Pakistan
National Human
Development Report

Unleashing the Potential
of a Young Pakistan

UNDP
Pakistan

The front cover of this report represents a visual exercise depicting Pakistan's youth as a 100 young people. Our wheel of many colours represents the multiple dimensions of what it means to be young in Pakistan today. Based on national data as well as results of our own surveys, the Wheel presents a collage of information on Pakistan's young people (details in Chapter 2). This tapestry shows the diversity as well as vibrance of our youth, while also highlighting the inequities and hurdles they face as young Pakistanis. We chose the Wheel as this Report's motif and cover art, because it represents not only the basis of our hopes for the future, but also our concerns.

Diagram inspired by Jack Hagley's *'The world as100 people'.*

Pakistan
National Human Development Report **2017***

Unleashing the Potential of a Young Pakistan

Human Development Reports: In 1990, Dr. Mahbub ul Haq produced the first Human Development Report, introducing a new concept of human development focusing on expanding people's opportunities and choices, and measuring a country's development progress though the richness of human life rather than simply the wealth of its economy. The report featured a Human Development Index (HDI) created to assess the people's capabilities. The HDI measures achievements in key dimensions of human development: individuals enabled to live long and healthy lives, to be knowledgeable, and have a decent standard of living. Subsequent Human Development Reports (HDRs) released most years have explored different themes using the human development approach. These Reports, produced by the UNDP's Human Development Report Office and ensured editorial independence by UNGA, have extensively influenced the development debate worldwide.

National Human Development Reports: Since the first national Human Development Reports (NHDRs) were released in 1992, local editorial teams in 135 countries have produced over 700 NHDRs with UNDP support. These reports bring a human development perspective to national policy concerns through local consultations and research. National HDRs have covered key development issues ranging from climate change to youth employment, to inequalities driven by gender or ethnicity. This is Pakistan's first National Human Development Report in over a decade. The last one in 2003, the NHDR on Poverty, focusing on growth and governance, was authored by Dr. Akmal Hussain.

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Special message

The Government of Pakistan is well-aware of the importance of the youth as a crucial force for our country's human development and economic prosperity. We welcome this landmark National Human Development Report 2017, a seminal publication which highlights the critical juncture at which Pakistan finds itself today with the unique opportunity to take advantage of its youth bulge.

This report comes at an auspicious moment. Pakistan is undergoing the most rapid demographic transition in its history. The resultant youth bulge is leading to young adults entering the labour market at an unprecedented speed. This transition offers Pakistan a golden opportunity to benefit from a potential "demographic dividend". The rising share of working-age adults among our population could well catalyse growth and raise living standards. But if we fail to harness the potential of our youth, this demographic dividend could turn into a liability. Prospects will be bleak if the growing pool of youth entering the labour market cannot secure jobs that offer them better earnings and opportunities.

The youth bulge in Pakistan raises some sharp questions for the future. Will Pakistan be, as some have augured, one of the countries to grow older before it grows richer? To address this situation, the report starts with the premise that whatever the potential of the much feted "youth dividend", it will be affected by the state of the country's human development indicators in education, employment, engagement, health, and poverty.

NHDR 2017 is particularly welcome as it aligns with the Government's recognition of youth as a critical force for human development. It complements our vision, outlined in the document Vision 2025, of placing youth at the very centre of the Government's efforts to develop of Pakistan's human and social capital. It also comes at a time when provincial policies are being agreed upon and road maps are being put in place. These developments are even more important as national and sub-national governments are either developing or in early stages of implementing policy frameworks to address the issues facing Pakistan's youth. Following devolution through Pakistan's 18th Constitutional Amendment, there is an urgent need for an all-inclusive framework for youth empowerment. The production of this National Human Development Report on youth will guide national policy discourse towards developing inclusive national and provincial youth policies and ensuring their implementation.

It was an honour to be the chairperson of a multi-party, multi-stakeholder Advisory Council for this Report. On behalf of the Government and my fellow members of the Advisory Council, I offer my sincere appreciation to UNDP for their support of Pakistan's efforts to improve human development outcomes for its people.

It is time for Pakistan to stand with its youth and work with them for a brighter future. I am confident that this Report will help us along this path.

Ahsan Iqbal
Minister, Ministry of Planning and Development Reform, Pakistan.
Chair, NHDR 2017 Advisory Council

Foreword

Pakistan is not only one of the youngest countries in its region, but also in the world. Sixty four percent of the country's population is under the age of 29, with some 30 percent between the ages of 15 and 29. For at least the next three decades, Pakistan will continue to be a younger country.

Never have the opportunities for social, economic and political progress been so great. Nor have the challenges facing us ever been more pressing. As in many countries, but more than in most, Pakistan faces an important opportunity – indeed, a responsibility – to place its young at the very centre of its development priorities. If there is one most important lesson of this Report, it is the need to invest in Pakistan's youth today, to ensure a better future tomorrow.

We have chosen 'youth' as the focal topic of Pakistan's National Human Development Report 2017 because we believe in this simple, unequivocal truth: the youth are a powerful force, possibly the most powerful force, for transformational change. With their demographic size and more importantly their fresh ideas and energy, if provided with a conducive environment, they can lead the way to sustainable human development.

This, the country's first National Human Development Report (NHDR) in over a decade, seeks to understand Pakistan's human development challenges and opportunities from the prism of youth. It focuses on how to improve human development outcomes – by empowering young people, addressing the root causes of the obstacles they face, and by proposing innovative ways to surmount these challenges. Offering first-rate analysis and evidenced-based policy recommendations, this Report looks at three key drivers of youth empowerment: quality education, gainful employment and meaningful engagement. These, we believe, are levers of change that can harness the potential of young people and catapult Pakistan on a path of greater human development.

The first lever is education for knowledge empowerment of the young. It is the most important tool for improving human development outcomes as education enhances the capabilities, freedoms and choices amongst the young. The NHDR's resounding call is that to enhance human development outcomes both the quantity and quality of Pakistan's education system will have to be improved.

The second lever of youth empowerment is gainful employment for economic empowerment. From a human development perspective, providing decent employment is not just about economic opportunity but also about increasing self worth, dignity and an expanding capability for social impact. The NHDR views youth unemployment as one of the biggest emerging challenges in Pakistan even as it views entrepreneurship as a great new opportunity. It emphasizes the need to improve the quality of employment, focusing on reducing unpaid and casual employment.

The third lever of transformation and meaningful engagement for social empowerment as identified by this Report is about voice, identity, inclusion and citizenship – meaningful social, political and institutional integration of youth into the fabric of society and its collective decisions. The NHDR 2017 reveals the existence of starkly limited open spaces and inadequate engagement opportunities for Pakistan's youth to be young. This is especially true for young women.

The NHDR concludes that to utilise the youth's potential as a positive force for transformation and as a human development enhancement tool, it is of critical importance to provide them with inclusive open spaces to voice their concerns as well as meaningful engagement opportunities in both the social and political spheres.

This Report celebrates the idea of human development, the invention of one of Pakistan's finest intellectuals, Dr. Mahbub ul Haq. The lead authors of this Report,

Dr. Adil Najam and Dr. Faisal Bari, have meticulously constructed a framework that is true to Dr. Haq's ideas of what human development is and how it can be actualised. Most importantly, they have done so by reaching out and listening carefully to what the young of Pakistan are saying. Behind this Report lies an intensely participatory process involving 81 youth consultations, besides one-on-one interviews, a national survey on youth perceptions and other out-of-the-box outreach methods, directly engaging over 10,000 young Pakistanis. I am proud to say that this Report truly is *"for the youth and by the youth".*

Maintaining a long and cherished tradition that also goes back to Dr. Mahbub ul Haq's vision, this Human Development Report is an intellectually independent effort supported by UNDP-Pakistan and its partners. It has benefited from the expertise, experience and participation of a wide array of stakeholders. Most importantly, we owe a special thanks to the Advisory Council chaired by Ahsan Iqbal, Federal Minister of Planning Development and Reforms, and including Dr. Akmal Hussain, Asad Umar, Dr. Baela Raza Jamil, Bushra Gohar, Jan Muhammad Khan Achakzai, Marvi Memon, Qazi Azmat Isa, Shahnaz Wazir Ali and Dr. Umar Saif. Bringing their wisdom and advice from a wide variety of perspectives and encouraging the authors of this Report the freedom to think boldly has made the process as well as the product most rewarding.

I am also grateful to the very dynamic team that worked on this Report and to the wide community of civil society activists, subject experts and international, national and provincial policymakers who were deeply engaged and consulted in the process. I take great pride in knowing that this is deeply and truly a country owned Report: an NHDR made for, by and in Pakistan.

Neil Buhne
Resident Representative
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Acknowledgements

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A human development approach to youth

"The real wealth of a nation is its people. And the purpose of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy, and creative lives. This simple but powerful truth is too often forgotten in the pursuit of material and financial wealth"

— Dr. Mahbub ul Haq

CHAPTER 1

A human development approach to youth

On 17 December 2010, a 26-year old fruit and vegetable vendor in a small town in Tunisia set himself on fire following a confrontation with a municipal official about where his cart was parked. While the specifics of what led to Mohamed Bouazizi's death are unclear, what is indisputable is his fatal self-immolation, which catalysed protests that toppled Tunisia's dictator and led to a string of uprisings in the region that came to be called the Arab Spring.

The aim of mentioning this situation here is not to recount what happened in Tunis that day, or in the other countries of the Arab Spring subsequently. This Report concerns itself with Pakistan's youth. So, fast forward to Pakistan.

Can you imagine a situation anywhere in Pakistan, where a young person feels so frustrated by unemployment or so disheartened, unempowered and marginalized that he takes a measure as extreme as Bouazizi did in Tunisia? One certainly hopes not. But hope alone is not enough. It is the responsibility of state as well as society to enable an environment for our youth where such a fate is not even imaginable. Not even in our worst nightmares.

Overview

The 2017 Pakistan National Human Development Report (NHDR) focuses on the country's youth as a critical force for shaping human development in the country. This Report covers three drivers of youth empowerment – education, employment and engagement – with the objective of informing public policy discourse and improving the policy landscape for young people.

Pakistan currently has the largest generation of young people ever in its history. Approximately, two-thirds of the total population is below the age of 30. The presence of this youth bulge raises critical questions for the future. Will Pakistan be, as some have augured, one of the countries to grow older before it becomes richer? With this question hanging over us, the NHDR 2017 is based on the premise that regardless of the potential of the much feted 'youth dividend', it will necessarily be affected by the state of the country's human development indicators in education, employment, and engagement.

The dramatic increase in the numbers of Pakistan's young people – potentially its human capital – should define development priorities for the next two decades.

The NHDR's revelations include the projection that at the current annual growth rate of net school enrolments, it will be 2076 before Pakistan can achieve its goal of zero out-of-school children. And, with the highest youth unemployment in the region, Pakistan must generate nearly a million jobs every year for the next 30 years, without interruption, in order to even maintain unemployment at the current levels. Another surprising finding is that far from being apathetic, Pakistan's youth are eager to be engaged and make a difference. They are held back by various factors including lack of quality in education and employment, and lack of opportunity.

The NHDR 2017 posits that although dire, the situation is salvageable. Thoughtful and immediate investment in youth development – providing them with quality education, gainful employment and meaningful engagement opportunities – can yet

turn the tide and move the country in the right direction. In order to do this, and convert the youth bulge into a win-win situation, it is first essential to understand Pakistan's youth, their thoughts, their needs and their aspirations. Yet there has never been a comprehensive survey encompassing all aspects of the Pakistani youth and their lives. The NHDR 2017 is the first step in this direction.[1]

The preparation time behind the writing of this Report was spent trying to understand the youth's perspectives, the issues they face with respect to the NHDR's key themes, their fears, and aspirations regarding their country. The aim was to not only understand youth and identify relevant evidence-informed policy interventions to improve development in Pakistan through youth empowerment, but also to generate informed debate and analysis on youth issues between policy-makers, the youth, and other stakeholders in Pakistan.

The Report's findings are substantiated by an array of statistical indices and computations, compiled as the Statistical Annex. These include the district-representative Human Development Index, the Youth Development Index, the Youth Gender Inequality Index, the Multidimensional Poverty Index, and other social development indicators. This Report also uses a combination of qualitative research methodologies and innovative outreach activities to seek the inputs of youth throughout the preparation period. Through its intensely inclusive and participatory process, the Pakistan NHDR 2017 reached out to nearly 130,000 individual across the country, 90% of whom where youth, making it essentially a Report *"by the youth, for the youth".*

Why this Report?

Pakistan is a country currently defined, among other things, by its youth -- for the simple reason that there are so many of them. The unbridled population explosion that continued until the 1980s before gradually slowing down – an ongoing phenomenon – has yielded a massive crop of youngsters. Children of the generation of Pakistanis born between the 1960s and 1980s are today the country's youth. While, the definition of youth varies from country to country and region to region, most United Nations documents categorise youth as individuals between 15 and 24 years of age. This NHDR uses the 15 to 29-year range for analysis, reflecting also the age range of youth defined by the government of Pakistan.

Pakistan's total population barely two decades ago was around 120 million.[2] Today, that is the number of Pakistanis under the age of 30, around 64 percent of the country's 189 million population.[3] Among under-30s, some 54 million youths (15-29 years) comprise nearly a third (29 percent) of the total population. Clearly, this is not only a very young country, but it will remain a very young country for another couple of decades, until at least 2040.

This burgeoning human capital presents a simple demographic advantage to Pakistan, an opportunity to convert this advantage into a generational dividend, as youth are one of the most important forces that will forge the future of Pakistan (special contribution: Adul Sattar Edhi). These youth will be tomorrow's leaders and decisions makers. To them falls the task of steering Pakistan through this century, as the current generation of adults (30-64 years old) ages and starts to thin out. There are three main points to consider.

- *Pakistan's youth bulge presents an opportunity – but risks turning into a disaster if not dealt with appropriately:* The youth bulge has the potential to be a force for good, generating socio-economic and political growth. The risk, if the youth are not steered in the right direction, entails the fallouts of large segments becoming unemployed, uneducated, disengaged and disempowered.

- *The youth can serve as catalysts for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) if engaged and steered properly:* Clearly, the

Valuing philanthropy to build a justice, peaceful and inclusive society

More young people live in Pakistan today than at any time in its history. They represent a wellspring of ideas and inspiration, leadership and creativity, and of voluntary spirit that has the potential to positively shape the future of this country in the coming decades. More than any other segment of the society, it is today's young generation that has the opportunity and responsibility to strengthen the traditions of generosity and selfless service by giving of their knowledge, time and resources to help those less fortunate.

Selflessness, simplicity and honesty are virtues that the youth of this country need to adopt if they are to contribute to the development of an inclusive and equitable society. No obstacle, whether of social status, educational level or political/religious affiliation, can deter a young individual determined to help others. If there are lessons to be learned from my work, they are that one should make honest and continuous efforts, regardless of circumstances, and have faith in the inherent goodness of humanity. One should also remember that no religion is complete without human values. It is the spirit of charity of Pakistanis that has enabled me to help people in distress here and across the world.

As we in Pakistan wrestle with poverty, inequality, conflict and intolerance, it is important that the young generation realises their potential, have faith in their ability and that of society to respond to their honest intentions and efforts, and grasp the opportunity to help build a better society for themselves and the generations to come. They should partake in the generosity and philanthropy of the people of Pakistan, and focus on helping humanity with their energy, knowledge and skills. Only then can the current and future generations of Pakistanis hope to live in a just, peaceful and inclusive society.

Abdul Sattar Edhi (1928-2016), founder of the Edhi Foundation, wrote this comment for Pakistan NHDR 2017 a few months before his death.

youth can play a central role in achieving sustainable human development. Empowering youth by providing them with equitable and accessible employment opportunities would enhance the quality of existing human capital. It would enable them to become future leaders of the economy, productive members of society and positive agents of change. If engaged in the sustainable development road map from the beginning, these youth can serve as catalysts to accelerate sustainable development through their enthusiasm, participation and innovative ideas. By raising their voice, they can serve as accountability agents, helping to enhance transparency and effectiveness of governmental efforts in achieving sustainable development. In other words, Pakistan needs to invest in youth empowerment, now more than ever, to achieve sustainable human development.

- *The youth will not remain youth forever – hence the need to act now:* The youth bulge presents a challenge for policy makers. They must provide the youth with quality education, quality employment, and meaningful engagement opportunities not only to enhance the personal wellbeing of the youth but also

to enhance the country's human development. It is imperative to invest in the youth now, today, while they are still youth. Pakistan stands at a critical juncture. It has a unique window of opportunity until about 2040 to make most of a *'youth advantage'* of untold potential. After this, the youth bulge will begin to decline, and so will the window.

Tapping a nation's real wealth

"People are the wealth of nations" – this term, used in the first sentence of the first Human Development Report (1990), best captures the human development concept introduced by the pioneering Pakistani economist Dr Mahbub ul Haq. Focusing on people and their opportunities and choices, human development measures human wellbeing through "the richness of human life, rather than simply the richness of the economy" in which people live.[4] Behind this novel approach lay Dr Haq's awareness of the inadequacy of theoretical debates and the need to think about policies that would help people improve their lives. He died in 1998, the year his Cambridge friend and colleague the Indian economist Amartya Sen won the Nobel Memorial Prize in

Economic Science for his contribution to welfare economics. Thus, these two powerful South Asian voices – a Pakistani and an Indian – together advanced the notion of human development.[5]

The first HDR also introduced the Human Development Index (HDI) – a "critical innovation" (Malik 2014) – as a measure of achievement in the basic dimensions of human development across countries (figure 1.1).[6]

The HDI's "somewhat crude measure of human development remains a simple unweighted average of a nation's longevity, education and income and is widely accepted in development discourse" even as it continues to evolve around the original structure (figure 1.2).[7]

The human development approach places emphasis on three main aspects of a nation's polity: people, opportunities and choices, outlined below.[8]

People

The focus of human development is on improving the lives people lead rather than assuming economic growth will automatically lead to greater wellbeing for all. The HD approach sees income growth as *"a means to development, rather than an end in itself"*.

Opportunities

Human development is about "giving people more freedom to live lives they value". This means enabling individuals to develop their abilities as well as providing them opportunities to use these abilities. For example, educating a girl would build her skills, but will be of little use if she is denied access to jobs, or does not have the right skills for the local labour market. Three foundations for human development are to "live a long, healthy and creative life, to be knowledgeable, and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living". Many other aspects are important too, especially in helping to create the right conditions for human development (figure 1.2). Achieving the basics of human devel-

FIGURE **1.1**

Dimensions of human development

Knowledge

Directly enhancing human capibilities

Long and Healthy life

Decent standard of living

Dimensions of Human Development

Participation in political and community life

Creating conditions for human development

Promoting equality and social justice

Environmental sustainability

Human security and rights

Source: UNDP 2016b.

FIGURE **1.2**

Human development index (HDI)

opment opens opportunities for overall progress.

Choices

Human development is, fundamentally, "about more choice" – providing people with opportunities they may or may not choose to make use of. It is about creating an environment that allows people to develop to their full potential and lead *"productive and creative lives that they value"*. As we move toward implementing and monitoring the 2030 agenda, the human development approach helps articulate the objectives of development, *"improving people's well-being by ensuring an equitable, sustainable and stable planet"*.

This approach, embodied in the UNDP's successive Global HDRs as well as the National HDRs of individual states produced in collaboration with UNDP, has led to growing acceptance of the HDI as an alternative measure of development. This people-centric approach goes beyond the traditional approaches that focus on

monetary aspects like GDP per capita to measure development. The human development approach is a measure of how the people of a country, or of the world, are doing, and how well they are likely to do in the future with the available opportunities.

It is for these reasons that Pakistan must take the human development approach to address the needs of its youth and provide opportunities for them to have the kind of choices that will enable them to be productive citizens. The alternative, if this youthful energy is not harnessed in a positive direction, is rising poverty, violence, hunger and disease, dwindling resources and chaos. There is thus a critical need to address the needs of the youth population and work to guide and mentor them and provide them the openings to fulfil their potential to the best of their ability.

This is what will lead to a win-win situation for Pakistan. This is the thinking that drives this report, using the human development concept and novel methodology to gather the voices of the youth. This is why we are focusing on the youth and on

the unique areas that policy makers must work on to transform Pakistan's youth bulge into a demographic dividend.

How the Report is structured

Chapter 1 outlines the three Es and elaborates how today's youth will define the future Pakistan. Following this introductory chapter, we provide an overview of the state of the youth in Pakistan and go beyond this to outline the state of youth human development in the country (chapter 2). The chapter hinges and elaborates on three main points. Firstly, that Pakistan has such a high youth population. Secondly, the youth are a massive segment of the population undergoing a major transition, between childhood and adulthood. And thirdly, keeping the first two in mind, how the youth develop and grow will have a major impact on Pakistan as a country.

We then devote a chapter each to the three Es – education, employment, and engagement. This is where readers will find more details and facts about each of these themes. The sixth and final chapter is the conclusion pulling together our major thoughts and findings.

The three Es

This Report studies the life transitions that youth undergo between age 15 and 29. Arguably the biggest changes that human beings undergo, that shape them into becoming who they are, take place during their youth. It is during this period that individuals transition from dependence into independence, physically, emotionally and financially. This is when they begin to engage with society at large beyond their families, clans and immediate communities, to become full citizens. Discussions on these areas led us to identify what we term the three Es – education, employment and engagement – as the three main drivers of these changes.

These three Es are inextricably inter-

linked – one cannot be understood without the other. Therefore, any attempt to compartmentalise them will provide only a partial picture. For instance, youth employment patterns cannot be separated from youth educational trends which in turn may depend on the household demographics and regional norms. Similarly, educational and employment patterns influence how the youth interact with the society – by voting, getting married and starting families, and becoming productive citizens. There is thus a complex web of inter-linkages between these key drivers of the youth's lives, which shapes each aspect of these lives. Below, a brief outline of the three Es.

Education

It is during their youth that individuals arguably learn the most – not just through books or school but also through practical experience, by either practicing skills around the house or working in an auto-mechanic's workshop as a 'chota' (apprentice). These experiences come under the broad umbrella of education, the first of the three drivers identified for this report. The human development approach considers education as one of the most important tools for enhancing the youth's capabilities, freedoms and choices. While school enrolment rates in Pakistan have improved slightly over the past decade, millions of children end up never going to school. Of those that do go, the dropout rate is high.

The NHDR 2017 highlights the concept that education by itself is not enough. Education has to be done right to enable the youth to make the right choices for the future. The Report delves into the state of education development in Pakistan, with the aim of assessing its relevance towards preparing the country's youth for meaningful employment and engagement. Pakistan has made marginal progress in improving education indicators, but considerable disparities remain in how this progress is

distributed across provincial, rural/urban and gender divides. Pakistan's encouraging enrolment figures and increasing number of graduates are not enough to prepare the youth to become productive and responsible citizens. What's needed is more focus on providing quality of education, rather than just improving access to education (quantity). Pakistan must improve the quality of existing programmes in formal education besides improving and integrating technical education and vocational training in the existing system of education, to generate effective links and spillovers for youth employment and engagement. Policymakers and all of society must come together to urgently repair this basic building block – foundation actually – that bears the weight of the entire edifice of the country's population including most critically the youth.

Employment

The second major driver of transitions for youth is employment. It is during their youth that individuals start carrying money and making economic choices, becoming complete economic citizens as they transition to financial independence by getting a job. Failure or inability to achieve this independence, or being underemployed in low paying and menial jobs becomes problematic, not just for the individual but for society which must then carry their burden. Providing the youth with equitable opportunities to engage with the economic activities of their choice is thus a central element of the relationship between employment and their human development.

The NHDR 2017 finds Pakistan falling woefully short of providing jobs for its employable youth and adults. In addition, the type of employment as well as work conditions ultimately determine the pace and character of human development. This Report advocates that the quality of income generating activities is essential to define the trajectory of economic and social development that a nation's youth will follow. The urgency, thus, is not just to increase

employment generation manifold but to also generate more 'quality' employment opportunities that enable the youth to not only earn a decent living with dignity and respect but also to experience the personal and professional growth necessary to achieve sustainable human development.

Engagement

The third driver, engagement, runs in parallel to the other two transition drivers. This is the most intangible of the three but no less critical. It is what determines the relationship of individuals to their surroundings as they begin to emerge from their immediate circles of family and school to autonomous friendships and relationships formed in the workplace and beyond. From the smallest unit, they start having the option to engage with larger communities in the nation and even the world. It is also between the ages of 15 and 29 that individuals attain physical and emotional maturity, voting and marriage rights, and develop as fully-formed human beings whose basic ideas and physical structure will define them from here onwards, regardless of the changes and developments that take place with time. The engagement process begins when the youth start to become fully involved with society on their own terms as they attain physical and emotional maturity.

Human development can only be achieved through actively engaged citizens, while actively engaged citizens are an outcome of human development. Human development and engagement are thus clearly intimately connected. This Report explores this driver of change by focusing on the youth's voice, identity, socio-political participation, marriage, societal inclusion and exclusion, radicalisation, and social attitudes. It advocates that providing meaningful socio-economic and political engagement opportunities to youth is a necessary condition for enhancing human development. Other conditions that enhance human development include equitable civic and political participation, human

rights and security, and environmental sustainability. All these factors are important development goals in and of themselves.

This report finds a dearth of meaningful engagement opportunities in Pakistan and access to information regarding the few opportunities that are available. It should therefore come as no surprise that despite the youth's high level of willingness to engage in community and political affairs, their engagement remains relatively low.

How this Report came about: Methodology and a little madness

To better understand the issues, it is important to understand how this Report came about. This section explains what went into this process, and the significance of each component.

Having outlined the basic concepts and structure of NHDR 2017, let's now turn to the methodology behind it – a unique combination of research, data analysis, consultations, and out-of-the-box outreach activities (figure 1.3). Apart from computing a wide array of statistical indices to support our findings, this report stems from an intensely participatory process that involved doing things a little differently with some "junoon" (madness). We did not want to speak for youth. We wanted to allow them to speak for themselves and involve them in this process so that they would feel ownership of the final product and know that their voices had been heard.

To achieve this, we went beyond the conventional methods that usually form the basis of such reports, to use multiple innovative outreach and engagement approaches, including digital tools and technology that define this generation.

National Youth Perception Survey

Foremost amongst the research tools employed by this report is the National Youth Perception Survey (NYPS) that targeted 7,000 young women and men in both rural and urban settings across the country. This extensive, scientifically robust, regionally representative survey was not district-bound but sub-provincial, and aimed to cover the length and breadth of the country. It was held across all four provinces, as well as Gilgit-Baltistan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K) and Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT).[9]

The survey enriches this Report's overall analysis by capturing the youth's hopes, fears and perceptions about their education, employment and engagement. The NYPS provides further depth to the research by looking at a range of other subjects that impact youth development such as health and wellbeing, quality of life, preferences regarding identity, and level of trust in society and institutions.

National Youth Consultations

The process was complemented by the exhaustive National Youth Consultations comprising 81 grassroots level consultations carried out across the country with the youth (figure 1.4, pg 10). These consultations tapped the views of over 1,500 young people between August 2014 and May 2016, with a specific focus on capturing the voices of underprivileged and marginalised individuals. They included religious minorities, brick kiln workers, domestic workers, madrassa students, transgender individuals, uneducated youth, sex workers and differently-abled youth through face-to-face group consultations.

Forming baseline data

In conjunction with the tools mentioned above, the findings of this report are reinforced by knowledge from credible secondary research sources, including empirically grounded in-depth reviews and analyses of statistically significant national and international data of large and smallscale surveys. Prominent among these were the Pakistan Demographic and Health Sur-

FIGURE **1.3**

National Human Development Report 2017 - An inclusive, partcipatory and youth-led process

1,300 EXPERTS AND KEY STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED*

4
high level Advisory
Council Member meetings

32
network meetings

10
National Expert
consultations

1500
youth consulted through
92 volunteers working
under Razakar
programme

400
ideas received for
collecting 101
Ideas

35
inspiring
Pakistanis
interviewed
under
#KhwabPakistan
campaign

2
large youth
conferences
held

MORE THAN
112,000
young people
engaged
through
social media
platforms

81
National Youth
Consultations held
2014-2016

10
Contributing Authors' back-
ground papers on youth

2
Media Briefing events

**National Youth
Perception Survey 2015**
carried out across all
regions of Pakistan

350
youth video messages
recorded hopes and fears
of youth

42
youth based radio
shows held

64
entries received
under
"Hopes & Fears
Art Competition"

**More than
130,000
people reached-out,
out of which
90% are youth**

112,000
followers on
Facebook &
Twitter platforms
that engaged
500,000
unique individuals

12,000 YOUTH CONSULTED

*Government representatives, civil society members, policy makers, academics, statisticians, labour unions, employee's federation, UN agencies, International development organizations and the private sector organizations.

National Human
Development
Report 2017 -
An inclusive,
partcipatory
and youth-led
process

FIGURE **1.4**

Pakistan National Human Development Report - National Youth Consultations

81 CONSULTATIONS

KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA
CONSULTATIONS **12**
Buni (Upper Chitral)-1
Charsadda-1
Chitral city-1
Bumboret (Kalash Valley)-1
Haripur-1
Peshawar-5
Swat-2

GILGIT-BALTISTAN
7 CONSULTATIONS
Astore-1
Ghizer-1
Gilgit city-2
Hunza-1
Skardu-2

FATA
CONSULTATIONS **5**
Peshawar*-5

AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR
CONSULTATIONS **2**
Muzaffarabad-2

BALOCHISTAN
CONSULTATIONS **16**
Quetta-9
Khuzdar-1*
Gwadar-1
Kech/Turbat-1*
Mastung-1*
Lasbela-1
Killa Abdullah-1*
Sibi-1*

ISLAMABAD
2

PUNJAB
25 CONSULTATIONS
Faisalabad-3
Gujjar Khan-1
Jhang-2
Lahore-2
Sargodha-3
Sheikhupura-2
Bahawalpur-2
Multan-6
Muzaffargarh-3
Rawalpindi-1

SINDH
12 CONSULTATIONS
Ghotki-1
Hyderabad-1
Karachi-3
Larkana-3
Mirpurkhas-1
Sukkur-1
Tando Allahyar-1
Tharparkar-1

*The consultations for FATA were held in Peshawar. In Balochistan, the consultation for Kech/Turbat was held in Gawadar; for Khuzdar in Hub; and for Killa Abdullah, Sibi and Mastung in Quetta. The consultation with young miners from Shangla was held in Swat. Multan consultations included consultations with surrounding smaller communities. Consultations in Quetta included segmented consultations with different ethnic communities in Balochistan.

vey (PDHS), Labour Force Survey (LFS), Time Use Survey, and Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM).

These sources not only support the findings of the NYPS and National Youth Consultations but were also helped produce a district-representative Human Development Index (HDI) and a regionally representative Youth Development Index (YDI) as well as Gender Adjusted YDI. All these are tools developed for the first time in Pakistan. Given the minimal national level data on many aspects related to youth, this data and indices can serve as the baseline for comparisons and to gauge the future progress of youth development.

Listening to the youth, understanding their hopes, fears, and aspirations

While we did engage expert opinions,

the most exciting aspect of this Report is the voices of the youth that inform it. We made a conscious decision to hear and listen to the youth – the main stakeholders in the process of compiling this report – to truly make this a report *"by the youth, for the youth"*. To this end, apart from National Youth Consultations, we conducted further consultations on the ground and sought the views of young people in-person and online across the country as well. These additional consultations included participants from different backgrounds, mainly falling in the age bracket of 15 to 29 years. Overall, apart from main research tools listed below, we consulted and captured thousands of youth whom we reached and engaged with through various initiatives and platforms. This engagement, spread over three years, helped support the main research findings and uncover many ground truths.

Going around the country to talk to the youth, using the term "Jawan Pakistan" (Young Pakistan) to generate conversations amongst youth, policy makers, and other stakeholders, involved a lot of listening and learning from all these sources. We learnt about their views on different aspects of life and Pakistan, heard their hopes and fears, got a sense of what they were thinking, feeling and doing, and what they would like to be doing. In short, we did everything we could think of to mine the youth's views on how things can be done differently to take Pakistan along the path to sustainable development and progress. By the end of the process we had consulted almost 130,000 people out of which 90% were young through various campaigns, activities, and events described in this section.

Razakar programme

Working with the UN Volunteers programme in Pakistan, our team conducted a pilot programme with 25 highly engaged youths from all four provinces, mostly students at various universities. We enlisted them as messengers and ambassadors of

Jawan Pakistan.[10] The excitement and high level of engagement generated through these workshops and discussions led to the initial pilot project being further extended, as the Razakar (volunteer) programme involving 76 volunteers from 32 districts in all provinces of Pakistan.[11] Basically, our aim was to reach as many youths as possible and bring on board voices we ourselves were unable to reach. We wanted to create a ripple effect – get young people to reach out to and talk to more of their peers, and keep the conversation going. The Razakars in effect were our champions, tasked with talking to their peers and giving us feedback beyond the youth consultations. We provided them with guidance, questions, and training (in person, via phone and email) on how to conduct youth consultations and discussions in their own districts. After holding these discussions, the Razakars compiled reports and wrote essays reflecting the concerns of youth in their areas.[12] These reports and essays helped our team access the views of 1,500 more young people in Pakistan, whose outlooks also inform this report.

Your Idea Counts

This innovative campaign took forward our "by the youth, for the youth" philosophy, seeking actionable ideas from young people about how to improve the lives of Pakistan's youth population. The online questionnaire for this campaign received 400 entries in two months. [13] It also included several brainstorming sessions (in English and Urdu) on the ground with youth-led organisations, civil society experts, UN agencies, and other development partners to collect actionable ideas for youth.

#KhwabPakistan

We put the question, "What is your dream for Pakistan?" to 35 inspirational young Pakistani leaders for the #KhwabPakistan (Dream Pakistan) campaign.[14] The idea was to kindle a sense of hope and optimism amongst young Pakistanis, by showcasing some inspiring Pakistanis who achieved their dreams against all odds. The young leaders who shared their messages through this campaign, represent various fields ranging from art and politics to sports, science and education, encapsulating the diversity that exists across the country. Male, female or transgender, urban or rural dwellers, speaking in various languages, highly educated or self-educated, from privileged or downtrodden communities, all of them dream of and work tirelessly towards a better Pakistan. We disseminated the videos through social media and posted them on the NHDR website and Youtube.[15]

Other engagement and outreach

We organised day-long conferences that connected youth with local and international policy makers to discuss civic engagement.[16] Beyond the traditional measures of engaging youth to learn about their hopes and fears, we utilised other forms of expression like art to engage youth from across Pakistan. This included the Paint the Canvas of Youth Art Competition on "Youth Hopes and Fears". We invited members of the public to vote online for their favourite among the 64 entries received from around the country. An eminent panel of judges selected the final winners from the top 12 entries.[17] *The Pakistan I want* was another campaign that actively sought the views of the youth. Nearly 60 youth sent in whiteboard entries from across the country sharing their views in pictures. Many shared these on social media platforms.

Our pioneering "Speakathon" campaign encouraged young people to share their needs, hopes, fears, and aspirations through short videos. For this purpose, we set up mobile recording pop-up studios with Jawan Pakistan backdrops at various universities and popular recreation spots in different cities. More than 2,000 young people engaged with our team at 22 different spots. While most shied away from the camera, we recorded 350 video messages. We also collected entries from social media platforms.

"I think it's the perfect time to be young in Pakistan"

_
Male, National Youth Consultation, Peshawar.

Media and social media

The media component informing this report includes several kinds of engagement. Some components involved sharing information and concepts, as the NHDR team did with the television outreach and radio podcast. However, the main idea was to reach more young people and listen to them to ensure an inclusive final product in the shape of this report. One of our most exciting and proactive engagements took place in the virtual space where young people hang out – various social media platforms where we sought inputs from Pakistan's youth on their hopes, dreams and challenges. The NHDR Facebook page and Twitter accounts have attracted a following of over 100,000.[18] Overall, our social media platforms engaged more than 500,000 unique users through various campaigns, activities, and events.

A hugely successful engagement was the Twitter chat using the hashtag #PKYouth with this Report's lead authors Dr. Adil Najam, Dr. Faisal Bari, and former Country Director UNDP Pakistan Marc-Andre Franche.[19] The original chat time of 10.30-11.30 pm Pakistan time stretched till midnight, as well-known journalists and other civil society members joined the trending discussion. In another outreach session, economists Dr. Nadeem Haque, former Deputy Chairman Planning Commission Pakistan, and Dr. Anjum Altaf, former Dean of the School of Humanities, Social Sciences and Law at the Lahore University of Management Sciences, hosted a discussion related to the theme of this report for their podcast "SochBichar" (Thinking).[20]

The mainstream media were very much part of the process that led to this report. A well-attended and well-reported briefing in early 2015 introduced the forthcoming report and its key purpose.[21] This is where we launched the short introductory video titled "Jawan Pakistan" (Young Pakistan) outlining the aims of the project and inviting Pakistan's youth, experts and others to join the conversation.[22] But more valuable than this major event were sev-

eral smaller meetings with key journalists held throughout the process. In this realm, our most direct, real-time live engagement took place through 42 call-in shows on radio channels popular with youth across the country, including regions like Islamabad, Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi, Sialkot, Faisalabad, Swabi, Gujranwala and FATA. The discussions, spread over two months, took place in different languages on the issues of education, employment and engagement.[23] Additionally, between 2015 and 2016, we disseminated quarterly newsletters and news feeds to those engaged in our consultative process.

Overall, our main purpose in engaging with the media was not merely to publicise this Report, but to utilise Pakistan's journalists as resources for their insights and to learn from them, as part of a sincere and honest effort to hear anyone who might have ideas about the key issues we were tackling.

Advisory Council and expert stakeholders

This Report has enjoyed the support and guidance of 10 high level Advisory Council members comprising parliamentarians from all leading political parties whom we met periodically between August 2014 and May 2016. We also had on board 10 contributing authors comprising Pakistani academicians, policy makers and civil society members who presented background papers on youth related themes. We tapped a further 1,300 experts and key stakeholders through a series of 32 one-on-one meetings, held 10 national expert consultations as well as consultations with youth-led and donor organisations, consultations with the Ministry of Labour, ILO and UNFPA, and roundtables with secretaries from relevant government departments from all four provinces. These experts and stakeholders comprised government representatives from the national and sub-national level, civil society members, policymakers, academics, statisticians, representatives of labour unions, employees' federations, UN

#KhwabPakistan

agencies and international development organisations, and private sector members.

Igniting debate around NHDR's preliminary findings

To keep the process transparent, we took every opportunity to brief the public about our ongoing research and to kick-start a conversation on the critical issue of Pakistan's youth and their needs. For example, at the Lahore Literary Festival 2016, Marc-Andre Franche used key findings of the NHDR to moderate a discussion with the panellists, inspiring young activists Gulalai Ismail, Waqas Ali, Muzamil Hasan Zaidi, Sana Mir and Saifullah Magsi.[24]

We consulted with politicians and parliamentarians from all of Pakistan's provinces, particularly those who represent the youth as well as those holding youth portfolios at the national and provincial levels. These meetings aimed to share the preliminary and emerging key findings of this Report for feedback and suggestions. Between 2015 and 2016, we conducted lectures followed by discussions at several universities about the NHDR preliminary findings, hoping to hear something that we had missed earlier on. This led to inputs of nearly 400 students and faculty members, that also inform this report and reinforce the findings of the National Youth Consultations and the NYPS.[25] Beyond Pakistan, towards the end of the research process, a panel discussion based on the preliminary findings of this report was held at the London School of Economics (LSE) South Asia Centre in collaboration with UNDP Pakistan. The conversation focused on the critical role of youth engagement as a strategy to improve human development and peace in Pakistan.[26]

Along the way, we shared our key findings at several meetings with civil society representatives, academics, NGOs, journalists, researchers, and think tanks, as well as a meeting with development partners and donor community in Islamabad including representatives from the World Bank, DFID, the European Union,

UNRC, Embassy of Japan, German Embassy, Canadian High Commission and Norwegian Embassy.[27] Several participants expressed their intentions to use this Report's findings towards evidence-based youth programming in their portfolios. In Lahore, we organised a similar engagement with civil society in collaboration with Bargad, a youth development organisation. Stakeholders from wide array of civil society organisations and those interested in youth issues participated in the discussion.

Tools that capture our learning

We hope we are able to convey the excitement, energy, passion and commitment that went into the making of this Report. It has been an incredibly exhilarating, rewarding and enriching journey for all those involved. Below, we outline some of the tools used to capture aspects of the multi-layered and rich material that has been mined and incorporated in the coming chapters.

Jawan ideas

Spread across this Report, on the sidebars, are 101 Jawan Ideas. These are a sampling of ideas from the young people we encountered during our youth consultations, conferences, surveys, discussions, and on social media about what can and should be done; and mainly from the campaign #YourIdeaCounts. These are not always refined policy proposals, but we think policy-makers should consider them seriously. There is much practical wisdom in them. 101, of course, is a nice number and, in the South Asian context, a good omen!

Sentiment Meter

Another unique aspect of this report is the Sentiment Meter, a tool developed from the National Youth Consultations to gauge how young people feel about various issues that concern their lives, in different areas of the country (figure 1.5). The Meter

identifies the gender mix, general profile, and size of the focus group – small (less than 12), medium (12-30) and large (more than 30). It also shows whether the group was mixed or gender segregated, and what kind of group. The last category yielded an enormous range of diversity.

Groups included university students, madrassa students, and school students, as well as those who were less educated or had no education; educated unemployed youth, educated slum dwellers, and those who were economically struggling; unskilled workers, vocational trainees, teachers, farmers, miners, brick kiln workers, domestic workers, manual workers; youth living at shrines and those living at home; rural mothers; drug affected youth; urban activists; youth from religious communities like Hindu, Christian and Sikh, as well as ethnic, like Hazara, Pashtun and Baloch, besides transgender workers; and youth with disabilities.

Readers going through the Sentiment Meter should be able to access critical information at a glance – about the hopes and fears of Pakistan's young people, and more specifically, what are the youth thinking who participated in the 81 National Youth Consultations held as part of NHDR process. The hopes and fears identified in the chart represent dominant themes that emerged during each consultation rather than signifying any group consensus or prioritisation. Readings of their overall "sentiments" are based on the NHDR team's subjective general assessment – the feelings that appeared to be predominant in the discussions. It would therefore be inappropriate to consider these sentiments as markers for any statistical evaluation or ranking.

Each of the 81 groups outlined in the Sentiment Meter provides a unique perspective into the hearts and minds of young people in different parts of Pakistan, hailing from different backgrounds. The Meter tells us that technically trained youth in a medium sized group in Astore, Gilgit-Baltistan, have an overall positive outlook, indicated by the arrow going past

the yellow and into the green part of the gauge. What provides hope is their "Political awareness". What gives rise to fear is the "Sectarian tension and terrorism" they face with. The needle for a small group of urban, educated females in Ghotki, Sindh is at the centre of the gauge. What provides hope in this setting is the *"Employment opportunities for women in new fields"*, and what gives rise to fear is the "Deep structural poverty" of their area. For a small group of transgender youths in Larkana, Sindh, the needle goes well into the red, almost reaching the end of the gauge that indicates negative sentiments. Hope in this group arises from the fact that *"Legislation recognises and respects the third gender"*. What holds them back is the *"Social injustice and prejudice"*.

Beginning the conversation

Essentially, this report shares the story of talking to young people in Pakistan and hearing what they said. The unique combination of comprehensive and participatory research process over three years has yielded many practically implementable ideas and recommendations to secure human development progress in Pakistan. We invite policy makers, academics, national and international development organisations, UN agencies, and the private sector to invest in youth development in a coordinated manner to progress human development in Pakistan.

Most importantly, through these pages, we want to reinforce the significance of Pakistan's youth population. In fact, of all the levers that can turn Pakistan's future in one or other direction – and there are many levers, ranging from the political to societal and developmental – this is the one with the single most potential and power. The course Pakistan takes in coming years then, depends on this one factor: how we enable, equip and empower our youth.

We have tried to make a thoroughly honest and transparent effort to really listen and hear as many voices as we possibly

Jawan Ideas

Ensure the rights of young people with special needs and other marginalised communities and provide equal access to all educational, employment and other opportunities.

Jawan Ideas

Establish programmes to encourage safe and affordable mobility for young women, including subsidised scooters and bicycles, and free female driver education for two–wheel automobiles.

FIGURE **1.5**

Sentiment Meter – NHDR National Youth Consultations

The table summarizes general sentiments of youth participants (15-29) at the 81 National Youth consultations held as part of NHDR process. The table also identifies the gender mix, general profile, and size of the consultations. The hope and fears identified here represent dominant themes that came up during each consultation but do not signify any group consensus or prioritization. The sentiment's readings are based on NHDR Team's general assessment and would be inappropriate for any statistical or evaluation or ranking.

SENTIMENT METER

Less Hopeful — Neutral — More Hopeful
1 2 3 4 5

SIZE
Small: Less than 12
Medium: 12-30
Large: More than 30

GEOGRAPHY	HOPES	SENTIMENTS	FEARS	GENDER | PROFILE | SIZE
AZAD JAMMU & KASHMIR				
Muzaffarabad	Increased entrepreneurship amongst the young		A sensationalist and irresponsible media	Mixed | University students | Medium
Muzaffarabad	Democracy		Brain drain	Mixed | Educated & employed | Medium
BALOCHISTAN				
Gawadar	Better education opportunities		CPEC opportunities and benefits will not flow to local youth	Male | Less educated youth | Small
Kech/Turbat	Community development and more recreational opportunities		Lack of jobs for the educated	Male | Economically struggling | Small
Khuzdar	Improved law and order situation		Lack of employment and skills training	Male | Migrant workers | Medium
Killa Abdullah	Democracy and political participation		High crime rate	Male | employed youth | Small
Lasbela	High spirit of volunteerism amongst youth		Local workers ignored, not promoted, and never trained	Male | Uneducated workers | Medium
Mastung	CPEC and improved law and order situation		Jobs being taken away by non-local workers	Male | Poorer background | Small
Quetta	Growth of private sector and job opportunities		Corruption	Mixed | University students | Medium
Quetta	Increased opportunities for all Pakistanis including minorities		Discrimination against minorities	Mixed | Christain/Hindu youth | Medium
Quetta	Increased political participation		Lack of sports opportunities	Male | Drug affected youth | Medium
Quetta	Induction tests will bring in more competent teachers		Lack of security and difficulty for women to work	Mixed | Hazara youth | Medium
Quetta	Desire to educate children, both girls and boys		Education not preparing young people for jobs	Mixed | Pashtun youth | Medium
Quetta	Growth of entrepreneurship opportunities		Limited job opportunities for women	Female | Entrepreneurial Youth | Small
Quetta	Growing acceptance of women's employment		Nepotism (sifarish) and corruption	Female | Settler communites | Medium
Quetta	Increased sense of social responsibility		Poor quality of education in schools	Mixed | Young professionals | Medium
Quetta	Realization of the benefits of education		Securitization and lack of trust in the state	Mixed | Baloch youth | Medium
Sibi	Improved law and order situation		Poverty and lack of quality education facilities	Male | Manual workers | Small
FATA				
FATA	Improved education opportunities for girls		Restrictions on womens' political participation	Female | College students | Small
FATA	Improved scholarship opportunities		Violent extremism	Male | Unskilled workers | Small
FATA	Improved income earning opportunities for women		Insecurity and violence	Female | IDPs | Medium
FATA	Opportunities for political participation		Poor quality education	Female | University students | Small
FATA	Increased sense of social responsibility		Insecurity and violence	Male | University students | Small
GILGIT-BALTISTAN				
Astore	Political awareness		Sectarian tension and terrorism	Male | Technically trained | Medium
Ghizer	Increased religious tolerance and understanding		Lack of economic opportunity	Mixed | Educated youth | Small
Gilgit	Greater mobility		Political isolation	Mixed | University students | Medium
Gilgit	Growth in job opportunities		Lack of quality education opportunities	Mixed | Young professionals | Medium
Hunza	Entrepreneurial spirit among women in Hunza		Workplace harassment of female employees	Female | Vocational trainees | Small
Skardu	Government centre training mountaineers improving employment		Religious intolerance	Male | Employed in tourism | Small
Skardu	Greater mobility		Political isolation	Female | Vocational trainees | Medium
ISLAMABAD CAPITAL TERRITORY				
Islamabad	Economic growth		Lack of funding and access to capital for entrepreneurs	Male | Students & Entrepreneurs | Small
Islamabad	Increased youth participation in politics		Lack of quality education opportunities	Mixed | Affluent youth | Medium
KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA				
Charsadda	Young people are rising up against corruption and terrorism		Prevalence of cheating	Male | 11th & 12th graders | Medium
Chitral	Increased use of technology		Climate change and likelihood of more floods	Mixed | Youth volunteers | Medium
Chitral	Increased sense of social responsibility		Deteriorating law and order situation	Mixed | University students | Medium
Haripur	More diverse educational opportunities		Lack of career counselling	Mixed | University students | Small
Kalash	Growth of entrepreneurship opportunities for women		Lack of good teachers	Mixed | Kalash youth | Small

GEOGRAPHY	HOPES	SENTIMENTS	FEARS	GENDER | PROFILE | SIZE
KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA				
Peshawar	Demand for good education is universal		Marginalization of minorities	Mixed | Hindu youth | Small
Peshawar	Economic mobility of the poor into the middle class		High cost of good education	Female | Domestic workers | Medium
Peshawar	Emergence of new and younger political leaders		Multiple education systems in place	Female | Young teachers | Medium
Peshawar	More focus on need for religious tolerance and diversity		Discrimination against minorities	Mixed | Christian & Sikh youth | Medium
Peshawar	Technology and entrepreneurship		Poor quality of education is producing unemployable youth	Male | Young entrepreneurs | Small
Shangla	Desire to educate children, both girls and boys		No attention to worker health and safety	Male | Miners | Medium
Swat	Growth in employment opportunities		Education not preparing young people for jobs	Mixed | Youth activists | Medium
PUNJAB				
Bahawalpur	Education opportunities for out of school children and youth		Feudalism	Males | Young rural fathers | Medium
Bahawalpur	More vocational training for women		Domestic violence and early marriage	Female | Young rural mothers | Medium
Faisalabad	Better vocational training		No respect for women in the workplace	Female | Factory workers | Medium
Faisalabad	Improved security and policing		Poverty pushing women into sex work	Female | sex workers | Small
Faisalabad	Increased awareness of transgender issues		Job discrimination against marginalized groups	Transgender | Transgender | Medium
Gujjar Khan	Opportunities for starting own business		Poor quality education	Male | Rural youth | Small
Jhang	A more morally grounded society		Lack of transport prevents girls from being in schools	Female | Madrassa students | Medium
Jhang	Better vocational training		Terrorism and corruption	Male | Madrassa students | Medium
Lahore	More focus on human rights and social justice		Education deepens economic inequities	Mixed | Young researchers | Medium
Lahore	Revival of local cultures and national pride		Multiple education systems in place	Mixed | PhD students | Medium
Multan	Greater opportunity for higher education, especially for women		Poor quality of school teachers	Mixed | Young researchers | Small
Multan	Increased activism against forced child labour		Poverty and debt leading to child and bonded labour	Mixed | Brick klin workers | Large
Multan	Increased entrepreneurial spirit amongst youth		Diminishing cultural and social values	Mixed | Fine arts students | Medium
Multan	Increased mobility		Practice of early marriage, especially for girls	Mixed | Unemployed youth | Medium
Multan	Increased opportunity for vocational training		Lack of qualified teachers in public schools	Female | Vocational trainees | Medium
Multan	Possibility of migration		Difficult for illiterate young adults to get education	Mixed | Youth living at shrines | Small
Muzaffargarh	Decline in feudalism		Water scarcity in agriculture	Mixed | Farmers | Medium
Muzaffargarh	Greater acceptance of education for girls		Terrorism and violence	Mixed | Mostly uneducated | Medium
Muzaffargarh	Increased mobility within Pakistan and abroad		Disconnect between Urdu and English medium education	Mixed | Educated unemployed | Medium
Rawalpindi	Lots of young role models, including many women		Women outside the home are made to feel unsafe by leering men	Female | University students| Large
Sargodha	Greater opportunity for higher education		Difficulties for Urdu medium students in higher education	Female | 11th & 12th graders | Large
Sargodha	Increased mobility within Pakistan and abroad		Rise of indecency in society	Male | 11th & 12th graders | Medium
Sargodha	More job opportunities for women		Nepotism (sifarish) and corruption	Mixed | University students | Large
Sheikhupura	Increased mobility within Pakistan and abroad		Nepotism (sifarish) and corruption	Male | Factory workers | Small
Sheikhupura	More employment opportunities for women		Social barriers for working women	Female | Rural | Small
SINDH				
Ghotki	Employment opportunities for women in new fields		Deep structural poverty	Female | Urban educated | Small
Hyderabad	More jobs open to women workers		Political instability and insecurity	Female | Urban educated | Small
Karachi	Improved law and order situation		Ineffective local government	Mixed | Urban activists| Small
Karachi	Increased desire to educate daughters		No safety nets for daily labourers	Mixed | Educated slum dwellers | Small
Karachi	Realization of the benefits of education		Ghost Schools and poor quality teachers	Female | Fishing community | Medium
Larkana	Legislation recognize and respects the third gender		Social injustice and prejudice	Mixed | Transgender/sex workers | Small
Larkana	More access to information		Lack of employment opportunities in rural areas	Male | Farmers | Small
Larkana	Sense of community belonging		Lack of qualified teachers in public schools	Male | Young farmers | Small
Mirpurkhas	Technology-enabled work-at-home opportunities		Public transport challenges for people with disability	Mixed | Youth with disabilities | Small
Sukkur	Sense of citizenship among youth		Rise of sectarian and religious intolerance	Mixed | Urban educated | Small
Tando Allahyar	More focus on need for religious tolerance and diversity		Too many people dependent on informal and non-permanent jobs	Female | Rural | Medium
Tharparkar	Creation of local jobs in (coal) mining sector		Rise of sectarian and religious intolerance	Male | Hindu youth | Medium

NOTES

The consultations for FATA were held in Peshawar. In Balochistan, the consultation for Kech/Turbat was held in Gawadar; for Khuzdar in Hub; and for Killa Abdullah, Sibi and Mastung in Quetta.
The consultation with young miners from Shangla was held in Swat. Multan consultations included consultations with surrounding smaller communities. Consultations in Quetta included segmented consultations with different ethnic communities in Balochistan.

Celebrate the week of August 14 as National Youth Week. Hold youth–focused activities, celebrate young role models and emphasise regional linkages.

could. It is of course not possible to hear everyone, but we tried to reach as many as we could through conventional as well as unconventional means. We also tried to access different types of expertise and experience – specialists, donors, and stakeholders particularly the youth – to fish for ideas that would inform this report. It was in the end not possible to include all the voices we heard but we have sincerely attempted to synthesise and reflect them all.

We see this chapter, and this Report, as beginning a conversation on the all-important issue of Pakistan's youth, rather than trying to provide a prescription. There is no prescription, in fact. We see

our job as alerting readers to the enormity of the challenges as well as potential and opportunities posed by Pakistan's youth bulge. The idea is to invite the reader to contextualise the issue of youth and push it into the limelight, making it Pakistan's primary policy focus. We have no standard solutions to offer. It is multiple actions taking place simultaneously that will move the needle towards the goal of sustainable human development.

Through this report, we offer a framework of how to begin thinking about this issue, premised on the view that the youth are not a problem to be solved but a responsibility to fulfil.

2

The state of youth in Pakistan

Kalash Youth, Bumboret

*"Auqabi rooh jab bedaar
hoti hai jawanon mein*

*Nazar aati hai inko apni
manzil aasmanon mein"*

(When an eagle's spirit awakens in youthful
hearts, They see their goal in the skies)

– Allama Iqbal

CHAPTER 2

The state of youth in Pakistan

On Friday, 21 September 2012, a recent college graduate with a computer science degree and a minor in sociology channelized his outrage about the destruction of public property across Pakistan with a call for action. His tools: Twitter and Facebook.[1]

"I say when/if these #protests end, we take up the streets and clean up the mess. Show the world that real #Pakistanis say NO to violence", posted Faran Rafi in Islamabad in response to the damage caused by demonstrators.[2]

Encouraged by friends, he created a Facebook Event: "Project Clean Up For Peace". The venue: "All over Pakistan". They then took to social media to promote the event using the hashtag #ProjectCleanUpForPeace. Within 24 hours, over 5,000 people had expressed support for the event. On Sunday, dozens of volunteers – mostly young men and women -- turned up at simultaneous events in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad to clean up damaged downtown areas. Armed with buckets, mops, brooms, garbage bags, paint and paintbrushes, they swept broken glass, filled in bullet holes in walls and painted over graffiti, countering #MuslimRage with their new hashtag: #MuslimLove. The buzz from their photos and videos forced the mainstream media in Pakistan and abroad to sit up and take notice.

Participants brought water and juice for the police, many of whom were injured during the protests. They learnt that the police are not allowed to accept food and other items from citizens – but it's the thought that counts.

And one thought that clearly drives young Pakistanis is the need to "show the world that this country is not only all about violence, terrorism, intolerance, and corruption" – to affirm there are many Pakistanis "who believe in peace, humanity, tolerance, and coexistence" as one youth put it.

The need for thoughtful investment in the youth

What does it mean to be young in Pakistan today? This report attempts an answer based on extensive research aimed at understanding young people in Pakistan, their needs, wants, perspectives and key concerns regarding education, employment, and engagement. It examines their fears, concerns and aspirations regarding their wellbeing and their country. In sum, the NDHR 2017 is an attempt to truly understand what it means to be a young individual in Pakistan, and how to utilise the youth's potential for human development.

This report encapsulates the findings of the National Youth Perception Survey (NYPS) as well as insights from the National Youth Consultations (NYC) and other innovative consultative methods detailed in the previous chapter. It is enriched with voices of young people and experts – nearly 130,000 individuals across the country out of which 90% were youth. Thus, this is not just a report about the youth, but also a report by the youth, for the youth, crowd-sourcing and incorporating the youth's voices to generate an appreciation of what it means to be in their shoes.

The findings of this report provide not only grounds for greater optimism to enhance human development through the youth but also raise points of concern for the future of Pakistan and the dire consequences unless there is thoughtful investment in the youth. Implicit in this big picture is the need for Pakistan's policy makers

Young people hold the key to success

The 2017 National Human Development Report (NHDR) of Pakistan comes at a critical time in the country's history, bringing focus to its most valuable resource – young people. As we embark on a journey to implement the boldest global agenda on development, young people hold the key to success. To achieve the vision of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, we must create enabling environments for young people everywhere to fulfil their potential. This is particularly crucial in countries like Pakistan where young people form the majority of the population.

The NHDR provides insightful findings and recommendations on three main issues that are so critical to youth development – education, employment, and civic engagement. While all three areas have been analysed from a national context, they also have global relevance.

Firstly, the 30 percent illiteracy rate among the total youth population of Pakistan is unacceptably high and needs to be urgently addressed. This gap must be closed for the country to achieve its human development objectives. Education is the great driver of social, economic and political progress and it must fully assume its central role in helping people to forge more just, peaceful, tolerant and inclusive societies.

Secondly, we must rise to the challenge of creating and investing an estimated 1.5 million jobs annually to match the needs of Pakistani youth entering the labour market. The government alone cannot shoulder this task. Therefore, it is important to facilitate the transformation of young people from 'job seekers' to 'job creators' as entrepreneurs. This requires visionary and long-term reforms in the legislative, financial, and investment landscape of Pakistan.

Thirdly, we must open more avenues for young people's participation in the political and civic life of the country. This Report presents overwhelming evidence which suggests that young women and men of Pakistan are eager to take active part in the political life of the country.

All these efforts should be undertaken with a specific emphasis on the empowerment of young women and girls. We need to build on the momentum of increased participation of young women in higher education in Pakistan and ensure this positive trend translates into their equal access to jobs.

In June 2014, I visited Pakistan for the first time in my capacity as the Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth. I had the opportunity to engage with many of its youth leaders, parliamentarians, activists, and entrepreneurs. I have fond memories of these interactions and was impressed by the inspiring energy and dedication of the numerous young people I met in Islamabad and Lahore. Based on these experiences, I firmly believe that equipped with the right tools and incentives, the young people of Pakistan have all it takes to realise their khwabs (dreams) not only for themselves, but for their country and the world at large.

Ahmad Alhendawi is the former UN Secretary-General's Envoy on Youth. Comment for Pakistan NHDR 2017.

to understand that the roadmap they lay down today for the youth will determine not only the youth's future but that of the entire country. It is what will determine the direction the country moves towards and what it will become.

Rectifying neglect

It cannot be stressed enough that the first step towards moving in a positive direction is to recognise, acknowledge, and understand the realities – with all their accompanying complexities and nuances. The time for simplifications is over. While recognising that the "youth" are not a homogenous mass, it is critical to understand the overall ethos of Pakistan's young population. This understanding will better channelize the energy and potential of the youth – and thereby the country itself – in a positive direction. The alternative is to allow this en-

ergy and potential to spiral into negativity.

While there is in general a growing consensus around the significance of the youth for economic growth and the need to reflect their desires and aspirations in policymaking, young people in Pakistan are often, for a variety of sociological, traditional and cultural reasons, simply not 'heard'. There is in general little or no understanding of their aspirations, hopes, dreams, challenges and fears.

The NDHR 2017 aims to address this issue by incorporating the views of thousands of young people who participated in the National Youth Perception Survey and National Youth Consultations thereby bridging the gap and learning from Pakistan's young people.

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Population dynamics and the youth bulge

Pakistan is currently one of the youngest countries in the world, and the second youngest in the South Asian region after Afghanistan.[3] Its youth population (15-29 years) is estimated to be at least 54 million, accounting for about 29 percent of its total population of around 189 million in 2015, just under half of its workforce.[4]

The region's traditionally high fertility rates will contribute to an increase in the youth population in the years to come. This is the case with Pakistan as well. Although the country's population growth rate has declined steadily over the years, the existing fertility rates will continue to drive the ongoing population growth before it reaches a plateau and starts to decline.[5]

Around the region, we see countries reaping the demographic dividends of their youthful populations – for example, Iran, Turkey, China, and India. Pakistan must also seize the moment and maximise the opportunities offered by its youth bulge.

Another significant aspect of the country's current demographics is that the youth currently constitute almost half of the total working age (15-64 years) population (figure 2.1). This is changing due to the ongoing decline in fertility. The proportion of the youth in the working age group is expected to decline steadily – by more than 10 percent by the year 2050 (figure 2.2). An ageing labour force will have implications that need to be considered and planned for now, today, rather than reacting once the negative consequences appear.

A window of opportunity

As Pakistan's mortality rate slowly declines and life expectancy rises, the combination of these factors indicates that the coun-

FIGURE **2.1**

Population and its growth rate in selected age groups: 1950-2100

Source: UNDESA 2015.

FIGURE **2.2**

Share of youth in working age population

Source: UNDESA 2015.

try's current median age of 22.5 will hover at around 31 years by 2050.[6] Pakistan will then be home to more young people than ever before. This reflects a global trend in which a staggering 90 percent of the world's 1.8 billion young people live in less developed countries, with almost one fourth concentrated in South Asia.[7]

All these demographic processes have repercussions for the country's economy. However, not all repercussions are negative. One potentially positive aspect of this phenomenon is "the demographic dividend" – a window of opportunity offered by the changing demography of a population where the dependency ratios shrink. This is when there are more people of working age (15-64), than there are older people (65 and above) or children (< 15 years).

Pakistan is currently undergoing a phase in which dependency ratios are much lower than in the previous century. However, this decline in the total dependency ratios is expected to end in 2045. That is when the window of opportunity will start to close for good. The dependency ratio will remain constant for the next three decades. After that, the 'old dependency ratio' will start contributing to the total dependency ratio. This will impact Pakistan's total

dependency ratio that will again start to increase in 2075 (figure 2.3). Pakistan's population pattern currently follows the conventional pyramid structure – a large base and narrow peak. This shape will start transforming into a cylindrical one in 2030. By 2060 Pakistan's population will have a uniform age structure (figure 2.4).

Between 2010 and 2015 Pakistan had the highest proportion of young people ever in its history, accounting for almost a third of the total population. The proportion of youth began to decline after this spike, although the rate of decline has been slow. The under-15 population age group, currently declining at a higher rate, will slow down after 2035. After that, the population share of these two segments – under-15, and 15-29 years – will become almost equal.

Growth trajectory of the youth

As declining fertility rates lead to fewer births, the number of individuals who make up the younger generations will decrease to become less than the older generations. Hence the youth bulge will not last for long, especially as fertility rates continue to decline. After 2020, the decline in the youth proportion will be primarily

FIGURE **2.3**

Timing of the 'window of opportunity': dependency ratios

- ■ Total dependency ratio
- — Youth dependency ratio
- ■ Old dependency ratio

Source: UNDESA 2015.

Jawan Ideas

Ensure provision of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) especially for girls in all schools – make this a criterion for school approval and certification.

driven by falling death rates (figure 2.5).

In absolute terms, Pakistan's population below 30 years of age will rise to 148 million by 2040. It will remain stationary at 150 million for couple of decades and start declining after 2060. The population between 30-64 years of age will continue to rise until 2080, when it is expected to reach more than 45 percent of the country's population.[8]

Thus, now is the time to invest in the youth and provide them gainful employment. This will enable the country to reap the benefit of the opportunity afforded by the current demographic trends. It is important to note that there is no automatic dividend. The right policies and their efficient implementation are necessary to reap the benefits of the changing demographics.

Measuring development

Since the 1980s, it has come to be accepted that economic growth does not automatically improve people's lives. Measures of national income indicate how rich the economy is but are largely silent on human development, or how rich the lives of the people are. In 1990, the first Human Development Report introduced the Human Development Index (HDI), which is a summary measure of the social and economic progress that a country has made in achieving development.

Human development with its people-centric approach defines development as a means not only for boosting incomes but also maximising opportunities available to human beings to improve their lives, health, and overall wellbeing. The HDI, a tool to measure achievements in three dimensions of human development, education, health and standard of living, complements the overall concept of human development. Each dimension is divided into further indicators. Comparing the HDI of different countries can show which ones are comparatively more successful in expanding people's choices, opportunities and wellbeing. Intercountry comparisons can illustrate differences and unequal distribution of choices, resources and opportunities available to people in different re-

FIGURE **2.4**

The changing shape of Pakistan

Source: UNDESA 2015.

