoysaska Soomaalida waxayna qatar galisay qutul-yoomka qoysaska faqiirka ah.

## Adeegyada Bulshada

■ Guud ahaan tilmaamayaasha horumarinta aadanaha ee Soomaaliya waxaa ku dhex qarsoon kala duwanaansho la taaban karo oo dhaqaale. Heerarka horumarka aadanahu guud ahaan wuxuu ku sareeyaa 'Somaliland' iyo 'Puntland' marka la bar bardhigo inta badan koofurta iyo gobolada dhexe ee Soomaaliya, cunta helidda oo ka fiican, dagaalo hubaysan oon aan jirin iyo dakhliga qoyska oo sareeya. Dadweynaha reer magaalka ah si fiican ayey wax ugu gadmaan marka loo eego kuwa reer miyiga ah, sababtoo ah adeegyada bulshada oo ku uruursan xarumaha magaalooyinka. Qoysaska dibadda wax looga soo diro waxay fursad fiican u helaan adeegyada bulshada, qutul

yoom heliddoodu way ka sareysaa kuwa aan waxba loo soo dirin.

■ Waxaa jiray hor u kac macquul ah ee dhanka wax barashada, iyadoo is qoridda dugsiyada hoose ay ku dhawaatay heerkii dagaalka ka hor, dugsiyada sare qaarkoodna ay kor u kaceen tan iyo 1998-kii. Si kastaba ha ahaatee, dadka wax qora waxna akhriya oo ah 17.1% iyo ka qayb galka dugsiyada hoose oo ah 13.6%, heerka helidda waxbarashadu waxay ku danbeysay meelaha ugu hooseeya ee aduunka.

■ Tusayaasha caafimaadku waxay muujinayaan in aanay jirin wax ka soo reyn ah ee caafimaadka dadweynaha sadexdii sano ee la soo dhaafay. Dhab ahaantii, tusayaashu waxay tusayaan in ay waxoogaa kor u kaceen dhimashada dhalaanka iyo kuwa shanta sano ka yar iyo meelaha qaarkood oo ay ka jirto nafaqo daro daba-dheeraatey koonfurta Soomaaliya. Helidda Tafiilaadka caafimaadku waxay ku uruursanyihiin xarumaha magaalooyinka kaas daraadeed dadweynaha miyiga ciriiri ayey ku tahay gaaridda adeegyada caafimaadku. Aad ayey u yar yihiin shaqaalaha carbisan ee caafimaadka ee shaqeeya. Soo dajinta daawooyinku ma laha wax sharci ah taas oo keentay in adeegyada gaarka ah ee daawooyinka loo keeno daawooyin dhacay oo tayadoodu xuntahay.

### **Sansaanka Dhaqaalaha**

■ Lacagaha la isu soo diro muddo badan ayey qayb muhiim ah ka ahaayeen dhaqaalaha Soomaaliya. Waqtiga xaadirka ah, Heerka wax soo saarka beeraha iyo sancada oo aad u hooseeya awgeed, lacagaha dibadda ee

Soomaalida badan ee banaanka jirta waxay wadanka awood u siisay in ay la qabsadaan dheelitirka hoos u dhaca dhaqaalaha (deficit) ganacsiga ayna heer sare ka gaaraan sugidda qutul yoomka iyo helidda adeegyada gaarka ah oo haddii kale sida kale u dhici lahayd. Sansaanka ay qaadato lacagaha la isu soo diro ayaa fure u ah sida ay u sii socoto horumarinta aadanahu.

■ Lahaanshaha gaarka ah ayaa sal u ah horumarinta aadanaha ee Soomaaliya. Dumidda dheeraatay ee dowladdii dhexe iyo heerka hooseeya ee kaalmada dib u dhiska iyo horumarinta waxay la macno tahay in qoysaska Soomaalidu ay baahidooda nololoeed ka soo gataan qaybaha lahaanshaha gaarka ah. Meelaha qaarkood lahaanshaha gaarka ahi si wanaagsan ayuu uga hir galay. Meela kalena, xumaanshaha suuqa ayaa ka qancin waayey baahida bulshada, soo saaridda khidmad laga bixiyo adeegyada caafimaadka iyo waxbarashada waxay si aanay ka baxsan karin banaanka u dhigtay faqiirka.

■ Dhaqaaluhu hoos ayuu u dhacayey tan iyo intii ay dilaaceen dagaalada sokeeye, taasoo aan la isticmaalin hanti tira badan, muruq iyo dhulbeereedba. Qaybaha qaarkood, si kastaba ha ahaatee, waxaa jiray heerar koboc oo macquul ah. Baahida gacanka carabta ee nuuradda qalalan iyo sisintu, tusaale ahaan, waxay fursado cusub u abuureen miro dhoofiyayaasha yar yar ee koonfurta Soomaaliya, tiyoo qayb ahaan daboolaysa dumitaankii dhoofinta muuska. Hargeysa, Muqdisho, iyo Boosaaso, maalgalinta sancada

yar yari way balaaratay, taas oo tusaysa kalsooni-da maalgaliyayaasha deegaanka ee dhinaca dhaqaalaha iyo nabadgalyada deegaanka.

■ Qaybta adeegga waa tan ugu xarakada badan ee dhaqaalaha. Shirkadaha lacagaha xawila waxay ku fideen Soomaaliya oo dhan, waxayna kordhiyeen heerar badan oo adeegga maaliyadda ah iyagoo fududeenaya socodka lacagaha dibad-da laga soo diro iyo wax isdhaafsiga ganacsiga. Shirkadahaan oo aan toban sano ka hor jirin, waxay ka mid yihiin maanta gancsiga ugu xoogga badan leh ee Soomaaliya. Sidoo kale, qaybta gaadiidka ayaa balaaratay, iyadoo dhowr diyaaradood oo Soomaalidu leeyihiin ay ka hawl galaan adeegyada caalamiga ah. Waxbashada gaarka ah iyo caafimaadka, hoteelada iyo maqaayadaha iyo shirkadaha waxyaabaha la'isticmaalo sida korontada iyo biyaha, ayaa iyaguna abuuray dakhli iyo fursado shaqo oo cusub. Horumarka qayta adeegga waxaa hakiyey, si kastaba ha ahaatee, la'aanta shuruucda iyo la qabsi la'aanta waxyaabaha la isticmaalo qaarkood sida isgaarsiinta taleefoonada.

■ Ganacsigu wuu balaartay sanadahaan dambe. In kastoo ay xayireen dhoofinta xoolaha wadama-da gacanku, baahida gudaha, oo lagu maalgaliyo inta badan lacagaha banaanka laga soo diro, waxay suuq mac-quul ah u sameeyaan cuntada, shidaalka, dharka, badeecooyinka kale ee lagama maarmaanka ah. Dhaqdhaqaaqa ganacsiga waxaa aad u koray ganacsiga isu-gudbinta (transit trade), taasoo ay Soomaaliya noqotay meel la isaga gudbiyo ganacsiga Geeska iyo Bariga Africa. Marinka Berbera waxaa mara shixnado sii

badanaya oo ku jeeda Etoobiya, halka koofurtana uu maro ganacsi xoogan oo isaga goosha dekedaha xeebta ah ee Muqdisho iyo Kenya. La'aanshaha adeegyo bangi oo la isku haleyn karo oo bixiya warqadda deynta (L/C) ayaa caqabad xun ku ah ganacsiga.

■ Jiritaan la'aanta cid lala xisaabtamo iyo awood xil kas ah oo fulisa siyaasadaha lacagta ayaa ah mid khatar ku ah horumarka dhaqaalaha iyo noloshaba. Labadii kun (2000) iyo Labada kun iyo kowda (2001) Ganacsato Soomaaliyeed ayaa soo dajiyey lacago Shilin Soomaali ah oo aan sharci ahayn taasoo keentay sicir barar xun. Tani waxay si ba'an hoos ugu dhigtay awoodda wax iibsiga ee dan yarta, halka Soomaalida qaniga ah oo dhaqaalahoodu ku salaysanyahay Doolarka, ayan wax saas ah saamayn ugu yeelanin.

■ Waxa jira kala duwanaansho xun oo u dhexeeya koofurta iyo waqooyiga Soomaaliya ee dhinaca kaabayaasha dhaqaalaha. 'Puntland' iyo 'Somaliland' maalgalinta jidadka iyo dibudhiska dakaduhu way suurta gashay, taasoo sahashay socodka ganacsiga. Dhinaca kale, jidadka, dakadaha iyo dhismayaasha garoomada diyaaradaha ee koofurtu waxay ku suganyihiin xaalad aad uga sii daraysa, oo sii kordhinaysa qaymaha gaadiidka iyo badeecooyinka.

## Sansaanka Deegaanowga

■ Soomaaliya waxaa soo food saaray dhibaato adag oo xagga deegaanka ah. Jaridda aan xakamaysnayn ee geedaha dhaadheer (acacia) iyo kaymaha (juniper forests) ee dhuxusha la dhoofiyo iyo caagga (timber) loo jaro ayaa dhibaa-

to waarta ku keentay dhulka daaqa ah (range-lands) oo ah hantida ugu qaalisan ee Soomaaliya. Sidoo kale, hantidii badda ee Soomaaliya ayaa waxaa xaalufiyey falal kaluumaysi oo inta abadan ah fuuqsadayaal (trawlers) shisheeye.

### **Sansaanka Kaalmada Caalamiga ah**

■ Kaalmada caalamiga ah ee Soomaaliya aad ayey hoos ugu dhacday tan iyo dagaalka ka hor iyo tan iyo horaantii 1990-kii. Tan iyo 1998-kii kaalmadii aadaminimo hoos ayey u dhacday halka taageerada dib u dhisku ay korodhay marka la barbar dhigo kaalmada guud, taasoo ka turjumaysa ka soo raynta xaaladda nabad galyada iyo siyaasadda deeq bixiyayaasha. Marka la barbardhigo qaymaha ganacsiga iyo lacagta sanadkii dibadda laga soo diro, si kastaba ha ahaatee, kaalmada caalamiga ahi wax yar ayey ka tahay dhaqaalaha Soomaaliya.

### **Caalamiyeynta iyo Deegaamaynta**

*Cutubka 2* aad wuxuu darsayaa saamaynta ay caalamiyeyntu ku leedahay horumarka aadanaha ee Soomaaliya. Warbixinta UNDP ee adduunka ee horumarinta aadanaha ee la soo saaray 1999kii waxay ku soo gaba gabaysay in 'caalamiyeyntu ay wax weyn ka geysanayso ciribtirka gaajada qarniga 21aad, laakiin in saamaynta ay ku yeelanayso wadamada saboolka ah ay tahay mid isku dhafan, oo inta badan xaqiraysa (marginalise) kuwa ugu faqiirsan halka ay fursado cusub uga abuurayso kuwa kale<sup>4</sup>. Si loo xaqiijiyay in caalamiyeyntu ay si fiican ugu adeegto in ay kor

u qaado horumarinta aadanaha, warbixinta adduunka ee horumarinta aadanuhu ee 1999ku waxay ku baaqday in si fiican loo agaasimo caalamiyeynta loo marayo is-xukun wax ku ool ah ee heerar deegaan, mid gobol, iyo mid caalamiba.

Caalamiyeyntu waxay la xiriirtaa daciifidda madaxbanaanida iyo awoodda dawladda waxaana lagu kabay sansaanka ku aadan deegaameynta (localisation). *Cutubka labaad* wuxuu darsayaa sida ay isula shaqeeyaan caalamiyeynta iyo deegaameynta Soomaaliya. La'aanshaha raagtey ee dawlad dhexe ee Soomaaliya waxay la macno tahay in ay bulshada Soomaalidu si toos ah ugu dayacantahay faa'iidada iyo khasaaraha ee saamaynta caalamiyeynta. Saamaynta horumarinta aadanaha waa cakiranyahay waana kala duwanyahay, laakiin dhowr meelood ayuu ka muuqdaa:

■ Qaabka adduunka ee qoxootiga iyo dhaqdhaqaaqa tacabirka shaqo raadiska ayaa fududeeyey kororka Soomaalida dibadda ee caalamka.

■ Tiknolojidda cusub ee isgaarsiinta ayaa fududeysay horumarka nidaam si fiican u horumarsan oo lacagta ay Soomaalida dibadda degan ay dadkooda Soomaaliya jooga ugu soo diraan.

■ La'aanta shuruuc ganacsi ee Soomaaliya waxay sahashay fididda xiriirada ganacsiga caalamiga ee Somaliya mara, oo ku xiran Dubei iyo Kenya. Si kastaba ha ahaatee waxay kaloo fududeysay soo galitaanka hubka ee suuqa caalamiyoobey ee ganacsiga hubka iyo soo dajinta daawooyin tayadoodu hooseyso iyo cuntooyinka wakhtigoodii dhacay.

■ Kooxaha dambiyada caalamiga ah ayaa iyana ka faa'iidaystay dumidda dowladdii Soomaaliyeed.

■ Ururada hay'adaha caalamiga ah ee QM, deeq bixiyayaasha, iyo ururada aan dawliga ahayn, waxay door muhuum ah ka ciyaaraan baahida nolosha iyo ilaalinta bulshada ee Soomaaliya, walibana waxoogaa ay qayb ka qaataan dhaqaalaha wadanka.

■ Dhaqdhaqaaqada caalamiga ah ee islaamiga ah xiriiradooda ayey la leeyihiin kooxaha islaamiga ah ee Soomaaliya.

Cutubku wuxuu tixgalin siinayaa siyaasadaha dhaqsaha loogu baahanyahay ee heer deegaan, qaran iyo caalamiba, si loo xoojiyo dhinacyada wanaagsan ee caalamiyeynta ee Soomaaliya loona yareeyo dhinaceedo xun ee horumarinta aadanaha.

## **Lahaanshaha Gaarka ah iyo Saameynteeda Horumarinta Aadanaha**

Mid ka mid ah isbedelada ugu waaweyn ee Soomaaliya ka dhacay tobankii sano ee la soo dhaafay waa koridda lahaanshaha gaarka ah. Dhaqaalaha aan sharciga ku dhisnayn iyo hanti gaar u yeelashada waxaa wehliyey deegaanow sare oo is-xukun leh. Kor u kaca lahaansha gaarka ah wuxuu si dhow ugu xiranyahay hababka caalamiga. Xaaladaha daciifka ah oo inta badan na aanay jirin maamul shacab oo wax ku ool ah oo dad weyne, lahaansha gaarka ahi wuxuu door muhiim ah ka ciyaaraa daboolidda adeegyada bulshada iyo qaabeynta horumarka. Mar hadii dhaqaalaha suuqu hogaamiyo uu bedeley

dhaqaalihii dhexda (central) laga qorsheyn jiray, horumarku wuxuu noqday mid uu suuqu hogaamiyo halkii ay dawladdu ka hogaamin jirtay. *Cutubka 3aad* wuxuu si faah-faahsan u darsayaa horumarka lahaanshaha gaarka ah iyo saamaynta uu ku leeyahay horumarinta aadanaha. Cutubkani wuxuu ku doodayaa:

■ Dagaalada sokeeye waxay keeneen wax aanay keenin barnaamijyadii lagu toosinayey qaabka dhaqaalaha (structural adjustment) ee 1980dii. Taas oo ah dhaqaale aan sharciyaysnay oo keenay fididda lahaanshaha gaarka ah. Si kastaba ha ahaatee marka laga reebo qaybo yar sida isgaarsiinta-telefoonada, wax is bedel weyn ahi kuma dhicin dhaqaalaha. Qaybaha badankooda, xarakaadka dhaqaaluhu wuxuu fiicnaa dagaalka ka hor, sababta ugu weyn waxay ahayd kaalmada dibadda wadanka uga imaan jirtay. Halka ay tahay in ay dad yari ka faa'iidaystaan xaaladdaan iyada ah, heerarka sare ee shaqo la'aantu waxay la macno tahay in dad tiro badani aanay ka qayb gali karin dhaqaalaha.

■ Isbedelada dhaqaalaha iyo dabaqadda ganacsatada hadda ah ee Soomaaliya waxay salka ku hayaan isbedelada dhaqaale iyo siyaasadeed ee dhacay 1980-dii. Gobolada kala duwan dadka ganacsatada ah ee Soomaalida ah siyaabo kala duwan ayey ula qabsadeen dawlad la'aanta, oo siyaabo kala duwan ay u saameeyeen arimaha ay ka mid yihiin nabadgalyada, xiriirka xigtada iyo qaraabada qofku ku leeyahay barta uu ganacsiga ka wado iyo ku dhawaanshaha diinta.

■ Waxaa jira in ay Soomaalidu soo garanayso in



lahaansha gaarka ahi uu kaalin ka ciyaaro is-xukunka. Dadka ganacsatada ah qaar baa waxay door bidaan ganacsi sharci ku dhisan oo waxyaabaha uu u fududaynayo ay ka mid tahay iskaashiga ay la yeelan karaan shirkadaha shisheeye.

■ Maamulada Soomaalidu ma haystaan ilo ku filan oo ay ku taageeraan adeegyada bulshada. Si kastaba ha ahaatee, Kororka lahaansha gaarka ah ee kaalinta adeegyada bulshada iyo maareynta alaabada dadweynuhu uma badna inay haggajiso sinaanta, qaybsashada qaniimada iyo daryeelaka nolosha. Mararka qaarkood, qaybaha gaarka ahi waxay xaqiijiyeen in ay nisbo ahaan noqon karaan adeegayaal wax ku ool ah ee adeegyada bulshada ee lagama maarmaanka ah sida biyaha iyo gaadiidka. Meelaha qaarkood, sida caafi-maadka, ma'anay noqon. Marka la qeexo, adeegyada gaarka ahi waxa lagu helaa in la bixiyo khidmad, sidaasi awgeedna waxaa heli kara oo kali ah kuwa awoodi kara.

### **Xuquuqda Aadanaha iyo Isxukunka**

Muddo 30 sano ah Soomaaliya waxa ka jiray dhibaato dhanka xuquuqda aadanaha ah. Xukunkii labaatanka iyo kowda sano ee Siyad Barre wuxuu lahaa mid ka mid ah raad reebista (records) ugu xun ee xuquuqda aadanaha ee Afrika Xiligii dagaalkii sokeeye ee dhamaadkii 1980-kii waxaa Soomaaliya ka lumay dhamaan sharcigii, maxkamadihii iyo nidaamkii sharci fulintuba oo dumay, ku tumashada xuquuqda aadanaha ayaa kor u kacday, caadooyinkii iyo xeerarkii

caalamiga ahaana si quman ayaa loogu tuntay.

Tobaneeyadii sano ee ay Soomaaliya dawlad la'aanta ahayd, xuquuqda aadanahu waxay gaartay in ay noqoto cabirka, xiriirada caalamiga ah iyo kuwa gudahaba, ee is-xukun wanaagga. Xukunka caalamiga ah ee xuquuqda aadanaha waxaa sii xoogeeyey samaynta Xafiiska Hay'adda Sare ee Xuquuqda Aadanaha iyo heshiiska in la abuurto Maxkamadda Caalamiga ah ee Danbiyada. Waxaa jiray horumaro hanaanka jaasa marinta (redress) ku xad gudubka xuquuqda aadanaha, sida Guddiga Runta (Truth Commission) ee Koofurta Afrika, Maxkamadda caalamiga ah ee Yugoslafiyadii hore iyo Ruwanda. sida ay u koreen grashada muhimnimada iyo qaymaha xuquuqda aadanuhu, Hay'adaha samafalka iyo horumarintu waxay shaqadooda ku wajeheen si ku dhisan xuquuqda qofka.

Si kastaba ha ahaatee, kor uqaadidda xuquuqda aadanaha ma aha mid aan iska hor imaad ka jirin. Xiisado ayaa ka jira jamac ahaanta xuquuqda iyo gaar ahaansheheeda dhaqameed, xuquuqda gaarka ah iyo tan guud, kala qaybsan la'aanteeda iyo kala mudnaanta xuquuqda, xeerarka caalamiga ah iyo xeerarka qaran, madaxbanaanida qaran iyo faragalinta caalamiga ah iyo ansixinta iyo fulinta. Tacbiirada caalamiga ah ee quseeya xuquuqda aadanaha waxaa lagu eedeeyaa in ay ku dhisantahay xulasho. Intaa waxaa dheer, halka dawladaha lagala xisaabtamo shirarka xuquuqda aadanaha, jilayaasha aan dawlaga ahayn ee muhiimka ah sida kuwa qaramada badan wada leeyihi-

in, hay'adaha caalamiga ah ee lacagaha iyo ururada aan dawliga ahayn, lalama xisaabtamo.

*Cutubka afraad* wuxuu baarayaa xiriirka ka dhexeeya is-xukunka iyo, xuquuqda aadanaha iyo horumarinta aadanaha ee Soomaaliya. Marka la eego maamulo kala qoqoban, dhaqaale aan nidaam lahayn, iyo bulsho fir-fircoon oo shacab ah, cutubkani wuxuu darsayaa wixii qorshe bulsheed ah ee jira si ay u ilaaliyaan xuquuqda aadanaha iyo caqabadaha haysata maamulada Soomaalida iyo beesha caalamka si ay u ilaaliyaan xuquuqda Soomaalida oo dhan una sugaan caddaaladda. Cutubku waxaa u ka hadlay arimaha soo socda:

■ Kor u qaadidda xuquuqda aadanaha ee Soomaaliya waxay ku xirantahay taariikhda murugsan ee dawlad Soomaaliyeed. Horukac waara ee laga gaaro horumarinta aadanaha ee Soomaaliya wuxuu ku xiranyahay ilaalinta iyo sare u qaadidda xuquuqda aadanaha ee Soomaalida oo dhan.

■ Dhamaadkii xukunkii militariga ahaa wuxuu dadka qaarkii u keenay xoriyad, laakiin ixtiraamid-da xuquuqda aadanuhu sidoo kale waxay gaartay heerkeedii ugu hooseeyey intii ay socdeen dagaalada sokeeye horaantii 1990-kii. Toban sano ka bacdi, xaaladda xuquuqda aadanaha ee Soomaaliya si sahlan looma jamcin karo. Meelaha dhanka dhaqaalaha yo siyaasadda dib u kabanaya, xaaladda bani'aadaminamadu aad ayey u hagaagtay. Meelaha daganaansha la'aanta siyaasadeed iyo baahida aadaminimo ee daba

dheeraatay ka jiraan, xaaladda xuquuqda aadanuhu aad ayey u xuntahay.

■ Guud ahaan Soomaaliya oo dhan xiligan ma jiraan wax mideeya oo dastuuri ah ama xeerar sharci oo hogaaminaya dabeecadda bulsho ama dhaqaale. Meelaha maamkulada dad weynuha laga dhisay, horumar ayaa laga sameeyey soo celinta nidaamyadii maxkamadaha. Meelaha kale, iyo inta badan beelaha miyiga, xeerarka Soomaalida ee dhaqanka iyo shareecada islaanka ayaa looga dhaqmaa.

■ Horumar la taaban karo ee dhinaca sharciga ah ee Soomaaliya waxay ahayd aburidda Maxkamadaha Shareecada iyo fididda fiqiga oo dhaafsiisan arimaha qoyska ee lagu dabaqay arimaha danbiyada iyo ururinta canshuuraha. Tani waxay abuurtah xiisad xagga horumarinta xuquuqda aadanaha ah. Soomaalida qaarkeed waxay u arkaan ajandaha xuquuqda aadanaha mid ka hor imaanaya Islaamka iyo caadooyin dhaqan oo jira, halka kuwo kalena ay qabaan in xuquuqda aadanaha iyo shuruucda diintu ay wada socon karaan.

■ Dib u abuuridda hay'ado lala xisaabtamo oo wax qabd wanaag leh iyo hay'adihii sharciga iyo kala dambeynta waxay muhiim u noqon doontaa ilaalinta iyo daryeelka xuquuqda aadanaha iyo dib u kabashada bulshada iyo dhaqaalaha Soomaaliya. Shuruudda guud ee arinkani wuxuu ahaa hab nabadeed iyo wada hadal siyaasadeed oo keenaya heshiis bulsho iyo qaab dhismeed dastuur ee dib u aasaasidda sharciga iyo kala danbaynta. Xeerka ku meel gaarka ah ee maamulada 'Somaliland', 'Puntland' iyo Dawladda ku

Meel gaarka ahba, oo ka hadlahaya xuquuqda iyo waajibaadka muwaadiniinta, waxay nidaamyadaan u horseedayaan in ay yeeshaan dastuur.

■ Dib u aasaasidda sharciga iyo kala danbeynta nafsad ahaanteedu uma dhiganto kor u qaadidda xuquuqda aadanaha iyo caddaaladd, hay'adaha caalamiga ah oo si nabadgalyo ah meel uga shaqayn karana looma tarjumi karo in ay deegaan nabad ah u tahay Soomaalida. Habka dib u aasaasidda garsoorka ee gobolada oo dhan iyo raadka yaalla ee maamulada oo dhan dhaqangalinta xukunka sharcigu wuxuu ahaa mid aan isu dhigmin.

■ In kastoo horumar laga sameeyey dib u aasaasidda hay'ado qaanuun iyo kuwa sharci fulilinta, arrinta caddaaladda dagaalka ka dib muhimad badan lama siin. Eedeymaha ku tumashada xuquuqda aadanaha ee aan laga jawaabin iyo danbiyada lidka ku ah aadaminimada ayaa caqabad u salaxay wadahal iyo dib u heshiisiin waxaana lacaadaystay in aan la ciqaabin dadka danbiyada gala. Arimaha ku saabsan lahaanshaha dhulka la isku haysto lagama gaarin wax xal ah. Ma jiraan wax ay Soomaalidu isaga raacsantahay sida arimahaan loo wajahayo, iyo xitaa in la wajahaba. Aragtida caddaaladda ee reer galbeedka iyo tan Soomaalidu si sahlan isulama qabsan karaan. Si kastaba ha ahaatee, mar haddii aan xuquuqda aadanaha iyo qaabka sababta dagaalka aan la wajahin, waxaa jirta qatar ah in la abuuru xaalad 'nabadgalyo xun' oo aan caddaalad la samayn.

■ Caalamiyan, dawladda waxaa loo citiqaadaa in ay mas'uul ka tahay ilaalinta iyo sugidda xuquuq-

da muwaadiniinta. Halka dawladdu ka dunto, su'aalo ayaa ka soo baxaya cidda mas'uulka ka ah ilaalinta iyo sugidda xuquuqda aadanaha. Xaaladda hadda ah, qoyska, qabiilka, ururada bulshada, maamulada, ganacsatada iyo hay'adaha caalamiga ahiba kuli xil ayaa ka saaran ilaalinta iyo sugidda xuquuqda aadanaha.

## Tilmaamayaasha Horumarinta Aadanaha

Qalalaasaha daba dheeraaday ee siyaasadeed ee Soomaaliya wuxuu sanado badan xanibay dadaalada si nidaamsan loogu aruurinayo looguna xaqiijinayo macluumaadka la xiriira xogaha horumarka aadanaha, gaar ahaan inta badan bartamaha iyo koonfurta Soomaaliya. Sidaa daraadeed ilaa hadda ma jirto liis xaqiiqooyin lays ku raacsanyahay Somaliya. Si arintaan loo kabo, Warbixinta Horumarka Aadanaha ee 2001<sup>da</sup> waxay isu soo arurisay liiska tusayaasha aasaasiga ah ee horumarka aadanaha ee ay guud ahaan isku raacsanyihiin hay'adaha samafalka ee ka hawl gala Soomaaliya. Arintaan waxaa laga heli karaa karaa *cutubka 5aad*, oo ay la socdaan xigashooyinka dhammaan xogaha la taxay. Halkii suura gal ah, shaxahaanu waxaa ku diiwaan gashan sansaanka tilmaamayaasha horumarka aadanaha ee tobankii ilaa iyo shan iyo tobankii sano ee la soo dhaafay. Tusayaasha Horumarinta Aadanaha waxaa lagu xisaabiyey tiyoo lagu salaynayo daraasadda bulsho dhaqaale ee qoyska ee ay samaysay UNDP ee 2001 oo dabooshay gobolada oo dhan. Waxaa la rajeynayaa in shaxaha tilmaamayaasha horumarin-

ta aadanaha ay u noqdaan wax lagu nacfiyo oo si fudud ay u helaan Soomalida iyo hay'adaha horumarintaba.

Dhaqdhaqaaqa dadweynaha ee baaxadda weyn ee sanadihii dagaalka, qaab nolol baadiyeedka dadweynaha, xuduudaha aan sugnayn iyo rasmi la'aanta dhaqaalaha ayaa ka dhigtay ururinta iyo taxliilka ee inta badan xogta asalka ah ee Soomaaliya mid dhib badan. Halka ay dagaalka ka hor jireen hay'ado dhexe oo xog ururin iyo taxliil (analysis) saameeya, hadda waxaa jira hay'ado

samafal oo badan oo leh baahiyo kala duwan oo xogeed iyo siyaabo kala duwan oo ay xogta u ururiyaan. Intaa waxaa dheer, waa arin doodi ka furantahay in halku dhagyadii caadiga ahaa sida dakhli, waxbarasho, cimri dherer (xitaa haddii ay sax yihiin) ay run ahaantii ka tarjumi karaan horumarinta adanaha ee nooca Soomaaliya. Si kale, oo ku haboon qaabka dhaqanka oo aan ahayn 'itus oo itaabsii' ayaa malaha loo baahanyahay. *Cutubka 5aad* wuxuu arintaan u soo qaadayaa in ay noqoto qodob laga doodo isagoo darsaya noocyada ururinta xogta ee Soomaaliya. ■

## Ilo laga soo xigtey

<sup>1</sup> Warbixintaan oo dhan 'Somaliland' iyo 'Puntland' waxay u taaganyihiin labadaas maamul ee waqooyiga. Tanu ma bixinayso aqoonsi Qaramada Midoobay warbixintaana wax mowqif ah kam qaadanayso sharcinimada maamuladaan iyo khariiradaha.

<sup>2</sup> UNDP Somalia (1998) *Warbixinta Horumarinta Aadanaha 1998*. Nayrobi:UNDP

<sup>3</sup> Keen, D. (1997) 'Waalida Caqliga Qabta'. Daraasadaha Horumarinta ee Oxford (25) 1: p 67 – 75.

<sup>4</sup> UNDP (1999) *Warbixinta Horumarinta Aadanaha 1999*. New York/Oxford: OU Press. p. v, 1.

# Overview

## Somalia in Transition

In 1991, the world was shocked when civil war engulfed Somalia, the government collapsed and a humanitarian tragedy of unprecedented scale unfolded. The impact of 'state collapse' on human development has been profound, involving the mass loss of life, massive internal migrations and flight abroad, the collapse of political institutions, the destruction of social and economic infrastructure, and environmental damage. Somalis experience the indignities of statelessness in restrictions on international travel, their marginalisation in economic transactions, and a lack of national and international protection and security. Civil war has led to a questioning of a single Somali sovereignty and has revealed the heterogeneity of Somali society and culture. At the same time, many Somalis in the diaspora are investing substantially in their country through overseas remittances. At the start of the new millennium, Somalia is in a period of complex political, economic and social transition.

Although Somalia was without a single central government throughout the 1990s, politics, economics and development did not stand still. The early 1990s were a period of state fragmentation and a localisation of political authority in which varied structures of governance and authority emerged at community, district, and regional levels to fill the vacuum of central government. Since 1998, the process of state fragmentation and factional politics

that characterised the early 1990s has given way to a process of consolidation and an evolution of broader political alliances based on more institutionalised and less violent forms of authority. Politics have been established since 1991 in the northwest 'Republic of Somaliland' and since 1998 in the northeast 'Puntland State of Somalia', with public administrations that fulfil some basic functions of government'. Since 1999, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) has begun to establish an administration in the two southern regions of Bay and Bakol that have been chronically insecure for most of the past decade. The most significant political development since 2000 has been the establishment of a 'Transitional National Government' (TNG), based in Mogadishu. The product of a lengthy national peace process, the TNG holds the potential for resolving the protracted conflict that has plagued southern Somalia for over a decade. The TNG's acceptance in the UN General Assembly, the Arab League, and the former Organisation of African Unity has given Somalia formal representation in these international bodies for the first time in a decade.

The political and economic decentralisation that has taken place in Somalia over the last decade is unlikely to be totally reversed and the political entities are still fragile and evolving. Nevertheless, there are economic and social forces in Somalia that appear to demand greater regulation and order. The development of governmental forms of political authority in regional administrations and the growth of urban centres such as Hargeisa,

Garowe, Bosasso, and Baidoa, point to a process of consolidation. Coupled with a decrease in humanitarian needs since 1999, due to improved security conditions and a respite from climatic stress, these trends herald the potential for a period of positive change in Somalia.

In the decade that Somalia has been without an effective central government, the international environment has also undergone significant changes. These include the ending of the Cold War, the deregulation of world trade, the consolidation of economic wealth and political power in the West, and the emergence of liberal democracy as the template for 'good governance'. The model of state-led development has been superseded by one of market-led development. Human rights have risen up the international agenda. Regional institutions have gained a greater political and economic role in state affairs. There have been rapid advances in communication technology. Official development aid has declined and as governments are no longer considered the sole arbiters of development, the systems for the delivery and management of aid have changed, with a growth in the number, wealth, and influence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These changes have an impact on human development in Somalia and the transformations taking place are, in

part, an adaptation to these external influences.

These internal and external transitions present unique challenges to the promotion of human development. This Human Development Report (HDR) provides a vehicle for an analysis of the impact of these transitions on the Somali people.

## Human Development

Since the early 1990s, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and its partners have been promoting the concept of human development. As defined by its principal architect the late Mahhub ul Haq, human development aims at 'enabling people to have wider choices'. For many years, Gross National Product (GNP) per capita was used as a crude measure of development. This has proven to be an unreliable indicator, however, because many countries enjoying high real GNP

### Box 0.1: Definitions of Human Development

Two operational definitions of human development are used in the Human Development Reports.

The first is a specific quantitative index which combines three key indicators – life expectancy, adult literacy rates, and real GNP per capita. This is used to generate an overall human development index (HDI) or value for each country. The HDI is then used to rank and compare progress in human development across countries and regions. Although the index has been refined over the years to better capture human development, it is understood to be a relatively crude measurement of the very rich and complex phenomenon of human development.

A second definition of human development, which is used in this report, is broader and less quantifiable. It considers a wide range of issues, including a country's health care system, education levels, food and nutrition, income and poverty, human rights, the environment and human security.

per capita are unable to translate this into development gains for their citizens. Moreover, for many people, improved income or material gain is of secondary value to cultural or religious freedoms or a sense of community. Placing people at the centre of the development process, human development expands the concept of development beyond a sole concern for economic growth and provides a more qualitative measure of development (see box 0.1).

Since 1990, global, regional, national and sub-national HDRs have become one of UNDP's principal vehicles for promoting and measuring advances in human development. The long-running collapse of the Somali state means that there is no single, unified Somali voice for formulating development policies. Indeed, the disputed legitimacy of sub-national polities in the country reflects both the diverse developmental needs and varied aspirations of the Somali people. This report seeks to describe some of the main trends in human development in Somalia.

## Aims of the 2001 Human Development Report

In 1998, UNDP produced the first HDR for Somalia<sup>2</sup>. The report, which was the first HDR produced for a country without a government, provided a historical background to the long running political and humanitarian crisis in Somalia. It analysed the political and economic causes of Somalia's low levels of human development and examined specific sectoral themes of education and governance. The policy recommendations and findings arising from that report are summarised in box 0.2.

War can involve not just the breakdown of society, but also 'the re-ordering of society'<sup>3</sup>. Strategies to promote human development in Somalia should therefore be cognisant of the changes that have taken place in Somalia over the past decade. The 2001 Somalia HDR assesses the main socio-economic trends since 1998. By compiling the latest available data on human development in Somalia, the report aims to aid Somali community leaders

### Box 0.2: Recommendations of the 1998 HDR for Somalia

The 1998 HDR produced a series of recommendations for donors, aid agencies and policy makers

**Somali participation:** There should be greater Somali consultation and participation in international development programmes. Women in particular should have a greater voice in fora where development priorities are set.

**Good governance:** Aid programmes should build the capacity of local government administrations and civil society organisations.

**Relief and development:** Donors should match their support for humanitarian relief with a commitment to building Somalia's future capacity through human development activities, especially in education and the economic activities that increase employment.

**Social:** International agencies should support local efforts to reduce qaat consumption.

**The environment:** International efforts should support and encourage local environmental conservation efforts.

and international policy makers, donors and assistance agencies in formulating human development and humanitarian strategies in Somalia.

The 2001 HDR further seeks to contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of transition in Somalia by examining three forces that impact on human development, creating both challenges and opportunities: *globalisation*; *the private sector*; and *human rights*. By this, the report aims to both describe and promote discussion on the changing nature of the Somali state and the international context, and how these forces can be harnessed to advance rather than hinder human development.

## Themes of 2001 HDR

### Trends in human development: continuity or change?

After ten years of civil conflict and state collapse, human development in Somalia is unacceptably poor. Hundreds of thousands of Somalis live in destitution, vulnerable to the vicissitudes of political violence, global markets and climate. At the same time, some people have benefited economically and over the past decade and there have been significant developments in communications technology and economic infrastructure. Cultural changes are also apparent in the enhanced role of traditional institutions in governance, the greater economic role of women, and the influence of Islamicists in social, economic and political life.

*Chapter 1* assesses the state of human develop-

ment in Somalia. Drawing on existing documentation and data, the HDR considers several questions:

- What are the significant trends in human development?
- Is the state of human development in Somalia better or worse than 10-15 years ago?
- Are the trends similar across regions and social groups?

The current data indicates that the trends in human development are mixed. While there have been very modest improvements in some of the human development indicators over the past three years, such as primary school enrolment and per capita income, Somalia's Human Development Index (HDI), which is calculated at 0.284, places the country near the bottom of world rankings in human development. These improvements are primarily due to reduced levels of armed conflict and population displacement in comparison to the early and mid 1990s.

### Demographic trends

■ There are some favourable demographic trends. The numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons have declined over the past three years, indicating an improved security environment. However, migration to strong economic centres, such as Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Bosasso, Burco, Galkaiyo, and Baidoa, is creating new human development challenges in the provision of services and employment that are typical of rapid urbanisation.



■ The most vulnerable people are the internally displaced, returning refugees, the urban poor, destitute pastoralists, and southern riverine farming communities.

### Human security trends

■ The stabilisation of violent conflict throughout much of Somalia since the mid 1990s has meant that war-related deaths, life-threatening emergencies, refugee movements, and internal displacement have diminished. However, the security situation cannot be generalised. While security in the northern regions continues to be relatively secure, volatile and unpredictable security in much of the south restricts humanitarian access. Security and humanitarian access have dramatically improved in Bay and Bakol regions since 1999, when the RRA established control. The resource-rich agro-pastoral lands of this region were intensely fought during the civil war and a settlement of the conflict in these regions could signal one of the most important changes in the war for a decade. The potential impact on Somalia of the attacks on the US in September 2001 is a cause of concern.

■ Long-term trends in food security show little improvement. After the disastrous El-Niño floods of 1997/98 and drought in 1998/99, cereal production in southern Somalia in 2000 was the best in seven years. Overall agricultural production, however, remains far below pre-war levels and 2000 may prove to be a short reprieve. It is anticipated that crop yields for 2001 will be low in parts of the south, due to the failure of the spring rains. Importantly, a long-term decline in terms of trade for livestock

continues to affect the pastoral economy and bans on livestock imports by Gulf States in 1998 and 2000 have dramatically reduced the purchasing power of most Somali households and jeopardise the food security of poorer families.

### Social services

■ Aggregate human development indicators for Somalia disguise significant economic disparities. Levels of human development are generally higher in Somaliland and Puntland than in much of southern and central Somalia, with better food security, an absence of armed conflict and higher household income. Urban populations generally fare better than rural ones, due to the higher concentration of social services in urban centres. Families with access to overseas remittances enjoy privileged access to social services and have better food security than households without.

■ There have been modest gains in education, with enrolment in primary schools reaching levels similar to those pre-war, and numbers of secondary schools increasing since 1998. However, with overall adult literacy of only 17.1% and a gross primary school enrolment of 13.6%, levels of educational attainment remain amongst the lowest in the world.

■ Health indicators suggest there has been no improvement in the health of the population over the past three years. Indeed, indicators show a slight increase in levels of infant and under-five mortality and pockets of chronic malnutrition persist in southern Somalia. Health facilities are concentrated in urban centres so that rural populations

have limited access to health services. There are very few newly qualified medical personnel taking up work. Drug importation is unregulated with the consequence that the privatised health services are supplied with expired and poor quality medical drugs.

## Economic trends

■ Remittances have long been a critical part of Somalia's economy. Currently, with very low levels of agricultural production and manufacturing, remittances from the large Somali diaspora enable the country to run a balance of trade deficit and to enjoy higher levels of food security and access to private social services than would otherwise be the case. Future trends in remittances will be a key factor in sustaining human development.

■ Privatisation is shaping human development in Somalia. The protracted collapse of the central government and low levels of international rehabilitation and development assistance means that Somali households must procure their social welfare needs from the private sector. In some places, the private sector has responded reasonably well. Elsewhere, market failures have left welfare needs unmet and the introduction of user fees for health or educational services invariably excludes the poorest.

■ The economy has been in recession since the outbreak of the civil war, with large amounts of capital, labour and agricultural land unutilised. In some sectors, however, there have been modest levels of growth. A demand in the Arabian Peninsula for dried limes and sesame, for example, are generat-

ing new opportunities for smallholder export crops in southern Somalia, partially offsetting the collapse of banana exports. In Hargeisa, Mogadishu, and Bosasso, investments in light manufacturing have expanded, indicating local investor confidence in the economy and local security.

■ The service sector is the most dynamic part of the economy. Money transfer companies and telecommunication companies have expanded throughout Somalia and increased the range of financial services, facilitating the flow of remittances from the diaspora and commercial transactions. These companies, which did not exist a decade ago, are amongst the most powerful businesses in Somalia today. Likewise, the transportation sector continues to expand, with several Somali-owned airlines operating international services. Private education and health care services, hotels and restaurants, and utility companies such as electricity and water, are also providing new income generating and employment opportunities. Progress in the service sector is hindered, however, by the lack of regulation and the incompatibility of some utilities such as telecommunications.

■ Commerce has expanded in recent years. Despite the embargo on livestock exports by Gulf States, domestic demand, funded largely by remittances, provides a modest market for foodstuffs, fuel, clothing, and other basic commodities. The main growth in commercial activity has been in the transit trade, with Somalia acting as an entrepôt for goods travelling to markets in the Horn and East Africa. The Berbera corridor handles increasing amounts of container cargo destined for Ethiopia,

while in the south a robust transit trade moves consumer goods from Mogadishu's beach ports into Kenya. The absence of credible banking services that can provide a letter of credit remains a severe constraint to trade.

■ The lack of an accountable and responsible authority to execute monetary policy is a threat to economic development and livelihoods. In 2000 and 2001, the import of counterfeit Somali shillings by Somali businessmen triggered hyperinflation. This has severely reduced the purchasing power of the poor, while wealthier Somalis, who operate mainly in a dollarised economy, have been less affected.

■ There is a stark contrast between northern and southern parts of Somalia in the state of the infrastructure. In Puntland and Somaliland investment in road and port rehabilitation has been possible, facilitating the flow of commerce. By contrast, the road, seaport, and airport infrastructure of the south is in a state of rapid deterioration, adding to the costs of transport and merchandise.

### Environmental trends

■ Somalia faces some serious environmental challenges. Uncontrolled cutting of acacia and juniper forests for charcoal exports and timber is causing lasting damage to the rangelands, Somalia's most precious resource. Similarly, Somalia's marine resources are being depleted through unsustainable fishing practices, mostly by foreign trawlers.

### Foreign aid trends

■ Foreign aid to Somalia has fallen significantly since before the war and since the early 1990s.

Since 1998 humanitarian assistance has declined while rehabilitation assistance has increased as a proportion of overall aid, reflecting an improved security environment and change in donor aid policy. Compared to the value of trade and annual remittances, however, international aid represents a small contribution to the Somali economy.

### Globalisation and localisation

*Chapter 2* examines the impact of globalisation on human development in Somalia. UNDP's 1999 global HDR concluded that globalisation 'offers enormous potential to eradicate poverty in the 21<sup>st</sup> century', but that its impact on poorer nations is mixed, often marginalising the poorest of the poor while creating new opportunities for others<sup>4</sup>. To ensure that globalisation is better harnessed to promote human development, the 1999 global HDR called for the better management of globalisation through more effective governance at the local, national, regional and international levels.

Globalisation is linked to the weakening of state sovereignty and competence and is complemented by a trend towards 'localisation'. *Chapter 2* examines the interplay between globalisation and localisation in Somalia. The prolonged absence of a central Somali government means that Somali society is more directly exposed to both the beneficial and harmful effects of globalisation. The impact on human development is complex and diverse, but is apparent in a number of areas:

■ The global nature of refugee and migrant labour

movements has facilitated the growth of a large Somali diaspora around the world.

■ New telecommunication technologies have facilitated the development of a sophisticated financial system for the remittance of money from the Somali diaspora to Somalia.

■ Lack of trade regulation in Somalia has facilitated the expansion of international trade networks through Somalia, linked to Dubai and Kenya. However, it also facilitates the flow of weapons from the globalised arms market and the importation of poor quality drugs and expired foodstuffs.

■ Global crime syndicates have exploited the collapse of the Somali state.

■ The global network of UN agencies, donors, and NGOs play a significant role in meeting welfare and social protection needs in Somalia and, to a lesser extent, in the country's economy.

■ International Islamic movements conduct their own relations with Islamic groups within Somalia.

The chapter considers the policies that are urgently needed at local, national, and international levels to maximise the positive aspects of globalisation in Somalia and to minimise its more harmful impacts on human development.

## The private sector and its impact on human development

One of the major changes in Somalia over the past decade has been the growth of the private sector. Economic deregulation and privatisation have accompanied the radical localisation of governance. The growth of the private sector is closely

linked to processes of globalisation. In the context of weak and often ineffectual public administrations, the private sector is playing an instrumental role in providing social services and shaping development. As a market economy has replaced a centrally planned economy, development has become market-driven rather than government-led. *Chapter 3* examines in some detail the evolution of the private sector and its impact on human development. The chapter argues that:

■ The civil war achieved what the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s did not, that is, economic deregulation that has enabled the expansion of the private sector. However, with the exception of a few sectors such as telecommunications, there has been little fundamental change in the economy. In most sectors economic activity was better before the war, due largely to external aid. While a few people are likely to benefit from this situation, high levels of unemployment mean that a large number of people are unable to participate in the economy.

■ The changes in the economy and the current business class in Somalia have their roots in economic and political processes that took place in the 1980s. In the different regions of Somalia, business people have adapted to state collapse in different ways, variously influenced by security, kinship, and Islam.

■ There is a growing recognition among Somalis that the private sector has a role to play in governance. Some business people are supportive of a more regulated, legal environment for the private sector which, among other benefits, would facilitate cooperation with foreign companies.

■ The administrations in Somalia lack sufficient resources to support social services. However, the private sector's increased role in social service provision and the management of public goods is unlikely to improve equity, wealth distribution, and welfare. In some instances, the private sector has proved to be a relatively effective provider of key social services, such as water or transport. In other cases, such as health, it has not. By definition, private services are provided for a fee, and hence tend to be accessible only to those who can afford them.

## Human rights and governance

For some 30 years there has been a human rights crisis in Somalia. The 21-year regime of Siyad Barre had one of the worst human rights records in Africa. During the civil war in the late 1980s Somalia's entire legal, judicial and law enforcement system collapsed, human rights abuses escalated, and international and locally accepted norms and rules were systematically violated.

In the decade during which Somalia has been without a national government, human rights have risen in international and domestic relations as a measure of 'good governance'. The international human rights regime has been strengthened by the establishment of the Office for the High Commission of Human Rights (OHCHR) and an agreement to create an International Criminal Court. There has been an evolution in mechanisms for the redress of human rights violations, such as the South African Truth Commission and the international tribunals

on former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. As recognition of the instrumental as well as intrinsic value of human rights has grown, relief and development agencies have increasingly adopted a rights-based approach to their work.

The elevation of human rights, however, is not uncontroversial. Tensions exist between the universality of rights and their cultural specificity, between individual and collective rights, between the indivisibility and prioritisation of rights, between international law and national law, between national sovereignty and international intervention, and between ratification and enforcement. International expressions of concern for human rights violations are criticised for being selective. Furthermore, while states are accountable to human rights conventions, influential non-state actors such as multinationals, international financial institutions and non-governmental organisations are not.

*Chapter 4* examines the relationship between governance, human rights, and human development in Somalia. In the context of fragmented authority, a deregulated economy, and a dynamic civil society, the chapter examines what social arrangements exist to protect human rights and the challenges to Somali administration and the international community in protecting the rights of all Somalis and securing justice. The chapter finds the following:

■ The advancement of human rights in Somalia is closely linked to the troubled history of the Somali state. Lasting progress in human development in

Somalia will depend on protecting and advancing the human rights of all Somalis.

■ The end of military rule brought some freedoms for some people, but respect for human rights also reached its nadir during the civil war and famine in the early 1990s. A decade later, the human rights situation in Somalia defies simple generalisations.

In areas of political and economic recovery, the human rights situation is much improved. Where political instability and chronic humanitarian need persist, the human rights situation remains dire.

■ Across Somalia there are currently no uniform constitutional and legal rules governing social or economic behaviour. Where public administrations have been established, advances have been made in restoring formal judicial systems. Elsewhere, and in most rural communities, traditional Somali law (*xeer*) and Islamic *shari'a* continue to be practised.

■ A significant legal development in Somalia over the past decade has been the creation of *shari'a* courts and the extension of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) beyond family matters to penal issues and revenue collection. This has created some tensions over the promotion of human rights. Some Somalis view the international human rights agenda as antithetical to Islam and certain cultural norms, while others perceive human rights and Islamic law as entirely compatible.

■ The re-establishment of accountable and effective legal institutions and law and order agencies will be critical for the protection of human rights and for social and economic recovery in Somalia. A common pre-requisite for this has been a peace process and political dialogue resulting in a 'social

compact' and constitutional framework for the re-establishment of law and order. The Transitional Charters for governance of the Somaliland, Puntland, and TNG administrations, which articulate the rights and responsibilities of citizens, have provided such frameworks as precursors to constitutions.

■ The re-establishment of law and order cannot by itself be equated with the advancement of human rights and justice, nor does a secure operating environment for international agencies necessarily translate into a secure environment for Somalis. The process of re-establishing the judiciary across the regions and the record of the administrations in applying the rule of law has been uneven.

■ While progress has been made in re-establishing legal institutions and law enforcement agencies, the issue of post-war justice has received little attention. Unanswered allegations of human rights abuse and crimes against humanity pose an obstacle to dialogue and reconciliation and perpetuate a culture of impunity. Issues of contested land ownership remain unresolved. There is no consensus in Somalia over how these issues should be addressed, or even whether they should be. Western and Somali concepts of justice sit uneasily together. However, while human rights and structural causes of violence go unaddressed, there is a danger in creating an environment of 'negative peace' in which justice is not seen to have been done.

■ Internationally, the state is considered the legal 'duty-bearer' for protecting and upholding the rights

of its citizens. In a 'collapsed state', questions arise over where responsibility for the protection and upholding of human rights lies. In the current situation, the family, clan, civil society organisations, administrations, businesses, and international actors all have responsibilities for protecting and advancing human rights.

## Human Development Indicators

Somalia's protracted political crisis has for years hampered efforts to systematically collect and verify data on human development, especially in much of central and southern Somalia. Consequently, to date there has been no agreed list of 'facts' on Somalia. In an effort to redress this, the 2001 HDR has compiled a list of basic human development indicators on which there is a broad consensus among aid agencies operating in Somalia. These can be found in *Chapter 5*, along with references for all data cited. The HDI was calculated on the

basis of a socio-economic household survey undertaken by UNDP in 2001 that covered most regions. It is hoped that these tables will be an accessible resource for both Somalis and aid agencies.

Large-scale population movements during the civil war years, the nomadic life-style of the population, fluid borders, and the informalisation of the economy make the collection and analysis of the most basic data in Somalia problematic. Whereas before the war there were central institutions for data collection and analysis, there are now many aid agencies with different data needs and different ways of collecting information. Furthermore, it is debatable whether conventional variables, such as income, education, or life expectancy (even if they can be accurate) are able to capture the complexities of human development in the context of Somalia. Alternative, more culturally appropriate variables that go beyond 'facts and figures' may be needed. *Chapter 5* raises this as a point of debate by examining the complexities of data collection in Somalia. ■

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Throughout this report Somaliland and Puntland are used to refer to these two northern polities. This does not confer recognition by the United Nations and the report takes no position on the juridical status of these administrations or their borders.

<sup>2</sup> UNDP Somalia (1998) *Human Development Report 1998 Somalia*. Nairobi: UNDP.

<sup>3</sup> Keen, D. (1997) 'A rational kind of madness'. *Oxford Development Studies* (25) 1: p.67-75.

<sup>4</sup> UNDP (1999) *Human Development Report 1999*. New York/Oxford: OUP. p.v, 1.



# Chapter 1





# Trends in Human Development

## Human Development Index for Somalia

**S**omalia, by any international measure of development, is considered amongst the least developed countries in the world. Economic decline and civil war in the 1980s followed by a protracted armed conflict in the 1990s resulted in deepening levels of poverty, deprivation

period, some areas of the country have experienced progressive changes in human development indicators, while disparities between regions and socio-economic groups have grown. In 2001, Somalia's HDI has been calculated to be 0.284 (see chapter 5 table A). This indicates an overall improvement since 1998. Nevertheless, human development indicators in Somalia remain extremely low. Ranked globally, this would place Somalia 161 out of 163 states in

**Table 1.1: Comparative Human Development Indicators, 2000<sup>1</sup>**

Country	Life Expectancy	Infant MR	Under 5 MR	Maternal MR	Primary School GER	Adult Literacy	GDP per Capita PPP US \$
Djibouti	41.0	104	149	--	32.0	63.4	--
Eritrea	51.5	66	105	1,000	30.0	52.7	881
Ethiopia	44.5	118	176	--	35.0	37.4	628
Kenya	52.2	76	118	590	65.0	81.5	1,022
<b>Somalia</b>	<b>47.0</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>1,600</b>	<b>13.6</b>	<b>17.1</b>	<b>795</b>
Tanzania	51.1	90	141	530	48.0	74.7	501
Uganda	41.9	83	131	510	73.0	66.1	1,167

<sup>1</sup> Non-Somalia data is taken from UNDP (2001) *Human Development Report 2001*. New York: OUP, except the Primary school GER for Uganda and Kenya taken from UNDP *Human Development Report 1998* and 2000. New York: OUP.

and vulnerability. This is reflected in Somalia's declining Human Development Index (HDI). In 1990, this was calculated as 0.200, ranking Somalia 123 out of 130 countries<sup>1</sup>. The 1998 HDR for Somalia calculated a HDI for the years 1995-1997 ranging between 0.159 and 0.184<sup>2</sup>.

In the three years since the first HDR for Somalia was published, the country has undergone significant economic, political and social changes. During this

terms of the level of human development, above Niger and Sierra Leone<sup>3</sup>. Among seven neighbouring countries in Eastern Africa and the Horn, Somalia ranks lowest in all indicators, with the exception of life expectancy and GDP per capita (see table 1.1).

It has been argued that armed conflict is the single most significant factor explaining the persistence of poverty in Africa<sup>4</sup>. Not surprisingly, several of the other countries that share Somalia's low levels of



human development are also in the throes of a so-called 'complex political emergency' (see box 1.1)<sup>5</sup>. Countries in a complex political emergency, such as Somalia, constitute a unique category among the world's least developed countries. The weakening of government institutions, the collapse of social services, the erosion of property rights, the disruption of livelihoods, the forced displacement of populations, and the stagnation of the economy, invariably lead to a general decline in human development indicators. In these countries armed conflict is not just an obstacle to development, but an expression of a crisis of development. Strategies to promote human development in Somalia should be cognisant of this in addition to the processes of social, political, and economic change that have taken place over the past decade.

Conventional variables, such as income, education, or life expectancy are unable to really capture the complexities of human development in Somalia. Nevertheless, the human development indicators do provide an illustration of the depth of Somalia's human development crisis (see Human Development Indicator Tables, chapter 5).

In the early to mid-1990s, plummeting life expectancy was attributed to high levels of mor-

tality due to war, starvation, and disease. Over 350,000 Somalis are estimated to have died from war-related causes between 1988 and 1992<sup>6</sup>. Since the mid-1990s, the security environment throughout much of Somalia has improved, leading to a decline in war-related deaths, life-threatening emergencies, refugee movements, and internal displacement. However, life expectancy is estimated to be only 47, one of the lowest in the world. Low life expectancy is linked to high rates of infant mortality, one of the highest rates of maternal mortality in the world, and the spread of preventable diseases such as TB, malaria and measles (see chapter 5 tables E and G). The high levels of mortality and low life expectancy are attributed to inadequate curative and preventative health services, the col-

### Box 1.1: Complex Political Emergencies

Complex political emergencies arise from protracted political crises. Livelihoods, social services, and the economy are affected as they are in natural disasters. However, unlike natural disasters, political, economic, social and environmental systems are deliberately destroyed in complex political emergencies. While every situation has its unique features, certain common characteristics of complex political emergencies are apparent in Somalia:

- governance is contested
- national identity is challenged
- civilians are targets of violence
- there is mass displacement of populations
- human rights are violated
- property rights are overturned
- a war economy develops that is organised and controlled through violence
- politically vulnerable groups face extreme impoverishment while the politically powerful accumulate wealth
- humanitarian needs are long lasting if those in power benefit from the continuation of emergency conditions
- there are persistent high levels of unemployment
- there are changes in the division of labour
- international development investment is suspended
- international UN, donor and NGO institutions are created to manage the crisis
- non-governmental organisations proliferate



lapse of sanitation and water systems, erratic food security and pockets of chronic malnutrition, all of which increase susceptibility to fatal illnesses.

Other human development indicators are equally sobering. Malnutrition is chronic, with a global rate for children under-five of 17.2%, although there is a marked difference between socio-economic groups (see chapter 5 table R). The overall adult literacy rate has fallen from 24% pre-war to 17.1% in 2001, (see chapter 5 table H and box 5.2) and the Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) for primary schools has fallen from 18% pre-war to 13.6% in 1999/2000. Although there are longer-term indications of progress, only 58.4% of those enrolled are reported to be attending school.

There are signs of a modest revival in economic production. Food production has slowly improved since the mid to late 1990s and small-scale enterprises are increasing in the main towns, particularly

### **Countries such as Somalia constitute a unique category among the world's least developed countries**

Mogadishu, Bosasso, Galkaiyo, Hargeisa, and Burco. Between 1998 and 2001 fewer conflict or climatic-induced emergencies in southern Somalia, have enabled Somalis and international aid agencies to focus more on rehabilitation efforts. However, the economy remains in recession<sup>7</sup>. Productivity nationally remains very low, and per capita income is estimated to be US \$200 (see chapter 5 table J)<sup>8</sup>. This is an improvement on US

\$176 in 1997/98, but remains one of the lowest in the world. The ban by Gulf States in 1998 and 2000 on the import of livestock from the Horn of Africa due to Rift Valley Fever (RVF), has affected the country's main source of export revenue, with predictable ripple effects on household income and food security<sup>9</sup>. For households fortunate to have family members living abroad, the extensive remittance system has proven to be a critical safety-net.

Given these poor development indicators, the conclusion of the 1998 Somalia HDR remains pertinent, that 'the chronically low levels of human development in Somalia constitute a long-term emergency for Somali society'<sup>10</sup>. Two other points made in the 1998 HDR are also worth reiterating.

First, these low levels of human development are not solely the outcome of civil war and state collapse. In the mid to late 1980s, when Somalia was the recipient of high levels of foreign aid, its development indicators were amongst the worst in the world. Indeed, despite the war, poor services, and high unemployment, indicators such as life expectancy, primary school enrolment and GNP per capita are not significantly different from those pre-war (see chapter 5). Explanations for Somalia's current human development crisis must therefore look beyond the complex political emergency of the past decade.

Second, aggregate human development indicators have their uses but disguise significant disparities in Somalia along regional, class, occupational, and rural-urban divides. The higher per capita incomes,



better access to food and social services in Somaliland and Puntland compared to southern Somalia reflect environments that are generally more conducive to human development. In urban centres, household incomes are generally higher and access to basic health, education, and other services are better than in rural Somalia. At the same time the largest concentration of destitute are found in the peri-urban areas among displaced people, returning refugees, and economic migrants. Although Somali society has few of the sharp class divisions that characterise many societies, there is a widening gap in human development between economically privileged and poor households. Those Somali households that receive remittances from relatives abroad have greater economic security and thus enjoy privileged access to privately-run social services.

## Political Trends

As politics shapes the opportunities and constraints for human development, recent political trends in Somalia are therefore a necessary point of departure for this chapter<sup>11</sup>.

### State formation

Over the past century, the Somali people have experienced various forms of state-based governance. Prior to colonisation, the Somali 'nation' of people did not constitute a state with a system of central authority. The formation of a modern Somali state began when European countries divided the Somali people into five territories (Italian Somalia, the British Somaliland Protectorate, French

Somaliland, the Ethiopia Ogaden and the northern frontier district of Kenya) and established colonial administrations.

In 1960, the two independent colonial territories – British Somaliland and Italian Somalia – united to form the Republic of Somalia. The Somali people experienced only nine years of civilian multi-party democracy before the system was abolished in a military coup d'état in 1969. For the next 21 years, the country was subjected to oppressive and autocratic rule by a military regime under the leadership of Major-General Mohamed Siyad Barre.

### Political trends in the 1990s: state collapse, civil war and international intervention

In 1991, the Somali state collapsed as civil war engulfed the capital Mogadishu and the military regime was overthrown. In the civil war that ensued, the destruction of social and economic infrastructure, asset stripping, forced displacement, and the disruption of food supplies led to mass starvation in the riverine and inter-riverine regions of southern Somalia. Some 1.5 million Somalis fled the country and as many as 2 million were internally displaced. Between 1991 and 1998, the political process in Somalia was characterised by state fragmentation, a mushrooming of political factions and the 'localisation of political authority'<sup>12</sup>.

The international community responded to the famine in southern Somalia with an unprecedented humanitarian and military intervention, but failed to



mediate an end to hostilities or engender a process of national reconciliation. Instead, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) became embroiled in the conflict and, its critics argue, deepened the crisis by shoring up the power structures of the warring factions<sup>13</sup>.

By the time UNOSOM withdrew from Somalia in 1995, the civil war had subsided and levels of violence had declined. Two exceptions were in separatist Somaliland where civil war had broken out in 1994 and in Bay and Bakol regions which were 'occupied' by the forces of the late General Mohamed Farah 'Aideed' in 1995. By the late 1990s, the situation in much of Somalia could be described as one of 'not war-not peace'<sup>14</sup>. In different regions, localised political processes had produced local cease-fires and, in places, nascent public administrations. A government administration had been formed in secessionist Somaliland in 1991. In the northeast, the traditional leadership and the Somalia Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) maintained stability and security in the absence of a formal administration. In 1994 the Digil-Mirifle Supreme Governing Council was formed to administer the regions of Bay and Bakol. Elsewhere in southern Somalia a variety of institutions emerged, including two 'governments' in Mogadishu, councils of elders, district councils and *shari'a* courts<sup>15</sup>. Throughout much of Somalia titled clan elders played a crucial role in re-establishing social contracts (*xeer*) between clans as a transitional step towards restoring political stability and establishing public administrations. Importantly, the process of stabilisation was also supported by an

economic revival, with loose inter-clan and inter-regional patterns of cooperation being forged to facilitate the resumption of trade and commerce.

## Political trends since 1998: consolidation

The 1998 HDR reported that there were over 30 factions and political movements in Somalia. From as early as 1991, however, there has been a slow and an uneven process of rebuilding state-like institutions, beginning with the creation of the 'Republic of Somaliland' and followed by the formation of 'Puntland Federal State of Somalia' in 1998. In 1999, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) took control over Bay and Bakol regions and established an administration<sup>16</sup>. In August 2000 the Somali National Peace Conference held in Arta, Djibouti, formed a 'Transitional National Government' in Mogadishu.

The level of popular support and territorial control that these political entities enjoy is contested. Their financial base and their ability to raise revenue, administer public services and provide security varies, and the models of governance they offer also differ (see appendix 2). The centres of authority are fragile and could unravel, and for most Somalis localised political practices and structures remain the most important functional form of day-to-day governance. Nevertheless, since the late 1990s the political landscape of Somalia has been partially reshaped by a discernible trend towards political consolidation with the institutionalisation of larger regional and transregional polities.



The process is driven by a convergence of internal and external interests. Internally, there are economic and social forces that demand greater regulation and order. Business people have concluded that commercial expansion requires political structures capable of providing security, financial services, and a more regulated business environment. Civil society groups, Somalis in the diaspora, and ordinary people are demanding greater security in their daily lives. Externally, foreign states and international aid agencies have found Somalia's localised polities too fluid and weak to serve as effective interlocutors in matters of security and development and have, therefore, encouraged the creation of larger political units, as a potential precursor to national unity.

External encouragement to political consolidation since 1998, however, has taken two somewhat incompatible forms. One, the so-called 'building-block' approach, has sought to encourage the emergence of regional or transregional political authorities, as a first step towards a re-unified Somali state with a loose federal or confederal form of government. After UNOSOM's failure at state building, this approach was initially embraced by neighbouring countries, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the executive committee of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) in the late 1990s<sup>17</sup>. Its advocates consider it the path that can provide a more legitimate grass-roots and participatory form of governance to facilitate the task of rebuilding a war-torn society. Its critics contend that it has limited applicability in the south and that it encourages secessionism and

clanism and is designed to meet foreign interests that want to keep Somalia weak and divided.

The second approach, which has regained the support of regional and international bodies, is based on reviving the Somali state through a process of national reconciliation and the formation of a national government, albeit within a federalised system. The following pages briefly describe the main political administrations that dominate the political scene in Somalia in mid-2001<sup>18</sup>.

## Somaliland

In May 1991, the 'Grand Conference of the Northern Peoples' meeting in Burco revoked the 1960 Act of Union with the south and declared the independence of the 'Republic of Somaliland', whose borders follow those of the former British Somaliland Protectorate<sup>19</sup>. Traditional forms of governance, in the form of councils of clan elders (*guurti*) have been instrumental in re-establishing political stability. A conference of clans (*shir beeleed*) in 1993 in Boroma produced a framework for governing the country, known as the National Charter (see chapter 4)<sup>20</sup>. This conference, a subsequent conference in 1996/97, and a locally financed referendum on a constitution for Somaliland in May 2001 reaffirmed people's aspiration for independence. For many people in Somaliland, the referendum was the first opportunity to exercise their democratic vote since the 1960s, and for most the first time ever. However, neither the independence claim nor the referendum are recognised in other parts of Somalia or internationally.



Somaliland has managed to avoid the protracted conflict and violence that has afflicted much of southern Somalia, although it has twice been afflicted by civil war – in 1992 and 1994-1996. Since 1991, a functional and modest state structure has been established, with a bicameral parliament, judiciary, police force, and municipal structures. The restoration of security has revitalised the economy and facilitated the rehabilitation of the damaged infrastructure and public services. In terms of volume of trade, Berbera port is flourishing, while Hargeisa has the only airport in Somalia that receives regular commercial passenger airlines from the Gulf States and other countries in the region. Revenue raised mainly from import duties has enabled the administration to oversee the formation of a police force, sectoral ministries and municipalities which provide a mechanism for the prioritisation of needs and planning, as well as basic education and health systems. An active local NGO sector, new business initiatives and an active media challenge the stereotypical description of Somalia as aid dependent. The restoration of security in Somaliland is reflected in the larger proportions of international aid channelled to the region since 1997 and the reorientation of aid programmes from rehabilitation to development (see Foreign Aid Trends).

## Puntland

Puntland State of Somalia in the northeast was formed in August 1998, following the failure of national reconciliation efforts. The Puntland administration, like that in Somaliland, derives its legitimacy from a series of locally sponsored conferences, in which titled clan elders (*isimo*) again

played an important role<sup>21</sup>. The Garowe Constitutional Conference of 1998 adopted a provisional charter which supports Somali unity and describes Puntland as an 'autonomous self-governing state', the borders of which incorporate regions claimed by Somaliland. As such, Puntland represents a 'building block' towards a future federal state.

Formed in 1998, Puntland's administrative structures are still embryonic. Lacking the infrastructure and potential revenue sources of Somaliland the administration's impact on public services and the economy has been more limited. However, Puntland can boast active business and NGO sectors. The population of the region has increased greatly since the war as people originally from there fled the south. This has led to high levels of investment by Somalis in housing and businesses and reflects the public's confidence in the political and security situation.

Although relations with Somaliland are strained over border definitions and Puntland's southern border is intermittently insecure, the region has managed to avoid any major security threats for ten years. In June 2001, the administration's three-year term expired. The failure to agree upon a transfer of power led to a constitutional crisis, which has now threatened the region's security. In August a constitutional conference was held to deliberate on the political future of Puntland.

## Bay and Bakol

Prior to the war, the agro-pastoral regions of Bay



and Bakol were considered the 'breadbasket' of Somalia, the main centres of sorghum and maize production. In 1992, however, these regions became the epicentre of the famine and the Reewin<sup>22</sup> people among its principal victims after they were pillaged by the troops of Siyad Barre in 1991. In 1995, Reewin politicians and traditional leaders formed the Digil-Mirifle Supreme Governing Council to administer the regions. This was toppled soon after UNOSOM withdrew and between 1995 and 1999 the 'occupation' of military forces from other regions and internal divisions within the Reewin kept the area highly insecure. In 1999, with foreign support, the RRA succeeded in taking control of the regions and installing its own administration. Better security since then has improved the food security situation and access for international aid agencies. Although the RRA participated in the Arta peace conference, some of the leaders withdrew their support soon after it was concluded. Since then the RRA has sought to consolidate its own regional administration. While certain civil structures have been established, the RRA has yet to transform itself into an effective civilian administration.

### **Transitional National Government**

The formation of a Transitional National Government (TNG) in August 2000 has been recognised as an important development in Somalia's progress towards national reconciliation and state building. The TNG was the outcome of a lengthy process of dialogue and negotiation that was initiated by the government of Djibouti and IGAD in September 1999. The Somali National

Peace Conference (SNPC) which took place between May and August 2000 in Arta, Djibouti, differed in significant ways from previous internationally sponsored efforts. The timeframe for dialogue was considerably longer than previous conferences, it was more Somali-driven, more emphasis was placed on civil society rather than factional representation, and women and minor clans were represented among the voting delegates<sup>23</sup>.

Although the conference attracted participants from most regions, the Mogadishu-based faction leaders chose not to participate. The Somaliland authorities initially endorsed the initiative, but later denounced it when it became clear that it did not serve Somaliland's interests. The formal delegation from Puntland was also withdrawn, although some Puntland representatives continued to participate in the process. The RRA leadership participated, but withdrew their support after the proposed location for the TNG was changed from Baidoa to Mogadishu. Internationally, the SNPC enjoyed the backing of the UN Security Council and Secretary-General, the Arab League, the former Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the European Union (EU), and neighbouring states.

The TNG was established in Mogadishu in October 2000, with a 245-member Transitional National Assembly and a President and Prime Minister supported by a 25-member cabinet. It has enjoyed considerable success in garnering international acceptance in the UN General Assembly, the Arab League, and the African Union, which has given





Somalia formal representation in these bodies for the first time in a decade.

With a three-year mandate, the TNG has set about establishing an administration and restoring law and order in Mogadishu, while avoiding a military confrontation with rejectionist faction leaders. At its inception, it enjoyed much public goodwill locally and in the international community, who recognised the enormous political challenges it would face. However, the hope of attracting substantial foreign aid has not materialised as most Western donors have adopted a 'wait and see' approach and made aid conditional on signs of 'effective government'. With Mogadishu port closed, lacking revenue from livestock exports, and unable to raise taxes, the TNG has had to depend on some friendly states and members of the Mogadishu business community to finance the police force, judiciary, demobilisation and rehabilitation. The decision by some businessmen to import large quantities of new Somali shillings triggered hyperinflation and touched off street protests in Mogadishu.

Recognition by the Bretton Woods institutions, donor governments, and other international bodies would lend much credibility to the new administration and release much needed resources<sup>24</sup>. However, this is unlikely to happen until greater progress has been made towards national reconciliation. In its first year the TNG has made little progress in extending the reconciliation process to the administrations and factions that remained outside the Arta peace process. On the contrary, it has

found itself confronted by the SRRC, backed by a regional government with a powerful capacity to influence the political process in Somalia. The extent to which the TNG in the future is able to overcome these challenges, to establish a competent administration, and reach an accommodation with other Somali administrations will have a significant impact on human development.

### **The changing role of government**

'State collapse' has been used to describe situations in several countries where governance is weak and contested. However, it is in Somalia that state collapse has perhaps been most complete, after the civil war in the 1990s dismantled the political, social, and economic institutions of the state. In 2001, the situation in Somalia is one in which governance, sovereignty, and national identity are contested, with several political entities making overlapping and conflicting claims over territory, legitimacy, and political representation. Contested authority is not a new phenomenon. What is new, is the fact that the administrations of Somaliland, Puntland and the TNG can all claim to derive legitimacy from a series of consultative conferences, while Somaliland and the RRA also claim legitimacy from their 'liberation' struggles. These administrations represent both different and converging political aspirations of Somalis and face similar challenges and opportunities.

First, an enduring legacy of Western colonialism has been an apparent contradiction between a cen-



tralised system of state-based authority and a traditionally egalitarian political culture. This has led some to conclude that political disorder in Somalia can often be traced 'not to any malfunction of the Somali system of authority, but to the unimaginative application of alien systems of governance that have undermined it'<sup>25</sup>. After nine years of discredited multi-party government, twenty-one years of dictatorship, and a decade of armed conflict, there is an opportunity to break with the corrupt and unrepresentative types of governments that Somalis have endured in the past. The challenge for the Somali people is to craft a system of governance that is responsive to people's needs, protects their rights, and reconciles an inherently democratic political culture with modern democratic ideals. Over the past decade, local and regional reconciliation processes in Somalia have demonstrated the resilience of traditional systems of governance, with Somalis exploring different forms of governance that are a hybrid of Somali and Western democratic styles (see appendix 2). In Somaliland and Puntland, at least, people are experiencing localised forms of government that are more participatory than they have been for decades.

Second, strategies of political reconstruction based on the availability of large amounts of foreign aid are likely to be stillborn. International aid to Africa is declining and levels of aid to Somalia have fallen sharply since the 1980s (see Foreign Aid Trends). Furthermore, as bilateral development aid is still premised on the existence of government, the absence of an accepted 'national' government means that aid resources are always likely to be lim-

ited. The capacity of the administrations to deliver security, welfare, and social services will depend not only on trained and experienced administrators, but also on their ability to raise revenue. Currently, people's ability to pay is limited. In Somaliland, for example, where a system of revenue collection has been established, the administration is able to raise only US \$26 million per annum from duties in Berbera port and other taxes to support its activities<sup>26</sup>. Resource use, however, remains heavily skewed towards security, with some 55% of the Somaliland and the Puntland administration's expenditure allocated to the military and security services and 6% to all social services<sup>27</sup>. Ministerial budgets are minimal, civil servants salaries are inadequate and the provision of social services remains largely reliant on user fees, foreign aid and the private sector. The revenue collection system of the RRA and TNG is embryonic. Furthermore, two consecutive embargoes on Somali livestock by Saudi Arabia have undermined and exposed the general weaknesses of the country's virtually mono revenue base.

Third, in the decade that Somalia has been without central government, ideas about the role of government have changed. The notion of governance has broadened to include the state, the private sector, and civil society<sup>28</sup>. Governments are no longer considered the sole channel for aid, as the growth of NGOs illustrates, and the model of state-led development has largely been replaced by one of market-driven development. In an era of globalisation and trade liberalisation, claims over national economic sovereignty are being weakened (see chapter 2). A



minimalist role for government may mitigate a return to autocratic rule. However, it can also leave a fragile environment for managing the forces of globalisation, ensuring law and order, the provision and regulation of social services, and for protecting common natural resources, such as rangelands or maritime waters, from local and foreign exploitation.

Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, despite the trend towards stabilisation many of the political, social, and economic factors that precipitated the humanitarian crisis of 1991-1993 remain fundamentally unresolved, particularly in Somalia's southern regions. Stabilisation in some areas of the south has only served to consolidate the negative impacts of the civil war. This includes the geographical realignment of population groups, asset transfer, the occupation of land, impunity to human rights abuse, and forms of commerce based on exploitative and often violent social relations. After ten years of civil war the same political elites remain in power. The benefits of economic revival are unevenly distributed and are occurring in an environment of massive unemployment and social deprivation, providing a fragile base in which good governance can take root.

Furthermore, the contradictions arising from grafting an external 'modern' system of centralised governance onto a decentralised and egalitarian political system remain unresolved.

## Civil society

One of the political outcomes of the civil war has been a greater role for non-governmental forms of association in political and social life, beyond the all-encompassing clan system. These include local NGOs, informal professional networks, interest groups who form around issues such as women, children, the disabled, minorities, and political parties. The first Somali NGOs emerged in response to the Ogaden refugee crisis in the early 1980s. In the late 1980s, their growth was further encouraged by World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programmes. In the 1990s, as a consequence of the collapse of gov-

### Box 1.2: Somali NGO Consortiums

Over the years, Somali NGOs/CSOs have shown varying levels of credibility and capability. Recently, a number of capable and committed NGOs/CSOs have emerged with a strong commitment to community development needs. Recognising their own limited capacities and the need for information sharing, NGOs/CSOs have formed umbrella organisations to disseminate information on community development needs or human rights to strengthen their combined knowledge and skills base. Among others, these include:

The Consortium of Somaliland Non-Governmental Organisations, COSONGO, was founded in 1998. COSONGO believes that NGOs can build their capacities by pooling resources and sharing information. COSONGO aims to 'give local NGOs a stronger voice to disseminate information about development, to improve the capacity of its members, and to continue advocating for local NGOs in Somaliland.'

The Network for Somali NGOs, NETSON was launched in southern Somalia in 1999. NETSON members implement relief and development projects in a diverse number of locations, but aim to maintain mutual relations and co-operation since they all have common goals. NETSON's goals are to establish a public information centre on socio-economic indicators for Somalia, to provide training to NGOs/CSOs to improve their capacities, and to assist member NGOs to develop technically sound proposals and secure funding.

The Talawadag Network of NGOs in Puntland was founded in 2000. It aims to strengthen the capacity of local NGOs, improve their project implementation skills, initiate contact and dialogue with local and international stakeholders, and



ernment, local NGOs proliferated as international aid agencies sought out local interlocutors.

Many of those created during the famine years did not survive long. The development of an autonomous civil society has been hampered by the limited opportunities for skills development and, until recently, a lack of exposure to global civil society movements<sup>29</sup>. However, since the mid-1990s, a strong cadre of professional organisations has emerged concerned with a range of social issues such as community development, human rights and women's rights. The emergence of women-led organisations is a common phenomenon throughout Somalia. Over time, professionalisation and self-regulation have led to the emergence of umbrella organisations in different regions (see box 1.2). Somali NGOs are also represented on the SACB and the NGO consortium in Nairobi. In most regions, civil society organisations at different times have provided an important platform, independent of the political factions, for raising social concerns. Many have worked as peace advocates and have played prominent roles in the peace conferences. While most are still reliant on external funding, a few have been able to raise financial and material support from local communities or the Somali diaspora. Until such a time that international donors are willing to work through local administrations and their capacity is strengthened, local NGOs working in collaboration with local and regional authorities will continue to play an important role in articulating and addressing community needs.

## Demographic Trends

### General population

Estimating the current population of Somalia with any degree of accuracy is difficult, due to the nomadic movement of people both within Somalia and across international borders, economic migration, and the displacement and relocation of populations during the war. In 1986/87, the Somali

#### Box 1.3: Key Demographic Trends

- decline in the number of Somali refugees in neighbouring countries
- a decline in numbers of internally displaced populations
- increasing internal economic migration to urban centres

Ministry of National Planning gave Somalia's population as 8.4 million, but this was generally considered unreliable as it was based on a controversial census<sup>30</sup>. At the end of 1997, a careful review by UNFPA of all previous population estimates concluded that in 1995 the total population in Somalia was probably 5.52 million (allowing for international migration), giving a projected population of 6.38 million in 2001 (see chapter 5 table B)<sup>31</sup>. Estimating the regional breakdown of populations or breakdown by socio-economic groups is particularly problematic given internal displacement, migrations, and contested borders<sup>32</sup>.

Somalia's population is normally defined as urban, rural settled and nomadic with up to 24% of the population estimated to be urban, 17% rural settled and 59% nomadic. This is probably misleading.



Pastoralism is a generic term for people herding livestock, while 'nomadic', 'transhumant' or 'agro-pastoral' describe different livelihood strategies. Nomads move with their livestock, while agro-pastoralists are normally more sedentary and plant crops as well as herd animals. The percentage of purely nomadic pastoralists is probably less than the above figure suggests. Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that this is the largest section of the population and they have the worst human development indicators and the least access to social services.

Given the inconsistency of past population estimates it is difficult to track demographic trends with any certainty. Nevertheless, there are several trends worth highlighting.

## Urban migration

Although the population of Somalia is predominantly rural, there are strong patterns of urban migration. In the 1980s, Somalia's rate of urban migration was one of the highest in Africa, estimated to be 6.5%<sup>33</sup>.

For a time during the war this process was reversed as people fled the main towns and moved to areas that their clans came from. Consequently, the populations of previously small regional towns such as Beletweyne, Galkaiyo, Qardo or Baidoa, and rural villages such as Jeriban, rose dramatically<sup>34</sup>. The population of Bosasso is estimated to have increased from 10,000 to 60,000 since 1991, as people fled fighting in Mogadishu, the Lower Juba and the inter-


riverine areas. Rapid urban migration has become a particular issue in Hargeisa, where some 62 per cent of Somali refugees returning from Region 5 of Ethiopia have chosen to settle. The concentration of businesses and aid programmes in the administrative capitals serves to attract the rural population, Somalis returning from the diaspora and economic migrants from Bay and Bakol regions. Smaller towns are experiencing similar trends, which present a challenge for urban planning. The concentration of aid agencies in urban centres such as Hargeisa, and a lack of clear policies by the administrations on investment in rural areas, exacerbate this trend. It is reminiscent of pre-war Somalia and indicates that development policies have changed very little.

## Refugees and refugee returnees

Prior to 1991, Somalia hosted one of the largest refugee populations in Africa, from the Ethiopian Ogaden. In 1987, one in six persons resident in Somalia was registered as a refugee<sup>35</sup>. The civil war reversed this situation. In 1988 when war erupted in the northwest, over 600,000 people fled to Ethiopia in one of the fastest and largest forced population movements ever recorded in Africa<sup>36</sup>. During 1989, a significant number of Somalis sought refuge in Kenya from fighting in southern Somalia. The mass flight of Somalis, however, took place from early 1991 when over one million are estimated to have fled to countries in the region and outside Africa. People continued to leave southern Somalia in large numbers up until 1995. Since then there has been a decline in refugee flows from Somalia and a gradual process of repatriation and reintegration (see figures 1.1 and 1.2).



**Figure 1.1: Somali Refugees by Selected Countries\* of Asylum 1990-September 2001**



Source: UNHCR (2001) Regional Office for Somalia, Nairobi.


Many have returned to Somalia, while others have obtained permanent residence rights in countries of asylum. Some 400,000 refugees in Ethiopia spontaneously returned to Somaliland in 1991 after the fall of the government, although 90,000 fled again in 1994 when civil war erupted in Hargeisa and Burco. Voluntary repatriation from Region 5 in Ethiopia restarted in December 1998 and after a decade in exile the last refugees from Somaliland resident in Ethiopia and Djibouti are expected to repatriate in 2001<sup>37</sup>. The decline in Somali refugee numbers is, in part, due to improved security inside Somalia, the difficult and unwelcoming environments in refugee camps, and the tighter asylum policies in the West.

The patterns of refugee flight, asylum, and repatriation among Somalis illustrates very clearly the significance of familial ties and mutual co-operation in this clan-based society<sup>38</sup>. Refugees fled across the Ethiopian or the Kenyan border to areas inhabited by their kin, often where they already had livestock, and where they received protection and assistance from their extend-

ed families before the arrival of relief aid. Some, instead of fleeing abroad, chose to move to safe areas within Somalia where they would receive protection and assistance from kin. Patterns of repatriation are also determined by the relationship between returning refugees and the host population.


The level of security and the

**Figure 1.2: Assisted Refugees Returning to Somalia 1992-2001**



Source: UNHCR (2001) Regional Office for Somalia, Nairobi.

**Figure 1.3: Regional Destinations of Returning Somali Refugees 1992-2001**





absorptive capacity of the recipient communities also determine the pace of repatriation. As can be seen in figure 1.3, over 50% of the repatriations to Somalia have been to Somaliland (Woqooyi Galbeed and Awdal region) from Region 5 in Ethiopia. Repatriation to areas where instability continues will be slower and certain Somali citizens from politically weak groups such as the Barawanese are unlikely to return in large numbers for some time, if ever. While some Somalis still seek to leave the country, they do so mainly as migrant workers or as part of family reunification programmes.

### Internally Displaced Persons


Another demographic trend is the levelling off of numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Somalia (see figure 1.4). Internal displacement as a result of conflict has a long history in Somalia, although the numbers of displaced were never recorded prior to 1991<sup>39</sup>. The largest war-related displacements from central and southern Somalia took place between 1991 and 1993. Prior to May 1992 the main cause of displacement was fighting and drought, and after May 1992 it was mainly food scarcity. In September 1992 there were estimated to be between 556,000 and 636,000 'visible' displaced people in static camps, 50% of whom were living in Mogadishu. In addition

there were 'invisible' displaced who were supported by kinfolk<sup>40</sup>. Some estimates numbered the displaced at that time to be over 1.6 million<sup>41</sup>.

Since then there have been smaller displacements caused by fighting in the Juba valley (1993), in Bay and Bakol (1995-1999), and in Somaliland (1994-1996). In late 1997 and early 1998, extensive flooding displaced people from central and southern Somalia. In 2001, some 10,000 people were temporarily displaced from Gedo region into Kenya as a result of armed clashes.

It would appear that the overall trend since 1993, however, has been one of diminishing internal displacement, as the war subsided and people either returned to their homes or 'resettled' in different regions of Somalia. Over the years, there has been a clear pattern of people from northern clans moving to the northern regions from the south, which has radically altered the demography of those regions.

**Figure 1.4: Internally Displaced Persons in Somalia 1992-2001**



Source: United States Committee for Refugees (October 2001) Global IDP database.

Note: Figures are based on available data



As violent conflict has declined and food deliveries have been reduced, displaced camps have also diminished. Climatic stress and economic hardship are now the main causes of population movement. In 2001, there were estimated to be 300,000 internally displaced, including 40-50,000 newly displaced (see chapter 5 table C). These figures should be treated with some caution, as there has been no comprehensive study of IDPs since UNOSOM withdrew from Somalia. There is little information on Mogadishu, which is thought to have the biggest concentration of IDPs.

IDPs today constitute over 60% of those Somalis considered to be food insecure<sup>42</sup>. The majority are from the poorest rural families or minority groups and live on the peripheries of the urban centres. Bereft of assets and with limited access to stable employment, their access to education, health and other services is restricted by an inability to pay user fees. Among IDP populations malnutrition rates as high as 25% have been recorded in the last two years<sup>43</sup>, compared to a global malnutrition rate for Somalia of 17%, and 10% among more affluent populations.

The declining incidents and scale of internal displacement is a positive trend. However, few of the existing displaced seem to be returning to their original homes. For some who were displaced from rural areas such as Bay and Bakol, there is little economic incentive to do so. For others who were originally residents of Mogadishu, a significant proportion do not feel it is safe or viable to

return there. This is a potential obstacle to future reconciliation. First, because it reflects the continuing instability of several regions, and second because it reflects a consolidation of population realignments and the violent transfer of property, such as land, that occurred during the war.

## The Somali diaspora

A fifth important, but largely unstudied demographic phenomenon, is the large population of former Somali nationals now settled outside Somalia – the so-called diaspora<sup>44</sup>. Some estimates put the number of Somalis living abroad today to be over one million<sup>45</sup>. The diaspora are an extremely important force in the Somali economy and in Somali politics. Several ministers in the TNG, the Somaliland administration, as well as the faction leaders and their family members hold non-Somali passports, for example. The remittances from the diaspora are a key part of the economy and critical to people's livelihoods.

The large diaspora means that the Somali 'nation' is no longer confined within territorial borders, but has been globalised, and the diaspora links Somalia into global economic networks (see chapter 2). Somalis returning from the diaspora have brought new businesses, restaurants, ideas, and technologies. While many in the diaspora express a desire to return to Somalia, insecurity and poor social services and employment opportunities mean that there are few inducements to do so. In 2000, for example, airline companies estimated that as many as 15,000 Somalis from





the diaspora returned to Somaliland during the European summer school holidays. However, few remained.

## Human Security Trends

### Security, law and order

Refugee movements and internal displacement are generally good indicators of levels of violence and security. The stabilisation of the conflict throughout much of Somalia since the mid-1990s has resulted in a decline in war-related deaths, life-threatening emergencies, refugee movements, and internal displacement, and is the main reason why there has been no repeat of the major food deficits and famine of the early 1990s.

Since 1998, the most dramatic improvement in security has been in Bay and Bakol regions. These inter-riverine regions have been intensely fought over since the start of the war, in part due to their resource-rich agro-pastoral lands<sup>46</sup>. They were the epicentre of the 1992/93 famine and between 1995 and 1999 this former 'breadbasket' of Somalia was consistently the most food insecure area as a result of on-going conflict. The long-term impact on people has been severe (see box 1.4). The establishment of control by the RRA in 1999 improved security and ended the occupation of land. Displaced people were able to return and farm, and access for humanitarian agencies improved. In 2000, crop production and food security in these regions were the best since 1994. Investment by members of the diaspora in real estate and busi-

nesses is an indication of confidence in the security situation. Given the protracted struggle over this land in the past, a settlement of the conflict in these regions could signal one of the most important changes in the war for a decade. However, the RRA's claims to other regions could see insecurity increase elsewhere.

Although large-scale warfare has diminished, much of southern and central Somalia remains volatile, and criminality and banditry are a constant threat to security. Several hundred people continue to die annually in armed clashes. Contested control over the port city of Kismayo and the Middle and Lower Juba regions have made these areas some of the most inaccessible in Somalia. Gedo and the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions are also volatile. Following the formation of the TNG in 2000 insecurity initially increased in and around Mogadishu as opposition forces contested its authority. Indeed, with the exception of Bay and Bakol, by mid-2001 humanitarian access in southern Somalia was at its worst for three years.

This insecurity impacts on the economy, disrupting livelihoods, impeding commercial traffic, and increasing business costs, due to the necessity of carrying armed guards on commercial vehicles. Public demand for basic law and order and a secure business environment has resulted in the emergence of *shari'a* courts, mostly funded by business people (see chapter 4). Ultimately, the security situation will only be improved by advancing reconciliation efforts.



### Box 1.4: The Social Costs of War<sup>1</sup>

Ibraahim (aged 65) lives in a one room *arish* on one side of the main street of the village. There are no windows and Ibraahim and his two sons sleep on cowhides placed directly on the brushed mud floor. There is no furniture and a small charcoal fire burns in the corner heating a battered aluminium pot of soor (sorghum porridge) for their only meal of the day. The hut keeps them dry when it rains, which is an improvement on their previous lodgings. His wife, Hawa (64) lives elsewhere in the village.

The other villagers consider Ibraahim to be one of the poorest in the community. This was not always the case, because prior to the war he lived in a large compound, owned a large farm, twenty goats, two cattle, and ten chickens, and was a prominent shopkeeper.

When the war started he buried his stock from the shops. Unfortunately they were found by the roving militia and looted. Consecutive droughts took their toll and the few crops that were planted failed, the livestock was gradually slaughtered or sold to feed his family and even the farm had to be sold. Ibraahim migrated with his family to the Lower Shabelle in an effort to find food from the international feeding centres that had been established. Thus began nearly eight years of constant migration in search of employment and food around the two rivers of the Juba and Shabelle, before he felt it was safe to move back to his village. In the meantime, his wife was killed by his own clan militia.

Currently, Ibraahim has access to two farms - one of his own and one that he has on loan. With virtually no harvest and no other assets he struggles to make ends meet and is sad that he does not have enough money to send his two boys to school. Although he was fortunate enough to find work on a neighbour's farm during the 2000 *gu* harvest, he received seed in return for his labour, and is still in debt to his friends. Once a giver of *zakat*, he is now a receiver. After the last harvest (*gu* 2000), Ibraahim and his two sons were given a total of five sacs of sorghum panicles by four different neighbours who had seen his plight. His son sometimes eats for free in one of the restaurants in the village. Ibraahim is looking forward to a good *deyr* in 2000 and contributed to a Qur'an reading fund to pray to God for a good harvest. He hopes that there will be an even better *gu* (2001) season to alleviate his current plight.

<sup>1</sup> Narbeth, S. (2001, March) *The targeting of emergency food distribution in Somalia: vulnerability, redistribution and beneficiary participation*. Nairobi: WFP.

In Somaliland and Puntland, incidents of insecurity since 1998 have been minimal. Vehicles have not needed to carry armed guards in Somaliland for several years and crime statistics indicate a relatively low level of homicide<sup>47</sup>. However, landmines continue to pose a threat (see Landmines). Disputes over land is another cause of insecurity in Somaliland, which sometimes result in fatalities. In rural areas, disputes arise between farmers and pastoralists over the closure of land for fodder or for land banking, which can encroach on grazing areas and restrict pastoralists' movements. In urban centres, disagreements over land for construction purposes have also increased. One solution to this has been to support cadastral survey-

ing for the demarcation and registration of land (see box 1.5).

These different security environments are reflected in the international aid programme. For southern and central Somalia, cross-border operations remain largely the same as when UNOSOM withdrew in 1995, with aid being delivered from Kenya by road, sea and air. Over the past five years, many NGOs have withdrawn from southern Somalia. In 2000, less than 25 international aid agencies were serving a population of between 4 and 5 million. Of these an estimated 1.6 million persons were inaccessible to a substantial UN presence due to insecurity<sup>48</sup>. In contrast, positive changes in the security environment have



### Box 1.5: Cadastral Surveys

In west Somaliland, UNDP and the Danish Government have been sponsoring a programme of cadastral surveying of agricultural land holdings. Between 1998 and 2001, a team of locally taught surveyors in Somaliland have demarcated over 1,700 farms in Gabiley district, averaging five hectares each. They have produced wall maps of the surveyed land and a database showing *inter alia* map references of each farm, hectareage, and crops grown. Staff of the Somaliland Ministry of Agriculture are trained concurrently in surveying and mapping techniques. Each farm has concrete emplacements at farm boundary turning points and each farmer is given a laminated registration certificate.

The benefits to poor farmers of a cadastral survey are the eradication of land disputes and security of tenure by a sound title deed. Security of tenure has brought peace where there was conflict. Registration certificates that certify hectareage or acreage can also be used as collateral for sale and purchase of land, for inheritance, and for loans to hire tractors. Expanding the means of cultivation by hiring tractors will help reduce poverty.

enabled aid agencies to decentralise their aid operations to the north, where there are currently over 40 international aid agencies operating.

#### Landmines<sup>49</sup>

Landmines pose a serious personal and economic threat in Somalia. They have been used in Somalia since the 1960 border wars with Ethiopia and Kenya and were used again during the 1977 war with Ethiopia. The majority were planted in the late 1980s in Somaliland during the war between the Siyad Barre government and the SNM, and in the 1990s civil war. Landmines continue to be used in some areas of southern Somalia.

In the early 1990s, Somaliland was considered one of the most heavily mined countries in the world, with estimates of up to one million mines laid during the war by the Somali National Army and the SNM. The mines were used not only with military objectives but also as weapons of terror against civilians, planted on agricultural land, on access routes, around water resources, and in people's homes. Most were planted without markings or record keeping.

In 1991, casualties among civilians returning to Hargeisa were high due to the mines laid in and around the city. An estimated one in every 652 returnees became a mine victim. Since 1991, 5,000 mine casualties (3,500 fatalities and 1,500 amputations) have been recorded in Somaliland. The first clearance of landmines began in 1992 to facilitate the return of civilians.

The clearance programme was set back by the 1994-1996 civil war in Somaliland when landmines were again used, particularly around the town of Burco. Since 1999, a robust mine clearance programme has been re-established involving several mine clearance agencies, coordinated through the National Demining Agency in Hargeisa and the Somaliland Mine Action Centre supported by UNDP. While landmine incidents have subsided, casualties continue with some 109 cases recorded in Somaliland in 2000. In a country with very limited medical facilities, landmine victims face enormous problems of first aid and post-operative care. However, mine clearance agencies believe that Somaliland could be declared 'mine-safe' within five to seven years with the present capacity for clearance.



In the absence of a government, Somalia is one of the few countries not to have signed a landmines ban treaty. Some groups, such as the RRA, continue to reserve the right to use them and during the first half of 2001 there were several landmine incidents. In Somaliland, although the parliament has passed a motion to ban landmines, it has not passed into law and the administration is unable to sign the global treaty due to lack of diplomatic recognition. More encouragingly, in Puntland, the parliament has adopted the treaty and prohibited landmine use, although they are also unable to sign or ratify it.

## Small arms

Another threat to human security in Somalia is the proliferation and availability of light weapons. Somalia's militarisation began in the 1960s during border disputes with Kenya and Ethiopia. However, it was during the Cold War that Siyad Barre was able to solicit a vast array of armaments, first from the Soviet Union and then in the 1980s from the US government. Italy, Romania, East Germany, Iraq, Iran, Libya, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and China all contributed to the arsenal at different times.

Many small arms came into the hands of civilians following Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden war. Insurgents in the 1980s were armed by neighbouring countries, while the government itself armed paramilitaries and the general population. Arms were also sold by the military to civilians as a source of income. The collapse of government and the dissolution of the military in 1991 left the country awash

with stockpiles of weapons obtained by the regime from Cold War allies.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc released a huge number of weapons onto the international market. This meant that in the early 1990s the warring parties in Somalia were able not only to draw on existing arms caches, but also to import new weapons into the country. In 1982, the UN Security Council imposed a weapons embargo on Somalia to try to halt the flow of weapons. Despite this, there are circumstantial but consistent reports that weapons have been received from neighbouring states and other countries in Africa and the Gulf. In turn, the trade of weapons through Somalia is impacting on conflicts in neighbouring countries. The Kenyan government periodically closes its border with Somalia in an attempt to contain the flow of weapons, the last time being in August 2001.

To date there has been very little research to determine the scale of the problem of small arms and their impact. The establishment of conditions of peace and public administrations in Somaliland and Puntland has helped to reduce the threat posed by heavy weapons. In Somaliland a successful community based disarmament programme combining traditional and modern forms of demobilisation has also helped remove small arms from the streets. Nevertheless, new small arms and ammunition are traded openly in most markets. The presence of large privately owned stockpiles of small arms and the regional trafficking network continue to threaten peace and security.



## Human rights

One of the most important elements of human security is that people should be able to live in a society that honours their basic rights. After 21 years of an oppressive military dictatorship and a decade of protracted conflict, the human rights situation in Somalia defies generalisations. In areas where security has been re-established and where there is political and economic recovery, the human rights situation is much improved. Where political instability and chronic humanitarian need persists, the human rights situation remains dire.

Chapter 4 describes in some detail current trends in

human rights. Box 1.6 below describes some of the on-going overt violations of human rights, particularly in areas of southern Somalia. Throughout Somalia, however, there are certain groups whose full rights are denied or are at risk, including minorities, internally displaced, women and children. Furthermore, despite advances in some civil liberties since the war, such as the right to free speech and expression, many human development indicators point to a regression in the realisation of socio-economic rights over the past decade, with declining levels of literacy, higher levels of child mortality, pockets of chronic malnutrition and high levels of unemployment.

### Box 1.6: On-going Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in Somalia<sup>1</sup>

<b>Violence against life</b>	The taking of life remains common in many contested areas in southern Somalia. Mass killings of civilians are alleged to have occurred in Baidoa and environs in February 1999. During a battle for Kismayo in June 1999 the warring factions are reported to have executed many prisoners. In 2001, attacks on Bantu villages occurred in the Middle Shabelle and Lower Juba regions.
<b>Intentional attacks against civilians</b>	Kidnapping, rape and murder are common, especially in Mogadishu and Kismayo.
<b>Pillage</b>	The looting of private property and diversion of relief materials is common.
<b>Underage conscription</b>	Children under 15 are commonly recruited by militia. Some as young as 10 have allegedly been recruited as personal bodyguards to faction leaders.
<b>Rape and sexual violence</b>	Such violence is reported throughout Somalia, with violence against minorities reported to be particularly problematic.
<b>Persecution</b>	Discrimination and persecution of minority and politically weak groups is commonplace.
<b>Illegal ordering of displacement of civilians</b>	Levels of internal displacement and refugee flight have declined since the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, forced displacement and flight from areas of insecurity does continue. In April 2001, 10,000 civilians fled fighting in Gedo region to Kenya. The diversion of assistance to internally displaced persons, who have the right to request and receive protection, constitutes a violation of humanitarian law.
<b>The denial of the due process of law</b>	Irregular courts operate throughout Somalia, in which procedures for judgement and punishment do not accord with international practice.
<b>Violence against humanitarian workers</b>	National and international staff of humanitarian agencies continue to be subject to kidnapping, violence and intimidation.

<sup>1</sup> See OHCHR (2000). Office for the High Commission of Human Rights (2000). *Towards a Mutually Reinforcing Human Rights Strategy for Somalia*. Nairobi: OHCHR.



## Food security


The right to food is firmly established in international law<sup>50</sup>. However, this right is continually and widely violated. Food security, which is concerned with entitlement to or ready access to food, is fundamentally a human rights issue. When access is denied due to displacement and looting of assets, as happened in the 1991-1993 Somali civil war, the result can be famine. The severity of the 1992 famine, in which global malnutrition rates reached 80%, has been named by Somalis *dad cunkii* ('the time of cannibalism'), which alludes to its man-made causes. The international community responded with food aid, as well as health and other emergency interventions. Stabilisation of the conflict since 1993 means there has been no repetition of famine on that scale, but food security trends have fluctuated due to changing environmental, market, and security conditions. It is estimated, for example, that one in every five harvests in Somalia will be

a partial failure and one in ten will be a complete write-off<sup>51</sup>.

The highest post-war harvest in southern Somalia was recorded in 1994. Although subsequently the general trend has been one of relatively stable grain production as figure 1.5 shows, average production has consistently been below sixty per cent of the pre-war average<sup>52</sup>. Between 1995 and 1999 Bay and Bakol were chronically food insecure due to on-going conflict and displacement. In 1997/98, drought followed by severe flooding caused by El Niño weather conditions produced Somalia's worst harvest since 1994 and led to the largest food aid intervention since the famine, targeting 700,000 beneficiaries<sup>53</sup>.

Improved security in Bay and Bakol after 1999, coupled with good *gu* and *deyr* rains, meant that by September 2000 food production was the highest since 1994 in irrigated and rainfed sectors.

Figure 1.5: Cereal Production in Southern Somalia 1993-2000



Source: FSAU February 2001, Nairobi.



The estimated number of food insecure people fell from 750,000 to 400,000<sup>54</sup>. With food aid for Ethiopia and Kenya finding its way into Somalia, cereal prices in late 2000 were very low. Consequently, by May 2001 the nutritional situation in Somalia was reported to be marginally better than neighbouring countries<sup>55</sup>. However, a failure of the 2001 *gu* rains in the south led to new projections of food deficits. This, in addition to the embargo on livestock imports from the Horn of Africa by Gulf States and inflation triggered by the unregulated import of new money, meant that food security had again deteriorated by mid-2001.

In comparison to southern Somalia, food security in the north has generally been better over the past decade. Better physical security and a greater reliance on pastoral production have been the main reasons. Nomadic pastoralists who are mobile and able to move their assets have proven better able to cope with conflict and climatic stress than sedentary farmers. However, the 1998 and 2000 bans on livestock imports by Gulf States, drought in 1998, and inflation have all affected livelihoods. The livestock bans have particularly hurt urban populations, including returning refugees and IDPs who, being dependent on the market, are reliant on a healthy economy for access to jobs and income generating opportunities. Access to overseas remittances among urban populations and links to pastoral kin have helped to offset shocks to livelihoods, but the continuation of the bans leaves the economy highly fragile to any additional shocks.

## Coping strategies and social networks<sup>56</sup>

Individuals and communities are not passive in the face of crises but employ their intimate knowledge of the environment, or political and social relations to mitigate against disaster. Rural households in Somalia employ a range of strategies to cope and survive in adverse circumstances. These can include the diversification of livelihood strategies through seasonal migration for employment, changes to dietary intake, or the consumption of famine foods. Often, short-term needs are sacrificed to preserve a 'way of life'. In the absence of any formal welfare system in Somalia, resource transfers and wealth redistribution within social networks play a crucial role in the maintenance of livelihoods. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in hard times resources from these informal networks can account for 25-60 % of the household economy.

Amongst the Reewin in the inter-riverine regions of southern Somalia these social resource networks are based on a complex mix of culture, kinship, religion, and friendship and are sustained by mutual trust and reciprocity. The local saying '*Jiirtaa koo gutumaase maay makoo gohaase*' (You are obliged to help your relatives because they are part of your body), emphasises the importance that kinship plays.

Migration is an integral part of people's way of life in Somalia and a critical coping strategy in a risk-prone environment. Migration, resettlement through adoption into another clan (*sheegata*),



and exogamous marriage mean that most Somali families have relatives spread among clans and over a large geographic area. These personal and familial networks can be drawn on in times of conflict or drought. Mobility as a coping strategy of pastoralists during drought, however, is restricted during conflict.

Clan affiliation and identity with a place of residence form a system for the sharing and co-operative control of resources at the level of the household, compound, community and clan. Among the Reewin, traditional obligations of assistance, in the form of food, shelter, and water, are extended to guests (*meerto*) and wayfarers (*dareerto*) and between relatives. Other forms of assistance include the loan of farmland (*hoors*) or a milking animal (*irmaans*), the restocking of livestock, and the giving of credit (*amaa*). Helping those most in need is also integral to the religious and social obligations of Islam, institutionalised in the giving of *zakat* and *sadaqa*. Within the community, co-operative forms of labour, such as temporary assemblies of kin and acquaintances (*goob*) to perform a specific agricultural task or water-user groups (*fatiir*) are commonplace.

In the past decade, the livelihood strategies upon which the Reewin depend were adversely affected by war and drought with profound and differing impacts upon the social structures of the Reewin. Localised drought can normally be dealt with by seeking assistance from relatives, friends or the clan. But more widespread drought places greater

demands on the system as a whole. Initially expanding to meet needs, the networks contract as drought continues and assets are eroded. When widespread conflict and drought are combined, as witnessed in the early 1990s, the impact can be devastating. Production systems and household and community assets, such as food stores and livestock, were destroyed or looted and the option of migration was constrained by warring militia. As livelihood options were reduced and trust within and between clans was eroded, the geographical spread of the resource networks contracted, and families retreated to the reassuring safety of the community. However, in some instances, the migration of individuals abroad served to extend these networks.

Households are not equally poor and the benefits of social networks vary, depending on the strength of family connections or exclusion from certain groups. Through these networks people show a great capacity to 'cope' with debilitating crises. However, while these social networks can be extensive, spreading over hundreds if not thousands of kilometres, they are not inexhaustible. While 'social capital' is important, other forms of human, financial, and natural capital are needed to enable the majority of people to escape from poverty.

## Employment and unemployment

Prior to the war it was estimated that over 70% of the population lived in the rural areas and that over 75% of the population drew their livelihoods





from pastoralism and agriculture, 16% from the service sector and 8.4% from industry (see chapter 5 table S). There are currently no estimates of levels of income or employment for the various sectors<sup>57</sup>. The rural sector continues to provide the main source of employment for people, but due to massive internal and external displacement and the collapse of industry and public services a high percentage of the population in both rural and urban areas is unemployed or underemployed. Lack of employment opportunities is one factor sustaining the large numbers of militia, particularly in the urban areas of southern Somalia.

Wage labour is an important supplementary income for rural households, and is typically done by women and children. Seasonal migration of members of rural households to towns or irrigated agricultural areas is a common practice, particularly during periods of hardship. Most wage labour comprises unskilled or semi-skilled casual work based on daily contracts for services, such as porters, farm labourers, and construction workers. Households that rely entirely on wage labour are amongst the poorest in Somali society, as it tends to be unreliable and typically pays less than US \$1 per day. Remuneration for domestic workers may be in the form of in-kind lodging or food and in many cases this work is done by extended family members. Indeed, the provision of employment opportunities to kin is an important social obligation of wealthier families.

Busy seaports like Berbera, Bosasso or El Ma'an and major transport centres generate a lot of casual work. The construction boom in the northern cities has also provided much needed employment for displaced people and returning refugees and has triggered a significant flow of migrant labour, mainly from the south but also former pastoralists and non-Somali migrant workers from Ethiopia. As the labourers from southern Somalia (mostly inter-riverine Reewin and Bantu groups) are skilled in construction and other occupational skills, they can be better off than former pastoralists<sup>58</sup>.

Opportunities for educated people are few and tend to be concentrated in the main urban centres in trade, the retail business, financial and telecommunication services, and the aid sector. In Somaliland, Puntland and more recently in Mogadishu, the administrations are providing new employment opportunities for skilled labour. In Somaliland, the administration pays salaries to some 4,000 public employees<sup>59</sup>, while in Puntland over 65% of the recurrent budget is consumed by salaries<sup>60</sup>. In both places, the security forces consume the largest proportion of the wages bill. In Somaliland the high recurrent costs to the administration has led to a rationalisation and retrenchment of the labour force over the past two years. The introduction of examinations means that employees are increasingly recruited on the basis of merit rather than patronage.

With up to 89 international NGOs and other UN



### Box 1.7: Food Security Assessment in Somalia

In Somalia, national-level food economy analysis is undertaken by the Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU) in collaboration with the FAO, FEWS-Net, Save the Children-UK, the UN Co-ordination Unit and UNICEF.

The FSAU uses household food economy as its analytical framework. This explores the different ways that households access food, such as through production (crops, livestock), purchase from the market, gifts (including relief), and wild foods (fishing, hunting, wild fruits, nuts, vegetables).

To assess food purchases, sources of income and expenditure patterns are examined. The main sources of income are from the sale of crops, sale of livestock and livestock products, self-employment activities (such as petty trade or firewood collection), labour (agricultural and other) and gifts (including remittances).

Food economy analysis divides the population into *food economy groups* and then into *wealth groups*, usually defined as 'poor', 'middle' and 'better-off', using local definitions of wealth. A food economy group is a group of people who share similar methods of accessing food and income and are at risk from similar events that may undermine that access (floods, droughts, livestock disease). Over twenty food economy groups have been identified in Somalia. The main ones are:

- *Pastoral*: throughout all rural areas of Somalia, but predominant in the arid lands of northern and central Somalia, as well as along the Ethiopian and Kenyan borders.
- *Agro-pastoral*: mainly in inter-riverine regions of Bay, Bakol, western Hiran and eastern Gedo in southern Somalia, but also found in certain areas of the northern regions.
- *Riverine farmers*: defined as households whose domestic production is derived exclusively from farming and who do not maintain livestock holdings. They live along the banks of the Juba and Shabelle Rivers.
- *Fishing*: coastal fishing communities mostly found along the southern coast.
- *Urban*: a population mostly dependent on the market for income and food.
- *Internally displaced populations*: the majority are concentrated in the cities of Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Kismayo, Bosasso, Baidoa, and Galkaiyo.

These general groups can be broken into sub-groups that reflect local environmental and market characteristics. The information and analysis obtained through the household food economy approach helps to identify those vulnerable to food insecurity and the context within which they are living. This may be used for the identification and targeting of appropriate food and non-food assistance.



agencies operating in Somalia<sup>61</sup>, the aid sector is also one of the biggest employers of waged labour. The limited employment opportunities, however, are one reason why the skilled labour force that fled Somalia has not begun to return in large numbers.

### Cost of living

Accurate figures on cost of living in Somalia are currently unavailable<sup>62</sup>, but data collected by aid agencies points to a negative trend in household purchasing power. Declining purchasing power and rising costs of living are placing poorer households under considerable strain.

There is a long-term decline in terms of trade for livestock against cereal grains (the 'goats for rice' terms of trade). Although terms of trade for livestock vary seasonally due to the impact of the monsoons, dry and rainy season sales, or Islamic festivals when demand from the Gulf States for livestock is highest, the long-term trend is one of higher prices for imported grains and lower prices for livestock sold. The reasons for this lie in external market factors beyond the control of Somali pastoralists and merchants. When the livestock ban was imposed in 2000, terms of trade for livestock in Hargeisa immediately dropped to between 40% to 50% below the terms of trade for the previous year<sup>63</sup>. The implications for human development are clear. The decline in the value of livestock reduced household purchasing power and affected household livelihood security, with the result that households were forced to switch to

eating cheaper grains such as sorghum and maize<sup>64</sup>.

This trend is less apparent among southern pastoralists where the high demand for beef in Kenya has sustained the price of Somali cattle. In the south, the most dramatic influence on the cost of living in the past three years have been the currency crises (see Currencies) that have triggered hyperinflation and eroded the purchasing power of poorer households.

### Populations at risk

As a result of political and economic trends, more Somalis have the potential to achieve sustained socio-economic recovery than three years ago. Nevertheless, for many people food security remains chronically and unacceptably poor. The degree of food security varies between food economy groups (see box 1.7) and between localities and regions (see box 1.9).

#### Box 1.8: Populations at Risk

- *Riverine Bantu agricultural communities in the Middle and Lower Juba regions* - aid agencies identify these communities as the most chronically poor in Somalia
- *Internally displaced populations in urban areas* - nutritional surveys conducted in Somalia since 1980 reveal that IDPs are consistently the group that suffer most from acute malnutrition
- *Returning refugees*
- *Poor agro-pastoralists in southern Somalia*
- *Urban poor in southern Somalia*



Nutrition is not only a good indicator of a person's health, but also of their social, economic, and political vulnerability. Although nutrition levels have improved greatly since the early 1990s, pockets of chronic acute malnutrition remain in certain regions and among certain social groups (see chapter 5 table R). The acute malnutrition rate is estimated to be 17% for Somalia as a whole<sup>65</sup>. This is considerably worse than neighbouring countries (see figure 1.6), although there

social systems that sustain both lives and livelihoods has weakened the ability of many Somalis to cope with further stress or to meet their basic human needs<sup>67</sup>. Consequently, in 2001, an estimated 400,000 people still remain displaced or destitute and vulnerable to political, economic and climatic shocks (see box 1.8)<sup>68</sup>.

### The structural causes of vulnerability

The stabilisation of the conflict and the gradual improvement in food production, means that for most people continuing high levels of need arise not from conditions of acute humanitarian crisis, but from long-term structural causes of poverty<sup>69</sup>. Certain key economic factors sustain high malnutrition rates and the chronically poor socio-economic indicators across the

**Figure 1.6: Prevalence of Underweight, Stunting and Wasting in Somalia Compared to Other Countries 1999**



Source: FSAU/FAO (July 2001) *Nutrition Update* Somalia data from UNICEF (2001) *EndDecade MICS*. Other countries: data from *State of the World's Children 2001*.

is a marked difference between south and central Somalia and the north, where acute malnutrition in Somaliland is less than 10%. High levels of malnutrition are consistently found among displaced populations and marginalised groups who face discrimination in access to food, health, and water. Nutritionists also stress that the cumulative damage to personal health caused by a decade of war and malnutrition cannot be healed by a single year of improved food security<sup>66</sup>. Over the past decade, the disruption to political, economic, and

country. These include:

- lack of infrastructure and social services;
- depletion of household assets;
- lack of labour opportunities;
- limited benefits to the poor of economic growth;
- lack of macroeconomic management;
- dependency on a single export market.

Among northern pastoralists, for example, the main threats to livelihood security are long-term trends in the commercialisation of livestock production and

# Box 1.9: Regional Trends in

## **Awdal, Woqooyi Galbeed, Togdheer**

These regions have experienced great changes over the last 10-12 years, with massive destruction of infrastructure and displacement in 1988-90 and 1994-96, but rapid recovery and peace in between and up to the present. Relative stability, private foreign remittances, livestock export and the transshipment trade to Ethiopia have been important catalysts of economic development. Food economy groups in these regions include pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and urban communities. Food insecurity is relatively localised, small-scale and seasonal, affecting poor agro-pastoralists in the west, poor pastoralists in the Haud and IDPs. It is symptomatic, however, of underlying problems in the economy, including increasing settlement, lack of environmental management policies and practices (particularly around the livestock/pastoral sector), land grabbing, and asset loss. A focus on Hargeisa and its surrounds by the Somaliland administration and the international community neglects crucial issues affecting pastoral populations.