Age **2060**

Age **2070**

Age **2080**

Age **2090**

Age **2100**

FIGURE **2.5**

Share of youth in population: 1950-2100

Source: UNDESA 2015.

gions or districts of that country.

Human Development Index – Pakistan

For this report, UNDP has formulated a Human Development Index using national data sources and covering all the districts of Pakistan. Following the global methodology, Pakistan HDI is based on three dimensions: education, health and standard of living. The HDI's Education Index is calculated using mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling at the district level from the 2014/15 Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) data. The Health Index is constructed using two indicators: immunisation rates and satisfaction with health facility taken from the PSLM data. Whereas, for the Standard of living index we used the living standards from the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) as a proxy.[9]

The national HDI for 2015 is 0.681, which according to the thresholds used for this report categorises Pakistan as a country with a medium level of development. This figure differs from the global HDI 0.538 calculated for Pakistan in the HDR 2015, that accordingly ranks Pakistan 147th out of 188 countries and classifies it as a low human development country. This difference is due to use of different methodology and data, as well as different cut-offs.[10]

Jawan Ideas

The Government must be held accountable if the census is delayed for more than 6 months. Census delay should require a new vote of confidence, or other significant penalty.

This Report takes a closer look at the country, including its four regions – Islamabad Capital Territory, Azad Jammu and Kashmir [AJ&K], Gilgit-Baltistan [GB] and Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA] – and four provinces, Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Punjab and Sindh (map 2.1). Amongst the regions, the highest HDI in 2015 is 0.875 for Islamabad, a federally administered territory and the capital of the country, followed by AJ&K with an HDI score of 0.734. The lowest HDI is 0.216 for FATA, a very low human development category. Amongst the provinces, Balochistan has the lowest HDI of 0.421 falling in the category of low human development. Punjab has the highest, 0.732, placing it in a high medium human development category. The other two provinces, Sindh and KP, perform relatively better and fall in the medium human development category.[11]

These variations in HDIs amongst regions and provinces clearly depict the state of choices and opportunities available for people. Higher HDI figure mean higher development levels and a greater availability of opportunities and freedom of choice for people to enhance their lives. However, it is uncertain whether these opportunities cater to the specific needs of youth and promote youth development as well. To achieve this goal, the UNDP has produced, for the first time in Pakistan, a Youth Development Index and Youth Gender Development Index to measure youth development. This is explained in detail below.

Youth Development Index and Youth Gender Inequality Index

Just like human development, youth development can be better understood through an aggregation of several indicators. The Youth Development Index (YDI) supplements the insights provided by the Human Development Index. Given the current unprecedented rise in Pakistan's youth population, the YDI can help fill a critical gap in the country's development landscape,

MAP **2.1**

Pakistan Human Development Index (2015)

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX (HDI)

High HDI		0.800 or more
High Medium HDI		0.700 - 0.799
Medium HDI		0.600 - 0.699
Low Medium HDI		0.450 - 0.599
Low HDI		0.300 - 0.449
Very Low HDI		0.299 or less

Note: Map is based on the data presented in table 2 of the Statistical Annex.
Due to unavailability of the PSLM 2014/15 data for Gilgit-Baltistan, Azad Jammu & Kashmir, Panjgur and Turbat, most recent available data is used instead.

offering an overview of the youth across various dimensions – education, employment and engagement – disaggregated by region and gender.

Since the performance of the youth is critical to achieving many of the targets under the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the YDI can play a crucial role in helping Pakistan keep track of the progress made towards some of these goals over the next 15 years. As a tool to consistently monitor the situation of Pakistan's youth, the YDI can also be a measure of how young people are doing across various dimensions of their lives. It can further be used to rally policymakers by flagging the importance of young people and helping insert youth into the policy discourse.

The Youth Development Index

This is a combination of indicators that

presents an assessment of inclusion regarding education, employment and political and social life. It is a composite index that measures average achievement in four dimensions of youth development – health, knowledge, engagement, and employment. To capture the multidimensional nature of youth development, the YDI assigns the same importance to indicators regarding the civic and political participation levels of young people as it does to indicators about their education, health and economic prospects (figure 2.6).

The YDI is estimated based on the most recent sets of household level data and surveys available – the Pakistan Standard of Living Measurement Survey, National Youth Perception Survey, the Labour Force Survey and Pakistan's Demographic and Health Survey. The index ranges between a minimum possible value of 0 and maximum 1. To calculate the YDI across the widest areas using the available time and resources, researchers for this report divided Pakistan into a total of 18 regions. The regional division for the provinces of Punjab and Sindh was based on the Pickney's (1989) agro-climatic zones, whereas for Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa divisions were based on proximity, cultural similarities and geographical topography. Islamabad, Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) were considered separate regions and based on administrative divisions (map 2.2).

Karachi and Hyderabad, eastern Sindh and other regions like central, western, and south-eastern Punjab scored between 0.500 and 0.599 (table 3 in Statistical Annex). These regions fall in the medium youth development category. The youth social participation rate is extremely low all over Pakistan. Even in Islamabad only 1.4 percent of the youth were found to be involved in any kind of social activity which led to Islamabad's unexpectedly modest YDI. Similarly, Karachi and Hyderabad's relatively lower YDI is due to the youth's low rate of physical activity.

All regions of Balochistan, FATA and northern KP were found to be most deprived in terms of YDI. Apart from the two indicators related to employment used in the YDI, youth labour force participation rate and the ratio of total unemployment rate to the youth unemployment rate, the youth's performance in all other dimensions of YDI in these regions is alarmingly low.

FIGURE **2.6**

A conceptual framework of the YDI

MAP **2.2**

Pakistan Youth Development Index (2015)

Note: Map is based on the data presented in table 3 of the Statistical Annex.

Our findings are substantiated by a wide array of statistical indices and computations compiled as this Report's Statistical Annex. These include the district representative Human Development Index, the Youth Development Index, the Youth Gender Inequality Index, the Multidimensional Poverty Index and other social development indicators.

Youth Gender Inequality Index

The YDI is accompanied by a Youth Gen-

der Inequality Index (YGII), rather than a gender adjusted youth development index. The YGII, also a composite index, measures gender-based disparities across three dimensions of health, empowerment and the labour market (figure 2.7).

In terms of gender equality among youth, Azad Jammu & Kashmir along with all regions of Punjab fare relatively better. Islamabad and regions in Sindh are in the middle. Upper KP, GB and Balochistan are towards the bottom but score relatively higher than FATA and lower regions of KP,

FIGURE **2.7**

Dimensions and indicators used in the YGII

which are last in terms of YGII (map 2.3).

Although gender disparities exist across the board in all the indicators, major gender disparities in physical activity and labour force participation translate to lower YGII scores.

Global Youth Development Index

The Commonwealth Secretariat's Global Youth Development Index is a research initiative that seeks to address a gap in global data on young people's development in areas such as health, education, employment, and civic and political participation across 183 countries. The index uses the Commonwealth's definition of youth as people between the ages of 15 and 29, consistent with the definition of youth used in this report, while some countries and international institutions define youth differently.

The global YDI is a composite index of 18 indicators related to five areas: education, health and wellbeing, employment and opportunity, civic participation, and political participation. The five domains of the global YDI also fall within the three drivers of youth development identified in this report. Measures of education and

employment are straightforward while the other three (health and wellbeing, civic participation and political participation) are critical components of 'engagement'.

The latest global YDI report (2016) places Pakistan at 154 amongst 183 countries with a score of 0.470. Pakistan is the only non-African country amongst the ten lowest-ranked Commonwealth countries (figure 2.8, pg 34).

Pakistan trails behind the Asian average in all domains except health and wellbeing. Within South Asia, except for Afghanistan, all the countries have better scores for education than Pakistan as well as a better YDI global ranking. Pakistan's low score stems from its low performance in the areas of education, financial inclusion and political participation, exacerbated by the lack of a coherent youth policy, both at the federal and provincial levels.

The Youth of Pakistan as 100 people

The 'Youth of Pakistan as 100 people' (YoP100) diagram incorporates informa-

MAP **2.3**

Pakistan Youth Gender Inequality Index (2015)

YOUTH GENDER INEQUALITY INDEX (YGII)

Low YGII	0.119 or less
Medium YGII	0.120 - 0.239
High YGII	0.240 - 0.319
Very High YGII	0.320 - 0.400

Note: Map is based on the data presented in table 4 of the Statistical Annex.

tion from the various information-mining tools developed for this report to convey the basic heterogeneous composition of Pakistan's youth in percentage terms (figure 2.9, pg 35).

Taken as a microcosm of Pakistani society, the youth population reflected in this wheel represents a multitude of backgrounds, ethnicities and levels of education, ranging from the unlettered to PhDs. Each section of the wheel determines the trajectory of development of not only the youth but also of the country at large.

The wheel's population section shows that about half of Pakistan's youth are male and half female. Some are married while others are single. In the field of education, 29 out of the 100 are completely unlettered and only 6 of them have completed beyond 12 years of education. While 39 (32 males and 7 females) out of the 100 youth are employed, 57 (16 males and 41 females)

FIGURE **2.8**

Pakistan is the only non-African country amongst the bottom ten Commonwealth countries

Rank
Rank	Country
0	Australia
	UK
10	New Zealand
	Canada
20	Malta
	Barbados
30	Brunei-Sri Lanka
	Malaysia
	Cyprus

Rwanda
Sierra Leone
PAKISTAN
Namibia
Malawi
Cameroon
Tanzania
Lesotho
Zambia
Mozambique

Source: Wight 2016.

are neither working nor seeking jobs, and only 4 are not working but are seeking jobs. Other sections of the wheel show that only 15 have access to the Internet and 52 own a cell phone.

The youth wheel reflects the dearth of extracurricular facilities for Pakistan's youth – 94 out of 100 don't have access to a library while 93 don't have access to a sports facility. Furthermore, they have limited mobility. Only 23 have their own transportation while 77 need to find other means of transport, in a situation where there is an overall paucity of public transport.

Regarding political engagement, the Youth Wheel reveals a high willingness to engage in the political process. As many as 80 out of a 100 of registered youth voted in the past elections. The most encouraging revelations of this tool relate to the Pakistani youths' feelings of hope. Despite security concerns and militant unrest in several parts of Pakistan, an overwhelming number of youth are optimistic about Pakistan (48), feel safe (70), feel happy (89), and feel their life is better than their parents (67).

The youth wheel helps to better understand the situation of Pakistan's youth. However, it reveals only part of the picture. One of the most critical functions of the NDHR 2017 is to apply the nuances obtained from various data sources and portray a complete picture. Taken together, these elements are critical to understand the situation of youth in Pakistan in a more holistic way, particularly in the context of three important areas of transition – the three Es: education, employment and engagement – identified and examined in this report. The coming chapters convey more details related to the key themes.

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Looking ahead

The overall picture conveys that this may

FIGURE **2.9**

The Youth of Pakistan as 100 People

50 female
50 male

67 unmarried
33 married

48 feel it will be bright
16 feel it will not change
36 feel it will be bleak

55 live in Punjab
23 in Sindh
4 in Balochistan
14 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
4 in AJ&K, FATA and G-B

67 feel their life is better than their parents'
18 feel it is the same
15 feel worse off

64 live in urban areas
36 in rural areas

38 play sports frequently
3 play occasionally
59 play infrequently

15 Urdu
37 Punjabi
10 Sindhi
13 Pushto
4 Balochi
13 Seraiki
8 other languages

89 feel happy
8 feel indifferent
3 feel unhappy

70 literate
30 illiterate

70 feel safe
15 feel unsafe
15 feel neither safe nor unsafe

29 have no education
16 have 1-5 years of education
40 have 6 - 10 years of education
9 have 11 - 12 years of education
6 have > 12 years of education

80 voted in past elections
(amongst registered voters)
20 did not

39 employed (32m/7f)
4 unemployed seeking jobs (2m/2f)
57 unemployed not seeking jobs (16m/41f)

52 own mobile phones
48 do not

60 not working
14 unpaid workers
10 irregular workers
8 self-employed
8 employers and salaried workers

1 has a car
12 have motorcycles
10 have bicycles
77 none of the above

15 have access
85 no access

6 have access
94 no access

7 have access
93 no access

GENDER
PAKISTAN'S FUTURE
QUALITY OF LIFE
HEALTHY PHYSICAL ACTIVITIES
HAPPINESS
SAFETY
VOTING
MOBILE PHONE
TRANSPORTATION
INTERNET
SPORTS FACILITY
LIBRARY
TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT
EMPLOYMENT STATUS
EDUCATION
LITERACY
FIRST LANGUAGE
AREA
PROVINCE
MARITAL STATUS

The
YOUTH OF PAKISTAN
as
100 PEOPLE

The Youth of Pakistan as 100 People

not be a bad time to feel optimistic about the future of Pakistan, especially of its youth. Pakistan's young people exude an element of hopefulness and energy. The country, however, may suffer terribly in the coming years if we allow the youth's optimism and potential to degenerate into frustration and rage.

Another finding of this report is that Pakistani youth today are possibly more fractured than youth in other developing countries, reflecting fissures evident in society at large. The disparities that exist at a societal level appear more starkly amongst the youth. Many of the divisions observed in the previous generations are reflected in their children, the youth of today. In some cases, these divisions have intensified amongst the younger population. This makes the task of enabling them to become productive citizens even more difficult. Pakistan now faces the challenge of trying to reduce these divisions through imaginative, long-term policies that will bring people together rather than deepening the rifts.

Third, the concerns of Pakistan's youth generally lie beyond the policy discourse, in the sense that the policies being framed are all too often irrelevant for most of them, bypassing the difficulties they face. For example, successive governments have tended to focus on creating more schools or retaining those who enter the education stream while ignoring those who never make it to school in the first place. Similarly, government efforts to generate employment rarely incorporate or try to uplift the youth already working in the informal or unregulated sector.

Making a difference

The biggest surprise emerging from the National Youth Consultations is the intensity and preoccupation with making a difference and taking a stand one way or another that characterises Pakistan's youthful population, particularly in the urban areas. This preoccupation with politics and political statements crowds out the carefree-

ness that is a universal characteristic of the youth.

Examples abound. Take Qaisar Ronjha, 26. Hailing from a conservative, rural background in Lasbela district, Balochistan, he is an outspoken advocate for the rights of youth and women. There is Karachi-based lawyer and activist, Muhammad Jibran Nasir who was barely in his mid-twenties when he stood for elections in 2013 as an independent candidate. His on-the-ground activism and skilful use of the social media makes him one of the most visible under-30 Pakistanis, standing for a pluralistic, inclusive, democratic, tolerant, and just society. Another prominent youth activist is human rights activist and co-founder of Aware Girls, Gulalai Ismail, who heads an organisation advocating for equal rights of young women.

These young people are not exceptional in their zeal and passion to make a difference. Nearly every young Pakistani who participated in the National Youth Consultations revealed similar tendencies, whether their politics were leftist, rightist or centrist. Most of them expressed the determination to make their voices heard, to be out there making statements and taking a stand on one thing or another.

Space to be young

Lost in this earnest activism is the essence of what it means to be young, which by its very definition should be the freedom to experiment and to make mistakes. Youth is that precious time when individuals can have the space to be more concerned about matters like music and movies, shoes and clothes, haircuts and makeup, and love and longings – rather than being concerned about one political crisis or another.

The critical question thus arises: is there still space to be young in Pakistan? The young people who participated in the National Youth Consultations and have enriched this report with their voices, while by no means homogenous group, yet had this in common: they don't talk like youth. It seems just about everyone, particularly

in urban areas, is an activist, out to prove a point. Burdened by a constantly charged political environment with its overtones and undertones of violence, corruption, lack of social amenities and the lack of basics or poor quality basics like health, education and employment, Pakistan's young people are overwhelmingly preoccupied with making things right, and demonstrating what Pakistan is – or what it is not.

At this critical juncture, the direction Pakistan takes will depend on the policies being formulated with an eye on its youth bulge. This burgeoning youthful population and the country itself are the cusp of something momentous. Whether this will be a boom or a bust will depend on what is being done – and what can be done – to ensure that the country moves in a direction leading towards positive development. The overall picture clearly shows that Pakistan needs to urgently focus on improving not just the quantity but the quality of services. The country needs more education and more employment, but the quality of these sectors must also be markedly improved if they are to have a positive impact in the long run and harness the potential of the country's youth population.

Fork in the road

Today, Pakistan stands poised at a fork in the road. One path leads towards peace and prosperity while the other delves into a murky future filled with more chaos and violence. This report attempts to honestly identify the areas that need attention – those that have potential as well as those that have pitfalls. It is now up to the policy makers, educators and mentors of youth to review the findings of this study and use the pointers and tools it contains. It is beyond time to take up the challenge of ensuring that Pakistan's coming generations have something to look forward to and to live for.

It is these questions that the following chapters address, exploring crucial issues that are impacting Pakistan's young people, through the lens of the three 'E's mentioned earlier: education, employment and engagement. Our hope is that a greater understanding of the youth through these three critical, interconnected areas in the Youth Development Index will help policymakers to seize the moment and take the necessary actions to lead the youth – and Pakistan – to a better future.

Jawan Ideas

Start a National Reading Drive in which role models like young sportspersons, businesspeople and entrepreneurs visit schools regularly to read to students in under–privileged areas. The Prime Minister, chief ministers, minsters, senators, MNAs and MPAs should be required to do this in their constituencies at least once a month.

3

Education for the youth's human development

BA students, Sargodha

"You must concentrate
on gaining knowledge
and education. It is your
foremost responsibility.
Political awareness
of the era is also part
of your education.
You must be aware of
international events and
environment. Education
is a matter of life and
death for our country"

— Muhammad Ali Jinnah

CHAPTER 3

Education for the youth's human development

"My early encounter with reading really shaped my imagination and had a very strong impact on me", says Muhammad Sabir, who was forced by poverty to work as a garbage picker from age 5. Curious about the writing on the newspapers he sold for his family's survival, he enrolled himself at a local government school and went on to college and beyond. In doing so, he went beyond what was expected of him as the eldest of 9 siblings, whose father drove a donkey cart and mother cleaned people's houses. School was never in his realm of possibilities – but he made it happen, doing his garbage picking work before and after school, bringing in the money his family badly needed, while also studying.

The education he fought for helped Sabir overcome not only extreme poverty but also the caste discrimination he faced as a descendent of the Hindu outcastes who converted to Islam at the time of partition. Since 2007, he has been working to address two critical issues in the slums: sanitation and education through the organisation he established, 'Slumabad'.

Sabir's social work led to him being selected as a 2012 fellow for the Emerging Leaders of Pakistan (ELP) programme run by the Atlantic Council, a development program empowering future Pakistani leaders. For his training, Sabir travelled to the US for the very first time. He has been awarded other fellowships, including from the Acumen Fund in 2015.[1]

This powerful story shows what is possible when youth are able to gain literacy. Their education benefits not just individuals and their families, but also society and the country at large.

Harnessing the potential

Pakistan's increasing youth population (15-29 years) represents nearly a third of its total population.[2] This youth bulge offers the country a potential demographic advantage while simultaneously raising the critical challenge of providing adequate services, and jobs. Will Pakistan's youth be the country's biggest asset – or biggest liability - in the years to come? The answer to this depends largely on how policy makers and society approach education, a critical dimension of human development along with the other two Es, employment and engagement. When developed effectively, these areas, major links in the chain, can together put the country on the path of sustainable development.

This chapter delves into the state of education development in Pakistan, with the aim of assessing its relevance towards pre-paring the country's youth for meaningful employment and engagement. We review the key challenges in improving access to education and its relevance for the youth, incorporating the voices captured through the various platforms employed for this report, including the extensive and unprecedented National Youth Perception Survey (NYPS) 2015. The analysis shows that while Pakistan has made some progress in improving education indicators, there are considerable disparities in the distribution of this progress based on provincial, rural/urban and gender differences.

Like employment and engagement, education, when done right, enables young people to make the right choices for the future. Pakistan must urgently improve the quality of existing programmes in formal education as well as technical education and vocational training and integrate the non-formal sectors in the existing education system. This will generate effective

Jawan Ideas

Establish scholarships and exchange programmes offering young people the opportunity to live and study in different regions of Pakistan for a semester.

links and spill-overs for youth employment and engagement. There is also a dire need to focus on alternative education systems including non-formal basic education programmes and madrassas in order to reach a sizeable proportion of youth who have never had access to education.

The link between education and human development is critical, as this report emphasises. Human development goes beyond mere accumulation of human capital, to develop youth capabilities, enhance freedom of choice and the opportunities available to young people, and create meaningful ways for them to engage in society.

Broadening choices

Human development is a process of broadening people's choices. As an instrument for the formation and use of human capabilities, education is the core principle of the human development paradigm that enables individuals to fully develop their potential, and lead more productive lives. Positive human development requires an equilibrium between the formation and use of these capabilities[3] (box 3.1).

Human development views education not only as means to an end but also an end in itself. Investment in education stimulates progress on social, political, technical and economic fronts, conditioning individuals as consumers and citizens to enable them to better survive in today's economic and socio-political systems. Theories on economic growth put education and knowledge at the centre of the growth process. Enhanced education has spill-over effects in the form of better health, decreased absolute poverty, reduced infant and maternal mortality rates, greater civic and political participation and reduced population growth. Thus, without quality education, human development is fragmented and unsustainable.

Education is one of the three dimensions constituting the Human Development Index and has a significant impact on the other two dimensions, health and standard of living. Empirical evidence shows

that an increase in the expected years of schooling is nearly 40 percent more likely to contribute to producing a high human development index.[4] Understanding how education affects other dimensions of human life and eventually economic growth is therefore critical for policy making.

While emphasising the importance of education, it is as essential to evaluate how the current education systems can achieve human development. The Human Development Index captures the education dimension by focusing on two important components. The first, mean years of schooling, provides a crude reflection of educational attainment levels. The second, expected years of schooling, is based on the prevailing age-specific enrolment rates of school going children. However, simply using statistical aggregates to measure education progress obscures the fact that the primary objective of development is to benefit the people.

Therefore, in addition to the quantitative aspects of education attainment, this Report captures the qualitative aspect through the National Youth Perception Survey (NYPS) and National Youth Consultations. Are the students building skills that translate into better social, cultural and economic outcomes? The extent to which education promotes the 'human good' is an important question.[5] It is in that context that this chapter analyses education for Pakistan's youth.

Beyond human capital

As stated earlier, human development is a much richer notion than human capital. Placing quality of life and not economic growth at the centre of its concerns, the concept goes further than the human capital approach in thinking about the ways education enhances freedom of choice.

The idea of 'human capital' is founded on the observation that schooling develops certain qualities in people, and that these qualities enhance economic productivity and growth. Within this framework, schooling produces certain aspects of hu-

man capital like skills, knowledge and other social and personal attributes, based on which individuals can take up occupations that are appropriate for their level for skills (box 3.1). The human capital approach views schooling like an education machine where students enter and exit with enhanced productivity. It generally considers the efficiency of education system at the input level without considering complexities like the inequalities in education due to socioeconomic status, gender, race and other factors. Because schooling assists growth, this framework pushes decision-makers to increase access to schooling to facilitate growth.[7] This goal certainly needs to be met, but the equation leaves out the crucial aspect outlined in the human development approach regarding the capability of human beings to lead lives they have a reason to value and to enhance the substantive choices they have.[8]

Overall, the "idea of human capabilities is a much more expansive notion than human capital because education encourages aspects of human flourishing that are wider than those associated with merely increasing productivity or economic growth".[9]

Sen (1992) identifies three distinct ways to link the importance of education to expanding "valuable capabilities". First, education fulfils an "instrumental social role" -- literacy can foster public debate about social and political arrangements. Secondly, education plays an "instrumental process role" in facilitating people's capacity to participate at different levels of decision-making -- household to community, national, and beyond. Finally, education plays an "empowering and distributive role" in enabling political organisation by historically disadvantaged groups -- education helps them gain access to power centres and lobby for redistribution.

Indeed, education has "redistributive effects between social groups, households and within families". Overall, it has an "interpersonal impact", enabling people to help others as well as themselves, thus contributing to democratic freedoms and the

Jawan Ideas

Besides distributing laptops under the PM Youth Programme, distribute subsidised scooters to women.

BOX **3.1**

Human capital versus human development

Given her personal characteristics, social background, economic circumstances, etc., a person has the ability to do (or be) certain things that she has reason to value. The reason for valuation can be direct (the functioning involved may directly enrich her life, such as being well nourished or healthy) or indirect (the functioning involved may contribute to further production or command a price in the market). The human capital perspective can – in principle – be defined very broadly to cover both types of valuation, but it is typically defined – by convention – primarily in terms of indirect value: human qualities that can be employed as 'capital' in production in the way physical capital is. In this sense, the narrower view of the human capital approach fits into the more inclusive perspective of human capability, which can cover both direct and indirect consequences of human abilities.

Consider an example. If education makes a person more efficient in commodity production, then this is clearly an enhancement of human capital. This can add to the value of production in the economy and also to the income of the person who has been educated. But even with the same level of income, a person may benefit from education, in reading, communicating, arguing, being able to choose in a more informed way, in being taken more seriously by others and so on. The benefits of education thus exceed its role as human capital in commodity production. The broader human capability perspective would record – and value – these additional roles. The two perspectives are thus closely related.

There is, however, also a crucial difference between the two approaches – a difference that relates to some extent to the distinction between means and ends. The acknowledgement of the role of human qualities in promoting and sustaining economic growth – momentous as it is – tells us nothing about why economic growth is sought in the first place. If, instead, the focus is, ultimately, on the expansion of human freedom to live the kinds of lives that people have reason to value, then the role of economic growth in expanding these opportunities has to be integrated into that more foundational understanding of the process of development as the expansion of the human capability to lead freer and more worthwhile lives.

The distinction has a significant practical bearing on public policy. While economic prosperity helps people to lead freer and more fulfilling lives, so do more education, health care, medical attention and other factors that causally influence the effective freedoms that people actually enjoy. These 'social developments' must directly count as 'developmental' since they help us to lead longer, freer and more fruitful lives, in addition to the role they have in promoting productivity and economic growth or individual incomes.

Source: Sen 1997.

good of society overall.

It is not easy to translate these broad aims into policy actions. Nonetheless efforts to go beyond the human capital approach are evident in international declarations like the Millennium Development Goals, Education For All and the recent Sustainable Development Goals, with target indicators not just for access to schooling but for quality education (box 3.2). It is imperative to realise that beyond private benefits, quality education contributes to political stability and strengthening democracy and civic institutions. These social benefits set the stage for subsequent economic growth which translates into higher earnings as part of the entire well-being process.

Education for developing youth capabilities

Despite recognising education as a right,

Pakistan's performance in improving education indicators has remained poor (figure 3.1). This contributes to the country's low ranking in the Global Human Development Index report 2016, 147 out of 188 countries. While Pakistan failed to meet the MDG goal of universal primary education in 2015, it has embraced the SDG agenda with new goals for 2030 that stress parallel improvements in both quantity and quality indicators for education (box 3.2).

Meanwhile, the country's recent efforts at improving enrolments underline the nexus between quality education and human development, highlighting two key issues:

1) Pakistan's increased educational attainment levels have failed to reduce the socio-economic deprivation of a significant section of the population

BOX **3.2**

Human capital versus human development

Sustainable development goals – Goal 4: 'Quality education
At the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit on 25 September 2015, world leaders adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which includes a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals to end poverty, fight inequality and injustice, and tackle climate change by 2030. Near the top of the list, Goal 4 of the 17 SDGs of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development states: *'Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all'*.

Goal 4 identifies the following targets to aim for by 2030:
- Ensure that all children complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes
- Provide all children access to quality early childhood development, care and pre-primary education, readying them for primary education
- Equal access for all to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university
- Substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship
- Eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples,

and children in vulnerable situations
- Ensure that all youth and a substantial proportion of adults achieve literacy and numeracy
- Ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development
- Simultaneously, build and upgrade education facilities that are child-, disability-, and gender-sensitive, and provide safe, nonviolent, inclusive and effective learning environments for all.

The aim is also, by 2020, to substantially expand the number of scholarships available to developing countries, particularly the least developed countries, small island developing states and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and information and communications technology, technical, engineering and scientific programmes, in developed countries and other developing countries.

By 2030, member states should also substantially increase the number of qualified teachers, including through international cooperation for teacher training in developing countries, especially the least developed countries and small island developing states.

Source: : United Nations 2016c.

2) Despite rising literacy and enrolment levels, unemployment levels have not improved significantly – indicating the link between expanding human capabilities and higher productivity.

These failures are a powerful reminder that expanding education is a means to a far greater objective – that of providing learning and skills. Education is one of the means to the goal of human wellbeing. Expanding human capabilities must be the central focus of education planning and analysis, because a society's wellbeing depends on how education is implemented and used, not just on how many people are functionally literate. Thus, development must focus on creating linkages between education and human progress.

Pakistan must reform its education system in line with the ever-changing dynamic needs of a global setting and the challenges faced by the nation. The impact of globalisation with its accompanying information revolution has highlighted the need to re-think and re-design policies, considering the opportunities globalisation presents for progress – as well as its potential perils. The shift from labour intensive production to scientific and technological applications has led to intellectual capital occupying the central place in the process of production while decreasing the value of traditional factors like land, raw materials and labour. Given these developments, it is now imperative to provide quality education and high value learning opportunities to the people.

The key concerns of this chapter include questions like: How can education be managed in the interest of Pakistan's growing youth population? How can the quality of education system be improved to better teach employable skills to the youth? How can quality education be a means for the dignity and fulfilment of the youth? What alternative policies and strategies need to be pursued to make lifelong learning the principle focus of education reforms?

FIGURE **3.1**

Comparison of the youth's education rankings for selected countries

Source: Institute of Economics and Peace 2016.

Jawan Ideas

Empower and encourage ownership amongst teachers and school principals by giving them reasonable autonomy in selecting teaching methods and study materials to cover the curriculum.

State of education in Pakistan

There is a difference between 'access to' education and 'access in' education. 'Access to' means to have access to the buildings, enrolment procedures and so on. 'Access in' refers to the quality of the teaching and learning, and the level of participation in school life. As the analysis in this section illustrates, Pakistan's progress in literacy and enrolments in the formal schooling system has been marred by persistent, overlapping disparities in access to, and access in education. Poor access to education in Pakistan leads to the country having one of the world's lowest completion rates for primary education.

The abysmal levels of public spending on education under subsequent governments reflect on the poor quality of teaching and learning outcomes and inadequate infrastructure. A staggering 9.45 million children at primary level were estimated to be out of school in 2015 (figure 3.2). At the current growth rate of net enrolment 0.92 percent, it will take another 60 years to reach the target of zero out-of-school children. To achieve the goal of zero out-of-school children by 2030, just over a decade away, Pakistan must increase its net enrolment ratio to a yearly growth of 3.8 percent.

Pakistan is a signatory to various international commitments regarding the goal of universal education, like Education for All, the MDGs and the SDGs. These commitments have been incorporated in the national agenda. Pakistan's Constitution recognises free education as a right and accepts the provision of free and compulsory education as the State's responsibility. Constitutional Amendment 18 (2010) states: 'The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of five to sixteen years in such manner as determined by the law' (Article 25-A, Chapter 1, Fundamental Rights', Constitution of Pakistan 1973).

However, expanding enrolments through increased access to education for over a decade has hardly improved the plight of the average citizen. Absolute poverty prevails along with social stratification and widening gaps between the rich and poor. Unemployment levels remain high with the 'educated' constituting a large proportion of the unemployed population. While the failure of the education system alone cannot be blamed, it is imperative to realise that claims about quantitatively expanding educational opportunities as the solution to Pakistan's problems have proved to be overstated.

Literacy

Pakistan adopts a loose definition of literacy, bypassing the two critical components – numeracy and life skills. The 1998 national census counts anyone 10 years or older as literate if they can "read a newspaper and write a simple letter in any language".[10]

Pakistan has committed to the Education for All (EFA) goal that entails achieving a 50 percent improvement in adult literacy levels by 2015, along with equitable access of education for all. However, the country still lags in its education targets.[11] For over a decade, the literacy rate for 10 years of age and above has improved at a slow pace – from 53 percent in 2004/05 to 60 percent in 2014/15 (figure 3.3). This has resulted in an average growth in the literacy rate of 1.25 percent annually between 2005 and 2015. The literacy rate for 15 years of age and above increased from 50 percent in 2004/05 to 57 percent in 2014/15.[12]

Despite these marginal improvements, the total number of unlettered people has increased in absolute numbers.[13] With a youth literacy of barely 70.7 percent, Pakistan fares poorly compared to other South Asian countries, outperformed by Maldives, Sri Lanka, Nepal, India, Bangladesh and Bhutan.[14]

Disparities in literacy levels are stark across different divides in Pakistan – between more and less developed regions, male-female, and urban-rural. Youth literacy varies from 94.5 percent in Islamabad to

FIGURE **3.2**

Different scenarios to achieve zero out-of-school children

OUT-OF-SCHOOL CHILDREN

OUT-OF-SCHOOL CHILDREN

OUT-OF-SCHOOL CHILDREN

9.79 Million 2020
9.45 M 2015   9.43 M 2025
8.64 M   2030
7.79 M   2035
7.03 M   2040
6.38 M   2045
6.03 M   2046
5.55 M   2050
5.29 M   2055

3.44 M   2060

2.37 M   2065

1.32 M   2070

0.26 M   2075

0   2076

9.28 M   2020   9.45 M   2015
8.31 M   2025
6.87 M   2030

5.29 M   2035

3.70 M   2040

1.97 M   2045
1.19 M   2046

0   2050

9.45 M   2015

7.58 M   2020

4.29 M   2025

0   2030

0.92%   1.62%   3.82%

Annual growth rate of net enrolment required to achieve zero out-of-school children

NER = Net Enrolment Ratio
Source: UNDP Pakistan calculations based on multiple rounds of PSLM data and Population projections from UNDESA.

Different scenarios to achieve zero out-of-school children

FIGURE **3.3**

Literacy rate of population above 10 years

Literacy Rate (%)

Year	Value
2005	53
2007	55
2009	57
2011	58
2013	60
2015	60

Source: Government of Pakistan 2015f.

FIGURE **3.4**

Pakistan's youth literacy rate varies widely across provinces/regions and gender

Region	Total	M	F
ISLAMABAD	94.5%	96.1%	92.9%
AJ&K	86.9%	92.0%	82.8%
PUNJAB	73.6%	78.8%	68.8%
GB	70.0%	82.1%	58.2%
SINDH	67.7%	75.3%	59.1%
KP	63.5%	82.7%	45.1%
BALOCHISTAN	50.0%	66.1%	29.9%
FATA	39.9%	59.4%	13.6%
PAKISTAN	69.7%	77.8%	61.8%

Source: UNDP calculations based on PSLM 2012/13 and 2014/15, and FDHS 2013/14.

39.9 percent in FATA. FATA and Balochistan have the lowest female youth literacy rates, 13.6 and 29.9 percent respectively; Islamabad and AJ&K have the highest, 92.9 and 82.8 percent respectively (figure 3.4). Similar disparities exist between rural and urban areas. The literacy rate for 10 years of age and above is 25 percentage points lower in rural areas compared to urban areas.[15] The relatively higher illiteracy rates for vulnerable categories such as women and rural dwellers indicate the intense deprivation of education. This also affects people's ability to make informed choices.

These patterns pose important challenges for how we think about education from a human development perspective, how education is measured, and what policies will improve outcomes and processes over time.

Enrolment and dropout rates in formal education

Differences in enrolment follow the same patterns as differences in literacy for gender, locale and social status, with the highest rates of enrolment at the primary level and the rates declining at middle and metric levels. According to the PSLM 2014-15, the current Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) at the primary level is 89 percent. This drops to 59 percent at the matric level and 55 percent at the middle level. Overall, Pakistan's GER has gradually improved over the years, though not substantially (figure 3.5).

Since 2010, GERs have declined for the primary level (age 5-9 years), from 92 percent to 89 percent. Enrolment rates for the middle level (age 10-12 years) and matric (age 13-14) have remained around the same, 55 percent and 59 percent respectively. This might be partly due to a decrease in the number of primary education institutes (0.145 million in 2015-16, from 0.156 million in 2008-09), and partly due to an increase in the school-going age population among other reasons.[16] Still, GERs at the primary level are relatively better, stemming from the primary level educa-

tion institutes' relatively greater capacity to enrol students compared to higher level institutes, leading to improved access.

As discussed above, there are marked differences in education attainment across geographical locations. Amongst the provinces, Balochistan has the lowest GER at primary level (59 percent), compared to GERs for AJ&K (76 percent), Sindh (81 percent), and GB (83 percent). Islamabad (130 percent), KP (112 percent), and Punjab (107 percent) have the highest GERs.[17]

There are also gender based differences – GER at the primary level is 81 percent for females compared to 97 percent for male. Similar differentials persist in male and female enrolments at the middle level (male 60, female 50 percent) and the matric level (male 67, female 50 percent).[18]

A major problem in Pakistan's education system is high dropout rates, due to various school-related and other factors including poor academic achievement, quality of teachers, high rates of repetition, socio-economic conditions, access and equity. Data from Pakistan Education Statistics reveals that out of every 100 students entering primary school (grades 1-5), only 43 percent make it to class 6. Figure 3.6 shows the number of students at the primary and secondary levels' entry and exit points.

About 43 out of 100 students reach the post-primary level (grades 6-10). Only 30 percent reach grade 10, a major exit point for students; many enter the casual labour force or the ranks of the educated unemployed after completing this level.[19]

A comparison of retention rates from grades 1 to 10 for two cohorts of students over the last two decades shows only marginal improvement. Only 23 out of 100 children enrolled in class 1 in 1996-97 made it to class 10 by the year 2005-06. These figures improved only slightly for students starting grade 1 in 2006-07, of whom 30 out of 100 reach class 10.

There is clearly a greater need to improve the efficiency and quality of educational institutes, enabling them to retain students till the end of different educational levels. The need to produce quality students who

are a better fit for labour market demands is also markedly evident.

Budgetary allocation

One of the principal reasons for Pakistan's slow progress in education is policy failure. The budgetary allocation to education reflects the low priority assigned to education. Only 14 out of 195 countries spend less on education than Pakistan; 9 of these 14 have a lower HDI ranking than Pakistan.[20] Pakistan's international commitments include promises to spend at least 4 percent of its GDP on education to reach EFA and the MDGs, while the National Education Policy 2009 required the allocation for education to 7 percent of GDP by 2015. Some progress is visible, with Pakistan doubling its total education budget over time, from PKR 322 billion in 2010-11 to PKR 663 billion in 2016-17. How-

FIGURE **3.5**

Enrolment drastically drops at middle and matric level

- Primary
- Middle
- Matric

GER (%)

Source: Government of Pakistan 2015f.

FIGURE **3.6**

Comparison of retention rates from class 1 to 10 for the years 1996-2006 and 2006-2016

Retention Rate (%)

Out of 100 children enrolled in Class 1 in 1996/97, only 23 made it to Class 10 by 2005/06

100	70	55	53	47	38	33	32	26	23
1996/97	1997/98	1998/99	1999/00	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06
Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	Class 5	Class 6	Class 7	Class 8	Class 9	Class 10

Retention Rate (%)

Out of 100 children enrolled in Class 1 in 2006/07, only 30 made it to Class 10 by 2015/16

100	80	71	63	53	43	39	37	37	30
2006/07	2007/08	2008/09	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16
Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4	Class 5	Class 6	Class 7	Class 8	Class 9	Class 10

Source: Government of Pakistan 2006; Government of Pakistan 2016b.

ever, the education budget is still only 2.3 percent of the GDP.[21]

Besides low budgetary allocation for education another factor for Pakistan's poor education outcome is the inefficient and inadequate use of the money. Around four-fifths of Pakistan's budgetary allocation goes towards recurrent overhead costs – mainly salaries and routine operational costs, leaving only one-fifth for development and improvements like teacher training, curriculum development, provision of school facilities, monitoring and supervision of educational programmes.[22]

Budget allocations are also not the same as actual budget spending, reported at the end of a fiscal year. Actual spending tends to be lower and mostly concentrated in the last quarter. Under-utilisation of the education budget, especially development spending, has far reaching consequences for the infrastructure facilities at public schools, like provision of clean drinking water, toilets, electricity and even boundary walls. Persistent infrastructure deficiencies translate into higher dropout rates and increased absenteeism.

The 18th Amendment in 2010 devolved education to the provincial level, igniting hopes that greater provincial autonomy would lead to policies relevant to local needs and improve issues of allocation and efficiency. However, for this autonomy to yield dividends towards improved education outcomes requires far greater and more concerted efforts than witnessed so far.

Disparities in educational attainment and quality of learning

Overlapping dimensions of inequality – along with income, location, gender – reinforce the education disadvantage for Pakistan's burgeoning youth population. Regional differences within the country, whether between provinces or between rural and urban areas, strongly affect access to education and primary school completion rates. For example, almost twice as many children from Balochistan, 47 per-

cent, never attended a school, compared to children in Punjab, 24 percent (Malik and Rose, 2015). Similar disparity is visible between rural and urban areas – 37 and 19 percent respectively.[23]

Income, gender and disability further reinforce the inequalities in access to education for Pakistan's youth. Despite a wide range of policies – a quota system, special funding schemes and scholarship programmes – aimed at making education more inclusive and increasing access to under-privileged groups, the enrolments present smaller percentages from the lower social strata (figure 3.7). Wealth inequality plays an important role in keeping individuals in and out of school. As Malik and Rose (2015) note, "gender inequities exacerbate wealth inequities at least in rural communities, where among poor children, 74 percent of girls have never been to school compared to 55 percent of boys. However, there is no gender gap among urban children from wealthy families. Overlapping geographical, wealth-related, and gender inequalities increase when children enter school – only 15 percent of poor rural girls complete primary school, compared to 40 percent of their male counterparts".[24]

Pakistan's Annual Status of Education Report (ASER) 2015 finds that children (3-16 years) from the poorest quartile, regardless of location, are twice as likely to remain out of school compared to the richest (figure 3.7). Girls from poor families are 20 percent more likely to remain out of school than their male counterparts – i.e. 32 percent females are out-of-school overall compared to the male rate of 52 percent.

Many participants at the National Youth Consultations expressed concerns about the cost attached to obtaining higher education (fees, books, and transportation). Being unable to afford these essentials deprives them of access to higher education.

Even when children enter and complete primary school, what they learn is questionable. According to data (ASER 2015), only 50 percent of rural children enrolled in grade 5 could perform two-digit divi-

Jawan Ideas

No school or academy should be allowed to operate without a playground. Public school playgrounds may be utilised by the community and nearby private schools.

Jawan Ideas

Schools with the most improved performance, within each district, should be identified and rewarded annually. Monetary incentives for improvement in quality should be considered for schools as well as teachers.

sions. Less than half (49 percent) could read sentences in English and just over half (55 percent) could read a story in their native language (Urdu, Pashto or Sindhi).[26] Urban students aren't much better off: 52 percent could do a two-digit division, 60 percent could read a sentence in English and 58 percent could read a story in their native language. There are also wide disparities in learning levels across locations.[27]

Simple indicators reveal much about quantity but very little about the quality of educational outcomes or problems the youth face. Despite Pakistan's commitment towards providing equal education

FIGURE **3.7**

Proportion of out-of-school children belonging to the poorest backgrounds is twice that of the richest

OOSC (%)

Source: SAFED 2015.

opportunity to all, the hierarchy of schooling means only the elite have access to quality education (box 3.3). The increasing number and variety of private schools reflects a growing divide between low and high quality education. Private high-cost primary schools provide far better quality education than low-cost private and public schools. This creates further class distinctions in society, with quality education a luxury accessible only to those who can pay the price.

Pakistan's labour market generally requires at least a secondary education as a minimum qualification (figure 3.8). State initiatives have achieved some modest success in terms of increasing the number of secondary school graduates. According to the PSLM data (2014-15) on highest educational attainment, 22.9 percent of urban male youth aged 25-29 are matric qualified, 9.7 percent have completed intermediate education, 10.7 percent graduated in undergraduate programmes with 8.7 percent completing their Masters' degrees (figure 3.9). The trends for urban females are similar. Structural disparities affecting access and equity to education lead to educational attainment figures dropping considerably for the rural group at higher levels. Rural students have highest education attainment at the primary stage, with these levels dropping at successive higher levels.

Despite various efforts to make education more inclusive and widen access to under-privileged groups, the education attainment scenario presented above reflects limited success. Participation has undoubtedly increased especially for girls, but the uneven gains underline the need to identify and address the continuing barriers to equitable access for the masses. A whole set of cultural, social and economic reasons make higher education inaccessible to a large swathe of the youth. Many of those who make it are unable to attain the skills needed to gain employment in today's knowledge-based economies.

Jawan Ideas

Create and provide incentives for adopt−a−school programmes where successful, affluent private schools 'adopt' and work to improve failing, under−resources schools (government or private).

Jawan Ideas

Set up optional summer programmes in schools for skills that regular curricula may not cover (such as languages, art, technology, music, etc.).

FIGURE **3.8**

Education attainment levels of youth at the time of their first job

Note: The values of educational attainment do not aggregate to 100 percent because "Don't Know" category is not being shown in the figure.
Source: UNDP estimates based on National Youth Perception Survey 2015.

FIGURE **3.9**

Jawan Ideas

Honour Pakistan's best teachers by establishing the Prime Minister's Teaching Medal. This should be awarded annually to outstanding school teachers at the district, provincial and national levels, at a special ceremony on Pakistan Day.

While a significant proportion of youth (25-29 years) in urban areas manages to attain at least matric, a major proportion of youth in rural areas has never been to school

Primary = 5 years of education, Middle = 8 years of education, Matric = 10 years of education, Intermediate = 12 years of education, Bachelors = 14-16 years of education, Masters = 16-18 years of education
Source: UNDP calculations based on PSLM 2014/15.

Gender parity

There is significant disparity between literacy levels for females compared to males at all provincial levels. Punjab's male literacy level (10 years and older) is 71 percent compared to the female literacy rate of 55 percent. In Sindh, it is 70 percent and 49 percent, KP 71 percent and 35 percent, Balochistan 61 percent and 25 percent, Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) 91 percent and 79 percent respectively.[28] The enrolment pattern for girls at primary and secondary levels continues to show the same gaps that have persisted over the past few decades. A redeeming feature is increased female participation at the tertiary level which in some cases surpasses male participation rates.

The reasons behind the educational deprivation of girls reflect regional patterns, where cultural constraints affect fe-

BOX **3.3**

Elitism in education

With the knowledge economy and the information society now the basis for future development, there are compelling reasons for the increasing importance governments are giving to higher education. These include:

- Countries that invest heavily in higher education benefit economically and socially – econometric tests show a causal relationship linking the level of knowledge accumulation to future economic growth.
- Quality higher education is essential for economies seeking to move up the value chain in their production processes.
- Expanding primary and secondary education enrolments fuel a rising demand for access to post-secondary opportunities.
- Research and development at universities and the public sector positively effect overall productivity and growth, as evident from countries that are part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
- Quality higher education produces better primary and secondary school teachers. This improves the quality of education overall, leading to excellence in higher education, and generating a more highly skilled labour force.

Most of Pakistan's higher education institutes (HEIs) are of mediocre or low quality, barring a small number of elite private institutes. The Asian Development Bank's study on private HEIs categorises them into two kinds based on their placement in the prestige hierarchy – elite or semi-elite, and non-elite or demand-absorbing. The demand-absorbing HEIs form the largest growing private higher education sub-sector, while the elite category caters only to a small proportion of youth.

The quality of semi-elite private HEIs may not cause as much concern but there is a policy issue around the limited and inequitable access to these institutions, restricting them to students who can afford the high tuition fees. In other words, these institutions remain out of bounds to those who are already marginalised economically and academically.

Furthermore, the academic quality of non-elite HEIs is questionable – many are motivated more by profit-making than producing educational excellence. They include the demand-absorbing, typically small, private HEIs that have emerged in recent decades particularly in Asian countries like Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. These institutes tend to compromise on quality by offering low cost programmes and running their institutions in a secondary school mode – with limited investment in university-setting infrastructure, minimal or no research and development, dependence on part-time faculty etc. Findings from different countries suggest that the less privileged youth who cannot pass the entrance tests for universities turn to these private HEIs.

male participation in education. Families give lower priority to girls' education, seeing it as poor investment since girls tend to get married off and leave their natal homes (special contribution: Malala Yousafzai). Girls are also deterred from enrolling in school due to supply side factors such as unavailability of girls' schools, lack of female teachers, longer distances to schools perceived as security threats by parents, and lack of proper public transport and sanitation facilities at schools.

Through the voices of the youth

A statistical representation of the aggregate performance and disparities in access to formal education and literacy helps to broadly identify how education in Pakistan fails to cater to the youth in terms of quantity and quality. Beyond that what's needed is a more subjective, nuanced analysis of the misgivings regarding the why and the how of Pakistan's education. The National Youth Perception Survey (NYPS) and the National Youth Consultations conducted for this Report aimed to hear and understand the voices of the youth. These data collection techniques yielded information about the major education challenges, among other issues, that Pakistani youth face, discussed below.

The dynamics of Pakistan's present and future human development depend largely on how far policy makers succeed in implementing future oriented reforms in the education system keeping a focus on the youth. Such reforms are essential to maximise the potential of youth with a view to the continuously changing global settings and ongoing technological revolutions. Education reforms carried out in Pakistan must be linked to these factors, as well as the needs, aspirations, challenges and pressures faced by the youth.

Jawan Ideas

Establish free–meals programmes in schools serving underprivileged populations.

The importance of girls' education

To build a healthier, more prosperous and peaceful future for Pakistan, we must empower all Pakistanis, girls and boys alike, through education. Education enables us to make informed choices. It enhances our knowledge, builds character by polishing different skill sets and prepares us for a better tomorrow.

Article 25-A of Pakistan's Constitution promises that state will provide free and compulsory quality education to all till 10th grade. However, we need to go beyond this now. As my father once told me, "Basic education begins to unlock potential, but it is secondary education that provides the wings that allow girls to fly". We need to educate girls especially beyond basic education to empower them. The state must provide 12 years of free, safe, quality education to girls as their basic right.

However, many girls in Pakistan are still deprived of even basic education. They are forced to work for extra income, get married off early, care for younger siblings or do not have schools in their areas. Among those who do go to school, many drop out because of poverty, fear of violence, or due to traditions that do not value girls' education.

Girls make up half of the country's population. It is essential to educate them not only to benefit from the increased economic returns but also because this brings socio-political benefits to the country. Education makes girls more productive workers, responsible civilians and better mothers. It empowers them to have increased political participation, gives them the voice to end orthodox practices such as child marriage and domestic violence, and helps them to raise healthier children.

Educating girls is not the only stepping stone towards transformation, but it is the first step we must take to make a future for Pakistan that is worthy of our talents and our dreams.

Malala Yousafzai is a recipient of Nobel Peace Prize, 2014. Comment for Pakistan NHDR 2017.

Youth illiteracy

Pakistan's limited progress in providing education for all means that a significant proportion of its total youth population has never been enrolled in school (figure 3.10). This group is a by-product of a multitude of disparities, ranging from income related factors to social and cultural constraints. Being excluded from the education realm altogether affects the overall productivity of these youth people, including their earning potential, political and social empowerment, and capacity to improve quality of life. The result is a vicious cycle – lack of access to education leads to lower productivity that perpetuates poverty, and further restricts access to education.

Among Pakistan's youth, the percentage of those who have never been to school is lower among younger groups. Policies being formulated must cover all groups with a view to integrating them into the productive economy. It cannot be stressed enough that illiteracy renders youth incapable of availing opportunities or becoming a part of economic activity. It also keeps them away from the growing interconnectedness within and between countries. Most of Pakistan's illiterate youth, residing in rural areas, have been hardest hit by the shift

Jawan Ideas

Create opportunities for youth who want a second chance at education through a part–time, fast–track non–formal education programme to complete grades 10 and 12.

FIGURE **3.10**

A significant percentage of Pakistani youth have never been enrolled in schools; however, the situation is worse for older groups

Source: UNDP calculations based on PSLM 2014/15.

from the agricultural sector to manufacturing and services industries, combined with the replacement of manual work by new technologies. Living on the wrong side of digital divide contributes to their social and economic isolation. Their lack of education is augmented by dearth of training and skills-development opportunities. These factors combine to effectively exclude them from the labour force.

Education marginalisation: a problem of numbers and quality

Educational marginalisation refers to individuals whose educational levels are below average and who are marginalised in society in general, particularly the labour market.[29] In Pakistan the threshold level of education that leads to marginalisation has varied with time. When a child is forced to drop out of school before completing primary education, this may be considered as a form of education marginalisation. Given the diminishing returns of primary education, dropping out before secondary education can also be considered a form of education marginalisation. This has been the case in Pakistan, where children increasingly drop out as they move up to higher classes (figure 3.6).

These trends show persistent education marginalisation among Pakistan's growing youth population. Such marginalisation is a product of structural disparities across geographic, gender and income dimensions. Supply side issues including the elitist nature of the education system, irrelevance of curriculum, as well as poor quality of teaching and learning also contribute to this marginalisation.

Hidden qualifiers

Equitable access to quality education is clearly essential to harness an individual's potential. Such access defines the youth's involvement in the labour market. It is thus critical to provide an equal chance to every individual irrespective of structural disparities like gender, ethnicity and language. Capable students from disadvantaged backgrounds who are denied entry into higher education levels add to the country's underdeveloped human resources, leading to a loss of human capital for the society.[30]

Many youth responding to the NYPS 2015 said they dropped out of school for financial reasons. Young people from lower income groups participating in National Youth Consultations 2014-2016 talked about feeling less motivated to study, partly due to the unavailability of jobs in the market. Fearing they would not get a job after completing graduation, many felt that staying in school longer would mean losing the income they could have been earning instead of studying, also known as opportunity cost. This higher opportunity cost for low income individuals forces them out of school during the first few years of schooling. The NYPS found that a majority (76.9 percent) started working because of monetary problems. Very few (12.5 percent) dropped out because of opportunity cost.[31]

Economic status is thus a hidden qualifier for entry and success in the education system, given the costs of private schooling and for staying in the education system.

Curriculum: from transmission to transformation

Pakistan has seen an increase in the total number of school enrolments, but the qualitative dimension of learning remains sorely lacking. The issue of quality is rooted in a range of supply side issues, particularly curriculum design and quality of teaching. The pervasiveness of cheating in the examination system is also a corollary of poor teaching and learning quality (box 3.4).

The many gaps in Pakistan's education system include the failure to design a curriculum that moves beyond mere transmission of subject matter, to a transformation of individuals in terms of skills, values and attitudes. The contents and language patterns of curricula shape how children see their shared identity, as citizens of a country and the world in general. Governments across the world use curricula as a tool for nation building and to propagate and enforce political and ideological messages that serve their own interests.

In Pakistan, the state's intrusion into the educational space intensified in the era of military dictator Gen. Ziaul Haq in the 1980s as part of the regime's bid to "Islamise" society for political purposes. The military government chose subjects that

> "I studied botany, but the institutions [to complete my specialisation] are only in Islamabad and Karachi.... This becomes a problem for girls because their families tell them they can't move so far away to finish their studies"
>
> —
> Female, National Youth Consultation, Daska

Jawan Ideas

All teachers at public, private and madrassa schools must have the same minimum standardised teaching certification and be re-tested through qualification exams every three years.

BOX **3.4**

Cheating – the new normal, a growing threat to the education system

In several National Youth Consultations, when asked how many participants had cheated at one time or another, after initial hesitation just about every hand came up. The question of 'Why?' elicited a near uniform response: students rationalised the dishonesty by saying they have no choice. Even some parents who sat in as observers chimed in to voice their agreement about this supposed lack of choice.

These discussions support media reports about the prevalence of cheating in Pakistan, involving not just students but also teachers, parents and education department officials. All this highlights the reprehensible state of affairs in Pakistan's education system as well as the downward dive of society's moral compass. Digging deeper into the rationale behind the phenomenon of cheating reveals contributing factors like outdated examination systems that test memory and rote learning and poor quality of teachers.

Students learn to empty their filled memory banks, with the quantity of regurgitated material serving as a proxy for excellence in learning. The resulting suppressed cognitive development ossifies the tendency to cheat in exams, with many students considering this an appropriate and normal way to obtain good grades. NYPS respondents also cited tough competition, social pressure and lengthy courses as factors that led them to cheat. In the rural areas, English as a medium of instruction serves as a barrier to learning and frustrates students, contributing to the prevalence of cheating.

Known venues of massive cheating are the annual board examinations at the secondary and higher secondary levels – pressure-packed tests that thousands of students take each year. Even though elite/semi elite higher education institutes (HEI) no longer base admissions entirely on grades attained in these exams, public sector institutions like medical schools still largely rely on Board exam results for acceptance. Thus, performance in these exams determines the path for many candidates. This structure reinforces the rote learning culture and ensures that the cheating phenomenon will continue to thrive.

Recognition of a problem is the first step towards resolving it. In this spirit, the Government of Balochistan initiated a 'Goodbye to Cheating' campaign in 2015. With a higher pass percentage assumed to be a function of cheating, this campaign included reducing the pass percentages in matriculation examination, from 75.52 to 51.33 percent for the Sciences and from 71.07 to 39.73 percent for the Humanities.[1] Analysing the impact of this initiative through the results of matriculation examination in Balochistan, Alif Ailaan's report *'Pass/Fail? Matriculation Examination Results in Balochistan and What They Mean for the Future'* concludes that the initiative was a success and should continue.

Overall, ending this practice will need concerted efforts by school management, teachers, parents and students. It will be necessary to make a structural shift in teaching practices to move away from the focus on testing memory to enhancing creativity and cognitive skills. Making these skills the criteria for admission systems to higher learning would be a fairer and more effective way to judge students' capabilities. This requires a drastic change and holistic approach to education, including training teachers to teach effectively and significantly boosting the field of teacher training in Pakistan.

Cheating cannot be curbed within the present teaching-learning paradigm. Until that changes, the education system will continue to churn out 'educated illiterates'.

Notes
1. Alif Ailaan and SCSPEB 2015.
Source: UNDP 2016c; Alif Ailaan and SCSPEB 2015.

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provided room for political and ideological engineering to condition the population for its own ends. Injecting narrowly defined religion and nationalism into the curriculum reinforced social divisions, developing a deviant identity antithetical to a progressive and moderate Pakistan. Under successive governments, the curricula have continued to sanctify the ideological views of certain interest groups.

The need for curriculum reform has become a part of the public discourse on education, with studies by independent scholars and civil society organisations highlighting the heavy presence of exclusivist material in the textbooks and paucity of content to promote critical and analytical skills. However, most proposed reforms have yet to be implemented. Policy makers have done little to develop curricula relevant to students' lives where practical knowledge and skills play a major role. Thus, curricula in Pakistan sorely lack materials that encourage cognitive development or analytical and critical thinking skills, compromising the productivity of millions.[32] The learning levels of students at the lower primary, upper primary and lower secondary levels are abysmal in English language, numeracy and cognition. Less than 20 percent of 8th graders from public and private schools across Pakistan could secure 60 percent marks in writing, numeracy and cognition tests

> "Our chief minister has now taken steps to discourage cheating. He should have first ensured that we are taught properly in schools"
>
> –
> Female, National Youth Consultation, Quetta.

conducted by the Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi's Learning Metrics Task Force.[33] Young people at the National Youth Consultations also criticised the school and college curricula as outdated, not challenging enough to provoke critical thinking, and primarily focused on rote learning.

The rising 'functional illiteracy' in Pakistan attests to the country's poor curricula that are clearly inadequate as a foundation in the continuum of lifelong learning. With economic and technological progress, the yardstick for functional literacy will keep evolving. Children who are considered literate today will be tomorrow's functionally illiterate adults, barely able to write or read. The skills being provided through the curriculum need to be designed in a dynamic frame of reference to provide a baseline for building higher skills. Unless curricular reforms focus on providing high quality basic knowledge, functional illiterates will remain incapable of making use of their education in their work and life. This form of illiteracy in the guise of literacy will thus become another insurmountable education battle in coming years.

Relevance of higher education for youth

Alignment with secondary education

It is evident that compromising on the crucial link between the quality of secondary education and readiness for higher education leads to large numbers of youth being ill prepared for higher education. The weakest entity in the entire chain of institutions in Pakistan's education system is the higher secondary colleges. Education debates revolve around reforms mostly at the primary level, with some attention to the higher levels. Ignored in the entire planning and initiatives process are colleges that act as a bridge between the two ends of the education spectrum.

Pakistan has 5,470 intermediate colleges with an enrolment of around 1.7 million.[34] Lack of funds and poor infrastructure at these institutes – poorly equipped librar-

ies, a non-existent research culture and inadequately trained faculty – lead to a student body ill-prepared for university learning. The situation is worsened by antiquated teaching methods that promote rote-learning instead of skills development as a measure of students' academic success. There is no institutionalisation of quality control or mechanisms to improve matters. The Medium Term Development Framework clearly notes that these colleges have been neglected: "Structurally, postsecondary education is not able to deliver the required goals of competency, quality and relevance of education because the state has allowed college education to drop from the 'radar screen' as regards reforms which are being attempted at various tiers of school and higher education".[35]

The absence of cognitive and innovative skills development and patterns in secondary school curricula makes university entrance examinations particularly challenging. Students who pass find themselves unable to cope with learning patterns at the university level. This presents a further challenge for the higher education system, about the need to recognise the diversity of intellectual capabilities of the student base and to develop flexible methods of learning and teaching.[36] Better awareness is needed for the value of skills and alternative opportunities like TVET. Unless Pakistan develops closer collaboration between the various systems – primary, secondary, higher level, vocational and skills training, and madrassas – the nation will continue to bear the loss of educational resources as well as loss of the potential human capital needed to achieve national development goals.

Alignment with labour market

Academic institutions as education providers and students as beneficiaries continue to miss an important element of human capital – the job specific component. Academic institutions can ease the youth's school-to-work transition by focusing on job-specific human capital and establishing

> "Education is a game of money. If you have money, you can get education, if you don't, you cannot"
>
> –
> Male, National Youth Consultation, FATA.

Jawan Ideas

Work with media to launch a national campaign against cheating, targeting all who are involved: students, teachers and staff, examination officials, racketeers, parents, all others.

linkages with the industry. However, there is little infrastructural liaison in Pakistan between industries and technical and commerce colleges and public and private sector universities. Establishing such linkages would help to a) develop curriculum that is compatible with latest trends, b) design skills-development and capacity-building programmes to train students in skills that fulfil industry and trade requirements, and c) establish standardised and coordinated systems of job information and placement. Pakistan's youth clearly have concerns related to issues like networking and using personal links for internships and jobs, as evident from the discussions at the National Youth Consultations 2014-16. These are issues policy makers are also aware of. HEC responded in 2011 to the need for academia-industry linkages by developing its Office of Research, Innovation and Commercialisation (ORIC), aimed at attracting industry towards investment in higher education. However, the model has not been leveraged to effectively connect education and economic institutions. The main challenge is to align the higher education institutions (HEIs) that send the largest share of graduates to the workforce, with the changing dynamics of workplace skills sets incorporating innovation, communication, adaptability and non-cognitive or soft skills. Information about the skills needed by the labour markets can help design relevant curricula. Unless HEIs enable their students to enter the labour market, these institutes will not be centres of learning that provide the talent needed to drive economic change.

Choice of subjects at higher education levels

It can also be argued that the subjects that students choose for higher education are limiting the absorption capacity of the labour market. A far greater number of youth are taking up non-professional undergraduate degrees (BA/BSc) in the arts, humanities and general/social science subjects, than those enrolling in engineering, med-

icine and law (figure 3.11). The oversupply of graduates with no professional skills prepares them for little other than administrative careers, reducing their employability. In the National Youth Consultations, most of the youth pointed to the dearth of career counselling services available at their schools and universities, leading most to chose professions based on how lucrative those professions were or on the limited knowledge they had about career options rather than on their own interests or aptitude. Many participants said they chose less demanding professions. Teaching surfaced as a preferred choice for females in Balochistan owing to its relatively secure environment. For males in less developed areas, career was largely synonymous with a government position, with its accompanying benefits like job security and pension. Of serious concern in a country with an agriculture-dependent economy is the youth's minimal participation in agriculture studies at the higher education level. National development priorities highlight

Figure **3.11**

The majority of youth in Pakistan enrolled in higher education are doing B.A./B.Sc./B.Ed./ B.CS degrees

Source: UNDP calculations based on PSLM 2014/15.

agriculture, but agricultural graduates are practically non-existent. The degree's diminished appeal is rooted in factors like its weak link to the labour market and poor guidance by teachers on possible opportunities.

A sector with virtually no analytical experts, agriculture in Pakistan relies on the conventional techniques of unlettered farmers. The low education of farmers is a contributing factor in the reduced productivity of the agriculture sector. Farmers with five or more years of average schooling demonstrate higher productivity compared to those with less, or no schooling.[37] Youth from farming backgrounds at the National Youth Consultations 2014-16 revealed that there is a demand for agricultural education amongst farmers, who are prevented from updating their knowledge about emerging technologies in agriculture due to lack of resources. A handful of agriculture graduates in the National Youth Consultations said that their education benefitted them considerably in their farming work on the ground.

Paucity and quality of research and development

Pakistan's GDP allocation for research and development (R&D) is 0.29 percent.[38] This is less than half of what other South Asian countries spend on R&D. In addition, Pakistan's universities, under-resourced and poorly staffed, fail to provide an environment where research culture can thrive.
Efforts by Pakistan's Higher Education Commission (HEC) have led to a drastic rise in the number of research publications produced – over 3,000 doctoral dissertations were defended in Pakistan between 2003 and 2009, nearly as many as the total 3,300 doctoral dissertations defended between 1947-2002.[39] However, the continued focus on the quantity of research produced rather than quality leads to much of this research not meeting international benchmarks. The dearth of research culture is also evident from the negligible

number of students enrolled in higher level programmes – only around 12,400 students in MS/MPhil and 14,370 in PhD programmes across the country.[40] The patent applications filed by Pakistanis in 2013 stood at a paltry 151, compared to India's around 10,670 or Iran's 11,300.[41] The situation points to another handicap leading to the vacuum of quality in Pakistan's higher education system, given that the research output of academia helps shape a country's the economic and social policies.