## **Gedo**

Gedo is the most livestock dependent region in southern Somalia. Most crop production is of a marginal nature, except in Bardhera district and to a lesser extent Lugh. Food security conditions have been poor for most of 1999 and 2000. Gedo has been subject to a variety of shocks over the last 2 years, including drought, insecurity and conflict, and disrupted markets and trade. North Gedo is close to the epicentre of the regional drought that particularly affected northeast Kenya and Ethiopia. North Gedo also has significant numbers of minority and weaker clans. Poor rains over several seasons have disproportionately affected cattle owners. The main market for most animal types is Kenya. The northern districts of the region have fared worst. Southern parts, including Bardhera, that contains a significant proportion of the regional population, have received better rainfall. Significant irrigated and higher potential rainfed areas boost cereal supply and provide some job opportunities and crop sharing. In addition, wealthier pastoral and urban groups are found in southern districts. Cattle owners have

been disproportionately affected. Food aid needs were significant in 1999 and 2000. This was largely targeted at the small agro-pastoral and urban populations in Belet Hawa, Lugh and Dolo.

## **Lower Juba**

This is a very mixed region in terms of food economy groups and therefore vulnerability to food insecurity. Significant pastoral, agro-pastoral, riverine, urban, and coastal groups inhabit the region. This region has amongst the highest rainfall levels in Somalia and is richly endowed in natural resources. Food security conditions have been stable since the El Niño floods, although information on the region is limited due to insecurity, restricted access, and the presence of only a few agencies. The full impact of the floods on livelihoods is unknown. Four factors affect food security. First, the reliance on Kenya for livestock marketing (especially cattle), which has generally been advantageous to livestock owners. Second, the impact of the El Niño floods was both positive and negative. The floods increased opportunities for recession cultivation but damaged river embankments, spread livestock and human diseases, and increased livestock deaths. Third, the charcoal production and export trade has brought a 'healthy' source of income for some, but is environmentally damaging. Fourth, the wide variety of cultivated crops, including maize, cowpeas, sesame, fruits, vegetables, and wild foods means that little emergency food aid was recommended for the region in 1999 and 2000, when inland areas were facing drought conditions. However, in 2000/01, rains in the Juba valley were poor in contrast to much of the rest of southern Somalia.

## **Middle Juba**

A variety of food economy groups inhabit the region, including riverine agriculturalists, agro-pastoralists and pastoralists. Food security conditions have been unstable, with conflict, insecurity, and displacement affecting some areas, particularly Sakow in 1999. The northern rainfed areas have suffered from poor climatic conditions. In-migration to riverine areas from Bay region over the past 2-3 years has placed additional pressure on local resources. Few agencies have been present in recent

years. Livestock owners benefit from the marketing opportunities in Kenya.

## **Bakol**

The people of Bakol region are predominantly agro-pastoralists and pastoralists. The region was the most severely affected by food insecurity in 1998, 1999 and early 2000. Past and recent conflict, drought, poor market conditions, and limited humanitarian assistance led the FSAU and FEWS to issue a 'Famine Alert' in January 2000. High levels of malnutrition, displacement, and asset loss have been recorded, as well as consecutive very poor harvests. Minority groups, who rely more on crops than livestock, were most affected. Significant variations in humanitarian conditions within the region were also noted. Excellent Gu rains in 2000, improved security conditions following the recapture of Bay and Bakol in 1999 by the RRA, and the presence of more humanitarian agencies have alleviated the worst effects mentioned above. However, while the region is recovering it remains vulnerable to future shocks. Emergency food needs remained high up to mid-2000.

## **Lower Shabelle**

Food security conditions have been improving in this region following the El Niño floods of late 1997, which damaged most of the banana plantations and irrigation infrastructure that remained after the war. From 1998, canal rehabilitation, reasonable rains and relative security have been the main factors associated with this improvement. As a coastal region, Lower Shabelle benefits from the mid-season Haga'a rains, as well as the Gu and Deyr rains. The major population groups in this region are pure riverine farmers and agro-pastoralists who practice either or both irrigated and rainfed cultivation. A variety of crops are grown, including maize, sorghum, cowpeas, sesame, vegetables, and fruit, for which Mogadishu is the principle market. Livestock owning groups use Mogadishu and Kenyan markets. Riverine resources and a large irrigated cultivated area that provides employment opportunities attract people and livestock from other regions during periods of hardship. During the 1998-1999 drought many people moved to Lower

# Food Security

These summaries of regional food security trends were compiled by FSAU in mid-2001

Shabelle from Bay, where clan relations are strong. Land ownership in this region is highly politicised and the control of canal infrastructure is problematic. Marginalised population groups, such as the riverine Bantu and the Bimaal, are generally more vulnerable to food insecurity. No emergency food aid was recommended for this region for most of 1999 and 2000, but canal rehabilitation was supported through food-for-work.

## **Middle Shabelle**

In terms of food economy groups, this is a very mixed region, with significant populations practising riverine irrigated agriculture, agro-pastoralism or pure pastoralism. Trends in, and vulnerability to, food insecurity therefore varies. Food security conditions have generally been stable or improving for several years, particularly as rains have been more reliable in coastal and near coastal areas compared to further inland. Southern areas of this region have the advantage of Haga'a rains, in addition to the Gu and Deyr. Although insecurity is common, conflict has had only a localised impact on food security. Some canal rehabilitation has taken place. In riverine areas a variety of crops are grown, including maize, cowpeas, sesame, and vegetables. In rainfed areas, sorghum inter-cropped with cowpeas is most common. Proximity to Mogadishu is advantageous for marketing. Livestock are sold to southern markets such as Mogadishu, as well as to Saudi Arabia through the northern towns of Bosasso and Berbera. Therefore, the current ban on livestock imports in the Gulf will have some negative impact. Little emergency food aid has been recommended since early 1999.

## **Bay**

Bay region is one of the most populous and homogenous of southern Somalia, with the majority of the population practising agro-pastoral farming on relatively high potential rainfed lands. Livestock are normally an important reserve. Food security conditions reached very low levels in 1998, 1999 and early 2000, until the drought broke. Livestock, food stocks, and other assets have been depleted for many years due to looting, conflict and drought conditions. Bay has probably suffered more than other

regions from the lack of government and insecurity over the last 10 years. However, the recapture of the area by RRA in 1999 and the breaking of the drought in early 2000 resulted in much improved security conditions, a bumper harvest and an increase in international assistance. However market problems remain, with the road and trade between Baidoa and Mogadishu intermittently disrupted by tensions between the RRA and the TNG. Emergency food needs were high in 1998, 1999 and early 2000.

## **Hiran**

Hiran is predominantly a livestock dependent region, with marginal rainfed crop production practiced as well as limited irrigated cultivation. Food security indicators have been fluctuating, with the regional drought of 1998, 1999 and early 2000 particularly affecting northern areas. Agro-pastoral groups, dependent on rainfed farming and cattle were most vulnerable to food insecurity. Very good rains and production in the Gu of 2000 have improved the situation since then. However, following the death of the Chief Ugass in mid-2000, security has deteriorated, affecting Beletweyne town in particular. Beletweyne has become an important trade hub, with connections in all directions – Ethiopia, Bay and Bakol, Mogadishu and Central and Northeast Somalia (Puntland). A reasonable presence of humanitarian agencies has existed in the region, particularly in Beletweyne town, and relatively little emergency food assistance has taken place, compared to other inland and neighbouring regions.

## **Galgadud/ South Mudug**

In these central regions of Somalia, people are predominantly nomadic pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, with small-scale cowpea production also practised by livestock owning groups near coastal areas. A clear borderline between two dominant clans in Mudug intermittently restricts the migration of pastoralists. Inland areas are vulnerable to poor rains and limited water sources, while eastern coastal and near coastal areas have better possibilities for out of season showers and therefore water and pasture access. Food security conditions have been stable with good rains and crop production in the last 2-3 seasons.

## **Sool and Sanag**

Pastoralism is the predominant form of livelihood for the majority of the population in Sool region, while in Sanag region agro-pastoralism, horticulture and fishing are also practised. With a low population density and peaceful conditions, food security has been reasonably stable over the past ten years. These regions were little affected by the drought of 1998-1999. Livestock productivity and birthing rates have been high in 2001, but the current livestock ban by the Gulf countries threatens current income levels and future livelihood security. Furthermore, because these regions are relatively isolated from the main urban centres in Somaliland and Puntland, the less powerful clans here are excluded from many of the benefits of commercial developments and international assistance.

## **Bari, Nugal, North Mudug**

The northeast regions of Bari, Nugal, and North Mudug were very underdeveloped prior to 1990, but were spared from the fighting during the war and have been one of the most peaceful areas of Somalia. The completion of the Garowe-Bosasso road and the development of Bosasso port in the late 1980s, the rapid expansion of urban populations and trade (livestock and lobster) as people indigenous to the area relocated from Mogadishu, and the peace, have helped the area grow economically relative to many others. The lack of regulations and taxes and the closure of Mogadishu port have also helped to stimulate trade. These generally positive developments have been interrupted by drought conditions and bans on the import of Somali livestock by Gulf countries. The drought of 1998-99 had a significant impact throughout the region, particularly in the Addun area where significant asset loss and destitution resulted. Since the Deyr of 1999-2000, climatic conditions have been positive with livestock conception and birthing rates high, enabling re-stocking and increasing livestock productivity. However, the comprehensive ban on livestock imports imposed by the Gulf countries in September 2000, as well as the printing of new Somali currency, has seriously affected household livelihoods.



## Box 1.10: Structural Vulnerability and Environmental Degradation in the Haud<sup>1</sup>

The Haud is prime wet season grazing land straddling the Somali-Ethiopian borders. Historically there were few permanent water sources or villages in the Haud and the land was reserved for seasonal grazing patterns. This was disrupted when colonial authorities introduced water reservoirs which increased settlement. However, environmental and grazing practices enforced by colonial and post-colonial governments served to preserve the ecology. A workshop organised by Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU) in 2000 identified the following reasons for food insecurity amongst pastoralists in the Haud of Togdheer.

### Problems identified in the Haud

- uncontrolled settlement and private water reservoir (*berkhad*) construction, disrupting seasonal grazing patterns
- expansion of human and livestock population, although livestock holdings per household have declined
- lack of active environmental management practices
- commercialisation of livestock sector causing trucking of livestock and water, causing environmental damage
- restricted movement of livestock due to conflict leading to over-concentrations and land degradation
- increased private enclosures disrupting pastoral migration patterns
- increased charcoal burning and tree cutting
- increased incidence of droughts or below normal seasonal rains and longer dry spells, with pastoralists reporting lower yields in recent *gu* and *deyr* seasons

### Impact on the environment

- reduction in bio-diversity
- decrease in palatable pastures
- consumption of grasses before they seed
- poor regeneration of rangeland after the dry season

### This impacts on livelihood security

- decreasing livestock numbers per family and reduction in productivity
- increasing the cost of water
- decreasing livestock reproduction rates and productivity
- increasing susceptibility of livestock to drought and disease
- decreasing herd diversity, with a reduction in numbers of sheep and cattle
- increasing destitution
- increasing rural to urban migration

### Actions that could improve food security in the Haud

- research and policy development geared towards sustainable pastoralism and rangeland use
- education and extension services for pastoralists to encourage participation in environmental management practices
- development of alternative livestock markets
- diversification of pastoralists' livelihoods and creation of employment opportunities in rural areas
- implementation of appropriate community-based rangeland and resource management practices
- improved inter-ministerial, inter-agency and community collaboration
- formation of pastoral associations for advocacy purposes
- pasture reseeding
- banning of private enclosures on communal land
- identification of alternative low cost energy sources
- rehabilitation of roads to prevent off-road driving
- improvement of public services in selected settlements to discourage new settlements
- banning of charcoal burning and tree cutting, and development of energy saving alternatives

<sup>1</sup> FSAU (2000) *Structural Vulnerability Workshop - Environmental Degradation In The Haud.*



environmental change (see box 1.10). The expansion of the livestock trade since colonial times and the commercialisation of livestock production have involved a historic decline in semi-subsistence production that has affected herd investment strategies, land use patterns, intra-group relations and the environment<sup>70</sup>.

Fluctuating environmental and market conditions makes it essential for poor Somali households to be able to capitalise on temporary improvements in food security conditions in order to rebuild their asset bases. Current conditions, however, make this difficult, as one of the effects of the war has been to entrench differential access to assets

such as land. While some have benefited, others have lost out. Current economic development programmes operate on an assumption that increased private sector activity will lead to poverty reduction. However, wealth accumulation by merchant classes does not necessarily 'trickle down' to benefit the poor in any substantial manner. On the contrary, vulnerability is sustained by decades of economic stratification, devastated household asset bases, a lack of basic social services, and the alienation of producers from the country's productive resource base. In order to prevent recurrent emergency needs and to sustain human development, these underlying structural factors need to be addressed (see box 1.11).

### Box 1.11: Addressing Structural Vulnerability

In order to prevent emergency needs from recurring it is necessary to sustain and increase household access to entitlements. This may be done by:

- protecting household asset bases by extending social services to reduce household expenditure
- rebuilding household asset bases by supporting the economic strategies of poor groups, including the benefits received from the informal economy, social networks, and coping strategies
- timing aid interventions to minimise seasonal stress (e.g. during the dry season or planting season) to enable households to capitalise on seasonal gains from good harvests or restocking
- increasing direct household income through 'public works' projects targeted at improved market and social service infrastructure
- intervening in non-food markets to ensure adequate access and terms of trade for poor households





## Social Services

### Health Trends

In the absence of a functioning health surveillance system, accurate data on mortality and morbidity is difficult to obtain in Somalia. There is a consensus, however, that Somalia has some of the worst health indicators in the world, with life expectancy of 47 years, infant mortality of 132 per 1,000 live births, under-five mortality of 224 per 1,000 live births and maternal mortality of 1,600 per 100,000 live births. Vaccination rates are dismally low, with only 10.6% of all children less than one year and 27% of children less than five years fully immunised against all the childhood diseases, with considerable variations between urban, rural settled and nomadic populations<sup>71</sup>. There has been no Yellow Fever vaccination for a decade. Despite the investments made in health services by international agencies and the private sector over the past decade, there appears to be little improvement in these indicators (see chapter 5 table G).

Prior to the war, the provision of public health services was heavily subsidised by foreign aid. In

1989, over 95% of the Ministry of Health's budget was funded by donors, with the government allocating only 2% of its recurrent budget to health<sup>72</sup>. An urban bias and uneven access to health services, poor quality of care due to inadequate training of health care providers, mismanagement and poor knowledge and practice, contributed to generally poor health indicators.

Foreign aid continues to subsidise public health services. The Somaliland and Puntland administrations currently allocate some public money to the health sector. In 2000, however, this amounted to as little as 2.9% and 2.5% respectively of Somaliland's and Puntland's recurrent budgets, and was mostly allocated to salaries<sup>73</sup>. Over the past decade, however, private health provision has grown significantly. In 1997, for example, it was estimated that 90% of all curative care was being provided by the private sector, with up to 75% of the population in some areas utilising private health facilities<sup>74</sup>. This trend is encouraged by declining external finances, a lack of resources or commitment by administrations to support a public health service, and a lack of

#### Box 1.12: Key Health Trends

- no improvement in basic health indicators since 1998
- increasing incidence of TB and malaria
- low HIV/ AIDs prevalence
- increase in preventative services
- unregulated curative services
- diminishing numbers of qualified medical personnel



qualified personnel. In this context, community self-financing of minimal services is considered the only option for sustaining health services. This policy has several consequences.

First, privatisation and the introduction of user fees limits poor people's access to health services.

Second, there are probably more health facilities in Somalia now than before the civil war, and the distribution of health facilities and health professionals has changed to the advantage of some areas like Puntland. Nevertheless, there is still a bias towards urban areas. Although difficult to measure, it has been estimated that only 15% of rural people have access to health services, compared to 50% of the urban people (see chapter 5 table D). In Puntland, for example, 49% of health personnel are in Bosasso while the whole of eastern Sanag has only one doctor<sup>75</sup>.

Third, the focus of international assistance is mainly on Primary Health Care (PHC), preventative and life saving health care. Consequently, there has been an increase in community-based health posts since the war, with community health workers and traditional birth attendants providing basic preventative and curative care, but a decline in referral services. Before the war each district, on paper, had a hospital with a qualified doctor. In reality, few of them functioned. A rationalisation of the health system in the 1990s has seen the closure of many hospitals. For example, Baidoa has the only hospital for the whole of Bay

region, and this has not provided an adequate standard of service for several years.

Fourth, with an estimated 0.4 qualified doctors and 2.0 qualified nurses per 100,000 people, there is a chronic lack of qualified health professionals<sup>76</sup>. Most qualified professionals have migrated overseas and those that remain work in the urban centres. With no newly qualified young people coming in to replace them, the health system will face a major crisis in the next ten years. This requires long-term public investment in basic education and training and a creative strategy to attract professionals to return from the diaspora. Currently the only nurse training facilities are in Bosasso and Hargeisa.

Fifth, the private provision of health services is unregulated and, as such, can be a risk rather than a solution to health problems. For example, the importation of cheap uncertified drugs and self-medication risks developing drug resistance that constitutes a health threat for Somalia and the entire region. Efforts are being made by the administrations in Somaliland and Puntland with international support to tackle this problem.

Finally, certain health interventions, such as HIV/AIDS prevention, require a wider structure of public support beyond a community-based system. In the absence of a central government authority, attempts have been made in some regions to foster a broader health structure through district and regional health boards.

# Box 1.13: Health Indicators

## Life Expectancy

In 1986/87 average life expectancy was recorded as 47 years (45.7 for males, 47.6 for females)<sup>2</sup>. Between 1990 and 1995 life expectancy is estimated to have dropped to as low as 30-35 years, due to war, famine and economic crisis<sup>3</sup>. Life expectancy is estimated to have returned to pre-war levels of 47 years or even higher<sup>4</sup>.

## Child survival

Infant and under-five child mortality currently estimated to be 132 and 224 per 1,000 live births, an improvement from pre-war indicators of 152 and 275 per 1,000 live births (see chapter 5 table E). However, while child survival has certainly improved since the famine in the early 1990s, the data also indicates a deterioration from the previously accepted estimates in 1998 of 125 and 211 per 1,000 live births. The main causes of morbidity and mortality among children are acute respiratory infection, diarrhoeal diseases, cholera, malaria, tuberculosis, and measles. Rates of infant and under-five child mortality are lower in the north than the south, and lower in nomadic than settled rural and urban communities. The differences between urban, rural and nomadic populations are consistent with patterns identified in Somalia in the 1980s, and may be attributable to dense living conditions, poor sanitation and exposure to communicable diseases in urban areas, as well as the greater mobility of nomadic populations in times of crisis<sup>5</sup>. Despite poorer access to health services, studies suggest that early child survival is best amongst pastoral populations, and worst amongst sedentary rural populations. Gender variations are also apparent, with females recording lower rates of

infant mortality, but higher under-five mortality rates. The latter may reflect preferential treatment given to male children.

## Maternal Mortality

The estimate of maternal mortality – 1600 per 100,000 live births – has not altered since 1990<sup>6</sup>. This is one of the highest maternal mortality ratios in the world, and translates into the deaths of over 45 women every day as a result of pregnancy and childbirth complications<sup>7</sup>. Factors influencing maternal mortality include: female genital mutilation; low education and literacy; low demand and access to family planning services; lack of adequate access to professional health services during pregnancy and delivery; and the poor nutritional status of women. In order to lower the maternal mortality ratio the status of women's health in Somalia must be prioritised.

## Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)

Almost 100% of women in Somalia are estimated to undergo FGM of the Pharaonic kind (the most severe form) between the ages of 4 and 11 years. This practice, which has been recognised as violence against women and thereby a violation of human rights<sup>8</sup>, is a source of serious health problems among women and also a cause of death. Although FGM in Somalia is not recognised as a violation of women's rights, its health consequences are acknowledged. The prohibition of the practice by local authorities, and campaigns by Somali organisations supported by international partners to eradicate the practice, are reported to be having some impact.

## Anaemia

High levels of anaemia

amongst women due to iron deficiencies and repeated malaria episodes are a contributor to maternal death. The high prevalence reported in the 1980s is probably unchanged, but there is no recent data to confirm this.

## HIV/AIDS

With an HIV/AIDS prevalence of less than 1%, Somalia still has one of the lowest rates in Africa. However, as this figure is based on a small sample study, the epidemiological picture of HIV/AIDS is unclear. As Somalia is surrounded by countries with high prevalence rates, the situation could easily change. The high prevalence of tuberculosis (TB) and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) – 30 percent among women attending antenatal clinics in Somaliland – which are both common risk factors for HIV/AIDS, means there is a need for timely HIV/AIDS awareness, prevention and control programmes to prevent its expansion.

## TB

Somalia is estimated to have one of the highest incidences of TB in the world. It is one of the main health problems in the country and one of the most expensive to treat. There is no certainty about the total number of TB cases, but the incidence is assumed to be higher than pre-war, around 300 per 100,000 of all forms. Some 14,800 new smear positive cases per year are estimated, of which only 30% are detected and treated<sup>9</sup>. Cases are highest in the most productive age group (15-44 years), with twice the number of males to females affected. The number of cases of all forms being detected and put on treatment each year grew from 2,504 in 1995 to 5,662 in 2000.

### Cholera

Prior to the war, cholera outbreaks were recorded only in 1970 and 1985. Since 1994 cholera has become endemic with annual outbreaks. Between 1994 and 1998<sup>10</sup> there were 70,250 cases recorded, and between 1994 and 1996<sup>11</sup> there were 1,867 recorded deaths. Relatively low fatality rates (1.9% - 4.6%) are attributed to a well-coordinated and funded cholera prevention and response programme. Cholera outbreaks have been most frequent in southern Somalia, and fatality rates have been higher in rural villages and small towns where there are lower levels of preparedness and fewer treatment facilities.

### Measles

Measles epidemics recur every two years in Somalia, due to low levels of immunisation, with 3,965 cases reported in 2000<sup>12</sup>. It is assumed to be an important contributor to under-five child mortality.

### Yellow Fever

Due to the collapse of health services, there has been no vaccination against Yellow Fever in the past decade<sup>13</sup>. An outbreak could be catastrophic for Somalia and neighbouring countries.

### Polio

Annual polio eradication campaigns have been conducted since 1997. The coverage of annual National Immunisation Days for polio eradication was reported to be 80% in 1997 and 98% in 2000<sup>14</sup>.

### Malaria

Malaria is hyper-endemic in the riverine areas and increases elsewhere during the rainy seasons. It is a major contributor to mortality, directly through its severe forms and indirectly by causing anaemia and low birthweight. Anti-malarial programmes all but collapsed prior to the war, with the government allocating only US \$6,000 for malarial control<sup>15</sup>. A Roll Back Malaria strategy is only just being initiated in

Somalia.

### Rift Valley Fever (RVF)

RVF vectors exist in southern Somalia and can be stimulated by heavy rains in semi-arid areas. Cases of RVF occurred during the 1997 floods, causing minor loss of human life, and resulted in an embargo by Saudi Arabia on livestock imports from Somalia in 1998. Fatalities from RVF in Saudi Arabia in 2000 led to the imposition of a comprehensive ban on livestock imports into the Gulf States from the Horn of Africa.

### Kala Azar

Kala Azar was sporadically reported prior to the war, mainly in the Middle and Lower Shabelle Regions. Cases have been reported since the mid-1990s and since July 2000 an outbreak was recorded on both sides of the Kenya-Somalia border. The complex epidemiology, high cost of treatment and high mortality without treatment make this a significant health risk for Somali populations<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> See also chapter 5 tables E and G.

<sup>2</sup> WHO (1990) *WHO in the Eastern Mediterranean Region*.

<sup>3</sup> Vaidyanathan, K.E. (1997, December) *Report of the UNFPA Consultant on Population Statistics of Somalia*. Nairobi. UNDOS.

<sup>4</sup> WHO use a figure of 48 years (47.8 for women and 44.6 for men). See WHO (1999) *Demographic and Health Indicators for Countries in the Eastern Mediterranean*.

<sup>5</sup> UNICEF (1991) *An Analysis of the Situation of Children and Women in Somalia*.

<sup>6</sup> A Safe Motherhood survey by CARE in December 1999 using the 'sisterhood method' estimated the MMR for Somaliland to be 828/100,000. However, the figure of 1,600/100,000 is generally accepted, based on the general fertility rate and the proportion of deliveries attended by a trained person. As 15% of all women experience complications during pregnancy and labour, maternal morbidity levels in Somalia are likely to be high.

<sup>7</sup> Prendiville, N. (1999) *Maternal Health Services in Somalia: Guidelines for programme planners and managers*. Nairobi: UNICEF Somalia. Prendiville, N. (1998) 'The role and effectiveness of traditional birth attendants in Somalia', in *Evaluation and Program Planning 21*. Elsevier Science Ltd. pp353-361.

<sup>8</sup> FGM is considered a violation of women's rights in the Convention for the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention of the Rights of the Child. UNICEF (1994, October) *Guidelines for UNICEF Action on Eliminating Female Genital Mutilation*.

<sup>9</sup> Mehta, F.R. and Mojadidi, N. *Dots Implementation in Complex Emergencies - Somalia's Experience*. WHO.

<sup>10</sup> SACB (2000, October) *Strategic Framework in Support of the Health Sector in Somalia* vol 1.

<sup>11</sup> Schick, M.T. (1997, July) *Cholera in Somalia 1994-1997*. WHO-Somalia.

<sup>12</sup> WHO personal communication.

<sup>13</sup> SACB (2000) *Strategic Framework in Support of the Health Sector in Somalia* vol 1.

<sup>14</sup> Somalia NIDS 2000.

<sup>15</sup> UNICEF (1991) *An Analysis of the Situation of Children and Women in Somalia*.

<sup>16</sup> SACB (2000, October) *Strategic Framework in Support of the Health Sector in Somalia* vol 1.



## Water and sanitation trends

Over the past decade, considerable resources have been invested by the international community in rehabilitating water and sanitation systems damaged during the war. In 2000, for example, donors committed twice as much funding to water as to education<sup>77</sup>. Many of the urban water systems that were destroyed or fell into disrepair have been rehabilitated. While, overall, more Somalis have access to clean water than five years ago, the current data indicates that the percentage of the population with access to safe water has declined since before the war to less than 30%, with better access in the north than the south. There is extensive contamination of surface supplies that serve a large number of the population. Only 35% of boreholes are estimated to be functioning due to lack of maintenance, poor construction, and conflict-related destruction<sup>78</sup>. Unhygienic drawing and storage of water and limited water treatment increases risks of water-borne diseases. A long-term issue of concern is the decline in water resources (see Environmental trends).

The collapse of government has led to a significant change in the management of formerly public owned water resources. Most rural boreholes that were previously managed by government have been taken over by private individuals, and most municipal water systems are managed on the basis of a private-public partnership. This is considered the only sustainable system under the current circumstances, although some Somalis raise the concern that the cost of water limits the access of poorer households to clean water.

## Education trends

Education indicators have been in decline since the mid-1980s. Initially in the mid-1970s, the Barre government invested substantial resources in education and literacy campaigns, allocating 11% of the recurrent budget to education<sup>79</sup>. By 1990, this had fallen to only 1.5%<sup>80</sup>. As a result, teachers left the service, schools closed, and enrolment rates dropped below those of neighbouring countries. In 1990, there were 150,000 students in 644 primary schools, half the number there had been in 1980<sup>81</sup>. The 1980s and 1990s saw a 'brain drain' from Somalia as secondary and tertiary educational institutes collapsed and many qualified Somalis left the country. Although many Somalis have gained from new educational opportunities in countries of asylum, there is limited inducement for them to return to Somalia. Consequently, two decades of decline have resulted in what the 1998 HDR identified as not one but two 'lost generations' of Somalis with little education and training<sup>82</sup>.

### Box 1.14: Key Education Trends

- decline in overall literacy since pre-war
- overall increase in primary school enrolment in the past three years, but a decline in some regions
- gender imbalance in educational enrolment
- increase in numbers of secondary schools since 1998
- new universities founded
- increase in private provision of education

When the government collapsed so did the education system. Between 1991 and 1992, the only education in Somalia was provided by Koranic schools and private institutions. Since 1993, the education




system has been gradually revived through the support of local communities, external donors, and NGOs. Progress has been made with rehabilitating infrastructure, reprinting school text books and teaching guides, revising the curricula, instituting the certification of examinations, and in-service teacher training. Although a national education system does not exist, a modest public one is supported by communities, foreign donors and, in Somaliland, the administration<sup>83</sup>. This system runs parallel to Koranic schools and private colleges offering courses in languages, computer skills and accounting.

The growth of private education establishments means that it is difficult to obtain accurate information on education standards, as the numbers of pupils enrolled in these schools is unknown. However, the current data indicates that overall literacy levels have declined (see figure 1.8), from 24% in 1985 to an estimated 17.1% in 2001 (22.1% male, 12% female)<sup>84</sup>.

On the other hand, data on primary school education indicates a slow improvement.

**Figure 1.8: Adult Literacy by Gender in Somalia 2001**




In the mid-1990s, with substantial international support, primary school enrolment and numbers of teachers reached levels close to the late 1980s (see figure 1.7). But as international aid declined after UNOSOM withdrew so did enrolment in areas of the south. In 1997, the Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) was 9.5% (11.9% for males and 7.2% for females), declining to 9% in 1998/99 (11.8% for males and

6.3% for females)<sup>85</sup>. This compares to enrolment rates in the late 1980s of 18% for males and 6% for females of primary school age<sup>86</sup>.

However, in Somaliland and some other

**Figure 1.7: Primary Schools and Enrolment 1970-2000**



Source: UNICEF, UNDP/UNFPA, UNESCO (2000) *Somalia Year 2000 Education For All Assessment Report*, Nairobi.

Note: Figures are based on available data



# Somalia


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more stable regions enrolment has grown steadily since 1991.

Indeed, data from 2000/2001 indicate the total number of primary schools now exceeds the number in the late 1980s and that the GER has risen to 13.6%, although with considerable regional variation<sup>87</sup>. As figure 1.9 indicates, the increase since 1999 is partially due to the re-opening of schools in Bay and Bakol regions. Other regions where there has been a substantial increase include Sanag, Woqooyi Galbeed, and Banadir. In Lower Juba, Lower Shabelle, Awdal, and Hiran regions, however, a slight decrease in enrolment is recorded.

the 2000 *Education for All* report surmises, 'measurement difficulties cannot hide the fact that Somalia is characterised by very low primary school enrolments'<sup>88</sup>. Moreover, it was estimated in 1999 that only 58% of those enrolled were actually attending school at the beginning of the school year<sup>89</sup>. Furthermore, enrolment declines in higher grades, and while this shows signs of improve-

**Figure 1.10: Primary School Enrolment by Grade and Gender 1997-2000/01**




Source: UNICEF (2001) *Survey of Primary Schools in Somalia 2000/2001*, Nairobi.

These statistical trends are inconclusive, but as

ment, the low completion rate means that only a few children will internalise the basic learning skills

**Figure 1.9: Change in Primary School Enrolment in Somalia by Region 1999-2000**



Source: UNICEF (2001) *Survey of Primary Schools in Somalia 1999, 2000/2001*, Nairobi.

and knowledge gained in schools. Reasons for the low enrolment and high drop out rates include the poor quality of instruction and facilities, the inability of parents to pay modest school fees (typically US \$0.50-US \$1.50 per month), and a calculation on the part of parents that Somali-language schooling will not reap dividends in the form of future employment. In terms of the



long-term impact, it is worth repeating the 1998 HDR's conclusion that 'The collapse of Somalia's educational system constitutes a societal emergency, which will constrain development for decades'<sup>90</sup>.

As with other sectors, there is differential access to educational opportunities. Female enrolment is disproportionately low, and the non-completion rate of female students is disproportionately high. This reflects the situation pre-war and shows no sign of improving. Indeed, between 1999 and 2000 the gender gap increased marginally (see figure 1.10). In 1999, 36% of pupils enrolled were girls compared to 35% in 2000. The gender gap in enrolment varies considerably from one region to another, but is generally smaller in urban areas.

There is also an urban bias in educational opportunities, with private and public schools concentrated in a few of the largest urban centres. An estimated 30% of

all primary schools in the country are in Mogadishu alone<sup>91</sup>. Prior to the war only a small percentage of children in pastoralist families were enrolled in primary schools and this situation has not changed. This is also reflected in low literacy rates among nomadic pastoralists compared to urban dwellers (see chapter 5 table H)<sup>92</sup>.

Finally, while overall enrolment is increasing, in some southern regions where security and livelihoods are worst, enrolment is declining.

Two positive developments in education since 1998 are important to note. The first is the establishment of secondary schools. In 1997, there were only three functioning secondary schools, compared to 103 prior to the war. Currently there are 20 secondary schools either operating or about to start, catering for approximately 5,350 students, 10% of whom are female<sup>93</sup>. There remains, however, a shortage of qualified secondary

### Box 1.15: Amoud University

Amoud University in Somaliland was inaugurated in November 1998 and it admitted its first undergraduate students later that month. The faculties of Education and Business Administration are operational and Faculties of Medicine and Agriculture are scheduled to open in 2001. The University is community owned, national in character and admits both men and women who meet the admission requirements. There are students from various regions of Somalia, Ethiopia and Djibouti.

The idea of Amoud University was conceived by a group of Somalis living in the Gulf, who formed strong links with the local community, the Somaliland administration, the business community and other Somalis in the diaspora to raise funds for the project. Cash donations were used to rehabilitate buildings, and purchase furniture, equipment and books. In-kind donations included logistical support, computers, books, a generator, and a bus.

The Amoud University project is an example of how local initiative can contribute towards the revitalisation of the education sector and the development of the country. Qualified Somali nationals have returned to Somaliland and have taken up teaching positions at the university. With the existence of Amoud as a viable option for tertiary education, research, and teaching opportunities, the community and staff at Amoud anticipate that fewer individuals will leave the country in search of educational opportunities.





school teachers. A second development is the establishment of institutions for tertiary education. The Somali National University was the only university in pre-war Somalia. Since 1998 universities have been established in Boroma, Hargeisa, Bosasso, and Mogadishu (see box 1.15). Some of these have been established through the efforts of Somalis in-country and in the diaspora. Others receive support from foreign charities. These institutions are privately run, raising money from fees and private donors. There are a limited number of courses on offer and as yet there is no coordination between them. Nevertheless, the universities represent an important step towards reviving tertiary education in Somalia and may provide an alternative for Somalis seeking educational opportunities abroad.

Throughout Somalia there are numerous privately run schools and institutes of technical and vocational training. A survey in Somaliland by UNICEF in 2000 identified 83 such institutions, of which half were language schools. Islamic schools teaching in Arabic typically subsidised and staffed by foreigners are popular. The quality of teaching and the facilities in these schools are often superior to public schools, tuition waivers are often available to poorer families, and fluency in Arabic is considered by many parents as a ticket to employment overseas. The most common for-profit schools provide foreign language (English and Arabic) and computer training, reflecting an emphasis among Somalis on developing skills which will enable them to work abroad.

The growth of private educational establishments also reflects the difficulties of establishing sustainable financing of public education. In Somaliland the administration has provided public funding for education, but in 2000, this was equivalent to only 3% of recurrent costs<sup>94</sup>. The teacher salaries paid by the administration are as low as US \$8 per month, with an equal amount paid by parents. This is estimated to cover only 10-20% of the cost of living of a teacher<sup>95</sup>. Furthermore, education receives only 10% of donor funding, estimated at US \$10.9 million per year<sup>96</sup>. This contrasts with non-traditional donors, such as Islamic states or Islamic charities, for whom long-term investment for education is a priority.

As with the health system, aid policy in Somalia has promoted the sustainability of public schools through the introduction of school fees and community funding. This policy has achieved some success, with up to 89% of schools in Somaliland and Puntland charging school fees. However, the feasibility of a fully self-financing system is doubtful. Currently, community expenditure on education per capita (US \$15.6 per annum) is actually higher than the pre-war per capita government expenditure on primary education (US \$3.50 per annum), but it has been calculated that this covers 37% of the cost of a reasonable primary education<sup>97</sup>. To cover 80% of costs would require raising the per capita contribution to US \$33. As this is equivalent to 16.5% of per capita income estimated at US \$200, it is unlikely that a significant proportion of families could afford this.



## Access to information

In Somalia – a society with a strong oral tradition in which the skills of oratory and poetry are prized – information has a particularly important political, economic and social function.

Prior to the war the government controlled public information. The Ministry of Information and National Guidance censored all newspapers, radio, and television. The use of VHF radios was strictly licensed. There were National Security Laws against ‘gossiping’ (*aafminsha*) and foreign travel was heavily restricted. A newfound freedom of information was one of the dramatic changes brought about by the war and the end of state control.

## Newspapers

Under the military regime, all print media came under the direction of the Ministry of Information and National Guidance and there was only one official newspaper *Xiddigta Oktobaar* (October Star). The overthrow of the government was followed by a proliferation of newspapers. While the initial quality was poor and many were political broadsheets of the factions, the quality of reportage has improved over time. In Mogadishu, an active press in the past two years has played an important role in the opening up of dialogue on the peace process. In Somaliland, an English language weekly is published in addition to daily Somali language newspapers. In Puntland and Somaliland, the administrations have at times sought to impose restrictions on the media through the introduction of press laws. However, press freedom remains fairly good and in Somaliland at least two of

the papers are fully independent and are often openly critical of the government.

## Radio

Due to the low level of literacy, radio is probably the most popular news medium in Somalia. Radio broadcasting was first introduced to Somali society in Hargeisa in the 1940s. Short wave radios are one of the most essential and prized household items found throughout the country. As with other information media, radio broadcasting was heavily censored under the former government. Today there are numerous radio stations broadcasting in Somali from inside and outside the country (see box 1.16).

### Box 1.16: Somali Language Radio and TV Stations

#### Radio Stations

BBC Somali Service (UK) re-broadcast in FM in Mogadishu and Hargeisa  
Bosasso FM  
Horn Afrik Radio (Mogadishu)  
Radio Baidoa (broadcast in *af maay*)  
Radio Banadir  
Radio Free Somalia (Galkaiyo)  
Somali Television Network Radio  
The Voice of the Holy Koran  
The Voice of the People  
The Voice of the Republic of Somalia  
Voice of Peace (Ethiopia)  
Voice of the Republic of Somaliland (Hargeisa)

#### TV Stations

Horn Afrik (Mogadishu)  
Somaliland Television (Hargeisa)  
STV (Mogadishu)  
TV Burco

## Television

Somali Television was inaugurated in 1983 in Mogadishu, with a very limited transmission radius. In 1987, it was estimated that there were 200,000 television sets in Somalia and a TV audience of 600,000. Since the war, televisions have proliferated, with relatively cheap equipment imported from



the Gulf, providing access to international news and market information. The first private TV station was started in Hargeisa in 1996 and others have since started in Mogadishu, although their transmission radius is limited.

Both radio and television have been important for the increasing participation in, and the transparency of, peace processes. The 1993 Boroma conference in Somaliland, for example, received some international radio coverage, but no international TV coverage. The conference was filmed and videos distributed among Somalis in Somaliland and the diaspora. The 1998 Puntland consultative conference received similar coverage. In 2000, the Arta conference received much wider media coverage. Somalis in Somalia with access to TV could follow the daily proceedings of the conference broadcast by Djibouti on what became known as 'Arta TV'.

## Freedom of movement

The war placed severe restrictions on internal movement for many Somalis and unrecognised travel documentation severely restricts international travel. Despite this, many Somalis regularly travel abroad for the annual *hajj*, on business, or to visit relatives. This is facilitated by the relatively relaxed border regime with Ethiopia and the operations of several commercial airlines. Somalis resident abroad are also increasingly visiting Somalia.

## Information technology

International development efforts to date have focussed on meeting basic educational needs through school rehabilitation, teacher training, and curriculum development. Somalis themselves have ensured that they have not missed the 'information revolution' by investing in new technologies for information transfer and knowledge acquisition. The deregulation of the market that accompanied

### Box 1.17: Horn Afrik

Established in 1999 by three Somalis returning from Canada, Horn Afrik was the first independent, commercial, multi-media station (television, radio and website) in Somalia. Horn Afrik is a sharp contrast to the state controlled radio stations of the Barre regime. With newly found freedom of speech on the airwaves, Somalis are speaking out on issues as diverse as the Somali National Peace Conference, the plight of street children and human rights on Horn Afrik's live call-in show, which is broadcast simultaneously on radio and television. Horn Afrik provides radio and television services to Mogadishu and neighbouring areas and links to the world through its interactive website, which features daily news updates as well as radio and television broadcasts. Pledging to serve the public interest in an impartial, accurate, and sensitive manner, Horn Afrik's programming has filled a void in information, education, and entertainment for the Somali people.

Horn Afrik's television and radio programming includes local, regional and international news; business news; health, education and environment programs; distance education programs; religious programs; cultural programs; children's programs; and sports updates. Programs are aired in Somali, English, and Arabic. Horn Afrik recently entered into partnership with the BBC World Service to broadcast shows from the BBC's Somali service.

Somalia has a high illiteracy rate and is in the process of rebuilding its education system which collapsed during the civil war. With the relatively low cost of television, radio, and Internet services, Horn Afrik has the potential to stimulate learning, promote and preserve Somali culture and tradition, and enhance public awareness on the reconstruction and development of the country.



the collapse of government has enabled some technologies to develop much faster than in countries where government is strong. Telecommunications, stimulated by the remittance economy, are the prime example, but there has also been an expansion of television and radio services.

Somalis in the diaspora have been key, investing in this new technology and leading the way in the dissemination of Somali news, culture, and entertainment through the Internet. There are several interactive websites run by Somalis that carry news updates, articles on Somali current affairs, as well as 'notice boards' and 'chat rooms' for the Somali community. In Mogadishu, the Horn Afrik multi-media group pledges to 'lead the way into the new millennium through information, education and entertainment' (see box 1.17). Notwithstanding the aforementioned 'brain drain', there are professionals in Somalia running high-tech companies. Institutions of information technology in Mogadishu offer professional training up to diploma level.

The gains from these new technologies are uneven. Progress has been slower with certain technologies such as computers, many of which remain under-utilised in the offices of the administrations. While investment in basic education can reap benefits to the whole of society, the benefits from investment in new information technology currently accrue mainly to Somalia's urban populations.

## Economic Trends

Household food security, livelihoods, health, and educational opportunities are all affected by macro-economic trends. This section assesses some of those changes in the Somali economy over the past decade (see box 1.18).

Somalia's economy is notoriously unconventional. Accurate economic measurements were problematic even before the collapse of state institutions. The present day informalisation and deregulation of the

### Box 1.18: Key Economic Trends

- long-term recession
- privatisation of economic and social services and formally public goods
- economic differentiation between regions, between urban and rural areas, and between and within social groups
- declining terms of trade in the primary industries of livestock and agriculture
- increasing levels of interstate, transborder and transshipment trade and a growing role as an entrepôt economy
- heavy reliance on diaspora remittances
- growth in the service sector

economy makes this even more difficult. Without a central banking system, estimates of money supply and monetary stocks are unavailable. Insecurity, intermittent access, and large population movements mean that production and consumption are also difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify certain economic trends.

In the late 1980s, two decades of erratic macro-economic policy and mismanagement of public



resources had already set the economy on a downward spiral. With a mounting trade deficit, lack of investment in rural production and social services, overspending on security, widespread corruption, and bankrupt financial services, the economy was close to total collapse before the regime fell<sup>98</sup>. When the state collapsed, financial, physical, and human capital assets were lost on a huge scale and production and all economic activity virtually stopped. Ironically, while the collapse of the formal economy in the 1980s helped feed the conditions for war, the informal economy that emerged during this period later served to provide a functioning economic system in the absence of state institutions or policies to manage it. Until late 2000 even the currency exchange rate and inflation were reasonably stable.

A decade after state collapse, some regions and sectors have experienced remarkable economic recovery. In most places, however, the recovery is fragile and the economy as a whole is considered to be in recession, with economic productivity below pre-war levels and a large amount of capital, labour and agricultural land remaining idle<sup>99</sup>. Per capita income is estimated to be US \$200<sup>100</sup>. This continues to place Somalia at or near the bottom of the global indicators of per capita GNP, but represents a small and hopeful improvement since 1998.

Over the past three years, most sectors of the economy have experienced modest gains and also setbacks. For instance, both livestock husbandry and agricultural production have grown due to favourable

rains and improved security, but both sectors are also vulnerable to natural and man-made shocks, and face a long-term downward trend in terms of trade. The livestock sector has suffered from drought and two embargoes on livestock imports by Gulf States in 1998 and 2000. Improved agricultural production in staple grains is offset by the virtual collapse of the small but profitable banana production.

Domestic and interstate commerce is strong and is one of the main sources of employment. However, Somalia's role as an entrepôt economy for regional markets is affected by the hyperinflation of the Somali shilling, deteriorating roads, and periodic insecurity at the beach ports of Merka and El-Ma'an and at the Kenyan border.

The service economy has proven to be the most dynamic and innovative sector, with remittance companies and telecommunications companies expanding their coverage and range of services, and the private provision of education and health care services growing. The transportation sector continues to provide employment for many, and construction work is booming in most large urban centres. Lack of regulation, however, means that these services are variable in quality and distribution. Underlying all economic activities are two significant trends – *privatisation* and *differentiation*.

## **Privatisation**

The change from a centrally planned economy to a deregulated, free market economy is one of the most obvious consequences of the civil war and the col-



lapse of a central authority. Although, as described in chapter 3, the process of economic liberalisation and privatisation began under the former regime, the prolonged absence of a central authority means that virtually all facets of the economy and services are in the hands of the private sector. Somaliland challenges this trend to some extent, with the administration and some municipalities managing some public goods, like airports, seaports, water supplies, a central bank, and some social services.

The level of privatisation probably makes Somalia unique in the world and its impact on human development is uneven and complex. Most public goods, such as education and health care, telecommunications, and financial services are either partially or wholly privatised. Air transport is run exclusively by private companies, as are most airports. The beach seaport of El-Ma'an in north Mogadishu, which was established during the war and serves most of southern Somalia's import-export trade, is a privately run facility. Berbera port and airport are currently publicly run, but the Somaliland administration is considering the feasibility of granting concessions to private companies to operate the facilities<sup>101</sup>. In Baidoa, the Juba Commercial Bank is a private concern. Most municipal water systems are under the stewardship of private companies or a public-private partnership, and are designed as such by donors and UN agencies. In southern Somalia, control of the money supply and the establishment of exchange rates is conducted by business persons in Mogadishu. The lack of a regulating authority also

means that the practice of enclosing pastoral rangeland (historically a common property) and the building of private water catchments (*berkhads*) is uncontrolled.

### **Economic differentiation**

The benefits of economic growth are unevenly distributed and national-level data obscure sharp variations in local living conditions and incomes. Economic differentiation is becoming marked, particularly between the north and the south, between urban and rural areas, and between and within socio-economic groups. The impressive generation of wealth by entrepreneurs in the transit trade, remittance companies, or the telecommunications sector, for instance, masks declines in living conditions for the majority of Somali households who are unable to participate in these parts of the economy. There has been an obvious increase in affluence in Hargeisa over the past three years, with money to invest in hotels, fitness centres and cyber cafes, while on the outskirts of Hargeisa the numbers of destitute returning refugees, displaced persons, and economic migrants have increased. A similar situation can be found in Bosasso and Mogadishu. Studies of food security and household income also point to a marked economic disparity between southern and central Somalia and the north, and economic migration from southern Somalia to the northern cities of Hargeisa and Bosasso is indicative of this<sup>102</sup>. It is no coincidence that those populations in southern Somalia who continue to be at risk from food insecurity are those that suffered most during the 1991-1993 famine.



The fact that the more arid but more peaceful regions of the north are economically outperforming the south highlights how insecurity and lack of governance affects economic underperformance. It also illustrates how commerce has become the main engine of economic activity and opportunity in Somalia, a fact that has greatly benefited the northern entrepôt economies. The livestock import ban by Gulf States, however, has disproportionately hurt the northern areas.

In pre-war Somalia, an income gap between urban and rural households was generally assumed, but this gap varied between socio-economic groups. For pastoralists, for example, the size of this gap was disputed, as some economic studies argued that the unconventional nature of the pastoral economy meant that formal statistics and household income studies did not reflect the real wealth of the pastoral economy<sup>103</sup>. Amongst most Somalis, pastoralists are not normally perceived as being poor.

The present data are unclear. In 1997, it was estimated that the per capita incomes of nomadic populations was US \$106, compared to US \$149 for rural settled and US \$300 for urban populations<sup>104</sup>. What is true is that the purchasing power of rural households is declining as the terms of trade for agricultural and pastoral production continue to drop against the value of food imports. This may be leading to an impoverishment of rural areas. Urban households, by contrast, generally have better access to employment, commercial opportunities, remittances and

social services. The main cities have become magnets for destitute populations of displaced persons, returning refugees and economic migrants, reversing the urban depopulation that occurred during the early years of the war.

The economic disparity between rural-urban populations is also a manifestation of the gap between those households who have access to remittances from relatives abroad and those who do not (see Remittances). Within pastoral communities there is evidence of a growing wealth gap between richer livestock owners, who are able to monopolise access to water and grazing lands, and poorer nomads<sup>105</sup>.

The impact of growing economic differentiation on human development in Somalia is unclear. As noted under 'coping strategies', Somali society has a strong tradition of reciprocal wealth-sharing within the lineage. In this way, the wealth gap between the rich and the poor may be offset by the custom of gift-giving and alms. It is this social obligation that fuels the

**Somali society has a strong tradition of reciprocal wealth-sharing within the lineage. Among Somalis who are employed or have access to income, the notion of shared poverty is common**

remittance system, as Somalis in the diaspora are expected to send money to their kin. The extent to which these traditional social obligations are surviving intact or changing has implications for the vulnerability of the population. Among Somalis who are employed or have access to income, the notion of 'shared poverty' is common. Evidence among some



groups suggests that the long-term erosion of assets is negatively impacting on the system<sup>106</sup>.

## Trade

### Interstate trade

Trade has always been an important part of the Somali economy. Historically, coastal city-states linked the Somali hinterland to regional trade networks, and nomadic populations traded livestock for grains and salt. The collapse of agricultural production, manufacturing and public employment during the war has made trade an increasingly vital part of the economy.


Most Somali households are involved in some form of commerce that is ultimately linked to the import-export trade. This includes petty traders of imported goods, pastoralists selling a few livestock for export, entrepreneurs who may own a small store and wealthy traders who buy and sell on the international market. When one adds to this the services that support commercial activities, such as transportation, finance, telecommunications, ports and security services, it is clear that commerce is a significant source of employment and income for many Somali households. As such, import and export trends are of unquestionable importance to human development in Somalia. Several of these are worth noting.

One overriding trend is the *increasing levels of interstate commerce*. Since the early 1990s, there have been significant increases in the number of ships and volume of imports and exports passing through Berbera and Bosasso ports (see figures 1.11 and 1.12)<sup>107</sup>.

A proportion of this trade is to meet a domestic demand, due to the weakness of Somalia's own productive sectors. The primary imports for domestic consumption are mostly food staples, although there has been an increase in second hand clothes, construction materials, vehicles, and qaat (*catha edulis*). Somalia's chronic trade deficit has grown since the civil war with most household food and non-food commodities being imported. A portion of these imports are paid for with hard currency generated from livestock exports and minor exports of hides, fruits, fish, and aromatic gums, but as before the conflict, the balance of trade deficit is largely financed by external remittances<sup>108</sup>.

One of the biggest changes in the nature of

**Figure 1.11: Livestock Exports from Berbera and Bosasso Ports 1991- September 2000**




Source: Berbera & Bosasso Port Authorities & UNCTAD, 2000.

Note: Figures are based on available data



**Figure 1.12: Rice and Sugar Imports Berbera and Bosasso Ports 1996-2000**



Somalia's economy over the past decade has been the growth of *transshipment* and *transborder* trade and the emergence of an entrepôt economy. As the state has collapsed the 'national' economy has been internationalised, a process that started before the war (see chapters 2 and 3). Over the past decade, Somalis have gradually exploited the country's geographical position within Africa as a sea, land and air link between the Horn of Africa, East and Central Africa and the Middle East, Asia and Europe<sup>109</sup>. This role as an entrepôt economy is a natural one, given its extensive coastlines and the role Somalis have long played in the transportation sector in East Africa.

Berbera port has become increasingly important to Ethiopia since the Ethiopian-Eritrean war cut off Ethiopia's access to Assab and Massawa, the congestion at the port of Djibouti, and the preferential port duties at Berbera. In 2001, Ethiopian traffic through the port of Berbera was estimated to constitute between 30% and 50% of the total port traffic<sup>110</sup>,

with some 60% of livestock exported through Somaliland and Puntland coming from Ethiopia. Since February 1999, 128,000 MT of food aid has been imported through Berbera by the European Commission<sup>111</sup>.

Even if the peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea reopens Eritrean seaports to Ethiopian traffic, Berbera is

expected to continue to have a role in transit trade to Ethiopia. In 2000, Somaliland strengthened its trade relations by signing a trade agreement with Ethiopia for the use of Berbera port. These relations were further strengthened with the start of scheduled flights by Ethiopian Airlines to Hargeisa in April 2001.

In recognition of its importance as a trade route and a corridor for humanitarian supplies, the European Union (EU) is investing in improving the 'Berbera Corridor' and the Ethiopian road authority upgraded the road on the Somaliland side of the border. As one of the four main ocean ports on the European-Far East maritime trade route and with the longest runway in Africa, international commercial interest is growing in both Berbera as a commercial transport hub for the region. In recognition of this, the Somaliland authorities are considering establishing a free trade zone in Berbera.

Since the trade with Kenya is mostly illicit, there is lit-



tle hard data on this transborder trade. However, field reports document a significant increase in exports of Somali cattle for sale in Kenya and a developing southern entrepôt economy<sup>112</sup>. There are no accurate data on shipping, but it is clear that since the mid-1990s commercial trade through the largely untaxed ports of El Ma'an in Mogadishu and Merka has grown. Like Berbera and Bosasso, these ports have assumed a major role in the transshipment of consumer goods to Kenya and beyond, with some transit goods traded as far as eastern Congo. The main commodities shipped include sugar, fuel, and cloth to Kenya, but Mogadishu has also become a source of spare parts for automobiles for the entire region of East Africa. The expansion of interstate commerce despite the complete or partial closure of Mogadishu and Kismayo all-weather ports is an impressive achievement.

This role as an entrepôt economy has significant potential. In Somaliland and Puntland it is a growing source of employment and source of revenue for the administrations. The growth of this economy, however, is conditional on there being efficient, safe and competitive transit transport services and an enabling regulatory environment. In southern Somalia, insecurity and bad road conditions are obstacles to the expansion of the transshipment trade. A further obstacle is the illicit nature of the much of the trade. A significant part of the trade with Kenya involves 'arbitrage' – the re-export to Kenya of Kenyan goods – and the unregulated borders facilitate the flow of small weapons in the region.

Furthermore, while the entrepôt economy can bring economic benefits, the integration of Somalia's economy into international trade makes it *vulnerable* to the volatility of external markets. The importation bans by Gulf States on Somali livestock in 1998 and 2000 seriously affected livelihoods and the revenue raising potential of the administrations in Somaliland and Puntland<sup>113</sup>. Another example of Somalia's market vulnerability has been the decline in banana production due to changes in EU preferential trade policies.

New export products are being developed, however, including hides and skins, chilled meat from Mogadishu and Galkaiyo, dried fruit and sesame exported from the south to markets in the Gulf States. The international company The Body Shop is purchasing henna from producers in Somaliland. More negatively, as noted, the unregulated trade in charcoal and offshore fishing are having damaging long-term environmental and ecological impacts.

While deregulation of the economy has enabled international trade to expand, the ability of Somalis to benefit from it is constrained by the absence of government. The lack of official trade relations with other states weakens the bargaining position of Somali traders. The benefits of this trade are also difficult to gauge, with two countervailing trends occurring. On the one hand, there is a consolidation of trade in the hands of a few large merchants who have access to letters of credit and financial services abroad and are linked into international trade networks (see chapter 3). At the same time, inexpensive telecommunication services are enabling



smaller traders to access foreign markets such as Dubai, which has emerged in the late 1990s as the offshore commercial capital of Somalia. Furthermore, in the south the conflict has served to break previous monopolies on trade. The lucrative transborder cattle trade into Kenya, for example, favours the decentralised, small-scale movement of cattle and goods overland, allowing many more mid-size traders to profit from the commerce.

### **Domestic trade**

Internal local and intraregional trade continues to revolve around a few basic commodities, such as livestock, milk, grain staples, fruit and vegetables, and locally produced handicrafts. This mostly involves petty traders, especially women, and is an important supplement to household incomes. In rural areas, barter arrangements between pastoralists and farming communities still occur.

Some important changes are occurring in trade patterns. The decentralisation of governance and dispersal of the population has been accompanied by economic decentralisation. While Bakara market in Mogadishu remains the biggest commercial centre in the whole of Somalia – despite the insecurity – Hargeisa market has also grown in scale. The closure of Mogadishu seaport has meant that Berbera and Bosasso have grown as commercial centres, handling livestock from southern Somalia. As the population of towns such as Garowe or Beletweyne has grown, so too has commercial activity. At the same time, the growth of some urban centres is affecting smaller towns.

Commercial activity in Boroma, for example, is losing out to Hargeisa.

Another change is apparent in food preferences in urban areas, especially Hargeisa, Mogadishu, and Bosasso. The displacement of people from Mogadishu and the return of Somalis who have lived abroad has generated higher demands for fruits and vegetables. This has led to an expansion of horticulture in irrigated farming communities in locations such as Beletweyne. Broccoli, a temperate climate crop unknown to Somalia until very recently, is now being cultivated on a few farms in the Boroma-Gabiley area and finding a niche market in Hargeisa. Fish has also become a popular alternative to meat in towns in Somaliland, particularly Hargeisa.

### **Production**

Overall economic production is relatively low, with significant underutilisation of both human and natural resources<sup>114</sup>. The rural sector has always been Somalia's primary productive sector, accounting for 65% of GDP and 95% of total exports prior to the war<sup>115</sup>. A significant proportion of the urban population also derives income from rural production. Lack of long-term investment, however, and adverse government policies led to a steady decline in Somalia's ability to feed itself. Between 1970 and 1984, the country moved from a food surplus of 5% to a deficit of 30% as per capita food production declined, rendering the country increasingly reliant on food imports and food aid<sup>116</sup>. The situation reached a low point during the 1991/92



famine. Although there has been some recovery in the rural sector since then, agricultural production remains below pre-war levels and much arable land is uncultivated or abandoned. Urban unemployment is very high, although there has been a modest revival of small-scale manufacturing.