The lack of quality in education coupled with a challenging labour market leads to a vicious cycle where enrolling in PhD programmes has in effect become a form of compensation for the unemployed. Many educated youths who can afford to stay longer in education use this as a last resort to avoid entering a daunting labour market, revealed PhD students of a renowned university (National Youth Consultation 2014-2016). In the process, many of them are likely to become over-qualified and less employable for the Pakistani job market.

Meritocracy – fuelling social exclusion

The merit-based admission criteria, while ostensibly an objective arrangement, fail to take into consideration the diversity amongst the youth in terms of quality of schooling – urban-rural differences, the language barrier (English as a medium of instruction for those who are not proficient in it) and range of students' socio economic backgrounds.[42] Following the standard HEC-defined eligibility criteria for merit, university admissions policies inadvertently add to social exclusion and serve as a tool for inequity since they govern the selection of prospective students into higher levels.

Given such disparities, even well-meaning attempts to ensure fairness and transparency in student selection are an anomaly. The merit system reinforces the privilege of students from advantaged backgrounds with sounder basic and secondary education foundations. The sharp urban-rural

Jawan Ideas

Universities should encourage students to explore different subjects before they decide on a career path and allow for flexible electives before selecting a major.

Jawan Ideas

Set up awards for the arts and performing arts at the high–school level to encourage students whose talents or interests lie in areas other than science and maths; the awards would be given to district, provincial and national–level submissions judged on merit by qualified jurors. (got this idea from the Gold and Silver Key awards system in the public high schools here)

Jawan Ideas

Set–up quality state–run madrassa schools, with Auqaf department funding, to provide a quality alternative to those who prefer sending their children to *madaris*.

divide in Pakistan privileges urban students, as evident in the huge gap in urban-rural enrolment rates. Urban students enjoy greater social and economic privileges than their rural counterparts, besides funding, quality and private tutoring opportunities that give them a further boost from the foundational years all the way up to secondary education and beyond.

The underdeveloped school system in rural areas undermines students' academic path to higher levels and equal access to higher education. It also fails to develop students with skill sets matching the advantaged urban groups. Furthermore, the predominant medium of instruction in rural areas, Urdu, makes the transition to the English medium higher education system difficult for students. The English language proficiency requirement poses a severe challenge to education equity even in urban areas for students coming from Urdu medium and disadvantaged backgrounds. This makes them more vulnerable amidst fierce competitions in universities' admission tests.[43] This increasing institutional heterogeneity creates classes of education where the advantaged retain their right to privileges that define their upward social mobility, and worsens the development divides.

Quality – the missing factor

There is credible evidence that educational quality impacts individual earnings and economic growth. However, when associating educational attainment with higher productivity and resultantly higher incomes, there is a tendency to equate it to the number of school years, ignoring the critical factor of quality. Policy typically equates the economic aspects of education with the 'quantity' of education which is easier to measure. Measurable goals should not obscure the fact that what ultimately matters for development is cognitive and professional skills – which in turn depends on schooling. In the final analysis, it is the quality more than the quantity of educa-

tion that translates into greater benefits for individuals over their lifetime.[44]

Years of schooling do not automatically result in better learning or skills development, particularly given the standard of education at different levels in Pakistan, do not ensure that the students learn anything that will be useful to their working lives. In fact, the continued growth of low quality schools has proven to be a self-defeating strategy. Low educational quality decreases the returns from education and discourages access to higher education across a broader segment of the population. As a result, low quality can in fact become a barrier to pursuing higher education. The need of the hour is to improve the system rather than blindly expanding it (expert opinion: Zakia Sarwar).

Pakistan has witnessed tremendous growth in the higher education sector over the past two decades. However, this rapid growth has failed to translate into satisfactory human development due to the pervasively poor quality of education. Investment in quality in tandem with investment in quantity has a higher payoff.[45] The quality of education in terms of what students learn and the skills they acquire is more important than quantity – merely increasing school enrolments, the number of years spent in school, or building more schools will not yield the desired results.

The 'degree-mindset' has diluted the value of learning for its own sake. Students tend to focus on obtaining a degree which they wrongly believe will guarantee them a job. Understand the value of acquiring skills that will enable them to succeed in their personal and professional lives. It is wider cognitive skills rather than degrees that help gain entry into more lucrative occupations. In the long run, this contributes more to development than increasing enrolments or number of years of schooling.

Beyond formal education

The focus on quantitative expansion of

The importance of teaching teachers to teach

"Who would you choose: a native speaker of English to teach English whose language is accurate, or a non-native speaker whose English is not always accurate but has been trained to teach?" asks a Pakistani teacher.

"The non-native teacher!" responds Henry Widdowson, renowned English language expert at University College London.

"Why? Wouldn't she be teaching incorrect English to the learners?" presses the questioner, a member of the Society of Pakistan English Language Teachers (SPELT).

"Because training is more important", replies Widdowson. "A teacher who has been trained to teach English will improve her own as well as the learners' English. She will know that a language can only be learnt by using it and will find ways to give learners opportunities to use language."

This conversation some years ago in London underscores the importance of training for teachers.

Teacher training is critical for all subjects. A good knowledge base of the subject being taught is an advantage, but knowing how to teach, making the matter accessible to learners at their level and meeting their needs in a safe and positive learning environment is as important. This can only come through training teachers.

Quality education means empowering learners with critical thinking skills. Only by teaching learners to become autonomous and imparting ways of "learning to learn" can teachers equip students to meet contemporary challenges. Knowing how to teach these skills is particularly critical given the fast pace at which knowledge is being added, making it impossible teachers to teach everything.

It is therefore critical for teachers to remain abreast of modern trends and research in education. Today, a silent class is seen not as a well-disciplined class but a "graveyard". A classroom throbbing with students 'learning by doing', eagerly asking questions, experimenting, opining and expressing ideas is more important than one where students silently submit to their teacher's will and only do as told.

At a government school training in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa once, we talked about how to change the culture of maintaining discipline through the cane. In an evaluation later, asked what changes they had noticed in their teachers, the students replied: "They don't beat us anymore".

One reason for the high rate of school dropouts, besides beatings, is that a vast number of unhappy children do not get what is relevant for their needs in school.

Most teachers in Pakistan want to do their job well. But they teach as they have been taught, through rote learning and strict discipline. Most are never exposed to modern trends of education research. Training teachers is essential to enable them to better motivate learners and attain positive learning outcomes.

Zakia Sarwar is honorary executive director, Society of Pakistan English Language Teachers. Comment for Pakistan NHDR 2017.

formal education in Pakistan, evident in increased enrolments at the primary level, compromises quality and lowers the returns of primary education. Trying to reach productive employment, the youth's increased focus on tertiary education has created an oversupply of graduates. Most expect too much from the labour market and are unwilling to take up the available low productive jobs (box 3.5). These gaps in education and labour market realities point to a strong need for effective technical and vocational education to equip the youth with relevant skills for productive employment.

To address the barriers in access to technical and vocational education and training (TVET) for the youth, Pakistan must also focus on the quality and relevance of these programmes for the industry. This may provide second chances through non-formal basic education (NFBE) to those excluded through the formal education system.

Economic and social returns to education

As mentioned above, Pakistan's formal education system as the means to build human capital has largely focused on quantitative expansion through improving enrolments. However, merely expanding enrolments does not translate into economic wellbeing. The increase in primary enrolments in recent years has led to an oversupply of primary completers compared to the number of jobs available. In the urban landscape, the numeracy and literacy skills of of primary school students are below avage, with the picture even grimmer at the rural front.[46] This significantly diminishes chances of entering the more rewarding occupations. Good post-primary education is neces-

BOX **3.5**

Rising phenomenon of youth not in education, employment or training (NEET) - the expectation gap

With the diminished economic returns to primary levels of education, the demand for formal education at all levels has increased. This has resulted in an increased supply of graduates whose numbers outstrip their demand in the labour market, leading to high unemployment rates amongst the educated. With the academic standards of secondary education declining, the less educated have replaced the uneducated in the unemployed population.

Another upshot of this supply-demand imbalance is the rising qualifications for entry into better paid jobs, and even tertiary level education. Employers seek more qualified workers, but graduates avoid jobs that they see as a downgrading of their qualifications. While the 'frictional effect' has led to unemployment at all levels, the percentage of unemployment is higher for those with lower education levels.

The better educated youth also meet a crisis of expectations. In general, the expectations of job seekers exceed the realities of the labour market, and they tend to resist the jobs they feel are beneath them. The education system builds up their aspirations and expectations, making it difficult for them to adjust to the real life playing field. The economic status and rewards associated with the modern sector are very high compared to the traditional sector, making the former a 'reference sector' in terms of occupational aspirations for the youth.

Youth who stay unemployed for varying periods are forced to scale down their aspirations and accept jobs created for those who are less educated. Many of those who are unable to find jobs that meet their aspirations prefer to stay unemployed, joining the cadre of NEETs. This interval of unemployment adversely affects the individual's skills and leads to low self-esteem, agitation and frustration, that can have serious social consequences.

sary to obtain a job in the formal sector.

The NYPS findings reinforce the positive correlation between educational attainment levels and the nature of employment (figure 3.12). Youth who have never been to school swell the ranks of unskilled workers – almost half (48 percent) of the uneducated respondents fall in the unskilled workers' category. Respondents with Masters' degrees are in the greatest ratio at supervisory level jobs (55 percent). Self-employment is virtually non-existent for those with lower education levels. Even at higher education levels, self-employment constitutes a lower share – only 2.5 percent Bachelors' level graduates and 3 percent Masters' level graduates fall in this category.

Conclusive evidence from various studies in Pakistan indicates the "convexity of education-earnings relationship i.e. the return to an extra year of education progressively increases with education level".[47] The growing international economic competitiveness in knowledge-based economies leads to tertiary education yielding higher returns than secondary education, and secondary education yielding higher returns than primary.

Employers prefer higher educated youth to the lower educated. The rising unemployment levels in Pakistan clearly validate the premise of diminishing economic re-

turns to lower levels of education. NYPS findings reinforce that increasing education levels lead to increased earnings (figure 3.13). Youth with tertiary education secure the largest share of higher earnings, compared to the less educated. This has led to a rise in the demand for tertiary education and a consequent excess supply of graduates in the labour market – resulting in the rising number of youth who are not in education, employment or training (box 3.5).

Making technical and vocational education and training (TVET) work for the youth

Changing global economies and the increased globalisation of trade, investment and finance underscore the importance of technical and vocational education and training (TVET) to prepare youth for adapting to shifting skills requirements. There is substantial evidence about the essential role of TVET in promoting human development and economic growth with benefits for youth and their families and for societies in general.[48] It is thus important to take effective measures to build human capital through TVET for the bulk of youth entering the labour market. This is what will help the country to break out of a low human de-

Jawan Ideas

Get Higher Education Commission to rank universities' business incubation centres to incentivise them to follow global standards.

FIGURE **3.12**

Youth with no formal education swell the ranks of unskilled workers

Legend: Never admitted to school · Less than 1 year · Below Primary · Primary but below middle · Middle but below Matric · Matric · Intermediate · Bachelors · Masters or above · Total

Note: The value of educational attainment categories do not aggregate to 100 percent because only selected categories are being shown in the figure.
Source: UNDP estimates based on National Youth Perception Survey 2015.

Figure **3.13**

There are strong returns to education but only at higher levels of education

Legend: Less than Rs. 5,000 · Rs. 25001 to Rs. 50000 · Rs. 5001 to Rs 10000 · Rs. 10001 to Rs 25000 · Rs 50000 to Rs. 100000 · Rs. More than 100000

Note: The value of educational attainment categories do not aggregate to 100 percent because the responses of "Don't know" and "Refused to answer" are not being shown in the figure.
Source: UNDP estimates based on National Youth Perception Survey 2015.

velopment trap in the next few decades.

Recognising this, the Government of Pakistan now gives priority to TVET development though its Medium-Term Development Framework (2005-10) and National Skills Strategy (2009-2013). However, besides providing quality TVET programmes aligned with the labour market, it is necessary to supplement supply side measures with interventions that improve the demand for these services. For this, what's needed is the provision of low cost access to these opportunities and complementary interventions in the labour market that improve the economic returns of skills training.

The rise in the number of young adults seeking productive employment requires Pakistan to not just improve its rate of employment creation, but also invest in improving high quality and productive job opportunities for its youth.[49]

Pakistan and TVET: a profile

Treating skills development as a sub-sector of education and employment in Pakistan has compromised its efficacy in generating productive opportunities for the youth. The country currently has just over 3,700 technical and vocational institutions of which about 2,600 are private institutions while the rest are public.

Technical education facilities are not equitably available to women and rural dwellers. Female rural dwellers are doubly disadvantaged. TVET institutions (public, private and others) enrol less than half a million (0.3) students – 0.2 million males and 0.1 females. Of the provinces, Balochistan has the fewest TVET institutions – only 135, enrolling around 3,760 students. Of the regions, FATA has the fewest TVETs, only 65 with an enrolment of about 3,500 students.[50]

The training and vocational strands in Pakistan include formal systems – polytechnic, vocational training centres, apprenticeship schemes – as well as informal – 'ustaad-shagird' (trainer-apprentice).[51] The formal institutions produce a minuscule

share of the country's total skilled workforce – and that too of a quality that does not match the labour market's demands. Of 7,000 NYPS respondents, only 9.7 percent males and 5 percent females had undergone formal vocational training. The National Youth Consultations 2014-16 further demonstrate how the youth themselves ascribe low importance to TVET institutes and consider it "second class education".

The highest TVET participation is among male youth from north Punjab (33.7 percent) followed by eastern Punjab (17.4 percent) and Islamabad (13.6 percent). The highest participation in KP is in the central region (8.8 percent). In Sindh, the highest participation is in the eastern region (6 percent). Balochistan is at the bottom, its highest participation being in northern Balochistan (2.6 percent). For females, the highest participation rates are in Gilgit Baltistan (19 percent) followed by north Punjab (10.2 percent).[52]

Barriers to effective technical and vocational education training

Besides the inadequate numbers and poor quality of technical and vocational education and training (TVET) in Pakistan, a range of factors further restrict access to TVET and productive employment. Only those with middle or matric level qualification can obtain TVET, creating a major hurdle for the majority that lacks even basic education. Technical and vocational skills cannot be developed without strong basic knowledge of reading, writing and numeracy, necessary for an able labour force.[53]

Pakistan's TVET programmes suffer from debilitating supply side issues ranging from a shortage of teachers to inaccessibility of the curriculum as most textbooks are imported and in the English language. The institutes follow outdated curricula, with mainly theory-oriented examination systems. Moreover, there is no effective linkage between the skills required by the industries and skills development through TVET.[54]

Perception of TVET as 'second class' education

Discussions at the National Youth Consultations 2014-16 reflected the general perception in Pakistan that technical and vocational training is a form of "second class" education compared to formal education and that TVET graduates are somehow less "respectable". Such misperceptions about this informal pathway to education and employment lead to few young people being motivated to join TVET institutions.

The disinclination for technical and vocational education contributes to a shortage of technically qualified and skilled people to fulfil the demands of industry, particularly in the manufacturing sector. The supply of graduates from the formal education sector far exceeds the absorption capacity of the white-collar job market, resulting in large-scale unemployment.

TVET for 'a second chance'

Pakistan needs to integrate TVET within the general education system to provide alternative pathways for youth who feel disenfranchised by the traditional education system and less inclined towards it. There is much to learn from countries like Singapore and Korea that provide strong TVET opportunities at the secondary and post-secondary level compared to Cambodia, Vietnam and Pakistan where the emphasis is on expanding general education. Countries like Ghana and Senegal have incorporated vocational content into their general education programmes to prepare young people for wage employment or self-employment if they do not want to continue schooling.[55] Raising the prestige of technical education is another key point. The greater prestige of tertiary education as compared to TVET contributes to growing youth unemployment.

TVET, if done right, has the enormous potential to provide Pakistan's disempowered youth with a second chance (box 3.6). It gives students who are not academically inclined or have no resources to continue higher education, a chance for better opportunities in life. After acquiring the necessary tools to be absorbed in the work force, they can opt for further education or continue working.

Non-formal basic education – including the excluded

Non-formal basic education (NFBE) centres provide a second chance for education to youth who have never gone to school. Such centres can serve help main-

Jawan Ideas

Reward students academically with credit hours for running start–ups that are part of universities' incubation centres to encourage them to focus on practically applying academic knowledge.

BOX **3.6**

Evolution of Asia's successful skills development systems

It took Korea 40 years to develop a strong, state-led skills training system featuring enabling policies for private sector participation to train workers. These policies include incentives to companies like exemption from tax levies in return for training workers. The government also raised the prestige of TVET and built Meister schools, where the students were given additional incentives such as free tuition and room and board. At least 90.8 percent of the first generation "young Meisters" had jobs lined up before graduating.[1] To reduce college graduate unemployment, the government introduced a 'work first, study later' policy including incentives to companies to hire college graduates.

Like Korea, Singapore invests heavily in TVET. Its world class Institute of Technical Education addresses the needs of the lowest 25 percent of less academically inclined students. The government also set up a vibrant and responsive polytechnic sector to offer industry-relevant and demands-driven programmes that train technologists to meet the changing workforce needs of industry as it moves up the value chain.

The Singapore government funds and supports employment training for school graduates and dropouts to continue their education and training. The government also provides subsidies to cover up to 90 percent of the training cost, while the employee pays the remainder. Like Korea, the Singapore government provides companies with incentives to send employees for further training.

Notes
1. McKinsey and Company 2013.
Source: : Asian Development Bank 2013a.

stream the uneducated youth into the formal education system and continue their education at higher levels. NFBE programmes primarily target adult learners and include basic skills development in reading, writing and numeracy and are designed to ensure maximum participation through convenient timings and locations.

Despite the recent improvement in access to NFBE, these programmes are clearly inadequate in catering to the millions of uneducated youth in Pakistan and reach only a miniscule percentage of the population. In 2015, some 0.6 million students in Pakistan were enrolled in NFBE centres run by over 13,000 basic education community schools (BECS) that mostly employ local female teachers.[56] These schools offer students the opportunity to enter the formal sector education in grade 6 after passing an examination at the end of grade 5.

Given the sizeable proportion of Pakistani youth receiving education at deeni madrassas (religious schools) there is clearly also a need to tap the potential of these institutions, get them to provide alternative education, and bring their students into the mainstream education system through regulation and oversight (box 3.7).[57]

Results from the National Youth Perception Survey 2015 (figure 3.14) reveal a high ratio of youth aspiring for a second chance to education. It is these masses living out their lives in illiteracy who need to be made functionally literate for better human and social development. The cost of neglecting this uneducated youth will manifest in the form of persistently low human capital and productivity.

The way forward

This chapter underscores key dimensions of the education issues that Pakistan must urgently address to leverage schooling as a means of enhancing the productive capacity of the country's youth, leading to jobs that yield dignity and fulfilment. Despite the progress in enrolments, far too many children are still out of school. Even worse, most of those who are in school are not learning what they should be.

The severely compromised quality of learning – whether measured in terms of literacy and numeracy skills in the formal schooling system, or its vocational and technical versions – leads to large numbers of disenfranchised youth. There is less money to go around the education system as evidenced by supply side issues of the formal education and technical training system. Furthermore, despite the rhetoric, government policies have altered little except to focus on the easier, more measurable aspects of progress in education, like increased enrolments.

Meanwhile, the demographic shift is in full swing yielding a tidal wave of young people entering the labour market, lacking the tools to engage in the economy and society. Building on the analysis presented earlier, this section presents key conclusions about the most urgently needed education reforms.

• Fix quality to get more children into school, and to get them to stay

Pakistan has made considerable progress in enrolments with provincial public education systems going through a plethora of reforms in the last couple of decades and launching enrolment drives to increase the

FIGURE **3.14**

A significant portion of young dropouts aspire for a second chance to education

Source: UNDP estimates based on National Youth Perception Survey 2015.

BOX **3.7**

Mainstreaming madrassas

National Youth Consultations shattered any misconceptions about madrassa students hailing primarily from the rural poor. Many of the madrassa students at these consultations were from urban areas. What primarily compels parents to send their children to madrassas is the lack of formal schools in their area, or the low quality of education in nearby schools. Families particularly don't want their girls travelling long distances to school, even when public transport is available. They also tend to trust madrassa administrators to take look after their children.

The mushrooming of madrassas over the years makes them a significant entity in the education sector. The number of madrassas, under 300 in 1947, was reportedly over 32,270 in 2016, enrolling over 2.25 million students.[1]

The madrassa curriculum, Dars-e-Nizamya includes religious and secular subjects. However, most madrassas teach only religious subjects, and focus heavily on memorising Arabic texts ('Madrassa Education: 2014 - Challenges, Reforms and Possibilities', Youth Parliament Standing Committee on Education and Youth Affairs). Their exclusion of basic numeracy, science and geography and focus on rote learning impedes the students' cognitive development. The inculcation of a lack of critical thinking affects madrassa students' capacity to meet the demands of the job market later.

There have been some attempts towards madrassa reforms but policies relating to the capacity building of madrassa teachers need urgent revision. Most madrassa teachers, with no proper guidance or training, themselves lack critical thinking skills. Their teaching methodology is mostly a one-way communication with little or no interactivity, a key component of learning.

Madrassa graduates have few job alternatives. Some serve as clerics in local mosques while others impart religious education privately or at schools or other madrassas. The internet has broadened the teaching scope for them, and some now teach the Quran online. Female madrassa students participating in the National Youth Consultations 2014-2016 expressed an interest in other careers, but cultural constraints limit them to teaching in gender-segregated schools.

Attempts to reform or mainstream Pakistan's madrassas have yielded little. Proposals include mandatory registration of madrassas, adding course offerings in mathematics, science and business studies to existing curricula, and giving madrassa graduates certificates of education equivalent to public school after ten years of education. This equivalence of status and increased knowledge would help students compete for jobs beyond mosques and madrassas. To take the idea further, slots for former madrassa students could be allocated in vocational and technical institutes offering more demanding coursework.

The Youth Parliament Standing Committee on Education and Youth Affair's report (2014) discusses the Asian Development Bank's project on Madrassa Education Development in Indonesia, which has successfully integrated its madrassas into the general education system. Indonesia's madrassas come under its Ministry of Religious Affairs and follow the national curriculum and education standards set by the government. Since these madrassas mostly serve disadvantaged communities and attract more female students, the government targets these sections of society through education programmes that help promote economic growth and improve civic knowledge. The madrassas' syllabus is in line with the needs and demands of Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, so their graduates, known to be highly competent, readily find jobs.

Without serious reforms in Pakistan, madrassa students will remain largely unemployable particularly in the urban markets where the services sector is emerging as a major employer. A balanced curriculum with a blend of religious and scientific knowledge is necessary to enable madrassa students to pursue higher education and become productive citizens.

Notes
1. Government of Pakistan 2016b.
Source: : ADB 2015; Afzal 2015.

number of school-going children. Provincial governments have increased teacher salaries, improved infrastructure, and increased focus on monitoring teachers. They are making teacher recruitment more transparent, and spending more on teacher training. However, the country is still far from achieving universal enrolment.[58]

Well-known factors behind the high percentage of out-of-school children include: too few schools, distance to school, financial difficulties (leading to child labour), and cultural factors limiting girls' education. What gets overlooked is the lack of quality that reduces enrolments and impacts drop-out rates. Poor learning quality at the primary level leads to a high percentage of youth failing in matric examinations. What's needed then, is investment in quality, not merely quantity of education.

Merely getting children to school is not enough. Providing them quality education relevant to the labour market skills is what will ensure high returns to investment in

Jawan Ideas

Provide summer internships to student entrepreneurs.

education.[59]

It is thus essential to revisit the curriculum to improve the relevance of what is being taught, as well as reform the system of high stake examinations where the primary incentive of teachers and students is teaching and learning to the test, respectively. This undermines the potential benefits of education and produces graduates unable to adapt to a rapidly changing labour market.

• Government programmes must provide 'second chances' for youth

Of the millions who never went to school or dropped out, many later aspire for a second chance at education. Government policy and finance focus on increasing enrolment rates but neglect the school dropouts and youth who want to re-enter the education space. A few non-formal education models that allow children to return are miniscule and lack substantial government support.[60] A successful model in this area is the Punjab Education Endowment Fund

(PEEF) that provides government support and scholarships to students who do well in at the matriculation/intermediate level but do not have the resources to continue their education.

Such programmes need to be scaled up and replicated in other provinces to help the uneducated youth break out of the vicious circle of unemployment and low paying jobs. In addition, Pakistan needs to harness the potential of internet to increase access to education (expert opinion: Dr. Taimur Rahman). Pakistan's educational and vocational training institutions and programmes must also find ways to cater to this category of youth.[61]

• Increase resource allocations and utilize resource more efficiently

Pakistan must increase both the size of the envelope for education spending, and utilise money more effectively. It must also increase spending on primary and secondary education to improve equity, and introduce targeted scholarships at the tertiary

Jawan Ideas

Hold business idea competitions at HEIs in partnership with business incubation facilities. Applicants with winning ideas gain priority admission; discuss the other ideas in post–event seminars with recommendations for improvement.

EXPERT OPINION — Dr. Taimur Rahman

Converting the internet's potential into reality

With nearly 3.7 billion internet users in the world today, 49.6 percent of the global population now has access to the internet.[1] Pakistan has over 35.8 million internet users – around one-fifth of the country's adult population – and ranks 69th in the world in terms of its internet use amongst 100 countries.[2] Most of Pakistan's population is expected to have access to the internet within a decade. The transformation is already underway – some 76 percent of Pakistan's population already has mobile phone access.[3] These trends suggest that audio-visual and text material provided through cell phones will soon directly reach three-fourths of the population.

Aiming to harness new technologies for education, the Pakistan government established the Virtual University (VU). However, the tremendous potential of this poorly thought out project remains un-realised. The most powerful facet of this new technology is its value as a multi-media instrument but VU's effort is restricted to monologues like one-way lectures – the oldest and most primitive

form of communicating information. The university's greatest weakness is arguably not resources but how it has failed to take advantage of the nature of this new medium. In fact, the great advantage of the internet is precisely that a user requires only a virtual infrastructure.

Pakistan needs new, creative and revolutionary policies to realise the positive potential of internet, especially in the field of education. In this regard, policy makers need to recognise that any initiative that is primarily market-driven will be limited by a focus on costs and monetary advantages at the expense of more holistic development.

It is also important to recognise that technology is not the enemy but a great opportunity. At the end of the day the internet makes it possible to reach millions of people. To engage people in a meaningful way and to participate in the process of knowledge sharing and creation depends not on the technology but on how it is utilised. Pakistan's education policy makers must think more deeply about this area to convert the potential into reality.

Notes
1. Internet World Stats 2017. 2. Freedom House 2016. 3. Gallup 2015.
Dr. Taimur Rehman is assistant professor of political science, LUMS. Extract from "The Internet, Youth and Education in Pakistan: An Appraisal and Plan for the Future", background paper for the Pakistan NHDR 2017.

level.

- **Integrate technical and vocational education at secondary level, add subjects that equip students with more employable skills**

Rather than working in silos, government programmes targeting education should integrate various forms of education, including technical, at the secondary level. This would enable youth who feel estranged from formal education to enter a ready stream of skills training. Government and civil society must also work to change the negative perceptions about technical and vocational education, particularly for the youth. Changing the culture about how society perceives the value of technical and vocational education is necessary to draw more youth into these programmes, as a viable means of acquiring labour market skills.

- **The state has to be involved in regulating and monitoring education**

The poor quality of government schools coupled with the increasing demand for education has led to a spike in private education in Pakistan. Between 2013 and 2014, the proportion of children enrolled in private schools across the country increased from 20 to 24 percent.[62] Many of these schools charge relatively low fees but may not be registered with the government and remain unregulated.[63] In the absence of a strong state-led and state-implemented regulatory framework for private schools, this may even backfire by churning out more "educated illiterates". ASER reports show that children in low-cost private schools on average do not learn any better than their public school counterparts.

Improving access to education through public-private partnerships based on the Punjab Education Foundation model would be a viable option to improve enrolments. However, to reach and maintain the goal of quality education, it is essential for the state to be involved in regulation and monitoring (expert opinion: Dr. Baela Raza).

In sum, it is all too evident that while recognising and tackling Pakistan's poor education system, the focus has been disproportionately on the quantity of education at the expense of quantity. Today, with the number of educational institutes on the rise and an almost universal acceptance of the need for at least basic education, including for girls even in the most traditional communities, there is an urgency to improve the quality of education.

Moving towards the Sustainable Development Goals of 2030, which include quality as a key theme (Target 4), Paki-

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EXPERT OPINION   **Dr. Baela Raza**

Human development and youth in the context of public private partnerships in Pakistan

Policy makers often see public private partnership (PPP) arrangements, in which the private sector performs partially or traditionally public activities, as a panacea for bridging governance and resource gaps in developing and developed countries. Since 2000, Pakistan's government has embraced PPPs in a range of sectors, including education, to bridge resource and management constraints. PPPs have been formalised in national and provincial policies and frameworks against the backdrop of a perforated, exclusionary education system.

The shifting position of Pakistan's public sector from being the sole provider, financier and manager, to a financier, enabler and regulator has created new spaces for the youth to innovate, both formally and informally. The youth's growing potential to act as partners and innovators in experiments of active citizenship offers a way forward.

The resultant PPPs are innovative, leveraging unique forms of energy to create social capital, spur promising trends developing active citizens, young leaders and practitioners in interactive learning, and social mobilisation at multiple levels. These youth leaders work on the ground, with evidence and energy, mobilising schools, universities, teachers and students to help transform classrooms, institutions, attitudes, approaches to learning, and mindsets. Several NGOs, international organisations and semi-autonomous bodies have established successful PPP models to improve Pakistan's education landscape with and through the youth. The work undertaken by youth-driven PPPs has had an impressive impact on communities, children, youth and key education indicators.

In the education sector, youth-led groups have created niches of

Human development and youth in the context of public private partnerships in Pakistan

engagement ranging from intensive small-scale work (Teach for Pakistan) to large scale nationwide efforts for accountability, like the Annual Status of Education Report (ASER), and popularising technologies in learning (iEARN, TeleTaleem). Large NGOs such as Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi (ITA), Society for Community Strengthening and Promotion of Education, Balochistan (SCSPEB), the CARE Foundation, National Rural Support Programme (NRSP) and International Rescue Committee (IRC) work with models of school improvement primarily in public sector schools.

Others focus on school improvement and Information Communication and Technology (ICT) based partnerships through active participation in schools, digital learning, and popularising the idea of learning as a right. These initiatives include incubators supported by Ilm Ideas, the British Council's Active Citizens programme, Right to Play, Teach for Pakistan and Aman Sports.

Virtually all PPPs in Pakistan's education sector are voluntary and mobilised through philanthropy, corporate entities and donors. Sharing core resources with private partners to meet common goals, rarely do they involve the public sector. Moreover, the state having shifted from being the sole provider to a financier and facilitator through PPPs, has been reluctant to take on the role of regulator. The downside of this arrangement is that relying on private partners to generate resources is not part of a long-term and sustained strategy. Private resources, projects or donations typically fizzle out at some point, leaving the initiative with no support. This contributes to a rising cynicism among the youth about the sustainability of improvements.

The tremendous potential of PPPs in Pakistan's education sector can only be sustained through government effort and two-way partnerships involving resource sharing between the public and private sector. Initiatives and reforms must be backed by concrete, timely and legal resource transfers.

On the plus side, the range of programmes spearheaded by youth-led PPPs offers immense potential for synergy. The post-2015 global development agenda under the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2030 also offers strategic spaces for lively youth engagement in education from the primary to tertiary levels, as well as obtaining decent work and vocational training. In this context, the government of Pakistan needs to actively explore youth-engaged PPPs across all sub-sectors of education to meet targets related to poverty reduction, education and learning, health, nutrition, gender, environment, climate change, urbanisation and social justice.

Providing enabling conditions to the youth will allow them to actively be accelerators of reform. Streamlining the role of partners (private sector, philanthropists, communities and civil society organisations) will facilitate the deliverance of non-state provided public goods, as well as the partners' direct support to public sector facilities.

Such measures will enable formal youth-driven partnerships to embody a new, sustainable social contract between youth and the state, reaping the youth dividend for Pakistan's human development and wellbeing.

Dr. Baela Jamil Raza is director of programmes at Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi. Extract from "Human Development and Youth in the Context of Educational Public-Private Partnerships in Pakistan", background paper for Pakistan NHDR 2017.

stan must boost efforts to improve education quality. This is necessary not just for individual self-fulfilment but ties in critically to better quality employment. As the following chapter makes clear, good quality education develops the traits that foster the eco-system of entrepreneurship and the provision of quality jobs Pakistan needs. Employers need candidates with the kind of education that enables them to thrive in start-ups and other entrepreneurial ventures.

Quality is thus a key dimension of progress, and something that Pakistan needs to focus on across the board, particularly in education which is the first and most basic building block of a dynamic, forward-looking society.

4

Youth employment and human development

Sikh, Christian, and Hindu community, Peshawar

"My young friends, I look forward to you as the real makers of Pakistan, do not be exploited and do not be misled. Create amongst yourselves complete unity and solidarity. Set an example of what youth can do. Your main occupation should be in fairness to yourself, to your parents, in fairness to the State, to devote your attention to your studies"

— Muhammad Ali Jinnah

CHAPTER 4

Youth employment and human development

"My biggest reward is really when I see the women growing through this, when I see them not only gaining not only financial advantages from being part of Popinjay, but the dignity and pride they feel to be part of this initiative", says young entrepreneur Saba Gul. Her venture features high-end hand-made, hand-embroidered handbags that have been making waves in the fashion world since she launched the non-profit Bliss in 2011.

In 2013, she began rebranding Bliss as a for-profit company, learning to build reports for investors, negotiating terms for the company's financials, and hiring staff suitable for a fashion label to manage production, marketing, sales and product design.

In seven weeks of sales after the launch of its first line in October 2013, the company's revenue was equal to an entire year's revenue as Bliss. Popinjay now employs 150 women who earn two to three times what they were making at the non-profit. Working three hours a day, they still earn half of what their husbands do working full time.[1]

A clear relationship

The human development paradigm seeks to deliver a world where all members of society are able to not only achieve basic human rights such as access to health and education, but also expand their abilities and be creative including in how they improve their lives and livelihoods. Employment enables individuals to utilise their mental and physical energies for economic gains. It also indirectly leads to social gains when individuals can realise their potential and be affirmed as human beings, when their work is acknowledged and appreciated. The worst forms of employment negatively affect workers' physical and mental health, yield no social benefits and hold back human development (box 4.1).

Advocating a human development approach for the youth demands a critical evaluation of how the youth of a nation function in their milieu. This approach also requires developing an enabling environment that provides opportunities for economic and social growth.

Employment and income generation play a critical role in driving the youth's so-cioeconomic development. Youth employment in turn determines income levels and directly impacts the youth's ability to help their families escape from poverty, defeat cycles of inequality and improve standards of living. At a macro level, greater youth engagement in the workforce results in a better chance at creating a globally competitive labour force, participation in value added production, and more opportunities for innovation and knowledge creation. All this leads to virtuous cycles of increased output for enhanced development – that is, beneficial cycles or chains of actions or events, each positively affecting the next.

Providing the youth with equitable opportunities to engage with the economic activities of their choice is thus a central element of the relationship between employment and youth human development.

Conversely, there are adverse implications when the youth remain unemployed or are unable to access income generating activities. Under-utilisation of human capital resources, low skilled labour and unfavourable investment climate stunt a nation's economic development. Social marginalisation and inability to obtain employment exacerbate violence, insecuri-

Jawan Ideas

With different HEIs at different stages of entrepreneurship, education and incubation, HEC/ORIC should facilitate knowledge transfer between HEIs so beginners can benefit from the experiences of successful entrepreneurs.

BOX **4.1**

Work and human development

Employment is necessary for economic returns, but non-economic returns are essential for human development which in turn produces conditions that enhance economic productivity. Policy must therefore consider economic value and non-economic conditions holistically rather than in isolation or separately from each other.

At its best, employment can create the non-economic value of broadening the landscape of choices, starting from the kind of work an individual wants or does not want to engage in. Employment contributes to human development when society and environment equitably provide opportunities to all individuals to engage with the work they want, and if there is good quality work available.

Quantitative indicators of employment like participation and unemployment rates are of course important. Beyond that, it is qualitative indicators that establish the relationship between employment and human development. These qualitative indicators include minimum standards in wages, social security system, job security and skills development opportunities. Worker satisfaction and ability to raise their voice and participate in forums like trade and labour unions lead to higher standards of human development. Higher work standards yield higher rates of human development. Discrimination, coercion and violence at the workplace weakens and reduces life satisfaction

and happiness. It also affects labour market indicators with a decline in labour force participation and rise in unemployment.

Workers' satisfaction increases when they receive their due rights both in economic and non-economic terms, with their worth and contribution to society acknowledged and respected. Societal recognition and respect of work need to be beyond paid work, to include caregiving and domestic work that are performed mostly by women. Society hugely undervalues voluntary work and caregiving, both of which create a sense of belonging and social cohesion and provide intrinsic satisfaction and happiness.

Happy, satisfied workers enhance productivity which is critical for economic growth. This raises a country's economic profile, improves quality of employment, and creates more employment opportunities. All these factors trigger higher labour force participation, which is currently low in Pakistan especially among women.

In sum, employment, a necessary condition for human development, by itself is not enough. Work quality and conditions are equally important. The human development side of employment is therefore essential, especially to convert Pakistan's youth bulge into a demographic dividend.

Source: UNDP 2015a.

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ty and crime.

While there is a clear relationship between employment and human development, the type of work and the conditions under which work is performed ultimately determine the pace and character of this development. In other words, the quality of income generating activities is paramount to defining the trajectory of economic and social development that a nation's youth will follow. There is now an unprecedented demand to push for quality or decent work for all, broadly summarised by the ILO as work that is:

> productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace and social protection for families, better prospects for personal development and social integration, freedom for people to express their concerns, organize and participate in the decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men.[2]

Goal 8 of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals also emphasises "productive employment and decent work for all".

What constitutes decent work further emerges in many of the other 16 goals.[3] With the youth as a commonly disadvantaged population subgroup, policies need to specifically enhance the quality characteristics of employment, and promote fair access and equity across region, gender and social class.

Dimensions of youth employment

Actively engaging the youth in productive work not only improves wellbeing at the individual level, but also benefits national level outcomes. As a country experiencing a youth bulge with approximately 54.4 million individuals (around 29 percent of the population) between the ages of 15 and 29, Pakistan faces both challenges and opportunities in terms of youth employment – that is, the percentage of workers aged 15 to 29 years who are either self-employed or receive some form of remuneration for their work – the number of young indi-

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Universities should encourage students to work on campus. Opportunities for meaningful student employment in libraries, cafeteria, services, etc. should be created to develop a strong work ethic amongst the young.

viduals without work who are looking for employment.

Youth between 15-29 years make up 41.6 percent of Pakistan's total labour force (between 15-64 years).[5] Youth unemployment, declining before 2007, has witnessed a sharp rise: 6.5 percent in 2007 compared to 9.1 percent in 2015, although still lower than in 2004 (figure 4.1). Youth also traditionally experience lower employment and higher unemployment rates than the overall workforce. Additionally, there is a wide gender gap: the unemployment rates of young females are substantially lower than their male counterparts.

It is important to evaluate unemployment and participation levels to determine the scale of youth disengagement from work, and to identify the sectors, regions and causes for unemployment. These measures can facilitate targeted policy responses.

According to estimates by ILO, unemployment between the ages of 15 and 24 in Pakistan is 10.8 percent. This is higher than other countries in the region, like India, Bangladesh and Nepal although better than Sri Lanka (figure 4.2).

Pakistan's sluggish growth rate of employment generation aggravates the situation, putting the youth at a significant disadvantage at the beginning of their careers. Graphically illustrating unemployment rates by age cohorts reveals a "U" shape, demonstrating how the youth experience higher joblessness in the country compared to older people (figure 4.3).

Almost 4 million youth attain working age every year in Pakistan.[6] This, coupled with a steady youth labour force participation rate, lends a sense of urgency to enabling the labour market to absorb these new entrants (box 4.2). In terms of human development, failure to productively engage a substantial proportion of a nation's youth leads to various negative socio-economic spill-overs.

The multifaceted youth employment issues in the heterogeneous economic and cultural environment of Pakistan require area and gender specific strategies. In fact,

FIGURE **4.1**

Youth unemployment rates in Pakistan – 2004-2015

Source: UNDP calculations based on mutliple rounds of Labour Force Survey.

FIGURE **4.2**

Regional comparison of unemployement rates amongst youth (15 -24 years)

Source: ILO 2016f.

FIGURE **4.3**

Unemployment rates across age groups

Source: UNDP calculations based on Labour Force Survey 2014/15.

BOX **4.2**

Additional employment opportunities to match the youth bulge

The number of individuals who attain working age every year in Pakistan is expected to rise from the current 4 million to around 5 million by 2035. A growth in employment creation is necessary to match the unprecedented number of young people entering the working age. Current labour force participation and unemployment rates suggest that Pakistan's working age population includes around 3.5 million unemployed individuals. An additional 1.4 million or more people of working age will join the labour force every year for the next 5 years.

At the current participation and unemployment levels and considering the number of retirees, Pakistan needs to create 4.5 million jobs over the next 5 years (0.9 million jobs annually). Meanwhile, the gradual increase in labour force participation rates means added pressure on the labour market with increased demand for employment opportunities. If the labour force participation rate increases to 66.7 percent, Pakistan will need an additional 1.3 million jobs on average every year for the next 5 years (figure 4.4).

Job creation has been relatively fast in Pakistan. A coherent strategy adopted at the provincial and then district level across multiple sectors with clear annual targets can help generate 0.9 million jobs a year. The challenge lies in creating jobs that also ensure better living standards. Expanding the formal sector, supporting entrepreneurship, building the human capital of youth and active labour market policies are key instruments to ensure that the required growth is inclusive and sustainable (box 4.3; box 4.4).

There is a trade-off between creating limited work opportunities that are high in quality and offering a larger number of jobs that do not meet quality conditions. This is a contentious debate. Focusing solely on quality and not on creating enough jobs will be equally problematic. Failure to create additional employment opportunities can lead to 43 million people being unemployed by 2050.

BOX **4.3**

Where will 0.9 million jobs come from?

The caseload for Pakistan to create additional jobs is unprecedented. According to estimates, the country needs to generate 0.9 million jobs every year for the next 30 years, without interruption, even to maintain unemployment at the current levels. It is also clear that the country's few urban centres, or any one sector of the economy, cannot create all these jobs. Every sector of the economy and every city, town and village will have to contribute to employment generation to meet the target.

The agricultural sector, constituting Pakistan's main source of employment (42.3 percent), has immense potential for employment generation at both the farm and non-farm levels.[1] However, suffering from declining shares in the national GDP and low productivity, this sector will require the right set of investments and policy reforms to improve. Apart from reforms in the traditional farming sector, rural enterprise development has significant potential for employment generation.

Another key sector of Pakistan's economy, manufacturing, currently absorbs around 15.3 percent of the total employed labour force despite being hindered by energy shortages and the poor law and order situation.[2] Although the situation is improving, policy needs to increase focus on small and medium manufacturing units with the potential to create more and better employment opportunities in the relatively short term.

The services industry, currently employing 42.4 percent of Pakistan's total employed labour force, is another important sector with great untapped potential.[3] Here too, some sub-sectors function at a far lower rate than their capacity. The hospitality sector – accommodation and food – which is directly linked to tourism, accounts for only 1.6 percent of the country's total employment. This sector can contribute significantly to employment generation if supported and promoted with a clear policy direction for employment generation.

Sub-sectors of this industry, finance and insurance services, contribute just under 2 percent to Pakistan's employment, while information and communication contribute less than half a percent. Increasing economic activities and improving access to finance and technology will spur significant growth and employment creation in these sectors.

Overall, with the rapidly growing services sector becoming a major source of jobs in the country, Pakistan must ensure that this sector provides the young with a chance at long-term career progression.

The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), constructing new roads and improving current road and rail networks to connect major regional markets with Pakistan's seaports, can also generate significant employment in the medium and long term through hotels, restaurants, trade and transportation (box 4.4).

Within the agriculture, manufacturing and services sectors, there is a huge potential to generate employment on a sustainable basis. The key to realising this potential is initiating a strategy to create employment at the national level, all the way to the provincial and district levels, in multiple sectors with clear annual targets.

Currently, key government documents like the Economic Survey and the annual budget do not specifically discuss employment generation. Given the youth bulge and the urgent need to engage young people in economic activities, all planning in Pakistan around development expenditure must consistently focus on employment generation for the next 35 years.

Developing a clear strategy focused on employment generation and implementation is the first step in the necessary task of creating 0.9 million jobs a year in this country of close to 200 million people.

Notes
1 Government of Pakistan 2015c. 2. Government of Pakistan 2015c 3. Government of Pakistan 2015c.

FIGURE **4.4**

Number of additional jobs required under different labour force participation rates (2015-2045)

Number of jobs (Million)

Gradual decrease in unemployment to 5% & increase in LFPR to 66.6%

Current unemployment & gradual increase in LFPR to 66.66%

MORE THAN 21.4 MILLION ADDITIONAL JOBS NEED TO BE CREATED BY 2030

MORE THAN 21.1 MILLION ADDITIONAL JOBS NEED TO BE CREATED BY 2030

Current LFPR & gradual decrease in unemployment to 5%

Current LFPR 53.2% & current unemployment 5.8%

MORE THAN 13.6 MILLION ADDITIONAL JOBS NEED TO BE CREATED BY 2030

MORE THAN 13.3 MILLION ADDITIONAL JOBS NEED TO BE CREATED BY 2030

Source: UNDP calculations based on Labour Force Survey 2014/15 and Population projections from UNDESA 2015.

Number of additional jobs required under different labour force participation rates (2015-2045)

a vital aspect of Pakistan's youth employment narrative lies in identifying the scale and nature of young women's participation in income generating activities. Data trends suggest that female workers are consistently at a disadvantage compared to their male counterparts. They have lower participation rates, and if in work, are exposed to considerably poorer working conditions.

Empowering women through employment is essential to improve human development outcomes. Numerous studies have recorded the socioeconomic benefits of educated and healthy women. Empowered women are more likely to invest in their children's health and education. Women's access to quality work can play a significant role in triggering these virtuous cycles of improved human development.

A major challenge for Pakistan's young women remains the expectation to combine household duties with work outside the home. Additionally, there is a low monetary value attached to women's economic outputs.[7] In fact the proportion of young Pakistani women who are not in employment, education or training (NEET), at over 65 percent, is one of the highest NEET rates amongst developing countries.[8]

Pakistan also has the lowest female labour force participation rates in South Asia across all age groups.[9] Although the adjusted LFPR for young females has improved, particularly since the year 2004, the gender gap remains largely unchanged. In 2015, the adjusted LFPR for young women was 28.7 percent. The same indicator was around 97.2 percent for men (figure 4.5).[10] These adjusted LFPR trends may seem ironic given Pakistan's significant improvement in female education attainment. A sharp rise in education, particularly at the secondary level, has led to young girls rapidly catching up to their male counterparts.[11] However, greater enrolment of young women in higher level education clearly does not necessarily translate into their greater participation in the workforce. The labour force participation of uneducated women is in fact higher across all age groups compared to those with secondary and higher secondary education; only women with above higher secondary education supersede these groups (figure 4.6).

Labour market studies focusing on South Asia highlight household duties as a major hindrance for young women, preventing them from entering or staying in the labour force. In Pakistan too, women face a trade-off between household work and paid employment, as they tend to take on a disproportionately higher share of domestic responsibilities. An estimated 88.2 percent of women are involved in household and non-paid work compared to 30.5 percent of men.[12] This imbalance in household responsibilities increases the opportunity cost of paid employment for women and is one of the major reasons keeping them out of the labour force. A significant share of women's daily activity also remains un-acknowledged and unaccounted for in national level statistics.

FIGURE **4.5**

Young women participate at a much lower rate than young men in the labour market

Adjusted labour force participation rates* (%)

*See Endnote 13.
Source: UNDP calculations based on mutliple rounds of Labour Force Survey.

It is therefore clear that policy needs to push for advocating greater acknowledgement of the social and economic value of household work. From a human development perspective, the purpose of employment goes beyond being a means of only income generation. Work should also allow women a sense of dignity and achievement as equal contributors to national output.

Where women do work outside the home, they are more vulnerable to harassment during the commute and at the workplace. They also face other difficulties in a highly volatile security environment and are exposed to long working hours with informal employment agreements.[13] A higher participation rate for unlettered women also explains the nature of local employment opportunities. Over the past decade, the higher LFPR for young women in rural areas compared to women in urban areas indicates that significantly more women in rural areas are willing to join the labour force compared to their urban counterparts. This gap that is widening. It bears pointing out that a rise in rural LFPR coupled with stagnant urban participation rates contributes to the growing divergence in urban-rural female participation rates (figure 4.7).

In fact, urban men and women across all age groups in Pakistan face higher unemployment rates. This is worsened by the phenomenon of individuals with poor quality education or no education continuing to migrate to urban areas in search of better earning opportunities. This leads to a Catch-22 situation in which urban areas, unable to create jobs to absorb the incoming unskilled and uneducated labour from rural areas, continue to face higher unemployment.

Despite having fewer opportunities for growth, the largely agriculture based rural areas absorb more uneducated and unskilled workers. The rural sector currently employs more than half (around 53 percent) of Pakistan's young adults.[14] This figure is changing with the rise in the youth population. As the rural labour market becomes saturated, there is greater need to generate urban employment.

Regional variations in unemployment rates also reinforce the need to create equitable access to quality work (figure 4.8). In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for instance, 28 percent of females and 8.5 percent of males are unemployed, with young women particularly disadvantaged by stringent cultural and security constraints. Provincial disparities in employment can both reinforce youth disengagement and trigger internal migration between provinces.

FIGURE **4.6**

Adjusted labour force participation by education attainment across age groups among young women*

*See Endnote 13.
Source: UNDP calculations based on Labour Force Survey 2014/15.

FIGURE **4.7**

Divergence in urban-rural female participation rates continues due to stagnant urban rates and increasing rural rates

Source: UNDP calculations based on mutliple rounds of Labour Force Survey.

Jawan Ideas

Make it mandatory for workplaces with working mothers to provide childcare spaces and support.

FIGURE **4.8**

Delivering quality employment

There are significant provincial disparities in unemployment rates

Unemployment Rate
(%)

Source: UNDP calculations based on Labour Force Survey 2014/15.

A significant part of the discourse around youth employment in Pakistan focuses on the urgency of creating jobs for around 4 million young adults who enter the working age population every year.[15] With Pakistan's demographic shift triggered by its current youth bulge, the economy is struggling to create enough jobs to absorb these new entrants. In this scenario, focus on traditional markers like unemployment and LFPR rates should not be at the expense of the equally critical areas of the nature and quality of economic engagement for the youth.

Pakistan can develop better employment policies by understanding a breakdown of various factors, such as the proportion of workers in informal and vulnerable employment, average daily working hours and stability of income levels, and what keeps people out of the labour force. Vulnerable employment for instance is more apparent where individuals are self-employed, engaged in unpaid work and/or caregiving tasks. Similarly, reasons for being out of the labour force can vary from temporary unemployment to worker de-motivation or even being involved in work that official surveys don't account for.[16]

Casualization of the labour force in Pakistan is a defining characteristic of youth employment. Casual work typically involves casual paid employees, piece-rate

Jawan Ideas

Parliament must discuss and approve ILO Protocol 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention of 1930, which Pakistan has not yet ratified.

The increasing number of individuals traveling to urban areas to find work makes it imperative to enable urban areas to absorb the incoming labour. Pakistan is already struggling to overcome urban sprawl and the growing slums across its cities. Here, livelihoods are considerably threatened by high poverty rates, hazardous environmental conditions and the predominance of vulnerable work. Rural areas need similar attention, along with exploring ways to expand labour productivity in agriculture. Policy makers also need to explore the employment generation potential in high-value sectors like dairy, textile and other agri-businesses. Creating opportunities in these sectors will increase rural areas' capacity to absorb unemployed labour.

BOX **4.4**

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – an opportunity for employment

The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is one of the six economic corridors initiated under China's One Belt One Road development enterprise. The project provides a significant opportunity in connecting Pakistan to regional and international markets through the construction and renovation of road, rail and seaport networks. The incoming Chinese expertise also offers Pakistan a chance to expand its human capital through tacit knowledge-sharing initiatives.

CPEC has the potential to create a noteworthy number of jobs in a variety of industries from Gilgit Baltistan in the northeast to coastal districts in the southwest, provided a clear-cut employment

generation strategy is developed. While there are concerns about CPEC-related jobs being limited to short-term infrastructure work and not hiring enough locals, several services related sectors could be leveraged for expanding quality work. The hotel and tourism industry, transportation and related services, financial and banking services are all potential areas to look towards.

While it is unclear how many jobs CPEC will create, the project has the potential to impact employment, particularly by increasing the mobility of Pakistan's youth within the country and to regionally proximate areas in search of quality work.

pay, and paid non-family apprentice.[17] Around one-fourth of the employed youth are engaged in casual work. The trend has remained constant over time (figure 4.9).

Studies show that worker motivation is key to enhancing productivity – output rises especially when individuals feel their work is important and they are accountable in terms of delivering results.[18] Yet the highest proportion of young workers in Pakistan is reported to be associated with unpaid family work, making no tangible contribution to household income. This trend has improved since 2009 but the share of youth involved in unpaid family work is still high, at 33.9 percent. Altogether, casual labour and unpaid family work account for more than half of total youth employed (figure 4.9).

The provinces reflect similar trends of casualization of labour force, with minor regional variations. Less than one-fifth of the young workers in all the provinces have regular employment, with a majority working as self-employed, unpaid family workers and casual labour (figure 4.10).

Employment figures can therefore be misleading if phenomena like casualization are not considered, undermining the impact of job creation on human development outcomes. In fact, if employment is both a means and an end to enjoying basic freedoms such as the ability to choose source of income, Pakistan's youth do not fare too well. Here, employment choices are led by the fight for survival rather than expanding personal development. The National Youth Perception Survey 2015 reveals that 88 percent of young workers feel they had no choice in the type of work they do and must accept whatever is available. Similarly, 76 percent of the employed youth said they started a job because they could no longer afford to remain unemployed. A remarkable 32 percent asserted that they had to give up their education and take up employment for financial reasons. Additionally, a significant proportion of young workers, around 21 percent, felt dissatisfied with the kind of jobs they obtained. More than half cited low wages

FIGURE **4.9**

Unpaid family workers outnumber paid employees

Percentage of total employed youth

Source: UNDP calculaitons based on mutliple rounds of Labour Force Survey.

as the key reason for dissatisfaction, while for 94 percent the main reason was a lack of choice in employment.[19]

Young workers in rural areas are even worse off, with the share of casual employed and unpaid family work higher than the national average.[20] The high employment sectors in rural areas – the agriculture sector and the non-farming sector – both offer little prospect for upward social and economic mobility. Most workers in these sectors are either low skilled, low paid labourers working on their own, without any employees, or self-employed.

Among the youth, women are the hardest hit in terms of accessing quality work. An astounding 72 percent of women continue to stay in low quality employment – mostly high-risk, low-quality economic sectors like agriculture, fishing, manufacturing and retail sectors – compared to 53 percent of men.[21] More than 7 out of 10 agriculture workers are women.[22] The precariousness of women agricultural workers' lives is further compounded by their heavy dependence on seasonal variations

FIGURE **4.10**

Major proportion of youth in all provinces are engaged in low quality work

Legend: — Unpaid family workers — – Casual workers ▬ Self employed ⋯⋯ Regular employed

Panels: BALOCHISTAN, KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA, PUNJAB, SINDH

Years: 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2015

Source: UNDP calculations based on mutliple rounds of Labour Force Survey.

and hazardous working conditions.[23] The agricultural sector is also one of the lowest paid in Pakistan.[24]

In addition to the economic and social consequences of working in vulnerable jobs, low quality employment also affects women's decision to enter the labour force in the first place. The opportunity cost of working as opposed to remaining unemployed is especially low where employment remains limited to vulnerable work for low skilled women. Here, participating in the labour market may even adversely impact socioeconomic and physiological wellbeing.

Young women in both rural and urban areas face the added burden of household responsibilities, which culturally takes precedence over 'outside' work. To enhance women's access to work as well as quality of work, Pakistan needs to frame policies that will improve the infrastructure and facilities available for women at work and reduce transaction costs associated with employment. Additionally, men and women alike need to be convinced about the economic value of having empowered women in the family, as discussed further down.

A continuous casualization of employment over the long run for both young women and men suggests that most of the new jobs being created in Pakistan are in low productivity sectors, preventing the youth from improving their quality of life (box 4.5). Lack of quality jobs causes various adverse impacts ranging from human rights violations to negative economic and social spill-overs. Poor working conditions for the labour market can impede the right to safe and healthy work environments and to dignified jobs. Similarly, low levels of worker motivation and productivity, in ad-

Jawan Ideas

Ensure adoption and strict implementation of worker safety procedures in all workplaces, including through better enforcement and whistle–blower protection.

dition to damaging psychological effects, can result in restricted human capital, and eventually national development. More importantly, lack of quality jobs can prevent qualified individuals from working job creation. further, thus perpetuating vicious cycles of unskilled labour, low human capital levels and restricted economic growth. A dearth of quality work also prompts a sizeable proportion of the workforce to seek employment abroad. Since 2006, more than 6 million workers have registered for overseas employment with the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment.[25]

For Pakistan to retain its young minds and develop a competitive human capital base, employment policy for the youth must focus on jobs that will improve living standards. Only when youth see employment as both a means and an end to enhance human development, can we expect the focus to shift from job creation.

What entails quality work?

The definition of 'quality work' can vary according to a country's socioeconomic, political and cultural environment. However, there is a set of minimum standards internationally recognised as the most basic requirements for decent working conditions. For instance, as an ILO member since 1947, Pakistan has ratified all eight fundamental conventions that secure basic rights at work.[26] These conventions are legally binding upon member states and include aspects like setting 14 years as the minimum age for employment, abolition of child labour, equal pay for equal work (gender equality), non-discrimination at work and promoting equality of opportunity. ILO conventions also safeguard the right to form worker associations and labour unions.[27] Pakistan's Constitution further enshrines factors into its labour laws like 'freedom of association', prohibition of 'forced labour' and 'securing just and humane conditions' at the workplace. Additionally, Pakistan's labour laws determine maximum working hours and minimum wage levels, with special regulations for workers under the age of 18.[28]

Besides reasonable monetary benefits, quality work hinges upon a good work environment that entails intangible aspects like respect and dignity at work, respectful relations between co-workers, employees and employers and acknowledgement and credit for hard work. Further, the ILO advocates work that allows individuals to contribute productively while pushing boundaries of creativity and enhancing personal growth. It calls for employment that encourages workers to have a voice in the management of their jobs.[29]

Jawan Ideas

Create avenues to provide non–formal education and skills training for young farmers – in crops management, farm machinery management, livestock, agribusiness, etc.

BOX **4.5**

Casualization of employment

This widening gap between the demand and supply of labour in the market has negative consequences for the quantity and quality of youth employment. The lack of opportunities leads to unemployment among some youth, while others take up any available work for survival, most often as unpaid family workers on family farms or enterprises or as casual labourers.

Casual work is typically exploitative, low-paid, with poor working conditions, no social security cover and no job security. The Labour Force Survey categorises as casual/unpaid workers all those who work as casual paid employees, are paid piece rates or paid for work performed, and unpaid family workers. The steady rise in the number and share of such workers in the labour force leads to the casualization of employment.

Without taking casualization into consideration, Pakistan's single digit youth unemployment figure, less than 10 percent, is misleading. The casualization trend highlights the fact that most employment opportunities created over time have contributed little to human development and economic growth, given the shockingly high rate (59 percent) of vulnerable employees in the Pakistan.[33]

Increasing casualization of employment hinders economic and social wellbeing, the two key outcomes of employment. Caught in the rut of working for survival, those taking up casual employment do not have the time, energy or money to invest in their own and their families' health, nutrition, education and skills. This negatively affects the human capital of Pakistan's existing workforce as well as that of future workers.

Notes
1. Government of Pakistan 2013e.

Jawan Ideas

Create opportunities for e–jobs training to prepare the young for the global digital market.

The three 'soft' components that are thus indispensable to quality work are: dignity, purpose, and identity. While each indicator varies from individual to individual and is difficult to quantify, it nonetheless determines the extent to which people believe their work enables them to lead quality lives. Assessing employment for the youth in Pakistan therefore demands an evaluation of whether their employment gives them an identity, whether it gives them purpose and motivation in life and whether it enables them to work with dignity. These interlinked measures are often embedded in society's cultural practices. Pakistan's conventional hierarchical forms of economic activity, marked by relations of dominance and subservience, superiority and inferiority, threaten the emancipation of the individual as a free economic agent. When young adolescents transition into adulthood they gain the ability to become active contributors to national output. This is a significant responsibility that under the right circumstances also provides an opportunity to help a country shift into virtuous cycles of improved human development.

Dignified employment implies a certain level of individual choice and decision-making ability at work. It implies the freedom to agree, disagree or voice an opinion regarding a managerial decision without fear of losing employment. It involves a worker's right to job security and stability. Stories of workers being dismissed without notice or due remuneration are common in Pakistan, indicating the scale of informal and exploitative working conditions in the country. When an employee feels unable to refuse a task without anticipating repercussions in the form of harsh treatment from the employer or even the risk of being fired, it is evident that the individual's digzzznity is being compromised. Sexual violence and harassment at the workplace often go undocumented and are all too common particularly in the absence of formal contractual employment. Excessive working hours, including on the weekends, and unpredictable work schedules also characterise the kind of casual employment the youth are forced into. Women workers with no fixed work timings are vulnerable to harassment and "catcalling" on their way home if it gets late, as one female domestic worker at a National Youth Consultation in Peshawar commented. Another young female domestic worker at the same consultation said that she and her family live in a 'servant quarter' (usually located outside the employer's house), in exchange for their domestic work for which they receive no wages.

Employment opportunities for the youth must be designed to allow career progression. The services sector as a major source of jobs is particularly problematic. Young workers find themselves stuck in work that does not entail professional growth, as several commented during the National Youth Consultations. There are innumerable examples – waiters in restaurants and service providers at gas stations, telephone operators, or hostesses in travel coaches. The career progression of these young people rarely goes beyond a basic managerial post achieved in a 3 to 5-year span. An important objective for employment policy should therefore be creating jobs that entail professional training at work and expanding opportunities for greater achievement.

Additionally, for women, factors like access to facilities such as clean toilets or separate changing rooms can be crucial for comfort at work. Often limited by cultural taboos on issues such as openly discussing the need to use toilets, women in South Asia don't like to be seen standing in queues to use communal facilities in public spaces like parks, bazaars or bus stops. Besides the associated health risks of insanitary toilets, the absence of women-friendly facilities can greatly hamper their decision to take on work.

Distance to work or the availability of transportation services also determines women's decisions about entering the workforce. There is a general dearth of public transport in Pakistan, in addition to which it is associated with social class divisions,

unlike in more developed countries or even in neighbouring India or Iran where people from all classes use public transport. Additionally, cultural constraints mean that women avoid sharing seats with men, besides having real concerns about safety and traveling unescorted. These reasons may contribute to women choosing not to work where they are unable to comfortably commute. Organisations that provide transportation services to female employees manage to recruit and retain a higher share of women workers. Gradual improvements in urban transport infrastructure are contributing to an increase in women's mobility but the solution requires going beyond expanding transportation services. Policies must also target the social negativity associated with public modes of transport.

An environment that guarantees a safe and healthy setting with reliable working procedures also constitutes quality work. This is especially relevant in Pakistan, which sorely lacks health and safety regulations. All this seriously impacts unskilled labour in agricultural fields and factories and those working in hazardous jobs like waste collection. Even blue-collar workers in construction, electricity or plumbing often lack proper equipment and face hazardous working conditions. These are all areas that policy makers need to urgently address.

Barriers to quality employment

Pakistan's socioeconomic environment is characterised by phenomena like mass poverty and chronic income inequalities, which greatly undermine the country's development trajectory. This contributes to violence ranging from petty crime to ideologically-motivated militancy, which find fertile breeding grounds where individuals feel socio-economically or politically marginalised.[30] Countering the societal and economic damage caused by such violence requires creating inclusive employment opportunities where the youth feel that they are not only recipients of national develop-

ment but active participants of the process. Employment policies that aim to create participatory engagement thus demand targeting barriers to youth employment.

The biggest barrier to accessing quality employment in Pakistan is related to the country's poor education system. As discussed earlier, Pakistan's education system with its various systems of schooling perpetuates inequality (chapter 3). While there is a range of curricula, from the relatively outdated or ineffective public school system to the elite International Baccalaureate system, family income and social status determine access to education systems. This is what determines which students gain academic expertise and soft skills like effective communication or creative thinking. When prevented by their socio-economic background from acquiring the education needed to prepare for the labour market, the youth cannot access quality job opportunities. No wonder Pakistan ranks 118 out of 130 countries in the 2016 human capital index.[31]

Key indicators that determine human capital levels include education (learning) and employment. Both indicators present a problematic situation for Pakistan, where younger age cohorts have the lowest levels of human capital development. In practical terms this translates to young individuals with neither the formal qualifications needed to strengthen their employment prospects, nor the skill sets needed for economic participation. Consequently, a significant proportion of adolescents end up working low-skill, menial jobs as construction workers, waiters, cleaners at car washes or petrol pumps or as domestic help. When an economy is over dependent on low-skilled work and families associate a high opportunity cost of sending children to school, children and young adults are also pushed into bonded and child labour (box 4.6).

The exploitative nature of informal employment is intuitive. Workers do not have access to fundamental rights such as decent working hours, minimum wage levels, or security nets like health insurance

Jawan Ideas

Mandatory adoption and institutionalisation of anti–sexual harassment codes of conduct and redress procedures in all workplaces and public transport.