## Livestock

Arid and semi-arid rangelands make up a large part of Somalia's landmass, making pastoralism the most appropriate form of land use. Only the southern riverine and inter-riverine areas provide land suitable for significant agriculture production. Somalia has the highest percentage of pastoralists per population and the largest area of rangelands in the Horn of Africa. Different forms of pastoralism are found in different regions of Somalia. Northern pastoral production is characterised by wide-ranging transhumance between permanent water points and rainy season grasslands. In the southern inter-riverine regions, the Shabelle and Juba river valleys and northern escarpments, richer soils and rainfall provide conditions for agriculture and agro-pastoralism. The pervasiveness of pastoralism as a mode of production throughout the Horn of Africa means that resource management and ecological and environmental issues are common regional concerns<sup>117</sup>.

Pastoralism dominated the Somali economy pre-war, accounting for 80% of exports in normal years<sup>118</sup>. With the collapse of banana production and the manufacturing sectors, livestock remains for many Somalis, in both rural and urban settings, the main or only source of livelihood, especially for

those who do not have access to remittances. Importantly, Somali pastoralism is more than an economic strategy. The close relationship between the semi-subsistent mode of production, socio-political organisation, culture, political identity rights, and economic security means that Somali pastoralism has been central to the culture and politics of Somalia since independence. Indeed, the collapse of the Somali state has enabled some Somali scholars to question the cultural hegemony of nomadic pastoralism in Somali society<sup>119</sup>.

There is no accurate data on the number of livestock in Somalia<sup>120</sup>. In 1989, the total herd was estimated to be over 42 million head (see map 1). It is thought that overall livestock numbers have recovered to this level from the losses incurred during the civil war period of 1990-1992. Local conditions for livestock, however, vary considerably. In southern Somalia, for instance, the El Niño flooding of 1997/98 produced lush grazing conditions for cattle, but created disease conditions for goats and camels. Drought conditions in 1998 led to heavy loss of livestock in Mudug region. The Horn of Africa regional drought in 1999-2000 reduced herd sizes in the central regions and affect-

### Box 1.19: Factors Affecting Pastoral Production

- declining terms of trade
- dependency on a narrow export market
- weak trade relations
- degradation of rangeland ecology
- labour exit
- lack of investment
- lack of environmental legislation
- lack of social service provision
- sedentarisation



ed livestock exports. However, in mid-2001 cross-border trade of Somali cattle to Kenya is reported to be booming<sup>121</sup>.

A number of chronic problems confront Somalia's most important productive sector (see box 1.19). The livestock export trade grew substantially from the 1950s in the wake of the oil boom in the Gulf States. This commercialisation had a profound and long-term impact on this subsistence pastoralism and communal resource management systems<sup>122</sup>. However, the sophisticated system of export trade that developed generally fell outside international animal health and welfare norms. Since the 1980s, disputes with importing states over human and animal health, qual-

ity of livestock, as well as geopolitical and commercial interests, have led to intermittent embargoes on Somali livestock by Gulf States in 1983-1988, 1998 and 2000. Somalia's share of the Saudi market fell from two-thirds in the early 1970s to less than one quarter in the late 1980s<sup>123</sup>. As these states have remained the main market for Somali livestock, with up to 80% of live animals exported to Saudi Arabia alone (see figure 1.13<sup>124</sup>), this has a serious impact on the bargaining power of Somali herders. In the absence of a government, Somalis are vulnerable to external market exploitation.

Consequently, terms of trade for livestock continue to fall against basic grain imports, making livestock less

### Box 1.20: Rift Valley Fever

In 1997 and 1998, excessive rains associated with the El Niño weather phenomenon led to an outbreak of Rift Valley Fever (RVF) among livestock in the Horn of Africa. Saudi Arabia immediately imposed a ban on the import of Somali livestock that was lifted after nine months. In September 2000, over 100 people in Saudi Arabia and Yemen died from contracting RVF. As a consequence, the Gulf States placed a total ban on the import of livestock from all countries in the Horn of Africa.


The two bans have had devastating economic consequences for Somalia. Prior to the ban Somalia exported some 3 to 3.5 million head of livestock annually. In addition, chilled meat was exported to several Gulf countries. Since the ban, the country is said to be losing at least US \$120 million annually from livestock sales, while the administrations are losing tens of millions of dollars from customs duties. The ban also affected household livelihoods. A resultant shortfall in foreign currency caused the Somali and Somaliland shillings to devalue, raising the local prices of imported food and non-food items.

In response to the bans, UNDP and the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) facilitated the development of strategies to reactivate the livestock and chilled meat trades and establish measures to control RVF. Disease vectors are present in many countries in Africa, but only become activated during periods of excessive rainfall or flooding (RVF is transmitted by mosquitoes to livestock and humans). Normally, levels of infection are low and almost undetectable. Combating and managing RVF will, according to FAO, require the adoption of a range of strategies by both exporting and importing countries.

- When there is an outbreak of RVF in livestock, a temporary ban on livestock movements is justified.
- Advance knowledge of meteorological conditions can warn of a possible outbreak, allowing time for livestock vaccination.
- During normal periods, disease surveillance can be carried out.

In May 2001, after UNDP and FAO sponsored veterinarians from the United Arab Emirates to inspect the health of livestock at Somali abattoirs, livestock markets and holding grounds, the UAE lifted the ban on chilled meat. This was an important step towards a more comprehensive lifting of the ban.

Figure 1.13: Destination of Livestock from Berbera Port January - June 2000



profitable than in the past and seriously affecting the livelihoods of pastoral households<sup>125</sup>. This long-term trend appears unlikely to be reversed<sup>126</sup>. The 1998 and 2000 embargoes on livestock imports by Gulf States in response to outbreaks of RVF have been particularly damaging. Short-term responses such as holding livestock off the market is something only wealthier livestock owners can afford to do. Poorer pastoralists are forced into 'distress sales' at much lower prices. The economy as a whole suffers from the loss of hard currency that

the trade generates. Households employed in the trade are particularly hard hit. The cessation of exports deprives political authorities of much-needed customs revenue. Lack of off-take due to the embargo places additional stress on the environment. Addressing the problem of RVF requires a range of strategies by importing and exporting countries. (see box 1.20)

Annual investment in the pastoral sector was as little as 1.2% of GDP under the former regime<sup>127</sup>. However, the collapse of government has deprived the sector of even this minimal support for rangeland management, veterinary services, and export certification. As noted, in the absence of a regulatory policy framework, wealthier livestock owners are using enclosures and privately owned wells and water catchments to monopolise access to water and pasture, thus disrupting patterns of grazing and watering. In some places, prime pastureland is being cordoned off as farmland by agro-pastoralists.


### Box 1.21: Reflections of a Somali Pastoralist<sup>1</sup>

My age is well over 90 and in my late age there is growing uncertainty in my nomadic profession of animal rearing. During my early age, there was little to worry about. Food was abundant, either from animals and their products or from the flora and fauna. There were nuts, fruits, edible leaves and roots, nectar and a lot more to eat. Two milking camels were enough to feed the family while those without animals were able to subsist on the nature's wealth. By then the population (both human and animals) was small, resources plenty, the climate generous, and movement was unrestricted. Moreover, there was little required from outside as needs were mostly satisfied locally.

Just in my short life the situation has been reversed – population explosion, sporadic rains, extinction of most of the fauna and significant flora species, and decline of the communal rangeland reinforced by private land grabbing. The change is nowhere more pronounced than in the commercialisation of pastoralism. We depend on external markets now. No matter whether it is good or bad, the present market-based production is irreversible. What we need therefore, is to have our say in the market decisions. Unless this is achieved, pastoralism will continue to decline, which has reduced us to being slaves of the animals and watchdogs for the livestock traders and urban users, who enjoy the profits of trade as well as the best delicacies of our animal products. Previously, the animals were *xoolo* (wealth) but now are *hauulo* (labour or drudgery).


<sup>1</sup> SADIA. M. Ahmed, Hassan Mohamed Ali and Amina Mohamoud Warsame (2001) *Research Findings on the State of pastoralism in Somaliland*. Hargeisa: Penha/ICD.

# Livestock Population and Distribution in Somalia 1999



# Food Economy Groups in Somalia 2001

Map 2







Some of these trends bode ill for the sector in general and for poorer nomadic pastoral households (see box 1.21). Those who drop out of the system are considered by aid agencies to be amongst the most vulnerable sections of Somali society. However, the trends are ambivalent and localised. Pastoralism has proven to be a resilient part of the economy. In parts of southern Somalia, where pre-war monopolies on livestock trade collapsed during the civil war, pastoral communities are faring better than before the war<sup>128</sup>.

### Agriculture

In southern Somalia, most settled agricultural households are semi-subsistent, typically able to produce just enough staple crops for family consumption and a modest surplus to sell. The Somali civil war in the early 1990s was largely fought on and over Somalia's southern agricultural regions. Farming communities were subjected to forced displacement and land grab-

bing, dramatically reducing the amount of land under production. Those households who did not flee were unable to produce enough to meet family consumption needs<sup>129</sup>. The 1997/98 floods caused by El Niño weather conditions devastated Somalia's southern agricultural belt<sup>130</sup>. Throughout

much of the 1990s, therefore, agricultural production was well below pre-war averages creating a recurrent food deficit and a need for external food aid.

As described in Food Security Trends (see box 1.9) there was an improvement in overall food production between 1998 and 2000. A combination of good rainfall, improved security in Bay and Bakol regions, and canal rehabilitation in the Lower Shabelle helped produce good harvests in both the 2000 *gu* and *deyr* seasons. The *gu* season cereal harvest in 2000 was an estimated 214,000 MT, well above the average post-war harvest of 174,000 MT, but still 40% below the pre-war average<sup>131</sup>. In 2001, lack of rainfall during the important *gu* season in the inter-riverine regions signals another potentially poor agricultural season.

From the 1950s to the 1990s, bananas were Somalia's primary cash crop, produced mainly in the Lower Shabelle region in gravity-fed irrigation plantations, and to a lesser extent in pump-irrigated fields in the Lower Juba region. Banana production collapsed during the war, but was partially revived in 1994 by local entrepreneurs in Lower Shabelle. When Somalia lost the protected market it enjoyed within the EU, large-scale banana production for export ceased. Exports could be revived as part of a niche market for organically grown bananas, but production is unlikely to reach past levels. In Puntland, date palm production is also in decline.

The collapse of the banana plantations and government agricultural schemes has brought some benefits to small-scale farmers by increasing the land

#### Box 1.22: Constraints to Agricultural Production in Southern Somalia

##### Insecurity

- displacement
- loss of land tenure rights
- loss of labour
- abandonment of fields
- reduction in field sizes
- lack of investment in equipment

##### Lack of government extension services

- lack of credit
- lack of agricultural inputs
- lack of pest control

##### Lack of a river authority

- lack of river water management
- deterioration in flood embankments
- destruction of flood embankments
- lack of canal maintenance
- loss of agricultural land



available for staple crops and different cash crops. New types of cash cropping have emerged in the past few years targeted at the Gulf States, including dried limes, which are sought-after for the beverage industry, and sesame. The advantage of these cash crops over bananas is that they provide opportunities for both small-scale as well as large-scale producers.

Chronic insecurity, a lack of extension services, and the deterioration in irrigation and flood protection systems along the Shabelle and Juba rivers contribute to the continuing underperformance of the agricultural sector (see box 1.22). In the absence of an effective transregional river and canal authority, recurrent flooding is a risk and there is a possibility of the Shabelle river valley returning to the swamp-land that characterised the area in the pre-colonial era, with the loss of a considerable amount of Somalia's best farmland.

## Fishing

Somalia has some of the richest fishing grounds of Africa in terms of abundance and diversity of marine life and scattered along the coasts there are communities with long fishing traditions. During the 1980s, the government operated a fishing fleet that netted an annual catch of 9,000 MT. The artisan fishing industry employed over 30,000 people and contributed about 2% to GNP<sup>132</sup>. During the civil war, the fishing fleet was broken up and the industry became dispersed. Urban centres like Mogadishu and Hargeisa provide a modest domestic demand, but the main demand is overseas. Entrepreneurs in Puntland, in particular, have

developed a lucrative business in lobster and shark fins with fresh catch flown direct to the Gulf. The exploitation of Somalia's rich coastal fisheries by foreign trawlers, licensed by Somali faction leaders, however, means that Somalia is left with few benefits from this important resource.

## Light industry

Manufacturing has never been an important feature of the Somali economy and the small industrial base that existed in the 1980s was destroyed during the civil war. Over the past three years, there has been a small-scale revival in light industry, producing a range of basic consumer products for the local market, including pasta, soap, bottled water, furniture and roofing sheets. Although it is a minor part of the economy, the revival of light industry is a positive indicator of the increasing confidence of business people in both the security situation and the local market.

## Construction

The major towns in Somaliland and Puntland and sections of Mogadishu have all witnessed high, and in some cases unprecedented, levels of rebuilding and new construction. In Boroma, Hargeisa, Bosasso, Garowe, Galkaiyo, Mogadishu, and Baidoa this has been financed through remittances from Somalis in the diaspora investing in real estate. Continuing high levels of new construction in a period when the livestock trade has ground to a halt again indicates the importance of remittances and a certain confidence in the security environment. In places, unplanned construction is leading to land and property disputes.



## Extractive industries

There has been little development of Somalia's few natural resources that are amenable to profitable extraction. These include frankincense, meerschaum, quarry stone, fossil coal, sand, cement, mica and honey<sup>133</sup>. The one exception is charcoal production, noted above. One extractive industry that continues to attract attention in Somalia is oil and natural gas exploration. Exploration in the 1980s indicated the possible presence of oil reserves in Somalia, but further development was interrupted by the war<sup>134</sup>. Several international companies, however, have struck deals with the administrations in Somaliland, Puntland, and Mogadishu to restart exploration for oil and gas. The possibility exists that at some future point Somalia may become a site for modest oil production. A danger is that control over the revenues from this production could become a sensitive issue between the various political authorities. Care needs to be taken by foreign governments and companies and Somali administrations to ensure that this potential opportunity does not become the cause of another conflict, as it has in Sudan.

## Remittances

Financial remittances from Somalis living outside the country are perhaps the outstanding feature of the Somali economy. Remittances have long been a crucial part of the economy. Their significance grew as part of the emerging parallel economy in the 1980s, when they were estimated to be worth US \$370 million annually, 75% of which came from workers in the Gulf countries<sup>135</sup>. This was equal to 13 times the Somali-based national wages bill and partially

explains how households at the time were able to survive on basic government salaries that covered only 8% of household expenditure<sup>136</sup>.

As a result of the civil war the size of the diaspora has grown and along with it the volume of remittances. The source has also changed as the Somali diaspora in Europe, the USA, Canada, and Australia has increased. Although remittances have become the critical source of hard currency for the country, the precise value of this economy is difficult to calculate for several reasons. First, there is no reliable data on the size of the Somali diaspora. Second, the remittance companies (*xawaalada*) are reluctant to report the amounts transferred. Third, remittances are transferred in different forms and through different channels, as cash or goods in kind, through remittance companies, through merchants, or through relatives<sup>137</sup>.

While hard data is difficult to obtain, there is no doubting the significance of remittances. In 2000, it was estimated that US \$2 million per month was remitted from Minnesota in the USA<sup>138</sup>. Another study estimates that remittances to Somaliland alone could be as high as US \$500 million per year. That is four times the value of livestock exports from Somaliland in a normal year<sup>139</sup>. Another study estimates annual remittances to Somalia of US \$800 million<sup>140</sup>. Remittances to southern Somalia are poorly documented. One study in the town of Beletweyne, with a population of some 50,000, estimated that US \$200,000 was received in remittances monthly, averaging US \$4 per town resident<sup>141</sup>. In Baidoa, the records of just one



remittance agency showed that US \$75,000 was remitted monthly through their office<sup>142</sup>.

A study in Hargeisa, Burco, and Bosasso calculated that remittances constitute nearly 40% of the income of urban households<sup>143</sup>. Preliminary data from UNDP's household socio-economic survey indicates that on average, remittances make up 22% of per capita household income. Based on a population figure of 6.38 million this would make the total annual remittances around US \$280 million. However, as this does not take into account money remitted for investments, US \$500 million would be a more realistic if conservative estimate for total annual remittances to Somalia. Even the conservative estimates of remittances are in excess of the value of exports and well in excess of the value of official international aid, estimated by the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) as US \$115 million in 2000<sup>144</sup>. Remittances probably reach more people than international aid, although because a significant percentage of it goes to finance *qaaf* import, only a small proportion may remain in-country<sup>145</sup>.

The studies of remittances highlight several important features of this economy. First, remittances both reflect and serve to increase the economic differentiation in society. For historical, social and political reasons, remittances are more common in urban rather than rural areas and the main beneficiaries of remittances tend to be urban households with educated and skilled members in the diaspora. Due to a history of better access to education, political privilege, or accident of geography, some social groups and clans

have a higher percentage of their members in the diaspora than others. Migrant workers and refugees tend to come from better off families who can afford to invest in sending a family member abroad. The rural poor and the internally displaced from groups who have fewer relatives abroad receive fewer remittances and are less well served by telecommunications. One study found that while the majority of households in Hargeisa received remittances, only 5% of rural households did<sup>146</sup>. In Hargeisa and Bosasso, there is clear evidence of significant differential access to remittances between urban residents and displaced populations and economic migrants from southern Somalia<sup>147</sup>. The pattern of remittances also varies depending on the socio-economic position of the diaspora in the host country. The poor education of many Somali immigrants means that they are often on the margins of society.

Second, most remittances fall in the range of US \$50-200 per month and service an extended household. Some customers have standing arrangements with transfer companies to remit funds on a monthly basis. The flow of remittances remains fairly regular, but increases in times of economic stress, during droughts or in response to inter-clan warfare. In 1998, for example, remittances offset the impact of the livestock export ban<sup>148</sup>. The volume of imports did not decline as remittances financed the import bill. Women play an important role, as both remitters and recipients of money.

Third, while remittances are important for livelihoods, they are also used to pay for the massive importation



bill for *qaat*. No reliable figures exist on the outflows of hard currency to purchase *qaat*, but conservative estimates put the amount at US \$50 million per annum, while others suggest it could be US \$250 million per annum or higher<sup>149</sup>.

Fourth, while remittances have historically been used to finance purchases of basic consumer goods, a recent trend has been to use remittance money for investing in small businesses or real estate, some of which may not have been legally obtained.

What is clear is that remittances have become a dominant feature of the Somali economy, central to household livelihoods and financing Somalia's trade deficit<sup>150</sup>. In other words, in terms of income, labour has become the main export and Somalia runs the risk of being relegated to the role of a labour reserve. It remains to be seen whether second generation Somali immigrants abroad will continue to remit money to relatives they do not know in a country they may never have visited.

## The service sector

The service sector in Somalia is vibrant, especially in the main urban centres. Much of the sector is oriented towards servicing commercial activity, but a part of it, especially the telecommunications and the 'hospitality industry', also reflects efforts to build and sustain 'social capital', an asset that Somali society is relatively rich in.

## Financial services

One of the most intriguing new enterprises to

emerge from the crisis in Somalia are the *xawaalaad* – the money transfer or remittance companies. The first remittance brokers appeared in the late 1970s when large numbers of Somalis migrated to the Gulf States and Europe for employment and their importance grew as the banking system and formal financial services collapsed<sup>151</sup>. There are many small companies, but the sector is currently dominated by five companies that operate throughout most of Somalia and in dozens of countries around the world.

The *xawaalaad* developed with the remittance economy, as a safe means of transferring funds from the diaspora to households anywhere in Somalia. In recent years, they have expanded their services. Business people routinely use *xawaalaad* to transfer funds to purchase goods from abroad or for domestic business transactions to avoid carrying money on dangerous roads. The larger ones issue their own cheques for this purpose, using scanned photos of customers on computers to verify transactions. They also handle money for international aid agencies. Some business people have also begun to use the *xawaalaad* as a bank, holding funds in the company's account for short periods. It is this trend, toward a quasi-banking role, that generates special interest in the remittance companies. Whether they will remain money transfer businesses or evolve into banks is uncertain. Their development over the past five years, however, has been essential for the expansion of commerce in Somalia.



## Telecommunications

Telecommunications and postal services were both previously state-run and were destroyed during the war. They were replaced initially by VHF radios, which are still found throughout the country, particularly in rural areas. Since 1994, however, Somali-run companies linked to international ones have re-established telecommunication services in the main urban centres and some of the smaller towns and villages.

The expansion of telecommunication services is driven by the demands of the economy, facilitating the flow of remittances and information for trade. The past three years have witnessed the continued expansion of private telecommunication services across Somalia, which are cheaper, offer higher coverage, and are of higher quality than they were before the war. Currently there are twelve companies in Somalia providing local and international services and with tariffs of US \$1 per minute they are amongst the most competitive in Africa. According to the Somalia Telecom Association based in Dubai, in 2000 there were 58,000 telephone lines, 68 public telephones, 11,000 mobile phone subscribers and 4,500 individuals connected to the Internet (see chapter 5 table I). Somalia's telecommunications sector is one of the most interesting cases of entrepreneurship and adaptation in contemporary Africa. The lack of regulation, however, is creating problems of efficiency, one of the main problems being the inability to communicate between the different systems.

Postal services have been slower to restart but inter-

national private delivery services, such as DHL, now operate out of the main cities.

## Road transport

The transport sector is a dynamic and important part of the service economy, moving both people and goods across the country. It also provides employment for tens of thousands of Somali males, who serve as drivers, guards and mechanics. Towns along major trade routes host dozens of tyre and engine repair shops and rely heavily on this sector. Taxation of road traffic is an important source of revenue for local authorities, *shari'a* courts and freelance militia in many areas, while in Somaliland and Puntland a more formal taxation system has been developed.

Investments in trucks and buses are favoured by aspiring entrepreneurs because of their mobility in times of insecurity and because of the consistent demand for transport services. In the north, where roads have been maintained and security is good, new vehicles are being imported to meet the demand of commercial traffic. In Puntland, new taxi services have proved very successful. By contrast, in the south the fleet of trucks, cars, and buses is fast deteriorating. New vehicles are a risky investment due to looting and the wear and tear caused by ever-worsening roads. In some locations, a shortage of motorised transport services has caused the price of donkeys to rise sharply.

## Air transport

Private air transport has grown considerably in



Somalia since the war. Prior to the war, the state owned Somali Airlines and three other international carriers flew to Somalia. Today, six privately owned Somali airline companies operate between Somalia and neighbouring countries. Since April 2001, Ethiopian Airlines and Regional Air from Kenya have begun scheduled flights to Hargeisa. In addition, numerous small aircraft are chartered by traders, the UN, and others. According to the UN, aircraft operations to airports in Somalia have increased from 50 flights per month in 1996 to an average of over 400, and passenger movements increased by 14% between 1999 and 2000<sup>152</sup>. The Somaliland Ministry of Aviation estimates that there were 97,760 domestic and international passengers in 1999 and over 6,000 MT of cargo was moved<sup>153</sup>.

The Civil Aviation Caretaker Authority for Somalia under ICAO provides services to international air transport operations into and through Somali airspace and maintains Somalia's links to the airspace of its neighbours. Revenue raised from air transport operators is reinvested in infrastructure and services on the ground.

### Private social services

As noted above, the private sector has stepped into the vacuum left by government to run social services, such as education, health care, and veterinary services. The Somaliland administration provides a modest public financing for education and health services, but there as elsewhere, these services are heavily subsidised by communities, international aid agencies or Islamic foundations.

The privatisation of social services began prior to the war, when a lack of investment resulted in their virtual collapse. To compensate for this, the government began to decentralise responsibility for public sector financing to regional and district levels, and users were encouraged to contribute directly to the financing of these services. International donors responded with substantial resources to re-establish essential social services in the early 1990s, but from 1995 onwards, as donor financing declined and in the absence of competent public administrations, aid policy reverted to encouraging greater self-financing of services.

For-profit private schools are currently expanding throughout Somalia, especially in urban areas. Private health care services similarly are concentrated in a few major urban areas, where physicians and nurses run private clinics or attach themselves to a local pharmacy. Despite the low fees charged for a consultation (typically around US \$0.50), doctors complain that people still attempt self-diagnosis, running the risk of misuse of antibiotics and other medicines that are readily available in local pharmacies. Pharmacies themselves are often run by business people with no training in medicine.

### Utilities

Urban water and electric power systems were publicly run prior to the war. Today these utilities are almost exclusively run as private enterprises (see box 1.23). An exception is Somaliland, where several municipal water systems are run by municipal administrations. Rehabilitated systems in most other loca-



### Box 1.23: The Private Management of Utilities

In the absence of government, private businesses have emerged to manage what were formerly public utilities. Mumin Global Service and Trading Agency in Baidoa is one example.

The Mumin Agency was established as a trading company in Dubai in the early 1990s by a businessman from Baidoa. The company opened an office in Baidoa after the RRA established control in 1999. Mumin is typical of several businesses in Baidoa, having more than one line of activity. It trades in construction materials, spare parts, and food; runs a computer and language training institute; supplies 24 hour electricity to one section of Baidoa; and is repairing and expanding the underground piped water system. The agency also has a philanthropic side, providing free schooling to some 50 youth who were formerly militia members.

Social services in Baidoa were rehabilitated by international agencies in the early 1990s, but fell into disrepair after 1995 when the region was occupied by outside forces. In 2001, Mumin was granted the right by elders and local authorities to re-establish the piped water system. They have rehabilitated the offices of the former Water Development Agency and employ fifty of the former staff. They supply over 200 houses with piped water and are planning to extend the system further.

To date the work has been funded by contributions from people outside Somalia, from Mumin's own resources, and from households buying the extension pipes to their homes. As such, the Managing Director of Mumin describes the water service as a 'community owned' project. He argues that unlike in the past when the system was government run, people will look after the system because they have directly invested in it. In order to extend the existing services they are hoping to attract investment from foreign companies or donor funding.

tions are now run as a private-public partnership or as a private concern. In Jowhar and Bosasso, for example, UNICEF has helped establish piped water systems, which were turned over to private companies to operate, with the oversight of community leaders or municipal officials. In most urban locations, potable water is also available from private wells and sold from donkey carts for a small fee. Cart-delivered water is a modest but important source of income for families who own donkey carts.

The public-managed diesel power plants that provided electricity to the main urban centres were mostly destroyed during the war, with the exception of Bosasso and Hargeisa. Currently, private generators provide power for several hours in most towns and in some locations for 24 hours. Typically, the owner of one or several private diesel engines will provide electricity to businesses and residences in the imme-

diately area, with electricity sold by the 'bulb', at locally negotiated prices. In some cases electricity is provided free to mosques and the local government buildings as a public service or a form of patronage. In larger towns, some companies have been formed to provide electricity to a larger market. As with hotels, phone services, and other fixed assets, the expansion of private electric services is an indicator of confidence in an improved security environment. However, as with some other utilities the lack of regulation means that the quality of service can vary considerably.

#### **Private security**

The collapse of state institutions and the end of state monopoly on security have created opportunities for private services that provide security for businesses, wealthy households, seaports, large markets, trade convoys, and aid agencies. The





services are informal, with business people mostly relying on kin from their immediate lineage, which is their ultimate source of security. The security forces are comprised mainly of young militiamen or ex-militiamen, which has the social benefit of providing employment to many people. This can significantly improve public safety, since those same men, if left unemployed, could return to banditry and extortion. The sector, however, is plagued with problems as armed guards can often resort to extortion and threats against their employees. More problematic is the fact that the armed guards may not be stakeholders in a return to a system of law and order in which private security is no longer necessary.

The trend in recent years has been for businesses to shift responsibility for payment and management of security forces to a public or quasi-public authority. In some locations, this has involved businesses 'sub-contracting' security to local *shari'a* courts, which receive taxes or contributions from business people in return for absorbing armed guards into a court militia. In other cases, business people have sought to strengthen the capacity of local political authorities to run and maintain an effective police force. The onerous 'cost of doing business' has also encouraged business people to support the return of government, with Mogadishu merchants explicit in their support of the TNG and willing to pay taxes to build a local police force. In some parts of the country – mainly in the northwest and northeast – public safety has been so effectively re-established that the need for private security

services has been greatly reduced or eliminated.

## Hospitality industry

The hospitality industry is vibrant in Somalia. Somalis who have accrued some wealth often invest part of it in a hotel or restaurant. The number of hotels and restaurants in a town is a good indicator of the strength of the local economy and the level of security of the area. The fact that investments in hotels appear to be growing is therefore a positive indicator. Hotels and restaurants are not in themselves especially profitable investments, but the hospitality industry has another more subtle value to hotel owners. As gathering places for adult males where news is shared, contacts established, and partnerships formed, they generate a significant amount of 'social capital'.

## Economic infrastructure

Prior to the civil war Somalia had four main ports (Mogadishu, Kismayo, Bosasso and Berbera) and several tertiary ports. There were three international airports in Mogadishu, Kismayo, and Berbera, in addition to military airfields at Balidogli and Galkaiyo. The road network extended for some 21,830 kms, of which less than 13% was paved<sup>154</sup>. An extensive system of irrigation and flood control infrastructure had been developed since colonial times along the length of the River Shabelle. Plans had been under development since the 1970s to build a dam at Bardheere on the Juba River for irrigation, power, and flood control purposes. Much of this public infrastructure was destroyed or severely damaged during the civil war and the control of public and commercial assets such



as ports, airports, and to a lesser extent roads and irrigation infrastructure, became a focus for factional conflict, competition and taxation. Somalia's dependence on commerce means that the rehabilitation of economic and productive infrastructure is of importance to economic recovery.

No-where is the gap between southern and northern regions of Somalia more pronounced than in the state of economic infrastructure. In the north, local and international aid efforts have maintained and even improved upon the system of seaports, roads, and airports serving the region. The seaports at Berbera and Bosasso have enjoyed sustained financial and technical assistance from external donors and are handling more cargo than in the pre-war era. Minor trade also occurs through tertiary ports along the northern and eastern coasts.

Hargeisa airport has been substantially rehabilitated and handles an increasing amount of international airline traffic and Bosasso and Galkaiyo runways in Puntland have been re-equipped. As noted, investments have also been made in maintaining and repairing the two main north-south highways between Berbera and the Ethiopian border, and between Bosasso and Galkaiyo. This has enabled Somaliland and to a lesser extent Puntland to develop their role as entrepôt economies.

By contrast, the economic infrastructure in the south is in a state of accelerating deterioration, and in some locations has become an impediment to commerce. Control of Mogadishu's seaport and international air-

port is contested and they have remained closed since UNOSOM withdrew in 1995. Both will require renovation before they can reopen. Instead, Mogadishu is served by several small airports and beach ports at El Ma'an and Gezira, and Merka further south. While these beach ports handle substantial volumes of trade, their use is restricted during the monsoon seasons. Merka was particularly affected by the decline in the banana trade. Further south, the all-weather seaport at Kismayo is partially functional, but commerce is constrained by chronic insecurity in and around the city. The main export through Kismayo for the past three years has been charcoal. Throughout the south, airstrips are in a variable but generally worsening condition.

Economic infrastructure in the riverine agricultural areas, consisting of irrigation canals, river embankments, and other flood control devices have also suffered from damage and neglect. Much of the damage caused by the 1997/98 floods has been repaired, notably in the Lower Shabelle valley. However, without sustained support and an authority to regulate land and water use, there is a continued risk of flooding beyond normal flood recession agriculture.

The worst aspect of southern Somalia's economic infrastructure is the road system. Due to lack of investment in the 1980s, many of the all-weather roads in southern Somalia had already fallen into a state of disrepair before the civil war. These roads have now been rendered virtually unusable due to war damage, floods, and lack of maintenance, forcing vehicles to use dirt track roads. During the rainy sea-



sons this can leave agricultural communities cut off for months. Due to chronic insecurity, repair efforts have been minimal. This long-term deterioration of the road system in southern Somalia is a very serious problem and a potential threat to improvements in human development.

### Currencies


Over the past decade the collapse of state authority and financial institutions in Somalia has led to a proliferation of currencies in circulation and multiple exchange rates. Although the US dollar has become the currency of choice for major business transactions and savings, the Somali shilling continues to be used in southern Somalia, Puntland and eastern Somaliland. In western Somaliland the Somaliland shilling is used. Several international currencies are also traded on the open market including the Ethiopian birr, Djibouti franc, Kenyan shilling, and Saudi riyal.

Since 1992, faction leaders and their financial backers have injected new Somali shillings into the economy to reap the windfalls of seigniorage and to finance their militia and administrations. Between 1992 and 1998 the value of new money introduced was equivalent to US \$32 million, and in 1999 it was estimated that 40% of currency in circulation in Somalia was new money<sup>155</sup>. For most of the past decade the Somali shilling has devalued steadily, but remained surprisingly stable. The increase in money supply during the 1990s did not, for the most part, cause adverse devaluation or inflation. Reasons for this included the gradual 'dollarisation' of the economy, the measured way money was introduced and the need to replace old notes.

Since late 2000, however, several major injections of new Somali shillings have thrown the market into turmoil. Mogadishu business people backing the TNG and the Puntland administrations have intro-

duced several million dollars worth of shillings causing the rapid devaluation of the shilling and hyperinflation. In August 2001, the Somali shilling had devalued to SoSh 22,500 against the dollar, from SoSh 9,500 a year earlier, a drop of 116% in

**Figure 1.14: Depreciation of Somali and Somaliland Shilling against US Dollar 1995-2001**



Source : FEWS NET October 2001, Nairobi.



one year<sup>156</sup>. As exchange rates are still largely determined by Mogadishu's Bakara market, the impact has been felt all over Somalia, including Somaliland, where the Somaliland shilling fell to SSh 6,000 in August 2001 from SSh 3,000 a year earlier. As can be seen in figure 1.14 this was the sharpest fall in the value of Somali currency for six years. The severity of the currency crisis led Bakara Market in Mogadishu to close for four days in February and led to street protests in Mogadishu, Bosasso and Burco.

The impact of the new currency was particularly hard due to the lack of dollars in circulation because of the livestock ban. Prices of all commodities, particularly imported ones, as well as fuel and transport, doubled from the previous year. Many small businesses were forced to close, while the wealthy sections of society who have access to remittances and hard currency were little affected. The people most affected by the swings in the currency market are those who do not hold reserves of foreign currency, the rural population, the poor dependent on wage labour, street vendors and petty traders, who make up the bulk of the population. Their purchasing power was immediately halved.

Some efforts have been made by the TNG to stabilise the situation, by buying up the new currency, auctioning dollars, and intervening with the printers. However, unless and until an effective authority takes control over currency supplies, the value of the Somali shilling will remain volatile.

## Environmental Trends

The social and economic well-being of the Somali people is intrinsically linked to the status of the country's natural resources. Many of the regulations for governing the use and protection of natural resources have not been enforced since the government collapsed. Economic necessity has resulted in the unplanned overuse of some natural resources by some groups, while others have opportunistically exploited them for economic gain. There has been no comprehensive study of environmental change over the past decade, or a programme for monitoring the environment. Various studies, however, point to problems of rangeland degradation, deforestation, coastal desertification and sand dune encroachment, depletion of wildlife, marine pollution and the depletion of marine life through excessive fishing, and lack of sanitation and waste management facilities<sup>157</sup>.

### Box 1.24: Key Environmental Trends

- rangeland degradation
- deforestation
- depletion of renewable fresh water
- depletion of wildlife
- marine pollution
- depletion of marine life
- revival of customary rules (*xeer*) for community-based management

## Rangeland degradation

The dominance of pastoralism as a mode of production and way of life means that Somalia's rangelands are a key resource. The symbiotic relationship between the environment and livestock production is recognised in the words of a Somali



poem, which declares that 'livestock are the growing grass'. Concerns have been voiced since long before the war about the management of this common property resource. Nomadic pastoralism however, is finely adapted to the management of rangeland ecology. It is the most efficient way to exploit this marginal environment and Somali pastoralists are skilled in its management. The non-equilibrium nature of the ecology means that data on the carrying capacity of rangelands or evidence of long-term degradation of the rangelands is difficult to determine. The causes, extent, and nature of environmental change therefore remain open to debate. The pressures on the rangeland environment come not from pastoralism, but from other forces.

There is some evidence that the enclosure of rangelands, the development of private water resources, sedentarisation, the embargoes affecting livestock export, economic hardship, the breakdown in reciprocal relations between clans, and environmental practices during the civil conflict are negatively affecting the rangelands<sup>158</sup>. There is some evidence that the use for rangeland resources for other purposes such as cutting trees for charcoal is also forcing pastoralists onto less productive rangeland. Ecological change is certainly occurring in places such as the Haud (see box 1.10), and the loss is not just in vegetative cover, but also species diversity.

### Deforestation

There is a clear decline in Somalia's forest cover, which may be as low as 10% according to some estimates<sup>159</sup>. The pressure on Somalia's forest

cover comes from charcoal and fuelwood production, the clearing of land for agriculture, cutting of timber for construction, and livestock browsing. The most serious threat, however, comes from the charcoal and fuelwood production, which supplies 89% of Somalia's domestic energy needs, and more particularly the export trade in charcoal that has developed since the civil war<sup>160</sup>. Acacia forests in parts of the northwest, Bay region and the Lower Juba have been rapidly denuded, causing soil erosion and irreparable damage to once valuable grazing areas. In Lower Juba, acacia forests have been cut all the way across the unpoliced Kenyan border.

#### Box 1.25: Community-based Disaster Prevention

In 1998/99, Jeriban district of Mudug region was severely affected by drought. Lying in the Addun ecological area, also known as *Guri Ari* (home for shoats), the predominantly pastoralist population are sheep, goat and camel owners. Small-scale offshore fishing started in recent years. Herders suffer from poor terms of trade and a lack of milk marketing opportunities due to Jeriban's long distance from the main roads and towns and the consequent high transportation costs. On a border between two clans, insecurity since 1991 has restricted the mobility of the pastoralists. Increased settlement due to population displacement and *berkhad* construction has also led to degradation of dry season grazing areas.

The drought of 1998/99 had a significant impact on livelihoods, causing losses in herds of sheep and goats among some of the poorest households. Some 60-80 households lost pack camels. Without a pack camel, a pastoralist drops out of the pastoral system, as water and food cannot be fetched and carried, and the children, the sick, and the elderly can no longer be carried. Households survive by borrowing from their relatives or engaging in small income generating activities such as the sale of firewood.

The communities in Jeriban organised their own initiatives in response to the drought. Volunteer drought committees mobilised herders to raise

<sup>1</sup> FSAU/UNCU (2000, July) *Disaster Prevention and Preparedness: Report of a Rural Community Meeting in Jeriban, July 9, 2000.*



Under the former government it was forbidden to harvest trees for charcoal export. This restricted charcoal production for the local market and helped to protect Somalia's acacia forests. Charcoal production was traditionally limited to a particular group who produced for local consumption, using hand axes. After the start of the conflict, the cutting of trees for charcoal production increased as alternative fuel supplies dried up and environmental controls collapsed, but the export of charcoal continued to be banned in the south by the faction leader General Aideed. Since his death in 1995, however, there has been a dramatic rise in the export of acacia charcoal from Somalia to

the Arabian peninsular. In 2000, it was estimated that 112,000 MT of charcoal were produced, of which 80% was exported<sup>161</sup>. Almost 50% of the trade in southern Somalia is exported through Kismayo. By continuing to import Somali charcoal these Gulf countries are contributing to the rapid deforestation of Somalia.

The trade has reaped modest earnings for thousands of low-paid charcoal producers, but those who have benefited most and reaped handsome profits are a few major charcoal merchants and faction leaders who control forest access, access to the market, and access to capital<sup>162</sup>. According to some

### and Preparedness in Jeriban'

funds from kin in towns and abroad. Trucks were hired to evacuate livestock to better grazing areas and to bring water. The business people, mosques and women's groups all participated. They appealed to the Puntland authorities for assistance and coordinated the assistance that was provided.

The community identified a number of factors increasing the vulnerability of Addun pastoralists to drought. These included:

- accelerating environmental degradation over the last 10 years due to poor resource management
- insecurity since 1991 restricting grazing mobility
- poor terms of trade and labour opportunities due to inaccessibility aggravated by poor infrastructure
- poor management of boreholes, as the key water sources

Environmental degradation was considered the key cause of increased vulnerability to drought. Since the war the human and livestock populations had increased and settlements had grown up in traditional grazing areas. Trees and wildlife were reported to be disappearing so in 1995 the communities enacted a local law penalising those caught cutting trees or killing wildlife. The communities agreed on the need to better manage *berkhad* construction in order to control unplanned settlements, and to prevent seasonal camps set up by petty traders. The people also highlighted the importance of reviving Somali customary laws (*xeer*) for protecting the environment. In customary law, rangeland is communal, private enclosures are prohibited, and forests protected. Migrating pastoralists have rights of access to rangelands in return for protecting the environment. When wood is needed for shelter or fuelwood, the law recommends leaving a third of the tree for regeneration and forbids the use of green wood for firewood. To protect the environment the communities proposed the introduction of sustainable tree cutting, the institution of rotational grazing, and the establishment of seasonal and emergency grazing reserves.

To address the restrictions on mobility, it was proposed to strengthen traditional conflict resolution mechanisms to negotiate shared access to grazing areas. Communities recognised the need to control the fishing of lobster if the industry is to be sustainable. The need for a policy for borehole management was also accepted.

Finally, while emphasis was placed on the importance of community-level response, the importance of Puntland authorities and the international community in formulating policy and regulations to support community initiatives was recognised.



estimates, a sack of charcoal purchased locally for US \$3-4 sells for US \$10 in the Gulf<sup>163</sup>. With a ship carrying up to 100,000 sacks, the potential value of a single shipment could be as high as US \$1 million.

Juniper forests are also being denuded for timber, while the regeneration of frankincense, myrrh, and gum Arabic is threatened by overgrazing. In addition, during the war, plantations of citrus fruit and mango trees in the south were felled for charcoal and fodder.

### **Marine resources**

Over the past decade Somalia's rich marine resources have been over-fished. Over-fishing off Mogadishu, for example, is reported to be seriously affecting the sustainability of the lobster population, while endangered species like turtles and dugongs are also threatened. The biggest threat throughout Somalia, however, has come from industrial fishing within Somalia's 200 nautical miles Economic Exclusion Zone, by local and foreign vessels in joint venture operations with Somali business people and faction leaders.

### **Environmental pollution**

Environmental problems also arise from the lack of systems for solid waste disposal. Garbage collection systems in most urban centres are inadequate or non-existent, and only 52% of the population have sanitary means of excreta disposal (see chapter 5 table D). There are also frequent reports of toxic waste dumping by foreign vessels along Somalia's coastline, although the material evidence for this has not been produced.

### **Environmental protection**

There is considerable awareness among the administrations and communities of critical environmental issues. Some Somali communities are taking action in response to some of these problems, reviving traditional laws (*xeer*) or drawing up new ones to protect the environment (see box 1.25). The Somaliland and Puntland administrations have also drawn up environmental policies to conserve and protect the environment.<sup>164</sup> Recognising the magnitude of the charcoal problem, the Puntland administration in early 2000<sup>165</sup>, and the TNG more recently, have banned charcoal exportation. However, the trade continues. Such ecological resources are a regional concern and therefore international and regional action is needed to promote the sustainable management of Somalia's natural resources.

### **Water security<sup>166</sup>**

Water resources are key to sustainable development in Somalia's semi-arid lands. There are indications that Somalia's renewable sources of water are declining and with current demographic, hydrological and climatic trends, improving water security through the effective management of water resources is central to human development.

A major constraint to improving water security is the uneven distribution of water resources and the uncertainty of drought and floods due to global climate change. Average annual rainfall throughout Somalia is low with a high spatial and temporal variability. Annual averages range between 500 mm in Lower Juba and the northern mountains, to virtually zero on



the northeastern coastal plain. Somalia also has the highest recorded inter-annual variability of rainfall of any African mainland state and this variability has a pervasive influence on the pastoral and agro-pastoral production systems, with a strong correlation between rainfall and livestock numbers<sup>167-168</sup>. The nomadic way of life is vulnerable to persistent low rains and drought is an ordeal that, with varying degrees of severity, enters the experience of almost every generation. The impact is so keenly felt that each drought is remembered by its character e.g. *Xaaraamacune - Eater of Forbidden Food* (early 1910s), *Siigacase - Blower of Red Dust* (early 1950s) and *Dabadheer - Long Tailed One* (early-mid 1970s).

Coping with drought is made onerous by the arid hydrogeology of much of the country. Although groundwater resources are thought to be adequate to meet current needs, the distribution is highly uneven and of little benefit in large parts of Somalia owing to the smallness of the yield, the poor quality of the water or the cost of extraction<sup>169</sup>. Moreover, climate change models predict a reduction in rainfall and increasing hydrological drought throughout the pastoral areas. In these areas trends in urbanisation, therefore, demand close monitoring of the groundwater resources, to ensure that water demands can be balanced with the sustainable recharge of water supplies.

In contrast, in the Shabelle and Juba basins the geomorphology and hydrology provide opportunities for settled agriculture, although riverine communities are also vulnerable to drought and flooding. Most of the

discharge of the Juba and Shabelle rivers originates in runoff from the Ethiopian highlands. Contribution to river flows from inside Somalia occurs only during heavy rainfall<sup>170</sup>. There are large inter-annual variations in recorded flows and often the rivers cease to flow in the lower reaches during the early part of the year<sup>171</sup>. However, current models of climate change predict up to a 45% increase in annual runoff in the major river basins of Somalia by 2030<sup>172</sup>. Trends in flooding in the Juba and Shabelle rivers are therefore predicted to increase significantly, with a corresponding impact on riverine communities.

The long-term predictions are that water stress conditions in Somalia, as in other sub-Saharan countries, will worsen in the coming years, due to an intensification of the hydrological cycle leading to greater extremes in drought and floods, coupled with a number of man-influenced trends. It has been argued that when available renewable freshwater per capita falls below 1,000 m<sup>3</sup> per annum (the condition of 'water scarcity'), lack of water begins to hamper health, economic development, and human well-being. When water availability drops to less than 500 m<sup>3</sup> per annum it becomes life threatening. When population growth increases, meeting needs becomes more challenging. Based on population growth figures for 2025, Somalia's annual renewable freshwater fell from 2,500 m<sup>3</sup> per capita per annum in 1950, to 980 m<sup>3</sup> in 1990, with a prediction of 363 m<sup>3</sup> by 2025. Future implications for water security, health, and livelihoods therefore look serious.

In short, trends in water resources and water





resource management demand serious attention. There is a need to assess the available water resources thoroughly and to plan for their equitable and sustainable management. To what extent their uneven distribution can be overcome and to what extent risks associated with hydro-meteorological uncertainty can be managed remains to be seen. It depends largely on the commitment and ingenuity of all concerned stakeholders, including regional governments, Somali authorities and water professionals. It ultimately requires a commitment to the 'good governance' of water by the Somali authorities, and the adoption by stakeholders of an integrated water resource management system, as the foundation on which to build a sustainable future for Somalia's water resources.

## Foreign Aid Trends

Pre-war Somalia was considered a classic case of an aid-dependent state, a perception reinforced during the time of UNOSOM. Indeed the 'modernisation' of Somalia from a 'nation of nomads' to a 'nation state' was predicated on copious amounts of development aid channelled through state institutions. From the 1960s to the 1980s Somalia was one of the highest per capita recipients of foreign aid in the world. Successive governments relied on foreign aid grants for development projects and faced few problems in attracting them during the Cold War. By the mid-1980s, 100% of Somalia's development budget was externally funded and 50% of its recurrent budget was dependent on international loans and grants<sup>173</sup>.


The adoption of structural adjustment and liberal economic policies in the 1980s, as elsewhere in the world, heralded a reversal of policies that for decades had supported the state as the engine of development. Increasingly, wealth-redistributing government was seen as the obstacle to development and the market as the more efficient engine, with 'civil society' as a partner. Somalia's adoption of these policies coincided with a decline in development aid to the government, growing support for non-governmental civil society organisations, and the intensification of the civil war. As aid declined, the struggle for control of the state was redirected to other resources such as land (see chapter 4). As aid was cut off, government institutions collapsed.

The international response to the war and famine in Somalia temporarily reversed this trend with a massive infusion of assistance. In 1993, the annual budget of UNOSOM II alone was US \$1.5 billion<sup>174</sup>. Although as little as 4.5% of the cost of UNOSOM went into the economy, the infusion of aid did much to prop up the faction leaders. Since 1995 foreign assistance to Somalia has fallen significantly.

Gauging the volume and importance of international aid to Somalia is difficult. The UN Consolidated Appeals (CAP) for Somalia and periodic reports of the SACB are the main public records of international aid to Somalia. These, however, provide only a partial analysis. They do not include assistance provided by the UN and NGOs from their own resources or assistance from non-traditional donor sources such as the Arab



**Figure 1.15: Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia 1993-2000**



States or Islamic institutions. Similarly, there are no records of non-developmental financial or military aid to Somalia. A number of trends in external assistance are worth noting, however.

First, since 1995 international aid to Somalia has fallen to below pre-war levels and the UNOSOM period. As figure 1.15 illustrates, between 1993 and 2000 assistance raised through the CAP fell from US \$200 million to less than US \$50 million<sup>175</sup>. Since 1993, the CAP has raised less than one third of the funding requirements of UN agencies. Although the total assistance to Somalia from SACB donor members for the year 2000 was reported to be US \$115,487,100, this still represents a significant decline from the early 1990s<sup>176</sup>.

There are several reasons for this decline in aid. Reduced aid flows to Somalia reflect global declines in foreign aid. During the period of UNOSOM, Somalia received an inflated amount of foreign assistance so that a drop-off in assistance was inevitable. After 1994, donors prioritised humanitar-

ian crises in Rwanda and the Balkans. A long history of failed aid projects in Somalia has also contributed to a certain level of donor fatigue and wariness. And, finally, the objectives of the international engagement in Somalia have changed.

A second trend worth noting since 1998 is a decline in

humanitarian assistance as a proportion of overall aid, although it continues to be more readily available than rehabilitation and development funding<sup>177</sup>. This trend reflects both an improved security environment in Somalia and a change in donor aid policy. Rehabilitation assistance is itself changing in nature, with greater emphasis on technical support and capacity building as opposed to material assistance, and a greater insistence on cost-recovery measures in social services.

Third, since donors adopted a so-called 'peace dividend' approach in Somalia in the late 1990s and made aid conditional on security and good governance, the policy has been to invest in the more politically stable northern areas of the country. In 1998, the UN stated that 'the most important work of the UN is to invest in the rehabilitation and development of the social and economic fabric of relatively peaceful areas'<sup>178</sup>. Of the US \$115.4 million disbursed in 2000, 42% was spent in the north compared to 31% in the south, with 27% on coun-



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trywide programmes<sup>179</sup>. The difficult operational environment in the south and the northwards drift of resources has seen international NGOs either withdraw or move to the north. The 'wait and see approach' to the TNG in Mogadishu adopted by western donors also reflects this position.

Finally, the channels through which aid is disbursed have changed. Since 1993, only 36% of total humanitarian assistance has been channelled through the UN, with most channelled through the ICRC and NGOs.


One lesson of the past decade, therefore, is that the Somali state can no longer rely on foreign aid. The education sector, for example, was almost 100% funded pre-war by foreign. In 2000, donor funding for education was estimated to be only US \$10.9 million<sup>180</sup>. Furthermore, a study of food aid illustrates that, with the exception of 1991-1993, food aid to Somalia throughout the 1980s (excluding food for refugees) was significantly

higher than it is today (see figure 1.16)<sup>181</sup>. Bilateral aid, when or if it is restored, is unlikely to reach pre-war levels.

The US \$115 million in aid in 2000 represents a small contribution to Somalia's economy, when compared to the value of trade or estimates of annual remittances of up to some US \$500 million. As a proportion of the aid is spent on logistics operations and offices in Nairobi, and on foreign personnel, the amount that actually enters the Somali economy is much smaller. The ability of international aid to influence the direction of development in Somalia is, therefore, more limited than in the past. More importantly, as international aid resources decline, responsibility for meeting welfare services is being passed on to Somali households through policies of participation, cost-recovery, and privatisation. While rationalised in terms of sustainability, Somali ownership, or good governance, it still needs to be proven that Somali populations are able to sustain welfare services better now than they were

before the war. An inability to meet such costs should not be confused with an unwillingness to do so or 'dependency'. However, for the foreseeable future, social welfare provision will continue to be reliant on international subsidies. ■

**Figure 1.16: WFP Food Aid to Somalia 1975-1998**



Source: Narbeth, S. (2001, March) *The targeting of emergency food distribution in Somalia: vulnerability, redistribution, and beneficiary participation*. Nairobi: WFP.



## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> UNDP (1990) *Human Development Report*. New York/London: OUP.
- <sup>2</sup> Since 1997, Somalia has not been ranked in the global HDI due to lack of adequate data. See chapter 5 for a discussion on the challenges of data collection in Somalia.
- <sup>3</sup> UNDP (2001) *Human Development Report*. New York/London: OUP.
- <sup>4</sup> Luckham, R., Ahmed, I., Muggah, R. & White, S. (2001, March). *Conflict and poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: an assessment of the issues and evidence*. IDS Working Paper 128. Sussex: IDS. Between 1989 and 1998 41% of countries in the bottom half of UNDP's HDI were affected by war, compared to 15% of states in the top half of the HDI (Project Ploughshares, 2000).
- <sup>5</sup> These include: Angola ranked 146 in the global 2001 HDI, Mozambique ranked 157, Sierra Leone ranked 162, and Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, Yugoslavia all unranked like Somalia due to inadequate data.
- <sup>6</sup> Some estimates put the death toll from starvation and disease as high as 500,000.
- <sup>7</sup> Del Buono, M., & Mubarak, J. (1999, January) *The Macroeconomy of Somalia: A Conceptual View*. Nairobi: UNDOS.
- <sup>8</sup> This is based on the preliminary analysis of UNDP's 2001 Socio-economic Household Survey.
- <sup>9</sup> FSAU/FEWS (2001, January) *Livestock Ban Threatens Food Security in Northern Regions of Somalia*. Nairobi: FSAU.
- <sup>10</sup> UNDP Somalia (1998) *Human Development Report Somalia 1998*. Nairobi: UNDP. p.22.
- <sup>11</sup> For a detailed history of Somalia see the 1998 Human Development Report for Somalia pp.22-32. See also appendix 1 of this report for a chronology of key historical events.
- <sup>12</sup> UNDP Somalia (1998) *Human Development Report Somalia 1998*. Nairobi: UNDP.
- <sup>13</sup> Much has been written on this period. See for example Clark, W. & Herbst, J. (1997) *Learning from Somalia*. Oxford: Westview Press/HAAN Publishing.
- <sup>14</sup> Helander, B. (1997, September) *Is there a Civil Society in Somalia?* UNDOS.
- <sup>15</sup> Menkhous, K. & Prendergast, J. (1995, May) *Governance and Economic Survival in Post-intervention Somalia*. CSIS Africa Notes, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, no.172. See also Bryden, M. (1999, June) *Somalia's New Order: Patterns of Political Reconstruction since State Collapse*.
- <sup>16</sup> The Digil-Mirifle Governing Council for Bay and Bakol regions had been overthrown by the forces of General Aideed in 1995.
- <sup>17</sup> The Somalia Aid Coordination Body is a forum of UN, donor and NGO representatives created in late 1993 to facilitate aid coordination in Somalia.
- <sup>18</sup> These are described chronologically, in the order in which they were established between 1991 and 2000. The Baidoa-based Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), formed in April 2001, is not included in this description. A loose alliance of faction leaders opposed to the TNG, it had not established an administration at the time of writing. There have been other efforts to form regional and transregional authorities, from Hiran region to the Lower Shabelle to the Juba valley, but these have not materialised.
- <sup>19</sup> This independence claim is based on the independence the territory briefly held in 1960 before uniting with southern Somalia.
- <sup>20</sup> See: Bradbury, M. (1997) *Somaliland Country Report*. London: CIIR; WSP International (2000) *A Self-Portrait of Somaliland: Rebuilding from the Ruins*. Hargeisa.
- <sup>21</sup> WSP International (2001) *Rebuilding Somalia: issues and possibilities for Puntland*. London: HAAN Associates.
- <sup>22</sup> Often referred to as Rahanweyn, *Reewin* is the preferred local name.
- <sup>23</sup> United Nations Security Council (2000) *Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia S/2000/1211*.
- <sup>24</sup> In March and July 2001, the World Bank held fact-finding talks on economic development with representatives of the Somali administrations in Nairobi.
- <sup>25</sup> Drysdale, J. (1964) *The Somali Dispute*. Pall Mall Press. p.21.
- <sup>26</sup> This was in 1999. *Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, Somaliland National Development Plan for 2001- 2003: Prerequisites and policy framework for sustainable transition and recovery*.
- <sup>27</sup> *ibid*.
- <sup>28</sup> UNDP (1997, January) *Governance for sustainable human development*. New York.
- <sup>29</sup> Abdillahi, M.S. (1997) *Somaliland NGOs, Challenges and Opportunities*.
- <sup>30</sup> Ministry of National Planning (1990) *Somalia in Figures*.
- <sup>31</sup> Vaidyanathan, K.E. (1997, December) Report of the UNFPA Consultant on Population Statistics of Somalia. Nairobi: UNDOS. WHO estimated the population to be 6.6 million in 2000, based on National Immunisation Days data.
- <sup>32</sup> For example, the 1997 UNFPA study projected a population for Somaliland of 1.09 million in 2000, compared to Somaliland's own estimate of 3 million, Ministry of National Planning and Coordination (2000) *Somaliland in Figures*, Third Edition. Puntland also claims a population of 1.8 million, see PDRC (2001) *Comments and Review of the Draft HDR, by the Puntland Reading Circle*. Garowe.
- <sup>33</sup> UNICEF (1987) *Women and Children in Somalia: A Situation Analysis*. Mogadishu's population increased from 50,000 in 1960 to over 1 million in the mid-1980s. In the 1980s, investment in urban real estate was also encouraged by the presence of international aid agencies.
- <sup>34</sup> It has alternatively been described as the 'ruralisation' of Somalia.
- <sup>35</sup> UNICEF (1987) *Women and Children in Somalia: A Situation Analysis*. Mogadishu.
- <sup>36</sup> Africa Watch (1990) *Somalia: A government at war with its people*. New York: The Africa Watch Committee.
- <sup>37</sup> UNHCR/UNDP (December, 2000) *Reintegration of Returning Refugees and Displaced Persons in Somalia*. (draft).



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- <sup>38</sup> Farah, A.Y. (1995) *Gender and Refugees: The Case of Somali Pastoral Women Refugees in the Camps of the Eastern Ethiopia*. A Paper Commissioned by the Pastoral and Environmental Network in the Horn of Africa. Addis Ababa.
- <sup>39</sup> War induced displacements occurred in the central regions of Somalia in 1979, in the northwest after 1988, and in the south in 1989.
- <sup>40</sup> Rogge, J. (1994, September) *The Displaced Population in South and Central Somalia and Preliminary Proposals for their Re-Integration and Rehabilitation*. A Report to UNDP. Disaster Research Unit. University of Manitoba.
- <sup>41</sup> World Bank (1993, October) *Somalia Framework for Planning of Long Term Reconstruction and Recovery* (draft). Report of a Multi-Donor Task Force under the Coordination of the World Bank.
- <sup>42</sup> UNCU Somalia (2000, May 19) *Responding to Internal Displacement: A profile of needs and activities in Somalia*. (draft).
- <sup>43</sup> UNCU Somalia (2000, February) *Inter-Agency Assessment for Gedo region*. Nairobi.
- <sup>44</sup> See for example, Farah, N. (2000) *Yesterday, Tomorrow: Voices from the Somali Diaspora*. London: Cassell.
- <sup>45</sup> Nair, K.N.S & Abdulla, F. (1998) *Somalia 1997-1998: A Status Report*. Nairobi: UNDOS.
- <sup>46</sup> Besteman, C. & Cassanelli, L.V. (eds) (1996) *The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War*. Westview Press.
- <sup>47</sup> Somalia Civil Protection Programme (2001, June) *Crime Information in Somaliland*. Data Compiled by the Somaliland Judiciary.
- <sup>48</sup> UNDP Somalia (2000) *Resident Coordinator's 2000 Annual Report*. Nairobi.
- <sup>49</sup> See Ahmed H. Esa (2001) *Landmines and Landmines Policy in the Horn of Africa*. The Institute of Practical Research and Training, Hargeisa. Additional information provided by John Dingley, UNDP Civil Protection Programme.
- <sup>50</sup> For example, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 recognises the right to adequate food as part of the right to an adequate standard of living.
- <sup>51</sup> SACB Secretariat (2001) *SACB Operational Framework for Continuing Cooperation in Somalia*. Nairobi.
- <sup>52</sup> FSAU (2001, February). Nairobi.
- <sup>53</sup> WFP Somalia (1999) *Standardised Project Report 1999*. Nairobi.
- <sup>54</sup> UNCU Somalia (2000, May 19) *Responding to Internal Displacement: A profile of needs and activities in Somalia* (draft).
- <sup>55</sup> FSAU (2001, May) *Nutrition Update for Somalia*. ReliefWeb (May 18, 2001).
- <sup>56</sup> For a detailed analysis of livelihood strategies and social networks among the Reewin of southern Somalia see Narbeth, S. (2001) *The targeting of emergency food distribution in Somalia: vulnerability, redistribution and beneficiary participation*. Nairobi: WFP.
- <sup>57</sup> Forthcoming results of the UNDP 2001 Household Socio-economic Survey will provide such information.
- <sup>58</sup> Medani, K. (2000) *Report on Internal Migration and Remittance Inflows Northwest and Northeast Somalia*. Nairobi: UNCU and FSAU.
- <sup>59</sup> Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination (1999, July) *Plan of Action for Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Workshop Report*.
- <sup>60</sup> Puntland Development Research Centre (2001, September) *Comments and Review of the Draft HDR*. Garowe.
- <sup>61</sup> SACB (2001, October) *Project Matrix* (draft). Nairobi.
- <sup>62</sup> Forthcoming results of the UNDP 2001 Household Socio-economic Survey will provide such information.
- <sup>63</sup> FEWS-NET (2001, May 18) *Somalia in Deep Financial Crisis Again*. Nairobi.
- <sup>64</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>65</sup> UNICEF (2001) *End Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, Full Technical Report for Somalia*. Nairobi.
- <sup>66</sup> Noreen Prendiville, personal correspondence (November 2000).
- <sup>67</sup> Le Sage, A. & Majid, N. (2001) *The Livelihoods Gap: Responding to the Economic Dynamics of Vulnerability in Somalia*.
- <sup>68</sup> UNOCHA (2001) *United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Somalia*. New York/Geneva.
- <sup>69</sup> Le Sage, A. & Majid, N. (2001) *The Livelihoods Gap: Responding to the Economic Dynamics of Vulnerability in Somalia*. p.5.
- <sup>70</sup> This process is not new. Even in the mid-nineteenth century the expansion of livestock export is said to have undermined subsistence strategies leaving herders more vulnerable to drought. See Durrill, W.K. (1986) 'Atrocious Misery: The African Origins of Famine in Northern Somalia, 1839-1884'. *The American Historical Review*. *The American Historical Association*. pp.287-306.
- <sup>71</sup> UNICEF (2000), *End-Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Full Technical Report*, 2001 Table 21: Percentage of Children Age 12-23 Months Currently Vaccinated Against Childhood Diseases, Somalia, 1999.
- <sup>72</sup> UNICEF (1991) *A Situation Analysis of Children and Women in Somalia*; UNICEF (1998) *Children and Women in Somalia: A Situation Analysis*.
- <sup>73</sup> Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination (1999, July) *Plan of Action for Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Workshop Report*.
- <sup>74</sup> Development Solutions for Africa (1997) *Health Financing in Somalia: A Feasibility Study*. Nairobi.
- <sup>75</sup> Puntland Development Research Centre (2001, September) *Comments and Review of the Draft HDR*. Garowe.
- <sup>76</sup> WHO (1999) *Demographic and Health Indicators for Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean*.
- <sup>77</sup> SACB (2000) *Donor Report*. Nairobi: SACB.
- <sup>78</sup> UNOCHA (2001) *Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Somalia*. New York/Geneva.
- <sup>79</sup> UNDP Somalia (1998) *Human Development Report*.
- <sup>80</sup> UNICEF Somalia, UNDP/UNFPA Somalia, UNESCO Somalia (2000) *Year 2000 Education for All Assessment Report*.
- <sup>81</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>82</sup> UNDP Somalia (1998) *Human Development Report*. Nairobi.
- <sup>83</sup> In Somaliland the Ministry of Education accounts for a large number of public employees. Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination (1999, July) *Plan of Action for Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Workshop Report*.
- <sup>84</sup> UNDP Somalia (2001) *Socio-economic Household Survey*. Nairobi. The UNICEF (2001) *End-Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Full Technical Report* (Table 12), recorded a rate of 16.6% in 1999.
- <sup>85</sup> GER is the number of children of primary school age (6-14) enrolled calculated as a percentage of the population, from UNICEF, UNDP/UNFPA & UNESCO Somalia (2000) *Year 2000 Education for All Assessment Report*. This does not include enrolment in private schools.

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- <sup>86</sup> UNICEF (1997), *A Situation Analysis of Women and Children in Somalia*. Nairobi: UNICEF.
- <sup>87</sup> Based on UNICEF (2001) *Primary School Survey 2000/2001*.
- <sup>88</sup> UNICEF, UNDP/UNFPA & UNESCO Somalia (2000) *Year 2000 Education for All Assessment Report*.
- <sup>89</sup> UNICEF (2001) *End-Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Full Technical Report*. Table 10: Percentage of children of primary school age attending primary school, Somalia 1999.
- <sup>90</sup> UNDP Somalia (1998) *Somalia Human Development Report 1998*. Nairobi.
- <sup>91</sup> UNICEF, UNDP/UNFPA & UNESCO (2000) *Somalia Year 2000 Education for All Assessment Report*. Nairobi.
- <sup>92</sup> UNICEF (2001) *End-Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Full Technical Report*. Table 12: Percentage of population aged 15 years and older that is literate, Somalia 1999.
- <sup>93</sup> Centre for British Teachers, personal communication, March 2000.
- <sup>94</sup> Somaliland Ministry of Finance, recurrent budget, 2000.
- <sup>95</sup> Somaliland Ministry of National Planning and Coordination (1999, July) *Plan of Action for Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Workshop Report*.
- <sup>96</sup> SACB (2000) *Donor Report*. Nairobi: SACB.
- <sup>97</sup> UNICEF, UNDP/UNFPA & UNESCO (2000) *Somalia Year 2000 Education for All Assessment Report*.
- <sup>98</sup> Mubarak, J. (1997) 'The Hidden Hand Behind the Resilience of the Stateless Economy of Somalia.' *World Development*. vol.25. no.12. pp.2027-2041.
- <sup>99</sup> Del Buono, M. & Mubarak, J. (1999, January) *The Macroeconomy of Somalia: A Conceptual View*. (draft) Nairobi: UNDOS.
- <sup>100</sup> Preliminary results of the UNDP 2001 Household Socio-economic survey.
- <sup>101</sup> Cabanius, P. (2001, January) *Trade efficiency for Economic Recovery of Somalia. Back to Office Report and Outline for a Programme of Action*. UNDP-UNCTAD.
- <sup>102</sup> Medani, K. (2000) *Report on Internal Migration and Remittance Inflows Northwest and Northeast Somalia*. Nairobi: UNCU and FSAU.
- <sup>103</sup> Jamal, V. (1998) 'Somalia: Understanding an Unconventional Economy', *Development and Change*, Vol 19, pp205.
- <sup>104</sup> Nair, K. N. S. & Abdulla Faisal (1998) *Somalia 1997-98: A Status Report*. Nairobi.
- <sup>105</sup> Hashi, Ahmed Mohamed (1996) *Pastoral Livelihood Systems: Resource trends and institutional constraints in Sool and Sanag Regions*. Somaliland: VetAid.
- <sup>106</sup> Narbeth, S. (2001, March) *The targeting of emergency food distribution in Somalia: vulnerability, redistribution, and beneficiary participation*. Nairobi: WFP.
- <sup>107</sup> See the following documents from Republic of Somaliland, Berbera Port Authority: "Vessels Arrived in the year 2000 as Against 199-1998" (Berbera: Manifest and Statistics Office, 2000); "Containers Report 1998-99, 1999-2000" (Berbera: Manifest and Statistics Office, 2000); "Port of Berbera Export Statistics (Livestock) 1999-2000" (Berbera: Manifest and Statistics Office, 2000); "Port of Berbera: Import Statistics 1999 and 2000" (Berbera: Manifest and Statistics Office, 2000). See also FSAU, "Berbera Livestock Export 1991-1999" (Nairobi: FSAU, April 2000); FSAU, "Bossaso Livestock Export 1994-1999" (Nairobi: FSAU April 2000); and Bossaso Port Authority, "Ships and Export Cargo Statistics for the Year 1999/2000" (Bossaso: no date).
- <sup>108</sup> Del Buono, M. & Mubarak, J. (1999, January) *The Macroeconomy of Somalia: A Conceptual View*. (draft) Nairobi: UNDOS.
- <sup>109</sup> Cabanius, P. (2001, January) *Trade Efficiency for Economic Recovery of Somalia. Back to Office Report and Outline for a Programme of Action*. UNDP-UNCTAD.
- <sup>110</sup> IRIN (2001, April 3) *The Berbera Lifeline. Part I*. Interview with port manager.
- <sup>111</sup> Joannes, P. (2001, July) *The Berbera Corridor*. Presentation given at the 8<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Somali Studies International Association. Hargeisa. EU Ethiopia, Local Food Security Unit.
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## Chapter 2





# The Impact of Globalisation and Localisation on Human Development

## The Phenomena of Globalisation and Localisation

It is impossible to meaningfully assess trends in human development, or to consider human development strategies and goals, without placing them in the context of 'globalisation'.

Various aspects of globalisation have a crucial influence on human development. These include:

- the rise in the transnational movement of people, goods, and information;
- the instantaneous global movement of finance capital;
- the telecommunications revolution;
- the proliferation of powerful non-state actors ranging from multinational corporations to NGOs to transnational criminal rings; and
- the development of new international norms on matters ranging from human rights to environmental protection.

Globalisation is not a new phenomenon and Somalis have been involved in global trade networks since pre-colonial times and have long travelled and settled overseas<sup>1</sup>. What is new is the scale and pace of globalisation.

At the same time, globalisation has been complemented by another phenomenon – localisation.

Around the world, coalitions and agendas for human development are being reshaped by:

- demands for democratic participation;
- the trend of decentralising political power to regions and municipalities; and
- the rising importance of civil society as an autonomous and influential social and political actor.

Together, the forces of globalisation and localisation have commanded centre stage in recent development analysis and have been accompanied by debate over their impact<sup>2</sup>. Localisation and globalisation both have their enthusiastic advocates and harsh critics. Without minimising the differences between these camps, it is nonetheless possible to identify an emerging consensus on the impact of globalisation and localisation on human development. This consensus serves as a point of departure for an exploration of the impact of globalisation and localisation on human development in the Somali setting.

■ Both critics and advocates concur that globalisation and localisation appear to be long-term and fundamental trends. As the World Bank concludes, they constitute 'phenomena that no development agenda can afford to ignore<sup>3</sup>.

■ The impact of globalisation and localisation on human development can be positive or negative, depending on a variety of circumstances. As the



World Bank has noted 'Globalisation and localisation offer exceptional opportunities, but can also have destabilising effects'<sup>4</sup>. This can occur within a single developing country. Indonesia, for instance, was first a beneficiary and then a major victim of the revolution in global financial investment flows.

■ There is consensus that globalisation's benefits have been unevenly distributed, creating winners and losers in the world economy. Globalisation has contributed to a dramatic widening of the gap between rich and poor countries. It has also widened the gap within the Third World between fast growing 'newly industrialising countries' and the marginalised 'fourth world' states<sup>5</sup>. It has also contributed to the concentration of wealth and worsening income inequality within both rich and poor countries<sup>6</sup>. The unequal distribution of the benefits of globalisation is mainly responsible for the recent public backlash against it<sup>7</sup>.

■ Integration in a globalised economy has increased the vulnerability of local and national human development efforts to external shocks, trends, and decisions that are beyond the control of developing countries, and is another reason for backlashes against globalisation.

There is a vital task, therefore, to develop strategies to manage the phenomena of globalisation and localisation in ways that will maximise their beneficial impact and minimise their potential for harm. That is, maximising new opportunities while minimising risk. The challenge, it has been argued, is to develop the rules and institutions for governance that will preserve the advantages of global

markets and competition, while providing space for human, community, and environmental resources to ensure that globalisation works for people, not just for profits<sup>8</sup>. There is an implicit understanding in this that central governments are not the sole managers of globalisation, but they are an essential component of a multi-level strategy for the governance of globalisation.

The ability to manage globalisation and localisation depends on structures and practices of *good governance* at each of these levels. At the international level, globalisation has outpaced the ability to devise new regimes, rules and institutions for managing the global flow of goods, finances, people, information and illicit material. At the national level, localisation has sometimes proceeded faster than local and national governments have been able to devise workable strategies for decentralisation, or to institutionalise patterns of intra-governmental relations<sup>9</sup>. In other words, the world is changing faster than we are able to create mechanisms to manage its impact.

Together, globalisation and localisation are often blamed for eroding the power and sovereignty of national governments, from above and from below. However, a consensus is emerging that far from eclipsing the nation-state, globalisation and localisation depend on effective governance at the national level. As Kofi Annan has observed:

❗ ... weak states are one of the main impediments to effective governance today, at national and inter-



national levels alike ... we must help to strengthen the capacity of those states to govern, not undermine them further<sup>10</sup>.

The World Bank concurs, arguing that both globalisation and localisation often require responses that are beyond the control of a single national government, but 'national governments will remain pivotal in shaping development policies in an environment that circumscribes, constrains, and redefines their role'<sup>11</sup>.

## Globalisation

The implications of the above conclusions for Somali human development are clear. Due to prolonged state collapse, the forces of globalisation in Somalia are unmediated, unfiltered, and unmanaged by a functional government (or governments). Somali communities have thus been fully exposed to the impact of globalisation, for better and for worse, and its impact has been mixed and uneven. The following examines some of the ways that globalisation has affected human development in Somalia.

### Foreign aid

Foreign assistance has long been an important component of a globalised effort to promote human development and remains an important force today. In the three decades prior to the collapse of the state, Somalia received one of the highest per capita rates of foreign aid in the world. Military aid also enabled Somalia to build up one of sub-Saharan

Africa's largest standing armies. This had several ramifications for human development. First, it meant that most programmes and projects devoted to human development in Somalia were externally funded, and usually externally conceived. This made progress in human development dependent on outside sources over which Somalis had little control, and gave Somalis little sense of ownership over their development agenda. Second, the high levels of foreign aid generated a bloated and unsustainable civil service, military and urban service sector. Employment opportunities were good thanks to foreign assistance programmes, but were unsustainable. Third, the repressive nature of the externally supported state considerably worsened human security. Ironically, some parts of Somali society enjoy better human security today than they did in the Barre era, despite state collapse. Finally, the partial suspension of foreign aid in the late 1980s due to human rights concerns weakened the Somali state, which within two years collapsed in

### **'International aid agencies have reshaped the political and social geography in Somalia'**

the face of armed insurgencies. It is for this reason that some observers argue that the rise and the collapse of the Somali state was the product of globalisation<sup>12</sup>.

In the past decade, foreign aid has been much more modest in scope, but continues to play an important role in human development in Somalia. As in the past, external donors continue to fund



public social services in Somalia. In the absence of a functional central government, international aid agencies and their coordinating bodies have assumed responsibility for most of the strategic planning, prioritisation, data collection and evaluation of human development-related programs in Somalia. Furthermore, international aid agencies have reshaped the political and social geography in Somalia in their search for local interlocutors and partners. This has been especially through their support to local NGOs as implementers of human development projects. But it has also been through their interaction with local authorities and traditional structures.

It is here that the forces of globalisation and localisation meet. The global movement to empower civil society has, in the Somali context, helped to promote the rise of a number of civil society organisations and to create an entirely new sector of local NGOs. This 'independent sector', which barely existed in Somalia only ten years ago, may help to institutionalise a societal commitment to human development goals, and is very much a product of the 'globalisation of localisation'. However, the sector is also highly fragmented and externally dependent.

Finally, international aid agencies reflect the changing global agenda of human development. Foreign aid has been a powerful transmitter of new ideas, priorities and goals for human development and the global development agenda is shaping how Somalis conceive of their own human developmen-

tal objectives. The international campaign to end female genital mutilation, for instance, has forced Somali communities to consider whether this traditional practice is an impediment to human development. Somali non-governmental organisations quickly reflect and absorb the global agenda, specialising in the fields of women's issues, human rights, minority rights, governance, the environment, and other issues that previously had little or no role in local understanding of development.

If the global human development agenda represents real progress towards addressing universally acknowledged development priorities, then the adoption of this agenda in Somalia is positive. If, however, this globalised agenda is simply an imposition of the values and goals of more powerful international actors on Somalia, it will be only as sustainable as the flows of foreign aid linked to it. One of the great challenges to the human development agenda itself is ensuring a strong sense of local ownership of that agenda. Somalis lack a recognised functional government to negotiate the development agenda with external actors and are in a very weak position to claim ownership over development priorities and strategies. Generally, Somali communities have little choice but to take or leave the terms of development aid offered by external agencies. Efforts such as the War-torn Societies Project are an example of efforts to ensure Somalis have more of a voice in the agenda.

## Telecommunications

One of the most dramatic aspects of globalisation has been the revolutionary advances in telecom-



munications. Satellite phones, faxes, the Internet, and email have exponentially increased the flow of information and communication around the world. Improved telecommunications have been an essential catalyst for the global financial revolution, in which capital can now be moved instantly in search of the most profitable investments.

Somalia has not enjoyed access to the more powerful aspects of telecommunications. Only a few Somalis inside the country have access to email and the Internet. Yet this aspect of globalisation has had a transformational effect on Somali commerce and social safety-nets. Since the mid-1990s, twelve Somali satellite phone companies have been established, providing one of the cheapest and most accessible satellite phone systems in Africa. Even Somalia's smaller towns have satellite phone centres, and rural dwellers can access international phone lines via local HF radios. The result is a communications system which, while not problem free, is vastly superior to the service available under the former government.

This global telecommunications network affects human development in Somalia in several ways. First and foremost, it serves as an essential conduit for the remittance economy on which Somalis are so dependent. The remittance companies that facilitate the transfer of funds from the Somali diaspora to relatives in Somalia are built around the global telecommunications system. Without this, Somalis would still send and receive remittances, but the procedure would be more costly, risky and slow.

Second, Somalis rely on satellite phones to conduct international business transactions and monitor vital commercial information. The ability of Somali businessmen and businesswomen to succeed in the import-export business depends on their access to timely and accurate information, and their ability to forge and maintain international business partnerships over the phone. The access to better information has meant fewer catastrophic business decisions. Few merchants suffer losses by exporting livestock when prices are low in Nairobi, for instance, now that they are able to monitor livestock prices in Kenya on a daily basis.

The benefits of the telecommunications network in Somalia are, however, mainly concentrated in the middle class who have the most family members in the diaspora and the business class. Although there may be some indirect benefits to the poor from economic growth, most of the poor have little access to the telecommunications system and would not be in a position to benefit from it even if it were affordable for them. This aspect of globalisation has benefited Somalia overall, but those benefits have been concentrated in the hands of a relatively small social and economic elite.

### **Global media**

Globalisation of the media has also left an imprint on Somalia. Somalis are avid consumers of news and are an attentive audience for global news services such as the BBC. In recent years, however, the development of satellite television has enabled a growing number of Somalis to access global televi-



sion, exposing hundreds of thousands of Somalis who have never travelled abroad to images – both accurate and distorted – of the wider world. Enterprising cafe owners in larger towns purchase inexpensive satellite dishes and attract a paying clientele to watch television which can include CNN, Indian movies, and a range of other stations. Videos of popular Western, Arabic, and Indian films are also available in urban markets and are viewed in cafes, private homes, and makeshift movie theatres.

The impact that this exposure to global media, information, and entertainment has had on human development in Somalia is not clear. On the positive side, Somalis have more access to information. On the negative side, some Somalis worry about culturally inappropriate or offensive material now easily available in Somalia, and the extent to which exposure to images of the West creates expectations among Somali youth, accelerating out-migration.

## International financial flows

Globalisation has accelerated the international flow of money. Currently there is no direct foreign investment and very little other international financial investment in Somalia. The principal source of hard currency for the country comes from financial remittances from relatives overseas. Some estimates suggest that some US \$500 million may be remitted to Somalia every year. As described in chapter 1, these remittances have become the 'life blood' for many Somali households, particularly in urban, middle class settings. Many households would suffer significant setbacks in food security and access

to private medical care and private schools if remittance flows were interrupted<sup>13</sup>. Remittances are therefore an important mechanism for meeting human development needs at the household level. In addition, a significant proportion of the funds remitted is invested in property, businesses and assets such as *berkhads*.

In addition to remittances, globalised finance manifests itself in the gradual dollarisation of the Somali economy. Due to the unregulated importation of Somali shilling notes by business people and the ensuing hyperinflation and loss of confidence in the Somali shilling, the dollar is replacing the shilling as the preferred unit of exchange, especially for major transactions and for household savings. This has the advantage of providing the country with a more stable currency, although again the benefits lie with those who have access to the dollars. Ironically, the dollarisation of the economy constitutes a return to the historical era of globalisation, as a move into a new globalised economy, when in the pre-colonial era Indian rupees and Portuguese Maria Theresa dollars were a standard currency in Somalia's small coastal enclaves.

## Global population movements

Globalisation has accelerated the movement of people across borders as migrants, immigrants, refugees, and tourists and Somali society has in many ways been transformed by this facet of globalisation. Most Somalis in the diaspora fled the country after the outbreak of war in 1988. Some are legal migrants or guest workers, others have won



asylum and still others are illegal immigrants. By some estimates, as many as one in six or over one million Somalis now live outside of Somalia. Stringent immigration controls in rich northern countries are increasingly restricting Somali access to foreign countries. Nevertheless, the sheer size of this diaspora means that in some ways Somali society as a whole has been 'globalised', and is no longer confined to the borders of a nation state. It also reminds us that Somalia's principal export is no longer livestock, but human labour, and gives Somalia a role in the global economy as essentially a labour reserve. While this role is of marginal importance in the global economy, it is of real significance within Somalia, given the remittance flows, and has wide-ranging impact on human development choices.

### **'Improved human development for individuals may actually be counterproductive for human development at the societal level'**

The impact of this diaspora economy on human development goes further than mere remittances. Educational choices inside Somalia, for instance, are now informed largely by calculations of how that education will enhance prospects for finding employment abroad. For this reason, English and Arabic-language curricula are strongly preferred, as competence in those languages is required for work abroad. Well-to-do families send their children out of the country altogether for educational and health care opportunities in more developed countries. The outflow of human capital to more developed countries, while serving as a vital survival

mechanism in the short-term, constitutes a serious 'brain-drain' which may hamper long-term post-war recovery. This raises a sensitive aspect of human development in the Somali context. Namely, that improved human development for individuals may actually be counterproductive for human development at the societal level. The expansion of individual choice may, in certain circumstances, leave the community as a whole worse off than before.

While the diaspora generally plays a positive role in human development by providing remittances to finance basic food, health, and educational needs, it can play a destructive role as well. The diaspora has, during certain periods, been a critical source of funds for clan militias, which have raised funds (sometimes via coercion) from clan members living abroad. Indeed, a recent study suggests that countries with large diasporas are much more vulnerable to destructive civil wars than those which do not, a reflection of the financing power of the community living and working abroad.

Meanwhile, the flow of people across Somalia's borders constitutes a human development crisis in neighbouring countries. The human development needs of an estimated 265,000 Somalis are compromised by their long-term presence as refugees in camps in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Yemen. In addition, the movement of people across these borders has become a security concern for Somalia's neighbours, with Somali armed bandits operating across these borders threatening the property and lives of local communities.



## The global movement of goods

A feature of globalisation has been its impact on the free flow of goods across state borders, and the increasing volumes of interstate trade. Somalia has seen a dramatic rise in the flow of cross-border trade since 1990 that is closely connected with regional and global networks of trade ranging from Brazil, Dubai, Italy, and Indonesia. Chapters 1 and 3 of this report document in some detail the rise of these global trade networks. The following trends in globalised commerce in Somalia are worth reiterating:

- Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, has become the *de facto* commercial capital of Somalia, where major Somali traders arrange for purchases of a host of imported goods from around the world.
- Seaports in both northern and southern Somalia have developed new roles in an entrepôt economy, facilitating an expanding international transit trade to the Horn of Africa and Eastern Africa.
- There has been an increase in goods imported into Somalia from an increasingly diverse set of sources, most of which make their way into Somalia via Dubai. Sugar, once produced inside Somalia, is now routinely imported from Brazil; cigarettes from Kenya; cloth from South Asia; processed food such as tomato paste from Indonesia; rice from Thailand; and automobiles from Japan. This array of goods from around the world can be found even in remote interior trading centres and reflects the fact that there are few restrictions on Somali merchants to seek and purchase the lowest-priced goods in the global market.

Somalia's exports, however, contribute little to global commerce, mainly serving markets in the Gulf States and Kenya. Recent developments in the export of sesame, dried limes, and charcoal from Somalia to the Gulf States, however, illustrate Somalia's capacity to respond to consumer demands in other countries. It also reinforces the fact that even relatively poor and isolated areas of the world are very much integrated into global commerce.

Globalised commerce in Somalia has both positive and negative effects. Positively, it has improved access to consumer goods and choice, and has provided new opportunities for entrepreneurs. On the other hand, some types of global commerce are destructive, illicit and unwelcome. The booming charcoal trade, for instance, has enriched a few, but at an enormous environmental cost to the whole country. With no state to protect its marine waters, the global demand for fish has led to unsustainable illegal fishing along Somalia's coastlines by foreign trawlers. Somalia's easy access to the global trade in weaponry has undermined prospects for peace and stability.

## Globalised criminality

The threat of global criminal activity is of growing concern to the UN Security Council. Transnational crime is facilitated by the same technological advances that promote commerce and financial flows, and weak or collapsed states like Somalia are often a preferred operating environment for transnational criminal elements. Countries most





affected by a spillover of criminal activity from Somalia are neighbouring states, although even distant countries can be affected. Evidence of transnational crime operating in Somalia is by nature difficult to secure, but some of the main concerns have included use of Somalia as a safe haven by terrorists and guerrilla groups, toxic waste dumping inside Somalia and in its coastal waters, weapons smuggling and drug-running<sup>14</sup>.

## Globalised disease

One downside of this increased mobility of populations and movement of goods is the potential for the rapid spread of disease. In countries in crisis, where public health structures have been rendered inoperable, vaccination campaigns interrupted, and large numbers of internally displaced persons forced into unsanitary and overcrowded camps or slums, the potential for new and dangerous strains of diseases are real. Somalia is feeling the cost of lax veterinary controls that have been unable to contain the spread of RVF. In addition, Somalia is vulnerable to the spread of HIV/AIDS from neighbouring countries where prevalence rates are very high.

## Localisation

Just as the protracted collapse of the state has rendered Somalia more exposed and vulnerable to the forces of globalisation, the absence of a working central government has meant that politics have become radically localised. Indeed, it would not be difficult to argue that contemporary Somalia is polit-

ically the most localised country in the world. Many aspects of political localisation which directly affect human development activities in Somalia have been detailed in chapter 1 and need not be explored in detail here. A brief inventory of the phenomenon of localisation in Somalia suffices to provide ample evidence of the importance of this trend in the country today.

## Localisation of political authority

In the absence of a functional central government, the only governance that is provided in Somalia today is at the local or regional level. Several polities claim to govern at the regional or transregional level, but at present only Somaliland actually exercises meaningful authority within most of its borders, although in some regions this is also contested. Until the constitutional crisis in mid-2001, Puntland's capacity to govern was weaker but still consequential.

**'The re-establishment of a responsible, effective government is a necessary ... condition for expanding the benefits and mitigating the undesirable effects of globalisation in Somalia'**

Even where regional administrations are functioning, however, the day-to-day practice of political authority tends to be carried out at the local, municipal or village level. Clan elders, *shari'a* courts, business coalitions, militia leaders, prominent social and religious figures, and selected or self-proclaimed political leaders collectively form the mosaic of polities that shape local governance. In most of the country, municipal, village, and sub-clan level authority is the only mean-



ingful form of governance in existence. In larger cities such as Mogadishu, systems of governance are currently most effective at the neighbourhood level. This form of governance is informal and fluid in nature. In many places, local authority consists of a multitude of overlapping and sometimes competing sources of power. Leaders usually possess little coercive power, and rely more on the power of persuasion and negotiation. Localised authority in Somalia includes not only functions of internal governance, but also assumes responsibility for quasi-diplomatic relations

**‘Clan elders, *shari’a* courts, business coalitions, militia leaders, prominent social and religious figures, and selected or self-proclaimed political leaders collectively form the mosaic of polities that shape local governance’**

with neighbouring clans, villages, and regions, and in some instances with foreign states and international aid agencies.

This portrait of radical localisation of governance in Somalia reinforces the important fact that despite the absence of a central government Somalia is not anarchic. Localisation in Somalia is essentially involuntary in nature, a reactionary and *ad hoc* measure borne of the collapse of the central government. Nevertheless, local communities are slowly developing political practices to meet minimal political needs, law and order, safe passage for commerce, property rights, and routine procedures for managing disputes between individuals or between clans. Some of these practices draw on

traditional customs. Others are new and innovative efforts to address non-traditional problems.

The localisation of political authority in Somalia in some respects provides much greater local ownership of political decision-making than was the case in the past. Virtually all governance in contemporary Somalia now requires lengthy and protracted negotiations with a wide number of local social and political groups, and local political leaders spend much of their day in meetings with constituents. Even

mundane and minor issues such as the hiring of teachers or awarding of contracts by aid agencies necessitate repeated meetings with interested constituencies. Because the civil war has left most social and political groups well-armed, ‘veto coalitions’ are now a standard feature of Somali politics. Any group that feels unsatisfied by a political decision or arrangement can disrupt the process by threat of recourse to violence. The involuntary localisation of Somali politics has therefore empowered small, local constituencies more largely than before and this heightened level of accountability, empowerment, and democratic voice is seen by its advocates as the chief virtue of localisation.

The localisation of Somali governance, however, has also come at a high cost. Localisation has been imposed by circumstances on the Somali people and has not been marked by any level of planning. Decentralisation and localisation in the context of a collapsed state is, therefore, little more than crisis management. Far from empowering local commu-



nities, localisation in a collapsed state is generally a manifestation of an aggregate loss of power and control. Localisation has, in some parts of Somalia, simply recast predatory political behaviour onto powerful local groups at the expense of minority groups, even to the point of fostering ethnic cleansing and the armed conquest of territory.

Throughout Somalia, despite fiercely negative experiences with a central state in the past, communities recognise the tremendous disruptions and costs linked to state collapse. Certain central state functions, such as issuance of passports, currency control and fiscal policy, foreign policy and defence, livestock certification, standardisation of laws, and land registration are irreplaceable and well beyond the scope of local administrations. Positive localisation does not come through the weakening or collapse of a central state; but it is best achieved in the context of an effective national government. The re-establishment of a responsible, effective government is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for expanding the benefits and mitigating the undesirable effects of globalisation in Somalia.

### **Localisation of social identity**

Somalia's long period of civil war and state collapse has bred radically localised social identity. Somalia has long been known for possessing one of the strongest nationalist identities in Africa, yet paradoxically Somali society has also been organised along clan lines that tend to be exclusivist and rival in nature. A decade of civil war and state

collapse has heightened the importance of clan as one's sole source of security in a highly insecure environment. Over the latter half of the 1990s, clanism itself also grew increasingly localised, as clan groupings tended to fragment into sub-clan political groups. Since 1995, most armed clashes in Somalia have tended to occur within rather than between clans and sub-clans, reflecting the shrinkage of lineage-based political units in the country.

### **The rise of civil society**

Localisation is also often portrayed as a trend toward greater empowerment and activity of grassroots organisations collectively described as 'civil society'. There is not a long history of activism by local NGOs, professional groups, and other social groups in Somalia, but over the course of the 1990s, many local NGOs and other civic organisations were created. Most were formed in direct response to need and the availability of external funding. When that funding was reduced or cut off many of the local NGOs quickly folded. However, some do have local support, fulfil local agendas, and have shown an ability to sustain themselves. For example, Somali human rights groups, professional organisations, women's groups, and health and education groups have all become more empowered in recent years. In locations where they are present, local NGOs and other civil society groups can have a powerful influence over local governance and an impact on human development in their community.



## Managing Globalisation and Localisation

Collectively, these aspects of both globalisation and localisation shape the political, social, and economic parameters of human development efforts in Somalia. The impacts of globalisation in Somalia and the benefits of localisation have been mixed. In the absence of a strong public sector, private trade and commerce will continue to play a significant role in human development in Somalia. While economic deregulation has supported the growth of the private sector, strengthening

Somalia's position in the global economy will require a legal and regulatory framework that can facilitate more equitable relations with trading partners.

Likewise, while localisation may have increased the potential for participatory governance, the benefits of decentralisation have been uneven. While regional urban centres may have gained, it is unclear that these gains have filtered down to rural areas. A framework that guarantees real devolution of authority and redistribution of resources would strengthen the process of localisation. ■

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Marchal, R. et al. (2000), *Globalization and its impact on Somalia*. Nairobi: UNDOS.

<sup>2</sup> They were highlighted in the World Bank's *World Development Report 2000*, the UNDP *Human Development Report 1999*, the UNDP *Poverty Report 1998: Overcoming Human Poverty*, and the UN Millennium Report *We the Peoples*.

<sup>3</sup> World Bank (2000) *World Development Report 2000*. New York: OUP. p.5.

<sup>4</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Eighty countries have per capita incomes lower than they were a decade ago, according to UNDP (1999) *Human Development Report 1999*. New York/Oxford: OUP. p.2.

<sup>6</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> Kofi Annan (2000) *We the Peoples*. New York: United Nations. p.10.

<sup>8</sup> UNDP (1999) *Human Development Report 1999*. New York/Oxford: OUP. p.2.

<sup>9</sup> World Bank (2000) *World Development Report 2000*. p.9.

<sup>10</sup> Annan, K. *We the Peoples*. New York: United Nations. p.13.

<sup>11</sup> World Bank (2000) *World Development Report 2000*. New York: OUP. pp.3-4.

<sup>12</sup> Marchal, R. et al. (2000) *Globalization and its impact on Somalia*. Nairobi: UNDOS. p.1.

<sup>13</sup> The closure of offices of Somali remittance companies following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the US had an immediate impact on the fragile economy.

<sup>14</sup> Since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the US, Somalia has come under scrutiny as providing a possible haven for terrorist networks.



# Chapter 3



# The Private Sector and its Impact on Human Development

## Introduction

One of the major changes in the nature of the Somali state over the past decade has been the growth of the private sector. In the absence of an accepted central government, and in the context of weak and often ineffectual local governance, the private sector is playing an instrumental role in shaping development. This chapter examines the evolution of the private sector and its impact on human development.

As described in the previous chapters, since the mid-1990s there has been a boom in trade and services throughout most of Somalia. This presents a challenge to conventional aid policy, which tends to highlight the negative economic consequences of war and promote investment in areas of peace and stability. The economic impact of the war in Somalia has certainly been devastating for many people and the benefits of economic recovery are unequally distributed. However, despite the chronic insecurity and lack of administration, investments by Somalis are probably greater in Mogadishu than in other parts of the country and Mogadishu's Bakara market has remained the most important market in Somalia throughout the conflict. This raises a series of questions about the role of the private sector.

*First, how has a business class<sup>1</sup> been able to emerge from the midst of a civil war, the collapse of the formal economy and so-called 'chaos'? In wars, alternative economic systems emerge that can be sustained for a significant period, at a high social cost.*

*Second, who are the actors involved in this economic renaissance? The war forced many in the political and the economic elite into exile or to resettle in other parts of the country. However, the presence of people from the previous regime in the different Somali administrations indicates that the civil war was not so much a political revolution, but a process of social change whose impact is ambivalent.*

*Third, how should Somalia's new economy be assessed? Despite the emergence of new businesses and services, the cornerstones of the Somali economy have not radically changed. A few success stories such as telecommunications should not disguise the fact that economic activity was better in many sectors before the war. The import ban on Somali livestock by Saudi Arabia illustrates the vulnerability of Somalia's economy. While the lack of state regulation leaves Somalia freer to participate in the globalised economy, it misses out on the potential economic opportunities of globalisation.*



*Fourth, what is the relationship between the business class and the Somali administrations and what role does, or should, the business class play in governance? A weak adherence to notions of 'public goods', the 'free market' model, and the function of government are all elements in a discussion about the role of the business class in Somalia today. Despite the adoption of liberal economic policies in the late 1980s, the notion of a state-centred economy continues to influence the behaviour of Somalia's political and business classes. Views on the function of states, however, have changed. While a competent government is one that should create conditions of law and order and political stability that can facilitate economic recovery, they are no longer considered the sole agents of development or channels for foreign aid. The growth of a new business class and a civil society, however weak, potentially creates a new environment for a re-emergent Somali state.*

*Finally, what role can, and should, the business class play in shaping human development? Who is benefiting in Somalia's new economy and how are the gains from economic recovery being distributed?*

## **The Legacy of the Military Regime**

From an economic perspective, the war resembles a process of radical structural adjustment. Foreign trade has been liberalised and the exchange rate freed, national markets have been deregulated and consumer subsidies eliminated, public sector employment has virtually ended, and parastatal

enterprises have been looted or privatised. The war has created an 'enabling' environment for private sector development and the small-scale, informal sector in particular. However, state collapse did not happen suddenly, but was a long and uneven process. Many of the economic changes wrought by the civil war are rooted in the social and economic processes which took place in the 1980s and earlier<sup>2</sup>.

### **A crisis in the centrally planned economy**

Under the military regime of Siyad Barre the economy came under state control. The banking system, industry and much of the import-export trade were nationalised and the economy was centrally planned according to socialist economic policies<sup>3</sup>. Initial advances in economic performance were not sustained and by the end of the 1970s, overall economic performance was falling. Weakened by defeat in the Ogaden war against Ethiopia in 1978, the regime turned to the West for military and economic support and reluctantly endorsed the policies of the International Monetary Fund<sup>4</sup>.

The adoption of neo-liberal economic policies did not stop the regime from attempting to maintain the state's monopoly over the economy. Parastatal companies continued to receive subsidies, foreign aid was channelled through state institutions and the state remained sole arbiter in the allocation of profitable contracts. Private sector autonomy was further curtailed by political patronage, which was the easiest way to access resources controlled by the state. Following the emergence of armed opposition



groups, the autonomy of the private sector was further compromised because business people were forced to endorse the coercive policies of the regime to protect their interests.

Mass embezzlement of state resources, the use of parastatals to reward the kinsmen of the ruling elite and to finance repressive security structures<sup>5</sup>, the regime's hold over foreign aid, and its efforts to eliminate potential market rivals, have left a legacy of mistrust among the business class towards any state or government over which they have no control. Public mistrust of state-run public institutions has run deep since the collapse of the Somali Commercial and Savings Bank in 1989 due to pervasive corruption and mismanagement. Consequently, public institutions in the current administrations, which could play a role in the economy at a regulatory level, are perceived by other stakeholders to be threatening.

Despite this, there remains an expectation that certain services such as health and education should be provided by the state free of charge, with no consideration given to budgetary constraints<sup>6</sup>. The current takeover of these sectors by private enterprise is considered a temporary solution.

## The misuse of foreign aid

From independence to the civil war, the Somali state benefited from geopolitical rent in the form of development and military aid. In the 1980s, foreign development and humanitarian aid represented more than 70% of the state's resources, with Italy alone spending more than one billion US dollars between 1984

and 1987<sup>7</sup>. Foreign patronage helped to maintain the repressive state structures, which devastated parts of northeast and northwest Somalia before turning on the southern regions<sup>8</sup>. Significant amounts of money were simply embezzled, with only a muted reaction from allied foreign donors, either for geopolitical reasons or because they also profited from the mismanagement.

The legacy of this is apparent in the contemporary attitudes of some Somalis towards foreign aid. First, there is an assumption that foreign aid should be supplied without conditions. During the civil war, the way Somali factions sought to play off perceived rivalries between foreign states is analogous to Barre's use of Cold War tensions to solicit support<sup>9</sup>. Second, there is an over-inflated expectation of foreign aid that ignores the fact that aid has been diminishing throughout the last decade<sup>10</sup>. Third, lack of accountability is considered innate to foreign aid, a perception informed by the way food aid was diverted in the 1980s, the stories of political or business figures who enriched themselves on the proceeds of aid, and the activities of some local NGOs. The persistent expectation that foreign aid will pay for everything means that realistic assessment of local resources is rare.

## The informalisation of the economy

The proliferation of informal economic activities seen today in Somalia began in the 1980s and was directly linked to the privatisation of the state by the ruling elite<sup>11</sup>. Several elements of this process are significant today. First, the official economy and the 'infor-





mal' or 'parallel' economy were not separate entities. Many prominent bureaucrats or traders in the former also participated in the latter<sup>12</sup>. Second, the growth of the informal economy was linked to the insecurity in the subsistence sector, population migration, and increasing violence. Third, 'clanism' and political mobilisation were increasingly integrated with economic networks.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, urbanisation accelerated without a corresponding expansion of the labour market<sup>13</sup>. The reasons for this were complex, but included the attraction of the urban way of life, growing insecurity in the countryside, and drought. The phenomenon reshaped urban settlement and culture. As most of the migrants were from pastoral regions and relied on the safety-net of kinship in their new surroundings, urban settlement became more stratified along clan lines<sup>14</sup>. Kinship was not alien to Somali urban culture, but the function it assumed at the end of the 1980s was a consequence of political mobilisation and the workings of informal economic networks. Remittances were important in this. In the 1980s, the money remitted from migrants in the Gulf States, the USA, and Europe was significant enough to reinforce clan identity as an important asset. The volume of remittances channelled through the informal economy challenged the state and the macroeconomic policies of the IMF.

The informalisation of the economy, therefore, reinforced the importance of kinship in commercial networks as the medium of political discourse and as a social safety-net. At the same time, the develop-

ment of an informal economy involved the subversion of normal legal rules, often by the very people who should have enforced them, and a disregard for any principles that did not favour its proponents.

### **The impact of globalisation on Somali trade networks**

The informalisation of the economy created a change in commercial networks in the 1980s. The roots of this transformation were both internal and international. Internally, the growth of the informal sector and the availability of hard currency through remittances enabled traders to establish commercial relationships with regional markets where there was a long-established Somali community, again mobilising shared clan identities among other assets<sup>15</sup>. This occurred in Djibouti, Italy, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and Yemen, but the process was most marked in Dubai and the East Asian countries of Hong-Kong, Indonesia and Thailand.

The reasons for the choice of markets included the availability of cheaper commodities compared to Europe, which was important in rural Somalia where migration and foreign aid were affecting people's way of life, and the established presence of Somalis in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Yemen, and Oman. After 1991, Dubai became the offshore business centre for Somalia. Business people who had access to the banking system could open letters of credit. Others were able to mobilise Somali emigrants to gain a working knowledge of these new markets or to establish a local counterpart. International changes also affected



the structure of networks. Recession in Saudi Arabia in the mid-1980s and relaxed re-export regulations and rules on taxation enabled Dubai to become the 'super-market' of the Horn of Africa. Prior to the war Somali Airlines flew between Mogadishu and Dubai twice a week.

### **The legacy of the 1980s**

In summary, the 1980s witnessed the development of a business class whose relationship with the state was ambivalent. The relationship was at once symbiotic and antagonistic. Most practices of the business class were outside the legal framework, but protected through political patronage. At the same time, major economic actors were denied any political authority or representation in real power circles. Traders, for example, who profited from opportunities created by foreign aid and from their closeness to the ruling elite, had to accept coercive policies against the armed movements and clans that were backing them. When pushed too far they also joined the opposition.

Straddling the political and economic spheres was precarious for business people. There was a danger that the regime could use state apparatus to interfere with the market and edge out the merchants who did not support it. During the 1980s, many leading business people from the northwest and southern Somalia suffered due to the regime's policy towards the armed movements.

Finally, during the 1980s, the clan dimension of commercial networking became progressively more signif-

icant. Kinship was increasingly used to identify both the ruling elite and any opposition to it. Kinship was important for entry into urban or refugee settlements and into the informal economy. It helped frame the rules of social interaction in the urban environment where violence was a daily concern and where the state was perceived more and more as a predatory tool in the hands of the few. As kinship became paramount, other identities and associations lost ground and social meaning. Education and respect for public goods became meaningless. Educated people working as civil servants received only notional salaries that could not sustain their families, while traders with little formal education could make significant profits. Personal relationships, patronage networks, and sharp opportunism were more useful than educational qualifications, which were no longer seen as an asset.

### **The New Business Class**

In analysing the transformations in the Somali economy and the business class since 1991, it is important to be aware of several distinct periods and the differential impact of the civil war and state collapse. After 1991, the impact of the civil war was greater in southern Somalia than in the north. Between 1991 and 1992, the situation throughout Somalia was generally catastrophic. The UN intervention of 1992-1995 had an important social and economic impact in the south and it is from that period that a new business class emerged. Another group of business entrepreneurs emerged after 1998 as migrants and refugees returned from North America and Canada. It is also important to recognise that the current business

classes in southern Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland are comprised of individuals with very different backgrounds<sup>16</sup>.

### **The re-creation of a business class in Mogadishu**

The most radical changes occurred in Mogadishu in 1991. Many members of the business class, who were either linked to the former regime or were from clans not allied to the dominant clan in Mogadishu, fled the capital and the country to Kenya, Tanzania, Dubai, and Yemen. Ironically, after 1993, some of those who had fled became partners with those who had taken over their economic role inside Somalia. Others chose to stay out of the market because the war radically changed commercial practices. A common reason was that much of their capital existed in forms that could not be used as guarantees because all financial institutions had been destroyed.

Not all of the current Somali business people in Mogadishu are newcomers. In addition to those who had been members of the economic elite, other small and medium-size traders who had been involved in the informal economy seized the window of opportunity. They had a good knowledge of the market and were members of commercial networks that could access foreign countries such as Dubai, Kenya or Saudi Arabia and supply essential goods. They were also accustomed to managing risks, and their social background made them closer to the militias who could either protect or loot their assets. This social group became prominent in business, and in 2000, a significant proportion of

big business people in Mogadishu were in this category of traders.

Another noteworthy category consists of people who benefited from the looting of Somali properties and international aid. Between 1991 and 1992, figures provided by the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry indicate that there was a significant export of machines, copper, and scrap metal from Somalia<sup>17</sup>. Within this group, one could include those masquerading as local NGOs who accumulated a share of the international humanitarian aid.

Militias who spontaneously demobilised and became involved in small and medium level trade during the time of UNOSOM constitute another group. Whatever the political limitations of UNOSOM, it willingly or unwillingly offered substantial economic opportunities to new traders in Mogadishu.

There is probably a higher concentration of businesswomen in Mogadishu compared to other areas of Somalia. This group of women is also not homogeneous and ranges from petty traders to very wealthy international traders. The most powerful businesswomen obtained their capital in the 1980s. Others developed their businesses during the war.

A final group comprises people from the diaspora, who began to return to Mogadishu from 1993 onwards and considerably increased in number after 1998. They have had a significant political influence and include, for instance, those who



have established the TV networks and the FM radios in Mogadishu.

While much has been made of the importance of looting as a way of raising commercial capital, there were other means as well. Some households sold assets such as women's gold and jewellery in order to resume trading. Others sold properties, especially in 1992 and in 1995 after the departure of UNOSOM II, when the political situation was gloomy and economic needs were most acute. Remittances, however, provide the largest share of working commercial capital.

Relationships between members of the current business class are not always easy. During UNOSOM's time, for example, members of the established elite publicly criticised the new entrepreneurs who looted and destroyed national assets. The latter retorted that the plundering of the state started during Barre's time and that it was not only the President's relatives who had benefited.

### **Somaliland and the influence of Djibouti**

In Somaliland, the business class evolved differently from that in Mogadishu and its structure is less complex. From the early 1980s, as a result of SNM insurgencies, most of the big northern merchants were forced to relocate to Mogadishu where the financial infrastructure existed and where there was a lucrative internal market. The long duration of the war in the north and the centralisation of economic life in Mogadishu meant that the economy of the northwest was shaped more by external factors. These includ-

ed food aid to the refugee camps in Ethiopia, the remittance economy, and resources mobilised inside and outside the country in support of the struggle. Although not all clans living in Somaliland after 1991/92 may have equally shared nationalistic sentiments, the proclamation of independence did play a role in energising supporters to invest in the country even while it was still fragile. A similar dynamic occurred, with some differences, in Puntland after August 1998.

After 1991, Somaliland's economy revived quickly, centred on livestock export to Saudi Arabia via Jezzan. The trade benefited from the absence of state regulation. Although only minimal livestock health services were provided and no certification was available, a modus operandi was accepted by the Saudi authorities and their veterinarians. Instability between 1991 and 1992 did not prevent the continuation of livestock export. The change of regime in Ethiopia also benefited the Somaliland livestock traders.

The major changes in Somaliland's economy occurred after the 1993 Boroma Conference, which restored political stability to the region. Again, several groups of business people can be identified. After Boroma, some of the former Mogadishu-based business people who had relocated to Somaliland in 1991 began to operate in the market again. A second group of traders and business people comprises those who were able to make progress during the civil war and who became prominent in trade and livestock export. The refugee economy also provided

opportunities to new entrepreneurs, as key markets developed around major refugee camps such as Harta Sheekh in Ethiopia.

A third group comprises business people long established in Djibouti, whose clan affiliations are in Somaliland. This group, which is the biggest in terms of capital and monopoly over certain markets, was eager to develop business in Somaliland. The opportunity arose because of the downturn in the Djiboutian economy after the war between FRUD (Front pour la Restauration de la Democratie) and the Djiboutian government, and greater access to the Ethiopian market through Somaliland due to lax regulations. Their support to the administration elected at Boroma was repaid in the form of attractive tax exemptions.

A final group includes people from the diaspora who returned to Somaliland. They brought back little capital, just their energy and enthusiasm. Healthy alliances as well as competition developed between this generation of younger, better educated business people from the diaspora and the older generation who have less experience of the outside world but deep roots in the society. This was apparent in the telecommunications and livestock export sectors.

### **The Puntland business class**

The situation in Puntland differs from the other two regions in several respects. Prior to the war commercial activity was small. Historically, trade was run by small coastal clans in Bari region, while populations inland were pastoralists. Bosasso was used mainly

by traders to avoid import taxes. Investments in the region were minimal and the fishing business was not as important as it has become since 1991<sup>18</sup>.

After 1991, the situation changed radically, when people with kinship ties to the northeast fled there from the violence in Mogadishu and Kismayo. A significant number also migrated through Yemen to the US, Europe and Australia. Others, including members of the former administration and business class, settled in the region.

As in Mogadishu and Somaliland, the business class comprises several groups: traditional traders linked to the coastal economy, livestock exporters, shopkeepers in the main towns, and members of the former elite who were able to mobilise capital from relatives abroad to start some import-export trade. These groups benefited from Bosasso's competitive advantage over Berbera due to a lighter taxation regime. Commercial fishing for export has boomed, although the market is very poorly organised.

The relative stability that Puntland has enjoyed compared to southern Somalia has created new opportunities for a service economy. Bosasso port services not only the whole of Puntland but also a large part of central Somalia and even parts of Middle Shabelle and Bakol. Puntland traders have been astute in developing trade networks with Yemen and Oman where their kinsmen have been settled for generations. This proved a crucial advantage when Saudi Arabia banned the import of livestock from the Horn of Africa in February 1998.



A construction boom and the growth of urban settlements in Puntland demonstrate the importance of familial relationships and remittances, although the diaspora has not played as significant a role as it has done in Somaliland. Only a few sectors such as telecommunications and money-transfer have benefited from investment by the diaspora.

## **Characteristics of the private sector**

The current Somali business class has developed in very specific circumstances in which violence has played a structuring role. During the 1991/92 humanitarian disaster wealth, market, and the state were linked within an economy of protection and extortion and certain business people embraced the ethos of plunder. To understand its post-civil war role, certain features of the private sector should be noted.

First, the environment is too insecure to allow people to extend trust beyond strictly defined limits, normally of the family or clan. The high level of risk generates an individualistic and opportunistic ethos. This has led, in some instances, to negative business competition, such as accusations against certain companies for financing political activities.

Second, the lack of security encourages a view that a rapid turnover of goods is the key to becoming rich. This can temper the element of mistrust since business people will, in certain circumstances, share the risks to keep a business going. That is typically the case for large food or fuel imports in the south, where a shipment of a few

thousands tonnes can sometimes be shared by up to 150 traders.

A third feature of the private sector is imitation. This has both positive and negative aspects. People are eager to draw lessons from the successes of others, but take insufficient care to analyse the failures. The disasters seen in the lobster and meat export industries illustrate that only a few are prepared to invest the business capital required to meet export standards. Most entrepreneurs rush to identify where they can buy or sell, without thinking about the rules, the prices, or the sustainability of the market. Indeed, most traders do not accept that engaging in business may require investment, specific expertise, and rules and regulations. They sometimes have so little capital that extra value must be generated as quickly as possible to pay daily expenses, without affecting the capital needed for business. Many people have dropped out of the market simply because they used their money to buy and sell goods without incorporating operational costs into their prices. Training *per se* cannot solve these shortcomings because such mistakes are not due to ignorance of accounting, but the very understanding of what business is about.

## **Business and Social Structure**

The specificity of the social environment is critical to the way that business organisations are established and operate. Somalia is no exception<sup>19</sup>. The business sector can only be understood in relation to the social fabric of society and Somalia's contemporary political economy.

## **Business and kinship**

Although there are examples, such as the money transfer, airline, or livestock sectors, which have developed networks – some religious – beyond the boundaries of any clan, the workings of business are, to a significant extent, framed by the clan system. Numerous Somali proverbs express the relationship between wealth and kinship and the strong fidelity to kinship. This ethos remains constant despite the social stratification of society since independence.

***‘Nin boqol ari leh reerkiisana xoolo la’ hiyiin waa faqri’ the man who owns 100 goats, but his relatives have nothing, is poor***

The close relationship between business and kinship is evident in the way the informal economy developed in the 1980s. While the formal economy was on the verge of collapse, to outside observers daily life did not appear to be negatively affected<sup>20</sup>. The strength of the informal economy, structured along kinship lines, was the way it supported many people who migrated to urban centres. The system of remittances from migrant workers, a cornerstone of the informal economy, was dependent on trust because of the dubious legality of the practice. The whole understanding of business, tax avoidance, and building patron-client networks which were needed to keep this second economy functioning were, in one way or another, based on the mobilisation of clan loyalties. This habit is still in evidence. Many companies, including those delivering sophisticated services, initially mobilise clan sentiments as a means of building their customer base.

Security needs also explain why kinship was so closely associated with business. During the civil war, the political order was based on a fragile balance of forces between groups of clan militias responding to certain leaders. The easiest way for business people to protect their assets and business activities was to employ militia from their kinsmen. An alternative was to support a recognised clan leader with resources when needed. This might involve, for example, paying *dija* (blood money) on behalf of the clan, or sponsoring schools, mosques and sometimes MCHs, either as a way of paying *zakat*<sup>21</sup> or as direct support to kinsmen. Big traders also refer to another commercial practice, *caddeeyen ama soo caddee*, which is to supply a relative with commodities, without making any profit on the goods he sells. Another example is *ribah wadaag* (profit sharing) where goods are supplied to a relative and the profits shared. In certain strata of Somali society, pride, not money, is the most important asset, which can lead to behaviour that may seem illogical.

***‘Tol iyo fardo, tol baan doortay’ between wealth and kinship, I chose kinship***

Security needs during the civil war saw the re-emergence of the institution of *abbaan* (protector)<sup>22</sup>. During pre-colonial times, trade caravans had to secure the protection of a guardian when journeying through different and often hostile clans. He was selected for his probity, status, and strength of his lineage. Attacks on a protected caravan were considered attacks against the *abbaan* and his lineage whose honour and name could only be upheld by retaliatory action. The protector was rewarded by gifts for his services. In the



civil war, international aid organisations and smaller business people utilised this system to maintain their activities in Somalia. They were able to continue operating, not only because they were paying for a service, but also because they were considered to be under the protection of a big trader or politician of a powerful lineage.

## The market and social relations

The institution of *abbaan* illustrates that the linkage between business and clan is not a simple one. The market in Somalia is not solely structured along narrow kinship lines and the way clan identity is managed is often complex and ambiguous. The classic case of 'adoption' (*shedad*) among the Digil-Mirifle, whereby people adopt the lineage of those they settle among, is more common than is assumed<sup>23</sup>. Men will often seek to mobilise kin relations in their maternal clan, as well as those of their grandmother and wife, in order to maximise support and access to the whole of society. There are also other socialising identities besides that of clan. Assistance and support can be sought and given without consideration of kinship. Friendships among schoolmates, for example, commonly play an important role, as do relationships between former neighbours or business partners, particularly among women.