BOX **4.6**

Exploitative employment at its worst – bonded and child labour

The two most exploitative forms of employment are bonded and child labour which completely contradict the principles of human development. Pakistan's Constitution guarantees every individual the right to engage in any lawful economic activity both as employer and employee including the right to form unions, and prohibits all forms of slavery, discrimination and coercion (Articles 11, 17, 18, 25 and 37e). However, the Global Slavery Index 2016 ranks Pakistan 6 out of 167 countries in the world with 2.1 million individuals in debt bondage and other forms of bonded work.[1] While the most bonded labour occurs in agriculture, carpet-weaving and brick kilns, bondage also prevails in other sectors where it transfers from one generation to the next in a form of modern day slavery. The "employers", essentially owners, keep wages low thus forcing families to remain engaged in bonded work for generations.

But bonded labour is not always inherited. Workers can be trapped in the worst forms of exploitative work because they lack opportunities or are unable to acquire technical skills for higher levels of human capital. Examples abound in various employment sectors across the country. In Hyderabad's bangle industry women picking glass for production earn PKR 300 for 15 days' work (PKR 20 a day).[2] Young cobblers who migrate to cities in search of work spend their entire working life roaming around in the markets earning less than PKR 200 a day. Households with scant earnings that are unable to make at least PKR 15,000 a month (the minimum wage level a month as defined in the federal budget 2016-17) find themselves trapped in perpetuating cycles of poverty, unable to invest in their children's education and health.

Child labour is common in Pakistan's formal and informal, rural and urban sectors. The sectors with the most bonded labour are also among the most common sources of child labour – brick kilns, agriculture farms, retail, small restaurants and hotels, and domestic work. According to the ILO, around 5.7 million children between 10-17 years are forced to go to work in Pakistan.[3]

Article 11 (3) of Pakistan's Constitution prohibits any form of employment of children below the age of 14 years, and provides specific directives about working conditions and hours for those between 14 to 17 years. However, like bonded labour, child workers provide cheap labour and are therefore a means to lower costs and increase profits especially in the informal economy. While household poverty forces parents to send their children to work, the problem is augmented by a thriving informal sector and lack of implementation of labour laws. Systems of informal apprenticeship (ustaad-shagird) are a way of skills development for these children. Access to education, working conditions, working hours and child protection mechanisms determine the level of exploitation in such arrangements.

Low literacy rates also serve as both the cause and effect of child labour. Parents with no literacy are more likely to encourage their children to enter paid work, reinforcing patterns of inter-generational poverty.

Pakistan's social policies have historically neglected children. The state and society's indifference towards child welfare explains why child labour continues to threaten the country's human rights progress.

It is crucial to invest holistically in child development to overcome development challenges like mass poverty and persistent inequality.

Notes
1. Walk Free Foundation 2016. 2. Hisam 2015. 3. ILO 2015b.

Jawan Ideas

Provide all working mothers with six months paid maternity leave, and allow fathers the option of three–months paid paternity leave any time within the first year of their baby's birth to enable them to be engaged and supportive partners and parents.

or job security. Evidence suggests that the share of informal workers in total employment has increased over time – it rose from around 64 percent in 2001-02 to 73 percent in 2012-13.[32]

Disadvantaged youth tend to be stuck in vicious cycles of poor schooling and low-quality work options. At a macro-level, breaking away from such cycles requires a paradigm shift in the education policy (discussed in Chapter 3). Given the evidence that education is the most important determinant for access to good quality jobs, overcoming low levels of human capital amongst the youth is essential to improve their employability. As explained earlier, merely increasing the number of educational institutes is not enough to develop a strong human capital base. It is critical to enable adolescents to gain the skills that they need to successfully transition from education to employment, preferably quality employment.

While higher levels of education are associated with access to better jobs and mobility evidence from South Asia suggests that the relationship may not be that linear.[33] World Bank (2012) analysis for instance indicates that in the absence of related policy interventions, education does not necessarily increase employment. In Pakistan young women and men with education above matric level have the highest unemployment rates.[34]

One possible reason for this counter-intuitive pattern can be explained by the expectancy value theory: individuals with higher levels of education remain unem-

ployed because they are unable to find jobs that match their expectations and personal requirements.[35] A significant proportion of young adults in Pakistan are either over-qualified or undereducated for the jobs they end up doing. This relates to the issue of 'employability of education' in Pakistan – how far their education provides individuals with adequate skills for employment – that often doesn't leave students with the ability to acquire the soft skills that employers value, like interpersonal communication, good teamwork, problem-solving or creative thinking. The National Youth Perception Survey 2015 reveals that students limited by the rote learning culture are unable to gain tools to adapt or apply their academic knowledge in the field.

The scale of income inequality determines the poverty reduction capacities of economic growth – greater income inequality leads to lower rates of poverty reduction. At the heart of this argument is the understanding that equitable distribution of economic gains is essential for poverty alleviation. Similarly, for individuals to be able to participate fairly in market exchanges they need to have assets that are "saleable".[36] Thus skills are tools that provide the youth a greater chance at succeeding in an increasingly competitive global economy.

Increased youth employment can help overcome cycles of high economic growth and chronic mass poverty. Lacking the right skills handicaps the youth in terms of equitable access to quality job markets and reduces the chances of breaking cycles of low development.[37]

Pakistan must therefore help its youth to develop skills responsive to market needs. Arming them with innovative dynamism will create a more sustainable, competitive society and economy. In other words, people from all socioeconomic backgrounds should have the same chance at accessing economic and social opportunities, to enable them to contribute towards individual and national development, rather than being held back by factors like geographic location, gender, ethnicity and religious background.

FIGURE **4.11**

Only a small percentage of youth have completed vocational training; females are even worse off

Source: UNDP calculations based on mutliple rounds of Labour Force Survey

Vocational training can overcome deficits in the education system and equip youth with 'saleable' competencies. It also acts as an alternative to formal schooling systems. Yet in Pakistan technical and vocational education and training (TVET) enrolment has historically been quite low. Recent data indicates a slight improvement but TVET enrolment still hovers at only 13.6 percent (figure 4.11).

Informal systems of apprenticeship tend to be popular in Pakistan, with young adults often obtaining on-the-job training from servicemen like mechanics, electricians, plumbers, and artisans like wood craftsmen, painters or potters. Over 70 percent of skilled workers are trained in the informal sector, through the 'ustaad-sha-gird' tradition and 'learning by doing'.[38] This prevalent system entails more precarious forms of work, possibly offering the lowest quality of employment to the youth. Young apprentices face dangerous working conditions, with low wages, and little prospect of stable employment opportunities. Mainstreaming vocational training thus remains a major challenge for youth employment policy in Pakistan, particularly for those with little to no education.

Vocational training programmes require

Jawan Ideas

Local government at district level should be required to produce an annual report on the status of employment, including plans to generate new quality jobs and to connect the unemployed to work.

Jawan Ideas

Literacy should not be a barrier to enrolment in vocational skills. 'Make–up' literacy and numeracy courses should be provided to candidates interested in technical and vocational training.

a minimum education qualification of 8 years of schooling. Given that around 30 percent of Pakistan's youth is illiterate,[39] this criterion marginalises a significant segment of this population. There are also no training programmes for basic life skills like reading and numeracy. Inclusive vocational training programmes with lifelong learning approaches are fundamental to

expand the number of youth with employability skills. There must also be focus on the quality of such vocational trainings as many of training courses are either outdated or are delivered in a way that do not address market requirements (expert opinion: Dr. Ali Cheema).[40]

In addition to the supply-side constraints associated with quality techni-

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EXPERT OPINION   **Dr. Ali Cheema**

Vocational training today: challenges and opportunities

Technical vocational education and training (TVET) in Pakistan currently does not act as an effective pathway for building human capital. Enrolment in Pakistan's specialised TVET sector remains low with less than half a million (around 350,000) trainees enrolled in around 3,580 public and private institutions in 2016.[1] Slightly more than 13 percent of Pakistan's young adult population reports having been enrolled in TVET. Low enrolment persists despite high demand for skills training among both genders.[2] Pakistani employers, who tend to under-invest in their workers' skills creation, are not addressing this shortfall in TVET.[3]

This situation is of grave concern given the Pakistan youth's low educational attainment. Federal and provincial governments have responded by significantly increasing public investment in TVET. Many ambitious public sector programmes have been initiated with donor support, for example by the National Vocational and Technical Training Commission, Punjab Skill Development Fund, Technical Upgradation and Skill Development Company for KP and FATA, and the Sindh Skill Development Project. However, simply increasing public investment in TVET cannot be a panacea for young adults' low human capital accumulation.

Increasing public investment will increase the number of TVET institutes but is unlikely to have an impact on earnings and employability. Creating impact will require designing complementary interventions to in-class training that strengthen the linkages between the markets for skills and labour. The weak linkage between TVET programmes and employers lowers the impact of these investments in a labour market where the average graduate faces high barriers to accessing jobs. These barriers are an outcome of narrow personalised job placement networks that are pervasive in the labour market. Integrating job placement into publicly-supported skills programmes appears to be necessary for better returns.[4]

Weak linkages between skills and product markets are lowering the impact for women. Low social mobility makes women excessively reliant on local labour markets, which tend to be shallow. As a result, women end up specialising in flexible home production.

However, their low mobility which precludes their access to denser markets in turn lowers the impact of skills on earnings. It is necessary to experiment with innovative market linkage interventions as part of skills programmes to create positive impact for women. In addition, combining skills programmes with active labour market programmes that create non-traditional local jobs for women may promise higher returns.

Low social mobility further reduces impact by lowering women's access to training. Women's enrolment rates have been found to fall by 6 percentage points for every kilometre increase in distance from the training centre.[5] Experimental evidence from the PSDF programme shows that distance-related access constraints for women can be significantly lowered through effective spatial calibration of central locations and the provision of safe and secure transport.[6] To enable positive impact of skills programmes for women at scale, it is necessary to have policies that effectively integrate interventions designed to mitigate access constraints.

Finally, public supported programmes are often supply driven, have weak demand linkages and tend to exclusively fund public providers. Their content is often not embedded in frontier skills and is not designed to address skills-gaps in the market. Many programmes, not underpinned by an effective qualifications framework, tend to incentivise managers and providers to deliver based on numbers trained and not on an increase in earnings. There is a need to establish an institutional framework for delivery that addresses these shortcomings and rewards managers and providers based on increases in earnings for graduates.

Public programmes such as Punjab Skill Development Fund have started to experiment with innovative models of delivery that incentivise "the market" to create supply and give trainees choice over the type of provider, irrespective of their social and economic status. These programmes are experimenting with innovative complementary interventions to in-class training. Carefully evaluating these initiatives offers the promise of devising a high returns menu of TVET interventions.

Notes
1. Government of Pakistan 2016a. 2. Cheema, Naseer, and Shapiro 2012b. 3. Cheema, Naseer, and Shapiro 2012a. 4. Cheema, Naseer, and Shapiro 2012b. 5. Cheema, Naseer, and Shapiro 2013. 6. Cheema, Naseer, and Shapiro 2015.
Dr. Ali Cheema is assistant professor at the Economics Department, Lahore University of Management Sciences. Extract from 'Pakistan Demographic Transition: Young Adults, Human Capital and Jobs', background paper for Pakistan NHDR 2017.

cal and vocational training in Pakistan, barriers to quality employment include an equally challenging demand-side aspect for skills in the labour market. Analysts have often claimed that Pakistan is stuck in a "low-level skills trap"[41] where a dearth of skilled labour causes employers to settle for the kind of low skills readily available in the market. This sub-optimal use of human capital leads to low-quality production, undermining the overall potential of the economy. Where employers continue to accept low-skilled workers, the actual demand for technical skills in the market may not become evident.[42] As the global economy signals the significance of knowledge-production and innovation, technically inferior production systems with little capacity for value added goods will continue to handicap Pakistan's international competitiveness.

A fundamental piece of the jigsaw puzzle is improving information flows in the labour market and internalising technical training as a method to optimise the interaction between the industry and learning institutes. From a human development point of view, technical and vocational training can open the door to greater possibilities allowing the youth to engage in quality work. Young individuals can only be considered empowered when they are able to exercise freedom of choice in the right to choose the kind of work they want to be engaged in. This empowerment translates into economic gains too, where a wider horizon of job opportunities encourages creativity and innovation and enhanced technological adoption.

Contrarily when young individuals' cognitive abilities are limited by the kind of training or learning they obtain, their employment options are restricted to low-skilled, manual labour. Differences in human capital not only explain differences in income levels but also determine the kind of relations that develop between employees and their employers. Low levels of human capital characterised by low technical knowledge can push workers into roles of subservience, helplessness or a sense of in-feriority against a domineering and overassertive form of supervision. In this regard increasing the demand for high-skilled labour through greater linkages between both formal and informal institutions and industry can help bridge the gap between the kind of skills employers want, and the training these institutes are able to provide. More importantly, investing in human capital development can also enhance human capabilities for greater empowerment.

Leveraging opportunities for quality employment

Creating an environment to facilitate the youth in achieving better livelihoods for themselves and their families must be envisioned as a human development objective of the state. As previously highlighted, policies need to ensure youth economic and social empowerment through employment that is dignified, provides a sense of purpose and builds an identity the youth are happy to associate with. This chapter has underscored some of the challenges youth employment in Pakistan poses both in terms of the scale of jobs that need to be created and the quality of life these jobs entail. Yet Pakistan possesses certain opportunities that can be leveraged to create quality employment. Some of these possible policy interventions are outlined below.

• Encourage entrepreneurship

The challenge of youth employment is huge and can only be tackled by formulating and implementing national level coordinated interventions with a focus on socio-economic diversities across provinces and regions. All such interventions should be part of a national policy with a single point agenda: to create more and better jobs in the coming years to absorb the new labour market entrants in gainful employment. One way of doing this is through entrepreneurship, a tool known to create quality employment. The youth's

ability to quickly adapt technology to local conditions is leading to entrepreneurial ventures in Pakistan, increasingly connected to global knowledge networks through mechanisms such as social media. A faster and cheaper flow of information, and to a certain extent finance, is enabling the creation of original ideas with practical solutions for localised problems.

Entrepreneurship, under the right conditions, leads to direct employment creation. Furthermore, as a business grows, it demands efficient, skilled and productive assets to contribute towards its growth, including labour supply. From businesses of the self-employed to large-scale multinationals, entrepreneurship acts as a key driving force creating a domino effect in terms of job creation as well as through meaningful contribution to families, society and the community at large.

What differentiates entrepreneurial ventures from other sources of employment is that they are built through principles of innovation and creativity. With problem-solving approaches to business development, companies create cultures of competition and push economies into virtuous cycles of further innovation and technological learning. Evidence suggests that entrepreneurial businesses catalyse sustained economic growth through the crucial ingredient of technological progress. As globalisation expedites the rate at which knowledge is created and shared, countries that can effectively compete through innovation are the ones that experience greater productivity and access to more diverse market opportunities, stimulating greater innovation.[43]

Over the past few years Pakistan has seen a mushrooming interest and investment in cultivating entrepreneurship, especially in urban centres. Although the number of such interventions for entrepreneurship is small, their rapid growth indicates the potential of businesses to contribute to national level development. Several higher education institutions including LUMS in Lahore, IBA in Karachi, NUST in Islamabad and IMSciences in Peshawar, have established incubation centres that regularly organise events promoting entrepreneurship. This is a step in the right direction as inculcating a culture of creativity and innovative thinking in the education system can enable the youth to enter the labour market as skilled, problem-solving individuals. In a rapidly globalising world where centres of knowledge creation make the most economic gains, Pakistan can no longer afford to delay its human capital development (expert opinion: Nabeel A. Qadeer).

The government, private sector and international development partners also support business incubation centres with a view to facilitating start-ups and to help convert ideas into business models. Pakistan has at least 28 business incubators, accelerators and co-working spaces that provide mentoring, office space, consultancy and networking opportunities to potential and existing start-ups[44] (box 4.7). While these initiatives are important to encourage entrepreneurial activity, they tend to be restricted to urban localities targeting individuals with a certain level of education and social background. Rural youth and those in peripheral urban settlements find themselves restricted by factors like language and lack of communication skills, location and social networks.

Pakistan's informal IT industry abounds with examples of talented individuals, like young, self-taught graphic designers, imaging specialists and web developers working for small-scale businesses such as photocopier shops or card-printing shops. This is also the case in the textile and fashion industry where highly skilled artisans work for unfair wages and in uncomfortable working conditions.

The scale of unstructured/informal entrepreneurship is complex and diverse. It includes tailors and their apprentices scrunched in crowded working spaces in small, concrete multi-level shops where they cannot stand and are forced to climb down to the ground floor to stretch their legs. Embroidery artisans sit in groups of 3 to 4 in congested rooms in urban plazas,

Entrepreneurship and education

The relationship of entrepreneurship to economic growth, employment generation and enhancing employment quality is well-established, based on the experience of economies that prioritise entrepreneurship for growth and employment generation. Start-ups, typically small and fuelled by innovative ideas, have the capacity to provide good quality employment and expand over time, creating more employment. The strength of entrepreneurship is that it relies on ideas and innovation rather than on large investments. It can flourish in large and small cities as well as in rural areas if the required eco-system is successfully developed. This happens in three stages: the ideas stage, the early stage, and the growth stage that transitions the start-up into a commercial venture.

Pakistan is at an early stage of entrepreneurship development. Stakeholders, primarily in metropolitan cities, are starting to recognise the concept of innovative ideas and the benefits of converting ideas into businesses as a way towards economic growth. The expanding information technology and emerging massive open online courses (MOOC) with increasing internet connectivity are benefiting Pakistani youth by providing access to global knowledge sources that were previously not as accessible. As a result, initiatives like business incubation centres, hackathons, shared work spaces, competitions like start-up weekends and student-run entrepreneurship societies are emerging. Such initiatives play a pivotal role in motivating potential entrepreneurs to step up to the challenge of taking their destiny in their own hands for a better future.

The education system, especially higher education institutions (HEI), will give the biggest push for entrepreneurship. The Higher Education Commission of Pakistan (HEC) is supporting the establishment of new HEIs, helping them in academics and research to facilitate growth. HEC has also established the Office of Research, Innovation and Commercialization (ORIC) to help universities to establish the critical linkage between academia and industry. HEIs have started including entrepreneurship in their curricula; some have established business incubation centres that are conducting large scale events to promote entrepreneurship. However, to make an impact at the national level, all these initiatives, centres and events need to be organised and directed at the national level with clear objectives and performance indicators.

Building on the strengths and potential of the higher education sector, the following policy interventions can strengthen existing initiatives and make a national impact:

1. To counter the lack of a collaborative platform for stakeholders, develop a national entrepreneurship network to:
   • Coordinate efforts by government, entrepreneurship institutions, business incubation centres, entrepreneurs, mentors, industry representatives and investors.
   • Hold conventions to exchange ideas and highlight problems faced by entrepreneurs, and help redefine laws in favour of entrepreneurs and small start-ups
   • Provide access to mentors and have outreach in small cities through local universities and colleges to support grassroots entrepreneurship and provide equal opportunities to youth across regions.
2. HEC should devise a method to rank universities' business incubation centres and facilitate their interlinkages with global networks to follow global standards on performance indicators and achieve international recognition.
3. Encourage students to focus on practically applying academic knowledge by academically rewarding them with credit hours for running start-ups that are part of universities' incubation centres.
4. Revise curricula and teaching methodology to support entrepreneurship and promote entrepreneurial values. Provide summer internships to potential entrepreneurs so they gain exposure to the dos and don'ts of entrepreneurship.
5. Organise business idea competitions at HEIs in partnership with incubation facilities. Applicants with winning ideas can gain priority admission into HEIs. Discuss non-successful ideas in a post-event seminar and develop recommendations for improvement.
6. Different HEIs are at different stages of entrepreneurship, education and incubation. HEC/ORIC should facilitate knowledge transfer between HEIs so that beginners can benefit from the experiences of those who are at an advanced stage of entrepreneurship initiatives.

Nabeel A. Qadeer is former director at Punjab Information Technology Board. Extract from "A Mutually Inclusive Model of Entrepreneurship and Education: The Effect on Youth and its Development in Pakistan", background paper for Pakistan NHDR 2017.

working on intricate details for which they get paid a fraction of the profits garnered by a finished garment. Wood craftsmen, furniture designers and carpenters, painters, general store owners and street food vendors face similar issues.

While these small businesses provide an opportunity for income generation, their workers' professional and creative growth remain limited. Policy must therefore target individuals with potential who are disadvantaged by a lack of formal training and inability to access larger networks of mentorship, investment or professional training.

Support interventions that encourage

BOX **4.7**

Start-ups in Pakistan

Entrepreneurship is a significant part of employment generation known to yield results relatively faster, besides fuelling and sustaining growth in the long run if provided with a favourable policy framework. This leads to start-ups that have great potential but are fragile by nature, and highly vulnerable to economic changes. With the available and increasing support for entrepreneurship, the number of success stories is increasing. However, not every successful start-up will survive in the long run given the volatility of small and medium enterprises especially in a developing economy like Pakistan.

Successful start-ups include Plan9's Markhor, making men's handcrafted shoes that it aspires to grow into a global brand.[1] Connecting local artisans (shoe makers) with customers and providing handmade custom-made shoes, Markhor has already made international headlines. Another venture is the i2i incubated doctHERs, con-

necting female doctors with underserved patients in remote areas in real time using technology.[2] The initiative, utilising the services of doctors who have opted out of full time employment, increases rural women's access to health services. Darewro, incubated by the Entrepreneurship Develop Centre of the Institute of Management Sciences (IMSciences) Peshawar, offers door-to-door pick-up and delivery for a range of items, besides intra-city courier services.[3]

Even if some of today's successful enterprises collapse, this should not be seen as a failure of entrepreneurship. Increasing the number of start-ups overall will yield a higher number of successful companies in the long term. More and better managed enterprises will ensure more and better quality employment generation, which is one way of converting the youth bulge into a demographic dividend.

Notes
1. Markhor 2016. 2. DoctHERS 2016. 3. Khan 2015.

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entrepreneurial activity need to be made more accessible across economic class, educational background and geographic location. Civil society initiatives can complement state policies by training young people in marketable skills such as oral and written communication, presentation techniques and report writing. This should be accompanied by awareness-raising activities to sensitise workers on the financial aspects of running a business, like fair wages, profit maximisation and investment methods.

Small businesses that provide further employment must also learn about worker rights and the basics of creating healthy, enabling work environments. Equally important is the need for entrepreneurs to internalise the principles of running businesses with policies that uphold environmental sustainability, community development and inclusive employment opportunities.

Pakistan needs to develop an entrepreneurship network that brings together young entrepreneurs, mentors, industry and government representatives to provide new entrants, especially those who are socio-economically and educationally marginalised, with investment opportunities, access to technical knowledge pools and international markets for improved condi-

tions for entrepreneurship.

• Improve access to finance

Pakistan's youth has much to offer in terms of entrepreneurial abilities and the potential to innovate. This skilled, relatively cheap IT labour, boosted by increasing access to the internet and other forms of digital communication, has made the country a popular choice for outsourced contracts. Pakistan now ranks fifth globally in terms of online freelance work, which accounts for some $850 million of Pakistan's total software exports.[45] What's needed now is to ensure fair pay to those who provide competitive, quality work. In addition, for those with entrepreneurial interests, policy interventions to provide financial support should also be envisaged.

The government and independent microfinance institutions provide loans to fund small businesses, but the size and coverage of these loans are inadequate. The Small and Medium Enterprises Authority (SMEDA), the Prime Minister Youth Business Loans Scheme and business loans by the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP), although insufficient, are important sources of finance for start-ups. Start-up funds are also available from foundations like P@SHA, Ashoka, and Pakistan

Jawan Ideas

Develop a network of mentors with outreach in small cities through local universities and colleges to support grassroots entrepreneurship and provide equal opportunities to youth across all regions.

Innovation Fund. Similarly, grants by the Engro Foundation, Shell Tameer and Google Pakistan are examples of financial support by the corporate sector while i2i Angels and Plan9 investor club are angel investors for start-ups that depend on an enabling environment, facilitation services and human capital. Such interventions and services have started yielding results as successful start-ups begin to emerge in major cities like Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad and Peshawar (box 4.7).

There are numerous other examples of successful start-ups. The number is increasing as the country's entrepreneurship ecosystem becomes stronger, aided by venture capitals like SEED, Impakt Capital and DYL. Additionally, Abu Dhabi Group, JS Private Equity, Pakistan Catalyst Fund, Cyan Capital and Abraaj Capital provide private equity funds.[46] Overall gradual improvement in the law and order situation and consequently in macroeconomic indicators are helping to restore investors' confidence in the Pakistani economy. This will further improve access to finance.

Small enterprises seldom graduate from the informal economy to the formal sector that could generate more quality opportunities for community members. The small and medium enterprises (SME) sector remains particularly underdeveloped in Pakistan. Studies by Harvard Kennedy School's Centre for International Development show that the SME sector has the capacity to generate rapid employment and needs to be expanded for both job creation and economic growth.

However, lack of access to financial capital acts as a major deterrent to the growth of small enterprises. Companies that face excessive costs of doing business due to high tax regimes or regulations may deliberately restrict growth, or choose to remain informal.[47] Moreover, banks, microfinance institutions and venture capitalists find it either too costly or risky to both evaluate and monitor loans to these enterprises despite the fact that SMEs are generally found to be financially profitable.[48] Goal 8 of the Sustainable Development Goals emphasis-

es an important policy response, including the need to expand the coverage insurance and financial services to a wider set of beneficiaries.[49] Possible solutions include lowering the cost of running a business, greater public investment in SMEs, and legislation that protects small businesses.

• Bring more women into the workforce

Borrowing from Amartya Sen's concept of women's agency – women as active agents of change and promoters of social transformations that can alter the lives of both women and men – employment policies for Pakistan's young women need to go beyond a narrow approach of creating jobs that solely target economic wellbeing.[50] Rather, employment policies for women should focus on gaining from their physical and intellectual capabilities. Jobs for women shouldn't be restricted to a supply-side reaction in the form of increasing jobs in areas that are traditionally "female". Projecting or perceiving young women as "passive recipients of welfare enhancing help" holds back growth.[51] Policies targeting increased employment for women should aim to unleash their potential for the human development of all, regardless of gender.

The greatest barrier to female employment for enhanced human development is the gender discrimination entrenched in a highly patriarchal society. Families dictate women's choices about entering the workforce -- if they will be 'allowed' to work, under what circumstances, or what jobs will 'suit' them most as women. Challenges to female employment in Pakistan include women's low rate of labour force participation as the most salient feature of their economic inactivity. Even where women manage to achieve higher education and professional training, their employment levels remain low.

Sensitising communities on the economic and social returns of female employment is an important public policy responsibility. Awareness raising campaigns that

Jawan Ideas

Provide access to the right guidance for young people across the country with an interest in opening businesses. Incentivise business incubators in secondary cities and towns.

Jawan Ideas

Remove the national labour legislation that prohibits women from working night shifts, but require employers to provide requisite assurances of safety during night shifts.

celebrate working women as positive role models can help change societal attitudes towards women in employment. When female role models visit communities, and engage with young women, particularly their families, this contributes to a greater societal realisation about the benefits of women's financial independence, social and political empowerment as well as the health and nutrition gains achieved through income generation.

Meanwhile, women who are expected to manage domestic tasks as well as earn an income must be supported. Paid maternity and paternity leave, flexible working hours for women with difficult family situations and providing childcare spaces or day-care centres at offices and factories are all ways of encouraging women's participation in the labour force.

Directly tackling the aspects that keep women away from work can also help. For instance, employers can make health and safety at the workplace a human resource policy priority and institutionalise anti-sexual harassment codes of conduct, taking the support of new labour laws like the Protection Against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, in Punjab province. Forming women's committees at the workplace to address women-specific issues can also help create a more enabling environment.

Acknowledging that dignified employment is both a means and an end to human development reinforces the concept that quality work is as much of a right for women as it is for men. Given the evidence that women stay away from the workforce in the absence of the right conditions, more women would enter the labour force if employers improved the qualitative aspects of their working conditions. An example would be greater investment in facilities like clean changing rooms and hygienic bathrooms. While lack of access to clean water and sanitation is a national level concern in Pakistan, separate toilet facilities at work can be a game changer for women who for cultural reasons will not use shared toilets. Women's health is also more susceptible to unhygienic sanitary conditions.

Improving transportation services would greatly enhance the mobility of female workers and encourage their participation in the workforce. Road safety and security in public spaces such as bus stops, market places and parks demand equal attention. Initiatives like female-only "pink buses" and rickshaws, while a step in the right direction, have been unable to transition from pilot phases and cover a wider clientele in terms of region and social class. CCTV monitoring, strict review of drivers' criminal records, vehicle and license registrations all require effective implementation. Coordination between the biometrically engineered National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA), the City Traffic Police and employers can ensure safer and more affordable commutes for women. Additionally, effective implementation of laws that penalise 'eve teasing' and street harassment can help address the deterrents that keep women from employment.

Women need a level playing field in terms of equitable access to employment opportunities. While an increasing number of women in Pakistan are now representing their communities in parliament, serving at managerial positions in private companies and in institutions of governance such as bureaucracy and judiciary, most continue to struggle to reach influential positions. A far smaller proportion of women reach top positions compared to men, as ministers in parliamentary cabinets, CEOs in organisations, secretaries in civil services, and judges in the higher courts.[52] Women in Pakistan struggle to make it to influential positions both in the private sector and as government officials.

Although a few women do make it past the barriers, there is an overall lack of acceptance of the idea that women can and should be able to compete with men for competitive professional positions across the employment hierarchy. To put the matter in perspective however, it should be noted that this is a tall order – total equal-

ity is something even advanced countries haven't achieved. Still, this is a critical part of human development and a goal to aspire towards.

Paying attention to these factors and developing policies that encourage women's participation in the labour force will enable women to enjoy a wider set of career options in a more diverse range of economic sectors. This is not only their right but also essential for Pakistan's human development, and will help correct the "occupational segregation" that prevents women – and men – from stepping out of traditional employment roles.[53]

Multifaceted approaches to professional training can help women overcome traditional barriers to career growth. An enabling policy framework will enable young women to benefit from career guidance and fulfil their potential. Such policies would include vocational programmes and awareness campaigns about women's legal rights at work, how to access markets for quality employment and form inter-personal relations and networks that encourage greater empowerment.

Role models like microfinance entrepreneur Roshaneh Zafar, Oscar award-winning director Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy and track-and-field athlete Naseem Hameed demonstrate the diversity of women's capabilities. Such women can be engaged as motivational speakers for public sponsored campaigns to promote female employment. Only when women are treated as equal contributors in the progress of national development will a more equitable and enlightened society emerge.

• Improve working conditions for quality employment

In a people-centred approach where there is employment creation, employers pay equal attention to aspects like worker rights, their career growth, employees' work-life balance and inclusive occupation policies. However, in developing countries such as Pakistan, even the best employment policies can be threatened by cultures of poor implementation and unaccountable institutions, causing the youth to suffer further economic marginalisation.

Such an environment requires greater commitment towards enforcing the link between quality employment as a means for the youth's human development. This requires a multifaceted approach by a variety of stakeholders, including the government, formal and informal educational institutions, families and communities, and the youth themselves, to provide the fundamentals of decent working conditions and quality employment. A nation's youth are a major determining force of its development trajectory. Pakistan's policy makers must ensure that the youth's capabilities are channelized in a positive manner for equitable and sustained development (box 4.8).

There is a need to change societal perceptions about employment from the restrictive view that it is a necessary means for survival, to a way of enabling a life of dignity for humane development. In the context of Pakistan's youth, there is a need to stress quality employment to enable equitable development. With income inequality creating divisions across social, ethnic and locational class, Pakistan can no longer afford employment policies that reinforce patterns of marginalisation and exclusion. Employment creation in terms of quantity is a pressing concern given the country's youth bulge. But far more important is the urgency of ensuring the creation of quality.

Although it is difficult to measure quality work, several indicators can be used to assess the extent to which the employment of youth in Pakistan enables them to lead a life of dignity with purpose and a sense of identity. This includes formal employment and informal work – the latter often being the youth's only way of earning an income. While a casualization of labour in Pakistan makes it difficult to implement labour policies, it is this segment of employed youth that demands the greatest policy support and a wider coverage of labour laws.

Beginning with access to opportunities for quality work, policies must enhance la-

Jawan Ideas

Give a one–time tax incentive to small and medium enterprises who register their employees with SMEDA enabling employees to come under the protection of the minimum labour law standards.

Jawan Ideas

Expand a government National Internship Initiative to support young graduates in their transition to the workforce through training, job placements, internships and apprenticeships.

BOX **4.8**

Understanding the youth population subgroup – better data-analysis for better policies

Treating the youth as an independent population cohort requires comprehensive data and information to enable effective policies tailor-made for the youth, defined in Pakistan as individuals between the ages of 15-29 years. However, the considerable variation within this 15-year bracket leads to the question of whether employment policy should differentiate between age groups within the "youth" category, and target programmes accordingly?

This is an important way of looking at the youth-human development relation. For instance, teenagers -- between ages 15-19 -- may demand a different approach to employment than 20 to 29-year olds. As adolescents, the younger group faces a higher trade-off between staying in school and making the transition into employment. Should public policy work towards keeping teens in formal education to build skilled labour in the long run or pay greater attention towards creating jobs for the unskilled/ unqualified? These questions have a deep impact on the physical, emotional and socioeconomic wellbeing of teenagers, whose development is different from 'tweens', 10 to 14-years old. Even labour legislations recommended by institu-

tions such as the ILO present a paradox when they define individuals under the age of 18 as "child" yet set the minimum age for admission into work at 15 -- and in some circumstances as low as 12 years "where the economy and educational facilities are insufficiently developed".[70]

It is therefore necessary to review how Pakistan classifies different age groups and to ensure that differing development needs are met. Providing teenage workers with greater non-formal educational opportunities and professional training will improve their career development and standards of living. Similarly, for older age groups with the youth cohort, a different strategy to career development can help enhance their lifestyle. Adopting a lifelong learning approach to help older youth without any formal education gain relevant technical skills and academic knowledge will help promote inclusive development. Similarly, e-learning, evening academic programmes and coaching can help enhance both academic qualifications and soft employability skills.

Notes
1. ILO 2016c.

Jawan Ideas

Encourage and support local governments at the district level to organise district job fairs and encourage businesses to participate.

bour market information flows across rural and urban areas, urban centres and slum areas. Connecting the right skills to the right job not only leads to higher worker motivation but to increased productivity and revenue. Similarly, in terms of fair and equal pay, workers should earn competitive wages even as informal domestic help.

Pakistan lacks legislation that targets such support workers. Policy makers must develop and enforce this as a priority area since domestic helpers tend to work under some of the most exploitative working conditions. Depending on salaries and volatile social security mechanisms, the terms of which are determined by employers, domestic workers tend to lack legal coverage.[54] Only three forms of labour legislation cover domestic workers: the Provincial Employees Social Security Ordinance 1965 that makes employers responsible for their workers' medical treatment; the Minimum Wages Act 1961 that mentions domestic help but does not determine minimum wages; and the Domestic Workers (Employment Rights) Act 2013 that outlines certain rights for house help but is limited to the Islamabad Capital Terri-

tory.[55] Characterised by vulnerable working conditions, domestic work encourages child and bonded labour and is rife with stories of sexual, physical, and verbal abuse.

The state must enforce social protection mechanisms for employees through public budgeting and ensure that a certain amount is allocated to social welfare, access to quality health and educational services, clean drinking water and hygienic sanitation, as well as opportunities to earn a pension and old-age benefits. Similarly, coverage for accidental injuries and maternity insurance can encourage a quicker and healthier transition back into employment. For those who are unemployed or between jobs, social welfare mechanisms should provide housing and basic subsistence in the form of nutrition and clothing. Effective social security can prevent the youth from falling into poverty traps and provide them the temporary support to make the difference between leading life as helpless dependents or with dignity.

Social protection in the form of safe and healthy working environments also fosters virtuous cycles of increased productivity and opportunities for greater wages. In

BOX **4.9**

Working time and decent work

While setting a maximum number of working hours may not be ideal for a country like Pakistan with a widespread and flourishing informal economy, legislation nonetheless needs to be in place that ensures a work-life balance, especially essential for the youth. The European Union (EU) Working Time Directive outlines the maximum working hours that are considered healthy, and conditions under which higher than average time spent at work is justified. EU econ-omies also realise the importance of having flexible working hours and allowing customised work schedules to target a variety of socie-tal, cultural and financial conditions.[73] Parental leave, part-time work or the option to work from home for parents are all ways of manag-ing work-life balance. Giving new fathers time off from work can also encourage greater sharing of domestic responsibilities.

Notes
1. ILO 2006.

this way labour laws should evaluate what characterises decent working hours includ-ing the extent to which work at night and weekends is justified (box 4.9).

Employers have a responsibility to pro-tect workers, formal or informal, from ac-cidents at work and to prevent, measure, record, and compensate such accidents. Where certain forms of employment have a higher incidence of work-related acci-dents or occupational mortality, the regu-latory authorities and relevant government departments should penalise employers for lack of effective health and safety reg-ulations.[56] The agriculture industry is an example where workers face permanent injuries, particularly while milling grain. A potential policy focus area is to promote contractual work that will enable better health and accident insurance coverage to labour.

Other indicators to evaluate working conditions include employee malnutrition levels, literacy rates, access to potable wa-ter and clean bathrooms, and the availabil-ity of childcare.[57] Given the pervasiveness of informal employment in Pakistan, the government can also assess whether work-er rights are being met through measures such as the presence of child labour, height and weight measures of workers' children, and hygienic facilities at the workplace. Data collection around such indicators can ensure evidence-based policy making and eventually more accountable employment agreements. Enumerators who carry out census surveys can be engaged to determine quality characteristics. While the threat of misinformation and incorrect recording can compromise the quality of data collec-tion, frequent visits by enumerating offi-cials can push informal employers to abide by standardised labour requirements.

Ensuring quality work also entails al-lowing employees to exercise their basic rights at work. This includes equitable access to job opportunities and career pro-gression. Gender-disaggregated pay scales and identifying the proportion of women at positions of power can help determine how gender balanced employment is in Pa-kistan. This can also be done to measure ethnic and religious discrimination.[58]

Creating participatory and inclusive employment continues to be a major chal-lenge in Pakistan where various religious and ethnic groups find it hard to break out of traditionally low-paying, menial jobs. Christian communities for instance, are often restricted to work as janitors or sweepers in private homes and public plac-es. The government's institutional failure is visible in job advertisements that violate constitutionally-enshrined principles of equality and non-discrimination by call-ing for non-Muslims to apply for vacant sanitation work.[59] Women from minority communities find a niche market at local beauty parlours but their career progres-sion also remains limited. The discrimina-tory cultural attitudes towards ethnic and religious minorities prevent the youth of these communities from breaking out of traditional career paths. Affirmative action that supports these marginalised youth is not only essential for equitable employ-

ment but also for Pakistan's human rights progress.

Finally, quality work should allow freedom of association and the ability to form unions for greater negotiating power.[60] Yet in Pakistan, a casualization of labour has made it difficult for employees to negotiate terms of employment including aspects like wages or number of working days in a month. This not only impacts job security but also impinges on workers' right to dignity and self-respect. Informal employees risk losing their job or being monetarily penalised for refusing a given task or disagreeing with employers. Rather than workers being allowed to manage their chores in an agreed-upon time frame, informal workers are forced to complete tasks dictated by employers. Examples abound in various sectors including agricultural farms, brick kilns, textile factories and domestic work. Young workers are more likely to find themselves in subservient positions where employers take advantage of their inexperience and lack of power.

The bottom line is that Pakistan's labour laws must ensure that employers, particularly in the informal sector, follow basic principles of human development. Informal workers must be provided with contracts with predetermined agreements on aspects like wages, health coverage and child education, annual leave and a leeway to negotiate all these matters. Awareness campaigns and making it mandatory for employers and employees to enter job contracts can help in the overall progress towards fair and decent employment for all.

5

Youth engagement and human development

Madrassah Jamia Muhsanaat, Jhang

"The human soul needs
freedom of opinion.
Mutual benefits cannot
take place of freedom"

– Fatima Jinnah

CHAPTER 5

Youth engagement and human development

Just four days after the massacre at the Army Public School (APS) in Peshawar that left 141 people dead, including 132 school children in December 2014, the NHDR team was in Peshawar to speak to young people about their hopes and fears. It was no surprise that the APS tragedy was uppermost on their minds. But the way they engaged with the impacts of the calamity alerted us to some truths so obvious that they are often ignored.

Particularly harrowing was the realisation that in Pakistan's ongoing war with extremism and terror, those who kill are predominantly the youth, while those who are being killed are also predominantly the youth.

Reminders of this realisation continue to haunt us: a university graduate murdering peace activist Sabeen Mahmud in Karachi (2015), terrorist attack on the Bacha Khan University in Charsadda (2016), students lynching a fellow student for alleged blasphemy at the Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan (2017).

Focusing on the youth of Pakistan the material contained within these pages also contains a sober warning about factors and conditions that lead to destructive patterns of behaviour.

The conversations in and around Peshawar on our visit also opened our eyes to just how profoundly living in a constant state of insecurity impacts the youth. To be young in Pakistan today means having no experience that is not contextualised by living in a state of war. For the youth particularly, there is a pervasive sense of insecurity and an acute need to be always alert.

That does not mean that the youth are overwhelmingly preoccupied with thoughts of insecurity. That would make life not just miserable, but unbearable. What it does mean is that conversations about insecurity cannot be easily compartmentalised and separated from other conversations. This one reality, more than all others, helps shape the intensity, intent and impact of how the youth in Pakistan engage with the society around them – whether in a political, a civic, an economic or a social context.

Champions of change

Never has there been a generation of young people in Pakistan so invested in the future of their country, so aware that the solutions to their problems will not come from above or abroad, who know that it is they who can and must be the change that must starts from within. Additionally, this generation has unprecedented access to information, with communication and technology providing spaces and platforms never available to Pakistan's young people before.

Participating in the movement to restore the judiciary in 2007 under a military re-gime, Pakistani youth gained a sense of their agency. They became a symbol of street power in sit-ins against the current political government. The militant attacks on Pakistan's educational institutions, heritage sites and indeed the country's very existence catalysed them into reclaiming their voice from silent, private condemnation to a vocal censure that is collective and open.

Interacting with society in new and innovative ways, the youth are becoming a lever of transformation pushing society to give them space to be heard. Youth engagement in Pakistan is currently a fight for that space, on their own terms. To mean-

Jawan Ideas

Let us make sure young people laugh. Set up laughing clubs where students and teachers can laugh together to relieve stress.

Jawan Ideas

Incentivise civil society to create outdoor opportunities for young people that create a caring and responsibility for nature amongst them.

ingfully engage with this important demographic, society must enter a social contract that the youth accepts and that the community upholds. Pakistan's youth have historically been an overlooked and in-between category that typically slips under the development radar. Youth policies have been piecemeal, with little appreciation of the interconnected forward and backward linkages with the areas that drive youth development. These linkages are necessary to develop meaningful engagement with the youth – where engagement is taken to be a right as fundamental for human development as the right to shelter, food and health. Only when the youth are engaged will they be empowered. Merely educating young people and providing jobs does not empower them unless they themselves feel that they can, in some capacity, influence the decisions that shape their lives.

Skills gained from schooling and the labour market enable engagement. But this does not mean that uneducated and unemployed youth cannot be empowered or engaged. In a society where the young outnumber the old, this reading of youth potential is dangerously simplistic and pessimistically self-defeating. Where half of Pakistan's adult population is illiterate and youth unemployment is higher than overall adult unemployment, this logic curses entire generations to "disempowerment" because of a failure in the implementation of education, health, and economic policies.

The more important driver of active participation is identity – what it means to be young in terms of your own experience. This is what shapes an individual's worldview and sense of control over their life. It is their personal experience – whether as a married semi-literate young woman or as an under-employed young man – that will shape how the youth interact or engage with society. The two are inter-linked, but when viewed as "human becomings" the youth are so much more than just a job or a degree.[1] Identity is the intermediary between individual and societal engagement: how young people view themselves in so-

ciety and equally importantly, how society views them across the range of their identities. The critical question that then arises is whether society can provide space for the youth to engage within those identities.

Secondly, the period of youth development is one of momentous changes regarding how individuals identify themselves and society. Generally, in Pakistan, this transition period – as a child becomes an adult – is protracted for the privileged and restricted for the poor. In this context, the change from child to young adult engaged in economic, political and social activity is dramatic. Fruitfully engaging the youth entails successful management of their associated responsibilities and expectations. The life course transitions theory (Hutchinson, 2011) illuminates the various transitions they must navigate in terms of responsibilities.[2] Along this path, individual and shared perceptions shaped by various mental models play a role in determining expectations – those of the youth, as well as society's expectations of the youth. This is what underlies the intrinsic (individual) and extrinsic (social) motivations for engagement.[3]

Thirdly, Hart's 8-step "ladder of participation", designed to create authentic youth engagement opportunities (figure 5.8, pg 118) illustrates highlights differences between levels of youth participation – the extent and quality of youth engagement. This can also be applied to Pakistan where each rung reflects the extent of youth's involvement in decision-making that impacts them or society at large. If Hart's levels are applied to the existing engagement opportunities in Pakistan it becomes evident that we hardly go above rung 3. We explain this aspect in greater detail further on.

Engagement is not simply an end itself but also the means to an end, towards an informed, engaged and responsible citizenry in control of the decisions that affect their lives. Meaningful engagement increases the chances that a young person's views are heard, respected and utilised. This in turn leads to young people feeling more connected to and developing a stake

in a collective larger than themselves (expert opinion: I.A. Rehman).

While bearing most of the brunt of the increasing physical, financial, economic and mental insecurity that has typified Pakistan for the past 15 years, it is nonetheless the youth who have reclaimed their lost citizenship, so to speak, by standing up for their more vulnerable or victimised fellow citizens as is evident in the youth revival that Pakistan is witnessing.

This revival entails the youth being increasingly cognisant of their rights as well as their obligations towards society. The resurgence manifests in how the youth are at the forefront of some of the most promising and exciting civil society interventions in fields like education, governance and democracy, gender equality and conflict-resolution. They are engaging with society by volunteering as youth mobilisers, by partnering with public and private institutions, and by facilitating the two-way transfer of information that is essential for democratic accountability and secular enquiry. Our consultations with Pakistan's youth suggest that they are eager to play an even bigger role.

Overall then, engagement in the context of this chapter may be defined as the youth's ability to participate in and influence the decisions that affect them, to build a better society and to drive social change.[4] Seeing engagement as a social contract between the youth and society, this chapter also looks at the set of rights, means, spaces, opportunities and support that Pakistani society provides. We can thus gauge the extent to which Pakistani society enables individuals to simultaneously pursue individual goals and participate in collective activities. This is measured by their well-being, freedom of expression and association, and participation in sports, recreational

Jawan Ideas

Set up community centres in all neighbourhoods as spaces where youth can meet to share ideas, food and receive and provide mentorship and exchange expertise.

EXPERT OPINION   **I. A. Rehman**

Citizenship and the youth

It is puzzling that citizenship receives due attention neither in Pakistan's educational curricula nor in its political discourse given that this state was founded based on common and equal citizenship of its people.

While defining the ideal and ideology of Pakistan in his famous speech of 11 August 1947, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah declared that every person living in Pakistan, "no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this state with equal rights, privileges and obligations".

By describing citizenship as the bond that united the people of this country in a single nation, the nation's founder reminded Pakistan's first parliamentarians that, though demanded as a homeland for Muslims, Pakistan belonged to all its citizens, regardless of belief, gender and social status. The Quaid-i-Azam himself outlined the basic attributes of citizenship: equality in terms of rights – the fundamental rights to life, liberty and security, and all the basic freedoms; and obligations – to live within the law and to respect the rights of the fellow beings. These rights belong to young people and children as well as adults.

One key right – to participate in governance, that is, management of people's affairs from basic needs to education, health, employment and social security etc. – becomes available to citizens on reaching the age of 18, when they are entitled to vote. At that point citizens acquire responsibilities in addition to rights and obligations.

All citizens aged 18 and above have a responsibility to join the effort to make the lives of the people happier, richer and more productive, for citizenship demands an active role in the promotion of public good. A person who does not assert her or his rights and does not help fellow human beings in realising their entitlements cannot be accepted as a full citizen.

The youth have a special responsibility to act as dynamic, public spirited citizens for, unlike their elders who have lived their lives, they have longer spans of life ahead. They have a right to choose and shape the conditions in which their genius can flower. However, they can adequately discharge their citizenship responsibilities only if they imbibe the concept of citizenship and the role of citizens early in life, during childhood years. Well-informed youth alone will grow into conscious young women and men and give the country leaders capable of establishing a democratic, just and progressive order.

For all this to happen all children and the entire youth of Pakistan must be guaranteed opportunities of learning what citizenship means, besides being allowed space to exercise their rights as independent-minded citizens.

I.A. Rehman is former editor, Pakistan Times, former Director, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Comment for Pakistan NHDR 2017.

Jawan Ideas

Establish special voter registration drives focusing on young people reaching voting age.

activities and the arts. The current state of youth engagement in Pakistani society, gleaned from the National Youth Consultations and the National Youth Perception Survey conducted for this report shows the potential that an active and meaningfully engaged youth presents for Pakistani society. Findings from both the consultations and the survey also warn of the potential pitfalls of a societal failure to engage the youth.

Engagement as human development

The emphasis on measurements to chart progress in meeting development targets makes it easy to forget that human development is about real people – living, breathing, individual human beings. At the most basic level, human development should enlarge the choices available to individuals by improving their competencies. This would help them to attain an acceptable living standard enabling them to live a healthy and long life and enhancing their capacity to obtain knowledge. Equally importantly, engagement should also provide the conditions necessary for human development to expand freedom of choice and opportunities to enable individuals to live the lives they value.[5] These conditions include civic and political participation, human rights and security, and environmental sustainability, all of which are important development goals in and of themselves.

To belong, to be heard and to be valued are at the core of human existence. Those who lack the ability to associate and cannot form and express their own opinions have far fewer choices in life. Youth engagement is a critical component of the asset-based approach to youth development – that is when young people have both the capacity and agency to solve their own problems, enabled by a supportive environment (figure 5.1).

The contextual aspects of human development comprising participation in political and community life can be described by a single word: engagement. Without engagement, gains made in terms of incomes, longevity and educational enrolment ratios will have little impact on the actual quality of young people's lives. Without engagement, the youth will not feel they are a part of society or have any stake in it. Engagement can ensure bonds between generations by providing the youth with a crucial investment in society.

Engagement is also about full and productive involvement in the affairs of a society beyond political and social rights. It is a social contract between an individual and society, where individuals actively enact their rights through a recognition of their responsibilities as citizens and make efforts to fulfil them. In return, society must provide the support, means, spaces and opportunities to develop an awareness of the individual's rights and ensure that those rights are given. This creates a sense of the individual's place in a larger collective. Engagement signifies trust that institutions exist to expand freedoms and opportunities that enable individuals to live a more fulfilled life.

The three pillars that strengthen productive capacities and hence mobilise individual agency include improved education and health, equitable economic growth, and engagement through participation in democratic governance. Engagement thus promotes collective as well as individual agency. Collective action is the ability of individuals to associate with each other, and to form and voice opinions to claim their economic and social rights. Being free of poverty and disease allows people to do more than just survive— it enhances their ability to demand economic and social policies that respond to their priorities.[6]

The existence of opportunities for engagement in Pakistan and the youth's willingness to avail those opportunities underscores a recognition of the complexity of public issues and a will to seek collective political solutions. Engagement signifies a recognition on the part of Pakistani society that its youth are not a 'problem', but are active players in society, with their own

FIGURE **5.1**

Mutually reinforcing capabilities

Enjoying political
freedom and
participation

Collective agency
for greater equity

Collective agency
for greater equity

**Enhanced
Human Development**

Enjoying a decent
standard of living

Being
knowledgeable
and enjoying good
health

Mutually reinforcing links
through individual agency

Source: UNDP 2002.

set of strengths. Human development and engagement are thus clearly intimately connected. Human development can only be achieved through actively engaged citizens, while actively engaged citizens are an outcome of human development.

Society must recognise the risks that the youth face at key moments in their lives, as well as the economic, social and political contexts of these risks and moments, to fully appreciate their role in Pakistan's human development. At the same time, the youth can begin to address through engagement the constraints that limit their aspirations and realities, holding them back particularly if they identify with a vulnerable socioeconomic class. Involving the youth in the design, implementation and feedback of policies and projects through engagement enables them to become better beneficiaries, substantive collaborators and eventual initiators in human development. This trajectory would make a sustainable difference to the lives of two thirds of Pakistan's citizens, strengthen democratic principles and civic participation, introduce accountability in public office, and most importantly, rebuild the trust that is necessary for a

functioning and tolerant society.

Youth in transition: constructing an identity

The transition from childhood to adulthood is a critical stage of human development. It is a period during which young people undergo vital social, psychological, economic and biological changes. For many, these changes involve critical challenges and choices. The quality of life that adults lead depends to a large degree on how well they negotiated the critical period of youth. The transition to work and to citizenship, marriage and starting a family are the major economic and social changes that young people experience on the way to adulthood. Included in these transitions are schooling and health that also prepare the youth for adult roles. Enabling them to make smart choices during these transitions will help them to fully realise their potential as engaged citizens, workers, family members, and entrepreneurs -- and as leaders in all these areas. Failure to create this enabling environment produces a vacuum that makes young people suscep-

Jawan Ideas

Encourage school trips to explore Pakistani heritage, arts and culture –– both local and national excursions.

Jawan Ideas

Encourage universities to give admission preference for civic volunteering such as caring for the sick at hospitals, helping in orphanages, cleaning streets etc.

tible to the clear leadership and direction provided by those peddling radical or and militant ideologies.

Pervasive changes that transcend boundaries in demographics, technology, economics, politics, environment and culture are throwing up new and emergent conditions for young people. These changes bring with them the transformational potentials of markets, technology and democracy. But as new ways of organising social, political and economic life interact with traditional norms and institutions, there is also the risk of instability and marginalisation, factors that can drive the youth towards militant ideologies that carry false promises of certainty and reward. It is no coincidence that most of those involved in militant attacks are young men who feel disenfranchised in one way or another and have never had the opportunity to develop a sense of their own potential in shaping a better future for themselves, their families and communities.

The sheer rapidity and scale of these changes profoundly influence both the opportunities and risks that the current generation of young Pakistanis face as they prepare to assume adult roles. The transition to work is not smooth for many youth, especially young men, who stay unemployed for longer periods of time during their early twenties. Most young women stay out of the labour force – in 2016, 3 out of 4 women did not participate in the labour force.[7] This leads to negative impacts on economic wellbeing and societal engagement. Moreover, those who obtain employment often stay in poor quality jobs hindering their economic and social mobility. It also impacts their children, creating and reinforcing an intergenerational cycle of poverty.

The low quality of both education and employment outlined in earlier chapters means that many young people are unable to transition to successful marriage and parenthood, or citizenship. The current generation of young people is more willing to demand greater involvement in societal decisions, but many transition to citizenship without developing an understanding of their rights as citizens or the responsibilities that citizenship entails. Thus, they view politics mostly in terms of political office, rather than as a comprehensive set of relations where voting and participating in public life are as important as successfully contesting elections.

How successfully the youth negotiate various areas of their life -- as individuals and at the level of households, institutions, communities and societies – depends on their access to opportunities and support along the way. This is what enables them to make important life choices. Access to nutrition, health facilities, education and training, or being able to form and voice opinions, all determine outcomes for young people as they move into adulthood.

This calls for a "life course perspective" that identifies and examines earlier experiences to assess how they affect outcomes in health, education, employment, marriage, parenthood and societal participation.[8]

According to the life course transitions theory, at the outset the youth's successful transition to adulthood is heavily mediated by the social relationships they forge within their families, peer groups and in wider society.

These relationships significantly affect how young people negotiate risks and seek opportunities and support as they prepare for adulthood. Secondly, individual agency plays a big role in life course development.

Young people are not passive consumers of opportunities or sufferers of crises. They shape their destinies through individual agency to help expand life choices for themselves and their communities. Both social relations and individual agency are determined by youth identity.

It is through engagement with society that young people develop their capabilities to make choices — which is the true goal of human development.

Identity and society

Engagement between the youth and society is intermediated by identity -- how the youth view themselves in society and how

society views them across their various identities. Self and social perception are mutually reinforcing. How young people perceive themselves can lead to changes in how the family, the labour market, the marriage market, and the political arena view them. The youth's agency is described as their ability to make their own choices and act on them, their skill sets and capabilities, and their power to transform their own lives. This asset-based approach to youth development is essential in a society like Pakistan, where socioeconomic class discrimination is systemic and where inequality is entrenched and persists across generations, since vertical social mobility requires socioeconomic intercession. Status is conferred through accident of birth. Class dictates how public institutions, society and government choose to treat a young person. In such a society, how young people construct their identities is a function of their experiences, which are broadly determined by class.

Social identities are constructed and reinforced on the path to adulthood. These identities are shaped by both external (social) and internal (individual) forces. Internal forces consist of the individual mental models that the youth use to understand how things work, their place in society, and what is "thinkable" for their lives. Mental models critically consist of identities, stereotypes, prototypes and stories. The youth as a group, because of their different experiences and exposure, have their own set of mental models to understand their place and role in society. This creates divergence in the path that young people chart for themselves, in their aspirations or goals, and in the level and meaning of engagement with society. The possibility and quality of engagement is thus determined by youth identity, which in turn is a function of socioeconomic class. Identity is what it means to be a youth of a certain class in one community or another.

Individuals have multiple identities, some more salient than others, and identity has important effects on a range of behaviours.[9] The stifling class structure

in Pakistan, transcending gender, location, ethnicity, and religion, places youth in a rigid hierarchy the relevance of which is determined by the dominant narrative produced by various interest groups in society. Consultations with youth from across the country show that where young people place themselves in that social fabric reflects how society sees their various identities, as well as their own acceptance or lack of acceptance, of themselves in these roles. Young people are particularly vulnerable where multiple poverties coincide: a young, rural, uneducated, Christian woman is excluded in large part due to her poverty in capital — whether it is physical, financial, human capital, or social. The vulnerability increases if the youth is disabled. The National Youth Consultations highlight how being poor, female, disabled, or marginalised makes a difference in how the youth experience life (box 5.1).

At the same time, the identity that the youth create for themselves must be one that society also accepts, as these identities are based on shared mental models, that people need to solve collective action problems, express solidarity, and belong. Being malleable, these mental models can be shaped by exposure to alternative ways of thinking. Experiences and better role models can improve trust, encourage collective action and to build institutions. As a cohort, the youth represent a generation, that is, a group of individuals born around the same time, who have faced common cultural events in their formative years. However, their life experiences in key developmental stages vary according to socioeconomic class. These experiences shape the identity the youth create for themselves and that society accepts them in.

Engaging the youth in meaningful activities exposes them to those from different socioeconomic classes and allows them to interact with individuals who may share their ideas and aspirations and facilitate networking around shared ideals and causes. Increased interaction with people from diverse backgrounds helps break stereo-

Jawan Ideas

Animal welfare organisations and veterinary clinics should work with schools to involve young people to care for animals to relieve stress, inculcate humanity and learn to take responsibility.

Jawan Ideas

Work with civil society to create a social media peace corps of young volunteers countering extremist ideology through messages of peace and tolerance.

types, dispel myths, puncture exclusivist narratives and develop a more inclusive and pluralistic outlook. In a "cycle of mutual constitution", this two-way engagement can help reduce differences by creating a narrative that cuts across class, ethnicity, location and religion.[10]

While the youth may be divided in a narrow, albeit meaningful way, at a meta level the problems they confront are not. For example, 1 in 3 young adults who responded to the NYPS 2015 believed that Pakistan was becoming worse as a country for young people to live in (figure 5.2). Increasing pessimism can affect agency and dull aspirations.

Aspirations and agency

Young people in Pakistan face a dilemma in terms of a dwindling locus of control; that is, their actions don't determine outcomes. The overwhelming belief is that chance of birth or geography or fate determines outcomes, and that powerful others control their lives.

A 2012 survey estimates that half of Pakistan's youth believe that they have little autonomy over their lives.[11] This is especially true for females. According to NYPS, 80 percent of females as compared to 60 percent of males felt they had no say

regarding the most important decisions in their lives, such as marriage.

This lack of control leads to a crisis of concept of self – the personal identity that the youth create for themselves – that cuts across society but is more pronounced in marginalised ethnicities and socioeconomic classes. The youth tend to have unrealistically high aspirations – or set their sights dismally low. Since self-concept depends on the mental models that the youth use, policy makers, educators, leaders and families can help change perceptions about constraints and opportunities that are embodied in mental models. This would increase both the level and quality of the youth's engagement. To increase engagement, it is necessary to raise aspirations about what is possible in life.

One way of doing this is through simple exposure to positive and attainable role models. It is important to populate the youth's "aspiration window" – those they want to emulate – with a healthy dose of those they can realistically aspire to be like.[12] Too often in the consultations the youth identified as their role models, personalities who were exceptional and unique – the Holy Prophet of Islam (PBUH) or Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Numerous studies show that having attainable role models can raise aspirations and increase self-efficacy.[13] Research suggests that it is in fact possible to change aspirations and improve self-esteem by simply exposing individuals to success stories of people who are like them, who worked hard and achieved their goal.

A one-hour long documentary shown to poor farmers in remote villages of Ethiopia managed to immediately increase self-reported measures of aspirations and self-efficacy.[14] Pakistan's marginalised youth, especially in rural areas, may benefit from such documentaries that could change their locus of control – the sense of whether they have control over their lives – and alter their aspirations. Here, aspiration refers to a more immediate and tangible forward-looking goal or target in terms of

Jawan Ideas

Establish a national young government employee exchange programme amongst provinces to enable the sharing of best practices and ideas.

FIGURE **5.2**

Youth perceptions about Pakistan's progress in the selected domains

Note: The total doesn't add up to 100 as the "Don't Know" category is not being shown in the figure.
Source: UNDP estimates based on National Youth Perception Survey 2015.

BOX **5.1**

Youth and disability

The Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development, to which Pakistan is a signatory, identifies social integration as *"fostering societies that are stable, safe and just and that are based on the promotion and protection of **all** human rights, as well as on non-discrimination, tolerance, respect for diversity, equality of opportunity, solidarity, security, and participation of **all** people, including disadvantaged and vulnerable groups and persons".*[1] In 2011, Pakistan ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CPRD).[2] Together, the two underscore Pakistan's commitment to protecting the civil, political, social and economic rights of persons with disabilities. However, little has changed in terms of policy interventions, awareness-raising and investment to address the attitudinal, social and physical barriers faced by persons with disabilities.

Take for example the issue of the availability of data on persons with disabilities. The failure to conduct a national census on a regular basis has hampered, among other things, the gathering of accurate statistics on the number of disabled persons and types of disability. The 1998 census recorded the number of disabled persons then as 3.35 million, with the prevalence of disability in Pakistan at 2.54 percent of the total population.[3] Given the rise in population since then, the number of persons living with disabilities in Pakistan would be well over a quarter of a million today, to be ascertained when data from the 2017 census is publically released.[4]

Promising early attempts in Pakistan to include persons with disabilities as fully engaged and productive citizens involve setting up special schools and requiring businesses to employ persons with disabilities as a certain percentage of their workforce. However, persons with disabilities still face difficulty in exercising their civil and political rights, obtaining quality education and finding gainful employment. Pakistan's ratification of CPRD, which emphasises a rights-based approach that empowers people with disabilities, has achieved little in terms of shifting the focus away from a charity and medical approach.[5] There is a need to monitor how employers are implementing the Disabled Persons (Employment and Rehabilitation) Ordinance 1981, which requires employers with 100 workers to ensure that 2 percent their total workforce consists of persons with disabilities. However, the weakness of implementation coupled with social constraints and attitudes leaves most of the disabled population out of work.

There are few special education schools for people with disabilities, especially in rural areas. Those that exist leave a lot to be desired in terms of quality. Provisions for educating people with disabilities in regular educational institutions, such as building features that allow easy access, remain almost non-existent.

Young people between and adolescence and adulthood are at an age of major transitions and accompanying anxieties to begin with. For differently abled youth, especially women, from disadvantaged backgrounds, their many vulnerabilities intersect to make these transitions even harder to negotiate.

Notes
1. UN 1995. 2. UN 2007. 3. Government of Pakistan 1998. 4. British Council 2014a. 5. British Council 2014a.

what futures the youth believe are possible. When this is a case of presenting information they probably already have, the impact lies in altering beliefs about how likely an outcome is (success/failure) or on the returns to an activity (new/old). This can help align aspirations (future targets) with expectations (the level they expect to be at in say, ten years).

Misaligned aspirations can lead to disengagement with society. For example, in 2013, 2 out of 3 young people believed that their economic prospects had worsened over time.[15] Persistent economic insecurity amidst growing inflation can be a major obstacle to realising the youth dividend.

Life interrupted: extremism and violence

Youth disengagement stems from society's failure to respond positively to a young person's basic human urge to belong and to have a voice in how society functions. This can cause a fall in individual capability to work towards goals, to contribute to the wellbeing of society, and in the functioning of the society at large. But disengagement is not an individual problem. Youth from marginalised communities – the rural poor, the disabled, the transgendered and the religious and ethnic minorities – often disengage with society due to the social structures and settings in which they spend time.

In the absence of opportunities for meaningful participation and given suspicion of existing ones, the youth may seek alternative avenues of belonging and participation that conflict with their own long-term best interests. These avenues may be drug gangs or more dangerous ideological, extremist

Jawan Ideas

Establish a confidential Youth Help Hotline to assist young people in stressful situations, including those contemplating suicide, victims of violence and abuse, health emergencies, etc.

Perceptions of how to relate to people of other faiths

Source: UNDP estimates based on National Youth Perception Survey 2015.

platforms. Although it would be hard to draw a linear connection between disengagement and involvement in terrorism, it may be argued that disengagement increases the appeal of exclusivist narratives and encourages activities that harm the youth particularly and society in general.

Pakistan's current generation of youth are at the receiving end of more polarising tendencies than at any time in the country's history. They have seen internal wars waged against anti-state militants, debated their 'legality' and efficacy, and witnessed sectarian violence. Most were schooled in a curriculum that forges an identity based exclusively on Islam, is discriminatory towards non-Muslim communities and cements an 'us vs. them' mentality.[16] Moreover, authority figures like parents, teachers and community leaders often discourage secular inquiry, critical thinking, and discussion of alternative visions of religion, society and state. It is worrying that almost half of all the NYPS respondents said they do not approve of having friendly relations with non-Muslims or Muslims of other sects, the right of these "other" communities to build places of worship, and especially, to preach their faith (figure 5.3).

Radicalisation

This is not the place to delve into the complex interplay of factors that push individuals across the continuum from becoming observers to perpetrators of violence. However, it is important to briefly outline the factors causing the radicalisation of young minds. These factors include socioeconomic poverty (both absolute and relative), education systems based on curricula that breed close-mindedness, discouraging questioning and independent mindedness, and a religion-dominated ideological narrative. While the state has lately made efforts to reduce militancy, more needs to be done to curb exclusivist narratives and militants (expert opinion: Dr. Moeed Yusuf).[17] In a survey about why violence is becoming more common, most youth betrayed a sense of persecution while ascrib-

ing the phenomenon to economic insecurity and an unjust society. For many, chronic insecurity is a way of life, with peace unlikely for the next generation if Pakistan continues down this path.[18] Recruitment is easy when vested interests can capitalise on perceptions about a "failed state", a suspicious population, and misplaced ideals of pan-Islamic greatness. In the absence of a credible counter-narrative by the state, youth conditioned through these narratives in the media and curricula are more easily seduced by promises of religious glory.

To minimise violent engagement by the youth, it is important to address how they become radicalised, and identify ways to wean them away from radical ideas. Such youth from conflict areas must be re-absorbed into the social fabric through a careful combination of financial (cash transfers) and psychological support (cognitive and behavioural therapy). Successful graduates of rehabilitation programmes can be designated as youth ambassadors to discourage extremism. They can address mosques, schools and youth seminars as examples of model citizens, uplifting their self-esteem while also serving as role models for others. There is evidence to suggest that war-affected youth benefit from such interventions, leading in turn to a decrease in anti-social behaviours and an increase in long-term savings.[19]

In the absence of a well-crafted and comprehensive national de-radicalisation policy, a few such efforts mark a modest start. These include de-radicalisation programmes in Swat where the first such project was launched in 2009, with a focus on adolescents (15-18 years), youth (19-25 years), and their families through religious re-education, psycho-emotional counselling, formal education and vocational training.[20] By 2014, almost 2,200 youth had completed the programme.[21] A similar programme in Punjab was launched in March 2015 under the National Action Plan 2015.

It is yet to be determined to what extent such programmes succeed in re-orienting

Youth radicalisation in Pakistan

What drives young people to become radicalised? Factors include lagging human development indicators – education, socio-economic deprivation, poor governance and corruption. In addition, a negative politico-ideological environment has increased the susceptibility of Pakistani youth to radicalisation.

Radicalisation is most usefully understood as a process that moves along a 'continuum', starting from an individual's peaceful outlook and ending in outright violence against those seen as enemies (figure 5.4). The move along the continuum from pre-radicalisation to actual radicalisation is enabled by 'drivers' or 'enablers'. In the absence of systematic panel data, we do not know enough about such processes in Pakistan. Much of what we know is derived from polls and surveys that capture the views of young people and attempt to infer the state of radicalisation among them. Notable trends include the importance of religion in the youth's lives, increasingly intolerant belief systems and a tendency to buy into an 'us vs. them' worldview. While some studies extrapolate a linear correlation between these factors and radicalism, most such trends fall in the pre-radicalisation phase of the continuum.

The education system and socio-economic deprivation are most commonly cited as enablers of youth radicalisation. Scholars often argue that the curriculum of subjects like Pakistan Studies and Islamiyat try to impose Islam as the national ideology, create exclusionary mindsets and present a biased view of history. While the different education systems prompt potential polarisation among youth, a linear relationship between what is taught in schools and radicalisation has not been established. Similarly, explanations focusing on poverty or inequality as the leading driver of youth involvement in violence prove untenable. The overwhelming majority of Pakistan's poor, alienated or not, have stayed away from radicalisation and militancy.

To move forward, Pakistan needs a pluralistic national narrative that celebrates difference and promotes tolerance of diversity, religious or otherwise. Improving understanding of the problem will be key, ensuring that youth radicalisation does not remain an understudied or data starved subject. Policy interventions are essential to improve the politico-ideological environment. The state must succeed in eliminating physical militant infrastructure, recruitment bases and recruiters, radical madrassas, and the funding streams that support radical elements and militant violence. It must hold all religious institutions and clerics to current laws to prevent narratives or actions that incite violence. Some of this is now being pursued under the National Action Plan. A coherent de-radicalisation policy is sorely required.

Most importantly, the state must tackle the militant narrative by developing a direct counter-messaging to address each aspect of the militant narrative, accompanied by a national outreach campaign through media, school tours and seminars. Moderate religious voices are needed to demystify radical misinterpretation of religion. Investing in quality education and socio-economic equality is also essential. Textbooks should reorient biased narratives about violence and Pakistan's position in the world; state-run moderate madrassahs should be set up in areas rife with radical mindsets; and regular interaction and dialogue facilitated between students from the three different education tracks. Alleviating socioeconomic disparity will also be vital to undercut militant narratives that feed on deprivation as a means of discrediting the state.

FIGURE **5.4**

Youth preferences mapped on the radicalisation continuum

Pre-Radicalization Phase   Radicalization Phase

Source: Yusuf 2015.

Dr. Moeed Yusuf is director of South Asia programs at the U.S. Institute of Peace. Extract from "Radicalism among Youth in Pakistan: Human Development Gone Wrong?", background paper for Pakistan NHDR 2017.

BOX **5.2**

Engaging youth to combat climate change and natural disasters

Pakistan is one of the world's most vulnerable countries for climate-related risks.[1] In coming years, climate-related disasters, expected to be more frequent, unpredictable and intense, will push back decades of gains in human development indicators. The country's response to natural disasters like floods and earthquakes underscores the lack of response mechanisms at the local level, and lack of implementation of existing mechanisms -- procedures as well as physical infrastructure such as shelters.

However, natural disasters in recent years have ignited the nation's voluntary spirit, especially the youth who mobilised in large numbers to organise relief and rescue efforts. The LUMS Trekking and Adventure Society was the first to reach many affected villages and relay valuable information on the villagers' needs. Across the country, thousands of students and teachers gathered at educational institutions to sort and pack relief goods and raise funds.[2]

Such spontaneously organised collective actions point to a resource that must be harnessed to implement risk reduction and response measures. Pakistan's large youth population is relatively healthier and better educated than previous generations due to investments in education and health service delivery. This is an opportune moment to make climate change and disaster risk reduction a central concern of Pakistan's human development agenda.

As a party to the Paris Accord, Pakistan must endeavour to keep global temperature rises 'well below' 2 degrees centigrade. Making its youth the vanguard of the response to climate-change-related risks and other natural disasters will help Pakistan secure its human development gains, that receive massive setbacks when natural disasters strike. Engaging the youth will also harness their voluntary spirit towards enhanced human development.

This will require educating people at all levels about climate-change-related risks, from the formal education curricula and informal awareness sessions to campaigns in the print, electronic and social media. Another step would be to institutionalise the youth's voluntary spirit through a national disaster preparedness programme that includes forming and training community rescue and response teams.

Notes
1. Kreft and others 2015. 2. Rashid 2015.

> "We are independent but independence here does not mean we have the decision–making power in our life"
>
> –
> Male, National Youth Consultation, Islamabad.

Jawan Ideas

Dedicate open–air spaces in important parks and public gathering places for use by young musicians and performers for performances that are free to the public. Local councils should allocate budgets to pay these performers stipends that at least cover their costs.

these individuals, and more critically, how accepting society is of them. In general, however, extremists take advantage of the vacuum provided by a weak state writ, both geographical and ideological — whether they are separatists, religious militants, or ethno-political groups. In this situation, what is clear is that Pakistan urgently needs a national counter-narrative independent of religion and promoted through state-society linkages. Positive examples of youth-led engagement include groups focusing mostly on conflict resolution, working in areas with a high level of extremism. They include the College for Youth Activism and Development in Karachi, and the Coalition for the Rights and Responsibilities of the Youth, and Aware Girls, a female empowerment initiative to create young women peace activists, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.[22]

There is also clearly a need to reform and register the existing madrassahs, and introduce curriculum reforms in madrassahs to teach a broader range of subjects and a moderate version of Islam. Such efforts can be backed by cash stipends for madrassa students, particularly in vulnerable areas that lack state-run social safety nets.[23] This would help counter the ultra-orthodox madrassahs and militant groups who also focus on these regions and gain inroads through their own social welfare programmes, providing essential services like health and education.

Societies that experience profound violence often re-invent national identity to overcome the resistance offered by entrenched social norms, such as those centred on ethnicity or, in Pakistan's case, religion. A positive example is from post-genocide Rwanda, where radio programmes were used to reach out to people and encourage them to think independently, work collectively, and resolve dissent with authority through debate and discussion, rather than violence. The experiment revealed that it is possible to alter attitudes, thought processes, and perceptions of social norms using mass media. Groups that heard reconciliation versus entertainment programmes were more open to using discussion to solve problems.[24]

It is essential to include young people at all levels of social and development decision-making, for one thing because they

are the ultimate beneficiaries of the programmes being undertaken and policies being made. And also, more importantly, because "voice and participation are a key part of the human development approach and important for long term policy-making" (Hall, 2015).

Violence

The current generation of young Pakistanis has witnessed more violence and internal conflict than at any time in its history. The number of terrorism-related deaths have declined in recent years in Pakistan, but it remains the world's sixth deadliest country.[25] In 2016, it ranked fourth in the Global Terrorism Index of countries most impacted by terror, scoring 8.6 on a scale of 10.[26]

In 2013, nearly 1 out of every 4 young Pakistanis had been either been victims of violence or had family or friends who were victims. Of those who had experienced a traumatic violent event, 41 percent reported suffering symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).[27] In FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, almost 62 and 35 percent of youth respectively were affected by violence. More alarmingly, of the youth affected by conflict in Balochistan, 80 percent were direct victims. Youth from Sindh have been so affected by violence that they believe it to be a serious threat to the country's very existence.[28]

There are at least four broad implications of violence for young people. First, violence has emerged as a major threat to their health. Many have died or been permanently disabled in the various terrorist attacks over the past 15 years. Second, the effect on young people – as compared to adults – of living in a constant state of terror makes them persistently more distrustful of others.[29] The youth are especially affected as victims, survivors, perpetrators or helpless bystanders. Third, many of those who experienced violent events develop PTSD. The negative consequences of PTSD, especially for those in their teens, include fear, aggression, low self-esteem

and abuse of drugs.[30] The fourth implication of violence is having to leave their homes, their livelihoods and their education.

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, as of July 2015, insurgency, counter-insurgency, sectarian violence and tribal feuds had displaced 1.8 million Pakistanis.[31] In addition to internally displaced persons, Pakistan also hosts 1.6 million external refugees (belonging to other countries), that is, 10 percent of the world's 16.1 million refugee population – the second highest number globally.[32] Thus, for many young people in Pakistan – whether they are internal and external refugees – the transition to adulthood takes place in refugee camps. This affects their identity, family relationships and status in society. Many of these young people will not be able to complete their education. Many will fail to find work, hindering not only their human development but also that of their children.

To tackle violence it is important to acknowledge it, appreciate the effect of chronic insecurity on the youth, engage with and listen to victims of violence, and support their recovery to enable them to re-join society. It is critical to create a safe and nurturing environment starting from the family all the way to the community and beyond. It is heartening to see youth civil service organisations (CSOs) lead the way in engagement, creating a facilitating environment for youth in conflict-affected areas of Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan to emerge as agents of positive change. One such initiative is Chanan Development Association (CDA) that emerged from a theatre group in 2004 and operates out of 65 districts of Pakistan through partners and network members. Providing a platform for youth, it focuses on peacebuilding initiatives like Cricket for Peace and a National Youth Peace Festival, and interfaith dialogue.[33]

Pervasive gender violence also severely limits young women's economic and societal engagement. According to the Pakistan Demographic Health Survey 2012-2013,

many youth think that beating women who go out without permission is justified.[34] Despite being disproportionately at the receiving end of violence, young women appear to be more accepting of this violence as compared to men. This attitude affects how young women access opportunities for education and work.

With the current generation Pakistan still has the opportunity to lay firm foundations for an equitable society where everyone, regardless of gender, class, religion or socioeconomic background and despite the limitations imposed by vulnerable identities, can play a role as an agent of human development. Such a transformation will only be achieved through educated, productive and engaged citizens.

Youth action: political and civic engagement

Pakistan is one of three countries that slipped from medium to low levels of youth development between 2010 and 2015. This alarming 18 percent decline – the largest in the world – is attributed mostly to a fall in political and civic participation (69 percent and 58 percent respectively), especially in terms of voice (expressing opinion to an official), volunteerism, absence of a national youth policy and low likelihood of helping a stranger.[35] This indicates a wider social malaise born out of distrust in institutions and higher levels of stress. In such societies, so much more time and energy is devoted to routine tasks because infrastructure is weak, accountability is superficial and there is little acceptance of different identities. For the youth who are poor, the additional preoccupation with mere survival leaves little time for anything else.

Between the ages of 15 and 29, Pakistan's youth gain entitlement to several civic rights, such as voting and contesting elections. This period is thus crucial for the youth in terms of enacting their rights through fulfilling civic responsibilities. How well they fulfil their civic responsibilities depends on how successfully society responds to their aspirations and channels their potential. National identity is particularly complex in Pakistan where post-independent history becomes an attempt to forge a nation out of a people with strong allegiances to various ethno-linguistic and religious identities. Nevertheless, around half of the NYPS respondents answered

FIGURE **5.5**

Majority of young Pakistanis believe their nationality and religion are the most important parts of their identity

Legend:
- Nationality (Pakistan)
- Religious identity
- Other*

PUNJAB: 7.4%, 41.2%, 51.4%
SINDH: 20.8%, 46.7%, 32.6%
KP: 8.5%, 41.5%, 50%
BALOCHISTAN: 21.2%, 40%, 38.8%
PAKISTAN: 11%, 43.9%, 44.7%
ICT: 7.5%, 27.6%, 64.9%
FATA: 16.3%, 5%, 78.7%
G-B: 0.7%, 3.6%, 95.7%
AJ&K: 5.6%, 7.6%, 86.8%

*Ancestral, Familial, Tribal, Ethnicity and Neighbourhood/Community
Source: UNDP estimates based on National Youth Perception Survey 2015.

"Pakistani" as their main identity (figure 5.5).

Civic engagement

Civic engagement is defined as the "individual and collective actions designed to identify and address issues of public concern".[36] The health of a society is often gauged by the extent of civic engagement of its citizens. For the youth in Pakistan, this engagement has been tumultuous. It has ranged from being active citizens in a new Pakistan in 1947, where Jinnah asserted that the real makers of Pakistan would be the youth, to the harsh reality in later years that saw the youth freed from their responsibilities by being side-lined in the national debate and robbed of their rights.

By the end of the Cold War, Pakistan was shackled to a geopolitical agenda imposed by outside forces. Civil society was emaciated. The "War on Terror" cost the country not only in terms of casualties, but also led to an erosion of civic values, heritage and culture. Years of encroachment by a state over-dependent on external validation for its survival eroded a sense of national trust and identity not just among the youth but also among adults.

The youth are now reclaiming civic life in Pakistan. There is a pervasive belief that education should not be limited to academic learning but also incorporate civic learning – a sense of what it means to be a Pakistani citizen at home and in the world.[37] Many of the country's most vibrant civil society organisations are youth-led and have created opportunities for the youth to participate in their communities as initiators or implementers. The youth have also paved the way for Information Communication and Technology (ICT) innovations in schools (like iEARN, Tele Taleem, Alif Laila Book Bus Society) and capacity building for teachers and leaders – Youth Engagement Services (YES) Network, Leadership for Environment and Development (LEAD), College of Youth Activism and Development (CY-AAD).[38] Similar efforts are being made

to revive pride in Pakistani culture – the Citizens Archive of Pakistan (CAP) is one such youth-led NGO that highlights national culture, history and heritage. CAP also helps to develop supplementary educational content for government schools on national identity through curricula and stories.[39]

As evidenced by the youth's overwhelming response following the 2005 earthquake, the 2010 floods, and the Balochistan earthquake of 2013, Pakistan's young people have considerable national spirit (box 5.2; expert opinion: Dr. M. Amjad Saqib). Country-wide consultations conducted for this report show that many young people are involved in voluntary activities. They exhibit great willingness to be involved – including young women, despite being constrained by cultural barriers to participation.

Voluntary participation helps young people become active agents of human development. It leads to developing vital communication and networking skills, which increases the chances of accessing opportunities for education, work and societal participation. Voluntarism also leads to better understanding of collective decision-making, participation in formal political processes and higher demand for effective service delivery from the government. The government should institutionalise the youth's voluntary spirit revitalising existing institutions like Boy Scouts and Girl Guides, especially given the recent natural disasters that have affected people across Pakistan. One way of sustaining volunteerism would be through a national, mandatory volunteer corps channeling the energy and talents of every young individual in community service.

Initiatives to develop youth leadership skills include the Active Citizens programme of the British Council Pakistan initiated in 2010 which aims to develop capacity and motivate youth for community engagement through volunteerism, advocacy, and youth-led social action projects (SAPs). Enabling, training and encouraging youth to use their indigenous resourc-

"Being voluntarily involved is a duty that we owe to our community. Without voluntary service, collective well–being is hard to achieve"

–
Male youth volunteer, National Youth Consultation, Swat.

Youth volunteerism

In recent years, there has been a dramatic shift in how young people perceive development challenges in Pakistan. The youth have started recognising themselves as part of the solution instead of asking others for the solutions. This has resulted in increased youth-led political activism, volunteerism for social causes, and public calls for accountability and action. Youth are increasingly being considered as emerging agents of change in their communities.

With the increasing eagerness of youth to volunteer for development of the country, I believe volunteerism should be made a priority. Youth volunteerism can be a crucial avenue for exposing young people to the economic, social and environmental challenges facing the world and preparing them for playing a positive role in developing innovative solutions and creating inclusive, peaceful and safe societies in the future. For instance, at Akhuwat, we have made youth volunteerism a priority and part of our culture by providing young people the platform to learn, design, and implement innovative solutions to development challenges. This has led to the formation of many social service programs through Akhuwat that are entirely being led by young volunteers who are given necessary guidance and support in implementation.

Similarly, many other organisations in the development sector have adopted youth volunteerism as an integral part and are increasingly looking towards young volunteers to spearhead change in their communities. Volunteers of today will be the policymakers of tomorrow. To utilise the youth as agents of positive change we must create similar volunteering opportunities not only in the development sector but also in the government and private sector.

Dr. Muhammad Amjad Saqib is executive director at Akhuwat. Comment for Pakistan NHDR 2017.

es and skills, the programme helps set up income generation projects that create and sustain more networks of young Active Citizens.[40]

Political engagement

The 2013 general elections in Pakistan marked a shift in perceptions about the youth, who emerged as a significant political constituency. Numbering about 55 million, nearly one out of two registered voters (48 percent) were between 18 to 30-years old – half of them from the urban middle class – against the national turnout of 55 percent.[41] Additionally, around one-fifth of the members of the National Assembly (73 out of 241) were below the age of 40 when elected in 2013.[42]

All this puts the youth in a unique position to demand better quality political engagement that transcends tokenism, co-option or exploitation. They are beginning to demand increased attention from political parties, especially in terms of economic policies. As a generation, they have experienced both military dictatorship and Pakistan's first ever democratic transfer of power between civilian governments. Following the 2013 general elections, the local bodies elections extended youth responsibility beyond just a constituency to become a major stakeholder in decision making process (box 5.3, pg 120).

The electronic media's reach and increasing boldness in facilitating interaction between people and political leadership along with the organising potential of social media enabled young voters to realise their own significance and that of the political process. Political parties responded by announcing targeted youth initiatives in education, health and employment and promising youth quotas within their leadership structures. There is greater willingness to engage with young opinion leaders to tap into the important "youth vote" after the 2013 general elections.[43]

Voting is an important link between citizenship and political participation. Enabling young people to vote is an example of engagement and an exercise in strengthening individual political agency.[44] The third most important concern among Pakistani young men and women between the ages of 16 and 30 years, of all education levels, is an "honest and responsive government".[45] The NYPS validates earlier studies that show young people have low trust in the political leadership of the country (figure 5.6).[46]

If state and society fail to take steps for meaningful and sustained political youth engagement, the youth — who are expect-

Jawan Ideas

Organise a national convention of youth counsellors to train them in effective service delivery and local policy development.

ed to comprise half of Pakistan's population by 2025 — will have no experience of being involved in ideating, designing, deliberating and implementing public policies and decisions. It is they who must take over the helm of affairs eventually. Not preparing them for this monumental task would be short-sighted and foolish, to say the least.

Negative perceptions of politics and politicians have not led to political disengagement among the youth, who are eager to vote in the next election (figure 5.7). To restore their trust, political parties should be required to make their internal functioning more transparent and democratic.[47] This includes being clear about membership drives, eligibility criteria for party tickets and internal elections to leadership. Such measures, along with regular and fair national, provincial and local level elections, will elevate the stature of public office and encourage young people to become candidates, volunteer election staff in local elections, or political workers. The age criterion for local public office should also be lowered from the current age of 25. If 18-year old Pakistanis can vote, marry, drive, start businesses, and join the army and security forces, it is time to let them become members of parliament too. Adding youth quotas for seats in national and local bodies would also be a good move.

The extent and quality of the Pakistani youth's current civic and political engagement may also be measured from where they stand on Hart's eight-rung ladder of participation (figure 5.8).[48] The first three rungs signify the youth's participation in activities without understanding or feedback. In these rungs, involving manipulation, decoration and tokenism, adults use the youth to implement an agenda without providing complete information or allowing room to voice their own opinions. The next five categories place participation on a continuum. Engagement begins at the fourth step – a significant stage in terms of rising autonomy – when youth play an assigned but informed role in adult-led activities. The seventh rung is when the youth

FIGURE **5.6**

Young people's trust in various public figures and institutions

Source: UNDP estimates based on National Youth Perception Survey 2015.

FIGURE **5.7**

Future voting behaviour of youth by provinces/regions

Source: UNDP estimates based on National Youth Perception Survey 2015.

introduce initiatives and complete them with little input from adults (youth-initiated and directed). At the highest level, the eighth rung, young people conceive and lead initiatives with adults involved as equal partners (youth-initiated, shared decisions with adults).

Historically, youth political engagement in Pakistan has been mostly on the fourth rung, where adults enlist the young to their own agendas. The youth's mainstream political participation takes place mostly in "low politics" – like foot soldiers following directions. This engagement is not mediat-

FIGURE **5.8**

Roger Hart's ladder of participation

RUNG 8

Youth initiated shared decisions with adults
Youth-led activities, in which decision making is shared between youth and adults working as equal partners.

RUNG 7

Youth initiated and directed
Youth-led activities with little input from adults.

RUNG 6

Adult inititated shared decisions with youth
Adult-led activities, in which decision making is shared with youth.

RUNG 5

Consulted and informed
Adult-led activities, in which youth are consulted and informed about how their input will be used and the outcomes of adult decisions.

Assigned, but informed
Adult-led activities, in which youth understand purpose, decision-making process, and have a role.

RUNG 4

Tokenism
Adult-led activities, in which youth may be consulted with minimal opportunities for feedback.

RUNG 3

Decoration
Adult-led activities, in which youth understand purpose, but have no input in how they are planned.

RUNG 2

Manipulation
Adult-led activities, in which youth do as directed withouth understanding of the purpose for the activities.

RUNG 1

Note: Extracted from Hart 1992.

FIGURE **5.9**

Political party affiliation increases in older age cohorts for young males but remains fairly low and consistent for females

Male
Female

(%)

	15-29	20-24	25-29
Male	11.1%	20.5%	26.1%
Female	7%	8%	8.8%

Source: UNDP estimates based on National Youth Perception Survey 2015.

ed by institutions that engage and empower the youth, such as student unions that serve as nurseries for training young people as future political leaders, political parties, youth councils, or youth parliaments.

Since the first three rungs do not signify engagement, the fourth rung is the lowest level of youth engagement on Hart's ladder. In our consultations between 2014-2016, we found that in the most politically engaged age group (aged 25-29 years), only 25 percent of men were affiliated with a political party; the figure fell to 9 percent for women (figure 5.9).

The banning of student unions in 1984, criminalisation of student wings of political parties, and their undemocratic internal structures may be some factors responsible for this trend. At the same time, data from the NYPS and National Youth Consultations across the country shows a highly politically engaged young generation. Past voting behaviour, a strong willingness to vote in future elections, and high levels of interest in political events appear to be the hallmarks of a generation that is tran-

sitioning to adulthood. The number of males who voted in any past election is just above 80 percent; female voters are just slightly less.

Overall, more youth are expected to participate in the 2018 elections. However, while the number of males who said they will vote in future elections goes up to nearly 90 percent, the percentage of females for that question drops to below 60 percent – something that is of concern and needs to be addressed (figure 5.10).

It is heartening to see youth efforts in providing political literacy on the rise. Although there is no official national Youth Council in Pakistan, there is a Young Parliamentarians Forum (YPF) that focuses on capacity building about political institutions, and a National Youth Assembly (in the Youth Parliament of Pakistan) that has a working relationship with 30 district governments and aims to train young people in democratic principles.[49]

In terms of civic participation, however, Pakistan's youth are at the highest rung of Hart's ladder of engagement. For instance, the NYPS 2015 indicates that 4 out of 5 young adults count poor quality education as the most pressing issues confronting them (figure 5.11). Many are actively tackling this problem through civic engagement. Participation in joint public-private partnerships (PPPs) are at the highest level of youth engagement. Teach for Pakistan (TfP), Rabtt, Annual Status of Education Report and Idaara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi are youth-led PPPs with joint decisions by both adults and the youth, where young people play a directive role.

While engaging the youth through social media is a great means of mobilisation, the ease of conscription to a social cause in a generation with short attention spans and too many issues to tackle sometimes makes participation trifling and temporary. "Clicktivism" needs to be complemented with grassroots youth participation to avoid becoming tokenism – a leisurely sport for the urban middle-class educated demographic that is more visible simply because it's more active on social media.[50]

Youth development: health and social norms

Engagement is part of belonging to a community, taking ownership of it, and creating a space to interact. This space is above the public space – the existing institutional structures that mediate participation – as well as the individual space where private choice and action occur on personal issues. There is a third space where the individuals are free to participate on their own terms of engagement while upholding the law and safety of all. In this space, the youth can participate through social campaigns, art, music or theatre, festivals or parades, public debates or speeches, and other forms of non-violent association without fear of government regulation or retribution. But unless society actively creates, nurtures and protects that space, youth engagement will translate into co-option or tokenism.

For the youth, adulthood is the stage where they weigh alternative political and moral views, come in more frequent contact with people from other backgrounds and seek avenues for self-expression. Gainful employment, too, is not only a function of education and hard skills, but also soft skills. These may include teamwork and collaboration, adaptability, and inclusivity. Youth who are free to engage with each other in this space are much more likely to develop these skills and are thus in a better position to avail job opportunities, accomplish their personal goals and contribute to the societal development.

To participate fully in this space and lead productive lives requires being in good health. Health is an enabler of societal engagement that allows individuals to benefit from policies and programmes intended at improving access to education, sources of income and political freedoms and participation (box 5.4, pg 121). The most vital aspects of being young include good health and healthful habits. Barriers such as poverty, deficient life-skills education, traditional social norms and a general reluctance of parents to address issues of adjustment and identity can worsen the youth's health problems at this crucial stage. As the life course perspective tells us, adolescence and early youth are periods of transition that take place in a context of vulnerabilities. This means that support in health, education and welfare must come early if it is to set a strong foundation for a smooth transition to adult roles. Failing that, young people will transfer their disadvantages to their children, continuing a cycle of inherited low human development.

Promoting good health among the current generation of young Pakistanis is vital

Youth voting behaviour by gender

Source: UNDP estimates based on National Youth Perception Survey 2015.

Percentage of youth who believes that these critical issues need immediate attention

Source: UNDP estimates based on National Youth Perception Survey 2015.

BOX **5.3**

Youth in local government bodies: opportunity and responsibility

The elections to local bodies in Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Sindh after the 2013 national elections which catapulted the youth to national prominence as an increasingly important political demographic. The local bodies' elections provided an opportunity not only to the youth to participate actively in the political process at the grassroots level, but also to political parties to follow through on their promises of allowing greater representation to the youth within the local governments.

Balochistan was the first province to conduct elections to local bodies on 7 December 2013. Although the Balochistan Local Government Act of May 2010 includes no specific measures for youth representation such as through reserved quotas, young people did contest seats for various local government structures in the province.[1] Both KP and Punjab reserved 8 percent of seats for youth, while Sindh reserved 9 percent.[2] Additionally, in 2015 Sindh and KP lowered the age limit for contesting both reserved and general seats to 21 years, while Punjab set the age limit for youth seats at 21- and 25-years for all other seats.

This means that large numbers of young people across Pakistan have joined the ranks of political decision makers at the local level. In some districts, such Shangla and D. I. Khan, they have become dis-trict nazims, the highest rung of elected leadership at the local level.[3]

Their representation in local government structures gives Pakistan's youth the opportunity to strengthen the discourse on decentralised governance, initiated by the passage of the 18th Constitutional Amendment in 2010. A vibrant local government system is essential to achieve and sustain democratic governance at the national level. Local governments provide the opportunity for people to influence decisions that affect their lives – as active citizens rather than passive subjects. Strengthening participation through local governments is essential to address inequality, instability and underdevelopment. When this participation includes the youth, it also sets standards for effective local governance by enhancing the quality and coverage of services in these young people's constituencies. Such developments will restore public trust in the political process and elected leadership and prepare the youth to take up leadership positions at the national level.

Today's youth councillors will be tomorrow's parliamentarians. It is therefore imperative that they take this opportunity and responsibility as a trust from their constituencies and utilise their resources, mandate and authority to address disparities that have for too long stalled human development in Pakistan.

Notes

1. Government of Balochistan 2010. 2. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Government 2013. 3. Ali 2015.

> "No matter what happens politically, one day this area of land is going to flourish. it's going to be the next Dubai"
>
> –
> Male and female, National Youth Consultation, Islamabad.

if Pakistan is to turn its youth bulge into a youth dividend. Government spending must coincide with the crucial early years of biological and psychological development.[51] Youth health is not just a question of individual wellbeing. Studies show that investing in the health of young people helps enhance growth and reduce expenditures on health.[52] With the population size of the youth as a proportion of the total population increasing, their health will be a major determinant of economic and social development in the coming decades.

Health is a human right. Living a long and healthy life is one of the foundational goals of human development. Health is not merely the absence of disease; rather, it is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being.[53] This means that to be healthy, individuals must have access to a nurturing social environment where they have rights, are valued and expected to contribute to the wellbeing of others. The youth are entitled to the highest standards of physical and mental health, not only be-cause they are in their prime years, but also because they have specific health needs due to certain vital concerns.

First, youth is generally seen as a period of mental and physical vigour and optimum health. This means that society and young people often ignore serious health issues and avoid seeking medical attention. Health issues can worsen with time and have serious consequences. Second, public health policies tend to focus on children and the elderly, largely ignoring the youth. It is quite telling that the provincial health strategies do not cater to youth-specific health issues, such as sexual education, age at marriage, and adolescent health care.[54] Third, during puberty, young people undergo various biological and psychological changes that are accompanied by heightened sexual feelings, risk-taking and impulsive behaviour. This means that the youth, especially young women, not only require specific information and access to specialised medical care and hygiene facilities to manage these changes, but also family and

BOX **5.4**

The health of Pakistan's youth

The third goal of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is to "ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages".[1] The targets address maternal and child mortality, communicable and non-communicable diseases, behaviour and health, sexual and reproductive healthcare services, universal healthcare coverage and environmental pollutants. With almost two-thirds of Pakistan's population comprising those under thirty years of age, Pakistan's human development outcomes depend on raising a healthy generation of young men and women.[2] This means providing comprehensive, equitable and youth-friendly healthcare services as well as promoting healthy lifestyle choices through well-structured health education.

The two major killers of the youth in Pakistan are Hepatitis C and tuberculosis (TB) that are also affecting those who survive these illnesses. Unless tackled on an urgent footing, these infectious diseases will negatively affect the nation's youth, as well as the youth bulge and potential dividend.

Another major cause of concern is the high rate of premature cardiovascular mortality that is claiming Pakistanis at the peak of their productivity. At a human level, families are left traumatised and often destitute when cardiovascular disease claims their main breadwinners, aged barely 40-45 years.

Basic screening facilities are available in Pakistan and must be implemented on a war footing at early stages, childhood and youth, so that likely victims can be identified and provided long-term treatment. Command centres to monitor the situation need to be made available throughout the country.

Pakistan is among the four countries in Asia and the Pacific along with Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, where HIV is expanding with more HIV infections each year than the previous year. In Pakistan, the HIV epidemic is concentrated among four key population groups: 1) People who inject drugs, with a national prevalence of 27.2 percent; 2) Hijra (transgender) sex workers, 5.2 percent; 3) Male sex workers, 1.6 percent, and 4) Female sex workers, 0.6 percent.[3]

Young people are made more vulnerable by lack of awareness about healthful practices, coupled with misconceptions about how HIV is transmitted. HIV-positive individuals resist seeking help due to fear of social stigma. The most marginalised youth are those from the transgender community, whether sex worker or not. Few are aware that regular use of anti-retroviral drugs can suppress HIV, enabling infected individuals to lead normal lives.

Drug use often starts at a very young age (UNODC 2013). The amount and types of drugs increase with age. The first choice, cannabis, is followed by prescription opioids, opium, solvents, inhalants, tranquilisers, sedatives, heroin, and amphetamine-type stimulants.[4] The availability of drugs and the dearth of healthy activities are a major cause of increase in the number of youth who take drugs. Drug use also increases vulnerability to HIV.

To achieve the goal of healthy lives and well-being for all and to ensure healthy young generations for coming decades, Pakistan has to drastically improve access to health facilities and information for all citizens, especially the youth.

Notes
1. UN 2016a. 2. UNDESA 2016. 3. Government of Pakistan 2015e. 4. Government of Pakistan 2013a.

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community support to ease the transition (box 5.5).

Inadequate childhood nutrition has a devastating and lasting impact on health and cognitive development – the first thousand days of a child's life are critical for mental and physical development. Malnutrition affects non-cognitive development, including personality traits, self-esteem, and self-efficacy, which the youth carry forward to schools and then the labour market. Pakistan is now home to the third largest percentage of malnourished children (under 5-years of age) in the world.[55]

Childhood stunting by 7-years (a measure of nutritional deprivation) is linked to dulled educational aspirations, poor earnings, low self-esteem and self-efficacy in later life. This holds true even when socioeconomic factors such as wealth, ethnicity and other parental characteristics are taken into consideration.[56]

Life skills training provided to young people can help overcome the deficits of formative years, that will also positively impact educational and labour market outcomes.[57] In fact, such trainings that focus on both hard and soft skills can together counter the long-term effects of childhood nutritional deprivation. Failure to do so would be a failure to offer 9.6 million children even a fighting chance to join the labour force in the future.[58] Given that almost 64 percent of Pakistan's population is below the age of 30, this food insecurity puts three generations at risk of receiving inadequate nutrition and, consequently, negatively impacting their health, education, work and societal engagement.

Several biological and socioeconomic factors make young people, especially those

Jawan Ideas

Train large numbers of youth in CPR, first aid and basic health knowledge, including in both urban employment settings and in rural agricultural settings.

BOX **5.5**

Maternal health and young women

The 8 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted by the international community in 2000 included improving maternal health (MDG 5). This goal had two targets: to reduce maternal mortality by three quarters between 1990 and 2015, and to achieve universal access to reproductive health by 2015. The global maternal mortality ratio (MMR) fell from 385 deaths per 100,000 live births in 1990, to 216 in 2015 – about the same as the relative decline of 43.9 percent in maternal deaths worldwide.[1] In South Asia, MMR fell by 64 percent between 1990 and 2013.[2] Pakistan made progress on all indicators of MDG 5 – it reduced the 1990-91 MMR from 533 per 100,000 live births to 178 in 2015. However, it was unable to achieve its target of reducing MMR to 140 by 2015 (figure 5.12).[3]

Pregnancy-related complications and childbirth accounted for one-fifth, or 10.9 percent of the death of women of childbearing age in Pakistan (2014-2015).[4] In the 20-49 age bracket, 4 in 10,000 women die of complications in pregnancy and childbirth.[5] Those under 20-years are the likeliest to die of pregnancy related complications.[6]

A high percentage of women in Pakistan marry before the age of 18 (box 5.6) and are therefore more likely to experience early pregnancy and become vulnerable to pregnancy-related complications. This high number of preventable deaths means that society has failed its young women and been unable to ensure their right to life. This failure also means depriving young citizens of the opportunity to develop their individual potential and harness their energies for the human development of their communities.

In the coming years, Pakistan will need its youth to take up leadership roles in all areas of national life. Their contribution will determine how Pakistan does in terms of achieving SDGs, compared to its performance with the MDGs. To achieve the SDGs will require investments that enable young women to, firstly, live longer by reducing maternal mortality through expanding family planning and other reproductive health services (SDG 3). Secondly, to empower women by eliminating harmful practices such as child and early marriages (SDG 5), and third, to enable women to be equal and effective partners in building peace, justice and strong and accountable institutions (SDG 16).

FIGURE **5.12**

Comparison of Pakistan's maternal mortality ratios with selected countries

Maternal mortality ratio*
(modeled estimate per 100,000
live births) for 2011-2015

TURKEY 16
AFGHANISTAN 396
NEPAL 258
EGYPT 33
SUDAN 311
PAKISTAN 178
BANGLADESH 176
MALAYSIA 40
KENYA 510
INDIA 174
SRI LANKA 30

Note: Number of women's deaths while pregnant from any cause related to or aggravated by the pregnancy but not from accidental or incidental causes per 100,000 live births
Source: World Bank 2015.

Notes

1. Leotine and others 2015. 2.UN 2015c. 3. Government of Pakistan 2013f. 4. Leotine and others 2015. 5. Government of Pakistan 2008. 6. Government of Pakistan 2008.

BOX **5.6**

Child marriage

Child marriage is defined as a formal marriage or informal union before the age of 18. While this is a reality for many across the world, girls are disproportionately more affected. The highest rates of child marriage are found in West Africa, northern Africa/the Middle East, Latin America and South Asia (figure 5.13). With South Asia's population and early marriage rates, approximately half the girls in early marriages live in this region.[1] According to some estimates, 21 percent of young women in Pakistan are married before they are 18-years old.[2]

Child marriage is a fundamental human rights violation with grave consequences for all aspects of a girl's life. Early marriage leads to early pregnancy with increased risk of complications during pregnancy and childbirth. Girls in early and middle adolescence are at greater risk of dying during childbirth or developing serious long-term health complications such as obstetric fistula. Up to 5,000 fistula cases are reported every year in Pakistan.[3] The leading causes of death globally among girls aged 15 to 19 are complications arising from pregnancy and childbirth.[4] Infants born to young mothers are at greater risk of being born underweight, premature and experiencing serious health problems.[5] Child brides are at greater risk of violence, abuse and exploitation.[6]

Being married off young often forces girls to leave school. This reduces their opportunity to learn and gain skills that will enable them to find jobs, generate income and develop any financial independence. Child marriages lead to separation from family and community support networks at a young age, leaving girls disadvantaged in terms of access to support or developing the capacity to participate in the lives of their communities. Child marriage, thus, negatively impacts all aspects of a girl's human development outcomes.

Early marriage can be prevented. Constituting and enforcing laws that prohibit marriage before the age of 18 is a promising area of action. Under the Pakistan Child Marriage Restraint Act, XIX of 1929, a 'child' is defined as a person under the age of 18 for boys and 16 for girls. The Sindh Provincial Assembly's Child Marriage Restraint Act 2013 defined 'child' as a person, male or female, who is under 18 years of age. The Act makes it a criminal offence for males over 18-years to contract a child marriage, for any person to solemnise a child marriage, and for parents or guardians to arrange a child marriage.[7] The Punjab Assembly's Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act 2015 increased the jail term and fines for those involved in child marriage.[8] However, for laws to be effective, they must be firmly implemented. Additionally, laws need to be supported by building a consensus at the societal level, including interventions like keeping girls in schools, and challenging and changing social norms by working with all stakeholders.

Child marriage violates human rights. It reinforces gender inequality and perpetuates poor human development outcomes by truncating girls' education, jeopardising their health and putting at risk the health of the next generation. It also has negative impacts on girls' employment, economic well-being and engagement in the public sphere. The greater the age difference between girls and their husbands, the more likely they are to experience intimate partner violence.

Only by ending child marriage and allowing young women the opportunity to fully develop their potential, will Pakistan be able to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls (SDG 5) and promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels (SDG 16).

FIGURE **5.13**

Percentage of women (aged 20-24), who marry before the age of 18

Source: UNICEF 2016.

Notes

1. Joar, Chandra-Mouli, Christiansen and Mbizvo 2012. 2. UNICEF 2014. 3. Dawn 2015. 4. UNICEF 2011. 5. Raj and others 2010. 6. UNICEF 2009. 7. Government of Sindh 2014. 8. Government of the Punjab 2015b.

from disadvantaged and marginalised backgrounds, vulnerable to health risks that cut across class and economic circumstances -- sexual exploitation, gender-based violence, sexually transmitted infections, tobacco use and drug abuse, and mental health disorders. In 2013, males aged 25-29 years were over-represented in drug use (9 percent of youth versus the national rate of 6 percent), with use starting early

in life.[59] This leads to secondary diseases like AIDs (27.2 percent of drug users have HIV) and Hepatitis.[60]

Between 2008 and 2014, new HIV infections among 15 to 24-year olds were estimated at 12 percent of the total persons living with HIV (PLHIV) population.[61] Many of those who inject drugs are married and transmit infections to their spouse and children, reinforcing the vicious intergenerational cycle of poor outcomes in health, education, gainful work and societal participation. Apart from negatively impacting their health outcomes, contracting HIV jeopardises young people's chances of education, work and societal participation.[62]

Investment in health facilities will have to be sensitive to the needs and developmental issues of these youth. Not much is known about the health, access to health facilities and health-seeking behaviour of Pakistan's youth. From the little we do know, it appears that the response to their specific health needs has been too slow. This must change if the youth are to develop into a healthy and productive citizenry. Healthcare must be equitable, accessible, respectful, appropriate and gender-sensitive.

Social norms can also limit the space available to the young for engagement, especially for young women. Social norms are shared beliefs about what members of society are likely to do (descriptive norms) and what they ought to do (prescriptive norms). They are shared mental models, learnt early in life, and reinforced through social interaction. This makes societies settle on social norms that may be less than desirable. Many social norms in Pakistan prevent young women from participating fully in society. These include norms of early marriage and purdah (gender seclusion).

Marriage is perhaps the most important transition in the lives of Pakistani youth, especially women. Early marriage and adolescent childbearing affect young women's ability to access education, work and participate in societal life. It cannot be stressed enough that marriage, in and of itself, does not mark the attainment of adulthood status, especially for girls who are married off during early teenage years (box 5.6).

Being able to choose who and when to marry is not only a question of personal freedom but has potential consequences for other life transitions, such as being able to study, work and start a family. Decisions regarding young women's education, employment and mobility are intimately linked to their marital status. Findings from the National Youth Perception Survey reiterate that the majority of Pakistan's youth, especially women, have little say in this critical aspect of their lives (figure 5.14).

Many young people, especially females, report that they are under extreme stress. According to the NYPS 2015, almost half of all females aged 25 to 29 years experienced anxiety. Recent studies show that half of all lifetime mental disorders in adults appear to start by age 14.[63] It is critical to support young women through effective health facilities, ensure completion of their education and ease their transition into gainful work if they are to bring up an engaged next generation. Having fewer unintended pregnancies can facilitate women's participation in paid work and active engagement in societal life, especially if employers offer suitable maternity leave policies, crèches, and day-care to working women.

For most young women, the biggest obstacle to participation in society is harassment – "eve-teasing" – in public places and on public transport. This common and socially entrenched phenomenon prevents many parents from sending their daughters to school. It also reinforces the norm for early female marriage and contributes to low labour force participation due to workplace sexual harassment. In many cases, women's employment reflects a distress sale of their labour arising due to extreme poverty and is low quality, vulnerable work. Recourse to law for sexual harassment is largely absent due to implications for family honour, while most women qui-

etly accept harassment as something they can't do much about – yet another additional hurdle to meaningful participation in society.

Nevertheless, there has been a slow rise in the number of young women who are challenging social norms of purdah (religious and social practice of female seclusion) and what is considered appropriate for young girls in public spaces. Girls at Dhabas is one such initiative.[64] Women are also paving the way for women to excel in male-dominated sports. Samina Baig who became the first Pakistani woman to climb Mount Everest, Maria Toorpakai, the internationally ranked squash player who had to hide her identity and eventually leave the country to pursue her passion, and rock-climber Nazia Parveen are all role models for young women.[65] Inspiring young women to pursue their passion in sports is an investment in expanding choices for women (special contribution: Sana Mir).

Physical spaces: sports

The youth need physical spaces to be young – to be themselves and act their age – to do what young people do. While there is no clearly established link between involvement in sports and parallel or subsequent active participation in civic affairs from a human development lens, providing opportunities for sports is an investment in expanding choices for youth – an enabling feature of human development.[66] Sports clearly play a significant role in encouraging social interaction and cohesion, cooperation, and conflict-resolution. Youths who played sports in high school are more likely to volunteer regularly, work toward solving a community problem, and vote.[67]

But Pakistan has too few sports grounds, particularly in urban areas and low income localities. There is a dearth of local sports clubs or school teams in general, more so in low income areas and schools. It was clear from the countrywide National Youth Consultations for NHDR that young people are constrained by the lack of physical

Not many young people, especially young women, decide for themselves when and who to marry

Who decides when young people marry

Female: 3%, 15.1%, 81.9%
Male: 18%, 20.3%, 61.7%

Who decides who young people marry

Female: 5%, 12.9%, 82.1%
Male: 23.1%, 17.8%, 59.1%

Self   Parents   Combine*

*Self+Family+Other
Source: UNDP estimates based on National Youth Perception Survey 2015.

spaces, sports facilities, and for women, social barriers to participation in the public space. Initiatives that focus on youth empowerment and engagement through sports, cutting across class, ethnicity and gender, include the British Council Dosti programme in Karachi, looking to expand regionally.[68]

Apart from the miniscule number of sports grounds, youth physical activity has also been constrained by the prevailing security situation. Militant attacks on sports venues and symbols have deprived young people of international sports events in Pa-

Sports for youth development

Sport trains us to meet people without being concerned about their religious, ethnic or financial background. I enjoy this sort of human interaction, and I love the opportunities cricket has provided me to interact and learn from people from different walks of life. It has taught me social acceptance by providing avenues to interact and integrate with other individuals as humans above all, regardless of religious, ethnic or financial background.

I feel sad to see the wasted potential of sports that can be used as a tool for positive youth development in Pakistan. Most young people do not even have access to open spaces, grounds, equipment or any kind of training facilities that could foster their sporting talents. Even national players are deprived of state-of-the-art training facilities. It is sad that the lack of importance placed on sports as a development tool makes playing sports a mere deviation from studies and a socially unacceptable career option in Pakistan.

To utilise sports as a tool for positive youth development, we need a more inclusive and collective approach. This would involve a) government creating open spaces and increased opportunities for promoting sports; b) parents and coaches providing support and guidance to ensure the positive impact on character building of youth; and c) society becoming more acceptable towards sports as a career option.

If we increase the opportunities available for fostering sports as an activity, as a career and as a way of life, imagine how many young individuals could rise and fulfil their potential as I was able to do.

Sana Mir is Ex-captain of the Pakistan National Women's Cricket Team. Comment for Pakistan NHDR 2017.

Jawan Ideas

Where feasible, convert schools into community centres in the evening, especially for youth–led community activities.

kistan and created a general atmosphere of fear. That Pakistan's National Games were last held in 2012 is itself a telling reminder of these realities.[69]

Civic amenities: affirming culture

It is a sad comment on a society when its youth do not have facilities where they can set their imaginations free and expend their energies, like playgrounds, parks, cinemas and libraries. These amenities offer opportunity for interaction that are cru-cial to holistic human development. In this sense, enhancing opportunities for providing the physical, mental and virtual space for young people to be themselves is a goal worthy of a national human development agenda. Sadly, the NYPS 2015 confirms that the youth have limited or no access to such facilities in their localities (figure 5.15). By failing to provide these facilities to its youth, Pakistani society not only inhibits the youth's avenues of expression but also prevents those of diverse social, cultural and religious backgrounds from interacting with each other. In the process, it also hinders the development of civic spirit among its youth.

City district governments and municipal authorities in Pakistan are required by law to provide community centres and mixed-use spaces.[70] Cultural and civic amenities such as museums, libraries, theatres, cinemas and parks are also important to citizens' quality of life, particularly for the youth. Spaces that celebrate a country's heritage, its arts and culture play an important role in building a vibrant, diverse and interesting community of residents with high social capital. However, these facilities remain conspicuous by their absence.

Cultural and civic amenities cultivate strong social relationships that are crucial

FIGURE **5.15**

Majority of youth who do not have access to recreational facilities and events

☐ Have Access
▇ Do not have access

LIBRARY 94.5%
LIVE MUSIC 97.2%
SPORTS EVENT 93.9%
SPORTS FACILITES 93%
CINEMA 97%
PARKS 78.6%
DO NOT HAVE ANY OF THESE 71.7%

Source: UNDP estimates based on National Youth Perception Survey 2015.

for achieving the human development goals of education, health, a decent standard of living, political freedoms and quality participation. For instance, in the National Youth Perception Survey 2015, individuals with more than one friend were more likely to be on good terms with people from different sects and religion. Providing space to young citizens is particularly important given the potential of such spaces engage youth in productive activities rather than those that can harm their wellbeing and complicate their transition to adult roles. To reduce the propensity for violence and likelihood of recidivism, it is necessary to create an enabling environment where the youth can safely access information, community resources and support, as well as gain life skills.

The online generation

The information, communication and technology (ICT) revolution has greatly empowered the youth. Its ability to inform, mobilise, and engage the youth is endless.[71] Mobile phones and the internet have made youth activism safer and more likely. Reports about the journeys of young artists, activists, philanthropists, leaders as well as the hardships of the victims and survivors of crime and conflict embolden young Pakistanis, despite the risks and violence that have taken the lives of some of these individuals, like Sabeen Mahmud and Amjad Sabri. Through activism, art, blogs, discussion, theatre and cinema today's youth are moulding the national discourse, highlighting the pulse of this energetic and diverse segment of society. While class divisions cut through the social fabric, many youth activists from more privileged and middle classes are raising awareness about the disadvantaged and most marginalised (expert opinion: Beena Sarwar).

But for each individual person who is educated and has access to the internet, many more rural uneducated youths are offline. The digital divide is increasing the powerlessness and frustration of youth with no access to TV, radio or the internet. In 2012,

almost 25 percent of Pakistan's youth had no access to TV, with rural women faring worst (36 percent had neither a TV nor a radio).[72] They obtain information from men who enjoy the privilege of filtering it as they see fit. In 2016, the number of internet users in Pakistan was estimated at 17.8 percent of the total adult population.[73] Again, the situation is even worse for women – the majority have no internet access (figure 5.16). The poor, already marginalised, are also excluded from an increasingly digitalised national debate, or equally harmfully, grow more disillusioned when confronted by the injustice of living in the same misery as their forefathers. In many ways, the ICT revolution makes their entrenched poverty more visible and less acceptable.

Internet penetration is an issue that must be addressed. But an even bigger challenge is to enable those who have access to the internet to use its potential to effect positive change, in their own lives and in their communities. The NYPS indicates that Pakistani youth – much like their global counterparts – use the internet for entertainment more than education. Emphasising educational uses of the internet, while making it a safe space for the youth, is essential. Mental models may be easier to change through social messaging, media content or positive role models to help individuals make better decisions. For instance, in Uganda when newspapers began to print the percentage of allocated budgets schools received in reality, the figure increased from a miniscule 24 percent to 80 percent.[74]

Reflections and the way forward

Today's young people have a generational identity distinct from their parents'. Pakistan has made significant progress towards achieving the goals of human development, in terms of access to health, education, longevity, and lower morbidity. Almost 2 in 3 youth feel that their quality of life is better than their parents' generation (figure

Jawan Ideas

Encourage bicycles in schools, for both boys and girls. This can include subsidised bicycles for students, bicycles as prizes for high achievement, and corporate or government supported bike–sharing programmes.

5.17).[75]

Nevertheless, despite being more educated than their parents, the 'quality' of their education makes the youth's transition to work, marriage and active citizenship difficult. Those who work face a crisis of aspirations — their jobs are not commensurate with their expectations. In addition, gender norms foisted upon both men and women imply unequal playing fields for young women. This is reflected in men and women having vastly different priorities even at the same age. These differences are starker in the older cohorts, 25-29 years (figure 5.18).

The need for engagement is therefore urgent and imperative. Countries with exceedingly young populations are more likely to experience conflict.[76] Unable to be absorbed into the economy, polity and society, Pakistan's army of unemployed youths may (re)turn to crime or militancy. Inadequate educational, economic, civic and political engagement could cost Pakistan well into the next century, as the demographic window of opportunity is expected to close by 2045. Creating new social ties between young people and society or improving the quality of existing interactions can deepen social cohesion, solidarity and trust among the youth by setting in motion events that could foster new social norms. This could change distortive perceptions of collective norms and identify new best responses to societal problems.

The success in meeting this challenge lies in the strength of the social contract between the youth and the state. This depends on the quality of engagement between the two as mediated by institutions, not individuals. Institutional memory, a nationally inclusive narrative and opportunities for the youth to participate in all spheres are necessary to enable the youth to be in control of decisions that affect them and their society.

The stakes have never been higher. Pakistan is home to more young people than ever before. The high rate of rural to urban migration has pushed most of its youth to live in crowded towns and cities. To lead

Jawan Ideas

Promote, expand and celebrate the Pakistan Boy Scouts and Girl Guides movements

FIGURE **5.17**

How do young people compare their quality of life with their parents?

Note: The total doesn't add up to 100 as the "Don't Know" category is not being shown in the figure.
Source: UNDP estimates based on National Youth Perception Survey 2015.

dignified and valued lives, they need high quality education that meets their aspirations and equips them with the right set of tools to enter the labour market. To ensure overall wellbeing, they must be healthy and have opportunities to interact with society. For this, society must offer ways of letting the youth be youth, voice their opinion, and be visible.

A vibrant youth with fresh attitudes, brimming idealism and energy will help create indigenous solutions. Put simply, it is the youth who are the drivers of economic, social, institutional and political change. Their mental models are changing, and their aspirations are on the rise. This makes them more future-oriented, more likely to believe in a better future, and therefore, more likely to invest in it. Providing greater numbers of youth the opportunity to be like this will yield dividends in the country's economic, human and social capital and consequently, economic growth.

By participating in this growth, young people solidify their stake in society and engage with it in their various roles. In this way, a virtuous circle is set in motion, where societies invest in a better future in expec-

FIGURE **5.18**

The top priority of young people in the next five years

Legend:
- Complete studies
- Get a job
- Change job
- Marry
- Have children
- Emigrate
- Buy a house
- Buy a car
- Other

Categories (y-axis): 15-19 (Male, Female), 20-24 (Male, Female), 25-29 (Male, Female)

x-axis: (%) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Source: UNDP estimates based on National Youth Perception Survey 2015.

The top priority
of young people
in the next five years

EXPERT OPINION　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　**Beena Sarwar**

Information technology: connected identities

Seeing the photos on Facebook a few years back, I was struck by the courage of the young men gathered at Liberty Roundabout in Lahore to protest the vandalising of a graveyard. In the context of Pakistan, it takes guts to speak out publicly for the community in question, Ahmadis, constitutionally declared non-Muslim in 1974. A 1984 military ordinance makes it a criminal offence for them to practice their faith as Muslims. Since the 1990s particularly, in what I see as a battle for the soul of Pakistan, extremist groups claiming legitimacy from Islam have been engaged in anti-Ahmadi activities to whip up emotions and stay in the limelight. On 3 December 2012 such extremists had attacked an Ahmadi graveyard and smashed tombstones bearing Islamic inscriptions.

The demonstrators at Liberty Roundabout were born much after the anti-Ahmadi legislation was passed. Most of them were not Ahmadi. And yet here they were, about a dozen, braving militants, standing in public to make their voices heard.

"We want to let the world know that Pakistan is not only about desecrating graves and persecuting minorities," college student Muhammad Murtaza told a Press TV reporter. "You can support any belief or cause, but that has to be done in a more civilised manner. You cannot come and desecrate graves or impose your will upon others by acts of terrorism." When Press TV, an Iranian channel, realised what the report was about, they fired the assignment desk editors who had approved it and suspended the reporter, Islamabad-based Hamza Ameer, who had been in Lahore by chance – and was in fact the only journalist to cover the demonstration.

However, web-based platforms like YouTube and Vimeo allow video reports like the one on Press TV to be viewed and shared long beyond their broadcast dates. These platforms are vital given the intimidation and self-censorship of mainstream media outlets. But the restrictions become meaningless as people increasingly use smart phones to document their own events to share on social media platforms. Growing up in a post-military governed Pakistan, in an era of democracy and internet, today's youth have more tools available to express their aspirations, about human rights violations or anything else, as compared to earlier generations. Information and communications technologies enable them to document and share their journeys and inspire others, whether it is cleaning up neighbourhoods, countering militant narratives, or literally going on path-breaking travels as so many young men, and now women, are doing—like Zenith Irfan 'Pakistan's boundary-breaking motorcycle girl', and bicyclists Gulafshan Tariq and Samar Khan (#twogirlsride). This generation is no longer dependent on mainstream media to 'cover' them. In fact, by sharing their activities and views online, they often force the mainstream media to take note.

More and more young people will have access to the internet and smart mobiles as affordable solutions reach lower budgets and connectivity improves. As these trends gain ground, they coincide with Pakistan's embarkation along the democratic political process, following the peaceful transfer of power from one elected government to the next in 2013, for the first time in the country's history. We are only just beginning to see the life-changing effects of these phenomena, as citizens gain access to information, knowledge and ideas.

For better or worse, digital technology and social media platforms are enabling the youth to engage with public spaces and contribute to the narrative as never before. Information, they say, is power. And with this power, the people of Pakistan, particularly the youth, are becoming game-changers in the socio-political equation.

Beena Sarwar is a journalist, editor, writer, filmmaker, journalism professor. Comment for Pakistan NHDR 2017.

Jawan Ideas

Establish work centres/outlets especially in girls' institutions where students can make/sell materials (embroidery, knitting, crochet work) or take orders, thereby enhancing dignity of labour as well as financial means of sustaining their studies.

tation of such a future, and thereby achieve economic and social well-being. With such high stakes, the youth become more critical of short-sighted policies, weak governance and intolerant social norms that threaten their prosperity. Above all, they insist on institutions which are accountable and sustainable.

The aspirations of Pakistani youth are as endless as they are bounded. They are trying harder than ever to reclaim their rights and bear their responsibilities as they mobilise and participate. In doing so, they build on and generate their own social capital to leverage in various capacities -- as aware citizens, informed constituency, confident opinion leaders, development partners and practitioners. Their unbridled energy will prove critical to rescue positive narratives, reconstruct social identities and re-define social norms — the shared attitudes, beliefs and mind-sets — that have been held hostage by an encroaching state and its various actors under a thin veneer of necessity. Now is the time for society to make good on the social contract that Pakistan's youth deserve. The youth are not numbers to be thrown around, carelessly, in policy documents, public speeches or election campaigns. They are individuals who possess a confidence and ambition that is native only to this generation. Too young for trust, too old to be helped, never the right age for both. In an ideal world, they should not have to fight for their right to engage with society. But if this is something they need to do this generation is well poised to take up the challenge.

6

Enhancing human development through youth

Shrine, Multan

"The youth in Pakistan are not a problem to be solved; they are a potential to be unleashed"

— Dr. Adil Najam

CHAPTER 6

Enhancing human development through youth

The smartphone video of a Spanish love song spontaneously rendered by students jamming in a college corridor in Quetta does the rounds on social media, shattering stereotypes about youth in Balochistan. The students, enrolled in conventional subjects at the private Balochistan University of Information Technology Engineering and Management Sciences, are members of a student-initiated platform for the arts.[1]

Youth in cities around the country, inspired by the Dewar-i-Mehrbani (wall of kindness) initiated in Iran, set up several such walls – in Karachi, Peshawar, Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Bahawalpur, Sialkot, Quetta, Khuzdar – to share clothing and other items for those in need without compromising their dignity.[2]

The horrific bombing at a church in Peshawar catalyses youth group Pakistan for All into forming symbolic interfaith human chains around churches in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad in solidarity with Pakistani Christians. "We have more similarities than differences as humans. Pakistan would prosper if we celebrate our diversity and end discrimination and divisions", says activist lawyer M. Jibran Nasir, one of the youth spearheading the initiative.[4]

Fed up of the ongoing violence and use of public spaces to promote calls for intolerance and bigotry young artists and students in Karachi take charge of their city walls to paint them with creative murals depicting their hopes for Pakistan. Several educational institutes and corporations join in.[5]

A group of young women decide to reclaim public spaces and defy conservative social norms by "loitering" at tea-stalls and cafes. Their Girls at Dhabas initiative takes on another dimension with an online photo series giving them more visibility.[6]

An emerging, changing Pakistan

The stories above come from across Pakistan. Young people in all domains and at all levels, from different geographies and backgrounds, are demanding change and demonstrating that they are willing and able to "be the change" they want. These examples are representative of an outburst across the country, of youth stepping up to shape the Pakistan they want to see. There appears to be a wave, a momentum throughout the country, of youth aspiring for a better, more wholesome and more satisfactory life. Enabled by the digital age, new media and technology tools, they are fired by the zeal of policy entrepreneurship. They do not want to stagnate in the Pakistan that the older generation is handing over to them.

The good news this Report delivers is that Pakistan's youth is buzzing with great ideas (some highlighted in the 101 ideas sprinkled throughout these pages), propelled by unbound energy and a desire to act. The bad news is that they deserve better than what we have provided them. They know this and are willing to do what it takes to change things. But when the youth lack a historical and political depth of perspective, due partly to an ideologically driven and uneven education system, the outcome is impatience and frustration. This can drive them to take matters in their own hands in ways that are not always positive (chapter 5).

This Report reinforces our belief that the most important and best source of ideas of how to help the youth is the youth

themselves. We need to listen to them, respect them, and learn from them. They deserve a favourable policy environment and institutional support, and the societal space to nurture their energies and ideas. They deserve better than to have to fill in for deficiencies of state and society that confront them. The choice between providing Pakistan's youth this environment, this support and this space, or not, is the difference between a future defined by a youth boom – or a youth bomb.

Pakistan's youth are driving and leading many positive initiatives. Other constituencies – adult-led NGOs, corporations, and government departments – are reaching out to them and harnessing their drive and passion. Sometimes these initiatives are politically driven, gaining momentum as elections come up. Others are socially driven to claim public spaces or to stand against human rights violations.

Despite the absence of a working youth policy in all regions of Pakistan, several small and largescale initiatives, focusing on improving education facilities or skills development of young people, are already underway at the community, provincial and national levels. Indeed, there is no dearth of initiatives or investment for youth empowerment in Pakistan. However, research conducted for this Report indicates that despite the plethora of action-oriented direct and indirect initiatives for the youth, overall youth development in Pakistan is still lagging.

Pakistan has been performing poorly in the youth development index according to Global Youth Development Index Report 2016, as discussed earlier. This is the only non-African country amongst the 10 lowest-ranked Commonwealth countries. It even trails behind the Asian average in all domains except health and wellbeing. In South Asia, it is one of the two worst performing countries, the other being Afghanistan.

The existing efforts no doubt serve as small 'islands of change' but they cannot create an overall substantial change for the youth. There is thus the need for

greater synergy and coordination between various stakeholders. The importance of developing sound youth policies, underscoring the needs, issues and aspirations of the youth in tandem with more sustainable initiatives cannot be ignored. Additionally, a comprehensive strategic plan needs to be developed to channel all development efforts in alignment with the human development paradigm.

The underlying message of this report, as stressed throughout, is that it is imperative for Pakistan to focus not just on the quantity of services for the youth, but in equal measure the quality being provided. This is especially the case with the three Es, education, employment and engagement. The following section outlines the broad, overall policy approach required to improve each of the three Es, as well as Pakistan's policy process pertaining to the youth.

Necessary steps in the areas of the three Es

Education

In terms of education, the first of the Es, Pakistan has seen excessive focus on increasing enrolments in schools, with little attention paid to the low quality of education, as discussed in Chapter 3. The human development approach considers education as one of the most important tools for enhancing the capabilities, freedoms and choices amongst the youth. Now, however, efforts need to go beyond increasing the number of educational institutes and enrolments to also provide quality education that produces quality graduates who can improve their own and their family's wellbeing.

Implement and ensure education for all: There is a visible and clear consensus in Pakistan on the need to educate the nation's children. Compared to earlier decades, the awareness about this issue is unprecedented. Today, the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis want their children

Jawan Ideas

The national and provincial disaster management authorities should offer certification training courses at colleges and universities in disaster preparedness.

to receive at least a basic formal education. There is a recognition, especially among the lower middle class, that education helps children to break out of traditional paths dictated by socio-economic status. Many parents, particularly in urban areas, aspire for their children to "be someone" rather than live their lives out in nameless obscurity like their forefathers. However, many either still don't recognise the importance of education or perceive it to be important only for boys. This partly explains why, despite the overall increase in the number of children joining school, 9.45 million children at primary level were still estimated to be out of school in 2015, and dropout rates have soared.