Islam also plays a major role, both between Somalis and between the Somali business community and Islamic countries. Religious associations, such as Al-Islah, Ansar-el Sunna, and Ahlu Sunna wa Jameeca, have emerged for various reasons. Some support a political agenda. Others are based on long distance

trading networks and play the role that the Muslim brotherhoods (*tariqa*, singular; *turuq*, plural) have played in other Islamic countries like Sudan, Libya, Chad and Senegal. Allegiance to different Islamic schools of thought provides an international network of contacts. However, the business sectors can also be polarised between contending religious groups, as is the case in Mogadishu's Bakara market and increasingly in Puntland. Al-Islah, whose form of Islam lies between the traditionally moderate and urbanised Islam of Somalia and the more radical Islam, has been the most influential religious association in Mogadishu. Its membership closely reflects the clan diversity of south Mogadishu with the significant involvement of certain big traders. In Puntland, the tensions between sectors of those business people belonging to the coastal clans and those belonging to major livestock herding clans of the hinterland reflect, to an extent, the competition between traditional Muslim brotherhoods and radical Islamic groups<sup>24</sup>.

In seeking to maximise market access, business people will identify counterparts in areas to which they need access and strike a deal. Telecommunications companies, airlines, and money transfer companies, among others, operate in this way. A need for business counterparts has fostered a radical change in business – in the form of 'shareholdings' – which enables people in Somalia and the diaspora to invest in their country. The largest companies in Somalia are owned by shareholders, some of whom may be non-Somalis. This approach ensures security, extends the area of intervention, and facilitates further investment. It is largely based on what is called



'contractual trust'<sup>25</sup>, where trust is the product of social obligation. Although this kind of trust is not without risk, the stakes are not limited to the individual, but the clan and its pride and reputation in the marketplace. Shareholding is increasingly common but not without problems. In particular, where company staff and shareholders are the same, any disagreement can wreck the company.

### **Social regulation of the market**

The Somali economy does not operate on the basis of a totally free market. In the absence of a state, other forces including kinship, security, and violence play a role in regulating the market. Business people do not all belong to the most powerful clans, neither do they all have equal access to the market. However, those from unarmed or less powerful clans do have higher transaction costs because they are dependent on others for the protection of their business and their life. They are therefore unlikely to gain the most lucrative contracts (especially those related to foreign aid) unless they are acting as a front for others who can provide protection.

As business prestige does not differ greatly from clan prestige, the concept of 'competition' is also specific to Somali society. In Somaliland, because of the stratification of the business class and, in some cases, the close link between the biggest traders and the Somaliland administration, monopolistic practices restrict competition. This was seen in the food market when Djiboutian traders tried to show their complete dominance. It also occurred briefly in the telecommunications sector in 1998. In the south and in Puntland

there is less polarisation between the very rich business people and others, so competition is more open. Nevertheless, this does not stop some business people from provoking security incidents to slow down the delivery of certain goods and keep commodity prices high.

## **The Business Class and the Factions**

Although much analysis of the Somali crisis has focussed on the warlords and the factions, it is important to recognise that they are the products of a specific crisis and a specific form of social mobilisation structured by kinship. Neither political parties nor 'Mafiosi', the warlords in the early 1990s, represented an attempt to reshape the social relationships and the society of which they were a product. They were able to function as long as their clan supported them. However, they shared with the former ruling elite a common vision of administering the country through centralised control<sup>26</sup>.

As many Somalis have argued, the civil war was not a political revolution because people who held high positions in the former regime are still prominent in politics. However, a process of social transformation has occurred. Political power and business opportunities were reshaped by the war. Under the Barre regime, businesses and political positions were allocated to sections of certain clans that were often the most urbanised, a phenomena that has roots in the colonial administrations. The more urbanised sub-clans had fewer fighters than their nomadic counter-



parts, so one result of the civil war was a shift in political and economic power between and within clans.

Business people supported factions for reasons that often appeared contradictory. Initially, they feared that a new state would not be amenable to them, unless controlled by factions they supported. Once the war began to dissipate they continued to finance the faction leaders because of the clan support they drew. While reluctant to participate in politics that might damage their business interests, they could not afford to antagonise the clan and go against its political stance; supporting the clan is never illegitimate even when the clan is wrong. Similarly, there were limits to the claims faction leaders could make on businesses. The situation in the south and north evolved differently.

### **Business and politics in Mogadishu**

The stakes have always been very high in the south because Mogadishu is perceived by the leading factions as the core of Somali sovereignty. In the 1990s, the two main Mogadishu factions and their administrations initially received support from their associated business people. Both failed, however, to provide an effective administration in the territory they claimed to control, or to build a police or military force that could have provided security for businesses and access to markets. Their one success was to establish a loose system of taxation on the import-export trade and to establish alternative international outlets to Mogadishu seaport and airport. The main function of so-called 'ministers' and high-ranking civil servants

in the cabinets was to use their positions to provide tax exemption to business people of their clans in return for financial support. This practice, and the consensus within clans on their stake in the factions, was instrumental in building common agendas between the political and economic elites. The bond between faction leaders and business people, however, was fragile. Business people who invested in the administrations lost huge amounts of money and this resulted in a growing disregard for the authority of the faction leaders. The failure of the Banadir Administration in 1999 signalled an end to that relationship, although even before this the business class was developing alternative strategies.

Islamic Courts provided one such alternative. The purpose of the first courts established in north Mogadishu in 1994 was to counter increasing banditry. Because of the increasing cost of security, business people supported the courts to ensure that they and their customers had access to local markets. This experiment in Islamic justice collapsed in 1997 after the signing of the Sodere agreement<sup>27</sup>. Faction leaders, business people, and Ethiopia who had sponsored Sodere, had become concerned at the growing economic and political power of the courts. The subsequent divisions that developed along clan lines were endorsed by business people who were unable to agree on the management of El Ma'an port in north Mogadishu, thus providing the opportunity for the establishment of a new port at Gezira in south Mogadishu. Despite attempts to resolve these issues, Islamic Courts have not been able to resume functions in north Mogadishu.

The experience of Islamic Courts in south Mogadishu has been different. The business class there is more mixed and the political experience has been more complex. Acting through associations like Al-Islah, the business sector took the lead in creating Islamic Courts in the south, although religious groupings, elders, and ordinary people were also involved. Business people from Mogadishu, Nairobi, and Dubai contributed financially. Initially the Islamic Courts were clan-based and although their efforts are coordinated they are not fully integrated and differences can erupt into violence. The court militia, who are essentially the same as those who used to disrupt the markets, are paid and guided by religious officers.

Learning lessons from the experience of north Mogadishu, *xudduud* (*shari'a* penalties) is not practised and religious leaders have been careful to conceal any political ambitions. Financing from business people influences their activities. For example, they cleared roadblocks from the Mogadishu-Merka road in 1999 to allow goods imported through Merka to move unhindered. This commercial agenda also encouraged them to enter dialogue with the RRA after they had captured Baidoa. The failure of the court in Merka to ensure the security of international NGOs led traders to threaten to stop funding the courts. The business community needs security in Merka because of the port and because of lucrative contracts with international aid agencies.

It would be wrong to conclude from this, however, that the Mogadishu business class is now tackling matters of public good. The business people who

finance the Islamic Courts also sponsored the Somali National Peace Conference, and after the TNG was formed, the same people imported billions of new Somali banknotes into Mogadishu, which destroyed the livelihoods of the poorest people. Whatever the need may have been for new banknotes after ten years of civil war<sup>28</sup>, the importation of billions of Somali shillings was motivated by financial gain, rather than the well-being of the common people or the improved functioning of the economy.

The sudden political activism of the business community can also be attributed not only to the failure of the factions to deliver a credible government and services, but also the need for a secure investment environment. Since 1998, a significant number of the diaspora have returned to Mogadishu. Business people there are interested in increasing investments, restarting the industries that existed before the war, and attracting foreign contacts and expertise. This positive investment mood, encouraged by successes such as the telecommunications sector, requires a secure environment, which may explain business people's support to the Djibouti process. Ambiguities remain, however, such as the private sector's control over public goods and national assets such as ports. This illustrates that the business class have some way to go before they acquire a consciousness of their potential social role.

### **Business and politics in Somaliland and Puntland**

Somaliland and Puntland share common features



concerning policies on the public and private sectors. Both express a public commitment to a free-market economy, although the implications of this for governing structures and policies are not spelled out.

Under the Barre regime there was, as noted, a strong link between the regime and the business community. In Somaliland and Puntland, a relationship of co-dependency between the business class and the administration has been recreated. In 1993, business people in Somaliland loaned the new Egal administration US \$7 million. This has since been repaid with 2-3% interest through tax exemptions. The administrations provide access to patronage networks, while ministerial and civil servant salaries are so low that the only way to survive is to bargain for favours with the business class. Tax exemptions or delays in payment are the norm, even though the social impact of this may be negative. Furthermore, cadres of the former regime are represented in the administrations. Ministers who have a clear understanding of their mandate are so overburdened by clan duties that the establishment of new 'sets of rules' will take a long time to put in place.

In both regions, as in other African countries, the taxation system is based mostly on import-export activities, with seaports and airports providing the main contributions to the administrations' budget. This indicates that internal market and fiscal policies are only loosely enforced, as was the case under the former government. In addition, as in the past, public investment in social services is limited, other than that undertaken by foreign assistance. The relationship

between the private and public realms is ambiguous and neither the private sector, whose collective behaviour is structured by short-term opportunism, nor the politicians have a clear vision of how it should be restructured. For example, the Somaliland Chamber of Commerce was set up as a state-managed institution. Its membership improved when external support encouraged a more positive attitude towards the institution. Interest may again dissipate if donor support is stopped, although the leverage that its top members have over licensing may be sufficient to keep it going. A similar dynamic is taking place in Puntland, even though at the beginning the Chamber was more of a private initiative.

Both administrations are keen to participate in the market. In Somaliland in 1999, the Ministry of Telecommunications tried to connect the telecommunications companies through a company to be set up by the Ministry itself. Similarly, the Somaliland and Puntland administrations have sought to bring electricity production and distribution in Hargeisa and Bosasso under their control. Regarding financial services, the administrations have set up central banks whose single function is to act as the Treasury for government. The Central Bank of Somaliland has sought to prohibit money transfer companies from opening customer accounts in order to retain control over this sector. There is a case for regulating private sector enterprises like telecommunications in order to control price fixing. An argument can also be made for the administrations to bring some public assets back under public control. In most countries, governments retain some control over some public goods. In these



cases, however, there is the question of whether the Somaliland and Puntland administrations are acting as regulatory bodies or as competitors against companies who may have greater public trust.

This situation should raise particular concern when foreign companies are involved. The Somaliland and Puntland administrations have devoted a great deal of effort to attract foreign companies to their territories, such as TOTAL in Somaliland and the Hart Group in Puntland. Similarly, in Mogadishu, the TNG has signed deals with foreign oil and construction companies. There has, however, been a lack of public transparency in the deals. Discussions over privatising the management of Berbera port and the main airports, for example, have not involved public tenders open to local and international companies. In Puntland, the agreement between the administration and the British company Hart Group<sup>29</sup> to protect the sovereignty of Somali waters in this region has not been open to parliamentary debate or public scrutiny. Foreign private investment would certainly boost development and encourage a more positive stance among foreign donors. TOTAL's operation in Somalia has created an effective price structure for oil products and has generated substantial income. However, the Somali business class rightly expresses concern that competition should be more open.

The trend, therefore, seems to be towards the growing involvement of these public administrations in the market. What is striking is what they do not bring – rules and regulations. Foreign investment laws are

still not formulated, although there is little point in tackling these technical issues if only lip service is paid to the rule of law. Their interests appear to be more in the taking-over of a profitable activity. Where a foreign company is involved, the stakes are much higher. Such behaviour will continue until aid agencies develop clear policies on what should be done in the absence of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

## **The Business Sector in Shaping Human Development**

Civil society in the former Somalia was almost non-existent. Social groups that could have emerged as autonomous stakeholders in the political and economic arenas were kept under the control of patron-client networks rooted in the state apparatus. The business class is a good example of this. Its dependence on the state for major contracts and opportunities meant that it could not claim to be part of civil society<sup>30</sup>. Business people and politicians were promoted because they were the partners of officials who were too well known to appear in business circles, rather than for their business skills. Using the same set of criteria, they could be arrested, jailed, and bankrupted. Business organisations like the Chamber of Commerce were used by the state to promote its clients. The only way to survive and increase one's share of the market was through political patronage.

The role of the business sector has changed through



the civil war. There is a greater consciousness among Somalis about the role that the private sector could play in generating economic prosperity and supporting social services in a more stable setting. This is clear from the way investments are no longer constrained by 'political' or 'clan' boundaries. Some business people from the south have invested in Somaliland and Puntland. The emergence of the Islamic Courts in Mogadishu indicates that some sections of the business community may be prepared to play a more formative social role if politicians prove ineffective.

The situation, however, remains far from ideal. Four issues are paramount in promoting economic prosperity and job creation. The first is the need for the business community to be autonomous from other stakeholders. Second is the difficult question of representation. Third is the regulation of the market and offering a sense of justice, both in terms of allocation of resources and in the sense of a legal operational framework. Fourth is the need for social responsibility among the business class; one that enables Somalis to participate in the private sector and that manages public goods for the good of the population in the absence of an effective government.

## The need for autonomy

A key issue is for business people to behave like business people rather than politicians, elders or warlords. Of course, this is complex given the operating environment.

Kinship is, of course, a key issue and although fac-

tions have been weakened, they are still able to create crises of security, in which business interests are of secondary concern. The involvement of some business people in the capture of Kismayo is an example. Although the administrations in Somaliland and Puntland use more benign tactics, favours are granted or problems created because of the links between public and private interests.

The Arta peace conference was interesting in this respect. On the one hand, it reflected the desire of business people for a normalisation of the situation and the establishment of a government, which would enable co-operation with foreign companies, and a legal system to guarantee more substantial investments. On the other hand, many prominent traders and business people crossed over and became politicians and MPs, while others played kingmakers. While it is positive that business people are members of the body of national representatives, there are potential conflicts of interests that may arise from their continued business activities. It is easy to criticise the administrations for lack of transparency and inefficiency, while many business people themselves are eager to re-create the former conditions of dependency. To promote autonomy requires policies directed at both the state and the business people.

## The question of representation

As in any other sector of Somali society, representation is a key issue. Currently, there are three different kinds of business groupings. The first are the Chambers of Commerce established in Somaliland and Puntland. Although the conditions under which



they were established were different, there is a common concern about their ability to operate independent of foreign support. Furthermore, capital-city businesses are over-represented in the Chambers compared to those from other areas.

A second group is the Somali Business Council established in Dubai in May 2000 by a group of 60 businesspersons. This was the outcome of a two-year UNDP programme. One may surmise that its success will be linked to the outcome of the Djibouti Conference, because although officially neutral, many of its members supported the Djibouti initiative. This association intends to become an official counterpart to institutions in the UAE and, if a national government is re-established, it may decide to appoint its own counterpart.

A third group is the Somali Telecommunications Association, also based in Dubai, which is the recognised counterpart of ITU. This organisation has produced other associations in Hargeisa and Mogadishu. A fourth example is the Somali Professional Veterinary Association.

These associations may be the most suitable for the current conditions in the former Somalia. They allow identification and selection of potential members and their agenda is focussed on specific problems. Operationally, however, things may not be simple. For instance, the decision of the European Commission to accept the certification of bananas by sound regional Chambers of Commerce encouraged banana producers to set

up an association. The group, however, failed to address the basic issues of transparency, non-political orientation, and accountability, thus illustrating the difficulties in establishing sound organisations without adequate preparatory work and a clear agenda. A move made by meat exporters in Mogadishu and Galkaiyo gives more hope for a successful outcome.

### **The market and regulation**

Aid interventions in the private sector have different objectives. One may be to promote economic recovery by working with people who are more accountable than warlords or faction leaders. Economic growth can help job creation, which may ease social tensions at the root of armed conflict, although uneven or inequitable growth can also have the opposite effect.

A second objective may concern the building of new social regulations in a post-war economy. Many usual functions of the state cannot be fulfilled by the current administrations and will not be for a long time to come. Nevertheless rules and regulations are necessary for Somali traders to have access to international markets and to give internal growth more coherence. Some of those rules may have a positive impact on governance.

Certification for livestock, meat, or fruit is a good example of one of the problems faced by the new Somali economy. While Somali businesses have used every opportunity to escape procedures ordinarily required for exports, certification is an interna-



tional requirement and non-compliance can stop any lucrative business. The ban on Somali livestock imports in 1998 and 2000 is a clear example.

The ease with which the Somali business class will comply with international standards will vary in different sectors of the economy. Telecommunications cannot exist without compliance with international rules, while airlines have been able to do so since the international liberalisation of this sector at the beginning of the 1990s and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The livestock sector is a more complex situation with different standards related to commercial interests. Brazil and Australia have been trying to establish rules that Somali traders will not be able to meet for decades. At the same time, custom offices in some neighbouring countries have proven flexible, whatever the official health requirements are.

Respect for internationally recognised standards is not only a necessary condition for maintaining exports. These rules can have positive side effects for the development of a civil society, such as the institutionalisation of corporate interests. The acknowledgement of certain international regulations may provide a way for people to protect or express their common interests across clan or political lines. A sound economy produces more than wealth; it also produces the rules of competition and structures for different markets. In the current situation such regulations, though marginal in the social realm, can bring some normalcy and provide a way to establish collective aims and a collective demand for security as a condition for an effective functioning market.

### **The need for social responsibility**

A vibrant business sector can promote human development in various ways. A prosperous economy generates job opportunities and tax revenues generated by business can be invested in social services. This however requires an effective administration, with the capacity to enforce laws, collect taxes, and monitor and regulate the activities of the private sector.

For business, the benefits to be gained from a prosperous society can explain the current interests of the business class in political stability. The business class has a stake in a society that offers skilled labour, law and order, credit schemes and low transaction costs. Furthermore, the private sector currently has a central role in the provision of public goods, as public revenue from business taxes or personal income is insufficient to support these. The provision of public goods requires social cooperation, and it has been argued that there are powerful economic incentives for greater social cooperation, such as through trade<sup>31</sup>. Although interstate trade is a critical component of the private sector, the domestic market is likely to play an increasingly significant role. However, while sections of the business class may see benefits in stability and economic growth, in a weak state and in the absence of effective public institutions, economic incentives for sustaining instability may persist. As such, the private sector has a key role in determining the future prospects for peace and development in Somalia. ■



## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> The term 'class' is used here loosely to mean group, although it does not have a consciousness as a specific and autonomous group within Somali society.
- <sup>2</sup> This continuity with the past is not uncommon in revolutions. See Skocpol, T (1998) *States and Social revolutions: a comparative analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge: CUP.
- <sup>3</sup> Samatar, A. (1988) *Socialist Somalia; Rhetoric and reality*. London: Zed Press.
- <sup>4</sup> Tommasoli, M. (1992, December) 'Aggiustamento strutturale e sviluppo in Somalia: il negoziato con le istituzioni finanziarie internazionali', *Africa (Rome)*, vol.XLVII, no.4.
- <sup>5</sup> Ekstrom, C. (1993) 'Budgetary chaos and evasion: the case of Somalia', *International Journal of Public Administration*, vol.16, no.7.
- <sup>6</sup> The Interim Charter adopted by the Djibouti Conference promises free education up to the secondary level and other social services for the next three years, regardless of the scarcity of financial and human resources.
- <sup>7</sup> Rawson, D. (1993), *The Somali State and foreign aid*, Washington, Foreign Service Institute, 1993; Maren, M. (1993) *The road to hell; the ravaging effects of foreign aid and international charity*. New York: Free Press; del Boca, A. (1993) *Una sconfitta dell'intelligenza: Italia e Somalia*, Rome & Bari, Giuseppe Laterza & Figli Spa.
- <sup>8</sup> For background information on the Somali armed opposition fronts up to 1991, refer to Markakis, J. (1987) *National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa*, Cambridge: CUP; Compagnon, D. (1998) 'The Somali armed opposition fronts' in Clapham, C. *African guerrillas*, London, James Currey; Marchal, R. & Messiant, C. (1997) *Les Chemins de la guerre et de la paix*. Paris: Karthala.
- <sup>9</sup> For example, throughout the summer crisis of 1993 Somalis in Mogadishu were debating the 'war' between the USA and Europe, since French and Italian blue helmets differed in their behaviour from their American colleagues.
- <sup>10</sup> This attitude is apparent in Mogadishu in the ransom demands made for kidnapped foreign workers. In late July 2000 \$200,000 was demanded as ransom for the release of two kidnapped aid workers.
- <sup>11</sup> A similar process has been described by W. Reno in Sierra Leone and J. MacGaffey in Zaire.
- <sup>12</sup> For an overview and reference, see Meagher, K. 'Crisis, informalisation and the urban informal sector in Sub-Sahara Africa', *Development and Change*, vol.26, no.1, 1995. Roitman, J. 'The politics of informal markets in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol.28, no.4, 1990. Pedersen P. Ove & McCormick, D. 'African business systems in a globalising world', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 7, no.1, 1999.
- <sup>13</sup> Mogadishu had 223,000 inhabitants in 1970, around 1 million in 1980 and slightly less than 2 million in 1990.
- <sup>14</sup> Aboagye, A. (1998) *The informal sector in Mogadishu: an analysis of the survey*. Addis Ababa: ILO/JASPA.
- <sup>15</sup> Some authors emphasise the notion of the 'global tribe' to underline the ethnic feeling in the transnational trade. See Kotkin, J. (1993) *Global Tribes. How race, religion and identity determine success in the new global economy*. New York: Random House.
- <sup>16</sup> Marchal, R. (1996, September) *The Somali post-civil war business class*, Nairobi: EC/Somali Unit. See also War-Torn Societies Project notes on Puntland.
- <sup>17</sup> Data are accessible on its website: [www.dcci.org](http://www.dcci.org).
- <sup>18</sup> In 1997, fish products represented around one third of all Somali exports to the European Union. Pre-war, foreign sub-contractors were bigger players than Somalis. See [www.intracen.org](http://www.intracen.org) for data.
- <sup>19</sup> Evans, P. (1995) *Embedded autonomy, States and industrial organisations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- <sup>20</sup> Jamal, V. (1988) 'Somalia: understanding of an unconventional economy', *Development and change*, vol.19.
- <sup>21</sup> Often referred to as a 'poor tax', the payment of *zakat* is the fourth pillar of Islam and one of the duties of a Muslim. Traders should pay 2.5% of their net profits. It can also be paid in livestock or grains. One telecommunication and money-transfer company is said to have paid several hundred of thousands of dollars in Mogadishu in 1999.
- <sup>22</sup> Early references to abbaan are made by Ibn Battuta. Hamdun, S. & King, N. (1995) *Ibn Battuta in Black Africa*, New York, Marcus Wiener Publisher. See also. Guillain, C. (1856) *Documents sur l'histoire, la geographie, le commerce de l'Afrique orientale*. Paris: Arthur Bertrand. A synthesis is provided by I. Lewis in the case of Somaliland: 'Lineage continuity and commerce in northern Somalia' in Lewis, I. (1994) *Blood and Bone*. Trenton: Red Sea Press.
- <sup>23</sup> Luling, V. (1991) *The structure of the southern Somali tribes*, London, PhD. D. University of London. Cassanelli, L. (1982) *The shaping of the Somali society 1600-1900*. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press. See also the works of B. Helander.
- <sup>24</sup> Business people identifying with the traditional *tariqa* such as Qadiriyya can be viewed as supporters of the current administration which favours moderate Islamic behaviour and is opposed to business people supporting reformists like the Wahabites of Ansar-el Sunna or Al-AI Itixaad al Islam.
- <sup>25</sup> As distinguished from 'competence trust' or 'goodwill trust'. Contractual trust assumes that the businessperson will act honourably, Competence trust that the businessperson has sufficient technical and organisational capacity and capital or credit worthiness to fulfil his obligation, and Goodwill trust is the mutual expectation of an open commitment. See: Williamson, O. (1985) *The economic institutions of capitalism: firms, markets, relational contracting*, New York: Free Press. Gambetta, D. (1988) (ed) *Trust: making and breaking cooperative relations*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- <sup>26</sup> Marchal, R. (2000, September) 'Etude d'une gouvernmentalité somalienne: les ordres de Mogadiscio dans la guerre civile'. *Les Etudes du CERI*. Paris.
- <sup>27</sup> The Sodere reconciliation conference was sponsored by Ethiopia.
- <sup>28</sup> Del Buono, M. & Mubarak, J. (1999), *A conceptual understanding of the Somali economy*, Nairobi: UNDOCS.
- <sup>29</sup> An off-shoot of the securities firm Sandline.
- <sup>30</sup> Kasfir, N. (1998) 'The Conventional Notion of Civil Society: A Critique', in Kasfir N. (ed), *Civil Society and Democracy in Africa*. London: Frank Cass.
- <sup>31</sup> Olson, M. (2000) *Power and prosperity: outgrowing communist and capitalist dictatorships*. New York: Basic Books.



# Chapter 4



# Human Rights and Governance

## Introduction

In 1992, Amnesty International described the civil war and the famine in Somalia as a 'human rights disaster'<sup>1</sup>. Famine, it argued, was not the result of climatic factors and a deficit in food production, but was the consequence of long-term political processes and a civil war in which humanitarian and human rights norms were systematically violated.

Lasting progress in human development depends on protecting and advancing the human rights of all Somalis and changes in the human rights environment is an indicator of the political, social, and economic transformations taking place in Somalia. This chapter examines the changing relationship between human rights, governance, and human development in Somalia. It takes a definition of human rights that encompasses both civil and political rights and social, economic, and cultural rights (see box 4.1).

In Somalia, the advancement of human rights is closely linked to the history of the state. European colonial rule established bureaucratic systems of legal justice, while at the same time subjecting Somali people to land expropriation and forced labour. At independence, the Somali government accepted the state's responsibility for the protection

### Box 4.1: Human Rights

Respect for others and notions of equality and responsibility are inherent in all societies and all societies have arrangements for social protection. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was the first expression of a universal definition of human rights. This defines human rights as rights inherent to the person and that belong equally to all human beings regardless of their race, colour, sex, language, religion, political opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status. Human rights are considered natural and cannot be granted or taken away by the state or any person.

Since 1948 the international community has developed a comprehensive legal framework for the protection and promotion of human rights. Together the UDHR, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights constitute the International Bill of Rights. These covenants give the state the duty to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil all human rights. States party to these covenants voluntarily accept the obligation to implement their provisions.

For UNDP, the fundamental principles of human rights are commensurate with human development. Although the movements for human rights and development have distinct traditions, human rights and development are increasingly conceived as having a common purpose, giving rise to the 'rights-based' approaches to development adopted by NGOs, multi-lateral organisations, and donor governments. The declaration of the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights concluded that *'the right to development is an inalienable human right and part of fundamental*

and realisation of the rights of its citizens by adopting the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The military coup d'état in 1969, however, ushered in 21 years of autocratic rule, in which the



state became the main violator of human rights. The struggle for human rights was often cited as one of the motivations for the war against the regime, but when the regime fell, state repression was replaced by a civil war in southern Somalia in which strategies for establishing control over resources, institutions and people violated basic human rights.

and the challenges to Somali administrations and the international community in protecting human rights and securing justice.

## The human rights framework in Somalia

In September 2000, the TNG re-occupied Somalia's seat at the United Nations Assembly. The UN was founded on a commitment by its member states to uphold respect for human rights for all. Somali administrations claiming territorial control should, therefore, recognise the commitment of UN members to uphold human rights and the obligations set out in international covenants.

### Box 4.2: International Human Rights Instruments Ratified by Somalia

- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its First Optional Protocol
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
- Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

#### Fundamental Labour Rights Conventions

- Convention on the Elimination of Forced and Compulsory Labour
- Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation

#### 1949 Geneva Conventions (signatory 1962)

In the decade that Somalia has been without an accepted national government, human rights have been elevated in international and domestic relations as a measure of 'good governance'<sup>2</sup>. A good government by this measure is one that demonstrates a commitment to human rights and the rule of law. However, changing international practice and notions of government mean that governments are no longer viewed as the sole 'duty-bearers' of human rights. In Somalia, a fragmented authority, a deregulated economy, and an active civil society raise questions about where the responsibility for the protection of human rights lies. The chapter examines the social arrangements that exist to protect human rights in Somalia

In Somalia, human rights are protected by a range of local customs and norms and by international human rights instruments ratified by past governments (see box 4.2). The various constitutions and governance charters of the Somali administrations reaffirm a commitment to these instruments. In 1997, however, the UN Independent Expert on Human Rights for Somalia concluded that international humanitarian law, as defined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, was applicable in Somalia in the absence of a government and until a peaceful settlement was reached<sup>3</sup>. This finding is important for defining the responsibilities of the Somali authorities and the international community to all Somalis.



## Human Rights and the Somali State

### Colonial rule

In Somalia, current patterns of development and human rights reflect the historical processes of state formation, marginalisation, and exploitation. The development of the modern Somali State was not a peaceful process. The European colonisation of Somalia and the Horn of Africa involved periods of warfare between the colonialists and darawish forces of Sayid Mohamed Abdulla Hassan and between Britain and Italy during World War II. The colonial expropriation of land for commercial purposes, labour conscription and the introduction of tied labour systems had a profound impact on social organisation and production in southern Somalia<sup>4</sup>. Politically, the colonial administrations altered customary authority, parcelled out territory with little regard to indigenous rights, and introduced Western judicial systems that affected indigenous systems of customary law and dispute resolution. The centralisation of authority in the state involved investment in law and order agencies to protect state interests, including 'public order' laws to control the population. Economically, colonial state formation created a 'national' economy and Somalia's unequal incorporation into an expanding global market led to new internal inequalities of wealth<sup>5</sup>.

### Independence

In 1960, the government of the newly independent Somali Republic accepted the responsibilities of

statehood towards its citizens. Upon taking its seat at the United Nations, the UDHR was incorporated into the Republic's constitution and in 1962 it became a signatory to the Geneva Conventions.

During the nine years of democratic rule the human rights record of the civilian government was generally good. The legacy of that period on human rights in contemporary Somalia is apparent in several ways, however. First, the centralising tendency of state bureaucracy and the growth of an urban elite established a process of inequitable development. Second, the control established by ethnic Somalis over the postcolonial state served to marginalise non-Somalis<sup>6</sup>. Third, the incomplete integration of different judicial systems inherited from colonial administrations impacted on the administration of law. Fourth, from its foundation, the Somali State was heavily dependent on foreign aid. As this aid declined in the late 1980s, political and economic competition among the elite was turned inwards over Somalia's local resources.

### Human rights suspended

The military take-over in October 1969 was to produce one of the most repressive regimes in Africa. With a vision to transform the Republic into a modern socialist state, the first charter of the 'revolution' articulated the central role of the state in society, elevated social and economic rights, guaranteed the right to work and social justice, and promoted popular participation in development. The reality was somewhat different, as the vision also involved a suspension of civil and polit-



ical rights, institutionalised through legal reforms and repressive state security.

On taking power the military suspended the 1960 constitution, political parties were banned, and members of the former government were detained without trial. Labour associations and civil and professional associations came under party control and independent non-governmental forms of civil association were proscribed. A strongly censored media controlled the freedom of political and cultural expression.

The army became the most powerful institution in the country, with military personnel taking over government posts. National security structures were created to control the population. Legislation established the military's legal control over state affairs. Particularly notorious was Law No. 54 of September 1970 of the National Security Law, which defined twenty-six acts considered detrimental to the maintenance of peace and order, twenty of which were made capital offences, including that of spreading 'rumours' (*afminshar*)<sup>7</sup>. Such offences were tried by a National Security Court whose procedures violated international treaties to which Somalia was a signatory. The torture of political prisoners and their relatives and extra-judicial executions were commonplace.

When defeat in the Ogaden war with Ethiopia threw the Somali Democratic Republic into a Cold War alliance with the West, the regime came under pressure to liberalise. The introduction of a new

constitution in 1979, elections and the official ending of military rule did little, however, to improve civil and political liberties. With military hardware provided by the Soviet Union and the US, the regime responded to the SSDF and SNM insurgencies in the late 1970s and 1980s with civilian killings, forced displacement, asset stripping, destruction of water reservoirs, and the planting of landmines<sup>8</sup>.

According to the Somali scholar Said Samatar, by the end of the 1980s a serious disjuncture had emerged between the moral and coercive authority of the Somali state<sup>9</sup>. With strategic interests in Africa declining, human rights abuses provided a justification for the West to freeze aid to Somalia, a move that both weakened the government and served to internalise the political and economic crisis.

## **Development and conflict**

Conventional explanations of the Somali war and famine have tended to highlight the fragmentary nature of clanism, the unsustainability of Somalia's rural economy, or environmental stress. While the war took the form of an inter-clan struggle, underlying it were the long-term processes of marginalisation and exploitation and, as described in chapter 3, a struggle among an elite over the state and its productive assets. Supported by international aid, the 'development' trajectory in Somalia prior to the war was one of increasing inequalities between a largely urban elite and a rural and urban underclass<sup>10</sup>.

On taking power, the Barre regime had embarked



on an ambitious development programme to modernise the country. Socio-economic rights to employment and education were guaranteed by the state and equitable access to productive resources ensured through the nationalisation of land. Legal reform also afforded women greater equality before the law. The reality, again, was somewhat different.

State interventions in the rural sector proved disastrous. During the 1970s, the country slid from self-sufficiency in grain production to a food import dependency. In the pastoral sector, policies aimed at transforming an 'archaic' nomadic way-of-life to a more sedentary one, by providing preferential rights to grazing lands to herding cooperatives and encouraging sedentary agriculture, served to encourage the spread of enclosures, restrict the movement of pastoralists, and undermine livestock production. While economic deregulation and structural reforms agreed with the IMF in the 1980s led to a substantial improvement in grain production (particularly maize), these policy reforms only served to increase social inequalities. A liberalisation of land tenure caused land prices to rise. The main beneficiaries were state bureaucrats and military officers, who had preferential access to land. The losers were pastoral nomads and small-scale farmers, who constituted the majority of the population.

As power relations are partially based on 'the ability to acquire and allocate the means of subsistence'<sup>11</sup>, clanism and clientelism became a key source of political and economic power and security. Those allied to the government gained preferential treatment. Some

41% of planned investments in the 1987-1989 development budgets were allocated to Mogadishu and 81% of the remainder to five favoured regions in the south and northeast<sup>12</sup>. The northwest region, which accounted for the largest share of the country's export earnings, saw little of this return as development investment. Mogadishu grew, while rural infrastructure and services deteriorated.

As noted in chapter 1, by the late 1980s, the Somali economy was in serious decline, a consequence of the slump in the livestock export trade, increasing internal strife, and bad economic management. Early achievements in raising literacy levels and improving educational and health standards were not sustained. The oil slump in the 1980s meant that remittances also began to decline. Coupled with diminishing external assistance, the appropriation of national assets such as land and water by individuals and the state became commonplace. Land in particular became a focus for conflict.

### **Land and war**

Land was a critical issue in the war and is a key human development issue. State formation in Somalia was linked to the transformation of rural production from semi-subsistence to a commercially oriented mode of production. In southern Somalia, this involved the alienation of land from rural producers by force and administrative fiat. The precedent for this was established during the colonial period, when land along the Shabelle and Juba rivers was confiscated for banana plantations, and was continued post-independence by urban elites.



The pace of alienation increased after the 1975 land reform law, the industrialisation of agricultural production in the 1970s and 1980s, and with economic liberalisation and decline in the 1980s.

The 1975 land reform legislation, which placed all land under state control, effectively annulled collective customary land tenure and legalised individual leasehold ownership, undermining the tenure rights of indigenous smallholder farmers. The result was a new class of landowners, including local elders, members of the regime, and richer families with urban connections, who had privileged access to the means for land registration<sup>13</sup>. Land reform enabled the government to take land for national projects, including the resettlement of drought-displaced pastoralists and refugees from the Ogaden war. Land reform also affected the complex land-use system of smallholder farmers and pastoralists.

Some of the largest land alienation took place in the Juba valley, where three major state projects together expropriated over 17,000 hectares of land. The politically marginalised Gosha people of that area were too weak to resist<sup>14</sup>. With substantial international investment, the state farms operated on a feudal-style relationship with villages whose land had been expropriated. Women and children's labour was heavily exploited. As noted in chapter 3, such projects, which were intended to assist Somalia overcome dependency on foreign food imports, became 'rental havens' for privileged and politically powerful state officials<sup>15</sup>. State modernisation development policies were anti-develop-

mental in their impact, reducing access to resources by local producers, undermining food security, and increasing inequality (see box 4.3)<sup>16</sup>.

#### Box 4.3: The Violence of Development

"Under the guise of development, and with international assistance, powerful political-military interests expropriated the resources of weak minority farming communities in the lower Juba, de-legitimised their rights to land by terming them 'squatters' and dehumanised them by treating them as little more than 'labour inputs', rather than as *bona fide* communities and partners in development. With the onset of civil war and famine, the pattern of parasitism continued as these same power brokers diverted and looted relief aid intended for starving Gosha villagers and forcibly conscripted them to work on their private farms. In both pre-war and civil war Somalia, indifference to the fate of minority farming communities has marked the political and economic behaviour of Somali leaders, power brokers, and their militias."

In the 1980s, as the value of land increased, forcible land acquisition became common practice under the military regime. This reached new heights in the civil war, when Somalia's productive resources became the battleground for warring factions<sup>17</sup>. The chief losers were the politically weak smallholder farmers and pastoralists. Having lost rights and control over resources, and lacking sufficient military and political strength, tens of thousands of farmers and herders in southern Somalia were forcibly displaced. Their coping strategies undermined, they were amongst the foremost victims of the civil war, dying in disproportionate numbers during the 1991/92 famine<sup>18</sup>. It has been argued that the aggressive expansion into southern agricultural areas by pastoral clans during the war was an extension of a process that began with the mass expropriation of land by powerful Mogadishu-based military and political figures in the 1970s and 1980s<sup>19</sup>.





Such state violence went unreported and unchallenged outside the country<sup>20</sup>. Development projects such as the proposed Bardheere dam amounted to little more than 'strategic rent' from the West, intended to wean Somalia away from the Soviet Union<sup>21</sup>. International concerns for human rights in the 1980s were mostly confined to the protection of refugees in Somalia rather than the rights of citizens within their own country. As the Cold War thawed and Somalia began to lose its strategic importance, a proliferation of reports on human rights in Somalia encouraged the suspension of some bilateral aid<sup>22</sup>.

### War without rules

Journalistic accounts of the Somali civil war in the 1990s largely neglected the conflicts in the 1980s between the government and the SSDF and the SNM, in which tens of thousands were killed, and many more were forced to seek refuge in Ethiopia and surrounding countries<sup>23</sup>. The actions of the Somali Armed Forces violated international humanitarian law and Somali social conventions and set a precedent for the conflict in southern Somalia (see box 4.4)<sup>24</sup>. No effort was made to distinguish between civilians and armed combatants. The wounded and sick were not spared, private property was stolen, humanitarian access denied, and humanitarian aid looted. The SNM was also accused by human rights groups of summarily executing military officers and civilians associated with the regime.

This pattern of abuse continued as the war spread and government forces responded to escalating military threats from other movements. After the regime

was overthrown, the abuses continued and even intensified with civilian massacres, rape, torture, and the looting and destruction of public and private property. An estimated 25,000 civilians are said to have been killed in Mogadishu alone between 1991 and 1992. Asset stripping, forced displacement, and the disruption of food supplies led to mass deaths from starvation and disease (see box 4.5). Those who died in the greatest numbers were from politically marginalised groups in the inter-riverine agro-pastoral regions of southern Somalia.

#### Box 4.4: Somali Laws of War<sup>1</sup>

Traditionally, the two ideal roles for a man in Somali pastoral nomadic society were to be either a warrior (*waranle* - 'spear bearer') or a man of God (*wadaad*). Historically, feuding and warfare were bounded by rules and social conventions that controlled the scale and nature of warfare. These rules – *biri-ma-geydo* ('spared from the spear') – read like a Somali version of the Geneva Conventions<sup>2</sup>.

In battle women, children, *wadaad*, guests, community leaders, the elderly, enemy captives, war wounded, the sick, and peace delegates all had immunity (*biri-ma-geydo*) from attack. Titled heads of clans, like the *suldaan*, *garaad*, *islaan* or *ugass*, were not supposed to actively participate in or encourage war, but to counsel against it. Certain weapons and certain violent practices were prohibited. The looting of camels and horses was permissible, but the economic impact of warfare was contained by prohibitions against the looting of those livestock and household assets essential to the sustenance of women and children. Public utilities such as wells that benefited all were protected.

These codes, known as *xeerka biri-ma-geydada*, were not enforceable, but depended on reciprocal obligations defined in unwritten customary law (*xeer*). Wrongs were compensated for in accordance with customary and Islamic law. As the weak and vulnerable were considered protected

<sup>1</sup> Excerpt from Bradbury, M. (1999) 'Rights, responsibilities and the Somali Conflict' in *Human Rights in Somaliland: Awareness and action*. London: Amnesty International and International Cooperation for Development.

<sup>2</sup> See contributions to: International Committee of the Red Cross/Somali Red Crescent Society (1997) *Spared from the Spear*. Nairobi.



The international response to the war through UNOSOM helped reduce the level of violence, and provided a measure of protection for the weaker and marginalised populations. However, the UNOSOM operation and aid agencies were criticised for neglecting human rights issues in negotiations with the warring parties over humanitarian access and during peace talks<sup>25</sup>. An Independent Expert on Human Rights was appointed to Somalia in August 1993, but it was not until 1996 that the first systems for reporting human rights violations were estab-

by God, attacks on them would bring 'divine retribution' (*cuqubo*). The social pressure to maintain group honour was strong.

These conventions of warfare are associated with a particular kinship system and a semi-subsistence pastoral nomadic way of life that is changing. The integration of Somalia's semi-subsistence economy into broader market relations, new centralised forms of state governance, the introduction of constitutional rights in place of customary rights, and judicial law in place of customary law, a changing resource base, and the militarisation of society, among other factors, eroded the balanced reciprocity. The military strategies of the Barre government and the Somali warlords overturned these norms. Those traditionally protected have been killed, rape has been widespread, and public and private resources have been destroyed. Financed through regional and international trading networks and armed by allied governments, warlords are neither dependent on a semi-subsistence economy, nor dependent on reciprocal kin relationships. Consequently, war could be fought without restraint and social norms could be violated with impunity, at an enormous human cost.

Clearly, not all social values have been overturned. Some have been strengthened and new ones have emerged<sup>3</sup>. Alongside the excessive brutality of the war, there has been much bravery and humanitari-

<sup>3</sup> See Marchal, R. (1997), 'Forms of Violence and Ways to Control it: The Mooryaan of Mogadishu' in Hussein M. Adam & Ford, R. (eds) *Mending Rips in the Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Red Sea Press, for a description of the 'deviant' social codes developed among fighters in Mogadishu.

### Box 4.5: Human Rights Violations during the Somali Civil War

In war, Somali civilians and combatants have rights that are defined in international humanitarian law and human rights conventions. The evidence from international and Somali human rights organisations and United Nations human rights observers is that most of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, in particular Protocol II relating to the protection of individuals in non-international conflicts, were violated in Somalia in the course of the war. These include:

- reprisals against civilian populations (Conventions I-II, Protocol II)
- a humanitarian embargo (Conventions I-IV)
- 'war crimes' against civilian populations (Protocol II, article 3) – including wilful killing, murder, torture, abduction, mass deportation, forced conscription, outrages against personal dignity, extrajudicial executions, deliberate starvation through famine, the killing of women and children
- inhumane treatment including the prevention of child education (Protocol II, article 6)
- wanton destruction of personal and cultural property (Protocol II, article 4)
- lack of action by the authorities against those alleged to have committed breaches of the Conventions or to have ordered them

lished. Ultimately, the UN itself lost the moral high ground, when UNOSOM became drawn into the conflict and some troops of the multi-lateral intervention force violated international human rights and humanitarian standards that they were there to uphold<sup>26</sup>.

## Human Rights in a Collapsed State

### A new beginning?

The war against Siyad Barre was, in part, fought in the name of human rights<sup>27</sup>. The overthrow of the regime



brought some freedoms to some people, but respect for human rights also reached its nadir during the civil war and famine. A decade later, the human rights situation in Somalia defies simple generalisations. Basic political rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of movement, and personal security vary throughout Somalia. In areas of political and economic recovery, such as Somaliland and Puntland, the human rights situation is much improved. Where political instability and chronic humanitarian need persist, the human rights situation remains dire. As described in chapter 1, throughout Somalia there is evidence of growing inequalities in wealth and declining well-being for many people. With the dismantling of government institutions, state responsibility for protecting social and economic rights was lost. In a society with multiple authorities, an evolving civil society, and a vibrant but unregulated economy, how

people's rights are protected and realised is a major challenge to human development.

### Re-establishing law and order

For over a decade, many Somalis have been subjected to chronic low-level violence, displacement, and deprivation, and have been forced into exile as refugees. If respect for and protection of human rights is a measure of the quality of governance, there would seem to be a glaring 'governance gap' in large areas of Somalia. As described in chapter 1, the past decade has seen the emergence of varied structures of governance. A critical measure of the ability of the different authorities to fill the 'governance gap' will be their success in re-establishing security and the rule of law.

#### Box 4.6: Somalia's Legal Traditions

The pre-colonial Somali system of law combined customary law (*xeer soomaali*) with Islamic shari'a (of the *shafi'i* school). Colonialism subsequently bequeathed to an independent Somalia two additional bodies of codified law and judicial systems<sup>1</sup>. The law of the British Somaliland Protectorate was based on the English Common Code and Statute Law and the Indian Penal Code. In Italian Somalia, Italian Colonial Law was applied. In both Somaliland and Somalia customary law and *shari'a* law continued to be applied in domestic matters. In Italian Somalia *xeer* was also extended to penal matters involving Muslims in times of insecurity.

At independence these four systems were partially integrated by the 'Law on the Organisation of the Judiciary', adopted by the National Assembly of Somalia in 1962. This established the independence of the judiciary, based the civil and penal code and commercial law on the Italian law and the criminal procedure code on Anglo-Indian law. In family matters *shari'a* continued to be applied, while *xeer* was applied in inter-clan matters, sanctioned by civil courts. In practice, *xeer* and *shari'a* were commonly applied in rural areas where state law did not reach, with *xeer* the principal means for regulating inter-clan disputes, including those arising over resources or in criminal matters<sup>2</sup>.

The integration of secular law was only partially resolved. In Somaliland, the lower courts continued to practise in English and, prior to 1977, expatriate judges working in the north were mainly Sudanese conversant in common law and *shari'a*. In the south, courts practised in Italian and Italian judges conversant in contract and commercial law were common. As law was taught in Italian at university, northerners felt discriminated against. Today some Somalilanders not only point to different colonial legal traditions in northern and southern Somalia, but also to different pre-colonial traditions of customary law.

<sup>1</sup> Campo, A. & Battera, F. (1999, July) *Judiciary System in Somaliland*. Nairobi: UNDOS/UNDP.

<sup>2</sup> Puntland Development Research Centre (2000, October) *Harmonisation of Somali Legal Traditions (shari'a and xeer) and Secular Law in the Puntland State of*



Human rights only become real when there are social structures and institutions to uphold them. During the civil war Somalia's legal, judicial and law enforcement system collapsed and social rules and norms were violated. Since then no uniform constitutional and legal rules governing social or economic behaviour have been applied across the country. In most regions, a combination of customary law (*xeer soomaali*), Islamic *shari'a*, elements of the pre-1969 penal code and of the law used during the military period are applied. Where popularly mandated public administrations have been formed, the authorities have begun to re-establish judicial systems. Elsewhere, and in most rural communities, customary and *shari'a* law are used to maintain public order. The heterogeneity of practice reflects, in part, the historical evolution of legal and judicial systems in Somalia (see box 4.6).

### Customary law

Throughout Somalia, the 'pillars of law' for the great majority of people are a combination of customary law (*xeer*) and Islamic *shari'a* (see box 4.7). In addition, traditional values (*caado*) and a code of social conduct (*dhagan*), practices of kinship protection within *diya*-paying groups, structures of mediation by respected elders and sheikhs, and the adoption by stronger clans of weaker social groups all serve to hold society together and sustain public order and personal security<sup>28</sup>.

During the war many elements of customary law were violated. The abuse and killing of maternal kin (*xigaalo*) is one example<sup>29</sup>. On the other hand, in the vacuum of an alternative legal system, there was a reversion to customary practices and institutions that have emerged strengthened. Indeed, between cer-

The military coup in 1969 changed the relationship between the state, the judiciary, and the substance of law. On taking power the regime promulgated Law No. 1 of October 21, 1969 giving the Supreme Revolutionary Council legislative, executive, and judicial powers – effectively legalising the dictatorship. Decree No. 12 of October 25, 1969, abolished the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court and limited the powers of the Court of Appeal and District Courts, thus removing people's ability to contest the military rule. Although the Supreme Court was later restored, the creation of a National Security Court sanctioned the involvement of the extrajudicial forces in the legal system and removed any pretence of judicial independence and equality before the law. This court had jurisdiction over offences under the Somali Penal Code that were deemed by the regime to threaten state security, including offences falling under Public Order Law No. 21 of August 26, 1964. This law was a consolidation of several colonial laws intended to suppress anti-colonial movements<sup>3</sup>. In Somaliland and Puntland adoption of the pre-1969 legal system means that this law remains on the statutes.

Other significant changes enacted by the regime included laws on property. Law No. 67 of November 1, 1975, abolished communal rights to land and water making them the property of the state. The customary system of *diya* ('blood compensation') for homicide in which responsibility was collectively borne by the clan was altered. The offence was made punishable by death and compensation payable only to close relatives. The socialist regime also challenged the role of *shari'a* in domestic matters through the Family Act of 1975 giving equal inheritance rights to women.

After the collapse of the government different regions of Somalia have reverted to the pre-1969 legal system, but have established different regional legal structures based on historical legal traditions. In all areas a major development has been the extension of Islamic jurisprudence.

*Somalia: Concept and Format of Workshop Discussion Paper.* Garowe.

<sup>3</sup> Kassahun, Y. (1997, March) *The Courts: Problems, Prospects and Role in Somalia's Emerging Regions.* Nairobi: European Union Somalia Unit.

#### Box 4.7: Xeer Soomaali

In Somalia, social rules and norms that define reciprocal rights and responsibilities are defined in customary law (*xeer soomaali*) and in Islamic *shari'a* law.

The *xeer* comprises an unwritten set of conventions and procedures based on precedents that are passed down orally through generations. The *xeer* are defined and negotiated by councils of elders (*xeer-beegti*) meeting in assemblies (*shir*). They establish reciprocal rights and obligations between kin and clans. These cover domestic matters, social welfare, relations between close kin, political relations between clans, property rights, and the management of environmental resources. As such they enshrine the basic norms and values of Somali society. Penalties and sanctions for breaches of the law are defined in the *xeer*, but their enforcement relies on the moral weight of elders and social pressure.

In contrast to secular law and *shari'a*, there is no universal law. Instead, *xeer* is specific and localised to relations between neighbouring clans. Nevertheless, it may commonly cover the following:

- mutual obligation for the payment and receipt of *diya* (blood compensation)
- theft and banditry
- rape
- the protection of maternal in-laws (*xigaalo*) and the wife's in-laws (*xidic*)
- violence and defamation against elders
- the protection of respected groups (*biri-ma-geydo*)
- hospitality to mediators (*ergo*) from warring parties
- marriage practices
- domestic violence
- management of common property resources
- financial or material support to in-laws

Some of these norms contradict internationally accepted human rights norms, such as those relating to women's rights. Others are similar to international codes, such as those relating to the conduct of war.

Despite the changes in systems of governance, customary law has remained constant in many aspects, such as the payment of *diya*. It has, however, been strongly influenced by Islamic *shari'a*, and in turn *xeer* has influenced the application of *shari'a* in Somalia. The colonial state, which assumed responsibility for security, law and order and introduced western secular law, also influenced the application of customary law. One example was by investing lineage elders (*aqal*) with an authority that they previously did not possess. For rural populations secular law has been seen as an 'urban law' which had little relevance to them and both the colonial and post-colonial governments have, therefore, continued to recognise the utility of customary law. This remained the case during the military regime, although it sought to abolish certain elements of *xeer*, such as the payment of *diya*.

tain clans where no mutual *xeer* existed there was nothing to mitigate violence. Traditional methods of conflict management and resolution have proven durable in containing crime and violence at a community level. The peace processes in Somaliland and Puntland that led to the establishment of regional administrations were in effect processes to re-establish *xeer* among the clans in those regions. The Somaliland National Charter adopted at the 1993

Borama conference gave lineage elders the responsibility to enforce 'codes of conduct' among the clans, while the Puntland Charter recognises the value of alternative dispute resolution for establishing justice and peace. The application of customary law has been extended to matters other than *diya* and has replaced secular law in urban settings<sup>30</sup>. As noted in chapter 1, traditional rules have also been revived to protect environmental resources.



While kinship continues to define Somali politics, *xeer* is likely to be important in any future legal systems. Customary law is not a simple panacea, however, being neither uniformly applied nor equitable for everyone in society, particularly women. Furthermore, support for informal or traditional institutions can unwittingly reinforce unfair practices and power structures<sup>31</sup>. Nevertheless, laws and legal practices that are grounded in notions of justice relevant to a society are more likely to be accepted by people than ones imposed from outside.

## Islamic jurisprudence

A significant legal development in Somalia over the past decade has been the extension of Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*). The Islamic tradition has a long history in Somalia, with Islamic law in use as early as the 8<sup>th</sup> century<sup>32</sup>. Under European colonialism and independence governments, *shari'a* was integral to the legal system in dealing with family matters. In 1961, the constitution made Islam the state religion and the main source of law for the state.

The past decade has seen a revival of Islamic learning and practice throughout Somalia. In the legal vacuum left by the collapse of government institutions, many Somalis have looked to Islam as the main source of law. The Somaliland constitution and the transitional charters of Puntland and the TNG stipulate Islamic jurisprudence as the 'basis' of law. In areas of contested governance in southern Somalia, *shari'a* courts have emerged as a popular means for re-establishing order and as an important part of the current systems of governance. The

impact of these changes is seen in three areas: public security, the extension of Islamic jurisprudence, and as described in chapter 3, the political and commercial role of *shari'a* courts.

The first *shari'a* courts that came to prominence were established in north Mogadishu in 1994. They were established by an agreement between elders, religious leaders, politicians, and businesspersons to meet a public demand for security in the face of rampant banditry. A similar consensus led to the establishment of courts in Hiran, Middle Shabelle, and Gedo regions, south Mogadishu and Lower Shabelle. The courts typically included a detachment of police or militia. In north Mogadishu *shari'a* penalties such as amputations were used to enforce the law. These have rarely been applied in the courts elsewhere.

One impact of the *shari'a* courts has been to extend the application of *shari'a* beyond family matters to penal issues and revenue collection<sup>33</sup>. It has also affected the application of customary law. The relationship between *shari'a* and *xeer* is complex. Traditionally, Imams and elders perform different roles in society and while *shari'a* has been concerned with family law, *xeer* deals with clan matters. Customary law considers criminal conduct a communal clan responsibility, while *shari'a* is concerned with the individual. Customary law does not require the death penalty or punishments that are sanctioned by *shari'a*. The *xeer* emphasises restitution based on consensus, rather than retribution. Some women and religious leaders, however,



argue that the provisions of *shari'a* on family law afford women more rights than customary law. Other women argue that their participation in economic activities is more constrained by those who advocate for *shari'a*. Either way, the extension of Islamic jurisprudence potentially reflects a profound change in the way that disputes are handled in Somali society.

The *shari'a* courts have played an important role in restoring personal security and law in many areas in southern Somalia. The courts in north Mogadishu, for example, helped with the non-violent settlement of land disputes. However, as the political and economic power of *shari'a* courts grew, consensus over their role dissipated. For politicians the courts were a transitional instrument for controlling crime, for the businesses they ensured a secure environment for business transactions, while for some religious leaders they were a step towards establishing an Islamic state<sup>34</sup>. The turmoil that followed state collapse was proof for some religious leaders of the failure of man-made laws and justification for the application of god's law<sup>35</sup>. In north Mogadishu tensions between the politically active judges and the politicians led to open conflict and the collapse of the court. That experience has led Islamic movements to engage in longer term economic and social programmes, including support for educational and medical services among some of the poorest people and promotion of Islamic jurisprudence. In Mogadishu, some of the *shari'a* courts and their militia have since been absorbed into the TNG security forces.

The increased influence of Islam in governance, law, and business has created some tensions over the promotion of human rights. For some Somalis the human rights agenda is antithetical to Islam and certain cultural norms<sup>36</sup>. Other Somalis perceive human rights and Islam as entirely compatible. From a human rights perspective, there are several problems with the ways in which the law is applied by the courts. Few of the judges who administer the courts have expertise in *shari'a* and their different theological interpretations mean that its application is not uniform. Some of the judges have no legal training and the courts often do not follow internationally accepted standards for trials. In addition, corporal punishments are prohibited in international law. Compared to secular law, the treatment of women is also considered by many Somalis to be regressive. In Somaliland and Puntland, where progress has been made in restoring legal systems and the judiciary, other difficulties associated with the extension of *shari'a* arise.

### **Social compacts and constitutional frameworks**

Fundamental human rights were guaranteed in Somalia's first constitution and related legislative documents. Under military rule, these guarantees were removed and the legal system was used against the people. The re-establishment of accountable and effective legal institutions and law and order agencies will be critical for the protection of human rights and for social and economic recovery in Somalia. In the different regions, a common pre-requisite for this has been a peace process and political dialogue resulting in a 'social



compact' and constitutional framework for the re-establishment of law and order. The transitional governance charters of the Somaliland, Puntland and TNG administrations, which articulate the rights and responsibilities of citizens, have provided such frameworks.

The 1993 'Grand Conference on National Reconciliation' in Boroma was an important moment in the process of re-establishing institutions of governance in Somaliland. Convened by Somaliland's lineage elders (*Guurti*) two years after declaring independence, the purpose of the conference was to end inter-clan hostilities, to oversee the transfer of power from the interim SNM government, and to elaborate a system of governance among the northern clans<sup>37</sup>. Three months of deliberations produced two public charters – *the Security and Peace Charter* and *the National Charter*. These elaborated a national security framework, defined the responsibilities of elders in mediation and conflict resolution, detailed mechanisms for demobilisation, the formation of police forces and judicial institutions, and defined the composition of structures for the future governance of Somaliland. This proposed a bicameral parliament, consisting of a House of Elders (*Golaha Guurtida*) and a House of Representatives (*Golaha Wakiillada*) for the legislature, and an executive comprising a President, Vice President, and Council of Ministers. By fusing traditional and modern elements of Somali political culture the charter provided a means of bringing communities into a regional governance

framework. The 1993 Charter has since been replaced by a constitution, endorsed in a public referendum in May 2001<sup>38</sup>.