The National Assembly's unanimous passage of the Right to Free and Compulsory Education Bill 2012 ensures free and compulsory education to all children of aged 5 to 16 years. While Article 25-A of the Constitution already enshrined this right, the bill was the first attempt to articulate how it would be delivered. The 2012 law provides three-months imprisonment for parents who don't send their children to school, and six-months for employers who hire school-age children, along with fines for both categories of offenders.

There is little implementation of this law on ground, but its very existence can be the basis of change. At the societal level, there is an urgent need to sensitise parents, especially from lower income strata and rural areas, along with community elders, influential people, and implementing bodies about this issue. These steps together will help ensure that every child is provided his or her constitutional right to education.

Bring quality to education: The number of private organisations and individuals working to boost education has increased dramatically over the years. Large non-government organisations like Developments in Literacy (DIL), The Citizens Foundation (TCF) and Alif Ailaan, to name a few, impact thousands of lives a year. Smaller initiatives include mohalla (neighbourhood) schools run by educated residents to promote adult literacy. Such initiatives are also targeting out-of-school children who are forced to go to work, reaching previously neglected sections of the population.

With some exceptions, the primary focus of work remains on quantity of enrollment. Additionally, all these efforts remain a drop in the ocean given the sheer numbers involved, despite many of them working in partnership with the government. There is in fact a growing recognition of the state's responsibility to provide these services, as well as awareness that only the state can function on the large scale necessary to really make a difference.

In addition to the role of the state in ensuring the provision of education to all, the quality of education also need a strong policy focus. In the absence of a strong state-led and state-implemented quality regulatory framework for private and public schools, the large number of graduates emerging from the low quality private, semi-private and public school system are more likely to feed the ranks of Pakistan's 'parhe likhe jahil' (educated illiterates). Many of these private, semi-private and public sector institutes often hardly even qualify as schools, given their lack of proper syllabus, sports grounds, library and other essential facilities. In the pursuit of formal education, their graduates receive no skills training to help them generate income after entering the workforce. The poor quality of education they receive does not make them very employable in the increasingly competitive job market. No wonder Pakistan's youth largely feel frustrated and let down.

With the growing competition in the labour market, getting children to school is understandably not enough. Providing quality education relevant to the labour market skills is what will ensure high returns to investment in education, not just for the economy but also for the youth's wellbeing.

It is thus imperative to revisit the curriculum to improve what is being taught and make it relevant to rapidly changing labour market demands. It is also essential to standardise the curriculum across the public and semi-private institutes and introduce

Jawan Ideas

Let young girls be young a little longer. Increase the legal age of marriage from 16 to 18 years.

Jawan Ideas

Encourage the formation of women's support groups in workplaces to address the issues women face in workplaces and provide mutual support to new female workers.

skills-based training in the curriculum, improve teaching quality through teacher trainings and change the teaching style – the existing focus on rote learning must give way to developing the students' conceptual clarity. Additionally, the government can make tertiary learning easily accessible to the masses through the internet. One way would be to create and promote massive open online courses, or MOOCs, to foster gainful learning amongst youth.

Create government programmes to provide a 'second chance at education': An inclusive education system is central for human development, a concept that allows all individuals the freedom of choice to acquire education at any point in time. Pakistan is full of those, including in the youth age bracket, who never went to school or who dropped out due to various reasons. Many respondents of the National Youth Perception Survey and participants of the National Youth Consultations expressed the desire for a second chance at education. Yet, although there is clearly a demand for a second chance at education, there are not many avenues available that cater to this demand. While focusing on increasing enrolment rates, government policies and finance have in the past overlooked school dropouts and youth who want to re-enter the education space.

Jawan Ideas

Let local communities utilise public school playgrounds after school hours.

There is a miniscule number of non-formal education models that allow children to return to school. A successful model in this area is the Punjab Education Endowment Fund (PEEF) that provides government support and scholarships to students who do well in at the matriculation/intermediate level but do not have the resources to continue their education. However, it doesn't cater to those who never reached the matriculation level. More government programmes like this need to be created to provide the youth with a 'second chance at education'.

Another avenue that can be explored to cater to these left-out youth is public-private partnerships. Both the public and private sector should collaborate in designing

initiatives. Such programmes need to be scaled up and replicated in other provinces to help the uneducated youth break out of the vicious circle of unemployment and low paying jobs. In this context, programmes like PEEF need to be scaled up and replicated in other provinces with collaboration of private sector. Pakistan can also harness the potential of the internet to increase access to education for the youth who want a second chance at education.

Integrate technical and vocational education into the formal education systems: An inclusive education system allows the freedom of choice to youth to improve their wellbeing by choosing or making their own path, whether through the formal education system or through technical and vocational training. The government has established a programme for the training individuals at various technical and vocational education centres in Pakistan, but such government programmes targeting education should not work in silos. Policy needs to integrate these technical and vocational education streams into the formal education stream at the secondary level, so that youth who feel estranged from formal education can enter a ready stream of skills training. Much can be learned from countries like Singapore, Korea, and Turkey that provide strong TVET opportunities at the secondary and post-secondary level in the formal education system.

There is also a great need to improve the image associated with acquiring vocational skills as well as a need to confer prestige upon work acquired through such skills. Government and civil society can work together to change the negative perceptions about technical and vocational education, particularly for the youth. Changing the culture about how society perceives the value of technical and vocational education is necessary to draw more youth into these programmes, as a viable means of acquiring labour market skills.

Increase efficient use of resources

allocated for education: One of the principal reasons for Pakistan's slow progress in education is the policy failure in assigning low priority to this sector, reflected in the budgetary allocation. Although Pakistan's total education budget has doubled over time, it is still a very small (2.3) percent of the GDP. (figure 2.3, chapter 2). Only 14 out of 195 countries spend less on education than Pakistan, including 9 that have a lower HDI ranking than Pakistan. This clearly indicates the need to increase budgetary allocation to education, which would enhance human development.

Poor education outcomes stem not only from low budgetary allocations but also from inefficient and inadequate use of funds. As mentioned earlier, recurrent overhead costs eat up as much as four-fifths of Pakistan's budgetary allocation -- mainly salaries and routine operational costs. What's left is just one-fifth for development and improvements like teacher training, curriculum development, school facilities, monitoring and supervision of educational programmes.

To top that, budgetary allocations do not necessarily translate into actual budget spending reported at the end of fiscal year. In fact, actual budget spending is far less than the amount allocated in the beginning, resulting in massive underutilisation of resources. There is a dire need to increase both the size of education spending, and to adopt measures to monitor the efficient utilisation of the funds. For this purpose, a proper monitoring mechanism – designed with an inclusive approach involving all stakeholders (students, parents, teachers, government etc.) – needs to be put in place.

Employment

In terms of sheer numbers, Pakistan has had a fairly good record of creating jobs, even with rising population. However, they are mostly low quality jobs. Poor quality jobs essentially mean servitude with low pay and little or no security. Such jobs are detrimental to the economy as they do not con-

tribute much in either monetary or social welfare terms. Additionally, they also have an adverse effect on the personal growth, self-esteem and dignity of the workers.

The over-arching message of this Report is that quantity without quality is not only not helpful but is even counter-productive in the long run. For example, many more youth in Pakistan work as domestic servants than do those who are employed at the checkout counter of a multinational food chain. However, given the social mores of the country, the checkout counter employee at least receives more respect and therefore retains more sense of dignity than the one who is forced to work as a domestic servant.

Global phenomena like the rise of ride-share or taxi-hailing services like Careem and Uber are also becoming visible in Pakistan. In addition to providing decent means of alternate employment, these services also lead to a greater inclusion of women in their workforce. For example, at the end of 2016, Careem introduced women drivers to its fleet, saying they wanted "to give women the same opportunities and the same chance that men have of leveraging our platform to generate healthy income".[7]

Although the number of women drivers is still small, their reasons for joining the service are representative of women's experiences around the country. For example, a 30-year old widow with two children whom she is raising alone since her husband's death had just enough money to buy a car. Aiming to work as a ride-share driver, she also got her driving license. It is a sign of the changing times that while Careem originally turned down her application as they weren't hiring women then, they later called back and got her on board. "The only skill I know is driving," she says. "Now I can raise my children honourably, I can give my children a good education."[8]

This story signals not only changes in social and employment norms, but also underlines another universal phenomenon: women's yearning to make an honourable living and educate their children. However, while such opportunities are increasing in

Jawan Ideas

Encourage universities to assign academic credit for students' volunteer activities including in schools, civic organizations, local and city government, etc.

Jawan Ideas

Allow nursing mothers to bring their babies to work and provide space that allows them privacy.

Pakistan, there are still far too few of them to go around and absorb the millions who attain the working age every year. Dedicated efforts to generate employment prospects for the youth are urgently needed.

Suggestions to generate employment opportunities include:

Encourage entrepreneurship: The sluggish growth of employment generation in Pakistan makes it difficult to cater to the youth entering working age every year. Multiple strategies involving all stakeholders are necessary to foster employment creation not only in public the sector but also in the private sector. One such strategy is entrepreneurship – often associated with innovation and creative problem solving - which under the right conditions can lead to employment creation. When an entrepreneurial venture grows, it requires services, raw materials, productive assets to contribute towards its growth, including labour supply -- hence creating more jobs and need for services.

Entrepreneurial ventures from sole proprietorship (individual-led business) to large-scale multinationals create a domino effect by enhancing opportunities in terms of job creation and improving overall wellbeing. More importantly, inculcating a culture of creativity and innovative thinking in the education system can enable the youth to enter the labour market as skilled, problem-solving individuals.

Over the past couple of years Pakistan has seen increasing interest and investment in cultivating entrepreneurship, especially in large urban centres. Although a step in the right direction, these initiatives tend to be restricted to urban localities targeting individuals with a certain level of education and social background. Rural youth and those in peripheral urban settlements are restricted by factors like limited access to finance, lack of communication skills, location and social networks.

The government must provide formal training and facilitate access to larger networks of mentorship, access to finance and favourable policy environment to rural and peripheral urban youth who are comparatively disadvantaged. State policies can be complemented by a more holistic approach involving civil society and the private sector to train the youth in marketable skills such as oral and written communication, presentation techniques and report writing. This can be accompanied by awareness-raising activities to sensitise workers on the financial aspects of running a business, like fair wages, profit maximisation and investment methods. Additionally, an entrepreneurship network can be built to bring together youthful entrepreneurs, mentors, industry, and government representatives. Policy can ensure that new entrants, especially those who are socio-economically and educationally marginalised, gain access to investment opportunities, financial capital, technical knowledge pools, and international markets to foster entrepreneurship at the grassroots level.

Bring more women into the workforce: The education attainment gap between young men and women has narrowed over the past 7 years. However, the gap in their labour force participation remains consistently wide, showing no signs of convergence anytime soon. With the growing young population, abysmally low levels of participation of young women in labour force can lead to an increasing dependency ratio, where the non-working population exceeds the working population by a large number. In this situation, there is a huge loss of the potential of young women, especially the educated who are not enrolled in further education, employment, business or training. They must be provided with an environment that facilitates not only their participation but also their economic and social wellbeing.

Essentially, what is required is concrete policy interventions to encourage increased participation of women in the labour force and create equitable growth opportunities for women even if that counters broadly accepted cultural and religious norms.

There is a dire need to: improve fami-

Jawan Ideas

Initiate national level school sports competitions including students from all types of schools – private, public and *madaris.*

Jawan Ideas

Include a mandatory employment component in the annual federal budget summary saying how many new jobs need to be created and outlining a strategy for future employment growth.

ly-friendly policies enabling a better work-life balance; improve infrastructure facilities to reduce transaction costs associated with women's access to the labour market; and increase quality job opportunities. For instance, young mothers often face the dilemma of having to choose between the wellbeing of their family, children and their career. This restricts their participation in the workforce. Most importantly, it is critical to change the mindset and social values that see women as being only homemakers within the family. This mindset severely restricts women's role in society to within the confinements of the domestic sphere.

To counter these handicaps and increase opportunities, policy can require employers to offer paid maternal, paternal and family sick leaves. This would balance the distribution of unpaid family-care work including looking after children or an acutely ill family member. Investing in improving access to electricity and water sources closer to home, especially in rural areas, is another effort that would spare women's unpaid work time and allow them to participate in the labour force.

Similarly, facilitating access to affordable and safe transport and commuting would greatly increase young women's participation in the labour force in both rural and urban settings. For instance, upgrading and expanding existing road networks and providing incentives to the private sector to invest in new transport routes and vehicles would increase mobility of labour. It would also increase employment opportunities in the short run. Similar measures to increase mobility for women in rural areas would pave the way for their increased participation in labour force.

In general, policies that improve economic opportunities for young women lead to a positive correlation between the number of young women entering the labour force and overall women's economic success in society. For example, establishing career-nurturing platforms with senior women mentors and role models, as well as mentoring and coaching facilities, increases women's labour force participa-

tion. This leads to not only increased female labour force participation but also to increased economic and social wellbeing.

Improve working conditions for quality employment: The many jobs generated every year in Pakistan are mostly low quality, marked by low pay and insecurity. To reach the goal of providing quality employment, it is essential to ensure minimum standards for working conditions. The Ministry of Labour and Manpower can be tasked with developing these standards that typically include: maximum weekly working hours, health standards, minimum health insurance especially for companies with hazardous working conditions, minimum annual, parental and personal care leave entitlements, public holidays, social security, old-age benefits, and minimum overtime pay. Where these standards exist, their implementation needs to be ensured.

Relevant government departments can ensure that all the registered companies follow these standards. Additionally, the government should raise public awareness about these standards, non-compliance of which may be challenged in court. Simultaneously, provide alternate issue resolution mechanisms – such as mediation and conciliation – to avoid going through the court to avoid lengthy procedures. This may reduce implementation barriers and enable better enforcement of workers' legal rights.

To ensure that workers' rights are protected within the private sector as well, the government can provide incentives to the private sector (including corporations, small, medium and micro enterprises) to register themselves with relevant ministries and provide minimum working standards protection to their employees. An Informal Sector Labour Policy could be formulated for this sector which includes agriculture, fishing, mining, manufacturing, wholesale, and retail etc. The Labour Policy 2010 does currently touch upon issues concerning the informal sector. However, a full-fledged policy custom-made to look after the needs of the informal sector, which is the largest growing sector, would greatly benefit in

Jawan Ideas

Support voluntary programmes in colleges and universities for awareness and education on drug abuse, HIV and STD, dealing with mental stress, etc.

Jawan Ideas

Under the guidance of the Ministry of Labour, establish Labour Market Observatories at universities to analyse labour market trends to improve decision–making.

improving the quality of youth are increasingly engaged in politics jobs. An Informal Labour Policy can set minimum labour standards specific to informal sector jobs.

It is dignity that completes the individual and gives meaning to the lives of even the poorest of the poor, affirming their being. Dignity is also central to resolving conflict. And dignity is at the heart of the concept of human development. Violating the dignity of human beings leads to adverse reactions and negative consequences not just for the individual but also for society at large and in a ripple effect, for the economy.

Engagement

This brings us to the last E, engagement. As discussed in chapter 4, while Pakistan's youth are eager to be engaged, not many meaningful engagement opportunities exist for them to participate in the community, or political affairs. A handful of engagement opportunities that do exist, unfortunately do not become widely known.

Efforts need to be made to not only create meaningful opportunities but also to engage the youth in positive manner. These include:

Invest in the social contract to nurture future leaders: Creating meaningful social relationships between young people, government, and society and improving the quality of existing interactions can deepen social cohesion, solidarity and trust among the youth. This in turn fosters greater responsibility as individuals and as citizens.

In Pakistan, with its history of poor quality education and health facilities, low quality jobs and deteriorating socio-economic conditions, this social contract has remained weak. In addition, nearly half of the country's 70 years has been under military dictatorship, preventing citizens from experience democracy in the true sense of the word and learning how to participate in the state affairs. It was only recently in 2013 that a government completed its tenure without being disrupted. Thereby, social contract between the state and society has remained weak. There

is a greater need to strengthen the weak ties between state and society by educating civilians of the merits of democracy

There need to be sincere efforts to ensure meaningful engagement of the youth. Failure to engage this youth bulge constructively could lead to disengaged future leaders with little or no interest in the country's socio-political affairs and those more prone to violent extremism.

The government can foster a positive social contract by creating opportunities for youth to interact meaningfully with government officials at various administration levels – national, provincial, and district level. These platforms could provide the youth a chance to influence policy decision-making by voicing their needs and concerns, and contributing their ideas and solutions for societal problems. Existing platforms such as Youth Parliament of Pakistan and Young Parliamentary Associates (YPA) can be further expanded to consciously include rural youth and marginalised communities. Similarly, policy can ensure increased representation of the youth in decision-making roles by allocating more youth-specific seats at the national, provincial and district level.

Ignite the spirit of 'Edhisim' – encourage volunteer work: Young Pakistanis show a high level of willingness to participate in community affairs. However, their level of engagement remains low, restricted by a lack of viable social engagement opportunities and lack of information about existing opportunities. The government can make voluntary work a national priority for all, and the youth particularly. Voluntary engagement opportunities can be made publicly accessible for both rural and urban youth through different media platforms like newspaper, television and radio channels, and the social media. Policy can encourage voluntary work by providing special incentives, for instance, prestige awards and study credits to youth, and public grants for voluntary organizations and their work. There are plenty of spaces in the public sector where

young, energetic ideas can be utilised and spaces for voluntary work created. All that's needed to make this happen is sincerity and consistency of effort.

Give the space to the young to be young: The most important lesson of Chapter 4 on engagement is that there is a shrinking space for the young in Pakistan to be young. Insecurity, uncertainty, intolerance, and sheer lack of opportunities, all collude to restrict the space available to the young in Pakistan to be young. Generations are growing up under the clouds of violence that can sometimes force them to 'grow up' much faster than they should be.

The good news is that this is a generation that is politically engaged, even eager to take on challenges. The better news is that the young of Pakistan have a very high desire to be active in the search for change, and is optimistic that it can bring about change. The bad news is that it is deprived of the infrastructure that can allow its youth to blossom with innovation. From a lack of public spaces to opportunities for physical activity and to restrictive norms of participation in the decisions that impact their own future, there are significant hurdles for the young in Pakistan to be as engaged in societal processes as they clearly want to be. Creating and expanding the space for societal engagement for the young can be the single best investment that can be made in their lives, or in the future of Pakistan.

Policy-wise, what is to be done?

Analysing policy options regarding the youth, Pakistan already has necessary institutional structure in place. There is a ministry of Youth Affairs at the provincial and regional levels. Youth policies also exist at provincial and regional level, since youth affairs become a provincial subject after the passage of the 18th Amendment. Punjab has a working youth policy (passed in 2012), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has approved youth policy (passed in 2016), Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Sindh

have unapproved drafts, while Balochistan and Gilgit Baltistan are engaged in consultations and the drafting processes.

While these are all necessary and positive steps in terms of developing a policy narrative on youth, in terms of implementation what is needed are not large expensive programmes but subsidiarity – that is, a very large number of generally very small steps taken at all levels of government, but especially at the local level, including village council, tehsil, and city.

This report has earlier outlined the broad and overall policy approach required for each of the three Es, education, employment and engagement, and for Pakistan's policy process, pertaining to the youth, in general.

Many of the steps that need to be taken are included in the Jawan ideas highlighted throughout this report. These are examples authentically collected through the various processes that inform our findings. They point to the kind of actions that may be required to channelise the energies of Pakistan's youth into a positive direction. We hope that readers will allow these ideas to percolate and develop them into actionable steps. Therefore, we will not summarise them here.

Clearly, as mentioned above, in terms of subsidiarity, many positive things are happening in Pakistan, youth-driven and led, as well as led by adults engaging the youth. To harness their full potential, the following policy steps are essential:

Sow lots of seeds – a Johnny Appleseed approach

The first step when formulating policy for youth human development would be to envision the approach taken by Johnny Appleseed, the pioneering American frontiersman who became legendary for planting swaths of apple seeds to begin orchards that would nurture later settlers.[9] Like the celebrated orchardist, Pakistan needs to plant swaths of seeds and nourish them to grow more fruit-bearing orchards around the country. This could be part of policy but does not necessarily have

Jawan Ideas

Establish district, provincial and national level competitions in art, poetry and writing to encourage avenues for self–expression and promote interaction amongst young people.

to be government driven as the approach allows a great deal of autonomy, initiative, ownership and entrepreneurship to the ordinary Pakistani citizen. The policy recommendation here would be for the government to view as allies those who join in this youth-orchard-development movement, and automatically bring them under the umbrella of government policy. Government policy, then, would enable and support these private initiatives rather than placing bureaucratic obstacles in their way. The policy will then be civil society and youth-driven rather than top-down.

Establish a youth impact assessment (YIA)

The second step we recommend is a major policy point. More important than creating a balkanised set of 'youth policies' or creating what are likely to become side-lined and un-empowered ministries, is to bring a youth focus into every policy that is made, at the project and policy level. The Planning Commissions at the federal, provincial, and local body levels would take on a much more central role in terms of putting every policy to test to gauge how the proposed policy will impact Pakistan's youth and quality of services for the youth. In other words, this would be a youth impact assessment (YIA). This could be along the lines of what is done in some countries for diversity, gender, or environment. Pakistan in fact has a robust environmental impact assessment (EIA) in place that may be used as a template for the YIA.

Macro level policy

At the macro level, Pakistan must include the critical issue of the country's youth at the budgetary level. It is not necessary for a separate youth budget to be developed, but Parliament must include a national budget test in the national budget on all three Es – education, employment and engagement. This document would provide an assessment of the

YIA in each of the Es to the Parliament.

Donors should also adapt the YIA as a best practice and require the initiatives they support to submit a YIA. Pakistan already does this for the environment, with the national and provincial budgets required to provide an EIA for all budgetary allocations. The budgets should also be required to provide a YIA every year to give an assessment of how budgetary allocations will impact the goals of the three Es.

There must be an acknowledgement and realisation of the inter-connectedness of the three Es. Pakistan must enhance the quality of education to create opportunities for entrepreneurs which in turn leads the way to quality engagement – an engaged and active, rather than passive citizenry is what will enhance the quality of life in the country and connect Pakistan to the world.

This has begun to happen in the field of the first E, education. To take the momentum further, in addition to focusing on increasing budgetary allocations for education and educational opportunities, the budget must also specify the steps being proposed and taken to enhance the quality of education. Similarly, for the second E, employment, the annual budget must state not only how many jobs are being created but also give an idea about the quality of the jobs being provided.

The third E, engagement, requires that Pakistan provide its young people with the opportunities to enable them to participate in the civic and political life of the country as full, active citizens and not as passive subjects, to choose the kind of life they want to live and be respected for who they are regardless of class, ethnicity, religion or gender.

This report mentions several initiatives around the country that lead towards these goals. However, there is an urgency to scale up these enterprises and view them as part of a larger policy goal even when they are private rather than government-initiated or funded.

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Last words: let the youth lead

The essential approach outlined here, and throughout this report, is to integrate a concern for the youth – as expressed by the three essential policy levers of education, employment and engagement (the 3 E's) – within all policy and societal decisions. This is a different approach from creating balkanized policies for the youth, as if they are separate from the rest of society. While an enhanced and special focus on the young is always welcome, the danger is that it can quickly turn into sloganeering; or into side-lined and marginalized institutions.

A better approach is to apply the 'youth test' – possibly, via the YIA – to every policy process. What will be the impact of the policy on the young? How can that impact be made positive? How can we leverage the 3 E's to make this happen?

The most important lesson that emerges from this exercise, however, is the need to listen to the young.

Throughout this report, we have included ideas that we gathered from the young of Pakistan. These ideas may not always be practical in a policy context, but they do reflect the felt needs of the youth of Pakistan. More than that, they reflect a clear sense that our youth have something to say, and we should be listening to them. The single most important thing that policy can deliver for the young, is to open up the space in which the they can lead and chart their own course; to enable and empower them to unleash the potential of a young Pakistan.

Jawan Ideas

Provide incentives to small and medium enterprises to create meaningful internship and apprenticeship programmes for high school students.

Notes

Chapter 1

1 The only prior national level survey focusing on youth in Pakistan was conducted in 2001-02 – 'Adolescent and Youth in Pakistan 2001-02' (Population Council, 2002). However, it missed out several important aspects of the lives of the youth, like religion and politics - two areas that the youth are now actively involved in. In any case, life has changed much in the last 14 years since this survey was conducted, and new empirical evidence is required.

2 Government of Pakistan 1998.

3 Pakistan's current population stands at 207.7 million according to the recent census (2017). However, since age specific disaggregation had not been released at the time of writing, for purpose of analysis this Report uses data based on the 1998 census.

4 UNDP 2016b.

5 Khalid 2014.

6 UNDP2016c.

7 UNDP 2016b.

8 Ibid.

9 See Technical note 8 for further details

10 May-June 2015.

11 June-August 2015. The project, "Razakar Programme", is estimated to have engaged some 1,500 youth.

12 The reports and essays were submitted in Urdu and English.

13 We sought entries in English and Roman Urdu between November and December 2016 through the online survey 'Your Idea Counts' -- https://www.surveymonkey. com/r/578ZS6J. Publicised through the NHDR social media platforms and media outreach.

14 UNDP 2016a.

15 Ibid.

16 Some 500 youths participated in the International Youth Day Conference and Panel discussion, Islamabad (12 August 2015) and the Youth Civic Engagement Conference, Quetta (2 September 2015).

17 The judges were then UNDP Country Director Marce Andre Franche, Assistant Professor (Fine Arts) at National College of Arts R. M. Naeem, architect Seemi Saeed and former CEO of the School of Leadership Umair Jaliawala. Winners were selected based on the judges' decisions and online votes. The winners were announced at the UNDP Media Briefing on 26 February 2015: Fizza Nassir, Lahore; Momina

Khattak, Abbottabad (first runner up); Saira Agha, Rawalpindi (second runner up) and Hafsa Bintee Aqeel, Karachi (third runner up).

18 Facebook page: www.fb.com/pg/ PakistanNHDR; Twitter @JawanPakistan

19 Hosted by Newsweek Pakistan, 30 July 2015, the chat attracted 375 unique active participants and generated 1,500 tweets, with an estimated reach of 2,000,000, estimated exposure of 3,500,000 and a total of around 27 million deliveries.

20 PodBean 2016.

21 The briefing was held at Marriot Hotel in Islamabad, 26 February 2015.

22 UNDP 2016e. This short film Jawan Pakistan (3.5 min) was broadcast from February-March 2015 on television channels Express News, Samaa TV, Abb Tak News, 8XM music Channel (Urdu); Apna Channel (Punjabi); AVT Khyber News (Pushto); Kawish Television Network - KTN (Sindhi); and VHS NEWs (Balochi).

23 The radio shows were broadcast on weekends, February-April 2015, to allow the maximum number of youth to participate, on channels FM 89, FM 90, FM 94 Peshawar, FM 94 Sialkot, FM 94 Swabi, FM 96, and FM 100.

24 The LLF panel discussion "We Can be Heroes" is online at: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=YO35by84gSc.

25 They include Fatima Jinnah Women's University in Rawalpindi, University of Peshawar, the Information and Technology University Lahore, and Lahore University of Management Sciences.

26 The session was held on "Youth Bulge or bomb? Harnessing the potential of youth", LSE, chaired by Dr. Mahvish Shami, Assistant Professor, International Development, with speakers Marc-André Franche and Emrys Schoemaker, communications and conflict specialist. 28 April 2016.

27 This was a round table discussion held with the donors and development partners to discuss the preliminary findings of NHDR, at UNDP Islamabad, 12 August 2016.

Chapter 2

1 Positive News 2012.
2 Dawn 2017.
3 UNDESA 2015.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.

6 UNDESA 2015.
7 Wight et al. 2016.
8 UNDESA 2015.
9 For more details see Statistical Notes in Annex.
10 The cut-offs used in the global HDI computations are different than the ones used for this Report. The global HDI cut-offs are as follows: Low— less than 0.550, Medium – between 0.550 and 0.699, High — between 0.700 and 0.799, and Very High —greater than 0.800. The HDI cut-offs used (and their corresponding classifications) are arbitrary and should be referred to with caution. See Technical note 1 for further details.
11 Ibid.

Chapter 3

1 Khawar 2015.
2 UNDESA 2016.
3 UNDP 1990.
4 Connolly, Leoz, Gorospe and Sebastian 2014.
5 Meyer 2014.
6 Šlaus and Jacobs 2011.
7 Ibid.
8 Sen 1997.
9 Deneulin 2009.
10 UNESCO 2003.
11 UNESCO 2016.
12 Government of Pakistan 2015f.
13 UNESCO 2006.
14 Alif Ailaan 2014.
15 Government of Pakistan 2015f.
16 Government of Pakistan 2016b.
17 Ibid.
18 Government of Pakistan 2015f.
19 Government of Pakistan 2016b
20 UNDP 2016g.
21 Government of Pakistan 2017a.
22 Ibid.
23 Malik and Rose 2015.
24 Ibid.
25 SAFED 2015.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Government of Pakistan 2015f.
29 Pastore 2012.
30 World Bank 2009.
31 UNDP 2015c.
32 UNESCO 2004.
33 Idara-e-Taleem-o-Aagahi 2015.
34 Pakistan Education Statistics 2015-16. Government of Pakistan 2016b.
35 World Bank 2006.
36 ADB 2012b.
37 Hussain 2012.
38 World Bank 2017.
39 Haider 2011.
40 Government of Pakistan 2015b.
41 World Intellectual Property Organization 2013.
42 ADB 2012b.
43 Boni and Walker 2013.
44 Castelló-Climent and Hidal

go-Cabrillana 2010.
45 Akbari and Muhammed 2000.
46 SAFED 2014.
47 Aslam, Bari and Kingdon 2008.
48 ADB 2013a.
49 Government of Punjab 2015a.
50 Government of Pakistan 2016b.
51 The structure of TEVT in Pakistan is bi-layered. The federal level has a National Vocational & Technical Training Commission while there are Technical Education & Vocational Training Authorities at the provincial levels.
52 UNDP 2015c.
53 MHHDC 1998.
54 Alam 2008.
55 ADB 2013a.
56 Government of Pakistan, AEPAM, UNESCO, WFP, and UNICEF 2015.
57 Ibid.
58 Bari 2016b.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 SAFED 2015.

Chapter 4

1 Stankorb 2014.
2 ILO 2016b.
3 UN 2016c.
4 UNDESA 2016.
5 Government of Pakistan 2015c.
6 UNDESA 2016.
7 ILO 2009.
8 Pieters 2013.
9 World Bank 2011.
10 Since youth in the first two age groups (15-19 and 20-24) are expected to be engaged in the labour force, this report deviates slightly from the standard definition of labour force participation rate (LFPR), and excludes those from the denominator who are enrolled.
11 MHHDC 2016.
12 Government of Pakistan 2007.
13 Government of Pakistan 2013e.
14 Government of Pakistan 2015c.
15 UNDESA 2016.
16 Pieters 2013.
17 Government of Pakistan 2015c.
18 Srivastava and Barmola. 2011.
19 UNDP 2015c.
20 Government of Pakistan 2015c.
21 Ibid.
22 Government of Pakistan 2013e.
23 Also see Women in Agriculture in Pakistan: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
24 Government of Pakistan 2015c.
25 Government of Pakistan 2017b.
26 ILO 2016d.
27 ILO 2016a.
28 ILO 2004.
29 ILO 2016b.
30 Hussain and Dubey 2014.
31 World Economic Forum 2016.

32 Government of Pakistan 2013e.
33 World Bank 2011.
34 UND2015c.
35 UNDP 2009.
36 Nayyar 2011.
37 This understanding is a summary of Deepak Nayyar's essay "Some Reflections on Development in South Asia: Markets, Democracy, and People" in Democracy, Sustainable Development, and Peace (2011).
38 Government of Pakistan 2015g.
39 Government of Pakistan 2015f.
40 Cheema 2015.
41 Rashid 2005.
42 Ibid.
43 International Training Centre of the International Labour Organization 2011.
44 Plan9 2015.
45 Shorish 2016.
46 Invest2innovate 2014.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 UN 2016c.
50 Sen 1999.
51 Ibid.
52 MHHDC 2016.
53 ILO 2009.
54 Ibid.
55 Hisam 2015.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Aqeel 2015.
60 ILO 2006.

Chapter 5

1 Hall 2015.
2 Hutchinson 2011.
3 Mental models consist of identi ties, stereotypes, prototypes and stories that the youth use to understand how things work, their place in society, and what is "thinkable" for their lives.
4 Council of Europe 2003.
5 UNDP 1990.
6 UNDP 2002.
7 World Bank 2017.
8 Hutchison 2011.
9 Cohn, Marechal and Noll 2013. For instance, Hoff and Pandey (2014) show that low caste school boys in India perform worse on puzzles when their low caste is made salient, while there is an increase in cheating on games among prisoners when their criminal identity is made obvious.
10 Markus and Kitayama 2010.
11 British Council Pakistan 2013a.
12 Genicot and Ray 2003.
13 Beaman, Duflo, Pande and Topalova 2012. There was a positive role model effect of female local leaders in Indian village councils where women held office for two electoral rounds: the gap in parental aspirations for daughters vis-à-vis sons fell by 20 percent and girls' educational achieve-

ment gap with boys almost disappeared.
14 Bernard, Dercon, Orkin and Taffesse 2015.
15 British Council 2013.
16 Afzal 2015.
17 Yusuf 2015.
18 British Council 2014b.
19 Blattman, Jamison and Sheridan 2016.
20 Basit 2015.
21 Kaiser 2014.
22 Kaul 2016.
23 Yusuf 2015.
24 Paluck and Green 2009.
25 Hall 2015.
26 IEP 2015b.
27 British Council 2014b.
28 British Council 2013.
29 Bauer, Cassar, Chytilová and Henrich 2014.
30 US Department of Veteran Affairs 2015.
31 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2015.
32 UNHCR 2015.
33 Insight on Conflict 2016a.
34 Government of Pakistan 2008.
35 Wight 2016.
36 Centre for Civic Education Pakistan 2016.
37 British Council 2009.
38 Jamil 2015.
39 Citizens Archive 2016.
40 British Council 2016a.
41 British Council 2013; Population Council Pakistan 2016.
42 Computed based on information provided by National Assembly of Pakistan 2016.
43 Siddiqui 2015. Before the 2013 elections, the PML (N) constituted a team to find out why urban youth in Punjab were pro-PTI. They found that "the [youth] are pro-PTI because they feel like they have a role to play in that party. They basically want importance. If the PML-N gives them room, [they would be more likely to hold pro-PML-N opinions]"
44 There are areas in Pakistan where mostly male community leaders, on the pretext of religion and cultural traditions, prevent women from exercising their right to vote.
45 UN 2015a.
46 For instance, according to the British Council Pakistan: Next Geneation, Voices in Conflict & Violence report, 54 percent of young people between the ages of 18 and 29 rate the national government unfavourable.
47 The existing sub-clause requiring intra-party elections was removed from the Constitution during the passage of the 18th Amendment.
48 Hart 1992.
49 Insight on Conflict 2016.
50 British Council 2013.
51 UNDP 2014e.

52 World Bank 2007.
53 WHO 1946.
54 Population Council Pakistan 2016.
55 UNICEF 2015b.
56 Stefan and Sánchez 2011.
57 Krishnan and Krutikova 2015
58 UNICEF Pakistan 2015b.
59 Government of Pakistan 2013.
60 Government of Pakistan 2015e.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Lancet Series on Adolescent Health 2014.
64 Iqbal 2015.
65 Ibid.
66 Coakley 2011.
67 Lopez and Moore 2010.
68 British Council Pakistan 2016b.
69 Punjab Olympic Association 2012.
70 The City District governments and Town Municipal administrations are supposed to provide these spaces under the Master, Zoning, Land Use and Spatial Plans, to be implemented at the local government level.
71 Kuyoro, Awodele and Okolie 2012.
72 British Council 2013.
73 Internet Live Stats 2016.
74 Reinikka and Svenson 2005.
75 UNDP 2015c.
76 British Council 2009.

Chapter 6

1 A Spanish love song from Quetta. 8 Nov 2015. https://beenasarwar. com/2015/11/08/a-spanish-love-song-from-quetta/
2 Walls of Kindness – 7 Cities That are Already Helping the Poor. https://www.parhlo.com/walls-of-kindness-7-cities-that- are-already-helping-the-poor/.
3 Positive.News. Riot clean-up in Pakistan. 4 October 2012. https://www.positive.news/2012/society/9248/riot-clean-up-pakistan/
4 M. Jibran Nasir. Facebook post. 13 September 2016. https://www.facebook.com/MohammadJibran-Nasir/posts/589104204617790/. UCA News. 30 September 2013. Religions unite to protest Peshawar church bombing Hundreds show interfaith solidarity by forming human chain in Karachi. http://www.ucanews.com/news/religions-unite-to-protest-peshawar-church-bombing/69358
5 A few examples: young artist Asim Butt (1978-2010) took to the streets of Karachi with his graffiti art – see http://asimbutt.pk/work/graffiti/ -- starting a trend of art as political protest (see Adrian Fisk, A Journey of Graffiti Through Pakistan, 1 Oct 2009. https://adrianfisk.photoshelter.com/gallery/A-Journey-Of-Graffiti-Through-Paki-

stan/G00004I9lCwMDMOM/). Another young artist Abdullah Ahmed Khan has been making waves with his upbeat, hiphop style of graffiti art (See Saadia Qamar, Express Tribune. July 30, 2012. 'Sanki King's graffiti knows no boundaries'. https://tribune.com.pk/story/415014/sanki-kings-graffiti-knows-no-boundaries/). In 2014, citizens fed up with violence and the ugly political, religious and commercial wall chalking in the city developed graffiti art into art for peace and against violence, utlising the skills of folk art practitioners like truck artist Haider Ali. Campaigns like I Am Karachi (Express Tribune, 10 Aug 2014. Campaign sets out to reclaim the lost vibes of Karachi. https://tribune.com.pk/story/746602/campaign-sets-out-to-reclaim-the-lost-vibes-of-karachi) and 'walls of peace' also harnessed the energies and passion of Pakistan's youth (AFP report in Dawn. July 25, 2015. Artists reclaim Karachi walls from hate graffiti. https://www.dawn.com/news/1196150).
6 Imaan Sheikh. 'Here's Why South Asian Women Are Uploading Photos of Themselves At Dhabas'. Buzzfeed. 10 August 2015. www.buzzfeed.com/imaansheikh/girls-at-dhabas. See also: Shilpa Phadke, Sameera Khan and Shilpa Ranade. Why Loiter?: Women And Risk On Mumbai Streets (Penguin 2011), the book that catalysed India's 'Why Loiter?' movement and inspired Girls At Dhabas. See also: Bhaskar Chawla. 'Why Loiter: A Movement to Reclaim Public Places for Women in South Asia. 4 January 2016. http://www.vagabomb.com/Why-Loiter-A-Movement-to-Reclaim-Public-Places-for-Women-in-South-Asia/ .
7 Reuters 2016.
8 Ibid.
9 Kristy Puchko. '9 Facts That Tell the True Story of Johnny Appleseed'. MentalFloss.com. 26 September 2016 http://mentalfloss.com/article/62113/9-facts-tell-true-story-johnny-appleseed.

Statistical annex

Readers' guide

The 11 annex tables provide an overview of the key aspects of human development in Pakistan, with a central focus on the youth. Table 1 contains the district-wise Human Development Index (HDI) for 2015 at the sub-index level, while Table 1A looks at district-wise HDI values for 2015 disaggregated at the sub-index component level. Table 2 presents a picture of human development in Pakistan over the last decade, across six time-periods — 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, and 2015. Tables 3 and 4 depict the Pakistan Youth Development Index (YDI) and the Youth Gender Inequality Index (YGII) at the regional level for 2015. Table 5 presents the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) at the district level. All these tables are estimated by the NHDR team at UNDP Pakistan. The next set of tables provide a broader set of indicators related to human development.

Sources and definitions

UNDP Pakistan uses primary files and estimates from various national surveys with mandate, resources and expertise. Definitions of indicators and data sources are given at the end of each table, with the full source details in the Statistical references.

Methodology

The Pakistan NHDR 2017 includes the HDI, the YDI, the YGII, and the MPI. Technical notes 1 to 4 explain the methodology used to compute these indices.

Comparisons over time: Six waves — 2004 to 2005 and 2014 to 2015 — of the Pakistan Standard of Living Measurement (PSLM) survey were used to compare the HDI values and rankings at the district level.

Human Development classification

HDI classifications are based on HDI fixed cut-off points. The cut-off points and HDI classification are as follows: less than and equal to 0.299 for very low human development; 0.300-0.499 for low human development; 0.500-0.599 for low medium human development; 0.600-0.699 for medium human development; 0.700-0.799 for high medium human development; and 0.800 or greater for high human development.

Youth Development classifications

The YDI classification scheme is based on the following cut-off points: less than 0.400 for very low youth development; 0.400-0.499 for low youth development; 0.500-0.599 for medium youth development; and 0.600 or greater for high youth development.

Youth Gender Inequality classifications

Based on the YGII scores, the following cut-offs are used to classify the regions on youth gender inequality: less than 0.120 for low; 0.120-0.239 for medium; 0.240-0.319 for high; and 0.320 or greater for very high youth gender inequality.

Regional classifications

The YDI is disaggregated at the regional level. Pakistan is categorised in a total of 18 regions, based mainly on Pickney's (1989) agro-climatic zones.

Symbols

The most recent year is mentioned for the data if the survey was conducted across two years. The following symbols are used in the tables:

..	Not available
0	Nil or negligible

Statistical tables

The first seven tables relate to the four composite human development indices and their components — the HDI, YDI, YGII, and MPI.

Table 1, Human Development Index and its sub-indices, provides districts' HDI, sub-index values and ranking in 2015. The table also presents the 2013 HDI values at the district level, along with the change in rank between

2013 and 2015.

Table 1a, Human Development Index and its components, rearranges the districts by provinces rather than by district HDI values in 2015, and reports the component values of the sub-indices.

Table 2, Human Development Index trends, 2005-2015, presents the HDI values across six waves, allowing a comparison of HDI scores.

Table 3, Youth Development Index and its components, provides YDI rankings in 2015 at the regional level.

Table 4, Youth Gender Inequality Index and its components, presents YGII rankings and values, along with YDI ranking at the regional level for 2015.

Table 5, Multidimensional Poverty Index and its components, captures the multiple deprivations in education, health and living standards. The MPI encompasses both the incidence of non-income poverty (a headcount of those who experience multidimensional poverty), and the intensity, or average share of deprivations experienced by poor at a point in time. To tailor the MPI for Pakistan, some modifications in the global MPI were proposed. In the Pakistani MPI, 15 indicators are used for the national measure, rather than the 10 used in the global measure.

Table 6, Education, presents gender inequalities in the standard education indicators along with mean and expected years of schooling, and percentage of population aged 25 years and older with some secondary education, at the district level in 2015.

Table 7, Health: Mother and child, provides information on the percentage of fully immunized children between the age of 12 and 23 months (based on record and recall), children below five years of age suffering from diarrhea in the last one month preceding the survey, and percentage of women between 15 and 49 years of age who gave birth in the last 3 years prior to the survey and received any prenatal consultancy during the pregnancy.

Table 8, Mode of Communication, presents the percentage of households with a television set, a computer and a radio at district level in 2015.

Table 9, Labour Force Participation, provides gender-disaggregated information on the labor force participation rate for both urban and rural areas at the provincial level.

Table 10, Employment, presents gender-disaggregated unemployment rates, for both urban and rural areas, at the provincial level.

1 Human Development Index and its Components

HDI rank	Province/Region[a]	Human Development Index (HDI) Value 2015[b]	Immunisation rate (%) 2015[b]	Satisfaction with health facility (%) 2015[b]	Expected years of schooling (years) 2015[b]	Mean years of schooling (years) 2015[b]	Living Standard (%) 2015[b]	Human Development Index (HDI) Value 2013[b]	Change in rank 2013-2015
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT									
1	Lahore	Punjab	0.877	89.5	85.8	12.2	7.5	98.9	0.858	2
2	Islamabad	Islamabad Capital Territory	0.875	85.2	77.7	12.6	8.2	99.1	0.891	-1
3	Rawalpindi	Punjab	0.871	92.4	84.5	12.7	7.4	94.0	0.826	1
4	Karachi	Sindh	0.854	80.2	82.5	11.8	7.7	98.5	0.867	-2
5	Sialkot	Punjab	0.834	93.7	80.6	12.3	5.9	94.6	0.770	5
6	Jhelum	Punjab	0.829	98.0	73.2	12.8	6.1	90.6	0.811	-1
HIGH MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT									
7	Gujrat	Punjab	0.795	92.5	71.7	12.3	5.3	90.8	0.792	-1
8	Chakwal	Punjab	0.792	96.2	81.5	11.9	4.9	87.2	0.788	-1
9	Attock	Punjab	0.786	96.7	75.8	11.9	4.7	88.4	0.762	4
10	Faisalabad	Punjab	0.782	88.2	84.5	10.8	5.2	89.4	0.775	-2
11	Gujranwala	Punjab	0.769	90.9	65.8	11.5	5.2	90.0	0.774	-2
12	Toba Tek Singh	Punjab	0.763	91.3	75.4	11.2	4.6	88.2	0.720	6
13	Abbottabad	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.761	94.3	70.7	12.0	4.8	83.7	0.768	-2
14	Peshawar	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.756	94.8	83.5	10.3	4.8	82.6	0.761	1
15	Narowal	Punjab	0.748	98.6	64.5	11.6	4.6	83.5	0.706	4
16	Nankana Sahib	Punjab	0.740	95.7	77.9	11.1	4.8	76.5	0.762	-4
17	Sheikhupura	Punjab	0.738	86.4	75.2	10.8	4.3	86.1	0.760	-1
18	Haripur	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.732	82.1	60.2	11.9	4.8	86.6	0.702	2
19	Layyah	Punjab	0.729	89.4	86.7	10.4	3.8	82.4	0.682	9
20	Sargodha	Punjab	0.728	90.8	70.9	10.6	4.3	83.7	0.692	6
21	Multan	Punjab	0.718	92.2	81.4	8.9	4.3	83.3	0.693	3
22	Hyderabad	Sindh	0.716	84.5	73.6	8.5	5.4	84.5	0.762	-8
23	Mandi Bahauddin	Punjab	0.716	91.6	73.0	11.4	3.9	77.5	0.738	-6
24	Kasur	Punjab	0.714	86.3	74.4	10.9	3.7	82.7	0.695	-1
25	Sahiwal	Punjab	0.710	91.1	62.3	10.2	4.0	86.2	0.691	2
26	Khushab	Punjab	0.706	90.6	78.6	10.4	3.7	78.4	0.650	9
27	Okara	Punjab	0.705	90.5	75.9	9.7	3.5	84.3	0.667	3
28	Hafizabad	Punjab	0.705	96.7	69.7	10.5	3.7	78.6	0.693	-3
29	Mardan	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.703	90.4	87.9	10.4	3.3	76.8	0.647	7
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT									
30	Khanewal	Punjab	0.699	95.1	81.1	9.0	3.6	80.4	0.651	4
31	Nowshera	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.697	84.4	80.4	10.3	3.2	81.6	0.696	-9
32	Malakand	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.690	94.8	59.7	11.7	3.7	73.6	0.640	5
33	Jhang	Punjab	0.682	89.1	77.5	9.6	3.6	75.9	0.636	6
34	Mansehra	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.676	77.3	66.0	10.8	3.8	78.1	0.609	13
35	Chitral	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.674	97.8	64.1	11.1	3.6	69.1	0.637	3
36	Charsadda	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.666	98.5	80.4	9.7	2.9	70.5	0.635	4
37	Naushehro Feroze	Sindh	0.665	70.7	69.7	9.8	5.1	72.2	0.594	11
38	Quetta	Balochistan	0.664	64.6	53.8	10.2	4.2	89.7	0.702	-17
39	Pakpattan	Punjab	0.660	93.9	69.2	9.1	2.9	78.2	0.629	5
40	Sukkur	Sindh	0.659	79.6	73.5	8.0	4.8	73.5	0.622	5
41	Lodhran	Punjab	0.659	94.8	79.7	8.2	3.1	76.9	0.629	2
42	Chiniot	Punjab	0.657	90.4	82.4	9.0	3.0	72.4	0.677	-13
43	Vehari	Punjab	0.655	92.5	79.2	8.8	2.8	75.7	0.661	-12
44	Swabi	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.654	87.1	63.9	10.4	2.7	76.9	0.657	-12
45	Kohat	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.650	83.5	79.2	9.9	3.3	68.1	0.560	12
46	Bahawalpur	Punjab	0.645	83.5	86.4	7.7	3.1	77.5	0.629	-4
47	Mianwali	Punjab	0.645	89.8	50.5	9.9	3.7	74.5	0.655	-14
48	Dadu	Sindh	0.632	82.9	49.0	9.3	5.0	68.5	0.591	1
49	Bahawalnagar	Punjab	0.630	78.7	71.9	8.8	3.0	75.5	0.635	-8
50	Bhakkar	Punjab	0.628	86.8	49.2	9.5	3.2	76.6	0.587	1

TABLE 1   Human Development Index and its components | **153**

1 Human Development Index and its Components

HDI rank	Province/Region[a]	Human Development Index (HDI) Value 2015[b]	Immunisation rate (%) 2015[b]	Satisfaction with health facility (%) 2015[b]	Expected years of schooling (years) 2015[b]	Mean years of schooling (years) 2015[b]	Living Standard (%) 2015[b]	Human Development Index (HDI) Value 2013[b]	Change in rank 2013-2015
51	Rahimyar Khan	Punjab	0.625	83.4	85.3	7.2	2.9	75.2	0.585	1
52	Swat	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.618	88.8	70.9	9.6	2.8	64.3	0.551	7
53	Larkana	Sindh	0.618	70.2	60.5	8.4	4.2	74.0	0.581	0
54	Karak	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.615	62.7	58.8	10.4	4.2	68.5	0.588	-4
55	Bannu	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.613	57.4	66.6	9.4	4.0	72.7	0.551	3
56	Lower Dir	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.600	84.1	58.7	10.9	2.8	59.8	0.549	4
LOW MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT										
57	Hangu	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.594	75.4	73.4	8.7	1.9	72.9	0.561	-1
58	Muzaffargarh	Punjab	0.584	88.2	73.5	7.7	2.5	64.9	0.564	-4
59	Lakki Marwat	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.577	49.2	70.3	9.5	3.9	62.8	0.489	13
60	Jamshoro	Sindh	0.572	81.7	55.7	8.0	3.0	65.8	0.529	4
61	Nawabshah/ Shaheed Benazir Abad	Sindh	0.572	76.1	67.7	7.7	3.4	60.9	0.503	9
62	Matiari	Sindh	0.569	86.6	75.6	7.0	3.6	54.7	0.562	-7
63	Khairpur	Sindh	0.556	79.7	49.3	8.2	3.6	58.3	0.528	3
64	Dera Ghazi Khan	Punjab	0.535	74.8	69.9	7.5	2.6	55.4	0.504	5
65	Tando Allahyar	Sindh	0.528	84.8	69.5	6.2	2.8	54.8	0.526	2
66	Buner	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.528	78.0	83.0	8.9	1.5	49.4	0.543	-5
67	Shikarpur	Sindh	0.520	64.5	75.9	6.2	3.2	54.8	0.529	-2
68	Ghotki	Sindh	0.514	62.0	75.8	5.7	2.9	59.4	0.537	-6
69	Rajanpur	Punjab	0.506	90.7	65.2	7.1	2.0	48.9	0.481	7
70	Battagram	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.505	51.1	56.0	7.9	1.8	68.0	0.532	-7
71	Dera Ismail Khan	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.496	64.5	56.2	7.6	3.0	50.1	0.489	2
72	Sanghar	Sindh	0.491	65.2	61.9	6.7	3.2	48.9	0.524	-4
73	Pishin	Balochistan	0.482	49.5	67.8	7.6	2.7	48.9	0.425	10
74	Kashmore	Sindh	0.471	73.3	81.5	5.3	2.4	45.6	0.426	7
75	Mastung	Balochistan	0.459	75.3	85.0	9.1	4.0	23.9	0.485	-1
76	Tank	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.459	66.1	70.1	7.8	2.8	35.4	0.449	2
77	Kamber Shahdadkot	Sindh	0.456	61.8	62.2	6.2	2.3	47.5	0.483	-2
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT										
78	Gawadar	Balochistan	0.443	51.4	74.0	10.6	2.7	28.2	0.442	1
79	Noshki	Balochistan	0.441	52.7	63.5	8.2	2.3	37.9	0.395	7
80	Sibi	Balochistan	0.441	60.9	38.3	6.6	3.5	43.7	0.618	-34
81	Jacobabad	Sindh	0.440	65.0	68.5	5.9	2.5	39.5	0.494	-10
82	Shangla	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.438	48.7	47.4	6.7	1.7	56.5	0.411	3
83	Mirpurkhas	Sindh	0.430	63.9	31.7	6.6	3.5	42.0	0.426	-1
84	Killa Saifullah	Balochistan	0.422	50.0	100.0	6.6	2.5	29.0	0.194	23
85	Lasbela	Balochistan	0.416	49.1	65.4	7.1	2.6	34.1	0.413	-1
86	Khuzdar	Balochistan	0.412	60.5	90.3	8.3	2.6	22.7	0.361	3
87	Badin	Sindh	0.412	73.1	60.2	5.8	2.9	31.1	0.330	10
88	Kalat	Balochistan	0.405	83.5	89.0	9.1	3.1	16.9	0.343	7
89	Loralai	Balochistan	0.381	44.5	99.9	8.7	2.9	17.6	0.361	1
90	Thatta	Sindh	0.377	50.6	74.1	5.9	2.5	26.8	0.314	8
91	Tando Muhammad Khan	Sindh	0.377	62.5	63.6	4.7	2.3	31.4	0.456	-14
92	Upper Dir	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.375	77.4	31.5	8.1	1.8	27.2	0.351	1
93	Musakhail	Balochistan	0.368	38.3	97.9	9.1	2.6	16.8	0.125	18
94	Jaffarabad	Balochistan	0.345	44.1	51.1	5.7	2.0	29.7	0.358	-3
95	Bolan/Kachhi	Balochistan	0.345	59.0	62.8	6.4	2.6	19.5	0.332	1
96	Sujawal	Sindh	0.326	47.7	61.3	5.4	2.4	21.2	..	..
97	Umerkot	Sindh	0.322	67.1	18.0	6.3	2.3	24.4	0.390	-10
98	Naseerabad	Balochistan	0.311	29.8	78.2	5.1	1.7	21.9	0.282	3
99	Ziarat	Balochistan	0.301	33.2	67.3	7.4	2.0	15.6	0.437	-19

TABLE

1

HDI rank		Province/Region[a]	Human Development Index (HDI) Value 2015[b]	Immunisation rate (%) 2015[b]	Satisfaction with health facility (%) 2015[b]	Expected years of schooling (years) 2015[b]	Mean years of schooling (years) 2015[b]	Living Standard (%) 2015[b]	Human Development Index (HDI) Value 2013[b]	Change in rank 2013-2015
VERY LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT										
100	Zhob	Balochistan	0.295	65.9	5.5	8.5	2.0	18.8	0.362	-12
101	Sherani	Balochistan	0.295	55.3	88.6	4.9	2.1	13.3	0.347	-7
102	Kharan	Balochistan	0.290	61.3	24.7	7.2	2.1	16.6	0.291	-3
103	Dera Bugti	Balochistan	0.271	31.6	59.0	4.3	2.1	17.7	0.145	7
104	Kohlu	Balochistan	0.267	30.8	93.8	6.5	2.0	9.6	0.091	10
105	Tor Ghar	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.240	3.0	69.6	6.1	0.9	15.4	0.217	-1
106	Killa Abdullah	Balochistan	0.238	29.6	74.6	4.8	1.1	12.0	0.200	0
107	Barkhan	Balochistan	0.237	67.6	5.7	6.8	1.2	12.7	0.213	-2
108	Kohistan	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.229	21.9	56.9	5.5	1.3	12.5	0.172	0
109	Tharparkar	Sindh	0.227	38.1	57.0	6.4	2.3	7.5	0.257	-6
110	Chaghi	Balochistan	0.210	29.5	65.3	4.3	1.6	8.6	0.165	-1
111	Washuk	Balochistan	0.188	48.8	71.9	4.8	1.4	4.8	0.101	2
112	Harnai	Balochistan	0.184	34.0	58.2	5.2	1.4	5.5	0.260	-10
113	Jhal Magsi	Balochistan	0.183	43.9	32.9	5.5	1.7	6.0	0.286	-13
114	Awaran	Balochistan	0.173	85.2	83.3	5.9	2.5	1.9	0.111	-2
..	Kech/Turbat[c]	Balochistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
..	Panjgur[c]	Balochistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Azad Jammu & Kashmir	High Medium Human Development	0.734	86.7	66.3	12.2	4.8	80.0	0.726	
	Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)	Very low Human Development	0.216	15.7	7.5	6.7	1.8	27.7	..	
	Gilgit-Baltistan	Low Medium Human Development	0.523	73.1	51.4	10.5	3.4	44.2	0.426	
	Balochistan	Low Human Development	0.421	51.0	65.8	7.4	2.6	33.9	0.382	
	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Medium Human Development	0.628	78.0	72.7	9.7	3.3	67.1	0.605	
	Punjab	High Medium Human Development	0.732	89.0	78.3	10.1	4.6	83.0	0.705	
	Sindh	Medium Human Development	0.640	73.0	73.2	8.3	5.1	67.6	0.620	
	Pakistan	**Medium Human Development**	**0.681**	**82.1**	**75.5**	**9.4**	**4.5**	**74.5**	**0.661**	

NOTES

a   For districts, their respective provinces and territories are mentioned. For regions and provinces, levels of human devleopment are identified.

b   Calculations are based on PSLM district level microdata for the year 2014/15. For Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, due to unavailability of PSLM microdata for the year 2014/15, data for the years 2012/13 and 2010/11 are used. For FATA, calculations are based on the FDIHS 2013/14 microdata.
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Average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older, calculated from education attainment levels using official durations of each level.

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Columns 1-7: UNDP calucalultions are based on micro data of PSLM survey for the years 2010/11, 2012/13 and 2014/15, and the FDIHS 2013/14.

Column 8: Calculated based on data in coloumns 1 and 7.

TABLE 1   Human Development Index and its components | 155

1A   Human Development Index and its Components

HDI rank		Human Development Index (HDI) Value 2015[a]	Immunisation rate (%) 2015[a]	Satisfaction with health facility (%) 2015[a]	Expected years of schooling (years) 2015[a]	Mean years of schooling (years) 2015[a]	Living Standard (%) 2015[a]	Human Development Index (HDI) Value 2013[a]	Change in rank 2013-2015	Human Development Status
BALOCHISTAN										
114	Awaran	0.173	85.2	83.3	5.9	2.5	1.9	0.111	-2	Very low Human Development
107	Barkhan	0.237	67.6	5.7	6.8	1.2	12.7	0.213	-2	Very low Human Development
95	Bolan/Kachhi	0.345	59.0	62.8	6.4	2.6	19.5	0.332	1	Low Human Development
110	Chaghi	0.210	29.5	65.3	4.3	1.6	8.6	0.165	-1	Very low Human Development
103	Dera Bugti	0.271	31.6	59.0	4.3	2.1	17.7	0.145	7	Very low Human Development
78	Gawadar	0.443	51.4	74.0	10.6	2.7	28.2	0.442	1	Low Human Development
112	Harnai	0.184	34.0	58.2	5.2	1.4	5.5	0.260	-10	Very low Human Development
94	Jaffarabad	0.345	44.1	51.1	5.7	2.0	29.7	0.358	-3	Low Human Development
113	Jhal Magsi	0.183	43.9	32.9	5.5	1.7	6.0	0.286	-13	Very low Human Development
88	Kalat	0.405	83.5	89.0	9.1	3.1	16.9	0.343	7	Low Human Development
..	Kech/Turbat[b]	..	..	..	..	..	..		..	..
102	Kharan	0.290	61.3	24.7	7.2	2.1	16.6	0.291	-3	Very low Human Development
86	Khuzdar	0.412	60.5	90.3	8.3	2.6	22.7	0.361	3	Low Human Development
106	Killa Abdullah	0.238	29.6	74.6	4.8	1.1	12.0	0.200	0	Very low Human Development
84	Killa Saifullah	0.422	50.0	100.0	6.6	2.5	29.0	0.194	23	Low Human Development
104	Kohlu	0.267	30.8	93.8	6.5	2.0	9.6	0.091	10	Very low Human Development
85	Lasbela	0.416	49.1	65.4	7.1	2.6	34.1	0.413	-1	Low Human Development
89	Loralai	0.381	44.5	99.9	8.7	2.9	17.6	0.361	1	Low Human Development
75	Mastung	0.459	75.3	85.0	9.1	4.0	23.9	0.485	-1	Low Medium Human Development
93	Musakhail	0.368	38.3	97.9	9.1	2.6	16.8	0.125	18	Low Human Development
98	Naseerabad	0.311	29.8	78.2	5.1	1.7	21.9	0.282	3	Low Human Development
79	Noshki	0.441	52.7	63.5	8.2	2.3	37.9	0.395	7	Low Human Development
..	Panjgur[b]	..	..	..	..	..	..		..	..
73	Pishin	0.482	49.5	67.8	7.6	2.7	48.9	0.425	10	Low Medium Human Development
38	Quetta	0.664	64.6	53.8	10.2	4.2	89.7	0.702	-17	Medium Human Development
101	Sherani	0.295	55.3	88.6	4.9	2.1	13.3	0.347	-7	Very low Human Development
80	Sibi	0.441	60.9	38.3	6.6	3.5	43.7	0.618	-34	Low Human Development
111	Washuk	0.188	48.8	71.9	4.8	1.4	4.8	0.101	2	Very low Human Development
100	Zhob	0.295	65.9	5.5	8.5	2.0	18.8	0.362	-12	Very low Human Development
99	Ziarat	0.301	33.2	67.3	7.4	2.0	15.6	0.437	-19	Low Human Development
ISLAMABAD CAPITAL TERRITORY										
2	Islamabad	0.875	85.2	77.7	12.6	8.2	99.1	0.891	-1	High Human Development
KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA										
13	Abbottabad	0.761	94.3	70.7	12.0	4.8	83.7	0.768	-2	High Medium Human Development
55	Bannu	0.613	57.4	66.6	9.4	4.0	72.7	0.551	3	Medium Human Development
70	Battagram	0.505	51.1	56.0	7.9	1.8	68.0	0.532	-7	Low Medium Human Development
66	Buner	0.528	78.0	83.0	8.9	1.5	49.4	0.543	-5	Low Medium Human Development
36	Charsadda	0.666	98.5	80.4	9.7	2.9	70.5	0.635	4	Medium Human Development
35	Chitral	0.674	97.8	64.1	11.1	3.6	69.1	0.637	3	Medium Human Development
71	Dera Ismail Khan	0.496	64.5	56.2	7.6	3.0	50.1	0.489	2	Low Medium Human Development
57	Hangu	0.594	75.4	73.4	8.7	1.9	72.9	0.561	-1	Low Medium Human Development
18	Haripur	0.732	82.1	60.2	11.9	4.8	86.6	0.702	2	High Medium Human Development
54	Karak	0.615	62.7	58.8	10.4	4.2	68.5	0.588	-4	Medium Human Development
45	Kohat	0.650	83.5	79.2	9.9	3.3	68.1	0.560	12	Medium Human Development
108	Kohistan	0.229	21.9	56.9	5.5	1.3	12.5	0.172	0	Very low Human Development
59	Lakki Marwat	0.577	49.2	70.3	9.5	3.9	62.8	0.489	13	Low Medium Human Development
56	Lower Dir	0.600	84.1	58.7	10.9	2.8	59.8	0.549	4	Medium Human Development
32	Malakand	0.690	94.8	59.7	11.7	3.7	73.6	0.640	5	Medium Human Development
34	Mansehra	0.676	77.3	66.0	10.8	3.8	78.1	0.609	13	Medium Human Development
29	Mardan	0.703	90.4	87.9	10.4	3.3	76.8	0.647	7	High Medium Human Development
31	Nowshera	0.697	84.4	80.4	10.3	3.2	81.6	0.696	-9	Medium Human Development

HDI rank		Human Development Index (HDI) value 2015[a]	Immunisation rate (%) 2015[a]	Satisfaction with health facility (%) 2015[a]	Expected years of schooling (years) 2015[a]	Mean years of schooling (years) 2015[a]	Living Standard (%) 2015[a]	Human Development Index (HDI) Value 2013[a]	Change in rank 2013-2015	Human Development Status
KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA										
14	Peshawar	0.756	94.8	83.5	10.3	4.8	82.6	0.761	1	High Medium Human Development
82	Shangla	0.438	48.7	47.4	6.7	1.7	56.5	0.411	3	Low Human Development
44	Swabi	0.654	87.1	63.9	10.4	2.7	76.9	0.657	-12	Medium Human Development
52	Swat	0.618	88.8	70.9	9.6	2.8	64.3	0.551	7	Medium Human Development
76	Tank	0.459	66.1	70.1	7.8	2.8	35.4	0.449	2	Low Medium Human Development
105	Tor Ghar	0.240	3.0	69.6	6.1	0.9	15.4	0.217	-1	Very low Human Development
92	Upper Dir	0.375	77.4	31.5	8.1	1.8	27.2	0.351	1	Low Human Development
PUNJAB										
9	Attock	0.786	96.7	75.8	11.9	4.7	88.4	0.762	4	High Medium Human Development
49	Bahawalnagar	0.630	78.7	71.9	8.8	3.0	75.5	0.635	-8	Medium Human Development
46	Bahawalpur	0.645	83.5	86.4	7.7	3.1	77.5	0.629	-4	Medium Human Development
50	Bhakkar	0.628	86.8	49.2	9.5	3.2	76.6	0.587	1	Medium Human Development
8	Chakwal	0.792	96.2	81.5	11.9	4.9	87.2	0.788	-1	High Medium Human Development
42	Chiniot	0.657	90.4	82.4	9.0	3.0	72.4	0.677	-13	Medium Human Development
64	Dera Ghazi Khan	0.535	74.8	69.9	7.5	2.6	55.4	0.504	5	Low Medium Human Development
10	Faisalabad	0.782	88.2	84.5	10.8	5.2	89.4	0.775	-2	High Medium Human Development
11	Gujranwala	0.769	90.9	65.8	11.5	5.2	90.0	0.774	-2	High Medium Human Development
7	Gujrat	0.795	92.5	71.7	12.3	5.3	90.8	0.792	-1	High Medium Human Development
28	Hafizabad	0.705	96.7	69.7	10.5	3.7	78.6	0.693	-3	High Medium Human Development
33	Jhang	0.682	89.1	77.5	9.6	3.6	75.9	0.636	6	Medium Human Development
6	Jhelum	0.829	98.0	73.2	12.8	6.1	90.6	0.811	-1	High Human Development
24	Kasur	0.714	86.3	74.4	10.9	3.7	82.7	0.695	-1	High Medium Human Development
30	Khanewal	0.699	95.1	81.1	9.0	3.6	80.4	0.651	4	Medium Human Development
26	Khushab	0.706	90.6	78.6	10.4	3.7	78.4	0.650	9	High Medium Human Development
1	Lahore	0.877	89.5	85.8	12.2	7.5	98.9	0.858	2	High Human Development
19	Layyah	0.729	89.4	86.7	10.4	3.8	82.4	0.682	9	High Medium Human Development
41	Lodhran	0.659	94.8	79.7	8.2	3.1	76.9	0.629	2	Medium Human Development
23	Mandi Bahauddin	0.716	91.6	73.0	11.4	3.9	77.5	0.738	-6	High Medium Human Development
47	Mianwali	0.645	89.8	50.5	9.9	3.7	74.5	0.655	-14	Medium Human Development
21	Multan	0.718	92.2	81.4	8.9	4.3	83.3	0.693	3	High Medium Human Development
58	Muzaffargarh	0.584	88.2	73.5	7.7	2.5	64.9	0.564	-4	Low Medium Human Development
16	Nankana Sahib	0.740	95.7	77.9	11.1	4.8	76.5	0.762	-4	High Medium Human Development
15	Narowal	0.748	98.6	64.5	11.6	4.6	83.5	0.706	4	High Medium Human Development
27	Okara	0.705	90.5	75.9	9.7	3.5	84.3	0.667	3	High Medium Human Development
39	Pakpattan	0.660	93.9	69.2	9.1	2.9	78.2	0.629	5	Medium Human Development
51	Rahimyar Khan	0.625	83.4	85.3	7.2	2.9	75.2	0.585	1	Medium Human Development
69	Rajanpur	0.506	90.7	65.2	7.1	2.0	48.9	0.481	7	Low Medium Human Development
3	Rawalpindi	0.871	92.4	84.5	12.7	7.4	94.0	0.826	1	High Human Development
25	Sahiwal	0.710	91.1	62.3	10.2	4.0	86.2	0.691	2	High Medium Human Development
20	Sargodha	0.728	90.8	70.9	10.6	4.3	83.7	0.692	6	High Medium Human Development
17	Sheikhupura	0.738	86.4	75.2	10.8	4.3	86.1	0.760	-1	High Medium Human Development
5	Sialkot	0.834	93.7	80.6	12.3	5.9	94.6	0.770	5	High Human Development
12	Toba Tek Singh	0.763	91.3	75.4	11.2	4.6	88.2	0.720	6	High Medium Human Development
43	Vehari	0.655	92.5	79.2	8.8	2.8	75.7	0.661	-12	Medium Human Development
SINDH										
87	Badin	0.412	73.1	60.2	5.8	2.9	31.1	0.330	10	Low Human Development
48	Dadu	0.632	82.9	49.0	9.3	5.0	68.5	0.591	1	Medium Human Development
68	Ghotki	0.514	62.0	75.8	5.7	2.9	59.4	0.537	-6	Low Medium Human Development
22	Hyderabad	0.716	84.5	73.6	8.5	5.4	84.5	0.762	-8	High Medium Human Development
81	Jacobabad	0.440	65.0	68.5	5.9	2.5	39.5	0.494	-10	Low Human Development
60	Jamshoro	0.572	81.7	55.7	8.0	3.0	65.8	0.529	4	Low Medium Human Development

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77	Kamber Shahdadkot	0.456	61.8	62.2	6.2	2.3	47.5	0.483	-2	Low Medium Human Development
4	Karachi	0.854	80.2	82.5	11.8	7.7	98.5	0.867	-2	High Human Development
74	Kashmore	0.471	73.3	81.5	5.3	2.4	45.6	0.426	7	Low Medium Human Development
63	Khairpur	0.556	79.7	49.3	8.2	3.6	58.3	0.528	3	Low Medium Human Development
53	Larkana	0.618	70.2	60.5	8.4	4.2	74.0	0.581	0	Medium Human Development
62	Matiari	0.569	86.6	75.6	7.0	3.6	54.7	0.562	-7	Low Medium Human Development
83	Mirpurkhas	0.430	63.9	31.7	6.6	3.5	42.0	0.426	-1	Low Human Development
37	Naushehro Feroze	0.665	70.7	69.7	9.8	5.1	72.2	0.594	11	Medium Human Development
61	Nawabshah/ Shaheed Benazir Abad	0.572	76.1	67.7	7.7	3.4	60.9	0.503	9	Low Medium Human Development
72	Sanghar	0.491	65.2	61.9	6.7	3.2	48.9	0.524	-4	Low Medium Human Development
67	Shikarpur	0.520	64.5	75.9	6.2	3.2	54.8	0.529	-2	Low Medium Human Development
96	Sujawal	0.326	47.7	61.3	5.4	2.4	21.2	..	..	Low Human Development
40	Sukkur	0.659	79.6	73.5	8.0	4.8	73.5	0.622	5	Medium Human Development
65	Tando Allahyar	0.528	84.8	69.5	6.2	2.8	54.8	0.526	2	Low Medium Human Development
91	Tando Muhammad Khan	0.377	62.5	63.6	4.7	2.3	31.4	0.456	-14	Low Human Development
109	Tharparkar	0.227	38.1	57.0	6.4	2.3	7.5	0.257	-6	Very low Human Development
90	Thatta	0.377	50.6	74.1	5.9	2.5	26.8	0.314	8	Low Human Development
97	Umerkot	0.322	67.1	18.0	6.3	2.3	24.4	0.390	-10	Low Human Development
	Azad Jammu & Kashmir	0.734	86.7	66.3	12.2	4.8	80.0	0.726		High Medium Human Development
	Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)	0.216	15.7	7.5	6.7	1.8	27.7	--		Very low Human Development
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	Sindh	0.640	73.0	73.2	8.3	5.1	67.6	0.620		Medium Human Development
	Pakistan	**0.681**	**82.1**	**75.5**	**9.4**	**4.5**	**74.5**	**0.661**		**Medium Human Development**

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2 Human Development Index trends, 2005–2015

			Human Development Index (HDI)						HDI Rank Change Since	
									Two Year Change	Decade Change
HDI rank		Province/Region	2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015 [a]	2013-2015	2005-2015 [b]
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT										
1	Lahore	Punjab	0.811	0.804	0.834	0.824	0.858	0.877	2	2
2	Islamabad	Islamabad Capital Territory	0.820	0.922	0.853	0.849	0.891	0.875	-1	-1
3	Rawalpindi	Punjab	0.716	0.827	0.802	0.791	0.826	0.871	1	2
4	Karachi	Sindh	0.812	0.819	0.852	0.864	0.867	0.854	-2	-2
5	Sialkot	Punjab	0.733	0.702	0.744	0.770	0.770	0.834	5	-1
6	Jhelum	Punjab	0.675	0.738	0.778	0.694	0.811	0.829	-1	3
HIGH MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT										
7	Gujrat	Punjab	0.656	0.725	0.745	0.705	0.792	0.795	-1	3
8	Chakwal	Punjab	0.680	0.718	0.754	0.765	0.788	0.792	-1	-1
9	Attock	Punjab	0.584	0.726	0.690	0.612	0.762	0.786	4	9
10	Faisalabad	Punjab	0.644	0.694	0.671	0.710	0.775	0.782	-2	1
11	Gujranwala	Punjab	0.691	0.716	0.741	0.758	0.774	0.769	-2	-5
12	Toba Tek Singh	Punjab	0.616	0.681	0.703	0.697	0.720	0.763	6	1
13	Abbottabad	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.604	0.651	0.692	0.688	0.768	0.761	-2	2
14	Peshawar	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.579	0.607	0.662	0.695	0.761	0.756	1	5
15	Narowal	Punjab	0.560	0.592	0.611	0.673	0.706	0.748	4	5
16	Nankana Sahib	Punjab	..	..	0.696	0.679	0.762	0.740	-4	..
17	Sheikhupura	Punjab	0.611	0.663	0.721	0.713	0.760	0.738	-1	-3
18	Haripur	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.552	0.603	0.684	0.731	0.702	0.732	2	5
19	Layyah	Punjab	0.520	0.594	0.567	0.571	0.682	0.729	9	14
20	Sargodha	Punjab	0.542	0.578	0.599	0.602	0.692	0.728	6	7
21	Multan	Punjab	0.555	0.572	0.609	0.634	0.693	0.718	3	1
22	Hyderabad	Sindh	0.587	0.641	0.760	0.746	0.762	0.716	-8	-5
23	Mandi Bahauddin	Punjab	0.511	0.652	0.666	0.655	0.738	0.716	-6	14
24	Kasur	Punjab	0.550	0.599	0.660	0.633	0.695	0.714	-1	0
25	Sahiwal	Punjab	0.593	0.626	0.624	0.617	0.691	0.710	2	-9
26	Khushab	Punjab	0.489	0.598	0.618	0.630	0.650	0.706	9	16
27	Okara	Punjab	0.466	0.513	0.617	0.607	0.667	0.705	3	21
28	Hafizabad	Punjab	0.494	0.563	0.611	0.658	0.693	0.705	-3	13
29	Mardan	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.501	0.565	0.583	0.580	0.647	0.703	7	10
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT										
30	Khanewal	Punjab	0.543	0.538	0.600	0.569	0.651	0.699	4	-4
31	Nowshera	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.544	0.647	0.643	0.610	0.696	0.697	-9	-6
32	Malakand	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.396	0.488	0.532	0.576	0.640	0.690	5	33
33	Jhang	Punjab	0.472	0.516	0.586	0.545	0.636	0.682	6	12
34	Mansehra	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.429	0.495	0.570	0.580	0.609	0.676	13	22
35	Chitral	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.404	0.431	0.386	0.515	0.637	0.674	3	27
36	Charsadda	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.441	0.507	0.520	0.580	0.635	0.666	4	18
37	Naushehro Feroze	Sindh	0.513	0.555	0.680	0.506	0.594	0.665	11	-3
38	Quetta	Balochistan	0.677	0.685	0.724	0.767	0.702	0.664	-17	-30
39	Pakpattan	Punjab	0.512	0.539	0.559	0.481	0.629	0.660	5	-3
40	Sukkur	Sindh	0.629	0.564	0.563	0.576	0.622	0.659	5	-28
41	Lodhran	Punjab	0.445	0.477	0.545	0.500	0.629	0.659	2	11
42	Chiniot	Punjab	..	..	..	0.555	0.677	0.657	-13	..
43	Vehari	Punjab	0.522	0.558	0.625	0.535	0.661	0.655	-12	-11
44	Swabi	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.526	0.511	0.566	0.632	0.657	0.654	-12	-14
45	Kohat	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.482	0.547	0.566	0.549	0.560	0.650	12	-1
46	Bahawalpur	Punjab	0.488	0.550	0.577	0.531	0.629	0.645	-4	-3
47	Mianwali	Punjab	0.530	0.577	0.568	0.560	0.655	0.645	-14	-18
48	Dadu	Sindh	0.385	0.418	0.574	0.539	0.591	0.632	1	19
49	Bahawalnagar	Punjab	0.542	0.553	0.565	0.547	0.635	0.630	-8	-21
50	Bhakkar	Punjab	0.451	0.495	0.462	0.490	0.587	0.628	1	1

TABLE 2   Human Development Index trends, 2005–2015 | **159**

2 Human Development Index trends, 2005–2015

| HDI rank | Province/Region | Human Development Index (HDI) | | | | | | HDI Rank Change Since | |
| | | | | | | | | Two Year Change | Decade Change |
		2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015 [a]	2013-2015	2005-2015 [b]
51 Rahimyar Khan	Punjab	0.513	0.512	0.540	0.547	0.585	0.625	1	-16
52 Swat	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.454	0.576	0.449	0.520	0.551	0.618	7	-2
53 Larkana	Sindh	0.413	0.465	0.597	0.516	0.581	0.618	0	6
54 Karak	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.401	0.475	0.474	0.404	0.588	0.615	-4	9
55 Bannu	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.456	0.498	0.522	0.530	0.551	0.613	3	-6
56 Lower Dir	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.499	0.443	0.428	0.598	0.549	0.600	4	-16
LOW MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT									
57 Hangu	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.505	0.512	0.535	0.519	0.561	0.594	-1	-19
58 Muzaffargarh	Punjab	0.391	0.380	0.500	0.421	0.564	0.584	-4	8
59 Lakki Marwat	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.397	0.403	0.440	0.426	0.489	0.577	13	5
60 Jamshoro	Sindh	..	..	0.442	0.470	0.529	0.572	4	..
61 Nawabshah/ Shaheed Benazir Abad	Sindh	0.441	0.414	0.437	0.474	0.503	0.572	9	-8
62 Matiari	Sindh	..	..	0.563	0.519	0.562	0.569	-7	..
63 Khairpur	Sindh	0.470	0.468	0.535	0.474	0.528	0.556	3	-17
64 Dera Ghazi Khan	Punjab	0.425	0.491	0.414	0.417	0.504	0.535	5	-7
65 Tando Allahyar	Sindh	..	..	0.546	0.471	0.526	0.528	2	..
66 Buner	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.354	0.473	0.515	0.437	0.543	0.528	-5	4
67 Shikarpur	Sindh	0.559	0.398	0.520	0.475	0.529	0.520	-2	-46
68 Ghotki	Sindh	0.526	0.408	0.470	0.486	0.537	0.514	-6	-37
69 Rajanpur	Punjab	0.441	0.348	0.347	0.399	0.481	0.506	7	-14
70 Battagram	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.380	0.401	0.553	0.576	0.532	0.505	-7	-2
71 Dera Ismail Khan	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.405	0.354	0.414	0.374	0.489	0.496	2	-10
72 Sanghar	Sindh	0.406	0.425	0.477	0.454	0.524	0.491	-4	-12
73 Pishin	Balochistan	0.277	0.300	0.407	0.583	0.425	0.482	10	9
74 Kashmore	Sindh	..	..	0.431	0.415	0.426	0.471	7	..
75 Mastung	Balochistan	0.328	0.442	0.277	0.435	0.485	0.459	-1	-1
76 Tank	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.332	0.346	0.370	0.361	0.449	0.459	2	-3
77 Kamber Shahdadkot	Sindh	..	..	0.458	0.439	0.483	0.456	-2	..
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT									
78 Gawadar	Balochistan	0.365	0.391	0.471	0.386	0.442	0.443	1	-9
79 Noshki	Balochistan	..	..	0.325	0.284	0.395	0.441	7	..
80 Sibi	Balochistan	0.340	0.339	0.412	0.633	0.618	0.441	-34	-8
81 Jacobabad	Sindh	0.347	0.243	0.378	0.330	0.494	0.440	-10	-10
82 Shangla	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.301	0.366	0.377	0.437	0.411	0.438	3	-4
83 Mirpurkhas	Sindh	0.467	0.413	0.451	0.515	0.426	0.430	-1	-36
84 Killa Saifullah	Balochistan	0.108	0.204	0.227	0.270	0.194	0.422	23	14
85 Lasbela	Balochistan	0.287	0.313	0.336	0.336	0.413	0.416	-1	-6
86 Khuzdar	Balochistan	0.218	0.255	0.214	0.342	0.361	0.412	3	0
87 Badin	Sindh	0.419	0.286	0.361	0.341	0.330	0.412	10	-29
88 Kalat	Balochistan	0.220	0.333	0.250	0.301	0.343	0.405	7	-3
89 Loralai	Balochistan	0.218	0.245	0.229	0.229	0.361	0.381	1	-2
90 Thatta	Sindh	0.302	0.268	0.374	0.335	0.314	0.377	8	-14
91 Tando Muhammad Khan	Sindh	..	..	0.435	0.351	0.456	0.377	-14	..
92 Upper Dir	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.280	0.297	0.340	0.417	0.351	0.375	1	-11
93 Musakhail	Balochistan	0.121	0.167	0.106	0.030	0.125	0.368	18	4
94 Jaffarabad	Balochistan	0.301	0.281	0.334	0.249	0.358	0.345	-3	-17
95 Bolan/Kachhi	Balochistan	0.280	0.236	0.174	0.367	0.332	0.345	1	-15
96 Sujawal	Sindh	..	..	..	..	..	0.326	..	..
97 Umerkot	Sindh	..	..	..	0.409	0.390	0.322	-10	..
98 Naseerabad	Balochistan	0.208	0.153	0.245	0.237	0.282	0.311	3	-10
99 Ziarat	Balochistan	0.269	0.283	0.265	0.409	0.437	0.301	-19	-16

TABLE

2

| HDI rank | Province/Region | Human Development Index (HDI) | | | | | | HDI Rank Change Since | |
| | | | | | | | | Two Year Change | Decade Change |
		2005	2007	2009	2011	2013	2015 [a]	2013-2015	2005-2015 [b]
VERY LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT									
100	Zhob	Balochistan	0.204	0.316	0.366	0.318	0.362	0.295	-12	-10
101	Sherani	Balochistan	..	..	..	0.246	0.347	0.295	-7	..
102	Kharan	Balochistan	0.142	0.223	0.225	0.266	0.291	0.290	-3	-6
103	Dera Bugti	Balochistan	..	0.126	0.183	0.069	0.145	0.271	7	..
104	Kohlu	Balochistan	..	0.179	0.142	0.202	0.091	0.267	10	..
105	Tor Ghar	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	..	..	..	..	0.217	0.240	-1	..
106	Killa Abdullah	Balochistan	0.206	0.153	0.228	0.414	0.200	0.238	0	-17
107	Barkhan	Balochistan	0.172	0.260	0.226	0.208	0.213	0.237	-2	-15
108	Kohistan	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.155	0.168	0.188	0.137	0.172	0.229	0	-15
109	Tharparkar	Sindh	0.303	0.164	0.185	0.203	0.257	0.227	-6	-34
110	Chaghi	Balochistan	0.143	0.201	0.158	0.187	0.165	0.210	-1	-15
111	Washuk	Balochistan	..	..	0.099	0.135	0.101	0.188	2	..
112	Harnai	Balochistan	..	..	..	0.211	0.260	0.184	-10	..
113	Jhal Magsi	Balochistan	0.149	0.180	0.182	0.153	0.286	0.183	-13	-19
114	Awaran	Balochistan	0.067	0.000	0.240	0.127	0.111	0.173	-2	-15
..	Kech/Turbat	Balochistan	0.196	0.274	0.321	0.273	0.357	..	..	-1
..	Panjgur	Balochistan	0.239	0.157	0.334	0.225	..	..	..	-23
Azad Jammu & Kashmir		..	0.459	..	0.726	0.734	..		
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)		..	..	..	..	..	0.216		
Gilgit-Baltistan		..	0.406	..	0.426	0.523	..		
Balochistan		0.294	0.350	0.337	0.383	0.382	0.421		
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa		0.463	0.513	0.515	0.555	0.605	0.628		
Punjab		0.583	0.630	0.648	0.643	0.705	0.732		
Sindh		0.559	0.560	0.586	0.599	0.620	0.640		
Pakistan		**0.547**	**0.584**	**0.600**	**0.608**	**0.660**	**0.681**		

NOTES

a Calculations are based on different waves of PSLM survey at district level. For FATA calculations are based on the FDIHS 2013/14 microdata.

b Calculations are based on PSLM microdata for the years 2012/13 and 2004/05 due to unavailability of the latest data for Ketch/Turbat. For Panjgur, PSLM microdata for the years 2010/11 and 2004/05 are used due to unavailability of data for the recent surveys.

MAIN DATA SOURCES

Columns 1-6: UNDP calculations based on micro data of PSLM survey for the years 2004/05, 2006/07, 2008/09, 2010/11, 2012/13, and 2014/15, and FDIHS 2013/14.

Column 7: Calculated based on columns 5 and 6.

Column 8: Calculated based on columns 1 and 6.

TABLE 2   Human Development Index trends, 2005–2015 | **161**

3 Youth Development Index and its components

YDI rank	Youth Development Index Value 2015	Youth mean years of schooling[a] (years) 2015	Youth literacy rate[a] (%) 2015	Youth secondary enrolment rate[a] (%) 2015	Youth labour force participation rate[b] (%) 2015	Ratio of total unemployment rate to youth unemployment rate[b] Ratio 2015	Youth social participation rate[c] (%) 2015	Youth political participation rate[c] (%) 2015	Percentage of youth with knowledge of AIDS[d] (%) 2013	Youth physical activity rate[c] (%) 2015
HIGH YOUTH DEVELOPMENT										
1 Azad Jammu & Kashmir	0.630	7.7	86.9	52.0	45.2	0.648	5.7	66.1	43.8	71.2
2 Eastern Punjab	0.611	7.7	84.3	51.8	50.0	0.656	9.3	53.3	49.8	42.5
3 Islamabad	0.609	9.3	94.5	65.2	45.2	0.648	1.4	55.6	80.1	57.8
4 Northern Punjab	0.607	8.6	90.5	62.4	50.0	0.656	3.0	61.5	49.8	49.5
MEDIUM YOUTH DEVELOPMENT										
5 Karachi & Hyderabad	0.595	8.5	86.8	65.4	44.4	0.702	11.1	54.0	39.9	33.9
6 Central Punjab	0.563	6.4	73.9	40.3	50.0	0.656	6.3	53.7	49.8	43.8
7 Western Punjab	0.528	4.7	57.8	27.9	50.0	0.656	5.0	66.1	49.8	35.5
8 Southeastern Punjab	0.518	4.9	60.9	27.9	50.0	0.656	4.5	63.8	49.8	31.7
9 Eastern Sindh	0.503	4.9	55.5	31.7	44.4	0.702	7.0	64.9	39.9	29.0
LOW YOUTH DEVELOPMENT										
10 Western Sindh	0.475	4.5	52.5	28.1	44.4	0.702	4.5	62.4	39.9	31.3
11 Gilgit-Baltistan	0.454	6.4	70.0	46.1	45.2	0.648	1.0	50.7	20.6	50.5
12 Southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.423	5.6	61.2	40.8	36.8	0.631	2.8	48.9	32.5	38.2
13 Central Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.412	5.9	64.7	42.2	36.8	0.631	4.0	40.6	32.5	36.1
VERY LOW YOUTH DEVELOPMENT										
14 Federally Administered Tribal Areas	0.392	3.5	39.9	13.5	40.4	0.680	1.2	53.7	32.5	50.5
15 Southeastern Balochistan	0.390	4.0	51.4	25.6	44.4	0.575	4.5	48.6	25.7	25.8
16 Northern Balochistan	0.380	4.0	51.1	25.2	44.4	0.575	2.2	51.0	25.7	27.7
17 Northern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.360	5.7	63.5	39.2	36.8	0.631	1.3	37.7	32.5	31.6
18 Central Balochistan	0.343	3.7	46.4	23.8	44.4	0.575	0.4	47.2	25.7	25.4
Azad Jammu & Kashmir	0.630	7.7	86.9	52.0	45.2	0.648	5.7	66.1	43.8	71.2
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)	0.392	3.5	39.9	13.5	40.4	0.680	1.2	53.7	32.5	50.5
Gilgit-Baltistan	0.454	6.4	70.0	46.1	45.2	0.648	1.0	50.7	20.6	50.5
Balochistan	0.373	3.9	50.0	24.9	44.4	0.575	2.3	49.3	25.7	26.5
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.394	5.7	63.5	40.6	36.8	0.631	2.6	41.3	32.5	34.5
Punjab	0.570	6.5	73.6	41.6	50.0	0.656	6.4	58.3	49.8	39.8
Sindh	0.538	6.3	67.7	44.7	44.4	0.702	8.1	59.3	39.9	31.8
Pakistan	**0.526**	**6.2**	**69.7**	**41.5**	**45.2**	**0.648**	**5.9**	**56.1**	**43.8**	**37.8**

NOTES

a Calculations are based on PSLM district level micro data for the year 2014/15, which is further aggregated at regional level. For Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Jammu Kashmir, due to unavailability of PSLM micro data for the year 2014/15 data, PSLM data for the year 2012/13 is used instead.

b Calculations are based on LFS micro data for the year 2014/15 at provincial level. For FATA, micro data of the FDIHS 2013/14 is used. National values from the LFS 2014/15 are imputed for the regions not covered in these surveys.

c Calculations are based on the NYPS 2015 at regional level.

d Calculations are based on the PDHS 2012/13 at provincial level.

DEFINITIONS

Youth Development Index (YDI)
A composite index measuring average achievement in four diemsions of youth development -- health, knowledge, engagement, and employment. See Technical Notes(this report) for details on how the HDI is calculated.

Youth Mean Years of Schooling
Average number of years of education received by people between 15 and 29 years of age, calculated from education attainment levels using official durations of each level.

Youth Literacy Rate
Percentage of literate youth.

Youth Secondary Enrolment Rate
Percentage of youth who have reached (but not necessarily completed) a secondary level of education.

Youth Labour Force Participation Rate
Percentage of youth who are either employed or unemployed.

Ratio of Total Unemployment Rate to Youth Unemployment Rate
Ratio of unemployment rate among the population 15 years or above to youth unemployment rate.

Youth Social Participation Rate
Percentage of youth with membership of any social organization and participation in the activities of that group at least once in a month.

Youth Political Participation Rate
Percentage of youth who voted in the past or wish to vote in the future.

Percentage of Youth With Knowledge of AIDS
Percentage of youth who had ever heard of AIDS.

Youth Physical Activity Rate
Percentage of youth involved in any physical activity at least once a week.

MAIN DATA SOURCES

Column 1: UNDP calculations based on microdata of the NYPS, PSLM survey for the years 2014/15 and 2012/13, the LFS 2014/15, the FDIHS 2013/14, the NYPS 2015 and the PDHS 2012/13.
Columns 2, 3 and 4: PSLM 2014/15.
Columns 5 and 6: LFS 2014/15 and FDIHS 2013/14.
Columns 7, 8 and 10: NYPS 2015.
Columns 9: PDHS 2012/13.

TABLE

3

Regions

Azad Jammu & Kashmir, Federally Administrated Tribal Areas, Gilgit-Baltistan, Islamabad

Central Balochistan	Bolan/Kachhi, Jhal Magsi, Naseerabad, Jaffarabad, Chaghi, Mastung, Kalat, Kharan, Noshki
Northern Balochistan	Quetta, Killa Abdullah, Killa Saifullah, Musakhail, Barkhan, Ziarat, Pishin, Loralai, Zhob, Kohlu, Dera Bugti, Sibi, Sherani, Harnai
Southeastern Balochistan	Awaran, Lasbela, Panjgur, Gawadar, Khuzdar, Washuk, Kech/Turbat
Central Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Peshawar, Nowshehra, Mardan, Swabi, Charsadda
Northern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Buner, Kohistan, Malakand, Shangla, Chitral, Battagram, Swat, Mansehra, Abbottabad, Lower Dir, Haripur, Upper Dir, Tor Ghar
Southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Kohat, Karak, Bannu, Hangu, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Tank
Central Punjab	Sargodha, Khushab, Faisalabad, Jhang, Toba Tek Singh, Okara, Chiniot
Eastern Punjab	Hafizabad, Narowal, Sheikhupura, Nankana Sahib, Gujrat, Kasur, Mandi Bahauddin, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Lahore
Northern Punjab	Attock, Jhelum, Chakwal, Rawalpindi
Southeastern Punjab	Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur, Sahiwal, Lodhran, Rahimyar Khan, Vehari, Multan, Khanewal, Pakpattan
Western Punjab	Mianwali, Bhakkar, Dera Ghazi Khan, Layyah, Rajanpur, Muzaffargarh
Eastern Sindh	Sukkur, Khairpur, Nawabshah/ Shaheed Benazir Abad, Tharparkar, Naushehro Feroze, Ghotki, Umerkot, Mirpurkhas, Sanghar, Matiari, Tando Allahyar, Tando Muhammad Khan
Karachi & Hyderabad	Karachi, Hyderabad
Western Sindh	Jamshoro, Dadu, Kashmore, Jacobabad, Kamber Shahdadkot, Thatta, Badin, Shikarpur, Larkana, Sujawal

TABLE 3   Youth Development Index and its components | **163**

4   Youth Gender Inequality Index and its components

YGII rank		Youth Gender Inequality Index Value 2015	Youth physical activity rate[a] (%)		Percentage of youth with knowledge of AIDS[a] (%)		Youth secondary enrolment rate[b] (%)		Youth political participation rate[a] (%)		Youth labour force participation rate[c] (%)		Youth Development Index rank 2015
			Female 2015	Male 2015	Female 2013	Male 2013	Female 2015	Male 2015	Female 2015	Male 2015	Female 2015	Male 2015	
1	Azad Jammu & Kashmir	0.085	64.6	77.7	41.0	63.0	48.0	58.9	63.5	69.3	23.0	70.7	1
2	Central Punjab	0.086	28.6	57.4	46.9	71.9	38.0	43.0	45.3	62.7	28.9	73.2	6
3	Eastern Punjab	0.103	21.2	62.3	46.9	71.9	55.5	52.1	40.9	67.3	28.9	73.2	2
4	Islamabad	0.114	25.0	89.3	78.5	91.7	65.4	65.0	51.9	60.6	23.0	70.7	3
5	Northern Punjab	0.114	19.6	76.6	46.9	71.9	61.9	63.0	53.7	71.8	28.9	73.2	4
6	Southeastern Punjab	0.129	11.4	48.9	46.9	71.9	24.0	32.1	54.5	73.6	28.9	73.2	8
7	Western Punjab	0.140	10.9	56.0	46.9	71.9	21.3	34.7	62.6	70.0	28.9	73.2	7
8	Eastern Sindh	0.213	9.6	48.1	38.6	46.5	19.3	42.4	63.8	65.7	15.1	71.0	9
9	Karachi & Hyderabad	0.217	8.3	56.4	38.6	46.5	66.9	64.1	41.4	67.5	15.1	71.0	5
10	Western Sindh	0.240	6.7	49.8	38.6	46.5	18.4	36.8	56.6	68.7	15.1	71.0	10
11	Gilgit-Baltistan	0.285	7.2	87.8	16.7	56.8	38.9	54.4	38.6	61.8	23.0	70.7	11
12	Southeastern Balochistan	0.288	7.6	45.5	19.6	70.3	11.2	37.1	37.4	66.1	20.7	65.1	15
13	Northern Balochistan	0.301	6.2	49.2	19.6	70.3	11.2	36.2	40.2	64.0	20.7	65.1	16
14	Central Balochistan	0.321	6.4	43.9	19.6	70.3	9.2	35.7	30.0	68.1	20.7	65.1	18
15	Central Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.338	8.7	60.6	28.8	63.1	26.4	57.8	17.9	68.0	13.4	63.1	13
16	Southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.339	10.4	59.8	28.8	63.1	22.3	60.3	20.4	77.8	13.4	63.1	12
17	Northern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.355	8.6	53.0	28.8	63.1	26.1	53.5	11.5	70.0	13.4	63.1	17
18	Federally Administered Tribal Areas	0.362	11.4	84.9	41.0	63.0	2.9	21.4	34.6	79.5	13.1	60.6	14
	Azad Jammu & Kashmir	0.085	64.6	77.7	41.0	63.0	48.0	58.9	63.5	69.3	23.0	70.7	
	Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)	0.362	11.4	84.9	41.0	63.0	2.9	21.4	34.6	79.5	13.1	60.6	
	Gilgit-Baltistan	0.285	7.2	87.8	16.7	56.8	38.9	54.4	38.6	61.8	23.0	70.7	
	Balochistan	0.302	6.6	46.7	19.6	70.3	10.7	36.3	36.4	65.8	20.7	65.1	
	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.344	9.0	57.0	28.8	63.1	25.4	56.6	15.7	71.2	13.4	63.1	
	Punjab	0.104	18.9	58.4	46.9	71.9	40.6	42.5	49.0	68.7	28.9	73.2	
	Sindh	0.147	8.4	52.2	38.6	46.5	38.9	49.9	51.2	67.2	25.1	71.0	
	Pakistan	**0.153**	**11.6**	**49.2**	**41.0**	**63.0**	**37.0**	**46.0**	**44.7**	**68.6**	**23.0**	**70.7**	

NOTES

[a] Calculations are based on the NYPS 2015 at regional level.

[b] Calculations are based on PSLM district level microdata for the year 2014/15, which is further aggregated at regional level. For Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, due to unavailability of PSLM microdata for the year 2014/15 data, PSLM data for the year 2012/13 is used instead.

[c] Calculations are based on LFS microdata for the year 2014/15 at provincial level. For FATA, micro data of the FDIHS 2013/14 is used. National values from the LFS 2014/15 are imputed for the regions not covered in these surveys.

DEFINITIONS

Youth Gender Inequality Index (YGII)
A composite index measuring gender-based disadvantage in three dimensions: health, empowerment and the labour market. See Technical Note 3 for details on how the YGII is calculated.

Youth Physical Activity Rate
Percentage of youth involved in any physical activity at least once a week.

Percentage of Youth With Knowledge of AIDS
Percentage of youth who had ever heard of AIDS.

Youth Secondary Enrolment Rate
Percentage of youth who have reached (but not necessarily completed) a secondary level of education.

Youth Political Participation Rate
Percentage of youth who voted in the past or wish to vote in the future.

Youth Labour Force Participation Rate
Percentage of youth who are either employed or unemployed.

MAIN DATA SOURCES

Column 1: UNDP calculations based on microdata of the NYPS 2015, the PSLM survey for the years 2014/15 and 2012/13, the LFS 2014/15 and the FDIHS 2013/14 and the PDHS 2012/13.
Columns 2, 3, 8 and 9: NYPS 2015.
Columns 4 and 5: PDHS 2012/13.
Columns 6 and 7: PSLM 2014/15 and 2012/13.
Columns 10 and 11: LFS 2014/15 and FDIHS 2013/14.

TABLE

4

Regions

Azad Jammu & Kashmir, Federally Administrated Tribal Areas, Gilgit-Baltistan, Islamabad

Central Balochistan	Bolan/Kachhi, Jhal Magsi, Naseerabad, Jaffarabad, Chaghi, Mastung, Kalat, Kharan, Noshki
Northern Balochistan	Quetta, Killa Abdullah, Killa Saifullah, Musakhail, Barkhan, Ziarat, Pishin, Loralai, Zhob, Kohlu, Dera Bugti, Sibi, Sherani, Harnai
Southeastern Balochistan	Awaran, Lasbela, Panjgur, Gawadar, Khuzdar, Washuk, Kech/Turbat
Central Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Peshawar, Nowshehra, Mardan, Swabi, Charsadda
Northern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Buner, Kohistan, Malakand, Shangla, Chitral, Battagram, Swat, Mansehra, Abbottabad, Lower Dir, Haripur, Upper Dir, Tor Ghar
Southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Kohat, Karak, Bannu, Hangu, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Tank
Central Punjab	Sargodha, Khushab, Faisalabad, Jhang, Toba Tek Singh, Okara, Chiniot
Eastern Punjab	Hafizabad, Narowal, Sheikhupura, Nankana Sahib, Gujrat, Kasur, Mandi Bahauddin, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Lahore
Northern Punjab	Attock, Jhelum, Chakwal, Rawalpindi
Southeastern Punjab	Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur, Sahiwal, Lodhran, Rahimyar Khan, Vehari, Multan, Khanewal, Pakpattan
Western Punjab	Mianwali, Bhakkar, Dera Ghazi Khan, Layyah, Rajanpur, Muzaffargarh
Eastern Sindh	Sukkur, Khairpur, Nawabshah/ Shaheed Benazir Abad, Tharparkar, Naushehro Feroze, Ghotki, Umerkot, Mirpurkhas, Sanghar, Matiari, Tando Allahyar, Tando Muhammad Khan
Karachi & Hyderabad	Karachi, Hyderabad
Western Sindh	Jamshoro, Dadu, Kashmore, Jacobabad, Kamber Shahdadkot, Thatta, Badin, Shikarpur, Larkana, Sujawal

TABLE 4   Youth Gender Inequality Index and its components | **165**

5 Multidimensional Poverty Index and its components

	Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) Value	Population in multidimensional poverty (%)		Contribution of deprivation to overall poverty (%)		
	Pakistan National MPI specifications 2015[a]	Incidence - Headcount (H) 2015[b]	Intensity (A) 2015[b]	Education 2015[b]	Health 2015[b]	Living Standards 2015[b]
BALOCHISTAN						
Awaran	0.415	77.2	53.8	38.4	18.1	43.5
Barkhan	0.627	93.6	67.0	39.9	30.4	29.7
Bolan/Kachhi	0.414	73.1	56.7	40.9	20.3	38.8
Chaghi	0.546	89.2	61.2	40.6	16.2	43.3
Dera Bugti	0.499	88.4	56.4	48.4	11.5	40.2
Gawadar	0.293	60.8	48.2	43.7	25.2	31.1
Harnai	0.633	94.2	67.2	38.2	28.9	32.9
Jaffarabad	0.404	75.0	53.8	45.1	21.3	33.6
Jhal Magsi	0.528	89.7	58.9	44.1	20.1	35.8
Kalat	0.275	57.1	48.1	36.5	24.5	38.9
Kech/Turbat[c]	..	..	..	..	..	..
Kharan	0.454	78.4	57.9	40.6	27.8	31.6
Khuzdar	0.285	57.5	49.6	42.5	14.5	43.0
Killa Abdullah	0.641	96.9	66.2	41.7	31.1	27.3
Killa Saifullah	0.386	79.3	48.7	47.8	28.1	24.1
Kohlu	0.503	86.8	58.0	42.0	19.3	38.7
Lasbela	0.395	68.1	58.0	38.8	22.1	39.0
Loralai	0.320	68.5	46.7	45.1	11.6	43.3
Mastung	0.302	62.0	48.7	35.2	23.8	41.1
Musakhail	0.351	66.9	52.4	43.8	17.0	39.2
Naseerabad	0.413	77.0	53.6	48.0	15.6	36.4
Noshki	0.316	64.0	49.4	47.9	23.6	28.5
Panjgur[c]	..	..	..	..	..	..
Pishin	0.453	82.2	55.1	40.6	35.0	24.3
Quetta	0.213	46.3	46.0	47.6	33.3	19.1
Sherani	0.526	90.6	58.1	38.8	21.4	39.8
Sibi	0.324	57.5	56.3	45.4	16.6	38.0
Washuk	0.466	81.9	56.9	41.6	18.7	39.7
Zhob	0.514	82.8	62.1	43.0	30.1	26.9
Ziarat	0.575	90.3	63.7	35.8	33.5	30.7
ISLAMABAD CAPITAL TERRITORY						
Islamabad	0.013	3.1	43.2	52.6	23.9	23.4
KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA						
Abbottabad	0.149	32.9	45.4	34.5	32.7	32.8
Bannu	0.289	58.6	49.2	43.5	30.9	25.6
Battagram	0.422	75.2	56.1	41.2	30.3	28.5
Buner	0.373	71.6	52.0	41.0	26.4	32.6
Charsadda	0.213	44.6	47.8	43.2	25.1	31.7
Chitral	0.194	43.3	44.9	37.6	28.3	34.0
Dera Ismail Khan	0.362	65.6	55.2	42.4	27.3	30.3
Hangu	0.271	55.8	48.5	46.9	24.2	28.9
Haripur	0.110	24.7	44.5	35.8	33.9	30.3
Karak	0.253	50.3	50.3	34.2	35.1	30.8
Kohat	0.238	47.5	50.0	41.4	29.3	29.3
Kohistan	0.581	95.8	60.6	41.9	24.1	34.1
Lakki Marwat	0.320	62.7	51.0	38.0	33.0	29.0
Lower Dir	0.194	41.6	46.7	43.9	23.7	32.4
Malakand	0.171	37.1	46.1	39.9	29.8	30.3
Mansehra	0.204	40.7	50.1	34.6	29.9	35.5
Mardan	0.153	33.8	45.3	43.9	26.8	29.3
Nowshera	0.168	37.4	44.9	44.7	29.5	25.8

TABLE

5

	Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) Value	Population in multidimensional poverty (%)		Contribution of deprivation to overall poverty (%)		
	Pakistan National MPI specifications 2015[a]	Incidence - Headcount (H) 2015[b]	Intensity (A) 2015[b]	Education 2015[b]	Health 2015[b]	Living Standards 2015[b]
KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA						
Peshawar	0.148	31.5	46.8	46.8	24.8	28.4
Shangla	0.438	80.2	54.6	46.8	23.4	29.8
Swabi	0.210	43.8	48.0	40.8	28.8	30.5
Swat	0.271	55.0	49.3	37.9	32.8	29.4
Tank	0.385	71.1	54.2	43.8	24.2	32.0
Tor Ghar	0.571	92.0	62.1	39.7	29.9	30.3
Upper Dir	0.443	76.4	58.0	41.2	29.3	29.6
PUNJAB						
Attock	0.041	9.9	41.1	49.2	12.8	38.0
Bahawalnagar	0.244	50.1	48.7	42.9	27.3	29.8
Bahawalpur	0.273	53.0	51.5	43.4	28.3	28.2
Bhakkar	0.255	51.7	49.3	39.1	31.9	29.0
Chakwal	0.056	12.9	43.6	38.3	28.6	33.1
Chiniot	0.199	42.1	47.4	45.5	23.0	31.5
Dera Ghazi Khan	0.351	63.7	55.1	43.2	25.9	30.9
Faisalabad	0.086	19.4	44.5	45.8	22.2	32.0
Gujranwala	0.064	14.0	45.6	46.0	26.5	27.6
Gujrat	0.078	18.4	42.1	32.6	39.3	28.1
Hafizabad	0.152	32.3	47.0	40.6	32.1	27.4
Jhang	0.196	41.6	47.2	41.1	25.7	33.2
Jhelum	0.035	8.5	40.7	48.6	16.7	34.8
Kasur	0.095	21.9	43.6	49.6	15.2	35.2
Khanewal	0.189	39.9	47.4	43.7	25.6	30.7
Khushab	0.200	40.4	49.7	38.8	32.0	29.3
Lahore	0.017	4.3	38.8	65.6	11.7	22.6
Layyah	0.214	45.6	46.9	35.7	34.0	30.3
Lodhran	0.230	46.8	49.2	44.1	23.9	32.1
Mandi Bahauddin	0.147	31.5	46.7	37.4	35.3	27.3
Mianwali	0.239	46.9	50.8	37.7	32.5	29.8
Multan	0.173	35.7	48.5	44.6	24.8	30.6
Muzaffargarh	0.338	64.8	52.1	41.7	27.0	31.4
Nankana Sahib	0.110	24.6	44.6	45.6	19.4	35.0
Narowal	0.118	26.6	44.3	34.2	37.0	28.8
Okara	0.185	39.5	47.0	42.0	29.1	28.9
Pakpattan	0.189	42.6	44.4	46.7	19.4	34.0
Rahimyar Khan	0.289	56.8	50.8	45.6	25.1	29.3
Rajanpur	0.357	64.4	55.4	44.3	22.2	33.6
Rawalpindi	0.032	7.5	43.0	44.9	24.0	31.2
Sahiwal	0.140	30.8	45.6	44.8	22.9	32.3
Sargodha	0.166	35.4	46.8	38.1	32.8	29.2
Sheikhupura	0.093	21.4	43.5	46.8	22.2	30.9
Sialkot	0.059	14.0	41.8	31.7	41.2	27.1
Toba Tek Singh	0.107	23.8	45.0	44.4	25.8	29.8
Vehari	0.200	41.9	47.6	45.0	22.3	32.7
SINDH						
Badin	0.433	74.8	57.9	37.5	24.6	37.9
Dadu	0.247	51.4	48.0	33.1	35.4	31.5
Ghotki	0.356	67.3	52.9	50.1	19.7	30.2
Hyderabad	0.129	25.7	50.2	48.8	20.1	31.1
Jacobabad	0.391	71.3	54.8	47.0	17.8	35.2
Jamshoro	0.297	55.6	53.3	40.4	25.2	34.4

TABLE 5   Multidimensional Poverty Index and its components | **167**

5 Multidimensional Poverty Index and its components

	Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) Value	Population in multidimensional poverty (%)		Contribution of deprivation to overall poverty (%)		
	Pakistan National MPI specifications 2015 [a]	Incidence - Headcount (H) 2015 [b]	Intensity (A) 2015 [b]	Education 2015 [b]	Health 2015 [b]	Living Standards 2015 [b]
Kamber Shahdadkot	0.383	72.0	53.2	43.4	24.8	31.9
Karachi	0.019	4.5	42.4	57.5	12.4	30.2
Kashmore	0.431	74.9	57.6	47.2	23.8	29.0
Khairpur	0.261	51.6	50.7	45.5	21.3	33.2
Larkana	0.194	42.0	46.3	48.5	20.6	31.0
Matiari	0.324	62.1	52.2	41.9	22.9	35.3
Mirpurkhas	0.401	68.9	58.2	39.5	25.6	34.9
Naushehro Feroze	0.214	45.0	47.5	37.5	31.6	30.9
Nawabshah/ Shaheed Benazir Abad	0.314	59.3	53.0	42.4	28.3	29.4
Sanghar	0.386	66.8	57.7	40.1	27.2	32.7
Shikarpur	0.324	60.1	54.0	46.9	20.7	32.4
Sujawal	0.447	82.0	54.5	41.2	14.9	43.9
Sukkur	0.197	39.5	50.0	53.3	14.4	32.3
Tando Allahyar	0.366	67.3	54.4	42.8	23.8	33.3
Tando Muhammad Khan	0.455	78.4	58.1	40.4	24.4	35.1
Tharparkar	0.481	87.0	55.2	38.8	18.0	43.2
Thatta	0.437	78.5	55.6	38.7	19.9	41.5
Umerkot	0.504	84.7	59.5	38.3	25.3	36.5
Azad Jammu & Kashmir	0.115	24.9	46.3	36.3	24.6	39.1
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)	0.337	73.7	45.8	52.6	15.3	32.1
Gilgit-Baltistan	0.209	43.4	48.3	46.7	17.7	35.6
Balochistan	0.394	71.2	55.3	42.9	24.5	32.6
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.250	49.2	50.7	41.5	28.2	30.3
Punjab	0.152	31.4	48.4	43.0	26.5	30.5
Sindh	0.231	43.1	53.5	43.0	22.9	34.1
Pakistan	**0.197**	**38.8**	**50.9**	**42.8**	**25.7**	**31.5**

NOTES

a The Pakistan national MPI specifications refer to modified methodology as compared to the global MPI specifications. See Technical note 4 for details.

b Calculations are based on PSLM district level microdata for the year 2014/15. For Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, due to unavailability of PSLM microdata for the year 2014/15, data for the year 2012/13 is used instead. For FATA, calculations are based on the FDIHS 2013/14 microdata.

c Districts of Kech/Turbat and Panjgur were dropped from the scope of the PSLM survey 2014/15.

DEFINITIONS

Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)
A measure identifying poor while considering the intensity of deprivations they suffer.

Incidence or Headcount (H)
The percentage of people who are multidimensionally poor.

Intensity of Poverty (A)
Average percentage of deprivation experienced by people in multidimensional poverty.

MAIN DATA SOURCE

Columns 1-6: Government of Pakistan (2016)

6 Education

		Population 25 years and older with at least some secondary educaiton (%)		Mean years of schooling (Years)		Expected years of schooling (Years)		Adult literacy rate-population 15 years and older (%)		Primary completion rate (%)		Net enrolment rate at the primary level (%)	
		Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
HDI rank	Province/Region	2015ᵃ	2015ᵃ	2015ᵃ	2015ᵃ	2015ᵃ	2015ᵃ	2015ᵃ	2015ᵃ	2015ᵃ	2015ᵃ	2015ᵃ	2015ᵃ
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
1 Lahore	Punjab	46.0	52.5	6.8	8.0	12.2	12.1	81.5	74.2	71.0	74.0	67.0	85.0
2 Islamabad	Islamabad Capital Territory	44.3	61.2	7.0	9.4	12.8	12.5	90.7	77.4	71.0	83.0	93.0	87.0
3 Rawalpindi	Punjab	40.0	55.4	6.2	8.7	12.7	12.8	89.9	72.5	69.0	82.0	80.0	76.0
4 Karachi	Sindh	44.8	55.2	6.8	8.5	11.6	11.7	85.2	77.0	73.0	78.0	74.0	74.0
5 Sialkot	Punjab	31.1	34.6	5.5	6.3	12.4	12.1	78.4	71.5	67.0	70.0	84.0	85.0
6 Jhelum	Punjab	28.4	43.2	5.1	7.3	13.0	12.7	84.1	68.5	64.0	77.0	87.0	94.0
HIGH MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
7 Gujrat	Punjab	24.6	37.2	4.6	6.1	12.6	12.0	77.4	66.6	66.0	69.0	77.0	83.0
8 Chakwal	Punjab	21.0	36.4	3.7	6.6	11.5	12.3	81.7	61.6	56.0	76.0	87.0	91.0
9 Attock	Punjab	19.2	38.8	3.4	6.4	11.3	12.5	77.6	52.4	48.0	71.0	85.0	87.0
10 Faisalabad	Punjab	25.3	35.6	4.4	6.1	10.6	10.9	71.8	59.8	57.0	66.0	78.0	77.0
11 Gujranwala	Punjab	27.0	32.3	4.7	5.8	11.6	11.3	72.3	64.7	61.0	66.0	76.0	74.0
12 Toba Tek Singh	Punjab	19.6	33.1	3.8	5.5	11.0	11.5	69.9	54.8	23.0	42.0	43.0	50.0
13 Abbottabad	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	19.2	38.4	3.7	6.2	11.2	12.9	78.1	53.5	55.0	70.0	87.0	76.0
14 Peshawar	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	16.0	49.6	2.6	7.2	8.6	11.6	74.9	36.4	18.0	54.0	27.0	55.0
15 Narowal	Punjab	18.5	36.0	3.5	5.9	11.5	11.7	76.1	59.5	57.0	71.0	84.0	80.0
16 Nankana Sahib	Punjab	19.4	34.0	3.8	5.9	10.3	11.9	72.2	54.9	51.0	65.0	76.0	77.0
17 Sheikhupura	Punjab	15.1	28.4	3.4	5.3	10.8	10.7	68.7	57.6	54.0	61.0	70.0	77.0
18 Haripur	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	18.8	39.1	3.6	6.4	11.2	12.6	79.1	54.8	49.0	73.0	83.0	79.0
19 Layyah	Punjab	11.7	26.1	2.3	5.2	9.4	11.2	73.5	42.4	40.0	63.0	86.0	89.0
20 Sarghodha	Punjab	19.3	32.4	3.3	5.5	10.0	11.3	70.3	48.2	45.0	62.0	68.0	74.0
21 Multan	Punjab	18.0	30.4	3.3	5.4	8.6	9.1	66.8	47.3	42.0	57.0	64.0	68.0
22 Hyderabad	Sindh	26.7	40.4	4.3	6.4	7.4	9.5	66.2	51.1	48.0	60.0	52.0	73.0
23 Mandi Bahauddin	Punjab	15.3	24.0	3.1	4.8	11.8	11.1	69.0	54.0	52.0	59.0	83.0	79.0
24 Kasur	Punjab	12.2	28.7	2.6	4.9	10.7	11.2	62.7	48.3	46.0	56.0	71.0	65.0
25 Sahiwal	Punjab	15.5	31.2	3.0	5.0	9.9	10.5	64.8	45.7	44.0	59.0	70.0	77.0
26 Khushab	Punjab	10.6	31.1	2.1	5.5	9.2	11.4	71.9	38.5	36.0	64.0	65.0	74.0
27 Okara	Punjab	13.7	23.3	2.6	4.5	9.1	10.5	59.6	40.4	39.0	52.0	78.0	84.0
28 Hafizabad	Punjab	12.0	23.5	2.7	4.6	10.1	11.0	63.3	48.0	47.0	57.0	71.0	70.0
29 Mardan	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	7.5	33.5	1.4	5.4	8.6	11.8	65.1	27.1	26.0	59.0	75.0	90.0
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
30 Khanewal	Punjab	10.6	25.5	2.4	4.9	8.2	9.8	66.2	42.4	39.0	57.0	65.0	73.0
31 Nowshera	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	5.1	26.8	1.8	4.6	8.7	11.6	65.1	34.7	34.0	57.0	71.0	86.0
32 Malakand	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	10.9	36.6	1.9	5.8	10.7	12.6	73.1	36.9	38.0	67.0	79.0	82.0
33 Jhang	Punjab	11.6	26.6	2.3	5.0	8.3	10.8	65.5	36.9	34.0	58.0	65.0	72.0
34 Mansehra	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	12.0	33.3	2.6	5.4	9.5	12.1	72.4	46.8	44.0	63.0	71.0	78.0
35 Chitral	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	12.0	32.4	1.9	5.3	9.9	11.9	71.8	37.1	39.0	66.0	68.0	84.0
36 Charsadda	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	6.3	31.7	1.1	4.9	7.7	11.5	64.7	23.7	23.0	58.0	67.0	81.0
37 Naushehro Feroze	Sindh	10.1	45.1	2.9	7.2	8.5	10.8	77.9	48.5	49.0	70.0	60.0	80.0
38 Quetta	Balochistan	15.0	37.9	2.3	6.0	8.9	11.0	74.8	36.1	35.0	61.0	67.0	78.0
39 Pakpattan	Punjab	7.7	21.2	1.7	4.2	7.8	10.4	59.7	33.8	31.0	50.0	66.0	79.0
40 Sukkur	Sindh	16.6	41.4	2.9	6.8	6.8	9.1	75.0	38.4	36.0	68.0	53.0	72.0
41 Lodhran	Punjab	8.2	21.2	1.8	4.3	7.5	8.9	62.8	34.0	32.0	51.0	55.0	64.0
42 Chiniot	Punjab	7.7	22.2	1.8	4.3	7.7	10.2	58.6	31.4	31.0	55.0	68.0	68.0
43 Vehari	Punjab	8.0	16.8	1.9	3.7	8.1	9.6	52.7	33.9	31.0	48.0	65.0	73.0
44 Swabi	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	3.5	34.3	1.1	4.6	9.1	11.6	59.7	25.5	29.0	56.0	75.0	85.0
45 Kohat	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	10.5	33.3	1.9	5.4	7.5	11.6	69.4	28.2	27.0	62.0	61.0	84.0
46 Bahawalpur	Punjab	12.0	20.3	2.2	3.9	7.2	8.0	53.5	32.0	30.0	45.0	48.0	52.0
47 Mianwali	Punjab	9.3	31.6	1.9	5.8	8.3	11.6	74.3	34.2	33.0	65.0	64.0	77.0
48 Dadu	Sindh	20.8	37.0	3.6	6.4	8.5	9.9	74.4	49.1	47.0	68.0	78.0	83.0
49 Bahawalnagar	Punjab	7.5	19.0	1.9	3.9	8.3	9.3	58.2	36.7	33.0	49.0	53.0	64.0
50 Bhakkar	Punjab	9.3	23.6	1.7	4.7	8.2	10.6	65.8	31.9	29.0	57.0	69.0	71.0

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6 Education

HDI rank	Province/Region	Population 25 years and older with at least some secondary educaiton (%)		Mean years of schooling (Years)		Expected years of schooling (Years)		Adult literacy rate-population 15 years and older (%)		Primary completion rate (%)		Net enrolment rate at the primary level (%)	
		Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]
51 Rahimyar Khan	Punjab	8.3	20.8	1.7	4.0	6.0	8.3	54.8	29.4	27.0	45.0	46.0	53.0
52 Swat	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	4.8	25.8	1.3	4.6	7.8	10.7	54.8	22.4	26.0	57.0	69.0	82.0
53 Larkana	Sindh	10.3	39.2	2.1	6.3	7.3	9.5	70.3	37.5	37.0	64.0	58.0	74.0
54 Karak	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	11.4	48.7	1.8	7.5	8.6	12.1	86.0	35.9	36.0	78.0	66.0	82.0
55 Bannu	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	7.0	41.6	1.2	6.8	6.3	11.8	78.2	23.1	22.0	69.0	49.0	77.0
56 Lower Dir	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	5.3	34.3	0.9	5.5	9.2	12.1	74.8	26.0	27.0	63.0	69.0	74.0
LOW MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
57 Hangu	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	2.5	26.5	0.4	4.1	5.4	11.4	62.7	11.7	10.0	56.0	54.0	83.0
58 Muzaffargarh	Punjab	6.1	18.2	1.3	3.7	6.6	8.7	54.6	26.1	24.0	46.0	51.0	70.0
59 Lakki Marwat	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	4.6	44.0	0.9	6.8	6.5	11.7	77.6	28.9	22.0	72.0	48.0	75.0
60 Jamshoro	Sindh	5.0	24.4	1.4	4.5	6.9	8.8	55.9	27.1	27.0	51.0	57.0	66.0
61 Nawabshah/ Shaheed Benazir Abad	Sindh	8.9	30.0	1.7	5.2	5.9	9.1	64.2	27.2	26.0	56.0	53.0	74.0
62 Matiari	Sindh	11.1	33.1	1.9	5.3	5.2	8.5	59.7	29.5	28.0	53.0	46.0	56.0
63 Khairpur	Sindh	8.2	36.8	1.3	6.0	6.8	9.5	66.6	25.0	27.0	61.0	58.0	74.0
64 Dera Gazi Khan	Punjab	8.6	20.9	1.5	4.0	5.9	8.9	52.8	24.0	23.0	45.0	54.0	73.0
65 Tando Allahyar	Sindh	7.6	24.7	1.4	4.2	5.2	7.0	48.1	24.2	18.0	35.0	27.0	44.0
66 Buner	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	1.3	18.6	0.3	3.2	6.1	11.2	51.4	9.9	11.0	47.0	66.0	87.0
67 Shikarpur	Sindh	6.7	27.7	1.3	4.9	5.2	7.3	58.6	25.1	23.0	51.0	45.0	56.0
68 Ghotki	Sindh	4.6	29.3	0.8	4.8	3.8	7.2	57.6	17.5	16.0	51.0	38.0	59.0
69 Rajanpur	Punjab	5.3	14.8	1.0	3.1	6.5	7.6	46.2	19.8	18.0	38.0	47.0	56.0
70 Battagram	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	1.3	18.6	0.5	3.7	5.5	10.2	52.3	13.4	13.0	48.0	52.0	68.0
71 Dera Ismail Khan	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	9.1	27.7	1.5	4.5	5.9	9.2	56.9	25.5	23.0	51.0	42.0	61.0
72 Sanghar	Sindh	6.8	27.8	1.3	5.0	4.9	8.2	62.4	25.7	25.0	52.0	41.0	62.0
73 Pishin	Balochistan	0.7	26.8	0.3	4.9	5.7	9.0	66.3	17.0	33.0	65.0	67.0	85.0
74 Kashmore	Sindh	4.5	26.6	0.8	4.1	3.6	6.6	45.2	14.6	14.0	40.0	31.0	51.0
75 Mastung	Balochistan	6.4	39.1	1.5	6.2	7.0	10.5	71.0	31.7	34.0	68.0	73.0	86.0
76 Tank	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	5.2	30.3	0.8	4.9	5.4	9.9	61.0	15.9	15.0	42.0	44.0	63.0
77 Kamber Shahdadkot	Sindh	3.7	21.4	0.9	3.7	5.1	7.3	47.0	22.1	18.0	40.0	50.0	66.0
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
78 Gawadar	Balochistan	1.0	9.2	1.1	4.4	8.0	11.4	72.1	22.9	24.0	65.0	68.0	91.0
79 Noshki	Balochistan	1.5	19.2	0.4	4.0	4.9	10.7	61.9	11.6	14.0	53.0	51.0	59.0
80 Sibi	Balochistan	14.6	31.2	2.1	4.7	5.8	7.4	54.8	26.4	29.0	44.0	38.0	53.0
81 Jacobabad	Sindh	4.2	26.4	0.8	4.3	4.6	7.0	48.6	15.6	15.0	43.0	37.0	56.0
82 Shangla	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	2.1	17.5	0.3	3.4	3.7	8.8	52.6	7.6	8.0	41.0	33.0	53.0
83 Mirpurkhas	Sindh	13.3	28.2	2.1	4.7	4.9	8.2	59.0	31.6	29.0	49.0	41.0	63.0
84 Killa Saifullah	Balochistan	0.0	28.0	0.0	5.0	2.0	10.8	71.4	2.0	5.0	32.0	16.0	51.0
85 Lasbela	Balochistan	6.2	22.0	1.5	3.6	6.6	7.6	48.2	24.1	23.0	41.0	43.0	50.0
86 Khuzdar	Balochistan	2.5	32.2	0.6	4.6	6.8	9.4	53.2	19.5	23.0	50.0	59.0	72.0
87 Badin	Sindh	7.0	26.8	1.3	4.4	4.3	7.0	51.3	20.8	20.0	44.0	37.0	53.0
88 Kalat	Balochistan	7.0	29.8	1.2	4.7	7.8	10.0	54.1	37.7	40.0	53.0	46.0	75.0
89 Loralai	Balochistan	3.9	34.2	0.7	5.0	5.9	10.3	54.9	15.2	17.0	48.0	40.0	86.0
90 Thatta	Sindh	5.0	16.1	1.1	3.7	4.8	7.0	55.5	19.7	51.0	62.0	76.0	76.0
91 Tando Muhammad Khan	Sindh	6.4	19.2	1.1	3.3	3.5	5.8	38.3	19.8	19.0	56.0	33.0	61.0
92 Upper Dir	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	2.2	18.6	0.4	3.4	5.6	10.0	57.9	16.4	16.0	46.0	43.0	66.0
93 Musakhail	Balochistan	9.0	32.2	1.2	4.3	8.7	9.6	48.7	18.3	21.0	44.0	49.0	61.0
94 Jaffarabad	Balochistan	1.9	21.8	0.5	3.5	3.8	7.2	49.4	11.4	12.0	43.0	37.0	59.0
95 Bolan/Kachhi	Balochistan	4.2	29.9	0.8	4.3	4.9	7.5	56.9	16.3	17.0	48.0	30.0	59.0
96 Sujawal	Sindh	1.4	18.0	0.9	3.7	4.1	6.7	50.4	19.2	16.0	41.0	34.0	59.0
97 Umerkot	Sindh	3.5	20.7	0.7	3.7	4.9	7.4	52.1	15.6	15.0	42.0	46.0	57.0
98 Naseerabad	Balochistan	1.4	17.2	0.3	3.1	3.7	6.2	44.0	7.1	8.0	40.0	21.0	55.0
99 Ziarat	Balochistan	1.9	21.6	0.4	3.6	5.7	8.7	50.5	12.9	13.0	43.0	39.0	68.0

TABLE

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HDI rank	Province/Region	Population 25 years and older with at least some secondary educaiton (%)		Mean years of schooling (Years)		Expected years of schooling (Years)		Adult literacy rate-population 15 years and older (%)		Primary completion rate (%)		Net enrolment rate at the primary level (%)	
		Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]
VERY LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
100	Zhob	Balochistan	0.3	25.8	0.1	4.0	4.9	11.2	51.9	9.7	12.0	51.0	33.0	62.0
101	Sherani	Balochistan	0.7	17.8	0.2	3.9	0.6	8.5	66.9	6.4	3.0	44.0	7.0	74.0
102	Kharan	Balochistan	0.1	22.9	0.2	3.8	5.5	8.7	54.2	12.9	19.0	49.0	41.0	69.0
103	Dera Bugti	Balochistan	1.3	26.4	0.2	4.2	1.9	5.7	41.3	3.0	4.0	37.0	18.0	35.0
104	Kohlu	Balochistan	1.6	30.5	0.2	4.0	4.1	8.0	43.9	6.4	7.0	37.0	34.0	56.0
105	Tor Ghar	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.1	7.6	0.1	1.9	2.8	9.6	38.6	3.2	3.0	30.0	31.0	60.0
106	Killa Abdullah	Balochistan	0.4	10.1	0.1	1.9	2.2	6.7	36.8	4.1	4.0	63.0	25.0	75.0
107	Barkhan	Balochistan	0.4	11.4	0.1	2.3	2.4	10.3	36.6	2.9	5.0	35.0	24.0	86.0
108	Kohistan	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.3	16.7	0.1	2.5	2.1	7.8	37.4	2.7	3.0	30.0	21.0	51.0
109	Tharparkar	Sindh	3.5	22.7	0.7	3.8	4.4	8.0	52.2	16.8	19.0	47.0	30.0	42.0
110	Chaghi	Balochistan	0.5	13.6	0.2	3.0	2.4	5.8	43.6	5.9	6.0	38.0	30.0	52.0
111	Washuk	Balochistan	0.1	11.0	0.2	2.6	2.9	6.2	46.9	9.5	12.0	44.0	43.0	68.0
112	Harnai	Balochistan	1.9	14.2	0.3	2.4	2.8	7.1	40.4	8.7	7.0	35.0	21.0	38.0
113	Jhal Magsi	Balochistan	2.8	16.6	0.5	2.7	4.3	6.4	37.4	8.9	8.0	28.0	45.0	63.0
114	Awaran	Balochistan	2.5	26.0	0.7	4.4	3.5	7.5	60.2	19.4	20.0	53.0	31.0	79.0
..	Kech/Turbat [b]	Balochistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
..	Panjgur [b]	Balochistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Azad Jammu & Kashmir		17.8	35.2	3.5	6.4	11.8	12.6	83.3	61.8	70.7	52.1	66.5	66.9
	Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)		12.4	30.2	2.0	4.9	9.5	11.5	49.9	12.9	40.4	7.7	43.5	27.4
	Gilgit-Baltistan		1.7	25.0	0.3	3.2	3.7	8.8	61.1	36.7	55.0	33.7	42.7	38.5
	Balochistan		4.7	25.5	0.9	4.2	5.5	8.8	18.0	56.0	19.0	48.0	42.0	67.0
	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa		8.6	33.5	1.6	5.3	7.8	11.3	29.0	66.0	28.0	59.0	62.0	78.0
	Punjab		20.3	32.4	3.6	5.6	9.7	10.5	51.0	69.0	47.0	61.0	67.0	73.0
	Sindh		22.6	40.0	3.7	6.4	7.3	9.2	46.0	70.0	43.0	62.0	54.0	67.0
	Pakistan		**18.6**	**34.2**	**3.2**	**5.7**	**8.6**	**10.2**	**45.0**	**68.0**	**43.0**	**60.0**	**62.0**	**72.0**

NOTES

a Calculations are based on PSLM district level microdata for the year 2014/15. For Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, due to unavailability of PSLM 2014/15 data, PSLM 2012/13 data is used instead. For FATA, the FDIHS 2013/14 is used.

b Data for Kech/Turbat and Panjgur is unavialble for PSLM 2014/15.