Like Somaliland, the Puntland State of Somalia was the product of a series of consultative conferences, sponsored by the people of the northeast. This culminated in the Garowe Constitutional Conference, between May and August 1998, at which titled elders and politicians approved a provisional charter for a new administration<sup>39</sup>. The participation of delegates from all clans in the northeast invested the new administration with a popular legitimacy. Puntland has a unicameral legislature, consisting of a single House of Representatives, an executive President and Council of Ministers. In contrast to Somaliland, the council of elders (*isimada*) was not institutionalised in the administrative structure. Instead, it maintains an independent advisory role, influencing government through selection of parliamentary representatives. A constitution to replace the charter after three years has been drafted.

In 2000, deliberations at the Somalia National Peace Conference in Djibouti, produced a Transitional National Charter (TNC) for the Transitional National Government. The transitional charter specifies a single parliamentary system of government with a Prime Minister and a President. Traditional elders are incorporated into the structure through a Council of Traditional Elders to advise and assist the government on, among other matters, peacemaking and reconcili-





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ation, demobilisation, and advising regional and district administrations. The charter should be replaced by a constitution after three years.

The Somaliland constitution and the Puntland and TNG charters differ in their preferred system of gov-

ernance. The Somaliland constitution affirms the independence of Somaliland, while the Puntland and TNC charters are committed to a federal system of government with devolved powers. In common, all three created a framework for the re-establishment of a legal and judicial system based

**Table 4.1: Human Rights Commitments in the TNG and Puntland Charters and the Somaliland Constitution**

Rights	Constitution <sup>1</sup>	Puntland Charter	Transitional National Charter
Acceptance of the United Nations Charter and the UDHR	Article 12.2	Article 5.1	Article 5.1
Commitment to social, economic and political rights	Article 35		Article 5.1
Equal opportunities for women	Article 57		Articles 6.1,16,15.8
Independence of the judiciary	Article 122	Article 19.1	Article 22
Equality before the law	Article 10		Article 6
The right of <i>habeas corpus</i>	Article 43.2		Article 8
The right to a fair trial	Article 44		Article 10
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion	Article 50	Article 6.2	Article 5.1
Independence of the media			Article 7
Freedom of movement	Article 37		Article 5.2c
Freedom of association	Article 38		Article 5.2c
Freedom of expression	Articles 48 & 51		
Freedom from torture	Articles 40,43.3,55	Articles 6.2	Article 8.6
Right to ownership of private property	Article 4		Articles 5.2a, 9

<sup>1</sup> Taken from the 1997 draft constitution of Somaliland.



on the 1962 legal system. All three make a commitment to human rights and to uphold the fundamental principles of an independent and impartial judicial system (see table 4.1). All three confirm Islam as the nation's religion and Islamic jurisprudence as the 'basis' for all legislation.

All three profess adherence to the UDHR<sup>40</sup>. In addition to the UDHR, the TNG charter also recognises the conventions on civil, political, social, cultural, and economic rights and other conventions to which Somalia is party. The Somaliland constitution makes a commitment to upholding human rights, equality before the law, adherence to international human rights, freedom of movement and expression and a commitment to promote the rights and status of women. It explicitly warns that a recurrence of human rights violations 'perpetrated on this land for a period of over twenty years' must be forestalled. A commitment to equal opportunities for women, for example, appears in the TNC and the Somaliland constitution. They also contain contradictions. The Puntland charter, for example, explicitly rules out 'torture', but accepts the use of corporal punishments (*xudduud*) administered by Islamic courts.

In June 2000, the Somaliland parliament ratified the Political Parties Law authorising the formation of three political parties to contest future elections in Somaliland. This has been criticised for limiting the number of political parties and the fact that no women were involved in drafting the constitution. In September 2001, political parties were registered in Somaliland in advance of planned elections.

## Re-establishing the judiciary

Progress in rebuilding legal systems and the judiciary is currently most advanced in Somaliland and Puntland. However, re-establishment of the rule of law faces many challenges, including low public confidence in public institutions, a heterogeneous legal system and the variable capacity and experience of the judiciary (see box 4.8).

The heterogeneous legal codes under which different Somali regions operate remain one of the main difficulties. In theory, the only laws applicable in Somaliland and Puntland are those that existed prior to 1969. In practice, judges apply what they know. The 1973 civil code and 1974 civil procedure code are therefore still used<sup>41</sup>. The blurring of *xeer* and *shari'a* and the judges' often limited knowledge of *shari'a* means that they are used interchangeably.

To bring more coherence to the system would require input from academics and legal experts in *shari'a*, secular and customary law, as well as the creation of a system for the interpretation and appli-

### Box 4.8: Common Problems with the Judicial Systems in Somaliland and Puntland

- heterogeneous laws unevenly applied
- lack of a single body charged with systematising laws
- few qualified judges and no refresher training
- limited availability of legal texts and no reference libraries
- untrained administrative staff
- lack of basic equipment
- overcrowded prisons with no segregation of juveniles and adults
- prison warders inadequately trained



cation of *shari'a*. There is currently no capacity to do this in either Somaliland or Puntland. In Puntland there is constructive dialogue and research being undertaken into a judicial model that both conforms to Somali culture and tradition and helps to meet the aspirations of creating a viable modern society<sup>42</sup>.

The process of re-establishing the judiciary has been uneven. In Somaliland, progress is greater in the west, with courts and qualified judges concentrated in Hargeisa. The limited number and capacity of district courts means that the administration of justice is weak outside the urban areas, with most local disputes dealt with by elders. Even in Hargeisa, the municipality has been entrusted with jurisdiction in matters of land disputes, which is inconsistent with the rest of the system. Likewise, in Puntland the reach of the judicial system beyond the main towns of Garowe and Bosasso is limited.

The capacity of the judiciary is weak. Only 19 out of 35 judges in Somaliland possess law degrees, the rest having some education and practice in administering *shari'a*. Most district judges read only Somali and Arabic so cannot administer civil and criminal procedures written in English or Italian. There are very few complete legal texts available and offices are generally under-equipped. Remuneration for judges is extremely poor, equivalent to US \$4-5 per month in 1999<sup>43</sup>. Only half of one per cent of the Somaliland budget is allocated to the judiciary, compared to over 55% for police and armed forces<sup>44</sup>. Legal punishments have not

been updated. Thus, fines in Somali shillings that were equivalent to US \$500 in 1962 are still applied, but are worth very little at current prices.

Puntland likewise suffers from a lack of qualified judges. Only 18 out of 44 judges possess law degrees from reputable universities. Most have knowledge of *shari'a*, but no experience in judicial procedure.

### Applying the rule of law

The manner in which the rule of law is applied is critical for guaranteeing human rights. In this respect, the records of the administrations in Somaliland and Puntland are clearly better than the former regime. However, the administrations cannot be free of criticism and the record of the judiciary in defending human rights has, to date, been poor.

The record of the Somaliland government has been tarnished by the arrest and detention of a number of political opponents and the limitations it has placed on the independence of the judiciary. Opponents of the administration have periodically been arrested without warrants and detained without trial for varying lengths of time. Human rights defenders have also been temporarily detained, as has the proprietor of the *Jamhuriya* newspaper in Hargeisa. Draft press laws have been criticised by journalists for giving too much control to the government.

An independent judiciary is critical for maintaining the impartial application of law and as a check on the power of the executive. Although the



#### Box 4.9: The Somali Civil Protection Programme

The rule of law is considered a central component of 'good governance' and since the mid-1990s, rule of law programmes have become a common part of post-war reconstruction and peace-building interventions. The rule of law should ensure that governments are accountable, both domestically and to international treaty obligations, and that personal freedoms are protected. The rule of law should provide a framework for post-war justice, a stable market environment, while law courts can offer a forum for the non-violent settlement of disputes. In Somalia, UNDP supports the return to the rule of law through the Somalia Civil Protection programme (SCPP). The four components of this programme are:

- capacity building for law enforcement agencies
- capacity building for the judiciary and custodial services
- demobilisation and the reintegration of former militia

Somaliland constitution established the judiciary's independence, the executive has curtailed its autonomy. Furthermore, although the House of Representatives nullified the controversial 1962 Public Order Law, the administration introduced new public order laws. In August 2000, the administration issued a decree creating a 'National Security Committee', with powers to suspend *habeas corpus*, ban public rallies, restrict the movement of people considered detrimental to public order, and detain people without charge for up to 90 days. The decree has been used to detain several people for attending and voicing opinion in support of the Arta peace conference and for questioning commercial agreements of the government. The response to such actions of the legislature in defending the independence of the judiciary is encouraging.

In Puntland, the judiciary has also been weak in defending freedoms, such as the freedom of the

press. Excessive force has been used on occasion by the police in response to opposition protests to the government.

In Somaliland and Puntland the application of rules for the treatment of prisoners has given some human rights activists cause for concern. Prisons and police stations are overcrowded. One report in 2000 estimated that there were 1,530 prisoners in Somaliland, including 24 women, 18 juveniles and several mentally ill prisoners<sup>45</sup>. There is no provision for

the separate detention of juveniles and no therapeutic treatment offered to the mentally ill. Food is described as poor, conditions unhygienic and medical treatment minimal. Of those detained in September 2000, 50 had not been brought to trial. There were also cases where people have been incarcerated for two years without trial.

The right to employment and to fair recompense for labour was protected under the former socialist regime through a strong labour code. In the absence of such a code, employees have no legal protection.

### Police reform

As guarantors of justice and basic human rights, an effective and accountable police force is essential for the rule of law. Progress in re-establishing police forces is most advanced where public administrations exist in Somaliland and Puntland. Since the TNG was established in Mogadishu a



judiciary and a police force are gradually being built. All fourteen district police stations in Mogadishu have been reopened.

Common problems associated with the police include high levels of illiteracy, poor pay, recruitment that favours majority clans and males, inadequate equipment, and lack of training in criminal court procedures. Law enforcement can be problematic, because there is little incentive to pursue criminals if clans hold the police liable for harm caused during arrests. Building the trust and confidence of the public is one of the biggest challenges facing the police. Unfortunately, some of the law enforcement practices of the past do continue, such as detention without the full and due process of the law<sup>46</sup>. Because such practices are not due simply to ignorance of the law, they may not be amenable to human rights training. Inculcating a sense of responsibility and accountability in the police force requires political will. Furthermore, a weak judiciary, with poorly trained judges and lawyers, means there may be no check on the power of the police.

UNDP is supporting the re-establishment of police forces in Somalia (see box 4.9). One proposal to overcome some of these problems is to decentralise the recruitment, management and finance of police to districts and to promote community policing. In order to do that, however, there is a need for a legal framework which addresses issues of public and political control and financing.

## Justice

Although progress has been made in re-establishing legal institutions and law enforcement agencies, issues of justice remain unaddressed. Many atrocities that qualify as war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed in Somalia<sup>47</sup>. The current administrations in Mogadishu, Somaliland, and Puntland include senior officials of the former regime, some of whom are accused by Somalis of human rights violations and crimes against humanity. Others accused of such crimes are residing abroad. Many ordinary Somalis are concerned that if such people continue to hold public office it will perpetuate a culture of impunity. As long as human rights and structural causes of violence continue to go unaddressed, there is a danger of creating an environment of 'negative' rather than 'positive peace'<sup>48</sup>. As the UN Independent Expert on Human Rights to Somalia wrote 'peace and justice should go hand in hand, not be alternatives to each other'.

***'Peace and justice should go hand in hand, not be alternatives to each other'***

**UN Independent Expert on Human Rights to Somalia**

There is currently no consensus among Somalis over how these issues should be addressed, or even whether they should be addressed. Some advocate a 'live and let live' approach, at least until the political situation has stabilised. A significant lobby, including local human rights organisations, favours pursuing legal justice through an interna-



tional criminal tribunal. Some propose the creation of a 'truth commission' (see box 4.10). Others argue there is a need to deal with the structural injustices, evident in the unequal distributions of resources and power that deny people their most basic social, economic, and political rights. These three avenues for tackling justice post-war have been distinguished as 'legal justice', 'rectifactory justice' and 'distributive justice'<sup>49</sup>.

In Somaliland the administration has established a Technical Committee for the Investigation of War Crimes to gather evidence on crimes against humanity (see box 4.11). The RRA leadership has requested that crimes against their people after

the fall of Siyad Barre should be investigated. The President of Djibouti, prior to the SNPC in Arta, called for the prosecution for crimes against humanity of warlords who did not support peace in Somalia.

To date, however, no action has been taken by the international community or the Somali administrations against Somalis accused of war crimes. The pursuit of legal justice is dependent on there being a functioning, independent and accountable police force and judiciary. Crimes against humanity should give rise to international criminal prosecutions through international tribunals. And while the international community has supported inde-

#### **Box 4.10: Dr Ismail Juma'le Human Rights Centre Calls for Justice<sup>1</sup>**

'In Somalia, over a period of 31 years ... a system was used to abuse the Somalis. The taxes people paid were used to send planes to bombard civilians in Hargeisa, in Galkaiyo, then in Mogadishu and Kismayo. Then human rights went into a crisis with warlordism. Now, those groups have to be accountable. At the end of the day, a lady who has been raped, bombarded, who went into a refugee camp in Ethiopia, came back again, had some of her children die on the way, again becomes a refugee, twice, thrice, then goes to Hargeisa to live in a house with the roof blown open – she needs to be told who has done that against her. Until she knows the truth, no reconciliation will take place in the true sense. Some faction leaders, administrators, ministers, generals, and security people have to take responsibility. They have to tell the truth about what happened. We say account now, not tomorrow. There are two ways. One is to establish a truth finding commission which can question everybody without immunity, whether parliamentarian, or minister or president. The other way is to set up a court system based on justice. Then each and every person or group who has committed abuses can be taken to court with evidence and can be prosecuted.

In Djibouti we had a workshop organised by UNESCO and local partners. We had a lot of things we wanted to put to the former government officials, the security people, and the Islamic fundamentalists. When we faced them collectively there was a great variety of opinion. The majority came across as human rights supporters. ... They supported the idea of a truth finding commission. ... But there were some elements that fear the very word human rights.

Of course some parliamentarians are known war criminals, people who have committed crimes against humanity. They are part of the parliament, but they are also part of the clan. They are seen as heroes of their own clan and were put forward (to parliament) as such by their chiefs and own traditional leaders. But, in fact, on that day I was happy because I saw that when the truth comes, they can't really stand against it or run away.'

<sup>1</sup>Source: IRIN (2000, October 10) *Interview with Hassan Shire Sheik, Co-Director of Dr Ismail Juma'le Human Rights Centre.*



pendent tribunals in Rwanda and Bosnia, it has indicated little readiness to do this in Somalia, despite the findings of the UN Independent Expert on Human Rights. Neither has any government taken action to prosecute war crime suspects from Somalia travelling to their countries. The consequences of such inaction against war crimes are potentially grave. Not only does it perpetuate a culture of impunity, but unanswered allegations pose an obstacle to dialogue and prospects for real reconciliation.

### Box 4.11: The Somaliland Technical Committee for the Investigation of War Crimes

In May 1997 heavy rains in Hargeisa exposed a mass grave containing some 200 bodies. Located near the former headquarters of the 26<sup>th</sup> Sector of the Somali Armed Forces, it was assumed that the dead were prisoners executed by the Somali Army in May 1988. A Ministerial Committee and Technical Committee were established by the Somaliland administration to investigate war crimes committed between 1988 and 1991.

The aim was to help national reconciliation and to deny impunity to the perpetrators of these crimes. Due to the difficulties of tracing persons who have left Somalia, and because the Somaliland courts would be perceived as biased, the Committee appealed for the establishment of an international tribunal to bring to justice the perpetrators of war crimes. As of September 2000, some 2000 names of victims and 200 mass graves have been registered in Hargeisa alone.

The UN Independent Expert on Human Rights in Somalia visited the mass grave in November 1997. The OHCHR sponsored two international forensic experts from the Boston-based organisation Physicians for Human Rights to visit Hargeisa in 1997 and also supported two Somalis to attend forensic training. Except for this, the appeal has received little response.

Over the past decade, considerable international attention has been given to alternative methods for reparation and restitution for crimes and harm done ('rectifactory justice'). These include national truth commissions, national memorials, or cultural healing practices. In Somalia, customary law provides one avenue for establishing such justice between clans, through compensatory mechanisms such as *diya* or marriage. Somali human rights organisations, however, argue that there is a need for more formal mechanisms and pressed for the establishment of such a commission during the Arta peace conference. There has, however, been little serious discussion of the issue in Somalia and the international community.

There are particular constraints to establishing such forms of justice in Somalia when action against individuals is seen as action against a clan. Furthermore, the needs of victims are not uniform. War crimes tribunals may address the needs of certain individuals seeking justice. They do not deal with the needs of thousands who have suffered for ten years as refugees or displaced persons or the needs of minorities in a society that continues to marginalise them.

Neither legal nor rectificatory justice address structural injustices arising from unequal distribution of resources and power in society, and which may underlie the conflict. Somali peace processes to date have almost exclusively focussed on establishing a political, legal and administrative framework in which clan and regional interests can be



accommodated. While the need for such a framework is beyond question, leaving socio-economic issues of vulnerability and exclusion means that the structural conditions for conflict remain. Peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction programmes often presume that the benefits of peace and post-war reconstruction will be beneficial to all, ignoring the fact that the impact of conflict on society is rarely equal. War and famine in Somalia disproportionately affected certain groups. To be sustainable, a peace process therefore needs to address issues of distributive justice. In Somalia, land is one such issue.

As 'rights' and 'development' converge on issues of land tenure and subsistence, the future of ownership and access to land is a key human development issue in Somalia. Disputes over land did not cause the Somali civil war. The expropriation of

pastureland in the northwest for Ogaden refugees, however, was a factor in the creation of the SNM and the violent alienation of land and erosion of customary land rights were contributory factors to the famine in southern Somalia. Access to and control of land will be a vital issue in any just resolution to the war. Some argue that a struggle over rural resources will continue even after a political settlement is achieved, 'because such resources represent the economic future for whichever regime or regimes emerge victorious'<sup>50</sup>. Furthermore, as land tenure will be central to any efforts to reconstruct household and community livelihoods, legal guarantees will be needed for rightful claimants.

In Somalia, post-war distributive justice will necessitate resolving the issue of land ownership and distribution. The issue was considered too com-

### Box 4.12: The Return of Lands: Reconciliation in Sanag Region<sup>1</sup>

During 1992 and 1993, two years after the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime, clan leaders (Sultans, Garads and Aqils) in the northern region of Sanag conducted extensive negotiations to re-establish peaceful relations among the clans of that region. This culminated in a Grand Conference of Clans held in Erigavo in 1993, the creation of a Council of Elders, and a Peace Charter that sought to settle outstanding disputes and prevent a return to instability.

One of the most critical and sensitive issues discussed at the conference was the restoration of immovable assets to those individuals and clans that had been dispossessed during the years of war. Chief among these was land. Following the conclusion of the conference, negotiations began on returning land to those clans from whom it had been appropriated. The long drawn out negotiations were conducted wholly by elders in the region. Two years later, on 18 September 1995, the titles of some 300 assets, including rangeland homesteads, stone buildings, farms and water reservoirs were formally and peacefully handed over to their original owners.

Throughout Somalia, the restoration of assets and equitable and secure land tenure is essential for reducing conflict and ensuring sustainable livelihoods. In Sanag the elders proved responsible and determined in their efforts to resolve conflict, promote stability, and exercise local governance that could lead to a resumption of locally desired services.

<sup>1</sup> Prepared by Haroon Ahmed Yusuf, ActionAid. See also Ahmed Yusuf Farah (1993) *The Roots of Reconciliation: Peace-making endeavours of contemporary lineage Leaders in North-West Somalia/Somaliland*. London: ActionAid. Bradbury, M. (1994) *The Somali Conflict: Prospects for peace*. Oxfam Research Paper no 9. Oxfam UK: Oxford.





plex to be dealt with at the Arta peace conference. In Sanag region, however, the redistribution of looted assets, including land, was critical to the success of the 1993/94 peace process there. Although this may not be replicable everywhere, it does provide an illustration of what is feasible (see box 4.12).

Conceptually, human development and distributive justice are compatible. A model of development, however, that elevates economic growth over redistribution or the market over social services, will potentially deepen poverty. The vibrancy of the private sector has been critical to Somalia's recovery, but there is little evidence yet that the benefits of growth are trickling down. Instead, economic disparities appear to be widening. Furthermore, the economic revolution has not been matched by a social revolution. Political and economic power largely remain monopolised by a few. There has been no real redistribution of power or wealth.

International support for 'good governance' in Somalia is currently concentrated on support for civil and political rights, through civil education, legal and judicial reform, human rights monitoring and advocacy, and transparent and efficient public administration. The contribution of human rights programmes will remain limited if their focus remains restricted to individual freedoms and civil liberties, to the neglect of socio-economic rights and equity. A rights-based approach to development will only have meaning if socio-economic and civil and political rights are addressed simultaneously.

## The Current Status of Human Rights in Somalia

### International humanitarian law and protection

In 1997, the UN Independent Expert on Human Rights in Somalia concluded that until a peaceful settlement is reached, international humanitarian law related to internal armed conflict, as defined in Common Article 3 of the fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949, shall apply in the whole of Somalia<sup>51</sup>. In 2000, the Independent Expert also referred to the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court to monitor war crimes and crimes against humanity in Somalia.

The scale of violent conflict in Somalia has declined since the early 1990s and several regions are enjoying levels of security that on a day-to-day basis are better than neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, as identified in chapter 1, atrocities continue to be committed against civilians in areas of southern and central Somalia that qualify as war crimes and crimes against humanity.

### Securing human freedoms

The 2000 global HDR identifies seven 'freedoms' that human rights and human development aspire to secure. Human rights activists at a human rights workshop in August 2001 in Hargeisa used the freedoms as crude indicators to assess the human rights environment in their regions. Table 4.2 summarises their conclusions<sup>52</sup>. Workshop



participants noted that there had been some progress in several areas: freedom of expression; the development of an independent media; human rights organisations; cross-clan representation in political forums; and participation of women in some political forums. However, they also noted,

among other problems, that violence against individuals continued particularly in Mogadishu, that legal systems were very weak, there was a lack of labour protection, and that more needed to be done to advance women's rights and the rights of minorities.

**Table 4.2: Securing Human Freedoms**

	The problem	Progress	Constraints to realisation of rights	Strategies to realise rights
<b>Freedom from discrimination</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Clan-based discrimination.</li> <li>■ Gender discrimination.</li> <li>■ Discrimination against certain minorities.</li> <li>■ Discrimination against disabled people.</li> <li>■ Illegitimate children.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Cross-clan representation in political forums.</li> <li>■ Women members of Puntland parliament and TNG.</li> <li>■ Increased access to control of resources by women.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Culture and customary law.</li> <li>■ Poor economy and education.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Raising awareness of equality based on religion.</li> <li>■ Development of policies on equity.</li> <li>■ Empowerment of women in economic, social and political spheres.</li> <li>■ Parliamentary legislation.</li> </ul>
<b>Freedom from want</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Unemployment.</li> <li>■ Poverty.</li> <li>■ Chronic food insecurity.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Improved distribution of economic resources.</li> <li>■ Expansion of informal sector of the economy.</li> <li>■ Private educational institutions.</li> <li>■ New employment opportunities in power and telecommunication companies, public institutions and light industries.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Potential of natural resources underdeveloped.</li> <li>■ Occupation of land by armed clan militias.</li> <li>■ Importation of fake currency.</li> <li>■ Little support from governments.</li> <li>■ Recurrent livestock bans.</li> <li>■ Toxic waste poisons the sea.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Increase in investment opportunities.</li> <li>■ Building peace.</li> <li>■ Credit facilities.</li> <li>■ Development of financial institutions.</li> <li>■ Professional schools.</li> <li>■ Reduce military expenditure.</li> </ul>
<b>Freedom to develop and realise one's human potential</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Lack of formal education system.</li> <li>■ Lack of peace.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Establishment of private schools.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Lack of a formal educational system and facilities.</li> <li>■ Absence of international financial institutions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Creation of local and central administration.</li> <li>■ Advocate with World Bank and IMF.</li> </ul>



# Somalia

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<b>Freedom from fear</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Absence of accepted government to uphold obligations to international human rights treaties.</li> <li>■ Political culture.</li> <li>■ Murder, kidnapping, looting.</li> <li>■ Lack of recognition is a threat to peace in Somaliland.</li> <li>■ Political prisoners.</li> <li>■ Emergency laws.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Regional Administrations and strong traditional mechanisms that maintain peace.</li> <li>■ Human rights NGOs campaigning on these issues.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Continued violence in parts of Somalia.</li> <li>■ Failure of national reconciliation processes.</li> <li>■ Absence of law and order in some areas.</li> <li>■ Armed militia.</li> <li>■ Lack of police training in human rights.</li> <li>■ Government does not enforce laws approved by parliament.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Establishment of legitimate democratic government.</li> <li>■ Reconciliation, demobilisation.</li> <li>■ Upgrade police training in law enforcement.</li> </ul>
<b>Freedom from injustice</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Absence of the rule of law.</li> <li>■ Lack of a fair trial.</li> <li>■ Lack of qualified judges.</li> <li>■ Lack of legal reference material.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Re-establishment of police forces, a judicial system and prisons.</li> <li>■ Emergence of civil society groups, including human rights organisations, and increasing awareness that impact on the justice system.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Inadequately trained and inexperienced judicial and law enforcement personnel.</li> <li>■ Lack of legal reference materials.</li> <li>■ Ethnicity and clanism.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Training of judicial and law enforcement personnel.</li> <li>■ Development of legal codes.</li> <li>■ Development of democracy and multi-party system.</li> </ul>
<b>Freedom of participation, speech and association</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Previously oppressive dictatorial regime.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Emergence of civil society groups.</li> <li>■ Independent media.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Civil society and NGOs are new concepts and not well understood.</li> <li>■ Insecurity and armed conflict.</li> <li>■ Lack of understanding of democracy and our religion.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Awareness raising about the role of civil society.</li> <li>■ Training for NGOs.</li> </ul>
<b>Freedom for decent work – without exploitation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Exploitation of cheap labour (e.g. from Ethiopia).</li> <li>■ Underdevelopment, poor economy, poor education, extreme poverty.</li> <li>■ High unemployment.</li> <li>■ Lack of independent work organisation.</li> <li>■ Low wages and long hours.</li> <li>■ Lack of annual vacation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Growing business sector.</li> <li>■ Ministries of Health and Labour established.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Lack of legal protection (e.g. labour codes, labour unions).</li> <li>■ Corruption discourages production.</li> <li>■ Lack of awareness of the international conventions on labour rights.</li> <li>■ Influence of clanism/nepotism in employment opportunities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ Establish legitimate, democratic government.</li> <li>■ Support exploited groups through advocacy.</li> <li>■ Campaign for the introduction of new labour codes.</li> <li>■ Encourage the formation of independent labour associations.</li> <li>■ Fight corruption.</li> <li>■ Invest in production.</li> <li>■ Establish international trade law.</li> </ul>



## Social and economic rights

At the end of the 1980s, Somalis experienced an erosion in their social and economic rights, as social services and incomes declined and levels of poverty deepened. As described in chapter 1, over the past decade human development indicators point to a regression in the realisation of some socio-economic rights, with declining literacy and education, higher levels of child mortality, chronic pockets of malnutrition, high levels of unemployment and a large number of displaced and destitute people. Three indicators illustrate this.

■ **Right to education:** Levels of literacy and primary school enrolment peaked in Somalia in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since then, diminishing levels of government investment in the 1980s and civil war have left educational indicators in Somalia well below those of neighbouring countries. Although there were gains in primary school enrolment during 2000/01, overall adult literacy has fallen from 24% pre-war to 17% in 2001. Access to secondary education has also declined. These statistics do not take into account the expansion of private education, which is providing new educational opportunities, but they do indicate that the right to education is not being sustained.

■ **Right to health:** Some health indicators, such as infant and under-five mortality show a marginal improvement in health status since pre-war. Nevertheless, Somalia has some of the worst health indicators in the world and the incidence of fatal diseases such as measles, TB, and malaria is

increasing. A proliferation of private services has increased overall access to health services, but there is little evidence that this has had a positive impact on health.

■ **Right to food:** Entitlements to food were violated during the famine in the early 1990s. Although there has been no repeat of famine, food insecurity remains a threat to many people, with continuing pockets of chronic malnutrition and some 400,000 people considered food insecure in 2001.

## Social discrimination

Non-discrimination and equitable treatment for all is a deeply rooted human rights principle. The aggregate statistics above hide sharp differences in the well-being and vulnerability of different social groups in Somalia. Access to education, health services, and clean water vary considerably between urban, sedentary rural, and pastoral nomadic populations. Literacy levels, educational opportunities, and political participation vary markedly between men and women. Social exclusion may be the underlying cause of chronic malnutrition, rather than a food deficit. To redress discrimination the needs of certain groups need to be prioritised.

## Minorities

Somali society is divided along socio-economic, cultural, occupational, class, and language lines. Understanding these differences is important in analysing resource distribution, exclusion, and vulnerability. As individuals are dependent on clans



rather than government for protection of their rights, the most vulnerable are those from politically weak clans or non-Somali groups. Ethnic groups, such as Arab and Bantu, and occupational castes, such as the Tumul, Midgan, or Yibr, face exclusion, discrimination, and violence. Ethnic minorities face social segregation, while occupational groups are denied the right to intermarry and they both have limited political representation. In Somaliland only one member of the House of Representatives and one member of the Guurti are from a minority group. Greater recognition was given to minorities at Arta, where 24 seats in the TNA were reserved for minority clans.

### **Internally Displaced Persons**

As many as 1.6 million people were internally displaced by the war and a further one million forced to flee as refugees. In 2001, there were estimated to be as many as 300,000 people in Somalia who are still displaced. Bereft of assets, with limited access to stable employment, the displaced constitute half of the people living in a state of chronic humanitarian need<sup>53</sup>. Living on the periphery of urban areas, they are vulnerable to personal insecurity, sexual exploitation, labour exploitation, eviction, destruction and confiscation of assets, biased media reporting, and lack of legal protection. Their access to health and educational services is limited and nutritional surveys indicate consistently high global malnutrition rates among the displaced. In Hargeisa, it is reported that 9% of the displaced rely on begging as their main source of income, and 84% are poor or destitute with house-

hold incomes of less than 40 cents per day<sup>54</sup>. Principle 3 of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2) states that 'national authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to internally displaced persons within their jurisdiction.' In the absence of a national authority, displaced persons are dependent on the goodwill and capacity of the local population and authorities.

### **Women**

Although women constitute over half the population of Somalia they are not afforded the same basic rights as men. In this patriarchal culture women's inferior status is portrayed as religiously sanctioned. Women have few opportunities to participate in political life, they receive only half the inheritance rights of male siblings, and female children are considered a second priority for education. Educational discrimination and illiteracy inhibits their participation in political life and their ability to express their aspirations. High levels of maternal mortality are, in part, a result of the lower priority given to women's health and the prevalence of FGM<sup>55</sup>.

As a result of the war women have taken on more economic responsibilities. This may have allowed for a more equitable balance in decision-making at the family level, but it has not led to greater participation in political decision-making. The SNPC did confer recognition of women by allocating seats for women delegates and reserving 25 seats for women in the TNA, but women hold only four out of



75 ministerial posts in the TNG. In Puntland, only five seats were reserved for women in the House of Representatives. In Somaliland, there are no female members of parliament, no women were consulted in the drafting of the new Somaliland constitution, women are not represented in the judiciary, and women have only a limited presence in the law enforcement agencies.

In a situation of high unemployment, women face discrimination in formal employment. For example, women make up only 15% of primary school teachers<sup>56</sup>. There is some evidence that the economic role taken on by women during the war is being eroded as the conflict subsides. In companies run by Islamic groups, women can be shareholders, but have no voting rights. In Somaliland, it is reported that female *qaat* traders are being marginalised by the more powerful male-run *qaat* companies.

Many women suffered from sexual violence during the war. This did not end with the war, as some reports indicate sexual violence is a persistent crime in areas of stability. Many women consider the traditional punishment of forcing the offender to marry the victim and to pay compensation to the family for 'their' loss a further degradation of their status. Several women's organisations are also beginning to highlight the issue of domestic violence, which is still treated as a matter to be dealt with through traditional means rather than as a legal issue.

Despite, or because of, their exclusion from other forums a number of strong independent women-led

organisations have emerged as advocates for women's rights and human rights generally. However, they face a challenge from conservative elements in Somalia who consider the concern for gender equality Western and anti-Islamic. Tradition and lack of education mean that few women are fully aware of their rights and in their efforts to hold communities together, they often accept violations of their rights as being consistent with *shari'a* and customary law<sup>57</sup>.

## Children

Due to the lack of central government, Somalia is one of two countries not to have signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Somali customs and practices recognise, celebrate, and protect children<sup>58</sup>. Many of these practices complement the rights of survival, development, protection, and participation set out in the CRC. In war, for example, children have the absolute right of protection. Nevertheless, hundreds of thousands of children died in the 1992 famine. Somalia has some of the highest levels of infant mortality in the world and some of the poorest educational opportunities. Thousands of children are living in destitution in displaced camps or on the streets, especially in Mogadishu and Hargeisa. Hundreds of children living in orphanages are deprived of a normal family environment. In addition, children have been conscripted into the militias. Prior to the war exploitation of child labour was common on plantations and large-scale agricultural projects, and there is no evidence that this practice has ended.



## Advancing Human Rights in Somalia

### Rights and responsibilities

Conventionally the state is considered the prime 'duty-bearer' for the protection and upholding of human rights, and this is reinforced in international and domestic law. As mentioned earlier, the absence of a nationally accepted government raises a question over where responsibility for the protection and upholding of human rights lies in Somalia. Internationally the roles and responsibilities of other actors are increasingly recognised as having an impact on human rights. In Somalia, one can identify several 'duty-bearers' – the family, clan, civil society organisations, administrations, businesses, and international actors – who, in the absence of a government, have responsibilities in respecting, protecting and advancing human rights. At a family, clan and community level, rights and responsibilities are defined by customary law and Islam. Responsibilities of authorities are defined in local governance charters and constitutions and in international humanitarian law and customary law. The responsibilities of international actors are defined in international law.

In 1992, the UN Security Council declared that authorities shall be held individually responsible for abuses of human rights committed in the areas that they control. The UN Independent Expert on Human Rights in Somalia elaborated on this in 1997, by stating that international humanitarian law related to internal armed con-

flict shall apply in the whole of Somalia until a political settlement is reached. This conclusion was important, as it provides a legal framework that clearly defines for local authorities and the international community their obligations to the Somali people.

### Somali administrations

The conclusion of the Independent Expert reminds all Somali administrations and other authorities who claim to represent populations that they are bound by international law, as outlined in Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions, to protect and promote human rights of populations in areas they control. As respect for human rights and the rule of law are considered cornerstones of 'good governance' a 'good government' by definition is one that demonstrates its commitment to human rights and the rule of law. Any political entity in Somalia seeking international recognition will therefore be assessed, in part, on the establishment of a responsible human rights regime. This includes an obligation to implement those treaties relating to fundamental human rights signed by the former governments of Somalia.

***'Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions aims to protect civilian populations and non-combatants, including prisoners of war, the wounded and the sick, to prohibit extrajudicial executions, hostage taking, humiliating and degrading treatment, harassment of relief workers and the manipulation of humanitarian aid'***



The capacity of administrations to promote human rights is clearly limited. To date, for example, the Somaliland and Puntland administrations have only a limited amount of revenue to invest in public services such as the judiciary. It is rationalised that the primary 'duty' of the administrations is to provide security. Even in a context of limited financial resources, however, a number of practical measures can be taken by Somali administrations to demonstrate their commitment to upholding human rights. These include:

- a plan of action for human rights aimed at advancing ratification of human rights treaties,
- reviewing and amending legislation to ensure rights are adequately protected,
- training of law and order agencies in human rights,
- enabling the formation of credible and impartial national human rights institutions,
- providing civic education that informs people of their civic and legal rights and civic responsibilities,
- promoting civil participation in government,
- ensuring equitable allocation of available development resources,
- reviewing and amending legislation to regulate harmful practices of local and international businesses, and
- guaranteeing the impartial enforcement of the law.

## Somali human rights organisations

States are no longer considered the sole duty-bearers for human rights. In UNDP's definition of 'governance', for example, the private sector and civil

society organisations are perceived to have a critical role in advancing human rights<sup>59</sup>. A striking feature of post-Barre Somalia has been the emergence of non-governmental civil society organisations and their significance has been recognised in the peace processes in Somaliland, Puntland and in the Arta conference.

***'When an individual's human rights are violated it is humanity itself that is violated. It is awareness of this fundamental universality of human rights which provides a key to promoting respect and universal attainment of human rights.'*** Somali human rights activist

For the first time in Somalia, there now exist independent organisations that monitor, raise awareness, and defend human rights. The interests of the organisations vary between minority rights, women and children's rights, with others advocating for the effective implementation of human rights law. In Mogadishu, there are 15 human rights, peace and women's organisations, 11 of whom form the Peace and Human Rights Network (PHRN). In January 2000, the PHRN convened a meeting in Bosasso of 37 organisations from southern and northeast Somalia – the largest cross clan meeting since the start of the civil war – to formulate a position on the Arta peace conference.

The existence of an independent media provides a check on human rights abuse. The Somali diaspora also play a role in monitoring and defending human





rights in Somalia. Improved telecommunications mean that Somalis in the diaspora are able to react swiftly to actions taken by Somali authorities.

The existence of such organisations was unthinkable under the Barre regime, but the absence of government also leaves them without legal protection. The lack of human rights awareness, certain cultural practices, a lack of enforceable constitutional rights, and a weak legal system, present major challenges to these organisations<sup>60</sup>. As advocates of human rights they can be at risk from the warlords and the *shari'a* courts. In Somaliland and Puntland, the authorities have at various times sought to control the activities of these organisations and human rights defenders have on occasion been temporarily detained.

### **Responsibilities of the international community**

The conclusion of the Independent Expert reminds the international community of its responsibilities to the protection and assistance of the war affected populations of Somalia. Crimes against humanity should be acted upon and national governments should take action to prosecute war crime suspects travelling in their countries. At the same time, it should ensure that foreign policies, foreign companies, and patterns of foreign trade, including the exploitation of natural resources and the arms trade, do not negatively impact on the rights of Somali people.

While the international community has a role in enhancing understanding and observance of

human rights and humanitarian principles in Somalia, foreign countries should also uphold their responsibilities towards asylum seekers from Somalia<sup>61</sup>. Support for human rights means not only strengthening institutions for law and order, but also maintaining the flow of assistance to Somali populations to protect their social and economic rights. While families and local administrations may be the primary duty-bearers, their capacity to play this role needs to be strengthened. Diminishing levels of international aid to Somalia since the mid-1990s does not necessarily reflect declining needs, rather a declining level of commitment from international governments.


Finally, as duty-bearers, international aid agencies are accountable for the quality and effectiveness of the assistance they provide. In recent years, international aid agencies have sought to establish minimum rights and claims to humanitarian assistance, by adopting a humanitarian charter and a set of minimum standards for humanitarian assistance<sup>62</sup>. While agreements on standards for health and education provision have been established through the SACB, more could be done to ensure minimum standards of assistance in all sectors. ■



## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Amnesty International (1992) *Somalia - A Human Rights Disaster*. London.
- <sup>2</sup> *The Agenda for Development*, General Assembly resolution A/51/240; *Right to Development*: General Assembly resolution A/51/99.
- <sup>3</sup> OHCHR (1997, March 3) *Report on the situation of human rights in Somalia*. Report of the Independent Expert of the Commission on Human Rights, pursuant to Commission resolution 1996/57 of April 1996. Commission on Human Rights 53 session.
- <sup>4</sup> Besteman, C. & Cassanelli, L.V. (eds) (1996) *The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War*. Colorado/London: Westview Press/HAAN Publishing.
- <sup>5</sup> Samatar, Abdi (1989) *The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia 1884-1986*. Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press; Ahmed I. Samatar (1988) *Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality*. London: Zed Books.
- <sup>6</sup> Ali Jimale Ahmed (ed) (1995). *Preface to The Invention of Somalia*. Lawrenceville: Red Sea Press.
- <sup>7</sup> Notorious cases which fell foul of national security legislation included: the long-term imprisonment of former government officials, including the Prime Minister and Police Commander; the trial, conviction and execution in 1975 of ten religious teachers who objected to the government's amendment of the Islamic law of inheritance; the long-term imprisonment in 1981 of forty professionals (known as the 'Hargeisa Group') for establishing a self-help scheme to improve Hargeisa hospital; and the arrest, in Mogadishu in May 1990, of forty prominent businessmen, politicians and intellectuals for publishing a Manifesto calling for the reinstatement of democracy.
- <sup>8</sup> Africa Watch (1990) *Somalia - A Government At War With Its Own People*. London: Africa Watch.
- <sup>9</sup> Samatar, Said (1991) *Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil*. London: Minority Rights Group.
- <sup>10</sup> Besteman, C. & Cassanelli, L.V. (eds) (1996) *The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War*. Westview Press/HAAN Publishing.
- <sup>11</sup> Cassanelli, L.V. (1996) 'Explaining the Somali Crisis', in Besteman, C. & Cassanelli L.V. (eds) *The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War*. Westview Press/HAAN Publishing.
- <sup>12</sup> Watson, M. (1990) *Collapse of Somalia and the Science of Governance*. London: Management Resource Limited.
- <sup>13</sup> African Rights (1993, October) *Land Tenure, the Creation of Famine, and Prospects for Peace in Somalia*. London: African Rights.
- <sup>14</sup> Menkhaus, K. (1996) 'From Feast to Famine: Land and the State in Somalia's Lower Juba Valley' in Besteman, C. & Cassanelli, L.V. (eds), *The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War*. Westview Press. pp.133-153.
- <sup>15</sup> Menkhaus, K. & Craven, K. 'Land Alienation and the Imposition of State Farms in the Lower Juba Valley', in Besteman, C. & Cassanelli, L.V. (eds) *The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War*. Westview Press/HAAN Publishing. pp. 133-153.
- <sup>16</sup> *ibid* p.175.
- <sup>17</sup> African Rights (1993, October) *Land Tenure, the Creation of Famine, and Prospects for Peace in Somalia*. London: African Rights.
- <sup>18</sup> Besteman, C. & Cassanelli, L.V. (eds) (1996) *The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War*. Westview Press/HAAN Publishing.
- <sup>19</sup> Menkhaus, K. (1996) 'From Feast to Famine: Land and the State in Somalia's Lower Juba Valley' in Besteman, C. & Cassanelli, L.V. (eds) *The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War*. Westview Press/HAAN Publishing. pp.133-153.
- <sup>20</sup> The US government, for example, ignored its own legal restrictions on providing financial assistance to regimes engaged in human rights violations, and continued providing financial and military support to the regime even after the outbreak of war in northwest Somalia in 1988.
- <sup>21</sup> Menkhaus, K. (1996) 'From Feast to Famine: Land and the State in Somalia's Lower Juba Valley' in Besteman, C. & Cassanelli, L.V. (eds) *The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War*. Westview Press/HAAN Publishing. pp.133-153.
- <sup>22</sup> Amnesty International, Africa Watch and the General Accounting Office of the US Congress published lengthy reports on the civil war, refugees and the human rights situation in Somalia.
- <sup>23</sup> Over a decade later the final repatriation of some of those who fled to Ethiopia got underway in 2000.
- <sup>24</sup> For an example of the long-term consequences of such actions, see Marchal, R. (1997) 'Forms of Violence and Ways to Control it: The Mooryaan of Mogadishu', in Hussein M. Adam & Ford, R. (eds) *Mending Rips in Sky: Options for Somali Communities in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. Red Sea Press. He describes how children of families affected by military action against the SSDF in the late 1970s became members of 'delinquent' gangs of alienated youth in Mogadishu and *mooryaan* (armed looters) during the war.
- <sup>25</sup> Human Rights Watch (1993, June) *The Lost Agenda: Human Rights and UN Field Operations*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- <sup>26</sup> UN forces were accused of firing on unarmed demonstrators, killing unarmed civilians, the forced relocation of residents, destruction of public and private property, an attack on a hospital, the bombing of a political meeting in Mogadishu, beatings, and torture. The Canadian, Belgium, Italian, and German governments have held commissions of enquiries into the behaviour of their troops in Somalia.
- <sup>27</sup> Compagnon, D. (1990) 'The Somali Opposition Fronts', in *Horn of Africa* vol. XIII, no.1&2. See, for example, the Manifesto of the SNM.
- <sup>28</sup> For a discussion of *caado* and *dhagan* see Drysdale, J. (2000) *Stoics without Pillows*. London: HAAN.
- <sup>29</sup> Puntland Development Research Centre (PDRC) (2000 October) *Harmonisation of Somali Legal Traditions (shari'a and xeer) and Secular Law in the Puntland State of Somalia: Concept and Format of Workshop Discussion Paper*. Garowe.
- <sup>30</sup> Some Somalis describe this as the 'ruralisation' of Somalia. *ibid*.

- <sup>31</sup> Pankhurst, D. (1998, February) *Issues of Justice and Reconciliation in Complex Political Emergencies*, Case Study Paper for COPE Project.
- <sup>32</sup> Kassahun, Y. (1997, March) *The Courts: Problems, Prospects and Role in Somalia's Emerging Regions*. Nairobi: European Union Somalia Unit.
- <sup>33</sup> For example, *shari'a* courts in Mogadishu receive revenue from the ports of El Ma'an and Merka. In Mogadishu they also receive income from certification of imported vehicles.
- <sup>34</sup> Kassahun, Y. (1997, March) *The Courts: Problems, Prospects and Role in Somalia's Emerging Regions*. Nairobi: European Union Somalia Unit.
- <sup>35</sup> Several Islamic movements exist in Somalia, some long established, others of more recent origin. They include various Sufis *туруq* which are the oldest Islamic sects in Somalia; Al-Tabliiq, a sect whose members are educated in Pakistan; Al Itixaad al Islam, believed to have been operating since 1988 in Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia, with a political and military agenda; Hisbul Islam, formed in 1996 after splitting from Al Itixaad; Al Islah are affiliated with Al Akwan in Egypt and movements in Yemen and Kuwait who focus on reconciliation while spreading Islam and advocating for an Islamic constitution; Majmaal Islam, established in 1975 to resist Barre's anti-Islamic doctrine, whose scholars were educated in Al Ahzar and who supported creation of courts in 1991 and are linked to Egypt and Sudan; and The Islamic Law Enforcement Body which are supportive of the *shari'a* courts.
- <sup>36</sup> In workshops on the role of women held in Puntland in 1999 this was strongly condemned by some religious leaders. See War-torn Societies Project (2001) *Rebuilding Somalia: issues and possibilities for Puntland*. London: HAAN Associates/WSP International.
- <sup>37</sup> Bradbury, M. (1997) *Somaliland Country Report*. London: CIIR.
- <sup>38</sup> The Constitution was drafted during the 1996/97 national conference in Hargeisa (see appendix 2).
- <sup>39</sup> War-torn Societies Project (2001) *Rebuilding Somalia: issues and possibilities for Puntland*. London: HAAN Associates/WSP International.
- <sup>40</sup> In October 1998, in the presence of Amnesty International, the Somaliland president publicly pledged to adhere to the UDHR.
- <sup>41</sup> Campo, A. & Battera, F. (1999, July) *Judiciary System in Somaliland*. Nairobi: UNDOS/UNDP.
- <sup>42</sup> Puntland Development Research Centre (2000 October) *Harmonisation of Somali Legal Traditions (shari'a and xeer) and Secular Law in the Puntland State of Somalia: Concept and Format of Workshop Discussion Paper*. Garowe.
- <sup>43</sup> Campo, A. & Tahlil H. Ahmed. (1999 November) *Assessment of the Judiciary System of Somaliland* (Draft). Nairobi: UNDOS/UNDP.
- <sup>44</sup> Ministry of National Planning and Coordination, *Somaliland National Development Plan for 2001-2003: Prerequisites and policy framework for sustainable transition and recovery*.
- <sup>45</sup> Horn Watch (2000, June-September) *Human Rights Violations against Women and Children in North West Region of Somaliland*. Hargeisa: Horn Watch.
- <sup>46</sup> Kurbiel, L.A. (1998, April 30) *Human Rights within the Somali Civil Protection Programme*. Nairobi: UNDP/UNOPS.
- <sup>47</sup> OHCHR (2000, January 26) *Situation of Human Rights in Somalia*. Report of the Special Rapporteur. E/CN.4/2000/110. United Nations Economic and Social Council.
- <sup>48</sup> Galtung, J. (1990).
- <sup>49</sup> Mani, R. (1999, September) *Building a Just Peace: The Quest for Justice in Post-Conflict Societies*. Dissertation submitted for the Ph.D. Degree. Faculty of Social and Political Sciences. University of Cambridge.
- <sup>50</sup> Besteman, C. & Cassanelli, L.V. (eds) (1996) *The Struggle for Land in Southern Somalia: The War Behind the War*. Westview Press/HAAN Publishing. p.ix.
- <sup>51</sup> OHCHR (1997, March 3) *Report on the situation of human rights in Somalia*, prepared by the Independent Expert of the Commission on Human Rights. Commission on Human Rights 53 session.
- <sup>52</sup> UNDP/UNCU/OHCHR (2001, August) *Human Rights & Human Development. Report of a workshop 15th - 19th August, 2001*.
- <sup>53</sup> UNCU Somalia (2000, May 19) *Responding to Internal Displacement: A profile of needs and activities in Somalia*. (Draft).
- <sup>54</sup> Medani, Khalid. (2000) *Report on Migration and Remittance Inflows: Northwest and Northeast Somalia*. Nairobi: UNCU/FSAU.
- <sup>55</sup> Prendiville, N. (1998) 'The role and effectiveness of traditional birth attendants in Somalia', in *Evaluation and Program Planning* 21. Elsevier Science Ltd. pp.353-361.
- <sup>56</sup> UNICEF/UNDP/UNESCO/UNFPA (2000) *Somalia: Year 2000 Education for All Assessment Report*. Nairobi.
- <sup>57</sup> See WSP-International (2001) *Rebuilding Somalia: issues and possibilities for Puntland*. HAAN: London.
- <sup>58</sup> Giama, S. (2000) *Caring for our Children - the Somali Tradition*. Nairobi: UNICEF Somalia.
- <sup>59</sup> UNDP (1997, January) *Governance for sustainable human development*. New York: UNDP.
- <sup>60</sup> Horn Watch (2000, June-September) *Human Rights Violations against Women and Children in North West Region of Somaliland*. Hargeisa: Horn Watch.
- <sup>61</sup> OHCHR (2000, January 26) *Situation of Human Rights in Somalia*. Report of the Special Rapporteur. E/CN.4/2000/110. United Nations Economic and Social Council. In her report of January 2000, the Expert expressed concern that a draft EU proposal for entering dialogue with regional authorities on arrangements for identification and documentation of returnees should not result in the forced return of asylum seekers to Somalia.
- <sup>62</sup> Sphere Project (1998) *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*. Geneva.



# Chapter 5



# Human Development Indicators

## Data Collection In Somalia

**D**uring the 1990s, Somalia slipped down the list of least developed countries from 123 to 172, and since 1997 has not been ranked in UNDP's global Human Development Index. Instead, Somalia is included in a separate table of countries for which the statistical data is considered to be inadequate to construct the Human Development Index (HDI).

**Table 5.1 - Somalia's Ranking in Human Development<sup>1</sup>**

Year	Global HDI Ranking	HDI
1990	123 out of 130 countries	0.200
1991	149 out of 160 countries	0.118
1992	151 out of 160 countries	0.088
1993	166 out of 173 countries	0.087
1994	165 out of 173 countries	0.217
1995	166 out of 174 countries	0.246
1996	172 out of 174 countries	0.221

<sup>1</sup> UNDP (1993) *Human Development Reports 1990-1996*.

Data collection and analysis is essential for understanding and meeting humanitarian and development needs. In the absence of adequate information, calculations of poverty or decisions in the provision of aid will be based on guesswork and hunches<sup>1</sup>. As vulnerability is socially constructed, the mapping of humanitarian risk not only requires information on food needs, but also cross-sectoral information on health, population movements, and socio-economic and political trends. Likewise, a holistic monitoring

system is required to assess progress in meeting international development targets and for purposes of accountability.

In Somalia the challenges of data collection and analysis are not new. Population statistics have long been controversial and deficiencies in all forms of data have been particularly apparent for nomadic households that constitutes up to half of Somalia's population. The 1985 census, for example, only

recorded fertility and mortality data for the sedentary population<sup>1</sup>. Somalia's pre-war economy confounded conventional economic analysis and led some analysts to question the description of Somalia as one of the world's poorest countries<sup>3</sup>. This situation has not changed. There is no accurate data on remittance flows, for example, but some

of the higher estimates completely change calculations of per capita GNP<sup>4</sup>. What has changed are the multiple actors gathering and using information in Somalia. The national institutions for data collection and storage were one of the many casualties of the Somali civil war.

Although there is insufficient reliable data to calculate all the human development indices and to complete all 31 indicator tables used in the global HDR



a large body of information on Somalia does exist. A reasonably sophisticated early warning system exists through FEWS and the FSAU. Databases exist on health, water, and economic issues. The SACB Programme Matrix of UN and NGO Activities lists aid projects by location, sector and approximate beneficiaries.

Gaps exist, however, in the type of data collected and the quality of data collection and analysis. There is an absence of comprehensive baseline statistics. Information on population movement and displacement or seasonal migration patterns is weak. The informalisation of the economy makes economic analysis particularly difficult and the extent of privatised services such as education is unknown. As data collection is dependent on the quality of access, there is a bias in the volume and quality of data collected to areas where there is better security. More information is available on Somaliland and Puntland than many southern and central regions, although improved security in Bay and Bakol regions since 1999 has increased the data available from those regions. For the purposes of this report many data sources were consulted, but the report mainly uses the data of UN agencies, rather than that collected by smaller agencies due to their generally limited geographical and demographic coverage. Much use is made of the UNICEF End Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey.

In the absence of a central government, the UN has no single counterpart with whom to develop a Common Country Assessment. Consequently, for Somalia as a whole there are currently no common

development objectives agreed between local administrations and international agencies or methods for monitoring and reporting on efforts to achieve international development targets. Individual agencies instead agree objectives with local partners. The multiple actors involved in Somalia and the absence of a competent central government body responsible for the collection and collation of data mean that data suffers from methodological inconsistencies. Agency mandates and needs greatly influence the type and quality of information collected. The different population estimates of the Ministry of Planning in Somaliland and the UN are illustrative of this. Changes in methodologies over time complicate the monitoring of long-term trends. Definitions of literacy, for example, have changed since pre-war. In addition, mass population movements during the war make pre-war population figures largely meaningless. Assessing trends and making comparative judgements is, therefore, problematic.

A key issue revolves around the question of the beneficiaries and users of the data collection and analysis. In the decade that Somalia has been without national government and nationally planned development programmes, participatory methods of data collection and analysis have been popularised. The World Bank Consultations with the Poor in Somaliland is illustrative of this<sup>5</sup>. Advocates of participatory methods argue that external definitions of development do not necessarily reflect local realities (see box 5.1) and that the primary collectors, analysts and users of data should be the communities and households at the receiving end of aid interventions.



## Somalia

### Human Development Report 2001

The 1998 HDR for Somalia included the first HDI for Somalia. The 2001 HDR for Somalia updates this index using data collected through a household socio-economic survey conducted by UNDP (see box 5.2). The report also provides a number of other human development indicator tables. These tables

are intended to make the HDR more useful for planning purposes for Somali administrations and aid agencies and to provide a baseline for future data collection and analysis for a UN Common Country Assessment. Some of the indices, such as the Human Poverty Index, are impossible to complete

#### Box 5.1: The Complexities and Challenges of Data Collection and Use in Somaliland<sup>1</sup>

What does the Human Development Index in Somaliland mean? What does it really tell us about the country and its people? What are the issues and challenges facing the collection of relevant data?

If we confine ourselves to the 'facts and figures', we might acknowledge the utility of an index that captures the 'reality' of Somaliland and ranks it against other countries according to their progress in human development. The HDI does appear to provide a method for cutting through the noisy and confusing interests of the population to arrive at an agreed and useful set of facts. However, the HDI offers only one reality amongst many and the trustworthiness and utility of 'facts' in Somaliland should be approached with caution, as validity and reliability in data collection are elusive ideals in Somaliland. Of course, the collection of some data is always possible, but unless criteria of validity and reliability - the cornerstones of sound quantitative research - are met, the quality of data will be below standard and its trustworthiness will remain unestablished. The challenges to consistent data collection in Somaliland are tremendous:

■ **Baseline data:** Baseline data would normally provide a historical backdrop against which to monitor trends or to cast new research. Baseline data is normally derived from population censuses and social and economic surveys, neither of which are carried out consistently in Somaliland and very few mechanisms and procedures are in place for the collection of longitudinal data. A glaring example is the absence of reliable demographic statistics. In addition, the body of accumulated knowledge inherent to other countries is not present in Somaliland. Without this, peer reviews of findings are not possible. The only way in which data claims can be evaluated is either through an examination of the methodology used or through an appeal to common sense. However, few research projects include explanations of objectives or scientific safeguards. Much of the data that is collected is done by individual organisations for individual projects, according to different methods, with a result that consistency suffers. Some projects are therefore designed on the basis of outdated figures or pure speculation.

■ **Sampling:** *Integral* to ensuring the validity of data are the identification of the correct population and the acceptable application of accurate sampling frames. Geographically, Somaliland provides a demanding environment for data collection. Large semi-arid tracts of land overlaid by a weak infrastructure make travelling arduous. Maps are only moderately reliable and some regional and sub-regional boundaries are disputed. The authorities and other organisations tend to restrict research to urban areas, in particular the capital Hargeisa, resulting in an urban bias in data and unwarranted generalisations about the whole country.