DEFINITIONS

Population 25 years and older with at least some secondary education
Percentage of the population 25 and older who have reached (but not necessarily completed) a secondary level of education.

Mean Years of Schooling
Average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older, converted from education attainment levels using official durations of each level.

Expected Years of Schooling
Number of years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates persist throughout the child's life.

Adult Literacy Rate
Percentage of the population ages 15 and older who can read and write with understanding.

Primary Completion Rate
Percentage of population who have completed primary level or higher.

Net Enrolment Rate
Percentage of children between 5 and 9 years of age corresponding to the total population in the same age group who are enrolled in primary level.

MAIN DATA SOURCES

Columns 1-6: UNDP calculations based on microdata of PSLM survey for the years 2012/13 and 2014/15, and FDIHS 2013/14.

Columns 7-12: PSLM 2012/13 and 2014/15, and FDIHS 2013/14.

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7 Health: mother and child

			Immunisation rate (%)			Incidence of diarrhea (%)			Prenatal care (%)		
HDI rank	Province/Region		Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Total 2015[a]	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Total 2015[a]	Urban 2015[a]	Rural 2015[a]	Total 2015[a]
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT											
1	Lahore	Punjab	87.6	91.5	89.5	12.0	6.0	9.0	97.6	73.5	90.7
2	Islamabad	Islamabad Capital Territory	85.4	85.0	85.2	3.0	7.0	5.0	93.3	98.1	94.8
3	Rawalpindi	Punjab	94.4	90.5	92.4	2.0	5.0	4.0	93.5	96.5	94.9
4	Karachi	Sindh	77.9	82.1	80.2	6.0	9.0	8.0	96.6	90.1	96.0
5	Sialkot	Punjab	97.1	89.0	93.7	10.0	8.0	9.0	80.4	69.2	72.2
6	Jhelum	Punjab	96.0	100.0	98.0	5.0	7.0	6.0	92.3	93.2	92.9
HIGH MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT											
7	Gujrat	Punjab	89.6	94.4	92.5	4.0	10.0	7.0	89.5	86.2	87.2
8	Chakwal	Punjab	100.0	93.3	96.2	3.0	4.0	4.0	94.2	79.5	81.5
9	Attock	Punjab	95.7	98.0	96.7	8.0	8.0	8.0	73.0	81.7	79.0
10	Faisalabad	Punjab	90.6	86.1	88.2	9.0	10.0	9.0	86.0	73.0	78.6
11	Gujranwala	Punjab	92.5	88.7	90.9	9.0	9.0	9.0	87.9	82.3	85.3
12	Toba Tek Singh	Punjab	92.9	89.0	91.3	6.0	5.0	6.0	88.0	84.7	85.3
13	Abbottabad	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	93.4	95.4	94.3	8.0	5.0	7.0	96.3	79.3	82.6
14	Peshawar	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	96.0	93.6	94.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	87.9	73.4	80.5
15	Narowal	Punjab	97.1	100.0	98.6	10.0	8.0	9.0	77.0	54.3	58.1
16	Nankana Sahib	Punjab	96.2	95.1	95.7	7.0	4.0	6.0	92.9	84.6	87.1
17	Sheikhupura	Punjab	86.5	86.4	86.4	8.0	4.0	6.0	87.0	79.9	81.8
18	Haripur	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	76.2	93.2	82.1	6.0	2.0	4.0	87.5	84.3	84.9
19	Layyah	Punjab	84.3	93.5	89.4	26.0	27.0	26.0	80.3	60.7	62.9
20	Sargodha	Punjab	94.0	88.3	90.8	10.0	11.0	11.0	81.9	70.6	74.0
21	Multan	Punjab	92.0	92.4	92.2	11.0	10.0	11.0	84.6	72.9	77.5
22	Hyderabad	Sindh	85.0	83.6	84.5	7.0	15.0	10.0	94.1	63.3	88.0
23	Mandi Bahauddin	Punjab	81.5	100.0	91.6	10.0	6.0	9.0	85.7	91.7	90.8
24	Kasur	Punjab	88.2	84.8	86.3	8.0	8.0	8.0	82.4	77.4	78.3
25	Sahiwal	Punjab	89.7	92.2	91.1	8.0	6.0	7.0	84.8	76.8	78.1
26	Khushab	Punjab	92.5	88.2	90.6	8.0	8.0	8.0	76.5	72.0	73.5
27	Okara	Punjab	87.1	94.2	90.5	9.0	14.0	11.0	75.0	65.6	68.0
28	Hafizabad	Punjab	95.6	97.4	96.7	12.0	9.0	10.0	64.3	70.0	68.3
29	Mardan	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	94.6	85.4	90.4	10.0	13.0	11.0	79.0	78.9	78.9
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT											
30	Khanewal	Punjab	97.5	92.5	95.1	6.0	8.0	7.0	83.2	78.5	79.4
31	Nowshera	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	83.0	85.4	84.4	14.0	15.0	15.0	77.9	80.8	79.5
32	Malakand	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	95.5	94.0	94.8	11.0	10.0	10.0	88.2	69.2	73.1
33	Jhang	Punjab	89.2	89.0	89.1	14.0	12.0	13.0	70.0	66.6	67.3
34	Mansehra	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	70.5	81.6	77.3	5.0	5.0	5.0	91.3	67.2	69.3
35	Chitral	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	100.0	96.4	97.8	2.0	8.0	5.0	75.4	64.6	65.3
36	Charsadda	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	98.6	98.4	98.5	11.0	10.0	11.0	72.7	66.1	67.0
37	Naushehro Feroze	Sindh	73.9	67.7	70.7	9.0	15.0	12.0	72.0	67.7	68.4
38	Quetta	Balochistan	62.7	66.3	64.6	5.0	13.0	9.0	63.8	41.1	54.5
39	Pakpattan	Punjab	97.7	88.9	93.9	9.0	5.0	7.0	79.2	63.5	65.1
40	Sukkur	Sindh	87.5	74.9	79.6	9.0	8.0	9.0	76.5	73.4	75.2
41	Lodhran	Punjab	92.8	97.3	94.8	15.0	13.0	14.0	65.6	73.7	72.6
42	Chiniot	Punjab	89.2	91.7	90.4	5.0	7.0	6.0	93.2	80.1	84.9
43	Vehari	Punjab	91.7	93.3	92.5	8.0	11.0	10.0	92.8	77.6	79.9
44	Swabi	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	94.8	60.3	87.1	7.0	7.0	7.0	64.6	69.2	68.5
45	Kohat	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	81.7	87.3	83.5	12.0	8.0	11.0	80.7	61.6	65.8
46	Bahawalpur	Punjab	82.9	84.2	83.5	17.0	17.0	17.0	84.0	75.6	78.0
47	Mianwali	Punjab	89.3	90.2	89.8	5.0	6.0	5.0	74.7	64.3	66.6
48	Dadu	Sindh	85.3	81.4	82.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	84.5	64.5	67.6
49	Bahawalnagar	Punjab	77.8	79.6	78.7	8.0	9.0	9.0	79.8	70.6	72.6
50	Bhakkar	Punjab	94.9	80.2	86.8	7.0	8.0	8.0	72.5	67.7	68.5

TABLE

7

HDI rank	Province/Region	Immunisation rate (%)			Incidence of diarrhea (%)			Prenatal care (%)		
		Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Total 2015[a]	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Total 2015[a]	Urban 2015[a]	Rural 2015[a]	Total 2015[a]
51	Rahimyar Khan	Punjab	84.4	82.3	83.4	9.0	7.0	8.0	83.1	78.0	78.9
52	Swat	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	90.7	87.1	88.8	5.0	7.0	6.0	65.6	68.6	68.0
53	Larkana	Sindh	68.3	71.7	70.2	5.0	5.0	5.0	62.4	56.6	58.9
54	Karak	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	68.4	55.1	62.7	14.0	8.0	11.0	64.2	42.8	43.9
55	Bannu	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	61.9	52.8	57.4	12.0	16.0	14.0	69.1	47.8	49.0
56	Lower Dir	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	87.3	81.0	84.1	3.0	4.0	4.0	67.8	58.9	59.5

LOW MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

57	Hangu	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	77.9	72.8	75.4	14.0	10.0	12.0	60.7	73.4	71.3
58	Muzaffargarh	Punjab	88.0	88.5	88.2	8.0	6.0	7.0	74.4	77.0	76.7
59	Lakki Marwat	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	46.4	52.5	49.2	12.0	11.0	11.0	62.0	32.2	35.8
60	Jamshoro	Sindh	66.9	94.3	81.7	4.0	7.0	6.0	81.7	80.0	80.5
61	Nawabshah/ Shaheed Benazir Abad	Sindh	76.9	75.4	76.1	7.0	6.0	7.0	82.5	59.2	65.4
62	Matiari	Sindh	86.6	86.6	86.6	9.0	8.0	9.0	90.2	75.3	79.1
63	Khairpur	Sindh	80.2	79.3	79.7	2.0	4.0	3.0	67.5	56.0	59.5
64	Dera Ghazi Khan	Punjab	78.8	69.8	74.8	17.0	13.0	15.0	77.1	59.6	61.5
65	Tando Allahyar	Sindh	82.9	86.8	84.8	4.0	5.0	5.0	85.1	52.4	59.8
66	Buner	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	75.8	80.7	78.0	3.0	4.0	3.0	..	65.3	65.3
67	Shikarpur	Sindh	66.9	62.2	64.5	4.0	7.0	6.0	70.5	64.0	65.6
68	Ghotki	Sindh	58.8	64.9	62.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	63.4	44.4	48.3
69	Rajanpur	Punjab	91.1	90.4	90.7	8.0	6.0	7.0	85.7	69.1	71.4
70	Battagram	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	53.9	48.1	51.1	15.0	16.0	15.0	..	50.2	50.2
71	Dera Ismail Khan	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	66.7	62.7	64.5	15.0	15.0	15.0	67.4	54.2	55.5
72	Sanghar	Sindh	56.4	73.1	65.2	10.0	11.0	10.0	72.0	65.3	67.1
73	Pishin	Balochistan	48.4	50.7	49.5	17.0	14.0	16.0	52.3	28.1	30.2
74	Kashmore	Sindh	81.3	66.3	73.3	2.0	2.0	2.0	67.7	49.0	54.0
75	Mastung	Balochistan	70.0	79.4	75.3	16.0	21.0	19.0	66.7	49.3	52.7
76	Tank	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	62.8	69.5	66.1	6.0	9.0	7.0	62.2	50.2	52.0
77	Kamber Shahdadkot	Sindh	52.8	71.4	61.8	2.0	2.0	2.0	54.8	43.2	45.5

LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

78	Gawadar	Balochistan	50.5	54.4	51.4	14.0	9.0	12.0	82.1	37.2	63.1
79	Noshki	Balochistan	65.6	47.1	52.7	8.0	8.0	8.0	54.4	33.4	37.9
80	Sibi	Balochistan	59.3	62.7	60.9	11.0	8.0	9.0	65.8	49.6	55.5
81	Jacobabad	Sindh	68.3	61.5	65.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	67.8	57.3	59.6
82	Shangla	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	46.3	50.5	48.7	5.0	5.0	5.0	..	62.2	62.2
83	Mirpurkhas	Sindh	63.0	64.9	63.9	7.0	6.0	6.0	78.2	44.3	52.2
84	Killa Saifullah	Balochistan	56.7	46.2	50.0	1.0	2.0	1.0	56.5	39.3	43.3
85	Lasbela	Balochistan	54.8	36.3	49.1	6.0	9.0	8.0	89.9	70.5	78.8
86	Khuzdar	Balochistan	53.1	68.3	60.5	28.0	28.0	28.0	48.5	61.2	57.0
87	Badin	Sindh	67.3	79.5	73.1	5.0	4.0	5.0	77.7	66.4	69.3
88	Kalat	Balochistan	89.6	77.2	83.5	34.0	29.0	31.0	54.6	58.2	57.5
89	Loralai	Balochistan	45.2	43.7	44.5	28.0	20.0	24.0	55.6	22.0	30.6
90	Thatta	Sindh	55.4	46.7	50.6	14.0	12.0	13.0	87.3	66.6	68.8
91	Tando Muhammad Khan	Sindh	63.0	62.1	62.5	11.0	8.0	9.0	81.7	51.7	55.4
92	Upper Dir	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	77.7	77.0	77.4	14.0	11.0	12.0	54.8	38.3	38.9
93	Musakhail	Balochistan	46.2	29.3	38.3	24.0	17.0	21.0	39.2	34.7	36.1
94	Jaffarabad	Balochistan	45.1	42.8	44.1	5.0	7.0	6.0	81.3	54.8	61.3
95	Bolan/Kachhi	Balochistan	56.0	62.6	59.0	2.0	9.0	6.0	45.1	37.5	39.0
96	Sujawal	Sindh	49.2	46.3	47.7	10.0	6.0	8.0	84.2	77.5	78.7
97	Umerkot	Sindh	64.8	69.4	67.1	6.0	7.0	7.0	66.9	36.2	41.8
98	Naseerabad	Balochistan	31.5	28.4	29.8	18.0	17.0	18.0	62.6	54.9	56.6
99	Ziarat	Balochistan	45.4	22.4	33.2	3.0	8.0	6.0	62.3	35.3	37.0

TABLE 7   Health: mother and child | 173

7 Health: mother and child

HDI rank	Province/Region	Immunisation rate (%)			Incidence of diarrhea (%)			Prenatal care (%)		
		Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Total 2015[a]	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Total 2015[a]	Urban 2015[a]	Rural 2015[a]	Total 2015[a]
VERY LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT										
100	Zhob	Balochistan	65.8	65.9	65.9	9.0	17.0	13.0	54.6	49.6	50.4
101	Sherani	Balochistan	61.1	47.1	55.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	..	67.6	67.6
102	Kharan	Balochistan	55.3	67.6	61.3	16.0	19.0	17.0	68.9	45.1	52.8
103	Dera Bugti	Balochistan	40.9	20.2	31.6	6.0	2.0	4.0	48.1	24.7	26.5
104	Kohlu	Balochistan	30.3	31.2	30.8	5.0	11.0	8.0	74.9	25.5	34.7
105	Tor Ghar	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	2.0	4.2	3.0	5.0	3.0	4.0	..	23.8	23.8
106	Killa Abdullah	Balochistan	28.2	30.5	29.6	7.0	8.0	8.0	54.0	17.3	20.8
107	Barkhan	Balochistan	66.0	68.9	67.6	13.0	15.0	14.0	62.0	60.9	61.0
108	Kohistan	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	19.5	24.3	21.9	8.0	5.0	7.0	..	27.3	27.3
109	Tharparkar	Sindh	36.3	39.8	38.1	5.0	4.0	4.0	72.4	57.0	57.9
110	Chaghi	Balochistan	33.8	24.5	29.5	5.0	7.0	6.0	62.3	39.8	41.0
111	Washuk	Balochistan	54.6	38.4	48.8	10.0	11.0	11.0	..	43.3	43.3
112	Harnai	Balochistan	26.6	41.7	34.0	16.0	8.0	12.0	64.3	51.9	52.8
113	Jhal Magsi	Balochistan	57.2	34.3	43.9	16.0	12.0	14.0	83.2	44.2	45.9
114	Awaran	Balochistan	88.0	82.1	85.2	21.0	10.0	16.0	..	50.1	50.1
..	Kech/Turbat [b]	Balochistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
..	Panjgur [b]	Balochistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Azad Jammu & Kashmir		87.9	85.4	86.7	6.7	5.6	6.2	85.2	79.4	81.1
	Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)		74.8	70.5	73.1	11.3	10.1	10.8	79.2	59.9	62.2
	Gilgit-Baltistan		15.7	15.6	15.7	10.9	11.0	10.9	..	..	56.6
	Balochistan		52.0	50.0	51.0	11.0	12.0	11.0	65.0	41.0	47.0
	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa		79.0	77.0	78.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	80.0	61.0	64.0
	Punjab		90.0	89.0	89.0	10.0	9.0	9.0	87.0	75.0	78.0
	Sindh		72.0	74.0	73.0	6.0	7.0	6.0	87.0	59.0	72.0
	Pakistan		**82.0**	**82.0**	**82.0**	**9.0**	**9.0**	**9.0**	**86.0**	**67.0**	**73.0**

NOTES

a Calculations are based on PSLM district level microdata for the year 2014/15. For Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, due to unavailability of PSLM 2014/15 data, PSLM 2012/13 data is used instead. For FATA, the FDIHS 2013/14 is used.

b Data for Kech/Turbat and Panjgur is unavailble for PSLM 2014/15.

DEFINITIONS

Immunisation rate
Percentage of fully immunized children between the age of 12 and 23 months based on record and recall.
Incidence of Diarrhea
Children below 5 years of age suffering from diarrhea in the last one month preceding the survey.
Prenatal care
Percentage of women between 15 and 49 years of ages, who gave birth in the last 3 years prior to the survey, receiving any prenatal consultancy during the pregnancy.

MAIN DATA SOURCES
Columns 1-9: PSLM 2012/13 and 2014/15, and FDIHS 2013/14.

8 Mode of communication

HDI rank	Province/Region	Computer (%) 2015[a]	Television (%) 2015[a]	Radio (%) 2015[a]
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT				
1 Lahore	Punjab	25.5	87.0	9.6
2 Islamabad	Islamabad Capital Territory	45.2	91.9	35.8
3 Rawalpindi	Punjab	33.3	88.5	36.5
4 Karachi	Sindh	28.5	93.3	21.9
5 Sialkot	Punjab	16.5	84.6	7.4
6 Jhelum	Punjab	18.6	88.0	21.3
HIGH MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT				
7 Gujrat	Punjab	19.4	83.2	7.1
8 Chakwal	Punjab	11.8	69.7	22.8
9 Attock	Punjab	17.1	82.9	24.4
10 Faisalabad	Punjab	12.3	77.9	8.6
11 Gujranwala	Punjab	16.7	82.0	6.5
12 Toba Tek Singh	Punjab	14.4	71.5	7.2
13 Abbottabad	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	14.6	61.9	13.2
14 Peshawar	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	37.0	73.7	24.6
15 Narowal	Punjab	4.2	63.4	3.1
16 Nankana Sahib	Punjab	10.7	73.3	6.8
17 Sheikhupura	Punjab	10.1	80.1	5.6
18 Haripur	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	12.9	69.2	15.9
19 Layyah	Punjab	7.8	48.4	31.9
20 Sargodha	Punjab	11.6	73.4	18.4
21 Multan	Punjab	11.8	65.2	9.5
22 Hyderabad	Sindh	10.8	84.5	16.0
23 Mandi Bahauddin	Punjab	12.4	81.2	2.8
24 Kasur	Punjab	7.0	60.7	5.2
25 Sahiwal	Punjab	8.0	79.1	1.1
26 Khushab	Punjab	10.0	62.2	12.6
27 Okara	Punjab	4.3	76.3	1.2
28 Hafizabad	Punjab	8.0	68.4	7.3
29 Mardan	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	22.4	57.9	24.6
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT				
30 Khanewal	Punjab	5.6	51.8	7.4
31 Nowshera	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	17.5	55.4	18.1
32 Malakand	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	13.4	44.0	24.3
33 Jhang	Punjab	7.9	40.4	4.6
34 Mansehra	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	11.2	43.0	9.0
35 Chitral	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	12.2	42.3	60.4
36 Charsadda	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	15.1	50.5	16.9
37 Naushehro Feroze	Sindh	7.4	68.4	16.1
38 Quetta	Balochistan	16.9	64.5	31.8
39 Pakpattan	Punjab	2.3	73.8	1.1
40 Sukkur	Sindh	11.6	65.8	6.8
41 Lodhran	Punjab	4.4	47.4	7.0
42 Chiniot	Punjab	4.1	59.2	3.2
43 Vehari	Punjab	8.3	45.3	3.1
44 Swabi	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	10.2	53.7	18.8
45 Kohat	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	19.2	55.9	27.9
46 Bahawalpur	Punjab	6.5	43.5	3.0
47 Mianwali	Punjab	9.1	66.4	19.3
48 Dadu	Sindh	9.9	65.8	36.3
49 Bahawalnagar	Punjab	4.3	45.1	3.5
50 Bhakkar	Punjab	5.3	57.1	9.6

TABLE 8   Mode of communication | **175**

8 Mode of communication

HDI rank	Province/Region	Computer (%) 2015[a]	Television (%) 2015[a]	Radio (%) 2015[a]
51 Rahimyar Khan	Punjab	7.6	53.3	4.1
52 Swat	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	17.3	39.9	31.3
53 Larkana	Sindh	9.6	76.1	8.2
54 Karak	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	11.9	29.3	15.9
55 Bannu	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	13.8	29.2	20.7
56 Lower Dir	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	16.3	38.9	42.3
LOW MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT				
57 Hangu	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	17.2	41.1	26.1
58 Muzaffargarh	Punjab	4.0	37.0	3.5
59 Lakki Marwat	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	9.6	29.1	20.6
60 Jamshoro	Sindh	4.3	60.4	9.0
61 Nawabshah/ Shahee Benazir Abad	Sindh	3.4	86.3	61.2
62 Matiari	Sindh	4.9	52.9	7.6
63 Khairpur	Sindh	5.4	56.6	6.6
64 Dera Ghazi Khan	Punjab	4.5	39.2	8.8
65 Tando Allahyar	Sindh	4.8	45.8	10.9
66 Buner	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	11.1	39.1	35.1
67 Shikarpur	Sindh	4.0	42.0	5.7
68 Ghotki	Sindh	3.6	47.3	6.7
69 Rajanpur	Punjab	3.8	34.3	2.6
70 Battagram	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	7.0	13.3	23.3
71 Dera Ismail Khan	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	10.2	49.2	13.4
72 Sanghar	Sindh	3.3	61.1	25.9
73 Pishin	Balochistan	2.8	24.6	33.5
74 Kashmore	Sindh	3.7	33.5	8.6
75 Mastung	Balochistan	10.0	63.0	10.7
76 Tank	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	7.6	33.9	16.7
77 Kamber Shahdadkot	Sindh	2.8	49.7	4.2
LOW MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT				
78 Gawadar	Balochistan	0.5	70.8	37.1
79 Noshki	Balochistan	1.8	44.2	37.1
80 Sibi	Balochistan	8.6	41.6	30.3
81 Jacobabad	Sindh	4.5	36.1	7.1
82 Shangla	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	5.4	16.0	57.7
83 Mirpurkhas	Sindh	3.6	42.6	4.8
84 Killa Saifullah	Balochistan	3.0	25.7	50.5
85 Lasbela	Balochistan	1.4	29.0	17.7
86 Khuzdar	Balochistan	2.1	62.5	27.7
87 Badin	Sindh	3.8	32.4	7.0
88 Kalat	Balochistan	10.4	74.2	35.6
89 Loralai	Balochistan	0.4	23.0	8.1
90 Thatta	Sindh	0.7	22.4	12.0
91 Tando Muhammad Khan	Sindh	2.6	31.7	4.1
92 Upper Dir	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	3.6	8.2	36.6
93 Musakhail	Balochistan	1.3	22.8	0.9
94 Jaffarabad	Balochistan	1.2	35.6	2.1
95 Bolan/Kachhi	Balochistan	0.1	48.4	18.3
96 Sujawal	Sindh	1.4	13.5	14.5
97 Umerkot	Sindh	1.6	23.5	5.6
98 Naseerabad	Balochistan	1.7	31.4	2.2
99 Ziarat	Balochistan	1.9	12.1	6.7

TABLE

8

HDI rank		Province/Region	Computer (%) 2015[a]	Television (%) 2015[a]	Radio (%) 2015[a]
VERY LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT					
100	Zhob	Balochistan	4.3	23.5	74.6
101	Sherani	Balochistan	0.1	3.0	0.3
102	Kharan	Balochistan	1.5	37.9	57.9
103	Dera Bugti	Balochistan	2.1	28.4	23.6
104	Kohlu	Balochistan	0.3	28.7	5.1
105	Tor Ghar	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0.1	4.0	24.5
106	Killa Abdullah	Balochistan	2.0	9.9	13.1
107	Barkhan	Balochistan	1.6	16.4	87.2
108	Kohistan	Khyber Pakhtunk hwa	1.2	8.7	35.3
109	Tharparkar	Sindh	0.7	6.9	8.5
110	Chaghi	Balochistan	0.7	19.9	35.5
111	Washuk	Balochistan	1.7	32.0	26.0
112	Harnai	Balochistan	0.7	8.9	6.4
113	Jhal Magsi	Balochistan	0.7	35.1	24.0
114	Awaran	Balochistan	2.3	39.4	4.4
..	Kech/Turbat[b]	Balochistan	..	..	..
..	Panjgur[b]	Balochistan	..	..	..
	Azad Jammu & Kashmir		7.0	58.8	36.7
	Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)		32.6	1.7	86.6
	Gilgit-Baltistan		34.6	12.5	16.6
	Balochistan		5.0	39.8	24.3
	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa		16.2	46.0	24.9
	Punjab		12.5	67.0	9.4
	Sindh		12.6	65.1	16.2
	Pakistan		**12.7**	**12.7**	**14.0**

NOTES

a Calculations are based on PSLM district level microdata for the year 2014/15. For Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan, due to unavailability of PSLM 2014/15 data, PSLM 2012/13 data is used instead. For FATA, the FDIHS 2013/14 is used.

b Data for Kech/Turbat and Panjgur is unavialble for PSLM 2014/15.

DEFINITIONS

Computer
Percentage of people residing in a household possessing a computer.

Television
Percentage of people residing in a household possessing a television.

Radio
Percentage of people residing in a household possessing a radio.

MAIN DATA SOURCES
Columns 1-3: PSLM 2012/13 and 2014/15, and FDIHS 2013/14.

TABLE 8 Mode of communication | **177**

9 Labour force participation

	Labour force participation rate								
	Overall (%)			Rural (%)			Urban (%)		
Province	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Total 2015[a]	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Total 2015[a]	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Total 2015[a]
Azad Jammu & Kashmir	6.9	52.6	29.2	6.2	52.1	28.5	11.8	55.9	33.6
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)	8.6	56.4	35.2	..	..	..	..	..	..
Gilgit-Baltistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Balochistan	20.5	83.4	54.2	24.5	85.0	56.9	9.9	79.3	47.2
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	16.6	74.6	44.3	18.2	75.3	45.2	9.8	72.0	40.7
Punjab	31.2	81.7	56.0	39.7	83.6	61.0	14.8	78.2	46.8
Sindh	20.5	83.8	51.7	25.3	88.3	58.7	7.5	79.8	45.5
Pakistan	**24.3**	**81.1**	**53.1**	**32.6**	**83.2**	**57.6**	**11.8**	**78.2**	**45.9**

NOTES

a For Azad Jammu & Kashmir, LFS 2012/13 is used. For FATA, the FDIHS 2013/14 is used. Due to security reasons, urban sample in the FDIHS does not represent the whole urban areas of FATA. No data is available for Gilgit-Baltistan.

DEFINITION

Labour Force Participation Rate
Labour force comprises all persons 15 years of age or above who may be categorized as employed or unemployed during the reference period of one week prior to the date of interview.

MAIN DATA SOURCES
Columns 1-9: LFS 2012/13 and 2014/15, and FDIHS 2013/14.

10 Employment

Province	Unemployment rate								
	Overall (%)			Rural (%)			Urban (%)		
	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Total 2015[a]	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Total 2015[a]	Female 2015[a]	Male 2015[a]	Total 2015[a]
Azad Jammu & Kashmir	39.2	10.9	14.4	39.9	11.3	14.5	36.6	8.6	13.5
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)	7.5	7.2	7.3	..	..	..	..	..	..
Gilgit-Baltistan	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Balochistan	7.0	3.6	3.9	7.2	2.4	3.3	22.8	4.0	5.8
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	16.3	6.6	7.9	14.3	5.6	7.4	30.6	7.0	9.8
Punjab	8.3	5.2	5.9	6.0	4.6	5.1	16.9	6.2	7.9
Sindh	8.2	4.4	4.8	5.5	1.7	2.5	28.5	5.5	7.3
Pakistan	**9.2**	**4.7**	**5.8**	**6.8**	**4.1**	**4.9**	**20.4**	**5.9**	**7.7**

NOTES

a For Azad Jammu & Kashmir, LFS 2012/13 is used. For FATA, the FDIHS 2013/14 is used. Due to security reasons, urban sample in the FDIHS does not represent the whole urban areas of FATA. No data is available for Gilgit-Baltistan.

DEFINITION

Unemployed
All people 15 years of age or above are categorized as unemployed who were reported as without work, seeking work during the last week, and currently available for work or not currently available for work due to illness, plan to take a job within a month, temporarily laid off and an apprentice not willing to work, during the last week prior to the date of interview.

MAIN DATA SOURCES
Columns 1-9: LFS 2012/13 and 2014/15, and FDIHS 2013/14.

TABLE 10 Employment | 179

Technical note 1
Human Development Index

The Human Development Index (HDI) is a tool to measure achievements in three dimensions of human development: education, health and standard of living. Each dimension of the HDI is further divided into indicators. The HDI is calculated following a two-step procedure: first, sub-indices for the three dimensions are calculated by standardizing indicators for each dimension; second, the geometric mean of these standardized indicators is calculated. The Education Index for Pakistan is calculated by following the same methodology adopted in the global HDI. However, as there is no data available at the district level, we devised a new methodology for the other two indices. Table 1 presents a summary of the methodology used for the global HDI, that is compared with HDIs in the national HDRs from 2017 and 2003.

Following the current global HDI methodology, the Education Index is calculated using mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling at the district level from the 2014/15 *Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM)* data. The P*akistan NHDR 2003,* however, used literacy rate and enrolment ratio as education indicators in accordance with the global HDI methodology used at that time.

We could not calculate life expectancy, as there is no data available for mortality in Pakistan. Instead, the Health Index is constructed using two indicators: *immunisation rates* and *satisfaction with health facility*. The for-

mer indicator, taken directly from the *PSLM data*, is an appropriate proxy for the overall strength of the government's public health system. *Immunisation rate* is the percentage of the children aged 12 to 23 months who have been fully immunised. The *satisfaction with health facility* defines households that lack access to quality healthcare facility if any of the household members had responded that he/she did not use a healthcare facility because: it was costly, it did not suit, it lacked equipment/did not have enough facilities, or if any of the household members were not satisfied with the health facility. Both indicators are available at the district level and are taken from the 2014/15 *PSLM data*. The maximum and minimum goalpost for both indicators are set at 100 and 0, respectively.

Calculation of the Real GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Parity in US Dollars (PPP$) requires data on GDP per capita. This data is available at the national and provincial levels, but not at the district level in Pakistan. Therefore, in the 2003 NHDR for Pakistan, the cash value of crop output and the manufacturing value-added at the district level were used as a proxy for real GDP per capita. For the Pakistan NHDR 2017, however, we used the living standards dimension from the **Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)** as a proxy for the standard of living dimension of the HDI. Compared to the 2003 Pakistan HDI, the living standards dimension has been used due to the unavailability of recent district level man-

TABLE **1**

HDI dimensions, indicators and data sources

	Indicators used for HDI in global HDR	Indicators used for HDI in Pakistan HDR 2017	Indicators used for HDI in Pakistan HDr 2003
Education	Mean years of schooling	Mean years of schooling	Literacy ratio
	Expected years of schooling	Expected years of schooling	Enrolment ratio
Health	Life expectancy	Immunisation rate	Immunisation rate
		Satisfaction with health facility	Infant survival ratio
Standard of living	GNI per capita (PPP $)	*Living standards from the Multidimensional Poverty Index:* Electricity Drinking water Sanitation Infrastructure Household fuel Household assets	District–wise GDP per capita (PPP$): based on cash value of crop output and the manufacturing value–added at the district level

ufacturing data, since the latest manufacturing census data is available for 2005-06. Second, cash value of agriculture crop output and manufacturing value may not be representative of the total GDP. Finally, in an undocumented economy like Pakistan, any macro level indicator may not be regarded as a true measure of economic output, since a significant proportion of economic activities are informal.

For the standard of living dimension the Global MPI methodology, which considers six indicators, as reported in the Global HDR 2015 was followed completely with one exception. Instead of using the *type of household floor*, because of data unavailability; *material for household walls and roof* was used. Houses without finished walls[1] or finished roofs[2] were considered deprived. If the house was deprived in three or more facilities/indicators, we regarded the household as deprived, and calculated the percentage of people not living in substandard living conditions. The range or 'goalposts' for the standard of living are 100 per cent for a maximum level and 0 per cent for no standard of living.

Standard of living from MPI:

A household is deprived if:

1. *Electricity:* did not have access to electricity.
2. *Drinking water:* did not have access to improved drinking water source.
3. *Sanitation:* did not have access to improved sanitation or if improved, it was shared.
4. *Cooking fuel:* had access to used 'dirty' cooking fuel (dung, wood or charcoal).
5. *Infrastructure:* was without a finished roof or fin

ished walls.
6. *Assets:* did not have any of the assets related to information access (radio, TV, telephone), did not have any of the assets related to mobility (bike, motor bike, car, tractor); or did not have any of the assets related to livelihood (refrigerator, arable land, live stock).

If a household is deprived in three or more MPI Standard of Living indicators, it is identified as deprived.

Steps to calculate the Human Development Index for Pakistan at the district level

Following the methodology of the global HDIs, the following two steps have been employed to calculate the HDI.

Step 1: Calculating the dimension of indices

Minimum and maximum goal posts for immunization rate and satisfaction with health facility are set at 0 and 100 to capture the maximum variation among the districts of Pakistan.

For education, the minimum goal post is set at 0. The maximum goal post for expected years of schooling is set at 15, based on the estimated maximum value of 13.5 for Islamabad. Similarly, the maximum goal post for mean years of schooling is set at 10 based on the estimated value of 9.1.

The minimum and maximum goal post for the living standard dimension, borrowed from the multidimensional poverty index, is set at 0 and 100, respectively.

TABLE **2**

Summary of dimensions, indicators and goal posts

Dimensions	Indicators	Minimum	Maximum
Health	Immunisation rate	0	100
	Satisfaction with health facility	0	100
Education	Mean years of schooling	0	10
	Expected years of schooling	0	15
Standard of living	*Living standards from the Multidimensional Poverty Index:* Electricity Drinking water Sanitation Infrastructure Household fuel Household assets	0	100

After defining the minimum and maximum goal posts, the dimension indices are calculated as follows:

$$\text{Dimension index} = \frac{(\text{actual value} - \text{minimum value})}{(\text{maximum value} - \text{minimum vaue})} \quad (1)$$

For the health and education dimensions, equation (1) is calculated first for each component, and then the health and education indices are calculated by taking the arithmetic mean of the two resulting component indices. For the living standard index, the percentage of people living in non-deprived households is used.

Step 2: Aggregating the dimensional indices to produce the Human Development Index

The geometric mean of the dimensional indices is calculated to construct the HDI:

$$\text{HDI} = (\text{I\_Health} \cdot \text{I\_Education} \cdot \text{I\_Living Standard})^{1/3}$$

Example: Quetta

Indicators	Value
Immunisation rate	64.6
Satisfaction with health facility	53.8
Expected years of schooling	10.2
Mean years of schooling	4.2
Living standards from the Multidimensional Poverty Index: *Electricity* *Drinking water* *Sanitation* *Infrastructure* *Household fuel* *Household assets*	89.7

$$\textit{Immunisation index} = \frac{64.6 - 0}{100 - 0} = 0.65$$

$$\textit{Satisfaction with health facility index} = \frac{53.8 - 0}{100 - 0} = 0.54$$

$$\textit{Health index} = \frac{0.65 + 0.54}{2} = 0.59$$

$$\textit{Expected years of schooling index} = \frac{10.2 - 0}{15 - 0} = 0.68$$

$$\textit{Mean years of schooling index} = \frac{4.2 - 0}{10 - 0} = 0.42$$

$$\textit{Education index} = \frac{0.68 + 0.42}{2} = 0.55$$

$$\textit{Living standard index} = \frac{89.7 - 0}{100 - 0} = 0.90$$

$$\textit{Human Development Index} = (0.59 \cdot 0.55 \cdot 0.90)^{1/3} = 0.664$$

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[1]built with stones, blocks or bricks
[2]made with iron sheets, t–iron, bricks, and reinforced brick cement

Technical note 2
Youth Development Index

The Youth Development Index (YDI) is a composite index designed to measure youth development in Pakistan at the regional level. The YDI is based on nine indicators under the four dimensions of education, employment, engagement, as well as health and well-being. These dimensions were decided through a consultative process with the Advisory Council of the NHDR 2017, lead demographers, and statisticians in the country. The following table summarises the dimensions and indicators used, along with data sources specified at the level of analysis.

Three indicators are included under education. The minimum goalpost for all the three education indicators is 0. The maximum goalpost for mean years of schooling is set at 10, based on the actual maximum value estimated from the Pakistan Social and Living Standard Survey (PSLM) at the regional level. For the youth literacy rate, the maximum goalpost is set at the theoretical maximum value of 100. The maximum goalpost for youth secondary enrolment rate is set at 75.

Two indicators are included under the dimension of employment: youth labor force participation rate and ratio of total unemployment rate to youth unemployment rate. Based on the actual minimum regional value of the labour force participation rate, the minimum goalpost for youth labour force participation rate is set at 30 whereas the maximum goal post is set in accordance with the global value of 65. Minimum and maximum goalposts for the ratio of total unemployment to youth unemployment are set at 0 and 1, respectively.

The engagement dimension of the YDI comprises of political and social participation. Political participation is incorporated in terms of youth voting behaviour. The maximum and minimum goalposts are set at 70 and 20 for this indicator. Social participation is defined as participating in any social organization. Therefore, a young person is regarded as participating in any social organization if that person has membership of any social groups and participates in the activities of that group at least once a month. Based on the estimated value at the regional level, the maximum and minimum goalposts for social participation is set at 15 and 0, respectively.

YDI dimensions, indicators, and data sources

Dimensions	Indicators	Data source and coverage
Education	Youth mean years of schooling	PSLM/District
	Youth literacy rate	PSLM/District
	Youth secondary enrolment rates	PSLM/District
Employment	Youth labour force participation rate	LFS/ Provincial
	Ratio of total unemployment rate to youth unemployment rate	LFS/ Provincial
Engagement	Youth political participation rate	NYPS/Regional
	Youth social participation rate	NYPS/Regional
Health & well-being	Percentage of youth with knowledge of AIDS	PDHS/Provincial
	Youth physical activity rate	NYPS/Regional

In addition to the three themes of the NHDR 2017, the dimension of health and well-being is also incorporated in the YDI under the indicators of knowledge about HIV and participation in physical activity. The maximum and minimum goalposts for both indicators are set at 100 and 0, respectively.

Dimension indices

After applying the goalpost to the actual values of indicators, the arithmetic mean is taken to obtain the dimension indices.

Formula for calculating YDI scores

The YDI is the geometric mean of the four dimensional indices:

$$\mathbf{YDI = (I_{Education} \times I_{Employment} \times I_{Engagement} \times I_{Health \& Well-being})^{1/4}}$$

Example: Islamabad

Dimensions	Indicators	Value
Education	Youth mean years of schooling	9.3
	Youth literacy rate	94.5
	Youth secondary enrolment rate	65.2
Employment	Youth labour force participation rate	45.2
	Ratio of total unemployment rate to youth unemployment rate	0.648
Engagement	Youth political participation rate	55.6
	Youth social participation rate	1.4
Health & Well-being	Percentage of youth with knowledge of AIDS	80.1
	Youth physical activity rate	57.8

$$\text{Youth mean years of schooling index} = \left(\frac{9.3 - 0}{10 - 0}\right) = 0.93$$

$$\text{Youth literacy index} = \left(\frac{94.5 - 0}{100 - 0}\right) = 0.945$$

$$\text{Youth secondary enrolment index} = \left(\frac{65.2 - 0}{75 - 0}\right) = 0.87$$

$$\textbf{\textit{Education index}} = \left(\frac{0.93 + 0.945 + 0.87}{3}\right) = \mathbf{0.915}$$

$$\text{Youth labour force participation index} = \left(\frac{45.2 - 30}{65 - 30}\right) = 0.434$$

$$\text{Ratio of total umemployment rate to youth unemployment rate} = 0.648$$

$$\textbf{\textit{Employment index}} = \left(\frac{0.434 + 0.648}{2}\right) = \mathbf{0.541}$$

$$\text{Youth social participation index} = \left(\frac{1.4 - 0}{15 - 0}\right) = 0.093$$

$$\text{Youth political participation index} = \left(\frac{55.6 - 20}{70 - 20}\right) = 0.712$$

$$\textbf{\textit{Engagement index}} = \left(\frac{0.093 + 0.712}{2} \right) = \textbf{0.403}$$

$$\text{Youth knowledge of HIV index} = \left(\frac{80.1 - 0}{100 - 0} \right) = 0.801$$

$$\text{Youth physical activity index} = \left(\frac{57.8 - 0}{100 - 0} \right) = 0.578$$

$$\textbf{\textit{Health index}} = \left(\frac{0.801 + 0.578}{2} \right) = \textbf{0.690}$$

$$\textbf{\textit{Youth Development Index}} = \left(0.915 \times 0.541 \times 0.403 \times 0.69 \right)^{1/4} = \textbf{0.609}$$

Technical note 3
Youth Gender Inequality Index (YGII)

The global Human Development Report's Gender Inequality Index (GII) captures gender-based inequality in three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment and the labor market. The Youth Gender Inequality Index (YGII) is constructed in this report using the same dimensions as the GII with data pertaining to the youth. However, the choice of indicators has differed due to data limitations due to the absence of disaggregated data for the age group of 15-29 years at the regional level.

The YGII has three dimensions: health, empowerment, and labour market. For health, the reproductive health indicators have been replaced with the indicators of knowledge about AIDS and the youth physical activity rate due to the unavailability of data at the regional level. These indicators are taken from the YDI methodology (see Technical Note 2 for details).

The empowerment dimension employs two gender-disaggregated indicators: youth secondary enrolment rate and youth political participation rate. The youth secondary enrolment rate is defined as the percentage of youth who have reached (but not necessarily completed) the secondary level of education. Youth political participation is defined as the percentage of youth who reported to have voted in the past elections or wished to vote in the future. The labour market dimension of the YGII is incorporated in terms of the youth labour force participation rate.

YGII dimensions, indicators, and data sources

Dimensions	Indicators	Data source	Coverage
Health & well-being	Percentage of youth with knowledge of AIDS (HK)	Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey, 2012–13	Provincial
	Youth physical activity rate (PA)	National Youth Perception Survey, 2015	Regional
Empowerment	Youth secondary enrolment rate (SE)	National Youth Perception Survey, 2015	Regional
	Youth political participation rate (PP)	National Youth Perception Survey, 2015	Regional
Labour Market	Youth labour force participation rate (LFPR)	Labour Force Survey, 2014/2015	Provincial

Formula for calculating YGII scores

To calculate YGII scores, the GII methodology has been replicated. Using the geometric mean, the aggregated formulae across dimensions for women and men are given as

$$G_F = \sqrt[3]{(PA_F \times HK_F)^{1/2} \times (PP_F \times SE_F)^{1/2} \times LFPR_F} \qquad G_M = \sqrt[3]{(PA_M \times HK_M)^{1/2} \times (PP_M \times SE_M)^{1/2} \times LFPR_M}$$

The harmonic mean is used to construct the equally distributed gender index

$$HARM(G_F, G_M) = \left[\frac{G_F^{-1} + G_M^{-1}}{2}\right]^{-1}$$

Equal weights are assigned to indices for men and women in order to construct the reference standard. The indices are further aggregated using the geometric mean as follows

$$G_{\overline{F,M}} = \sqrt[3]{\overline{Health} \times \overline{Empowerment} \times \overline{LFPR}}$$

$$\overline{Health} = \left[\sqrt{(PA_F \times HK_F)} + \sqrt{(PA_M \times HK_M)}\right]/2$$

$$\overline{Empowerment} = \left[\sqrt{(PP_F \times SE_F)} + \sqrt{(PP_M \times SE_M)}\right]/2$$

$$\overline{LFPR} = \frac{LFPR_F + LFPR_M}{2}$$

The comparison of the equally distributed gender index to the reference standard is given by

$$\textbf{YGII} = 1 - \frac{HARM(G_F, G_M)}{G_{\overline{F,M}}}$$

Example: Northern Balochistan

	Health and well-being		Empowerment		Labour market
	Percentage of youth with knowledge of AIDS (HK)	Youth physical activity rate (PA)	Youth secondary enrolment rate (SE)	Youth political participation rate (PP)	Youth labour force participation rate (LFPR)
Male	70.3	49.2	36.2	64.0	65.1
Female	19.6	6.2	11.2	40.2	20.7
$\frac{F+M}{2}$	$\frac{\sqrt{0.703 \times 0.492} + \sqrt{0.196 \times 0.062}}{2}$ $= 0.349$		$\frac{\sqrt{(0.362 \times 0.640)} + \sqrt{0.112 \times 0.402}}{2}$ $= 0.347$		$\frac{0.651 + 0.207}{2}$ $= 0.429$

$$G_F = \sqrt[3]{(0.196 \times 0.062)^{1/2} \times (0.112 \times 0.402)^{1/2} \times 0.207} = 0.169$$

$$G_M = \sqrt[3]{(0.703 \times 0.492)^{1/2} \times (0.362 \times 0.640)^{1/2} \times 0.651} = 0.569$$

$$HARM(G_F, G_M) = 1 / \left[\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{1}{0.169} + \frac{1}{0.569}\right)\right] = 0.261$$

$$G_{\overline{F,M}} = \sqrt[3]{0.349 \times 0.347 \times 0.429} = 0.373$$

$$YGII = 1 - \frac{0.261}{0.373} = 0.301$$

Technical note 4
Multidimensional Poverty index

The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) identifies multiple deprivations experienced at the same time at the household level in education, health and standard of living. The methodology for the Pakistan MPI is adopted from Alkire and Santos (2010, 2014), whereas indicators are selected through provincial and regional consultations with different federal and provincial government ministries, academia, and research organizations.
Methodology
Building on the global MPI, the three dimensions of education, health and standard of living are retained in the Pakistan MPI[1]. A total of 15 indicators are used to construct the MPI for Pakistan: three for education, four for health, and eight for standard of living. Unlike the global MPI, however, not all the indicators within each dimension are equally weighted in Pakistan's national MPI. Indicators, cut-off values, and weights are given below.

Dimensions	Indicators	Deprivation cut-off	Weights (%)
Education	Years of schooling	Deprived if no man OR no woman in the household above 10 years of age has completed five years of schooling	16.67
	Child school attendance	Deprived if any school–aged child is not attending school (between 6 and 11 years of age)	12.5
	Educational quality	Deprived if any child is not going to school because of quality issues (not enough teachers, schools are far away, too costly, no male/female teacher, sub–standard schools), or is attending school but remains dissatisfied with service	4.17
Health	Access to health facilities/clinics/Basic Health Units (BHU)	Deprived if health facilities are not used at all, or are only used occasionally, because of access constraints (too far away, too costly, unsuitable, lack of tools/staff, not enough facilities)	16.67
	Immunisation	Deprived if any child under the age of five is not fully immunised according to the vaccinations calendar (households with no children under five are considered non–deprived)	5.56
	Ante–natal care	Deprived if any woman in the household who has given birth in the last three years did not receive ante–natal check–ups (households with no woman who has given birth are considered non–deprived)	5.56
	Assisted delivery	Deprived if any woman in the household has given birth in the last three years and was attended by untrained personnel (family member, friend, traditional birth attendant, etc.) or in an inappropriate facility (home, other) (households with no woman who has given birth are considered non–deprived)	5.56

Dimensions	Indicators	Deprivation cut-off	Weights (%)
Standard of living	Water	Deprived if the household has no access to an improved source of water according to SDG standards, considering distance (less than a 30-minute return trip): tap water, hand pump, motor pump, protected well, mineral water	4.76
	Sanitation	Deprived if the household has no access to adequate sanitation according to SDG standards: flush system (sewerage, septic tank and drain), privy seat	4.76
	Walls	Deprived if the household has unimproved walls (mud, uncooked/mud bricks, wood/bamboo, other)	2.38
	Overcrowding	Deprived if the household is overcrowded (four or more people per room)	2.38
	Electricity	Deprived if the household has no access to electricity	4.76
	Cooking fuel	Deprived if the household uses solid cooking fuels for cooking (wood, dung cakes, crop residue, coal/charcoal, other)	4.76
	Assets	Deprived if the household does not have more than two small assets (radio, TV, iron, fan, sewing machine, video cassette player, chair, telephone, watch, air cooler, bicycle) OR no large asset (refrigerator, air conditioner, tractor, computer, motorcycle), AND has no car.	4.76
	Land and livestock (only for rural areas)	Deprived if the household is deprived in land AND deprived in livestock, i.e.: a) Deprived in land: the household has less than 2.25 acres of non–irrigated land AND less than 1.125 acres of irrigated land b) Deprived in livestock: the household has less than 2 cattle, fewer than 3 sheep/goats, fewer than 5 chickens AND no animal for transportation (urban households are considered non–deprived)	4.76

A person is categorized as poor in two stages. In stage one, she is classified as deprived or non-deprived in each indicator, based on the cut-off value. A deprived person receives a score of 1, whereas a non-deprived person gets a score of 0. In the second step, the weighted deprivation scores for each indicator are obtained by multiplying the scores with the weights of each indicator, and are summed to obtain the household deprivation score. A cut-off of 33.3 percent is used to identify a household as poor. If the weighted deprivation score is equal to or greater than 33.3 percent, that household is categorized as poor. Households which are deprived in less than one third of the indicators are considered non-poor. The headcount ratio, H, is the percentage of multi-dimensionally poor people in the population. The average deprivation score for the multi-dimensionally poor is denoted as intensity, A. The MPI is the product of H and A.

$$MPI = H \times A$$

Hypothetical example for calculating the living standard index

	Households			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**
Household size	**3**	**6**	**8**	**7**
Education				
No man OR no woman in the household above 10 years of age has completed five years of schooling	0	1	1	1
At least one school–aged child is not attending school (between 6 and 11 years of age)	0	0	0	1
At least one child is not going to school because of quality issues	0	0	0	1
Health				
Health facilities are not used at all, or are only used once in a while, because of access constraints (too far away, too costly, unsuitable, lack of tools/staff, not enough facilities)	0	0	0	1
At least one child under the age of five is not fully immunised according to the vaccinations calendar (households with no children under five are considered non–deprived)	0	1	0	1
At least one woman in the household who has given birth in the last three years did not receive ante–natal check–ups (households with no woman who has given birth are considered non–deprived)	0	0	1	1
At least one woman in the household has given birth in the last three years attended by untrained personnel (family member, friend, traditional birth attendant, etc.) or in an inappropriate facility (home, other) (households with no woman who has given birth are considered non–deprived)	0	0	0	1
Living conditions				
Household has no access to an improved source of water according to SDG standards, considering distance (less than a 30 minutes return trip): tap water, hand pump, motor pump, protected well, mineral water	1	1	0	0
Household has no access to adequate sanitation according to SDG standards: flush system (sewerage, septic tank and drain), privy seat	0	0	0	1
Household has unimproved walls (mud, uncooked/mud bricks, wood/bamboo, other)	1	1	1	0
Household is overcrowded (four or more people per room)	1	1	0	0
Deprived if the household has no access to electricity	1	1	0	0
Household uses solid cooking fuels for cooking (wood, dung cakes, crop residue, coal/charcoal, other)	1	1	0	1
Household does not have more than two small assets (radio, TV, iron, fan, sewing machine, video cassette player, chair, telephone, watch, air cooler, bicycle) OR no large asset (refrigerator, air conditioner, tractor, computer, motorcycle), AND has no car.	1	1	0	1
Household is deprived in land AND deprived in livestock, i.e.: a) Deprived in land: the household has less than 2.25 acres of non–irrigated land AND less than 1.125 acres of irrigated land b) Deprived in livestock: the household has less than 2 cattle, fewer than 3 sheep/goats, fewer than 5 chickens AND no animal for transportation (urban households are considered non–deprived)	0	1	1	0
Household deprivation score, c (sum of each deprivation multiplied by its weight)	23.8%	50.8%	29.4%	81%
Is the household poor? (c>=33.3 percent)	No	Yes	No	Yes

Weighted deprivations in household 1:

$$(1 \times 4.76) + (1 \times 2.38) + (1 \times 2.38) + (1 \times 4.76) + (1 \times 4.76) + (1 \times 4.76) = 28.6\%$$

$$Headcount\ (H) = \left(\frac{0+6+0+7}{3+6+8+7} \right) = 0.542$$

(54.2 per cent of people are multidimensionally poor)

$$Intensity\ of\ poverty\ (A) = \left(\frac{(50.8 \times 6) + (81 \times 7)}{6 + 7} \right) = 67.0\%$$

(The average poor person is deprived in 67.1 per cent of the weighted indicators)

$$MPI = H \times A = 0.542 \times 0.671 = 0.363$$

Contribution of deprivation in

Education

$$Contribution_1 = \left(\frac{16.67 \times (6 + 7) + 12.5 \times 7 + 4.17 \times 7}{3 + 6 + 8 + 7} \right) \Big/ 36.3 = 38.3\%$$

Health

$$Contribution_2 = \left(\frac{5.56 \times 6 + 16.67 \times 7 + 5.56 \times (7 \times 3)}{3 + 6 + 8 + 7} \right) \Big/ 36.3 = 30.6\%$$

Living Standards

$$Contribution_3 = \left(\frac{4.76 \times (6 \times 5) + 2.38 \times (6 \times 2) + 4.76 \times (7 \times 3)}{3 + 6 + 8 + 7} \right) \Big/ 36.3 = 31.1\%$$

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[1]Government of Pakistan, 2016.

National Youth Perception Survey 2015

The objective of the National Youth Perception Survey (NYPS) 2015 is to measure youth perceptions in the following thematic areas: education, employment, marital status, engagement and social life, health and well-being, as well as attitudes and values.

The target respondents for this survey were Pakistani youth, between 15 and 29 years of age, including both men and women.

1. Survey Design

The NYPS is a regionally representative survey covering all the four provinces, as well as Gilgit-Baltistan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K) and Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT). The total sample size is 7,000 youths. To provide maximum coverage in the available time and resources, Pakistan was divided into 18 regions. The regional divisions for the provinces of Punjab and Sindh are based on Pickney's (1989) agro-climatic zones, while the divisions in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are based on proximity, cultural similarities and geographical topography. Islamabad, Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) are considered separate regions on administrative divisions. The sampling frame of the survey was created using the 1998 population census.

2. Sampling methodology

After dividing the country in 18 regions, the sample within each region itself was further divided into urban and rural areas under the Probability Proportionate to Size (PPS) technique, using the exact proportions as defined by the 1998 census.

2a. Urban Pakistan sampling

A multi-stage stratified random sampling technique was used to conduct the survey in urban Pakistan. This technique involved various stages, from stratification of cities to selection of target respondents.

Urban Pakistan was divided into three strata to obtain maximum coverage and better representation. The strata are as follows: cities with a population of more than one million were categorized in stratum 1; cities with a population between 0.1-1 million were categorized in stratum 2; and the remaining areas were categorized as stratum 3. Stratification of cities within provinces is important because it enables us to represent all types of cities – small or big – to reflect the heterogeneity of urban Pakistan.

Using the Probability Proportionate to Size (PPS) systematic sampling technique, the required numbers of cities were selected from each stratum. All the cities of the same stratum within each province were listed in geographical order. The sampling interval for each cell (province by stratum) was determined by dividing the total population of all cities by the required number of cities to be selected from that cell. Then a random number was generated and located in the column for the cumulative population of all the cities. The cumulative population of the city which was closest to this randomly generated number was selected as the first city.

For the selection of the rest of the cities, a pre-calculated sampling interval was added to the randomly generated number, and all corresponding cities were included in the sample. In this systematic way, the required number of cities were selected from all three stratums. In order to select starting points (target areas), the survey firm

used its own area listings based on the homogeneity regarding social status and size of areas. The survey firm demarcated socio-economic clusters of union councils in urban centers. Union council maps, which are available from the Census office, have been used for this purpose. Based on the sample size of a given city, these areas were then divided by the number of interviews required per area.

In each selected area, the supervisors identified a central street of the area. All houses on that street were listed and one household was selected through balloting. This selected household served as the starting point for that area. This is a reasonable way of eliminating surveyor bias — by using city maps to make the area listings, then selecting the starting point using a balloting technique.

2b. Rural Sampling Methodology

Similarly, for the rural sample, a multistage stratified random sampling was adopted. For the selection of villages, the Probability Proportionate to Size (PPS) technique was used. Rural Pakistan was divided into two strata on the basis of population: stratum I included those villages with a population of more than 3,000; and a village with population less than 3,000 was included in stratum II. All the villages (PSUs) in a province were listed as per the Population Census 1998 sequence, based on their geographical placement. Once the PSUs of a particular region were listed, the cumulative population of all these villages was calculated, and an interval was determined on the basis of the total villages to be sampled from that region. The selection of a village was made using a random number, and the remaining villages were then selected using the same sampling interval.

After the above steps, each village was divided into four hypothetical quadrants. The center point of the quadrant was selected as the starting point. Three interviews were conducted around each starting point. In villages with population exceed-

ing 3,000, five households were skipped after each successful interview, whereas in villages with a population of less than 3,000, three households were skipped after each successful interview.

2c. Selection of household and respondent

For the selection of a household around a particular starting point, the Right Hand Rule (RHR) was used for female respondents and the Left Hand Rule (LHR) was used for males. This enabled us to adopt a systematic procedure to minimize surveyor bias.

If in a household there was more than one eligible respondent, then a Kish Grid was used for selection of the respondent. The use of a Kish Grid enabled us to select the final respondent in the most randomized manner. If a randomly selected respondent was not at home, three call backs were made to locate that respondent. If after three call backs the respondent was not available or alternatively, where the selected respondent refused to cooperate, substitution was done from the same vicinity. The original respondent was substituted by another respondent with a matched profile in the same vicinity.

2d. Margin of error

The margin of error denotes the range between which sample values would lie, with reference to the true population parameters.

The formula for calculating standard error (SE) is given by

$$S.E. = \sqrt{\frac{p \cdot (1-p)}{n}}$$

The margin of error depends on how confident one wants to be on the results (this is called the confidence level). The general formula for the margin of error for a sample proportion is

$$\textbf{Margin of error} = \textbf{Z.SE.CF.}$$

Where z is the appropriate z-value and CF is the design effect.

Margin of error with the sample achieved					
Province/Area	Region	Rural	Urban	Total	Margin of error (%)
Punjab	Central Punjab	259	290	549	4.14
	Northern Punjab	186	237	423	4.72
	Eastern Punjab	366	513	879	3.27
	Southeastern Punjab	366	264	630	3.87
	Western Punjab	180	100	280	5.80
Sindh	Karachi & Hyderabad	110	606	716	3.63
	Western Sindh	180	100	280	5.80
	Eastern Sindh	180	170	350	5.19
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	Central Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	169	174	343	5.24
	Northern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	218	70	288	5.72
	Southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	179	100	279	5.81
Balochistan	Central Balochistan	160	120	280	5.80
	Northern Balochistan	129	151	280	5.80
	Southeastern Balochistan	161	121	282	5.78
Islamabad	Islamabad	183	97	280	5.80
Gilgit-Baltistan	Gilgit-Baltistan	146	136	282	5.78
Federally Administered Tribal Areas	Federally Administered Tribal Areas	168	112	280	5.80
Azad Jammu & Kashmir	Azad Jammu & Kashmir	165	122	287	5.73
Total		34505	3483	6988	1.16

Data sources

For this report, multiple sources of data are used. For constructing the **Human Development Index (HDI)**, the *Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement (PSLM) survey 2014/15* is used for all parts of the country, except the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). To compute the HDI for FATA, the *FATA Development Indicators Household Survey (FDIHS) 2013/14* is used. The unit of analysis for the HDI is the district. For comparison over time, six waves of the PSLM survey are used— 2004/05, 2006/07, 2008/09, 2010/11, 2012/13, and 2014/15. The HDI is not computed at the district level for Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K), FATA, and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), which are considered separate regions due to the unavailability of district-level data.

The **Youth Development Index (YDI)** and the **Youth Gender Inequality Index (YGII)** are computed using data from multiple sources. These include the *PSLM survey 2014/15* at the district level, the *Labor Force Survey (LFS) 2014/15* at the provincial level, the *Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (PDHS) 2012/13* at the provincial level, the *National Youth Perception Survey (NYPS) 2015* at the regional level, and the *FDIHS 2013/14* for FATA.

The NYPS is a regionally representative survey covering all five provinces, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K) and Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT). Pakistan is divided into a total of 18 regions. The regional division of the provinces of Punjab and Sindh is based on Pickney's (1989) agro-climatic zones, whereas the provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are divided into regions based on the geographical topography. However, AJ&K, FATA, Gilgit-Baltistan and Islamabad are considered separate regions based on administrative divisions.

Regions

Islamabad
Islamabad Capital Territory

Azad Jammu & Kashmir
All districts of Azad Jammu & Kashmir

Gilgit-Baltistan (GB)
All districts of Gilgit–Baltistan

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
All agencies and frontier regions

Northern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Buner, Kohistan, Malakand, Shangla, Chitral, Battagram, Swat, Mansehra, Abbotabad, Lower Dir, Haripur, Upper Dir, Tor Ghar

Southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Kohat, Karak, Bannu, Hangu, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, Tank

Central Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Peshawar, Nowshera, Mardan, Swabi, Charsadda

Northern Punjab
Attock, Jhelum, Chakwal, Rawalpindi

Western Punjab
Mianwali, Bhakhar, Dera Gazi Khan, Layyah, Rajanpur, Muzaffargarh

Eastern Punjab
Hafizabad, Narowal, Sheikhupura, Nankana Sahib, Gujrat, Kasur, Mandi Bahauddin, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Lahore

Central Punjab
Sargodha, Khushab, Faisalabad, Jhang, Toba Tek Singh, Okara, Chiniot

Southeast Punjab
Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur, Sahiwal, Lodhran, Rahimyar Khan, Vehari, Multan, Khanewal, Pakpattan

Northern Balochistan
Quetta, Killa Abdullah, Killa Saifullah, Musakhail, Barkhan, Ziarat, Pishin, Loralai, Zhob, Kohlu, Dera Bugti, Sibi, Sherani, Kohlu, Harnai

Southeast Balochistan
Awaran, Lasbela, Kech/Turbat, Panjgur, Gawadar, Khuzdar, Washuk

Central Balochistan
Lehri, Bolan/Kachhi, Jhal Magsi, Naseerabad, Jaffarabad, Chaghi, Mastung, Kalat, Kharan, Noshki

Eastern Sindh
Sukkur, Khairpur, Nawabshah, Tharparkar, Naushehro Feroz, Ghotki, Umerkot, Mirpurkhas, Sanghar, Mitiari, Tando Allahyar, Tando Muhammad Khan

Western Sindh
Jamshoro, Dadu, Kashmore, Jacobabad, Kamber Shahdadkot, Thatta, Badin, Shikarpur

Karachi, Hyderabad
Karachi, Hyderabad

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With 64 percent of its population below the age of 30, Pakistan is a young country with a growing youth bulge. The 2017 National Human Development Report focuses on this young population as a critical force for securing human development progress in the country. Because not only are we a young country today, we are going to remain a young country for at least up to 2040. Given that the future of Pakistan will be determined by those who today are between 15 and 29 years of age, our idea was to directly engage the youth. The report is therefore a testament to the many voices of the youth that we have heard and shared.

It was essential for us that this did not become a report coined by a bunch of experts sitting in a room. In order to ensure this, we used an inclusive and intense participatory process to engage with youth, experts and other key stakeholders nationwide. To date, the Pakistan National Human Development Report Team has consulted over 130,000 people out of which 90 percent were youth. We can proudly say that this report is by the youth for the youth. However, for us, the process began the very first day we started discussing it.

The Report is only one milestone and we hope that the conversation started here will continue to stir debate and awaken thought for years to come. We also hope that this report will serve as a vessel to catalyse new proposals in terms of what can be done to integrate youth in the economy and the society, as we firmly believe that young people in Pakistan are *not a problem to be solved but a potential to be unleashed.*

"The future of Pakistan – one way or the other – will be determined by those who are between 15 and 29 years of age today. The single most useful thing that the rest of us can do is to create meaningful opportunities in education, employment and engagement that can empower our young to unleash their potential."

—Dr. Adil Najam – Lead author of the Report

"It is well known that young people are a force for positive social change. Their enthusiasm and entrepreneurship is driving innovation across the world. With majority of its population below the age of 30, Pakistan has an incredible opportunity to harness the energy of its youth, to transform its economy and future, and to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals."

—Haoliang Xu – UN Assistant Secretary General and UNDP Director for the Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific

"Pakistani youth has immense potential. Young people of Pakistan can achieve their dreams through hard work and determination – even if the dreams are to reach the heights of Mt. Everest."

— Samina Baig – Goodwill Ambassador at UNDP Pakistan

"If we increase the opportunities available for fostering sports as an activity, as a career and as a way of life, imagine how many young individuals could rise and fulfil their potential as I was able to do."

—Sana Mir – Ex-captain of Pakistan National Women's Cricket Team