■ **Cross-cultural understanding:** Data collection in Somaliland by international aid organisations is beset with the complexity of cross-cultural understanding. Translation from Somali to a foreign language can lead to errors in responses and recording of responses, which can threaten the viability of data. This holds true

<sup>1</sup> The author, Vaughn Dutton, was seconded by International Cooperation for Development to work as a technical advisor to the Department of Statistics in the Ministry of National Planning Hargeisa, in 2000. The article reflects the view of the author, and not necessarily that of the Ministry or UNDP.



due to deficiencies in data. For other indicator tables additional data is presented or reformatted to better reflect the realities in Somalia. Where feasible - and

despite the obvious methodological problems - the data is presented to illustrate trends and variations in human development in Somalia. ■

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup>UNCU Somalia (2000, June 6) *Data Collection for Monitoring and Reporting on Somalia*. Draft discussion paper. Nairobi.
- <sup>2</sup>Vaidyanathan, K.E. (1997, December) *Report of the UNFPA Consultant on Population Statistics of Somalia*. Nairobi: UNDOS. p.2.
- <sup>3</sup>Jamal, V. (1998) 'Somalia: Understanding an Unconventional Economy', *Development and Change*, vol.19. p.205.
- <sup>4</sup>Ahmed, Ismail I. 'Remittances and their Economic Impact in Post-War Somaliland', *Disasters (2000)* 24, 4.
- <sup>5</sup>ActionAid (1999) *Consultations with the Poor, Somaliland*. World Development Report.

not only for language but also concepts. Interviewer expectations and varying exposure to Western culture and language can influence local interpretations of what is implied in research questions and what constitutes an appropriate response. Perhaps a greater challenge is how to incorporate a sociological understanding of Somali society into research and data collection. Stratifying Somali populations into categories of 'families' and 'communities', 'urban' and 'rural', 'wealthy' and 'poor' presents real conceptual problems. Furthermore, the movement patterns of large sections of this highly mobile population are not well understood and can result in the production of impractical samples. A premature understanding of the culture can result in invalid assumptions and hurried inferences and flawed data. Indices such as 'personal distress' are based on proxy variables that may be valid in the West but cannot simply be cut and pasted to Somali culture.

■ **Resources:** Limited resources, arduous field conditions and the absence of human resources at all levels of expertise also place limits on data collection. Limited public interest in data collection and distrust of such activities means that the potential payback for Somali professionals to participate in this field is marginal.

The creation of a Somaliland-specific research framework is possible in the future, but its implementation is still many years off. Currently, data collection is strongest in areas where there are international interests, such as in de-mining, IDPs and returnees, and certain health issues, or government interest, such as in education, agriculture, health, and commerce.

At this stage in Somaliland's development, data collection should be designed to aid the national planning activities of the administration. With a national plan, a local method of gauging the country's 'progress' can be produced. However, the breadth of sectoral data needed for national planning is daunting. Currently, the creation of a government-centred information system is unthinkable, considering the human and material resources available to it. National planning is only feasible in collaboration with civil society and coordinating the information flows generated in this sector. For the foreseeable future, the national planning function of the administration will have to confine itself to the secondary analysis of relevant statistics solicited through the cooperation of local and international actors. The creation of a Somaliland national plan for 2000 was a step towards this end.

With some refinement, incorporating local indicators and considering local realities, this document could in the future provide an alternative picture of Somaliland's reality to that offered by the HDI. The advantages of this would be twofold. First, a Somaliland-specific index would be more immediately useful to local users and serve as a guide for local action. Second, foreign representations of the area (such as through the HDI) could be challenged and a more local and differentiated reality portrayed.





## Human Development Indicators Somalia 2001

**Table A - The Human Development Index, Somalia 2001<sup>1</sup>**

Indicator	Indicator		
	1989-90 [base]	1995-97 [median]	2001
Life expectancy at birth (years)	46.0	42.0	47.0
Adult literacy rate	24.0	15.5	17.1
Primary school enrolment ratio (6-12 years)	18.0	11.5	13.6
Secondary school enrolment ratio (13-16 years)	10.0	0.4	1.1
Tertiary enrolment ratio	3.0	--	0.1
Combined gross enrolment ratio	12.9	6.6	7.5
Real GDP per capita (PPP US\$)	836.0	650	795.0
Life expectancy index	0.350	0.283	0.367
Adult literacy index	0.240	0.155	0.171
Gross enrolment index	0.129	0.066	0.074
Educational attainment index	0.203	0.125	0.139
Real GDP per capita income index	0.354	0.312	0.364
<b>Human Development Index</b>	<b>0.303</b>	<b>0.240</b>	<b>0.284</b>

<sup>1</sup> The HDI for 2001 uses data collected through a socio-economic household survey managed by UNDP, primary school data from UNICEF, and demographic data from UNFPA. The index for the base and 1995-1997 are computed using UNDP's current methodology and are therefore adjusted from previous values.

### Box 5.2: UNDP's Socio-economic Household Survey 2001

In July 2001, UNDP embarked upon a socio-economic household survey in Somalia. This was the first such survey for several years. The purpose of the survey was to assess levels of development at national and regional levels. This was done by collecting data on household-level, socio-economic, and demographic characteristics, using a detailed questionnaire.

A set of indicators will be compiled that can be used to:

- prepare a common country assessment (CCA);
- prepare the human development index (HDI); and
- measure and monitor the global development goals, as outlined by various UN global conferences and summits.

The survey followed standard concepts, definitions and methodologies to make the results internationally comparable. However, unlike in other countries, there is no established sampling framework for Somalia. Population estimates for the surveys were based on UNDOS/ UNDP's socio-economic reports covering 10 regions which were conducted between 1996 and 1998, and UNFPA's 1997 report on population. In consultation with the Kenya Bureau of Statistics and Nairobi University, a sample size of 3,240 households in 300 clusters was decided upon, covering urban and rural environments. The first phase of the survey was completed in September 2001, by which time most regions of Somalia had been covered, with the exception of Puntland and the Juba regions.

There was considered to be sufficient data from these sources to compute the Human Development Index, and to present the preliminary data on per capita household income in this 2001 Human Development Report.



**Table B - Demographic Profile**

	Indicator		Year
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	
Total population (million)	7.5 <sup>1</sup>	6.38 <sup>2</sup>	1997
Population male (million)	--	3.3 <sup>2</sup>	1997
Population female (million)	--	3.0 <sup>2</sup>	1997
Life expectancy at birth (years)	47 <sup>3</sup>	47 <sup>2</sup>	1997
Annual population growth rate (%)	4.6 <sup>4</sup>	2.76 <sup>2</sup>	1997
Urban population (%)	23.5 <sup>5</sup>	--	1987
Rural settled population (%)	17.1 <sup>6</sup>	--	1987
Nomadic population(%)	59.4 <sup>6</sup>	--	1987
Urban population annual growth rate 1960-90 (%)	5.8 <sup>7</sup>	--	1991
Dependency ratio (%)	101 <sup>8</sup>	88.5 <sup>9</sup>	1997
Population 65 years and above (%)	2.7 <sup>9</sup>	2.9 <sup>9</sup>	1997
Population 15-64 years (%)	--	53.1 <sup>9</sup>	1997
Population under 15 years (%)	47 <sup>9</sup>	44.0 <sup>9</sup>	1997
Population under 5 years (%)	--	16.8 <sup>9</sup>	1997

<sup>1</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 21. p.161.

<sup>2</sup> Vaidyanathan, K.E. (1997, December) *Report of the UNFPA Consultant on Population Statistics of Somalia*. Nairobi: UNDOS.

<sup>3</sup> WHO (1990) in the *Eastern Mediterranean Region. Annual Report of the Regional Director*.

<sup>4</sup> Second National Population and Housing Census (1986/87) cited in UNICEF (1991). *An Analysis of the Situation of Children and Women in Somalia*.

<sup>5</sup> These figures are taken from The Second National Population and Housing Census (1986/87), cited in UNICEF (1991). *An Analysis of the Situation of Children and Women in Somalia*. The Ministry of National Planning (1987, June) *Somalia in Figures 9<sup>th</sup> Edition*, cited in UNICEF 1987 *Women and Children in Somalia A Situation Analysis*, gives different proportions of 24% urban, 21% rural settled and 44 % nomadic.

<sup>6</sup> Ministry of National Planning (1987, June) *Somalia in Figures 9<sup>th</sup> Edition*.

<sup>7</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 21. p.161.

<sup>8</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 20. p.159.

<sup>9</sup> Fowler, US Bureau of Census (March 1996). Consultation with UNDOS, WHO, active agencies and NGOs.

**Table C - Populations in Distress**

	Latest data	Year
People killed in disasters	50,000 (est.) killed in northwest Somalia <sup>1</sup>	1988
	40,000 (est.) killed in fighting in south and central Somalia <sup>2</sup>	1991/92
	240,000 – 280,000 (est.) died from starvation and disease <sup>3</sup>	1991/92
Internally displaced persons	300,000 <sup>4</sup>	2001
Refugees (neighbouring countries only)	246,400 <sup>5</sup>	2001

<sup>1</sup> Africa Watch (1990) *Somalia: A government at war with its own people*. New York: The Africa Watch Committee.

<sup>2</sup> Hansch, S., Lillibridge, S., Egeland, G., Teller, C. & Toole, M. (1994, November) *Lives Lost, Lives Saved. Excess Mortality and the Impact of Health Interventions in the Somali Emergency*. Washington.

<sup>3</sup> Re Hansch, S., Lillibridge, S., Egeland, G., Teller, C. & Toole, M. (1994, November) *Lives Lost, Lives Saved. Excess Mortality and the Impact of Health Interventions in the Somali Emergency*. Washington. Some estimates place the death toll from starvation and disease as high as 500,000.

<sup>4</sup> United States Committee for Refugees (2001). Internet: [www.refugees.org](http://www.refugees.org)

<sup>5</sup> UNHCR (2001) Regional Office for Somalia, Nairobi.



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**Table D - Profile of Human Poverty**

	Indicator		
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	Year
Adult literacy rate (%)	24 <sup>1</sup>	17.1 <sup>2</sup>	2001
Distribution of the adult literate population in Somalia			
urban	--	35.2 <sup>2</sup>	2001
rural/nomadic	--	9.9 <sup>2</sup>	2001
% of population without access to safe water	71.0 <sup>3</sup>	76.9 <sup>4</sup>	1999
urban	--	68.7 <sup>4</sup>	1999
rural settled	--	81.4 <sup>4</sup>	1999
nomadic	--	88.5 <sup>4</sup>	1999
% of population without access to health services	72 <sup>5</sup>	--	1989
urban	--	50 <sup>6</sup>	1993
rural	--	85 <sup>6</sup>	1993
% of population without access to sanitation	82 <sup>7</sup>	48.5 <sup>8</sup>	1999
Population below income poverty line of US \$1 per day (%)	60.0 <sup>9</sup>	--	1990

<sup>1</sup> UNESCO (1993) *Year Book*.

<sup>2</sup> UNDP Somalia (2001) *Socio-economic Household Survey*. Nairobi.

<sup>3</sup> SACB (2000, October) *Strategic Framework in Support of the Health Sector in Somalia*. vol.1, referencing World Bank in 1998 states that 29% of the population have access to clean water.

<sup>4</sup> UNICEF (2001) *End Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Full Technical Report for Somalia*. Nairobi. Percentage of population with access to safe drinking water, Somalia, 1999. Table 13.

<sup>5</sup> SACB (2000, October) *Strategic Framework in Support of the Health Sector in Somalia*. vol.1, referencing World Bank in 1989 states that 28% of the population have access to health services.

<sup>6</sup> For 1985-1993 UNDP (1995) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 6. p167.

<sup>7</sup> For 1988-1993 UNDP (1995) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 2. p159.

<sup>8</sup> UNICEF (2001) *End Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Full Technical Report for Somalia*, Nairobi. The percentage of population with access to sanitary means of excreta disposal, Somalia, 1999. Table 14.

<sup>9</sup> UNDP (1994) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 18. p165.



**Table E - Progress in Survival**

	Indicator		
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	Year
Life expectancy at birth (years)	47 <sup>1</sup>	47 <sup>2</sup>	1997
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	152 <sup>3</sup>	132 <sup>4</sup>	1999
male	--	134 <sup>4</sup>	1999
female	--	130 <sup>4</sup>	1999
Central/South	--	137 <sup>4</sup>	1999
North East	--	133 <sup>4</sup>	1999
North West	--	113 <sup>4</sup>	1999
urban	--	129 <sup>4</sup>	1999
rural settled	--	144 <sup>4</sup>	1999
nomadic	--	119 <sup>4</sup>	1999
Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	275 <sup>5</sup>	224 <sup>4</sup>	1999
male	--	221 <sup>4</sup>	1999
female	--	227 <sup>4</sup>	1999
Central/South	--	231 <sup>4</sup>	1999
North East	--	225 <sup>4</sup>	1999
North West	--	188 <sup>4</sup>	1999
urban	--	218 <sup>4</sup>	1999
rural settled	--	244 <sup>4</sup>	1999
nomadic	--	200 <sup>4</sup>	1999
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,00 live births)	1,600 <sup>6</sup>	1,600 <sup>7</sup>	2000

<sup>1</sup> WHO (1990) *The Work of WHO in the Eastern Mediterranean Region. Annual Report of the Regional Director.*

<sup>2</sup> Vaidyanathan, K.E. (1997, December) *Report of the UNFPA Consultant on Population Statistics of Somalia.* Nairobi: UNDOS.

<sup>3</sup> UNICEF (1991) *An Analysis of the Situation of Children and Women in Somalia.*

<sup>4</sup> UNICEF (2001) *End Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Full Technical Report for Somalia.* Nairobi. Infant and Under-Five Mortality Rates Somalia, 1999. Table 8.

<sup>5</sup> UNICEF (1991) *An Analysis of the Situation of Children and Women in Somalia.* This was the official government figure in 1988, but UNICEF estimated a U5MR between 325-375.

<sup>6</sup> UNICEF/WHO (1990); WHO (1999) *Demographic and Health Indicators for Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean.* SACB (2000, October) *Strategic Framework in Support of the Health Sector in Somalia.* vol.1.

<sup>7</sup> UNICEF (1998) *Children and Women in Somalia: A Situation Analysis.* Figure currently agreed by UNICEF Headquarters, also SACB (2000, October) *Strategic Framework in Support of the Health Sector in Somalia.* vol.1. A Safe Motherhood survey by CARE in December 1999 using the sisterhood method estimated Maternal Mortality for Somaliland as 828/100,000.

**Table F - Trends in Human Development and Economic Growth**

	Indicator		
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	Year
Human Development Index (HDI)	0.303 <sup>1</sup>	0.284 <sup>2</sup>	2001
Real GDP per capita (PPP US\$)	836 <sup>1</sup>	795 <sup>2</sup>	2001

<sup>1</sup> UNDP Somalia (2001) *Socio-economic Household Survey.* Nairobi. Figures adjusted to make them comparable with 2001 GDP.

<sup>2</sup> UNDP Somalia (2001) *Socio-economic Household Survey.* Nairobi.



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**Table G - Health Profile**

	Indicator		
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	Year
Infants with low birth weight (%)	16 <sup>1</sup>	0.3 <sup>2</sup>	1999
Children 1-5 immunised against all childhood diseases (%)	--	27 <sup>3</sup>	2000
One year olds immunised against all childhood diseases (%)	--	10.6 <sup>4</sup>	1999
One year olds fully immunised against polio (%)	--	36.9 <sup>4</sup>	1999
One year olds fully immunised against TB (%)	31 <sup>5</sup>	63.9 <sup>4</sup>	1999
One year olds fully immunised against measles (%)	30 <sup>6</sup>	15.6 <sup>4</sup>	1999
Oral rehydration therapy use (%)	78 <sup>7</sup>	67.2 <sup>8</sup>	1999
Pregnant women with anaemia (%)	40.7 <sup>9</sup>	--	1990
Female genital mutilation (%)	--	99.4 <sup>10</sup>	2000
Tuberculosis (per 100,000)	162 <sup>11</sup>	200 <sup>12</sup>	1993
Annual TB cases (smear positive)	--	14,800 <sup>13</sup>	1993
Total cholera cases	--	7,496 <sup>14</sup>	2000
Total malaria cases	--	104,862 <sup>14</sup>	2000
Total leprosy cases	--	222 <sup>14</sup>	2000
Fatality due to measles	8,000 <sup>15</sup>	15,400 <sup>16</sup>	1997
Total recorded people living with HIV/AIDS (0-49 years)	5 <sup>17</sup>	73 <sup>18</sup>	2000
HIV/AIDS (% adults 15-49 years)	--	< 1 <sup>19</sup>	1999
Doctors per 100,000	0.6 <sup>20</sup>	0.4 <sup>21</sup>	1997
Nurses per 100,000	2.8 <sup>21</sup>	2.0 <sup>21</sup>	1997

<sup>1</sup> WHO/UNICEF (1996) cited in the *Demographic, Health and Socio-economic Data for Somalia 1998* by WR Somalia.

<sup>2</sup> UNICEF (2001) *End Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Full Technical Report for Somalia*. Nairobi. Percentage of live births in the last 12 months weighing below 2500 grams at birth, Somalia, 1999. Table 20.

<sup>3</sup> UNICEF Somalia (2001) *EPI Strategy Review*.

<sup>4</sup> UNICEF (2001) *End Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Full Technical Report for Somalia*. Nairobi. Percentage of children age 12-23 months currently vaccinated against childhood diseases, Somalia, 1999. Table 21.

<sup>5</sup> For 1987-1993. UNDP (1995) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 8. p.171.

<sup>6</sup> WHO/UNICEF (1996) cited in the *Demographic, Health and Socio-economic Data for Somalia 1998* by WR Somalia.

<sup>7</sup> For 1987-1993. UNDP (1995) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 7. p.169.

<sup>8</sup> UNICEF (2001) *End Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Full Technical Report for Somalia*. Nairobi. Percentage of under-five children with diarrhea in the last two weeks and treatment with ORS and ORT, Somalia, 1999. Table 23.

<sup>9</sup> UNICEF (1991) *An Analysis of the Situation of Children and Women in Somalia*.

<sup>10</sup> WHO (2000, March) *Baseline KAP Survey on Reproductive Health and Family Planning in North East and North West Regions of Somalia*. Nairobi: Population Studies and Research Institute, University of Nairobi.

<sup>11</sup> UNICEF (1991) *An Analysis of the Situation of Women and Children in Somalia*.

<sup>12</sup> Sudre, P. (1993) *Tuberculosis Control in Somalia*. WHO Consultant report EM/TUB/180/E/R/5.93.

<sup>13</sup> This figure is computed on the population estimates from UNICEF (2001) *End Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Full Technical Report for Somalia*, and Sudre, P. (1993) *Tuberculosis Control in Somalia*. WHO Consultant report EM/TUB/180/E/R/5.93.

<sup>14</sup> WHO (2000) *Annual Report 2000*, Somalia Country Office.

<sup>15</sup> Resulting from 176,000 cases annually. UNICEF (1991) *An Analysis of the Situation of Children and Women in Somalia*.

<sup>16</sup> Estimated deaths due to measles in 1997. UNICEF "Measles Control" (CF/IPD/PRO/97-008).

<sup>17</sup> WHO (1998) *Demographic, Health and Socio-economic Data for Somalia*.

<sup>18</sup> WHO (2000) Somalia Office.

<sup>19</sup> SACB (2000, October) *Strategic Framework in Support of the Health Sector in Somalia*. vol.1.

<sup>20</sup> WHO (1990) *The Work of WHO in the Eastern Mediterranean Region. Annual Report of the Regional Director*.

<sup>21</sup> WHO (1999) *Demographic and health Indicators for Countries in the Eastern Mediterranean*.



**Table H - Education Profile**

	Indicator		
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	Year
Adult literacy rate (% above 15)	24.0 <sup>1</sup>	17.1 <sup>2</sup>	2001
Youth literacy rate (% 15-24)	--	--	--
Primary age group enrolment ratio (% of relevant age group enrolled in primary school)	18 <sup>3</sup>	13.6 <sup>4</sup>	2001
grades 1-4 male	--	63.0 <sup>5</sup>	2000/01
female	--	37.0 <sup>5</sup>	2001/01
grades 5-8 male	--	71.0 <sup>5</sup>	2000/01
female	--	29.0 <sup>5</sup>	2000/01
Enrolled children of primary school age who are attending school (%)	--	58.4 <sup>6</sup>	1999
Central/South	--	58.6 <sup>6</sup>	1999
North East	--	47.0 <sup>6</sup>	1999
North West	--	87.8 <sup>6</sup>	1999
urban	--	61.8 <sup>6</sup>	1999
rural settled	--	57.0 <sup>6</sup>	1999
nomadic	--	36.3 <sup>6</sup>	1999
Children reaching grade 5 (%)	--	72.5 <sup>7</sup>	1999
Secondary enrolment ratio (% of relevant age group enrolled in secondary school)	10.0 <sup>8</sup>	1.1 <sup>2</sup>	2001
Tertiary enrolment ratio (%)	2.9 <sup>8</sup>	0.1 <sup>2</sup>	2001
Tertiary students in science (as % of total tertiary)	18.0 <sup>9</sup>	--	1988
Combined gross enrolment ratio (%)	12.9 <sup>3</sup>	6.6 <sup>2</sup>	2001
Public education expenditure			
as % of GNP	6.0 <sup>10</sup>	--	1986
as % of total government expenditure	2.8 <sup>11</sup>	--	1988

<sup>1</sup> UNESCO (1993) *Year Book*.

<sup>2</sup> UNDP Somalia (2001) *Socio-economic Household Survey*. Nairobi.

<sup>3</sup> UNICEF (2001) Regional Office for Somalia, Nairobi.

<sup>4</sup> This figure is calculated on the basis of UNICEF (2001) *Survey of Primary Schools in Somalia 2000/2001*. vol.1: *Technical Report*, Nairobi, and a population figure of 6.38 million.

<sup>5</sup> UNICEF (2001) *Survey of Primary Schools in Somalia 2000/2001*. vol.1: *Technical Report*, Nairobi.

<sup>6</sup> UNICEF (2001) *End Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Full Technical Report for Somalia*, Nairobi. Percentage of children of primary school age attending primary school, Somalia, 1999. Table 10. This high attendance figure may reflect the fact that the survey took place at the start of the school term.

<sup>7</sup> UNICEF (2001) *End Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Full Technical Report for Somalia*, Nairobi. Percentage of children entering first grade primary school who eventually reach grade 5, Somalia, 1999. Table 11.

<sup>8</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 14. .p147.

<sup>9</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 15. p.149.

<sup>10</sup> For the year 1986. UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 15. .p149.

<sup>11</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 15. p.149. Between 1986 and 1988 this comprised less than 2% recurrent expenditure and 3% of development expenditure. Total expenditure represented less than 0.6% of GDP. UNICEF (1991) *An Analysis of the Situation of Children and Women in Somalia*.



# Somalia

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**Table I - Access to Information Flows**

	Indicator		
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	Year
Televisions (per 1,000 people)	1.2 <sup>1</sup>	21 <sup>2</sup>	1997
Radios (per 1,000 people)	4.0 <sup>3</sup>	72 <sup>4</sup>	1997
Telephone lines (total)	14,400 <sup>5</sup>	58,000 <sup>6</sup>	2000
Public telephones (total)	--	68 <sup>6</sup>	2000
Cellular mobile subscribers	--	11,000 <sup>6</sup>	2000
People connected to the Internet	--	4,500 <sup>6</sup>	2000

<sup>1</sup> UNDP (1994) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 16. p.161

<sup>2</sup> CIA (2001) *The World Fact Book – Somalia*. This figure is computed on the population estimates from Vaidyanathan, K.E. (1997, December) *Report of the UNFPA Consultant on Population Statistics of Somalia*. Nairobi: UNDOS.

<sup>3</sup> UNDP (1994) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 16. p.161.

<sup>4</sup> CIA (2001) *The World Fact Book – Somalia*. This figure is computed on the population estimates from Vaidyanathan, K.E. (1997, December) *Report of the UNFPA Consultant on Population Statistics of Somalia*. Nairobi: UNDOS.

<sup>5</sup> Based on figure of 0.2 telephones per 100 people in 1990. UNDP (1994) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 16. p.161.

<sup>6</sup> Latest information on telecommunications supplied by Secretary General of Somalia Telecom Association in Dubai, December 2000.

**Table J - Economic Performance**

	Indicator		
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	Year
GNP (US\$ billion)	1 <sup>1</sup>	1.3 <sup>2</sup>	2001
GNP per capita (US\$)	170 <sup>3</sup>	200 <sup>2</sup>	2001
Real GDP per capita (PPP US\$)	1,330 <sup>3</sup>	795 <sup>2</sup>	2001
GNP per capita annual growth rate (%)	-2.2 <sup>4</sup>	--	1988
Average annual rate of inflation (%)	38.4 <sup>4</sup>	49.7 <sup>5</sup>	1992

<sup>1</sup> For the year 1988. UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 23. p.165.

<sup>2</sup> UNDP Somalia (2001) *Socio-economic Household Survey*. Nairobi.

<sup>3</sup> For the year 1988. UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 17. p.153.

<sup>4</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 23. p.165.

<sup>5</sup> UNDP (1995) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 23. p.195.



**Table K - Macroeconomic Structure**

	Indicator		
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	Year
GDP (US\$ billion)	1.0 <sup>1</sup>	--	1988
Agriculture (as % of GDP)	65.0 <sup>2</sup>	--	1988
Industry (as % of GDP)	9.0 <sup>3</sup>	--	1988
Services (as % of GDP)	26.0 <sup>3</sup>	--	1988
Private consumption (as % of GDP)	112.0 <sup>4</sup>	--	1988
Gross domestic investment (as % of GDP)	34.0 <sup>5</sup>	--	1988
Gross domestic savings (% of GDP)	3.0 <sup>5</sup>	--	1988

<sup>1</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 23. p.165.

<sup>2</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 13. p.145.

<sup>3</sup> UNDP (1995) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 19. p.193.

<sup>4</sup> UNDP (1995) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 19. p.193. Includes government consumption.

<sup>5</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OUP. Table 23. p.165.

**Table L - Resource Flows**

	Indicator		
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	Year
Export of goods and services (as % of GDP)	--	4.6 <sup>1</sup>	1992
Import of goods and services (as % of GDP)	--	17.1 <sup>1</sup>	1992

<sup>1</sup> UNDP (1995) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 19. p.193.

**Table M - Resource Use**

	Indicator		
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	Year
Public expenditure on education (as % of GNP)	6.0 <sup>1</sup>	--	1986
Public expenditure on health (as % of GNP)	0.2 <sup>1</sup>	--	1986
Public expenditure on military (as % of GNP)	4.4 <sup>2</sup>	--	1986
Trade in conventional weapons: Imports (US\$ millions)	20 <sup>2</sup>	--	1987
Total Armed Forces ('000)	59 <sup>3</sup>	--	1990

<sup>1</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 17. p.153.

<sup>2</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 17. p.157.

<sup>3</sup> Based on population of 7.2 million and 8.2 people per 1,000 people in the military in 1990.





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**Table N - Aid and Debt**

	Indicator		
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	Year
Total official development assistance received (US\$ million)	440 <sup>1</sup>	--	2000
Humanitarian and development assistance (US\$ million)	--	115 <sup>2</sup>	2000
as % of GNP	--	9 <sup>3</sup>	2001
per capita (US\$)	--	18 <sup>3</sup>	2001
Total external debt (US\$ billion)	2.4 <sup>4</sup>	2.6 <sup>5</sup>	2000
External debt (as % of GNP)	185 <sup>6</sup>	--	1989

<sup>1</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 18. p.155.

<sup>2</sup> SACB (2001) *Aid distribution to Somalia*. Nairobi.

<sup>3</sup> Figure based on UNDP (2001) *Socio-economic Household Survey*. Nairobi.

<sup>4</sup> UNDP (1995) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 13. p.181.

<sup>5</sup> CIA (2000) *The World Fact Book*.

<sup>6</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 18. p.155.

**Table O - Environmental Profile**

	Indicator		
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	Year
Land area ('000 km <sup>2</sup> )	638	--	n/a
Population density (per km <sup>2</sup> )	--	10 <sup>1</sup>	1999
Rangeland (% of total)	45 <sup>2</sup>	--	1988
Arable land (% of total)	13 <sup>2</sup>	--	1988
Forest and woodland (% of total)	14 <sup>2</sup>	--	1988
Unclassified (% of total)	28 <sup>2</sup>	--	1990
Livestock per capita	5.35 <sup>3</sup>	6.7 <sup>4</sup>	1999
Production of fuelwood (annual % increase)	3.6 <sup>5</sup>	--	1985
Annual internal renewable water resources (1,000 cubic metres per capita)	980 <sup>5</sup>	750 <sup>6</sup>	1999
Annual fresh water withdrawals as % of water resources	5.1 <sup>7</sup>	--	1989
Annual fresh water withdrawals per capita (cubic metre)	99 <sup>7</sup>	--	1989
Average annual rate of deforestation (%)	0.1 <sup>8</sup>	--	1989

<sup>1</sup> Based on the population estimates from Vaidyanathan, K.E. (1997, December) *Report of the UNFPA Consultant on Population Statistics of Somalia*. Nairobi: UNDOS.

<sup>2</sup> *Somali Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics* (1988).

<sup>3</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 22. p.163.

<sup>4</sup> Ministry of Livestock, Forestry and Range, Department of Planning and Statistics, Mogadishu, Somalia, July 1990. The national total of cattle includes animals brought in by refugees from Ethiopia in 1987.

<sup>5</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 22. p.163.

<sup>6</sup> Chris, P. (1999) *Paradigms and Process: rainfall environment and water resource development in Somaliland and the Sahel*. MSc thesis. London: Imperial College.

<sup>7</sup> FAO (1995) *Aquastat Factsheet: Statistics on Somalia*.

<sup>8</sup> UNDP (1995) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 17. p.189.



**Table P - Primary Energy Supplies**

	Indicator		
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	Year
Crude oil ('000 tonnes of oil equivalent)	58 <sup>1</sup>	--	1988
Petroleum products (ktoe)	230 <sup>1</sup>	--	1988
Primary electricity (ktoe)	3 <sup>1</sup>	--	1988
Fuelwood (ktoe)	1,475 <sup>1</sup>	--	1988
Agricultural residues (ktoe)	40 <sup>1</sup>	--	1988

<sup>1</sup> Soussan, J. (1990) *The Government of Somalia Technical Committee for Energy Final Report on Alternative Energy Sources For Urban Areas*. Overseas Development Administration, London. <http://www.odi.org.uk/peg/greyllit/fuelwoodpdfs/SOUSSAN.pdf>.

**Table Q - Food Security**

	Indicator		
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	Year
Daily per capita supply of calories	1,870 <sup>1</sup>	--	1990
Food production per capita index	100 <sup>2</sup>	--	1988
Food aid (US\$ million)	12 <sup>2</sup>	--	1988
Food aid in cereals ('000 MT)	64 <sup>3</sup>	37 <sup>4</sup>	2000

<sup>1</sup> UNDP (1994) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 13. p.155.  
<sup>2</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 13. p.145.  
<sup>3</sup> For 1987/88. UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 13. p.145.  
<sup>4</sup> Personal communication with WFP Somalia and CARE Somalia.

**Table R - Percentage of under-five children who are severely or moderately undernourished, Somalia 1999<sup>1</sup>**

	Weight for age [underweight]		Height for age [stunting]		Weight for height [wasting]	
	Percent below-2 SD	Percent below-3 SD	Percent below-2 SD	Percent below-3 SD	Percent below-2 SD	Percent below-3 SD
Male	26.3	6.3	23.9	13.3	18.0	4.2
Female	25.2	7.7	22.8	10.9	16.3	2.8
Central/South	27.5	9.5	25.7	12.5	21.2	4.6
North East	26.8	4.8	17.7	10.5	14.8	2.4
North West	21.0	2.8	22.6	12.5	10.1	2.0
Urban	22.8	4.2	16.7	12.5	16.7	0.0
Rural settled	29.7	8.4	26.9	13.6	16.4	3.5
Nomadic	27.8	6.1	20.8	11.6	17.1	3.8
Overall	25.8	6.9	23.3	12.1	17.2	3.5

<sup>1</sup> UNICEF (2000) *End Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Full Technical Report for Somalia*. Nairobi. Table 15.



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**Table S - Job Security**

	Indicator		
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	Year
% of labour force			
male	61 <sup>1</sup>	--	1988
female	39 <sup>1</sup>	--	1988
% of labour force			
agriculture	75.6 <sup>1</sup>	--	1988
industry	8.4 <sup>1</sup>	--	1988
services	16.0 <sup>1</sup>	--	1988

<sup>1</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 16. p.151.

**Table T - Gender Development**

	Indicator		
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	Year
Life expectancy at birth (years)			
male	--	44.6 <sup>1</sup>	1999
female	--	47.8 <sup>1</sup>	1999
Adult literacy rate			
male	36 <sup>2</sup>	22.1 <sup>3</sup>	2001
female	14 <sup>2</sup>	12.0 <sup>3</sup>	2001
urban			
male	--	43.9 <sup>3</sup>	2001
female	--	26.2 <sup>3</sup>	2001
rural/nomadic			
male	--	13.5 <sup>3</sup>	2001
female	--	6.4 <sup>3</sup>	2001
Combined primary gross enrolment ratio			
male	--	9.5 <sup>3</sup>	2001
female	--	17.7 <sup>3</sup>	2001

<sup>1</sup> Fowler, US Bureau of Census (March 1996). Consultation with UNDOS, WHO, active agencies and NGOs.

<sup>2</sup> UNESCO (1993) *Year Book*.

<sup>3</sup> UNDP Somalia (2001) *Socio-economic Household Survey*. Nairobi.



**Table U - Gender and Education**

	Indicator		Year
	1985-90 [base]	Latest data	
Female adult literacy rate (%15 years and above)	14 <sup>1</sup>	12.0 <sup>2</sup>	2001
Female adult literacy as % of male rate	38 <sup>1</sup>	52 <sup>2</sup>	1999
Female primary age group enrolment ratio (% of primary school age girls)	6 <sup>1</sup>	6.3 <sup>4</sup>	1998/99
Female primary gross enrolment ratio	--	17.7 <sup>2</sup>	2001
Female primary age group enrolment ratio as % of male rate	33 <sup>1</sup>	53 <sup>5</sup>	1998/99
Female secondary age group enrolment ratio (% of secondary school age girls)	--	3 <sup>6</sup>	1997
Female secondary age group enrolment as % of male rate	--	75 <sup>7</sup>	1997
Female tertiary students as % of male rate	22 <sup>8</sup>	--	1988

<sup>1</sup> UNICEF (1993) *Year Book*.

<sup>2</sup> UNDP Somalia (2001) *Socio-economic Household Survey*. Nairobi.

<sup>3</sup> UNICEF (2001) *End Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Full Technical Report for Somalia*. Nairobi. Percentage of population aged 15 years and older that is literate, Somalia, 1999. Table 12.

<sup>4</sup> This is for the year 1998/99, reported in UNICEF, UNDP/UNFPA, UNESCO Somalia Year 2000 *Education for All Assessment Report*. However, the UNICEF *End Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Full Technical Report for Somalia 2001* (Percentage of children of primary school age attending primary school, Somalia, 1999. Table 10) gives a much higher attendance rate of 13.8% of females of primary school age, as the data were collected at the beginning of the school year.

<sup>5</sup> Based on male enrolment rates of 11.8 and female of 6.3 in 1998/99 reported in the UNESCO Somalia Year 2000 *Education for All Assessment Report*. If one uses the UNICEF *End Decade Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey Full Technical Report for Somalia 2001* attendance rate, the ratio of female to male is higher at 93%.

<sup>6</sup> Africa Educational Trust & UNESCO-PEER (1997, February) *Feasibility Study on the Re-Establishment of Secondary Education in Somalia*.

<sup>7</sup> Based on an enrolment rate of 5% and 3% for males and females reported in Africa Educational Trust & UNESCO-PEER (1997, February) *Feasibility Study on the Re-Establishment of Secondary Education in Somalia*.

<sup>8</sup> UNDP (1991) *Human Development Report*. New York: OAU. Table 10. p.139.

# Definitions of Statistical Terms

**Combined gross enrolment ratio:** See *enrolment ratio, gross*.

**Dependency ratio:** The ratio of the population defined as dependent (aged under 15 and over 64 years) to the working-age population (aged 15-64 years).

**Educational attainment index:** One of the three indicators on which the human development index is built. It is based on the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio and the adult literacy rate.

**Enrolment ratio, age group:** *Primary school enrolment ratio (6-12 years):* The number of primary school enrollees aged 6-12 years (regardless of the education level in which the pupils are enrolled) as a percentage of the population of official primary school age. *Secondary school enrolment ratio (13-16 years):* The number of secondary school enrollees aged 13-16 years (regardless of the education level in which the pupils are enrolled) as a percentage of the population of official secondary school age. *Tertiary enrolment ratio:* The number of tertiary level students (regardless of the education level in which the students are enrolled) as a percentage of the population of official tertiary level students.

**Enrolment ratio, gross:** The number of students at primary, secondary and tertiary levels as a percentage of the population of official school age for these levels.

**External debt:** Debt owed by a country to non-residents that is repayable in foreign currency, goods and services.

**Food production index:** The average annual quantity of food produced per capita in relation to that produced in the indexed year.

**Freshwater withdrawals:** Total annual water withdrawals, not counting evaporation losses from storage basins. Withdrawals include water from non-renewable groundwater sources and river flows from other countries.

**Gross domestic investment:** Investments made in addition to the fixed assets of an economy plus net changes in the level of inventories.

**Gross domestic product (GDP):** The total outputs of goods and services for final use produced by an economy by both residents and non-residents, regardless of allocation to domestic or foreign claims.

**Gross domestic savings:** The difference between GDP and total consumption (i.e. private and government consumption).

**Gross national product (GNP):** Comprises GDP and net factor income from abroad, which is the income received from abroad for factor services, less similar payments made to non-residents who contribute to the domestic economy.

**Human development index (HDI):** A composite index based on three indicators: longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth; educational attainment, as measured by a combination of adult literacy (two-thirds of weight) and the combined gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio (one-third of weight); and standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita. The Human Development Index is the average of the life expectancy index, the educational attainment index and the adjusted GDP per capita index.

**Humanitarian and development assistance:** Records the actual income of UN Agencies and NGOs from resources generated through joint and individual appeals, as reported to the SACB.

**Infant mortality rate (IMR) per 1,000 live births:** The probability of dying before the first birthday. This is calculated based on an indirect estimation technique using the mean number of children ever born for five-year age groups of women from age 15 to 49, and the proportion of these children who are dead, also for five-year age groups of women. The data is converted into probabilities of dying by taking into account both the mortality risks to which children are exposed and their length of exposure to the risk of dying. (*UNICEF MICS 2001*)

**Infants with low birth weight:** The percentage of babies born weighing less than 2,500 grams. In the case of Somalia, since many infants are not weighed at birth and those who are weighed may be a biased sample of all births, reported weight cannot be used to estimate the prevalence of low birth weight. Therefore, low birth weight is estimated from the mother's assessment of the child's size at birth (i.e. very small, small, average, larger than average, very large) and the mother's recall of the child's weight or the weight as recorded on a health card if the child was weighed at birth.

**Inflation:** The fall in the purchasing power of money reflected in a persistent increase in the general level of prices as measured by a consumer price index. This is measured monthly and averaged over a year.

**Internal renewable water resources:** The average annual flow of rivers and recharge of groundwater generated from endogenous precipitation.

**Life expectancy at birth:** The number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of birth were to stay the same throughout the child's life.

**Life expectancy index:** One of the three indicators on which the human development index is built. The index is computed based on fixed minimum and maximum values for life expectancy.

**Index =** 
$$\frac{\text{actual value of life expectancy} - \text{minimum value of life expectancy}}{\text{maximum value of life expectancy} - \text{minimum value of life expectancy}}$$

**Literacy index (adult):** An index computed based on fixed minimum and maximum values for adult literacy.

**Index =** 
$$\frac{\text{actual value of adult literacy} - \text{minimum value of adult literacy}}{\text{maximum value of adult literacy} - \text{minimum value of adult literacy}}$$

**Literacy rate (adult):** The percentage of the population aged 15 and above who can, with understanding, both read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life.

**Maternal mortality ratio:** The annual number of deaths of women from pregnancy related causes per 100,000 live births.

**Official development assistance (ODA):** The total value of grants or loans that are undertaken by the official sector with the promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective, on concessional financial terms.

**Private consumption:** The market value of all goods and services, including durable goods, purchased or received as income in kind by households and non-profit institutions.

**Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births):** The probability of dying before the fifth birthday. Calculated as for IMR.

**Undernourishment, severe or moderate:** In a well nourished population there is a standard distribution of height and weight of children under age five. Undernourishment in a population can be gauged by comparing children to this standard distribution. Weight for age is a measure of both acute and chronic malnutrition.

*Underweight:* Children whose weight for age is more than two standard deviations below the median of the reference population are considered moderately or severely underweight. Those whose weight is more than three standard deviations below the median are classified as severely underweight.

*Stunting:* Height for age is a measure of linear growth. Children whose height for age is more than two standard deviations below the median of the reference population are considered too short for their age and are classified as moderately or severely stunted. Those whose height for age is more than three standard deviations below the median are classified as severely stunted. Stunting is a reflection of chronic malnutrition as a result of failure to receive adequate nutrition over a long period, and recurrent and chronic illness.

*Wasting:* Children whose weight for height is more than two standard deviations below the median of the reference population are classified as moderately or severely wasted. Those who fall more than three standard deviations below the median are classified as severely wasted. Wasting is usually the result of a recent nutritional deficiency.

# Appendix 1: Key Events in Somali History

<b>1897</b>	Colonial partition of Somali-inhabited territories by United Kingdom, France, Italy and Ethiopia.
<b>1890 – 1921</b>	The Dervish movement under the leadership of Sayid Mohamed Abdulla Hassan fought to rid Somali territories of colonialists.
<b>1943</b>	The Somali Youth Club was created then changed its name to the Somali Youth League in 1947. Its aim was the unification of all Somali territories and independence from colonial rule. It opposed clanism. The Somali National League was formed in British Somaliland with similar nationalist aims.
<b>1950</b>	Somalia is placed under United Nations Trusteeship administered by Italy, British Somaliland reverts to its former protectorate status, and the Ogaden is returned to Ethiopia.
<b>1955</b>	Western part of British Somaliland Protectorate and Reserve Area is annexed to Ethiopia.
<b>1960 June 26</b>	British Somaliland Protectorate gains independence.
<b>1960 July 1</b>	United Nations Trusteeship of Southern Somalia gains independence from Italy. The two territories unite as the Somali Republic. Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke is Prime Minister and Aden Abdulle Osman is provisional President.
<b>1962</b>	Aden Abdulle Osman elected President and nominates Abdirizak Haji Hussein as Prime Minister.
<b>1967 June</b>	Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke elected President and appoints Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal as Prime Minister.

- 1969 October 15** President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke assassinated.
- 1969 October 21** The army, led by Major General Mohamed Siyad Barre, overthrows the civilian government headed by Prime Minister Egal, suspends the constitution and bans all political parties.
- 1970 October 21** Siyad Barre declares Somalia a socialist state, embarks on a range of socialist economic programmes, and seeks support from the Soviet Union.
- 1972 October 21** A Somali script is officially introduced using a modified Roman alphabet.
- 1974** Somalia joins the League of Arab States.
- 1977 July** Following clashes between the Ethiopian army and the Western Somali Liberation Front, the Somali army (equipped by the Soviet Union) invades the disputed Ogaden region of Ethiopia.
- 1977 November** Soviet Union switches its support to Ethiopia.
- 1978 March** The Somali Government withdraws its forces from Ogaden after being defeated by the Soviet and Cuban backed Ethiopian army. Thousands of Somalis flee from Ethiopia to Somalia as refugees.
- 1978 April** A coup attempt by disaffected army officers is crushed. The officers form the Somali Salvation Front, led by Lieutenant Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, which later merges with other civilian opposition parties in exile to form Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF).
- 1980** Somalia strengthens diplomatic links with United States and receives economic and military aid in return for US access to Berbera port.
- 1981 April** Somali National Movement (SNM) is formed overseas to fight the Barre regime.
- 1982** Under pressure from Western donors, the Barre government abandons socialist policies and adopts an International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment package.



<b>1988 April</b>	Somalia and Ethiopia sign peace agreement.
<b>1988 May</b>	The SNM briefly captures Burco and Hargeisa. The Somali government responds with aerial bombing of Hargeisa, killing thousands of civilians and forcing 650,000 people to flee to Ethiopia. Reports of human rights abuses lead to freezing of foreign aid.
<b>1989 January</b>	The United Somali Congress (USC) is formed in Rome.
<b>1989 March</b>	The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) is formed in Middle Juba.
<b>1990 May</b>	A 'Manifesto' calling for dialogue and political reform is published and signed by 114 politicians, religious leaders, professionals and business people. Many signatories imprisoned but later released under international pressure.
<b>1990 December</b>	Government forces lose control over most of countryside. United Somali Congress (USC) enters Mogadishu.
<b>1991 January</b>	Siyad Barre flees Mogadishu as United Somali Congress (USC) forces capture the city. One section of the USC elects Ali Mahdi as president but others reject the appointment. The 'presidency' goes unrecognised internationally.
<b>1991 February 28</b>	First internationally sponsored peace conference takes place in Djibouti. Ali Mahdi selected President, with Omar Moalim and Abdikadir Zoppe as Vice Presidents. Creation of an executive Presidency alters the 1960 Somali constitution. Civil war continues.
<b>1991 May</b>	The SNM proclaims independence for Republic of Somaliland.
<b>1991</b>	Intra-clan and factional fighting in southern Somalia kill, wound, and displace hundreds of thousands.
<b>1992</b>	Famine rages through much of southern Somalia.
<b>1992</b>	Attempt by Al-Ittihad forces to control the northeast defeated by the SSDF.

<b>1992 April</b>	United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) created.
<b>1992 July</b>	'Operation Provide Relief' is launched to airlift food aid to southern Somalia.
<b>1992 December</b>	'Operation Restore Hope' launched with a US-led multi-national peacekeeping force, United Nations Task Force (UNITAF).
<b>1993 March</b>	Joint UN-Ethiopian sponsored reconciliation conference held in Addis Ababa. 15 factions, with Somaliland as observer, sign agreement that is not implemented. UNOSOM II formed.
<b>1993 May</b>	Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal is selected President of Republic of Somaliland by assembly of elders at the 'Grand Boroma Conference'. Transitional National Charter for Somaliland agreed.
<b>1993 June</b>	A peace agreement establishes a cease-fire in Galkaiyo and Mudug.
<b>1993 June</b>	24 UNOSOM Pakistani troops are killed in ambush by supporters of General Aideed and Somali National Alliance (SNA).
<b>1993 October</b>	The US announces the withdrawal of its troops, following deaths of 18 US Special Forces and hundreds of Somalis in clashes in Mogadishu.
<b>1994 January</b>	General Aideed and Ali Mahdi sign a peace agreement, remain political rivals but security in Mogadishu improves.
<b>1994 March</b>	US military forces withdraw from Somalia.
<b>1994 November</b>	Civil war breaks out in Somaliland.
<b>1995 January</b>	Siyad Barre dies in exile in Nigeria.
<b>1995 March</b>	UNOSOM II forces and civilian officials depart Somalia. The country is still divided with no central government.

<b>1995 March</b>	Reewin form the Digil-Mirifle Governing Council for Bay and Bakol regions.
<b>1995 June</b>	General Aideed declares a “broad-based” government, but is unable to administer effective control even in Mogadishu. His government is not recognised internationally.
<b>1995 September</b>	General Aideed's forces occupy Baidoa, toppling Digil-Mirifle Governing Council and displacing civilians. Aid agencies withdraw from the region. Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) is formed.
<b>1996 August</b>	General Aideed dies of gunshot wounds sustained in a battle. His son, Hussein Aideed, takes over his leadership.
<b>1996 November</b>	Ethiopian sponsored reconciliation conference in Sodere brings together most southern factions, but is boycotted by Hussein Aideed and Somaliland.
<b>1996 December</b>	Somaliland National Conference in Hargeisa officially ends Somaliland’s civil war.
<b>1997 February</b>	The Somaliland National Conference replaces the National Charter with a Provisional Constitution and reselects Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal President of Somaliland for additional two years which is later extended to five.
<b>1997 Oct-Dec</b>	Abnormal deyr season rains due to El Niño weather patterns cause extensive flooding in Shabelle and Juba valleys, and inter-riverine regions. International community responds with largest relief programme since 1992.
<b>1997 November</b>	Peace conference held in Egypt. The leaders of 30 factions sign a peace accord which is not implemented.
<b>1998 February</b>	An outbreak of Rift Valley Fever in Somalia leads to ban on the import of Somali livestock by Saudi Arabia, which lasts 15 months.
<b>1998 Jul-Aug</b>	Mogadishu based faction leaders negotiate establishment of Banadir Regional Authority. Hussein Aideed relinquishes his claim to the presidency.

<b>1998 August</b>	Garowe Constitutional Conference held. Leaders in northeast form non-secessionist 'Puntland State of Somalia', and select Abdullahi Yusuf as President.
<b>1999 May</b>	Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) recaptures Bay and Bakol from occupying forces and installs its own administration. Food security situation improves. Increased access for aid agencies.
<b>2000 May</b>	On the initiative of the Djibouti government and IGAD, the Somali National Peace Conference (SNPC) is convened in Arta, Djibouti.
<b>2000 August</b>	The Transitional National Assembly (TNA) is formed in Arta with 245 representatives. Abdiqasim Salad Hassan is elected President of the Transitional National Government (TNG) for Somalia. His inauguration ceremony is attended by heads of neighbouring governments, the UN, EU, OAU and Arab League representatives.
<b>2000 September</b>	Gulf Countries impose another import ban on livestock from the Horn of Africa, following several human deaths from RVF in Saudi Arabia.
<b>2000 September</b>	Abdiqasim Salad Hassan addresses UN Millennium Summit in New York. The Somali flag is raised at UN Headquarters.
<b>2000 November</b>	Somalia is represented by the TNG at the IGAD summit.
<b>2001 February</b>	Somalia, represented by the TNG, attends the OAU summit in Tripoli. The TNA ratifies Constitutive Act of the African Union.
<b>2001 March</b>	Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), comprising faction leaders opposed to the TNG is formed in Awasa, Ethiopia. The base is established in Baidoa in April. Claims of plan to organise reconciliation conference inside Somalia.
<b>2001 April</b>	Somali shilling to US dollar exchange rate reaches all time low, fuelled by newly printed Somali shilling notes imported into country.
<b>2001 May</b>	Somaliland's constitution, which affirms Somaliland's independence, subjected to ref-

- erendum. Officials claim 97% of voters endorse constitution. Two international non-governmental organisations monitor voting.
- 2001 June** The Mandate of the Puntland Administration and Parliament expires, according to Puntland's Transitional Charter. Abdullahi Yusuf seeks to extend constitution, but the chairman of the Supreme Court rejects this move. He announces that, in line with the Charter and pending a community conference, he will assume the office of interim President.
- 2001 July** Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal forms a political party, UDUB.
- 2001 August** Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal survives an impeachment vote in Somaliland Parliament. Some Sultans critical of Egal's handling of the move to a multi-party system call for the disbandment of UDUB. Several are detained when they visit Hargeisa.
- 2001 August** Failure to resolve the constitutional crisis in Puntland leads to clashes in Bosasso between forces loyal to Abdullahi Yusuf and the opposition. Abdullahi Yusuf withdraws to Galkaiyo. A second Constitutional Conference is called to select a President, Vice-President, and to approve an additional three years of Puntland's Transitional Charter.
- 2001 September 11** Terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Somalia named as a state where 'terrorists' may find safe haven.

## Appendix 2: Political Profile

The 1998 HDR reported that there were over 30 factions and political movements in Somalia. Some of these factions and movements and their leaders still remain a force in Somali politics. However, since 1998 there has been a weakening of factions and an evolution to broader political alliances. The following describes the main political alliances and administrations that dominated the political landscape in Somalia in early 2001, as judged by the authors<sup>1</sup>. The precise level of popular support and territorial control that these political entities have is contested. In addition to these four administrations, there are numerous other factions, militia, and municipal councils claiming some form of territorial authority.

	<b>Republic of Somaliland</b>	<b>Puntland State of Somalia</b>	<b>Rahanweyn Resistance Army of Bay and Bakol Regions</b>	<b>Transitional National Government for Somalia</b>
<b>Established</b>	Declared independence at the Grand Conference of the Northern Peoples in Burco in May 1991.	Established in August 1998 by the Constitutional Conference in Garowe.	Founded in September 1995, following the overthrow of the Digil-Mirifle Governing Council. Established control in Bay and Bakol regions in June 1999.	Elected by delegates to the Somali National Peace Conference at Arta, Djibouti in August 2000.
<b>Territory</b>	Borders follow former British Somaliland Protectorate. Includes the six regions of former Northwest Somalia. Sool and eastern Sanag regions contested with Puntland. The contested areas have representatives in both Somaliland and Puntland administrations.	Includes Bari, Nugal, and Mudug (except Haradheere and Hobiyo) regions of former Northeast Somalia, with territorial claims to Sool, eastern Sanag region, and Buhoodle district in Togdheer.	Includes Bay and Bakol regions, with claims to Lower Shabelle, Middle Juba, parts of Lower Juba and parts of Gedo regions.	Claims a transitional national mandate and authority throughout Somalia.
<b>Administrative Centre</b>	Hargeisa	Garowe	Baidoa	Mogadishu

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<b>Clan Representation</b>	Representation of clans from Somaliland (Northwest Somalia).	Darood clan family with Harti in the majority.	Representation of Rahanweyn /Rewiin (Digil-Mirifle) clans.	Representation of clans from all of Somalia.
<b>Constitution</b>	<p>Transitional National Charter and Peace Charter adopted in 1993 at the Grand Boroma Conference.</p> <p>Provisional Constitution drafted in 1997, subjected to parliamentary debate in 1999, and a public consultation process in 2000. Constitution approved by public referendum in May 2001.</p>	<p>Transitional Puntland Charter adopted in 1998 at the Garowe Constitutional Conference.</p> <p>Provisional Constitution drafted, scheduled for adoption in 2001.</p>	Draft Constitution of the 1995 Digil-Mirifle Regional Governing Council.	<p>Transitional National Charter adopted for three years, until a federal constitution is adopted.</p> <p>Provides for regional autonomy based on 18 regions.</p>
<b>Political Structure</b>	<p>Executive: President, Vice President, Council of Ministers (25), Vice Ministers (8).</p> <p>Legislature: bicameral parliament; House of Elders (82), House of Representatives (82).</p> <p>Judiciary: Supreme Court, Attorney General.</p> <p>Independent agencies: Auditor General, Civil Service Commission, Central Bank.</p> <p>Regional Governors appointed by central government.</p> <p>Municipal Councils and Mayors/ District Officers appointed by central government.</p>	<p>Executive: President, Vice President, Cabinet (9 Ministers), Vice Ministers (10).</p> <p>Legislature: Mono-vameral; House of Representatives (66 members including 5 women).</p> <p>Judiciary: High Judicial Council, Supreme Court (not constituted).</p> <p>Independent agencies: Auditor General.</p> <p>Independent Council of Elders (isimada).</p> <p>Regional Governors appointed by Executive.</p> <p>District Commissioners/ Mayors appointed by Executive.</p>	<p>Executive: Chairman, Vice Chairmen (3).</p> <p>Executive Committee (36).</p> <p>Central Committee (100).</p> <p>Judiciary: High Judicial Council.</p> <p>Council of Elders (Malaqs and Suldans).</p> <p>Regional Governors (2) appointed by RRA.</p> <p>District Officers appointed by RRA.</p>	<p>Executive: President, Prime Minister, Cabinet of Ministers (27), Deputy Ministers.</p> <p>Legislature: 225 seat Transitional National Assembly.</p> <p>Council of Traditional Elders to advise and assist the government.</p> <p>8 National Committees formed, including reconciliation, human rights, and elections.</p>

<p><b>Electoral Process</b></p>	<p>President and parliament selected for two periods of 3 and 5 years by delegates to National Conferences (<i>shir beheedka</i>) in 1993 and 1996/97.</p> <p>Members of the Houses of Elders and Representatives are nominated by clans.</p> <p>Multi-party district elections scheduled for December 2001, and presidential elections before February 2002.</p>	<p>President and parliament selected for 3 year period at the Constitutional Conference in 1998.</p> <p>Presidential elections scheduled for 2001.</p> <p>Presidential term extended by parliament to 3 years in June 2001.</p>	<p>Executive Committee selected by Central Committee.</p>	<p>President selected by the Transitional National Assembly/Parliament.</p> <p>Prime Minister appointed by the President.</p> <p>Parliament/ TNA selected by clan delegates at the Somali National Peace Conference in August 2000, with 25 seats reserved for women and 24 for minority clans.</p> <p>National elections scheduled for 3 years.</p>
<p><b>Political Parties</b></p>	<p>Clan-based power-sharing structure, with no political parties allowed in transitional period.</p> <p>In June 2000, parliament passed a law allowing for the formation of 3 political parties.</p> <p>Political parties registered in September 2001.</p>	<p>Clan-based power-sharing structure, with no political parties allowed in transitional period.</p>	<p>Single party</p>	<p>Clan-based power-sharing structure, with no political parties allowed in transitional period.</p>
<p><b>Women's Participation</b></p>	<p>No female ministers.</p> <p>No female parliamentarians.</p>	<p>5 seats reserved for women in House of Representatives.</p> <p>No female ministers.</p>	<p>Women representatives on Regional and District Councils.</p> <p>2 seats reserved for women on District Councils.</p>	<p>90 seats reserved for women delegates to the SNPC.</p> <p>25 parliamentary seats reserved for women.</p> <p>4 women ministers.</p>
<p><b>Legal System</b></p>	<p>Islamic <i>shari'a</i> adopted as the basis of all laws.</p> <p>Laws prior to 1969 applicable.</p>	<p>Islamic <i>shari'a</i> adopted as the basis of all laws, with secular laws approved by previous government.</p>	<p>Mixture of <i>shari'a</i>, civil and military laws.</p> <p>Regional and District Courts.</p>	<p>Transitional National Charter, which defines executive, legislative and judicial powers, is to act as the supreme law for 3 years.</p>



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<b>Legal System</b>	<p>Independence of judiciary stipulated in National Charter and Constitution.</p>	<p>High Judicial Council, Regional Courts of Appeal, District level Primary Courts.</p>		<p>Islamic <i>shari'a</i> adopted as the basis for all laws.</p> <p>1960 constitution and laws applicable.</p> <p>Independence of the judiciary stipulated in the TNC.</p>
<b>Civil Society</b>	<p>Many registered Somali NGOs.</p> <p>Legislation on Somali NGOs passed by parliament.</p> <p>Several private newspapers.</p> <p>Many registered Somali NGOs.</p>	<p>Somali NGOs registered with RRA.</p>		
<b>Human Rights</b>	<p>Somaliland Constitution accepts the UDHR.</p> <p>Public Order Law introduced in 2000 problematic.</p> <p>Technical Committee for the Investigation of War Crimes.</p> <p>Several local independent human rights organisations.</p>	<p>Puntland Charter accepts the UDHR.</p> <p>Several Somali independent human rights organisations.</p>	<p>NGO human rights office in Baidoa.</p>	<p>TNC accepts the UDHR.</p> <p>TNC defines the rights of individuals.</p> <p>Several local independent human rights organisations in Mogadishu.</p>

<sup>1</sup>The political scene in Somalia is constantly evolving. These details may change by the time this report goes to print.